alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Schwartz, Appellant, *v.*Cramp

*Negligence*— Automo'biles—Personal *injuries*— Morning capacity— *Loss of earning capacity*— Mviclence.

In the trial of an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries, it is error to exclude evidence of the earning capacity of the injured during a period of eight weeks prior to the accident.

Past earnings are usually some proof of the earning ability of the plaintiff at the time of the accident. If the time is not too remote such evidence is admissible.

Argued October 5, 1925.

Appeal No. 14, October T., 1925, by plaintiff from judgment of Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, September T., 1923, No. 644, in the case of Samuel Schwartz by his father, Abraham Schwartz v. Joseph C. Cramp.

Before Poe-tee, Henderson, Trexler, Keller, Linn and Gawtheop, JJ.

Beversed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries.

The opinion of the Superior Court states the case.

Before Bonniwell, J.

Verdict for plaintiff in favor of Samuel Schwartz for $100.00 and in favor of Abraham Schwartz for $75.00. Plaintiff, Samuel Schwartz, appealed.

*Error assigned*was in excluding testimony as to the earning capacity of Samuel Schwartz,

*476November 20, 1925:

*Harvey Gourley,*for appellant.

*Herman Muller,*for appellee.

Opinion by

Trexler, J.,

This was an action of trespass brought by Samuel Schwiartz, a minor, by his father, Abraham Schwartz, to recover damages for personal injuries. At the time when the injury occurred the plaintiff had no gainful employment, but eight weeks before had been working in Kansas City, earning Forty-five Dollars per week. He sought to show what he had been earning, but the trial judge struck out all testimony relating thereto. We think this wias error.

Past earnings are usually some proof of the earning ability of the plaintiff at the time of accident. This has been recognized very generally. If the time is not too remote such proof is admissible. Wilson v. Penna. & M. V. Rwy. Co., 34 Pa. Superior Court 504; Helmstetter v. Pittsburgh Rwys. Co., 243 Pa. 422. The first and second ¡assignments are sustained.

The trial judge was right in excluding evidence of the project the plaintiff had for the establishment of a business in Philadelphia and the amount of capital he had invested. This was too indefinite and problematical to give any basis of the ascertainment of his damages resulting from the accident.

The assignments referring to the charge of the court are overruled, there having been no exceptions taken.

Although Abraham Schwartz, the father, was not a party to the suit except as “nearest friend,” the jury in addition to the amount given to the plaintiff, found in the father’s favor for a small amount. This was, of course, a mistake, but the defendant seems satisfied as he has not ¡appealed, and we see no reason why this court should interfere. Moreover there is but one appeal, that of Samuel Schwartz. The judgment in favor of Abraham Schwartz is not before us.

The judgment is reversed with a new venire.
```

[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 81 (Thursday, April 26, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21003-21004]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-10360]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health

National Institutes of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin 
Diseases; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Arthritis and 
Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases Special Emphasis Panel.
    Date: May 16-17, 2001.
    Time: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Double Tree Hotel, 1750 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 
20853.
    Contact Person: Aftab A. Ansari, PhD, Scientific Review 
Administrator, National Institutes of Health, NIAMS, Natcher Bldg., 
Room 5As25N, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-594-4952.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.846, 
Arthritis, Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases Research, National 
Institutes of Health, HHS)

[[Page 21004]]

    Dated: April 20, 2001.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 01-10360 Filed 4-25-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
```
#### *In re*HOOK, George Clive

(MR 15020)

Chicago, IL

*694Order of the Court:

The petition by respondent George Clive Hook for leave to file exceptions to the report and recommendation of the Review Board is denied. Respondent is disbarred, as recommended by the Review Board.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S BALANCE SHEET DATED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1998, AND ITS CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY, AND
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998, WHICH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ARE INCLUDED IN ITEM 8 OF THIS REPORT, AND IS QUALIFIED IN 
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                               77,082,530
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<NET-INCOME>                                 1,422,769
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.23
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.23
        

</TABLE>
#### Esther Spango et al., Respondents, v F. W. Woolworth Company, Appellant.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered October 6, 1986 (Burton Sherman, J.), reversed on the law and the facts and plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoena denied, without costs.

This is an action for breach of warranty, negligence and strict products liability in which plaintiff alleges that a dress she purchased at the defendant store caught fire and caused her injuries. Plaintiff’s daughter, Angela Clancey, a nonparty witness, appeared and testified at an examination before trial on August 27, 1985. Subsequently, on June 25, 1986, another nonparty witness, Dr. Robert Stephen Lemke, a psychiatrist who treated plaintiff after the accident, testified that Angela Clancey had told him that the accident was an attempt at suicide by her mother. Given this new evidence as to how the accident occurred, defendant was entitled to a further examination of the nonparty witness, Angela Clancey. CPLR 3101 (a) requires "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” even though the person to be examined may not be a party. The examination should be limited to the new information revealed by the psychiatrist’s examination. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Ross, Milonas and Smith, JJ.
386 P.2d 654

#### STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Donald Lee FRANCIS, Appellant.

No. 1269.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.

Nov. 13, 1963.

Lewis, Roca, Scoville, Beauchamp & Linton, Phoenix, for appellant.

Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Merton E. Marks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

LOCKWOOD, Justice.

Appellant, Donald Lee Francis, was convicted of kidnapping in violation of A.R.S. § 13-492. Motion for new trial was denied and judgment of guilty was entered. This appeal under A.R.S. § 13-1713 followed.

In State v. Francis, 91 Ariz. 219, 371 P.2d 97 (1962), we affirmed appellant’s conviction for statutory rape of a sixteen year old girl. The present appeal from the kidnapping conviction arose out of the same set of facts. Appellant, pretending to be a juvenile officer, lured the girl into his car and took her to a deserted area where he raped her.

*58Since appellant makes only one assignment of error, we will not present a detailed statement of the facts. Appellant contends the lower court erred in denying a motion for a new trial based on the alleged misconduct of the County Attorney during the trial, which substantially prejudiced appellant.

At two points during the trial, the County Attorney insinuated that he had knowledge of a prior criminal record regarding the appellant. During his cross-examination of a defense witness, the County Attorney asked: “Sir, are you acquainted with any of Mr. Francis’ problems with the police in th.e past?” (R.T. 405). The trial judge immediately sustained defense counsel’s objection, but denied a subsequent motion for mistrial. Later, during his closing remarks to the jury, the County Attorney again alluded to a prior criminal record of appellant:

> “Now, the defense defies me to mention anything about Mr. Francis’ background with the police, and the defense counsel is the first one who objects when anything inadmissible comes into the trial. There are a lot of things, as you folks know, that are inadmissible in Court, and the law protects people who are picked up for charges on different charges for arrests and so on, and those things are inadmissible.” (R.T. 527.)

These references to a prior police record,, for which the County Attorney made no' offer of proof, constitute reversible error. See State v. Eddington, 95 Ariz. 10, 386 P.2d 20 (1963), and State v. Jacobs, 94 Ariz. 211, 382 P.2d 683 (1963).

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

STRUCKMEYER and JENNINGS, JJ., concurring.
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<ALLOWANCES>                                   133,338
<INVENTORY>                                     76,602
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,183,563
<PP&E>                                       4,071,727
<DEPRECIATION>                                 814,292
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              88,220,123
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,247,996
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<PREFERRED>                                 55,026,843
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<OTHER-SE>                                  25,483,324
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,194,792
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,820,731
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (38,105,228)
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</TABLE>
#### R. BLACKINGTON & CO. v. ADELS.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 3, 1922.)

No. 267.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

Suit hy R. Blackington & Co., against Moses Adels, trading as M. Adels *&*Co. From a judgment for plaintiffs (282 Fed. 641), defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Emery, Varney, Blair & Hoguet, of New York City (Robert S. Blair, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Otto Munk, of New York City (George N. Goddard, of Boston, Mass., of counsel), for appellees.

Before HOUGH, MANTON, and MAYER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Decree affirmed, with costs.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of FIRSTBINGO.COM (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Thomas Sheppard, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) 	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) 	The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 14th day of April, 2005.

| | /s/ Thomas Sheppard    
| | -----------------------
| | Thomas Sheppard        
| | Chief Executive Officer



















---
UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS

Misc. No. 4-98

IN RE: FEE SCHEDULE

O R D E R

It is ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45(f), that the following revised schedule of fees approved by

the Court is announced. The fees marked * apply to services on behalf of the United States, if the

information requested is available through electronic access. The only change is marked by #: 

 

For filing Notice of Appeal or Petition for Extraordinary Relief in this Court, 

but not when the Court orders case redocketing for its administrative convenience $50.00 

For filing Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

(fee set by that court, payable to this Court) 105.00 

For reproducing a paper copy from original documents or from microfiche or 

microfilm reproductions of original records, per copy page .50*

For each microfiche sheet of film or microfilm jacket copy of any Court record, when available 3.00 

For reproducing audio or video tape recording, including cost of materials 15.00 

For searching Court records, per name or item searched 15.00*

For retrieval of a Court record from a Federal Records Center or National Archives 25.00 

For certifying a document or paper, whether certification is made directly on 

the document or by separate instrument 5.00 

For application for admission to practice before the Court 30.00 

For a certificate of admission to practice, suitable for framing 

(fee set by, and payable to, printer) 25.65#

For processing a check paid to the Court which is returned for lack of funds

(fee set by National Finance Center) 6.00 

DATED: June 9, 1998 FOR THE COURT:

ROBERT F. COMEAU

Clerk of the Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Yeargin, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the warrant-less search and seizure of the property found in his apartment was improper because the police were unlawfully in his home in violation of *Payton v New York*(445 US 573). Police had gone to defendant’s home after he had been identified by an eyewitness as being a suspect in a burglary in progress. The record indicates that defendant voluntarily accompanied the *966police outside his home for questioning *(see, People v Minley,*68 NY2d 952). While police were questioning defendant on his front porch, another officer confirmed the fact that there had been a break-in at 444 Allen Street, thus giving police the requisite probable cause to make a lawful arrest *(cf. People v Hicks,*68 NY2d 234). When police then advised defendant that he was under arrest, defendant physically resisted and fled back into his house, locking the door behind him. Defendant’s conduct clearly gave rise to exigent circumstances justifying police action in pursuing him in an attempt to prevent his escape *(see, People v Mealer,*57 NY2d 214; *People v Battee,*94 AD2d 935; *cf. People v Leung,*68 NY2d 734, 736). Since the police were thus lawfully in the hallway of defendant’s apartment building, the suppression court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the stolen property which was observed "in plain view” through the open door of defendant’s apartment *(see, Texas v Brown,*460 US 730; *Coolidge v New Hampshire,*403 US 443, 469-470; *People v Battee, supra).*

The court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting any hearing. Such a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made (CPL 220.60 [3]; *People v Tinsley,*35 NY2d 926, 927). (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga County Court, Murray, J. — burglary, second degree, and other offenses.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Green, Balio and Schnepp, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of CyberAds, Inc. #2 ("the
Company")on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended #3 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Walter Tatum,
Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer, Chief Executive Officer
and President, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:


         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated: April 22, 2004


/s/WALTER TATUM
Walter Tatum
President
# Official Journal L 131/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0677
  doi:10.3000/19770677.L_2013.131.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 131 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 5615 May 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0677

doi:10.3000/19770677.L_2013.131.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 131

English edition

Legislation

Volume 5615 May 2013

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 of 13 May 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People's Republic of China | 1 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 of 13 May 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People's Republic of China

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
#### CROW, Appellant, v. COFFIN, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.

May 18, 1894.)

Action by Moses R. Crow against William E. Coffin.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and FOLLETT and PARKER, JJ.

A. Perry, for appellant.

C. Norwood, for respondent

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. See 27 N. Y. Supp. 1108.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Henry Boyd, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Nassau County (Santagata, J.), both rendered March 14, 1984, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, robbery in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree under indictment No. 57284, upon a jury verdict, and convicting him of burglary in the second degree under indictment No. 56756, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentences.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

While the defendant is correct in his assertion that there was no direct evidence as to his participation in the burglary and robbery with which he was charged since the two witnesses to the incident were unable to identify him as the perpetrator, the trial court’s charge sufficiently apprised the *401jury as to how to evaluate the more than adequate circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt *(see, People v Morris,*36 NY2d 877, 878-879). Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Brown and Spatt, JJ., concur.
#### *In re*COHEN, Andrew Mark

(MR 20987)

Skokie, IL

Order of the Court:

The motion by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission to approve and confirm the report and recommendation of the Hearing Board is allowed, and respondent Andrew Mark Cohen is suspended from the practice of law for two years and until further order of the Court and until he complies with treatment.