IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 115

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014

September 16, 2014

ANTOINE DEVONNE BUTLER,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-13-0217

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. 

Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:

Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy 

Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. 

Jackson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; David E. Singleton, 

Student Director; Samantha Daniels, Student Intern.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, and FOX, JJ., and CRANFILL, D.J.

* Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made 

before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

CRANFILL, District Judge. 

[¶1] Appellant Antoine Devonne Butler challenges the revocation of his probation. He 

argues his probation was revoked based on violations for which he had previously been 

punished with administrative sanctions, which is in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-

1107 (LexisNexis 2013). We agree the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107 

requires the State to choose between administrative sanctions or revoking the probation 

of an Intensive Supervision Program participant who violates the rules. The State cannot 

subject a person to both punishments based on the same violations. In this case, the 

violations the State relied upon in their petition to revoke probation were the same 

violations which had previously been subject to administrative sanctions. We therefore 

reverse the order revoking probation and remand to the district court for an order granting

Butler’s motion to dismiss the State’s Petition for Probation Revocation. 

ISSUE

[¶2] The parties generally agree the sole issue for our review is:

Whether Mr. Butler’s probation was properly revoked based on Intensive 

Supervision Program violations which had previously been subject to administrative 

sanctions. 

FACTS

[¶3] On July 6, 2010, Mr. Butler was arrested for conspiracy to commit burglary and 

accessory, aiding and abetting that same burglary. He pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to the charge of conspiracy to commit burglary. He received a deferral under 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2013), and in March of 2011, the district court 

placed him on supervised probation for five years. The State filed a petition to revoke 

that probation on July 25, 2011. The petition alleged the Defendant had violated his 

probation in that he 1) did not report for a scheduled appointment with his supervising 

agent; 2) moved without his agent’s knowledge or consent; 3) failed to perform 

community service as directed by his supervising agent; and 4) had not paid his Victim’s 

Compensation Fund fee. Mr. Butler admitted the allegations in the petition, and the 

probation was revoked and reinstated.

[¶4] The State filed a second petition to revoke probation on January 4, 2013. The 

petition alleged the Defendant had violated his probation in that he 1) left the state of 

Wyoming without a valid travel permit or approval from his supervising agent; 2) failed 

to report to the Probation/Parole office for scheduled appointments; 3) was convicted of 

False Reporting-False Identification, a misdemeanor in Colorado; 4) had not actively 

sought employment or participated in community service as directed by his supervising 
2

agent; and 5) failed to make consistent payments toward the court-ordered Victim’s 

Compensation Fund surcharge, Public Defender fees, ASL/ASAM assessment fee and 

Court automation fee. Mr. Butler admitted the allegations of the petition. The district 

court revoked Mr. Butler’s deferral and imposed a four to seven year sentence, which was 

suspended in favor of five years of supervised probation. The district court also placed 

Mr. Butler in an intensive supervision program (ISP) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-

1101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2013).

[¶5] Mr. Butler committed eleven violations of the rules while in the ISP. The ISP 

program gave him an administrative sanction for those violations by placing Mr. Butler in 

a residential community corrections program, Cheyenne Transitional Center (CTC) for 

sixty days. He was expelled from the CTC after only two days. The expulsion resulted 

from Mr. Butler being allowed to go to a library, but an ISP employee was unable to 

locate him there despite looking through the entire library twice. 

[¶6] On June 17, 2013, the State filed another petition to revoke probation relying on 

the eleven violations of the ISP rules that had led to placement at CTC. The petition 

alleged the Defendant had violated his probation in that 1) his whereabouts were 

unknown; 2) he violated condition #5 of the ISP Agreement by being off schedule on 

April 17, 2013; 3) he failed to maintain employment; 4) he violated condition #5 of the 

ISP Agreement by being off schedule on April 22, 2013; 5) he violated condition #12 of 

the ISP Agreement by being at an unapproved location on April 22, 2013; 6) he violated 

condition #15 of the ISP Agreement by having contact with an unapproved person on 

April 22, 2013; 7) he violated condition #5 of the ISP Agreement by being off schedule 

on April 30, 2013; 8) he violated condition #5 of the ISP Agreement by being off 

schedule on May 27, 2013; 9) he violated condition #18 of the ISP Agreement by 

removing his Electronic Monitor on May 27, 2013; 10) he violated condition #13 of the 

ISP Agreement by being at an unapproved location on May 17, 2013; and 11) he violated 

condition #15 of the ISP Agreement by having contact with an unapproved person on 

May 27, 2013. 

[¶7] Mr. Butler admitted and explained the allegations contained in the petition at the 

probation revocation hearing. However, he argued the alleged violations could not form 

the basis for a probation revocation because they had previously been subject to 

administrative sanctions (placement at CTC). He also argued at the hearing that he 

should not have been expelled from CTC because he was unaware he was required to 

“check-in” with ISP when he arrived at the library. The district court revoked Mr. 

Butler’s probation and imposed the underlying sentence of four to seven years with a 

referral to the youth offender (Boot Camp) program. This appeal followed. 
3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. MF v. 

State, 2013 WY 104, ¶ 6, 308 P.3d 854, 857 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Rock v. Lankford, 2013 

WY 61, ¶ 17, 301 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Wyo. 2013); In re DCP, 2001 WY 77, ¶ 7, 30 P.3d 

29, 30 (Wyo. 2001)). 

[¶9] A district court’s decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. DeMillard v. State, 2013 WY 99, ¶ 11, 308 P.3d 825, 829 (Wyo. 2013). 

A district court’s decision to revoke probation and impose a 

sentence is discretionary and will not be disturbed unless the 

record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. Mapp v. 

State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 1996). We review the 

district court’s decision to determine whether the court could 

reasonably conclude as it did. Id. “Upon review, all that is 

necessary to uphold a district court’s decision to revoke 

probation is evidence that it made a conscientious judgment, 

after hearing the facts, that a condition of probation had been 

violated.” Sweets v. State, 2003 WY 64, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 404, 

406 (Wyo. 2003).

Id., ¶ 11, 308 P.3d 829 (citing Forbes v. State, 2009 WY 146, ¶ 6, 220 P.3d 510, 

512-13 (Wyo. 2009)). 

DISCUSSION

[¶10] In interpreting statutes, we seek to determine the legislature’s intent:

All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in 

ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating 

to the same subject or having the same general purpose must 

be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory 

construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is 

de novo. We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 

the legislature’s intent. We begin by making an inquiry 

respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 

employed according to their arrangement and connection. We 

construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 

clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute

in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and 

unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary 
4

meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of 

statutory construction. Moreover, we must not give a statute a 

meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 

another interpretation.

Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a 

statute to matters that do not fall within its express provisions. 

Only if we determine the language of a statute is ambiguous 

will we proceed to the next step, which involves applying 

general principles of statutory construction to the language of 

the statute in order to construe any ambiguous language to 

accurately reflect the intent of the legislature. If this Court 

determines that the language of the statute is not ambiguous, 

there is no room for further construction. We will apply the 

language of the statute using its ordinary and obvious 

meaning. 

Stowe v. Stowe, 2014 WY 97 (Wyo. 2014) (citing Redco Const. v. Profile Properties, 

LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415–16 (Wyo. 2012)) (quoting Cheyenne 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Building Code Bd. of Appeals of City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 

222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2010) (which in turn cites BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005)).

[¶11] The Legislature has given the Department of Corrections authorization to establish 

an intensive supervision program (ISP) for probationers and parolees and also granted the 

Department general supervisory authority over those who participate in the program.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-1101, -1102(a), and -1102(d) (LexisNexis 2013). The ISP 

established under this article may require:

(i) Electronic monitoring, regimented daily schedules or 

itineraries, house arrest, telephone contact, drug 

testing, curfew checks or other supervision methods 

which facilitate contact with supervisory personnel; 

(ii) Community service work, family, educational or 

vocational counseling, treatment for substance abuse, 

mental health treatment and monitoring of restitution 

orders and fines previously imposed on the participant; 

and 

(iii) Imposition of supervision fees to be paid by 

participants. 
5

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1102(b). 

[¶12] Participation in an ISP is a matter of grace and not of right. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-

13-1103(a) (LexisNexis 2013). No person is allowed to participate in an ISP unless they 

agree in writing to follow and abide by all the rules and regulations established by the 

Department related to the operation of the program and agree to submit to the 

administrative sanctions which may be imposed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1103(b). The Legislature has also given sentencing courts the 

authority to place a defendant in an ISP as a condition of their probation. Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 7-13-1105 (LexisNexis 2013). Section 1107 provides:

7-13-1107. Administrative sanctions for program 

violations. 

(a) The department is authorized to establish by rule and 

regulation a system of administrative sanctions as an

alternative to probation or parole revocation for probationers 

and parolees who violate the rules and restrictions of an 

intensive supervision program established under this article. 

(b) Authorized sanctions may include:

(i) Loss or restriction of privileges; 

(ii) Community service; and 

(iii) Restriction on personal liberty including:

(A) Detention in county jail for a period not 

exceeding thirty (30) days;

(B) Placement in a residential community 

correctional program for a period not to exceed sixty (60) 

days. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2013) (emphasis added). 

[¶13] The emphasis that has been added to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107(a) reflects a 

legislative intent that when an ISP participant violates the program rules and regulations, 

the State is required to choose between subjecting that participant to administrative 

sanctions under the statute or revoking their probation. This Court came to the same 

conclusion in Umbach v. State where we said “[i]f the State decides that a probationer 

who has violated a program rule should be subjected to administrative sanctions, then it 

shall not also seek probation revocation for that violation.” Umbach v. State, 2002 WY 

42, ¶ 12, 42 P.3d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 2002). 
6

[¶14] A plain language reading of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107 does not permit the 

State to both revoke Mr. Butler’s probation and subject him to administrative sanctions. 

The imposition of both options violates the statute’s express terms. In this case, the State 

chose to subject Mr. Butler to administrative sanctions for the eleven ISP violations by 

placing him at CTC. 

[¶15] The State argues that Mr. Butler was placed at CTC for violating the rules of the 

intensive supervision program. They further argue he was removed from CTC because 

he violated the ISP program rules, and it was at that time the district court revoked his 

probation. The State urges this Court to conclude Mr. Butler’s probation was properly 

revoked because he failed to fully serve the administrative sanction.

[¶16] A close examination of the Petition for Revocation of Probation and Affidavit for

and Request for Revocation of Probation Bench Warrant reveals that nowhere in the 

petition does the State allege Mr. Butler’s probation should be revoked for a failure to 

complete the administrative sanction. The State petitioned to have Mr. Butler’s probation 

revoked based solely on his eleven ISP violations, which had already been subject to 

administrative sanctions.

CONCLUSION

[¶17] The district court erred when it granted the State’s Petition to Revoke Probation

because the violations contained in the petition had already been subject to administrative 

sanctions. Using these same violations to revoke Mr. Butler’s probation is contrary to 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1107 and our ruling in Umbach. 

[¶18] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.