alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# USCIS Language Access Plan

## Providing Limited English Proficient individuals with meaningful access to USCIS services

                - DHS Comment Page

USCIS’ Language Access Plan  (PDF) establishes goals and guidelines to ensure that Limited English Proficient (LEP) individuals have meaningful access to our services and information. This draft plan summarizes our efforts to comply with Executive Order 13166 and the Department of Homeland Security’s Language Access Plan.

Executive Order 13166 directs each federal agency to “examine the services it provides and develop and implement a system by which LEP individuals can meaningfully access those services consistent with, and without unduly burdening the fundamental mission of the Agency.”

The Department of Homeland Security’s Language Access Plan requires each DHS component to draft its own plan.

USCIS regularly interacts with applicants in languages other than English through translated materials, multilingual public engagements, the USCIS Contact Center's toll-free line, and in-person appointments at our offices. As part of our commitment, we also routinely produce educational and outreach materials in multiple languages and publish them to the Multilingual Resource Center. The agency additionally conducts assessments of language access efforts and maintains an active Language Access Working Group (LAWG).

The LAWG works to implement the USCIS Language Access Plan, ensuring that LEP applicants have meaningful access to immigration benefit services in a manner consistent with the mission of USCIS. Because this is a key value for USCIS, the LAWG consists of leaders and representatives from across the agency and meets regularly in group and sub-group settings.

04/14/2020

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# L_2013159EN.01S00301.xml

| 11.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 159/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 159/s3

---

NOTICE TO READERS

Council Regulation (EU) No 216/2013 of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the Official Journal of the European Union

In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 216/2013 of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ L 69, 13.3.2013, p. 1), as of 1 July 2013, only the electronic edition of the Official Journal shall be considered authentic and shall have legal effect.

Official Journal of the European Union

Where it is not possible to publish the electronic edition of the Official Journal due to unforeseen and exceptional circumstances, the printed edition shall be authentic and shall have legal effect in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 216/2013.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Heber Humberto PORRAS-HERNANDEZ, also known as Jorge Arturo Alacios, also known as Heber Porras, also known as Heber Humerto Hernandez-Porras, also known as Heber Humberto Hernandez-Porras, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50854

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Alex A. Melendez, Esq., El Paso, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Heber Humberto Porras-Hernandez (Porras) *416has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Porras has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Porras’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Town of Islip, Respondent, v P.B.S. Marina, Inc., et al., Appellants.

In an action to permanently enjoin the defendants from operating a marina in the community of Seaview, Fire Island, Town of Islip, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.), dated May 4, 1987, which, after a nonjury trial, permanently enjoined them from operating the marina.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the action is dismissed.

We find that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was a termination through discontinuance of the appellants’ approximately 40-year, preexisting, nonconforming use of the subject property as a marina. Town of Islip Code § 68-15 (B) provides that "discontinuance of any nonconforming use for a period of one year or more terminates such non-conforming use of a * * * premises and thereafter said * * * premises shall not be used except in conformity with [the] provisions of this ordinance”. "Such a provision is deemed to supply as a matter of law the element of intent, so that discontinuance of the nonconforming use for such period, if reasonable in length, amounts to an abandonment of the use” *(Village of Spencer-port v Webaco Oil Co.,*33 AD2d 634; *see, Baml Realty v State of New York,*35 AD2d 857; *Matter of Daggett v Putnam,*40 AD2d 576; *see also, Matter of Marzella v Munroe,*69 NY2d 967). However, "[a] discontinuance connotes a complete cessation * * * so that a minimal nonconforming function, of itself, would not constitute an abandonment” *(Baml Realty v State of New York, supra).*Here, it is not disputed that the marina was fully used through 1983. After a contract of sale was signed, and while certain litigation was pending, the appellants leased one of the moorings to an attorney for the *82Seaview Terminal Company, Inc., the predecessor owner of the subject property, for the years 1984 and 1985, and that at least twice during each of those seasons, he used the marina. Subsequently, the marina was used during the 1986 season. Thus, it cannot be said that there was a complete cessation of the use of the property as a marina, thereby resulting in a termination of a nonconforming use pursuant to Town of Islip Code § 68-15 (B).

In light of our determination, the other issues raised by the appellants need not be reached by this court. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 81 (Thursday, April 26, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20970-20971]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-10310]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Defense has submitted to OMB for clearance, the 
following proposal for collection of information under the provisions 
of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).
    Title Form, and OMB Number: Registration for Scientific and 
Technical Information Services; DD Form 1540; OMB Number 0704-0264.
    Type of Request: Extension.
    Number of Respondents: 2,000.
    Responses per Respondent: 1.
    Annual Responses: 2,000.
    Average Burden per Response: 25 minutes.
    Annual Burden Hours: 833.
    Needs and Uses: The Department of Defense Scientific and Technical 
Information Program (STIP) requires the exchange of scientific and 
technical information within and among Federal Government agencies and 
their contractors. The DD Form 1540 serves as a registration tool for 
Federal Government agencies and their contractors to access Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC) services. The contractors, 
subcontractors, and potential contractors are requires to obtain 
certification from designated approving officials. Federal Government 
agencies need certification from approving officials and security 
offices only when requesting access to classified data. All collected 
information is verified by DTIC's Marketing and Registration Division.
    Affected Public: Business or Other For-Profit; Not-For-Profit 
Institutions; State, Local or Tribal Government.
    Frequency: On Occasion.

[[Page 20971]]

    Respondent's Obligation: Required to Obtain or Retain Benefits.
    OMB Desk Officer: Mr. Edward C. Springer.
    Written comments and recommendations on the proposed information 
collection should be sent to Mr. Springer at the Office of Management 
and Budget, Desk Officer for DoD, Room 10236, New Executive Office 
Building, Washington, DC 20503.
    DoD Clearance Office: Mr. Robert Cushing.
    Written requests for copies of the information collection proposal 
should be sent to Mr. Cushing, WHS/DIOR, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.

    Dated: April 19, 2001.
Patricia L. Toppings,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaision Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 01-10310 Filed 4-25-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-10-M
EXHIBIT 32.2

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C.ss.1350, as adopted), Andrew P. Calerich, Chief Financial Officer of
American Oil & Gas, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that, to the best of
his knowledge:

3.   The Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December
     31, 2003, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.2 (the
     "Report") fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
     the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

4.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Dated:  April 14, 2004               /s/  Andrew P. Calerich
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                    Andrew P. Calerich, Chief Financial Officer
#### KRANICHFELT v. SLATTERY.

(City Court o£ New York, General Term.

June 20, 1894.)

Appeal—Review—Weight of Evidence.

A verdict on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.

Appeal from trial term

Action Charles Kranichfelt against John Slattery. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before FITZSIMORS, REWBURG-EB, and CORLAR, JJ.

James P. Campbell, for appellant.

F. P. Trautman, for respondent.

NEWBURGER, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff. This action is brought against the defendant as a surety for work to be done under two contracts for the plaintiff by one Lynch, but which the latter failed to complete. The answer of the defendant was a general denial. On the trial, plaintiff offered in evidence the contracts between himself and Lynch, and also bond given by the .defendant. The defendant denied having executed the bond, or -that he acknowledged the same before the notary.

There is no dispute as to failure on the part of Lynch to carry .out the contracts, and therefore the only question remaining was, did the defendant execute the bond sued on? This was a.mere .question of fact, and was properly submitted to the jury. The judge’s charge, or any exception thereto, not appearing in the printed case, we assume that there was no error on the part of the trial justice in his submission of the case to the jury. There appears to be no error in the admission or rejection of testimony that would warrant ns in disturbing the judgment. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
(8 Misc. Rep. 449.)

#### RIPLEY v. SECOND AVE. R. CO.

(Superior Court of New York City, General Term.

May 7, 1894.)

Trial—Remarks op Court—Failure to Call Witness.

The court may properly comment on the failure of a party to call a witness as to a material fact which was peculiarly within the knowledge of the witness.

Appeal from jury term.

Action by Walter B. Ripley against the Second Avenue Railroad Company for personal injuries. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN and McADAM, JJ.

Merrill & Rogers, for appellant.

Morse, Koones & Findlay, for respondent.

McADAM, J.

It appears that on September 3, 1891, the plaintiff was a passenger upon one of the defendant’s open cars on a trip *684to the Fulton ferry. At Beekman street he told the conductor he wanted to get off at the ferry. As the car did not stop, the plaintiff stood up, and, while in the act of hailing the conductor, the car struck the curve on the switch, and the rapid and unexpected twisting motion of the car jostled the plaintiff down upon the step running along the side of the car, and his foot was crushed by the hub of a truck with which the car collided, causing the injuries complained of. The plaintiff occupied the rear seat, which faced the end of the car; and the conductor, at the time the plaintiff arose, was in the front part of the car, attending to the indicator dial, so that the plaintiff could not attract the conductor’s attention, except by arising in the manner he did. He was merely exercising a lawful right, and apparently guilty of no negligence whatever, when the jolting of the car, without any warning to him, threw him off, whereby he suffered injury, etc. The questions of negligence on the part of the defendant, and the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, were, by the verdict of the jury, found, upon satisfactory evidence, in favor of the plaintiff, and they assessed his. damages at the moderate sum of $700.

The only material exceptions urged are: (1) The court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint. (2) That the trial judge commented in his charge on the failure of the defendant to produce as witnesses the conductor and driver. The case was essentially one for a jury, so that the first exception is without merit. The second is-equally without force, for the comment was proper. It was a mere reference to a circumstance true in point of fact, and made in accordance with the rule that, where a prima facie case is made out by a plaintiff, it is strengthened by the failure of the defendant to. produce material evidence peculiarly within his knowledge and control. Smith v. Gunn (Sup.) 12 N. Y. Supp. 808; Gibson v. Bank, 98 N. Y. 95; People v. Briggs, 47 Hun, 266, affirmed 114 N. Y. 56, 20 N. E. 820. For these reasons the judgment and order must be affirmed, with costs.
# CI2021466EN.01000501.xml

| 18.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CI 466/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CI 466/5

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Information communicated by member states regarding closure of fisheries

(2021/C 466 I/03)

In accordance with Article 35(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Union control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), a decision has been taken to close the fishery as set down in the following table:

| Date and time of closure | 22.10.2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Duration | 22.10.2021 - 31.12.2021 |
| Member State | France |
| Stock or Group of stocks | LIN/1/2. |
| Species | Ling (Molva molva) |
| Zone | United Kingdom and international waters of 1 and 2 |
| Type(s) of fishing vessels | — |
| Reference number | 19/TQ92 |

Date and time of closure

22.10.2021

Duration

22.10.2021 - 31.12.2021

Member State

France

Stock or Group of stocks

LIN/1/2.

Species

Ling (Molva molva)

Zone

United Kingdom and international waters of 1 and 2

Type(s) of fishing vessels

—

Reference number

19/TQ92

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

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[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 83 (Monday, April 30, 2001)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 21297]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-10549]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 1

[REG-115560-99]
RIN 1545-AX66


Equity Options With Flexible Terms; Qualified Covered Call 
Treatment; Hearing Cancellation

<BD>AGENCY: <RM>Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

<BD>ACTION: <RM>Cancellation of notice of public hearing on proposed 
rulemaking.

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<BD>SUMMARY: <RM>This document provides notice of cancellation of a 
public hearing on proposed regulations providing guidance on the 
application of the rules governing qualified covered calls, and writing 
equity call options.

<BD>DATES: <RM>The public hearing originally scheduled for Wednesday, 
May 9, 2001, at 10 a.m., is canceled.

<BD>FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: <RM>Guy R. Traynor of the 
Regulations Unit, Office of Special Counsel, (202) 622-7180 (not a 
toll-free number).

<BD>SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: <RM>A notice of proposed rulemaking and 
notice of public hearing that appeared in the <CS>Federal Register 
<RM>on January 18, 2001, (66 FR 4751) announced that a public hearing 
was scheduled for May 9, 2001, at 10 a.m., in the auditorium of the 
Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, 
DC. The subject of the public hearing is proposed regulations under 
section 1092 of the Internal Revenue Code. The public comment period 
for these proposed regulations expired on April 18, 2001.
    The notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing, 
instructed those interested in testifying at the public hearing to 
submit a request to speak and an outline of the topics to be addressed. 
As of April 20, 2001, no one has requested to speak. Therefore, the 
public hearing scheduled for May 9, 2001, is canceled.

LaNita VanDyke,
Acting Chief, Regulations Unit, Office of Special Counsel 
(Modernization & Strategic Planning).
[FR Doc. 01-10549 Filed 4-27-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
#### Richard C. Barnes, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

Yesawich, Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Benza, J.), entered April 15, 1987, which granted the State’s motion to dismiss the claim.

The facts giving rise to this claim are set forth at *People v Barnes*(59 AD2d 170). Following reversal there of an Albany County Court judgment convicting claimant of violating probation, he filed this claim to recover damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b. The State’s motion to dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2) and (7) for failure to state a cause of action and lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted and claimant appeals. We affirm.

The State concedes in its moving papers that claimant, who *969was imprisoned after his Albany County conviction, has met the requirement of subdivision 5 (a) of Court of Claims Act § 8-b in that he was convicted of a crime and served all or part of his sentence. It still remains for claimant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his parole violation conviction was reversed or vacated on one of the grounds enumerated in subdivision 5 (b) of section 8-b, namely, those specified in CPL 440.10 and 470.20, and further that he did not through his own conduct contribute to his conviction *(see, Lanza v State of New York,*130 AD2d 872). These requirements have not been met. None of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law adverted to in subdivision 5 (b) of Court of Claims Act § 8-b were the basis for this court’s decision in *People v Barnes (supra).*And it is disingenuous, at best, for claimant to contend that he is innocent of the accusation that he violated the terms of his probation or that he failed to contribute to his conviction, given that he pleaded guilty before the Rensselaer County Court to driving while intoxicated at a time when a condition of his probation was that he not operate a motor vehicle, and that conviction remains undisturbed.

With respect to claimant’s other contentions, the only one meriting comment is the assertion that the Albany County Court proceeded without jurisdiction in violation of claimant’s constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. As to that, we have heretofore observed that reversals premised on double jeopardy grounds are excluded from the coverage of Court of Claims Act § 8-b *(Fudger v State of New York,*131 AD2d 136, 139, *lv denied*70 NY2d 616). Since innocence, a qualification claimant simply cannot meet, is the linchpin of the unjust conviction and imprisonment statute *(see,*Report of NY Law Rev Commn, 1984 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2930), the claim was quite rightly dismissed.

Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-91,518-01

EX P ARTE ANWAR LAM MON HOLMES, App licant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 17852-A IN THE 115 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM UP SHUR COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Applicant was convicted of possession of a con t ro l l ed s ubstance and sentenc ed to eig hty y ear s’ imprisonment. The Twelfth Court of Appea ls aff irmed his conviction. Holmes v. State , No. 12-18-00359- CR (Te x. App.—Ty ler Oct. 30, 2019) (not desig nated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habea s corpus in the county of conviction, and the district cler k forwa rded it to this Court. See T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07. Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffe ctive beca use he did not object to improper jury arg ument. Applicant has alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Acc ording ly , the rec ord should be develope d. The trial court is the appropr iate forum for finding s of fac t. T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07, § 3(d).2

The trial c ourt shall order trial counsel to re spond to Applicant’s claim. I n developing the re cord, the trial cour

t may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). I f the trial c ourt elec ts to hold a hear ing, it sha ll determine whe ther Applica nt is indi g ent. I f Applica nt is indi g ent and wa

nts to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to repr esent him at the hear ing. See T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 26.04. I f counsel is appointed or reta ined, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel’s name

. The trial court shall make finding s of fac t and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel’s perf ormanc e was defic ient and Applicant was prejudice d. The trial court m ay m ak e any other finding s and conc lusions that it deems a ppropriate in response to Applica nt’s claim. The trial court shall make findings o f fa ct and conclusions of law withi n ninety day s from the date of this order

. The district cler k shall then immediately forwa rd to this Court the trial court’s finding s and conclusions and the rec ord develope d on rema nd, including, among other things, aff idavits, motions, objec tions, proposed finding s and conclusions, order s, and transcr ipts from hear ings and depositions. See T E X . R. A P P . P. 73.4(b)( 4). Any extensions of time must be reque sted by the trial cour

t and obtained f

rom this Court.

Filed: Oc tober 7, 2020 Do not publish