I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6297 

To improve the international strategy of the United States for monitoring, 

reducing, and responding to biological risks, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

Mr. SHERMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To improve the international strategy of the United States 

for monitoring, reducing, and responding to biological 

risks, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘International Biosecurity Act of 2010’’. 

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

Sec. 3. Sense of Congress. 

Sec. 4. International Biosecurity Initiative (IBSI). 

Sec. 5. International Biosecurity Task Force. 


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Sec. 6. Establishment of the Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship 

Program. 

Sec. 7. Technical review and assessment of harmful biological incident and activity investigation technologies. 

Sec. 8. Review and assessment of global legal regime for biosecurity. 

Sec. 9. Reporting requirements. 

Sec. 10. International disease outbreak information sharing. 

Sec. 11. Definitions. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) The advance of biological science is vital to 

4 increasing the health of humanity, ensuring the well5 being of the environment, and spurring economic 

6 growth. 

7 (2) In 2001, letters containing anthrax spores 

8 were distributed via the United States postal system, 

9 infecting 22 people and resulting in five deaths, ex10 tensive social disruption, and extensive costs for 

11 emergency response and remediation. 

12 (3) In 2001, while engaging the Taliban in Af13 ghanistan, coalition forces came into possession of a 

14 significant body of evidence that al-Qaeda was seek15 ing to develop the capability to conduct biological 

16 weapons attacks. 

17 (4) In a time of international terrorist threats 

18 and global health epidemics, United States policy 

19 with regard to biological risks is in need of a well 

20 coordinated strategy to ensure the effectiveness of 


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1 efforts to protect the national security and foreign 

2 policy interests of the United States. 

3 (5) Biological risks extend beyond biological 

4 weapons developed or used by foreign countries and 

5 also include intentional release of harmful biological 

6 agents by non-state groups or individuals, harmful 

7 outcomes through unintentional release or unfore8 seen consequences of biological research and experi9 mental biological agents, and natural disease out10 breaks. 

11 (6) A major disease outbreak affecting animals 

12 or crops, whether intentionally inflicted or natural, 

13 anywhere in the world could threaten food supplies 

14 and economic prosperity, potentially exacerbating 

15 broader security concerns. 

16 (7) A major disease outbreak against civilian 

17 populations, whether intentionally inflicted or nat18 ural, anywhere in the world could cause devastating 

19 loss of life and economic harm. Such an outbreak 

20 would have adverse implications for United States 

21 national security and foreign policy. 

22 (8) Improving global capacity for monitoring 

23 and detecting disease outbreaks improves the ability 

24 of the United States to counter both natural and 

25 man-made biological risks. 


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1 (9) A well-coordinated strategy for countering 

2 harmful biological incidents that integrates United 

3 States foreign policies will help ensure the health of 

4 Americans as well as security against terrorism and 

5 other threats. 

6 (10) In November 2009, President Obama set 

7 forth a ‘‘National Strategy for Countering Biological 

8 Threats’’. 

9 (11) The changing geopolitical climate in which 

10 a number of countries and non-state actors are seek11 ing or have acquired weapons of mass destruction 

12 indicates that the United States will require special13 ized nonproliferation experts in addition to experts 

14 in regional security. 

15 (12) The United States national security com16 munity has focused primarily on technical and inter17 national security solutions to international prolifera18 tion. 

19 (13) There are limited opportunities for the 

20 next generation of policy makers and nonprolifera21 tion specialists to undertake interdisciplinary study 

22 in the area of nonproliferation policy. 

23 (14) Coordinating foreign assistance and other 

24 international efforts to improve the ability of partner 

25 countries to detect and respond to disease outbreaks 


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1 benefits partner nations and also improves the 

2 United States security by preventing the spread of 

3 infectious disease. 

4 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) emerging biological technologies, while pro7 viding the promise for unprecedented improvements 

8 in health and the environment, may pose a potential 

9 for harm, both intentional and accidental or inad10 vertent; 

11 (2) the ‘‘National Strategy for Countering Bio12 logical Threats’’, released by President Obama in 

13 November 2009, is a significant step toward enhanc14 ing domestic and international biosecurity; 

15 (3) because biological risks do not heed political 

16 borders, United States policy to counter such risks 

17 should include cooperation with other countries and 

18 improved coordination within the United States Gov19 ernment; 

20 (4) the United States should work with other 

21 countries toward developing international standards 

22 and an oversight framework for biological research 

23 to prevent and mitigate harmful outcomes; 

24 (5) the United States strategy for monitoring, 

25 reducing, and responding to biological risks should 


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1 address both natural and man-made risks and 

2 should be able to identify and mitigate the impact of 

3 both intentional and unintentional or unforeseen 

4 harmful biological incidents; 

5 (6) United States collaboration with and assist6 ance to foreign countries aimed at reducing biologi7 cal risks should be mutually beneficial and serve to 

8 counter natural or man-made biological risks that 

9 are mutually determined to be of high importance; 

10 and 

11 (7) because the Convention on the Prohibition 

12 of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 

13 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 

14 on their Destruction (commonly referred to as the 

15 ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’ or ‘‘BWC’’) em16 bodies the global norm against the development, pro17 duction, acquisition, and transfer of biological agents 

18 for hostile purposes, United States policy should aim 

19 to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by 

20 increasing its adherence, addressing its transparency 

21 and compliance mechanisms, and strengthening its 

22 effectiveness to build confidence internationally. 

23 SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY INITIATIVE (IBSI). 

24 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—To improve the United States 

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1 logical risks and to aid in the implementation of President 

2 Obama’s 2009 ‘‘National Strategy for Countering Biologi3 cal Threats’’, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

4 the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall estab5 lish an initiative to be known as the ‘‘International Bio6 security Initiative’’. 

7 (b) PURPOSE.—The International Biosecurity Initia8 tive shall— 

9 (1) pursue efforts, through multilateral and bi10 lateral activities, to support, establish, and imple11 ment internationally harmonized standards for as12 suring critical pathogen and laboratory safety and 

13 security and for assessing broad social consequences, 

14 including— 

15 (A) working in multilateral forums, includ16 ing forums that engage the private sector, re17 search, and public health communities, to estab18 lish, based on international needs and domestic 

19 lessons-learned, and regularly update inter20 national standards for pathogen and laboratory 

21 safety and security; 

22 (B) promoting international codes of ethics 

23 to ensure safety and security and reinforcing 

24 norms during the education and throughout the 


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1 career of scientists in academia, industry, or 

2 government; 

3 (C) encouraging the development and im4 plementation of emergency reporting and re5 sponse in the event of a breach of pathogen or 

6 laboratory security; and 

7 (D) providing technical and financial as8 sistance, including training, to other countries 

9 to facilitate the adoption, sustainable implemen10 tation, and enforcement of national measures in 

11 accordance with international standards for the 

12 safety, transportation, and security of biological 

13 agents and laboratories; 

14 (2) pursue efforts, through bilateral, regional, 

15 and multilateral activities, to ensure a strong global 

16 legal regime for biosecurity, including— 

17 (A) working with other countries to de18 velop and strengthen the national criminal leg19 islation and law enforcement capabilities of 

20 such countries for detecting, interdicting, inves21 tigating, and prosecuting criminal activities and 

22 harmonizing international biosecurity legal ef23 forts; 

24 (B) developing, establishing, and pro25 moting common internationally harmonized 


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1 standards, guidance, and best practices for ob2 taining, handling, analyzing and sharing micro3 bial forensic evidence; 

4 (C) promoting appropriate information 

5 sharing, that is in the national security inter6 ests of the United States, relating to threats 

7 and to best practices, and promoting coopera8 tion for preventing, deterring, detecting, attrib9 uting, interdicting, investigating, and pros10 ecuting criminal or terrorist use of biological or 

11 toxin agents between the intelligence commu12 nity, United States Federal law enforcement, 

13 and international law enforcement and security 

14 officials; 

15 (D) promoting international legal and tech16 nical cooperation to achieve the goals described 

17 in subparagraphs (A) through (C); and 

18 (E) providing technical assistance to other 

19 countries, including training, to achieve the 

20 goals described in subparagraphs (A) through 

21 (C); 

22 (3) pursue strategies to strengthen the Conven23 tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc24 tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 

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1 monly referred to as the ‘‘Biological Weapons Con2 vention’’ or ‘‘BWC’’) and its enforcement by— 

3 (A) promoting universal membership in, in4 creased adherence to, effective implementation 

5 of, and compliance with the BWC; 

6 (B) developing an action plan for increas7 ing international adherence to the BWC; 

8 (C) promoting stronger confidence-building 

9 and other transparency measures designed to 

10 provide mutual reassurance that national bio11 defense, threat assessment, and other activities 

12 comply with the BWC; 

13 (D) ensuring that United States participa14 tion in BWC meetings is broadly inclusive of 

15 representatives of relevant Federal departments 

16 and agencies; and 

17 (E) supporting efforts to strengthen the 

18 United Nations Secretary-General’s mechanism 

19 for investigating allegations of biological weap20 ons use and to establish a multilateral capa21 bility to investigate alleged breaches of BWC 

22 obligations; 

23 (4) engage in cooperative efforts to improve na24 tional, regional, and multinational surveillance and 

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1 fectious diseases, whether naturally occurring or 

2 man-made, including— 

3 (A) working with countries to ensure full 

4 compliance with World Health Organization 

5 disease reporting obligations; 

6 (B) supporting efforts, in coordination 

7 with the Emerging Pandemic Threats program, 

8 to improve global capacity for identifying, diag9 nosing, tracking, and reporting pathogens re10 sponsible for possible infectious disease out11 breaks of international significance, including— 

12 (i) improving international laboratory 

13 capacity for expeditiously collecting, ana14 lyzing, and identifying a broad array of 

15 pathogens including mutated strains which 

16 may cause infectious disease outbreaks or 

17 may be used in a biological weapon; and 

18 (ii) improving international capacity 

19 for effectively collecting, analyzing, trans20 mitting, and reporting validated data and 

21 public health information about such infec22 tious disease outbreaks; 

23 (C) providing assistance to international 

24 and regional health organizations to— 


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1 (i) enhance the surveillance and re2 porting capabilities of the World Health 

3 Organization and existing international re4 gional and international health networks; 

5 and 

6 (ii) develop new international regional 

7 and international health networks; 

8 (D) providing assistance to facilitate 

9 standardization in the reporting of public health 

10 information between and among developing 

11 countries and international health organiza12 tions; 

13 (E) working with the Secretary of Health 

14 and Human Services to establish new country 

15 or regional international Field Epidemiology 

16 Training Programs in eligible developing coun17 tries; 

18 (F) establishing and providing assistance 

19 for short training courses in— 

20 (i) laboratory techniques relating to 

21 the identification, diagnosis, and tracking 

22 of pathogens responsible for possible infec23 tious disease outbreaks; and 

24 (ii) techniques of disease and syn25 drome surveillance reporting and rapid 


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1 analysis of syndrome information using 

2 Geographic Information System (GIS) 

3 tools; 

4 (G) promoting efforts to make widely avail5 able, especially in developing countries, medical 

6 and pharmaceutical measures to counter infec7 tious diseases, including through stockpiling of 

8 such measures; and 

9 (H) working with other countries and mul10 tilateral and regional bodies to provide technical 

11 assistance for developing biological and health 

12 response capabilities in other countries; 

13 (5) support the development of international 

14 mechanisms that enhance the coordination and im15 plementation of biosecurity policies; 

16 (6) facilitate the alignment of foreign assistance 

17 for biosecurity with the public health needs of recipi18 ent countries, including— 

19 (A) assisting in the planning, development, 

20 enhancement, and training of response capabili21 ties for disease outbreaks in recipient countries 

22 and regions; and 

23 (B) assisting in the promotion of effective 

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1 ment, and other responder communities in re2 cipient countries and regions; 

3 (7) engage in multilateral and bilateral discus4 sions of biodefense programs and control of sensitive 

5 biotechnologies to ensure that they are limited to 

6 prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes; 

7 (8) develop an assessment of, and appropriate 

8 policies to address, the potential security threats and 

9 societal and ethical impacts posed by emerging and 

10 future biotechnology developments, including syn11 thetic genomics, synthetic biology, human genetic 

12 modification, and other biotechnology relevant for 

13 the modification of human beings, including through 

14 the establishment of international agreement regard15 ing the appropriate uses of advanced biotechnology 

16 and proscription of nefarious uses and abhorrent 

17 practices; and 

18 (9) pursue such other activities that the Sec19 retary of State determines will enhance international 

20 biosecurity. 

21 (c) PROGRAM COMPONENTS.—With respect to— 

22 (1) the short training courses related to labora23 tory techniques referred to in subsection 

24 (b)(4)(F)(i)— 


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1 (A) such courses shall be for eligible na2 tionals who are laboratory technicians or other 

3 public health personnel; 

4 (B) the training shall be held outside the 

5 United States and may be conducted in facili6 ties of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre7 vention located in foreign countries or in Over8 seas Medical Research Units of the Department 

9 of Defense, as appropriate; and 

10 (C) the Secretary of State shall coordinate 

11 the training, where appropriate, with existing 

12 programs and activities of international health 

13 organizations; and 

14 (2) disease and syndrome surveillance reporting 

15 and rapid analysis of syndrome information referred 

16 to in subsection (b)(4)(F)(ii)— 

17 (A) such courses shall be for eligible na18 tionals who are health care providers or other 

19 public health personnel; 

20 (B) the training shall be conducted via the 

21 Internet or in appropriate facilities located in a 

22 foreign country, as determined by the Secretary 

23 of State; and 

24 (C) the Secretary of State shall coordinate 

25 the training, where appropriate, with existing 


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1 programs and activities of international regional 

2 and international health organizations. 

3 (d) REPORTING.—Activities undertaken pursuant to 

4 subsection (b) to improve or facilitate the reporting of bio5 logical incidents, including breaches of pathogen or labora6 tory security, infectious disease outbreaks, and public 

7 health information, shall be aimed at improving and facili8 tating such reporting only to the United States, the World 

9 Health Organization, and other responsible countries and 

10 international entities. 

11 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act 

12 shall require the Secretary of State to share information 

13 about United States defensive measures against biological 

14 weapons or other threats that could be useful to adver15 saries in developing biological weapons or agents that 

16 could defeat such defensive measures. 

17 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

18 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are nec19 essary to the Secretary of State for carrying out this sec20 tion. 

21 SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY TASK FORCE. 

22 The Secretary of State shall convene an International 

23 Biosecurity Task Force of prominent experts, including 

24 from the scientific, public health, legal, academic, security, 

25 research bioethics, and private sector communities, to 


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1 serve as a nongovernmental consultative body for the 

2 International Biosecurity Initiative established pursuant 

3 to section 4. The Task Force shall provide advice to the 

4 security, societal, and ethical implications of emerging and 

5 future biotechnology developments, including synthetic 

6 genomics, synthetic biology, human genetic modification, 

7 and other biotechnology relevant for the modification of 

8 human beings, as well as efforts toward the establishment 

9 of international agreement regarding the appropriate uses 

10 of advanced biotechnology and proscription of nefarious 

11 uses and abhorrent practices. 

12 SEC. 6. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NONPROLIFERATION AND 

13 COUNTERTERRORISM FELLOWSHIP PRO14 GRAM. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es16 tablish a program (to be known as the ‘‘Nonproliferation 

17 and Counterterrorism Fellowship Program’’) to provide el18 igible students and recent graduates educational fellow19 ships for obtaining a deeper understanding of Federal ef20 forts to counter terrorist activities and groups and to pro21 mote nonproliferation. 

22 (b) FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM COMPONENTS.—The 

23 Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship Pro24 gram authorized by this section shall— 


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1 (1) be awarded to eligible students and recent 

2 graduates; 

3 (2) require such students or recent graduates to 

4 complete an educational fellowship at a Federal 

5 agency or in Congress, for a period of not less than 

6 3 months, during which fellowship such students and 

7 recent graduates shall participate in activities rel8 evant to the goals of the graduate studies of such 

9 students and recent graduates; 

10 (3) ensure that such educational fellowships at 

11 Federal agencies or in Congress are designed to con12 tribute to the eligible students’ and recent grad13 uates’ preparation for a career in a field relating to 

14 the goals of the Program authorized by this section; 

15 and 

16 (4) provide financial support to eligible students 

17 and recent graduates selected for the program in ac18 cordance with subsection (c). 

19 (c) FINANCIAL SUPPORT.—The Nonproliferation and 

20 Counterterrorism Fellowship Program shall provide to 

21 each eligible student and recent graduate selected for the 

22 program for the period during which the student or recent 

23 graduate is participating in an educational fellowship at 

24 a Federal agency or in Congress as required by subsection 


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1 (b)(2), a stipend in an amount determined by the Sec2 retary. 

3 (d) REGULATIONS.—Not later than one year after the 

4 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 

5 promulgate regulations to carry out this section. 

6 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

7 are authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each 

8 of fiscal years 2011 through 2015 to the Secretary of 

9 State for carrying out the Nonproliferation and Counter10 terrorism Fellowship Program under this section. 

11 SEC. 7. TECHNICAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF HARM12 FUL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT AND ACTIVITY 

13 INVESTIGATION TECHNOLOGIES. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

16 in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal 

17 agencies, the National Academies, or any other agency or 

18 organization the Secretary determines appropriate, shall 

19 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re20 port containing a technical review and assessment of the 

21 limits and capabilities of technologies that could be used 

22 for investigating biological incidents and allegations of ille23 gal biological weapons activities. This report shall be sub24 mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 

25 annex. 


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1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

2 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are nec3 essary to the Secretary of State for carrying out the review 

4 and assessment described in section (a) of this section. 

5 SEC. 8. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF GLOBAL LEGAL RE6 GIME FOR BIOSECURITY. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

9 in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal 

10 agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

11 committees a review and assessment of the global legal 

12 regime for biosecurity, including— 

13 (1) implementation and enforcement of laws 

14 against criminal activities in other countries includ15 ing extradition treaties and agreements; 

16 (2) transnational exchange of relevant informa17 tion between law enforcement authorities; 

18 (3) attributing responsibility, apprehending, 

19 and prosecuting individuals or entities responsible 

20 for deliberately releasing pathogens; 

21 (4) licensing and use approval of medical coun22 termeasures during a disease emergency; 

23 (5) national and international authority for ef24 fectively responding to and recovering from a disease 

25 outbreak; 


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1 (6) the establishment and implementation of 

2 national and international legal measures for ensur3 ing pathogen and laboratory biosafety and biosecu4 rity; and 

5 (7) national legal mechanisms to review bio6 defense research and development activities for com7 pliance with the BWC. 

8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

9 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are nec10 essary to the Secretary of State for carrying out the review 

11 and assessment described in section (a) of this section. 

12 SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 

13 Section 140(a) of the Foreign Relations Authoriza14 tion Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 12 

15 2656f(a)) is amended— 

16 (1) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

17 the end; 

18 (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at 

19 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

20 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

21 paragraph: 

22 ‘‘(5) detailed assessments of the ability of each 

23 foreign country described in paragraphs (1) through 

24 (4) to detect and respond to acts of terrorism, in25 cluding information on— 


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1 ‘‘(A) surveillance capabilities for detecting 

2 infectious disease outbreaks; and 

3 ‘‘(B) the ability of the public health and 

4 law enforcement communities of each such 

5 country to effectively minimize damage to pub6 lic health, economic infrastructure, and global 

7 security during and immediately after a ter8 rorist attack.’’. 

9 SEC. 10. INTERNATIONAL DISEASE OUTBREAK INFORMA10 TION SHARING. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall sub12 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

13 following any incident in which a foreign country fails to 

14 share, in a timely manner, information, including biologi15 cal samples and epidemiological data, about the outbreak 

16 of a previously unknown infectious disease or a new strain 

17 of an infectious disease or about an outbreak for which 

18 the country is otherwise required to share information 

19 pursuant to commitments made by the country. This re20 port shall include a summary the activities of the relevant 

21 country pertaining to the disease outbreak and steps taken 

22 by the United States and by relevant international organi23 zations, including the World Health Organization, to ob24 tain this information. 


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1 (b) WITHHOLDING.—The Secretary of State shall 

2 withhold 10 percent of the foreign assistance given to any 

3 country failing to share information on infectious disease 

4 outbreaks as described in subsection (a). This withholding 

5 will remain in effect until the information is provided. This 

6 withholding may be waived at if the President determines 

7 that to do so is in the national interest. 

8 SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS. 

9 In this Act: 

10 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT11 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com12 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

13 the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

14 Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

15 (2) APPROPRIATE GRADUATE PROGRAM.—The 

16 term ‘‘appropriate graduate program’’ means a 

17 graduate level degree or certificate program at an 

18 institution of higher education that provides for the 

19 multidisciplinary study of issues relating to weapons 

20 nonproliferation or counterterrorism and includes 

21 training in at least several of the following areas— 

22 (A) assessment and forecasting of pro23 liferation threats, including non-state actors, 

24 (B) technologies underlying weapons of 

25 mass destruction, 


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1 (C) international agreements and regimes 

2 to prevent and limit the spread of weapons of 

3 mass destruction, including threat reduction as4 sistance, 

5 (D) nonproliferation export controls, in6 cluding governance of dual-use technologies, 

7 (E) policy tools and responses to prolifera8 tion by both states and non-state actors, 

9 (F) the politics and process of nuclear pro10 liferation and renunciation decisionmaking, and 

11 (G) regional security issues relevant to 

12 proliferation. 

13 (3) CRITICAL PATHOGEN.—The term ‘‘critical 

14 pathogen’’ means any biological organism that is 

15 used in biological research and is involved in the 

16 transmission of infectious diseases whose intentional 

17 or unintentional release poses a significant threat to 

18 public health. 

19 (4) ELIGIBLE NATIONAL.—The term ‘‘eligible 

20 national’’ means any citizen or national of an eligible 

21 developing country who— 

22 (A) does not have a criminal background; 

23 (B) is not on any immigration or other 

24 United States watch list; and 


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1 (C) is not affiliated with any foreign ter2 rorist organization. 

3 (5) ELIGIBLE STUDENT.—The term ‘‘eligible 

4 student’’ means a student who— 

5 (A) has obtained from an institution of 

6 higher education (as defined in section 102 of 

7 the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 

8 1002)) a bachelor’s degree or other degree that 

9 is acceptable for admission to a graduate or 

10 professional degree program; 

11 (B) is applying to, or has been admitted 

12 for enrollment in, an appropriate graduate pro13 gram; 

14 (C) is a United States citizen; and 

15 (D) is otherwise qualified (as determined 

16 by the Secretary). 

17 (6) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘foreign 

18 assistance’’ means assistance authorized under the 

19 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 

20 seq.). 

21 (7) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—Ex22 cept as otherwise expressly provided, the term ‘‘insti23 tution of higher education’’ has the meaning given 

24 such term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education 

25 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). 


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1 (8) TECHNICAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT.— 

2 The term ‘‘technical review and assessment’’ means 

3 a policy-neutral study conducted by scientific and 

4 technical experts to assess the ability of available 

5 technology to verify the purpose of biological re6 search programs and to detect weaponization activi7 ties. 

8 (9) ELIGIBLE DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The 

9 term ‘‘eligible developing country’’ means any devel10 oping country that— 

11 (A) has agreed to the objective of fully 

12 complying with requirements of the World 

13 Health Organization on reporting public health 

14 information on outbreaks of infectious diseases; 

15 and 

16 (B) has not been determined by the Sec17 retary, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms 

18 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 

19 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

20 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export 

21 Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 

22 2405), to have repeatedly provided support for 

23 acts of international terrorism, unless the Sec24 retary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in 

25 the national interest of the United States to 


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27 

•HR 6297 IH

1 provide assistance under the provisions of this 

2 Act. 

Æ 


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