[Cite as State v. Marr, 2018-Ohio-5061.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

VAN WERT COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 15-18-09 

 v. 

TYLER D. MARR, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR-17-02-021 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 17, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Tyler W. Dunham for Appellant 

 Scott R. Gordon for Appellee 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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SHAW, J.

{¶1} The State of Ohio brings this appeal from the July 9, 2018, judgment of 

the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court granting the motion to dismiss filed by 

defendant-appellee, Tyler Marr (“Marr”). On appeal, the State argues that the trial 

court erred by finding that Marr’s handwritten letter filed with the trial court 

substantially complied with R.C. 2963.30, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 

(“IAD”), and that as a result of erroneously finding substantial compliance in this 

case, the trial court erred in finding that the State failed to bring Marr to trial within 

180 days of the receipt of his letter. 

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On February 2, 2017, Marr was indicted for seven counts of Burglary 

in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), all felonies of the second degree. Each count 

concerned a different burglary on a different date, ranging from May 19, 2016, to 

July 12, 2016. 

{¶3} On April 3, 2017, a letter written by Marr was filed with the trial court 

in this case, reading as follows. 

Dear Judge Burch[field] 

My name is Tyler Derrick Marr. I am writing you today in the 

hope that I might be able to get some information on an open case 

filed against me in Van Wert. I am incarcerated at Miami 

Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana on an unrelated 

charge. I have been notified of 7 Felony 2nd degree burglary 

charges that have been filed against me in Van Wert Ohio. My 

intention is to get transported to Van Wert to get arraigned on 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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these chargers or have them dismissed. Could you provide me 

with any cause [sic] number pertaining to these charges? I have 

not been read warrants or been given any information on the 

seven charges. I would like to move forward with this case and 

bring about a resolution to it as soon as possible. Any information 

you can provide on the charges themselves and also what I may 

need to do to get a transport order to face the charges. I’ll provide 

all of my personal information as well as my location in Indiana 

Dept. of Corrections. Thank you very much. 

(Doc. No. 4). The letter was signed by Marr. On a second page it contained his 

date of birth, his social security number, his inmate number in the Indiana 

Department of Corrections, and his current location, specifying even the cell. 

{¶4} The common pleas court provided a copy of the letter to the Van Wert 

County Prosecutor’s Office in April of 2017. 

{¶5} In July of 2017, the Van Wert County Prosecutor delivered forms 

requesting temporary custody of Marr pursuant to Article IV of the IAD. On 

November 17, 2017, Marr signed forms requesting, pursuant to Article III of the 

IAD, to be transferred to Van Wert for the purposes of bringing his untried 

indictment to final disposition. 

{¶6} It is unclear in the record why, but Marr was not delivered to Van Wert 

until April 23, 2018. 

{¶7} On April 25, 2018, Marr was arraigned and he pled not guilty to the 

charges. He also had counsel appointed for him at that time. 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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{¶8} On May 24, 2018, Marr filed a motion to dismiss arguing that pursuant 

to R.C. 2963.30, Article III of the IAD, he had not been brought to trial within 180 

days of receipt of his April 3, 2017, letter.1

 

{¶9} On June 7, 2018, the State filed a response to Marr’s motion to dismiss, 

contending, inter alia, that Marr’s letter had not substantially complied with 

provisions of the IAD such that the speedy trial time therein was invoked. 

{¶10} On July 3, 2018, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts for 

the trial court to use in determining the motion to dismiss. They read as follows. 

1. On March 28, 2017, Tyler Marr delivered a handwritten 

letter to the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas. The 

purpose of Mr. Marr’s letter was to inform the Court that 

Mr. Marr was incarcerated at the Miami Correctional 

Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana and to request 

transportation to Van Wert County for the purpose of 

resolving an untried indictment against him. * * * 

2. In early April of 2017, Tyler Marr’s letter was received by 

the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas. A copy of 

the letter was shortly thereafter provided to the Van Wert 

County Prosecutor. 

3. In July 2017, the Van Wert County Prosecutor prepared and 

delivered forms requesting temporary custody of Tyler Marr 

pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers. * * * 

4. On November 17, 2017, Tyler Marr signed forms requesting 

pursuant to Article III of the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers that he be delivered to the custody of the Van Wert 

County Sheriff for purposes of bringing his untried 

 

1

 The letter was dated March 28, 2017, but it was file-stamped April 3, 2017. 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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indictment to final disposition. Tyler Marr’s request was 

delivered to the Van Wert County Prosecuting Attorney on 

November 22, 2017 via fax. * * * 

5. Tyler Marr’s request described in paragraph 4 herein was 

not delivered to the Van Wert County Court of Common 

Pleas either by Tyler Marr or by the Miami Correctional 

Facility in any matter. 

6. On April 23, 2018, Tyler Marr was delivered to the Van Wert 

County Correctional Facility. 

7. On April 25, 2018, Tyler Marr appeared in the Van Wert 

County Court of Common Pleas for purposes of 

arraignment. Attorney Scott Gordon was appointed by the 

Court to represent Mr. Marr. 

8. On May 9, 2018, this case appeared for an initial pre-trial 

conference. On this date, Tyler Marr delivered to the Court 

a handwritten letter requesting alternate counsel, citing as a 

basis his dissatisfaction with Attorney Gordon. * * * 

9. On May 24, 2018, this case appeared for a second pre-trial 

conference. On this date, Mr. Marr appeared in open court 

and withdrew his request for new counsel. Also on this date, 

Attorney Gordon filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mr. Marr’s 

behalf. 

(Doc. No. 24). The stipulations were signed by both the State and defense counsel. 

{¶11} On July 9, 2018, trial court filed its entry granting Marr’s motion to 

dismiss. The trial court set forth the issue to be determined as follows. 

The question then arises did the Defendant substantially comply 

with R.C. 2963.30 and the IAD by his initial handwritten letter in 

March/April 2017 or the November 17, 2017 facsimile to the 

prosecuting attorney. 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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If the April 2017 letter substantially complied then the 

Defendant is beyond time. If November 17, 2017 dated facsimile 

delivered November 22, 2017 is substantially compliant then 166 

days had elapsed on May 9, 2018, when the request for new 

counsel was delivered to the Court. 

(Doc. No. 26). 

{¶12} After analyzing some case authority, the trial court conducted the 

following analysis. 

In the present case the defendant caused a letter to be delivered 

to the Court by April 3, 2017 [that] requested timely disposition of 

the Defendant’s case. That letter included the Defendant’s 

location. The State acknowledges receiving that letter from the 

Court. The State demonstrates actual knowledge by the July 2017 

request to the Indiana prison. 

In this case the Court and the State had both received the 

Defendant’s request in April 2017, thirteen months before the 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Further the State made a request 

under the State section of the IAD for possession of the Defendant 

in July 2017. That request was nine months before the Defendant 

provided his letter requesting a new attorney May 9, 2018. 

Whether the delay is the fault of the State or the prison 

authorities in Indiana is not relevant as over a year passed since 

the prisoner made his request and two lengthy delays ensued 

between July 2017 and November 2017 and also November 2017 

and April 2018 over which the prisoner had no control. 

* * * 

In this case there is no reasonable excuse for the delay from 

both April 3, 2017 or July 2017 for this defendant to have made 

available for trial and therefore this case is dismissed. 

(Doc. No. 26). 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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{¶13} It is from this judgment that the State appeals, asserting the following 

assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial [court] erred in dismissing case number CR 17-02-021 

for failure to bring the matter to trial within 180 days of the date 

that the court and prosecuting attorney received appellee’s letter 

dated March 28, 2017.

{¶14} The State argues in its assignment of error that the trial court erred by 

finding that Marr’s April 2017 letter substantially complied with the IAD. 

Standard of Review 

{¶15} Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss 

under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Keenan, 143 Ohio St.3d 397, 

2015–Ohio–2484; State v. Thompson, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-06, 2017-Ohio8686, ¶ 16. However, speedy trial issues present mixed questions of law and 

fact. State v. Hemingway, 8th Dist. Nos. 96699, 96700, 2012–Ohio–476, ¶ 8. 

Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issues but give 

deference to any factual findings made by the trial court. Id. citing Cleveland v. 

Adkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83295, 2004-Ohio-1118, ¶ 5. 

The IAD 

{¶16} The IAD is codified in R.C. 2963.30. Its provisions relevant to this 

case read as follows. 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT 

ON DETAINERS 

The contracting states solemnly agree that: 

Article I 

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 

detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 

complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons 

already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties 

which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 

rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and 

the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 

orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the 

proper status of any and all detainers based on untried 

indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also 

find that proceedings with reference to such charges and 

detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot 

properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the 

further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative 

procedures. 

* * * 

Article III 

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 

imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party 

state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of 

imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any 

untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of 

which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 

brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have 

caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 

appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written 

notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final 

disposition to be made of the indictment, information or 

complaint: provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 

prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having 

jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 

continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the 

prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the 

prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining 

to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the 

time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 

state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 

(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred 

to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner 

to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official 

having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together 

with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and 

court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 

(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official 

having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the 

source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall 

also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition 

of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer 

is based. 

(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner 

pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for 

final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or 

complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged 

against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official 

the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The 

warden, commissioner of corrections or other officials having 

custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate 

prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within 

the state to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is 

being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any 

notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied 

by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, request, and the 

certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 

complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner 

to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, 

information or complaint shall not be of any further force or 

effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 

prejudice. 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner 

pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a 

waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding 

contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph 

(d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to 

serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of 

his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for 

final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to 

the production of his body in any court where his presence may 

be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement 

and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original 

place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this 

agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the 

imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 

* * * 

Article IX 

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its 

purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and 

if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is 

declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of 

the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, 

agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the 

remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any 

agreement, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected 

thereby. * * * 

R.C. 2963.30. 

Argument and Analysis. 

{¶17} Both parties seem to be in agreement that under the IAD, the 180 day 

speedy trial time period begins to run when Marr substantially complied with the 

requirements in the IAD. State v. Thorn, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 16 BE 0054, 2018-

Ohio-1028, ¶ 18, appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2018-Ohio-2834, ¶ 18 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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(2018), citing State v. Quinones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86959, 2006-Ohio-4096, 

quoting State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 485, 597 N.E.2d 101 (1992). 

Substantial compliance means the defendant did “ ‘everything that could be 

reasonably expected.’ ” Quinones quoting State v. Ferguson, 41 Ohio App.3d 306 

(10th Dist. 1987). 

{¶18} However, the State argues that Marr’s letter received by the trial court 

April, 3 2017, did not substantially comply with the IAD as it was a “blanket 

demand.” (Appt.’s Br. at 8). The State argues that unlike cases where substantial 

compliance under this statute and similar statutes have been found, Marr’s letter was 

not properly filed with the trial court, that it made no reference to R.C. 2963.30, and 

that it made no explicit demand for a speedy trial. The State argues that permitting 

a letter such as Marr’s to constitute “substantial compliance” creates a bar too low 

that could prejudice the State. 

{¶19} At the outset of our analysis, we note that the State is fundamentally 

incorrect in stating that Marr’s letter was never properly filed with the trial court. 

In fact, the State actually stipulated to the trial court that the letter was received by 

the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court in April of 2017, and that a copy of the 

letter was thereafter provided to the Van Wert County Prosecutor. The record itself 

clearly indicates that the letter was filed in the trial court on April 3, 2017. (Doc. 

No. 4). It is disingenuous for the State to now suggest, multiple places in its brief, 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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that the letter was not properly filed with the trial court.2 Thus its argument on 

appeal is based, in part, on a faulty premise. 

{¶20} Nevertheless, it is true that Marr never specifically cited R.C. 2963.30 

in his letter, which would have more clearly invoked the IAD. However, we 

disagree with the State’s contention that the letter never contained a demand for a 

speedy trial. Marr’s letter stated, “I would like to move forward with this case and 

bring about a resolution to it as soon as possible.” (Doc. No. 4). Although the words 

“speedy trial” were not stated, the phrase used by Marr is undoubtedly closely tied 

to the principle underlying speedy trial rights. Despite these seeming contradictions 

in the State’s argument, the State still contends that Marr’s letter was not in 

substantial compliance with the IAD. 

{¶21} In State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 1992-Ohio-32, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio originally found that substantial compliance with the IAD was 

sufficient, and held as follows as to what was required for substantial compliance 

under the IAD. 

1. The one-hundred-eighty-day time period set forth in R.C. 

2963.30, Ohio’s codification of the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers, begins to run when a prisoner substantially complies 

with the requirements of the statute set forth in Article III(a) and 

(b) thereof. 

 

2

 At page 1 of the State’s brief, the State contends, “Although Appellee’s letter was never filed with the 

court, a copy of the letter was provided to the Van Wert County Prosecuting Attorney.” Then, at page 8 of 

the State’s brief, the State argues, “Although Appellee’s letter was never filed with the court, a copy of the 

letter was provided to the Van Wert County Prosecuting Attorney.” 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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2. A prisoner substantially complies with the requirements of 

Article III(a) and (b) of R.C. 2963.30 when he or she causes to be 

delivered to the prison officials where incarcerated, appropriate 

notice or documentation requesting a disposition of the charges 

for which the detainer has been filed against him or her.

Mourey at syllabus. 

{¶22} However, “[t]he Mourey holding that mere delivery of the request to 

the prison officials satisfies the statute was soon effectively overruled by the United 

States Supreme Court in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 

406 (1993).” State v. Moore, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-14-06, 14-14-07, 14-14-08, 

14-14-11, 14-14-12, 2014-Ohio-4879, ¶ 21. Reviewing a Michigan IAD case, the 

United States Supreme Court held that “the 180–day time period in Article III(a) of 

the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the 

charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting 

officer[.]” Fex at 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085; see State v. Ward, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

02AP–56, 2002-Ohio-4852, ¶¶ 48–49 (recognizing that the Fex holding “effectively 

overruled that portion of Mourey ”). “Yet, the Mourey reasoning and the substantial 

compliance standard continue to be governing law in Ohio.” Moore at ¶ 21. 

{¶23} Cases similar to the facts before us have been analyzed under R.C 

2941.401—Ohio’s statute regarding intrastate requests by a prisoner for speedy trial 

on pending charges. In State v. Moore, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-14-06, 14-14-07, 

14-14-08, 14-14-11, 14-14-12, 2014-Ohio-4879, we found that a defendant had 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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substantially complied with the requisite statute by sending a letter to the prosecutor 

requesting speedy trial even though the letter did not have a Warden’s certificate or 

some specific information regarding the defendant’s release date. See also, State v. 

Barrett, 191 Ohio App.3d 245, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94434, 2010-Ohio-5139. 

We found that we could not hold a defendant accountable for a Warden’s inaction, 

and that the letter held enough information to put the State on notice. Moore at ¶ 

34. 

{¶24} Similar to Moore, in this case, Marr’s letter did more than request 

speedy trial. His letter clearly identified where he was incarcerated, it had his social 

security number, his inmate number, and his desire to be transported to face the 

charges. As the State notes in its brief, “[f]or reasons that are not known, [Marr’s] 

request * * * was not fully processed by the Miami Correctional Facility until 

November 17, 2017.” The trial court also notes that it is unclear whether the State 

or the prison authorities in Indiana were at fault for the delay. 

{¶25} Regardless of fault in this case, undoubtedly, pursuant to the 

stipulations of the parties, Marr caused his request to be delivered to both the trial 

court, where it was filed, then later it was received by the prosecutor. The letter 

contained Marr’s request to have the matter resolved as soon as possible, and it 

contained the information on where Marr was incarcerated. There is also no 

explanation in the record for the additional delay of roughly one year from the time 
Case No. 15-18-09 

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of the notification in April of 2017 to Marr’s transport to Van Wert for arraignment 

in April of 2018. Based on the record before us, we cannot find that the trial court’s 

determination that Marr’s letter constituted substantial compliance under R.C. 

2963.30, and that Marr’s speedy trial rights thereunder were violated, was 

erroneous. Therefore, the State’s assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion

{¶26} For the foregoing reasons the State’s assignment of error is overruled 

and the judgment of the Van Wert County Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr