IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

MARY ANNVALEE FAUCETT,

Appellant.

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No. 38690-2-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FEARING, C.J. — As a matter of precaution to preserve her right to appeal, Mary 

Faucett appealed the superior court’s failure to address a pending motion for 

reconsideration of an order denying her motion to vacate a conviction and withdraw a 

guilty plea. Because the superior court judge, who entered the order has retired, we 

remand for another judge to entertain the motion for reconsideration. 

FACTS

We previously issued a decision in this prosecution memorialized at State v. 

Faucett, No. 35627-2-III (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2019) (unpublished), 

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/356272_unp.pdf. From a plea of guilty of

manslaughter, Mary Faucett appealed the superior court’s earlier denial to dismiss

FILED

FEBRUARY 1, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals Division III
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

2

homicide charges, which motion she based on an agreement with the State for her to

disclose information. We rejected the appeal because the guilty plea waived the right to

challenge the motion’s denial. 

We abbreviate some of the facts narrated in our earlier decision. Mary Faucett

participated in the December 3, 2014 homicide of Lorenzo Fernandez, shot by her 

husband’s cousin. The cousin believed a member of a gang, to which Fernandez 

belonged, shot one of the cousin’s friends. 

On the night of Lorenzo Fernandez’s death, Mary Faucett lured Fernandez, under

the pretext of sexual relations, to an apartment where the homicide occurred. After the 

shooting, she housed her husband’s cousin while police searched for him. She traveled 

with others to dispose of evidence. 

Mary Faucett denied participation in the shooting. At the outset of the police 

investigation, Faucett agreed to provide information to law enforcement that implicated 

others. In exchange for her truthful and complete cooperation, the State offered a plea of 

rendering criminal assistance. As the investigation progressed, the State discovered 

evidence that Faucett’s participation in the crime was greater than she claimed. The State 

withdrew the offer for leniency. 

With the progression of the investigation, the State amended the information to 

reflect mounting evidence of Mary Faucett’s role in the crime. During that time, a public 

defender represented her. After the State determined the full nature and extent of 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

3

Faucett’s involvement in the homicide, the State filed a fourth amended information that 

charged first degree murder. 

With the last amended information, Mary Faucett, under the mistaken impression 

that she could gain better representation from one other than a public defender, sought 

private counsel to challenge the first degree murder charge. She paid $20,000 to hire 

private counsel John Crowley. Under the retainer agreement, Crowley would retain the 

$20,000 no matter the amount of work he performed. 

John Crowley appeared as counsel on behalf of Mary Faucett on April 20, 2017. 

Faucett did not then know that on the date he filed his appearance to represent her, 

Crowley had been the subject of an ongoing investigation by the Washington State Bar 

Association Office of Attorney Discipline (OAD). Just three days before his appearance

on April 20, the investigation had progressed to the point that OAD filed and served 

Crowley with a Second Amended Formal Complaint and Notice to Answer on April 17, 

2017.

At the time of John Crowley’s appearance, Faucett’s trial was scheduled to begin 

June 5, 2017, but the court shortly thereafter postponed the first day of trial until August 

28, 2017. According to Faucett, she promptly disclosed facts to Crowley that would have 

supported a motion to suppress evidence, but Crowley failed to file any motion. 

OAD’s investigation discovered numerous ethical violations by John Crowley that 

contained a common thread. Crowley accepted large amounts of cash for representation 

and failed to aggressively represent the client or perform tasks he promised to perform. 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

4

OAD accumulated a catalog of untrue statements Crowley made to clients, opposing 

counsel, law enforcement, and courts. 

On July 18, 2017, John Crowley entered an agreement with OAD, under which he 

would resign effective September 18, 2017. Then on August 17, 2017, on the 

recommendation of attorney John Crowley, Mary Faucett pled guilty to a reduced charge 

of first degree manslaughter. The trial court sentenced Faucett on September 14, 2017. 

The court imposed an aggravated exceptional sentence of 130 months, twelve months 

higher than the high-end standard range sentence. She now maintains that Crowley 

“coerced” her to plead guilty to first degree manslaughter. Faucett further claims that

Crowley told her she could argue for a lower-range sentence of 84 months. 

Mary Faucett asserts that she learned, after her plea, that John Crowley had 

brokered a deal with the State for the exceptional high sentence. During the plea entry 

and the later sentencing hearing, Crowley failed to disclose to Mary Faucett, the State, or 

the Franklin County Superior Court the pending ethical complaints or his agreement to 

resign his lawyer license on September 18. 

PROCEDURE

In February 2020, nine months after issuance of the mandate by this appellate 

court, Mary Faucett, through a third attorney, filed a motion, pursuant to CrR 7.5 and 7.8,

to vacate the criminal judgment and sentence. As part of the motion, she also sought 

permission to withdraw her guilty plea to manslaughter because the plea was the product 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Faucett, Crowley failed to advise her 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

5

of his pending resignation as a lawyer and hurriedly resolved her prosecution in order to 

shelter the $20,000 retainer payment. In doing so, he failed to file a promised motion to 

suppress evidence. In furtherance of his design, Crowley misadvised her and coerced her 

into an unfavorable plea agreement. Faucett based the motion on information she gained 

about John Crowley after her appeal. 

The superior court regarded Mary Faucett’s motion to vacate her judgment as 

untimely and transferred the motion to this court as a personal restraint petition. We 

adjudged the motion timely and remanded the motion to the superior court. 

On remand, Faucett enlisted a third attorney to vacate the judgment. On August 

27, 2021, Franklin County Superior Court Judge Cameron Mitchell, who took the 2017 

guilty plea and sentenced Mary Faucett, conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion 

to set aside. Faucett, her sister Sudie Isidro, and her mother Joanne Romero testified. 

Judge Mitchell issued a written decision on December 6, 2021. The court denied 

Faucett’s motion because she failed to convince the court that she did not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently enter the guilty plea. 

On December 16, 2021, Mary Faucett’s third counsel filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the order denying withdrawal of the guilty plea. In an accompanying 

brief, the motion argued that the court misconstrued the record in denying Faucett’s 

motions. 

Certain procedural rules govern reconsideration motions. CrR 8.2 prescribes that 

a motion for reconsideration be governed by CR 59. Benton-Franklin Counties Superior 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

6

Court Local Rule 59 governs the process of the filing and resolution of a motion for 

reconsideration. In 2021, LR 59 imposed six obligations on the movant of a motion for 

reconsideration: filing of the motion with the clerk, providing legal authority, preparing 

and sending to the court a draft opinion, serving the motion on the opposing party, filing 

an affidavit of service, and giving notice to the court administrator by email. 

Mary Faucett’s counsel did not accompany the motion to vacate the guilty plea 

with a proposed order because, according to counsel, Faucett asked Judge Mitchell to 

reconsider a discretionary credibility ruling and crafting a meaningful proposed order 

would be superfluous. Counsel did not file an affidavit of service of the motion for 

reconsideration on the prosecutor, although the record demonstrates that he occasionally 

communicated with the prosecutor between the filing of the motion and the filing of this 

second appeal. Counsel admits that he lacks a recollection of serving the prosecutor’s 

office, but he averred that his practice was “to walk the 70 feet and deliver copies to the 

prosecutor’s office” of the documents he filed with the court. CP at 351. Counsel’s 

office is across the street from the Franklin County courthouse, which houses the 

prosecutor’s office. 

Mary Faucett’s counsel also failed to email the motion for reconsideration to the 

court administrator’s office, although the court administrator knew of the motion because 

of repeated attempts to obtain a hearing date. Faucett’s counsel did not know of any 

defects in the processing of the motion for reconsideration and continued to discuss 

resolution of the prosecution with the prosecuting attorney after filing the motion. After 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

7

the State’s attorney raised procedural obstacles to the motion for reconsideration, 

Faucett’s counsel refiled the motion for reconsideration with a proof of service. 

After filing the motion for reconsideration, Mary Faucett’s counsel called the court 

administrator more than once to schedule a hearing date for Judge Cameron Mitchell to

resolve the motion for reconsideration. Because of retirement, Judge Mitchell was not 

available beginning December 20, 2022. 

To preserve Mary Faucett’s right to appeal the denial of the motion to vacate the 

judgment, Faucett’s counsel, on January 7, 2022, filed a notice of appeal of the December 

6, 2021 order denying the motion to vacate. The notice stated that Faucett filed the 

appeal to protect her rights because she was unable to get a hearing on a motion for 

reconsideration. The superior court entered an order of indigency approval of funding the 

appeal at public expense and permitting an appellate public defender to replace the third 

attorney. 

Because the order upon which the appeal was based was entered of December 6, 

2021 and the notice of appeal was filed on January 7, 2022, more than 30 days later, this 

court scheduled a hearing for a commissioner to consider timeliness. See RAP 5.2(a). A 

commissioner of this court ruled that the filing of the unheard motion for reconsideration 

extended the time for appeal and the appeal was therefore timely. The motion for

reconsideration remains unaddressed by the superior court. 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

8

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Although Mary Faucett’s notice of appeal filed by her third attorney seeks to 

challenge the denial of her motion to vacate the guilty plea, Mary Faucett assigns error, in 

appellant counsel’s brief, to the superior court’s failure to address her motion for 

reconsideration. In the alternative, Faucett contends that she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because her third attorney failed to comply with local procedural 

rules when filing the motion for reconsideration. 

Because Mary Faucett seeks remand for a hearing on the motion for 

reconsideration, this appeal does not address the merits of the motion to vacate the 

judgment and to withdraw the guilty plea. This appeal also does not address the merits of 

the motion for reconsideration, which motion parallels the motion to vacate and 

withdraw. 

In response, the State highlights that Mary Faucett failed to gain Superior Court 

Judge Cameron Mitchell’s attention to address the motion for reconsideration. The State, 

however, does not argue against this court remanding to the superior court for a review of 

the motion for reconsideration. The State concedes that the deadline for Faucett to appeal 

the order denying the motions to vacate the judgment and to withdraw her guilty plea 

does not loom until after any denial of the motion for reconsideration. In reply, Faucett 

emphasizes a local court rule that does not require a party to schedule a hearing on a 

motion for reconsideration. 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

9

We characterize the superior court’s failure to address the motion for 

reconsideration as a failure to exercise its discretionary authority. The failure to exercise 

discretion is itself an abuse of discretion subject to reversal. State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d

680, 697, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 

Because of the difficulty encountered by Mary Faucett in procuring a resolution of 

her motion for reconsideration caused in part by the retirement of a superior court judge, 

we remand the prosecution to the superior court to entertain the motion. A determination 

that a trial court improperly failed to consider an issue properly before it typically 

requires a remand. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 706 (2023). The superior court 

may request a hearing or resolve the motion by a written order without a hearing. 

We recognize the State’s argument that Mary Faucett failed to comply with LR 59 

when filing the motion for reconsideration. The State may forward those arguments to 

the superior court on remand. The superior court remains free to forgive strict 

compliance with its local rules. Sorenson v. Dahlen, 136 Wn. App. 844, 848, 149 P.3d 

394 (2006). 

We further recognize that, regardless of whether the superior court grants or 

denies the motion for reconsideration, this case will likely return to us by way of an 

appeal of the decision on whether to vacate the conviction and allow the withdrawal of 

the guilty plea. We might now address the merits of the underlying motion to vacate the 

judgment, but neither party has had the opportunity to yet analyze for this court the merits 

of this underlying motion. 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

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CrR 8.2 directs the superior court, in part, to follow the civil rules when 

entertaining a motion for reconsideration. In ordering a remand for consideration of the 

motion for reconsideration, we note some of the principles emanating from the civil rules, 

which principles should also apply to an appeal. We construe the rules to secure the just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. CR 1. We should prefer 

practical solutions over technical solutions whose use might result in frustrating the 

purpose of the superior court rules. Kohl v. Zemiller, 12 Wn. App. 370, 372, 529 P.2d 

861 (1974). The procedural rules should be administered to eliminate procedural traps. 

Gott v. Woody, 11 Wn. App. 504, 508, 524 P.2d 452 (1974). 

We direct that a Franklin County Superior Court judge review the motion for 

reconsideration after reviewing the case file. Judge Cameron Mitchell need not decide 

the motion. Two Washington decisions, one unpublished and one published, mention a 

second judge entertaining a motion for reconsideration. In the unpublished decision, 

State v. Phet, 127 Wn. App. 1016 (2005), this court found no error in a second judge 

reconsidering an evidentiary ruling because of new evidence forwarded by the State. In 

Sanderson v. University Village, 98 Wn. App. 403, 408, 989 P.2d 587 (1999), the court 

did not address the propriety of the anomaly. 

CONCLUSION

We remand the case to the superior court for further action consistent with this 

opinion. 
No. 38690-2-III 

State v. Faucett

11

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040.

_______________________________

Fearing, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Pennell, J.

______________________________

Cooney, J.