Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEVEN KNECHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana

Lafayette, Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JASON B. FORREST, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 91A05-1106-CR-324

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, Judge

Cause No. 91D01-1011-MR-145

February 16, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge
2

Case Summary

Jason B. Forrest contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On November 23, 2010, the State charged Forrest with murder, class A felony 

burglary, class B felony burglary, and class D felony auto theft. The next day, Forrest gave a 

detailed videotaped statement to police explaining how he entered Judith Claypool’s 

residence intending to take her car keys and steal her car, how Claypool discovered him 

inside her residence, how he pushed her to the ground and stabbed her to death, and how he 

then stole her car. Immediately following his statement, Forrest wrote an apology letter to 

Claypool’s family.

Thereafter, Forrest entered into a plea agreement with the State. On May 6, 2011, 

Forrest appeared for a guilty plea hearing and pled guilty to murder and class A felony 

burglary. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Forrest agreed to a total executed 

sentence of seventy-six years, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. During 

the hearing, Forrest stated that he had read and discussed the plea agreement with his attorney

and that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Forrest further indicated that he 

understood the factual basis for his crimes as set out in the charging information and that he 

admitted the truth of the facts set forth therein. The court found that Forrest’s plea was freely 

and voluntarily given, took the matter under advisement, and set the cause for sentencing.
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On the morning of sentencing, June 6, 2011, Forrest filed a motion to withdraw guilty 

plea. Attached to the motion was an unverified letter written by Forrest on June 2, 2011, 

indicating that he had lied during all prior proceedings before the court, as well as during his 

videotaped confession to police. The court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw during 

which Forrest similarly testified that he had lied about committing the crimes and that he

pleaded guilty only because he did not want to receive a life sentence. The trial court denied 

Forrest’s motion to withdraw and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement. This 

appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

Forrest contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by Indiana Code 

Section 35-35-1-4. Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to 

withdraw can be summarized as follows:

[W]hether or not to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court may refuse to allow a 

defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant fails to show it would

result in manifest injustice. The ruling of the court is reviewable only for abuse 

of discretion. Finally, the reviewing court will presume in favor of the trial 

court’s ruling.

Hunter v. State, 676 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ind. 1996) (citations omitted).

Forrest contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea because he claims that he lied during all the prior plea proceedings

before the trial court. However, Forrest placed the trial court in the precarious position to 

determine whether he lied during his guilty plea proceedings or whether he lied during the 
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motion to withdraw proceedings. The trial court specifically found that Forrest’s statements 

during the guilty plea proceedings were “relaxed, candid, forthright, and spoken without 

hesitation.” Tr. at 52. In contrast, Forrest’s statements in his motion to withdraw were “selfserving,” “incredible,” and “an attempt to manipulate the system.” Id. at 53. In its discretion, 

the trial court was free to discredit Forrest’s subsequent recantation of his plea, and we will 

not reassess the trial court’s credibility findings. See Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 130 

(Ind. 2000) (“[a]dmissions of guilt and assertions of innocence come in many shades of gray, 

and the trial judge is best situated to assess the reliability of each”).

We note that, on appeal, Forrest fails to make the argument and, consequently, the 

required showing, that withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest 

injustice. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Forrest’s motion to withdraw. 

Affirmed. 

MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.