Filed 4/4/23 Lab Zero v. Cartwright CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LAB ZERO, INC.,

Cross-complainant and 

Respondent,

v.

MARIEL CARTWRIGHT et al.,

Cross-defendants and Appellants.

B319561

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21STCV12297)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Reversed.

King & Siegel, Julian Burns King and Robert J. King for 

Cross-defendants and Appellants.

LEGALAXXIS, Nazgole Hashemi and Tannaz H. Hashemi

for Cross-complainant and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳
2

Plaintiffs Mariel Cartwright and Francesca Esquenazi

(plaintiffs), former employees and board members of defendant

Lab Zero, Inc., appeal from the denial of their special motions to 

strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute,1 Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.16.2 

Plaintiffs contend that four causes of action in Lab Zero’s

first amended cross-complaint arose from their speech in 

connection with a public issue—their alleged public and private 

statements accusing Lab Zero’s sole shareholder Michael Zaimont 

of sexual harassment. As described below, we agree with 

plaintiffs that the challenged causes of action arise, at least in 

part, from their alleged statements about Zaimont’s sexual 

harassment. We further agree with plaintiffs that those alleged 

statements were made in connection with a public issue. 

We thus reverse and remand this matter to the trial court 

to determine whether Lab Zero has established that there is a 

probability it will prevail on the four challenged causes of action.

1 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “so-called strategic lawsuits 

against public participation.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify

Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 139 (FilmOn).)

2 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

I. Lab Zero and ensuing controversy 

Plaintiffs and Zaimont worked at Lab Zero, a video game 

development company. Lab Zero is known for its development of 

two popular video games—Skullgirls and Indivisible.4

During the events at issue, Cartwright worked at Lab Zero 

as a lead animator and was a board member. Esquenazi was Lab 

Zero’s chief executive officer and also a board member. Zaimont

was a designer and programmer when the company was founded, 

and later became its president, a board member, and the sole 

shareholder. Zaimont created the proprietary technology Lab 

Zero used to design and build its video games.

3 The parties made over 400 evidentiary objections in the 

trial court in connection with plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions, 

involving over 1,400 pages of objections and responses. On 

appeal, neither party’s brief complains that the other party’s brief 

has cited inadmissible evidence. As a result, we assume the 

evidence cited by the parties in their briefs was admitted by the 

trial court or that the parties have forfeited their objections to 

such evidence for purposes of the present appeal. 

4 Zaimont described Skullgirls as “a player-versus-player 

‘fighting’ video game” that “features mild language and partial 

nudity” and art that “became popular and moderately 

controversial for its sexualized depiction of cartoon” women. 

According to Zaimont, Indivisible is “an ‘action role-playing’ video 

game” that was the subject of “moderate controversy because Lab 

Zero employed a popular pornographic artist” during the game’s 

development and permitted the artist “to have an avatar with 

racy dialogue in one location in the game.”
4

The events at issue began around June 2020, when two 

individuals in the video game community publicly accused 

Zaimont of making inappropriate comments to them. An online 

article dated June 29, 2020, reported that “[t]wo people have 

accused Mike Zaimont, a lead designer on Skullgirls and

Indivisible, of making them uncomfortable with demeaning and 

sexually suggestive comments.” One of the individuals was

“Bunny,” described by the article as a “popular Twitch[5]

personality with over 1.5 million followers across her various 

social media pages.” The article reported that Bunny had 

recently stated on Twitter that she would be “stepping away from 

the [fighting game] genre,” and quoted her Twitter post 

explaining that a “ ‘big reason . . . is sexual harassment [she]

received from a big creator . . . .’ ” According to the article, “[t]his 

morning, Bunny came forward . . . saying that her previous 

tweets were about Mike Zaimont, a veteran fighting game 

competitor and developer on Skullgirls and Indivisible.” The 

article further reported that writer and video game tournament 

organizer Carbon Grey said in a video posted online, “ ‘I don’t 

know what Mike said to [Bunny], but I’m sure it was shitty and I 

know that because Mike’s been making weird, sexual comments 

at me . . . at fighting game events for actual years.’ ” The video 

apparently garnered more than 144,000 views. The next day, one 

online gaming community announced it had banned Zaimont 

from commenting on or participating in gaming events.

A declaration submitted by Zaimont in opposition to 

plaintiffs’ special motions to strike stated the day after the media 

5 Twitch is a live-streaming service that focuses on 

streaming live video games, including e-sports competitions.
5

coverage, plaintiffs organized a staff meeting where Lab Zero 

employees were openly critical of him. Afterwards, plaintiffs 

created a Slack channel6 for Lab Zero staff, except for Zaimont, to 

discuss their experiences with Zaimont. Employees discussed a 

range of issues on the Slack channel, including their complaints 

about Zaimont’s inappropriate behavior and comments; whether 

they felt comfortable continuing to work with him; whether they 

wanted him to remain in a leadership role in the company; and 

the possibility of leaving Lab Zero and forming another company. 

Cartwright later claimed in support of her special motion to 

strike that Zaimont “frequently made unprompted, unwelcome, 

and inappropriate comments about [her] body, dress, and 

sexuality,” and that she had spoken to him several years earlier 

“about his pattern of inappropriate behavior and explain[ed] that 

his comments were making [her] and the other employees 

extremely uncomfortable.”

In early July 2020, plaintiffs met with Zaimont to discuss 

his behavior and to attempt reaching an agreement about him 

leaving Lab Zero and disbursing his equity in the company. 

Zaimont did not resign. 

Instead, on August 17, 2020, Zaimont sent a memo to Lab 

Zero board members and employees stating, among other things,

that he would not resign. Zaimont also stated that Lab Zero’s 

situation was “obviously delicate,” and asked everyone “to decide 

by the end of this month . . . if they would like to leave or 

continue on here to try and help us all build a safer and better 

Lab Zero.”

6 Slack is an instant messaging platform.
6

II. Public resignations from Lab Zero

In late August 2020, several employees, including 

Cartwright, publicly announced their resignations from Lab Zero. 

One artist posted his resignation letter on Twitter, stating, 

in part, that “I’m leaving Lab Zero Games. Short version:

[Zaimont] creates an unsafe work environment for everyone.” 

The attached letter stated, among other things, that “[t]his is not 

a kneejerk reaction to singular recent incidents made public, but 

a whole retrospection and investigation among all employees at 

Lab Zero.”

Another animator posted his resignation letter on Twitter, 

stating, “Hey guys, I’ve resigned from Lab Zero Games.” The 

resignation letter noted that after Zaimont’s recent “public 

incident, the team began an internal investigation with all the 

employees, and soon realized that [Zaimont’s] behavior wasn’t 

just scattered incidents,” but that “[a]lmost every employee has a 

story where [Zaimont] abused his position of power to put his 

coworkers in uncomfortable stressful situations for years,” 

including “frequently mentioning his genitals, forcing unwanted 

physical contact, [and] making sexual comments about himself or 

about employee’s bodies . . . .”

Cartwright’s Twitter post said, “I’ve resigned from Lab Zero 

Games” and included a letter describing her reasons for 

resigning. Because Cartwright’s letter was a focus of Lab Zero’s 

subsequent cross-complaint against plaintiffs, as well as 

plaintiffs’ special motions to strike, we quote it at length. 

Her letter stated that she had considered Zaimont a “close 

friend and coworker for 10 years” and that she had “tried to be as 

understanding as any friend could b[e],” but that “June was hard. 
7

After the widely-criticized racist joke[7] and then the 

inappropriate DMs[8] and other stories, our team started speaking 

up. [¶] What we realized was that there was a pattern of 

behavior that I don’t think we had fully understood until then. A 

pattern of hostility, insults, threats, lying, and harassment that 

many on our team had not openly shared with each other before.” 

Cartwright claimed Zaimont did not “respect employees who 

don’t work at all hours. He gets hostile and talks down to people. 

He makes jokes about firing people to their faces. He makes 

inappropriate jokes about his dick. He threatens and insults 

people and our partners, both directly and in public. He straight 

up lies, or misrepresents things he said earlier.”

Cartwright’s resignation letter also stated that she had 

“been subject to harassment by [Zaimont] too. I tolerated years of 

sexual comments about my body and clothes, uncomfortable 

jokes, unwanted hugs. He once suggested that I masturbate 

when I told him I couldn’t sleep, and on another occasion 

suggested I ‘help’ him with his unfulfilled sexual needs. I made a 

complaint about him during my time at Reverge Labs[9] back in 

2011. I did try to talk directly to him about how I was

uncomfortable in 2017, and in return he called me a hypocrite 

and blamed me for how I dressed. He said he didn’t want sexual

7 Shortly after George Floyd’s murder, Zaimont apparently 

remarked, “I can’t breathe” during a live-streamed video game 

event.

8 “DMs” appears to be a reference to “direct messages” 

between Zaimont and Bunny.

9 Zaimont and Cartwright worked together at Reverge Labs 

prior to Lab Zero.
8

harassment training. If I wanted to keep my job, I felt like I had 

to just deal with it. [¶] And to be totally honest—if it was just 

me, I probably would’ve kept dealing with it. But I’ve learned 

that it’s not just me. He’s done this for years, to multiple people, 

and I can’t continue protecting him by staying quiet about it 

anymore.”

The resignations were followed by a public statement on 

August 24, 2020, from Autumn Games, which owned the 

intellectual property for Skullgirls, and Hidden Variable Studios, 

which developed a mobile version of the game, that they would no 

longer work with Zaimont or Lab Zero. Their statement noted 

that “a number of Lab Zero Games employees have decided to 

leave the company as a result of actions by Mike Zaimont and a 

series of reported incidents that involved [Zaimont] over the 

years,” and, “find[ing] their allegations to be credible,” declared 

that the companies “will no longer be working with Mike Zaimont 

or Lab Zero Games.”

Then, on August 25, 2020, Zaimont announced that Lab 

Zero was “no longer able to continue operating at the previous 

capacity,” and that “[r]emaining employees have been laid 

off . . . .”

Dozens of online articles covered the Lab Zero resignations 

and attendant controversy between August 24 and September 8, 

2020.

III. Lab Zero’s cross-complaint

In April 2021, plaintiffs sued Lab Zero for retaliation and 

wrongful termination.

Lab Zero filed a first amended cross-complaint against 

plaintiffs the following month, alleging that plaintiffs falsely

accused Zaimont of harassment with the aim of dismantling Lab 
9

Zero and starting their own competing company. The crosscomplaint included 11 causes of action, including the four causes 

of action at issue here: The eighth cause of action for intentional 

interference with contractual relations, the ninth cause of action 

for intentional interference with prospective economic relations,

the tenth cause of action for defamation, and the eleventh cause 

of action for unfair business practices.

According to Lab Zero’s cross-complaint, plaintiffs 

“facilitated written and oral conversations with Zaimont relating 

to sex, sexual orientation, urination, menstruation, porn, plastic 

surgery, body image, etc.,” and had “solicited commentary from 

Zaimont in response to these topics.” Then, “[i]n or around 2020, 

[plaintiffs] engaged in a scheme to characterize these 

conversations with Zaimont as harassment, unwelcomed 

behavior, and inappropriate behavior, and thus manipulate 

Zaimont into leaving Lab Zero, to force him out of Lab Zero, 

and/or to otherwise effectuate the dismantling of Lab Zero.” The 

cross-complaint alleged that plaintiffs “falsely accused Zaimont of 

sexual harassment and made various public statements that 

Zaimont had sexually harassed them for years, when in fact” they 

had “initiated and welcomed discussions relating to sex” and 

related topics.

Lab Zero alleged that the purpose of “[plaintiffs’] scheme 

was to effectuate and further their ultimate plan to dismantle 

and destroy Lab Zero and start a new, competing company . . . .” 

Thus, the cross-complaint alleged that in early July 2020, 

“[Plaintiffs] exchanged messages with one another and other 

employees about forming a new company after they completed 

their plan to force Zaimont out of Lab Zero,” including 

“discussions about taking over Lab Zero’s current projects and 
10

business interests with publishers, presenting themselves with 

positive publicity, and leaving Zaimont with all of Lab Zero’s 

debt.” For example, in July 2020 “Cartwright engaged in 

discussions with other employees on Lab Zero’s Slack channel 

about starting a new company and whether Lab Zero’s game 

engine was indeed proprietary.” Around the same time, plaintiffs 

“discussed continuing to work with developer Hidden Variable on 

Skullgirls without Zaimont. These discussions were based on 

[plaintiffs] leaving Lab Zero and working on the game through 

their new, competing company, Future Club.”

Additionally, Lab Zero alleged that in early July 2020

Cartwright had a conversation with Lab Zero’s public relations 

firm, asking whether it was “ ‘completely out of the question to 

renegotiate the contract with a new entity’ ” started by plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs also met with Focus, the publisher of Lab Zero’s next 

game, without Zaimont present. Then, after the meeting 

plaintiffs falsely informed other employees “that Focus did not 

want [Zaimont] to stay at Lab Zero and would cancel the project 

if he continued to stay at” Lab Zero. In fact, “Focus was 

surprised to learn what [plaintiffs] had reported to Zaimont; and 

Focus had requested that Lab Zero not publicly announce 

anything about Zaimont’s departure so that the companies could 

continue renegotiating the deal.”

Plaintiffs’ alleged scheme also included a “plan whereby 

they fostered negativity by other employees toward Zaimont with 

the intent of encouraging them to help dismantle and destroy the 

company.” For example, plaintiffs “facilitated and engaged in 

conversations with other employees on Lab Zero’s Slack channel 

and held team meetings without Zaimont, whereby they fostered 

employee discontent and unhappiness in the workplace.”
11

Then, “[a]fter falsely accusing Zaimont of harassment and 

making public statements against him, [plaintiffs] destroyed Lab 

Zero’s and Zaimont’s public images, causing Lab Zero to break up 

and perish, as publishers cancelled their contracts with the 

company and the company was left no funds to pay its employees 

and continue its dealings.” The cross-complaint alleged that 

Cartwright “resigned from her employment with Lab Zero, and 

immediately made false public statements and complaints 

against Zaimont.”

In September 2020, plaintiffs announced the “existence of 

Future Club,” describing the company on Twitter as “ ‘a new coop game dev studio, formed by the team that brought you 

Skullgirls and Indivisible!’ ” According to the cross-complaint, 

since forming Future Club, “[plaintiffs] have been working with 

developer Hidden Variable on Skullgirls.” 

Based on these allegations, Lab Zero’s eighth cause of 

action for intentional interference with contractual relations

alleged that plaintiffs knew of Lab Zero’s contracts with 

developers and publishers, including Hidden Variable and Focus, 

and “disrupted or prevented performance of the contracts” 

through their “scheme, devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and 

destroy Lab Zero and start a new competing company, namely, 

Future Club.” The ninth cause of action for intentional 

interference with prospective economic relations similarly alleged 

that plaintiffs knew that Lab Zero was in an economic 

relationship with developers and publishers, including Hidden 

Variable and Focus, and “made defamatory statements to the 

public, publishers or developers working with Lab Zero, and/or 

Lab Zero’s employees” about Zaimont “as a part of their scheme, 
12

devise [sic], and plan to disrupt these economic relations” and 

“start[ ] a new, competing company, namely, Future Club.”

Lab Zero’s tenth cause of action for defamation claimed 

that plaintiffs “made false statements to the public, publishers or

developers working with Lab Zero, and/or Lab Zero’s employees 

about Zaimont,” including that he had “sexually harassed them 

over many years and that [he] had created a hostile work 

environment,” despite knowing such statements were false.

The eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices 

likewise alleged that plaintiffs engaged in “a scheme, devise [sic], 

and plan to dismantle and destroy Lab Zero and start a new, 

competing company,” including making “false and deceiving 

representations to the public, publishers, and/or Lab Zero’s 

employees” to encourage and solicit them to terminate their 

relationships with the company.

IV. Plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions 

Plaintiffs filed separate special motions to strike pursuant 

to section 425.16. Both plaintiffs contended that the eighth

through eleventh causes of action in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint 

arose, at least in part, from Cartwright’s resignation letter posted 

on Twitter. Plaintiffs further argued that Cartwright’s 

resignation letter was posted in a public forum—Twitter—and 

was connected to a matter of public interest—“an ongoing debate 

over sexism in the gaming industry generally,” and a “specific 

debate over Mr. Zaimont’s conduct,” which was “started by others 

more than a month before [Cartwright] made her statement.” 

Plaintiffs’ motions attached numerous online articles covering the 

public statements of Bunny and Grey, and the subsequent 

resignation letters from Lab Zero employees, including 

Cartwright, posted on Twitter.
13

Esquenazi also argued in her special motion to strike that 

any other purported defamatory statements about Zaimont’s 

sexual harassment at issue in the cross-complaint—such as 

plaintiffs’ statements to Lab Zero employees—were also 

protected, because they too concerned a matter of public interest. 

Finally, plaintiffs argued that Lab Zero was unable to show 

a probability of prevailing on the merits of its causes of action.

V. Lab Zero’s opposition 

Lab Zero opposed the motion. It argued that its eighth 

cause of action for intentional interference with contractual 

relations was not based on Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead 

plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle Lab Zero and start a competing 

company. Although it conceded that its eleventh cause of action 

for unfair business practices arose in part from Cartwright’s 

Twitter post, it argued that the cause of action also arose from 

plaintifs’ “scheme, devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and 

destroy” Lab Zero and start a new company, “which [did] not 

necessarily implicate the defamatory Tweet, but rather all of the 

events leading up to it.”

Lab Zero did not dispute that Cartwright’s Twitter post 

was the basis for its ninth cause of action for intentional 

interference with prospective economic relations and its tenth 

cause of action for defamation. Rather, it argued that the Twitter 

post did not concern a matter of public interest. According to Lab 

Zero, the purpose of Cartwright’s post was “to justify to the public 

the departure of Lab Zero’s employees from the company and to 

garner support from the public for the then-existing and latereffectuated plan to form a new company that did not include 

Zaimont.”
14

It also argued that its evidence demonstrated it had a 

probability of prevailing on the four challenged causes of action.

Included with the opposition was a lengthy declaration 

from Zaimont. He claimed that plaintiffs “routinely facilitated”

and participated in conversations with him regarding sex and 

related topics and gave him the impression that “no topic was off 

limits.” Zaimont contended that following the public accusation 

by Bunny, plaintiffs “conspired/decided to characterize [their] 

past conversations as harassment and thus manipulate” him into 

leaving the company.

He further pointed to evidence which, according to him, 

showed that plaintiffs did not believe he had harassed anyone,

and nonetheless decided to release a public statement 

characterizing his conduct as harassment. In particular, Zaimont 

identified Cartwright’s resignation letter posted on Twitter, 

which he claimed was a “defamatory statement” which plaintiffs 

“worked together to draft . . . and conspired to release . . . upon 

[Cartwright’s] resignation.”

Zaimont also discussed plaintiffs’ purported interference 

with Lab Zero’s contracts and business prospects. He claimed 

that because of plaintiffs’ communications with Focus, Focus 

refused to make a promised payment to Lab Zero and later 

terminated a binding deal memo related to the development of a

new game. He also claimed that “following [Cartwright’s] Twitter 

post, Autumn Games and Hidden Variables released an ‘official 

statement’ . . . end[ing] their relationship with Lab Zero,” and 

that Future Club thereafter “took over the relationship” with 

those companies. According to Zaimont, Lab Zero’s relationship 

with at least two other companies was also impaired as a result 

of the controversy and Lab Zero’s subsequent closure.
15

VI. Plaintiffs’ replies 

In reply, plaintiffs emphasized several points. First, they 

contended that even if Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action was not 

based on Cartwright’s Twitter post but instead “ ‘the events 

leading up to it,’ ” such “events” included plaintiffs’ speech with 

other employees accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment. 

Plaintiffs argued that such speech, like Cartwright’s Twitter post,

was in connection with a public issue. They further argued that 

even if some of the speech or conduct at issue in the crosscomplaint was not connected to a public issue, they could still 

strike the allegations that did arise from such speech or conduct.

Plaintiffs also challenged Lab Zero’s contention that 

Cartwright’s Twitter post involved a mere private dispute,

arguing that it was directly related to an ongoing public 

controversy over Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.

Last, plaintiffs contended that Lab Zero could not show a 

probability of prevailing on the merits of its challenged causes of 

action.

VII. Trial court ruling 

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ special motions to strike as 

to all four challenged causes of action. It held that Lab Zero’s 

eighth and ninth causes of action for intentional interference 

with contractual relations and prospective economic relations, 

and eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices, did not 

arise from Cartwright’s Twitter post. The court noted that the 

pertinent question was not whether the causes of action “allege or 

mention a protected activity,” but rather whether the causes of 

action “themselves, are based upon, and seek to hold [plaintiffs]

liable, pursuant to and because of the protected activity.” 
16

The court concluded these causes of action did not arise out 

of Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead plaintiffs’ alleged 

“ ‘scheme to dismantle Lab Zero so that they could redirect its 

business and affairs to the new, competing company that they 

intended to form, namely, Future Club.’ ” The court further held 

that to the extent Lab Zero’s cross-complaint referred to 

Cartwright’s Twitter post, that reference was “merely incidental 

or collateral to Lab Zero’s cause of action—such an allegation is 

not the basis for the relief Lab Zero seeks and is instead offered 

as evidence of Cartwright and Esquenazi’s purported scheme.”

The trial court denied the motions to strike Lab Zero’s

tenth cause of action for defamation based on its determination 

that Cartwright’s Twitter post was not connected to an issue of 

public interest. Although it agreed that “allegations of sexual 

harassment within an industry would be a topic of widespread 

public interest,” it ruled that “the degree of connection between 

the resignation letter and the topic of sexual harassment to the 

public interest” was insufficient to warrant protection under 

section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4). The court stressed 

that the “alleged sexual harassment was done privately, within 

the workplace and, according to Cartwright and Esquenazi’s 

theory, from Zaimont to various Lab Zero employees.” It further 

emphasized that the content of Cartwright’s letter “only 

generally touches on the issues of sexual harassment—to explain, 

in part, why Cartwright had chosen to leave Lab Zero—and is not 

closely enough linked with any ongoing public interest that might 

exist with respect to Zaimont.” The court concluded that 

“[w]hatever its purported impact on the industry, the resignation 

letter does not contribute to the public conversation about a 

matter of public interest.”
17

Cartwright and Esquenazi timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standard of review

“Enacted by the Legislature in 1992, the anti-SLAPP 

statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits 

that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition 

on matters of public concern. (See § 425.16, subd. (a); 

Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619

[(Rand)]; Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 

Cal.4th 180, 192.)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) To that end, section 425.16, 

subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A cause of action against a person 

arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s 

right of petition or free speech under the United States 

Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a 

public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless 

the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there 

is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” 

An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free 

speech under the United States or California Constitution in 

connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral 

statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or 

judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by 

law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in 

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement 

or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in 

connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other 
18

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection 

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (e).)

The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. 

“Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing 

that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected 

activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of 

Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 

1061 (Park).) A claim arises from protected activity “when that 

activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Id. at 

p. 1062.) Hence, “in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts 

should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what 

actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently 

form the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063; see also Bonni v. St. 

Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015 (Bonni) [“[A] 

claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike if its elements 

arise from protected activity.”].) “In deciding whether the ‘arising 

from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and 

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which 

the liability or defense is based.’ ” (City of Cotati v. Cashman

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79, quoting section 425.16, subd. (b).)

Importantly, an anti-SLAPP motion can be brought in 

response to “a ‘ “mixed cause of action” ’—that is, a cause of 

action that rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which 

constitute protected activity and some of which do not.” (Bonni, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; see also Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral) [“an anti-SLAPP motion, like a 

conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a 

count as pleaded”].) In that event, “courts should analyze each 
19

claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, 

of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of 

action—to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, 

whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of 

merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni, at p. 1010.) Thus, at the 

first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a moving defendant “must 

identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are 

protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In 

turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected 

and supply the basis for any claims. It does not matter that other 

unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has 

been labeled a single cause of action; these are ‘disregarded at 

this stage.’ ” (Ibid.) “So long as a ‘court determines that relief is 

sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the 

statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims.” 

(Ibid.)

However, “[a]ssertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or 

‘collateral’ are not subject to section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1 

Cal.5th at p. 394.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely 

provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot 

be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.)

If the defendant carries its burden to demonstrate that 

plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must 

then demonstrate its claims have at least “ ‘minimal 

merit.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) To do so, “plaintiff 

must show the complaint is legally sufficient and ‘ “ ‘supported by 

a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 

judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is 

credited.’ . . .” ’ ” (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 

Cal.App.4th 482, 488.)
20

An order granting or denying a special motion to strike is 

appealable. (§ 425.16, subd. (i); § 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) Our 

review is de novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)

II. Parties’ contentions

Plaintiffs contend that Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action for 

intentional interference with contractual relations, ninth cause of 

action for intentional interference with prospective economic 

relations, tenth cause of action for defamation, and eleventh 

cause of action for unfair business practices arise, at least in part, 

from protected speech—i.e., Cartwright’s Twitter post10 and 

plaintiffs’ alleged statements to coworkers accusing Zaimont of 

sexual harassment. Plaintiffs further contend that such speech

was made in connection with a public issue, namely, an ongoing 

public controversy regarding Zaimont’s alleged sexual 

harassment.

Lab Zero counters that the focus of its eighth, ninth, and 

eleventh causes of action is not Cartwright’s Twitter post or 

plaintiffs’ speech with coworkers regarding Zaimont’s purported 

sexual harassment, but rather plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle 

Lab Zero and direct its business to their new company.11 To the 

10 Although Cartwright posted the resignation letter on 

Twitter, as noted above, Zaimont claimed she and Esquenazi 

“worked together to draft this post and conspired to release it 

upon [Cartwright’s] resignation.” For purposes of this appeal, we 

therefore treat Cartwright’s Twitter post as speech by both 

plaintiffs, not just Cartwright.

11 Lab Zero does not dispute that plaintiffs’ alleged speech 

accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment is the focus of its tenth 

cause of action for defamation.
21

extent such speech features in these causes of action, Lab Zero 

contends it is merely “collateral or incidental” to them or simply 

evidence of plaintiffs’ scheme. Lab Zero further contends that 

plaintiffs’ speech was not connected with a public issue, but 

instead concerned a private personnel dispute. 

We first examine whether Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action 

for intentional interference with contractual relations, ninth 

cause of action for intentional interference with prospective 

economic relations,12 tenth cause of action for defamation, and 

eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices arise out of 

Cartwright’s Twitter post and plaintiffs’ alleged statements to 

coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment. We conclude 

that these causes of action do arise, at least in part, from such 

speech. 

We therefore next examine whether such speech was in 

connection with a public issue, thus constituting protected 

activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) or (e)(4). We

conclude it was connected to a public issue, namely, an ongoing 

public controversy about Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.

12 Lab Zero titled its ninth cause of action “Intentional 

Interference with Prospective Economic Relations.” We 

understand this cause of action to be identical to a cause of action 

commonly referred to as intentional interference with prospective 

economic advantage (see Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629), 

and thus use the terms interchangeably.
22

III. The four challenged causes of action arise, at least in 

part, from plaintiffs’ alleged statements accusing 

Zaimont of sexual harassment

A. Eighth cause of action for intentional 

interference with contractual relations and 

ninth cause of action for intentional 

interference with prospective economic

advantage 

“The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the 

cause of action for intentional interference with contractual 

relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third 

party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s 

intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the 

contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the 

contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Pacific Gas 

& Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 

1126.) “The five elements for intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage are: (1) an economic relationship 

between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability 

of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s 

knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of 

the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual 

disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the 

plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Youst 

v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6.) 

As our Supreme Court has recognized, these “two 

intentional interference claims share many elements—

principally, an intentional act by defendant designed to disrupt 

the relationship between plaintiff and a third party.” (Rand, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 628.) We thus analyze these causes of 
23

action together to determine whether Lab Zero alleged that 

plaintiffs’ intentional acts designed to disrupt Lab Zero’s 

relationships with third parties included Cartwright’s Twitter 

post and plaintiffs’ private speech with coworkers accusing 

Zaimont of sexual harassment. (See id. at pp. 629–630.) Based 

on our review of the record, we conclude that these causes of 

action arise, at least in part, from such speech. 

As described above, in the summary of allegations at the 

outset of its cross-complaint Lab Zero alleged that plaintiffs 

“engaged in a scheme to characterize [prior conversations 

between plaintiffs and Zaimont] as harassment, unwelcomed

behavior, and inappropriate behavior, and thus manipulated 

Zaimont into leaving Lab Zero, to force him out of Lab Zero, 

and/or to otherwise effectuate the dismantling of Lab Zero.” The 

cross-complaint’s summary further alleged that “[a]fter falsely 

accusing Zaimont of harassment and making public statements 

against him, [plaintiffs] destroyed Lab Zero’s and Zaimont’s 

public images, causing Lab Zero to break up and perish, as 

publishers cancelled their contracts with the company” and the 

company was forced to shutter. It thus seems clear that Lab 

Zero’s cross-complaint characterized plaintiffs’ allegedly false 

accusations of sexual harassment as intentional acts designed to 

interfere with Lab Zero’s business relationships. 

Moreover, the cross-complaint alleged that Cartwright’s 

Twitter post was a specific intentional act designed to disrupt its 

business relationships. According to the cross-complaint, despite 

having initially welcomed Zaimont’s conduct, plaintiffs later 

“falsely accused Zaimont of sexual harassment and made various 

public statements that Zaimont had sexually harassed them for 

years . . . .” The public statement highlighted by the cross-
24

complaint is Cartwright’s Twitter post: The cross-complaint 

alleged that “on or around August 24, 2020, Cartwright resigned 

from her employment with Lab Zero, and immediately made false 

public statements and complaints against Zaimont.” In turn, 

Zaimont’s declaration in opposition to plaintiffs’ special motions

to strike described the alleged causal role Cartwright’s Twitter 

post played in damaging Lab Zero’s relationship with Autumn 

Games and Hidden Variables, and another potential business 

partner, Arc System Works. 

The cross-complaint also alleges that plaintiffs’ speech with 

coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment were some of 

the intentional acts designed to disrupt the company’s 

relationships with third parties. Lab Zero’s ninth cause of action 

for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage

specifically alleged that plaintiffs “made defamatory statements 

to the public, publishers or developers working with Lab Zero,

and/or Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont . . . as part of their 

scheme . . . to disrupt these economic relations . . . .” (Italics 

added.) The earlier allegations in the cross-complaint leave little 

doubt that these purportedly defamatory statements, a core 

feature of plaintiffs’ alleged scheme, centered around plaintiffs’ 

accusation that Zaimont had engaged in sexual harassment.13 

13 Our conclusion is buttressed by Lab Zero’s recognition that 

this cause of action requires it to show that plaintiffs “engaged in 

an independently wrongful act—i.e., an act ‘proscribed by some 

constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other 

determinable legal standard.’ ” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 1140, 1145.) Lab Zero concedes that plaintiffs’

defamation is the wrongful act in support of this cause of action.
25

Lab Zero emphasizes that unlike its ninth cause of action 

for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,

its eighth cause of action for intentional interference with 

contractual relations does not explicitly refer to plaintiffs’ 

statements to the public or other employees about Zaimont’s 

sexual harassment. Nevertheless, given the allegations in the 

rest of the cross-complaint, which Lab Zero incorporated by 

reference into this cause of action, we are hard-pressed to 

conclude plaintiffs’ alleged statements about Zaimont’s sexual 

harassment were not a principal part of the purported “scheme, 

devise [sic], and plan” to destroy Lab Zero encompassed by this

cause of action too. That is especially so given that, as described 

already, the cross-complaint’s summary of allegations described 

plaintiffs’ false accusation about Zaimont’s sexual harassment as 

an integral part of their scheme to dismantle Lab Zero, damage 

its business relationships, and divert its business to their new 

company. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1017 [concluding 

complaint’s allegations regarding protected speech were not 

“window dressing” where “the complaint makes clear that [the 

plaintiff] intended them to have operative effect”].)

Relying largely on Park, Lab Zero argues that to the extent 

Cartwright’s Twitter post figures implicitly in its eighth cause of 

action for intentional interference with contractual relations, or 

explicitly in its ninth cause of action for intentional interference 

with prospective economic advantage, it is simply evidence of 

plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle Lab Zero. In Park, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at page 1060, the plaintiff, Park, sued his university 

employer alleging it denied him tenure because of his national 

origin. Among other things, Park’s complaint alleged the “school 

dean ‘made comments to Park and behaved in a manner that 
26

reflected prejudice against him on the basis of his national origin’ 

and that Park pursued an internal grievance, which was denied.” 

(Id. at p. 1068.) The university filed a special motion to strike, 

arguing that Park’s suit arose from its decision to deny Park 

tenure and its communications connected to that decision, which 

it contended were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP 

statute. (Id. at p. 1061.) 

Our Supreme Court held that Park’s discrimination cause 

of action was not subject to a special motion to strike because 

“[t]he elements of Park’s claim . . . depend not on the grievance 

proceeding, any statements, or any specific evaluations of him in 

the tenure process, but only on the denial of tenure itself and 

whether the motive for that action was impermissible. The 

tenure decision may have been communicated orally or in 

writing, but that communication does not convert Park’s suit to 

one arising from such speech. The dean’s alleged comments may 

supply evidence of animus, but that does not convert the 

statements themselves into the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) As Park explained, “a claim may be struck 

only if the speech . . . itself is the wrong complained of, and not 

just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for 

which liability is asserted.” (Id. at p. 1060.)

The California Supreme Court reached a different result in 

Rand. There, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the plaintiffs

and the City of Carson agreed the plaintiffs would exclusively 

represent the city in negotiations with the National Football 

League over construction of a new stadium. (Rand, supra, 6 

Cal.5th at p. 617.) According to the complaint, the city breached 

that agreement by allowing a different company, the Bloom 

defendants, to represent it in negotiations with the NFL. (Id. at 
27

pp. 618–619.) The complaint further alleged that the Bloom 

defendants engaged in intentional interference with contract and 

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage by 

secretly representing the city in negotiations with the NFL. 

(Ibid.) Those two causes of action relied on the plaintiffs’ 

contention that the Bloom defendants “ ‘act[ed] as the City’s 

agent’ by ‘contacting NFL representatives’ using [the plaintiffs’] 

promotional materials and company name,” and met with the city 

and its mayor to “ ‘conspire about how to breach’ ” the city’s 

agreement with the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 629.) The trial court 

granted the Bloom defendants’ special motion to strike these two 

causes of action. (Id. at p. 619.)

On appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded that 

“[t]hese two courses of conduct are more than ‘merely a reference 

to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove their 

claims,’ ” and instead constituted the “conduct by which plaintiffs 

claim to have been injured in their intentional interference 

claims.” (Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 629.) Rand emphasized

that the Bloom defendants’ secret communications with the city 

“are the interference now complained of” in the plaintiffs’ 

complaint. (Ibid.) 

The present case resembles Rand, not Park. As in Rand, 

and unlike in Park, plaintiffs’ purported speech about Zaimont’s 

sexual harassment is an alleged basis for their liability. (See 

Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 629.) As illustrated above, Lab 

Zero’s cross-complaint alleged that plaintiffs’ false accusation 

about Zaimont’s sexual harassment was a key facet of their 

scheme to disrupt the company’s relationships with third parties, 

not just evidence of that scheme. We thus reject Lab Zero’s 
28

contention that such speech is “ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” 

to these causes of action. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 394.)

Nor do we find it determinative that, as Lab Zero 

emphasizes, plaintiffs’ alleged scheme involved several acts in 

addition to plaintiffs’ statements regarding Zaimont’s sexual 

harassment, including “stealing trade secrets, poaching 

employees and third-parties, and starting a competing business.” 

As explained earlier, a special motion to strike may be brought in 

response to a cause of action that “rests on allegations of multiple 

acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of 

which do not.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1010–1012; 

Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City 

of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 599 [“Under the rule in 

Baral, we must disregard the unprotected conduct and focus on 

whether any nonincidental protected conduct is charged, even 

just in part.”].) Thus, because an element of the eighth and ninth 

causes of action rests, at least in part, on plaintiffs’ alleged 

speech accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment, that these causes 

of action involve other activity does not by itself defeat plaintiffs’ 

anti-SLAPP motion.14

14 For this same reason, we are not persuaded by Lab Zero’s 

argument that there were causes other than Cartwright’s Twitter 

post that allegedly led to the cancellation of Lab Zero’s contracts 

with Focus and 505 Games. Again, plaintiffs need not 

demonstrate that every aspect of the eighth and ninth causes of 

action arises from protected activity; it is sufficient that some 

“nonincidental protected conduct is charged, even just in part.” 

(Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda, supra, 20 

Cal.App.5th at p. 599.)
29

B. Tenth cause of action for defamation

The parties do not dispute that Lab Zero’s tenth cause of 

action for defamation arises from plaintiffs’ alleged false 

accusation regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment. As described 

earlier, that cause of action alleged that plaintiffs “made false 

statements to the public, publishers or developers working with 

Lab Zero, and/or Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont in his role 

as a shareholder, employee, and/or director of Lab Zero,” 

including that plaintiffs “felt that Zaimont had sexually harassed 

them over many years and that Zaimont had created a hostile 

work environment,” despite knowing and believing such 

statements were false.

C. Eleventh cause of action for unfair business 

practices 

Lab Zero’s eleventh cause of action for unfair business 

practices requires it to show “ ‘either an (1) “unlawful, unfair, or 

fraudulent business act or practice,” or (2) “unfair, deceptive, 

untrue or misleading advertising.” ’ ” (Adhav v. Midway Rent A 

Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 970; see also Cel-Tech 

Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) 

It is not apparent from Lab Zero’s cross-complaint or its 

brief on appeal whether it contends plaintiffs’ alleged acts were 

unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent, or some combination of the three. 

But again, based on our review of Lab Zero’s cross-complaint, the 

eleventh cause of action plainly arises, at least in part, from 

plaintiffs’ speech activity, and in particular, their alleged 

statements regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment.
30

The eleventh cause of action alleged that plaintiffs 

“engaged in unfair business practices by engaging in a scheme, 

devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and destroy Lab Zero and start 

a new, competing company,” and “made false and deceiving 

representations to the public, publishers, and/or Lab Zero’s 

employees in an effort to solicit, induce, recruit, and encourage 

them to terminate their relationships” with Lab Zero. (Italics 

added.) The eleventh cause of action thus rests on the same 

“scheme” as the eighth and ninth causes of action, and features 

as a major component of plaintiffs’ scheme their purported 

defamatory statements to the public and other employees. As we 

have concluded already based on our review of the crosscomplaint, such statements concerned Zaimont’s alleged sexual 

harassment.

Lab Zero admits that the eleventh cause of action 

“references the defamatory speech as a part of a series of conduct

constituting unfair business practices or acts,” but argues that 

such speech is “just further evidence of liability for unfair 

business practices and is therefore collateral or incidental” to the 

cause of action. We disagree. Given that plaintiffs’ purportedly 

defamatory speech is one of the only concrete allegations 

supporting this cause of action, we cannot conclude it is merely 

“collateral or incidental” to the cause of action. To the contrary, 

the allegedly defamatory speech seems to be at the heart of the 

cause of action according to Lab Zero’s pleading. (See Bonni, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1017 [in analyzing whether cause of action 

arises from protected activity, “we will assume [the plaintiff’s] 

complaint means what is says”].)

Furthermore, for the reasons addressed already, we are 

unpersuaded by Lab Zero that the cause of action does not arise 
31

from plaintiffs’ speech activity because “there are other wrongs

complained of with respect to this cross-claim, i.e., all of the 

events leading up to and before the defamatory speech.” Because 

plaintiffs’ alleged speech pertaining to Zaimont’s sexual 

harassment is a central part of Lab Zero’s eleventh cause of 

action, the existence of other alleged unfair business practices is 

not consequential. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; 

Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393.) 

IV. Plaintiffs’ alleged statements regarding Zaimont’s 

sexual harassment were made in connection with a 

public issue

Having concluded that the eighth, ninth, tenth, and 

eleventh causes of action arise, at least in part, from plaintiffs’ 

alleged speech accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment, we now 

address whether that speech is protected by section 425.16.

A. Cartwright’s Twitter post

Plaintiffs contend Cartwright’s Twitter post was a “written 

or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or 

a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest” 

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)), and thus was protected by section 425.16.

We agree.

There appears to be no dispute that Cartwright’s Twitter 

post was “made in a place open to the public or a public forum,” 

thus satisfying the initial requirement of section 425.16, 

subdivision (e)(3). (See Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 

471, 481 [“Statements made on a Web site are made in a public 

forum.”]; Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146 

[holding that the “Internet is a classic public forum”].) We thus 
32

focus on whether Cartwright’s Twitter post was “in connection 

with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) 

“Section 425.16 does not define ‘public interest,’ but its 

preamble states that its provisions ‘shall be construed broadly’ to 

safeguard ‘the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of 

freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’ ” 

(Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039

(Nygard), quoting section 425.16, subd. (a).) Despite the absence 

of a statutory definition, courts have concluded that speech on an 

issue of public interest can concern “a person or entity in the 

public eye [citations], conduct that could directly affect a large 

number of people beyond the direct participants [citations], or a 

topic of widespread, public interest [citations].” (Rivero v. 

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 

AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924 (Rivero); see Rand, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 621; FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–

146.) As one court put it, “ ‘an issue of public interest’ within the 

meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) is any issue in which 

the public is interested. In other words, the issue need not be 

‘significant’ to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—it is 

enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.” 

(Nygard, at p. 1042.) 

By contrast, “ ‘a matter of concern to the speaker and a 

relatively small, specific audience is not a matter of public 

interest,’ ” and “ ‘[a] person cannot turn otherwise private 

information into a matter of public interest simply by 

communicating it to a large number of people.’ ” (Rand, supra, 6 

Cal.5th at p. 621.) Nor is a statement protected where it is 

“unconnected to any discussion, debate or controversy.” (Du 
33

Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 

110 Cal.App.4th 107, 118 (DuCharme).)

Cartwright’s Twitter post addressed both an issue and a 

person in the public eye. Clearly, identifying and eliminating 

sexual harassment is a topic of general public interest. (Baughn 

v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2016) 246 

Cal.App.4th 328, 339 [“[W]e do not doubt the public interest in 

preventing sexual harassment in the workplace”]; Olaes v. 

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1511 

[“public interest in the fair resolution of claims of sexual 

harassment is undeniable” and “the elimination of sexual 

harassment implicates a public interest”]). 

More to the point, Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment 

was of particular public interest following the public accusations 

by Bunny and Grey, which attracted media coverage and thus 

drew public attention to Zaimont’s alleged conduct. (See Seelig v. 

Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 

[statements concerned public interest where they concerned “a 

television show of significant interest to the public and the 

media”]; Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193 

Cal.App.4th 133, 143 [creation and broadcast of television show 

an issue of public interest “as shown by the posting of the casting 

synopses on various Web sites”]; compare Rivero, supra, 105 

Cal.App.4th at p. 924 [statements not protected where they 

“concerned the supervision of a staff of eight custodians by 

Rivero, an individual who had previously received no public 

attention or media coverage”].) Cartwright’s resignation letter, 

which she posted on Twitter less than two months after the 

media coverage began and which described her own experience 

“tolerat[ing] years of sexual comments about [her] body and 
34

clothes, uncomfortable jokes, [and] unwanted hugs” by Zaimont, 

was thus specifically connected to an ongoing controversy.15 (See 

Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042; Seelig v. Infinity 

Broadcasting Corp., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807–808;

compare DuCharme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [Web site 

posting regarding removal of union officer was not matter of 

public interest where it was “unconnected to any discussion, 

debate, or controversy”].) The connection between the ongoing 

controversy and Cartwright’s Twitter post is further evidenced by 

the significant media coverage that followed her and her 

colleagues’ Twitter posts announcing their resignations.

Plaintiffs and Lab Zero both argue that FilmOn favors

their respective positions. We find FilmOn favors plaintiffs here. 

In FilmOn, our Supreme Court considered how to determine 

whether a statement is protected by section 425.16, subdivision 

(e)(4), the so-called “catchall provision,” which concerns “ ‘conduct 

in furtherance of’ ” free speech “ ‘in connection with a public issue 

or an issue of public interest.’ ”

16 (FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th 

15 We are not convinced by Lab Zero’s contention that because

Cartwright’s resignation letter was not focused exclusively on 

Zaimont’s sexual harassment, it did not concern a matter of 

public interest. To be sure, Cartwright’s letter described a range 

of objectionable conduct by Zaimont in addition to describing his 

sexual harassment. In our view, that does not lessen the

connection between Cartwright’s resignation letter and the 

ongoing controversy about Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.

16 Although FilmOn addressed subdivision (e)(4) of section 

425.16, we agree with the parties that its analysis is also relevant 

to determining whether a statement concerns “an issue of public 
35

at pp. 139–140.) FilmOn instructed that courts should first ask 

“what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in 

question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the 

content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional 

relationship exists between the speech and the public 

conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at 

pp. 149–150.) FilmOn emphasized that it is not enough that a 

statement “ ‘refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the 

statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public 

debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) In examining that issue, a court must 

consider “context—including audience, speaker, and purpose.” 

(Id. at pp. 151–152.)

At issue in FilmOn were the confidential reports of the 

defendant, a for-profit business which tracked information about 

the Web sites on which its clients advertised. (FilmOn, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at pp. 140–141.) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 

had disparaged its digital distribution network by falsely 

classifying the plaintiff’s Web sites under the categories of 

“ ‘Copyright Infringement File-Sharing’ and ‘Adult Content.’ ” 

(Id. at pp. 141–142.) Even acknowledging that the general topics 

at issue, including “sexually explicit media content,” “seem[ed] to 

qualify as issues of public interest” under section 425.16, 

subdivision (e)(4), FilmOn concluded that the defendant’s 

confidential reports did not further “the public conversation on an 

issue of public interest.” (FilmOn, at pp. 152–153.) It stressed 

that the defendant “issues its reports not to the wider public—

who may well be interested in whether [the plaintiff] hosts 

interest” under subdivision (e)(3). (See Bernstein v. LaBeouf

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 22, fn. 4 (Bernstein).)
36

content unsuitable for children or whether its streaming platform 

infringes copyright—but privately, to a coterie of paying clients. 

Those clients, in turn, use the information [the defendant] 

provides for their business purposes alone. The information 

never entered the public sphere, and the parties never intended it 

to.” (Id. at p. 153.)

Here, however, Cartwright’s resignation letter was directed 

to the public: She broadcast it widely by posting it on Twitter

rather than privately submitting it to Lab Zero. By doing so, she 

placed her own experiences with Zaimont in the context of the 

ongoing public controversy that had been initiated months earlier 

by Bunny and Grey. We thus have little trouble concluding her 

statement was connected to an issue of public interest, which was 

only amplified by the media coverage following her and her 

colleagues’ public resignations. 

For these same reasons, we are not persuaded by Lab 

Zero’s attempt to compare this case to our decision in Bernstein. 

There the statements of the celebrity defendant calling a 

bartender a “racist” “were not directed at someone in the public 

eye,” and “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that, prior to this 

incident, [the plaintiff] was a public figure or had been involved 

in any issue of public interest.” (Bernstein, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 23–24.) Bernstein also found “no evidence that [the 

defendant’s] comments addressed an ongoing controversy or an 

issue that had garnered any public interest before [the 

defendant] lashed out at [the plaintiff].” (Id. at p. 24.) Here, 

however, Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment was already 

the subject of media coverage before Cartwright’s Twitter post. 

Also, Cartwright’s Twitter post was directly connected to that 
37

ongoing controversy by describing how she had “been subject to 

harassment by [Zaimont] too.”

Finally, Lab Zero challenges Cartwright’s motive for 

posting her resignation letter on Twitter. It argues that she did 

not want to address a matter of public concern; she instead 

wanted “to justify to the public the departure of Lab Zero’s 

employees from the company and to garner support from the 

public for” plaintiffs’ scheme to form a new company. But 

Cartwright’s motive is not relevant at the first step of the 

analysis under section 425.16. (See Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 888 [“[A]t the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we 

routinely have examined the conduct of defendants without 

relying on whatever improper motive the plaintiff alleged.”]; 

Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038 [“[O]ur task at 

the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis is to examine the 

challenged conduct without regard to the allegations of improper 

motive.”].) Hence, that Lab Zero points to evidence suggesting 

Cartwright publicized her resignation letter on Twitter to further 

plaintiffs’ purported scheme, not to further the public debate over 

Zaimont’s conduct, does not factor into our conclusion that the 

speech concerns an issue of public interest.

B. Plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers

Plaintiffs argue that their alleged statements to coworkers 

about Zaimont’s sexual harassment constituted “conduct in 

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 

or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 

public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)), 

and thus also are protected by section 425.16. Before we address 

that issue, we examine Lab Zero’s preliminary arguments.
38

i. Preliminary issues

Lab Zero first contends that Cartwright failed to identify 

her speech with coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual 

harassment as a category of protected speech in her special 

motion to strike, and thus forfeited the argument.

We conclude this issue was adequately raised in the trial

court and thus was not forfeited. As Lab Zero acknowledges, 

Esquenazi’s special motion to strike addressed plaintiffs’ alleged 

private speech to coworkers, urging that the speech was protected 

under the anti-SLAPP statute because “[s]ection 425.16 protects 

‘even private communications, so long as they concern a public 

issue.’ ” In particular, Esquenazi contended that “allegations of 

harassment by Mr. Zaimont were issues of public interest in the 

summer and fall of 2020 and thus any private statements by . . . 

Esquenazi or Cartwright about those issues are protected by 

Section 425.16.” (Italics added.)

Further, both plaintiffs’ reply briefs filed in the trial court 

argued that their alleged private speech to coworkers about 

Zaimont’s harassment was protected. They raised this argument 

in response to Lab Zero’s contention that its cause of action for 

intentional interference with contractual relations did not 

concern Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead the “events 

leading up to it.”

Finally, at the hearing on their motions plaintiffs pointed 

out that the scheme described in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint 

included their allegedly defamatory statements to coworkers

about Zaimont.

17

17 Plaintiffs’ counsel argued as follows: “Again, if you look at 

the opposition and if you look at the evidence submitted in the 
39

Accordingly, because we find that this issue was adequately

raised in the trial court, we are not persuaded that Cartwright 

forfeited it. 

Next, Lab Zero argues that plaintiffs’ alleged statements to 

coworkers regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment are not 

described with sufficient particularity to warrant anti-SLAPP 

protection. To the extent plaintiffs’ precise statements to 

coworkers are not identified in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint or its 

opposition to plaintiffs’ motions to strike, we hesitate to blame 

plaintiffs for that. It was Lab Zero’s obligation to plead the exact 

defamatory statements at issue. (See Hecimovich v. Encinal 

School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 

457, fn. 1 [“ ‘It is sometimes said to be a requirement, and it 

certainly is the common practice, to plead the exact words . . . or 

other defamatory matter.’ ”].) Lab Zero thus should not be 

allowed to take advantage of that same vagueness as a reason to 

defeat plaintiffs’ motions.

In any event, we find that plaintiffs’ alleged statements 

with coworkers are sufficiently identified for purposes of our antiSLAPP analysis. The summary of allegations in the crossopposition and if you look at the complaint, it’s clear that the 

scheme that is alleged here is based on the protected speech act. 

[¶] Specifically the scheme is the encouragement of the employees

and defamatory statements allegedly made by my clients that 

caused the collapse of this company. So the scheme is itself based 

on speech act. Again, you have to look at the conduct that is the 

basis of the acts here. And as the complaint is clear, the conduct 

is that cross-defendants made defamatory statements to the 

public, publishers, or developers working with Lab Zero and/or 

Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont.” (Italics added.)
40

complaint alleged that plaintiffs “engaged in a scheme to 

characterize [their] conversations with Zaimont as harassment, 

unwelcomed behavior, and inappropriate behavior,” in 

furtherance of their objective to dismantle Lab Zero. The ninth, 

tenth, and eleventh causes of action all alleged that plaintiffs 

made “false” and “defamatory” statements about Zaimont to Lab 

Zero employees. And the tenth cause of action for defamation 

makes clear that those false and defamatory statements were 

that “Zaimont had sexually harassed [plaintiffs] over many years 

and that Zaimont had created a hostile work environment.” 

Notably, on appeal Lab Zero makes no effort to explain what such 

defamatory statements were if not plaintiffs’ accusation that 

Zaimont had engaged in sexual harassment.

We thus conclude the cross-complaint adequately identifies

plaintiffs’ speech with coworkers for purposes of our analysis and 

proceed to examine whether such statements were protected by 

section 425.16.

ii. Plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers were 

protected by section 425.16

We conclude that plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to 

coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment constituted

“conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection 

with a public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (e)(4)), and thus were protected by section 425.16.

We begin by observing that “subdivision (e)(4) does not 

require a public forum” and “applies to private communications 

concerning issues of public interest.” (Terry v. Davis Community 

Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1545–1546 (Terry)

[affirming special motion to strike causes of action arising from 
41

church report accusing youth group leaders of inappropriate 

relationship with minor]; see FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 146 

[noting that “[l]ong before Terry . . . we held that section 425.16 

may protect private events and conversations”].) Thus, that 

plaintiffs’ alleged statements to coworkers were private does not 

undermine application of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) here.

As FilmOn instructs, our first task in evaluating whether 

speech is protected by subdivision (e)(4) is to “ask what ‘public 

issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question 

implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the 

speech.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) We have already 

concluded that Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment was an 

issue of public interest following the publicized accusations of 

Bunny and Grey. Plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to 

coworkers accusing Zaimont of similar conduct thus concerned an 

issue of public interest.

“Second, we ask what functional relationship exists 

between the speech and the public conversation about some 

matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that context 

proves useful.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) “[T]he 

catchall provision demands ‘some degree of closeness’ between 

the challenged statement[ ] and the asserted public interest,”

and, as noted already, “ ‘the statement must in some manner 

itself contribute to the public debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Our 

“inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance 

of the speech. We are not concerned with the social utility of the 

speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the 

conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine 

whether a defendant—through public or private speech or 
42

conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes 

an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at p. 151.)

Applying the framework from FilmOn, we find a close 

connection between plaintiffs’ alleged private statements 

accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment and the public interest in 

his alleged harassment. (See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.)

According to Zaimont’s declaration in opposition to plaintiffs’ 

special motions to strike, plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers 

accusing him of sexual harassment occurred in the period directly 

after media coverage publicized the similar accusations of Bunny 

and Grey. Additionally, the public resignation letters of Lab Zero 

employees indicated that it was partly the accusations of Bunny 

and Grey that spurred employees to begin discussing with one 

another their own experiences with Zaimont’s sexual 

harassment.

We also find that plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to 

coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment “furthered[ ] 

the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” 

(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 151.) Plaintiffs’ alleged private 

accusations were followed by the public resignation letters of 

Cartwright and her two colleagues, which, in turn, continued the 

ongoing media coverage and controversy over Zaimont’s 

purported harassment. And, importantly, Cartwright and her 

colleagues emphasized in their public resignation letters the role 

the earlier private communications among coworkers played in 

their decisions. Because plaintiffs’ alleged private statements 

were a catalyst for subsequent, similar speech in a public forum, 

we conclude the private statements constituted “conduct in 

furtherance” of “free speech in connection with a public issue or 

an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see Tamkin v.
43

CBS Broadcasting, Inc., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [“An act 

is in furtherance of the right of free speech if the act helps to 

advance that right or assists in the exercise of that right.”]; 

Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 

166 [defining “furtherance” in § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) as “helping to 

advance, assisting”].)

V. Remand

Plaintiffs make no serious effort to address the second step

of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and instead refer us to their motions 

in the trial court. We therefore do not reach the second step. 

(See Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 

1301, fn. 2 [“[I]t is not appropriate to incorporate by reference, 

into a brief, points and authorities contained in trial court 

papers, even if such papers are made a part of the appellate 

record.”].) We further note that Lab Zero has requested that we 

remand this matter to the trial court to analyze step two in the 

event we conclude plaintiffs have satisfied their burden at step 

one. We thus conclude it is appropriate to remand this matter to 

the trial court to determine whether Lab Zero can demonstrate 

its claims “have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at p. 884.)

To assist on remand, we reiterate our Supreme Court’s 

direction regarding how to address a case involving so-called 

“mixed” causes of action: “[C]ourts should analyze each claim for 

relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which 

there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to 

determine whether the acts are protected, and, if so, whether the 

claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive 

the motion.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) At step two, 

Lab Zero has the burden “to demonstrate that each challenged 
44

claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and 

factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary 

conflicts, must determine whether [Lab Zero’s] showing, if 

accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a 

favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of 

protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated 

from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on 

which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral, 

supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
45

DISPOSITION

The order denying plaintiffs’ special motions to strike 

pursuant to section 425.16 is reversed. The matter is remanded 

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

decision. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.