NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

KENYON OVERE HAMWRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0732

1 CA-CR 17-0739

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-105424-001

 CR2017-106383-001

The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eliza Ybarra

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kevin D. Heade, Seth M. Apfel

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 3-28-2019
STATE v. HAMWRIGHT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Kenyon Overe Hamwright appeals his convictions and 

sentences for aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm at a structure, and 

misconduct involving weapons. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 2017, Hamwright fired a handgun multiple times 

at a vehicle L.W. was driving. L.W. had been arguing about a phone with 

Hamwright’s girlfriend (in Hamwright’s presence) at a hotel, and L.W. fled 

when he saw that Hamwright had a gun. Before L.W. was able to drive 

away, Hamwright fired six shots at L.W.’s vehicle. The crime was captured 

on surveillance video, and when Hamwright was arrested, he was wearing 

much of the same distinctive clothing evident in the surveillance video. 

L.W. identified Hamwright as the shooter, and Hamwright was charged 

with the offenses outlined above.

¶3 Following a jury trial, Hamwright was convicted as charged. 

Based on Hamwright’s lengthy criminal history and the fact that he was on 

probation when he committed the instant offenses, the superior court 

sentenced him to concurrent aggravated sentences, the longest of which is

20 years.

¶4 Hamwright timely appealed his convictions and sentences. 

We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-

4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Restraints During Trial.

¶5 Hamwright argues that the superior court improperly 

required him to wear restraints during trial. He asserts that the order 

requiring him to wear a leg brace and a stun belt lacked sufficient 

justification and thus violated his due process rights.
STATE v. HAMWRIGHT

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 Issues involving courtroom security generally fall within the 

superior court’s discretion. State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 551, ¶ 22 (2011).

But a court may not require visible shackles to restrain the defendant unless 

the court determines—on a case-specific basis—that visible shackles are 

necessary to safeguard an “essential state interest,” such as courtroom 

security. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005) (citation omitted).

¶7 The threshold issue is whether Hamwright’s restraints were 

visible. Dixon, 228 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 27. The record indicates the restraints 

could not be seen. Further, the leg brace neither obviously impeded 

Hamwright’s movements nor made any sounds to alert the jury to his 

restraints. Because Hamwright has not established that the jury was aware 

of his restraints, we find no due process violation.

¶8 Moreover, even assuming the jury became aware of the

restraints, the court did not err by determining restraints were necessary to 

safeguard courtroom security. Hamwright was charged with offenses 

involving a deadly weapon. He had been convicted of several other violent 

offenses, including attempted murder. While in prison, he incurred 32

violations, including possessing or manufacturing weapons. Additionally, 

the small size of the courtroom made it difficult for security officers to

quickly neutralize any potential risks to the jury and courtroom staff.

Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 

restraints.

II. Right to Self-Representation and Access to the Court.

¶9 Hamwright asserts that after he chose to represent himself

(with the assistance of advisory counsel), he was unable to effectively 

represent himself because (1) his phone access was limited to when he was 

in court, (2) his restraints impeded his ability to represent himself, and (3) 

the jail disposed of legal documents he needed for trial. Hamwright argues 

that these issues combined to deny him his right to self-representation and 

his right of access to the courts. Although we review constitutional issues 

de novo, Hamwright failed to object on constitutional grounds in the 

superior court, so we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error. See 

State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 138, 142, ¶¶ 1, 21 (2018).

¶10 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees 

access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–22 (1977), overruled 

on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). But a defendant 

who represents himself does not have a right to his “preferred means of 

access.” State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 584 (1993). A defendant’s
STATE v. HAMWRIGHT

Decision of the Court

4

constitutional rights are violated only when he is “denied all meaningful 

opportunity to prepare a defense.” Id.

¶11 Here, the record demonstrates the court did not deny 

Hamwright a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense. 

A. Phone Access.

¶12 The court promptly addressed Hamwright’s complaint 

regarding phone access by requesting that the jail allow him to make calls

notwithstanding restrictions resulting from Hamwright’s disciplinary 

issues in jail. Hamwright did not raise the issue again, suggesting that the 

issue was resolved. Further, Hamwright does not explain how his alleged 

inability to make legal calls affected his right to receive a fair trial. He has 

not established fundamental error.

B. Restraints.

¶13 Hamwright asserted during trial that his restraints prevented 

him from moving around the courtroom and viewing the State’s evidence 

as it was presented to the jury. In response, the court offered to have bench 

conferences at the defense table, and offered to move the video screen so 

Hamwright could see the State’s evidence as it was being presented. The 

court permitted Hamwright to move around the courtroom in whatever 

way his defense required, and Hamwright has not pointed to a specific 

instance in which his ability to represent himself was prejudiced by his 

restraints. We find no error.

C. Disposal of Documents.

¶14 Hamwright notified the court that officers at the jail had 

disposed of some of his legal documents. The relevant legal documents 

included a copy of the preliminary jury instructions and the notes he had 

taken in preparation for a hearing. The superior court instructed a sheriff’s 

deputy to inform jail personnel that Hamwright needed access to his 

documents. The court also provided copies of the missing legal documents

(including the preliminary jury instructions), and postponed trial for 5 days 

to permit Hamwright to meet with his investigator and a trial witness. The 

court’s efforts apparently assuaged Hamwright’s previous concerns as he 

did not bring the issue to the court’s attention again. Further, he has not

explained how losing documents prejudiced his case.

¶15 Accordingly, Hamwright has not shown he was denied a

meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense.
STATE v. HAMWRIGHT

Decision of the Court

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III. Right to Confrontation.

¶16 Before trial, the court ruled that Hamwright would be 

permitted to impeach the victim with the victim’s felony convictions but 

could not discuss the nature of the victim’s prior convictions. In 2008, the 

victim was convicted of possessing marijuana for sale; in 2015, he was 

convicted of facilitating the transportation of marijuana for sale.

Hamwright argues the superior court’s ruling violated the Confrontation 

Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Generally, we review Confrontation 

Clause challenges de novo, but because Hamwright failed to object at trial 

on these grounds, we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error. See 

State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 337, ¶ 55 (2008).

¶17 Although the right of cross-examination is essential to the 

right of confrontation, the superior court retains discretion “to curtail the 

scope of cross-examination to within reasonable limits.” State v. Doody, 187 

Ariz. 363, 374 (App. 1996) (quotation omitted). The question is “whether 

the court unduly inhibited the defendant’s ability to present information 

bearing on issues or on the credibility of witnesses.” Id.

¶18 Here, Hamwright’s cross-examination of the victim was not 

unduly inhibited. His defense was mistaken identity. He elicited testimony 

that the victim was unsure of his identity as the shooter. Hamwright 

impeached the victim with three “sanitized” prior felony convictions and 

the victim’s probation status. Further, Hamwright was able to crossexamine the victim concerning the bullets found in his vehicle, implying 

that because the victim possessed bullets he likely possessed a gun as well, 

and the victim acknolwedged that he would be “in trouble” if he were 

caught with a gun because of his status as a convicted felon.

¶19 Hamwright argues the court should have allowed him to 

cross-examine the victim on the nature of his drug-sales convictions 

because a State’s witness testified that the victim had a valid medical

marijuana card. He contends the victim’s multiple drug-related convictions 

“called into question . . . the witness’s claim about having the . . . medical

marijuana card.” But under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, a 

qualifying patient’s receipt of a medical marijuana card does not depend on 

the patient’s prior felony convictions. A.R.S. §§ 36-2801(13), -2804.02(A), -

2804.05(A). Under A.R.S. § 36-2815(C), a cardholder will have his card 

revoked if he sells marijuana to non-cardholders. But the record does not 

include the date when the victim’s medical marijuana card was issued, so 

it is unclear whether he was convicted of marijuana sales before or after 

receiving the medical marijuana card. And even assuming the victim did 
STATE v. HAMWRIGHT

Decision of the Court

6

not have a valid medical marijuana card, Hamwright fails to explain how 

the victim’s legal or illegal possession of marijuana at the time of the 

shooting had any bearing on whether Hamwright committed the shooting.

¶20 Finally, even assuming error, Hamwright has not established 

prejudice resulting from the victim’s testimony, particularly given the 

surveillance video of the crime showing the shooter to be wearing the same 

type of clothing Hamwright was wearing shortly after the crime. 

Accordingly, Hamwright’s fundamental error claim fails.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, Hamwright’s convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.