IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-70003

QUINTIN PHILLIPPE JONES, 

 Petitioner - Appellant

v.

LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

 Respondent - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Treating the respondent-appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc as a 

petition for panel rehearing, the petition is granted. We withdraw our prior 

opinion1 and substitute the following. We deny the petitioner-appellant’s 

petition for panel rehearing.

Quintin Phillippe Jones was sentenced to death by a Texas court. He now 

appeals the district court’s denial of his federal application for post-conviction 

 

1 Jones v. Davis, 922 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 2019). 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 18, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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relief, arguing that evidence was erroneously admitted at sentencing in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and that the district court improperly 

denied him further investigative funding. We granted a certificate of 

appealability, and now affirm the district court’s judgment and denial of 

funding.

I

Jones beat his eighty-three-year-old great aunt, Berthena Bryant, to 

death with a baseball bat after she refused to continue lending him money.2

Fort Worth police arrested him the next day for outstanding traffic warrants 

and possession of a controlled substance. They interviewed him twice about 

Bryant’s murder.3 The first time, Jones denied involvement. The second time, 

he waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder—explaining that 

he had an alter ego named James who lived in his head and who was 

responsible for killing Bryant.4

Based on a lead from Jones’s sister, the police also investigated Jones’s 

involvement in the murders of Marc Sanders and Clark Peoples.5 Nine days 

after Jones confessed to killing Bryant, a Texas Ranger and sheriff’s deputy 

interrogated Jones about the Sanders and Peoples murders.6 Jones told them 

that he murdered Sanders and Peoples with his close friend Ricky “Red” Roosa.

He described how Roosa was the primary decision-maker and directed Jones 

to take steps like restraining the victims and disposing of their bodies.7

Authorities only informed Jones of his Miranda rights after this statement was 

 

2 Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 770–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

3 Id. at 771.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 781, 792–94.

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written down and he was about to sign; he proceeded to sign it.8 While Jones 

was only tried for Bryant’s murder and this written statement was not 

introduced at the guilt phase of his trial, it was introduced in the punishment 

phase. 

A Texas jury convicted Jones of capital murder. At the punishment phase 

of his trial, the jury was asked to answer Texas’s two special issues: “1) would 

appellant probably commit future criminal acts of violence that would 

constitute a continuing threat to society; and 2) whether, taking into 

consideration all of the evidence, there are sufficient mitigating circumstances 

to warrant a life sentence rather than a death sentence.”9 Based on the jury’s 

findings that Jones was likely to commit future acts of violence and that there 

were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a life sentence, the trial 

court sentenced Jones to death.10 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, or 

CCA, affirmed his conviction and sentence,11 and the United States Supreme 

Court denied certiorari.12 After allowing Jones multiple extensions of time to 

file his state habeas petition, the CCA denied Jones’s application in 2005.13

Despite Jones’s persistent efforts to have substitute or additional counsel 

appointed for his federal postconviction proceedings, the district court 

appointed his state habeas attorney, Jack Strickland, in an order that also 

directed Jones to “timely file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus” and 

required “[t]he petition [to] demonstrate that it is timely filed under 28 U.S.C. 

 

8 Id. at 772.

9 Id. at 777.

10 Id. at 770.

11 Id.

12 Jones v. Texas, 542 U.S. 905 (2004). 

13 Ex parte Jones, No. WR-57,299-01, 2005 WL 2220030, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 

14, 2005) (per curiam). 

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§ 2244(d)(1).” Strickland miscalculated the filing deadline and filed Jones’s 

federal petition 149 days late.14

After Strickland did not contest the dismissal of the petition before the 

district court or on appeal,15 the district court appointed new counsel and 

vacated its dismissal to give Jones a chance to respond. After an appeal and 

remand concerning whether Jones was entitled to equitable tolling, the district 

court initially found that no grounds existed for equitable tolling, then was 

persuaded to reverse course after Jones moved for reconsideration.

Jones filed an amended petition adding claims for relief, and sought 

additional funding for investigative services. The district court denied Jones’s 

investigative funding request, then denied each of Jones’s six claims for relief. 

It denied Jones a certificate of appealability on all claims. We granted Jones a 

certificate of appealability on his claim that the trial court violated his Fifth

Amendment rights by admitting an unmirandized confession at the 

 

14 While Strickland thought the deadline fell one year after the state court’s denial of 

Jones’s habeas petition, the correct deadline was one year after the denial of Jones’s petition 

for certiorari on direct appeal, with tolling for the pendency of the state habeas proceedings: 

April 18, 2006. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). And, although the federal filing deadline was tolled 

while Jones’s state habeas petition was under consideration, it was not tolled for the 149-day 

period between when the Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct appeal and Jones filed 

his state petition. Jones’s federal petition was precisely 149 days late.

As the district court explained, this was not an inexplicable error. Typically, the 

deadline to file a post-conviction petition in Texas state court passes before the case is 

finalized on direct appeal. Where a petitioner files a state habeas application before the 

judgment is finalized on direct review, the one-year federal limitations period is instantly 

tolled when the direct appeal terminates, and only resumes when the state habeas 

proceedings are finalized. Here, in contrast, the deadline for Jones’s state habeas petition 

was tolled because Jones received an extension allowing him to file the state petition after

the Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct appeal. 15 Strickland informed Jones that he was investigating options, but did not notice an 

appeal in this court or tell Jones that he was not filing an appeal.

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punishment phase,16 and instructed Jones to simultaneously brief his appeal 

from the district court’s denial of investigative funding.17

We conclude that Jones is not entitled to relief on his Fifth Amendment 

claim, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

investigative funding. As a result, we do not address the Director’s argument 

that the district court erred in equitably tolling the limitations period for

Jones’s federal petition.18

II

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment denying federal 

habeas relief de novo.19 Under AEDPA, we evaluate claims decided on the 

merits by the state court for whether they were “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or whether they 

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”20 A 

decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if it either “applies 

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in the Supreme Court’s 

holdings or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from 

a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

 

16 Jones v. Davis, 673 F. App’x 369, 376 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). The Supreme 

Court denied certiorari on the claim for which we declined to grant Jones a COA. Jones v. 

Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 

17 A COA is not needed to appeal this issue, so when we granted Jones a COA on the 

Miranda issue, we instructed him to brief his § 3599 argument at the same time. Jones, 673 

F. App’x at 376.

18 See Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Because we deny 

the habeas petition, we do not address the issue of tolling . . . .”); see also Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (observing that AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is not 

jurisdictional). 

19 Whitaker v. Davis, 853 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2017). 

20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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from [Supreme Court] precedent.”21 A state court unreasonably applies such 

law when it “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.”22 In reviewing state court decisions, we bear in mind that 

“[s]ection 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court 

unreasonably applies [the Supreme] Court’s precedent; it does not require 

state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the 

failure to do so as error.”23

As we have explained, Jones was prosecuted solely for the capital murder 

of his aunt, but evidence was admitted at the punishment phase as to his role 

in the murders of Peoples and Sanders. That evidence included a written 

confession that Jones gave to authorities where he was only informed of his 

rights immediately before signing the confession. The Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals held on direct appeal that the confession was taken in contravention 

of Miranda v. Arizona, but that its admission was harmless error under the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman v. California.24 Jones argues that this 

was contrary to clearly established law because a confession to murder can 

never be harmless, and that at a minimum, the state court unreasonably 

applied the Chapman standard for harmless error.

A

First, Jones argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ 

harmlessness determination was contrary to clearly established federal law 

because Miranda violations should not be subject to harmless-error analysis. 

 

21 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). The governing Supreme Court 

precedent must have been clearly established at the time of the state court’s adjudication. 

See, e.g., White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419–20 (2014).

22 Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).

23 White, 572 U.S. at 426 (emphasis omitted). 

24 Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 770–83. 

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He relies heavily on Justice White’s opinion—joined by Justices Marshall, 

Blackmun, and Stevens—in Arizona v. Fulminante, which he characterizes as 

a plurality holding that Miranda violations are not subject to harmless error 

analysis.25 There are several reasons why the state court’s consideration of 

harmless error was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Most 

plainly, Fulminante addressed coerced confessions, not confessions taken in 

violation of Miranda.26 And the Fulminante “plurality” Jones cites was in fact 

a dissent on the precise point at issue—Justice White explicitly acknowledged 

in the relevant section of the opinion that “five Justices have determined that 

harmless-error analysis applies to coerced confessions,” and that portion was 

labeled as a dissent.27 Other courts and treatises therefore correctly treat 

Fulminante as holding that the admission of a coerced confession is “trial 

error” subject to harmless-error analysis, as opposed to “structural error” not 

subject to such analysis.28 In sum, no Supreme Court precedent holds that 

Miranda violations are not subject to harmless-error analysis, and the Court 

of Criminal Appeals’ decision to apply harmless-error analysis did not conflict 

with clearly established federal law. 

B

Second, Jones argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably 

applied Chapman in concluding that the admission of the confession was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.29 We disagree, mindful of the Chapman

 

25 499 U.S. 279 (1991).

26 Id. at 287–88. Jones shifts his characterization of the confession over the course of 

his briefing from having been taken in violation of Miranda to having been coerced. But he 

presents no argument that the confession was coerced, and no Texas court evaluated such a 

claim. 

27 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 282, 288, 295. 

28 See, e.g., 3B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 855 (4th ed.). 

29 Chapman requires a court to declare an error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

to excuse it as harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

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inquiry’s fact-sensitive nature and the sizable deference we must accord a state 

court determination on the merits under AEDPA. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals concluded on direct appeal that given the other evidence introduced 

at the punishment stage, Jones’s confession to the Sanders and Peoples 

murders did not impact—beyond a reasonable doubt—the jury’s answer to the 

special issues of whether Jones was likely to commit future acts of violence and 

whether there were sufficient mitigating circumstances.30 The jury was 

presented with extensive evidence that Jones murdered Peoples and Sanders. 

On cross-examination, Jones’s sister testified that Jones had told her about the 

murders in detail that substantially mirrored what Jones included in his 

written confession.31 An expert for the State also testified that when he 

interviewed Jones, Jones blamed his alter ego James for Bryant’s death 

because he “wouldn’t have killed his aunt if Red hadn’t made him help kill 

Sanders and Peoples.”32 Jones’s written statement confessing to the murders 

of Peoples and Sanders introduced some details that did not come out through 

other testimony at trial—most significantly, Jones’s statement indicated that 

he and Roosa initially targeted Peoples because Roosa asked him if he knew 

anyone with money.33 All told, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals 

determined that Jones’s participation in the murders and details of the 

murders were “well established through other witnesses and evidence.”34 Jones 

did not dispute at trial or on appeal that he participated in the murders.35

 

30 Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777–83. Two judges dissented, writing that they “[w]ould not 

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the constitutional violation in admitting [Jones’s]

confessions to two additional murders at the punishment stage did not contribute to the jury’s 

verdict for capital punishment,” and would remand for a new trial on punishment.” Id. at 

803–04 (Womack, J., dissenting).

31 Id. at 779–80 (majority opinion).

32 Id. at 780.

33 Id. at 782, 792. 34 Id. at 780.

35 Id. at 782.

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The Court of Criminal Appeals also noted the extensive evidence of 

Jones’s future dangerousness extending beyond the Sanders and Peoples 

murders: he brutally beat his aunt to death to steal money for drugs; had been 

convicted of several juvenile offenses, including for assaulting two teachers, 

possessing a handgun, and setting fire to another student’s hair; and was a 

member of a gang.36 In sum, it found that the written statement “did not carry 

the weight a confession might normally bear in light of the volume and weight 

of the other evidence . . . on the future dangerousness issue.”37 While it 

concluded that the prosecution’s reference to the written confession in its 

closing argument was “somewhat troubling”—the prosecutor suggested that 

Jones was aware that Red was planning to kill Peoples because “it beg[an]”

when Red asked Jones if he knew anyone with money—the court concluded 

that this reference did not play a significant role beyond “rhetorical flourish” 

in responding to the defense theory.38 As a result, it found that “beyond a 

reasonable doubt . . . the erroneous admission of the [written] statement did 

not materially contribute to the jury’s finding that there is a probability that 

[Jones] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 

continuing threat to society.”39

As for the mitigation special issue, the court concluded that Jones’s 

written confession to the Sanders and Peoples murders essentially emphasized 

that Jones was following Red’s instructions—reinforcing “the basic defensive 

theory at the punishment stage that it was Red’s bad influence that set 

appellant down the path toward his alter ego’s murder of his aunt.”40 The 

confession “by no means belittled [Jones’s] overall mitigation case”—which 

 

36 Id. at 780–81. 

37 Id. at 780.

38 Id. at 782.

39 Id. at 783.

40 Id. at 781.

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rested on evidence of Jones’s dissociative mental disorder.41 These 

observations led the court to hold that “had the [written] statement not been 

erroneously admitted into evidence, there is no reasonable likelihood that the 

jury might have returned an affirmative answer to the mitigation special 

issue.”42

The CCA’s decision on direct appeal, approved of in Jones’s postconviction proceedings, did not unreasonably apply Chapman. The court 

recognized and accounted for the significant impact that a defendant’s 

confession has on a jury, and concluded that given the particularities of this

trial record, it was confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of 

the written confession did not affect the jury’s answers to the special issues. 

Crucially, Jones never contested that he committed the murders described in 

the confession, and the information he provided in the confession was largely 

presented to the jury through other admissible avenues. Under our deferential 

review of the state court determination, we cannot disturb its conclusion.43

III

We turn to Jones’s argument that the district court improperly denied 

him investigative funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). Section 3599(f) allows a 

court to authorize funding for “investigative, expert, or other services” that are 

“reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in 

connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence.” We review a district 

 

41 Id. at 782.

42 Id. at 783.

43 To the extent that Jones argues that the confession in violation of Miranda led him 

to make other confessions to people who later testified at his trial, and that those confessions 

were “fruit of the poisonous tree,” this misapprehends the sweep of the evidence against him, 

as well as the Supreme Court’s statements on the matter. See United States v. Patane, 542 

U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (explaining that “the Miranda rule ‘does not require that the [otherwise 

voluntary] statements [taken without complying with the rule] and their fruits be discarded 

as inherently tainted’” (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).

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court’s denial of funding under this section for abuse of discretion.44 The 

district court did not abuse its discretion here.

In Ayestas v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected our prior “substantial 

need” standard for reviewing challenges to denials of § 3599 funding. It held 

that the “substantial need” requirement was more demanding than the 

statute’s requirement that the services sought be “reasonably necessary” to a 

defendant’s post-conviction challenge.45 It also made clear, however, that “[a] 

natural consideration informing the exercise of [the district court’s] discretion 

is the likelihood that the contemplated services will help the applicant win 

relief.”46 Therefore, “[p]roper application of the ‘reasonably necessary’ standard 

thus requires courts to consider the potential merits of the claims that the 

applicant wants to pursue, the likelihood that the services will generate useful 

and admissible evidence, and the prospect that the applicant will be able to 

clear any procedural hurdles standing in the way.”47

Jones sought investigative funding to develop a potential claim under 

Wiggins v. Smith48 that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

sufficiently investigate and present mitigation evidence about Jones’s social 

history, including his mental health, abusive childhood, and history of 

substance addiction.49 The district court, writing before the Supreme Court 

decided Ayestas, offered several reasons for denying Jones § 3599 funding. It 

 

44 See Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1094 (2018). 

45 Id. at 1092–93. 

46 Id. at 1094 (“After all, the proposed services must be ‘reasonably necessary’ for the 

applicant’s representation, and it would not be reasonable—in fact, it would be quite 

unreasonable—to think that services are necessary to the applicant’s representation if, 

realistically speaking, they stand little hope of helping him win relief.”).

47 Id.

48 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 

49 The funding would also partially contribute to investigating Jones’s state habeas 

counsel’s ineffectiveness, which would help combat the procedural default of his ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

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observed that “there is no question that [Jones’s new federal habeas] counsel 

previously investigated, prepared, and was compensated for an amended 

petition containing substantially the same issues for which she now seeks 

funding.” And it found that Jones had not demonstrated “reasonable necessity”

for a 400-hour investigation costing $30,000, because Jones had failed to 

demonstrate sufficient likelihood that his trial defense team inadequately 

investigated the claims. Most clearly, Jones failed to address the testimony 

provided by the defense’s mental health experts at trial—one of whom had 

interviewed Jones’s family members and looked at relevant school, hospital, 

and police records, and the other of whom submitted a report addressing 

Jones’s history of drug and alcohol abuse and other factors in his history 

contributing to emotional disturbance.50 Even though Jones identified “red 

flags” involving alcohol and substance addiction and childhood physical and 

sexual abuse, the district court concluded that he had not shown that he was 

likely to uncover anything beyond what his experts had already addressed: 

“[t]he funding statute is not designed to provide petitioner with unlimited 

resources to investigate speculative claims.”51 This was especially so where 

Jones sought services in excess of $7,500 and therefore needed to show that 

excess funding was “necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an 

unusual character or duration,”52 but wholly failed to address this 

requirement.

 

50 Jones argued that his trial investigator spent inadequate time investigating 

potential mitigation evidence and witnesses. He did not address the fact that his experts 

evidently reviewed and cited evidence on the precise issues he sought funding to investigate, 

or offer insight into why he viewed that investigation as deficient.

51 While the district court acknowledged that a petitioner may be entitled to funding 

to investigate unexhausted claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness—on the premise that state 

habeas counsel was also ineffective—the court concluded that Jones had not demonstrated 

that he was likely to uncover further evidence. 

52 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2).

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Although the district court denied funding before the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Ayestas, the denial did not hinge on our now-rejected requirement 

that Jones show “substantial need” for the funding. Instead, it viewed Jones’s 

request for additional funding as effectively seeking a full retrial of the issues 

already litigated in the state court. Ayestas did not disturb the long-settled 

principle that district courts have discretion to separate “fishing expedition[s]” 

from requests for funding to support plausible defenses.53 Because “the reasons 

the district court gave for its ruling remain sound after Ayestas,”54 we conclude 

that remand is unnecessary and affirm the denial of funding. 

IV

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

 

53 See Ayestas, 138 S. Ct. at 1094–95.

54 Mamou v. Davis, 742 F. App’x 820, 824 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of funding 

without remand where the district court found that the petitioner had failed to provide 

“sufficient detail” about the bases of his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim); 

see Ochoa v. Davis, 750 F. App’x 365, 372–73 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (affirming denial 

of funding without remand where the petitioner “ha[d] not explained how further 

investigation would yield evidence that is different from what was available at the time of 

his trial” and was instead “simply seeking to ‘turn over every stone’”).

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