[Cite as Valentin v. Edison, 2012-Ohio-2437.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

PABLO VALENTIN, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V. 

OHIO EDISON, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

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 CASE NO. 11 MA 93 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Youngstown Municipal 

Court of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 10CV103662Y 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Atty. Raymond M. Delost 

3685 Stutz Drive, Suite 100 

Canfield, Ohio 44406 

For Defendant-Appellee Atty. John T. Dellick 

26 Market St., Suite 1200 

P.O. Box 6077 

Youngstown, Ohio 44501-6077 

Atty. Michael B. Lindow 

76 S. Main St., 15th Floor 

Akron, Ohio 44308 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

 

 

 Dated: May 29, 2012 
[Cite as Valentin v. Edison, 2012-Ohio-2437.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Pablo Valentin, appeals from a Youngstown 

Municipal Court judgment dismissing his case against defendant-appellee, Ohio 

Edison Company. 

{¶2} On or about September 30, 2010, appellant experienced an electrical 

power surge at his Youngstown residence. Appellant claims, as a result of the power 

surge, his various electronics were ruined. 

{¶3} Acting pro se, appellant filed a small claims lawsuit against appellee 

asserting, “Ohio Edison’s wire was faulty, therefore, it sent a power surge through our 

property, causing our electronics to blow.” 

{¶4} Appellee subsequently filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss arguing 

that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) has the sole authority to hear 

and determine electric service complaints from its customers. 

{¶5} Appellant retained counsel and filed objections to the magistrate’s 

decision. 

{¶6} The trial court considered the objections, overruled them, and adopted 

the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶7} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 6, 2011. 

{¶8} Appellant raises a single assignment of error, which states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 

CONCLUDING THAT THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OHIO 

(PUCO) HAS EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER 

THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIM BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST 

THE DEFENDANT, UTILITY COMPANY. 

{¶9} By enacting R.C. Title 49, the General Assembly created PUCO to 

administer the activities of public utilities. PUCO’s statutorily-granted jurisdiction is 

exclusive and reviewable only by the Ohio Supreme Court. Higgins v. Columbia Gas 

of Ohio, 136 Ohio App.3d 198, 201, 736 N.E.2d 92 (7th Dist. 2000). PUCO’s 

exclusive jurisdiction includes matters involving public utilities, such as rates and 
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charges, classifications, and service. State ex rel. The Illum. Co., 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 

2002-Ohio-5312, ¶18. The common pleas courts retain subject-matter jurisdiction 

only on claims of pure common-law tort and certain contract actions. Id. at ¶20. 

{¶10} Appellant argues that his complaint is one in negligence and, therefore, 

does not fall within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. Appellant asserts that the 

substance of his claim is that appellee was negligent in failing to inspect, repair, and 

maintain its electric feed wire that is attached to his house. He urges that PUCO’s 

expertise is not required to resolve this claim. Instead, appellant argues that his 

claim is like that of any other claim brought against a business that negligently fails to 

correct a known, dangerous condition on its property. 

{¶11} A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction raises questions of law; thus, an appellate court 

reviews the decision de novo. Morway v. Durkin, 181 Ohio App.3d 195, 199, 2009-

Ohio-932, 908 N.E.2d 510, ¶18 (7th Dist.). 

{¶12} R.C. 4905.26 provides: 

Upon complaint in writing against any public utility by any person 

* * * that any rate, fare, charge, toll, rental, schedule, classification, or 

service * * * or service rendered * * * is in any respect unjust, 

unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unjustly preferential, or in 

violation of law, or that any regulation, measurement, or practice 

affecting or relating to any service furnished by the public utility, or in 

connection with such service, is, or will be, in any respect 

unreasonable, unjust, insufficient, unjustly discriminatory, or unjustly 

preferential, or that any service is, or will be, inadequate or cannot be 

obtained, * * * if it appears that reasonable grounds for complaint are 

stated, the commission shall fix a time for hearing and shall notify 

complainants and the public utility thereof. 

{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 4905.26 to confer 
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jurisdiction on PUCO to hear all complaints pertaining to rates and/or service 

provided by a public utility. Higgins, 136 Ohio App.3d at 201, citing Kazmaier 

Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 147, 573 N.E.2d 655 (1991). 

Casting the allegations in the complaint to sound in tort or contract does not confer 

jurisdiction upon a trial court when the basic claim is one relating to service, which 

only PUCO has jurisdiction to resolve. Higgins, 136 Ohio App.3d at 202. See, also, 

DeLost v. First Energy Corp., 7th Dist. No. 07-MA-194, 2008-Ohio-3086, ¶21; 

Suleiman v. Ohio Edison Co., 146 Ohio App.3d 41, 45, 764 N.E.2d 1098 (7th Dist. 

2001). 

{¶14} In determining whether a claim is under PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction, 

we apply the two-question test adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 119 Ohio St.3d 301, 2008-Ohio-3917, 893 

N.E.2d 824, ¶12-13, quoting Pacific Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Illum. Co., 8th Dist. No. 

82074, 2003-Ohio-3954, ¶15: 

“First, is PUCO's administrative expertise required to resolve the 

issue in dispute? Second, does the act complained of constitute a 

practice normally authorized by the utility?” 

If the answer to either question is in the negative, the claim is not 

within PUCO's exclusive jurisdiction. 

{¶15} As to the first question, PUCO’s administrative expertise is required to 

resolve the issue in dispute. The issue is whether appellee provided faulty service to 

appellant resulting in a power surge. This issue is specifically governed by appellee’s 

tariffs, which are filed with and approved by PUCO. 

{¶16} Section IV(B) of appellee’s tariff provides in part: 

Continuity: The Company will endeavor, but does not 

guarantee, to furnish a continuous supply of electric energy and to 

maintain voltage and frequency within reasonable limits. The Company 
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shall not be liable for damages which the customer may sustain due to 

variations in service characteristics or phase reversals. 

And Section X(B) of appellee’s tariff provides in part : 

Limitation Of Liability: The Company shall not be liable for any 

loss, cost, damages or expense that the customer may sustain by 

reason of damage to or destruction of any property, including the loss of 

use thereof, arising out of, or in any manner connected with, 

interruptions in service, variations in service characteristics, high or low 

voltage * * * whether such damages are caused by or involve any fault 

or failure of the Company or otherwise except such damages that are 

caused by or due to the willful and wanton misconduct of the Company. 

{¶17} When the plaintiff’s cause of action falls within the parameters of the 

utility company’s tariffs, review by a common pleas court or appellate court would 

result in usurpation of authority from PUCO and the Ohio Supreme Court. LaForge v. 

Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 740, 741, 686 N.E.2d 311 (11th 

Dist. 1996). 

{¶18} Furthermore, in examining a power-surge claim against an electric 

company, the Eighth Appellate District has stated: 

Here, the plaintiffs argue that CEI is responsible for damages 

stemming from two alleged power surges. Plaintiffs' claim calls into 

question the manner by which CEI provided electrical service. In 

addressing the power surges, it will be necessary to determine whether 

CEI's response and correction of the problem complied with industry 

standards. The answers to these questions require the expertise of the 

PUCO administration because jurors do not have the experience or 

understanding regarding the distribution of electricity. The determination 

of issues related to applicable laws and regulations, industry practices 

and standards, is best accomplished by PUCO with its expert staff 
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technicians familiar with the utility commission provisions. 

Pro Se Commercial Properties v. Illuminating Co., 8th Dist. No. 92961, 2010-Ohio516, ¶11. 

{¶19} Based on the above considerations, the answer to the first question (is 

PUCO’s expertise required to resolve the dispute in this case?) is yes. 

{¶20} As to the second question, the act complained of constitutes a practice 

normally authorized by appellee. Appellant’s complaint alleges that appellee’s “wire 

was faulty” causing it to send “a power surge” through his property, which damaged 

his electronics. 

{¶21} What appellant alleges falls under the broad category of “service,” 

which is within PUCO’s jurisdiction. Quality of service complaints fall under PUCO’s 

jurisdiction. Miles Management Corp. v. First Energy Corp., 8th Dist. No. 84197, 

2005-Ohio-1496, ¶12, citing State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 

Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶20. A power surge is a servicerelated complaint. Hiener v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 11th Dist. No. 95-G1948, 1996 WL 495092 (Aug. 9, 1996). Likewise, a period of low voltage, commonly 

called a “brownout,” is also service-related. LaForge, 115 Ohio App.3d at 741. 

“When one suffers damages related to events that are purely electrical, * * * the claim 

is service-related and under PUCO's jurisdiction.” Pro Se Commercial Properties, at 

¶15. 

{¶22} Appellant claims that at one point in time, too much power was provided 

to his home causing damages. In other words, he claims there was a problem with 

his service that resulted from a faulty wire and a power surge. Thus, the answer to 

the second question (does the act complained of constitute a practice normally 

authorized by the utility?) also is yes. 

{¶23} Because both questions of the Allstate test are answered in the 

affirmative, appellant’s claim is within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, 

appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶24} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 
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affirmed. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

Waite, P.J., concurs.