alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher E. Williams, Appellant.

Weiss, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Danaher, Jr., J.), rendered January 11, 1988, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thé crime of burglary in the second degree.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, defendant entered an *Alford*plea of guilty to burglary in the second degree in full satisfaction of a two-count indictment *(see, North Carolina v Alford,*400 US 25). In accord with the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to an indeterminate term of 4 to 8 years’ imprisonment. On this appeal, *862defendant maintains that County Court’s failure to expressly determine that he qualified for sentencing as a second violent felony offender vitiates the sentence *(see,*Penal Law § 70.04 [2]).

The contention is entirely unpersuasive. The record confirms that defendant freely admitted the predicate assault conviction during the sentencing proceedings, with the advice of counsel. Moreover, the plea bargain assumed defendant’s status as a second violent felony offender. Unquestionably, there was substantial compliance with the statutory requirements *(see,*Penal Law § 70.04 [2]; CPL 400.15; *People v Carmello,*114 AD2d 965). Since defendant received the minimum term authorized by statute *(see,*Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [b]; § 70.04 [3] [b]; [4]), we readily dismiss his excessive sentence claim.

Judgment affirmed. Kane, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
      32.1




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**




SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
      connection with the Annual Report of China Natural Gas, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Qinan
      Ji, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
      March 31, 2008





/s/
              Qinan JiQinan
                Ji, Principal Executive Officer
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-10-00524-CV

C & A TRUCKING, INC.,

Appellant

v.

Sylvia HETHERLY,

Appellee

From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas

Trial Court No. 09-07-48163-CV

Honorable Richard C. Terrell, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 29, 2010

DISMISSED

The parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss this appeal. We grant the motion and 

dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

PER CURIAM
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 61 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide an alternate release 

date for certain nonviolent offenders, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 6, 2009 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide an alternate release date for certain nonviolent offenders, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Prison Bureau 

5 Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2009’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EARLY RELEASE FOR CERTAIN NONVIOLENT OF7 FENDERS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3624 of title 18, United 

9 States Code, is amended— 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
2 

•HR 61 IH

1 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘at the early 

2 release date provided in subsection (g), if applicable, 

3 or otherwise’’ after ‘‘A prisoner shall be released by 

4 the Bureau of Prisons’’; and 

5 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(g) EARLY RELEASE FOR CERTAIN NONVIOLENT

7 OFFENDERS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 

8 law, the Bureau of Prisons, pursuant to a good time pol9 icy, shall release from confinement a prisoner who has 

10 served one half or more of his term of imprisonment (in11 cluding any consecutive term or terms of imprisonment) 

12 if that prisoner— 

13 ‘‘(1) has attained the age of 45 years; 

14 ‘‘(2) has never been convicted of a crime of vio15 lence; and 

16 ‘‘(3) has not engaged in any violation, involving 

17 violent conduct, of institutional disciplinary regula18 tions.’’. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-8052

WILLIAM LEE RICHARDSON, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

U.S. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER; STATE OF WEST

VIRGINIA,

Plaintiffs,

versus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT; W. CRAIG

BROADWATER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,

District Judge. (CA-01-609-2)

Submitted: February 21, 2002 Decided: March 6, 2002

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Lee Richardson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

William Lee Richardson, Jr., appeals the district court’s

order dismissing his civil complaint as frivolous. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the

magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Richardson v. United States Dist. Court, No. CA-01-609-2 (S.D.W.

Va. Nov. 20, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofSOUTH SHORE RESOURCES INC.(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Richard Wachter, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|  

Dated this 12thday of April, 2007.

RICHARD WACHTERRichard WachterChief Financial Officer

















---
#### In the Matter of George Gross, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, et al., Respondents, v Cesar Perales, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Appellants.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur Blyn, J.), entered August 29, 1986, which in this CPLR article 78 proceeding granted the petition of George Gross, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, and the City of New York to the extent, *inter alia,*that it found that respondent had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in applying a particular standard in its audit of the timeliness of the city’s public assistance case closings and reductions and imposing upon the city a $20 million administrative penalty and which determined that the administrative penalty was null and void and directed respondents to restore the $20 million to the city, with interest from March 28, 1983, is modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the award of interest, and the judgment is otherwise affirmed, without costs.

We affirm the judgment for the reasons stated below, except to vacate that portion of the judgment directing that as to the $20 million to be returned to the city, respondents must pay 9% interest as of March 29, 1983, the date the penalty was assessed. The right to interest is purely statutory. Under CPLR 7806, which specifies what relief may be granted in a judgment in a special proceeding, only restitution or damages which are incidental to the primary relief sought by the petitioner may be awarded.

*38The primary relief requested in this proceeding was a determination that respondent New York State Department of Social Services had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in applying a particular standard to its audit concerning the timeliness of petitioner’s public assistance case closings and reductions. Incidental to that relief was a recovery of the penalty imposed on petitioner as a result of respondent’s findings. Thus, a judgment awarding a return of that penalty was appropriate under CPLR 7806 as restitution incidental to the primary relief.

However, CPLR 7806 nowhere authorizes an award of interest under the circumstances presented. Concur Sandler, J. P., Carro, Kassal, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ. *[See,*130 Misc 2d 132.]
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAFI SHOTLAND,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

DAVID DUNCAN,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 08-17243

D.C. No. 4:08-cv-00188-JMR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 5, 2011** 

Before: B. FLETCHER, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Rafi Shotland appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his

28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we

affirm.

FILED

APR 11 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-17243

Shotland contends that the time spent in federal custody awaiting sentence

should be credited toward his federal sentence. Contrary to Shotland’s contention,

the district court did not err in determining that Shotland was not entitled to credit

toward his federal sentence for the time he spent in presentence custody. The state

maintained primary jurisdiction over Shotland during this period, and Shotland was

given credit for this time toward his state sentence. See Thomas v. Brewer, 923

F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (state retains primary jurisdiction over state

prisoner transferred to federal custody by writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum);

see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3585(b), a defendant may not receive double credit for presentence detention

time). 

We construe appellant’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the

certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 

22-1(e); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam).

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Dwight C. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-31052

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 2011.

Josette Louise Cassiere, James G. Cowles, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Betty Lee Marak, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

*411Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Dwight C. Jackson appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for possession of five grams or more of cocaine base with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Jackson’s sentence on the drug count was enhanced due to his prior conviction for possession of cocaine. The district court sentenced Jackson to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment on the drug count and the statutory minimum consecutive sentence of 60 months of imprisonment on the firearm count.

Jackson first argues that the five-year minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i) should not have been imposed because his sentence on the drug possession count constitutes a greater minimum sentence than is otherwise provided by another provision of law. As he concedes, his argument is foreclosed in this circuit; this issue has since been decided adversely to him by the Supreme Court. *See Abbott v. United States,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 18, 23, 178 L.Ed.2d 348 (2010); *United States v. London,*568 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir.2009).

Next, Jackson argues that his case should be remanded to the district court for resentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, which raised the minimum quantity of cocaine base required to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence he received on the drug count. Although his guilty plea and sentencing occurred before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, he maintains that the Fair Sentencing Act is retroactively applicable because his case is not yet final. This argument is also foreclosed. *See United States v. Doggins,*633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir.2011).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### GROSS v. GRANITE STATE PROVIDENT ASS’N.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

May 18, 1894.)

Opening Default—Dismissal for Want of Prosecution.

Where an action is dismissed for want of prosecution, and not on the merits, the default will not be opened a year afterwards, but plaintiff will be left to his remedy by a new action.

Appeal from special term.

Action by Max Gross against the Granite State Provident Association. From an order opening a dismissal for want of prosecution, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before VAN WYCK and McCARTHY, JJ.

Philip Carpenter, for appellant.

Abram A. Joseph, for respondent.

VAN WYCK, J.

The record shows that plaintiff entered into an agreement in August, 1890, with his attorney, to give him 25 per cent, of Ms recovery in this action, which was commenced in that month, and a warrant of attachment was issued herein, and defendant’s attached that never served *770notice of trial or filed a note of issue herein; that in December, 1892, defendant made a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, and served notice of same upon plaintiff’s attorney who sought and secured an adjournment of same for two days, and then defaulted, upon which defendant’s motion was granted, with costs of action to date, whereupon, on January 11, 1893, defendant entered a judgment against plaintiff wholly for costs, after, notice of entry of same, and taxation of costs was duly given to plaintiff’s attorney, and an execution issued, and returned unsatisfied, whereupon, on February 3,1894, an order in supplementary proceedings was issued, and plaintiff was examined thereunder on the 8th of that month. On March 1, 1894,—over 3J years after commencement of the action, and more than one year after same had been dismissed for want of prosecution,—the plaintiff moved to open his default in the motion to dismiss, and his motion was granted, and the default opened by the order from which this appeal is taken. Not a single fact, as above set forth, was denied by plaintiff’s attorney, nor by plaintiff’s own affidavit, except that he says he did not personally hear about the case until the judgment was entered, which was more than one year before his motion. The defendant’s judgment was for costs only, and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action was not on the merits. Hence, he can bring a new action, if" he has any cause, and, if he does, he needs to amend his complaint, for it is indeed doubtful whether it sets forth a cause of action. His motion should have been denied, leaving him to his new action. Judge Van Brunt says in James v. McCreery (Sup.) 7 N. Y. Supp. 494:

“There is no good reason why all the damages arising from the negligence of a party or his attorney should be visited upon the opposing party to the action, as would be the case if defaults were to be opened as a matter of course. The plaintiff in this case has been guilty of laches in the making of this motion, and should be remitted to a new action for the enforcement of his rights, if he has any.”

And see Wygant v. Brown, Id. 490.

The order is reversed, and plaintiff’s motion denied.
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<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999             MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1999             OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                                          12,818                  12,818
<SECURITIES>                                    11,668                  11,668
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,893                   7,893
<ALLOWANCES>                                       570                     570
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                32,416                  32,416
<PP&E>                                           2,984                   2,984
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,134                   1,134
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.01

CERTIFICATIONS

I,
John K. Kibarian, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of PDF Solutions, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the period presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f))
for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



| |  |                                                                                                          
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ JOHN K. KIBARIAN John K. Kibarian President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)

Date:
March 16, 2009

---



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