MATTER OF Gin DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-10808945 

Doided by Board May 6, 1959 

Crime involving moral turpitude-18 U.S.C. 1001—False writings in matter in 

which U.S. is involved—Does not involve moral turpitude. 

Moral turpitude will not be found in the offense defined by the second part of 

18 U.S.C. 1001 (making false writings in a matter involving the United 

States) while the conflict among Circuits remains unresolved as to whether 

materiality is essential to support a conviction. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241 (a) (4) (8 U.S.U. 1251(a) (4) J--Uonvicted 

of crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years 

after entry and sentenced to confinement for a year or more—Conspiracy to make and use false writings. 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

Discussion: The Assistant Commissioner, Investigations, requests 

that this Board reconsider its order of February 10, 1959, which 

held that respondent was not deportable on the charge stated above. 

The facts are fully set forth in previous orders. The issue is 

whether mural turpitude is involved in a conviction under the second 

part of 18 U.S.C. 1001 which, in brief, concerns the making of false 

writings knowing them to contain false statements in a matter in 

which the United States is involved. 

In similar laws, even as to statements made under oath, moral 

turpitude is not found unless materiality is an element (Matter of 

S—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 353, 361, footnote 15; Matter of G , 1 I. & 

N. Dec. 73). Section 1001 does not require that the statement in-. 

volved be under oath, and there is a "sharp conflict" between circuits 

as to whether materiality is required (United States v. Quirk, 167 

F. Stipp. 462. 464 (Ell. Pa., 1958) ). (The cases supporting the 

different positions are listed in footnote 3 on page 464 of Quirk. 

Four circuits require materiality (4th, 5th, and 6th) ; the Second 

and Third Circuits hold that materiality is not an element.) 

The conviction in the instant case occurred in the Fifth Circuit 

where materiality is required to obtain a conviction under the second 

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part of section 1001. The Service is of the opinion that since 

materiality is an element of the conviction involved here, we must 

rule that moral turpitude is involved. As far as the immigration 

laws go, it is immaterial that conduct of the respondent may have 

involved moral turpitude, if the law under which he was convicted 

does not inherently involve moral turpitude (Matter of S , supra, 

pp. 360-362). So, it is with the law itself, not the respondent's 

conduct, that we are concerned. Without materiality, we cannot 

find that the law involves moral turpitude. There is a conflict in 

the jurisdiction as to whether materiality is involved. A substantial 

doubt exists as to whether the law does require materiality. Such 

a doubt will exist until the matter is clarified by either the Supreme 

Court or by legislation. Doubt must be resolved in favor of the 

alien. Until clarification comes, we cannot hold that the Service 

has borne its burden of establishing that the alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Moreover, let us see where the Service view will lead. We shall 

assume for the purpose of this discussion that moral turpitude is 

involved if the law requires materiality. If the conviction oceure in 

a jurisdiction requiring materiality, the alien will he deportable. 

What should be done as to a person who had been convicted in the 

jurisdiction where materiality is not required? Could it be held 

that such a person has been convicted of a crime involving moral 

turpitude? We think not. In the court where he was convicted 

materiality is not an element; it need not be alleged nor proven. 

This person has been convicted under a law which does not inherently involve moral turpitude. We would be required to find that 

he was not deportable. Then we would be faced with the situation 

that persons convicted of identical ulTelist0 under identical la wa 

would be deportable if convicted in one jurisdiction but not deportable if convicted in another jurisdiction. This cannot be. A Federal law must be given a uniform interpretation for immigration 

purposes. Until the conflict is resolved, the law can be interpreted 

uniformly only by holding that a person convicted under the portion 

with which we are concerned has not been convicted of a crime' 

involving moral turpitude. 

Order : It is ordered that the motion be and the same is hereby 

denied. 

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