Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four

Federal District Courts:

Final Report to the Advisory Committee on

Civil Rules

Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic

Federal Judicial Center



This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s

statutory mission to conduct and stimulate research and development for the improvement of judicial administration. The views expressed are those of the authors and not

necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center.

iii

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction 

The Rule  Debate in Historical Perspective 

The  FJC Study 

Study Design and Methods 

Nature of the Data 

Summary of Findings 

Findings 

() Individual Actions and Aggregation 

(a) Average recovery per class member 

(b) Consolidation and related cases 

() Routine Class Actions 

(a) What was the relationship, if any, between the “easy applications” of Rule  and

the substantive subjects of dispute? 

(b) How did class actions compare to other types of cases in terms of the type of outcome and the stage of the case at which the outcome occurred? 

(c) What was the frequency and rate of certification of (b)(), (b)(), and (b)() classes

and how did these rates correspond with substantive areas? 

(d) How much judicial time did class actions take and how did that compare to other

civil actions? 

() Race to File 

() Class Representatives 

(a) How many “repeat players”? 

(b) Did judges add or substitute representatives? 

(c) Did named representatives attend the approval hearing? 

(d) What was in it for the class representatives? 

() Time of Certification 

(a) Timing of motions and certification decisions 

(b) Local rules on the timing of certification motions 

(c) Decisions on merits in relation to certification 

(i) Outcomes of rulings on dismissal and summary judgment and impact on the

litigation 

(ii) Timing of rulings on dismissal and summary judgment 

(d) Simultaneous motions to certify and approve settlement 
iv Class Actions

(e) Changes in certification rulings 

() Certification Disputes 

(a) How many certification contests were there and how much time did counsel spend

opposing certification? 

(b) Was there a relationship between disputes over certification and the nature of

suit? 

(c) How much effort was devoted to the choice between (b)(), (b)(), and (b)()

classes and did the effort vary by nature of suit? 

() Plaintiff Classes 

(a) Did defendants ever seek and win certification of a plaintiff class? 

(b) How frequently did defendants acquiesce in certification of a plaintiff class by failing to oppose or by stipulating to class certification? 

() Defendant Classes 

() Issues Classes and Subclasses 

() Notice 

(a) What types of notice, in what time frame, have been required in (b)(), (b)(), and

(b)() actions? 

(b) In what form was the notice issued, who paid the cost, and does the cost of notice

discourage legitimate actions? 

(c) How much litigation of notice issues occurred? 

(d) Did the notices of proposed settlements contain sufficient detail to permit intelligent analysis of the benefits of settlement? 

() Opt Outs 

(a) Number of opt outs and relationships with subject areas and size of claims 

(b) Opt outs in (b)() or (b)() classes 

() Opt Ins 

(a) Opt-in classes 

(b) Claims procedures 

() Individual Member Participation 

(a) Participation before settlement 

(i) Attempts by class members to intervene 

(ii)Attempts by nonmembers to intervene 

(b) Class member participation in settlement by filing objections and attending settlement hearings 

(c) Nonrepresentative class member participation by filing appeals 

() Settlement 

(a) Did certification coerce settlement of frivolous or nearly frivolous claims? 

(i) Outcomes of certified classes compared with outcomes for noncertified

cases 

(ii) Frequency of rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment,

trial dates scheduled, and trials held in certified class actions 

(iii) Timing of settlements in relation to class certification 

(b) Notice 

(c) Attendance of nonrepresentative parties at settlement approval hearings 
Contents v

(d) Provisions favoring named representatives 

(e) How often did magistrate judges or special masters evaluate settlements? 

() Trials 

(a) How often were trials held and with what results in what types of cases? 

(i) Certified cases with jury trials 

(ii)Noncertified cases with jury trials 

(b) How did class action trial rates compare with trial rates for all other civil cases

within the district? 

() Fee/Recovery Rates 

(a) What were the ratios of attorneys’ fees to recoveries? 

(b) How were fees calculated? 

(c) How was benefit to the class taken into account? 

(d) What percentage of the fee amounts requested were awarded and how often were

objections and appeals filed concerning fees? 

() Trivial Remedies; Other Remedies 

(a) How frequently did certified (b)() classes lead to relief that is relatively trivial in

comparison to attorneys’ fees? 

(b) How frequently did certified (b)() classes lead to injunctive relief that is relatively

trivial in comparison to attorneys’ fees? 

(c) How often were recoveries distributed to charities or the like? 

() Duplicative or Overlapping Classes 

() Res Judicata 

() Appeals 

(a) How often were appeals filed? 

(b) How often did appeals alter the prior decision of the trial judge? 

(c) To what extent did appellate review serve to correct errors in procedural decisions

relating to the class action mechanism, such as class certification? 

() Class Action Attorneys 

(a) How extensive was the class action bar across the four districts? 

(b) How often did the same attorneys appear as counsel for the class in different cases

and in different courts? 

Conclusion 

Appendix A: Advisory Committee Draft of Proposed Rule — 

Appendix B: Advisory Committee Draft of Proposed Rule — 

Appendix C: Figures and Tables 

Appendix D: Methods 

vii

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Professor Edward H. Cooper and Dean Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., for their

comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

In gathering data at the courts, we became indebted to individuals too numerous to mention

and in ways too numerous to document. In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania we owe special thanks to Chief Judge Edward N. Cahn, Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of

Court, and Marlene Anderson, liaison to the study; in the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of California, to Chief Judge Thelton E. Henderson, Richard W. Wieking, Clerk of

Court, and Ian Keye and Cheri Borromeo, liaisons; in the U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of Florida, to Chief Judge Norman C. Roettger, Carlos Juenke, Court Administrator/Clerk of Court, and Mario Toscano, Deborah Hirshberg, and Matthew Balch, liaisons; and

in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to then-Chief Judge James B. Moran, H. Stuart Cunningham, Clerk of Court, and Ted Newman, Chris Lavizzo, and Larry Appelson, liaisons. We also express our appreciation to the numerous members of their staffs who

made our work possible and productive.

Within the Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center, the authors received substantial

assistance from Marie Cordisco, George Cort, James Eaglin, William Eldridge, David Ferro,

Scott Gilbert, Jane Ganz Heinrich, Julie Hong, Yvette Jeter, Molly Treadway Johnson, Patricia

Lombard, Kim McLaurin, Naomi Medvin, Melissa Pecherski, Charles Sutelan, Elizabeth C.

Wiggins, Carol Witcher, and other staff members.

We are also grateful to the editorial staff of the Center’s Publications and Media Division for

the editing and formatting of this document.

A shorter version of this report has been published in volume  of the New York University

Law Review as part of a spring  symposium on class actions.



Introduction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure , an outgrowth of an equity rule, was promulgated in  as

part of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The current version of the rule creates a procedure designed to permit representative parties and their counsel to prosecute or defend civil

actions on behalf of a class or putative class consisting of numerous parties. Rule  was last

amended in . The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is currently

considering proposals to amend Rule .

The Rule 23 Debate in Historical Perspective

Creating a workable procedural standard for class actions has challenged rule makers since the

first draft was published in .

2 The  amendments to Rule  sparked a “holy war”3 over

the rule’s creation of opt-out classes. Opinions became polarized, with class action proponents

seeing the rule as “a panacea for a myriad of social ills” and opponents seeing the rule as “a form

of ‘legalized blackmail’ or a ‘Frankenstein Monster.’”4

Apparently anticipating debate about the  amendments to Rule , Professor Benjamin

Kaplan, then reporter to the advisory committee that drafted those amendments, was quoted as

saying that “it will take a generation or so before we can fully appreciate the scope, the virtues,

and the vices of the new Rule .”5 Respect for Professor Kaplan’s caution may have dampened

any advisory committee interest in revisiting Rule .

6 Now, a generation has passed and the

current advisory committee has returned its attention to the hotly debated policy issues under-

. Fed. R. Civ. P. , Advisory Committee Note to  adoption (West ed. ). The U.S. Supreme Court

adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on December , , and ordered them to be reported to Congress at

the beginning of the January  session. Fed. R. Civ. P. at  (West ed. ).

. See James W. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft,  Geo.

L.J. ,  () (“It is difficult, however, to appraise the various problems involved and state a technically sound

and thoroughly workable rule” for class actions.).

. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,”  Harv. L. Rev.  ().

. Id. at .

. Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule ,   F.R.D. ,  ()

(paraphrasing Professor Kaplan).

. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule : Challenges to the Rulemaking Process  (Apr. , ) (unpublished

draft paper presented at NYU Research Conference on Class Actions and Related Issues in Complex Litigation, on

file at the Research Division, Federal Judicial Center) (an unspoken barrier shielded Rule  from Advisory Committee scrutiny for many years). A later version of Professor Cooper’s paper has been circulated and is expected to be

published in a spring  symposium on class actions in the NYU Law Review.
 Class Actions

lying the procedural framework of Rule . This report to the advisory committee addresses

many of the empirical questions underlying those policy issues.

After the  amendments, the emergence of mass torts as potential class actions has added

fuel to the debate because of the high stakes inherent in that type of litigation. But the issues

remain similar.7 Broadly stated, three central issues permeate the debate. First, does the aggregation of numerous individual claims into a class coerce settlement by raising the stakes of the

litigation beyond the resources of the defendant?8 Second, does the class action device produce

benefits for individual class members and the public—and not just to the lawyers who file them?

And, finally, do those benefits outweigh the burdens imposed on the courts and on those litigants who oppose the class?9

In  a Special Committee on Class Action Improvements of the American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation articulated a list of recommended revisions of Rule  and called it to

the attention of the advisory committee.10 The ABA special committee found that “the class action is a valuable procedural tool” and recommended changes so that such actions would not

“be thwarted by unwieldy or unnecessarily expensive procedural requirements.”11 Recommended changes included collapsing the three categories of class actions into one, expanding

judicial discretion to modify the notice requirements, authorizing precertification rulings on

motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, and permitting discretionary interlocutory appellate review of rulings on class certification.12

In March , the Judicial Conference of the United States acted on a report of its Ad Hoc

Committee on Asbestos Litigation. The Judicial Conference requested “the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to direct its Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to study

whether Rule  of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to accommodate

the demands of mass tort litigation.”13 Given these developments, the advisory committee

drafted a proposed revision of Rule , based primarily on the ABA special committee’s 

recommendations. Professor Edward H. Cooper, reporter to the advisory committee, circulated

this draft to “civil procedure buffs,” including academics, lawyers, interest groups, and bar organizations.14 Many of the responses questioned the need for change and suggested that

changes might upset settled practices and make matters worse.15

. See, e.g., Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent,  U. Ill. L. Rev. ,  (raising

issues of fairness to litigants and coercion of settlements in mass torts).

. See, e.g., Staff of the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, d

Cong., d Sess., Private Securities Litigation – (May , ) [hereinafter Senate Staff Report].

. Id.; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 

Stan. L. Rev.  () (regardless of the merits of the claims on which they are based, settlements in securities class

actions produce returns of only about % of the potential loss).

. American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on

Class Action Improvements,  F.R.D.  () [hereinafter ABA Special Committee Report]. The House of Delegates of the ABA authorized the Section of Litigation to transmit the report to the Advisory Committee but neither

approved nor disapproved its recommendations. Id. at .

. Id. at .

. Id. at –.

. Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Asbestos Committee Report  (March ).

. Memorandum from Professor Edward H. Cooper to “Civil Procedure Buffs” (Jan. , ) (on file at the

Research Division, Federal Judicial Center). A copy of the  version of the Advisory Committee’s proposed Rule
Introduction 

Legislative proposals to modify Rule  have paralleled the rule-making policy debates over

the past twenty years.16 As a recent example, in December , Congress overrode a presidential veto and adopted legislation designed to alter substantive and procedural aspects of securities class actions.17 This legislation had bipartisan support and was an outgrowth of hearings and an extensive staff report in .

18 Among other provisions, the statute tightens

pleading requirements for securities class actions and directs district judges to stay discovery

and all other proceedings until there is a judicial ruling on any pending motion to dismiss for

failure to satisfy those heightened pleading requirements.19 The statute also modifies the notice

requirements applicable to the filing and settlement of securities class actions20 and limits attorneys’ fees to “a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest

actually paid to the class.”21

The  FJC Study

The Federal Judicial Center conducted the present study in – at the request of the advisory committee. In general, the committee asked the Center to provide systematic, empirical

information about how Rule  operates. The study was designed to address a host of questions

about the day-to-day administration of Rule  in the types of class actions that are ordinarily

filed in the federal courts. The research design focused on terminated cases and did not encompass the study of mass tort class actions, which appear to occur relatively infrequently and remain pending for long periods of time.

This report describes the results of the study and addresses many of the issues in the continuing debate about class actions, including those raised by the ABA special committee’s recommendations. The principal issues are:

• What portion of class action litigation addresses the type of class to be certified?

• Are judges reluctant to rule on the merits of claims before ruling on class certification?

• Does filing of a case as a class action or certifying a class coerce settlement without regard

to the merits of the claims?

• How well does the notice process work and who bears its costs?

• In what ways do class representatives and individual class members participate in the litigation?

 is attached as Appendix A. A copy of the November  draft of proposed Rule  is included as Appendix B.

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. For example, the th and th Congresses considered proposals to amend Rule  at the behest of the U.S.

Department of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice. See S. , th Cong., d Sess.

(), and H.R. , th Cong., st Sess., Tit. I (). For further discussion of this proposal, see Stephen Berry,

Ending Substance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action,

 Colum. L. Rev.  () (evaluating H.R.  to determine whether it satisfies the goals of improving the

efficiency of small damage claim actions while protecting the interests of defendants and absent parties).

. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of , Pub. L. No. -,  Stat.  ().

. See Senate Staff Report, supra note , for a discussion of the issues raised at the hearings.

. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of ,  U.S.C.A. § z-(b) (West Supp. ).

. Id. § z-(a)(), (a)().

. Id. § z-(a)().
 Class Actions

• In cases that settle, how do the benefits to the class compare to the benefits to the class

attorneys? How extensive is the class action plaintiffs’ bar?

• How well does the appellate process work and how might discretionary interlocutory

appeals of rulings on class certification affect the fairness of the process?

Such questions—and more—are incorporated in Professor Edward Cooper’s April  report to the advisory committee and conferees at New York University Law School’s Research

Conference on Class Actions.22 Our report parallels Professor Cooper’s report in that we have

presented study data and analyses to correspond with his questions as closely as possible.23

Where relevant, we present general background on the state of the law, often focusing on recent

decisions in the circuits where study cases were filed.

Study Design and Methods

We selected for analysis as class actions closed cases in which the plaintiff alleged a class action

in the complaint or in which plaintiff, defendant, or the court initiated class action activity, such

as a motion or order to certify a class. This report presents empirical data on all class actions

terminated between July , , and June , , in four federal district courts: the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa., headquartered in Philadelphia), the Southern District of

Florida (S.D. Fla., headquartered in Miami), the Northern District of Illinois (N.D. Ill.,

headquartered in Chicago), and the Northern District of California (N.D. Cal., headquartered

in San Francisco).24

We identified class actions meeting these selection criteria by a multistep screening process

that included reviewing electronic court docket records, statistical records maintained by the

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and published opinions. We then reviewed all cases

that were candidates for inclusion in the study.25 For each case meeting study criteria, we examined court records and systematically entered appropriate case information into a computerized database. These data were then analyzed by the same attorney researchers who collected

the data. In addition, we reviewed data about class actions from the Federal Judicial Center’s

– district court time study;26 those data are summarized at relevant parts of this report.27

. Cooper, supra note .

. Our headings and subheadings generally follow the structure of Professor Cooper’s paper, but occasionally

we have adapted the titles or rearranged the parts to present the data more clearly.

. Cases in the study represent a termination cohort, i.e., a group of cases that were selected because they were

concluded within the same time period. Termination cohorts sometimes present problems of biased data if recent

filing trends show fluctuations. Because of the limitations of class action filing data we have not been able to test filing

trends as thoroughly as we would like. On the other hand, we have no reason to believe that the use of a termination

cohort presents serious problems for these data. See Appendix D, Methods.

. See Appendix D for details about the identification of class actions.

. See Thomas E. Willging, et al., Preliminary Report on Time Study Class Action Cases (Feb. , )

(unpublished report on file with the Information Services Office of the Federal Judicial Center). The time study report includes national data derived from judges’ records of the time they spent on the  class actions in the study. See

infra § (d) and Table . See Appendix D for details about the time study.

. The current report supplements Willging et al., supra note , and supersedes our preliminary presentation

of data to the advisory committee concerning the first two districts studied. See Thomas E. Willging et al., Preliminary Empirical Data on Class Action Activity in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
Introduction 

We generally used the median (midpoint) to describe the central tendency of the data. We

used this statistic because the mean (average) in many instances was inflated by a few extraordinarily large or small values (“outliers”).

Nature of the Data

Several perspectives regarding—and limitations of—the data deserve special mention at the outset. The four districts were not selected to be a scientific sampling of class actions nationwide.

Rather, we selected the four districts because available statistical reports on the frequency of

class action activity in those districts indicated that we would have the opportunity to examine a

relatively large number of cases in those districts. This high volume would allow us to observe a

variety of approaches to class actions. Similarly, the selection of districts from four separate

geographic regions would enable us to observe any regional differences in approaches and the

selection of districts from four circuits would enable us to observe variations in case law. Because this study did not employ random sampling or control or comparison groups, our results

cannot and should not be viewed as representative of all federal district courts nor should causal

inferences be drawn from the data. On the other hand, we have no reason or data that would

lead us to believe that these districts are unusual or that they present a picture that is radically

different from what one would expect to find in other large metropolitan districts.

Each district should be viewed as a separate entity and the data from the four districts should

be viewed as descriptive—four separate snapshots of recent class action activity. Generally, data

from the four districts should not be aggregated. Occasionally, when the number of cases on a

given subject is quite small, we discuss combined data from the four districts for descriptive

purposes only, but no inference should be drawn that these data are necessarily representative

of all courts.28

California in Cases Closed Between July , , and June ,  (rev. Apr. , ) (unpublished preliminary

report on file with the Information Services Office of the Federal Judicial Center).

. For example, when discussing subject matter (nature-of-suit) categories of cases in relation to infrequent

events, we present the data in figures with a caution that no overall conclusions can be drawn from them.



Summary of Findings

Overall, we identified  class actions in the four districts. Of those,  were certified as class

actions,  of which were certified for settlement purposes only.

. Individual Actions and Aggregation. Across the four districts, the median level of individual recoveries ranged from $ to $ and the maximum awards ranged from $, to

$, per class member. Without an aggregative procedure like the class action, the average

recovery per class member or even the maximum recovery per class member seems unlikely to

be enough to support individual actions in most, if not all, of the cases studied.

Occasionally, other aggregative procedures were used in conjunction with a class action.

District court consolidation of related cases occurred more frequently than multidistrict litigation (MDL) consolidation.

. Routine Class Actions. Securities (b)() cases in the four districts exhibited a number of

standard characteristics that suggest routineness in the way in which they are litigated and adjudicated. Such cases did not necessarily last longer than nonsecurities class actions, were about

as likely to be subject to some form of objection to certification, and did not necessarily yield

more dollars to individual class members. Securities cases were, however, more likely to be certified, to be subject to representativeness objections, to involve larger class sizes than nonsecurities cases, and to contain boilerplate allegations. Finally, numerosity objections were unlikely

to occur in securities cases, but more likely to occur in other cases.

We did not find the above pattern of routine litigation practices in nonsecurities cases in

which only a Rule (b)() class was sought. Nor did we find such a pattern in (b)() civil rights

cases, a subset of the nonsecurities cases. Accordingly, we concluded that we cannot generalize

about whether these types of (b)() cases represented routine applications of Rule .

Comparing class and nonclass settlement and trial rates as possible indicators of routineness,

the settlement rate for other nonprisoner class actions was comparable to the settlement rate for

nonprisoner civil actions, but no consistent pattern was detected across the four districts. The

settlement rate for securities class actions was higher than for nonclass securities actions in three

of the four districts. Trial rates (jury and bench), however, were generally about the same for all

nonprisoner civil cases whether or not they were filed as class actions.

Despite similarities with nonclass cases in settlement and trial rates and despite some standardization of arguments and certification decisions in securities cases, class actions as a group

do not appear to be routine cases according to two other measures. In three districts, class actions took two to three times the median time from filing to disposition (– months compared to – months). In a national time study, certified and noncertified class actions on average consumed almost five times more judicial time than the typical civil case. Both these meas-
 Class Actions

ures suggest that class actions are not routine in their longevity or in their demands on the

courts.

The most frequently certified class was the Rule (b)() or “opt-out class,” which occurred

in roughly % to % of the certified classes in the four districts. The second most frequently

certified class was the Rule (b)() or “injunctive class,” which occurred in % to % of the

certified classes. Rule (b)() “mandatory” classes were certified in a total of fourteen cases in

three districts.

A securities case was the most likely case type to be certified as a (b)() class, while civil

rights cases of various types were most likely to be certified as (b)() classes. Certification under

more than one (b) subsection occurred in about % of the certified classes. The most frequent multiple certification combination was (b)() and (b)().

. Race to File. Multiple filings of related class actions might indicate a race by counsel to

the courthouse, perhaps to gain appointment as lead counsel. We found the following multiple

filings: intradistrict consolidations, MDL consolidations, and related but unconsolidated cases.

At least one form of multiple filing occurred in % to % of the class actions in the four districts.

On a related issue, it did not appear that many class action complaints were filed quickly for

the ostensible purpose of preserving discoverable information.

. Class Representatives. We did not find any evidence of professional class action plaintiffs. Very few persons functioned as a class representative in more than one case and none

served in that capacity in more than two cases in the study. There were, however, changes in

class representatives in % to % of certified class actions. Many of the changes appeared to

signify a significant shift in the litigation or the removal of a person in response to arguments of

opposing parties or objections of nonrepresentative parties. A substantial minority (% to

%) of all certified class actions in which the court approved a settlement included separately

designated awards to the named class representatives. The median award per representative

was under $, in three courts and $, in the fourth.

. Time of Certification. Counsel filed motions to certify—or courts issued show cause orders for sua sponte certification—in the four districts within median times of . months to .

months after the filing of the complaint. Judges ruled on motions to certify within median times

of . months to . months after the date of the motion.

Parties often filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and judges generally ruled

on those motions in a timely fashion, often dismissing a case in whole or in part. These rulings

on the merits often preceded rulings on class certification, with the rate of precertification rulings on motions to dismiss being higher than the rate for summary judgment motions (although

there were some precertification rulings on summary judgment motions in all four districts).

Overall, approximately two out of three cases in each of the four districts had a ruling on

either a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal order.

Approximately three of ten cases in each district were terminated as the direct result of a ruling

on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

As to the timing of such rulings, defendants generally had an opportunity to test the merits of

the litigation and obtained prompt judicial rulings on motions to dismiss. Not surprisingly,

testing the factual sufficiency of claims via summary judgment took longer—sometimes more

than a year—than obtaining rulings on motions to dismiss.
Summary of Findings 

. Certification Disputes. Across the four districts,  (%) of the  cases filed as class

actions were certified as such. Fifty-nine (%) of the certified cases were certified for settlement

purposes only. About % of the latter cases were settlement classes, that is, cases in which the

parties submitted a proposed settlement to the court before or simultaneously with the first motion to certify a class.

In three of the four courts, opposition to certification was indicated in over half of the cases

in which class certification was raised. Most arguments centered on traditional issues relating to

the typicality, commonality, and named plaintiffs’ representativeness. Opposition infrequently

addressed the subtype of Rule (b) class to be certified; approximately % of judicial rulings

granting class certification addressed the type of class certified. (See also sections  and  of this

Summary.)

. Plaintiff Classes. Defendants almost never sought certification of a plaintiff class and were

successful in having a plaintiff class certified in only one instance. In half of the  certified

cases, defendants acquiesced in a plaintiff class either by failing to oppose a motion to certify or

by stipulating to certification.

. Defendant Classes. Across the four districts, there were a total of four motions requesting

certification of a defendant class, three filed by plaintiffs and one filed by defendants. One defendant class was certified, at plaintiffs’ request, in a civil rights case.

. Issues Classes and Subclasses. There were no issues classes in any of the four districts.

Subclasses were infrequent, appearing in ten cases, five of which were securities cases.

The ability of the named plaintiff to represent the class was frequently disputed because of a

potential conflict of interest with other class members. But disputes regarding the typicality of

class representatives’ claims were less frequent.

. Notice. Notice of class certification or notice of settlement or voluntary dismissal was

sent to class members in at least three-quarters or more of the certified class actions. Notice was

delayed in a substantial number of cases. While the reason for the delays could not be determined, one consequence of the delays was to postpone notice expenses until the case had been

resolved and such expenses could be shifted to the defendant. In a dozen cases, half of which

were settlement classes, neither notice to the class nor hearing on settlement approval appeared

to have taken place.

Parties and judges provided individual notice in almost all certified (b)() actions in which

notice was issued. In at least two-thirds of the cases in each district, individual notices were

supplemented by publication in a newspaper or other print medium.

The median number of recipients of notice of certification or settlement (or both) was substantial, ranging from approximately , individuals in one district to over , in another.

In many cases plaintiffs and defendants shared the cost of notices. Across the four districts, the

median cost of notice in the limited number of cases with data available exceeded $, for

notice of certification or settlement or both. Litigation related to notice issues occurred in less

than one-quarter of the certified cases in which notice was communicated to the class.

Settlement notices generally did not provide either the net amount of the settlement or the

estimated size of the class. A class member typically did not have the information with which to

estimate his or her individual recovery. Also missing from most notices was information about

the amount of attorneys’ fees, costs of administration, and other expenses. Usually, however,

notices included sufficient information about plans to distribute settlement funds, procedures
 Class Actions

for filing claims, opt-out procedures, and the timetable for filing objections and participating in

hearings.

. Opt Outs. At the settlement stage, the percentage of cases with at least one member opting out was considerably higher than at the certification stage. The occurrence of at least one

member opting out of a settlement ranged from % to % of the cases compared to % to %

with at least one member opting out of a certification before settlement.

Across all four districts, the median percentage of members who opted out of a settlement

was either .% or .% of the total membership of the class; % of the opt-out cases had .%

or fewer of class members opt out. Settlements with small average individual recoveries had a

higher number of cases with one or more opt outs than cases with larger average individual recoveries.

. Opt Ins. None of the certified class actions required that class members file a claim as a

precondition to class membership. Many cases in the study used a claims procedure to distribute any settlement fund to class members. Claims procedures were used routinely in securities

class actions. The effect of combining a claims procedure with an opt-out class appeared to be

that a class member who did not opt out or file a claim was nonetheless precluded from litigating class issues in the future.

. Individual Member and Nonmember Participation. Attempts to intervene in cases

filed as class actions occurred relatively infrequently. Following rulings rejecting an attempt to

intervene, three prospective intervenors filed appeals challenging that decision, but none was

successful. Prospective intervenors also filed three appeals addressing other issues—again without success. In addition, objecting class members filed appeals of settlements in two major consumer class actions.

 Overall, about half of the settlements that were the subject of a hearing generated at least one

objection. Nonrepresentative parties participated by filing written objections to the settlement

far more frequently than by attending the settlement hearing. Courts approved approximately

% or more of the proposed settlements without changes in each district. In a small percentage

of cases, the court conditioned settlement approval on the inclusion of specified changes.

. Settlement. In each district, a substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by class-wide settlements. Certified class actions were two to five times more likely to settle than cases that contained class allegations but were never certified. Certified class actions

were less likely than noncertified cases to be terminated by traditional rulings on motions or

trials. The vast majority of cases that were certified as class actions had also been the subject of

rulings on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, most of which did not result in dismissal or judgment. But noncertified cases were not simply abandoned; in each district, they

were at least twice as likely as certified class actions to be disposed of by motion or trial (mostly

by motion). Overall, about half of the noncertified cases were disposed of by motion or trial.

As to the relationship between class certification and settlement, many cases settled before

the court ruled on certification. At the other end of the spectrum, a sizable number—a majority

in three of the districts—settled more than a year after certification.

Special masters were never used to evaluate settlements and in only one case was a master

used to facilitate settlement. Magistrate judges were used occasionally to evaluate a settlement

and more frequently to facilitate settlement.
Summary of Findings 

. Trials. The number of trials in study cases was small; a trial began in only  (%) of the

 cases in the four districts combined. Plaintiff classes and individual plaintiffs did not fare

well at trial. Except for one default judgment that led to a class settlement, no trial resulted in a

final judgment for a plaintiff class. Of the three trials that found for individual plaintiffs, one

judgment was vacated and remanded for dismissal, one judgment was vacated with a resulting

$ damage award for the plaintiff on remand, and one defendant’s appeal was dismissed. Five of

the  trials led to settlement during or after trial, including the default judgment case mentioned above, two certified cases that settled after partial judgments for the class, and two noncertified cases.

. Fee-Recovery Ratios. Net monetary distributions to the class regularly exceeded attorneys’ fees by substantial margins. In cases where benefits to the class can readily be quantified,

the “fee-recovery rate” (fee awards as a percentage of the gross settlement amount) infrequently

exceeded the traditional .% contingency fee rate.

When a settlement created a fund for distribution to the class, three of the four districts calculated fees using the percentage of recovery method far more often than the lodestar method.

Not surprisingly, courts generally used the lodestar method in cases where the class settlement

produced nonquantifiable benefits. Judges appeared to attach special importance to actual

benefits won for the class when calculating fees, either by using the percentage of the recovery

method, considering fee objections, or adjusting the lodestar calculation.

Four or fewer appeals per district involved attorneys’ fees issues. All fee-related appeals related to plaintiffs’ counsel fees, including challenges to the amount of the award, denial of the

fee request, or reduction of the fee request. For the four districts combined, only one of the feerelated appeals resulted in vacating a fee award. The other appeals ended in fee-award affirmance (two cases), appeal dismissal (two cases), reversal of denial of fees (one case), vacating

the trial court’s reduction of fees (one case), and remanding for reconsideration (one case).

. Trivial Remedies; Other Remedies. We did not find any patterns of situations where

(b)() actions produced nominal class benefits in relation to attorneys’ fees. Nor did we find any

(b)() cases that appeared to result in clearly trivial injunctive relief accompanied by high fees.

The fee-recovery rate, as described above, exceeded % in % or fewer of settled cases, half of

which included nonquantifiable benefits such as a permanent injunction. In the balance of cases

with high fee-recovery rates, the settlement produced relatively small payments to the class as

well as to attorneys for the class.

In five cases in two districts, a portion of the settlement funds was distributed to a charitable

or other nonprofit organization.

. Duplicate or Overlapping Classes. We found five duplicative or overlapping classes in

related cases that were not consolidated with similar litigation pending in federal and state

courts. Our review of the files indicated that those cases generated few difficulties for the court.

. Res Judicata. No data were available.

. Appeals. The rate of filing at least one appeal ranged from % to %. Noncertified

cases were more likely to have one or more appeals than certified cases. Cases with trials

showed even a higher rate of appeal. Few appeals led to altering the decision of the trial judge at

the appellate level or on remand. Class certification before appeal, however, may have been one

of the factors that led to settlement in cases that settled on remand.
 Class Actions

Plaintiffs filed % to % of the appeals and were rarely successful in reversing or vacating

trial court decisions. On the other hand, defendants rarely filed appeals; their appeals also did

not lead to a high rate of reversal or vacation. Among appeals resulting in full or partial reversal

on appeal, most reversals significantly changed the direction of the case. For appeals in cases

that had been previously certified, reversal and remand generally resulted in a class settlement,

although there were only seven such reversals in the study. On the other hand, reversal and remand in thirteen cases not previously certified generally did not lead to a successful outcome for

the plaintiffs.

Parties rarely sought appellate review of district court decisions that dealt with the mechanics of the class action process, such as certification or class settlement. Litigants appealed certification decisions in seven study cases. Two cases involved certified classes. In one, the certification of a class was affirmed and, in the other, class certification was vacated. In the other

five cases, putative class representatives appealed the denial of class certification. Three of these

five appeals were unsuccessful. The fourth resulted in reversal and remand that led to class certification and the fifth resulted in dismissal with no class certified.

. Class Action Attorneys. In  cases,  different law firms served as lead, co-lead, or

liaison counsel, with more than  firm appointed in most cases. Twelve of these law firms served

as lead or co-lead counsel in  or more cases. In total, these  firms appeared  cases, % of

the certified cases in the study.


Findings

() Individual Actions and Aggregation29

(a) Average recovery per class member

Background. In this opening section, we report data on one alternative to class actions, namely,

the filing and consolidation of individual cases. The ultimate question in this subsection is:

How many members of certified classes would have maintained individual actions absent the

class action? We cannot answer that question in exactly those terms, but even the highest level

of recovery per individual class member that we found appears unlikely to support separate individual actions.

Data. Across the districts, the median level of the average recovery per class member30

ranged from $ to $; % of the awards ranged from $ to $,; and the maximum

awards ranged from $, to $, (see Figure ). Even assuming that an individual member

might recover a higher award in a separate trial, the multiplier would have to be ten or more for

an individual to meet the minimum jurisdictional amount for a diversity case. Cases seeking injunctive relief and cases brought under federal statutory authority could be brought as individual actions. However, without a substantial multiplier of individual damage awards, none of the

awards would likely induce a private attorney to bring the case on a contingent fee basis or an

individual to advance sufficient personal funds to retain an attorney to file the action. Nor is it

clear how many, if any, individual actions would be supported by the hope for a statutory fee

award (see infra § (b)).

The median net settlement per class member in the relatively few securities cases ranged

from $ to $ (see Figure ). The comparable medians for nonsecurities classes ranged

from $ to $, (see Figure ). Given the small numbers of cases with monetary settlements

in each district, no firm conclusions can be drawn about the differences between securities cases

and all other cases. It does appear, however, that neither level of recovery would have been

likely to support individual actions.

. See generally Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer , at 

(describing a trend toward aggregation).

. We calculated the average recovery per class member by starting with the gross settlement amount, deducting

expenses, attorneys’ fees, and any separate awards to the named class representatives, and dividing that net settlement

amount by the number of notices sent to class members.
 Class Actions

Discussion at the advisory committee’s November  meeting raised a question about the

incidence of the “two-dollar” individual recovery.31 To address that question, we examined all

class actions in the four districts that were certified solely under (b)() and that produced an

average distribution per class member of less than $ (see Table ). There were nine such

cases in the four courts. These data did not include any two-dollar cases, but they do tend to

bridge the gap between the anecdotal evidence and our quantitative evidence. The absence of

such nominal recoveries in the four districts suggests that the anecdotal cases on which the discussion was based, which presumably arose in other districts, may represent outlier cases at the

bottom of the range of class action recoveries.

For these nine cases with monetary awards below $ per member, the average award to

the class was $. million and the median award was $. million (see Table ). For those

same cases, fee awards were generally based on a percentage of the gross recovery. Those percentages clustered around % and five of the nine awards were exactly % of the total recovery. The average size of the class was , and the median size was , members. Eight of

the nine cases were securities cases. (See alsoinfra § (a) for a discussion of (b)() cases in

which the relief was relatively trivial in relation to attorneys’ fees and for a discussion of nonmonetary relief in such cases.)

(b) Consolidation and related cases

Background. In the previous section, we concluded that individuals would be unlikely to file

individual cases to recover damages. In this subsection, we look at the extent to which separate

cases were filed in relation to the same transactions. An important distinction, however, is that

the separate cases discussed in this subsection generally were filed as class actions and not simply as individual claims. Here, we look for “relationships . . . between aggregation and numbers

of individual actions arising out of the same transactional setting.”32 We also address how often

“individual actions proceed in the same court, or in different courts, without any attempt at aggregation.”33 We found what appears to be a modest amount of interdistrict and intradistrict

consolidation and also found a smaller number of cases that the court declined, or was without

authority, to consolidate.

On occasion, a court may find that “[c]laims identical or similar to those made in a class action may be the subject of other litigation, either in the same court or in other federal or state

courts.”34 Individuals who have no interest in being class members may file their own separate

suits either before or after certification. Under Rule (b)()(B), the court must consider the

pendency of other litigation concerning the controversy, in both state and federal courts, by or

against members of the class.35 Further, under Rule (c)(A)() common issues of fact or law

may be carved out for class certification36 on both an intradistrict37 and on a nation-wide38 ba-

. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes at –, Nov. –, .

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. Id.

. Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, § ., at  (Federal Judicial Center ) [hereinafter MCL d].

. Id. § ., at  & n. (citing Califano v. Yamasaki,  U.S.  () (need to consider whether proposed nation-wide class would improperly interfere with similar pending litigation in other courts)).

. Id. § ., at  & n. (citing Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Ill. )

(negligence liability for infected blood), mandamus granted, class certification denied, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Findings 

sis. Federal courts use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (a)39 for intradistrict transfers and the

MDL statute for interdistrict transfers.40 There is no clear authority for a federal court to consolidate cases filed in state court with actions filed in federal court.

Data on consolidations. In all four districts, interdistrict consolidation of cases in which there

was class action activity was relatively infrequent. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

consolidated between % and % of cases with cases from other districts. The median time

from filing the complaint in a case to MDL consolidation ranged from approximately four

months in three districts to approximately six months in the other district (see Figure ). Due to

the small number of cases for different nature-of-suit categories, we are unable to observe any

distinct patterns or draw any reliable inferences about, say, antitrust, securities, or civil rights

cases. In this small subset of cases, the most common nature-of-suit categories were antitrust

cases followed by securities cases (see Table ).

District courts consolidated similar cases within their own districts more often (% to %)

than the judicial panel consolidated cases across district lines. The median number of cases

within each consolidation ranged from two to four (see Figure ). Among intradistrict consolidations, the most frequent nature of suit was securities (see Table ).

Data on nonconsolidations. We also looked at how often courts do not consolidate cases

even though they are related to other litigation pending in federal and state courts. On the federal level, nonconsolidation of related cases occurred in % to % of the cases in the four districts (see Figure ). Securities was the most common nature of suit among the nonconsolidated

cases (see Table ).

Inc.,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (district judge ordered to decertify the plaintiff class), cert. denied,  S. Ct. 

(); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., “Albuteral” Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL ,  F.R.D.  (D. Wyo.

) (negligence, breach of warranty claims for contamination of bronchodilator), defendant’s motion to decertify

plaintiff class denied, In re Copley Pharmaceutical,  F.R.D.  (D. Wyo. )).

. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,  F. d  (th Cir. ) (opt-out class of water contamination victims in vicinity of a landfill); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (district-wide class

of asbestos-injury claimants to resolve specific issues).

. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.) (nation-wide (b)() class of schools

seeking compensatory damages associated with the presence of asbestos-containing building materials), cert. denied,

 U.S.  ().

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (a) states:

(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the

court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may

tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

Rule (a) permits partial or complete consolidation of related actions pending in the same district for both

pretrial and trial purposes. See Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test Labs, Inc.,  F. Supp.  (S.D.N.Y. ) (securities

case where the court granted the defendant’s cross motion for consolidation); Wellman v. Dickinson,  F.R.D. ,

 (S.D.N.Y. ).

. Pursuant to  U.S.C. § (a) (), the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is authorized to transfer

civil actions pending in more than one district involving one or more common questions of fact to any district for

coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings upon its determination that transfer “will be for the convenience of

the parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”
 Class Actions

On the state level, we identified nonconsolidation with pending state litigation infrequently,

ranging from % to % of the study cases (see Figure ). Among this small group, securities and

other civil rights cases were the most common nature of suit (see Table ).

Nonconsolidation of related cases can present difficulties for courts, especially during discovery. Other problems arise when multiple actions result in conflicting or overlapping classes

that may produce, among other things, inconsistent adjudications. For details about the types of

difficulties we found in eight cases that were not consolidated with related litigation pending in

federal and state courts, see Tables  and . While the nonconsolidations presented difficulties

for the court, they did not appear to be insurmountable. Of the eight cases, half were eventually

disposed of via a class settlement approved by the court. Three of the remaining cases were

terminated via a judicial ruling on a motion to dismiss, a stipulated voluntary dismissal, and a

judicial ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

() Routine Class Actions

(a) What was the relationship, if any, between the “easy applications” of Rule  and

the substantive subjects of dispute?

Background. Some have maintained that class actions in certain nature-of-suit categories are

often “easy applications” of Rule . These cases are considered easy or routine because they

frequently involve complaints with boilerplate allegations, similar class certification arguments,

and standard settlements. In particular, some have viewed securities class actions as fitting into

such standard molds.41 To test these premises, we compared study cases in different nature-ofsuit categories. Since the number of filings in most categories was small, we limited our analysis,

where appropriate, to securities cases, nonsecurities cases, and civil rights cases (a subset of

nonsecurities cases).

Data on Rule (b)() cases. First, we compared indicators of routineness in cases filed as Rule

(b)() class actions,42 starting with duration of the case from complaint to closing. Despite the

perceived complexity of securities cases, they did not take much longer to settle and close than

nonsecurities class actions. Study data for the four districts showed the median time period

from filing the complaint to closing ranged from twenty-four to twenty-eight months for settled

securities class actions. In comparison, median time periods for settled nonsecurities class actions were shorter in two districts (with medians of eleven and thirteen months) and longer in

two others (with medians of thirty-six and fifty months) (see Table ).43 In particular, the me-

. In re Activision Sec. Litig.,  F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Cal. ) (“all too familiar path of large securities

cases,” including “lugubrious” pleading contests and “massive” discovery). A recent report found courts reacting to

what some view as boilerplate shareholder allegations of officer/director fraud: “The increased [judicial] application

of Rule (b) may stem from the courts’ thinning patience with nearly identical ‘boiler-plate’ securities fraud complaints.” Edward M. Posner & Karl L. Prior, Motions to Dismiss Shareholders’ Suits Against Officers and Directors

(ALI-ABA Course of Study: The Prosecution and Defense of Shareholder Litigation against Directors and Officers,

Washington, D.C.), May –, , at , .

. These include cases filed under Rule  (b)() alone or in combination with one or more other subdivisions of

(b).

. In addition, Figure , discussed infra, presents median duration periods for settled and nonsettled securities

cases combined and compares class actions to nonclass civil actions.
Findings 

dian case lengths for (b)() civil rights actions were about the same as, or longer than, for settled

securities cases in the three districts where civil rights cases settled.

Do these results indicate that securities cases are “routine”? To respond to that question, we

looked at the rate at which (b)() classes were certified, finding somewhat distinctive results for

securities and civil rights cases. A (b)() class was certified in % to % of the securities

cases where a motion or sua sponte order on certification was filed. In contrast, for nonsecurities actions, the certification rates were % to % in the three districts with sufficient numbers

of cases for meaningful comparison (see Table ). Interestingly, the certification rate for (b)()

civil rights cases was % in each of the three districts with (b)() civil rights class actions, but

these constituted only two or three cases per district. Although these data are not sufficient to

support broad conclusions, high rates of certification within the securities and civil rights categories could indicate that these are easy applications of Rule , at least with respect to the certification decision.

We next examined the bases for opposition to class certification and again found some distinctive patterns among securities cases. In two districts, disputes over certification in securities

cases were about as frequent as for the other major nature-of-suit categories in those districts. In

the other two courts, objections to certification were filed about . times as often in nonsecurities cases44 as in securities cases.45 Of special note is that objections on the basis of numerosity

were absent from all (b)() securities cases in three districts and were present in only % of the

certification disputes in the fourth district. In nonsecurities cases, however, numerosity generally was raised more frequently. In two districts, it was at issue in % and % of the certification disputes; the other two districts had only two or three such cases. These limited results

could be viewed as indicating relatively “easy” sailing toward satisfying the numerosity requirement in securities cases.

However, another observed difference was in arguments concerning the representativeness

of the principal plaintiffs. In all or nearly all securities cases in the four districts, defendants disputed the ability of named plaintiffs to represent the class, often basing their arguments on alleged conflicts or purportedly unique facts applicable to the representatives (see infra § (b)).

Generally, these objections occurred less frequently in nonsecurities (b)() cases (see Table ).

Representativeness disputes were often harder fought battles than numerosity disputes and frequently involved complex issues and facts. The relatively high rates of certifying securities

classes, however, indicates that these challenges were quite often overcome; for example, the

class representative in some cases was replaced by one who was more “representative” (see infra § (b)).

We also compared the amounts distributed from settlement funds in certified b() cases

where the court approved a settlement. As might be expected, securities cases had median net

monetary distributions to the class ($. million to $. million) far greater than in nonsecurities

cases ($. million or less). Comparing median attorneys’ fee awards for securities and other

class actions showed similar disparities in all but one district. These figures are misleading,

though, unless viewed in light of class size because securities classes are generally large. We

considered class size by computing the net settlement per class member—dividing the total net

. Certification objections were filed in % and % of nonsecurities class actions in these two districts.

. Certification objections were filed in % and % of securities class actions in these two districts.
 Class Actions

monetary settlement amount by the number of notices sent to class members (see supra § (a)).

The median net settlement per class member for securities cases exceeded that in nonsecurities

cases in only one of the three districts with sufficient case counts to allow for comparison (see

Table ).

Discussion. In sum, the following general characteristics were found in many securities (b)()

cases in the four districts: They did not necessarily last longer than most nonsecurities class

actions; were about as likely, or somewhat less likely, to be subject to some form of objection to

certification; and did not necessarily yield more dollars to individual class members. In addition, securities cases were more likely to be certified and subject to representativeness objections. Finally, numerosity objections were a rarity in securities cases, but a relatively frequent

occurrence in other cases. Large class sizes in securities cases often made them distinctive when

compared with most nonsecurities classes.

In addition, and somewhat understandably, the securities complaints contained more frequent use of boilerplate allegations when compared with the wide variety of other types of (b)()

class actions. This appeared to be a factor of the governing law, the subject matter of the complaints, and the frequency with which securities cases were filed. Securities claims generally

followed a recognizable pattern based on federal securities statutes and case precedent, whereas

claims not dealing with securities often covered ground not as frequently traveled or charted

new territory.

Data on Rule (b)() cases. We also compared similar indicators in nonsecurities cases in

which only a Rule (b)() class was sought. In those cases that settled, the median time from

complaint to closing ranged from fifteen to sixty months, not notably different from (b)() cases

given the relatively small number of cases involved (see Table  compared to Table ). The

rate of (b)() certification ranged from % to % (see Table ). In three of the districts, the

(b)() certification rate was lower than for nonsecurities (b)() cases; in the fourth district it was

higher (see Table  compared to Table ). Looking just at the subset of (b)() civil rights cases

showed a range of certification rates of % to %, with no notable patterns observed (see

Table ). We also found no recognizable patterns in the frequency of defendant opposition to

motions to certify a (b)() class (see Table ). We did, however, observe that the median fee

award was considerably smaller for (b)() class counsel when compared to fees in nonsecurities

(b)() cases (see Table  compared to Table ). Given the disparate nature of these data, it is

not possible to generalize about whether (b)() cases are easy or routine applications of Rule .

(b) How did class actions compare to other types of cases in terms of the type of outcome and the stage of the case at which the outcome occurred?

Background. In this subsection, we look at the routineness of class actions from a different angle, namely, how do class actions compare to other types of civil cases. Two related assertions

are commonly made about class actions: that such cases generally settle and that they are rarely

tried.46 The underlying assumptions—sometimes explicitly stated47—are that the settlement

. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors

Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,  Yale L.J. ,  () (“Defendants’ and plaintiffs’

attorneys agree to settle virtually all class actions that survive motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.”). Cf. Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment On Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying

Private Rights Of Action Under The Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority,”  Harv. L. Rev. ,
Findings 

rate for class actions is higher than that for other types of civil cases, and the trial rate is lower.

In this section we will address that assumption by comparing the settlement and trial rates in the

class actions we studied with such rates in nonclass action civil cases. The comparison group

consists of all nonclass civil cases that were terminated in the four study districts during the

same time period.

Data. Differences in data collection make it difficult to compare settlement rates in class actions and nonclass civil cases.48 Allowing for such differences, it appears that the settlement

rates for nonprisoner class actions were within approximately ± % of the settlement rates for

nonprisoner nonclass actions (see Figure ). It also appears that settlement rates were higher for

securities class actions than for all nonclass securities cases in all but one district (see Figure ).

The rate of trial (jury and bench) was about the same for class actions and nonclass civil

cases in one district and the class action rate was slightly higher in two districts. In the fourth

district, the trial rate for class actions was .% and the rate for nonclass civil cases was .%

(see Table ). In securities cases, there were too few cases to treat as other than anecdotal information. Because of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’s interest in

the subject, we include the information for descriptive purposes only (see Table ).

In comparison with nonclass civil cases, class actions are not routine in terms of their longevity. Overall, the median time from filing to disposition for class actions was two to three

times that of other civil cases in three of the four districts, and in the fourth (S.D. Fla.), class

actions took about four and a half months longer at the median (see Figure ). The patterns

were similar for securities cases, but the gaps between class and nonclass securities cases were

generally not as long as the corresponding gaps in nonsecurities cases (see Figure ).

Discussion. Examining trial and settlement rates might lead one to conclude that class actions

are routine, not very different from other cases terminated in the same courts during the same

time span. But the length of time from filing to termination and, as we will see in infra § (d),

the amount of judicial time required by class actions distinguish them from other cases.

(c) What was the frequency and rate of certification of (b)(), (b)(), and (b)() classes

and how did these rates correspond with substantive areas?

In this subsection, we examine the frequency and rate of certification of (b)(), (b)(), and (b)()

classes (and combinations thereof) and address how the rates correspond with different natureof-suit categories.

Background. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  a case may be certified pursuant to

 () (“A substantial portion of securities class actions have been resolved by judicial dismissal on the basis of a

defendant’s motion.”).

. Alexander, supra note , at  (“Though empirical data are hard to come by, it seems clear that securities

class actions are resolved by adjudication significantly less often than are other civil cases.”).

. As noted in Figures  and , the settlement rate for class actions was based on our observations, derived from

the case files. Settlement rates for nonclass cases were derived from data provided by each court to the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts upon termination of a case. We used the categories “dismissed: settled,” “dismissed: voluntarily,” and “judgment on consent.” The differences between Administrative Office data and our data for the same

set of class actions suggest that differences between class and nonclass cases may simply reflect the differences in data

collection methods.
 Class Actions

subdivisions (b)()(A), (b)()(B), (b)(), or (b)().49 Determining which subdivision under Rule

 to use is not always clear.50 There may also be instances where a class action may qualify under Rule (b)() as well as under (b)() or (b)().

If a (b)() class is sought and approved, class counsel is required to provide notice to all class

members and an opportunity to opt out. The (b)() and (b)() subdivisions do not require notice of class certification and do not ordinarily allow opting out. “Because of the notice requirement and the frequent necessity of having to deal with individual damage claims, greater precision is required in (b)() actions than in those brought under (b)() or (b)().”51

If a proposed class action qualifies or fits the criteria of more than one of the (b) subdivisions, do parties or judges indicate a preference for class certification pursuant to Rule (b)()

or (b)() over Rule (b)()?52 Some believe that the increased burden of mandatory notice and

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (b) states in relevant part:

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision

(a) are satisfied, and in addition:

() the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be

dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

() the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,

thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the

class as a whole; or

() the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:

(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against

members of the class;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;

(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action.

. “The problem is that all class litigation, even litigation for damages, has the potential to affect a defendant’s

standard of conduct. For instance, a suit for nuisance damages may be won by some claimants and lost by others,

thereby creating ‘incompatible standards of conduct’ for the defendant. Hence, damage actions, which are normally

construed as (b)() actions, may also fall within the language of (b)()(A), and the court may deny notice, giving opportunity to appear or to opt out. The confusion from such amorphous language has resulted in inconsistent case law

on what exactly constitutes a (b)()(A) class action and games in which the category is manipulated to avoid the time

and expense of giving notice.” Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the

Case for Reform,  Neb. L. Rev. ,  () (footnotes omitted).

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at  & n. (citing Rice v. Philadelphia,  F.R.D.  (E.D. Pa. )).

. See, e.g., Patrykus v. Gomilla,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Ill. ) (civil rights case certified under Rule  (b)()

and (b)()); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan,  F. Supp.  (D.D.C. ) (civil rights case certified conditionally under Rule (b)()(A) or (b)()); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l, Inc.,  F. Supp.  (D.R.I.

) (securities case certified pursuant to Rule  (b)() and (b)()); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc.,  F.R.D.

 (N.D. Cal.), modified,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Cal. ) (employment discrimination case certified under Rule

(b)() and (b)()), aff’d sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods,  F.d  (th Cir.), cert. denied,  U.S. 

().
Findings 

other requirements53 deter parties from seeking (b)() certification. Similarly, some courts have

expressed reluctance to certify a (b)() class when an action also met the requirements of either

a (b)()

54 or (b)() class.55 One commentator recommends that “[i]f the court determines that

both provisions [(b)() and (b)()] apply, then it should treat the suit as having been brought

under Rule (b)() so that all class members will be bound”56 because “[t]o hold otherwise

would allow the members to utilize the opting out provision in subdivision (c)(), which in

some cases would thwart the objectives of representative suits under Rule (b)().”57

Data. Of the  certified classes for which information was available,  (%) were (b)()

classes,  (%) were (b)() classes, and the remaining  (%) reflected an equal number of

(b)()(A) and (b)()(B) classes (see Figure ). Below, we look at the frequency and rate of certification of (b)(), (b)(), and (b)() classes among the different natures-of-suit categories. We

present nature-of-suit information in response to the question raised, but with the caveat that

the numbers are often so small that no general conclusion can be drawn from them.

Rule (b)()(A) and (b)()(B). Two of the four districts (E.D. Pa. and N.D. Ill.) certified a

total of seven (b)()(A) classes.58 Similarly, two districts (N.D. Ill. and N.D. Cal.) certified a total of seven (b)()(B) classes.59

Rule (b)(). The four districts had a total of forty cases with certified (b)() classes. One

district accounted for just over half of these cases. Civil rights cases of various types accounted

for % of the (b)() classes. This is consistent with the advisory committee’s note that describes various actions in the civil rights field as prototypes of a (b)() class,60 without suggesting that subdivision (b)() is limited to civil rights cases. The second largest nature-of-suit category was ERISA, accounting for five of the forty cases (.%).

. Additional requirements include: () notice must be individual to all members who can be identified through

reasonable effort; () absent class members have the right to exclude themselves from the class and from the binding

effect of the judgment; and () absent class members have the right to enter their appearance through counsel. Rule

(c)().

. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n,  F.d  (d Cir. ) (antitrust case where the court

found a Rule (b)() preferable to a (b)() class so that opt-out privileges would be unavailable).

. See, e.g., Hummel v. Brennan,  F.R.D.  (E.D. Pa. ) (a labor action where the court certified a Rule

(b)() class rather than a Rule (b)() class to insure that one litigation would dispose of the issue; court also indicated that procedural safeguards are unnecessary when a class is homogeneous, and that any unfairness caused by

members’ inability to opt out was outweighed by the preventing of repetitious suits). See also Herbert Newberg &

Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § ., at - n. (d ed. ).

. A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § , at  & n. (d ed.  & Supp.

) (citing Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (“Although [the] suit could have been

brought as a (b)() action, (b)() actions generally are preferred for their wider res judicata effects.”); McGlothlin v.

Connors,  F.R.D. ,  (W.D. Va. ); Tustin v. Heckler,  F. Supp. ,  (D.N.J. )).

. Wright et al., supra note  at – (footnotes omitted).

. The nature-of-suit categories were other personal property damage (), civil rights (), and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) () in one district and securities (), civil rights (), ERISA (), and other

statutory actions () in the other.

. N.D. Ill. certified five cases with the following nature-of-suit categories: ERISA (), securities (), and constitutionality of a state statute (). N.D. Cal. certified the remaining two cases, which were securities actions.

. Fed. R. Civ. P.  advisory committee’s note (citing Potts v. Flax,  F.d  (th Cir. ); Bailey v. Patterson,  F.d  (th Cir. ), cert. denied,  U.S.  (); Brunson v. Board of Trustees,  F.d 

(th Cir. ), cert. denied,  U.S.  (), as some examples).
 Class Actions

Rule (b)(). The largest number of certified classes—eighty-four (%)—were in the (b)()

category. N.D. Ill. had the most, twenty-six (%), followed by E.D. Pa. twenty-four (%),

N.D. Cal. twenty-three (%), and S.D. Fla. eleven (%). In the four districts combined, %

of the certified (b)() classes were in securities cases (over % of certified (b)() classes in S.D.

Fla., % in N.D. Cal., .% in E.D. Pa., and % in N.D. Ill.).

Multiple Certifications. Multiple certifications were found in sixteen cases.61 Three courts

each had five cases and one court had one case (see Table ). The most frequent combination

was (b)() and (b)(), occurring in five cases, including two ERISA actions, two civil rights actions, and one other statutory action. The second most frequent combination was (b)()(A) and

(b)(), occurring in three cases, one each of other statutory action, civil rights, and other personal property damage cases. The remaining eight cases contained a variety of certification

combinations and involved securities, civil rights, ERISA, and constitutionality of state statute

actions.

(d) How much judicial time did class actions take and how did that compare to other

civil actions?

Background. Yet another measure of the relative routineness of class actions is the amount of

judicial time required. Using data from a sample of cases in the Federal Judicial Center’s most

recent District Court Time Study,62 we compared the judicial time expended on class actions

with that of civil cases (including class actions) filed within the time study sample period.

Data. Based on case weights derived from time study data, the average class action demands

considerably more judge time than the average civil case. We found this when we looked at the

data for all subject matter (nature-of-suit) categories combined and when we looked at the data

by nature-of-suit category. Case weights are scaled in relation to the weight of an average case,

which is rated as a “.” Note that the case weights are based on data from all cases (including

class action cases) in the entire time study sample. Case weights are based on average judicial

time expenditures and take into account a wide range of cases and judicial activity, from summary dismissals to extended trials.

If class actions were treated as a separate category for case weighting purposes (which they

are not), the hours demanded for the class action cases in the district court time study would

justify a case weight of .,

63 higher than any civil case type except death penalty habeas corpus (.). Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) (.) is the next closest

. Includes three cases with combinations that included at least one (b) subdivision and an unspecified class

type.

. In the Federal Judicial Center district court time study (Willging et al., supra note ), district and magistrate

judges maintained records of the time they spent on a random sample of , civil cases filed in  U.S. district

courts between November  and January . Fifty-one of those cases (.%, an incidence of . class actions

for every , cases filed) contained class action allegations. For a more complete description of the time study

methods and a listing of case weights for all nature-of-suit categories, see Memorandum from John Shapard to Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Committee on Judicial Resources  (July , ) (on file with the Research

Division, Federal Judicial Center) [hereinafter Shapard Memorandum].

. Shapard Memorandum, supra note , at –. The . case weight for class actions was derived by aggregating the time required for all class action cases in the sample and comparing that time to the time required for the

average case. See Memorandum from John Shapard to Mark Shapiro, Rules Support Office, Administrative Office of

the U.S. Courts (February , ) (on file with the Research Division, Federal Judicial Center).
Findings 

civil case type. As compared to criminal cases, an average class action case would require about

as much judge time as an average case dealing with extortion, racketeering, and threats (.)

and would require less time than the average criminal prosecution for bankruptcy or securities

fraud (.). Note that these are averages that take into account all judicial activity in the sample

cases, including trials and sentencing when applicable.

The case weights for the three nature-of-suit categories that were most prevalent in the class

action study are: securities, commodities, and exchange, .; other civil rights (filed originally

in federal court), .; and prisoner civil rights (not U.S. defendant), ..

64

The average amount of time required for the average class action of each of the above three

types is more than three times the average amount required for the average civil case of the same

type. Securities class actions required . times the judicial time spent on all securities cases;

other civil rights cases, . times as long; and prisoner civil rights cases, . times.

Certified class action cases consumed considerably more judge time than cases filed as class

actions but never certified. Still, noncertified cases required more judicial time than the average

civil case. In the eleven certified class actions in the time study, judges spent, on the average,

eleven times more hours than they did in the average civil action. In the noncertified cases,

judges spent twice the number of hours they spent on the average civil case (see Table ).65

The above data indicate that class actions, on the average, are far from routine. However,

some types of cases filed as class actions but not certified appear to be fairly routine. For example, other civil rights cases that were filed but not certified as class actions consumed less than

one-third of the judge time consumed by all other civil rights cases. Likewise, securities cases

that were filed but not certified as class actions consumed less than two-fifths of the judge time

consumed by all securities cases. The low time demands of some of these noncertified cases

may be accounted for by their consolidation into other cases that were not part of the time

study.66 In addition, the civil rights cases may have included some filings with frivolous class

action allegations (e.g., by a pro se litigant who is not authorized to represent a class) combined

with frivolous claims, leading to a prompt dismissal.

(3) Race to File

Background. Critics of the use of the class action rule, especially in the securities field, claim that

lawsuits frequently are filed without an adequate investigation, immediately after a triggering

event, such as a precipitous decline in a stock’s value.67 Reportedly, the purpose of such practices is to gain an advantage in the competition to be appointed lead counsel for the class. Some

commentators wonder whether the claims of speedy filings of class actions might be explained

by less venal considerations, such as an effort to preserve evidence, especially in tort cases.68

. Shapard Memorandum, supra note .

. The calculation of the above hypothetical . case weight for class actions included both certified and uncertified cases. The average number of judge hours per case was approximately eleven for all class actions, but the

amount of judge time for certified class actions was approximately three times that.

. If a non–time study case became the lead case, judges were instructed not to count the time spent on the consolidated cases.

. See Senate Staff Report, supra note , at –; see also, e.g., Greenfield v. U.S. Healthcare,  F.R.D. 

(E.D. Pa. ), aff’d sub nom. Garr v. U.S. Healthcare,  F.d  (d Cir. ).

. Cooper, supra note , at .
 Class Actions

We can supply only a modest amount of information relevant to the ultimate issue. We looked

for multiple filings of class action claims and for information about efforts to preserve evidence,

as indicated by a motion to expedite discovery or to preserve evidence.

Data on multiple filings. A race to the courthouse might be inferred from multiple filings of

related claims. If so, the frequency and size of intradistrict consolidations (see Figure ), the

frequency and size of multidistrict litigation consolidations (see supra § (b) and Table ), and

the frequency with which we found related cases (see infra §  and Figure ) represent potential races to the courthouse. The cumulative number of such cases is considerable: %, %,

%, and % of the cases in the four districts had one or more of these three forms of multiple

litigation (see Figure ). Looking only at cases that led to either multidistrict or intradistrict

consolidation indicates that from % to % of the cases involved multiple filings of cases that a

district judge or the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation found to have common questions

of law or fact.69

Data on expedited discovery. We also gathered information about whether class action complaints were filed for the ostensible purpose of expediting discovery or preserving discoverable

information. Generally they were not, at least as measured by the frequency of requests for expedited discovery or preserving information in class litigation.

In seven cases in the four districts, plaintiffs moved for expedited discovery,70 typically for

the purpose of gathering evidence to support a motion for a preliminary injunction. Courts

granted all but two of those seven requests. Otherwise, we found no evidence to support the

claim that any early filings of class actions were for the purpose of expediting discovery or preserving information.

() Class Representatives

Call for research. In this section we address issues related to the selection and supervision of

class representatives. Examining the full range of questions raised concerning class representatives would call for interviewing lawyers and class representatives about their relationships and,

perhaps, going back to case files or other records to examine depositions and other discovery

information concerning named representatives. Most of that research is beyond the scope of this

study. We urge other researchers to pursue the issues raised and we stand ready to provide information to support such an effort.

Background. To assure that a class is adequately represented, the court has wide discretion

in selecting the named representative and class counsel.71 While the selection of the representative may be less critical than the appointment of counsel, the class representatives should be free

of conflicts of interest with the class72 and should present claims and raise defenses that are

typical of the class claims and defenses.73

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (a);  U.S.C. §  ().

. Plaintiffs so moved in three (%) of  cases in E.D. Pa., three (%) of  cases in N.D. Cal., and one (%) of

seventy-two cases in S.D. Fla. In N.D. Ill., there were no such cases.

. MCL d, supra note , § ..

. Id. See generally Downs, supra note , at –.

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (a)(). See also General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,  U.S.  (); Howard M. Downs,

Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of Representation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon,  Ohio St. L.J.  ().
Findings 

(a) How many “repeat players”?

Background. One of the questions asked was if there are “professional” representatives who

appear repeatedly, at least in particular subject areas.

Data. We found few multiple appearances of named plaintiffs in the four districts. Pooling

all the names of class representatives into one file with  names of class representatives from

 cases, we identified duplicate appearances by four individuals and one corporation. In each

instance, the representative appeared in two separate class actions. None of the class representatives appeared in more than two cases in the study. In no instance did the same name arise in

two districts.74

One of the five sets of duplicate appearances involved two securities actions, two sets involved one securities action and another statutory action (ERISA, RICO, and “other”), one set

involved an antitrust action and a civil rights action, and the fifth set involved an ERISA action

and an “other statutory action.”

(b) Did judges add or substitute representatives?

Background. The court has a continuing duty to insure that class representatives “remain free of

conflicts and . . . ‘vigorously pursue’ the litigation in the interests of the class, including subjecting themselves to discovery.”75 The court may have to replace a class representative if “the

representative’s individual claim has been mooted or otherwise significantly affected by intervening events, such as decertification, or where the representative has engaged in conduct

prejudicial to the interests of the class or is no longer interested in pursuing the litigation.”76

We examined the frequency with which representatives were changed in certified class actions.

Data. Changes in class representatives occurred in a considerable percentage of certified

class actions in the four districts (%, %, %, and %, representing ten, one, ten, and eleven

cases, respectively) (see Figure ). These differences in the rate of changes did not seem to

have any direct relationship with the frequency of objections to certification based on the representativeness of the named plaintiffs in (b)() or (b)() cases (see Tables  and ). Nor did the

differences appear to have any direct relationship with the longevity of cases in those districts.

The three districts with rates from % to % had approximately the same median times from

filing to disposition (see Figure ). Perhaps some unexamined feature of the local legal culture

among the bar or bench in N.D. Cal. might help to explain the higher frequency of changes in

that district.

For almost half of the changes, no reasons were evident in the case file. In three cases, the

changes were to replace a deceased class representative. The remaining cases—also, almost half

of the changes—were instances in which the change in representative appeared to reflect a significant change in the litigation. Seven changes involved explicit recognition that the representatives’ claims were atypical of the class claims; five changes responded to situations affecting

the ability of the class representative to continue to represent the class (e.g., conflict of interest;

a redefined class did not include the representative); and three involved voluntary withdrawal

. But note that our data only include class actions that were terminated in four districts during a two-year span.

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at  (footnote omitted).

. Id. at –.
 Class Actions

from or opting out of the class. One change added representatives of a subclass of stock option

holders.

(c) Did named representatives attend the approval hearing?

Background. Class representatives’ “views may be important in shaping the [settlement] agreement and will usually be presented at the fairness hearing.” 77 While representatives’ views may

be entitled to “special weight,” they do not have veto power over a proposed settlement.78

Data. Attendance of representative parties at the settlement approval hearing was uneven

across the four districts. In E.D. Pa. (where records of the settlement hearing were most complete) one or more class representatives attended the settlement approval hearing in % of the

certified, settled class actions (see discussion at infra § (b) and Figure ). The rates in the

other districts varied from % to %.

(d) What was in it for the class representatives?

Background. “The propriety of ‘incentive’ awards to named plaintiffs has been rigorously debated. While a number of courts have approved such awards on the basis that class representatives take on risks and perform services, others have denied preferential allocation on the

grounds that the named plaintiff may be tempted to settle an action to the detriment of the class

or come to expect a ‘bounty’ for bringing suit.”79 A notice of proposed settlement should

“disclose any special benefits provided to the class representatives.”80

Data. A substantial minority of all certified, settled class actions in which the court approved

a settlement included designated awards to the named class representatives.81 In the four districts the percentages that included such awards were %, %, %, and % (see Figure ).

The median amounts of all awards to class representatives in the four districts were $, in

two districts, $, in the third, and $, in the fourth (see Figure ). In many cases,

there was more than one representative. The median award per representative in three courts

was under $, and in the fourth was $, (see Figure ). The median percentage of the

total settlement that was awarded to class representatives was less than or equal to eleven thousandths of one percent (.%) in all four districts.

() Time of Certification

Introductory Data. Across the four districts we found a total of  cases with either a motion

for or against class certification or a sua sponte show cause order regarding certification in the

four districts. Of these cases,  (%) were unconditionally certified,  (%) were certified

for settlement purposes only,  (%) were denied certification,  (%) were deferred, and 

. Id. § ., at .

. Id.

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - to - and cases cited at nn. –. See also Downs,

supra note , at  (“Cases in the late s and early s abhorred such preferences, but recent cases permit

such practices more freely.” (footnote omitted)).

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at .

. The data, of course, include only information that was available in the court file, the settlement, the notice to

the class, or the motion for approval of the settlement and does not include any undisclosed preferences to class representatives. See Downs, supra note , at – (reporting that often the preferences are not disclosed to the class

in the notice of settlement; also, finding that % of the cases studied in N.D. Cal. contained such preferences).
Findings 

(%) had no action indicated. In the following sections we discuss the process whereby decisions about certification were made.

(a) Timing of motions and certification decisions

Background. In this subsection, we examine the point at which motions to certify are filed and

the length of time that elapses before the court rules to see if there is “any pattern to the point at

which the first certification decision is made.” We also examine (see infra § (b)) “the effect of

local rules requiring that a motion to certify be made within a stated period.”82 Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure (c)() directs the court to determine “as soon as practicable” after the commencement of a case whether an action is to be maintained as a class action.

Data. How soon do counsel file motions to certify—or courts issue sua sponte orders regarding certification? Median times in the four districts ranged from . months to . months

after the filing of the complaint.83 Seventy-five percent (th percentile) of the motions or orders were filed within a range of . months at one end to . months at the other (see Figure

).

How soon do courts rule on motions to certify after they have been filed?84 Three districts’

median times ranged from . months to . months. The other district had a median time of

. months. In % of the cases, courts ruled on class certification within ., ., ., and .

months after the filing of a motion to certify (see Figure ).

(b) Local rules on the timing of certification motions

Background. As noted above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (c)() directs the court to determine class status “as soon as practicable,” but the rule provides little specific guidance. To

fill that gap and encourage early resolution or settlement, three of the four districts specify, by

local rule, a definite time within which the plaintiff must file its motion for certification unless

good cause is shown to extend the time. E.D. Pa. and S.D. Fla. require the filing of a motion to

certify within  days,85 and N.D. Cal. requires the filing of such a motion within  days.86

N.D. Ill. has no local rule addressing the timing of motions to certify.

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. In the time study, % of the motions or orders in fifty-one class action cases were filed within  days of the

filing of the complaint. Preliminary Time Study, supra note , at –.

. For one standard of promptness, see  U.S.C. §  (motions pending for more than six months need to be

included in a district court’s semiannual report under the Civil Justice Reform Act). Note that the data reflect only

those cases that contained both the certification motion filing date and the date of the court’s ruling.

. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Local Rule (c) (Aug. , ) states, in relevant

part:

Within ninety () days after the filing of the complaint in a class action, unless this period is extended on motion

of good cause appearing, the plaintiff shall move for a determination under subdivision (c)() of Rule , Fed. R.

Civ. P., as to whether the case is to be maintained as a class action.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Local Rule .(A)() (Feb. , ) states:

Within  days after the filing of a complaint in a class action, unless this period is extended on motion of good

cause appearing, the plaintiff shall move for a determination under subdivision (c)() of Rule , Fed. R. Civ. P.,

as to whether the case is to be maintained as a class action.

. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Local Rule -(c) (rev. Nov. , ) states:
 Class Actions

Data. In the previous section, we saw that in % of the cases the time from the filing of the

complaint to the filing of a motion to certify ranged from more than . to more than .

months in the four districts. In E.D. Pa., the median time for filing a motion to certify was

slightly longer than called for by the local rule, and in S.D. Fla., the median time was more than

a month longer (see Figure ). In N.D. Cal., the median time was in compliance with the -

day limit, but the time for filing a motion to certify was longer than  days in at least % of

the cases. N.D. Ill., which has no rule addressing how soon after the complaint a motion for

certification must be filed, had the third shortest time span (. months) between the two filings

for % of the cases (see Figure ). At the other extreme, N.D. Cal., with a -day filing requirement, had the longest time span between the filing date of the complaint and the filing date

of the motion to certify (see Figure ).

We found no relationship between the local rule and the time within which judges rule on

motions to certify once filed. For example, judges took more time to issue % of their rulings

(between seven and fifteen months) in the two districts with rules requiring early filing of motions to certify than in the district with a rule requiring filing within  days (see Figure ).

Further, the time to settlement of the case did not appear to have any relationship to the local

rules or the absence of a local rule. Our data revealed that neither the length of time from the

court’s ruling on certification to settlement of the case nor the length of time from filing of the

case to settlement appeared to be influenced by the presence, absence, or provisions of a local

rule. For example, in one district with a -day rule, % of the cases took approximately threeand-one-half years from the filing of the complaint to settlement, a figure higher than that of

N.D. Ill., which has no rule. Cases in N.D. Cal. (-day rule) were disposed of more quickly

than cases in one jurisdiction with the -day rule (see Figure ). On the other hand, E.D. Pa.

(-day rule) disposed of % of its cases approximately one year faster than the other three

courts.

The time from ruling on certification to settlement followed similar paths. However, it must

be noted that there was a substantial amount of missing data regarding settlements in two districts, and our conclusions are based solely on the limited available data. Overall, courts settled

% of their cases in a range of fourteen to thirty-eight months after certification (see Figure ;

see alsoinfra § (c)). Again, early filing practices did not correspond with quicker resolution of

cases. It took over three years for one district with an early filing rule to dispose of its cases. But

E.D. Pa. again settled its cases more quickly after certification than the other three courts.

Data on the time from filing to termination in two districts with the ninety-day certification

rule showed termination of % of the courts’ cases in just over two years. Termination rates

were the same for the other district with the early certification rule and the district with no rule.

Data showed that % of those cases were terminated in . months (see Figure ).

Discussion. There has not been substantial compliance with the presumptive time limits of

the local rules. However, it should be noted that each local rule has a clause “unless extended

for good cause.” Moreover, delays in judicial rulings on motions to certify can thwart the apparent intent of the local rules. Finally, prompt settlement of the case appears to be affected by

The party seeking to maintain an action as a class action shall file a motion for determination whether it may be so

maintained pursuant to Rule (c)() within six months of the filing of that party’s first pleading, or at such later

time as the assigned judge may order or permit.
Findings 

many factors other than a rule regarding the starting point of the class certification process. In

all three of these areas one might reasonably expect other factors, such as the workload of the

court or the number of judicial vacancies, to affect the court’s output. Lack of compliance with

the rules in the first instance suggests that in many cases judges and litigants do not see such

rules as necessary to the management of the litigation before them.

(c) Decisions on merits in relation to certification

Summary. In this rather lengthy subsection we present data on the frequency and type of rulings on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. We also address the key issue

of the timing of such rulings in relation to rulings on class certification. Many assume that class

action litigation proceeds directly from certification of a class to settlement without judicial examination of the merits of the claims. The data presented in this section indicate otherwise.

Parties often filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and judges generally ruled on

those motions in a timely fashion, often dismissing a case in whole or in part. These rulings on

the merits often preceded rulings on class certification.

Background. As noted above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (c)() directs the court to

determine “[a]s soon as practicable” whether an action is to be maintained on behalf of or

against a class. The rule is silent on the timing of rulings on class certification in relation to rulings on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. The proposed amendment to Rule  that

the advisory committee on civil rules circulated in January  contained a new provision in

(d)()(B) authorizing a court to “decide a motion under Rule  or  before the certification

determination if the court concludes that the decision will promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and will not cause undue delay.”87

Some argue that it would be more economical for a court to rule on the merits of a putative

class action before committing resources to certifying and managing the case as a class action

and before imposing an obligation to notify the class.88 For the same or similar reasons, the advisory committee is currently considering a procedure that would require a preliminary assessment of the merits as part of a (b)() certification decision (see Appendix B, § (b)()(E)). As

the data below show, many judges in the four districts have not seen themselves as lacking

authority to rule on a motion to dismiss or to issue a sua sponte dismissal order before ruling on

class certification. Nor, apparently, did judges in a prior empirical study of (b)() class actions

show any reluctance to rule on the merits before ruling on certification.89 Having explicit

authority to so rule, however, might influence any judge who has felt constrained to avoid ruling

on such motions prior to class certification.

Federal courts of appeals have taken divergent views on whether a ruling on a motion to

dismiss or motion for summary judgment may precede a ruling on class certification. Some

. Appendix A, § (d)()(B); see also Appendix B, §  (d)().

. Note, The Rule (b)() Class Action: An Empirical Study,  Geo. L.J. ,  () (“A judge concerned

with the most efficient use of court time may be reluctant to consider certification and notice without some belief that

the case is strong on the merits.”) [hereinafter Georgetown Empirical Study].

. Id. at  (“In the preliminary stages of litigation, the court showed no reluctance to dismiss or grant summary judgment to defendants on the merits without consideration of the class issues.”). The study examined all Rule

(b)() class actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia between July , , and Dec. ,

.
 Class Actions

courts have interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline90 to

mandate that the determination of class status is to be made before the decision on the merits.91

The reasoning of such courts is that Rule (c)() requires that a class action seeking damages

be certified before a determination on the merits in order to prevent one-way intervention or

opting out by class members, who would know the outcome of the ruling on the merits.92 Other

courts have approved precertification rulings on the merits, reasoning that a party filing a pretrial motion to dismiss or for summary judgment may explicitly or implicitly waive the protection.93 As noted above, of the courts of appeals for the four district courts involved in this study,

the courts of appeals in the Third and Ninth Circuits have approved the practice of issuing precertification decisions on the merits, the Seventh Circuit has generally disapproved the practice,94 and the Eleventh Circuit has no published ruling on this point. Based on the rulings in

each circuit we would expect that there would be few, if any, precertification rulings on the

merits in N.D. Ill. and that E.D. Pa. and N.D. Cal. would have more such rulings.

Data. In three districts in the current study—putting aside N.D. Ill., which we will discuss

separately below—the rate of precertification95 rulings on motions to dismiss exceeded %. In

cases in which there were rulings on both motions to dismiss and motions to certify, approximately % of the motions to dismiss were decided before the motions to certify (see Figure

).96 In all four districts, the rate of precertification ruling on motions for summary judgment

was lower than the rate of precertification rulings on motions to dismiss (see Figure ), but this

may be a function of the differences between motions to dismiss and motions for summary

judgment. One would expect, for example, that the need for discovery would delay the filing of

summary judgment motions. In all courts, more than % of the rulings on summary judgment

preceded the class certification ruling, and in N.D. Cal., % (ten of fifteen) of the summary

judgment rulings preceded the class certification ruling (see Figure ).

The data partially support the expectation that N.D. Ill. would have fewer precertification

rulings because of case law in its court of appeals disapproving that practice. In fact, N.D. Ill.

had the lowest rate of precertification rulings on motions to dismiss (twenty-eight of forty-six, or

%; see Figure ) of the four districts but the second highest rate of precertification rulings on

motions for summary judgment (eleven of twenty-seven, or %; see Figure ). Nevertheless,

.  U.S.  ().

. Id. at –. See, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp.,  F.d ,  n. (th Cir. ) (quoting Peritz v.

Liberty Loan Corp.,  F.d  (th Cir. )), vacated,  U.S.  ().

. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union,  F.d ,  (th Cir.), cert. denied,  U.S.  (). See also

Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp.,  F.d , – (th Cir. ).

. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,  F.d  (d Cir.) (en banc) (explicit waiver; use of “test case” procedure

before certification ruling), cert. denied,  U.S.  (); Wright v. Schock,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (implicit

waiver where defendant “assumes the risk” of a limited effect of its summary judgment motion).

. See cases cited supra notes  & . But see Roberts v. American Airlines, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir.

) (dictum that defendants by filing a motion for summary judgment before a ruling on class certification

“assumed the risk that a judgment in their favor would not protect them from subsequent suits by other potential

class members”), cert. denied,  U.S.  ().

. We use the term “precertification” to mean before a ruling on certification, whether or not the ruling is to

grant or deny certification.

. These data do not include rulings on motions to dismiss that terminated the case without the need for a ruling

on class certification.
Findings 

N.D. Ill. judges issued a substantial number of precertification rulings on both types of motions,

which suggests that the law of the circuit regarding precertification rulings has not been the only

factor affecting the district judge’s decision about when to rule on motions to dismiss or for

summary judgment.97

As discussed in the last subsection, three of the districts have local rules regarding the timing

of motions to certify a class; E.D. Pa. and S.D. Fla. require filing a motion to certify a class

within  days and N.D. Cal. requires filing within  days.98 Still, in E.D. Pa., the percentage

of precertification rulings was substantial for motions to dismiss (thirty-one of forty, or %; see

Figure ), though not for motions for summary judgment (eight of twenty-six, or %; see Figure ). In N.D. Cal., the percentage of precertification rulings was higher for both motions to

dismiss (twenty-six of thirty-two, or %; see Figure ) and for motions for summary judgment

(ten of fifteen, or %; see Figure ).

Again, as discussed in the last subsection, compliance with the rules did not appear to have

been strict. Whether the local rules had an effect seemed doubtful. Assuming that there is any

effect of the local rules, one might expect that requiring a prompt motion to certify would have

more impact on the generally slower and more deliberate summary judgment process than on

motions to dismiss. As one might expect, under the -day deadline for filing of motions to

certify in N.D. Cal., rulings on summary judgment more often preceded rulings on certification

than under the -day deadline in E.D. Pa. But the timing may say more about the nature of

summary judgment than about the effects of the two local rules.

Whether a motion to dismiss was ruled on before or after a motion to certify did not appear

to be related to the grounds cited in the ruling on dismissal. At both stages, such motions generally referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (b)() or (b)() (see Table ), which were

the most frequently cited grounds in motions to dismiss generally (see Table ). Note, however, that, in all districts but N.D. Ill., a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Rule

(b)()) was far more likely to be ruled on before certification. In N.D. Ill., such a motion was

almost equally likely to be ruled on before or after certification. Perhaps the law of the circuit

has some influence.

In our preliminary report to the advisory committee,99 we discussed the greater likelihood of

a motion being denied before rather than after a ruling on certification. We observed what appeared to be a pattern of denying precertification motions to dismiss more frequently in E.D.

Pa. and in the time study sample of cases. This phenomenon also occurred to a minor extent in

N.D. Ill., but not in N.D. Cal. or S.D. Fla. (see Table ). If there is any relationship between

the timing of certification and the denial of motions to dismiss, it might be subject to local variations. Note also that the disproportionate denial of precertification motions compared to

. Note that Fed. R. Civ. P. (a) allows the filing of a motion for summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of  days from the commencement of the action . . . ,” and Fed. R. Civ. P. (b) calls for the filing of a motion

“before pleading.” Neither rule sets a standard for when such motions should be decided.

Note also that case law in at least two other circuits has concluded that the parties may waive their right to a ruling

on certification or may assume the risk that a precertification ruling on the merits may not have class-wide effect. See

discussion at supra notes  & .

. See supra notes  & .

. See Willging et al, Preliminary Report, supra note , at –.
 Class Actions

postcertification motions also extended to summary judgment rulings in E.D. Pa., but not in the

other courts (see Table ).

(i) Outcomes of rulings on dismissal and summary judgment and impact on the litigation

Background. In this subsection we present data about the outcomes of motions to dismiss and

motions for summary judgment and in the following subsection we will present data as to the

timing of the filings and rulings on such motions. Critics of the class action device, especially

critics of shareholders’ securities class actions, frequently referred to such cases as “strike

suits.”100 While it is difficult to find a definition of a strike suit that crisply distinguishes it from

most other types of litigation,101 two essential ingredients seem to be the frivolity of the allegations and the difficulty of obtaining a ruling on the merits. The ultimate test of the strike element

seems to be whether settlements are seen as being coerced because the defendants do not have a

cost-effective opportunity to litigate the merits (see infra § (a)).102

The timing and outcome of rulings on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are relevant to the question of whether the class action device is used as a strike suit. Examining such rulings should illuminate whether and when litigants in class actions have an opportunity to address the merits or frivolity of a claim. Motions to dismiss generally test the

sufficiency of the underlying legal theory of the case as applied to the facts alleged in the complaint, regardless of whether or not those facts can be proved. Motions for summary judgment

generally test the sufficiency of the factual basis for each element of the claim for relief, as shown

through affidavits, depositions, and other documentary materials. In general, if a claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss, its legal claims are probably not frivolous. Likewise, if a claim survives a motion for summary judgment, its material factual allegations are probably not frivolous.

The timing of rulings on such motions is relevant to the cost of obtaining a ruling on the

merits. If rulings can be obtained promptly, whether before or after class certification, parties

opposing the class have an opportunity to resolve the claims on their merits without being

forced to settle.

Data on outcomes. Overall, approximately two out of three cases in each of the four districts

had rulings on either a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal order (see Table ). In three of the four districts, more than one out of six cases included both rulings on dismissal and summary judgment, and in the fourth approximately one

case in nine had both types of rulings (see Table ).103

. See, e.g., Senate Staff Report, supra note , at  (“Each of the corporate executives described what they

characterized as ‘strike suits’ that were filed against their companies, generally following an adverse earnings announcement and resulting stock price drop.”).

. See, e.g., Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the Shareholder

Class Action,  Dick. L. Rev. ,  n. () (“The term ‘strike suit,’ coined in the s, refers to a derivative

action whose nuisance value gives it a settlement value independent of its merits.”); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling

Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits, in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball,  Minn. L. Rev. , 

n. () (“‘Strike suits’ are ‘those based on reckless charges and brought for personal gain.’”) (quoting Robert C.

Clark, Corporate Law § . ()).

. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note , at  (evidence that defendants gained dismissal or summary

judgment indicates that they did not feel “forced to settle even if the plaintiff’s claim is weak”). We discuss the issue of

whether class actions lead to coerced settlements infra § (a).

. An unknown number of those cases had multiple rulings on motions to dismiss and on motions for summary
Findings 

Of the cases in which a motion to dismiss was filed, rulings were issued in from % to %

of the cases depending on the district. That rate of ruling approximates the rates found in three

studies of motions to dismiss in general litigation.104 Rulings in which all or part of the complaint was dismissed amounted to %, %, %, and % of the rulings in E.D. Pa., S.D. Fla.,

N.D. Ill., and N.D. Cal., respectively (see Table ). Overall, about half of the cases in each

district included rulings dismissing all or part of the complaint.

The vast majority of motions for summary judgment were, as is typical,105 filed by defendants (see Figure  and Table ). In two districts, rulings on such motions were issued approximately % of the time and in the other two districts about % of the time (see Figure

), data that are comparable to and, overall, somewhat higher than the rate of rulings in a study

of general civil litigation.106 Such motions were granted in whole or in part in more than half of

the rulings (%–%) in three of the four districts studied. In the fourth, such motions were

granted in whole or in part % of the time (see Table ).

Combining all dismissals and summary judgment rulings for all cases in the four districts, we

find that approximately two of five cases were dismissed in whole or in part or had summary

judgment granted in whole or in part in two districts and that approximately three out of five

cases were so treated in the other two districts (see Figure ). But note that granting dismissal

or summary judgment does not necessarily end the litigation because an amended complaint

may be filed or the summary judgment may be partial or may not apply to all parties.

What effect do these rulings have on the litigation as a whole? In examining each class action

file we identified the event or events that resulted in terminating the litigation. The effects of

motions in each of the districts were strikingly similar: Approximately three out of ten cases in

each district were terminated as the direct result of a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (see Table ; see also Table ).

(ii) Timing of rulings on dismissal and summary judgment

Data on timing. One general standard of promptness is that motions should be decided within

six months or a reason given for the delay.107 Looking at the time from the filing of the first motion to dismiss to the first ruling on dismissal, the median time for rulings on motions to dismiss

ranged from . months to . months. Three of the four courts had a median response time of

less than four months (see Table ). Because the median time is a measure of the central tendency (i.e., the middle of the data) and we wish to discuss a wider range of the data, we also

calculated the time by which % of the motions had been decided and found that they were

resolved in ., ., ., and . months (see Table ).

judgment filed on behalf of various defendants. To keep the demands of the study manageable we limited our motions study to identifying the filing of the first motion of a given type and examining the outcome of the first ruling on

each type of motion.

. Thomas E. Willging, Use of Rule (b)() in Two Federal District Courts – (Federal Judicial Center )

(finding a rate of % and reporting rates of % and % from two other studies).

. See Joe S. Cecil & C. R. Douglas, Summary Judgment Practice in Three District Courts  (Federal Judicial

Center ) (defendants filed %, %, and % of the motions for summary judgment in the three district courts

studied).

. Id. (finding that about two-thirds of the motions for summary judgment produced rulings).

.  U.S.C §  () (motions pending for more than six months need to be included in a semiannual report under the Civil Justice Reform Act).
 Class Actions

The timing of rulings on summary judgment follow a similar pattern, but involve generally

longer time spans than the rulings on motions to dismiss. The median time from the filing of the

first motion for summary judgment to the first summary judgment ruling was less than four

months in two courts and more than seven months in the other two courts (see Table ). Seventy-five percent of all motions for summary judgment were resolved in ., ., ., and .

months in the four courts (see Table ). The two slower courts were also slower in ruling on

motions to dismiss.

Discussion. In analyzing the issue of whether large numbers of class actions are strike suits,

our data yield mixed results. On the one hand, motions to dismiss are filed and granted more

frequently in class action litigation than in ordinary civil litigation.108 Such data indicate that a

relatively large number of cases are found to be without legal or factual merit, or both. Comparison with data from a  study of (b)() class actions indicates, however, that the rate of dismissal and summary judgment is lower in the current study than it was during – in one

federal district court.109

On the other hand, defendants generally appear to have had an opportunity to test the merits

of the litigation and obtain a judicial ruling in a reasonably timely manner, particularly for motions to dismiss. Testing the factual sufficiency of claims via summary judgment, however, may

take more than a year for some rulings in some courts.

For at least one-third of the cases in our study, judicial rulings on motions terminated the

litigation without a settlement, coerced or otherwise. The settlement value of other cases was

undoubtedly influenced by rulings granting motions for partial dismissal or partial summary

judgment and by rulings denying such motions. Such merits-related influences on settlement

value, however, seem not to fall within the broadest definition of a strike suit.

(d) Simultaneous motions to certify and approve settlement

Background. The question is how frequently do courts approve settlements which include the

initial certification of a class? As a general principle, settlement negotiations in class actions are

deferred until the court has ruled on class certification. However, on occasion, parties will enter

into settlement agreements before a class is certified. Because of their advantages courts have

. In an empirical study of the use of Fed. R. Civ. P. (b)() in two federal district courts, that rule was found

to account for the disposition of % to % of all cases in the sample. Willging, supra note , at –. Motions were

filed in % of the cases in the sample and approximately % of the rulings resulted in a total disposition of the case.

Id. An earlier study by the Center found higher rates of filing (%) and disposition (% compared to % in the

later study), as well as a higher rate of granting of motions (%) in a sample of cases in six federal district courts. Id.

at – (citing Paul Connolly & Patricia Lombard, Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Motions (Federal

Judicial Center )).

. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note , at  (showing that % [ of ] of class actions were disposed of favorably to defendants by dismissal or summary judgment). Excluding four voluntary dismissals which we

would not have counted as rulings on dismissal, the rate is % ( of ), compared to our rate of approximately

%.
Findings 

sometimes approved settlement classes.110 But settlement classes generally warrant closer judicial scrutiny than settlements where the class certification has been litigated.111

Data. Across the four districts, a total of  cases were certified in some form or fashion. Of

this total  cases (%) were certified unconditionally and  cases (%) were certified for

settlement purposes only. Of those  cases,  (%)—approximately % of all certified class

actions—contained information or docket entries indicating that a proposed settlement was

submitted to the court before or simultaneously with the first motion to certify.

The twenty-eight cases with simultaneous motions to certify and approve settlement were

filed in three districts. One district had fourteen cases or % of all cases, eight of which were

securities cases. The next district had seven cases (%), four of which were other statutory

actions. The third district also had seven cases (%), four of which were civil rights actions

(see Table ). In twenty-four of the twenty-eight cases (%), the court approved the settlement without changes. In the remaining cases, the court approved the settlement but with some

changes. (See alsoinfra § (b).)

Are there differences in the two types of classes certified for settlement purposes, that is,

cases certified with or without a simultaneous settlement? Our data were especially limited in

this area because information was missing for numerous cases, and as a result no reliable conclusions can be drawn from them. We found that the (b)() class was the most frequently certified class in both types of scenarios. The (b)() class was the second most frequently certified

class (see Table ). These results parallel our finding that the (b)() class is the most frequent

type of class sought and certified. (See supra § (c).)

(e) Changes in certification rulings

Background. In this subsection we look at the frequency with which courts change the definition of the class or the direction of their certification rulings. The Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, indicates that “[w]hether a class is certified and how its membership is defined can

often have a decisive effect not only on the outcome of the litigation but also on its management.

It determines the stakes, the structure of trial and methods of proof, the scope and timing of

discovery and motion practice, and the length and cost of the litigation.”112 The Manual also

warns that “[u]ndesirable consequences may follow when an expansive class, formed on insufficient information, is later decertified or redefined.”113

Data. Of  certified cases, counsel in  (%) cases filed either a motion to reconsider the

court’s decision or a motion to decertify the class. The courts’ responses to these motions varied.114 In  (%) of the  cases the court affirmed its certification ruling. In  (%) of the 

cases the court denied reconsideration of the matter altogether (see Table ).

. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick,  F.d  (d Cir. ); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig.,  F.d 

(th Cir. ). Cf. Plummer v. Chemical Bank,  F.d  (d Cir. ); In re Franklin Bank Sec. Litig., 

F.d  (d Cir. ).

. MCL d, supra note , § ..

. Id. § ., at .

. Id. § ., at .

. Outcomes included: denying reconsideration, affirming certification, reversing certification, modifying certification deferring reconsideration, taking no action, and lastly, taking some other form of action.
 Class Actions

Of the districts’ noncertified cases, in only % did counsel file a motion to reconsider the

court’s decision. The court denied the reconsideration motion in % of those cases. In the remaining % of the cases, the court either took some other action or did not rule on the request.

() Certification Disputes

In this section we first address the questions: How much time is spent contesting certification?

Are there correlations between the subjects of litigation and certification disputes? Is much effort devoted to contesting the choice between (b)(), (b)(), and (b)() classes, and does this

correlate to the subject of the litigation?115

(a) How many certification contests were there and how much time did counsel

spend opposing certification?

Background. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure , class certification is left to the

sound discretion of the district court.116 Because judicial discretion is not immutable, disputes

inevitably arise. At this stage, the court does not have the responsibility of adjudicating the

merits of the class or individual claims (see supra § (c)).

Data. In three of the four study courts, defendants opposed certification in slightly over

%117 of the cases with a motion or sua sponte order regarding class certification. Defendants

opposed % of the motions or orders in the other district (see Figure ).

We have no reliable measure to estimate the time counsel spend contesting certification.

Some have suggested that the length of the brief is an adequate indicator, but it is far from clear

that more pages equates to more time, especially when the subject matter has become routinized

(see supra § (a)). Notwithstanding this, because of the expressed interest in time spent on certification contests, we looked at brief lengths and at whether there appeared to be a relationship

between the length of the opposition brief and the outcome of the certification dispute, that is,

whether the case was certified.

We found that in at least % of cases where opposition to certification was indicated counsel in the four districts submitted opposition memoranda (see Figure ). Further, in cases for

which information was available, % of the opposition brief lengths ranged from twenty-seven

pages or less in one district to sixty-one pages or less in another, with median lengths ranging

from twelve pages to twenty-six pages. Briefs supporting certification in disputed cases were

somewhat longer; % ranged from thirty-five pages or less in one district to seventy-six pages

or less in another, with median lengths ranging from eighteen to forty pages (see Figure ).

A relationship, although modest, appeared to exist between opposition brief lengths and

whether a case was eventually certified. In % of the cases in three districts, opposition brief

lengths were longer in certified cases (with differences of three pages in one district, . in the

second, and thirty-one in the third).

How does the length of judicial opinions in contested cases that were ultimately certified

(certified dispute cases) compare to contested cases that were not certified (noncertified dispute

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. Zeidman v. Ray McDermott & Co.,  F.d , – (th Cir. ); B Wright et al., supra note ,

§ .

. This percentage is lower than the time study figure, which was %. See Willging et al., supra note , at .
Findings 

cases)? Should we expect to find lengthier opinions in certified cases? The length of opinions in

certified dispute cases were somewhat lengthier than those in noncertified cases, but not dramatically so. We found that in % of the certified dispute cases, opinion lengths ranged from

thirteen to twenty-four pages as compared to three to nineteen pages for noncertified cases (see

Figure ).118

Opposition to certification was indicated in twenty-seven different nature-of-suit categories

in the four districts. In twelve of these different case types, opposition to certification appeared

only once. Not surprisingly, because of the amount in controversy in many securities cases and

because of their overall prevalence in the four districts, in two of the four districts opposition

was most prevalent in these cases. In the third district, the number of securities and prisoner

civil rights cases were the same and in the fourth district most opposition arose in other civil

rights cases (see Table ). When we combined civil rights cases—other civil rights, jobs, accommodations and welfare—they accounted for the most opposition in two districts (see Table

). In another district, opposition was found equally in prisoner civil rights, securities, and

other civil rights cases.

(b) Was there a relationship between disputes over certification and the nature of

suit?

Data. Most of the contested cases included arguments about three of the four traditional Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (a) issues: typicality, representativeness, and commonality. Disputes addressing representativeness and typicality occurred with almost equal frequency. Arguments about the other traditional issue, the size of the class (numerosity), occurred less frequently (see Figure ). Most disputes, except numerosity, arose in securities, civil rights, and

labor cases. Numerosity disputes arose most frequently in civil rights and labor cases. Looking

at each type of dispute separately, we found:

Representativeness disputes. Disputes regarding the ability of the representatives to adequately represent the class occurred most often, appearing in  of the  cases (%) in which

there was opposition to certification. Most of these disputes arose in securities ( cases, or

.%), civil rights ( cases, or .%), and labor ( cases, or .%) cases.

Typicality disputes. Disputes addressing the typicality of the class representatives’ claims

arose in eighty-seven cases (%) and similarly appeared most often in securities (twenty-six

cases, or .%), civil rights (twenty-four cases, or .%), and labor (thirteen cases, or .%)

cases.

Commonality disputes. Disputes about the presence of common issues of law and fact appeared in seventy-four cases (%) and again were generally found in securities (twenty-one

cases, or .%), civil rights (nineteen cases, or .%), and labor (twelve cases, or .%) cases.

Numerosity disputes. Numerosity disputes arose less frequently than the other types of disputes, occurring in forty-nine cases (%). Such disputes generally appeared in civil rights

(twenty-one cases, or .%) and labor (six cases, or .%) cases.

. Time study data revealed that the average amount of judicial time spent on certification rulings was about five

hours. The average ruling was approximately seven pages. The median length was one page but some were as long as

twenty-five to thirty-five pages. Willging et al., supra note , at .
 Class Actions

(c) How much effort was devoted to the choice between (b)(), (b)(), and (b)()

classes and did the effort vary by nature of suit?

Background. One of the assumptions set forth in the September  report of the American

Bar Association’s Section of Litigation Special Committee on Class Action Improvements is

that disputes over the type of class to be certified are frequent and problematic.119 As a result of

these disputes, the committee indicated that “[t]he trifurcation created by present subdivision

(b) places a premium on pleading distinctions with important procedural consequences flowing

to the victor.”120 Further, the committee recommended eliminating the three subsections of

subdivision (b) “in favor of a unified rule permitting any action meeting the prerequisites of

Rule (a) to be maintained as a class action if the court finds ‘that a class action is superior to

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’”121

A central feature of the preliminary draft proposal of Rule  circulated by the Advisory

Committee on Civil Rules in January  was the merger of current subdivisions (b)(), (),

and () into a unitary standard.122 This standard would have applied a single set of certification

factors to all cases and allowed trial judges discretion in designing class actions suited to the

needs of particular cases, including “the power to certify different class actions for different

parts of the same case,” less stringent forms of notice for (b)( ) classes, some form of notice in a

(b)() or (b)() class action, and an opt-out right in (b)() or (b)() class actions.123 “This new

power over opt-out should make it easier for trial judges to experiment with novel opt-out

structures. For example, a judge might certify a mandatory class for liability and an opt-out class

for damages on the theory that the damage phase triggers a weightier litigant–autonomy interest

than liability or on the theory that [permitting an] opt-out for damages is necessary to protect

high stakes plaintiffs from exploitation.”124

Not everyone agrees that there should be a collapsing of categories as set forth in the 

draft proposal. Some argue that the elimination of the Rule (b) categories would () have

ramifications both for the opt-out provisions and the notice requirements of the existing rule

and () impact the legitimacy lent by the traditions established by (b)() classes and the moral

tones established by the civil rights cases’ uses of (b)() classes. Additionally, others believe that

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at  (“With such procedural consequences at stake, it is no

surprise that enormous amounts of energy and money are often devoted to the characterization battle, and difficult

questions command the attention of the courts as the parties struggle at the outset of a case to decide whether the

presence of an ‘individual issue’ defeats a claim to (b)() status . . . .”). See also Tober v. Charnita, Inc.,  F.R.D. 

(M.D. Pa. ); Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv.,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Ill. ).

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at .

. Id. The Committee Note of Proposed Rule  (see Appendix A) suggests that the rationale behind the collapsing of categories or proposing a unified rule was simplification:

This structure has frequently resulted in time-consuming procedural battles either because the operative facts did not fit neatly into any one of the three categories, or because more than one category

could apply and the selection of the proper classification would have a major impact on whether and

how the case should proceed as a class action.

. Cooper, supra note .

. Robert G. Bone, Rule  Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action,  Rev. Litig. ,  ().

. Id. at  n. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness

and Efficiency in the Large Class Action,  U. Chi. L. Rev. , – () (analyzing various conditions on opt

out)).
Findings 

the current subdivisions have historical roots that enable the courts to draw upon the jurisprudence developed from those cases. A change in the rule could very well lead to unpredictable

results.

If the language of the  draft proposal were adopted, courts would be able to allow class

members to opt out of (b)() and (b)() classes, and might deny members the opportunity to opt

out of a (b)() class, thereby preventing individuals from pursuing individual litigation. Additionally, “[e]liminating the three categories is likely to create greater procedural complexity because the court must then determine in every case whether notice and opt out requirements

should apply, and if so, under what conditions.”125 “This subjective standard . . . would invite

protracted procedural battles about what the parties consider to be ‘superior,’ ‘fair’ and

‘efficient.’ The standard’s inherent subjectivity would also practically assure that different

judges applying their own views of superiority, fairness and efficiency would render decisions

that litigants would inevitably find to be inconsistent and confusing.”126

Some courts have experimented with their application of Rule  and have employed judicial

discretion in applying the subsections of Rule (b) more flexibly.127

Data. We examined the extent to which the parties and the courts address the class-type

issue and found that in all four districts the parties infrequently address the issue. In the 

cases for which information was available, the parties’ arguments in  cases (%) did not address whether one type or another should be certified. In  cases (%) the portion of the

briefs devoted to such arguments was less than % of the size of the briefs. In the remaining 

cases arguments regarding class type were less than % of the size of the briefs in  cases and

between % to % in the remaining case.

Courts address the type of class to be certified less frequently than the parties.128 In the 

cases for which information was available, in approximately % of the cases the court did not

address the class-type issue at all. However, in the  cases where counsel did raise the classtype issue, the courts in  of those cases (%) addressed the issue. Of those  rulings,  devoted less than % of the opinion to the class-type issue and  devoted % to %.

Discussion. Data collected from the four districts do not support the American Bar Association’s earlier stated assumption that disputes over the type of class to be certified are frequent.

We cannot tell from these data whether the disputes over the type of class in this minority of

cases might be problematic. Whether or not having disputes over the type of class in % of the

opposition briefs and in about % of the judicial opinions supports a proposed rule change is

clearly a question for the special committee.

. Lawyers for Civil Justice et al., Comments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure , at ,  (Apr. , )

(unpublished report) (on file with the Research Division, Federal Judicial Center).

. Id. at .

. See, e.g., Bell v. American Title Ins. Co.,  Cal. Rptr.  (Cal. Ct. App. ); Boggs v. Divested Atomic

Corp.,  F.R.D.  (S.D. Ohio ).

. Cf. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note , at  (“Orders granting certification seldom specif[y]

which category of rule  (b) . . . [is] involved.”).
 Class Actions

() Plaintiff Classes

(a) Did defendants ever seek and win certification of a plaintiff class?

Data. Defendants almost never sought certification of a plaintiff class. In less than % of the

motions filed was the defendant seeking such certification. Our data uncovered one such motion in a tort (personal property-other fraud) case which was subsequently certified. In approximately % of the cases with certification motions, plaintiffs were seeking to certify a

plaintiffs class. In over % of the remaining cases (see Figure , other category), the parties

generally stipulated to a plaintiff class or settlement class.

(b) How frequently did defendants acquiesce in certification of a plaintiff class by

failing to oppose or by stipulating to class certification?

Data. In half of the  certified cases, defendants acquiesced in certification of a plaintiff class

by either failing to oppose the motion or sua sponte order for certification or by stipulating to

class certification. Our data did not reveal defendants’ basis or rationale for acquiescing.

() Defendant classes129

Background. The core questions are: How common are defendant classes? Are there identifiable but narrow settings in which they are most likely?130 Case law and commentary give us

more information than the empirical data in the study, which simply confirms that use of defendant classes is rare. Defendant class actions have been long recognized as a valid procedural

device “whereby an entire class of defendants can be bound to a judgment although some individual members did not participate in the litigation but were represented by named class representatives.”131 It appears on its face that Rule  allows for the certification of both defendant

and plaintiff classes.132 However, certification of defendant classes is presumed to be uncommon.133

Though perhaps uncommon, case law and commentary show that defendant classes have

been used in various types of cases. The most common use is reported to be “in suits against

local or state enforcement officials challenging the constitutionality of state law or practice.”134

Defendant classes have also been employed “in patent infringement cases in which a common

. Note, Defendant Class Actions,  Harv L. Rev. ,  ():

The traditional defendant class action is limited to the resolution of issues that are perfectly common to all the

class members. As such, it is essentially a device that permits the offensive assertion of collateral estoppel on the

common issues against non-parties, rather than a method of conducting a unitary proceeding that determines the

rights and liabilities of each class member represented in the suit.

. Cooper, supra note , at –. Professor Cooper also asks a number of questions about how defendant

classes work. Given the paucity of data on the subject, we are unable to respond meaningfully to those questions.

. Robert E. Holo, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule  and a Proposed Solution,  U.C.L.A. L.

Rev. ,  ().

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (a) provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative

parties. . . .”

. See DeAllaume v. Perales,  F.R.D. ,  (S.D.N.Y. ) (“Although Rule  provides for defendant

as well as plaintiff classes, certification of a defendant class is rare.”).

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.
Findings 

question of patent validity is litigated against a defendant class of alleged infringers.”135 Case

law also reveals that defendant classes have been upheld in civil rights,136 criminal justice,137

mental health,138 and securities cases.139

Data. Our data support the earlier assertion that defendant classes are not common. In the

four districts, there were a total of four motions requesting certification of a defendant class,

three filed by plaintiffs and one filed by defendants. Of the  certified cases in the four districts, N.D. Ill. was the only one with a certified defendant class. Certification had been sought

by the plaintiffs in a civil rights case. After reviewing that case file we were unable to determine

whether the defendant was a willing representative for the class, nor could we ascertain the extent of compensation for such an undertaking.

() Issues Classes and Subclasses

In this section we address the questions: How frequently, and in what settings, are issues classes

[i.e., cases in which some but not all of the issues are certified for class treatment] used? Subclasses? How diligent and sophisticated is the inquiry into possible conflicts of interest within a

class . . .?140 We found no issues classes and few subclasses. We also found that the ability of

the representative to represent the class was frequently disputed on the ground that the named

plaintiffs had a potential conflict of interest with other class members.

Background on issues classes and subclasses. Rule (c)() authorizes the court () to allow a

class action to be maintained with respect to particular issues, or () to divide the class into appropriate subclasses.141 Subdivision (c)() is helpful in assisting the courts with the ability to

restructure complex cases in order to meet the other requirements for maintaining a class action, such as the superiority and manageability requirements.142

All four of the districts, E.D. Pa.,143 S.D. Fla.,144 N.D. Ill.,145 and N.D. Cal.,146 have case

law reflecting the courts’ willingness to certify an issues class if the other Rule  requirements

are fulfilled.

. Id. at - (citing Dale Elecs., Inc. v. RCL, Inc.,  F.R.D.  (D.N.H. ); Research Corp. v. Pfister

Associated Growers, Inc.,  F. Supp.  (N.D. Ill. ); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs.,

Inc.,  F. Supp.  (N.D. Ill. )).

. See, e.g., Callahan v. Wallace,  F.d  (th Cir. ); Doss v. Long,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Ga. );

Florida Businessmen for Free Enter. v. Florida,  F. Supp.  (N.D. Fla. ), aff’d sub nom. Florida Businessmen for Free Enter. v. Hollywood,  F.d  (th Cir. ).

. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh,  U.S.  (); Marcera v. Chinlund,  F.R.D.  (W.D. N.Y. ).

. See, e.g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare,  F.R.D.  (E.D. Pa.), rev’d on other

grounds,  U.S.  (); Kendall v. True,  F. Supp.  (W.D. Ky. ).

. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig.,  F.R.D.  (S.D. Fla. ). The plaintiff successfully

sought certification of a defendant class in an action charging violation of federal securities and RICO laws; court

indicated that the “certification of defendant classes has gained considerable acceptance in securities fraud litigation.”

Id. at . See also In re Itel Sec. Litig.,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Cal. ) (court indicated that the existence of a plaintiff

class often enhances the likelihood of certification of a defendant class).

. Cooper, supra note , at . On this topic, Professor Cooper also raised a series of questions about how issues classes work. Given the absence of issues classes in our study, we cannot address those questions.

. See B Wright et al., supra note , § , at .

. Id.

. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,  F.d ,  (d Cir. ) (finding certification of the
 Class Actions

Additionally, case law also reveals that subclasses have been used in E.D. Pa.,147 S.D.

Fla.,148 N.D. Ill.,149 N.D. Cal.150 and in a variety of substantive case types.

class for purposes of determining liability entirely proper in an action seeking injunctive relief against the continued

maintenance of state school and hospital facility catering to persons suffering from mental retardation); Samuel v.

University of Pittsburgh,  F.d ,  (d Cir. ) (finding decertification of a class action in a case attacking a

state-wide residency rule to be in error when the court could have used Rule (c)()(A) and (B) to better manage the

class); McQuilken v. A&R Dev. Corp.,  F. Supp. , ,  (E.D. Pa. ) (utilizing Rule (c)()(A) to

limit the issues in a class action to recover damages to class members’ property by construction activity); Griffen v.

Harris,  F.R.D. ,  (E.D. Pa. ) (holding that in light of Rule (c)()(A) the district court should reconsider

its prior ruling on class certification, in an action challenging the Department of Housing and Urban Development

administration of rent supplement program, as it pertains to damages); Swarb v. Lennox,  F. Supp. , 

(E.D. Pa. ) (ordering class certification for a limited class with limited issues in a case involving the legality of the

Pennsylvania judgment by confession practice), aff’d,  U.S.  ().

. Appleyard v. Wallace,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (reversing the district court’s decision to deny class

certification in a suit brought for the denial of Medicaid benefits; court should have considered Rule (c)()); In re

Nissan Antitrust Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (affirming district court’s decision to separate out certain

issues for class treatment in an antitrust action), cert. denied,  U.S.  ().

. Denberg v. United States,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (finding that although the district court did not

have jurisdiction over the action challenging decision of the Railroad Retirement Board to deny benefits to husbands

of retired railroad workers, it was appropriate for the district court to utilize Rule (c)()(A) in order to separate out

particular issues for class treatment), cert. denied,  U.S.  (); Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., No. -C-, 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *,  (N.D. Ill. Jan. , ) (finding the use of Rule  (c)()(A) appropriate in a securities

action); Skelton v. GMC, - Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶,  (N.D. Ill. ) (holding that the common issue appropriate for class-wide treatment in a warranty case is the issue of whether a design or manufacturing defect

breached the implied warranty of merchantability). But see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th

Cir. ) (reversing district court’s decision to certify a class action as to the issue of negligence only in a product

liability/negligence suit because district judge “exceed[ed] the permissible bounds of discretion in the management of

federal litigation”), cert. denied, No. -,  U.S. LEXIS  (Oct. , ).

. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No. C-,  U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *- (N.D. Cal. Mar. ,

) (certifying pursuant to Rule (c)()(A) specific common issues for class treatment in a product liability/negligence suit); Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,  F.R.D. ,  (N.D. Cal. ) (excluding

plaintiff’s deterrence claims for class certification in a case under the Americans with Disabilities Act); In re Activision

Securities Litig.,  F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Cal. ) (certifying defendant underwriter class with respect to particular issues); In re Gap Store Sec. Litig.,  F.R.D. ,  (N.D. Cal. ) (certifying defendant class of underwriters as to particular issues); I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar,  F.R.D. ,  (N.D. Cal. ) (bifurcating issues in a civil

rights action pursuant to Rule (c)()(A)). But see In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th

Cir. ) (holding that “the few issues that might be tried on a class basis in this case balanced against issues that

must be tried individually, indicate that the time saved by a class action may be relatively insignificant”), cert. denied,

 U.S.  ().

. Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh,  F.d ,  (d Cir. ) (holding that the district court abused

its discretion by not investigating into the possible usefulness of subclasses before decertification was ordered); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., No. -,  U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * (E.D. Pa. June , )

(certifying a subclass in a case against the Housing Assistance Program); Troutman v. Cohen,  F. Supp. , 

(E.D. Pa. ) (certifying subclasses for class action involving challenges to the Medical Assistance Skilled Care

Regulations); Pennsylvania v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’r,  F. Supp. ,  (E.D. Pa. ) (certifying subclasses for a discrimination class action); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia,  F.R.D. ,  (E.D. Pa. )

(certifying subclasses in a civil action class action); Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Comm’n,  F. Supp. ,  (E.D.

Pa. ) (certifying subclasses in an action challenging certain policies and practices of the Philadelphia Gas Works);

Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,  F.R.D.  (E.D. Pa. ) (certifying subclasses in a

Sherman antitrust class action); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp.,  F.R.D. ,  (E.D. Pa. ) (certifying two
Findings 

Data on issues classes and subclasses. Our results uncovered no issues classes in the four districts. The cases that were certified appeared to encompass all the issues in question. We had,

for example, no mass tort cases where issues of fault and general causation might be suitable for

class treatment, leaving other issues, for example, proximate cause or damages, to be determined on a case-by-case analysis. Finding no issues classes is not surprising from a judicial

economy standpoint because issues classes can create additional litigation and courts are likely

to use issues classes only when the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of promoting additional litigation.151

Our data revealed a total of ten subclasses in the four districts. Each district except for one

certified three subclasses. Securities cases had the largest number of subclasses—five. Four of

the remaining five subclasses were found in civil rights cases (see Figure ). In these cases subclasses were often used to separate out different class members who either purchased stock under different circumstances than the rest of the class or were discriminated against by a defendant during a different time than the class period.

Our data showed that judges have used subclasses but not issues classes. It appears that

courts, or at least the ones in the four districts, were more comfortable in certifying subclasses in

cases where members held divergent or antagonistic interests. Allowing such subclasses in effect

brings to closure all issues in a class, thereby terminating the entire litigation.

Background on conflicts of interest. As a general principle, class representatives’ interests

should not conflict with the interests of the class.152 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (a)() “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on

behalf of all only if . . . () the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

subclasses in a securities class action).

. Appleyard v. Wallace,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (vacating district court’s decision to deny class certification and suggesting that the court should have considered using Rule (c)()). But see Mathews v. Diaz,  U.S. ,

 () (finding that the district court in the Southern District of Florida lacked jurisdiction over the class action

involving the Social Security Act and the class and subclass as certified were too broadly defined).

. Williams v. State Bd. of Elections,  F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Ill. ) (certifying subclasses in a civil

rights class action); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Method Elec., Inc.,  F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Ill. )

(certifying subclasses in a patent class action).

. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank,  F.d ,  n.  (th Cir. ) (finding subclassification appropriate in a usury class action suit); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No. C -,  U.S. Dist.

LEXIS , at * (N.D. Cal. March , ) (certifying subclass in product liability/negligence class action); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Serv., Inc.,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Cal. ) (certifying subclasses in class action against brokerage

houses). But see Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (finding that the district court had no authority to create a subclass in a Section  class action violation); Mendoza v. United States,

 F.d , – (th Cir. ) (affirming district court’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ subclass motion), cert.

denied,  U.S.  (); Wilkinson v. FBI,  F.R.D.  (N.D. Cal. ) (denying subclass in constitutional

class action challenge for failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement).

. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of issues classes, see B Wright et al., supra note ,

§ , at .

. But see Zinberg v. Washington Bancorp, Inc.,  F.R.D. ,  (D.N.J. ) (the court found that the

“[f]act that the named plaintiff in a securities fraud action purchased her stock through a broker who was her stepfather and who resided in the same household with her did not produce a conflict of interest between her and other

members of the class nor show that she had access to inside information not available to the general public, and did

not preclude finding that her claims were typical of those of members of the class.”)
 Class Actions

claims or defenses of the class . . . .” In some instances a party’s claim of representative status

will only be defeated if the conflict goes to the very subject matter of the litigation.153

Data on conflicts of interest. In the majority of cases where typicality of the class was disputed, defendants generally contended that plaintiffs’ claims were distinct from those of the

class they sought to represent, or were subject to a defense unique to the representative. Arguments addressing actual conflicts of interest between the representative and class members occurred infrequently. Such arguments were raised in general terms and usually addressed the

possibility of conflicts between class representatives and absent class members or alleged

conflicts in plaintiffs’ proposed class definition.

Under Rule (a)(), a representative party is expected to fairly and adequately protect the

interest of the class. In some instances, defendants might allege that a representative cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule (a)() if a potential conflict of interest exists with the other class

members. The ability of the representative to represent the class was often disputed on the

ground that the named plaintiffs had a potential conflict of interest with other class members.

The general types of conflicts found in our study included but were not limited to:

. Cases generally alleging inadequacy of representation due to antagonistic interests of the class representatives to class members whose rights and interests they purport to represent (e.g., named

plaintiffs wanted to withdraw their pension contributions whereas other members wanted to wait

for monthly retirement benefits).

. Cases where the conflict centered around some class members not being entitled to the same relief.

. A case where the dispute centered around the competition between lead counsel and another

plaintiff’s lawyer to represent the class. Lead counsel for the class submitted a proposal to continue to serve as lead counsel that included a $, cap on costs and expenses to be reimbursed from the fund. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the cap committed counsel to seek an early

settlement and represented a powerful incentive to settle the case and that lead counsel had bought

an interest in the litigation and that interest conflicted with the class.

. A case where counsel sought to act simultaneously as the class representative and as class counsel.

A potential conflict of interest existed between her duty as representative to the class and her economic interest in attorneys’ fees.

Courts addressed these conflicts in a variety of ways, sometimes substituting class representatives (see supra § (b)), sometimes denying class certification, and sometimes overruling the

objection.

. A Wright et al., supra note , § , at  & Supp.  (citing Michaels v. Ambassador Group, Inc., 

F.R.D.  (E.D.N.Y. ) (“any conflict of interest arising between members of proposed class in an action for alleged violations of Securities Exchange Act section (b), from different times of purchase and sale, was minimal

when compared to substantial questions common to all members of class, and any conflicts were too peripheral to

mandate denial of class certification motion”); United States v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Employment Sec.,  F.

Supp. ,  (D.R.I. ) (“[T]he fact that the class representative may be entitled to back pay in an amount different from that owed other class members does not automatically destroy the adequacy of her representation, nor

create any conflict among class members going to the ‘very subject matter of the litigation.’”)).
Findings 

() Notice

(a) What types of notice, in what time frame, have been required in (b)(), (b)(), and

(b)() actions?

Background. Two different situations may call for notice: class certification and settlement. Regarding notice of certification, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (c)() mandates that, “[i]n any

class action maintained under subdivision (b)(), the court shall direct to the members of the

class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” In (b)() and (b)() actions, district

judges have discretion to provide notices whenever they deem it necessary “for the protection

of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the actions.”154 The Manual for

Complex Litigation, Third indicates that notice of certification “may at times be advisable for

(b)() and (b)() classes.”155

Regarding notice of settlement, Rule (e) provides, without exception, that “notice of the

proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class . . . .” Courts and

commentators have concluded that “notice of [voluntary] dismissal or compromise is mandatory in all cases under Rule .”156

Rule  does not specify a time within which notice must be sent, but the Manual for Complex Litigation, Third suggests that “notice should ordinarily be given promptly after the certification order is issued.”157 In some instances, class members or their representatives and,

perhaps, defendants may have found it to be in their interests to delay notice, for example, when

a settlement158 or disposition of the liability issues is imminent. If the class prevails on liability,

the ruling might have the effect of shifting the burden of paying the cost of notifying the class.159

If the case settles, the parties can use the settlement agreement to specify their allocation of notice costs. If the class does not prevail on liability, however, the ruling will not bind class members who did not have notice of class certification.160

In its  study, the ABA Section of Litigation’s Special Committee on Class Action Improvements observed that Rule  imposes notice requirements exceeding those demanded by

the Constitution and that Rule (c)() “frequently obliges a court to require the class representative to advance huge sums of money as a precondition to further prosecution of the action.”161 The proposed amendment to Rule  that the advisory committee circulated in 

would give the district judge discretion to require “appropriate notice” (see Appendix A, Pro-

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (d)(). See B Wright et al., supra note , § , at .

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at . The purpose of the notice is to “help bring to light conflicting interests or antagonistic positions within the class . . . and dissatisfaction with the fairness and adequacy of representation.” Id. Similarly, Newberg and Conte assert that notice in such cases is “frequently advisable.”  Newberg &

Conte, supra note , § ., at -.

. B Wright et al., supra note , § , at  & n..

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at .

. Id. at –.

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.

. Failure to give adequate notice may mean that members of the class will not be bound by the judgment. B

Wright et al., supra note , § .

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at  (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline,  U.S. 

()).
 Class Actions

posed Rule ()  (c)()). In making that decision, the judge would be directed to take into

account a host of factors, including “the expense and difficulties of providing actual notice to all

class members, and the nature and extent of any adverse consequences that class members may

suffer from a failure to receive actual notice.”162 In this subsection we will present data on the

current practices in the four districts, relate those practices to the current rules, and discuss the

relevance of the data to proposed reforms.

Data. Notice of class certification or of the settlement or voluntary dismissal of a class action

was sent to class members in at least % of the certified class actions in each of the four districts

(see Figure ). Although notice of certification before settlement is not required in (b)() and

(b)() actions, the majority of such cases included some notice (see Table ). Generally the

notice in those cases was notice of settlement, but a sizable minority included personal notice of

class certification.163 As noted above, Rule (e) calls for notice of settlement in all certified

class actions. In six settled (b)() class actions, however, no notice to the class or hearing regarding the settlement was indicated on the record.164

In the (b)() certified class actions, notice of certification or settlement was sent in all but six

of the cases in the study.165 As we discuss below in this subsection, notice appeared to have

been delayed in sixteen certified (b)() actions in which the first notice was a notice of settlement. Our data do not reveal reasons for the lack of notice, but there are any number of possibilities, ranging from concerns about the cost of notice to the parties’ inadvertence or neglect. In

five of the six cases, the failure to notify the class of the certification appears to have deprived

class members of an opportunity to participate in the action before a settlement or a ruling on

the merits166 and may as well have deprived the defendants of a final judgment of class-wide effect.167 For further discussion of notice in settlement classes, see infra § (a).

Discussion. Failure to provide notice to the class in these cases seems to violate Rule

(c)()’s mandate that notice be provided promptly in all cases. The omission may be the result of a conscious litigation strategy. In the words of one commentator, postponing notice may

represent “litigation strategy and ingenuity,” designed to obtain a ruling on the merits before

providing notice.168 In this way, class representatives might avoid the burden of paying the cost

. Cooper, supra note .

. In all four districts notice was issued in  cases certified in whole or in part under (b)() and (b)(). Data was

available regarding the event associated with notices in  cases. Of those,  were notices of settlement and eight

were notices of certification. Only two of the eight cases with notices of certification had been certified in part under

(b)(). All eight cases included personal notice and four of those also included notice by publication. See also discussion of (b)() and (b)() classes infra § (b).

. In four of the cases injunctive relief was included in the final order and in one of those cases a $, payment to the named plaintiff was part of the settlement. In one of the other two cases, the court simply noted that the

parties “settled out of court.” The other case was dismissed “for statistical purposes” while the parties worked out

the details of their settlement, with the parties to report to the court if there was any difficulty reaching settlement.

. One of the six cases was terminated by remand to the state court. One was dismissed by stipulation without

any damages or other remedy indicated and without any indication of court approval. The other four cases, one of

which was certified as both a (b)() and a (b)() class, had been terminated by dismissal or summary judgment.

. One of the purposes of the notice is to give the absent class member an opportunity to “enter an appearance

through counsel.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (c)().

. See supra note .

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.
Findings 

of notice169 and both parties might avoid the expense and inconvenience of providing two sets

of notices to the class. Delays in notice could also, of course, be the result of any number of

other factors, such as the need to gather information about the class, inadvertence, neglect, the

press of business, or any of the myriad reasons for delays in litigation.

Data. To examine the extent of delays in notice, we looked at the length of time between

class certification and the first notice to the class (other than a notice of settlement). We found

some variation. In the fastest of the four districts on this point, the median time span was .

months between certification and notice, but % of the cases in that district took more than

. months (see Figure ). In the other districts, the median times were ., ., and .

months (see Figure ). In all four districts at least % of the certification notices were issued

more than six months after the class was certified. We have no direct data on the reasons for

those delays.

The time from ruling to notice of settlement may shed additional light on the extent to which

settlement avoids the need for the class representatives or their attorneys to advance the costs of

notice. In  (%) class actions that were certified and later settled (i.e., excluding settlement

classes), the first notice sent to the class was a notice of the settlement. Overall,  (%) of

those  cases had been certified as (b)() classes. The median elapsed time between certification and notice was almost three years in one district, more than a year in two other districts,

and about three months in the fourth. The number of cases in which such time gaps occur is a

relatively small proportion—less than %—of all certified and settled class actions. Nevertheless, the numbers are sufficient to show that the practice occurs and that the time gap between

certification and notice of settlement can be quite wide.

Discussion. The combined effect of finding no notice at all in six certified (b)() actions and

finding delayed notices in sixteen certified (b)() cases that eventually settled suggests that the

lack of a precise timetable or guideline in Rule (c)() has in some cases allowed the parties to

postpone or avoid notice. Such omissions thwart the intent of the advisory committee that class

members be notified promptly of the class certification so that they can effectively exercise their

rights to participate or opt out of the action.170 Omitting notice also has the effect of avoiding

the preclusive effect of a judgment for a defendant against a class.

These practices may be an effort to achieve informally, without a rule change, the result that

the ABA Section of Litigation’s special committee also sought, namely, recognition of notice

costs as potential barriers to access to the courts and flexible allocation of the cost of providing

notice. Addressing the merits of a case before certification might provide a mechanism for allocating the costs of notice.

(b) In what form was the notice issued, who paid the cost, and does the cost of notice

discourage legitimate actions?

Background. Rule (c)() requires individual notice in (b)() actions for class members “who

can be identified with reasonable effort.” Others are to be given “the best notice practicable un-

. Id.

. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note , at  (“But it seems obvious that if notice is to be effective—if class members

are to have a meaningful opportunity to request exclusion, appear in the action, object to the representation, etc.—the

invitation must go out as promptly as the circumstances will permit.”);  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at

- to -.
 Class Actions

der the circumstances.” The Manual for Complex Litigation, Third states that “[p]ublication in

newspapers or journals may be advisable as a supplement.”171 As discussed (see supra text accompanying note ), Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline172 requires that class representatives be

responsible for the cost. The Manual for Complex Litigation, Third points out that “[t]he manner of giving notice can encourage or discourage the assertion of certain claims, or can be so

costly and burdensome as to frustrate plaintiffs’ ability to maintain the action.”173 Commentators have asserted that the effect of Eisen “is to make the initiation of class actions more burdensome, particularly when they are brought under Rule (b)() and thus require individual notice to all identifiable class members.”174

Data. The data indicate that the parties and judges follow the dictates of the Eisen line of

cases by providing individual notice in almost all certified (b)() actions in which any notice was

provided (see Table ).175 In at least two-thirds of the cases in each of the districts, the individual notices were supplemented by publication in a newspaper or other print medium. Other

forms of notice, such as broadcasting or use of electronic media, were rarely or never used. A

number of cases involved posting of notices at government offices, a form of notice that was

particularly prevalent in (b)() actions.

The median number of recipients of notice of certification or settlement or both was substantial, ranging from a median of approximately , individuals in one district to a median of

over , in another (see Figure ). In all districts the number of notices sent to individuals

equaled or exceeded the estimated number of class members. Generally, parties estimated the

size of the class during the certification process, before notices were sent.

Data on the costs of implementing notices were difficult to obtain. Whether the data are representative of all cases in the four districts is doubtful. In three of the four districts we were unable to obtain cost data for half or more of the cases. Across the districts, in the cases for which

data were available, the median costs of distributing notices exceeded $, per case and in

two of the districts the median costs were reported to be $, and $, per case.176 In

at least % of the cases in each district, the cost of notice exceeded $, per case and in two

of the districts, such costs exceeded $, per case. These data are best viewed as a collection of anecdotes and estimates.

Who paid the costs? The short answer is that both plaintiffs and defendants paid. The practices varied in the four courts, but overall defendants paid more than plaintiffs in two courts,

slightly less than plaintiffs in one, and considerably less in the fourth. Defendants paid all or

part of the costs in %, %, %, and % of the cases in E.D. Pa., S.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., and

N.D. Cal., respectively. The data are consistent with the data on the timing of notice (discussed

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at .

.  U.S.  ().

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at .

. B Wright et al., supra note , § , at .

. In only one case was it clear that notice other than individual notice was used. In that case, notice was communicated to an estimated  million Sears Auto Center repair customers by newspaper publication and by posting

notices at all Sears repair centers. In another case, the file was incomplete, but there was no record of notice other

than by publication.

. These costs refer to notice of certification or settlement or both, depending on what type or types of notice

were issued in each case.
Findings 

supra in § (a)). Delays in issuing notice apparently led to shifting the cost of notice from

plaintiff to defendant. Our data cannot tell us whether the delays reflected a desire to avoid notice costs or some other motivation.

Do these requirements discourage the pursuit of class actions as the editors of the Manual

for Complex Litigation, Third and Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane assert? The available

data on costs suggest that the costs in some cases are high enough to deter litigants or law firms

from pursuing class actions, especially where a number of small claims are spread among a large

number of class members. Costs of notice may also induce plaintiffs to define a class more narrowly than if costs were not a factor. The larger the class, the costlier the notice. The data on

lack of notice in some cases and delays in others suggest that the impact of the cost is sufficient

to give parties an incentive to avoid notice, but we do not have direct data showing that the cost

of notice is the source of that problem.

(c) How much litigation of notice issues occurred?

Data. In each of the four districts, litigation of notice issues occurred in less than one-quarter of

the cases in which notice of certification or settlement was communicated to a certified class (see

Figure ). Overall, twenty-one objections were filed in  cases, fourteen by class members,

two by class representatives, three by defendants, and two by others.

The most frequent type of objection, occurring eleven times, was to the content of the notices, that is, the failure to include information about an item the objector deemed important.

Three of those eleven objectors complained specifically about the lack of information concerning attorneys’ fees. Others had more general complaints that the information in the notice was

inadequate to inform class members. Six objections complained that the notice had not been

received in a timely manner, sometimes arriving after an opt-out period had expired or the

hearing on settlement approval had been held. Two objectors complained about the exclusion

or inferior treatment of a subgroup. (Objections to the substance of the settlement that were

presented at the settlement approval hearing will be addressed in § (c), infra.)

Courts responded to all but six of the twenty-one objections. Seven were heard and rejected,

six were heard and accepted in whole or in part, one was withdrawn, and one was handled

through correspondence from the plaintiffs’ attorney.

Discussion. Overall, the number of objections as well as their tenor and force was not great.

Whether that is a sign that the process is working or not is hard to judge. Objections to notice

do not appear to represent a significant mechanism for addressing or correcting the types of

errors and omissions discussed supra in § (b) or infra in § (d).

(d) Did the notices of proposed settlements contain sufficient detail to permit intelligent analysis of the benefits of settlement?

Background. The Manual for Complex Litigation, Third recommends that a notice of proposed

settlement include a description of the essential terms of the settlement, information about attorneys’ fees, disclosure of any special benefits for class representatives, specification of the time

and place of the hearing, and an explanation of the procedure for allocating and distributing the

settlement.177 A combined notice of certification and settlement, as the first notice to the class,

should include information about opt-out rights and deadlines as well as sufficient information

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at . Cf.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.
 Class Actions

to allow the recipient to make an intelligent choice about opting out. A notice of settlement that

is the second notice—that is where the class has already been given notice of certification and

the opportunity to opt out—should communicate sufficient information to support an intelligent

appraisal of whether to accept or oppose the settlement and whether to file a claim.

In either of the above instances, the putative or actual class member would need sufficient

information to assess the impact of the settlement on the member’s personal situation. The ultimate question in a rational, economic analysis would be: What can I expect to recover? The

class member needs to know this to compare actual losses and determine whether to participate

in the settlement or oppose it. To estimate a personal recovery, one needs to know at least the

net dollar amount of the settlement and the estimated size of the class with which one can expect

to share the net settlement.178 Newberg and Conte state that it is “unnecessary for the settlement distribution formula to specify precisely the amount that each individual class member

may expect to recover.”179 Courts have not demanded precision but have called for estimates of

monetary benefits, fees and expenses, and individual recoveries.180

Language in a notice should be clear and direct.181

Data. We examined the settlement notices in all of the certified settled cases to determine

whether they communicated the type of information described above. Settlement notices in the

cases did not generally provide either the net amount of the settlement or the estimated size of

the class. Rarely would a class member have the information from which to estimate his or her

individual recovery. In only five cases, all of which were in two districts, did the notice include

information about the size of the class. As to the net amount of the settlement, in one district a

third of the notices included such information, in two districts, a fifth did, and in the fourth

district, a tenth. Notices included information about the gross amount of the settlement in %

to % of the cases (see Figure ).

Missing from most disclosures was information about the dollar amount of attorneys’ fees,

costs of administration, and other expenses. In only one district did more than half of the notices include the dollar amount of attorneys’ fees; at the other end of the range, in one district

only % of the notices included such information (see Figure ). In all four districts, however,

more than two-thirds of the notices included information about either the percentage or the

amount of attorneys’ fees (see Figure ). If the fees are calculated as a percentage of the gross

settlement and not as a percentage of the net amount (practices differ), then information about

the fee percentage and the gross amount of the settlement would suffice because a class member

could calculate the fees by multiplying the gross settlement by the percentage to be allocated to

. An estimate of the individual shares in the settlement or the percentage of damages to be compensated

would, of course, serve the same purpose.

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.

. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes,  F.d ,  (th Cir.) (“the notice may consist of a very

general description of the proposed settlement, including a summary of the monetary or other benefits that the class

would receive and an estimation of attorneys’ fees and other expenses”), cert. denied,  U.S.  (); Boggess v.

Hogan,  F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Ill. ) (“the notice should . . . include the best available information concerning fees and expenses together with an estimated range of unitary recovery”).

. See, e.g., Avery v. Heckler,  F.d ,  (st Cir. ) (affirming “a judicial decision that favors plain

and direct English” in a proposed notice). See generally  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § . (discussing the

language and content of notice, emphasizing the need for clear, objective language).
Findings 

fees. Information about the costs of administration and other expenses, including the attorneys’

legal expenses for discovery and other pretrial activity, are infrequently included in the notice of

settlement (see Figure ).182

Notices generally included sufficient information on the nonmonetary aspects of the settlement. In each district, more than % of the notices presented information on a plan of distribution for the proceeds and also included information and forms for submitting a claim. When

equitable relief was included in the settlement, it was generally summarized in the notice. Optout rights, where applicable, were stated in the vast majority of notices and all notices in all four

districts specified the date and time for a hearing on approval of the settlement.

Discussion and call for research. Notices did not appear to include sufficient information for

an individual class member to appraise the net value of a settlement to the class or to calculate

an expected personal share in the settlement. Is it reasonable to expect that additional information could be provided? It appears that much of the needed information was available at other

stages of the litigation and might have been calculated or estimated in the notice of settlement.

For example, the exact size of the class might not have been determined until after notices had

been sent, yet the parties frequently offered estimates of class size in seeking certification. The

Rule (a)() requirement that “the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” demands that the parties and the court consider the size of the class. Moreover, in cases

where notice of certification had been sent before a settlement, information about actual class

size was available based on the number of notices sent and opt outs received.

What about attorneys’ fees? The parties might argue that information about attorneys’ fees

was not available until after the settlement has been approved and the court entered an order

awarding fees. This is technically true. An estimate, with caveats, may have been the most that

could have been presented. But courts generally awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount requested by the plaintiffs183 and those requests were generally submitted to the court before the

settlement approval hearing. Including the amount of the fee request in the notice might call for

earlier calculation of the estimated fees. Where the fees are a percentage of the settlement, the

actual calculation—or a clear statement of the formula—would avoid any problems a class member might have in applying the formula.

Notices generally included the technical information about distribution plans, claims procedures, opt-out rights, hearings, and objections. Counsel in these cases often followed routine

formats for developing notices and presenting settlement approval information to the court.184

Because the practice appears to be routinized, one would expect that counsel would follow any

explicit guidelines established through the rule-making process.

Having read the notices in these cases presses us to make an additional observation. Many,

perhaps most, of the notices present technical information in legal jargon. Our impression is

that most notices are not comprehensible to the lay reader. A content analysis of the samples

could test this impression. For any researchers who wish to take up this call for further research,

. The median percentage of the gross settlement devoted to administrative costs was % across the four districts.

. See discussion and data at infra § (d).

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - (“[R]ule (e) notices are becoming standardized in

format . . .”). For sample forms, see id. at Appendix -. See also MCL d, supra note , § ..
 Class Actions

we can make available a file of most or all of the notices we encountered in the four districts.

Courts and commentators have agreed that notices should communicate the essential information in “plain English.”185

() Opt Outs

(a) Number of opt outs and relationships with subject areas and size of claims

Background. The questions in this section are: How frequently do members opt out of (b)()

classes? Is opting out related to specific subject areas or size of typical individual claims? The

background question, which our data cannot answer directly, is: Why do class members opt

out?

The choice of opting out may arise in two distinct contexts: after certification but before settlement or after a settlement has been proposed. As the discussion of notice indicates (see supra

§ ), notice of certification was often deferred until after a settlement had been reached. We

examined the rates of opting out at each stage separately and in combination and noted some

characteristics of cases with large numbers of settlement opt outs.

Data. At the certification stage, the percentage of certified (b)() class actions with one or

more class members opting out was %, %, %, and % in the four districts (see Figure ).

The number of cases in any single nature-of-suit category was too small for meaningful analysis.

Because the advisory committee has asked for data on nature of suit, we present the information

(see Figure ), but with the caveat that differences among the categories cannot support any

generalizations.

At the settlement stage, the percentage of cases with one or more opt-out members was considerably higher than at the certification stage. Those percentages ranged from % in two districts to % in the third and % in the fourth (see Figure ). Again, the number of cases in

each nature-of-suit category does not support detailed analysis of differences (see Figure ).

Combining the opt outs at the certification and settlement stages yields percentages of certified (b)() class actions with one or more opt outs ranging from % to % in the four districts (see Figure ). These percentages are somewhat lower than the percentage of opt outs

observed in the Georgetown study.186

How many class members opted out in these cases? In all four districts, the median percentage of members who opted out was either .% or .% of the total membership of the class and

% of the opt-out cases had .% or fewer class members opt out. Again in all four districts,

% or more of the cases with opt outs had fewer than  total opt outs. This left seven cases in

the study with more than  opt outs.187 Two cases had , and , members, respectively, who opted out. In both of these cases, objectors who were represented by attorneys ap-

. See supra note .

. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note , at  (% of cases in national study had one or more opt

outs).

. In five of those seven cases, objectors or class members other than the official representatives appeared at the

settlement approval hearing. Objections filed in the seven cases included objections to the attorneys’ fees (five), insufficiency of the settlement amount to compensate for losses (three), insufficient deterrence (two), disfavoring particular groups in the class (two), and a host of miscellaneous objections, including a single allegation of collusion

among the parties.
Findings 

peared at the settlement hearings, a sign that they might be planning further litigation.188 Overall, three of the seven cases with more than  class members who opted out were securities

class actions.189

Data regarding opt outs at the settlement stage suggest that there may be a relationship between the average net amount of the settlement and the presence of one or more opt outs (see

Figure ). The number of cases is too small to yield definitive results and other factors certainly may have affected the decision to opt out, but the direction and magnitude of the relationship in all four districts was similar. The data suggest the possibility that the smaller the average

individual portion of the settlement the larger the number of cases in which one or more parties

opt out.

Discussion. Intuitively, one might expect one of two relationships between the net monetary

award and the decision to opt out. For very large awards, say in a products liability case involving serious personal injuries, one would expect the opt-out rate to increase as the size of the

expected award increases because individuals with more serious than average injuries would be

able to obtain representation and pursue a larger individual award. None of the cases in the

study, however, had median awards of that magnitude (see supra § (a)). The largest average net

individual award was $, and the great majority of the awards were below $, (see supra §

(a)).

For the type of awards in this study—none of which seem high enough to support individual

lawsuits on a contingent fee basis (see supra § (a))—one might expect that class members would

have more incentive in the larger cases to remain in the class and recover an award in the thousands of dollars. As the size of the net average settlement decreases, members have less incentive

to file a claim. If totally dissatisfied with the amount of the recovery, some members may choose

to protest by opting out. Without additional research, we cannot know whether this happened

in our study, but the data in Figure  are compatible with such a scenario.

Comparison of the opt-out rates in this study with those in the Georgetown study, published

more than twenty years ago, showed no increase in the rate of opting out.190 The levels of opt-

. The case with , opt outs was the General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation. In re General Motors Corp.

Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  (). In that case

many of the objectors were represented by a public interest organization, the Center for Auto Safety, or by government attorneys; the settlement approval was reversed on appeal. In the other large case, , (%) of , class

members opted out of a securities class action settlement of $,, after objecting, through an attorney, that the

amount of the settlement was insufficient. Hooker v. Arvida/JMB, No. - (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. , ). No

appeal was filed in that case and there was no indication in the case file of further litigation, but the presence of the

attorneys and the large number of opt outs indicate the possibility of further litigation by the opt-out members.

. One of those cases was described in the previous note. In another, In re Oracle Sec. Litig., No. - (N.D.

Cal. filed March , ),  members (.%) of a class estimated at , opted out. The only objections

filed in that case were to the amount of attorneys’ fees. The other securities case, Mogul v. Nikken, Inc., No. -

(N.D. Cal. filed March , ), involved a class of independent distributors of a networking marketing program, not

a public securities offering;  (.%) members of a class of , opted out. In that case no objections were presented at the hearing and there is no indication of an independent action by the opt-out members. The settlement

included a mandatory (b)()(B) class for refunds for products and an opt-out (b)() class for claims based on economic loss arising from the marketing program.

. See discussion of Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note . This portion of the Georgetown study was

based on a national study of selected class actions, more than half of which were securities and antitrust cases. Id. at
 Class Actions

ing out reported in the Georgetown study, in fact, indicate that opting out may have declined

considerably.191

(b) Opt outs in (b)() or (b)() classes

Data. As a practical matter, putative class members do not opt out in (b)() or (b)() classes,

with one minor exception.192 In addition, there were four settled class actions with opt outs that

were certified under either (b)()(B) (one case) or (b)() (three cases) as well as (b)(). At least in

those cases, the certification of a class on mandatory grounds was not used as a way to evade the

opt-out requirements of Rules  (b)() and  (c)().

We also looked for cases that had not been certified under (b)() yet appeared to be damage

actions. In four cases, classes were certified under (b)() or (b)(), but not (b)(), and damages

were awarded on a class-wide basis. None of the cases, however, appeared to represent distortions of the mandatory class categories to evade (b)() opt-out requirements.193

() Opt Ins

(a) Opt-in classes

Background and Data. The question raised is whether devices are employed to create what are

essentially opt-in classes, by such means as defining the class to include only those members

who file claims. The Georgetown study found that judges in three cases required an opt-in procedure and found that it reduced the class size by %, %, and %.194 In that study the optout procedure generally reduced class size by % or less. Plaintiffs’ attorneys raised concerns

that the opt-in procedure excluded unsophisticated consumer class members.195 Along similar

lines, Newberg and Conte report a small number of opt-in cases that were approved under state

court rules.196

–.

. In the national portion of their study, the Georgetown authors reported that in  of the  cases for which

information was available, % or less of the class opted out. Id. at . In the instant study more than % of the

class actions in each district had fewer than .% of the class opt out. Only two cases in the entire study had opt-out

rates above %.

. In one case certified as a (b)()(B) class for settlement purposes only, the case file included three letters from

class members indicating their desire to opt out of the settlement. That settlement consisted of an agreement from a

corporate entity to provide supplemental funding if needed to satisfy the terms of a loan to an employee stock ownership plan and did not include a monetary distribution. One objection to the settlement was to the scope of the language in the release given to defendants. There is no indication that the opt-out letters from these class members had

any effect, because the class was defined as a mandatory class and because there was no monetary settlement. The

effectiveness of the notice of opting out would be tested if the opt-out members filed suit against the defendant, but

there was no evidence that this occurred.

. In all four cases, notice of settlement was provided to the class, but opt-out rights were not provided in the

notice. Three of these cases were ERISA cases involving relatively small retirement funds, each of which appeared to

qualify as a limited fund. The fourth case involved a class of claimants who had filed complaints with a state fair employment commission and whose complaints had not been processed. The relief consisted of an order that the commission process the complaints for all who wished and that they pay $ to those who chose that remedy. Thus, one

might conclude that the injunctive relief was the primary remedy.

. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra note , at –.

. Id. at –.

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ..
Findings 

None of the certified class actions in this study defined the class as requiring the filing of a

claim as a precondition to becoming a member of the class, but many used a claims procedure

that, as a practical matter, limited the number who shared in the common fund (see infra

§ (b)).197 Combining an opt-out class with a claims procedure appears to have the effect of

precluding further litigation by class members who do not opt out or file claims.

(b) Claims procedures

Background and data. A large number of cases in the study used a claims procedure to distribute the proceeds of a settlement fund to class members. Only those class members who filed

claims shared in the benefits of the settlement, but all class members—as defined in the class

certification order—who did not affirmatively opt out were bound by the judgment. Unfortunately, the parties generally did not report the number of claims received; thus, our data on

claims received are too incomplete to present.

Claims procedures were used in % of certified, settled class actions in one district; % in

another; % in the third; and % in the fourth (see Figure ). Claims procedures were a

standard modus operandi in securities class actions, being used in between % and % of

these cases in the four districts (see Figure ). Other types of cases that typically generate

monetary awards also used claims procedures. For example, all three antitrust settlements in the

study did so, as did three of the five employment discrimination cases. On the other hand, only

four of twelve ERISA cases and one of eleven “other civil rights” cases established such procedures. An advantage of using a claims fund is that once the total number of claims is known, the

entire fund can be distributed on a pro rata basis.198

() Individual Member Participation

(a) Participation before settlement

(i) Attempts by class members to intervene

Background. The question is how frequently do nonrepresentative class members seek to intervene before the settlement stage? Intervention by putative class members can proceed under

either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (a) (intervention of right when granted by statute or

when necessary to protect an interest of the prospective intervenor), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (b) (permissive intervention when a statute provides for conditional intervention or

there are common questions of law or fact), or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (d)() (court

may require that notice be given to class members to allow them “to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or oth-

. We encountered a few cases filed as statutory opt-in class actions under  U.S.C. § (b) () of the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and under  U.S. C. § (b) () of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA), both of which employ an opt-in procedure. Notice of filing a complaint is sent to all potential class members

at the outset and they are given an opportunity to file a written consent to join the class. We did not include these

cases in the study because they did not invoke Rule  and their structure did not match well with our study design.

A separate study of FLSA and ADEA cases might provide data that would be useful for assessing the viability of a

Rule  opt-in procedure.

. For an illustration of a formula for allocating the fund according to the proportion of each claimant’s damages, see  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - to -.
 Class Actions

erwise to come into the action”). The main purposes of allowing intervention in class actions

are to assure “that the class is adequately represented” and “to enable those class members on

the outside of the litigation to function as effective watchdogs.”199

Data. Attempts to intervene in cases filed as class actions occurred relatively infrequently in

the study, in %, %, %, and % of the cases in the four districts (see Figure ). Overall,

judges granted about half of the requests (see Figure ). The most frequently cited basis for

intervention was Rule (b) (permissive intervention) (see Figure ). Rule (d)() was cited in

only three cases. The authority cited for intervention did not appear to make a difference in the

outcome of the application (see Figure ).

Data on intervention activity was spread among a wide assortment of nature-of-suit categories and no meaningful conclusions can be drawn about differences among the categories (see

Table ).

(ii) Attempts by nonmembers to intervene

Data. In all four districts, a total of six nonmembers of an alleged class attempted to intervene in

the class actions. Aside from representing special interests, there was no pattern to their applications.200 Courts granted two of the six applications. All four of those that were denied intervenor status participated in the case at a later stage. In each case the would-be intervenors objected to the settlement and in three cases they filed an appeal, each of which was unsuccessful.201 In addition to appeals from the denial of an application to intervene, three proposed intervenor–plaintiffs filed appeals on the plaintiffs’ side from a denial of an injunction, a denial of

class certification, and a summary judgment for the defendant. All three decisions were affirmed

on appeal.

(b) Class member participation in settlement by filing objections and attending settlement hearings

The question raised is: How frequently do nonrepresentative class members appear to contest

settlement, and with what effect?202 Objections may be presented by any class member who has

not opted out of the litigation, any settling defendant, or any shareholder of a settling corpora-

. B Wright et al., supra note , § , at –.

. Two involved local labor unions, one of which successfully intervened on behalf of its members in a Title

VII action (Stender v. Lucky Stores, No. - (N.D. Cal. filed April , )) and the other of which was denied

intervention on the side of a class of abused and neglected children who were served by union members. The other

successful intervenor was permitted to intervene in a securities class action for the limited purpose of maintaining an

interpleader action. Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., No - (N.D. Ill. filed July , ). Two other

unsuccessful attempts are described in the next footnote.

. In one case, a bankruptcy trustee for a corporate defendant sought to insure that the corporation did not

waive its claims against accountants and other professionals. The trustee later filed objections to the attorneys’ fee

request and filed an appeal from the fee award, serving as the nominee of several class members. That appeal was

pending at the time of our data collection. Weiner v. Southeast Banking Co., No. - (S.D. Fla. filed March ,

). In another case, a pro-life coalition sought to intervene as a defendant in an abortion rights case against a defendants’ class of state attorneys general. The court denied the application and the denial was affirmed on appeal,

Keith v. Daley,  F.d  (th Cir.), cert. denied,  U.S.  (). See also discussion of appeals infra at

§§ (c) & (a).

. Cooper, supra note , at .
Findings 

tion.203 Generally, a written objection must be filed before the hearing, and an objector need

not appear at the hearing to have an objection considered by the court.204

Data. Our data permit us to document the objections raised by class members and other

objectors and, within limits, to document their attendance at settlement approval hearings. Except in E.D. Pa., however, we were generally unable to obtain transcripts of the settlement approval hearings, so our report of attendance in the other three districts is based on clerical entries that seem likely to undercount the participation of class members and objectors.205 With

this caveat, court files indicate that nonrepresentative parties were recorded as attending the

settlement hearing infrequently, with % in E.D. Pa. being the high mark and the other three

districts showing % to % rates of participation (see Figure ). Attendance of representative

parties was also mixed. Again, E.D. Pa. had the highest rate, %, and the other districts varied

from % to % (see Figure ; see alsosupra §  (c)).

Participation by filing written objections to the settlement was far more frequent than participation by appearing at the settlement hearing. Generally, objectors filed their objections in

writing before the hearing. Typically, the parties addressed the objections in the final motion

for approval of the settlement. Overall, about half of the settlements that were the subject of a

hearing generated at least one objection. The percentage of cases in which there was no objection ranged from % to % in the four districts (see Table ).

The most frequent type of objection was to the amount of attorneys’ fees as being disproportionate to the amount of the settlement; in % to % of the cases in the four districts, objectors raised this point (see Table ). The next most frequent objection related to the insufficiency of the award to compensate class members for their losses. Next in line were objections that the settlement disfavored certain subgroups. A wide variety of objections were

grouped in a miscellaneous category. Many of the miscellaneous objections raised serious concerns that were difficult to categorize.206

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - to -.

. Id. § ., at -.

. But, in a recent article, the author asserted that an empirical study of terminated class actions in N.D. Cal.

from  to  showed that “class representatives did not participate in % of the cases.” Downs, supra note ,

at . Our study, however, found that one or more class representatives attended nine of  settlement approval

hearings in N.D. Cal. and that the nine hearings were held between June , , and December , . The difference appears to be that we counted as an appearance any notation on the clerk’s minute entry that one or more

class representatives were present. Professor Downs did not count such entries as indicating presence because, in his

experience, clerks place in the minute entry what the lawyers say in court. Thus, the minute entries may simply represent instances where a lawyer for the class announced an appearance “on behalf of [a class representative]” who

was not present. Telephone conversation with Professor Downs (Jan. , ). Whatever view one takes of the N.D.

Cal. data, the data derived from transcripts in E.D. Pa. appear to be the most reliable data available.

. For example, in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d  (d

Cir. ), cert. denied, No. -,  U.S. LEXIS  (Oct. , ), an extensive number of complaints were

filed and heard at the settlement hearing, including complaints that the settlement did not properly address safety

concerns. In two ERISA cases, pensioners raised questions about the effect of the settlement on their retirement

benefits. In one case, shareholders raised a claim that the recovery was excessive and would diminish the value of

their stock. Schlansky v. EAC Indus., No. - (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. , ). At least three miscellaneous objections raised questions about the scope of the release and at least four raised questions about the substantive terms of

the proposed settlement.
 Class Actions

How did the courts respond to the objections? Approximately % or more of the proposed

settlements were approved without changes in each of the four districts. In a small percentage of

cases, the court approved the settlement conditioned on the inclusion of specified changes.

Overall in the four districts, judges made changes in nine settlements before approving them. In

seven of these cases, objections had been raised and the changes may have been responsive to

those objections, but our data do not permit us to examine that relationship systematically.207

Similar results were obtained for specific objection to the amount of fees requested. Overall,

in twenty-one cases, objections to the amount of attorneys’ fees were filed. In nineteen of those

twenty-one cases the court awarded % of the request and in the other two the court awarded

less than the full fee request.208 (For a comprehensive discussion of the courts’ treatment of attorneys’ fees in the study cases, see infra § .)

Our study was not designed to trace the responses to each objection, but our general impression is that the parties summarized and discussed most objections in a motion for settlement

approval. The parties generally filed such a motion after the deadline for filing objections had

passed, shortly before the settlement approval hearing. Many of the settlement approval orders,

which were typically prepared by the parties for the judge’s signature, specifically addressed

objections.

Discussion. Objections represent an outside source of information about the substance of the

settlement and its impact on class members. The settling parties at this stage have little or no

incentive to present negative information about the settlement, so objections from class members and others may be a crucial source of information about defects in the settlement.

In approximately half of the settlements, there was some level of participation by nonrepresentative class members and others. The process channels participation into written filings that

the parties review, filter, and present to the court. The objections, in the form received, are generally appended to the parties’ filings for the court to read.

Appearances at hearings are infrequent and changes in the settlement as a result of objections

are even less frequent. But, there are no data from other studies to suggest what one should expect.209

. In one case the connection between the objection and the changes in the settlement was clear. Objectors

complained that certification of a mandatory class was inappropriate and that parties should be given an opportunity

to opt out. The court’s approval of the settlement included an opportunity to opt out. McKenna v. Sears Roebuck,

No. - (N.D. Cal. filed June , ). In another instance, the change consisted of lowering the percentage of

attorneys’ fees awarded and changing the formula for calculation of fees and expenses, but it was unclear whether the

change was responsive to a specific objection. Nathanson, IRA v. Tenera, No. - (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. , ).

In another case, the court’s action in initially rejecting a settlement appeared to arise sua sponte. The court determined that a settlement of the derivative action had not been properly approved by disinterested members of the

corporate board and, for that reason, the court disapproved that settlement. Because settlement of the class action

was contingent on court approval of the derivative settlement, the class action settlement was disapproved until the

parties reached a proper settlement of the derivative action. In re Oracle Sec., No. - (N.D. Cal. filed March ,

).

. In E.D. Pa., % of the fee request was awarded in one case and % in the other five cases in which objections to fees were filed. In N.D. Ill., % was awarded in one case and % in the other four cases with objections.

In the other two districts % of the requested fees were awarded in all cases with objections to fees.

. The Georgetown study did not examine participation or objections. Georgetown Empirical Study, supra

note . See alsosupra note .
Findings 

(c) Nonrepresentative class member participation by filing appeals

Data. As noted in supra section (a)(), three prospective intervenors filed appeals from the

denial of their application to intervene. Prospective intervenors, together with one or more

named plaintiffs, also filed appeals addressing other issues in three cases, one involving the denial of an injunction, another the denial of class certification, and the third, the granting of

summary judgment for the defendant. In all three instances the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.

In addition, objecting class members filed appeals in two major consumer class actions. One

of those appeals, the General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation, resulted in a decision that vacated the order certifying a settlement class and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. In the other case, a class member filed an appeal from the district court’s approval of a $ million attorney fee award in a case in which the class remedy was to provide $

coupons toward the purchase of specified automotive equipment to replace prior purchases of

similar equipment.210 That appeal is pending.

() Settlement

(a) Did certification coerce settlement of frivolous or nearly frivolous claims?

Background. Earlier (see supra § (c)(i)), we observed that one indicator of a “strike suit” is the

power of the filing of a case to coerce a settlement without regard to the case’s merit or lack

thereof.211 In this section we carry that discussion further by examining the relationship between class certification and the settlement of cases. The central question is: Does the act of

certifying a class coerce settlement of frivolous or nearly frivolous claims? We cannot address

this question directly with our data because we have no way of knowing, from the written court

file, what factors influenced the parties to settle and whether class certification played so dominant a role as to be considered coercive. Such questions might be addressed by other methods,

such as interviews.

One indirect, limited approach is to compare the outcomes of certified class actions (other

than those certified for settlement purposes only) to cases in which certification was denied or

not ruled on. If it is the class action device that coerces settlement, one would expect that certified cases would achieve settlements more frequently than cases that are not certified as class

actions. Viewed from another angle, certified class actions would be less likely to be disposed of

by noncoercive means, such as rulings on the merits via motions or trials. Such merits-related

dispositions are the traditional ways for litigants to avoid being coerced to settle. These two

tests overlap because cases that settle have by definition not been disposed of by rulings on the

merits.

(i) Outcomes of certified classes compared with outcomes for noncertified cases

Data. Table  compares the various motion, trial, and settlement outcomes of all certified and

noncertified class actions. Cases certified for settlement purposes only were not included in the

above analysis because generally the settlement in those cases was reached before the court

. McKenna v. Sears Roebuck Co., No. - (N.D. Cal. filed June , ).

. See discussion supra § (c).
 Class Actions

ruled on certification. Thus, the settlement could not be said to be a product of a certification

ruling.

Across the four districts, a substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by

class-wide settlements. In the four districts, the percentage of certified class actions terminated

by a class settlement ranged from % to %, while settlement rates (including stipulated

dismissals)212 for cases not certified ranged from % to % (see Table ). Certified class actions were more than two times more likely to settle than cases that contained class allegations

but were never certified (see Table ).

The converse proposition—that certified class actions are less likely to be terminated by traditional rulings on motions or trials—is also true. For the most part, this finding follows directly

from having a high percentage of settlements that terminated the litigation. Combining the motion and trial categories in Table  yields a range of nonsettlement dispositions from % to

% for certified class actions compared to a range of % to % for cases filed as class actions

but never certified as such (see Table ). In each of the four districts, noncertified cases were at

least twice as likely as certified class actions to be disposed of by motion or trial. These data

confirm empirical data from an earlier study of class action activity in N.D. Cal.213

What do those data tell us about whether settlement was coerced? Without examining the

options available to the parties, whether those options were pursued successfully or unsuccessfully, one should not rush to conclude that the cases settled simply because they were certified. For example, if a case settled after a ruling on summary judgment or in the face of a trial

date, that settlement might be seen as primarily the product of the ruling or the setting of the

trial date. In the following section we will look at the data on these alternatives.

(ii) Frequency of rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, trial dates

scheduled, and trials held in certified class actions

Data. The vast majority of cases that were certified as class actions were also the subject of rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, or the setting of a trial date. Approximately a third of those cases in one district, % in two districts, and more than % in the

fourth were the subject of rulings on at least one motion to dismiss (see Figure ). The percentage of cases with rulings on motions for summary judgment ranged from % to %, with

the middle two districts showing % and % (see Figure ). Finally, trial dates were set in

percentages ranging from % to % in the four districts (see Figure ).

Overall, from % to % of the cases certified as class actions received either a ruling on a

motion to dismiss, a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, or the setting of a trial date (see

Figure ). Looked at from the other side, at most % to % of the certified class actions in the

four districts could possibly have settled without a ruling on the merits or the setting of a trial

date.

. Stipulated dismissals were not included as class settlements because a stipulation of dismissal does not satisfy

the Rule (e) requirement of obtaining court approval for a class settlement. On the other hand, a stipulation of dismissal is an acceptable way of indicating a nonclass settlement.

. Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action,  Ind. L.J. ,  (). Garth and

his colleagues found a % settlement rate for certified class actions compared to a % settlement rate for cases filed

as class actions but not certified. Seventy percent of the uncertified cases were disposed of by motion to dismiss or by

summary judgment.
Findings 

Of the three factors discussed, the effect of setting of a trial date seems somewhat ambiguous

and difficult to interpret because we have no way of measuring whether the date was firm or

realistic enough to have an impact on settlement. Local practices may have clerks enter the settings in a semiautomatic fashion. But even eliminating the setting of a trial date as a factor does

not change the data very much. More than two-thirds of the certified class actions in the four

districts had rulings on either a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or both (see

Figure ).

Discussion. The data indicate that certified class actions receive considerable attention from

judges or their staff in the form of ruling on motions and setting trial dates. Data from the time

study214 reinforce this finding. Judges spent about eleven times more time on class actions than

on the average civil case in the time study (see supra § (d)). Judicial rulings and active case

management, including the setting of trial dates and holding pretrial conferences (see Table ),

cannot be said to eliminate the possibility of coerced settlements, but their prevalence in this

study of class actions greatly diminishes the likelihood that the certification decision itself, as

opposed to the merits of the underlying claims, coerced settlements with any frequency. The

data show that a district judge examined the merits of the great majority of cases and that the

parties pursued some, if not all, of the litigation alternatives available to them. One might reasonably conclude that rulings on motions and the case management practices limited the ability

of a party to coerce a settlement without regard to the merits of the case.

Another perspective on the relationship between certification and settlement is to view certification as a “settlement event,” that is, an event that would “affect substantially the potential

value of a settlement,” “clarify uncertainty about the value of the case,” and “let lawyers gauge

the approach of the judge.”215 From this angle, the certification decision can be expected to

have a direct impact on settlement, just as a ruling on summary judgment or an arbitration

award might have. The impact, though, seems to arise from implicit judicial recognition of the

plausibility of the claims and the multiplication of those claims by the size of the class. In other

words, the impetus to discuss settlement may flow from an assessment of the total liability the

litigation might impose.

(iii) Timing of settlements in relation to class certification

Background. Another indicator of the relationship between certification and settlement is the

timing of the two events. If settlement occurs before or simultaneously with certification or long

after certification, the possibility of any connection between the two seems remote. Unless settlement follows reasonably promptly after certification, the settlement would not seem to be

directly related to the certification. While simultaneous settlement and certification might be

seen as anticipating the probability of certification if no settlement was reached, there is no judicial ruling that can be said to coerce settlement. (For discussion of the effect of the filing of the

complaint on settlement, see supra § (c).)

Data. The time from certification to settlement varied widely (see Table ). The median

times in the four districts ranged from . to . months. The majority of the cases in one district settled before certification and in the other three districts, %–% of the cases settled be-

. Willging et al., supra note .

. Garth, supra note , at .
 Class Actions

fore certification. In three districts, at least a quarter of the certified class actions settled within

two months after certification. A large number of these cases were settlement classes which were

certified simultaneously with the preliminary approval of a proposed settlement. At the other

end of the scale, at least a quarter of the cases in all four districts took more than a year after certification to settle. In three districts, this quarter of the cases took approximately two to three

and one-half years or more.

Discussion. The data on timing of settlements did not support any inference of a relationship

between certification and settlement. Many cases settled before the court ruled on certification

and a sizable number, a majority in three of the districts, settled more than a year after certification.

(b) Notice

Background. When certification is first sought at the settlement stage, the question raised is:

How effective is the attempt to ensure compliance with notice and certification requirements?

As noted in section (a), supra, Rule (e) requires notice of settlement or compromise in all

class actions, regardless of the type. Thus, all cases certified for settlement purposes would be

expected to have a notice of the certification combined with a notice of the settlement and

communicated to the class.216 In section (a), however, we found that six settled (b)() classes

received no notice of settlement. Our analysis in this section overlaps with that analysis. We also

found in section (a) that five certified (b)() classes received no notice of certification before

being disposed of on the merits (four) or by stipulation (one). We also found a tendency to delay notice after certification until a settlement was reached, perhaps to shift the costs of notifying

the class to the defendant or a settlement fund or perhaps for other reasons, such as to gather

information about the class.

Settlement classes are difficult for the court to evaluate because of the lack of an adversarial

proceeding on class certification.217 Complicated issues, such as conflicts between class counsel

and counsel for individual plaintiffs or the need to protect future claimants, may challenge the

court.218 The approval process generally involves two steps: a preliminary evaluation of fairness

and a later review, after notice, at a fairness hearing.219

Data. In two districts, notice of settlement was disseminated to the class in all class actions

certified for settlement purposes. In the other two districts  of  (%) and  of  (%)

settlement classes included notice to the class (see Figure ). Overall six cases in the latter two

districts did not include notice of the approval of a settlement class. In all of those cases, the

court explicitly approved the proposed class settlement without requiring any changes. In none

of the six cases did the file indicate that the classes were (b)() classes or that class damages were

included in the settlement. All involved some form of injunctive relief. Nevertheless, Rule (e)

requires notice to the class prior to the settlement of these cases so that class members have an

opportunity to review the proposed settlement and participate in the review process.

. When a settlement is presented to a court that has not ruled on certification, generally the court’s order preliminarily approving the settlement includes a ruling on class certification.

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at –.

. Id. at .

. Id. § ., at –.
Findings 

In those same settlement class actions, the court issued a preliminary approval of the settlement in more than % of the cases in three districts and in % of the cases in the remaining

district (see Figure ). Overall there were twelve settlement classes, eight in one district, that

did not appear to include a preliminary approval ruling (see Figure ). Three of these cases

involved class damages and all three of those cases had a subsequent fairness hearing. Seven

settlement classes had neither evidence of preliminary approval nor of a later fairness hearing

(see Figures  & ). None of those seven cases was certified as a (b)() class and none involved money damages.

Discussion. A handful of cases in the study had no notice to the class of a class-wide settlement, generally for injunctive relief. Most of these same cases did not have either the preliminary approval of the judge or a hearing to examine the fairness of the settlement. All had the

final approval of a judge. Rule (e) and the guidance of the Manual for Complex Litigation,

Third make it clear that more is expected for a settlement class. Without notice to the class and

the reaction of class members to the settlement, the judge might not have sufficient information

to assess whether the settlement is fair and reasonably responsive to the interests of the class.

Nor does the fact that the cases involved injunctive relief and not money damages diminish

the need for notice and a hearing. Injunctive relief sometimes weighs more heavily in the lives of

class members than a modest share in a pecuniary settlement. For example, one of the settlements was on behalf of a class of persons who use wheelchairs, crutches, or similar aids and

wish to attend sporting events at a specific facility. The injunctive relief provided that defendants would better accommodate such persons and stop denying floor level seating to the class.

One assumes that some class members have a serious interest in the shaping and implementation of this relief and that notice to the class would assist the court in affirming or rejecting the

rather vague proposed remedies. Notice and a hearing might generate information about

whether the proposed remedy addressed all the barriers faced by class members.

Another example from this set of cases involved injunctive relief on behalf of a class of mentally retarded individuals who were misplaced in facilities for the mentally ill. The settlement

provided for identifying all misplaced individuals and for funding  appropriate placements

in community settings across the state. Class members, their family members, attorneys, or

caseworkers would presumably be able to contribute information about whether the settlement

would be likely to meet their needs.

In proposing a settlement class, the parties usually intend to bar future claims. Ironically, the

lack of notice and a hearing leaves the settlement open to collateral attack by class members who

were not notified of its provisions.220

Why might a court and the parties bypass notice and a hearing in this context? While there

may be darker motives, a plausible reason may have been to save time and money, either for the

parties or the court, or both. Individual notice to a huge class might forestall a worthwhile settlement because neither side can afford the notice costs. And, of course, the economy could be

false if class members later successfully challenge the settlement.

That some courts and parties evaded the clear mandate of Rule (e) in this handful of cases

raises the question of whether bypassing notice and a hearing might in some cases be meeting a

need of class representatives or the court or both. If so, a rule allowing truncated notice (e.g., to

.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at -.
 Class Actions

a sample of class members or by posting at offices or locations where the problems arose) on

explicit findings of financial hardship and high cost–benefit ratios might warrant the advisory

committee’s consideration.

(c) Attendance of nonrepresentative parties at settlement approval hearings

This topic was discussed in supra section (b).

(d) Provisions favoring named representatives

This topic was discussed in supra section (d).

(e) How often did magistrate judges or special masters evaluate settlements?

Background. The proposed revision to Rule (e) “clarifies that the strictures of [Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure] (b) do not preclude the court from appointing under that Rule a special

master to assist the court in evaluating a proposed dismissal or settlement.”221 Rule (b) provides that a special master is to be appointed only in jury trials involving complicated issues, in

nonjury trials upon a showing of some exceptional condition, or, if a magistrate judge is to be

appointed, upon the consent of the parties.222

The proposed revision to Rule (e) also authorizes referring settlement or dismissal proposals to magistrate judges for evaluation. Currently, in civil litigation generally, district judges

assign a variety of duties to magistrate judges.223 These judicial officers perform duties that

range from resolving discovery disputes to presiding, with the consent of the parties, over civil

trials.

The principal reason for these proposed rule changes is to clarify that the court has the

authority to appoint an independent master to investigate the fairness of dismissal or settlement

proposals in any certified class action. The advisory committee cited some examples of when an

independent evaluation might be necessary: when the named parties and their counsel have

ceased to be adversaries with respect to the proposed dismissal or settlement, when the parties

are required to disclose weaknesses in their own positions in the course of the evaluation of the

proposal, when the parties are required to provide information to assure that the proposal does

not directly or indirectly confer benefits upon class representatives or their counsel inconsistent

with fiduciary obligations owed to members of the class, or when other conflict-of-interest issues must be resolved.224

Data on Special Masters. Of  proposed settlements in certified cases, a settlement was

assigned to a special master (other than a magistrate judge) in only  cases.225 One assignment

was for the purpose of facilitating settlement and the other was to review a consent decree that

incorporated a settlement. Neither assignment involved reporting to the judge on the merits of

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. Fed. R. Civ. P. (b). See also Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or

Reshaping Adjudication?,  U. Chi. L. Rev. , – () (discussing historical use and purpose of special

masters); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative

Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,  U. Chi. L. Rev. , –,  n. ()

(discussing courts’ justifications for appointing special masters).

.  U.S.C. § (b)() ().

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. There were no referrals to review dismissal.
Findings 

settlement. Moreover, courts appointed masters in only  cases in the study as a whole, counting all appointments for whatever purpose.226

Data on Magistrate Judges. The study found that referrals to magistrate judges for settlement purposes227 were somewhat more frequent. By far, the greatest rate of magistrate referrals

occurred in N.D. Cal. (% of certified cases with proposed settlement;  of  cases).228 In

the other three courts, the comparable rates were %, %, and %.229 Typically, the magistrate judge’s role was to facilitate settlement, not to report and recommend to the district judge

on the merits of a proposed settlement, although this occurred in some cases.

Discussion. The premise underlying the proposed rule change is that some judges are uncertain about their authority to appoint masters, especially for run-of-the-mill class action settlements or dismissals.230 The rarity of appointment may indicate that district judges are reluctant to spark Rule (b) disputes within the litigation. The data may also indicate district judge

confidence and pleasure with the effectiveness of referrals to magistrate judges. The differences

in magistrate judge referral rates among the four districts may indicate variations in district referral practice generally, rather than propensity or reluctance to refer class action settlements.231

Another view is that the data reflect a general reluctance to assign matters to nonjudicial

officers, who might be perceived as having the potential to create more problems than they

solve. For example, the large numbers of parties in a class action make conflict of interest checks

difficult for the master, possibly exacerbating the problems of potential and actual conflicts of

interest that, it is argued, inherently exist in the class action setting. Others argue, however, that

these “inherent” conflicts are themselves one reason to appoint a master, one who can, to some

extent, serve as an additional guardian against collusive settlements or other alleged abuses.

The study’s finding of generally low referral rates might suggest a need for the proposed rule

change. Since class actions often involve time-consuming and complex issues, clear authorization for the use of masters and magistrate judges could potentially conserve district judge time

and help expedite settlement and dismissal decisions.

. In the third case, a master reviewed requests for attorneys’ fees.

. There were no referrals to review dismissal.

. Although the proposed rule change would not affect cases until after certification, it is interesting to note that

the rate of referral was lower for noncertified cases (% or  of  cases). District judges eventually approved settlement in  of the  cases referred to magistrate judges.

. The numbers of cases referred were small ( of ,  of , and  of , respectively). Rates of referral were

similar for noncertified cases.

. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,  U.S. ,  () (construing narrowly exceptional circumstances

required to enlist services of special master).

. For example, looking at other phases of class actions, the magistrate referral rate in N.D. Cal. was also significantly higher than the average rates in the other three districts with respect to the following phases of litigation:

discovery management, resolution of class issues, claims resolution, fund administration, and counsel-fee application

review; however, the district’s rate of referral for pretrial case management was comparatively low and its rate of referring class certification issues was about average compared to the other three districts.
 Class Actions

() Trials

(a) How often were trials held and with what results in what types of cases?

Background. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules asked us to determine how often class actions were actually tried on the merits and what results came from those

trials. To this end, we identified the frequency and outcomes of trials by nature-of-suit code and

by other case characteristics, such as certification status and Rule (b) subdivision.

Data overview. A trial began in only eighteen cases in the four districts combined. The trial

rate in class actions in each of the four districts was not notably different from the % to % trial

rate for nonprisoner nonclass civil actions (see Table ). A little less than half of the eighteen

trial cases were certified as class actions.232 Given the small number of trials, we did not attempt

to stratify trial outcome data by district.233 Instead, we aggregated data for the four districts (see

Tables  and ); however, inferences about the universe of trials in class actions nation-wide

cannot be made from these aggregated results.

Plaintiff classes and individual plaintiffs did not fare well at trial. Except for one default

judgment that led to a class settlement,234 no trial resulted in a final judgment for a plaintiff

class. Of the three trials that found for individual plaintiffs, one judgment was vacated and remanded for dismissal, one judgment was vacated with a resulting $ damage award for the

plaintiff on remand, and one defendant’s appeal was dismissed. Five of the eighteen trials led to

settlement during or after trial, including the default judgment case mentioned above that was

settled during an appeal, two certified cases after partial judgments for the class, and two noncertified cases.

Some have theorized that trials are more common in (b)() actions, because they often pursue still developing legal theories, and less common in (b)() actions where large sums are often

at stake.235 This did not appear to be the case in the small number of trials we studied. Four of

the eighteen trials were in cases filed as (b)() class actions without any (b)() claims. Three

were certified; one was not. An additional three noncertified civil rights actions did not specify a

(b) type, but they also could have been of the pure (b)() variety. Thus, as many as seven of

the eighteen trials involved (b)() issues with no (b)() issues. The same number of other trials

involved classes seeking large dollar recoveries: five (b)() securities classes236 and two

(b)()/(b)() Title VII classes.237

. The percentage of certified class actions in which a trial began ranged from % to % in the four districts

(see Figure ).

. We did, however, gather data on the percentage of class action cases in which a trial date was entered on the

docket (see Figure ), the percentage of certified cases in which a trial date was entered on the docket (see Figure

), the timing of the first entry of the trial date (see Figures  and ), and the timing of the scheduled trial date (see

Figures  and ). The four study districts entered a trial date within two years of the filing of the complaint in over

% of the cases for which trial dates were entered (see Figure ). One district set a trial date in all of its cases within

the first two years of the case. See supra § (a)(ii) for a discussion of the effect of setting a trial date on settlement.

. In one certified case, the plaintiff class won a default judgment after the defendant failed to appear on the first

day of the jury trial.

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. These five were jury trials, generally involving fraud issues, with all but one of the classes certified.

. Bothwere combination jury/bench trial cases, one certified and the other not.
Findings 

The remaining four trials concerned a certified class’s (b)() contract claim, an uncertified

b() ERISA claim, and (b)()/(b)() tort claims in cases in which the case file did not indicate

that large dollars were at stake. No prisoner cases went to trial. More specific information on the

eighteen trials is presented below.

Data on Jury Trials. Ten of the eighteen trials were before a jury (see Table ). All but one

resulted in decisions for the defendant or in settlement by the parties. The verdicts generally

survived appeals, except for one reversal in part of a directed verdict.

Among the eighteen trials, cases involving (b)() claims had a higher rate of trial by jury than

cases without (b)() claims. Seventy percent of the trial cases with (b)() claims went to jury

trial, compared to % of the cases filed under (b)() alone.238

(i) Certified cases with jury trials

Six of the ten jury trials involved class issues in certified cases. The class was not successful in

four of these cases, including three securities cases and one contracts case. These four verdicts

for defendants survived appeal. The fifth of the six jury trials in certified cases was a jury/bench

combination in a protracted Title VII case that eventually settled, but only after nonfinal judgments for one large subclass on the issue of defendant’s liability and for the defendant on its liability to a second subclass. In the sixth certified case, the plaintiff class won a default judgment;

the court of appeals dismissed the appeal of that ruling after the parties settled.

(ii) Noncertified cases with jury trials

Four of the ten jury trials were in cases not certified as class actions. In one securities case, the

parties settled during the trial. In two civil rights cases, individual plaintiffs lost at trial; the resulting appeal in one case was dismissed and in the other case the court of appeals reversed in

part and affirmed in part the trial court’s directed verdict. In the fourth noncertified case, a

jury/bench trial combination resulted in injunctive relief and damages for the individual plaintiff

on Title VII claims and partial summary judgment for the defendant on an ADEA claim; resulting cross-appeals were dismissed.

Data on Bench Trials. Eight of the eighteen were bench trials (see Table ). Defendants

were found not liable in four of these cases. Three were not certified and involved individual

claims concerning civil rights, personal injury, and ERISA issues, with no resulting appeals in

two cases and an affirmance in the third. In the one certified case, the court found defendants

not liable for civil rights violations, both with respect to the class and with respect to individual

plaintiffs. No one appealed.

Courts found for individual plaintiffs in two bench trials239 but the court of appeals vacated

those judgments. Finally, two cases settled during, or immediately after, the bench trial: one a

certified civil rights action and the other a noncertified contracts case.

. Seven out of the ten trials in cases with (b)() claims (alone or in combination with (b)() or (b)() claims)

were jury trials, compared to one jury trial out of four trials in cases with (b)() claims and no (b)() claims.

. In one case involving personal property damage claims, the trial court awarded $, to the individual

plaintiffs with no award to the certified class. In the other, a civil rights case, no class was certified.
 Class Actions

(b) How did class action trial rates compare with trial rates for all other civil cases

within the district?

As discussed supra, in section (b), the rate of trial (jury and bench) for class actions and other

civil cases was in the % to % range in the four districts (see Table ).

() Fee/Recovery Rates

Overview. An overarching question concerning attorneys’ fees is whether, in addition to conferring benefits on attorneys, class action outcomes confer substantial benefits on class members.

The major questions posed in this section are: What were the ratios of attorneys’ fees to recoveries? What methods other than lodestar have courts used to regulate fees? To what extent have

methods of fee regulation taken into account the benefit to the class?

(a) What were the ratios of attorneys’ fees to recoveries?

Background. Professor Cooper has referred to the “cynical belief” that “many class actions serve

only to confer benefits on class counsel.”240 To address this issue, we computed a “fee-recovery

rate” (attorneys’ fee awards241 divided by gross monetary settlement242) for certified class actions where the court approved a settlement.243 This rate is meaningful only in “distribution

cases,” cases where some form of monetary benefit was available for distribution to class members after payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses, notice costs, and other administrative expenses. Interestingly, in two districts % of certified cases that settled were distribution cases,

but the comparable figure in the other two courts was %.244

Data and Discussion. There were no fee awards to, and few fee requests by, counsel other

than plaintiffs’ counsel.245 In most cases, net monetary distributions to the class exceeded at-

. Cooper, supra note , at . Some argue that class counsel at times receive large fees from settlements that

provide nominal benefits or only speculative benefits to the class. See MCL d, supra note , § ., at –. See

also Senate Staff Report, supra note , at –.

. Fee awards exclude sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses.

. Gross monetary settlement includes any cash payments or quantifiable benefits to class members, separate

payments to class representatives, donations to charities or public interest groups, attorneys’ fees and expenses

awarded by the court, and administrative costs of the settlement.

. No case that went to trial and did not settle resulted in a final judgment or verdict in favor of a class. See supra § (a).

. In the balance of certified and settled cases, the class received some form of equitable relief, coupons, price

reductions, or other benefits that the court could not quantify, that the parties did not quantify, or that led to unresolved disputes concerning value in the litigation or on appeal. We refer to these as “no distribution cases.” In the

General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation, the principal settlement (vacated on appeal) consisted of distribution of

$, coupon certificates to an estimated – million class members. Objecting class members placed economic

value on the coupon distribution that differed significantly from defendant’s estimates. In re General Motors Corp.

Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  (). The fee

award, vacated on appeal, was $. million. Id. at .

Sometimes litigants settled on liability issues but left each class member’s claim to be determined individually,

such that the total amount to be distributed to the class was not known at the time of the fee award. For example,

under the claims resolution procedure in one settled case, class members who filed valid claims could receive % of

the medical insurance benefits due to them for certain medical services. The settlement did not place a dollar limit on

claim recoveries. Fee awards totaled $. million.

. Defendants’ counsel unsuccessfully requested fees in one case each in three districts; case files did not con-
Findings 

torneys’ fees by substantial margins. The fee-recovery rate infrequently exceeded the traditional

.% contingency fee rate. Median rates ranged from % to %. Most fee awards in the study

were between % and % of the gross monetary settlement (see Figures  and ).246

Some distribution cases also included other class relief that the court did not quantify.247

This occurred about a third of the time in two districts and about % and % of the time in

the other two courts. To the extent that monetary value can be associated with that relief, the

data presented in this subsection understate the value of gross settlement and thus possibly

overstate fee-recovery rates.

The fee-recovery rate calculations discussed in this subsection do not include cases with no

net monetary distribution to class members (no distribution cases), because those settlements

contained only equitable or other nonquantifiable relief. Fees and costs comprised all or a large

percentage of the settlement funds in those cases.248

(b) How were fees calculated?

Background. In most study cases—as in most class actions generally—the court awarded attorneys’ fees under the century-old common fund doctrine.249 Traditionally, in determining fees in

common fund cases, courts included the size of the fund as a principal factor and frequently

tain the amounts sought. Parties other than plaintiffs or defendants requested fees in two cases in only one district.

The first was a $, fee application by nonlead counsel relating to legal services performed before the court

appointed lead counsel pursuant to a competitive bidding process. Although the court declined to award the requested fees from the settlement fund, the order stated that nonlead counsel might be entitled to fees on the basis of

quantum meruit. In the other case, counsel for an objecting class member unsuccessfully requested $, in fees.

. In one district, N.D. Cal., the median fee award to class counsel was $. million, with an average fee award

of approximately $. million. In the other three districts, the median and average fee awards were smaller—with

medians ranging between $. million and approximately $  million and averages from just under $. million to

approximately $. million (see Figure ). However, the N.D. Cal. average fee award was within the range of the

other three districts if one excludes the district’s largest fee award ($. million).

N.D. Cal. also had the highest median ($. million) and average ($ million) gross monetary settlement. In

comparison, the other three districts’ median settlement amounts were between just under $ million and approximately $  million, with average amounts between $. and $. million (see Figure ). For N.D. Cal., even if the

largest settlement ($ . million) is excluded, the district still had a comparatively large mean settlement amount

($. million). However, some perspective is offered by looking at the district’s average gross monetary settlement per

notice sent, which was only slightly above the comparable average for the other three districts combined.

. For example, in one case, class counsel valued the settlement’s “noncash” benefits at $. million in addition

to the $. million monetary distribution. In another case, the defendant supplemented the $ , monetary distribution by agreeing to implement practices designed to increase the representation of women and AfricanAmericans in its workforce.

. See supra note . Typically, the only payments defendants made in these cases were to attorneys, class

representatives, and noticing companies. We will refer to these payments collectively as “settlement costs.” Fee

awards as a percentage of these settlement costs were %, %, %, and % on the average for the four districts

(see Table ). The median percentage of gross settlement amounts attributable to costs of administering the settlement (primarily notice) was % across the four districts in the  cases for which data were available. In these cases,

the median amount of such expenses was $,.

. The principle governing the doctrine is that “persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.” Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,  U.S. ,

– (). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,  U.S. ,  (). See generally Alan Hirsch & Diane

Sheehey, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee Litigation - & - (Federal Judicial Center ).
 Class Actions

based awards on what the court considered to be a reasonable percentage of the fund.250 In the

early s, courts began moving away from this approach toward the lodestar method, under

which the fee award is calculated by multiplying the hours reasonably expended times the reasonable hourly rates.251 In the s, however, the pendulum swung again and courts began to

reconsider the lodestar method.252

In federal courts today, a threshold question in determining fees in common fund cases is

“whether the jurisdiction requires use of the lodestar method or whether it requires, permits, or

has yet to rule upon the propriety of a percentage fee award.”253 In recent years, the trend has

been toward the percentage of recovery method.254 For example, the Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit has required the percentage method in common fund class actions.255 The

Third,256 Seventh,257 and Ninth258 Circuits authorize either the lodestar or the percentage

method.

. A basic premise of the percentage of recovery method is that a common fund is “itself the measure of success

. . . [and] represents the benchmark from which a reasonable fee will be awarded.”  Newberg & Conte, supra note

, § ., at -. See also Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ).

. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.

). The Supreme Court never formally adopted the lodestar method in a common fund case. MCL d, supra note

, § ., at .

. The latest swing away from lodestar received momentum from a footnote in a  Supreme Court decision

that distinguished between calculation of fees under fee-shifting statutes (where “a reasonable fee reflects the amount

of attorney time reasonably expended”) and under the common fund doctrine (“where a reasonable fee is based on a

percentage of the fund bestowed on the class”). Blum v. Stenson,  U.S. ,  n. ().

Additional momentum came in  when a Third Circuit task force, formed to examine court-awarded attorneys’ fees, recommended the percentage of recovery method for common fund cases. Court Awarded Attorneys’

Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, reprinted in  F.R.D. , – () [hereinafter Task Force

Report]. The Task Force Report discussed criticism by courts, commentators, and members of the bar. Criticism

included that lodestar has proven to be difficult to apply, time-consuming to administer, inconsistent in result, and

capable of manipulation to reach a predetermined result. Id. at –.

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at  (footnotes omitted).

. Id. at .

. See Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (“Henceforth in this circuit,

attorneys’ fees awarded from a common fund shall be based upon a reasonable percentage of the fund established for

the benefit of the class.”).

. For example, in evaluating which method the district court could use, the Third Circuit stated recently that

“the court may select the lodestar method in some non-statutory fee cases where it can calculate the relevant parameters (hours expended and hourly rate) more easily than it can determine a suitable percentage to award.” In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct. 

().

. See, e.g., In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (fee award simulating “what the

market in fact pays not for the individual hours but for the ensemble of services rendered in a case of this character”

would be appropriate); Florin v. NationsBank of Georgia,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ); Harmon v. Lymphomed,

 F.d ,  (th Cir. ). Although permitting either method, the Seventh Circuit has expressed a preference for the percentage method. In re Continental Illinois,  F.d at –.

. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (allowing use of either

percentage or lodestar calculation method in common fund case). See also In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.

Sec. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ). In Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,  F.d ,  (th

Cir. ), the Ninth Circuit held that the percentage method is particularly suited for cases with multiple claims

where it would be difficult to identify what fees directly relate to the claims that created the fund.
Findings 

Proponents of the percentage method believe that it encourages early settlements and provides benefits to efficient counsel who under a lodestar approach might be penalized, rather

than rewarded, for their efficiency.259 The percentage method also saves the court from the

cumbersome task of closely scrutinizing lodestar fee petitions to determine whether the hours

claimed were reasonably spent for the benefit of the class.260

At the same time, the percentage method has been criticized because, when strictly applied,

it can result in windfalls to class counsel in cases with very large settlements. Conversely, class

attorneys can be penalized if they take on challenging cases that yield small monetary recoveries.261 The method has also been criticized because it encourages early settlement and, thus,

might deny the class a potentially more generous recovery that further litigation could bring.262

In a relatively small number of study cases, the court awarded fees pursuant to fee-shifting

statutes, such as the one governing civil rights claims,263 rather than under the common fund

doctrine. Although over the past decade the percentage method has gained favor in common

fund cases, lodestar remains the accepted method in fee-shifting cases.264 Given that the common fund doctrine applies in most class actions, we will concentrate our discussion on that

doctrine.

Data and Discussion. For all certified and settled cases in the study, lodestar was used more

frequently than the percentage method in only one district, E.D. Pa. (see Figure ). Even in

that district, however, the percentage method was used nearly as much as lodestar. By contrast,

N.D. Cal. determined fees by percentage of recovery : over lodestar and N.D. Ill. nearly :

. “Objections to the lodestar method were based on the . . . premise that attorneys pad their hours and otherwise engage in unethical activities to enhance their fees, and that key decisions pertaining to settlement are affected by

counsel fees.” Downs, supra note , at . See also  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - to - and

cases in nn. –; Kirchoff v. Flynn,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (lodestar creates an incentive to run up hours

in relation to the stakes of the case); In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,  F.R.D. , – (N.D. Cal. ) (same). For

additional problems identified with the lodestar method, see Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorneys’ Fees in Common

Fund Actions,  Fordham L. Rev. , – ().

. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ), cert. denied,  U.S.  ().

. Cooper, supra note , at .

. Some critics maintain that settlement sometimes occurs when class counsel determines that the case has

reached its point of diminishing returns from the fees perspective, with class counsel viewing the additional attorney

time necessary to obtain a larger class recovery as not cost beneficial. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful

Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer , at , –

[hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The “New Learning” on Securities Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. , , at  [hereinafter Coffee, New Learning]. For a discussion of conflicts of interest that

these situations create between class counsel and the class, see generally MCL d, supra note , § ..

. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of ,  U.S.C. §  () (public accommodation and employment discrimination cases). Such statutes specifically authorize recovery of attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party. Whether

the award is mandatory or permissive depends on the terms of the particular statute and applicable case law. MCL

d, supra note , § .. The availability of statutory fees is driven by public policy, encouraging private enforcement of substantive rights under the law. Statutory fee cases often produce only nominal damages or declaratory

judgments—the kind of results that usually cannot be quantified. See generally Lapointe, supra note , at –

(discussion of the differences between statutory fee and common fund cases).

. Blanchard v. Bergeron,  U.S. ,  () (indicating that lodestar approach is the centerpiece of attorneys’ fee awards in a statutory fee case (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,  U.S.  ())); Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,  U.S. ,  (); Blum v. Stenson,  U.S. ,  (). See

generally Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note , at -.
 Class Actions

over lodestar. It appeared that the percentage method was the exclusive method in S.D. Fla.

(see Figure ).

Interestingly, S.D. Fla., which did not use lodestar, had the lowest average rate (%) while

E.D. Pa., which used lodestar the most, had the highest average fee-recovery rate (%) (see

Figure ). The differences were not as pronounced for median fee-recovery rates, which

ranged from % (S.D. Fla.) to % (N.D. Ill.) (see Figure ).265 Factors other than selection

of fee-calculation method, of course, may have contributed to these results. Moreover, similar

differences in mean and median fee-recovery rates were found when we looked only at cases

using the percentage of recovery method (see Figure ).

The four courts differed in their approaches to fee calculation depending on whether or not

the settlement created a fund for distribution to the class. In certified cases with net monetary

distributions to class members (distribution cases), the percentage method was far more prevalent than lodestar (see Figure ). As one would expect, in settlements where the only benefits

to the certified class were those that could not be easily quantified (no distribution cases), courts

generally used lodestar or relied on consensual fee determinations (see Figure ).

We will first discuss distribution cases. In the three districts where the appellate courts have

authorized either fee-calculation method, lodestar was used in less than % of the distribution

cases in two districts but in a third of the cases in E.D. Pa.266 (see Figure ). In all four districts, judges determined fees using the percentage method in % or more of the distribution

cases. Percentage of recovery appeared to be the sole method used in S.D. Fla.267 In N.D. Cal.,

judges used it in %268 of the distribution cases, compared to about %269 in N.D. Ill. and

%270 in E.D. Pa.271 (see Figure ).

In no distribution cases, lodestar was the dominant method in two districts (see Figure ).

In the other two districts, findings were less informative because, in all but a few cases, the parties consented on fees or the method used was not apparent from case files. In all four districts,

nine cases were determined by lodestar and three by percentage of recovery (see Figure ).272

It appears that in many cases the court opted for lodestar when it could not quantify the value of

class benefits, making a percentage of recovery calculation problematic.

. Generally, the study could not measure the degree to which higher fee-recovery rates reflected high quality

work done, efforts to pursue challenging but deserving claims, or other factors. See discussion of fee adjustments and

multipliers infra §  (c).

. The mean and median fee-recovery rates in E.D. Pa. distribution cases using lodestar were % and %,

respectively, compared to % and % using the percentage method.

. In S.D. Fla., all percentage method cases involved securities claims.

. In N.D. Cal., over % of the percentage method cases involved securities issues. None involved civil rights

claims.

. In N.D. Ill., % were securities cases; % involved civil rights.

. In E.D. Pa., nearly % were securities cases; no cases involved civil rights.

. In one case each in two districts, the court applied both the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods (see

Figure ). These cases are included in the percentages cited above. In addition, we could not determine the method

the court used in about % of the distribution cases where generally the parties stipulated to a fee award and the

court approved all or most of the stipulated amount.

. In % or more of the cases, parties stipulated to fees or the fee method was otherwise unknown.
Findings 

Civil rights claims were generally more prevalent in no distribution cases.273 In part, this explains the higher lodestar usage in no distribution cases; lodestar is the appropriate method

when the court applies a fee-shifting statute.274

The Percentage Method. Median fee-recovery rates for distribution cases ranged from % to

% when the percentage method was used, consistent with precedents in the four districts’

respective courts of appeals (see Figure ). For example, recently the Third Circuit cited an

E.D. Pa. decision that noted that fee awards have ranged from % to % of the common

fund.275 In recent decisions, the Seventh276 and Eleventh277 Circuits have discussed benchmarks or ranges of % to %. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed district courts

to apply the twelve Johnson factors278 and other pertinent factors279 in determining the fee percentage. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that % should be the “benchmark”280 for such

awards, subject to adjustment upward or downward to account for any unusual circumstances

involved in a case.281 When federal district courts across the country use the percentage of recovery method for common fund cases, most select a percentage in a range from % to % of

the fund.282

Other Methods. To prevent a windfall to plaintiffs’ counsel in cases where the settlement fund

is unusually large, some courts have used the lodestar method283 or a sliding scale percentage

. Civil rights cases represented %, %, %, and % of cases with no net monetary distribution to the class,

compared to %, %, %, and % of cases where the class received net monetary distributions.

. See supra note .

. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.), cert.

denied,  S. Ct.  () (citing In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig.,  F. Supp. ,  (E.D. Pa.

)).

. See Florin v. NationsBank of Georgia,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (quoting In re Unisys Corp. Retiree

Medical Benefits ERISA Litig., MDL No. ,  WL , at * (E.D. Pa. Mar. , ) (“‘the benchmark in

common fund cases is %–%’”).

. Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle,  F.d , – (th Cir. ) (noting that percentage method is “better reasoned” for common fund cases and that the “majority of common fund fee awards fall between % and % of the fund”). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit stated, as a general rule, that % may be established as an upper limit. Id.

. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,  F.d , – (th Cir. ).

. The other factors include “the time required to reach a settlement, whether there are any substantial objections by class members or other parties to the settlement terms or the fees requested by counsel, any non-monetary

benefits conferred upon the class by settlement, and the economics involved in prosecuting a class action.” Camden I,

 F.d at . See discussion of fee enhancements infra § (c).

. “A benchmark is a single percentage figure used over and over again, regardless of the type of litigation or

the size of the recovery.” Lapointe, supra note , at , n..

. See Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (% of $, in

damages: a percentage award “should be adjusted or replaced . . . when special circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the case or other relevant factors”). See also Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (% of a $,,

recovery); In re Pacific Enterprises Sec. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (an award of % was justified because of the complexity of the issues and the risks). See discussion of fee enhancements infra §  (c).

. MCL d, supra note , § ., at  (%–% range). See also Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note , at 

(%–% range).

. In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (“the % ‘benchmark’

is of little assistance” in a case where the settlement fund was large ($ million)).
 Class Actions

method with the percentage to be awarded decreasing as the size of the fund increases (sliding

scale percentage method).284 Only one case in the study had a gross monetary settlement

amount greater than $ million.285 The fee-recovery rate in that N.D. Cal. case was %, below

the Ninth Circuit benchmark of %.286

In another case, as part of a bidding process for lead class counsel, the court selected a fee

structure that included the sliding scale percentage method. In addition, the fee percentage under this structure would be discounted by % if the case settled within the first year of litigation (an early settlement discount). That is, in addition to the sliding scale based on settlement

amount, the class would also receive a discount on fees if the case settled early.287 Such discounts generally are intended to keep class counsel from settling prematurely, under the theory

that early settlement is likely to be advantageous to class counsel but detrimental to the class.288

Some ascribe to this theory in particular with respect to cases with large potential recoveries

where, as described above,289 the sliding scale percentage method would decrease the fee percentage as the size of the fund increases. To offset any incentives for attorneys to settle early and

obtain fees at a higher percentage of a smaller settlement, the early settlement discount has been

introduced as a disincentive to premature settlement.

(c) How was benefit to the class taken into account?

Overview. In determining fee awards, the courts often included consideration of the extent to

which the class benefited from the settlement. We looked for the following as indicators: () use

of the percentage of recovery method, () any adjustments to the lodestar amount based on results achieved, and () whether the court considered any fee objections.

Using this somewhat limited data-gathering technique, it was apparent that the court took

class benefits into account in at least % of the distribution cases in two districts and at least

% and % of the time in the other two districts (see Figure ).290 In the balance of the dis-

. See Task Force Report, supra note , at . See also Florin v. NationsBank of Georgia,  F.d  (th

Cir. ) (“fee awards usually fall in the  percent– percent range for funds of $–$ million, and in the  percent– percent range for funds of $–$ million”). See also Coffee, New Learning, supra note , at  n. and

accompanying text. But, it has been noted:

A percentage is a relative concept and one court’s award of twenty-five percent of a $. million recovery does not mean that the percentage continues to be reasonable when applied to a $. million

recovery. Thus, the notion that a percentage falling within a certain range is reasonable is inherently

misleading.

Lapointe, supra note , at  & n..

. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Case No. - (N.D. Cal. filed April , ).

. The parties stipulated to attorneys’ fees and the court awarded the full amount of the fee request.

. In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,  F.R.D. ,  (N.D. Cal. ). The selected fee structure was as follows:

 Recovery Time for Resolution

(in millions)  –  months  or more months 

Up to $ % %

$–$ % %

$–$ % %

$ or more % %

. See supra note  and accompanying text.

. See supra note .

. This is in contrast to Professor Downs’ findings that “class attorneys received substantial awards . . . with
Findings 

tribution cases, case files did not provide sufficient information on fee-award rationale, often

because awards were based on consent of the parties or unadjusted lodestar calculations. Given

this, we generally could not determine whether or not the courts considered class benefits in

their fee decisions for these cases. To the extent that they did, the percentages cited above are

understated.

Background on fee adjustments and multipliers. One method courts have used to take class

benefits and other considerations into account has been to apply enhancements or reductions to

fee awards.291 In common fund cases, the trend had been that fee enhancements, where not

otherwise prohibited, should be reserved for the rare case in which the standard fee-calculation

method will not adequately compensate the professional.

One method used to enhance fees has been to apply a multiplier to the lodestar amount.292

In the past, the Seventh Circuit suggested limiting multipliers to a % increase in the lodestar.293 The majority of courts, however, had not imposed such limits.294

Data and discussion on fee adjustments and multipliers. In two cases, the lodestar was enhanced by a multiplier. In each case, the multiplier was approximately . times the lodestar

amount, resulting in a $, (%) fee award on a $. million gross settlement in one case

little or no judicial scrutiny.” Downs, supra note , app. at – (Chart D).

. When counsel request fee enhancements, arguments generally are that the case was especially difficult, that

the ultimate results produced exceptional benefits for the class, or that performance was otherwise superior. Counsel

also sometimes asks for adjustments to reflect the novelty of the issues presented, risk of nonpayment, and delay in

payment (loss of use of money). See Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note , at –;  Newberg & Conte, supra note ,

§ .. See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,  F.d , – (th Cir. ) (twelve factors to be

used in determining attorneys’ fees); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ), cert. denied,

 U.S.  (); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,  U.S. , – ()

(Delaware Valley I) (in the context of fee-shifting statutes, Johnson factors are subsumed within the lodestar amount

absent extraordinary circumstances).

. In a decision that might have affected the use of multipliers in study cases, on June , , the Supreme

Court barred risk multipliers (fee enhancers that account for counsel’s risk of nonpayment) in statutory fee-shifting

cases. City of Burlington v. Dague,  U.S.  (). The decision, however, did not address specifically whether

risk multipliers remain available in common fund cases. The effect of Dague on study cases (i.e., cases terminated in

the four districts between July , , and June ,  ) is unclear; the relevant appellate courts did not begin to

interpret the decision in the class action context until March .

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits concluded that Dague does not extend to common fund cases. See Florin v.

NationsBank of Georgia,  F.d , – (th Cir. ) (op. dated Sept. ,  ); In re Washington Public

Power Supply System Sec. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (holding that district court erred by refusing to

award risk multiplier to lodestar calculation) (op. dated Mar. , ). On the other hand, a recent Third Circuit

opinion, interrupting Dague, could be read to prohibit the use of multipliers for lodestar enhancement in common

fund class actions. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (d

Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ().

. Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ), cert. denied,  U.S.  (). But

see In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial,  F.R.D. ,  (N.D. Ill. ) (awarding multipliers ranging from . to ., depending on each attorney’s contribution). See also In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 

F. Supp. ,  (N.D. Ill. ) (no multiplier allowed), rev’d,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ). These three

cases were not in the study.

. See Richard B. Schmitt, Shareholders Suits Pay Attorneys Less, Wall St. J., Feb. , , at B, col. .
 Class Actions

and a $. million fee award in the General Motors Pick-Up Truck settlement recently vacated

on appeal.295

The dearth of enhancers or other adjustments in study cases might be related to the frequent

use of the percentage method where the selected percentage itself can incorporate the factors

that previously resulted in fee adjustments. Similarly, there is a trend, and in fee-shifting cases a

mandate, to incorporate those factors into the lodestar components. Also, it is possible that,

prior to  appellate decisions affecting two of the study courts, Dague had a chilling effect on

enhancements in common fund cases.296

(d) What percentage of the fee amounts requested were awarded and how often were

objections and appeals filed concerning fees?

Data and Discussion. We looked at how frequently the court awarded fee amounts less than

counsel requested. Again, we found differences depending on the calculation method used. In

the three districts that used the lodestar, courts granted lodestar amounts less than requested in

%, %, and % of the cases. By contrast, when these same three courts used the percentage

method, they reduced fee requests in %, %, and % of certified case settlements, respectively. The fourth district did not use lodestar and apparently did not reduce percentage

method requests. Regardless of the method, the vast majority of awards were % to % of

the request.

Class members, or other interested parties, did not object to fees very often; objections were

filed with respect to five out of thirty-four (%) fee awards in one court, three of eleven (%) in

another, five of thirty-four (%) in the third, and seven of twenty-eight (%) in the fourth district. An objection was filed in only one lodestar case (representing % of lodestar cases in that

district and % of lodestar cases in the four districts combined). In contrast, rates of fee objection were higher in cases using the percentage method297 (see Figure ). Since objections were

filed in percentage method cases . times as often as under lodestar, these results could be read

to indicate that objections are more likely under the percentage method. However, one must

also consider that notices of proposed settlement identified fee-related amounts298 in % of the

lodestar cases compared to % of percentage method cases. That is, for all four districts combined, class members in percentage cases were given information about fee amounts . times as

often as in lodestar cases. Even considering this, however, there appeared to be less propensity

to object under lodestar for some reason. Note, however, that one cannot extrapolate these data

on a small number of cases to all class actions nationwide; factors other than those discussed

here may have caused these results.

Appeals were filed in % to % of study cases (see infra § ). For three of the four districts, % to % of these appeals (four or fewer per district) involved attorneys’ fees issues,299

. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (d Cir.), cert.

denied,  S. Ct.  ().

. See supra note .

. The rate reflects the number of percentage method cases with at least one fee objection divided by the number of percentage method cases.

. These notices described the proposed settlements and either stated the amount or range of fees or the percentage of the settlement fund to be allocated to fees, subject to court approval.

. Not including appeals on sanctions.
Findings 

often accompanying appeals on other issues. In the fourth district, three fee-related appeals

constituted % of the court’s class action appeals. All fee-related appeals were challenges to the

award, denial, or reduction of plaintiffs’ counsel fees. In total, for the four districts, there were

ten such appeals. One of these cases, the General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation, resulted in

vacating a “settlement class” settlement that included $. million in fee awards. The other appeals ended in fee-award affirmance (two cases), appeal dismissal (two cases), reversal of denial

of fees (one case), vacating the trial court’s reduction of fees (one case), and remanding for reconsideration (one case). The other two appeals were pending (see Tables  to ).

() Trivial Remedies; Other Remedies

(a) How frequently did certified (b)() classes lead to relief that is relatively trivial in

comparison to attorneys’ fees?

Study results did not show recurring situations where (b)() actions produced nominal class

benefits in relation to attorneys’ fees. ( See alsosupra § (a) for a discussion of the average recovery per individual class member and of cases in which the average individual recovery was less

than $.) We gauged this by determining, for each certified case with (b)() recovery, what

percentage of the gross monetary settlement was paid to class counsel. This fee-recovery rate

exceeded % in % of settled cases in two districts and in less than % of settled cases in the

other two courts (see Figure ).300 In half of these cases, case files provided information that

helped explain the “high” rates. For example, in some cases, monetary relief was accompanied

by nonquantifiable (b)() benefits, such as a permanent injunction for the benefit of the class. In

other cases, the settlement produced relatively small payments to the class as well as to attorneys

for the class.301 (For a more detailed discussion of fee-recovery rates, see supra § (a).)

In the four districts, in twelve cases that were certified solely under Rule (b)(), attorneys’

fees were awarded but no objectively quantifiable monetary relief was awarded to the class. Table  summarizes the relief and the attorneys’ fee awards in those cases. Assessing whether the

relief is trivial in relation to the fees calls for subjective judgments that we leave to the readers.

The fee awards in these cases were generally the product of a stipulation (eight of nine cases for

which information was available). In one case, the General Motors Pick-up Truck Litigation, the

. The “fee-recovery rate” exceeded % in the following numbers of cases: two of eighteen certified settled

cases with net monetary distribution in each of two districts, one of twenty-three cases in the third district, and zero

of nine cases in the fourth.

. In the case with the highest fee-recovery rate (%), a $, monetary class recovery and $, fee

award were accompanied by a prothonotary’s agreement to place future interpleaded funds in separate interestbearing accounts. The second highest rate (%) involved a $. million fee award, $ , in notice costs and a

$. million net cash distribution to a certified class of approximately , stockholders that incurred stock losses.

The third highest rate (around %) was related to a $, net monetary distribution to a class of terminated members of a health plan, with attorneys’ fees of $,. The fourth largest rate (%) was based on a $, net

monetary distribution and $ , in fees related to bank customers that received improper forms. Two other cases

had high rates (just over % in each). One was a securities case, where the court used the percentage of recovery

method but did not place a value on other nonclass benefits valued by class and settlement counsel at $. million.

The other was a lodestar case with a net monetary settlement of $, where no noneconomic benefits were apparent in the case file. There also may have been other factors, not apparent in case files, that affected the rates at

which fees were awarded.
 Class Actions

court of appeals cast doubt on the justification for the stipulated fees when it vacated the settlement. Judges reduced substantially two of the four fee requests that were not stipulated by the

parties.

(b) How frequently did certified (b)() classes lead to injunctive relief that is relatively

trivial in comparison to attorneys’ fees?

We looked at the percentage of certified (b)() cases that resulted in injunctive relief without any

substantive monetary distribution. We found variation among the districts, with the percentage

ranging from % (zero of three cases) in one district to % (five of seven cases) in another.302 In

just over half of these cases, attorneys’ fee awards were around $ , or less, with injunctive

relief ranging in scope from a nationwide nondiscrimination policy in a federal agency ($,

in fees) to a local housing authority’s rewiring of dwelling units ($, in fees). It appears that

many would agree that the breadth of the results obtained was not trivial in comparison to the

size of the fee award in these cases.

Cases with fee awards greater than $, resulted in the following relief:

• improving treatment and placement opportunities for developmentally disabled Medicaid recipients ($,);

• entering into a consent decree concerning abortion and family planning services

($, in fees); and

• readjudicating claims for survivor and disability benefits ($,).

The comparatively high level of fees makes it more difficult to assess their appropriateness after

the fact. Given the breadth and complexity of these cases, however, many would consider the

relief to be nontrivial (see Table ).

(c) How often were recoveries distributed to charities or the like?

Nine percent or less of approved settlements included distribution of settlement funds to a

charitable or other nonprofit organization.303 This occurred in a total of five cases in two districts (see Table ). One example is a settlement fund that donated $, to the Chicago

Bar Foundation for specific programs on domestic abuse, juvenile justice, and mentoring.

() Duplicative or Overlapping Classes

Background. The core questions are: How common are duplicate or overlapping classes? What

difficulties were posed by such classes? Case law and commentary provide us with more information than the empirical data in the study. It is clear that multiple actions that are similar or

identical and brought in different forums can be problematic. Such problems include the de

facto surrender of jurisdiction by a court’s yielding priority to another action and intercourt and

intersystem consolidation.304 These multiple actions can result in conflicting or overlapping

. The percentages of certified (b)() settlements that resulted in injunctive relief without any substantive

monetary distribution were as follows: % (five of seven settled certified (b)() cases) in one court, % (seven of

sixteen cases) in another district, % (one of five cases) in the third court, and % (zero of three cases) in the fourth.

. The number of approved settlements with charitable distributions were as follows: three of thirty-four courtapproved settlements in one district, two of twenty-seven settlements in another, zero of thirty-four in the third, and

zero of eleven in the fourth.

. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Civiletti,  Fed. R. Serv. d (Callaghan)  (D. Kan. ) (court denied certification because of the danger of overlapping classes and of wasted judicial effort; the court found that there were cases
Findings 

classes that may produce inconsistent adjudications, duplication of effort, and confusion for

class members, litigants, and judges.305 “When such an overlap occurs, the individual’s claims

become subject to an ‘irrational resolution by a race to judgment,’”306 and “[e]ven if absent

class members are permitted to opt out of any or all of the parallel lawsuits, no guarantee exists

that the actions of many individual class members choosing to opt out will resolve the conflict or

eliminate the overlap.”307 Problems arising from competing classes may benefit by consolidation of the actions in one court.308

Data. We found that overlapping classes generally arose in related cases that were not consolidated with similar litigation pending in federal and state courts (see supra § (b)). Our data

uncovered five cases with what appeared to be duplicative or overlapping classes. The data

showed that those cases generated few difficulties, if any, for the court. In several instances, the

federal court avoided parallel proceedings by issuing a stay pending the completion of trial in

related state litigation. Aside from our search for file references to related and consolidated

cases, we did not inquire into the existence of competing class actions.

() Res Judicata

Call for Research. There are no data from the field study on this topic. It would be interesting to

pursue the extent to which opt-out plaintiffs or objecting class members filed an action on the

same issues that were addressed in the class action. Our data would permit identification of

counsel in those cases and a follow-up questionnaire or interview might well uncover interesting

and useful data.

pending in another district involving the same class members and issues; the case was eventually transferred to the

other district).

. George T. Conway III, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts,  Yale L.J. ,  &

n. () (quoting Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out,  Ariz. L. Rev. ,  (): “Among the hypothetical parade of horribles which can be projected is the scenario in which fifty competing, national, multistate opt

out class actions are brought on the same claims and all members remain silent in response to the fifty notices.”).

. Id. at  & n. (citing Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,  Yale L.J. ,  (): “Professors Miller and Crump observe that a race to judgment among competing class actions would encourage litigants to engage in unseemly tactical behavior. ‘For example, defendants could forum shop by delaying or accelerating particular actions. Plaintiffs could collude with similarly

aligned parties in stalking horse litigation, diverting their opponents’ attention or seeking collateral advantages such

as the cumulative benefits of inconsistent discovery rulings.’” Id. at  n. (quoting Miller & Crump, supra, at 

(footnotes omitted))).

. Id. at .

. Subclasses will often be necessary when independent actions are brought on behalf of classes that overlap or

conflict with classes represented in other actions. For example, in the settling Antibiotics cases, well over  actions

were filed, including several brought on behalf of nationwide classes. To avoid obvious conflicts, and to ease administrative chores, the consumer classes were redefined on a geographical basis, with states named as representatives of

statewide consumer classes.  Newberg & Conte, supra note , § ., at - to - (citing West Virginia v. Chas.

Pfizer & Co.,  F. Supp.  (S.D.N.Y. ), aff’d,  F.d  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  U.S.  ()).

“Similarly, nonsettling Antibiotics actions were upheld as statewide classes after being transferred for coordinated

pretrial proceedings.” Id. at - (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 

F. Supp.  (S.D.N.Y. ), nonsettling actions transferred,  F. Supp  (J.P.M.L. ).
 Class Actions

() Appeals

Background: Proposed Revision to Rule . Under the final judgment rule,309 orders granting or

denying class certification are interlocutory and generally not appealable until the entry of a final

judgment;310 however, in certain cases courts have allowed interlocutory appeal under the limited exceptions of  U.S.C. §§ (a) and (b).311 Generally,

[c]lass action certification rulings involve some factual analysis and thus do not qualify

as “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion . . . . ” [ U.S.C. § (b).] In short, there is little likelihood of immediate

review of class action rulings even though such rulings may be crucial and controlling

in the future conduct of the case.312

Pendent appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise unappealable order is available only to the extent necessary to ensure meaningful review of an appealable order.313 Granting a petition for

writ of mandamus for certification review is rare.314

The proposed revision to Rule  would add a provision that authorizes immediate appellate

review of class certification rulings by leave of the court of appeals. As described in the draft

committee note, this provision is intended to afford an opportunity for prompt correction of

error before the parties incur significant litigation or settlement costs.315 The underlying theory

is that class certification rulings very often have make-or-break significance for the litigation,

. Federal “courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”

 U.S.C. §  ().

. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,  U.S. ,  () (order decertifying a class is not appealable under

 U.S.C. § ); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,  U.S. ,  () (not appealable under 

U.S.C. § (a)()). But see Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,  F.d

 (d Cir. ) (class representative’s failure to prosecute its individual claims created a final judgment; denial of

class certification merged into that judgment), cert. denied,  U.S.  ().

. Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co.,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (interlocutory appeal reversed denial of class certification); Gay v. Waiters & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (ruling on class certification

that is integral to a preliminary injunction ruling, also appealed, may be reviewed pursuant to (a)). See also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. -,  WL , at * (th Cir. May , ) (certifying class certification ruling for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to  U.S.C. § (b)). But see Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &

Co., Inc.,  F.d , – (d Cir. ) (class certification not reviewable under pendent appellate jurisdiction

because preliminary injunction was vacated).

. Downs, supra note , at .

. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., No. -,  WL , at * (d Cir. May , l) (holding

that “[t]o give full effect to the appellants’ right to review of the injunction, we must reach class certification”). Hoxworth,  F.d at .

. In re Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C.,  F.d  (th Cir. ) (writ of mandamus will not issue unless

denying certification amounted to a usurpation of judicial power); Interpace Corp. v. Philadelphia,  F.d  (d

Cir. ) (writ of mandamus power is rarely exercised in class action context). But see In re American Medical Systems, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (ruling that writ of mandamus to decertify nationwide plaintiff class was

justified because of trial court’s “total disregard of the requirements of Rule ” in medical device products liability

case); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir.) (mandamus justified; district court certification

of class was in error and delaying review would cause irreparable harm), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ().

. Appellate review would be “available only by leave of the court of appeals promptly sought, and proceedings

in the district court . . . are not stayed . . . unless the district judge or court of appeals so orders.” Cooper, supra note

, Committee Note.
Findings 

with denial of certification sometimes leading to quick dismissal of the case and with granting of

certification at times seen as forcing defendants to settle. (See supra § (a).) The draft committee note anticipates that orders permitting immediate appellate review will be “rare.” Others

speculate about whether losing parties will seek interlocutory appellate review of nearly every

decision on certification.

In , the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements of the ABA Section of Litigation recommended a code change that would be similar in effect to the proposed rule

amendment.316 The ABA special committee proposed amending the jurisdictional provisions of

 U.S.C. §  to permit appellate review of a certification ruling by permission of the court of

appeals “with accompanying safeguards designed to deter vexatious or delaying resort to interlocutory review.”317 The ABA special committee also anticipated that orders permitting such

interlocutory review would be rare.318

Providing for discretionary interlocutory appeal of certification rulings might dovetail with

another proposed change: making some level of probable success on the merits an additional

element or factor for the court to consider in deciding whether to certify a class. (See supra §

(c).) Some argue that both proposed changes would affect the impact of the certification ruling

on parties’ bargaining power during settlement negotiations. Some maintain that allowing interlocutory appeal on certification would be even more important if Rule  provided for consideration of probable success on the merits, because the certification ruling would make an

even stronger statement on the potential outcome of a case than under the current rule.

(a) How often were appeals filed?

Data. In the four districts, the rate of filing at least one appeal in class action cases ranged from

% to % (see Figure ).319 For this purpose, rate of appeal is defined as the number of cases

in which at least one appeal was filed divided by the number of cases in the study.320 It is important to recognize, however, that the pool of cases from which parties generally might appeal

is far less than all class actions in the study, because study cases exhibited a high rate of settlement and settlement judgments are infrequently appealed (see Table  and discussion at supra

§ (a)). The overall rate of appeal (see Figure ) might have been even higher had it not been

for the high rate of class settlement. Significant differences in appeal rates for settled cases

. The ABA special committee made this recommendation prior to the enactment of  U.S.C. § (e)

(Supp. ) which provides the statutory authority for using the rule-making process to permit an appeal of interlocutory orders.

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at . The report cited  U.S.C. §  (), Fed. R.

Civ. P. , Fed. R. App. P. , and inherent judicial power as “ample deterrents against abusive resort to interlocutory

review.” Id. at .

. Id. at .

. In the time study, % of the class actions included one or more appeals. Willging et al., supra note , at .

For discussion and statistics on appeal rates in federal civil cases, see generally Carol Krafka et al., Stalking the Increase in the Rate of Federal Civil Appeals –, n. (Federal Judicial Center ); Judith A. McKenna, Structural

and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial

Conference of the United States – (Federal Judicial Center ); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis

and Reform – ().

. There are other ways to estimate appeal rates for these and other purposes. See, e.g., Krafka et al., supra note

, at –, –; McKenna, supra note , at  & n..
 Class Actions

(appeal rates ranging from % to %) and nonsettled cases (ranging from % to %) were

observed in three districts. In the fourth court, the rate of appeal was the same (%) for both

settled and nonsettled cases.

In three districts, noncertified cases were more likely to have one or more appeals than certified cases (see Figure ). These findings may reflect the higher rate of settlement found in

certified cases (see Table  and discussion at supra § (a)(i)). In the fourth district, there was

no difference in appeal rates for certified and noncertified cases.

Because of the elevated stakes in trial cases, one might expect that the percentage of cases

that resulted in appeal would be higher for cases that go to trial compared to those that do not.

This expectation was borne out for the four districts in the aggregate. Cases in the study resulted in eighteen trials and twelve of those trials led to appeals on trial-related issues (see Tables  and ),321 a  % rate of appeal.322 Looking only at fully completed trials, that is, excluding four cases that settled during trial (three of which resulted in no appeal), the rate of appeal was higher (%). Given that these rates are for a small number of trials in cases terminated

in a two-year period in four districts combined, they cannot be used to predict the rates for class

actions nationally. It is interesting to note, however, that these appeal rates are much higher

than past findings of the nation-wide appeal rate for all civil cases that terminated by trial. For

example, a  study found a % rate of appeal after full trials in , cases terminating

between  and the first half of .

323

There were twelve, thirty-four, thirty-six, and fifty-six appeals in the four districts. All but

two of the appeals were from a final judgment or order. Most cases with appellate review included only one appeal. Two districts experienced multiple appeals in about a third of the cases

with appeals; the comparable rate for the other two districts was around % (see Figure ).

(b) How often did appeals alter the prior decision of the trial judge?

Data: Overview of Results on Appeal. Few of the appeals resulted in altering the prior decision of

the trial judge (see Figure ).324 The appellate courts reversed, vacated, or remanded in full in

about % of the appeals from three districts and % from the fourth.325 Appellate decisions

affirmed in full with much greater frequency—in about % of decided appeals in three districts

and in % in the fourth court. The other frequent disposition was dismissal of the appeal, ei-

. Eight of  appeals of trial results led to an appellate ruling and the other four appeals were dismissed (see

Tables  and ).

. In computing rate of appeal, for this purpose, the numerator was the number of post-trial appeals in cases

where trial commenced; the denominator was the number of study cases where a trial commenced.

. Gordon Bermant et al., Protracted Civil Trials: Views from the Bench and the Bar, Table , at  (Federal

Judicial Center ). See also J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Court of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Study of

the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits, Table ., at  ().

. The disposition data shown in Figure  is broken down further by appeals filed by plaintiffs (see Figure )

and defendants (see Figure ). Figures – show the number of decided appeals, rather than the number of cases

with appeals; some cases had more than one appeal.

. These percentages were obtained by dividing the number of appellate reversals, vacations, or remands for

each district by the total number of appeals filed in study cases in that district, with the denominator excluding appeals where the court of appeals had not yet issued a decision. These five excluded appeals, shown in the legend for

Figure , amount to about .% of appeals filed in study cases in the four districts combined.
Findings 

ther by the court of appeals or by stipulation of the parties. This occurred at rates in the four

districts ranging from % to % of decided appeals (see Figure ).326

Plaintiffs were appellants more often than defendants were. Plaintiffs filed about % of the

appeals in three districts and % in the fourth.327 The preliminary time study found that

plaintiffs filed % of the appeals in that sample of fifty-one class actions nation-wide.328

In the instant study, between % and % of plaintiffs’ appeals were successful, in whole or

in part, in reversing or vacating trial court decisions in three courts.329 The fourth court did not

have a sufficient number of appeals for this stratification (see Figure ). Few defendants’ appeals resulted in reversal or vacation (see Figure ).

Data: Reversals. Generally in study cases, after appellate reversal and remand of a dispositive

order, case resolution in favor of the class appeared more likely if a class had been certified prior

to the appeal than if no class had been certified. While other explanations may be possible for

these observations, our study data establish a plausible hypothesis that may warrant further

testing.

Reversals in Cases with Certified Classes. Viewing the four districts as an aggregate, appellate reversals in whole or in part occurred in seven cases where the district court had certified a

class prior to the appeal (see Table ). In four of the seven cases, after the appellate court reversed a final judgment, the district court on remand approved a class settlement. The judgments appealed from in three of these four cases had been dispositive in favor of the defendants.330 The fourth case settled despite the court of appeals reversal of summary judgment for

the plaintiff class on liability. In the other three of these seven cases, the court of appeals vacated

a settlement (the General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation now pending in the district court),

affirmed nearly all of a summary judgment for defendants in another case (also pending), and in

the third case vacated a decision in favor of defendants with instructions to dismiss the case for

lack of jurisdiction.

Reversals in Cases with No Class Previously Certified. Thirteen reversals occurred in cases

where a class was not certified before appeal, again looking at the four districts as an aggregate.

. These calculations exclude appeals where no appellate disposition information was available. See supra note

.

. This is not surprising given () the frequency and outcome of defendant motions to dismiss some or all of

plaintiff claims, () the frequency and outcome of plaintiff motions for class certification, and () the outcome of trials

in study cases. For example, motions to dismiss were granted in full or in part in about % of the rulings on motions

to dismiss in two districts and in about % of such rulings in the other two districts (see Table ). The district

court denied certification of a plaintiff class in about one-third of the rulings on class certification in three districts

and in half of the rulings in the fourth district (see supra § ). For all four districts combined, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in about % of the trials that commenced, not counting trials that settled before completion (see Tables 

and ).

. Willging et al., supra note , at .

. See supra note .

. In the first of these three cases, an appellate panel vacated summary judgment for the defendants. In the second case, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim; the district

court had certified a plaintiff class on the same date that it dismissed the case. In the third settled case, the court of

appeals twice reversed and remanded summary judgments for the defendants, once before and once after class certification.
 Class Actions

The aftermath of reversals in these cases did not appear as favorable to the class as where a class

had been certified before the filing of the appeal (see Table  compared to Table ).

All but one of the thirteen were plaintiff appeals of claim dismissal or summary judgment for

the defendants.331 Despite appellate reversal of these judgments,332 remand led to dismissal or

no substantive success on plaintiffs’ original claims in all but five of the twelve cases with plaintiff appeals; three of those five remanded cases are pending in district court. Another one of the

five resulted in class certification and class settlement after remand. In the one additional case, a

class was certified after reversal of the first summary judgment ruling for defendants; the case

eventually settled after appellate reversal of a second summary judgment ruling for defendants.333

Data: Issues on Appeal. We categorized the principal issues and related outcomes on appeal

in Tables  through .

Implications for Proposed Amendments to Rule . Study data on appeals can be interpreted

in several ways but they should not be viewed as predictors of the universe of class action cases

nation-wide. Because study data reflect a small number of appeals in a limited time period in

only four districts, we cannot make broad-based conclusions.

Current supporters of the rule change have maintained that an appellate reversal of the class

certification decision could change the life of a case in ways far beyond the class certification

itself. Some might read the study’s reversal and remand findings to suggest that certifying a class

before a plaintiffs’ appeal of dismissal or summary judgment had a significant impact on the

eventual outcome of the case. Not surprisingly, cases certified before such appeal had a higher

likelihood of class settlement after remand than those cases with no class certification before the

appeal, suggesting the potential importance to a plaintiff class of a favorable and timely ruling on

certification.334 Some also might read the data to suggest that the absence of class certification

before appeal of a dispositive order may decrease the likelihood of settlement upon remand,

even if the appellate ruling on the dispositive motion is fully favorable to the plaintiff.

These readings of the data parallel the general observation that certified cases settled at a

higher rate than noncertified cases (see supra § (a)). These outcomes may indicate a higher

. In the defendants’ appeal in one case, the appellate panel vacated the district court’s injunction and award of

nominal damages to individual plaintiffs, resulting in nominal damages on remand.

. For example, in one case, the court of appeals vacated partial summary judgment for the defendants with

instructions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. In another case, plaintiffs and intervenors successfully challenged the district

court’s dismissal of the case but were unsuccessful in getting a reversal of the denial of class certification. In a third

case, the court of appeals reversed in part the grant of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

. Interestingly, there was no district court ruling on certification prior to the initial appeal in these two settled

cases, whereas in over half of the other reversal cases the trial court ruled on, but denied, class certification before the

filing of the appeal.

. Some may argue that our results illustrate that rulings on dispositive motions, before giving plaintiffs the

opportunity to have their class certified, could be viewed as a detriment to plaintiffs (see Table ). If this phenomenon is widespread beyond the four districts, plaintiffs’ lawyers might conclude after considering other factors that

they prefer the issuance of a certification ruling before any ruling on dispositive motions, rather than run the risk of

waiting and possibly precluding any future ruling on certification. See supra § (a)(i). Some plaintiffs’ counsel might

see this as a reason to oppose the proposed amendment to Rule  that would authorize, and thus possibly promote,

district court rulings on dispositive motions prior to rulings on class certification, putting aside the cost of notice

problem for purposes of this discussion. See supra § (c).
Findings 

level of merit in certified cases than in noncertified cases. Although one cannot conclude from

our data that class certification causes settlement, class certification before appeal could be

viewed as one of the factors that led to eventual settlement. But, defendants and their counsel

may view these cases as illustrations to support their arguments that certification exerts proplaintiff pressure on defendants.

(c) To what extent did appellate review serve to correct errors in procedural

decisions relating to the class action mechanism, such as class certification?

Data: Appeals Involving Certification. Study results suggest that litigants infrequently seek appellate review of district court decisions involving class action mechanics, such as certification

or class settlement. For example, in the four districts combined, seven cases included appeals

on class certification issues (see Table ).

Putative class representatives appealed the denial of class certification in a total of five cases;

two of the denials were reversed and remanded, two were affirmed, and one appeal was dismissed. After these appellate rulings, three of the cases were dismissed without class certification and two are pending in the district court. A class was certified in one of the pending cases;

nonclass claims are pending in the other case.

Parties other than class representatives filed certification appeals in two cases. In the General

Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation, objecting class members successfully challenged a class settlement judgment and the standards used to certify the class. And, in another case, defendants

twice appealed certification of a plaintiffs’ class. The appellate court deemed the first district

court certification decision as interlocutory and not reviewable.335 When the certification decision later came up for appellate review with a final order, the court of appeals affirmed class certification.

Discussion. There could be several explanations for the small number of appeals involving

class certification. For example, most class action appeals, given that they were nearly always

filed after a final judgment, may have excluded certification issues because other issues, such as

the merits of the claims, may have superseded the need or feasibility of revisiting the certification issue. Also, there was no apparent opposition to certification with respect to % to % of

certification orders in the study. (See supra § (a); see also supra § (a).) In about % of the

study’s certified class actions, the parties submitted a proposed settlement before or simultaneously with the first motion to certify. (See supra § (d).)

When certification is granted, some defendants might settle rather than incur the costs of

litigating to final judgment and appeal.336 Likewise, when certification is denied, individual

plaintiffs might be unwilling to incur expenses disproportionate to their individual recoveries to

litigate further to secure appellate review on certification.337 These projections of the impact on

. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.,  F.d ,  (d Cir. ).

. See Cooper, supra note , Committee Note.

. As described supra in § (c), the court of appeals reversed the denial of certification in two of the seven

cases with appeals on certification issues. Such reversals have been cited as one of the reasons for authorizing interlocutory appeals concerning certification. Under the current rule, if the denial of class certification is reversed on

appeal after the entry of a final judgment in the case, putative class members can delay their decision to opt in until

remand with full knowledge of the nature of the final judgment. Some have argued that this scenario gives putative

class members the advantage of “one way intervention.” See Cooper, supra note , Committee Note. The infre-
 Class Actions

plaintiffs and defendants can be viewed as consistent with the reasoning offered in the ABA special committee’s commentary to its  recommendation on interlocutory appeal.338

Regardless of the reasons, the dearth of certification appeals in the study does not necessarily

mean that the revised rule would not have generated more appeals in these cases had it been in

effect during the study period. Some believe that, since certification is a settlement-significant

event, if parties can seek appeal they will, especially defendants challenging the grant of certification. (See supra § (a)(i).) The discretionary nature of the proposed rule, however, is designed to be a guard against abuse of the appellate process.

Estimating Appeals of Certification Rulings Under the Proposed Amendment. Our data may

be useful as a description of the number of certification appeals currently taken. One might reasonably expect at least that many interlocutory appeals under the proposed amendment. Our

data cannot predict, however, how many parties will seek such appellate review and how these

interlocutory appeals will affect settlement prospects.

Even though few appeals in study cases involved the certification ruling itself, an analysis of

all appeals in cases with certification rulings may provide some insight into how many additional appeals the amended rule might bring. In two districts nearly two-thirds of class actions

included at least one ruling on certification, nearly half did in the third district, but only %

did in the fourth (see Figure ). Most (% to %) of the appeals in these cases occurred after the ruling on certification (see Figure ). Appeals, of any kind, in cases with rulings on certification occurred at about the same rate (% to %) as in cases without any ruling on certification (see Figure  compared to Figure ).

Many believe that the appellate courts will not grant appeals of routine certification decisions. The finding that only % to % of cases with rulings on certification resulted in any

appeal on any issue (see Figure ) could support the draft committee note’s statement that the

number of orders granting appeal under the proposed amendment would be rare. However, as

discussed above, there are strongly held views that parties will seek review of certification rulings as freely as possible and that the proposed revision adding consideration of probable success would increase the significance of the certification ruling.

Data: Appeals on Other Class Action Issues. In addition to the certification appeals described

above, only a small number of other appeals could be identified as characteristic of class actions.

Most of these were fee-award appeals (four or fewer in each district). Arguably, these are not

uniquely characteristic of class actions, particularly where a fee-shifting statute applied. (See

supra § (d) for a discussion of the results on these appeals.)

quency of these types of cases in the study does not necessarily mean that they occur as infrequently in other cases or

in other districts.

. The ABA committee commentary stated:

If [class certification] is denied, the individual plaintiff must abandon his efforts to represent the alleged class or

incur expenses wholly disproportionate to his individual recovery in order to secure appellate review of the certification ruling. If, as often happens, the individual plaintiff is unwilling to incur such an expense, the case is dismissed and the certification ruling is never reviewed. . . . Conversely, if class certification is erroneously granted, a

defendant faces potentially ruinous liability and may be forced to settle a case rather than run the economic risk of

trial in order to secure review of the certification ruling.

ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at –.
Findings 

In addition, prospective intervenors appealed the denial of intervention in one case in one

district and in two cases in another. None of the intervenors was successful on appeal.

Objecting class members sought appellate review of the fairness and reasonableness of a class

settlement in only one case, the General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation. That settlement was

vacated. In two other appeals, a third-party defendant challenged the district court’s approval of

a settlement; however, those appeals were dismissed. Finally, in one case, the trial court’s disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel was affirmed as part of an appeal of the district court’s decision on class certification.

In section (c) supra, we saw that the certified class actions included twenty-one objections

to some aspect of the notice process. But, no appeal involved any issue related to notice to the

class.

() Class Action Attorneys

(a) How extensive was the class action bar across the four districts?

Data and Discussion. Some have expressed concerns about the prevalence of “class action

firms” that appear with great frequency in class actions across the country.339 Related to these

concerns are questions concerning conflicts of interest that arise in class actions and even allegations of collusion between class counsel, defense counsel, and representative parties in certain

cases.340

Using court files,341 we identified lead, co-lead, and liaison counsel342 in  of the  certified cases in the study343 and in  noncertified cases.344 These attorneys were from  different law firms from across the country. In most cases, more than one firm served as class counsel

and at least one of the lead attorneys was from within the district where the case was being

heard.

Two-thirds of the  firms had offices within the district where their respective cases were

pending. As one might expect given the districts studied, most of these firms had offices in the

Philadelphia, Miami, Chicago, or San Francisco metropolitan areas and they appeared more

often within their respective districts than in the other study districts. However, certain Philadelphia firms had offices in California or Florida and appeared frequently outside E.D. Pa.

. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions,  Stan. L. Rev. , –, – ().

. See generally Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note , at –; Senate Staff Report, supra note , at

–, –.

. Court files, of course, would not identify behind-the-scenes participation by lawyers who did not enter an

appearance or identify themselves in a settlement or other document.

. For definition and discussion of lead counsel and liaison counsel, see MCL d, supra note , § ..

. The court docket indicated that plaintiffs in the other two certified cases appeared pro se.

. In  certified cases and  noncertified cases in the study, we identified counsel from court orders appointing class counsel or from notices to the class that included the name of class counsel. These  cases were as follows:

 in E.D. Pa.,  in S.D. Fla.,  in N.D. Ill., and  in N.D. Cal. In  of the  cases, liaison counsel were appointed

in addition to lead or co-lead counsel; in  case lead counsel was appointed for a certified defendants’ class.

For  additional certified cases where court orders or class notices did not identify lead or co-lead counsel, we

assumed that plaintiffs’ attorneys listed on the docket sheets were lead or co-lead counsel. There were  such cases

in E.D. Pa., none in S.D. Fla.,  in N.D. Ill., and  in N.D. Cal.
 Class Actions

A third of the  firms were from outside the study districts and generally appeared as colead counsel. Most of these firms were from New York City ( firms), Los Angeles ( firms), or

Washington, D.C. ( firms). Other firms hailed from various states, including Ohio ( firms),

Minnesota ( firms), Massachusetts ( firms), and Michigan ( firms).

(b) How often did the same attorneys appear as counsel for the class in different cases

and in different courts?

Data. As an indication of how often the same attorneys appeared as class counsel in different

cases in different courts, we looked at the firms that were lead or co-lead counsel in four or more

cases.345 For the four districts combined, there were twelve such firms in ninety-five cases. All

but two were certified cases. This means that these twelve firms were lead or co-lead counsel in

% of the certified cases in the study.

One firm was lead or co-lead in seventeen cases and liaison counsel in two cases. These

nineteen cases were spread more or less evenly among three districts, with no cases in N.D. Ill.

Two other firms were each lead or co-lead counsel in about fifteen cases in three districts, again

with no cases in N.D. Ill. One Washington, D.C., firm was in four cases in three districts. The

other eight firms appeared almost exclusively in cases in their own districts. Interestingly,

among these eight firms, the three Chicago firms did not appear outside N.D. Ill. (see Table

).

. Each consolidation of cases is counted as one case.


Conclusion

In this section, we summarize some of the more intriguing findings, discuss implications for

policy makers, and suggest areas for future research.

Summary of significant findings. Based on assumptions in the ABA committee report, we

expected to find considerable litigation over the appropriate Rule  category,346 judicial reluctance to examine the merits of cases before ruling on class certification,347 and limited opportunities for appeal of certification rulings before final judgment.

We found little litigation about which Rule  category was appropriate. This finding across

four districts suggests that the need for collapsing Rule ’s three categories is not as critical as

some have suggested, but the question of whether the amount of litigation we found would justify a rule change is a policy question. Further, collapsing categories could create unintended

consequences, such as clouding existing case precedent on noticing, opting out, and similar

matters. Our finding raises questions about the need for a rule change but could not address

whether there would be any harmful effect of changing the rule.

We also found, contrary to a premise underlying the ABA special committee’s recommendation, that judges frequently ruled on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment

prior to ruling on class certification. Among judges who did not so rule, however, we cannot

rule out the possibility that some may have considered the absence of express permission for

precertification merits rulings to be a factor that restrained them from so ruling. Again, our data

do not suggest that the proposed change would have harmful effects. An unintended, but not

necessarily harmful, consequence of the proposed change might be, for example, a dramatic

shift in allocating the costs of notice. Our data suggest that the parties often appear to avoid imposing the full cost of notice on the proponent of the class despite the clear ruling in Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacqueline.

348 Explicitly permitting precertification rulings on the merits would remove one of Eisen’s major premises and make the rule consistent with the general practice that

we found.

Concerning interlocutory appeals,349 study data confirmed the assumption in the ABA

committee report that there are limited opportunities for appellate review, interlocutory or not,

of decisions on certification. We also found limited success by appellants in altering district

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note , at – (“this problem arises frequently”).

. Id. at  (“Clarification [is needed] to eliminate confusion concerning proper treatment of pre-certification

motions . . . and to authorize consideration of such motions prior to certification of the class. . . .”).

.  U.S.  ().

. ABA Special Committee Report, supra note ,at  (recommending discretionary interlocutory appellate

review of rulings on certification).
 Class Actions

court decisions generally and few appeals of certification decisions. Whether the paucity of successful appeals of certification decisions is attributable to the lack of opportunity for earlier appeals of certification decisions or to the lack of appealable issues that survive final judgment

cannot be answered with our data for various reasons. For example, because parties often settled certified class actions, only dissenting class members or intervenors would have retained a

right to appeal. Thus, the number of appeals we found is not necessarily a measure of the number of issues that might have been candidates for interlocutory appeal immediately after the certification decision.

Based on anecdotal evidence, we expected to find a high level of abuse in the form of attorneys’ fees that were disproportionate to the class recoveries.350 Instead we found that attorneys’

fees were generally in the traditional range of approximately one-third of the total settlement.

While attorneys clearly derived substantial benefits from settlements, the recoveries to the class

in most cases were not trivial in comparison to the fees. But, recoveries by individual class

members were in amounts that could not be expected to support individual actions. This

finding confirms that many cases satisfy an underlying purpose of Rule , which is to provide a

mechanism for the collective litigation of relatively small claims that would not otherwise support cost-effective litigation. Our findings, however, do not address the monetary value or

sufficiency of plaintiffs’ recoveries in relation to any monetary losses they may have incurred.

Anecdotal evidence also led us to expect to find substantial evidence of “strike suits” where

filing a class action or certifying a class coerced settlement without regard to the merits of

claims.351 Instead we found that although certified cases in the study settled at a higher rate than

cases not certified as class actions, there were no objective indications that settlement was coerced by class certification. Rather, we found that settlements often appeared to be the combined product of a case surviving a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment as

well as being certified as a class action. Whether the size of the potential liability affected settlement was beyond the scope of the current study.

On the other hand, we found a sizable number of cases that might be characterized as unsuccessful strike suits, that is, cases that were filed as class actions and never certified as such. Such

cases were often found to be without merit and were terminated by rulings on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, not by settlements, coerced or otherwise. These data

suggest that judges generally rule promptly on the merits of claims and that these rulings frequently dispose of unmeritorious claims.

One of the more surprising findings was that settlement and trial rates for cases filed as class

actions were not much different from settlement and trial rates for civil cases generally.352 The

findings on settlement and trial rates are consistent with a general trend toward fewer trials and

more settlements in civil litigation in federal district courts.353

. See, e.g., Senate Staff Report, supra note , at  (“settlements yield large fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers but compensate investors for only a fraction of their actual losses”); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of ,

 U.S.C.A. § z-(a)() (West Supp. ) (attorneys’ fees in securities class actions shall be limited to “a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class”).

. See text accompanying supra notes  to  (§ (c)) and notes  to  (§ (a)).

. See text accompanying supra notes  to  (§ (b)).

. See Donna Stienstra & Thomas E. Willging, Alternatives to Litigation: Do They Have a Place in the Federal

District Courts –,  (Federal Judicial Center ) (federal civil trial rate diminished from more than % to less
Conclusion 

Addressing one of the advisory committee’s fundamental questions, we found that there are

significant numbers of “routine” class actions that represent relatively standard or “easy” applications of Rule , especially in the securities and civil rights contexts. This finding suggests

that there are well-established applications of Rule  that might be affected by a major restructuring of class action procedures.

Calls for research. In many respects, this study report represents a threshold empirical look

at contemporary class actions. Because of time and budget constraints, we were unable to address certain issues that the advisory committee identified and, in the course of our research, we

came across additional issues that warrant further study. We noted those issues in the various

sections of the report and summarize them here primarily with the hope that we might stimulate

other researchers to pursue them.

There is a basic need for research to determine the incidence or volume of class actions

throughout the ninety-four districts of the federal system. Nation-wide statistics on class actions

are reported to and by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, but that reporting is not

complete. For the four courts in this study we identified the majority of cases selected for the

study by using electronic searches of dockets and databases of published opinions; the majority

of the study cases could not be found in the statistics reported to the Administrative Office.354

Similar searches for a scientifically selected sample of the other ninety districts would be required to get a clear picture of the national incidence of class action activity.

The advisory committee sought information about class representatives that we were unable

to provide given the limits of our time and resources. Interviews of lawyers and class representatives would be necessary, for example, to develop a clearer picture of how representatives and

attorneys come to be involved in class actions. Along similar lines, interviews of nonrepresentative class members, especially those who participate in the process by filing objections, claims,

or opt-out notices would provide an opportunity to examine in-depth any “grass roots” dissatisfaction with particular class action settlements.

Some researchers have attempted to assess the percentage of individual loss that class action

settlements redress.355 Surveying class members might provide a better source of information

about individual damages and the percentage of those damages recovered through the class actions process. Further, an expanded analysis of the content of notices sent to class members

could provide more complete information about the clarity and effectiveness of notices in communicating relevant information about settlements.356

Also, study of the relationship among multiple filings of class actions seems in order. We

encountered related cases in state and federal courts and noted their presence.357 A more indepth look at such overlapping cases might provide insights into ways to improve federal–state

coordination and federal management of multidistrict and intradistrict consolidations.

than % between  and ).

. See the section “Identification and Definition of Class Actions” in Appendix D, infra, and Table .

. See Senate Staff Report, supra note , at – (summarizing studies of whether the merits matter in securities class actions).

. See text accompanying supra notes  to  (§ (d)).

. See text accompanying supra notes  to  (§(b)).
 Class Actions

Studying the res judicata effects of class settlements or adjudication would also be another

worthy candidate for further research. In a similar vein, studying the frequency and nature of

satellite or subsequent litigation by class members who opt out could generate data comparing

class and individual recoveries and could thereby facilitate examining the sufficiency of class

action settlements.

These calls for research suggest that there is much to be done before systematic data are

available to put into perspective the anecdotes and generalizations that long have been driving

the debate about class actions.


Appendix A

PROPOSED RULE —

Rule . Class Actions.

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representatives on behalf of all

if—with respect to the claims, defenses, or issues certified for class action treatment—

() the members are so numerous that the joinder of all is impracticable;

() legal or factual questions are common to the class;

() the representative parties’ positions typify those of the class;

() the representative parties and their attorneys are willing and able to fairly and adequately protect

the interests of all persons while members of the class until relieved by the court from that

fiduciary duty; and

() a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

controversy.

(b) Whether a Class Action Is Superior. The matters pertinent in deciding under (a)() whether a class

action is superior to other available methods include:

() the extent to which separate actions by or against individual members might result in

 (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct

for the party opposing the class, or

 (B) adjudications that, as a practical matter, would dispose of the nonparty members’ interests or

reduce their ability to protect their interests;

() the extent to which the relief may take the form of an injunction or declaratory judgment respecting

the class as a whole;

() the extent to which common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members;

() the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;

() the extent and nature of any related litigation already begun by or against members of the class;

() the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum; and

() the likely difficulties in managing a class action which will be eliminated or significantly reduced if

the controversy is adjudicated by other available means.

(c) Determinations by Order Whether Class Action To Be Certified; Notice and Membership in

Class; Judgment; Multiple Classes and Subclasses.

() As soon as practicable after persons sue or are sued as representatives of a class, the court must

determine by order whether and with respect to what claims, defenses, or issues the action should

be certified as a class action.
 Class Actions

(A) An order certifying a class action must describe the class and determine whether, when, how,

and under what conditions putative members may elect to be excluded from, or included in,

the class. The matters pertinent to this determination will ordinarily include:

(i) the nature of the controversy and the relief sought;

(ii) the extent and nature of the members’ injuries or liability;

(iii) potential conflicts of interest among members;

(iv) the interest of the party opposing the class in securing a final and consistent resolution of the

matters in controversy; and

(v) the inefficiency or impracticality of separate actions to resolve the controversy.

When appropriate, a putative member’s election to be excluded may be conditioned upon a

prohibition against maintaining a separate action on some or all of the matters in controversy in

the class action or a prohibition against its relying in a separate action upon any judgment rendered or factual finding in favor of the class, and a putative member’s election to be included in

a class may be conditioned upon its bearing a fair share of litigation expenses incurred by the

representative parties.

(B) An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before

final judgment.

() When ordering that an action be certified as a class action under this rule, the court must direct

that appropriate notice be given to the class under subdivision (d)()(C). The notice must concisely and clearly describe the nature of the action; the claims, defenses, or issues with respect to

which the class has been certified; the persons who are members of the class; any conditions affecting exclusion or inclusion in the class; and the potential consequences of class membership. In

determining how, and to whom, notice will be given, the court may consider the matters listed in

(b) and (c)()(A), the expense and difficulties of providing actual notice to all class members, and

the nature and extent of any adverse consequences that class members may suffer from a failure to

receive actual notice.

() The judgment in an action certified as a class action, whether or not favorable to the class, must

specify or describe those who are members of the class or have elected to be excluded on conditions affecting any separate actions.

() When appropriate, an action may be certified as a class action with respect to particular claims,

defenses, or issues, by or against multiple classes or subclasses. Subclasses need not separately

satisfy the requirements of subdivision (a)().

(d) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions.

() In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders that:

(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or

complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;

(B) decide a motion under Rule  or  before the certification determination if the court concludes that the decision will promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and

will not cause undue delay;

(C) require notice to some or all of the class members or putative members of:

(i) any step in the action, including certification, modification, or decertification of a class, or

refusal to certify a class;

(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or

(iii) the members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;

(D) impose conditions on the representative parties, class members, or intervenors;
Appendix A 

(E) require the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; or

(F) deal with similar procedural matters.

() An order under Rule  (d)() may be combined with an order under Rule , and may be altered

or amended.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. An action in which persons sue or are sued as representatives of a class

must not, before the court’s ruling under subdivision (c)(), be dismissed, be amended to delete the request for certification as a class action, or be compromised without approval of the court. An action certified as a class action must not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court, and notice of

a proposed voluntary dismissal or compromise must be given to some or all members of the class in such

manner as the court directs. A proposal to dismiss or compromise an action certified as a class action may

be referred to a magistrate judge or other special master under Rule  without regard to the provisions of

Rule (b).

(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying a request for

class action certification under this rule upon application to it within ten days after entry of the order. An

appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so

orders.

COMMITTEE NOTE

Purpose of revision. As initially adopted, Rule  defined class actions as “true,” “hybrid,” or

“spurious” according to the abstract nature of the rights involved. The  revision created a

new tripartite classification in subdivision (b), and then established different provisions relating

to notice and exclusionary rights based on that classification. For (b)() class actions, the rule

mandated “individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort”

and a right by class members to “opt-out” of the class. For (b)() and (b)() class actions, however, the rule did not by its terms mandate any notice to class members, and was generally

viewed as not permitting any exclusion of class members. This structure has frequently resulted

in time-consuming procedural battles either because the operative facts did not fit neatly into

any one of the three categories, or because more than one category could apply and the selection of the proper classification would have a major impact on whether and how the case should

proceed as a class action.

In the revision, the separate provisions of former subdivisions (b)(), (b)(), and (b)() are

combined to treat as pertinent factors in deciding “whether a class action is superior to other

available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,” which is added as

subdivision (a) as a prerequisite for any class action. The issue of superiority of class action

resolution is made a critical question, without regard to whether, under the former language,

the case would have been viewed as being brought under (b)(), (b)(), or (b)(). Use of a unitary standard, once the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, is the approach taken by

the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and adopted in several

states.

Questions regarding notice and exclusionary rights remain important in class actions—and,

indeed, may be critical to due process. Under the revision, however, these questions are ones

that should be addressed on their own merits, given the needs and circumstances of the case

and without being tied artificially to the particular classification of the class action.
 Class Actions

The revision emphasizes the need for the court, parties, and counsel to focus on the particular claims, defenses, or issues that are appropriate for adjudication in a class action. Too

often, classes have been certified without recognition that separate controversies may exist between plaintiff class members and a defendant which should not be barred under the doctrine of

claim preclusion. Also, the placement in subdivision (c)() of the provision permitting class actions for particular issues has tended to obscure the potential benefit of resolving certain claims

and defenses on a class basis while leaving other controversies for resolution in separate actions.

As revised, the rule will afford some greater opportunity for use of class actions in appropriate cases notwithstanding the existence of claims for individual damages and injuries—at least

for some issues, if not for the resolution of the individual damage claims themselves. The revision is not, however, an unqualified license for certification of a class whenever there are numerous injuries arising from a common or similar nucleus of facts. The rule does not attempt to

authorize or establish a system for “fluid recovery” of damages, nor does it attempt to expand or

limit the claims that are subject to federal jurisdiction by or against class members.

The major impact of this revision will be on cases at the margin: most cases that previously

were certified as class actions will be certified under this rule, and most that were not certified

will not be certified under the rule. There will be a limited number of cases, however, where the

certification decision may differ from that under the prior rule, either because of the use of a

unitary standard or the greater flexibility [given] notice and membership in the class.

Various non-substantive stylistic changes are made to conform to style and conventions

adopted by the Committee to simplify the present rules.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a)() is revised to explicitly require that the proposed class

representatives and their attorneys be both willing and able to undertake the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in representation of a class. The willingness to accept such responsibilities is a

particular concern when the request for class treatment is not made by those who seek to be

class representatives, as when a plaintiff requests certification of a defendant class. Once a class

is certified, the class representatives and their attorneys will, until the class is decertified or they

are otherwise relieved by the court, have an obligation to fairly and adequately represent the

interests of the class, taking no action for their own benefit that would be inconsistent with the

fiduciary responsibilities of the class.

Paragraph ()—the superiority requirement—is taken from subdivision (b)() and becomes a

critical element for all class actions.

The introductory language in subdivision (a) stresses that, in ascertaining whether the five

prerequisites are met, the court and litigants should focus on the matters that are being considered for class action certification. The words “claims, defenses, or issues” are used in a broad

and non-legalistic sense. While there might be some cases in which a class action would be

authorized respecting a specifically defined cause of action, more frequently the court would set

forth a generalized statement of the matters for class action treatment, such as all claims by class

members against the defendant arising from the sale of specified securities during a particular

period of time.

Subdivision (c). Former paragraph () of this subdivision contained the provisions for notice

and exclusion in (b)() class actions.

Under the revision, the provisions relating to exclusion are made applicable to all class actions, but with flexibility for the court to determine whether, when, and how putative class
Appendix A 

members should be allowed to exclude themselves from the class. The court may also impose

appropriate conditions on such “opt-outs”—or, in some cases, even require that a putative

member “opt-in” in order to be treated as a member of the class.

The potential for class members to exclude themselves from many class actions remains a

primary consideration for the court in determining whether to allow a case to proceed as a class

action, both to assure due process and in recognition of individual preferences. Even in the

most compelling situation for not allowing exclusion—the fact pattern described in subdivision

(b)()(A)—a person might nevertheless be allowed to be excluded from the class upon the condition that the person will not maintain any separate action and hence, as a practical matter, be

bound by the outcome of the class action. The opportunity to elect exclusion from a class may

also be useful, for example, in some employment discrimination action in which certain employees otherwise part of the class may, because of their own positions, wish to align themselves

with the employer’s side of the litigation either to assist in the defense of the case or to oppose

the relief sought for the class.

Ordinarily, putative class members electing to be excluded from a plaintiff class will be free

to bring their own individual actions, unhampered by factual findings adverse to the class, while

potentially able, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, to benefit from factual findings favorable

to the class. The revised rule permits the court, as a means to avoid this inequity, to impose a

condition on “opting out” that will preclude an excluded member from relying in a separate

action upon findings favorable to the class.

Rarely should a court impose an “opt-in” requirement for membership in a class. There are,

however, situations in which such a requirement may be desirable to avoid the potential due

process problems, such as with some defendant classes or in cases where an opt-out right would

be appropriate but it is impossible or impractical to give meaningful notice of the class action to

all putative members of the class. With defendant classes it may be appropriate to impose a

condition that requires the “opting-in” defendant class members to share in the litigation expenses of the representative party. Such a condition would be rarely needed with plaintiff

classes since typically the claims on behalf of the class, if successful, would result in common

fund or benefit from which litigation expenses of the representative can be charged.

Under the revision, some notice of class certification is required for all types of class actions,

but flexibility is provided respecting the type and extent of notice to be given to the class, consistent with constitutional requirements for due process. Actual notice to all putative class

members should not, for example, be needed when the conditions of subdivision (b)() are met

or when, under subdivision (c)()(A), membership in the class is limited to those who file an

election to be members of the class. Problems have sometimes been encountered when the class

members’ individual interests, though meriting protection, were quite small when compared

with the cost of providing notice to each member; the revision authorizes such factors to be

taken into account by the court in determining, subject to due process requirements, what notice should be directed.

The revision to subdivision (c)() is intended to eliminate the problem when a class action

with several subclasses should be certified, but one or more of the subclasses may not independently satisfy the “numerosity” requirement.

Under former paragraph (), some issues could be certified for resolution as a class action,

while other matters were not so certified. By adding similar language to other portions of the
 Class Actions

rule, the Committee intends to emphasize the potential utility of this procedure. For example, in

some mass tort situations, it might be appropriate to certify some issues relating to the defendants’ culpability and—if the relevant scientific knowledge is sufficiently well developed—

general causation for class action treatment, while leaving issues relating to specific causation,

damages, and contributory negligence for potential resolution through individual lawsuits

brought by members of the class.

Subdivision (d). The former rule generated uncertainty concerning the appropriate order of

proceeding when a motion addressed to the merits of claims or defenses is submitted prior to a

decision on whether a class should be certified. The revision provides the court with discretion

to address a Rule  or Rule  motion in advance of a certification decision if this will promote

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § ..

Inclusion in the former subdivision (c)() of detailed requirements for notice in (b)() actions

sometimes placed unnecessary barriers to formation of a class, as well as masked the desirability, if not need, for notice in (b)() and (b)() actions. Even if not required for due process, some

form of notice to class members should be regarded as desirable in virtually all class actions.

Subdivision (c)() requires that notice be given if a class is certified, though under subdivision

(d)()(C) the particular form of notice is committed to the sound discretion of the court, keeping

in mind the requirements of due process. Subdivision (d)()(C) contemplates that some form of

notice may be desirable with respect to many other important rulings; subdivision (d)()(C)(i),

for example, calls the attention of the court and litigants to the possible need for some notice if

the court declines to certify a class in an action filed as a class action or reduces the scope of a

previously certified class. In such circumstances, particularly if putative class members have

become aware of the case, some notice may be needed informing the class members that they

can no longer rely on the action as a means for pursuing their rights.

Subdivision (e). There are sound reasons for requiring judicial approval of proposals to voluntarily dismiss, eliminate class allegations, or compromise an action filed or ordered maintained as a class action. The reasons for requiring notice of such a proposal to members of a

putative class are significantly less compelling. Despite the language of the former rule, courts

have recognized the propriety of a judicially-supervised precertification dismissal or compromise without requiring notice to putative class members, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo,  F.d 

(th Cir. ). The revision adopts that approach. If circumstances warrant, the court has ample authority to direct notice to some or all putative class members pursuant to the provisions of

subdivision (d). While the provisions of subdivision (e) do not apply if the court denies the request for class certification, there may be cases in which the court will direct under subdivision

(d) that notice of the denial of class certification be given to those who were aware of the case.

Evaluations of proposals to dismiss or settle a class action sometimes involve highly sensitive

issues, particularly should the proposal be ultimately disapproved. For example, the parties

may be required to disclose weaknesses in their own positions, or to provide information

needed to assure that the proposal does not directly or indirectly confer benefits upon class representatives or their counsel inconsistent with the fiduciary obligations owed to members of the

class or otherwise involve conflicts of interest. Accordingly, in some circumstances, investigation of the fairness of these proposals conducted by an independent master can be of great

benefit to the court, particularly since the named parties and their counsel have ceased to be
Appendix A 

adversaries with respect to the proposed dismissal or settlement. The revision clarifies that the

strictures of Rule (b) do not preclude the court from appointing under that Rule a special

master to assist the court in evaluating a proposed dismissal or settlement. The master, if not a

Magistrate Judge, would be compensated as provided in Rule (a).

Subdivision (f). The certification ruling is often the crucial ruling in a case filed as a class

action. The plaintiff, in order to obtain appellate review of a ruling denying certification, will

have to proceed with the case to final judgment and may have to incur litigation expenses

wholly disproportionate to any individual recovery; and, if the plaintiff ultimately prevails on an

appeal of the certification decision, postponement of the appellate decision raises the specter of

“one way intervention.” Conversely, if class certification is erroneously granted, a defendant

may be forced to settle rather than run the risk of potentially ruinous liability of a class-wide

judgment in order to secure review of the certification decision. The consequences, as well as

the unique public interest in properly certified class actions, justify a special procedure allowing

early review of this critical ruling.

Recognizing the disruption that can be caused by piecemeal reviews, the revision contains

the provisions to minimize the risk of delay and abuse. Review will be available only by leave of

the court of appeals promptly sought, and proceedings in the district court with respect to other

aspects of the case are not stayed by the prosecution of such an appeal unless the district court

or court of appeals so orders. The appellate procedure would be the same as for appeals under

 U.S.C. § (c). The statutory authority for using the rule-making process to permit an appeal of interlocutory orders is contained in  U.S.C. § (e), as amended in .

It is anticipated that orders permitting immediate appellate review should be rare. Nevertheless, the potential for this review should encourage compliance with the certification procedures and afford an opportunity for prompt correction of errors.



Appendix B

PROPOSED RULE —

Rule . Class Actions (November  draft).

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf

of all if with respect to the claims, defenses, or issues certified for class action treatment—

() the members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

() there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

() the representative parties’ positions typify those of the class; and

() the representative parties and their attorneys will fairly and adequately discharge the fiduciary duty

to protect the interests of all persons while members of the class until relieved by the court from

that fiduciary duty.

(b) When Class Actions May Be Certified. An action may be certified as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

() the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a

risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that

would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter

be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

() final injunctive or declaratory relief may be appropriate with respect to the class as a whole; or

() the court finds (i) that the questions of law or fact common to the certified class predominate over

individual questions included in the class action, (ii) that {the class claims, issues, or defenses are

not insubstantial on the merits,} [alternative:] {the prospect of success on the merits of the class

claims, issues, or defenses is sufficient to justify the costs and burdens imposed by certification},

and (iii) that a class action is superior to other available methods and necessary for the fair and

efficient disposition of the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:

(A) the practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification and their interests in maintaining or defending separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any related litigation involving class members;

(C) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum;

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action that will be avoided or significantly reduced if

the controversy is adjudicated by other available means;

(E) the probable success on the merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses;

(F) whether the public interest in—and the private benefits of—the probable relief to individual

class members justify the burdens of the litigation; and
 Class Actions

(G) the opportunity to settle on a class basis claims that could not be litigated on a class basis or

could not be litigated by [or against?] a class as comprehensive as the settlement class; or

() the court finds that permissive joinder should be accomplished by allowing putative members to

elect to be included in a class. The matters pertinent to this finding will ordinarily include:

(A) the nature of the controversy and the relief sought;

(B) the extent and nature of the members’ injuries or liability;

(C) potential conflicts of interest among members;

(D) the interest of the party opposing the class in securing a final and consistent resolution of the

matters in controversy; and

(E) the inefficiency or impracticality of separate actions to resolve the controversy; or

() the court finds that a class certified under subdivision (b)() should be joined with claims for individual damages that are certified as a class action under subdivision (b)() or (b)().

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Certified; Notice and Membership in Class;

Judgment; Multiple Classes and Subclasses.

() When persons sue or are sued as representatives of a class, the court shall determine by order

whether and with respect to what claims, defenses, or issues the action should be certified as a

class action.

(A) An order certifying a class action must describe the class. When a class is certified under subdivision (b)(), the order must state when and how putative members (i) may elect to be excluded from the class, and (ii) if the class is certified only for settlement, may elect to be excluded from any settlement approved by the court under subdivision (e). When a class is certified under subdivision (b)(), the order must state when, how, and under what conditions

putative members may elect to be included in the class; the conditions of inclusion may include

a requirement that class members bear a fair share of litigation expenses incurred by the representative parties.

(B) An order under this subdivision is conditional, and may be altered or amended before final

judgment.

()(A) When ordering that an action be certified as a class action under this rule, the court shall direct

that appropriate notice be given to the class. The notice must concisely and clearly describe

the nature of the action, the claims, issues, or defenses with respect to which the class has been

certified, the right to elect to be excluded from a class certified under subdivision (b)(), the

right to elect to be included in a class certified under subdivision (b)(), and the potential consequences of class membership. [A defendant may be ordered to advance the expense of notifying a plaintiff class if, under subdivision (b)()(E), the court finds a strong probability that the

plaintiff class will win on the merits.]

(i) In any class action certified under subdivision (b)() or (), the court shall direct a means of

notice calculated to reach a sufficient number of class members to provide effective opportunity for challenges to the class certification or representation and for supervision of class

representatives and class counsel by other class members.

(ii) In any class action certified under subdivision (b)(), the court shall direct to members of

the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to

all members who can be identified through reasonable effort [, but individual notice may be

limited to a sampling of class members if the cost of individual notice is excessive in relation to the generally small value of individual members’ claims]. The notice shall advise

each member that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires,

enter an appearance through counsel.
Appendix B 

(iii) In any class action certified under subdivision (b)(), the court shall direct a means of notice calculated to accomplish the purposes of certification.

() Whether or not favorable to the class,

(A) The judgment in an action certified as a class action under subdivision (b)() or () shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class;

(B) The judgment in an action certified as a class action under subdivision (b)() shall include and

specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)()(A)(ii) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the

class; and

(C) The judgment in an action certified as a class action under subdivision (b)() shall include all

those who elected to be included in the class and who were not earlier dismissed from the

class.

() An action may be certified as a class action—

(A) with respect to particular claims, defenses, or issues; or

(B) by or against multiple classes or subclasses, which need not satisfy the requirement of subdivision (a)().

(d) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions.

() Before determining whether to certify a class the court may decide a motion made by any party under Rules  or  if the court concludes that decision will promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and will not cause undue delay.

() As a class action progresses, the court may make orders that:

(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or

complication in presenting evidence or argument;

(B) require, to protect the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, notice to some or all members of:

(i) refusal to certify a class;

(ii) any step in the action;

(iii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or

(iv) the members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, to otherwise come into the action, or to

be excluded from or included in the class;

(C) impose conditions on the representative parties, class members, or intervenors;

(D) require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent

persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;

(E) deal with similar procedural matters.

() An order under subdivision (d)() may be combined with an order under Rule , and may be altered or amended

(e) Dismissal and Compromise.

() Before a certification determination is made under subdivision (c)() in an action in which persons

sue [or are sued] as representatives of a class, court approval is required for any dismissal, compromise, or amendment to delete class issues.

() An action certified as a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of

the court, and notice of a proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the

class in such manner as the court directs.

() A proposal to dismiss or compromise an action certified as a class action may be referred to a

magistrate judge or a person specially appointed for an independent investigation and report to
 Class Actions

the court on the fairness of the proposed dismissal or compromise. The expenses of the investigation and report and the fees of a person specially appointed shall be paid by the parties as directed

by the court.

(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court

granting or denying a request for class action certification under this rule if application is made to it

within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless

the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.

PARTIAL DRAFT ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

December , 

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) has been amended in several respects. Some of the changes are designed

to redefine the role of class adjudication in ways that sharpen the distinction between the aggregation of

individual claims that would support individual adjudication and the aggregation of individual claims that

would not support individual adjudication. Current attempts to adapt Rule  to address the problems

that arise from torts that injure many people are reflected in part in some of these changes, but these attempts have not matured to a point that would support comprehensive rulemaking. When Rule  was

substantially revised in , the Advisory Committee Note stated: “A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that

significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class

action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.” Although it is clear that developing experience has superseded that suggestion, the lessons of experience are not yet so clear as to

support detailed mass tort provisions either in Rule  or a new but related rule.

The probability that a claim would support individual litigation depends both on the probability of

any recovery and the probable size of such recovery as might be won. One of the most important roles of

certification under subdivision (b)() has been to facilitate the enforcement of valid claims for small

amounts. The median recovery figures reported by the Federal Judicial Center study all were far below

the level that would be required to support individual litigation, unless perhaps in a small claims court.

This vital core, however, may branch into more troubling settings. The mass tort cases frequently sweep

into a class many members whose individual claims would easily support individual litigation, controlled

by the class member. Individual class members may be seriously harmed by the loss of control. Class

certification may be desired by defendants more than most plaintiff class members in such cases, and denial of certification or careful definition of the class may be essential to protect many plaintiffs. As one

example, a defective product may have inflicted small property value losses on millions of consumers,

reflecting a small risk of serious injury, and also have caused serious personal injuries to a relatively small

number of consumers. Class certification may be appropriate as to the property damage claims, but not as

to the personal injury claims.

In another direction, class certification may be sought as to individual claims that would not support

individual litigation because of a dim prospect of prevailing on the merits. Certification in such a case may

impose undue pressure on the defendant to settle. Settlement pressure arises in part from the expense of

defending class litigation. More important, settlement pressure reflects the fact that often there is at least a

small risk of losing against a very weak claim. A claim that might prevail in one of every ten or twenty individual actions gathers compelling force—a substantial settlement value—when the small probability of

defeat is multiplied by the amount of liability to the entire class.

Individual litigation may play quite a different role with respect to class certification. Exploration of

mass tort questions time and again led experienced lawyers to offer the advice that it is better to defer

class litigation until there has been substantial experience with actual trials and decisions in individual
Appendix B 

actions. The need to wait until a class of claims has become “mature” seems to apply peculiarly to claims

that at least involve highly uncertain facts that may come to be better understood over time. New and developing law may make the fact uncertainty even more daunting. A claim that a widely used medical device has caused serious side effects, for example, may not be fully understood for many years after the first

injuries are claimed. Pre-maturity [of] class certification runs the risk of mistaken decision, whether for or

against the class. This risk may be translated into settlement terms that reflect the uncertainty by exacting

far too much from the defendant or according far too little to the plaintiffs.

Item (ii) has been added to the findings required for class certification, and is supplemented by the

addition of new factor (E) to the list of factors considered in making the findings required for certification.

It addresses the concern that class certification may create an artificial and coercive settlement value by

aggregating weak claims. It also recognizes the prospect that certification is likely to increase the stakes

substantially, and thereby increase the costs of the litigation.

{Version } Taken to its full extent, this concern might lead to a requirement that the court balance the

probable outcome on the merits against the cost and burdens of class litigation, including the prospect

that settlement may be forced by the small risk of a large class recovery. A balancing test was rejected,

however, because of its ancillary consequences. It would be difficult to resist demands for discovery to

assist in demonstrating the probable outcome. The certification hearing and determination, already

events of major significance, could easily become overpowering events in the course of the litigation.

Findings as to probable outcome would affect settlement terms, and could easily affect the strategic posture of the case for purposes of summary judgment and even trial. Probable success findings could have

collateral effects as well, affecting a party’s standing in the financial community or inflicting other harms.

And a probable success balancing approach must inevitably add considerable delay to the certification

process.

The “first look” approach adopted by item (ii) is calculated to avoid the costs associated with balancing the probable outcome and costs of class litigation. The court is required only to find that the class

claims, issues, or defenses “are not insubstantial on the merits.” This phrase is chosen in the belief that

there is a wide—although curious—gap between the higher possible requirement that the claims be substantial and the chosen requirement that they be not insubstantial. The finding is addressed to the

strength of the claims “on the merits,” not to the dollar amount that may be involved. The purpose is to

weed out claims that can be shown to be weak by a curtailed procedure that does not require lengthy discovery or other prolonged proceedings. Often this determination will be supported by precertification

motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Even when it is not possible to resolve the class claims,

issues, or defenses on motion, it may be possible to conclude that the claims, issues, or defenses are too

weak to justify the costs of certification.

{Version } These risks can be justified only by a preliminary finding that the prospect of class success

is sufficient to justify them. The prospect of success need not be a probability greater than .. What is

required is that the probability be sufficient in relation to the predictable costs and burdens, including

settlement pressures, entailed by certification. The finding is not an actual determination of the merits,

and pains must be taken to control the procedures used to support the finding. Some measure of controlled discovery may be permitted, but the procedure should be as expeditious and inexpensive as possible. At times it may be wise to integrate the certification procedure with proceedings on precertification

motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. A realistic view must be taken of the burdens of certification—bloated abstract assertions about the crippling costs of class litigation or the coercive settlement

effects of certification deserve little weight. At the end of the process, a balance must be struck between

the apparent strength of the class position on the merits and the adverse consequences of class certification. This balance will always be case-specific, and must depend in large measure on the discretion of the

district judge.
 Class Actions

The prospect-of-success finding is readily made if certification is sought only for purposes of pursuing

settlement, not litigation. If certification of a settlement class is appropriate under the standards discussed

[with factor (G) and subdivision (e)] below, the prospect of success relates to the likelihood of reaching a

settlement that will be approved by the court, and the burdens of certification are merely the burdens of

negotiations that all parties are willing to pursue.

Care must be taken to ensure that subsequent proceedings are not distorted by the preliminary finding

on the prospect of success. If a sufficient prospect is found to justify certification, subsequent pretrial and

trial proceedings should be resolved without reference to the initial finding. The same caution must be

observed in subsequent proceedings on individual claims if certification is denied.

One court’s refusal to certify for want of a sufficient prospect of class success is not binding by way of

res judicata if another would-be representative appears to seek class certification in the same court or

some other court. The refusal to recognize a class defeats preclusion through the theories that bind class

members. Even participation of the same lawyers ordinarily is not sufficient to extend preclusion to a new

party. The first determination is nonetheless entitled to substantial respect, and a significantly stronger

showing may properly be required to escape the precedential effect of the initial refusal to certify.

Item (iii) in the findings required for class certification has been amended by adding the requirement

that a (b)() class be necessary for the fair and efficient [adjudication] of the controversy. The requirement that a class be superior to other available methods is retained, and the superiority finding—made

under the familiar factors developed by current law, as well as the new factors (E), (F), and (G)—will be

the first step in making the finding that a class action is necessary. It is no longer sufficient, however, to

find that a class action is in some sense superior to other methods of [adjudicating] “the controversy.” It

also must be found that class certification is necessary. Necessity is meant to be a practical concept. In

adding the necessity requirement, it also is intended to encourage careful reconsideration of the superiority finding without running the drafting risks entailed in finding some new word to substitute for

“superior.” Both necessity and superiority are together intended to force careful reappraisal of the fairness of class adjudication as well as efficiency concerns. Certification ordinarily should not be used to

force into a single class action plaintiffs who would be better served by pursuing individual actions. A

class action is not necessary for them, even if it would be superior in the sense that it consumes fewer litigating resources and more fair in the sense that it achieves more uniform treatment of all claimants. Nor

should certification be granted when a weak claim on the merits has practical value, despite individually

significant damages claims, only because certification generates great pressure to settle. In such circumstances, certification may be “necessary” if there is to be any [adjudication] of the claims, but it is neither

superior nor necessary to the fair and efficient [adjudication] of the claims. Class certification, on the

other hand, is both superior and necessary for the fair and efficient [adjudication] of numerous individual

claims that are strong on the merits but small in amount.

Superiority and necessity take on still another dimension when there is a significant risk that the insurance and assets of the defendants may not be sufficient to fully satisfy all claims growing out of a common

course of events. Even though many individual plaintiffs would be better served by racing to secure and

enforce the earlier judgments that exhaust the available assets, fairness may require aggregation in a way

that marshals the assets for equitable distribution. Bankruptcy proceedings may prove a superior alternative, but the certification decision must make a conscious choice about the best method of addressing the

apparent problem.

Yet another problem, presented by some recent class-action settlements, arises from efforts to resolve

future claims that have not yet matured to the point that would permit present individual enforcement. A

toxic agent, for example, may have touched a broad universe of persons. Some have developed present

injuries, most never will develop any injury, and many will develop injuries at some indefinite time in the

future. Class action settlements, much more than adjudications, can be structured in ways that provide for

processing individual claims as actual injuries develop in the future. Class disposition may be the only
Appendix B 

possible means of resolving these “futures” claims. Although “necessary” in this sense, class certification—if it is ever appropriate—must be carefully guarded to protect the rights of class members who do

not even have a realistic way to determine whether they may some day experience actual injury. The

needs to effect meaningful notice and to protect the opportunity to opt out of the class require that any

class be limited to terms that permit an individual claimant to opt out of the class and pursue individual

litigation within a reasonable time after knowing both of the individual injury and the existence of the

class litigation.

Factor (E) has been added to subdivision (b)() to complement the addition of new item (ii) and the

addition of the necessity element to item (iii). The role of the probable success of the class claims, issues,

or defenses is discussed with those items.

Factor (F) has been added to subdivision (b)() to effect a modest retrenchment in the use of class

actions to aggregate trivial individual claims. It bears on the item (iii) requirement that a class action be

superior to other available methods and necessary for the fair and efficient [adjudication] of the controversy. It permits the court to deny class certification if the public interest in—and the private benefits of—

probable class relief do not justify the burdens of class litigation. This factor is distinct from the evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits called for by item (ii) and factor (E). At the extreme, it would

permit denial of certification even on the assumption that the class position would certainly prevail on the

merits.

Administration of factor (F) requires great sensitivity. Subdivision (b)() class actions have become an

important private means for supplementing public enforcement of the law. Legislation often provides

explicit incentives for enforcement by private attorneys-general, including qui tam provisions, attorneyfee recovery, minimum statutory penalties, and treble damages. Class actions that aggregate many small

individual claims and award “common-fund” attorney fees serve the same function. Class recoveries serve

the important functions of depriving wrongdoers of the fruits of their wrongs and deterring other potential wrongdoers. There is little reason to believe that the Committee that proposed the  amendments

anticipated anything like the enforcement role that Rule  has assumed, but there is equally little reason

to be concerned about that belief. What counts is the value of the enforcement device that courts, aided

by active class-action lawyers, have forged out of Rule (b)(). In most settings, the value of this device is

clear.

The value of class-action enforcement of public values, however, is not always clear. It cannot be forgotten that Rule  does not authorize actions to enforce the public interest on behalf of the public interest. Rule  depends on identification of a class of real persons or legal entities, some of whom must appear as actual representative parties. Rule  does not explicitly authorize substituted relief that flows to

the public at large, or to court- or party-selected champions of the public interest. Adoption of a provision for “fluid” or “cy pres” class recovery would severely test the limits of the Rules Enabling Act, particularly if used to enforce statutory rights that do not provide for such relief. The persisting justification

of a class action is the controversy between class members and their adversaries, and the final judgment is

entered for or against the class. It is class members who reap the benefits of victory, and are bound by the

res judicata effects of victory or defeat. If there is no prospect of meaningful class relief, an action nominally framed as a class action becomes in fact a naked action for public enforcement maintained by the

class attorneys without statutory authorization and with no support in the original purpose of class litigation. Courts pay the price of administering these class actions. And the burden on the courts is displaced

onto other litigants who present individually important claims that also enforce important public policies.

Class adversaries also pay the price of class enforcement efforts. The cost of defending class litigation

through to victory on the merits can be enormous. This cost, coupled with even a small risk of losing on

the merits, can generate great pressure to settle on terms that do little or nothing to vindicate whatever

public interest may underlie the substantive principles invoked by the class.
 Class Actions

The prospect of significant benefit to class members combines with the public values of enforcing

legal norms to justify the costs, burdens, and coercive effects of class actions that otherwise satisfy Rule 

requirements. If probable individual relief is so slight as to be essentially trivial or meaningless, however,

the core justification of class enforcement fails. Only public values can justify class certification. Public

values do not always provide sufficient justification. An assessment of public values can properly include

reconsideration of the probable outcome on the merits made for purposes of item (ii) and factor (E). If the

prospect of success on the merits is slight and the value of any individual recovery is insignificant, certification can be denied with little difficulty. But even a strong prospect of success on the merits may not

be sufficient to justify certification. It is no disrespect to the vital social policies embodied in much modern regulatory legislation to recognize that the effort to control highly complex private behavior can outlaw much behavior that involves merely trivial or technical violations. Some “wrongdoing” represents

nothing worse than a wrong guess about the uncertain requirements of ambiguous law, yielding “gains”

that could have been won by slightly different conduct of no greater social value. Disgorgement and deterrence in such circumstances may be unfair, and indeed may thwart important public interests by discouraging desirable behavior in areas of legal indeterminacy.

Factor (G) is added to resolve some, but by no means all, of the questions that have grown up around

the use of “settlement classes.” Factor (G) bears only on (b)() classes. Among the many questions that it

does not touch is the question whether it is appropriate to rely on subdivision (b)() to certify a mandatory non-opt-out class when present and prospective tort claims are likely to exceed the “limited fund” of

a defendant’s assets and insurance coverage. This possible use of subdivision (b)() presents difficult issues that cannot yet be resolved by a new rule provision. Subdivisions (c)()(A)() and (e) also bear on

settlement classes.

A settlement class may be described as any class that is certified only for purposes of settling the

claims of class members on a class-wide basis, not for litigation of their claims. The certification may be

made before settlement efforts have even begun, as settlement efforts proceed, or after a proposed settlement has been reached.

Factor (G) makes it clear that a class may be certified for purposes of settlement even though the court

would not certify the same class, or might not certify any class, for litigation. At the same time, a (b)()

settlement class continues to be controlled by the prerequisites of subdivision (a) and all of the requirements of subdivision (b)(). The only difference from certification for litigation purposes is that application of these Rule  requirements is affected by the differences between settlement and litigation. Choiceof-law difficulties, for example, may force certification of many subclasses, or even defeat any class certification, if claims are to be litigated. Settlement can be reached, however, on terms that surmount such

difficulties. Many other elements are affected as well. A single court may be able to manage settlement

when litigation would require resort to many courts. And, perhaps most important, settlement may prove

far superior to litigation in devising comprehensive solutions to large-scale problems that defy ready disposition by traditional adversary litigation. Important and even vitally important benefits may be provided for those who, knowing of the class settlement and the opportunity to opt out, prefer to participate

in the class judgment and avoid the costs of individual litigation.

For all the potential benefits, settlement classes also pose special risks. The court’s Rule (e) obligation to review and approve a class settlement commonly must surmount the informational difficulties that

arise when the major adversaries join forces as proponents of their settlement agreement. Objectors frequently appear to reduce these difficulties, but it may be difficult for objectors to obtain the information

required for a fully informed challenge. The reassurance provided by official adjudication is missing.

These difficulties may seem especially troubling if the class would not have been certified for litigation,

particularly if the action appears to have been shaped by a settlement agreement worked out even before

the action was filed.
Appendix B 

These competing forces are reconciled by recognizing the legitimacy of settlement classes but increasing the protections afforded to class members. Subdivision (c)()(A)(ii) requires that if the class was

certified only for settlement, class members be allowed to opt out of any settlement after the terms of the

settlement are approved by the court. Parties who fear the impact of such opt-outs on a settlement intended to achieve total peace may respond by refusing to settle, or by crafting the settlement so that one

or more parties may withdraw from the settlement after the opt-out period. The opportunity to opt out of

the settlement creates special problems when the class includes “futures” claimants who do not yet know

of the injuries that will one day bring them into the class. As to such claimants, the right to opt out created

by subdivision (c)()(A)(ii) must be held open until the injury has matured and for a reasonable period

after actual notice of the class settlement.

The right to opt out of a settlement class is meaningless unless there is actual notice. Actual notice in

turn means more than exposure to some official pronouncement, even if it is directly addressed to an individual class member by name. The notice must be actually received and also must be cast in a form that

conveys meaningful information to a person of ordinary understanding. A class member is bound by the

judgment in a settlement-class action only after receiving actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to

opt out of the judgment.

Although notice and the right to opt out provide the central means of protecting settlement class

members, the court must take particular care in applying some of Rule ’s requirements. Definition of

the class must be approached with care, lest the attractions of settlement lead too easily to an over-broad

definition. Particular care should be taken to ensure that there are no disabling conflicts of interests

among people who are urged to form a single class. If the case presents facts or law that are unsettled and

that are likely to be litigated in individual actions, it may be better to postpone any class certification until

experience with individual actions yields sufficient information to support a wise settlement and effective

review of the settlement.

When a settlement class seems premature, the same goals may be served in part by forming an opt-in

class under subdivision (b)(). An opt-in class will bind only those whose actual participation guarantees

actual notice and voluntary choice. The major difference, indeed, is that the opt-in class provides clear

assurance of the same goals sought by requiring actual notice and a right to opt out of a settlement-class

judgment. Other virtues of opt-in classes are discussed separately with subdivision (b)().

Subdivision (f). This permissive interlocutory appeal provision is adopted under the power conferred

by  U.S.C. § (e). Appeal from an order granting or denying class certification is permitted in the

sole discretion of the court of appeals. No other type of Rule  order is covered by this provision. It is

designed on the model of § (b), relying in many ways on the jurisprudence that has developed

around § (b) to reduce the potential costs of interlocutory appeals. The procedures that apply to the

request for court of appeals permission to appeal under § (b) should apply to a request for permission to appeal under Rule (f). At the same time, subdivision (f) departs from § (b) in two significant

ways. It does not require that the district court certify the certification ruling for appeal, although the district court often can assist the parties and court of appeals by offering advice on the desirability of appeal.

And it does not include the potentially limiting requirements of § (b) that the district court order

“involve[] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Only a modest expansion of the opportunity for permissive interlocutory appeal is intended. Permission to appeal should be granted with great restraint. The Federal Judicial Center study supports the view

that many suits with class action allegations present familiar and almost routine issues that are no more

worthy of immediate appeal than many other interlocutory rulings. Yet several concerns justify some expansion of present opportunities to appeal. An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with

a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the mer-
 Class Actions

its of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. [The prior draft

added that if a plaintiff class is certified after judgment for the representative plaintiffs, the result may be

“one-way” intervention. That does not seem much of a concern to me—if indeed there is a valid claim on

the merits, why should we be concerned that the late-certified class members have not had to take a

sporting chance on losing their valid claims?] An order granting certification, on the other hand, may

force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a

discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.

The expansion of appeal opportunities effected by subdivision (f) is indeed modest. Court of appeals

discretion is as broad as under § (b). Permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of

any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive. Permission is most likely to be granted when

the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled question of law. Such questions are most likely to

arise during the early years of experience with new class-action provisions as they may be adopted into

Rule  or enacted by legislation. Permission almost always will be denied when the certification decision

turns on case-specific matters of fact and district court discretion.

The district court, having worked through the certification decision, often will be able to provide cogent advice on the factors that bear on the decision whether to permit appeal. This advice can be particularly valuable if the certification decision is tentative. Even as to a firm certification decision, a statement

of reasons bearing on the probable benefits and costs of immediate appeal can help focus the court of

appeals decision, and may persuade the disappointed party that an attempt to appeal would be fruitless.

The -day period for seeking permission to appeal is designed to reduce the risk that attempted appeals will disrupt continuing proceedings. It is expected that the courts of appeals will act quickly in

making the preliminary determination whether to permit appeal. Permission to appeal does not stay trial

court proceedings. A stay should be sought first from the trial court. If the trial court refuses a stay, its

action and any explanation of its views should weigh heavily with the court of appeals.


Appendix C

Figures and Tables

The following figures and tables are generally derived from data collected in the field study described in Appendix D. One exception is Table , which is based on data derived from the

Federal Judicial Center’s district court time study and a review of relevant pleadings in class

actions in the time study. See discussion infra Appendix D.

Another exception relates to the data supporting Figures – and Tables –. The data

for the class action cases in those figures and tables come from the class action field study that is

the subject of this report. The comparison data for nonclass cases come from the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated Data Base (IDB), which is a compilation of records and case status reports routinely sent by clerks of court to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

The Center makes the IDB available to the public through the Inter-University Consortium for

Political and Social Research, which is located at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,

Michigan -. The IDB number is ICPSR # .

As discussed in the Introduction and in Appendix D, we present these figures and data to

describe the class action activity in four district courts in cases terminated within the study period. We present the data and figures as a systematic examination of class action activity in those

four courts in cases terminated between July , , and June , . We caution the reader

not to read too much into the data and especially not to draw inferences and conclusions about

the universe of class activity. Data on subsets of the data elements, such as nature-of-suit categories or types of class actions, are particularly susceptible to misinterpretation because of their

small numbers. For example, differences among districts in such cases may simply represent

chance fluctuations or little more than that.
 Class Actions

Figure : Median Net Settlement Per Class Member in Settled, Certified Class

Actions

$393 $315 $528 $497 $645 $715

$3,341

$1,988

$1,505

$5,331

$2,620

$1,744

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

E.D. Pa. (n=16) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=15) N.D. Cal . (n=22)

District Court

Net Settlement

Median Net Settlement

75th Percentile

Maximum

Figure : Median Net Settlement Per Class Member in Settled, Certified Securities

Class Actions

District Court

Net Settlement

$0 

$1,000 

$2,000 

$3,000 

$4,000 

$5,000 

$6,000 

E.D. Pa. (n=12) S.D. Fla. (n=8) N.D. Ill. (n=8) N.D. Cal. (n=16)

$368 $447 $337 

$645 $852 

$1,934 

$763 

$352 

Median Net Settlement

75th Percentile
Appendix C 

Figure : Median Net Settlement Per Class Member in Settled, Certified

Nonsecurities Class Actions

District Court

Net Settlement

$0 

$1,000 

$2,000 

$3,000 

$4,000 

$5,000 

$6,000 

E.D. Pa. (n=4) S.D. Fla. (n=1) N.D. Ill. (n=7) N.D. Cal. (n=6)

$416 $275 

$811 

$1,472 

$275 

$4,561 

$2,213 

$1,097 

Median Net Settlement

75th Percentile

Figure : Mean and Median Times from Filing of Complaint to Multidistrict

Litigation Consolidation

District Court

Number of Months

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

E.D. Pa. (n=5) S.D. Fla. (n=2) N.D. Ill. (n=4) N.D. Cal. (n=3)

7.1

4.7

4.2 4.1

5.9

4.0 4.0

4.4

Mean

Median
 Class Actions

Figure : Mean and Median Number of Cases Within Each Consolidation by the

District Courts

2.7

5.7

2.0 2.0

2.5

4.0

4.7

3.5

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

E.D. Pa. (n=23)* S.D. Fla. (n=10) N.D. Ill. (n=10) N.D. Cal . (n=17)

District Court

Number of Cases Within Each Consolidation

Mean

Median

*Missing value = .

Figure : Percentage of Related Cases Not Consolidated with Similar Litigation

Pending in Federal and State Courts

11%

(13 of

117 cases)

6%

(4 of

72 cases)

5%

(6 of

116 cases)

23%

(23 of

102 cases)

3%

(4 of

117 cases)

1%

(1 of

72 cases)

3%

(3 of

116 cases)

0%

(0 of

102 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Nonconsolidated Cases

Pending Federal Litigation

Pending State Litigation
Appendix C 

Figure : Settlement Rates for Nonprisoner Class Actions Compared to Nonprisoner

Civil Actions in Cases Terminated Between July , , and June , 

53%

(57 of

108 cases)

57%

(33 of

58 cases)

59%

(64 of

108 cases)

64%

(60 of

94 cases)

66%

(5,047 of

7,603 cases)

41%

(2,112 of

 5,174 cases)

56%

(4,615 of

 8,264 cases)

53%

(2,850 of

 5,404 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N. D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Settlement Rates

Class

Nonclass

Source: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office data; Class: Federal Judicial

Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D). The two data sets refer to civil cases terminated between July , , and June , . The Administrative Office data on settlement for the study cases differed from our data for the same set of cases. The differences were not consistently in the same direction. Overall, the

Administrative Office data showed  settlements in the four districts compared to  in the Federal Judicial Center

database. The settlement rates and numbers shown by the Administrative Office data for class cases were % (),

% (), % (), and % (), respectively.
 Class Actions

Figure : Settlement Rates for Securities Class Actions Compared to Securities Civil

Actions

60%

(18 of

30 cases)

67%

(10 of

15 cases) 61%

(14 of

23 cases)

77%

(27 of

35 cases) 66%

(127 of

191 cases)

35%

(66 of

187 cases)

47%

(69 of

148 cases)

48%

(96 of

198 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Settlement Rates

Class

Nonclass

Source: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office data; Class: Federal Judicial

Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D). The two data sets refer to civil cases terminated between July , , and June , . The Administrative Office data on settlement differed from our data

for the same set of cases. The differences were not consistently in the same direction. Overall, the Administrative

Office data showed fifty-seven settlements in the four districts compared to sixty-nine in the Federal Judicial Center

database. The settlement rates shown by the Administrative Office data for securities class actions were % (twentyfour), % (four), % (twelve), and % (seventeen), respectively.
Appendix C 

Figure : Median Time from Filing to Disposition of Nonprisoner Class Actions

Compared to Nonprisoner Civil Actions

15.1

(n=108) 13.0

(n=58)

15.9

(n=108) 15.7

(n=94)

5.0

(n=7,603)

8.4

(n=5,174)

5.3

(n=8,264)

6.7

(n=5,404)

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Months from Filing to Termination

Class

Nonclass

Source: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office data, Class: Federal Judicial

Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D).

Figure : Median Time from Filing to Disposition of Securities Class Actions

Compared to Securities Civil Actions

District Court

Months from Filing to Termination

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

22.8

(n=30)

17.5

(n=15)

19.9

(n=23)

23.7

(n=35)

10.0

(n=191)

16.9

(n=187)

12.2

(n=148)

18.7

(n=198)

Class

Nonclass

Source: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office data, Class: Federal Judicial

Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D).
 Class Actions

Figure : Rule (b) Certifications

6.2%

(3 of

48 cases) 0.0%

(0 of

13 cases)

8.7%

(4 of

46 cases) 0.0%

(0 of

30 cases)

0.0%

(0 of

48 cases)

0.0%

(0 of

13 cases)

10.9%

(5 of

46 cases) 6.7%

(2 of

30 cases)

43.8%

(21 of

48 cases)

23.1%

(3 of

14 cases)

22.9%

(11 of

46 cases) 16.7%

(5 of

30 cases)

50.0%

(24 of

48 cases)

84.6%

(11 of

14 cases)

56.5%

(26 of

46 cases)

76.7%

(23 of

30 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100 %

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. I ll. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Rule 23(b) Certifications

Rule 23(b)(1)(A)

Rule 23(b)(1)(B)

Rule 23(b)(2)

Rule 23(b)(3)

Note: Data exclude combinations of types.

Figure : Cases with Intradistrict Consolidation

20.5% 

(24 of 117 cases) 13.8% 

(10 of 72 cases) 8.6% 

(10 of 116 cases)

16.6% 

(17 of 102 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal . 

District Court

Percentage of Cases
Appendix C 

Figure : Cases Referring to a Related Federal or State Case

13.6% 

(16 of 117 cases) 6.9% 

(5 of 72 cases)

7.7% 

(9 of 116 cases)

22.5%

 (23 of 102 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal . 

District Court

Percentage of Cases

Figure : Cases with Multidistrict Litigation Consolidation or Intradistrict

Consolidation or Related Case

32.4% 

(38 of 117 cases)

22.2% 

(16 of 72 cases) 19.8% 

(23 of 116 cases)

39.2% 

(40 of 102 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal . 

District Court

Percentage of Cases
 Class Actions

Figure : Certified Class Actions in Which Class Representatives Were Changed

21%

(10 of 47 cases)

8%

(1 of 13 cases)

21%

(10 of 48 cases)

33%

(11 of 33 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases

Figure : Certified, Settled, Approved Class Actions with Separate Award to Class

Representatives

26%

(11 of 43 cases)

46%

(6 of 13 cases) 40%

(16 of 40 cases) 37%

(11 of 30 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal . 

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Awards
Appendix C 

Figure : Median Amount of Separate Awards to Class Representatives in Certified,

Settled, Approved Class Actions

District Court

Median Amount of Award

$0 

$5,000 

$10,000 

$15,000 

$20,000 

$25,000 

$30,000 

E.D. Pa. (n=11) S.D. Fla. (n=6) N.D. Ill. (n=16) N.D. Cal. (n=11)

$12,000 

$7,500 

$17,000 

$7,500 

Figure : Median and th Percentile of Award per Individual Class Representatives

in Certified, Settled, Approved Class Actions

$2,583 $2,964

$7,560

$3,375

$7,500

$6,250

$28,571

2,500

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

E.D. Pa. (n=11) S.D. Fla. (n=6) N.D. Ill. (n=16) N.D. Cal . (n=11)

District Court

Amount Per Individual Award

Median 

75th Percentile 
 Class Actions

Figure : Time from Filing of Complaint to Filing of Motion for Class Certification

District Court

Number of Months

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

E.D. Pa. (n=96) S.D. Fla. (n=37) N.D. Ill. (n=78) N.D. Cal. (n=60)

4.3 4.1 4.2

7.0

8.2

16.3

3.1

6.5

Median

75th Percentile

Figure : Time from Filing Motion for Class Certification to Judicial Ruling on

Certification Issue

8.5

3.8

2.8

15.8

10.2

8.4

4.1

7.6

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

E.D. Pa. (n=76) S.D. Fla. (n=25) N.D. Ill. (n=77) N.D. Cal . (n=47)

District Court

Number of Months

Median

75th Percentile
Appendix C 

Figure : Length of Time from Filing of Complaint to Settlement in Settled Cases

25.4 25.9

16.7

43.8

41.7

39.4

18.4

28.5

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

E.D. Pa. (n=54) S.D. Fla. (n=23) N.D. Ill. (n=52) N.D. Cal . (n=49)

District Court

Number of Months

Median

75th Percentile

Figure : Length of Time from Ruling on Certification Motion to Settlement in

Settled Cases

District Court

Number of Months

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

E.D. Pa. (n=36) S.D. Fla. (n=10) N.D. Ill. (n=37) N.D. Cal. (n=23)

5.5

14.2 13.7 12.2

33.6

22.6

13.9

38.0

Median

75th Percentile
 Class Actions

Figure : Length of Time from Filing of Complaint to Termination

14.8

10.5

14.7 15.4

34.1 34.1

26.2 26.1

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

E.D. Pa. (n=117) S.D. Fla. (n=71)* N.D. Ill. (n=116) N.D. Cal . (n=102)

District Court

Number of Months

Median

75th Percentile

*Missing value = .

Figure : Timing of Rulings on Motions to Dismiss in Relation to Rulings on Class

Certification

78%

82%

61%

81%

22%

18%

39%

19%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

E.D. Pa. (n=40) S.D. Fla. (n=17) N.D. Ill. (n=46) N.D. Cal . (n=32)

District Court

Percentage of Rulings on Motions to Dismiss Before and 

After Rulings on Class Certification

Before

After
Appendix C 

Figure : Timing of Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment in Relation to

Rulings on Class Certification

31%

22%

41%

67% 69%

78%

59%

33%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

E.D. Pa. (n=26) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=27) N.D. Cal . (n=15)

District Court

Percentage of Rulings on Summary Judgment Before and After 

Rulings on Class Certification

Before

After

Figure : Type of Party Filing Motion for Summary Judgment

District Court

Number of Filings

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

8

5 4

2

26

18

2

0 1 2

25

8

Plaintiff

Defendant

Other (e.g., both Plaintiff

and Defendant)
 Class Actions

Figure : Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment

85%

(35 of

41 motions)

60%

(13 of

21 motions)

84%

(31 of

37 motions)

63%

(22 of

34 motions)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Rulings

Figure : Percentage of Rulings Granting Dismissal or Summary Judgment

District Court

Percentage Granting Dismissal or Summary Judgment

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

42%

(49 of

117 cases)

42%

(30 of

72 cases)

59%

(69 of

116 cases)

57%

(58 of

102 cases)
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Oppositions to Motions to Certify and Sua Sponte Orders

Regarding Certification

52%

(50 of

98 cases)

54%

(21 of

39 cases)

52%

(45 of

86 cases) 40%

(25 of

63 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Oppositions

Note: Data include only those cases where either a motion to certify was filed or a sua sponte order issued.

Figure : Percentage of Submissions of Opposition Memoranda to Certification

Motions and Sua Sponte Orders Regarding Certification

70%

(35 of

50 cases)

90%

(19 of

21 cases) 82%

(37 of

45 cases)

84%

(21 of

25 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Submissions of Opposition Memoranda
 Class Actions

Figure : Supporting and Opposition Brief Lengths in Cases with Opposition to

Motion for Certification or Sua Sponte Orders Regarding Certification

61

(n=35)

29

(n=19) 27

(n=37)

49

(n=21)

26

(n=35)

12

(n=19)

18

(n=37)

25

(n=21)

59.5

(n=36)

35

(n=19)

39

(n=38)

76

(n=21)

32.5

(n=36)

18

(n=19)

25

(n=38)

40

(n=21)

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Number of Pages

75th Percentile–Opposition

Median–Opposition

75th Percentile–Support

Median–Support

Figure : Length of Judicial Opinions in Certified and Noncertified Cases with

Certification Disputes

12

(n=12)

4

(n=26;

missing

values=2)

17

(n=6)

4

(n=19; 

missing

 values=6)

21

(n=12)

13

(n=26;

missing

values=2)

24

(n=6)

14

(n=19;

missing

values=6)

3.5

(n=8;

missing

values=5)

5

(n=13;

missing

values=4)

1.5

(n=6;

missing

values=9)

2

(n=18;

missing

values=7)

19

(n=8;

missing

values=5)

7

(n=13;

missing

values=4)

3

(n=6;

missing

values=9)

13

(n=18;

missing

values=7)

0

5

10

15

20

25

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal . 

District Court

Number of Pages

Certified Cases–Median

Certified Cases–75th Percentile

Noncertified Cases–Median

Noncertified Cases–75th Percentile
Appendix C 

Figure : Arguments Raised in Cases Opposing Motion for Class Certification or

Sua Sponte Order Regarding Certification

Arguments Raised

Number of Cases Including Type of Argument

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Representativeness Typicality Numerosity Commonality

87

49

74

89

Figure : Number of Party-Filed Motions For or Against Class Certification

0 00

9 10

34

1 1 0 1 0

66

0 0 1

15

0

48

1 0 0

12 12

88

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Plaintiff to

Certify a

Plaintiff's

Class

Plaintiff to

Certify a

Defendant's

Class

Defendant

to Certify a

Defendant's

Class

Defendant

to Certify a

Plaintiff's

Class

Other Not

Applicable

Type of Party and Motion for Certification

Number of Motions

E.D. Pa. (n=107)

S.D. Fla. (n=37)

N.D. Ill. (n=82)

N.D. Cal. (n=73)
 Class Actions

Figure : Certified Subclasses and Nature of Suit

Civil Rights

40%

(4 of 10 certified

subclasses)

ERISA

10%

(1 of 10 certified 

subclasses)

Securities

50%

(5 of 10 certified

subclasses)

Figure : Class Notice Issued as a Percentage of Certified Class Actions

78%

(38 of

49 cases)

100%

(13 of

13 cases)

76%

(37 of

49 cases)

89%

(31 of

35 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=53) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=51) N.D. Cal . (n=35)

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Notices Sent

Note: Data are missing for some cases in two districts.
Appendix C 

Figure : Time from Ruling on Certification to Notice of Certification for Cases in

Which Notice Was Issued

District Court

Number of Months

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

E.D. Pa. (n=20 of 53

certified class actions)

S.D. Fla. (n=3 of 13

certified class actions)

N.D. Ill. (n=12 of 51

certified class actions)

N.D. Cal. (n=14 of 35

certified class actions)

3.8

8.3

3.3 2.2

41.7

6.7

16.5 16.3

Median 

75th Percentile

Figure : Median Number of Recipients of Individual Notice in Certified (b)()

Class Actions

District Court

Median Number of Recipients

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

E.D. Pa. (n=17 of 21) S.D. Fla. (n=9 of 11) N.D. Ill. (n=18 of 24) N.D. Cal. (n=18 of 22)

4,119

2,997

6,937

15,477
 Class Actions

Figure : Percentage of Contests of the Notice Process in Cases with Notice

24%

(9 of

38 notices) 15%

(2 of

13 notices)

13%

(5 of

38 notices) 6%

(2 of

31 notices)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Contests in Cases with Notice

Figure : Percentage of Settled Class Actions with Notice Where Notice Includes

the Gross Amount of the Settlement

83%

(10 of

12 cases) 71%

(15 of

21 cases) 64%

(16 of

25 cases)

90%

(27 of

30 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=33) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=35) N.D. Cal . (n=33)

District Court

Percentage of Cases

Note: The balance of the cases for each court had missing or inapplicable data.
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Settled Class Actions with Notice Where Notice Included

Amount or Percentage of Attorneys’ Fees

39%

(9 of

23 cases)

10% 

(1 of 

10 cases)

56%

(14 of

25 cases)

40%

(12 of

30 cases)

36%

(8 of

22 cases)

67%

(8 of

12 cases)

30%

(7 of

23 cases)

61%

(17 of 

28 cases)

74%

(17 of

23 cases) 67%

(8 of

12 cases)

70%

(19 of

27 cases)

83%

(25 of

30 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=33) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=35) N.D. Cal . (n=33)

District Court

Percentage of Cases

Amount of Attorneys' Fees

Percentage of Attorneys' Fees

Either or Both of Above

Note: The balance of the cases for each court had missing or inapplicable data. In some cases, notices included both

the percentage and amount of attorneys’ fees.

Figure : Percentage of Settled Class Actions with Notice Where Notice Included

Amounts for Administration or Other Expenses

17%

(4 of 

23 cases)

18%

(2 of

11 cases) 10%

(2 of

21 cases)

18%

(5 of

28 cases)

13%

(3 of

23 cases)

30%

(3 of

10 cases) 19%

(4 of

21 cases)

25%

(7 of

28 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=33) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=35) N.D. Cal . (n=33)

District Court

Percentage of Cases

Amount for Administration

Amount of Other Expenses

Note: The balance of the cases had missing or inapplicable data.
 Class Actions

Figure : Percentage of Certified (b)() Class Actions with One or More Opt Outs

21%

(5 of

24 cases) 11%

(1 of

11 cases)

19%

(5 of 

26 cases) 9%

(2 of

23 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Opt Outs

Figure : Percentage of Certified (b)() Civil Rights, ERISA, Securities, and

Other Class Actions with One or More Opt Outs

100%

(2 of

2 cases)

0% 

(0 of 

0 cases) 

0%

(0 of

3 cases)

0%

(0 of

2 cases)

50%

(1 of

 2 cases)

0%

(0 of 

 0 cases) 

0%

(0 of

 2 cases)

100%

(1 of

1 case)

 13%

 (2 of

 15 cases)

11%

(1 of

9 cases)

15%

(2 of

13 cases) 6%

(1 of

 17 cases) 0%

(0 of

 5 cases)

 0%

 (0 of

 1 cases)

38%

(3 of

8 cases)

0%

(0 of

 3 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=24) S.D. Fla . (n=11) N.D. Ill. (n=26) N.D. Cal. (n=23)

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Opt Outs

Civil Rig hts

ERISA

Securities

Other
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Certified, Settled (b)() Class Actions with One or More

Opt Outs of a Proposed Settlement

58%

(11 of

19 cases)

36%

(4 of

11 cases)

36%

(8 of

22 cases)

43%

(9 of

21 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Opt Outs

Figure : Percentage of Certified, Settled (b)() Class Actions with One or More

Opt Outs from a Proposed Settlement by Nature of Suit

100%

(2 of

2 cases)

0%

(0 of

0 cases)

0%

(0 of

4 cases)

100%

(2 of

2 cases)

50%

(1 of

 2 cases)

0%

(0 of

1 case)

0%

(0 of

2 cases)

0%

(0 of

1 case)

42%

(5 of

12 cases)

44%

(4 of

9 cases)

44%

(4 of

9 cases) 40%

(6 of

15 cases)

100%

(3 of

3 cases)

0%

(0 of 

1 case)

57%

(4 of

7 cases)

33%

(1 of

3 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=19) S.D. Fla. (n=11) N.D. Ill. (n=22) N.D. Cal. (n=21)

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Opt Outs

Civil Rights

ERISA

Securities

Other
 Class Actions

Figure : Percentage of Certified (b)() Class Actions with One or More Opt Outs

from Certification or Settlement

50%

(12 of

24 cases)

45%

(5 of

11 cases)

42%

(11 of

26 cases)

48%

(11 of

23 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Opt Outs

Figure : Net Settlement Value Per Class Member of Certified, Settled Rule (b)()

Classes With or Without One or More Opt Outs

242

(n=11)

74

(n=4)

385

(n=8) 353

(n=9)

423

(n=6)

575

(n=6)

974

(n=9)

693

(n=8)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Trimmed Mean*

Opt Outs

No Opt Outs

*The trimmed mean statistic is, like the mean (average) and the median (midpoint), a measure of the central tendency

of a set of data. In this case, to reduce the distortion of extreme values, a % trimmed mean was used, that is, a mean

of the data after eliminating % of the data from the top and the bottom.
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Certified, Settled Class Actions Using Claims Procedures to

Distribute Settlements

42%

(18)

77%

(10)

45%

(18)

80%

(24)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=43) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=40) N.D. Cal . (n=30)

District Court

Percentage Using Claims Procedures (Cases)

Figure : Percentage of Certified, Settled Securities Class Actions Using Claims

Procedures to Distribute Settlements

86%

(12)

89%

(8) 80%

(8)

100%

(20)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=14) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=10) N.D. Cal . (n=20)

District Court

Percentage Using Claims Procedures (Cases)
 Class Actions

Figure : Percentage of Cases with Attempts of Putative Class Members to Intervene

and Percentage of Cases with Interventions Allowed

11%

(13 attempts) 9%

(10 attempts) 5% (5 attempts)

0%

6%

(7 allowed) 3%

(4 allowed) 2%

(2 allowed)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D . Pa. (n=117) S.D . Fla. (n=72) N. D. Ill. (n=116) N.D. Cal. (n=102)

District Court

Percentage of Attempts to Intervene and Interventions Allowed

Attempts to Intervene

Intervention Allowed

Figure : Success Rates for Various Bases for Attempted Intervention by Putative

Class Members

57%

(8 of 

14 attempts)

59%

(10 of 

17 attempts)

67%

(2 of 

3 attempts)

40%

(2 of 

5 attempts)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Rule 24(a)

(of right)

Rule 24(b)

(permissive)

Rule

23(d)(2)

(class

members)

Other

(Rules 15,

19, 20, 21)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Percentage Granted

Note: Some motions cited more than one source.
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Settlement Approval Hearings with Participation by Class

Representatives or Nonrepresentative Class Members or Objectors

46%

(16 of 35 

settlement

hearings)

21%

(3 of 14 

settlement

hearings) 11%

(4 of 36 

settlement

hearings)

28%

(9 of 32 

settlement

hearings) 14%

(5 of 35 

settlement 

hearings)

7%

(1 of 14 

settlement

hearings)

11%

(4 of 36 

settlement

hearings)

9%

(3 of 32 

settlement

hearings)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D . Pa. (n=35) S.D . Fla. (n=14) N. D. Ill . (n=36) N. D. Cal . (n=32)

District Courts

Percentage of Participation in Settlement Hearings

Partic ipation by Class Representative

Partic ipation by Nonrepresentative Class

Members or Objectors

Figure : Percentage of Certified Class Actions with a Ruling on a Motion to

Dismiss

47%

(17 of

36 cases)

33%

(2 of

6 cases)

51%

(18 of

35 cases)

81%

(13 of

16 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Rulings

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes are not included.
 Class Actions

Figure : Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment in Certified Class Actions

31%

(11 of

36 cases)

67%

(4 of

6 cases)

43%

(15 of

35 cases)

44%

(7 of

16 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Rulings

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.

Figure : Percentage of Certified Class Actions with Trial Date Set

28%

(10 of

36 cases)

33%

(2 of

6 cases)

17%

(6 of

35 cases)

56%

(9 of

16 cases)

14%

(5 of

36 cases)

0%

(0 of

6 cases)

6%

(2 of

35 cases)

13%

(2 of 

16 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Trial Set or Begun

Trial Set

Trial Begun

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Certified Class Actions with a Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss

or a Motion for Summary Judgment or a Trial Date Set

72%

(26 of

36 cases)

83%

(5 of

6 cases)

77%

(27 of

35 cases)

94%

(15 of 

16 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with a Ruling or Trial Date Set

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.

Figure : Percentage of Certified Class Actions with a Ruling on a Motion to

Dismiss or a Motion for Summary Judgment or Both

67%

(24 of

36 motions)

83%

(5 of

6 motions) 74%

(26 of

35 motions)

81%

(13 of 

16 motions)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with a Ruling

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.
 Class Actions

Figure : Percentage of Settlement Class Actions in Which Notice of Settlement

Was Communicated to the Class

81%

(13 of

16 notices sent)

100%

(7 of

7 notices sent)

80%

(12 of

15 notices sent)

100%

(16 of

16 notices sent)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Notices Sent

Figure : Percentage of Settlement Class Actions in Which Preliminary Findings

Were Entered

50%

(8 of 16

settlement class 

actions)

100%

(7 of 7 

settlement class 

actions)

80%

(12 of 15 

settlement class 

actions)

94%

(15 of 16 

settlement class 

actions)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Preliminary Findings Entered
Appendix C 

Figure : Percentage of Settlement Class Actions in Which Hearings Were Held

Prior to Approval of Settlement

75%

(12 of 16

settlement class 

actions)

100%

(7 of 7

settlement class 

actions) 80%

(12 of 15 

settlement class 

actions)

100%

(16 of 16

settlement class 

actions)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal .

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Hearings Held

Figure : Percentage of Cases with a Trial Date Set

District Court

Percentage of Cases

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

9%

(11 of

116 cases)

18%

(13 of

72 cases)

18%

(21 of 

117 cases)

24%

(24 of

102 cases)
 Class Actions

Figure : Mean and Median Time from First Complaint to First Entry of Trial Date

for Cases with a Trial Date Entered

District Court

Months from First Complaint to First Entry of Trial Date

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

E.D. Pa. (n=18) S.D. Fla. (n=12) N.D. Ill. (n=10) N.D. Cal. (n=24)

22

10

42

22

18

9

38

19

Mean 

Median

Figure : Time from First Complaint to First Entry of Trial Date for Cases with

Trial Date Entered

17% 17%

28%

5% 5%

33% 33%

0% 0% 0%

30%

20%

30%

10%

37%

4%

0%

28%

33%

 10%

 0%

 17%

 21% 21%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Within 6

months

Between 6

months–1

yea r

Within

1–2 years

Between

2–4 years

Within

4–6 years

Between

6–7 ye ars

Time

Percentage of Cases with Trial Date Entered

E.D. Pa. (n=18)

S.D. Fla. (n=12)

N.D. Ill. (n=10)

N.D. C al. (n=24)
Appendix C 

Figure : Time from First Complaint to Scheduled Trial Date—Mean and Median

for Cases with Trial Date Scheduled

District Court

Months from First Complaint to Scheduled Trial Date

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

E.D. Pa. (n=21) S.D. Fla. (n=13) N.D. Ill. (n=11) N.D. Cal. (n=24)

27

20

47

36

20

16

39

36

Mean

Median

Figure : Time from First Complaint to Scheduled Trial Date for Cases with Trial

Date Scheduled

33%

5% 5%

0%

62%

8%

0% 0%

9%

37%

27%

18%

0% 0%

38%

29%

0%

10%

37%

10%

15% 15%

 9%

 33%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Within 6

months

Between 6

months–1

year

With in

1–2 years

Between

2–4 years

Within

4–6 years

Between

6–8.1

years

Time

Percentage of Cases with Trial Date Scheduled

E.D. Pa. (n=21)

S.D. Fla. (n=13)

N.D. Ill. (n=11)

N.D. Cal. (n=24)
 Class Actions

Figure : Fee-Recovery Rate Intervals in Certified Cases with Court-Approved

Settlements Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

1

4

5

6

1 1

7

2

9

5

2

6

4

1 1* 1*

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1%–10% 11%–20% 21%–30% 31%–40% 41%–50% 51%–60% 61%–70% 71%–80% 81%–90% 91%–100%

Fee-Recovery Rate Intervals

Number of Cases

E.D. Pa. (n=18)

S.D. Fla. (n=9)

N.D. Ill. (n=18)

N.D. Cal. (n=23)

Note: Figures – exclude fourteen cases where the only monetary distribution was to class representatives and

twenty-four cases where the only monetary distribution was for attorneys’ fees or administrative expenses. These

thirty-eight cases (sixteen cases in two districts and two and four cases in the other two districts) are shown in Table

. Figures – also exclude three cases (one in each of three districts) where there was no record of a fee request

or a fee award but where the court approved a class settlement providing net monetary distribution to the class. “Net

monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. “Fee-recovery rate” is fee awards as a

percentage of gross monetary settlement. “Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel,

excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses. “Gross monetary settlement” includes the following where applicable: payments or quantifiable benefits to class members, separate payments to class representatives, donations to

charities or public interest groups, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and administrative costs of the settlement.

*In the case with the % rate, a certified class of approximately , stockholders received net cash distributions of

$. million for damages related to stock sales. For the % rate, the settlement included a relatively small amount of

interest a county prothonotary agreed to pay class members related to interpleaded funds in its trust account in the

past six years. In addition, the prothonotary agreed to place interpleaded funds in separate interest-bearing accounts

in the future.
Appendix C 

Figure : Mean and Median Fee-Recovery Rates in Certified Cases with CourtApproved Settlements Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

30%

24%

30% 28% 27% 27% 30% 29%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=18) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=18) N.D. Cal . (n=23)

District Court

Fee-Recovery Rate: Fee Award as Percentage of Gross 

Monetary Settlement

Mean Rate

Median Rate

Note: Figures – exclude fourteen cases where the only monetary distribution was to class representatives and

twenty-four cases where the only monetary distribution was for attorneys’ fees or administrative expenses. These

thirty-eight cases (sixteen cases in two districts and two and four cases in the other two districts) are shown in Table

. Figures – also exclude three cases (one in each of three districts) where there was no record of a fee request

or a fee award but where the court approved a class settlement providing net monetary distribution to the class. “Net

monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. “Fee-recovery rate” is fee awards as a

percentage of gross monetary settlement. “Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel,

excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses. “Gross monetary settlement” includes the following where applicable: payments or quantifiable benefits to class members, separate payments to class representatives, donations to

charities or public interest groups, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and administrative costs of the settlement.
 Class Actions

Figure : Mean and Median Fee Awards in Certified Cases with Court-Approved

Settlements Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

$732,537

$1,411,635

$667,500 $660,000

$959,901

$1,108,857

$2,536,670*

 $1,500,000 

$0

$500,000

$1,000, 000

$1,500, 000

$2,000, 000

$2,500, 000

$3,000, 000

E.D. Pa. (n=18) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=18) N.D. Cal . (n=23)

District Court

Fee Award

Mean Award

Median Award

Note: Figures – exclude fourteen cases where the only monetary distribution was to class representatives and

twenty-four cases where the only monetary distribution was for attorneys’ fees or administrative expenses. These

thirty-eight cases (sixteen cases in two districts and two and four cases in the other two districts) are shown in Table

. Figures – also exclude three cases (one in each of three districts) where there was no record of a fee request

or a fee award but where the court approved a class settlement providing net monetary distribution to the class. “Net

monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. “Fee-recovery rate” is fee awards as a

percentage of gross monetary settlement. “Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel,

excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses. “Gross monetary settlement” includes the following where applicable: payments or quantifiable benefits to class members, separate payments to class representatives, donations to

charities or public interest groups, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and administrative costs of the settlement.

*Includes one case with fee award of $,,.
Appendix C 

Figure : Mean and Median Gross Monetary Settlements in Certified Cases with

Court-Approved Settlements Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

$3,194,042

$4,698, 171 $4,568, 868

$10,044,540*

$2,450,000

 $5,100,000 

 $1,978,723 

 $3,050,000 

$0

$2,000, 000

$4,000, 000

$6,000, 000

$8,000, 000

$10,000, 000

$12,000, 000

E.D. Pa. (n=18) S.D. Fla. (n=9) N.D. Ill. (n=18) N.D. Cal. (n=23)

District Court

Gross Monetary Settlements

Mean Amount

Median Amount

Note: Figures – exclude fourteen cases where the only monetary distribution was to class representatives and

twenty-four cases where the only monetary distribution was for attorneys’ fees or administrative expenses. These

thirty-eight cases (sixteen cases in two districts and two and four cases in the other two districts) are shown in Table

. Figures – also exclude three cases (one in each of three districts) where there was no record of a fee request

or a fee award but where the court approved a class settlement providing net monetary distribution to the class. “Net

monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. “Fee-recovery rate” is fee awards as a

percentage of gross monetary settlement. “Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel,

excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses. “Gross monetary settlement” includes the following where applicable: payments or quantifiable benefits to class members, separate payments to class representatives, donations to

charities or public interest groups, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and administrative costs of the settlement.

*Includes one case with gross settlement of $,,.
 Class Actions

Figure : Fee Calculation Method in Certified Cases with Court-Approved

Settlements

E.D. Pa. 

 Percent of Recovery

21%

(7 of 34 cases)

Both Lodestar & 

Percent of 

Recovery* 6%

(2 of 34 cases)

Unknown with Objection

3%

(1 of 34 cases)

Lodestar*

23%

(8 of 34 cases)

Unknown 

21% (7 of 34 cases)

Consent of Parties

23% (8 of 34 cases) Consent of Parties 

with Objection

3%

(1 of 34 cases)

S.D. Fla.

Unknown

18%

(2 of 11 cases)

Percent of Recovery

73% (8 of 11 cases)

Consent of Parties 9%

(1 of 11 cases)

N.D. Ill.

Both Lodestar & 

Percent of Recovery

3% (1 of 34 cases)

Percent of Recovery

32% (11 of 34 cases)

Unknown with 

Objection 3%

(1 of 34 cases)

Lodestar** 18%

(6 of 34 cases)

Unknown 24%

(8 of 34 cases)

Consent of 

Parties

14% (5 of 34 cases)

Consent of Parties 

with Objection 6%

(2 of 34 cases)

N.D. Cal.

Lodestar

11% (3 of 28 cases)

Competitive Bid 3% (1 of 28 cases)

Percent of Recovery 68%

(19 of 28 cases)

Consent of Parties 

with Objection 7%

(2 of 28 cases)

Consent of 

Parties 

11% (3 of 28 cases)

*Includes one of two cases where the court enhanced the lodestar calculation by a . multiplier.

**Includes at least two cases (% of thirty-four cases) where the court reduced the lodestar calculation by more than

%.
Appendix C 

Figure : Mean and Median Fee-Recovery Rates in Certified Cases Using Percentage

of Recovery Method and Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

District Court

Fee as Percentage of Recovery

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=7) S.D. Fla. (n=7) N.D. Ill. (n=10) N.D. Cal. (n=18)

26%

31% 29% 27% 27% 30% 30% 28%

Mean

Median

Note: “Net monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses.
 Class Actions

Figure : Fee Calculation Method in Certified Cases with Court-Approved

Settlements Providing Net Monetary Distribution to Class

E.D. Pa.

Lodestar*

33%

(6 of 18 cases)

Percent of 

Recovery

39% (7 of 18 cases)

Both Lodestar 

& Percent of 

Recovery 6%

(1 of 18 cases)

Unknown

22%

(4 of 18 cases)

S.D. Fla.

Consent of 

Parties

11%

(1 of 9 cases)

Percent of 

Recovery

78%

(7 of 9 cases)

Unknown

11%

(1 of 9 cases)

N. D. Ill.

Unknown

16%

(3 of 18 cases) Lodestar

6%

(1 of 18 cases)

Percent of 

Recovery 56%

(10 of 18 cases)

Both Lodestar & Percent of 

Recovery

6%

(1 of 18 cases)

Consent of Parties

16%

(3 of 18 cases)

N.D. Cal.

Lodestar

9%

(2 of 23 cases)

Percent of 

Recovery

78%

(18 of 23 cases)

Competitive 

Bid 

4%

 (1 of 23 cases) Consent of Parties 9%

(2 of 23 cases)

Note: “Net monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses.

*Includes Masnik v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., No. - (E.D. Pa. filed June , ), where a . enhancer was applied to the lodestar amount.
Appendix C 

Figure : Fee Calculation Method in Certified Cases with Court-Approved

Settlements Providing No Net Monetary Distribution to Class

E.D. Pa.

Lodestar*

19%

(3 of 16 cases)

Unknown

25%

(4 of 16 cases)

Consent of Parties

56%

(9 of 16 cases)

S.D. Fla.

Unknown

50%

(1 of 2 cases)

Percent of

Recovery

50%

(1 of 2 cases)

N.D. Ill.

Lodestar

31%

(5 of 16 cases)

Percent of

Recovery

6%

(1 of 16 cases)

Unknown

38%

(6 of 16 cases)

Consent of

Parties

25%

(4 of 16 cases)

N.D. Cal.

Lodestar

20%

(1 of 5 cases)

Percent of

Recovery

20%

(1 of 5 cases)

Consent of Parties

60%

(3 of 5 cases)

Note: “Net monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. This figure includes cases

where the only monetary distribution was to class representatives, to class counsel for fees, or for administrative expenses.

*Includes General Motors Pick-Up Truck Liability Litigation ( F.d  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct. 

()), where district court used both lodestar and percentage methods, including a . multiplier applied to the

lodestar amount. The award was vacated and remanded on appeal.
 Class Actions

Figure : Objections to Attorneys’ Fees by Fee Calculation Method in Certified

Cases with Court Approved Settlements

11%

(1 of

9 awards) 

0%

(0 of

6 awards) 

0%

(0 of

3 awards) 

25%*

(2 of

8 awards)

38%

(3 of

8 awards) 33%*

(4 of

12 awards) 25%**

(5 of

20 awards)

0%

(0 of

 9 awards) 

0%

(0 of

1 award)

0%

(0 of

 7 awards) 

40%

 (2 of

 5 awards)

25%

(2 of

8 awards)

0%

(0 of

 2 awards)

11%

(1 of

9 awards)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. (n=34) S.D. Fla. (n=11) N.D. Ill. (n=34) N.D. Cal . (n=28)

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Objection

Lodestar

Percentage of Recovery

Consent of Parties

Unknow n

*Percentage of recovery cases include one case with both lodestar and percentage methods.

**Includes fee objections in the one case involving competitive bidding by prospective lead class counsel.

Figure : Percentage of Cases with at Least One Appeal (All Class Actions: Certified

Cases and Noncertified Cases)

26%

(31 of 

117 cases)

33%

(21 of

64 cases)

19%

(10 of

53 cases)

15%

(11 of

72 cases)

15%

(2 of

13 cases)

15%

(9 of

59 cases)

34%

(39 of

116 cases)

37%

(24 of

65 cases) 29%

(15 of

23% 51 cases)

(23 of

102 cases) 14%

(5 of

35 cases)

27%

(18 of

67 cases)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

All Class Actions Certified Cases Noncertified Cases

Percentage of Cases with at Least One Appeal

E.D. Pa. 

S.D. Fla.

N.D. Ill.

N.D. Cal. 
Appendix C 

Figure : Cases with Only One Appeal and Cases with Multiple Appeals

27

3

1 0

10

1 0 0

10

2 1

15

5

3

0

26

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Cases with One Appeal Cases with Two Appeals Cases with Three Appeals Cases with Four or More

Appeals

Number of Cases

E.D. Pa.

S.D. Fla.

N.D. Ill. 

N.D. Cal.

Note: E.D. Pa. =  cases,  appeals; S.D. Fla. =  cases,  appeals; N.D. Ill. =  cases,  decided appeals, 

pending; N.D. Cal. =  cases,  decided appeals,  pending.
 Class Actions

Figure : Disposition on Appeal

55%

(20 of

36 appeals)

3%

(1 of

36 appeals)

14%

(5* of

36 appeals)

28%

(10 of

36 appeals)

33%

(4 of

 12 appeals)

17%

(2 of

12 appeals)

17%

(2 of

12 appeals)

33%

(4 of

12 appeals)

47%

(25 of

53 appeals)

2%

(1 of

53 appeals)

15%

(8 of

53 appeals)

36%

(19** of

53 appeals)

44%

(14 of

32 appeals)

16%

(5 of

32 appeals)

6%

(2 of

32 appeals)

34%

(11 of

 32 appeals)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Affirmed Affirmed in Part/Reversed in

Part

Rever sed/Vacated/Remanded Appeal Dismisse d or

Withdrawn

Appeal Outcomes

Percentage of Decided Appeals

E.D. Pa. 

S.D. Fla. 

N.D. Ill.

N.D. Cal.

 Note: E.D. Pa. =  cases,  appeals; S.D. Fla. =  cases,  appeals; N.D. Ill. =  cases,  decided appeals, 

pending; N.D. Cal. =  cases,  decided appeals,  pending.

*Includes the Third Circuit vacating the settlement in the General Motors Pick-Up Truck case ( F.d  (d Cir.),

cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ()).

**Includes one case where party opposing the class filed a writ of mandamus which the court of appeals denied.
Appendix C 

Figure : Disposition on Appeals Brought by Plaintiffs

57%

(16 of

28 appeals)

11%

(3*of 28 appeals) 4%

(1 of

28 appeals)

28%

(8 of

28 appeals)

33%

(3 of

9 appeals)

22%

(2 of

9 appeals)

22%

(2 of

9 appeals)

22%

(2 of

9 appeals)

58%

(22 of

38 appeals)

0%

(0 of

38 appeals)

13%

(5 of

38 appeals)

29%

(11 of

38 appeals)

33%

(9 of

27 appeals)

19%

(5 of 27 appeals)

7%

(2 of 27 appeals)

41%

(11 of

27 appeals)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Affirmed Affirmed in Part/Rev ersed in

Part

Reversed/Vacated/Remanded Appeal Dismissed or

W ithdrawn

Appeal Outcomes

Percentage of Appeals by Plaintiffs

E.D. Pa.

S.D. Fla.

N.D. Ill. 

N.D. Cal.

Note: Most appeals were filed on behalf of the class; others were filed by individual plaintiffs or proposed intervenor–

plaintiffs. E.D. Pa. =  cases,  appeals; S.D. Fla. =  cases,  appeals; N.D. Ill. =  cases,  decided appeals, 

pending; N.D. Cal. =  cases,  decided appeals,  pending.

*Includes the Third Circuit vacating the settlement in the General Motors Pick-Up Truck case ( F.d  (d Cir.),

cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ()).
 Class Actions

Figure : Disposition on Appeals Brought by Defendants

50%

(4 of

8 appeals)

0%

(0 of

8 appeals)

25%

(2 of

8 appeals)

25%

(2 of

8 appeals)

33%

(1 of

3 appeals)

0%

(0 of

3 appeals)

0%

(0 of

3 appeals)

67%

(2 of

3 appeals)

20%

(3 of

15 appeals)

7%

(1 of

15 appeals)

20%

(3 of

15 appeals)

53%

(8 of

15 appeals)

60%

(3 of

5 appeals)

0%

(0 of

5 appeals)

0%

(0 of

5 appeals)

40%

(2 of

5 appeals)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Affirmed Affirmed in Part/Reversed in

Part

Reversed/Vacated/Remanded Appeal D ismissed or

Withdrawn

Appeal Outcomes

Percentage of Appeals by Defendants

E.D. Pa.

S.D. Fla.

N.D. Ill. 

N.D. Cal.

Note: Includes defendants, third-party defendants, and proposed intervenor–defendants. E.D. Pa. =  cases,  appeals; S.D. Fla. =  cases,  appeals; N.D. Ill. =  cases,  decided appeals,  pending; N.D. Cal. =  cases, 

decided appeals,  pending.

Figure : Percentage of Cases with Rulings on Certification

District Court

Percentage of Cases

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

65%

(76 of

117 cases)

36%

(26 of

72 cases)

66%

(77 of

116 cases)

49%

(50 of

102 cases)
Appendix C 

Figure : Appeals in Cases with Ruling on Certification

 

16%

(5 of

31 appeals) 0%

(0 of

6 appeals)

12.5%

(5 of

40 appeals)

16%

(3 of

19 appeals)

84%

(26 of

31 appeals)

100%

(6 of

6 appeals) 87.5%

(35 of

40 appeals)

84%

(16 of

19 appeals)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

District Court

Percentage of Cases with 

Ruling on Certification

Appeals Filed Before Ruling on

Certification

Appeals Filed After Ruling on

Certification

Figure : Number of Cases with at Least One Appeal in Cases with Ruling on

Certification

District Court

Percentage of Cases with Ruling on Certification

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

27%

(20 of

75 cases) 19%

(5 of

26 cases)

34%

(26 of

77 cases)

22%

(11 of

50 cases)

73%

(55 of

75 cases)

81%

(21 of

26 cases)

66%

(51 of

77 cases)

78%

(39 of

50 cases)

Cases with at Least One

Appeal

Cases with No Appeal
 Class Actions

Table : Certified, Settled (b)() Classes with Average Net Distribution < $ Per

Class Member

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Definition

Gross Monetary

Award

Net Monetary

Award/ No. of

Notices Sent

Total Award

to Class

RepresentativesNonmonetary

Relief

Attorneys’ Fee

Award (method)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Masnik v. Bolar

Pharmaceutical, No.

- (E.D. Pa. filed

June , ).

Holders of

SmithKline

Beckman Corp.

common stock

who sold it

during class

period or who

exchanged it in

the merger

$. M$. M/

, members

= $. per

member

$, None $,

(lodestar)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Mandel v. Mortgage

& Realty, No. -

(E.D. Pa. filed Mar. ,

).

Purchasers of

Mortgage &

Realty common

stock during

class period

$. M$,/

, members

= $. per

member

None indicatedNone $,

(% of recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Hoxworth v.

Blinder, No. -

(E.D. Pa. filed Jan. ,

).

Buyers and

sellers of 

companies’

securities

through defendant during class

period

$. M$. M/ ,

members =

$. per

member

$, None $. M

(% of recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Weiner v. Meridian

Bancorp., Inc., No. -

 (E.D. Pa. filed

Sept. , ).

Purchasers of

Meridian Bancorp securities

during class

period

$. M$. M/ ,

members =

$. per

member

$, None $,

($, requested; method

not specified)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Cannon v. Royce

Laboratories, Inc., No.

- (S.D. Fla. filed

Apr. , ).

Purchasers of

securities of

Royce Laboratories during class

period

$. M$,/

, members

= $. per

member

None indicated, shares

of common stock

and ,,

warrants were

included in the

settlement, %

of which were

distributed to the

class

$,

(% of recovery;

plus % of

common stock

and warrants

awarded)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Weiner v. Southeast

Banking Co., No. -

 (S.D. Fla. filed

Mar. , ).

Purchasers of

Southeast

Banking securities during class

period

$ M$. M/

, members = $.

per member

$, None $. M

(% of recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() In re GE Energy

Choice Light Bulb

Consumer Litigation,

No-- (N.D. Cal.

filed Nov. , ).

Consumer

purchasers of GE

Energy Choice

throughout the

U.S. during a .

year class period

$. M$ M/

, members = <$.

per membera

None indicatedModifications of

advertising and

packaging practicesb

$,

(% of recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

(cont.)
Appendix C 

Table : Certified, Settled (b)() Classes with Average Net Distribution < $ Per

Class Member (continued)

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Definition

Gross Monetary

Award

Net Monetary

Award/ No. of

Notices Sent

Total Award

to Class

RepresentativesNonmonetary

Relief

Attorneys’ Fee

Award (method)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Sahadi v. Stone, No.

- (N.D. Cal.

filed Sept. , ).

Purchasers of

Read-Rite stock

during the class

period

$ M$. M/ ,

members =

$. per

member

None indicatedNone $,

(% of recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

() Nathanson IRA v.

Tenera, No. -

(N.D. Cal. filed Oct. ,

).

Purchasers of

units of Tenera

during class

period

$. M$,/ ,

members =

$. per

member

$, None $,

($,

requested; % of

recovery)

(% of gross

monetary award)

Note: M = millions of dollars.

aThe distribution per class member was probably less because purchasers of GE Energy Choice products who were

not class members were also allowed to participate.

bNote that the monetary relief consisted of a funded rebate program with any surplus to be donated to charity or

energy research purposes.

Table : Number of Consolidated Cases Transferred by the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Legislation and Nature of Suit

Nature of Suit E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = ) N.D. Cal. (n = )

Other contract actions   

Contract product liability   

Personal injury–product

liability

  

Antitrust   

Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organization

Act (RICO)

  

Property rights–trademark   

Securities   
 Class Actions

Table 3: Number of Consolidations by District Court and Nature of Suit

Nature of Suit E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = ) N.D. Cal. (n = )

Contract  

Torts–other fraud  

Antitrust  

Other civil rights  

Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organization

Act (RICO)

 

Prisoner petitions–habeas

corpus

  

Other labor litigation  

Employee Retirement

Income Security Act

(ERISA)

 

Trademark   

Securities    

Other statutory actions  

Table : Number of Related Cases Not Consolidated with Similar Litigation Pending

in Federal Courts and Nature of Suit

Nature of Suit E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = ) N.D. Cal. (n = )

Contracts–stockholders suits   

Other contract actions  

Contract product liability   

Personal injury–product

liability

  

Other fraud 

Antitrust   

Other civil rights  

Civil rights–jobs   

Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organization Act

(RICO)

 

Prisoner petitions–habeas

corpus

  

(cont.)
Appendix C 

Table : Number of Related Cases Not Consolidated with Similar Litigation Pending

in Federal Courts and Nature of Suit (continued)

Nature of Suit E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = ) N.D. Cal. (n = )

Prisoner–civil rights   

Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (ERISA)

  

Property rights–trademark   

Securities    

Other statutory actions  

Table : Number of Related Cases Not Consolidated with Similar Litigation Pending

in State Courts and Nature of Suit

Nature of Suit E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = )

Contract product liability 

Personal injury–medical malpractice

Other personal property damage 

Other civil rights  

Securities  

Table : Difficulties in Cases Not Consolidated in Federal Courts

Case Type of Case Difficulty

Case  Statutory action Documents were filed in both cases—one was a class action and the

other was not. On different occasions, class-related documents were

filed in the nonclass case, but not in the class case, which caused

confusion not only for the parties but for the court.

Case  Contract Nonconsolidated case was stayed and later closed because the related

case was farther along. It was not clear from the case file how much

time and effort had been expended on the discovery process, but one

can assume that there was duplication of effort.

Case  Racketeer

Influenced and

Corrupt Organization Act

(RICO)

In this case, five other class actions were pending against the defendants who moved before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

for transfer of all of the cases to a single district. Prior to the court’s

ruling on the MDL issue the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Defendant later learned that to have the case transferred by the Judicial Panel the case had to be open. Defendant then had to move for

reconsideration of the court’s dismissal of the case. The court denied

vacating the dismissal order.

Case  Securities This case contained identical issues and the same defendants as in

other related cases. The court found that the case was related but

decided not to consolidate it.
 Class Actions

Table : Difficulties in Cases Not Consolidated in State Courts

Case Type of Case Difficulty

Case  Personal injury–

medical malpractice

In this case the district court decided to abstain from ruling on its

case while the state court case was still pending with parallel claims.

There was considerable delay in the case before the district court

ruled that the state court was a better forum for the plaintiffs.

Case  Contract product liabilityA number of class action complaints were filed in several state courts

relying on state law products liability claims. Plaintiffs in those cases

objected to the settlement. The court responded by coordinating the

notice and settlement proposal to account for the state actions.

Case  Statutory actionsClass action sought on state law claims. Defendant objected because

of the duplicative nature of the litigation.

Case  Securities Co-lead counsel filed a motion to take action against another attorney, who attempted to dismiss voluntarily the federal action and file a

duplicative class action in state court. The court held that the federal

action could only be voluntarily dismissed after counsel represented

to the court that he would dismiss the state class action and not file

any other duplicative class actions.

Table : Median Case Duration (in Months) of (b)() Securities and Nonsecurities

Cases with Court-Approved Settlements

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla.

Securities

NonsecuritiesCivil

Rights Securities

NonsecuritiesCivil

Rights

Settled Cases 

 (n=)



(n=)



(n=)



(n=)



(n=)

—

(n=)

Nonsettled Cases 

(n=)



 (n=)

—

(n=)

—

(n=)

—

(n=)

—

(n=)

N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Securities

NonsecuritiesCivil

Rights Securities

NonsecuritiesCivil

Rights

Settled Cases 

(n=)



(n=)



(n=)



(n=)



(n=)



(n=)

Nonsettled Cases 

(n=)



(n=)

—

(n=)



(n=)



(n=)

—

(n=)

Note: The “median case duration” is from filing the first complaint to termination of the case.
Appendix C 

Table : Rate of Certification in (b)() Securities and Nonsecurities Cases with

Motions or Orders Filed on Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla.

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Percentage of

Cases Certified

     —

N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Percentage of

Cases Certified

     

Table : Number of Numerosity and Representativeness Objections to Certification

in (b)() Securities and Nonsecurities Cases with Disputes Over Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Numerosity

objection



(%)



 (%)



(%)



(%)



 (%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Representativeness objection

 (%)



 (%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)
 Class Actions

Table : Median Settlement Fund Distribution Comparisons for Certified (b)()

Securities and Nonsecurities Cases with Court-Approved Settlements

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Securities

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Net distributiona $,, $c $,, $, $,, $, $,, $,,

Fee awardb $,, $, $, $, $,, $, $,, $,,

Net settlement

per class member

$

(n = )

$

(n = )

d

$

(n = )

—

(n = )

$

(n = )

$

(n = )

$

(n = )

$

(n = )

a“Net distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses.

b“Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel, excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket

expenses.

c Mean = $,.

d Mean = $.

Table : Median Case Duration (in Months) of (b)() Nonsecurities Cases with

Court-Approved Settlements

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Settled Nonsettled Settled Nonsettled Settled Nonsettled Settled Nonsettled

All nonsecurities

(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



 (n = )



(n = )



(n = )

Civil rights 

(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )



(n = )

—

(n = )

Note: The “median case duration” is from filing the first complaint to termination of the case.

Table : Rate of Certification in (b)() Nonsecurities Cases with Motions or Orders

Filed on Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Percentage of

Cases Certified

       
Appendix C 

Table : Number of Numerosity and Representativeness Objections to Certification

in (b)() Nonsecurities Cases with Disputes over Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Numerosity

Objection



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Representativeness Objection

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Table : Median Fee Awards for Certified (b)() Nonsecurities Cases with CourtApproved Settlements

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Nonsecurities

(n = )

Civil

Rights

(n = )

Median Fee

Awarda $, $, $, $, $, $, $, $,

a“Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel, excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket

expenses.

Table : Trial Rates for Nonprisoner Class Actions Compared to Nonprisoner

Nonclass Civil Actions

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Trial Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = ,)

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = ,)

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = ,)

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = ,)

Rate .% .% .% .% .% .% .% .%

Number    ,    

Note: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts data; Class:

Federal Judicial Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D). The two data sets refer to

civil cases terminated between July , , and June , .

The Administrative Office data on trial rates for the study cases differed from our data for the same set of cases. In

three districts, the Administrative Office data showed fewer trials than the Federal Judicial Center data and in the

other district the numbers were the same. Overall, the Administrative Office data showed thirteen trials compared to

eighteen in the Federal Judicial Center database. The trial rates shown by the Administrative Office data were %

(four), % (one), % (six), and % (two), respectively.
 Class Actions

Table : Trial Rates for Securities Class Actions Compared to Securities Civil

Actions

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Trial Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = )

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = )

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = )

Class

(n = )

Nonclass

(n = )

Rate .% .% % .% .% .% % %

Number        

Note: Nonclass: Federal Judicial Center integrated database of Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts data, Class:

Federal Judicial Center class action project database (see first paragraph, Appendix D). The two data sets refer to

civil cases terminated between July , , and June , .

The Administrative Office data on trial rates for securities class actions differed from the Federal Judicial Center

data on the same cases in only one instance. In E.D. Pa., the Administrative Office data showed two trials, a rate of

%, whereas the Federal Judicial Center data showed three trials, a rate of %.

Table : Number of Multiple Certifications and Rule (b) Certifications

Rule (b) Combinations E.D. Pa. (n = ) S.D. Fla. (n = ) N.D. Ill. (n = ) N.D. Cal. (n = )

(b)()(A) and (b)()   

(b)()(A), (b)()(B), and type

not specified

  

(b)()(A) and (b)()   

(b)()(A), (b)()(B), and (b)()   

(b)()(B) and (b)()   

(b)()(B), (b)(), and (b)()   

(b)()(B) and (b)()   

(b)() and (b)() 

(b)() and type not specified   
Appendix C 

Table : District Judge and Magistrate Judge Time Expended

 Judge Time (in Hours) Average Hours per Case

Type of Activity

Certified

(n = )

Not certified

(n = ) Certified Not certified

Class certification   . .

Motions to dismiss   . .

Discovery   . .

Summary judgment   . .

Notice to class  . 

Pretrial conference  . 

All other pretrial conferences  . 

Trial    .

Facilitating settlement   . .

Review and rule on proposed settlement  . .

Presiding at settlement approval hearing   . 

Ruling on attorneys’ fees   . 

Monitoring or enforcing final order    

Other   . 

Total   . .

Source: Willging et al., Preliminary Report on Time Study Class Action Cases (Feb. , ) (unpublished report on

file with the Information Services Office of the Federal Judicial Center).

Table : Grounds Cited in Rulings on Motions to Dismiss in Relation to Timing of

Ruling on Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Grounds Cited in

Rulinga Before(n = )

After

(n = )

Before

(n = )

After

(n = )

Before

(n = )

After

(n = )

Before

(n = )

After

(n = )

Rule (b)()   

Rule (b)()  

Rule (b)()  

Rule (b)()        

Rule (b)() 

Other        

Unknown 

Total        

aMore than one citation in some rulings.
 Class Actions

Table : Grounds Cited in Rulings on Motions to Dismiss in All Class Actions

Terminated Between July , , and June , 

Grounds Cited in Rulinga E.D. Pa.(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Rule (b)() (lack of subject

matter jurisdiction)

   

Lack of federal question  

Incomplete diversity   

Insufficient class amount in

controversy

  

Insufficient individual amount

in controversy

 

Other  

Rule (b)() (lack of personal

jurisdiction)

  

Rule (b)() (improper venue)  

Rule (b)() (insufficiency of

process)

 

Rule (b)() (insufficiency of

service of process)



Rule (b)() (failure to state a

claim)

   

Rule (b)() (failure to join a

party)

 

Rule (b) (failure to plead fraud

with specificity)

   

Rule (a) (voluntary dismissal)  

Rule (b)(by court order)  

 U.S.C. (d) (frivolous)   

Mootness  

Abstention   

Standing 

Stipulated   

Other  

Unknown    

Total    

aSome rulings cited more than one source.
Appendix C 

Table : Outcomes of Rulings on Motions to Dismiss in Relation to Timing of

Rulings on Class Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Outcome Before After Before After Before After Before After

Dismiss all  

Dismiss part        

Deny        

Defer  

No action 

Other    

Total        

Table : Outcomes of Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment in Relation to

Timing of Rulings on Class Certification

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Outcome Before After Before After Before After Before After

Granted        

Granted in

part

  

Denied 

Deferred 

Other  

Total        

Table : Percentage of Cases with Rulings on Motions to Dismiss, Motions for

Summary Judgment, and Sua Sponte Dismissals

Action

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Motions to dismiss    

Sua sponte dismissals    

Motions for summary judgment    

Cases with at least one ruling

regarding dismissal or summary

judgment



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Cases with both a dismissal

ruling and a summary judgment

ruling



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)
 Class Actions

Table : Outcome of Rulings on Motions to Dismiss

Outcome of Motion to Dismiss

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Dismissed entire complaint %

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

 ( cases)

%

( cases)

Dismissed one or more claims or

parties

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

Denied the motion %

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

Other %

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( case)

%

( cases)

Table : Outcome of Summary Judgment Rulings

Outcome

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Granted in whole 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Granted in part 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Denied 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Deferred 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Other 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Table : Cases Closed as a Result of a Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss or Summary

Judgment

Ruling

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Dismissal 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Summary judgment 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Subtotal 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Minus duplicate

cases

–

(–%)

–

(–%)

–

(–%)



(%)

Total 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)
Appendix C 

Table : Median Times (in Months) from Filing of Complaint to Filing of First

Motion to Dismiss and from Filing of First Motion to Dismiss to the First Ruling on a

Motion to Dismiss

Time E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Median time from complaint to

first motion to dismiss

. . . .

Median time from first motion to

dismiss to first ruling

. . . .

th percentile of time from first

motion to dismiss to first ruling

. . . .

Table : Median Times (in Months) from Filing Complaint to Filing of First Motion

for Summary Judgment and from Filing of First Motion for Summary Judgment to

First Ruling on Summary Judgment

Time E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Median time from complaint to

first motion for summary judgment

. . . .

Median time from first motion

for summary judgment to first

ruling

. . . .

th percentile of time from first

motion for summary judgment

to first ruling

. . . .
 Class Actions

Table : Number of Cases with Simultaneous Motion to Certify and Approve

Settlement and Nature of Suit

Nature of Suit

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Torts–other fraud  

Antitrust 

Civil rights–prisoner 

Civil rights–accommodations  

Civil rights–other 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)

Labor laws–other litigation  

Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (ERISA)

 

Securities 

Other statutory actions 

Contract: insurance 

Table : Number of Certified Cases With and Without a Simultaneous Settlement

and Type of Class

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Case type (b)()(A) (b)()(B) (b)() (b)()

With simultaneous settlement   

Without simultaneous

settlement

   
Appendix C 

Table : Number of Certified Cases with Motions to Reconsider or Decertify and

Outcome

Outcome

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = ) Total

Certification affirmed    

Certification reversed    

Certification modified   

Reconsideration denied    

Reconsideration deferred  

No action taken   

Other    

Table : Number of Oppositions to Certification and Nature-of-Suit Categories

Nature of Suit

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Stockholders suits 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Other contract actions 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Contract product liability 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Torts–marine 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Torts–motor vehicle–

product liability



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Personal injury–medical

malpractice



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Personal injury–product

liability



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Torts–other fraud 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Torts–truth in lending 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Torts–other personal

property damage



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Antitrust 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Withdrawal 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Other civil rights 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

(cont.)
 Class Actions

Table : Number of Oppositions to Certification and Nature-of-Suit Categories

(continued)

Nature of Suit

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Civil rights–jobs 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Civil rights–

accommodations



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Civil rights–welfare 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organization

Act (RICO)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Prisoner–civil rights 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Labor/Management Relations Act

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Other labor litigation 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Employee Retirement

Income Security Act

(ERISA)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Securities 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Social security–black lung 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Social Security–Social

Security Disability Income, Title XVI



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Tax suits 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Other statutory actions 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Constitutionality of state

statutes



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Table : Number of Oppositions to Certification and Nature of Suit for All

Categories of Civil Rights, Securities, and ERISA Cases

Nature of Suit

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

All civil rights 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Securities 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Employee Retirement

Income Security Act

(ERISA)



(%)

— 

(%)

—

Prisoner–civil rights — 

(%)

— —
Appendix C 

Table : Class Notice of Certification or Settlement Issued in Certified Class Actions

by Type

Type of Class

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

(b)()(A) %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

(b)()(B) %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

(b)() %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

(b)() %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

No type specified %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Note: Some cases were certified under more than one subsection.

Table : Type of Notice in Certified (b)() Class Actions

Type of Notice

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Personal    

Publication    

Broadcast  

Other (e.g., posting) 

No notice 

Note: Most cases used more than one type of notice.
 Class Actions

Table : Intervention Success Rates for Various Nature of Suit Categories

Nature of Suit Attempted Granted

Percentage

Granted

Contract  

Product liability–medical

malpractice

  

Fraud personal property   

Antitrust   

Other civil rights  

Jobs–civil rights   

Welfare–civil rights   

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 

Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (ERISA)

  

Securities, commodities,

exchange

  

Social security   

Other statutory actions  

Constitutionality of state statutes  

Table : Types of Objections Raised During Settlement Approval Process as a

Percentage of All Settlement Hearings

Type of Objection

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Insufficient compensation%

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Insufficient deterrence %

()

%

()

%

(1)

%

()

Representation parties

favored

%

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Groups unfairly

disfavored

%

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Collusion with opposing party%

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Attorneys’ fees disproportionate%

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

Other %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()

No objection %

()

%

()

%

()

%

()
Appendix C 

Table : Outcomes of Certified and Noncertified Cases

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Outcome

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Dismissed on motion 

(%)



(%)

 

(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Summary judgment

granted



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Judgment after bench trial 

(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

Judgment after jury trial 

(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Default judgment  

(%)



Voluntary dismissal by

plaintiff

 

(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

Stipulated dismissal 

(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

Nonclass settlement approved 

(%)

 

(%)



 (%)



(%)

 

(%)

Class settlement approved 

(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)



(%)

Other (e.g., case transferred)

(%)



(%)

 

(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.

Table 40: Settlement of Certified Class Actions Compared with Settlement of Cases

with Class Allegations that Were Not Certified

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Outcome

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Stipulated dismissal 

(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)

Nonclass settlement

approved

 

(%)

 

(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Class settlement approved

(%)

a

(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

(%)



(%)

Total % % % % % % % %

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.

aCase involved some class relief but not a class certification, either explicitly or implicitly.
 Class Actions

Table : Disposition by Motion or Trial of Certified Cases Compared with Cases

with Class Allegations Not Certified

E.D. Pa. S.D. Fla. N.D. Ill. N.D. Cal.

Outcome

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Certified

(n = )

Not

Certified

(n = )

Dismissal on motion 

(%)



(%)

 

(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Summary judgment

granted



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

Judgment after

bench trial



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

 

Judgment after jury

trial



(%)



(%)



(%)



(%)

 

(%)

Total % % % % % % % %

Note: Cases certified for settlement purposes only are not included.

Table : Time from Ruling on Certification to Filing of Settlement in Certified,

Settled Class Actions

Category

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

th percentile . months . months  months  months

Median . months . months . months . months

th percentile . months . months  months . months

Settlement filed before

class certification

 cases

(%)

 cases

(%)

 cases

(%)

 cases

(%)

No data available  cases  cases  cases  cases
Appendix C 

Table : Jury Trials

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Status

Nature of

Suit

Days of

Trial Outcome of Trial Results on Appeal

Hoxworth v. Blinder,

No. -, E.D. Pa.

Certified

(b)()

Securities  Default judgment for

plaintiff class

Affirmed; remanded for

settlement

Melendez v. Illinois

Bell Telephone Co.,

No. -, N.D.

Ill.

Not certified

(b)() & (b)()

Title VII a Injunction and damages

for individual plaintiff;

partial summary judgment for defendanta

Appeal dismissed

Jacobs v. Information

Resources, No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Certifiedb Contracts  For defendant against

plaintiff class

Affirmed

In re Atlantic Financial, No. -,

E.D. Pa.

Certified

(b)()

Securities  For defendant against

plaintiff class

Appeal dismissed

Ceisler v. First

Pennsylvania Corp.,

No. -, E.D.

Pa.

Certified

(b)()

Securities  For defendant against

plaintiff class

Affirmed

Schwartz v. System

Software, No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Certified

(b)()

Securities  For defendant against

plaintiff class

Affirmed

Bd. of Managers v.

West Chester Areas,

No. -, E.D.

Pa.

Not certified

(b)()

Civil rights  Directed verdict for

defendant against

individual plaintiff

Reversed in part; affirmed in part

Igo v. County of

Sonoma, No. -,

N.D. Cal.

Not certifiedb Civil rights  For defendant against

individual plaintiff

Appeal dismissed

Stender v. Lucky

Stores, No. -,

N.D. Cal.

Certified

(b)()&(b)()

Title VII a Parties settled after

finding for one subclassa

No appeal

Pucci v. Litwin, No.

-, N.D. Ill.

Not certified

(b)()

Securities  Parties settled No appeal

aCombination bench and jury trial.

bRule (b) type not specified.
 Class Actions

Table : Bench Trials

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Status

Nature of

Suit

Days of

Trial Outcome of Trial

Results on

Appeal

Packard v. Provident

Nat’l. Bank, No. -

, E.D. Pa.

Certified

(b)()(A)&(B);

(b)()

Personal

property

damage

 For individual

plaintiff after prior

class settlement

Vacated;

remanded for

dismissal

Hedges v. Wauconda

Community, No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Not certifieda Civil rights  For individual

plaintiff

Vacated in part;

remanded

Dowling v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. -

, E.D. Pa.

Certified

(b)()

Civil rights  For defendant

against plaintiff

class and individual plaintiff

No appeal

Berndt v. Budget

Rent-A-Car, No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Not certifieda Civil rights  For defendant

against individual

plaintiff

No appeal

Williams v. Cordis

Corp., No. -,

S.D. Fla.

Not certified

(b)()

Employee

Retirement

Income

Security Act

(ERISA)

 For defendant

against individual

plaintiff

No appeal

Mateo v. M/S KISO,

No. -, N.D.

Cal.

Not certified

(b)(),() & ()

Personal

injury

NA For defendant

against individual

plaintiff

Affirmed

Merrill Drydock v.

Longkeel, No. -

, S.D. Fla.

Not certifiedb

(b)()

Contracts  Parties settled

(appeal on damages)

Appeal dismissed

Buttino v. FBI, No.

-, N.D. Cal.

Certified

(b)()

Civil rights  Parties settled after

finding for plaintiff

on liability

No appeal

Note: NA = not available.

aRule (b) type not specified.

bMotion for certification of defendant class denied.
Appendix C 

Table : Means and Medians for Fee Awards as Percentage of Gross Settlement

Costs in Certified Cases with Court-Approved Settlements Providing No Net

Monetary Distribution to Class

No Net Monetary

Distribution to Class

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Fee awards as percentage of

gross settlement costs:

Mean % % % %

Median % % % %

Maximum % % % %

Minimum % % % %

Fee awards:

Mean award $, $, $, $,,

Median award $, $, $, $,,

Gross settlement costs:

Mean amount $, $, $, $,,

Median amount $, $, $, $,,

Note: This table shows the thirty-eight cases where the only monetary distribution was for payments to class representatives, attorneys’ fees, or administrative expenses. In addition to these thirty-eight cases, in fourteen certified

cases (seven, one, four, two cases in the four districts, respectively), there was no record of a fee request or a fee

award and court-approved settlements provided no net monetary distribution to the class. “Net monetary distribution” is net of attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses. “Fee award” equals the total amount of fees awarded to

plaintiffs’ counsel, excluding sanctions and out-of-pocket expenses. “Gross settlement costs” include the following

payments by defendants to fund the settlement where applicable: payments to class representatives, attorneys’ fees

and expenses, and administrative costs of the settlement such as notice costs.
 Class Actions

Table : Certified, Settled (b)() Classes with No Monetary Distribution to the Class

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Definition

No. of

Notices Sent

Total Award

to Class

Representatives Nonmonetary Relief

Attorneys’

Fee Award

(Method)

Brownell v. State Farm

Mutual Auto Ins., No.

- (E.D. Pa. filed

Mar. , ).

All insureds who

submitted a

medical payment

claim for personal injuries

. M None indicatedDefendant agreed () not to use

written criteria with respect to the

duration, frequency, cost, and type of

treatment without disclosing such

criteria; and () not to compensate

peer reviewers on a percentage or

contingency fee basis

$,

(stipulated)

Assad v. Hibbard

Brown & Co., No. -

 (E.D. Pa. filed

Nov. , ).

All who purchased or sold

Children’s

Workshop

Limited securities through

defendant

Unknown $, Class members who file claims are to

receive certificates of monetary credits to be applied to future transactions

with defendant

$,

(method not

specified;

$,

requested)

The Lindner Fund, Inc.

v. Pollock, No. -

(E.D. Pa. filed Nov. ,

).

All purchasers of

defendant’s

common stock

during class

period

Unknown None indicatedSettlement stated that plaintiffs’

counsel reviewed the prospectuses

and, based on discovery, stated that

there is no good faith basis for asserting that the prospectuses contain

any false or misleading statement or

omission

$,

(stipulated)

Cherkas v. General

Motors Corp., No -

 (E.D. Pa. filed

Nov. , ).a

Purchasers and

owners of specific full-size GM

pick-up trucks or

chassis cab

models

. M None indicatedCertificates with a face value of $,

toward the purchase of a new GM

pick-up truck (Notes: personal injury

claims were not released; settlement

vacated on appeal)

$. M

(stipulated)

Cohen v. Alan Bush

Brokerage Co., No. -

 (S.D. Fla. filed

Jan. , ).

Purchasers of

common stock of

Comterm during

class period

 $, Coupons of a total estimated value of

$ million representing a credit for up

to % of standard commission rates

for common stock trading on an

agency basis

$,

(stipulated

up to

$,;

award

contingent

on number

of claims)

Rodriquez v. Township

of Dekalb, No. -

 (N.D. Ill. filed

Nov. , ).

All applicants for

General Assistance (a local

welfare program)

Unknown

(notice by

posting)

$ Injunction that all local government

administrators adopt and consistently

apply written General Assistance

standards, maintained in a publicly

available manual

$,

(method not

specified)

(cont.)
Appendix C 

Table : Certified, Settled (b)() Classes with No Monetary Distribution to the Class

(continued)

Caption, Docket No.,

and District Class Definition

No. of

Notices Sent

Total Award

to Class

Representatives Nonmonetary Relief

Attorneys’

Fee Award

(Method)

Harris v. DeRobertis,

No. - (N.D. Ill.

filed July , ).

All inmates of

Cellhouse BWest, Stateville

Correctional

Center, from

// to //

Unknown None indicatedClaims procedure established—

inmates could choose $ payment

without proof of injury or up to

$, for physical or psychological

injuries sustained as a direct result of

the lack of heat in the cellblock

$,

(method not

specified)

Schlansky v. EAC

Industries, No. -

(N.D. Ill. filed Feb. ,

).

Purchasers of

EAC securities

during class

period

 $, , shares of common stock and

, warrants to buy an issue of

stock at $ a share during a five-year

period

$,

plus ,

shares and

,

warrants

(stipulated)

Aitken v. Fleet Mortgage, No. -

(N.D. Ill. filed June ,

).

Residential real

estate mortgagors with tax and

insurance

escrows computed by a

particular

method during

the past year

. M$, Rebates to be paid to current and past

mortgage holders using a set formula

$. M

(stipulated,

based on

percentage

of recovery)

Wesley v. GM Acceptance Corp., No. -

 (N.D. Ill. filed

May , ).

Illinois GMAC

auto lessees who

terminated a

lease early and

were assessed

termination fees

 $, Recalculation of lease termination

charges on an actuarial basis for postsettlement terminations; for presettlement terminations, choice of $

cash or $ applied to a new consumer lease within a year of the

settlement

$,

(lodestar;

$,

requested)

Koerber v. S. C. Johnson & Sons, No. -

 (N.D. Ill. filed

Oct. , ).

All direct and

indirect purchasers of Raid or

Raid Max during

class period

, None indicated() Requiring the defendant Bayer to

affirmatively offer a license for

Cyfluthrin to all of defendant’s competitors on nondiscriminatory terms;

() provide $. million in promotional benefits to direct purchasers

and $. million to indirect

(consumer) purchasers

$. M

(stipulated)

McKenna v. Sears

Roebuck & Co., No.

- (N.D. Cal. filed

June , ).

All purchasers of

auto repairs from

any Sears Center

during class

period of more

than four years

 M None indicated() Enforcing its policy of satisfaction

guaranteed or your money back and

() establishing a method of distributing $ coupons toward the purchase of brake calipers, coil springs,

master cylinder, or idle arm upon

showing proof of prior purchase of

such an item

$ M

(stipulated)

Note: M = Millions.

aThe General Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation ( F.d  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ()).
 Class Actions

Table : Injunctive Relief in Certified (b)() Cases Providing No Net Monetary

Distribution to Class

Caption, Docket No., and District Injunctive Relief Fee Award

Bonsall Village v. Patterson, No. -

, E.D. Pa.

Modifying a township’s zoning and development plans, encouraging

development of an area occupied primarily by minorities

$,

Bozzi v. Sullivan, No. -, E.D.

Pa.

Readjudicating claims for widow, widower, survivor and disability

benefits using appropriate regulations

$,

Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, No.

-, E.D. Pa.

Establishing a grievance-arbitration procedure allowing class members to

challenge a bank’s “sweep fees” applied to investment accounts

$,

Avery v. City of Philadelphia, No. -

, E.D. Pa.

Replacing the psychological examination process for police officer applicants, giving class members an opportunity for psychological reexamination

$,

Williams v. Philadelphia Housing

Authority, No. -, E.D. Pa.

Establishing a housing authority’s policy that applicants will not be determined ineligible for Section  housing solely on the basis of a related

debt to the housing authority unless that debt is the legal responsibility of

the applicant; providing hearing/review procedures for applicants who

disagree with authority’s findings

$,

Felix v. Sullivan, No. -, E.D. Pa. Changing the services offered under pharmaceutical, dental, and other

medical plans for all state residents who receive medical assistance

benefits

$,

Brooks v. Philadelphia Housing

Authority, No. -, E.D. Pa.

Requiring a housing authority to rewire certain housing units and install a

separate meter for common area electric service

$,

Keith v. Daley, No. -, N.D. Ill. Entering a consent decree () that allows the state to regulate abortions

and () that protects women’s right to choose an abortion and receive

family planning services

$,

Bogard v. Duffy, No. -, N.D. Ill. Improving treatment resources and placement opportunities for developmentally disabled Medicaid recipients$,

Castaneda v. Greyhound Retirement

and Disability Plan, No. -, N.D.

Ill.

Refraining from denying claims for return of individual contributions to a

pension plan

$,

Blum v. Icul Service Corp., No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Agreeing that no letter shall be sent threatening consequences for failure

to pay a debt before the -day validation period during which the alleged

debtor may challenge the claim

$,

Hiestand v. Schillerstrom, No. -

, N.D. Ill.

Agreeing to modify defendant’s collection letter so that no letter is sent

demanding payment until after the applicable validation period has expired

$,

Buttino v. FBI, No. -, N.D. Cal. Adopting Federal Bureau of Investigation policy that “sexual orientation

or preference may not be considered as a basis for a negative factor in

determining one’s suitability for employment”

$,
Appendix C 

Table : Donations to Charitable or Public Interest Organizations in Certified Cases

with Court Approved Settlements

Caption, Docket

No., and District Distribution for Charitable Purposes

N.D. Ill.

M&M v. Chicago

Bd. Options, No.

-

Cy pres grants to:

Chicago-Kent College of Law—$,;

DePaul Univ. Law School—$,;

John Marshall Law School—$,;

Public Interest Law Initiative—$,;

Illinois Institute of Technology—$,;

Loyola Univ. of Chicago—$,.

In re Clozapine AntiTrust Litigation, No.

-

() Discount credits with a value of $ million to be used by mental health agencies of thirty-four states to treat patients who do not

otherwise qualify for Medicaid benefits for therapy using the drug

Clozapine;

() additional $ million to the National Organization for Rare

Diseases (NORD) for treating new Clozaril patients not otherwise

qualified for Medicaid reimbursement; and

() a % rebate (to be distributed through NORD) for purchases,

over a two-year period, of the drug Clozaril by patients on Social

Security Disability Income.

In re Scouring Pads,

No. -

$, to Chicago Bar Foundation for specified programs on

domestic abuse, juvenile justice, and tutoring/mentoring.

N.D. Cal.

Lucky Stores No.

-

A specified donation to a nonprofit organization in a Title VII

employment discrimination case.

In re G.E. Energy

Choice Light Bulb

Consumer Litig.,

No. -

Any money remaining in a rebate and coupon settlement fund to

an unspecified charity.
 Class Actions

Table : Reversals and Remands in Cases with Previously Certified Class

Cherkas v.

General

Motors

Corp., Case

No.

-,

E.D. Pa.

Packard v.

Provident

Nat’l. Bank,

Case No.

-,

E.D. Pa.

Berman v.

Int’l Controls Corp.,

Case No.

-,

S.D. Fla.

Bennett v.

Bombela,

Case No.

-,

N.D. Ill.

Harris v.

DeRobertis,

Case No.

-,

N.D. Ill.

Castaneda v.

Greyhound

Retirement

and Disability Plan,

Case No.

-,

N.D. Ill.

Untermeyer

v. Margolis,

No. -,

Case No.

-,

N.D. Cal.

Issues on

appeal

Certification of

settlement

class; settlement approval; class

counsel fees

Bench trial

award of

punitive

damages for

individual

plaintiff after

class settlement

Summary

judgment for

defendants

Second of

two summary judgments for

defendantsa

Case dismissal for

failure to

state a claim

Summary

judgment on

liability;

declaratory

judgment for

plaintiff class

Summary

judgment for

defendants

Appeal filed

by

Objecting

class members

Defendants Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Defendants Plaintiffs

Outcome of

appeal

Vacated;

remanded

Vacated;

remanded

for case

dismissal for

lack of

subject

matter

jurisdiction

Reversed in

part; vacated

in part

Reversed;

remanded

Reversed;

remanded

Reversed

summary

judgment;

remanded

Affirmed in

part; reversed in

part; remanded with

respect to

claims

against

auditors

Eventual

outcome of

case

Pendingb Case dismissedCourtapproved

class settlement

Courtapproved

class settlement

Courtapproved

class settlement

Courtapproved

class settlement

Pendingb

aPrior to class certification, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the first summary judgment for defendants.

bOn remand after the study’s cutoff date of June , .
Appendix C 

Table : Reversals and Remands in Cases with No Class Previously Certified

Bd. of Managers

v. West Chester

Areas, Case #

-, E.D.

Pa.

Baby Neal v.

Casey, Case #

-, E.D.

Pa.

O’Neill v. City of

Philadelphia,

Case #

-, E.D.

Pa.

Flores v. Carnival Cruise, Case

# -, S.D.

Fla.

Grant v. U.S.

Parole Comm.,

Case # -

, S.D. Fla.

Joaquim v. Royal

Caribbean, Case

# - ,

S.D. Fla.

Cert. ruling

preappeal

Yes (not certified)Yes (not certified)Yes (not certified)No ruling Yes (not certified)Yes (not certified)

Issues on appeal Directed verdict

for defendants

Denial of class

certification;

partial summary

judgment for

defendants;

stipulated judgment against

named plaintiffs

Appeal #:

Denial in part of

defendants’

motion for

summary judgment

Appeal #:

Partial summary

judgment for

defendant

Summary judgment for defendants

Dismissal of case Dismissal of case

Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Plaintiffs #: Defendants

#: Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs

Outcome on

appeal

Reversed in part;

affirmed in part;

remanded

Reversed; remanded (without

review of partial

summary judgment

#: Vacated;

remanded for

dismissal of case

 #: Appeal

dismissed

Affirmed in part;

reversed in part;

remanded on

compensatory

claim

Affirmed in part;

reversed in part

Reversed in part;

vacated in part

Class certification after

remand

No No No No No No

Eventual outcome of caseCase dismissal Case dismissal Case dismissal Pendingb Case dismissal Pendingb

(cont.)
 Class Actions

Table : Reversals and Remands in Cases with No Class Previously Certified

(continued)

Bennett v.

Bombela,

Case # -

, N.D.

Ill.

Retired

Chicago

Police v. City

of Chicago,

Case # -

, N.D.

Ill.

Hedges v.

Wauconda

Community,

Case # -

, N.D.

Ill.

Twenty-First

Century v.

Sherwood,

Case # -

, N.D.

Cal.

Adesanya v.

West America

Bank, Case #

-,

N.D. Cal.

Miller v. Pacific

Lumber Col,

Case # -

, N.D.

Cal.

Vandenbosch

v. Georgia

Pacific Corp.,

Case # -

, N.D.

Cal.

Cert. ruling

preappeal

No ruling Yes (not

certified)

No ruling No ruling No ruling Yes (not certified)No ruling

Issues on appeal First of two

summary

judgments for

defendantsa

Denial of

motion for

class certification and intervention;

dismissal of

case

Permanent

injunction

against defendants and

nominal

damages for

individual

plaintiffs

Partial summary judgment for

defendants;

denial of

plaintiffs’

summary

judgment

motion

Dismissal of

certain claims

Denial of class

certification;

dismissal of

certain class

representatives;

partial summary

judgment for

defendant;

disqualification

of plaintiffs’

counsel

Summary

judgment for

defendants

Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Plaintiffs;

intervenors

Defendants Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs

Outcome on

appeal

Reversed;

remanded

Affirmed in

part

(including

affirmed of

denial of class

certification);

reversed in

part; remanded

Vacated

injunction and

damages;

remanded on

damages

Reversed;

remanded

Affirmed in

part; reversed

in part;

remanded

Reversed in

part; remanded

in part; affirmed

disqualification

of counsel

Affirmed in

part; reversed

in part;

remanded

Class certification after

remand

Yes No No Yes No No No

Eventual outcome of caseCourtapproved class

settlementb

Pendingb $ to plaintiffs;

case dismissal

Courtapproved class

settlement

Case dismissal Case dismissal Case dismissal

stipulated by

parties

a The second remand after appeal is shown in Table .

b On remand after the study’s cutoff date of June , .
Appendix C 

Table : Issues and Dispositions on Appeal in E.D. Pa. Class Actions Terminated

Between July , , and June ,  (n= appeals in  cases)

No. of Appeals Appellant Issue on Appeal Disposition of Appeal

 Defendant Certification of class  affirmed;  not reviewable

 Defendant Default judgment for plaintiff  affirmed

 Defendant Denial in part of summary judgment  vacated, remanded for dismissal

 Defendant Denial of arbitration  affirmed

 Defendant Bench trial judgment for plaintiff  vacated, remanded for dismissal

 Defendant Motion for stay  affirmed

 Defendant Preliminary injunction  affirmed

 Defendant Summary judgment for plaintiff  affirmed

 Defendant Denial of partial summary judgment  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of case  affirmed;  appeals dismissed

 Plaintiff Summary judgment for defendant  affirmed;  appeals dismissed

 Plaintiff Partial summary judgment for defendant  affirmed;  reversed and remanded;  vacated, remanded for

dismissal

 Plaintiff Order deeming dismissal motion to be summary judgment motion; issue not available appeal dismissed as interlocutory;  affirmed

 Plaintiff Taxation of defendant’s costs  affirmed

 Plaintiff Directed verdict for defendant  reversed in part, affirmed in

part

 Plaintiff Denial of class certification  reversed and remanded

 Plaintiff Denial of sanctions  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of certain claims  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Verdict for defendant  appeal dismissed

 Objecting class

members

Certification of classa  vacated and remanded

 Objecting class

members

Award of fees to plaintiff counsela  vacated and remanded

 Objecting class

members

Settlement approvala  vacated and remanded

 Party opposing

class

Issue not available  withdrawn

 Proposed

intervenors

Denial of intervention  affirmed

Note: Some appeals had more than one issue and some cases had more than one appeal.

aGeneral Motors Pick-Up Truck Litigation ( F.d  (d Cir.), cert. denied,  S. Ct.  ()).
 Class Actions

Table : Issues and Dispositions on Appeal in S.D. Fla. Class Actions Terminated

Between July , , and June ,  (n= appeals in  cases)

No. of Appeals Appellant Issue on Appeal Disposition of Appeal

 Defendant Dismissal of case  appeal dismissed

 Defendant Award of fees to plaintiff counsel  affirmed

 Defendant Judgment for plaintiff after trial  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of case  affirmed;  affirmed in part,

reversed in part;  appeal dismissed;  reversed in part, vacated in part

 Plaintiff Summary judgment for defendant  affirmed in part, reversed in

part;  reversed in part, vacated

in part

 Plaintiff Award of fees to plaintiff counsel  affirmed

 Non-named

class member

Award of fees to plaintiff counsel  appeal dismissed

Table : Issues and Dispositions on Appeal in N.D. Ill. Class Actions Terminated

Between July , , and June ,  (n= appeals in  cases)

No. of Appeals Appellant Issue on Appeal Disposition of Appeal

 Defendant Summary judgment for plaintiff  affirmed;  appeal dismissed;

 reversed

 Defendant Award of fees to plaintiff counsel  remanded for reconsideration;

 pending

 Defendant Judgment for plaintiff  affirmed in part, vacated in

part, and remanded;  appeal

dismissed

 Defendant Petition for writ of mandamus to recuse trial

judge

 petition denied

 Defendant Denial of motion to dissolve preliminary

injunction

 appeal dismissed

 Defendant Judgment for plaintiff  affirmed

 Defendant Extension of time for filing plaintiff notice of

appeal

 remanded for settlement

 Plaintiff Dismissal of case  affirmed;  appeals dismissed;

 reversed and remanded;

 remanded for settlement;

 pending

(cont.)
Appendix C 

Table : Issues and Dispositions on Appeal in N.D. Ill. Class Actions Terminated

Between July , , and June ,  (n= appeals in  cases) (continued)

No. of Appeals Appellant Issue on Appeal Disposition of Appeal

 Plaintiff Summary judgment for defendant  affirmed;  appeal dismissed;

 reversed and remanded

 Plaintiff Dismissal of certain claims  affirmed;  appeals dismissed; 

pending

 Plaintiff Verdict for defendant  affirmed

 Plaintiff Partial summary judgment for defendant  appeal dismissed;

 pending

 Plaintiff Denial of class certification  affirmed

 Plaintiff Denial of plaintiff attorneys’ fees  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of third-party complaint  affirmed

 Plaintiff Sanctions against plaintiff counsel  affirmed

 Plaintiff Reduction of plaintiff fee request  vacated and remanded

 Plaintiff Transfer of case  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff and

proposed

intervenor

Denial of injunction  affirmed

 Plaintiff and

proposed

intervenor

Denial of class certification  affirmed

 Plaintiff and

proposed

intervenor

Denial of intervention  affirmed

 Plaintiff and

proposed

intervenor

Summary judgment for defendant  affirmed

 Third-party

defendant

Settlement approval  appeals dismissed

 Third-party

defendant

Denial of motion for reconsideration  appeal dismissed

 Third-party

defendant

Dismissal of third-party defendant’s countercomplaint appeal dismissed

 Proposed

intervenor–

defendant

Denial of intervention  affirmed

Note: Some appeals had more than one issue and some cases had more than one appeal.
 Class Actions

Table : Issues and Dispositions on Appeal in N.D. Cal. Class Actions Terminated

Between July , , and June ,  (n= appeals in  cases)

No. of Appeals Appellant Issue on Appeal Disposition of Appeal

 Defendant Partial summary judgment for plaintiff  affirmed;  appeal dismissed

 Defendant Preliminary injunction  appeal dismissed

 Defendant Denial of summary judgment  affirmed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of case  affirmed;  appeals dismissed;

 pending

 Plaintiff Summary judgment for defendant  affirmed;  affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded;

 reversed in part, affirmed in

part

 Plaintiff Partial summary judgment for defendant  reversed;  reversed and remanded

 Plaintiff Judgment for defendant  affirmed;  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of motion for reconsideration  affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded;  appeal

dismissed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of certain claims  affirmed;  affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded

 Plaintiff Denial of class certification  appeal dismissed;  reversed

 Plaintiff Denial of injunction  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of in forma pauperis application  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of motion for modification of order  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of motion to disqualify judge  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of motion to vacate dismissal  appeal dismissed

 Plaintiff Denial of plaintiff attorneys’ fees  reversed and remanded

 Plaintiff Bench trial judgment for defendant  affirmed

 Plaintiff Summary judgment for opposing class

members

 affirmed

 Plaintiff Dismissal of certain class representatives  remanded

 Plaintiff Disqualification of plaintiff counsel  affirmed

 Objecting class

member

Award of fees to plaintiff counsel  pending

 Third-party

defendant

Summary judgment for plaintiff  affirmed

Note: Some appeals had more than one issue and some cases had more than one appeal.
Appendix C 

Table : Appeals Involving Certification Issues

E.D. Pa.

Case No. -

E.D. Pa.

Case No.

-

E.D. Pa.

Case No.

-

N.D. Ill.

Case No.

-

N.D. Ill.

Case No.

-

N.D. Cal.

Case No.

-

N.D. Cal.

Case No.

-

Issues on

appeal

Appeal #:

Certification

of class;

preliminary

injunction

Appeal #:

Certification

of class;

default

judgment for

plaintiffs

Denial of

motion to

certify class;

partial

summary

judgment for

defendants;

stipulated

order of

judgment

against all

named

plaintiffs on

individual

claims

Certification

of class;

class settlement;

attorneys’ fee

award

Denial of

motion to

certify class;

summary

judgment for

defendants;

denial of

intervention;

denial of

preliminary

injunction

Denial of

motion to

certify class;

summary

judgment for

defendants

Denial of

motion to

certify class;

partial

summary

judgment for

defendants

Denial of

motion to

certify class;

denial of

injunction

§(b)

certification

for appeal

No No No; prior

motion for

(b)

certification

was denied

No No; prior

motion for

(b)

certification

was denied

No No

Appeal filed

by

Defendant Defendant Plaintiffs Objecting

class members

Plaintiffs and

proposed

intervenors

Plaintiff Plaintiffs Plaintiffs

Outcome of

appeal

Injunction

vacated;

certification

decision not

reviewable

Affirmed Reversed;

remanded

Vacated;

remanded

Affirmed in

part

(including

affirmative of

denial of

class certification);

reversed in

part; remanded

Affirmed Reversed;

remandeda Appealdismissed

Eventual

outcome of

case

See Appeal

# (next

column)

Courtapproved

class settlementb

Class certified on

remand;

case pendingb

Pendingb Pendingb No class

certified;

case dismissed

No class

certified;

case dismissed

No class

certified;

case dismissed

aCourt of appeals held certification is reviewable in combination with partial summary judgment for defendant, settlement of rest of individual claims, and entry of judgment against all named plaintiffs on their individual claims. Appellate court did not review the trial court’s partial summary judgment decision, but reversed and remanded it because of the reversal of denial of class certification.

bOn remand after the study’s cutoff date of June , .
 Class Actions

Table : Firms Most Frequently Serving as Lead or Co-Lead Counsel (Number of

Class Action Cases)

Firm Firm’s Offices

E.D. Pa.

Cases

S.D. Fla.

Cases

N.D. Ill.

Cases

N.D. Cal.

Cases

Total No.

of Cases

Chimicles Burt et al. (and

Greenfield & Chimicles)

Los Angeles, Cal.

West Palm Beach, Fla.

Haverford, Pa.

 a   a

Milberg Weiss San Diego, Cal.

New York, N.Y.

    

Berger & Montague San Francisco, Cal.

Philadelphia, Pa.

    

Lieff Cabraser San Francisco, Cal.  

Community Legal Services Philadelphia, Pa. 

Barrack Rodos San Diego, Cal.

Philadelphia, Pa.

  

Stephen F. Gold Philadelphia, Pa. 

Beeler Schad Chicago, Ill. 

Cohen, Milstein Washington, D.C.  

Edelman & Combs Chicago, Ill. 

Kohn (Nast) Savett Philadelphia, Pa. 

Lawrence Walner & Assoc. Chicago, Ill. 

Note: Some firm names changed after they were entered on court records. Each consolidation of cases is counted as

one class action case.

aFirm was liaison counsel in two additional cases.


Appendix D

Methods

Nature of the Database. The data in this field study report represent a full census of the population of class action cases that were terminated in E.D. Pa., S.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., and N.D. Cal.

between July , , and June , . Unlike the time study data presented to the committee,358 the field study is not a random sample. It documents all identifiable class action activity

in the four districts in cases terminated during the study period and is a sample only in the sense

of being limited to that time period.

Selection of Courts. The four courts were selected for the field study on the basis of the level

of class action activity shown in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts data and on the

basis of geography. We undertook to study one court in the eastern, western, midwestern, and

southern regions of the country and to study courts that were among the ten courts with the

most class action cases filed.359 We chose the regional approach so that we could examine class

actions in different courts, in different circuits, and in different local legal cultures. Our purpose

was to study a variety of approaches used by the bench and bar in litigating and adjudicating

class actions.

For each case in the study, an attorney–researcher examined pleadings, documents, briefs,

orders, affidavits, declarations, and, when available, transcripts. In particular, we looked at rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, all briefs relating to class certification, filings relating to notice and approval of settlement, applications for attorneys’ fees, and

any orders relating to these matters. For certified class actions, we gathered a complete set of the

notices the court approved. These documents are available to researchers who wish to study the

notice process.

Identification and Definition of Class Actions. With each court’s assistance we conducted

various searches for class actions. Our aim was to find all cases with class action allegations in

the complaint or with indications of class action activity in the text of docket entries or published opinions. Because of limited resources available for the study we restricted the time period covered and selected all such cases that had been terminated360 between July , , and

. See Willging et al., supra note .

. We selected the courts before we discovered a substantial undercount of class action activity in the Administrative Office data, as explained below, in this section.

. We included in the “terminated” category cases that were closed but had issues pending appeal at the time

of our field visit. Our subsequent follow-up on the outcome on appeal determined that, in a few cases, the district

court case has been reopened after remand from the court of appeals. Nevertheless, these reopened cases are in-
 Class Actions

June , .

361 Cases that were consolidated or otherwise grouped were counted as a single

case. This approach avoids counting cases more than once when the post-consolidation litigation and rulings took place only once. However, for one purpose in the report, to capture the

total number of class action filings, we include the number of cases included in the consolidations (see supra § (b)).

Our initial search focused on databases provided on tape by the Administrative Office of the

U.S. Courts for the five years prior to August . An initial visit to two courts focused on

cases identified in the Administrative Office data. In both jurisdictions, a subsequent LEXIS

search of published opinions uncovered a large number of class action opinions in cases that

were not identified as class actions in the Administrative Office database.

Discovering these cases led us to ask both courts to conduct three searches of their electronic

records: one for the class action “flag” that is entered when a case is originally docketed; another for specific “event codes,” such as the filing of a motion to certify a class, that identify

class action activity; and a final search of the court’s electronic docketing system, looking for the

word “class.”362 These searches uncovered the majority of the cases in this study.363 In Table

 cases in the column “class action allegation” were the only cases identified in the Administrative Office data as class actions. The class action status of all other cases that were eventually

included in our study had been recorded in the Administrative Office database as “missing.” As

Table  shows, Administrative Office statistics identified from one-fifth to one-half of the class

actions in the four courts.

Table : Class Action Status in Administrative Office Data for All Class Actions

Terminated Between July , , and June , 

Class Action Status

E.D. Pa.

(n = )

S.D. Fla.

(n = )

N.D. Ill.

(n = )

N.D. Cal.

(n = )

Class Action

Allegation

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

Missing Data %

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

%

( cases)

cluded in the study because they were closed at the time of our field visit.

. We chose this period because the advisory committee expressed an interest in recent class action activity,

and July , , to June , , was the most recent period for which data were available. Two years of data represents the longest continuous period that could be studied with the resources available.

. After identifying a case that appeared to be a class action, an attorney on the research team examined the

docket sheet and file. If a case did not include a class action allegation, class certification activity, or class settlement

activity, we excluded it from the study.

. There may be class action cases that would escape identification by these searches, but they would be cases

in which there was no detectable docket entry identifying class action activity and in which the initial complaint and

cover sheet did not identify the case as a class action. Presumably, such cases, if they exist, would be rare, would have

no or negligible class action activity, and would add little to the reader’s understanding of class action litigation.
Appendix D 

Those data lead to the conclusion that information on class actions reported in the Administrative Office database substantially undercounted class action activity during the study period. Data in our time study report364 indicated that a substantial, but smaller, undercount occurred during the – time study period. Data from the Federal Judicial Center time

study sample and from the Federal Judicial Center study of four courts support the conclusion

that in the recent past there were no reliable national data on the number of class action filings

and terminations in the federal courts.365

The time study. In the Federal Judicial Center’s district court time study, district and magistrate judges maintained records of the time they spent on a random sample of , civil cases

filed in  U.S. district courts between November  and January . Fifty-one of those

cases (.%, an incidence of  class actions for every , cases filed) contained class action

allegations. A case was defined as a class action either by reference to the case statistics maintained by the Administrative Office (, or %) or, where there was no class action indicator in

the Administrative Office statistics, to class action activity in a judge’s time records (, or

%).366 For all  time study cases, we reviewed docket sheets and case file documents of the

type we reviewed in the four study districts, as described above.

Though informative, the time study class action data need to be used with caution. The time

study data should be read as descriptive of a small national random sample of class actions. In

total, the data are certainly more than anecdotal evidence; however, in many instances, information on important class action activity was available only for a small number of cases per district and these instances should be viewed as anecdotal examples. The time study data should

not be thought of as representing the universe of class action activity nation-wide.367

Termination cohort limits. The cases studied comprise what is often called a termination

cohort, consisting of all cases that terminated within a fixed time. Fluctuations in case filing

rates affect the composition of a termination cohort. For example, if the rate of filing of securities class actions was to have increased abruptly in , terminated securities class actions in

our cohort might include more cases of shorter duration (e.g., perhaps more settlements than

. See Willging et al., supra note , at , –. Subsequent to the preliminary time study report, our further

analysis of the time study data revealed more evidence of a serious undercount. In February  we examined the

published Administrative Office statistics for the period of the time study. Between January , , and December

, , the core period of the time study, Administrative Office data indicate that there were , cases filed in

all of the federal district courts and that , of these, or .%, were recorded as being class actions. That incidence

rate— class actions per , cases—is far lower than the rate of  per , cases found in the time study. See

Willging et al., supra note , at  n..

. In January  the Administrative Office of the United States Courts began reminding U.S. district courts,

on a monthly basis, of the correct procedures for reporting filing and termination data related to class action cases.

To the extent that these efforts have resulted in a change in reporting from the courts, beginning in  the reported

statistics will more accurately reflect class actions in the courts. For further discussion and documentation of the lack

of reliable national data on class action activity, see Willging et al., supra note , at –.

. One case identified in the Administrative Office data as a class action had no indication on the docket sheet

or in the documents in the file that any class action allegations were involved. That case was eliminated from the sample discussed in Willging et al., supra note .

. The time study data as a whole, of course, are fully suitable to their intended purpose of assigning case

weights to various types of cases that were observed with much greater frequency than class actions. There is no

separate case weight for class actions.
 Class Actions

trials) than if the filing pattern had been steady. We are unable to examine the filing patterns of

class actions because, as discussed above, there are no reliable national data on class action

filings. But we do know that the filing pattern for all securities cases (class actions and nonclass

actions) has been declining steadily at a rate of about % a year during the s. And, securities class actions were the largest single nature of suit in our study, comprising % to % of

the cases in the four districts. Other changes in filing patterns may have affected our cohort of

cases. If such fluctuations have occurred, they would likely create an error of a few percentage

points. Accordingly, our results—particularly on the time from filing to termination, settlement,

or ruling on motions—should be viewed as approximations with a margin of error.

Limits of the data. The field study data should be read as descriptive of class action activity

solely in the districts and the time period studied. We present these data as a systematic description of such activity, as four snapshots of courts selected because of their level of class action activity and their differences. Activity in one district cannot be generalized to other districts

nor, of course, to a universe of class action activity nation-wide.