FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Nos. 1D17-3602

 1D17-3603

 1D17-3604

 1D17-3605

 1D17-3596

 1D17-3597

 1D17-3598

(Consolidated for disposition)

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S.G., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Robert E. Long, Judge.

June 28, 2018

PER CURIAM.

S.G., who attacked and injured her father with a 6-8” shard of 

broken mirror glass and smashed a picture frame over his head all 

while threatening to kill him, challenges her conviction for 

aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, claiming the shard did 

not constitute a deadly weapon because it is not ordinarily 

considered such a weapon, was not converted into one by its use in 
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this case, and caused only a “scratch” that healed by the time of 

trial.

Though the aggravated battery statute does not define what 

constitutes a “deadly weapon,” it has been judicially defined as 

“1) any instrument which, when used in the ordinary manner 

contemplated by its design and construction will or is likely to 

cause great bodily harm, or 2) any instrument likely to cause great 

bodily harm because of the way it is used during a crime.” Smith 

v. State, 969 So. 2d 452, 454–55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting 

V.M.N. v. State, 909 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). While a 

piece of broken glass, whether a mirror, a window, or a beer bottle, 

may not ordinarily be a deadly weapon by itself, the context in 

which the item is used can transform it into one. Cloninger v. State, 

846 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (affirming determination that 

unbroken beer bottle could be deadly weapon); Brown v. State, 787 

So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (stating that evidence supported the 

finding that a glass bottle could be used as a deadly weapon); see 

also State v. Shilling, 889 P.2d 948, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)

(Beer “glass is not a per se deadly weapon; thus, the inherent 

capacity and ‘the circumstances in which it is used’ determine 

whether the weapon is deadly.”); Harris v. State, 705 So. 2d 542, 

548 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (“Although a glass bottle is not 

specifically included in the list of weapons defined as ‘deadly 

weapons,’ a bottle may be ‘adapted for the purposes of inflicting 

death or serious physical injury,’ and may therefore be a ‘deadly 

weapon.’”); Pauls v. State, 476 A.2d 157, 160 (Del. 1984) (“The end 

of a shattered glass bottle, with its ragged, jagged, sharp cutting 

edges, is clearly capable of causing death. It is well known to be as 

deadly as those objects listed in the statute as deadly weapons.”).

There was evidence from which the factfinder could determine 

that S.G. intended to use the shard to cause severe harm or death 

to her father, who was fearful and distraught; S.G. had already cut 

herself in multiple locations and was “angry, cussing, using all 

kind of crazy language” as she slashed the shard toward him. That

his injuries healed and left no permanent damage doesn’t 

undermine the fact that the shard could have caused far worse 

harm, such as loss of an eye. State v. Pomeroy, 573 P.2d 805, 808 

(Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (“One of the victim's eyes had to be removed 

as a result of the blow [from the broken beer bottle].”).
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Because the shard from the broken mirror was likely to cause 

great bodily harm as used by S.G. against her father, the trial court 

correctly determined it was a “deadly weapon” and denied S.G.’s

motion for judgment of acquittal. 

AFFIRMED.

MAKAR, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and John W. Hedrick, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.