In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2923 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

DEVONTAY SAWYER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cr-00161-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JUNE 12, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2019 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit 

Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Devontay Sawyer entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g), preserving for this direct appeal his challenge to the 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Sawyer contests 

the search of his backpack, which he left inside a home that 

he had entered unlawfully. The police found guns inside the 

backpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress, 
2 No. 18-2156 

concluding that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house and therefore none in the 

unattended backpack. We agree with the district court and affirm the judgment. 

I. Background

On July 26, 2016, Chicago police officers responded to a 

report of a residential burglary in progress. After they approached the home and looked for signs of a forced entry, 

someone named M.G. arrived, and told the officers that he 

and his wife owned the home. He explained that it was a 

rental property with no current tenants and that no one 

should be inside. M.G. then saw that one of the home’s front 

windows was cracked open and, peering inside, he saw a figure in the house. He yelled through the window, demanding 

that any occupants leave the house. The officers banged on 

the front door and ordered all the occupants to come outside. 

Ultimately, Sawyer and three others came out and stood with 

the officers on the porch. 

M.G. then asked the officers to “go inside and check my 

house.” In the basement, officers found a backpack; they 

opened it immediately and discovered four guns inside. The 

searching officers used the radio to inform the officers outside, who placed Sawyer and the three others in custody. The 

officers who had searched the backpack brought it outside. 

Officer Jorie Wood, who had remained outside, then opened 

the backpack and found a cell phone. She gave Miranda warnings to the arrestees and asked them who owned the phone. 

Sawyer responded that it was his phone and his bag. Wood 

later asked Sawyer again if it was his bag, and that time, he 

said no. 
No. 17-3221 3

After he was indicted, Sawyer moved to suppress the contents of the backpack and his statements about it. He argued 

that the officers lacked probable cause or consent to search it. 

The government responded that Sawyer had no “standing” to 

contest the search because he failed to provide evidence that 

he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack, 

and that even if he had, Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. The government also argued that the officers obtained 

consent from the owner to search the home. The district court 

denied Sawyer’s motion to suppress, concluding that Sawyer 

lacked “standing” to challenge the search because he was unlawfully present in the house and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy there. The court further determined that 

the officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of 

their ongoing investigation of a burglary. 

Sawyer then conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly 

possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He expressly retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion 

to suppress. 

II. Discussion 

This court reviews the denial of the motion to suppress 

de novo. See United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th 

Cir. 2018). On appeal, Sawyer maintains that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the backpack because it was 

undisputed that he owned it and that he told the officers that 

it was his. He also contends that the district court characterized his privacy interest too broadly by focusing on his expectation of privacy in the home instead of in the closed backpack 

itself. 
4 No. 18-2156 

Analysis of a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy 

requires us to determine first whether the defendant’s rights 

were personally violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 

(1978). In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that this determination is not a separate matter of “standing,” “distinct from the 

merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 138–

39. Instead, it should be addressed through the substantive 

Fourth Amendment question of whether the person challenging the search “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 

premises he was using” and thus could assert Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 143; United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 

750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine whether someone has a 

legitimate expectation of privacy, courts must consider (1) 

whether that person, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual, 

subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether his expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as 

reasonable. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at 756–57. Sawyer bears the 

burden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the backpack. See id. at 758. 

Although the district court mischaracterized Sawyer’s argument as an issue of “standing,” it properly concluded, 

nonetheless, that Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he 

unlawfully entered the premises. The Fourth Amendment requires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances,” 

see United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001), which in 

this case includes the presence of the unattended backpack in 

a home Sawyer was trespassing. A privacy interest is not reasonable when one’s presence in a place is “wrongful.” Rakas, 

439 U.S. at 143, n.12. (citation omitted). Here, the officers responded to a report of a residential break-in and learned from 

M.G. that the home should be empty and unoccupied. Sawyer 
No. 17-3221 5

and three others then emerged from the home. M.G. requested a search of the home during which the officers discovered and searched the backpack. Sawyer does not assert 

that his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was lawful 

or offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home. Thus, 

like “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during 

the off season,” Sawyer lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy to contest the search within the home because any expectation he had was not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. (citation omitted); United States 

v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011). 

This determination aligns with the decisions of other circuits that have concluded that a trespasser’s wrongful presence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge. See United 

States v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant who 

overstayed his visit became a trespasser with no “legally sufficient interest in the apartment to mount a Fourth Amendment challenge”); United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747 

(9th Cir. 2010) (trespassers cannot claim the protections of the 

Fourth Amendment); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 

303 (6th Cir. 2005) (trespasser who had tenuous connection 

with otherwise empty house had no legitimate expectation of 

privacy to contest its search). Because Sawyer has not shown 

a legitimate privacy interest in the home where the backpack 

was found, he also cannot contest the search of his effects that 

he left within the home. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d 

792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 

192, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (defendant wrongfully occupying 

apartment lacked legitimate expectation of privacy to contest 

search of box containing drugs in apartment); United States v. 

Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant who 
6 No. 18-2156 

placed bag in vacant, otherwise empty home had no legitimate reasonable expectation that his effects would remain undisturbed). 

Moreover, the officers’ search of the backpack did not violate the Fourth Amendment because M.G. consented to the 

search of his home, which included the backpack. An otherwise unreasonable search is permissible when a third party 

with common control over the searched premises consents, or 

when someone with apparent authority to consent does so. 

United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). A 

general consent to search the premises can include consent to 

search containers within it if those containers would reasonably hold the expressed object of the search. Fla. v. Jimeno, 500 

U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, M.G. told the officers that he coowned the house, that it was a rental property with no current 

tenants, and that no one—and therefore, no personal property—should be inside. When he saw a figure inside the 

house, he commanded that any occupants come outside and 

asked the officers to “go inside and check my house.” He did 

not limit the scope of the search. It was objectively reasonable, 

then, for the officers to conclude that M.G.’s general consent 

to search the house included consent to search a container, 

such as the backpack, that could contain evidence relating to 

the break-in. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. 

Because Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy 

in the backpack, we affirm the district court’s judgment.