1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti me th e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th e C o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200 U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s ARLIN GT ON CE NTRA LSC HOOLDISTRIC T BOAR D O FED UC AT IO N v . M U RPHY ET VIR

. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECON D CIRCUIT No. 05–1 8. Ar g u ed Apr il 19, 2006—D e c i d e d Ju n e 26, 2006 After respondents prevailedin thei r Individuals with Disab ilit ies Edu

c ationAc t (IDEA) ac tionto r e qu ir e petition ersch o ol boar d to payfor t h eir s o n’s priv a t e s chool t u it ion, t h ey s o ughtfees for s e rvices ren dered b ya neduca t i ona lcons ult a n tduring t h e procee dings , relyin g onanID EA pr ov isionth at per m its a c o u r tto “aw ar d r e ason ab le at

torneys’ fees as p a rt of the costs” to prevailing parents, 20 U. S. C

. §141 5(i)(3)(B). Th e D i str i c t Cou r tg r an ted th eirmotion inpar t

. Af

firming, t h e S e cond Circ uitnot e d t h a t , un der Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gib b o ns, Inc., 482 U. S

. 437, an d West Virgi n ia Uni v . Hospitals , Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 8 3 , acost- or fee-sh i fting provisio n will not be r e ad to per m i tr e c o v e r yof ex per tfees w i t h ou t ex plic it s tatu tor yau th or ity , bu t con c l u d ed th at a c o ng r e ssion al Con f er en ce Commit t ee Repor tr e latin gto §1415(i)( 3 )(B) an d a footn o te in Caseyreferencing t h a tReports h owed t h a tt h e IDEA a u t h orized s uch reimb urs ement

. Held: Section §1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize prevail i ng parents to

recove r expe rt fees. Pp. 3–12.

(a) The resolution of this questionis g u ided byth e fac tth at Con

g r ess en ac ted th e ID EA pu r s u a n tto th e Spen din gClau se. Wh il e Congres s ha s b r oa d power to s e t t h e t e rms on which itdis b urs es fed

er al mon e yto th e Sta t es, a n yc o n d ition s it at tac h e s to a St ate’s ac cept a nce of s uch funds mus tb e s e tout “ una mb iguous ly.” Pennhurst State School a nd Ho spital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 1 7

. Fu n d r e c i pien ts ar e b o u n don lybyth ose c o n d itio n s th at th eya c c e pt “v olu n tar ilyan d kn ow in g l y , ” ibid., a n d S t at es cannotknowin gl y a cceptcon dit i ons of which t h eya r e “ una wa re” or whicht h ey a r e “ unab l e t o asc e r tain , ” ibi d

. Thus , t h e q u es t i on here is whet h er t h e IDEA fur

n i sh es c l earnotic e r e g a r d ingex per tfees. Pp. 3–4.2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Sy llabu s (b) Th e Cou r tbeg i n s w i tht h e ID EA’s text, forif its “lan g u ag e i s pla i n,” t h e court s ’ funct ion “ ‘ “ i s t o enforce ita ccording t o it s t e rms . ” ’ ” Hartford Und erw rite rs I ns. Co. v. Unio n Planters Bank, N. A ., 530 U. S. 1, 6. Wh ile §141 5(i)(3 )(B) pr ov ides foranaw ar d of “r eason abl e attorneys’ fees,” it does not e v en hi nt that acceptance of IDEA funds makes a S tate r e spon sible forr e imbu r s in g pr ev ailin gparen t s forth e ser v ic es of exper t s. “Cos ts ” is a ter m of ar t th at doe s n o t g e n e r a lly include expert fees. The use of “costs” rather than “expenses” str o n g lysu ggests th a t§14 1 5 (i)(3)(B) w a s n o t mean t to be anopen ended provision making States l i ab le for all expenses. Moreove r , §141 5(i)(3)(B) say s n o t th a t a c o u r tmayaw ar d “c osts” b u t th at it may award attorney’s fees “as p a rt of the costs.” This lan g uage simply adds reasonable attorney’s fees to the list of recove rable costs se t out in28 U. S. C. §1920, th e g e n e r a l statu te c o v e r i n gtax ationof c o sts, which is s t rict ly limit ed b y§1 8 2 1

. Thus , §1 4 1 5 (i)(3 )(B)’s t e xtdoes not au th or ize anaw ar d of additi on al ex per tfees, an d it c e r tain l yfails t o pres entt h e clea r not i ce req u ired b yt h e S p ending Claus e . Ot her IDEA provisio ns point stro n g ly in t h e s a me direct ion. Of lit t l e s i g nifica nce hereis a provis ion in the Han d icapped Ch ildren’s Protec

t i on Actof 198 6 req u iring the Genera l Accou n t i ng Offi ce t o collec t data onaw ar ds to pr ev aili n gpar t ies inID EA c a ses, b u t makin gn o ment ion of cons ult a n t s or expert s or t h eir fees

. And t h e fa ctt h a t t h e pr ov isiondir e c t ed th e GA O to c o mpile d ata onth e h o u r s spen t by c o n s u l tan ts inID EA c a ses d oes n o t meanth at Con g r e ss in ten d ed for Sta t es to com p ensate preva iling pa rties f o r fees billed by these con

su ltan t s . Pp. 4–8.

(c) Crawfo rd Fitting Co. and Caseys t rongly reinfo rce t h e con c lu

sion thatthe IDEA doe s not una mbiguously auth orize prevailing pa rent s t o recover expe rtfe es . Crawford Fitting Co. ’s r e asoning sup

por t s th e c o n c l u s ionth at th e ter m “c os ts” in§14 15(i )(3)(B), like “c osts ” inFeder a l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc edu r e54(d), th e pr ov i s ionat is su e there, is defined by the catego ries of expens es enumera t e d in 28 U. S. C. §1920

. Th is c o n c l u s ionis bu ttr es s e d byth e pr inc i ple, r e c o g nized in Crawford Fitti ng C o ., that no sta t u te will be construed to au

thorize taxing witness fees a s costs unless the statute “re fer[s] explic

itly to witness fees.” 482 U. S., at 445. The conclu sion t h at the IDEA does not authorize expert f e e awar ds is confirmed eve nmore dra

matic a llyby Casey , wh er e th e Cou r th e l dth at 42 U. S. C. §1988, a fee-shifting provision with wording vi rtually identical to that of 20 U. S. C. §1415 (i)(3)(B), did n o t empow e ra distr i c tc o u r tto aw ar d ex

pert fees to a prevailing party. 482 U. S., at 10 2. The S e cond Circuit misunderstoo d the me aning of the Caseyfootnote on w h ich it relied. That footnote did not state that the Conference Committee Report se t ou t th e c o rr ect in ter p r e tatio nof §1415(i)( 3 )(B) orpr ov i d ed th e c l ear3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s not i ce req u ire dunder t h e S p ending Cla u s e . It s t hrus t wa s simply th at “a ttor n e y s ’ fees,” stan di n galon e, is g e n e r a llyn o t u n der s tood a s encompassing expert fees. P p . 8–11.

(d) Respondents’ additional ar guments are unpersua s ive. The I D E A’ s g o a l s o f “ e n s u r [ i n g] that all chi l d ren with dis abilities ha ve a v a i l a b l e t o t h e m a fr ee appr opriate pu bl ic edu c ation ,” §1400(d)(1)(A) , and of safeguarding pa re nt s ’ rightt o c h a llenge a d

vers e s chool decis i ons a r e too genera l t o provide muchs u pportfor their reading of the IDEA. And the IDEA ’s legisla t ive history is in

s u fficienthelp, whe re eve r yt hing ot he r t h a nt h a this t ory overw h elm

in g l ysu gg ests th at ex per tfees mayn o t be r e c o v e r e d. Pp. 11–1 2. 402 F. 3d 33 2, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

ALITO , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d S CALI A , K ENNEDY , an d T HOMAS , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., filed an opinion con cur ring inpa rta n d con c u rrin g in t h e j u dgme nt

. S OUTER , J., filed a di ssen t ing opinion. B REYE R , J., filed a d i ssent ing opinion, i n whichS TEVEN S an d S OUTER , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rma l revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 8
ARLIN GT ON CE NTRA LSC HOOLDISTRIC T BOAR D O FED UC AT IO N , P E TIT I O N E R v. PEAR L MURPHY ET V I R ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e 26, 2006 ] J USTICE ALI T O delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I DEA or Act) pro v ides that a court “m ay awa r d reasonabl e at

torneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents who prevail in an action brought under the Act. 111 Stat. 9 2 , 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)( B). We granted certi orari to de cide wheth e r this fee-shif ting provision authoriz e s prevailin g parents to recover fees for services re ndered by experts in IDEA actions. We hold that it does not. I Respondents Pearl and Theodore Murphy filed an action under the IDEA on behalf of their son, Jos e ph Murphy, seeking to require petitioner Arlington C e ntral Sch ool DistrictBo ard of Edu c ation to pay for their son’s privat e school tuiti o n for specified school years. Respondents prevailed in the District Court, 86 F. Supp. 2d 354 (SDNY 2000), and the Court of Appeals for the Se cond Circui t affirmed, 297 F. 3d 195 (2002). As prevailing parents, respondents then sought $29,350 in fees forthe servi c es of an educational consultant,2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt Marilyn Arons, who a ssisted respondents throughout the IDEA proc eedings. The DistrictCourt gra n ted respon

dents’ requ est in part. It heldthat only the value of Arons’ time spent between the hearing request and the ruling in respondents’ favor co uld properl ybe considered charges incurred inan “ac t ion or proceed ing brought ” under the Act, see 20 U. S. C. §14 15(i)(3)(B). 2003 WL 2 1694398, *9 (SDNY, July 22, 2003). This reduced the maximum recov

ery to $8,650. The Di strict Court also h e ld that Arons, a nonlawyer, could be compensa ted only for time spent on expert cons ulting serv ices, not for time spent on legal representation, id., at *4, but it concluded that all the relevant time could b e chara cteri zed as falling within t h e compensable category, and thus allowed compensation for the full $8,6 50, id., at *10. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuitaffirmed. 402 F. 3d 3 32 (2005). Ackno w ledging that other Circuits had taken the opposite view, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “Congress intended to and did authorize the reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA ac

tions.” Id ., at 336. The court began by discussing two decisions of this Court holding that expert fees could not be recovered as taxed costs under particular cost- or feeshifting provisions. See Cra wfo rd Fi ttin g

C o . v. J. T. Gib

bon s, In c., 4 82 U. S. 43 7 (1 98 7) (i n t e r pre tin g Fed. Rule Civ. Pr oc . 5 4 ( d) a n d28 U. S

. C

. §1 920) ; West Virg inia Univ. H

o spit als, Inc. v. Cas e y, 499 U. S. 8 3 (1 99 1) (in t erpre tin g 42 U. S. C. § 1 9 88 (1 98 8 e d .)). Acco rdin g tothes e deci sio n s, the co urt no te d, a cos t - o rfee-s h i f tin g pro vis ion wi ll no t be re a d t opermita pr evailing party t or e cov e r expertfees w i th out

“ ‘exp l i c i t st atu t ory au th ority’ in di cati ng th at Congr e s s int e nd ed f o r that sortof f ee-shifti ng .” 402 F. 3d, at 336. Ultimately, though, th e court was persuaded by a state

ment in the Conference Committee Report relating to 20 U. S. C. §1 415(i)(3)(B) and by afootnote in Caseyth at made reference to that Report. 402 F. 3d, at 336–3373 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt (citing H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986)). Based on these authorities, the c o urt conclu ded that it was required to interpret the IDEA to authorize the award of the costs that prevailing parents incur in h i ring experts. 402 F. 3 d , at 336. We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. _ ___ (2006), to resolve the conflict among the Circuit s w i th respect to whether Congress authorized the compensation of expert fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions. Compar e Goldring v. Dis t ric tof Columbia , 416 F. 3d 7 0 , 73–77 (CADC 200 5); Neosho R-V School Dist

. v. Cla rk ex rel. Clar k , 315 F. 3d 1022, 1031–1033 (CA8 2003); T. D. v. La Gr a n geSc hool Dist. No. 1 0 2 , 349 F. 3d 469, 480–482 (CA7 2003), wi th 402 F. 3d 332 (CA2 2005). We now reverse. II Our resolution of the questionpresented in t h is case is guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA purs u ant to the Spending Clause. U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1; see Schaffer v. We ast , 546 U. S. ____ (20 0 5 ). Like its statutory predecessor, the ID EA provides federal funds to assist state and local agencies in educating children wi th disabilities “and conditions such funding u p on a State’s compliance with extens ive goals and procedure s .” Bo a rd of Ed. of Hendric kH udson Ce ntral Sc hool Dist ., Westc h ester Ct

y. v. Ro wley, 4 5 8 U. S. 17 6, 1 79 (1 982 ). Congress has broad power to set t h e terms on which i t disburses federal mon e y to the States, see, e.g., South Dakota v. Do le, 48 3 U. S. 20 3, 206–2 07 (1 987 ), b u t w h e n Congress attaches conditions to a State’s a cceptance o f federal funds, the con d itions must be set out “unambigu

ously,” see Pe nnhurst StateSc hool and H o sp ita l v. Halder

man, 451 U. S. 1, 1 7(19 8 1 ) ; Rowley, s u pra , at 20 4, n . 2 6

. “[ L] e gis la tio nena c te d pu rs ua n ttothe s p e n di ng po we r i s mu ch in the na tu re of a co ntra ct,” a n d the r efore , to be bo un d b y “f ed er a l ly i m p o s e dco n diti o ns ,” re c i p i ent sof f

e der a l f u nds4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt mustacc e pt th em “voluntari ly and know ingl y . ” P e nn hurst , 451 U. S., a t 1 7

. States ca nn ot kno w i n gl y acce pt con di tio n s of whic h th ey ar e “unaware” or whic h they ar e “unable to as ce rtai n.” Ibid

. Thus, in the present case, we must vie w th e IDEA fr om th e p e r s p e ctiv e of a stateofficial who is e n g a g e d inth e pr oc es so f d e c i di ng wh eth e rth e St at e s h o u ld acce pt I D EA fu n d s an d the obli g a t i on s th a tgo wi ththo s e f u n d s . We mustask wh eth e r s u c ha st at e of fi ci a l w o u l d cle a rl y un d e rs t a n dt h a tone o f theobligatio n s of the Act is the obligation to co mpensate pr evailing par e nts f o rexpert f e e s . In other words, we must ask whether the IDE A furnishes clear notice regarding t h e liability at issue in this case. III A In considering whetherthe IDEA provides clear notice, we begin w i th the text

. We have “stated tim e and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute wha tit means a n d means i na statute what it says there.” C o n n ect icutNat

. Ba nkv. Ger main, 503 U. S. 2 49, 253 –2 54 (19 92). Whe nthe s t a t u t o ry “la n gua g eis plai n, th e sole f u n c tio nof the co urt s

— a t lea s t w h e r e t h e dis p o s i tio n req u i r e db y thete xt is n o t ab su r d—i s t o e nfo r c e it a c co rdin g to it s te rm s. ” Hartford Underwr itersIns

. Co. v. Union Plan ters Bank, N. A ., 5 30 U. S. 1, 6 (2 00 0) (qu o ti n g United Statesv. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 48 9 U

. S. 2 3 5 , 241 ( 1 98 9) , i n t u r nqu oti n g Caminettiv. United States, 24 2 U. S. 470 , 48 5 (1 9 17); in te rn al qu ota tio n ma rks om i tted). The go ve r n in g p r o vi s ion o f t h e ID E A , 2 0 U

. S

. C

. §1415(i)(3)( B), provides that “[i]n a n y action or proceeding brought un der this se ction, the court, in it s discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs ” to the pare nts of “a child with adisability” who is th e “prevailing party.” W h ile this provision provides for a n award of “reasonabl e a ttorneys’ fees,” this provision does5 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt not even h i nt that acceptance of IDEA fun d s makes a State respo n sible for r e imbursing prevailing parents for services rendered by experts. Respondents contend that we should interpret the term “costs” in a ccordance with its meaning in or dinary usage and that § 1415(i)(3)(B) should therefore be read to “au

thorize reimbursement of all costs parents incur in IDE A proceedings, including expert costs.” Brief for Respon

dents 17. This argum e nt has multiple flaws. For one thing, as the Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged , “ ‘co s ts’ is a term of art that generally does not include expert fees.” 402 F. 3d, at 336. The use of this t e rm of art, rather than a term s u ch as “e xpenses,” strongly s u ggests th a t §1415(i)(3)( B) was not meant to be an open -ended provi

sion that makes partici pating States liable f o r all expenses incurred by prevailing parents in connection with an IDEA case —for example, travel and lodging expenses or lost wages due to time take n off from work. Moreove r , contrary to respondents’ suggesti o n, §1415(i)(3)(B) does not say that a court may award “costs” to prevailing par

ents; rather, it says that a court may award reasonabl e attorney’s fees “as part of the cost s” to prevailing parents. This language simply adds reas onable attorney’s fees incurred by prevailing parents to the list of costs that prevailing parents are otherwise entitled to recover. This list of other w ise recoverable costs is obviou sly the l i st set out in 28U. S. C. §1920, the genera l statute governing the taxation of costs in federal court, and the recovery of witness fees under §1920 is strictly limited by §182 1, which auth o rizes travel reimbur sement an d a $40 p e r diem. Thus , the text of 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3) ( B) does not authorize an award of any addi tional expert fees, and i t certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the Spending Clause. Other p r ovi s ions of the IDEA poin t strongly i nthe same6 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt direction. While authorizing th e award of reasonable attorney’s f ees, the Ac t contains detailed pr ovisions that are designed to ensure that such awards are indeed rea

sonable. See §§141 5 (i)(3)(C)–(G). The ab sence of a n y comparable provisions relatingto expert fees strongly suggests that recoveryof expe rt fees i s notauthorized. Moreover, the lackof any reference to expert fees in §1415(d)(2) gives rise to a simila r inference. This provi

sion, which generally requires that parents r e ceive “a full explanation of the procedural safeguards” a v a ilable under §1415 and refers expressly to “at t orneys’ fees,” makes n o mention of expert fees. B Respondents contend that their interpretation of §1415(i)(3)( B) is supported by a provision of the Handi

capped Chil dren’s Protection Act of 1986 that required the General Ac counting O ffice (GA O ) to collect certain dat a , §4 (b )( 3) , 100St at. 7 97 (h er ein a f t er GA O s t udy pr ovis i o n) , bu t this provi s io n is of littl e si gn ifi c a n ce fo r pre s en t pu r p o s e s . Th e GAO s t udy pr ovis i o ndi r e ct edth e C o mptr o l l e r Ge ne ral , a c ti n g th ro u gh theGA O , to c o m p ile da t a o n , amo n g othe r thi n gs: “(A) th e sp ecific amount of atto rne y s’ fees , cos t s , a n d e x pe nse s awa r ded tothe p r e v a ili ng p a rty” i n ID E A ca ses fo r a p a r t i c u l a rpe rio d o f time , an d ( B) “ t h e number of hours spen t by personnel, includi n g attorneys and consultants, involved in the action or proceeding, and expenses incurred b ythe paren t s and the State edu c a tional agen cy and local education a l agency.” Id., at 797– 798. Subparag ra ph (A) wou l d provide some support for re

spondents’ position if i tdi rected t h e GAO to compile data on awards to prevailing parties of the expense of hiring consultants, but that i s not what subparagra ph (A) says

. Subparagra ph (A) ma kes no mention of consultants or7 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt experts or their fees. 1 Subparagra ph (B) simi larly does not help respondents. Subparag ra ph (B), which directs t h e GAO to study “the number of hours spe n t [in IDEA cases] b ypersonnel, including .

. . consultants,” says no thing about the award of fees to such consultants. Ju st because Congress di

rected the GA O to co mpile statistics on the hours spent by consultants in IDEA cases, it does not follow that Con

gress meant for States to compen sate prevai ling parties for the fees billed by these consult ants. Respondents maintain that “ C ongress’ direc t ion to the GAO would be inexplicable if Con g ress did n o t anticipate that the expenses for ‘ c onsult ants’ would be recoverable,” Brief for Respondents 19, but this is incorrec t

. There are many reasons why Congress might have wanted the GAO to gather data on expenses t hat were not to be taxed as costs. Knowing the co sts incurredby IDE A litigants migh t be useful i nconsideri n g future procedural amendments (which mig h t affect th ese costs) or a future amendment regarding f ee shifting. And, in fact, it is apparent that th e

——————

1 Bec au s e subp a r a g r a p h (A) refer s to bo th “co s ts” an d “exp en se s” aw ar d e d t op r ev a ili n g partiesa n d b e caus eit is g e ne rally p r es ume d th a t statut ory la ngua ge is nots u p e rfluous , it coul d b ear gued th atth isp r ovi

sion manife sts th e exp e c tatio n th at pr ev ailing p ar t ie s wo uld be aw ard e d c e r t a i n“ e xp en se s ” n o t in c lu d ed in th e li s to f “c o s ts ” s e t ou t i n 2 8U. S. C. §1920a n d that ex per tfees were i n t e n d ed t ob eamong thes e un enu m er at ed “ex p en ses.”Th i s ar gu mentfailsbec au s e, whatever expec tati on th is la ngu a ge migh tseem to evidence, th e fac tremain sth at n e ither 20U. S

. C. §1415nor a nyoth e r provisi o n of th e ID EA au thor izesth e aw ar d of a n y “ex p en se s ”o th e rth an “c o s t s . ”Rec o gn iz in g thi s , r e s p on d e nt s ar gu e n o t th a t th ey ar e ent i t l e d to r e c ov e r“ex p en se s ”th at ar e n o t “c o s t s , ”bu t th a t e xpe rtfe es are recov e r able “c osts. ” As a r e sult, th e re fe ren c e to award so f bo th “ex p en se s ”an d “c o s t s ” d o e sn o t s u p p or t r e s p on den t s’ po s i ti on . Th e referenc e t o“ e xpen ses” may relate to ID EA ac ti on sb r ough ti ns tate cou rt, §1415(i)(2)(A ) , where “ e x p en ses”oth e r th a n“c osts”mi gh t b erec e iv abl e. Or th e refer en ce may be s u r p lu sa g e . While it is gener a lly pr es u m ed th at s t a tut es dono tco nt ai ns u rp lus a ge , i n s t a n ceso f s u rplu s a g e ar en o t unknow n .8 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt GA O studyprovision covered ex penses that could not b e taxed as co sts. For ex ample, the GA O was i n structed t o compile statistics on the hours spent by all attorneys involved in an IDEA action or proceeding, even though the Act did not provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees by a prevailing state or loca l educational agency. 2 Similarly, the GAO w a s directed to compile data on “expenses in

curred by t h e parents,” not just those parent s who prevail and are thus eligible to recover tax e d costs. In sum, the terms of the IDEA ov erwhelmingly suppor t the conclusion that pre v ailing pare nts may not recover the costs of experts or consultants. Certainly the terms of the IDEAfail t o provide th e clear notice thatwou l d be needed to attach s u ch a cond ition to a State’s receipt of IDE A funds. IV Thus far, we have consideredonly the text of the IDEA, but perhaps the strongest suppo rt f o r our interpretation of the IDEA is supplied by our decisions and r e asoning in C ra wford F i ttin g , 482 U. S. 437, and Casey, 4 99 U. S. 83. In light of those decis i o n s, we do n o t see how i tcan be sai d that the I D EA gives a State unam biguous notice regardin g liability for expert fees. In Crawford Fitting , t h e Court r ejected an argume n t very similar to respondents’ argument that the term “costs” in §1415(i)(3)(B) should be construed as an open ended reference to prevailing parents’ expenses. It was argued in Cra wfo rd Fittin g

tha tFederal Rule of Civil

——————

2 In2000, th e attor n e y s ’ fees pr ov isionprov ided on lya naw ar d to pr ev ailin gparen t s. See 20 U. S. C. §1415 (i)(3)(B). In2 004, Con g r e ss amen ded §1 4 15(i)(3)( B) to in c l u d e tw o a ddition alaw a r ds. See § 1 0 1 , 118 S t a t . 272 4. Th e amendmen ts pr ov ided aw ar ds “ t o a pr ev ailin g pa rt y who is aS t at e educa t i ona la g ency or loca l educa t i ona la g ency” where the complaint f iled is frivol ous or presented for an improper purpos e, s uch a s t o ha ras s , dela y, or increa s e t h e costof lit i ga t i on. S e e 20 U. S. C. A. §§141 5(i)(3 )(B) (i)(II)–(III) (Supp. 2006).9 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Procedure 54(d), which provides for the award of “costs” to a prevailing party, auth o rizes the award of costs not listed in 28 U. S. C. §1821. 482 U. S. , a t439. The Court held, however, that Rule 54(d) d oes not give a district jud g e “discretion to tax what ever costs may seem appropriate ” ; rather, the term “costs” in Rule 54(d) is defined by the lis t set out in §1920. Id., at 441. Because the recovery of witness fees, see §192 0(3), is strictly limited by §1821, the Court observed, a br oader interpretation of Rule 54(d) would mean that the Rule impl icitly effected a partial repeal of those provisions. Id., at 442. But, the Co urt warned, “[w]e will not lightly i n fer that Congress has repealed §§1920 and 1821, either through Rule 54(d) or any other provision not referring explicitlyto witness fees.” Id. , a t445. The reasoni n g of Cra wf o rd Fittin g strongly su pports the conclusion that the term “ c osts” in 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)( B), like the same term in Rule 54( d), is defined by the cate gories of e x penses en umerated in 28 U. S. C. §1920. This conclusion is buttre ssed by th e principle, recognized in Crawfo r dFittin g

, that no statute will be construed as authorizing the tax a tion of witness fees as costs unless the statute “refer[s] ex plicitly to w i tness fees.” 482 U. S., at 445; see a l so ibid. (“absent explicit statutory or contrac t ual authorization for the taxatio nof the ex

penses of alitigant’s witness as costs, federal courts a r e bound by the limitations set out i n28 U. S. C. §1821 and §1920”). Our decision in Casey confirms even more dramatically that the IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees. In Casey , as noted above, we interpreted a fee-shifting provision, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the relevant wording of which was virtua lly identical to the wording of 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)( B). Compare ibid. (authorizing the award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to prevail

ing parents) with 42 U. S. C. §1988(b) (1988 ed.) (permit

-10 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt ting prevail i ng parties in certain civil rights actions to be awarded “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). We held that §1988 did not empower a district court to award expert fees to a prevailing party. Casey , supra , a t 102. To d e cide in fa vor of respondents here, we would have to int e rpret the virtually identical language in 20 U. S. C. §1 415 as having exactl y the opposite meaning. Indeed, we would have to go further and h o ld that th e relevant language in the IDEA unambigu o usly means exactly the opposite of what the nearly identical languag e in 42 U. S. C. §1988 was held to mean in Casey

. The Court o f Appeals, a s noted above, was hea v ily influ

enced by a Caseyfootn o te, see 402 F. 3d, at 336–337 (quot

ing 499 U. S., at 91–92, n. 5), but t h e court mi sunderstood the footnote’ s meanin g . The text accompanying the foot

note argue d , based on an analysis of several fee-shifting statutes, th at the term “attorney ’s fees” does not include expert fees. Id. , at 88–91. In the f ootnote, we commented on petitioners’ invocation of the Conference Committee Report rela ting to 20 U. S. C. §14 15(i)(3)(B), which state d :
“ ‘The confe r ees intend[ed] that the term “at t or neys’ fees as part of the costs” include reasonable expenses and fees of expert wi tn esses and the reasonable costs of any test o r evaluation which is found to be necessary for the prepara

tion of the .

. . case.’ ” 499 U. S., at 91–92, n. 5 (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5; el lipsis in origina l). This statement, the footnote commented, was “an ap par ent effort to departfro m ordinary meaning and to define a term of art.” 499 U. S., at 92, n. 5

. The footn o te did not state that t h e Conference Committee Reportset out the correct inte rpretation of §1415(i)(3 )(B), much less that the Report was sufficient, despite the language of the statute , to provide the clear notice required under t h e Spending Clause. The thrust o f the footnote was simply that the term “attor n eys’ fees,” standing alone, is g e nerally not understood as encompassing expert fees. Thus, Cra wford11 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Fittin g

and Caseyst rongly reinforce the conclusion that the IDEA does not u nambiguously authorize prevailing parents to r e cover expert fees. V Respondents make several argu ments that are not based on the text of the IDEA, but these arguments do not show that the IDEA provides cl ear notice regardingt h e award of expert fees. Res p onde n t s a r gue t h at thei r i n te rp re ta ti on of t h e IDEA fur t h e rs the Act ’ s overarchi n g goal of “ensur[ing] that a l l ch i l dren with dis abi l i ti es have avai la bl e to t h em a free appropriate public education,” 20 U. S. C. §1400(d)(1)(A) as well as the goalof “safeguard[ing] th e rights of parents to challenge sc hool decisions that ad

versely affect their child.” Brief for Res p ondents 20. These goal s, however, are too general to provide much support for respondents’ reading o f the terms of the IDEA

. The IDEA obviously does not see kto promote these goa l s at the expense of a ll ot her considerations, including fiscal considerations. Because the IDEA is not intended in all instances to further the broad goals identif i ed by the respondents at the expense of fi scal considerations, the goals cited by respondents do little to bolster their arg u ment on the narrow question presented here. 3 Finally, respondents vigorously argue that Congress clearly intended for prevailing pa rents to be compensated for expert fees. They rely on th e legis l ative history o f §1415 and in particula r on the fol l owing statement in th e

——————

3 Respon den t s n o te th at a GA O r e por tstated th at ex per tw i tn ess fees a r e reimb urs ab le expens es . S ee Brie f for Respondents 19 (citing GAO, Spec ial Edu c a tion : Th e Attor n e yFees Pr ov isionof Pu blic Law99–3 72, p. 13 (Nov. 1989)). But th is passing reference in a report issued by an agency not re sponsible for implemen tin gth e ID EA is plain l yin su ffi

cientt o provi d e clea r not i c e rega rdin g t h e s c ope of t h e condit ions att ac h e d to th e r e c e ipt of IDEA fu n d s.12 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of t h eCourt Conference Committee Report, discussed above: “The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include reas onable expenses and fees of expert witnesses a n d the reas onable costs of any tes tor evalua

tion which is found to be ne cessar yfor the pr eparation of the . . . case.” H. R. Co nf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5. Whatever weight this legislative history wou l d merit in another context, itis not suffici ent here. Puttin gt h e legislative history aside, we see virtually no support for respondents’ position. Under the s e circumst ances, where everything other than the le gislative history overwhelm

ing suggest s that expert fees may not be rec o vered, the legislative history is simply not enough. In a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Mem

bers of both Houses intend but wh at the State s are clearl y told regardi n g the cond itions that go along wi th the ac cep tance of those funds. Here, in the face of the unambiguous text of the IDEA and the reasoning in Crawfo rd Fittin g and Casey , we cannot say that the legislati v e history on which resp ondents rely is sufficient to provi d e the requi

site fair notice. * * * We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir c uit and remand the case for furt her proceed

ings consistent with thi s opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 8
ARLIN GT ON CE NTRA LSC HOOLDISTRIC T BOAR D O FED UC AT IO N , P E TIT I O N E R v. PEAR L MURPHY ET V I R ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e 26, 2006 ] J USTICE G IN S B UR G , concurring in part and co ncurring i n the judgme nt. I agree, in the main, with the Court’s resolution of this case, but part wa ys w i th the Court’s opinion in one re

spect. The Court ex tra cts from PennhurstStateSchool and Ho s p i t a l v. Halderman, 4 51 U. S. 1, 17 (1 9 81), a “ c l e a r notice” requirement, and deems it applicable in this case because Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabili

ties Educati o n Act (IDEA), as it did the legislation at issue in Pennhurst , pu rsuan t to the Sp ending Clause. Ante , at 3–4. That extraction, in myjudgment, is unwarran t ed. Pennhurst ’s “clear notice” requirement should not be unmoored f r om its con t ext. The Court there confronted a plea to impose “an unexpecte d condition for co mpliance—a new [prog r ammatic] obligation for parti cipat i ng States. ” Be ll v. New Jers ey, 46 1 U. S. 77 3, 790 , n. 1 7(198 3). T h e controversyhere is lower key: Itconcerns n o t the educ a tional programs IDEA directs sch ool districts to provide, but “the re medies available again s t a noncomplying [di s trict].” Ibid ; see post , at 9–11 (B RE YER , J., dissenting). The Court’s repeated references to a Spending Clause derived “clear notice” requirement , see ante , at 3–4, 6, 8, 11, and n. 3, 12, are questionable on other grounds as well. For one thi n g, IDEA was enacted not only pursuant to2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. Congress’ Spending Clause authority, but also pursuant to §5 of the Fo urteenth Amendment. See Smi t hv. Ro binson, 468U. S. 99 2, 10 09 (1 98 4) ( I D E A’ s p r e d e c e s s o r , t h e E d u c a tion of the Handicap ped Act, was “set up by Congress to aid the States in complying wi th their constitutional obligations to provide public ed ucation for handicapped children.”). Furthermore, no “cl ear notice” pr op is needed in this cas e given the twin pillars on which the Court’s judgment s e curely rests. First, as the Court explains, ante , at 4–6, the specific, attorneys’ -fees-oriented, provi

sions of IDEA, i. e. , 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)–(G); §1415(d)(2)(L), “overwhelmin gly support th e conclusion that pre v ailing parents may no t recover the costs of ex

perts or consultants,” ante , at 8. Those provisions plac e controls on fees recoverable fo r attorneys’ serv ices, without mentioning costs parents might incur for other profes

sional services and con trols ge aredto those costs. Second , as the Co urt de velops, prior de cisions closely in point “strongly s u ppor[t],” even “confir[m] .

. . d r amatically ,” today’s hol d ing tha tI D EA t r ains on attorne y s’ fees an d does not authorize an award covering amounts paid o r payable for the services of an educational consultant. Ante , at 9 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc

. , 4 8 2 U. S. 437(1 98 7) , a n d WestVirginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Case y, 49 9 U. S. 83 (1 991 )). For the contrar yconclusion, J USTICE B REYE R ’s dissent relies domi nantly on a Conference Report stating the conferees’ view that th e term “atto rneys’ fees as part of t h e costs” inclu d es “expenses and fees of expert witnesses” and payments for tests necessary fo r the preparation of a cas e . H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 9 9–687, p. 5 (1986) (int ernal quota

tion marks omitted). 1 Including costs of consultants and

——————

1 The releva nts t at ementfrom t h e Confer ence Reportrea d s in its en tir e ty : “Th e c o n fer ees in ten dth at th e ter m ‘atto r n e y s ’ fees as par tof th e3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. tests in §1415(i)(3)(B) would ma ke good sense in light of IDEA’s ove r arching goal, i.e. , to provide a “free appropri

ate public education” to children with disabiliti e s, §1400(d)(1)(A). See post , at 5–8 (B REYER , J., dissenting)

. But Congress did not compose §1415(i)(3)(B)’s text, 2 as it did the texts of other s t atutes too numerous a n d varied to ignore, to alter the common im port of the terms “attorneys ’ fees” and “costs” in the context of expense-allocation legis

lation. See, e.g. , 42 U. S. C. §1988(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. III) (added in 1991 specifically to “include expert fees as part of the attorney’s f ee”); Casey , 499 U. S., a t88–92, an d n. 4 (citing variously composed statu t e s tha t“explicitly shift expert .

. . fees as well asat torney’s fees” )

. Given th e

—————— cos t s ’ include rea s onab l e ex pens es and fees of expert witnesses and the r e ason able c o s t s of an ytest orev alu ationw h i c his found to be n e c e s sary for the preparation of the parent org u ar dian ’s c a se inth e ac tion or proceeding , a s well a s t r a d itiona l cos t s incurred in t h e c o urs e of lit iga t

in ga c a se.” H. R. Con f. Rep. 99–6 87, at 5.

Alt h ough t h e Conference R e portgoes on t o cons ider ot her ma tt ers , in c l u d in g c o n t r o ls onattor n e y s ’ fees, n o thin gfur t h e ris said onex per t witness fees or test costs.

2 At th e time th e Con fer enc e Repor tw a s su bmit ted to th e Sen ate an d Hous e, s p ons o rs of t h e legis l a t i on did notment ion a n yt hing ont h e floo r about expert or consultant fees. Theywe re altogether clear, howe ver, th at th e pu r p ose of th e leg i sl ationw a s to “r ev er se” th is C o u r t ’s dec i sion in Smith v. Rob i nson , 468 U. S. 992 (19 8 4 ). In Smith , t h e Courthel d that, under the sta t ute a s t h en de signed, prevailing parents were not entitled to att orneys’ fees. See 13 2 Cong. Rec. 16823 ( 1 986) (remarks of S e n. Weicker) (“ In a d opt i ngt h is legis l a t i on, we a r e rej e ct ing t h e rea s o ning of t h e S u preme Courtin Smit h vers us Robins on.” ); id. , at 168 24 (remarks of Sen. Kerry) (“ This vital legisla t ion reverses a U. S. S u preme Court decis i on S m ith vers us Rob i ns on[.]” ); id. , a t 1 7 6 0 8

– 1 7 609 (remarks of Rep. Bartlett) ( “ I support thos e provisions inthe confere n ce ag r eemen t th at, inr e spon se to th e Su pr eme Cou r tdec i sionin

. . . Smith versus Robinson, autho r iz[e] the aw arding of reasonable attorneys’ fees t o pa rent s who preva il in s p ecia l educa t i on cou r tca s e s . ”); id. , at 17 60 9 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi) (“T h is legi s l a t i on clea rly s u pport s t h e int e ntof Con g r e ss bac k in197 5 an d c o r r e c t s w h at I believ e w a s a g r oss mis i n ter p r e tationo f th e law

. At tor n e y s ’ fees sh ou ld be pr ov ided to th os e in div i du als w h o ar e bein g den i ed ac c e ss to th e edu c ational sy stem. ” ).4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. constant meaning of t h e formula t ion “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” in federal le gisl ation, we a r e not at lib

erty to rewr ite “the statutory text a d opted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President,” id ., at 98, to add several words Con g ress wisely might ha ve included. The ball, I conclude, is properly left in Congress’ court to provide, if it so el ects, for consultant fees and testing expenses beyond those IDEA and i t s implementing regul a tions already authori ze, 3along with any s p ecifications, conditi o ns, or li mitati o n s geared totho s e fe esand expe ns es Congress may deem appropriat e. Cf. §1415(i)(3)(B)–(G); §1415(d)(2)(L) (listing only attorn eys’ fees, not expert o r consulting fees, amon g the procedural safeguards abou t which school districts must inform parents). In sum, although I disagree with the Co urt’ s rationale to the e x ten t t h atitin vo kes a “ c lea r noti ce” re qu iremen t tie d to the Spending Clause , I agree with the Court’s discussion of IDEA’ s te rms, an te , a t4–6, a n d o f our de cisio n s in Craw fordan d Casey , an te , a t8–11

. Acco rdi n gly, I co ncu ri npart in the Cou r t’s o p inio n, a n d join the Cou rt’s judgment.

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3 Un der34 C. F. R. §300.50 2(b)(1) (2 00 5), a “par en t h a s th e r i g h t to anin depen d en t edu c ation alev alu ationatpu blic ex pen s e if th e par e n t disag r ees w i thanev alu ationobtain e d byt h e pu blic ag enc y .”_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
S OUTER , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 8
ARLIN GT ON CE NTRA LSC HOOLDISTRIC T BOAR D O FED UC AT IO N , P E TIT I O N E R v. PEAR L MURPHY ET V I R ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e 26, 2006 ] J USTICE S OUTER , dissenting. I join J USTI CE B REYER ’s dissent and add this word only to say outr ight wha t would otherwise be implicit, tha tI agree with the distinction he draw s between t h is case and Bar n esv. Gorman, 53 6 U. S. 18 1 (2 002 ). S e e pos t , at 10–1 1 (citing Barnes , supra , at 191 (S OUTER , J., concurring)). Beyond that, I emphasize the importance for me of §4 of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 10 0 Stat. 797, as amended, 20 U. S. C. A. §1415 note, which mandated the study b ywha tis now knownas the Go v ernment Accountability Office. That section, of equal dignity wit hthe fee-shifting provi s ion enacted by the same statute, m a kes J USTI CE B RE YE R ’s resort to the related Conference Report the reasonable course._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 8
ARLIN GT ON CE NTRA LSC HOOLDISTRIC T BOAR D O FED UC AT IO N , P E TIT I O N E R v. PEAR L MURPHY ET V I R ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e 26, 2006 ] J USTICE B REYER , wit hwhom J USTICE S T EVEN S and J USTICE S OUTER join, dissenting. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I DEA or Act), 20 U. S. C. A. §1400 et s e q ., (Supp. 20 06), says th at a court ma y “a ward reasonabl e attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents” who are prevailing parties. §1415(i)(3)( B). Unlike the Court, I bel i eve t hat the word “costs” incl udes, and authorizes payment of, the costs of experts. T h e word “c osts” does not define its own scope. Neither does the phras e “attorney s’ fees as part of costs. ” But Members of Congr e ss did make clear th eir intent by, among othe r things, approvin g a Conference Report that specified that “the ter m ‘attorney s’ fees as part of the costs’ include[s] reasonabl e expenses of expert wi tnesses and reasonable costs of any test or eval uation which is found to be necessar yfor the preparat ion of the parent or guard

ian’ s case i nthe action or proceeding.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (198 6); Appendix A, infra , at 19. No Senator or Representative voiced any opposition to this statement in the discussion preceding the vote on the Conference Report—th e last vote on the bill before it was sent to the President. I can find no good reason for this Court to interpret the language of this statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us i tintended.2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting I There are t w o strong r e asons for interpretingthe statu

tory ph rase to include t h e award of expert fees. First, tha t is what Congress said it intended by the phrase. Second, that interp r e tation furt hers the IDEA’s sta t ut orily defined purposes. A Congress added the IDEA’s cost-s hifting prov ision when it enacted the Handic apped Children’s Prot ection Act of 1986 (HCPA), 100 Stat. 796. Senator Lo well Weicker introduced the relevant bill in 198 5. 131 Cong. Rec. 1979– 1980 (1985 ). As introduced, it sought to overturn th is Court’s determination that the th en-current version of t h e IDEA (and other civil rights statutes) did not authorize courts to award attorneys’ fees t o prevailin g parents in IDEA cases. See Smi t hv. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (198 4). The bill p r ovided th at “[i]n any action or proceedin g brought un der this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award a reasonabl e attorney’s fee as part of the costs to a parent or legal representative of a hand icapped child or youth who is the p r evailing party.” 131 Cong. Rec. 1980; see S. Rep. No. 99–112, p. 2 (1985).

After heari n gs and debate, several Senators introduce d a new bil l in the Sen a te that would have put a cap on attorneys’ f ees for legal servic es lawyers, but at the same time would have explicitly authorized the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee, reas onable witness fees, a n d other rea sonable exp e n ses of the ci vil ac tion , in addition to the costs to a parent . . . who is the prevailing party.” Id., at 7 (emphasis added). Whil e no Senator objected to the latter provi s ion, some objected to the cap. See, e.g. , id ., at 17–18 (Additional Views of Senators Kerry, Kennedy, Pell, Dodd, Sim o n, Metzenbaum and Matsunaga) (accepting cost-shifting provision, but objecting to ca p and oth e r aspects of the bill). A bipartisan group of Se nators, led by3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting Senators Hatch and W e icker, proposed an alt e rnative bill that authorized courts to aw ard “a reasonabl e attorney’s fee in addition to the costs to a parent” who pr evailed. Id. , at 15–16 (Additional Views of Senators Hatch, Weicker, Stafford, Dole, Pel l , Matsunaga, Simon, Kerry, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Dodd, and Grassley); 131 Cong. Rec. 21389. Senator Weicker explai ned that th e bill: “will enable courts to compensate parents for wha t

ever rea sonable costs they ha d to incur to ful l y secur e what was g u aranteed to them by t h e EHA

. As in other fee shifting statutes, it is our inten tthat such awards will include, at the dis cretion of the court, reasonable attorney’s f ees, necess a r y exper t wi tnes s fe es, a nd other reasonabl e expense s w h ich wer e n eces sary forparen ts to vindica te thei r clai m to a f ree approp ria t e publi c educa t ion f o r thei r ha ndicapp ed child .” Id ., at 21390 (emphasis added). Not a wor dof opposition to this statement (or the provi

sion) was v o iced on th e Senate fl oor, and S. 415 passed without a r e corded vot e . Id ., at 21 393. The House version of the bill als o reflected an intention to authoriz e recovery o f expertcosts. Following the Hou s e hearings, the Committee on Education and Labor pro

duced a su bstitute bill that au th orized courts to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and cos t s ” to prevai l

ing parents. H. R. Rep. No. 99–2 96, pp. 1, 5 (1985) (em

phasis added). The House Report stated that “The phras e ‘expenses and costs’ includes expense s of exper tw i tn esse s; the re asonable costs of any s t udy, re

port, tes t, or projec t w h ich is foun d to be ne ce ssary for the p repa r a t ion of the paren ts ’ or guardian ’s due proc

ess hea r ing, state admi nistr a tiv er e vie w or civ il action; as well as traditional costs and ex penses incurred in the course of litigating a case (e.g., depositions and in

terrogatorie s ).” Id ., at 6 (emphasis added).4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting No one objected to this statement. Bythe tim e H. R. 152 3 reached the floor, anot h er subs titute bill wa s introduced. 131 Cong. Rec. 31369 (1985). This new bill d i d not change in any respect the te xt of the authorization of expenses and costs. It did ad d a prov ision, however, t hat directe d the General Accounting Office (GAO)—no w known as the Government Accounta b ility Office , see 31 U. S. C. A. §73 1 note(Supp. 2006)—to s t udy and report to Con g ress on th e fiscal impa ct of the cost-shifting provision. See id ., a t 31369–31370. The n e wly substituted billpassed the House without a record ed vote. Id

. , at 31377. Members of the House and Senate (including all of the primary sp onsors of the HCPA ) th en met in conference to work out c e rtain differences. Atthe conclu sion of those negotiations, they pro d uced a Co nference Report, which contained the text of the agreed-upon bill and a “Joint Explanatory Statemen t of the Committee of the Confer

ence.” See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 9 9–687 (198 6), Appendi x A, infra. The Confere n ce accepted the House bil l ’ s GAO provision with “an amendment exp anding the data collec

tion requirements of th e GA O stud y to include information regarding the amount of funds expended by local educa

tional agencies and state ed ucational agencies on civil actions and administrative proceedings.” Id ., at 7. And it accepted (with minor c hanges) the cost-shifting provisions provided in both the Senate and House versions. The conferees explained: “With slightly different wording, both the Senate bill and the House amend m ent provide for the awarding of attorneys’ fees inad dition to co sts. The Se nate re

cedes to the House and the House recedes to t h e Sen

ate with an amendmen t clarifying that ‘the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of t h e costs . . .’ This chan ge in wording incor

porates the Sup r eme Court[’s] M a rek v. Chesnydeci

-5 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting sion [473 U. S 1 (1985)]. Theconf eree s in tendtha tth e term ‘a ttor n eys’ fe es a s par t of th e costs’ in cl ude re a sonable exp e nses and f ees of expe r twi tnes ses and the reasonabl e costs of an y test or e v aluation which i s found to be necessary for th e p rep aration of the paren t o rg u a r d i a n ’ s c a s ei nt h ea c t i on or proceeding, as well as tr adition a l costs inc u rred in thecourse of li tiga ting a case .” Id ., at 5 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The Conference Report was return ed to the S e nate and the House. A motion was putto each to ado p t the Confer

ence Report, and both the Senate and the House agreed to the Confer ence Report byvoice votes. See Appendix B, infra , at 22 (Senate); Appendix C, infra , at 23 (House). No objection was raised to the Confer ence Report’s statement that the co st-shifting provision was intended to authorize expert costs. I concede that “spons ors of the legislation did not mention anything on the fl oorabout expert or consult

ant fees” atthe time t h e Conference Report was submit

ted. Ante , at 3, n. 2 (G INSBU R G , J., concurringin part an d concurring in judgment). But I do not believe that silenc e is significa n t in light of the fact that ev ery Senator an d thre e of th efiveRepresentatives who spok e on the floo r had previously signedhis name to the Co nference Re

port—a Re port that made Congress’ intent clear on t h e first page of its explanation. See Appendix A, infra , at 19. And every Senator and Representative that tookthe flo o r preceding t h e votes voiced his strong support for the Con

ference Report. 132 Co ng. Rec. 16 823–16825 (1986) (Sen

ate); id ., at 17607–17612 (House). The upshot is that Members of both Hous es of Congress voted t o adopt bot h the statuto r y text before us and the Conference Report that made c l ear that th e statute’s words inclu d e the expe rt costs here i nquestion. B The Act ’ s basic purpo s e further supports in terpreting6 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting the provision’ s language to include expert costs. The IDEA guarantees a“free” and “appropriate” public educa

tion for “all” children with disa bilities. 20 U. S. C. A. §1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2 006); see a l so §1401(9) (A) (defining “free appro p riate publ ic education” as one “provided a t public expense,” “without charge”); §1401(29) (defini n g “special ed ucation” as “speci ally designed instruction, a t no cost to p a rents, to meet the unique needs of a child w i th a disability” (emphasis added)). Parents ha ve every rig h t to becom e involved in the Ac t’s efforts to provide that education; indeed, the Act encour

ages their participatio n . §1400(c)(5)(B) (IDEA “ensur[es] that families of [disabled] children have meani ngful oppor

tunities to participate in the educ ation of their children at school”). It assures parents th at they ma y question a school district’s decisions about what is “appropriate” for their child. And in doing so, they may secure the help of experts. §1415(h)(1) (parents have “the right to be accom

panied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or tr aining with respect to the problems of children with disabilities”); s ee generall y Sc haf f

er

v. Weast, 546 U. S. ___, _ __ (2005) (s lip o p ., at 3–4) (de t ailing Act’ s pro c edures); Bo ard of Ed. of Hend rick Huds on Cen t ral Sc hool Dist ., Westc h ester Ct y. v. Ro wley, 45 8 U. S. 176 , 20 5 – 206 (1 98 2) ( e m p h a s i z i n gi m p o r t a n c e o f Ac t ’ s p r o c e d u r a l guarantees). The practi cal significance of the Act’s pa rticipator y rights and procedural protections may be seriously dimin

ished if parents are u nable to obtain reimbursement for the costs of their experts. In IDEA cases, experts are necessary. See Kuriloff & Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Res o lve Special Educa t ion Disputes? F i rst Empiri

cal Findings, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 35, 40 (1997) (detailing findings of study showi n g high correlation be

tween use of experts and success of parents in challenging school district’s plan); Kuriloff, Is Justice Se rved b yDu e7 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting Process?: Affecting t h e Outco me of Speci a l Education Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 La w & Contemp. Prob. 89, 100–101, 109 (1985) (same); see also Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae6–15 (collecting sources); cf. Schaffer , su pra , at ___ (slip op., at 5) (G IN SBU R G , J., dissenting) (“[T]he vast majority of parents wh ose children require t h e benefits and prote c tions provided in the IDEA lack k n owledge about the educational resources available to their ch ild and th e sophistication to mountan effe ctive case against a distric t

proposed IEP” (intern a l quotation marks a n d alterations omitted)). Experts are also expensive. See Brief for Respondents 28, n. 17 (collecting DistrictCo urt decisions awardi ng expert costs ranging fro m $200 to $7,600, and noting three reported ca ses in which expert a w ards exceeded $10,000). The costs of experts m a y not make much of a dent in a school district’s bud get, as many of the experts they use in IDEA proceedings are already on the staff. Cf. Obe r ti v. Board of Ed . Clemen to n School Di st. , 995 F. 2 d1204, 1219 (CA3 1993). But to pa rents, the a w ard of cos t s may ma t

ter enormously. Without potential reimbursement, par

ents may well lack t h e services of experts entirely. See Department of Education, M. Wagner et al., The Individ

ual and Ho usehold Characteristics of Youth With Disabili

ties: A Report from the National Longitudinal Transition Study–2 (NLTS–2), pp. 3–5 (Aug. 20 03) (findin g that 25 % o f disabled children live in poverty and 65 % live in households with incomes less than $50,000); see Department ofEducation, M. Wagner et al., The Children We Serve: The D e mographic Characteri stics of Ele

mentary a n d Middle School Students with Disabiliti e s and Their Households , p. 28 (Se p t. 2002), available at http: // www.seels.net / de si gn do cs / SEELS

_ Childr en

_ We

_ Serve_Report.pdf (as vi sited June 23, 2006, a n d available in Clerk of Court’s cas e file) (findi n g that 36 % of disabled8 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting children live in households with incomes of $25,000 or less). In a word, the Act’s st atutory ri g h t to a “free” and “ap

propriate” education may mean little to tho s e who must pay hundreds of dollars to obtai nit. That is wh y thi s Court has previously avoided interpretations that woul d bring about this kind of result. See School Comm. of Burlingtonv. D e pa rtm e nt of Ed. of Mass., 4 71 U. S. 35 9 (1985) (construing IDEA provisi o n granting equitable authority t o courts to incl ude the power to order reim

bursement for parents who switc htheir child to privat e schools if that decision later proves correct) ; id ., at 37 0 (without co st reimbursement for prevailing parents, “the child’s righ t to a f ree appropriate public education, th e parents’ rig h t to partic i pate fully in developi ng a proper individualized education plan (IEP), and all of the proce

dural safeguards woul d be less than complete”); Floren ce Count y School Dist

. Fourv. Cart er, 510 U. S. 7, 13 (1993) (holding that prevailing parents a r e not barred from reim

bursement for switchi n g their ch ild to a pr ivate school that does not meet the IDEA’ s definition o f a free and appropriate education). In Carter , we explained: “IDE A was intended to en su re that children with disabiliti e s receive an education that is bo th a ppropriate and free. T o read the provisions of §1401(a)(18) to bar rei m bursement in the circu mstances of this case would defeat this sta t u tory pur p ose.” Id ., at 1 3–14 (citation omitted). To read the word “ c osts” as requiring successful parent s to bear the i r own expenses for experts suffers from the same problem. Today’s resultwill l e ave many parents and guardians “ w ithout an expert wi th the firepower to matc h the opposition,” Schaff er , sup r a , at __ (slip op., at 11), a far cry from the level playi n g field that Congress envisioned. II The majority makes ess e ntially three argumen t s against9 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting this interpr e tation. It says that t h e statute’s purpose and “legislative history is simply not e n ough” to overcome: ( 1 ) the fact tha tthis is a S p ending Cl ause case; (2) the text of the statute; and (3) ou r prior cases which hold that the term “costs ” does not include expert costs. An t e , at 12. I do not find these arguments convincing. A At the outs et the majority says th at it “is guided by th e fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause.” Ante , at 3. “In a Spending Clause case,” the majority ad ds, “the keyis not whata majority of the Members of both Houses int e nd but what the States are clearly t o ld regardi n g the cond itions that go along with the accepta n ce of those funds.” Ante, a t12

. Thus, th e statute’s “conditions must be set out ‘una mbiguously.’ ” Ante , at 3– 4 (citing PennhurstStateSchool and Hospita l v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1 98 1) a n d Ro wley, 458 U. S., a t 2 0 4 , n . 2 6)

. An d“[w] e must ask” whetherthe statute “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in this case.” Ante , at 4. I agree tha tthe statute on its face does not clearlytell the States that they must pay expert fees to prevailing parents. B u t I do not agree thatthe majority has posed the right q u estion. For one thing, we ha ve repeatedly examined the nature and exte nt of the financial burdens that the ID EA imposes without ref e rence to the Spending Clause or a n y “clear-statement rule.” See, e.g. , Burling

to n, supra , at 369 (private school f ees); Carter, supra, at 13 (same); Smith , 468 U. S., at 1010–1011 (attorneys’ fees); Cedar Rapids Commu nity School Dist. v. G a rre t F., 52 6 U. S. 66, 76–79 (1999 ) (continuous nursing service); b u t see id ., at 8 3 (T HOMAS , J., joined by K ENNEDY , J., dissent

ing). Those cases did not ask whether the statute “fur

nishes clear notice” to the a ffirmative obligation or liabi l

ity at issue.10 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting For another thing, neither Pennhurst nor any other case suggests th at every spending detail of a Spending Claus e statute must be spel led out with unusual cla r ity. To the contrary, we have heldthat Penn hurst ’s requirement that Congress “unambiguously” set out “a condition on th e grant of fe deral money” does not necessarily apply to legislation setting forth “ th e r e me dies a v aila ble a gains t a noncomplying State .” Bell v. Ne w Jers ey, 461 U. S. 773 , 790, n. 17 ( 1983) (emp hasis added) (rejecting Pennhurst

based argu ment that Elementary and Secon d ary Educa

tion Act of 1965 did not unambiguously provide that th e Secretar yc o uld recover federa l fu nds that a r e misused b y a State). We have added that Pennhurstdo es not require Congress “ s pecifically” to “i dentify” and “proscribe eac h condition in [Spending Clause] legislation.” Jacksonv. Birmingh am Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 183 (2005) (reject

ing argume nt that Pen nhurst prec luded interpreting Titl e IX’s private cause of action to encompass retaliation (in

ternal quotation marks and alter a tions omitted)); see also Bennettv. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 665–666 (1985). An d we ha ve denied any implication that “suits under Spen ding Clause legislation are suits in contract, o r that contra ct-law p r inciples apply to allissues that they raise.” Barnes v. Gor m an, 536 U. S. 181, 188–189, n. 2 (2002) (emphasis added). These statements and holdings are not surprising. Afte r all, the basic objective of Pennhurst ’ s clear-statement requiremen tdoes not demand te xt ual clarity i nrespect to every detail. That is because amb i guity about the precis e nature of a statutory pro g ra m’s details—particula rly where they are of a kind t hat States might have antici

pated—is r a rely relevant to the ba sic question : Would the States have accepted t h e Federal Government’s funds had they only knownthe nature of the accompanying condi

tions? Often, the later filling-in of details through judicial interpretati on will not lead one to wonder whether fund

-11 Cite as: 54 8 U

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B REYER , J., dissenting ing recipients would have agree dto enter the basic p r o gram at all. Given th e nature of such detai l s, it i s clear that the St ates would have entered the program regard

less. At the same time, to view each statuto r y detail of a highly complex federal/state program (i nvolving say, transportat i on, schools, the environment) simply through the lens of linguistic clarity, rather than to asses s its meanings in terms of basic legislative purpose, is to risk a set of judic i al interpretations that can p r ev ent the pro

gram, overall, from achieving its basic objectives or tha t might well reduce a pr ogram in its details to incoherence. This case is about just such a deta il. Permitti ng parent s to recover expert fees will not lea dto awards of “indeter

minate ma gnitude, untethered to compensabl e harm” and consequentl ywill not “pose a concern that recipients of federal funding could not reasonably have anticipated.” Barnes , 536 U. S., at 1 91 (S OUTER , J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring) (citati o n and int e rnal quot a tion marks omitted). Unlike, say, punitive damages, an award of costs to ex pert par t ies is neither “unorthodox” nor “ind e terminate,” and thus does not throw into doubt whethe r the States would have entered into the program. Id ., at 188. If determination s as to whether the IDEA require s States to provide conti nuing nursing services, Cedar Rap

ids, sup r a , or reimbursement for pr iva t e school tuition, Burlington, supra , do not call forlinguistic clarity, the n the precise content of recoverable “costs” does not call for such clarityhere a fortiori

. B If the Cou rt believes that the statute’s language is unambiguous, I must disagree. The provi s ion at iss u e says that a court “may award reas onable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents wh o prevail in an action brought un der the Act. 20 U. S. C. A. §1415(i)(3)(B) (Su p p. 2006). The statute neither defines the word “costs” no r12 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting points to any other source of law for a definition. And the word “costs , ” alone, says nothing at all about which cost s falls within its scope. Neither does the statu t ory ph rase—“as pa rt o f the cost s to the parents of a child with a disability who is the pre

vailing party”—ta k en i nits entire ty unambiguously fore

close anaward of expe rt fees. I a g ree that, read literall y , that provision does notclea rly grant authority to award any costs at all. And one might read it, as the Court does, as referenci n g another federal sta t ute, 28 U. S. C. §1920, which provides that authority. See ante , a t5; see als o §1920 (federal taxation of cost stat ute). But s u ch a read

ing is not inevitable. The provision (indee d, the entire Act) says n o thing about that other statute. And one can, consistent with the la nguage, rea dthe provi s ion as bot h embodying a general a u thority to award costs while a l s o specifying the inclusion of “re asonable attorneys’ fees” as part of tho s e costs (as saying, for example, that a court “may a w ard reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of [a] costs [award] ” ).

This latter reading, wh ile l i nguistically the les s natural, is legis l atively the mor e likely. The majority’s alternative reading, by cross-referencing on ly the federal general costawarding s t atute (whi ch applies solely in fe deral courts ), would produce a jumbl e of different cost definitions appli

cable to similar IDE A admi nistrative and state-court proceedings in different Sta t es. See §1920 (“A judge or clerkof any court of theUnited S t a t esmay taxas costs the following. . . .” (emphasis added)). This result is particu

larly odd, as all IDEA actions must begin in state due process he arings, where the fed e ral cost st atute clearly does not apply, and the overwhelming majority of these actions are never appealed to any court. See GA O, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Healt h , Education, Labor and Pensions , U. S. Senate, Special Education: Numbers of Formal Disputes are Generally13 Cite as: 54 8 U

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B REYER , J., dissenting Low and States Are Us ing Mediation and Oth er Stra tegies to Resolve Conflicts (GAO–03–897 ), p. 13 (20 03) (approxi

mately 3,000 adminis trative hearings annually; unde r 10% appealed to state or federal court); see a l so Moorev. Dis t ric tof Columbia , 907 F. 2d 165, 166 (CADC 1990) (en banc) (joining other Circuits in holding that IDEA au thor

izes an “award of attor n ey fees to a parent w h o prevails in [IDEA] ad ministrativ e proceedings”). And when parents do appeal, they can file their actions in eit h er state or federal courts. 20 U. S. C. A. §1415(i)(2)(A) (Su pp. 2006). Would Con g ress “obviously” have wanted the content of the word “c osts” to var yfrom S t at e to State, proceeding to proceeding? Ante , at 5. Why? At most, the majority’s reading of the text is plausible; it is not the only possible reading. C The majorit y ’s most persuasive ar gument does not focus on eitherthe Spending Clause or la ckof statutory ambigu

ity. Rather , the majority says that“costs” is a term of art. In light of t h e law’ s lo ng practice of excluding expert fees from the sc ope of the word “costs, ” along with this Cour t’s cases interpreting the word similarly in other statutes, th e “legislative history is si mply not enough.” Ante , at 12. I am perfectly willing to assume that the majority i s correct abo ut the tradi tional scope of the word “costs.” I n two cases this Court has held that the word “costs” i s limited to the list set forth in 28 U. S. C. §19 20 and does not include fees paid to experts. See Cra wfo rd F i t ti n g Co

. v. J. T. Gibb on s, I n c., 48 2 U. S. 43 7 (198 7) (i nterpre tin g Fe d. Ru le C iv . Pr oc . 54(d)) ; WestVirg inia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Cas e y, 49 9 U. S. 8 3 (1 991 ) (i n t e rpre ti n g 4 2 U. S. C. §1 98 8 (19 88 ed .) ). B u tC o n g r e s s i s f r e e t o rede fi ne te rm s of a r t. See , e.g
. , Case y , 4 99 U. S., a t8 8–9 0 (ci ti n g e x a m ples of s t at ut es th atsh ift “ ‘ c ostso f l i ti ga ti on(i nc lu di ng . . . exp e rt witness fees)’ ”). And we have suggested thatitmigh twell14 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting do so th rou gh a s t a t u t ory pro visio n wo rde di na ma nne r s i mil a rt oth e sta t ut e her e

—i nd ee d, we cite d the Co nfe r ence Re po rt lan gua ge he re a tiss u e. Id., a t91 –9 2, n . 5 (c har a c te ri zi ng la n gu a ge as a n“ a pp a r en t e ffo r t to departfro m ordi na ry m e ani n g a n d to de fi ne ate rm o f a rt” an d n o ti ng th a tCon gre ss m a de no su ch “e f f o rt” in re sp ec t t o 42 U

. S

. C

. §1 98 8)

. Regardless, here the statute itself indicates that Con

gress did n o t intend t o use the word “costs ” as a term of art. The HCPA , whi c h added the cost-shifting provision (in §2) to the IDEA, a l so added another provision (in §4 ) directing th e GA O to “c onduct a s t udy of the impact of th e amendments to the [IDEA] made by section 2” over a 3 1 ⁄ 2 year period following the Act’s effective date. §4(a), 100 Stat. 797. To determine the fiscal impact of §2 (the costshifting provision), §4 ordered the GA O to submit a repor t to Congress containing, among other things, t h e following information : “Data, fora geographic ally representative select sam

ple of State s , indicating (A) th e sp ecific amou nt of a t

torneys’ f e e s , costs, an d expense s awa r ded to the p re vailing p a rty , in each action and proceeding under [§2] from the date of the enactment of this Act through fiscal year 1988, andthe range of such fees, costs and ex penses awarded in the actions and pro

ceedings under such section, categorized bytype of complaint and (B) for the same sample as in (A) the number of hours spen t by personnel, includin g

attor

neys and consultants , involved i nthe actio nor pro ceeding, and expenses incurred by the parents and the State edu c ational agency and local ed ucational agency.” § 4 (b)(3), id., at 797–798 (emphasis added). If Congress intended t h e word “co sts” in §2 t o authorize an award of only those costs listed in the federal cost statute, wh y did ituse the word “ expenses” in §4(b)(3)(A)15 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting as part of the “amount awarded to the preva iling party” ? When used as a term of art, after a ll, “costs” does not cover expenses. Nor does the federal costs statut e cover any expenses—at least n o t any that Congress could have wanted the GA O to stu d y. Cf. 28 U. S. C. §19 20 (referring only once to “expenses,” and doing so solelyto refer to special interpretation s e rvices provided in actions initiated by the United States). Further, w h y did Congress, whe nasking t h e GA O (i n the statute itself) to st udy the “nu m bers of hours spent by personnel” include among those p e rsonnel both attorney s
“ and consultants ”? W h o but experts could those consult

ants be? Why would C o ngress wa nt the GA O to study th e hours that those experts “spent,” unless it th ought that it would help keep trac kof the “ c osts” thatthe statut e imposed? Of course, one might, through s p eculation, find other answers to these questions. One might, for example, imagine that Congress wanted the GAO to study the expenses th at payment of expert fees engendered in stat ecourt proce e dings where state, but not federal, law re

quires that “ ‘expenses’ other than ‘costs’ might be recei v able.” Ante , at 7, n. 1; but see supra , at12

- 1 3

. O ron e might think that the word “expenses” is surplusage. Ante , at 7, n. 1; but see Duncanv. Walker , 5 33 U. S. 167 , 1 7 4 ( 2 00 1) (e xpr e ss i n g C o urt’ s“ ‘r eluc tan[ce] to treatstatut ory t e r m s a s su rp lu sag einany settin g ,’ ” but espec i ally when the y pla y “apivo tal ro lein the sta t uto ry s c h e me ”). Or o n e m i gh t believe that Co ngress was interested in the hours these experts spent, but not in the fees the yobtained. Ante , a t7. But these answers ar e not necessarily consis

tent with t h e purpose of the GA O studyprov ision, a pur

pose reveal ed by the language of the provision and it s position in the statute. Its placem ent and its reference to §2 indicate that Con g re ss ordered t h e study to help it keep trackof the magnitude of the reimburseme nts that an16 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY B REYER , J., dissenting earlier part of the new statute (namely, §2) mandated. See 100 Sta t . 797 (stati ng that purpose of GAO study wa s to determine the “impact” of “se ction 2”). And the only reimbursement requi rement that §2 man d ates is t h e payment of “costs.” But wh y speculate about this? We know what Congres s intended the GAO study to cover. It to ld the GAO in its Conference Report tha tthe word “c osts” included the costs of experts. And, not surprisingly, the GA O made clea r that it understood pre c isely w hat Congress a s ked it to do. In its final report, the GAO w r ot e: “Parents can receive reimbursement from state or local education agencies for some or allof their attorney fees and related expenses if they are the prevailing party in part or all of administra

tive hearings or court proceedings. Expert witn ess fe es , costs of tests or evaluations found to be necessary during the cas e, a nd court co sts for s ervi ces rend ere d during a d

ministr a tiv eand court proceedin gs are exam ples of rei m bursable expense s .” GA O, Brief i ng Reportto Congres

sional Req u esters, Special Education: The Attorney Fees Provision of Public La w 99–372 GAO/HRD– 22BR, p. 1 3 (Nov. 1989). At the ve ry least, this amounts to some indi

cation that Congress intended the word “costs,” not as a term of art, not as it w a s used in the statutes at issu e i n Casey and Cra wfo rd F i ttin g

, but rather as including ce r tain additi onal “expenses.” If t hat is so, the claims of tradition, of the interpr e tation this Court has given other statutes, ca nnot be so strong as to prevent us from exam

ining the legislative history. And that history could not be more clearabout the matter: Congress intended the statutory p h rase “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” t o include the costs of experts. See Part I, supra. III For the reasons I have set forth, I cannot agre e with the majority’s c o nclusion. Even less can I agree with its fail

-17 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting ure to consider fully th e statut e’s l e gislative history. Tha t history ma kes Congre ss’ purpose clear. And our ultimate judicial goal is to interpret l angua ge i nl i gh to f th es t a t u t e ’ s purpose. Only by see king th at purpose can we avo i d th e s ubsti t u ti on of j u di ci a lfor legi s l ative wi l l

. On ly by r e ading lan gua ge i nits li gh t ca n we m a in tain the de mo cra ti cli n k betweenvo te rs , le gi sl a t o r s , s t atu t es, an d ul ti ma te i m ple

ment ati o n, u p on wh ich th e l e gi ti ma cy of ourcon s ti t u ti onal s y st em r e sts

. In my view, to keep faith with that interpretive goal, we must retain all traditional in terpretive tools—text, stru c ture, history, and purp ose. And, because faithful interpre

tation is art as well as science, we cannot, th rough rule or canon, rule out the use of any of these tools, a u tomatically and in advance. Cf. Helv erin g

v. Gre gory , 69 F. 2d 809, 810–811 (CA2 1934) (L. Hand, J.). Nothing in the Constitution forbids us from givi n g significant weight to legislativ e history. By disregarding a clear state m ent in a legislative report ado p ted wi thout opposition in both Hou s es of Congress, the m a jority ha s reached a result no Member of Congress expected o r overtly desired. It has adopted an interpretation that undercuts, rather thanfurthers, the statute’s purpose, a “free” and “appropriate ” publiceducation for “all” children with disabilities. See Circui tCi ty Stores, Inc

. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 1 05, 133 (2001) (S TE VEN S , J., joined by S OUTER , G INSBURG , and B REY ER , JJ., dissenting) (“A method of statutoryi n terpretati on thatis deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that i s consistent with a cour t’s own vie w s of how t h ings should be, but it may also d e feat the v e ry pu rpose for which a provision was enacted”). An d it h a s adopted an approach that, I fear, divorces law from life. See Duncan, sup r a, at 193 (B REYE R , J., joined by G IN SBU R G , J., dissenting). For these reasons, I respectfully di ssent.18 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Appendix A to opinion of B RE Y E R , J. APPE NDIXA TO OPI N ION OF B REYE R , J.

[Tex t of Ac t o m itted.]19 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Appendix A to opinion of B RE Y E R , J.20 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Appendix A to opinion of B RE Y E R , J.21 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Appendix A to opinion of B RE Y E R , J.22 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SC HOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v. MUR P HY Appendix B to opinion of B RE Y E R , J. APPE NDIXB TO OPI N ION OF B REYE R , J. Excer p ts fr om Congressional Record 132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986) (Senate)

HA NDIC A PPE D C H ILDR EN’S P R OT ECTI O N ACT— C ON FERE NC E REP ORT Mr. WEIC KER. Mr. President, I submit a r e port of the committee of conference on S. 415 and ask for its immedi

ate consideration. The PRESI D ING OFFI CER. The report will be stated. The legislat ive clerk re ad as follow s : The committee of confe r ence on the disagreei ng votes of the two Ho uses on the amendmen ts of the House to the bill (S. 415) to amend the Edu c a t ion of the Handicapped Act to auth o rize the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to certain pre v ailing parties, and to clarify the effect of th e Education of the Han d icapped Act on righ ts , procedure s , and remedies under ot her laws relating to the prohibition on discrimination, having met, after full and free confer

ence, have agreed to recommend and do r e commend to their respec tive Houses this re port, signed by amajority of the conferees. The PRESIDING OF FICER. W i thout objection, the Senate will proceed to the cons ideration of th e conferenc e report. [Floor sta t ements omitted.] Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move adoption of the conference report. The PRESI D ING OFF I CER. The question is on agree

ing to the conference report. The conference report was agreed to. Mr. WEIC KER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by whi c h the conference report was agree dto.23 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Appendix C to opinion of B RE Y E R , J. APPE NDIXC TO OPI N ION OF B REYE R , J. Excer p ts fr om Congressional Record 132 Cong. Rec. 17607–17612 (House)

CON F ER E N CE REP ORT ON S. 4 15, HAN D I CAPP E D CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ACT OF 1986 Mr. WILLI AMS. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the Senate b ill (S. 415) to amend the Educatio n of the Handicapped Act to authorize the award of reason

able attorneys’ fees to certain prevailing parties, and to clarify the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, and reme dies underother laws relating to the prohibition of discrimination. The Clerk read the title of the Sen a te bill. [Floor sta t ements omitted.] Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the con

ference report. The previous question was ordered. The conference report was agreed to.