[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12412

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROMEO XAVIER LANGHORNE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00218-HES-LLL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12412

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Romeo Langhorne appeals his 240-month prison sentence, 

arguing that it was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.

I.

Langhorne pledged his allegiance to ISIS in 2014. In late 

2018 and early 2019, Langhorne participated in online chatrooms 

with fellow ISIS supporters and advocated for attacks on “infrastructure, specifically government buildings” at times of day when 

civilian casualties would be minimized. He also had an apparent 

interest in targeting military personnel. After Langhorne shared 

his interest in creating an explosives instructional video, he was

connected with an undercover federal agent posing as an ISIS 

member who offered to help put together the video. 

Langhorne worked with that agent to produce iterations of 

a video explaining how to make and use explosive material that 

could be assembled with readily available ingredients. The agent 

sent Langhorne a draft video but altered the explosive recipe so 

that it wouldn’t create a combustible product. Langhorne uploaded the video, overlaid with Islamic vocal music, to a publicly 

viewable video sharing website that he previously used to share 

ISIS propaganda.

Langhorne was arrested and indicted for knowingly attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign 

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22-12412 Opinion of the Court 3

terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2339B(a)(1). 

Langhorne pleaded guilty, admitting that he had attempted to create and distribute “an instructional video intended to teach followers of ISIS how to obtain materials for explosives without arousing 

suspicion and combine those materials to make an explosive sufficient to destroy specific types of targets.” 

At sentencing, the district court overruled Langhorne’s objections to the application of the violent act and terrorism guideline 

enhancements. The resulting guideline range of thirty years’ to life 

imprisonment far exceeded the statutory maximum of twenty 

years’ imprisonment, and so Langhorne’s guideline calculation became that twenty-year statutory maximum. See U.S.S.G. section 5G1.1(a) (“Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, 

the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”). Langhorne put a psychologist on the witness 

stand who testified that Langhorne most likely suffered from

ADHD and undiagnosed Asperger’s syndrome, a syndrome that

made him more susceptible to “fundamentalist beliefs, whether it’s 

ISIS or some other issue[].” Based on the psychologist’s testimony 

and cases featuring similar conduct, Langhorne asked for a sentence of just over eight years. 

The district court instead imposed the 240-month guideline 

sentence. The district court explained that it decided not to cut 

anything off Langhorne’s guideline sentence because Langhorne 

already received a significant “benefit” by pleading guilty and 

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avoiding the government bringing further charges that would’ve 

carried a longer sentence. 

II.

Langhorne appeals his sentence on the ground it violates his 

Eighth Amendment right under the Constitution to be free from 

excessive punishment. He argues his twenty-year sentence is 

grossly disproportionate to the offense he committed because 

(1) the explosives instructional video he helped create provided 

faulty instructions, (2) he advocated for striking targets that would 

minimize civilian casualties, and (3) he was suffering from untreated mental health problems at the time of his offense. Langhorne also highlights three out-of-circuit cases in which the defendants received lighter sentences for “providing support to terrorist 

organizations” in ways he argues were “more abhorrent and extreme.” See United States v. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2018);

United States v. Banol-Ramos, 516 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2013); United 

States v. Assi, 428 F. App’x 570 (6th Cir. 2011).

Langhorne acknowledges he makes this Eighth Amendment

challenge for the first time on appeal, and so we review it for plain 

error. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“[W]hen a defendant fails to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence in the district court, we review that challenge 

on appeal for plain error.”). For a defendant to succeed on a plain 

error challenge to his sentence, he must show the district court

clearly or obviously violated our precedent, the Supreme Court’s 

precedent, or “the explicit language of a statute or rule.” United 

States v. Sosa, 782 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

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22-12412 Opinion of the Court 5

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel 

and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. XVIII. “Successful 

Eighth Amendment challenges in non-capital cases are exceedingly 

rare.” United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2018)

(quotation omitted). “[W]e have never held that a non-capital sentence for an adult has violated the Eighth Amendment.” Id. “Outside the context of capital punishment cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality principle” that assesses whether a sentence “is grossly disproportionate 

to the offense committed.” Id. at 1335–36 (quotation omitted). A 

sentence within statutory limits generally isn’t grossly disproportionate. United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). 

See also McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir. 1992) 

(“[S]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). But if the sentence is determined to be grossly disproportionate, then we must “consider the 

sentences imposed on others convicted in the same jurisdiction and 

the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 

jurisdictions.” United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 432 (11th Cir. 

2016) (citation omitted). 

The district court did not plainly err in sentencing Langhorne to twenty-years’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum for

his offense. See 18 U.S.C. section 2339B(a)(1). That Langhorne’s 

sentence was within the statutory limits is a general indication that 

his sentence wasn’t grossly disproportionate. See Johnson, 451 F.3d 

at 1243 (“Because the district court sentenced [the defendant]

within the statutory limits, he has not made a threshold showing 

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of disproportionality with respect to his sentence.”). And he provides no precedent from this court or the Supreme Court to support his argument. Without such authority there’s no basis to find 

the district court committed “clear or obvious error.” Sosa, 782 

F.3d at 637 (quotation omitted).

Because Langhorne hasn’t shown the district court imposed 

a grossly disproportionate sentence, there’s no need for us to examine the sentences imposed for the same offense in the three outof-circuit cases Langhorne relies upon. Even so, Langhorne’s actions were serious: he admitted he attempted to create and distribute “an instructional video intended to teach followers of ISIS how 

to obtain materials for explosives without arousing suspicion and 

combine those materials to make an explosive sufficient to destroy 

specific types of targets.” His sentence is reasonable as compared 

to those for less or similarly “abhorrent and extreme” offenses. Cf. 

United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2013) (defendant’s life sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base was reasonable); Suarez, 893 F.3d at 1338 (defendant’s life sentence was reasonable for his attempt to use a 

weapon of mass destruction and attempting to provide material 

support to ISIS).

III.

It was not plain error for the district court to impose the 240-

month guideline prison sentence. We AFFIRM. 

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