N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT JOHN S. LAM PR OS, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. NANC Y L. B A KER , De fe nda

nt-c ounte r-c la im ant - Appe lla nt, C OUNTY OF W HITE PINE, C ounte r-de fe nda nt - Appe lle e . No. 14-15968 D.C . No. 3:14-c v-00026-R C J-VPC M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da R o be rt C l ive Jone s, Se nior Distric t Judge , Pre siding

Subm itte d

M ay 13, 2016 ** San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : FAR

R IS, O’ SC ANNLAIN, a

nd C H R ISTEN, C irc uit Judge s. 

# FIL ED MAY17 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).Nanc y B ak e r a ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s orde r dism issing he r 42 U.S.C . § 1983 c la im s and re m anding thea c tion ba c k to sta te c ourt. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291, N affe v . Fre y , 789 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th C ir. 2015), and we a ffirm . I A B ake r first a

rgue s tha t she ha s sta

te d a pla usible c la i m

for re lie f unde r § 1983 a ga inst both John La m pros a nd White Pine C ounty

(“ C ounty ” ). B ake r’ s c om pla i nt doe s not c o nta in suffic ie nt fa c tua l a lle g a tions to give rise to a pla usible infe re n c e of sta

te a c tion. S

e e Fe d. R . C iv. P. 8(a )(2); Ashc roft v
. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). She doe s not a lle g e tha

t La m pros a c te d while on duty

or whe n e xe rc ising his re sponsibilitie s pursua nt to sta te la w. Se e N affe , 789 F.3d a t 1037. Nor doe s she a lle ge tha t La m pros, while“ off duty ,” purporte d to or pre t e nde d to a c t unde r c olor of la w. Se e id. B ake r’ s c onc lusory a lle gations m e re ly re c i te the e le m e nt of sta

t e a c tion, a

re de void of furthe r fa c tua l de ve lopm e nt, a nd are i nsuffic ie nt to sta

te a c la im . B B ake r ne xt a

rgue s tha t the c ourt should tre a t La m pros’ s suit a s sta

te a c tion be c a use the “ sta

te ha s c re a te d its c ourts” and La m pros use d tha

t sy s te m to “punish 2B ake r.” Tha t a rgum e nt is fore c lose d by G ritc he n v . C ollie r , 254 F.3d 807, 813–14 (9th C ir. 2001). As in Gritc he n , what La m pros “ is doing by

. . . suing[] for de fa m a t ion is no differe nt from what a ny de fa m ation pla intiff doe s whe n he . . . sue s unde r [the re le v ant sta t ute ] . In e a c h insta

nc e the pla i ntiff is sim

ply e na ble d by sta te la w a nd de c ide s to pursuethe re m e dy a fforde d.” Id. at 814. Tha t doe s not

“ c o nve rt the pla intiff’ s pure ly priva t e a c tion into sta

te a c t ion.” Id. C B ake r ne xt a

rgue s tha t, “ [b] ut for La

m pros’ position on the B oa rd of C ounty C om m issione rs, he would not ha ve posse s se d

the m otive tha

t B ake r a lle ge s he ha d in filing the

de fam a t i on la

wsuit a ga inst he r, be c a

use but for his offic ia l position, he would not ha

ve be e n a ta rge t of B ake r’ s e xpre ssive a c tivity .” The que stion is not whe the r Lam

pros would ha

ve brought suit but for his holding a public position, but whe the r his suit wa s, or purporte d to be , a n e xe rc i se of his offic ia l re s ponsibilitie s. As in Gritc he n , Lam

p ros sought a

priva te goa l via

a priva te a c tion, a

nd his suit the re fore did not c onstitute sta t e a c tion. Se e Gritc he n , 254 F.3d a t 813–14. D B ake r argue s tha

t the distric t c ourt e rre d in dismissing sua sponte the c la im a ga inst La

m pros, who did not m

ove for dism issa l . A distric t c ourt “ m ay a c t on its own initia tive to note the ina de qua c y of a c om p la int a nd dismi ss it for fa ilure to 3sta

te a c la im .” Sparling v . Hoffman C onstr. C o. , 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th C ir. 1988) (c ita tion omitte d). He re , the distric t c ourt did not a c t e ntire ly on its own initia

tive . Inste a d, the C ounty

m ove d to dismiss be c a

u se Lam pros’ s suit did not c onstitute sta te a c tion a

nd a rgue d tha t “ B ake r’ s fa ilure to a lle ge the unde r c olor sta t e la w e le m e nt is fa

ta l to he r Se c t ion 1983 c la im s a ga inst theC ounty and, also, Mr. Lampros . ” (e m

pha sis a dde d). B ake r re s ponde d to tha t argum e nt in he r opposition to the m otion to dism

iss. Thus, B ake r wa s on notic e tha t he r c la im s c ould be dism isse d be c a

use she ha d not a lle ge d sta te a c tion, a

nd she ha d a

n opportunity

to re spond to the

C ounty ’ s a

rgum e nt. Se e Sparling , 864 F.2d a t 638. M ore ove r, B ake r’ s c la im s a

re fore c lose d by

c irc uit pre c e d e nt, a

nd she “ c annot possibly

win re lie f” a ga i nst La

m pros. Se e id. (c ita

tion omitte d). II B ake r a lso a

rgue s tha t the distric t c ourt e rre d by dism issing without le ave to am e nd the c om

pla int. Eve n if B ake r ha d re que ste d le a v e to a m e nd, the distric t c ourt c ould ha

ve prope rly

de nie d suc h le ave be c a

use it would ha

ve be e n futile . Se e Unite d Bhd. of C

arpe nte rs v . Bldg. & C

onstr. Trade

s De p’t , 770 F.3d 834, 845 (9th C ir. 2014). AFFIRM E D.

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