alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

CERTIFICATIONS

I, John Hromyk, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Coventure
  International Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
  untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
  to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
  statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
  report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
  financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
  respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
  registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
  controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
  for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
  such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision,
  to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
  consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities,
  particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
  controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the
  effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
  period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
  internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
  most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case
  of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
  materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
  and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of
  internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and
  the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
  the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
  reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
  summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
  or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
  control over financial reporting.

Date: November 9, 2004/s/ John Hromyk
  John Hromyk 
  Chief Executive Officer/Chief Financial Officer

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyrone Burton, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Suffolk County (Cacciabaudo, J.), both rendered August 14, 1984, convicting him of robbery in the first degree under indictment No. 361/84, and robbery in the first degree under indictment No. 362/84, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant was initially charged with committing five separate armed robberies and an additional series of grand larcenies in four separate incidents. These were consolidated *277into two indictments and the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in the first degree. At the time of the entry of the pleas, the court indicated that it would impose sentences of 3 Vi to 10 Vi years on each count to run concurrently. However, the court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive terms of 3 Vi to 10Vi years.

While it is generally true that "a guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” *(People v Selikoff,*35 NY2d 227, 241, *cert denied*419 US 1122; *see, People v Torres,*45 NY2d 751, 753; *People v Declemente,*108 AD2d 868; *People v Clemons,*70 AD2d 884, *appeal dismissed*49 NY2d 795), we have held that this principle is not applicable where the defendant’s claim has not been preserved and where the sentence actually imposed was not abusive or illegal *(see, People v Ifill,*108 AD2d 202).

In this case, the defendant’s probation report provided a sufficient basis for the court to refuse to abide by its original promise *(see, People v Grant,*99 AD2d 536). The defendant had been charged with five class B felonies and had made statements implicating himself in each. The defendant never challenged these statements. Under these circumstances, the sentence actually imposed was neither abusive nor illegal *(see, People v Ifill, supra,*at 204).

Nor has the defendant preserved any claim for our review. Neither the defendant nor his attorney voiced any objection to the sentence at the time of sentencing. In fact, both the defendant’s attorney and the Assistant District Attorney prior to the imposition of the sentence stated that they understood that the defendant would receive consecutive sentences. Clearly, under the circumstances, there was a waiver of any rights the defendant may have had to request the fulfillment of the original promise as to sentence, or, in the alternative, the withdrawal of his guilty pleas.

It should also be noted that at the time of sentencing the court offered the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his pleas because the probation report indicated that he had denied his guilt as to one of the robberies. The defendant expressly rejected this offer and reaffirmed his guilt under oath.

Under the facts of this case, the defendant cannot now be heard to complain about the sentences imposed.—Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence, Hooper and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
----

**EXHIBIT      32-1**

**CERTIFICATE      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C.      1350)**

|   | 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/                 Alex Hazan                        |   |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                       |   |
| Alex                Hazan                                  |
| Chairman of                the Board of Directors and |
| Chief                Executive Officer                     |
| August                22, 2006                             |

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6155

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RANDELL BRICE HARRIS, a/k/a Randall Brice

Harris,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior

District Judge. (CR-94-12-P)

Submitted: June 18, 1998 Decided: July 8, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randell Brice Harris, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. We have reviewed

the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Harris, No. CR-94-12-P (W.D.N.C. Jan. 14,

1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### BLOOM v. NATIONAL UNION BENEFIT LOAN CO.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

June 20, 1894.)

No opinion. Motion to strike case from the calendar, and for affirmance granted, with costs, unless papers are served on or before the second Friday of the term.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5802 

To repeal a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 

providing for funds to a health care facility and rescind funds made 

available under such section. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 20, 2010 

Mr. UPTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To repeal a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act providing for funds to a health care facility 

and rescind funds made available under such section. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RESCISSION AND REPEAL OF PPACA PROVI4 SION PROVIDING FUNDS TO A CERTAIN 

5 HEALTH CARE FACILITY. 

6 Section 10502 of the Patient Protection and Afford7 able Care Act (Public Law 111–148) is repealed. Any un8 obligated balances available on the date of the enactment 

9 of this Act of funds appropriated to the Department of 

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2 

•HR 5802 IH

1 Health and Human Services under such section are re2 scinded and all amounts made available under such section 

3 before such date shall be returned to the Treasury. 

Æ 

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#### Michael Anthony McKEOWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry D. McMASTER, Attorney General; John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Donald John Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General; Samuel Creighton Waters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Salley W. Elliot, Assistant Attorney General, Defendants, and Karen C. Ratigan, Assistant Attorney General; Rodney Wade Richey; C. Denton Matthews, Assistant Solicitor; Linda Whisenhunt, Solicitor; Skip Goldsmith, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-7639.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 28, 2011.

Decided: May 3, 2011.

*229Michael Anthony McKeown, Appellant Pro Se. William Henry Davidson, II, Daniel C. Plyler, Davidson & Lindemann, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Rodney Wade Richey, Greenville, South Carolina; Christopher R. Antley, Devlin *&*Parkinson, PA, Greenville, South Carolina; James Lee Goldsmith, Jr., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before KING, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony McKeown appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint and its subsequent orders denying his motion to alter or amend filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *McKeown v. Ratigan,*No. l:09-cv-00655JMC, 2010 WL 3521849 (D.S.C. Sept. 2, 2010). We deny McKeown’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-02-2000
<CASH>                                       3,685,795
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  760,819
<ALLOWANCES>                                    66,669
<INVENTORY>                                     97,133
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,281,756
<PP&E>                                      17,641,014
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,639,847
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             107,108,209
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 55,090,477
<COMMON>                                       399,453
<OTHER-SE>                                  31,962,884
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               107,108,209
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                66,669
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<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.70)
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</TABLE>
#### Oscar Daniel BOLANES-BLANCO, a.k.a. Oscar Bolanos, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71836.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 20, 2011.*

Filed April 22, 2011.

Oscar Daniel Bolanes-Blanco, Stockton, CA, pro se.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Robbin Kin-month Blaya, Esquire, Trial, Edward Earl Wiggers, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: RYMER, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Oscar Daniel Bolanes-Blanco, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 *750U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition for review and remand.

The BIA denied Bolanes-Blanco’s motion to reopen without the benefit of our decision in *Coyt v. Holder,*593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir.2010), in which we concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) did not apply to cause the withdrawal of a motion to reopen filed by a petitioner who subsequently has been removed from the United States. *See Coyt,*593 F.3d at 906-07. We remand in light of this intervening case law for the BIA to reconsider Bolanes-Blanco’s motion, including, if necessary, whether the 90-day filing limitation should be equitably tolled.

We construe Bolanes-Blanco’s letter of January 26, 2009, as a motion to supplement the record. So construed, the motion is denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
386 P.2d 794

#### STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Juan Arragon SOTO, Appellant.

No. 1368.

Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc.

Nov. 20, 1963.

Gerald E. Smallwood, Tucson, for appellant.

Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Norman E. Green, County Atty., for appellee.

*70PER CURIAM.

Appellant pleaded guilty in the Superior Court *to one count*of possession of heroin. He was represented in the Superior Court by court appointed counsel. He was sentenced to from 5 to 10 years in the State Prison. He filed his notice of appeal in propria persona and counsel was appointed by the trial court, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-161, to handle his appeal. Counsel stated to this court that he has reviewed the record and could find no grounds on which an appeal could be based. This court ordered that the appeal be submitted on the record for examination for fundamental error.

We have examined the record and find no error. Appellant was advised of his right to counsel, waived preliminary examination and had benefit of counsel at the time he made his plea and was sentenced. We find no irregularities as to the arrest, the preliminary hearing or the arraignment. At the time of sentencing counsel requested the trial court that appellant be sent to the United States Public Health Service for Addicts of. Narcotics. Appellant had a previous conviction on a narcotic charge and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion either as to sentencing appellant to a term in the state prison or as to the length of that term. State v. Salinas, Ariz., 387 P.2d 790.

Affirmed.
(31 Abb. N. C. 27.)

#### KLUEG v. BOSCH.

(Circuit Court, Kings County.

June, 1893.)

Corporations—Personal Liability of Stockholder.

A stockholder of an insolvent corporation cannot bring an action at law against another stockholder to enforce the liability imposed by Laws; 1848, c. 40, § 10, which provides that stockholders shall be individually liable for corporate debts until the whole amount of capital stock shall have been paid in, and a certificate thereof recorded.

Action by Jacob Klueg against John Bosch to enforce defendant’s liability as a stockholder of the Brooklyn Publishing Company, under Laws 1848, c. 40, § 10, which provides that stockholders shall be individually liable for corporate debts “until the whole amount of the capital stock * * * shall have been paid in, and a certificate thereof shall have been made and recorded.” Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that plaintiff was also a stockholder in said company. Granted.

Charles Reinhart (Daniel Cameron, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Thomas E. Pearsall and Isaac M. Kapper, for defendant,

KELLOGG, J.

This action was tried by the court without a jury. It presents the single question as to whether a stockholder in an insolvent corporation may bring an action at law against another stockholder on a liability created by failure to file a certificate and have the same recorded in the county clerk’s office, showing the entire capital stock to have been paid in as provided by the Laws of 1848. It seems to have been well settled in this state, by decisions of the courts, which have been uniform so far as the same question has arisen, that no such action will lie. Convincing reasons why such an action will not lie were given in the case of Bailey v. Bancker, 3 Hill, 188. I think the plaintiff in this case must be relegated to his action in equity against all stockholders, and that this complaint should be dismissed, with costs.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Moises Alirio ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10995

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 2011.

Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mark R. Danielson, Mansfield, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

*420PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Moisés Alirio Alvarez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Alvarez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2. Alvarez’s motion for appointment of new counsel is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 620 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow an increased work 

opportunity credit with respect to recent veterans. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 21, 2009 

Mr. KING of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow an 

increased work opportunity credit with respect to recent 

veterans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Jobs for Veterans Act 

5 of 2009’’. 

6 SEC. 2. WORK OPPORTUNITY CREDIT FOR RECENT VET7 ERANS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 51 of the Internal Rev9 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

10 following new subsection: 


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2 

•HR 620 IH

1 ‘‘(l) SPECIAL RULES FOR VETERANS.—For purposes 

2 of this subpart— 

3 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an individual 

4 who is an applicable veteran who begins work for the 

5 employer after December 31, 2008, but before Janu6 ary 1, 2011, the following rules shall apply: 

7 ‘‘(A) APPLICABLE VETERAN.—Such indi8 vidual shall be treated as a member of a tar9 geted group. 

10 ‘‘(B) INCREASED PERCENTAGE.—Sub11 section (a) shall be applied by substituting ‘100 

12 percent’ for ‘40 percent’. 

13 ‘‘(C) WAGE LIMITATION.—Paragraph (3) 

14 of subsection (b) shall be applied— 

15 ‘‘(i) by substituting ‘$5,000’ for 

16 ‘$6,000’, and 

17 ‘‘(ii) without regard to the parenthet18 ical therein. 

19 ‘‘(D) MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT PERIODS.— 

20 Subparagraph (A) of subsection (i)(3) shall be 

21 applied by substituting ‘0 percent’ for ‘25 per22 cent’. 

23 ‘‘(E) DISABLED VETERANS.—In the case 

24 of such an individual who is a qualified veteran 

25 by reason of subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii), the credit 


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3 

•HR 620 IH

1 determined with respect to such individual 

2 under the rules of this subsection shall be in 

3 addition to any credit allowable with respect to 

4 such individual under this section determined 

5 without regard to this subsection. 

6 ‘‘(2) APPLICABLE VETERAN.—The term ‘appli7 cable veteran’ means any veteran (as defined in sub8 section (d)(3)(B)) who is certified by the designated 

9 local agency as having been discharged or released 

10 from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United 

11 States after September 11, 2001. 

12 ‘‘(3) ELECTION TO HAVE SUBSECTION NOT

13 APPLY.—A taxpayer may elect (at such time and in 

14 such form and manner as the Secretary shall pre15 scribe) to have this subsection not apply with respect 

16 to an individual for any taxable year.’’. 

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

18 this section shall apply to individuals who begin work for 

19 the employer after December 31, 2008. 

Æ 


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