COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Beales, Huff and Senior Judge Clements 

LELA WEIFORD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0311-18-1 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 5, 2019 

CITY OF HAMPTON DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Walter J. Ford, Judge 

 (Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Kendall Bynum, Assistant City Attorney; Lola Rodriguez Perkins, 

Senior Deputy City Attorney; Rachel E. Madden, Guardian ad litem

for the minor child; Riley Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. 

 Lela Weiford (mother) appeals the circuit court orders terminating her parental rights to her 

seven children and approving the foster care goal of adoption. Mother argues that the circuit court 

erred by (1) approving the foster care goal of adoption because the City of Hampton Department of 

Social Services (the Department) failed to prove that the goal of adoption was in the children’s best 

interests and that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the children with their parents and 

(2) terminating mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) because the Department failed 

to offer sufficient evidence to support the termination. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
- 2 - 

BACKGROUND1

“On appeal, ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180 (1991)). 

 Mother is the biological mother to seven children, M.W., X.W., K.W., S.W., Z.B.W., 

Z.J.W., and V.W. The Department first became involved with the family when a dog bit Z.B.W. 

and S.W. on two different dates in 2015. Both of the children required medical treatment for the 

dog bites. The Department offered family support and child care services, but mother refused 

the services because she “did not want anyone in her home or caring for her children.” 

On May 1, 2016, the Department again became involved with the family after V.W., who 

was ten months old at the time, almost drowned. Mother reported that she was taking a shower 

with V.W. and Z.J.W., who was two years old at the time. She left the bathroom to get dressed 

and thought her boyfriend, Juan Alcala, was watching the children.2

 When Alcala came into the 

bedroom, mother asked Alcala about the children. They ran back to the bathroom and found 

V.W. under the water because the tub drain was broken. V.W. was blue and unresponsive. 

M.W. ran next door and asked the neighbors to call 911, while mother and Alcala performed 

cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. First responders revived V.W. and transported him to the 

 1

 The record in this case was sealed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing 

relevant portions of the record for purposes of resolving the issues raised by appellant. Evidence 

and factual findings below that are necessary to address the assignments of error are included in 

this opinion. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed 

record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case. 

The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 

283, 288 n.1 (2017). 

2

 Alcala was the biological father to the three youngest children, Z.B.W., Z.J.W., and 

V.W. 
- 3 - 

hospital. The hospital staff noticed that V.W. had a purple bruise on his right eyelid and that 

mother was “aggressive” with him. When asked about V.W.’s bruise, mother said that the day 

before, on April 30, 2016, Z.J.W. had knocked a chair off a table, and it hit V.W. 

The next day, on May 2, 2016, the Department removed all seven of the children from 

mother’s care. The three oldest children, who ranged in age from ten years old to seven years 

old, were placed in one foster home, and the four youngest children, who ranged in age from four 

years old to one year old, were placed in another nearby foster home. 

The Department required mother to complete a parental capacity evaluation, which the 

evaluator completed on June 16, 2016. The evaluator expressed concern about mother deferring 

to Alcala, who was not a “safe independent care provider,” for “primary care, limit setting, 

supervision, and discipline” of her children. The evaluator opined that mother had “an ongoing 

high risk for maladaptive parenting and inadequate supervision.” Based on the recommendations 

of the evaluator, the Department required mother to participate in parenting classes, a substance 

abuse treatment program, domestic violence and relationship classes, one-on-one parent 

mentoring services, and intensive individual psychotherapy. Mother completed the counseling 

services and four parenting courses. She also completed the substance abuse treatment program 

and had all negative drug screens. Mother actively participated in visitation with her children. 

Although she had some financial struggles, mother maintained a job and housing. 

By March 24, 2017, mother had made sufficient progress to permit the Department to 

start the process of allowing a trial home placement with the children and mother. The 

Department informed mother that Alcala, who had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, 

was not allowed in the home because the children were not safe around him. The Department 

was concerned that Alcala was too “unpredictable,” “angry,” and “verbally aggressive.” 

Furthermore, Alcala had not been compliant with his treatment plan for therapy and medication 
- 4 - 

management. The Department reviewed with mother the steps that she could take if Alcala came 

to the house while the children were present. 

 On April 1, 2017, the children began day visits with mother at her home, and on April 28, 

2017, they started overnight visits. On April 30, 2017, the Department transitioned the four 

youngest children for a trial home placement. 

 On May 1, 2017, the Department learned that Alcala had been at the home while the 

children were present. Alcala had disciplined M.W. and “pushed him out the front door and 

threw his shoes at him.” On May 2, 2017, the Department met with mother, who reported that 

Alcala had been to the home only one time. The Department warned mother that the children 

were at risk of being removed from her home if Alcala was present. 

 The children’s guardian ad litem subsequently met with the children and learned that 

Alcala had been at the home multiple times and had spent the night while they were present. In 

spite of the Department’s instructions, mother continued to allow Alcala to parent and discipline 

the children. Upon learning this information, the Department had “grave concerns regarding 

her[] ability to keep the children safe due to her poor judgement, lack of growth in increasing her 

protective capacity and past CPS [h]istory.” Accordingly, the Department removed the children 

from mother’s home on May 5, 2017, and placed them back in their foster homes. On May 7, 

2017, Alcala boarded a bus and moved to California. 

On July 18, 2017, the Department filed petitions for a permanency planning hearing with 

the goal of adoption. On August 15, 2017, the City of Hampton Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court (the JDR court) approved the goal of adoption for the children. Mother 

appealed the permanency planning orders to the circuit court. On October 10, 2017 the JDR 
- 5 - 

court entered the orders terminating mother’s parental rights to her children.3

 Mother also 

appealed the termination orders to the circuit court. 

On January 26, 2018, the parties appeared before the circuit court. The Department 

reported that the children had “some behavior problems and struggles,” but their foster parents 

were able to manage their behaviors. The children had established a good rapport with their 

foster parents. 

Mother presented letters from several friends, who supported mother and expressed their 

willingness to help her as needed. Mother also wrote a letter, expressing her love for the 

children and her desire to have the children returned to her. 

After hearing all of the evidence and argument, the circuit court found that it was in the 

children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and 

approve the goal of adoption. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

“On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, 

considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best 

interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) 

(quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as 

here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t 

 3

 The JDR court also terminated the fathers’ parental rights to their children. S.W.’s 

father, Harry Lee Walker, appealed the permanency planning order and the termination of 

parental rights order to the circuit court, which approved the goal of adoption and terminated his 

parental rights. Walker appealed the circuit court’s ruling to this Court. See Walker v. City of 

Hampton Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Record No. 0312-18-1. Alcala and the other father did not appeal 

the JDR court’s rulings. 
- 6 - 

of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)). 

 Mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to 

terminate her parental rights and approve the goal of adoption. Mother specifically asserts that 

the Department failed to prove that termination of her parental rights and approval of the goal of 

adoption were in the children’s best interests. She further contends that the Department did not 

make reasonable efforts to assist her in remedying the conditions that led to the children’s foster 

care placement and to reunite her with the children, especially after Alcala left Virginia on May 

7, 2017. 

 The Department argues that mother did not raise these specific arguments with the circuit 

court, so this Court should not consider them under Rule 5A:18. The Department asserts that 

mother did not move to strike the Department’s evidence, and her closing argument focused on 

allowing her to “have one final, last ditch attempt to make this work.” 

During her closing remarks, mother claimed that the trauma and abuse that she had faced 

in her life affected her choices, but “the ultimate removal of her children has got to be the one 

thing that . . . is the ultimate motivation for her.” Mother requested that the circuit court give her 

“one additional opportunity to reunite” with her children, but she did not argue that the “statutory 

criteria” had not been met, as she argues on appeal. In addition, she endorsed the final orders as 

“Seen and objected to” with no further explanation. 

 “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an 

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause 

shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “Ordinarily, 

endorsement of an order ‘Seen and objected to’ is not specific enough to meet the requirements 

of Rule 5A:18 because it does not sufficiently alert the trial court to the claimed error.” Herring 
- 7 - 

v. Herring, 33 Va. App. 281, 286 (2000) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515 (1991) (en 

banc)). “This Court has held that ‘[c]ounsel may meet the mandates of Rule 5A:18 in many 

ways. For instance, counsel may make clear the ground for his objection in a motion to strike the 

evidence or in closing argument.’” Moncrief v. Div. of Child Support Enf’t ex rel. Joyner, 60 

Va. App. 721, 729 (2012) (quoting Lee, 12 Va. App. at 515). “The Court of Appeals will not 

consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Tackett v. Arlington 

Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 315 (2013) (quoting Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 

Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)). “The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is ‘to ensure that the trial court and 

opposing party are given the opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and resolve issues in 

the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals.’” Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 544 

(2018) (quoting Andrews v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 493 (2002)). 

 Mother raises specific arguments on appeal that she did not raise in the circuit court; 

however, “[i]n interpreting Rule 5A:18, the Supreme Court has also held that ‘if a trial court is 

aware of a litigant’s legal position and the litigant did not expressly waive such arguments, the 

arguments remain preserved for appeal.’” Moncrief, 60 Va. App. at 729 (quoting Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010)). The circuit court was aware that mother opposed the 

termination of her parental rights and the goal of adoption. Therefore, assuming without 

deciding that mother sufficiently preserved her arguments for appeal, we find that the circuit 

court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights to her children under Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2) and approving the goal of adoption. 

 Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a court may terminate parental rights if: 

The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or 

unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months 

from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation 

of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the 
- 8 - 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health 

or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. 

 “[S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the 

problem that created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the 

parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 

271 (2005). 

 Contrary to mother’s arguments, the Department provided her with numerous services in 

an effort to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s placement in foster care. 

“‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of 

a particular case. Thus, a court must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate 

efforts given the facts before the court.” Harrison v. Tazewell Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 

Va. App. 149, 163 (2004) (quoting Ferguson v. Stafford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 

333, 338 (1992)). 

 The Department initially removed the children from mother’s care because of inadequate 

supervision. In September 2015, a dog bit two of the children, and then, a few months later, in 

May 2016, the youngest child almost drowned when Alcala was supposed to be watching him. 

The Department referred mother to a parental capacity evaluator, and based on the evaluator’s 

recommendations, the Department required mother to participate in parenting courses, 

counseling, substance abuse treatment, and domestic violence classes, all of which mother 

completed. The Department also arranged for mother to visit with the children, which she did on 

a regular basis. After mother complied with these requirements, the Department moved toward 

transitioning the children for a trial home placement with mother. The Department stressed to 

mother that Alcala, who was noncompliant with the Department’s requirements, should not be 

around the children while they were at her house. Mother assured the Department that he would 

not be at the home. Mother, however, allowed Alcala to spend the night and to discipline her 
- 9 - 

children. Despite all of the services provided to mother, she continued to exercise poor judgment 

and also showed that she could not protect the children because she continued to allow Alcala to 

be around the children. 

 The circuit court found that mother was a “threat to these children” and did “not have the 

ability, or else she doesn’t care about the safety of her children.” The circuit court recognized 

mother’s love for her children, but “she has not properly effected her job as being a mother to 

those children.” When the Department placed the children with mother on a trial basis, the 

children had been in foster care for approximately one year. “It is clearly not in the best interests 

of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be 

capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Tackett, 62 Va. App. at 322 (quoting 

Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990)). 

 Mother had the opportunity to show that she had remedied the conditions that led to the 

children’s placement in foster care; instead, she proved that she could not apply what she had 

learned and adequately protect the children. At trial, she argued for more time, and on appeal, 

she asserts that the Department should have continued to provide her additional services after the 

children were removed from the trial home placement. The Department had been working with 

her for more than twelve months, and she had not demonstrated, during that time period, that she 

was able to care for the children. “Code § 16.1-283(C)(2)’s twelve-month time limit ‘was 

designed to prevent an indeterminate state of foster care “drift” and to encourage timeliness by 

the courts and social services in addressing the circumstances that resulted in the foster care 

placement.’” Dung Thi Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 171 

(2014) (quoting L.G. v. Amherst Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 56 (2003)). 
- 10 - 

 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in holding that it was in the children’s best 

interests to terminate mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approve the goal 

of adoption.4

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed. 

 4

 With respect to mother’s challenge of the foster care goal of adoption, “[o]ur decision to 

affirm the termination order necessarily subsumes this aspect of [her] appeal because a 

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs judicial modifications of foster care plans.” 

Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265 n.3.