IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 27, 2013 Session

IN RE: JAIDEN C.W. and CAIDEN J.W.

Direct Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Coffee County

No. 07J-1623 Timothy R. Brock, Judge

No. M2012-01188-COA-R3-JV - Filed April 11, 2013

This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In

In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App.June

7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child

support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual

income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only

to Father’sincome, and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support.

Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’

actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration.

Vacated and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Vacated and

Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J.,

W.S., and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

Greg W., Manchester, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Eric J. Burch, Manchester, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jessica J.

OPINION

A full recitation of the relevant facts is set out in this Court’s previous opinion, In re

Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7,

2011) (“Jaiden I”). Appellee Jessica J. (“Mother”) and Appellant Greg W. (“Father”) are

the unmarried parents of two minor children, Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W., who were born
in 2006. While the parties were together, Father provided Mother $400 per month in child

1

support. Jaiden I, 2011 WL 2306057, at *1. However, the parties’ relationship ended in

October 2007, after which time Father ceased payment of child support. Id. In November

2007, Father filed a petition to establish paternity of the children and for designation of

primary residential parent. Id. Mother counter-petitioned for child support. Id.

On August 18, 2008, the trial court entered an order, providing that Father’s “child

support obligation shall be set at $329.00 per week.” As discussed in Jaiden I, the August

18, 2008 order was an “order of temporary child support . . . setting Father’s child support

obligation at $329.56 per week based on a monthly gross income of $8,917.00.” Jaiden I,

2011 WL 2306057, at *4. In setting support in the August 18, 2008 order, the trial court

imputed $29,300 income to Mother. Mother appealed the imputation of income in Jaiden

I; however, this Court declined to overturn the juvenile court’s imputation of income for the

relevant time period “[b]ecause Mother . . . [did not] provide reliable evidence of her income

or income potential from October 1, 2007, to August 22, 2008 [i.e., the effective date of the

August 18, 2008 order]. Id. at *3. After filing various motions, a final hearing was set for

March 12, 2009.

After hearing, the court found that the parties primarily resided together from the birth

of the children until February 1, 2007, and that the parties equally supported the children

from February 1, 2007, until October 1, 2007. Id. The court thus concluded that no child

support was due prior to October 1, 2007. Id. Father did, however, owe a child support

arrearage of $21,356.63 for the period beginning October 1, 2007, and ending September 28,

2009. Id. The juvenile court, in its amended final order, entered a judgment in favor of

Mother for $21,356.63, calculated Father's prospective child support obligation, and declined

to award attorney's fees to either party. Id. Father timely appealed. In Jaiden I, this Court

noted that, although the August 18, 2008 order was not a final order, “[a]t the final trial . .

. the juvenile court nevertheless relied exclusively on the August 19 order—despite the

presentation of evidence showing Father ceased making $107,000 in November 2008 . . . .”

Id. at *4. Accordingly, in the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court in all respects

except as to the calculation of Father’s child support arrearage. On that issue, this Court

vacated the trial court, specifically holding that:

The juvenile court entered an order of temporary child support

on August 18, 2008, setting Father's child support obligation at

$329.56 per week based on a monthly gross income of

$8,917.00. The order, effective August 22, 2008, specifically

It is the policy of this court to use the initials of children and parties involved in juvenile 1

court actions to protect the privacy of the children involved.

-2-
reserved all remaining issues regarding child support arrearages

for trial and did not resolve the outstanding issue of paternity.

The order therefore was not a final judgment. At the final trial

in the matter, the juvenile court nevertheless relied exclusively

on the August 18 order—despite the presentation of evidence

showing Father ceased making $107,000 in November 2008—to

determine Father owed a child support arrearage of $8,082.12

for the period of August 22, 2008, to September 28, 2009.

* * *

In this case, Father was unemployed for a significant period of

time pending the first trial. This undisputed fact appears to have

been disregarded by the juvenile court. Because the “fairness of

a child support award depends on an accurate determination of

both parents' gross income or ability to support,” Massey v.

Casals, 315 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), we

conclude the juvenile court should have accounted for this

period of unemployment when calculating Father's child support

arrearage. The existence of a temporary order setting child

support pending trial does not bar reexamination and retroactive

modification of the award at trial; rather, a temporary order of

child support is an interlocutory order subject to retroactive

modification . . . . If the evidence at trial demonstrates

developments subsequent to the entry of the temporary order

undermine its calculation, the court should modify the award to

reflect the parties' actual circumstances. We must conclude the

juvenile court erred in calculating Father's child support

arrearage from August 22, 2008, to September 28, 2009, without

taking into account the approximately nine-month period of time

in which he was unemployed. We accordingly vacate the

juvenile court's award on this single issue and remand for further

consideration.

Jaiden I, 2011 WL 2306057, at *4– *5 (footnotes and some internal citations omitted).

Upon remand, on September 20, 2011, Father’s attorney prepared and submitted a

-3-
letter to the trial court. The letter, which was filed in the trial court on September 26, 2011,

2

states Father’s position regarding this Court’s holding in Jaiden I as follows:

The Court of Appeals remanded for a determination of

child support arrearage. . .between August 22, 2008 and

September 28, 2009, taking into consideration that [Father] was

not earning $107,000 during that entire period. The Court of

Appeals found that the Juvenile Court should have considered

[Father’s] actual income from unemployment and earning

$900.00 [per] week when he resumed employment . . . .

Father attached a child support worksheet to this letter. Concerning arrears, the letter and

attached worksheet summarize Father’s position as follows:

For the period of August 22, 2008 through November 7, 2008,

[Father’s] income was $107,000 and he had 106 days of

parenting time. . . . [Father] was obligated to pay child support

in the amount of $246.93 per week for 11 weeks or a total of

$2,716.23.

* * *

On March 12, 2009, the juvenile court. . .awarded 156

days of parenting time to [Father]. Prior to that time, between

November 8, 2008 and March 12, 2009 (18 weeks), there was a

change in father’s income as he began drawing unemployment

We note that, although Father was represented by counsel at the trial of this matter, he has chosen 2

to proceed pro se in this appeal. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and

substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere. As recently explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary.

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected

to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010–01401–COA–R3–CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.

12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App.2003)).

-4-
in the amount of $1,193.50 . . . . Mother’s income of $2,458.00

remained the same and the number of days for both parents

remained the same . . . . [T]he Mother. . .would be obligated to

pay [Father] $148.00 monthly child support, $34.16 per week

for 18 weeks for a total of $614.88.

* * *

As a result of the March 12, 2009 hearing, Father

received 156 days of parenting time and the mother received 209

days of parenting time. On July 7, 2009, [Father] became

employed earning $900.00 weekly. Considering the change in

the number of days for parenting time and that the parents’

income remained the same between March 13, 2009 through

July 6, 2009, Mother would have been obligated to pay Father

$510.00 per month or $117.70 per week for 16 weeks for a total

of $1,883.20 . . . for that period March 13, 2009 through July 6,

2009.

* * *

During the period of July 7, 2009 through September 28,

2009, 12 weeks, it is undisputed that Father’s weekly income for

this period was $900.00 per week minus standard deductions, or

$3,186.22 . . . . During this period of time, Mother’s child

support would have been $7.00 per month or $1.62 per week for

12 weeks for a total of $19.44 . . . for the period of July 7, 2009

through September 28, 2009.

For the entire period between August 22, 2008 through

September 28, 2009, [Father] owed $2,716.23 and [Mother]

owed $2,517.52. [Father] would owe [Mother] $198.91 during

the entire period. Accepting the fact that [Father] paid $8,083.12

during the entire period in question, he overpaid $7,884.21 and

is entitled to a credit of that amount against the $10,654.83.

Therefore, [Father] should be given a credit of $7,884.21

against the $10,654.83 child support arrearage assessed between

October 1, 2007 and November 7, 2008. As a result, [Father]

would only owe child support arrearage in the amount of

-5-
$2,770.62.

On September 26, 2011, in response to the foregoing position letter, Mother’s attorney

filed a letter with the trial court, taking the following position:

The Court of Appeals only directed this Court to take into

account the nine-month period of time [Father] was

unemployed. [Father] was employed until November 7, 2008.

Therefore, until that date, the Agreed Order should control.

[Father’s] support obligation was $329.56 per week. Therefore,

he owed $3,625.16 for eleven weeksthrough November 7, 2008.

The more difficult issue to resolve relates to the child

support calculation from November 7, 2008 until September 28,

2009. Your Honor ruled that due to the fact that an Agreed

Order had been in place, and [Father] had not sought to modify

said Order, the Agreed Order controlled [Father’s] obligation.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, and stated that, “If the evidence

at trial demonstrates developmentssubsequent to the entry of the

temporary order undermine its calculation, the Court should

modify the award to reflect the parties’ actual circumstances.”

[Father’sletter] arguesthat this Court must hold [Mother]

to her income as stated in the Agreed Order, which would result

in [Mother] owing child support to [Father] even though she was

the primary residential parent for the two children. This is a

nonsensical result that surely is not what was intended.

* * *

At the time of trial, [Mother] had four preschool age children.

[Mother] had never made more than $8.25 per hour. The Court

of Appeals did not instruct this court that it must leave the

August 22, 2008 Order in place except for [Mother’s] income.

It did state that the Order should be modified to reflect the

parties’ actual circumstances . . . .

Mother attached a child support worksheet to this letter, which sets out her position on child

support arrearage as follows:

-6-
[Father’s] child support obligation [from August 22, 2008

through November 7, 2008] from the Agreed Order was

$3,625.16.

* * *

For the time period of November 8, 2008 until March 12, 2008,

[Father’s] child support obligation should be $202.00 per month

or $47.00 per week. For eighteen weeks, his obligation would

be $846.00.

From March 13, 2009 until July 6, 2009, [Father’s] child

support obligation should be $151.00 per month or $35.00 per

week. For sixteen weeks, his obligation would be $846.00.

From July 7, 2009 until September 28, 2009, [Father’s]

child support obligation should be $639.00 per month or

$147.00 per week. For those twelve weeks, his obligation

would be $1,764.00.

[Father’s] total child support obligation from August 22,

2008 until September 28, 2009 is $6,795.16. [Father] made child

support payments during this period of time in the amount of

$8,083.12. Therefore, [Father] overpaid $1,287.96. Deducting

this from the $10,654.83 he owes from a previous time period,

[Father] owes $9,366.87.

A hearing took place on November 18, 2011. On December 16, 2011, the trial court

entered an order, stating, in relevant part:

1. The Court interprets the Court of Appeal’s opinion [i.e.,

Jaiden I] to mandate this Court to change only the Father’s

income for the period of time from August 22, 2008 to

September 28, 2009. While this Court thinks that the parties’

actual circumstances should be examined during this period of

time, the Court is restricted from doing so due to the Court of

Appeals’ Opinion.

2. Based upon the prior testimony at trial, the Court finds that

[Father] made $107,000.00 from August 22, 2008 until

-7-
November 7, 2008. This is a period of eleven weeks. Pursuant

to the attached child support worksheet, [Father’s] child support

obligation was $1,428.00 per month or $329.56 per week.

Therefore, [Father’s] child support obligation for this period of

time would be $3,625.16.

3. Based upon the prior testimony at trial, the Court finds that

[Father] made $1,193.00 per month for the period of November

8, 2008 through March 12, 2009. This is a period of eighteen

weeks. Pursuant to the attached child support worksheet,

[Father’s] child support obligation for this period would be

$56.00 per month or $12.92 per week. Therefore, [Father’s]

child support obligation for this period was $232.56.

4. Based upon the prior testimony at trial, the Court finds that

[Father] made $1,193.00 per month for the period of March 13,

2009 through July 6, 2009. This is a period of sixteen weeks.

Pursuant to the attached child support worksheet, [Mother’s]

child support obligation for this period would be $307.00 per

month or $70.85 per week. Therefore, [Mother’s] child support

obligation for this period was $1,113.60.

5. Based upon the prior testimony at trial, the Court finds that

[Father] made $3,186.22 per month for the period of July 6,

2009 through September 28, 2009. This is a period of twelve

weeks. Pursuant to the attached child support worksheet,

[Father’s] child support obligation for this period would be

$449.00 per month or $103.62 per week. Therefore, [Father’s]

child support obligation for this period was $1,243.44

6. Considering the foregoing amounts owed by the parties, from

August 22, 2008 until September 28, 2009, [Father’s] child

support obligation was $3,967.56. [Father] paid $8,083.12.

Therefore, [Father] overpaid $4,115.56 during this time period.

Deducting from the $10,654.83 he owes from the previous time

period, [Father] owes $6,539.27.

In reaching the conclusion that Father owes $6,539.27 in child support arrears, the

worksheets attached to the trial court’s order give Father a credit of $328.55 for the

children’s health insurance, and give Mother credit for $433.33 in work-related child care.

-8-
On January 17, 2012, Father filed a motion to alter or amend the December 16, 2011 order,

arguing, inter alia, that:

1. The order entered on December 16, 2011 continues to

provide the mother a $433.33 credit for child care expenses

which, in fact, she has not incurred nor is she expected [to incur]

child care expenses for the twin children. The Court should

modify the child support worksheet to delete the $433.33 child

care credit as such allowance is false and does not reflect “the

parties actual circumstances” . . . as specifically directed by the

Court of Appeals.

2. The Court should modify the child support worksheets to

provide the correct amount of health insurance premiums of

$438.33 that the Father actually pays for insurance coverage on

the minor children.

3. The Court of Appeals declined to overturn the juvenile

court’s imputation of $29,300 [in income to Mother] during the

period between October 1, 2007 and August 22, 2008. [Mother]

did not appeal the imputation of $29,300 income for any of the

period of time . . . .

4. [Mother’s attorney] argued . . . that the court should consider

her “actual circumstance” of earning only $300 monthly . . . .

5. Given the fact that [Mother] is no longer advocating for her

actual circumstance to reflect income at $300 monthly, there is

nothing in the Court of Appeals’ decision that should make this

court “think” that it is restricted from examining the actual

circumstances of the parties to correct information known to be

inaccurate, specifically amounts allocated for child care and

health insurance premiums . . . .

6. The worksheet for the period designated at “7-7-09 forward”

should be stricken as it reflects credit for in-home children that

appears inaccurate, fails to identify the names and birth dates of

the covered children, some of whom were not born as of 7-6-09

and should not be included in the calculation for the period set

forth in the court of appeals decision.

-9-
On February 3, 2012, Father filed a supplemental motion to alter or amend to clarify

his position that the trial court’s calculation of child support, based upon the December 16,

2011 order, was incorrect because it was based upon: (1) Mother receiving an erroneous

credit for work-related child care; (2) Father receiving less than full credit for his payment

of the children’s medical insurance premiums; and (3) Mother receiving credit for two

additional children in her home.

A hearing on Father’s motion to alter or amend was held on April 16, 2012. By order

of April 30, 2012, the trial court denied Father’s motion to the extent that it argued for

additional insurance credit for Father and denial of child care credit for Mother:

1. The Court interprets the Court of Appeals’ opinion as

instructing the court that the Court is restricted to modifying the

portion of the child support arrearage from August 22, 2008 to

September 28, 2009 to reflect the Father’s actual income. All

remaining variables from the child support worksheet submitted

with the August 18, 2008 Agreed Order shall remain

unmodified.

However, concerning the amounts owed by Father, the trial court modified the

December 16, 2011 order as follows:

2. From November 8, 2008 until July 6, 2009, [Father] was

unemployed. His income was $1,193.00 per month. This is a

period of thirty-four weeks. Pursuant to the child support

worksheet. . .[Father’s] weekly child support obligation during

this period of time was $12.92. Therefore, [Father’s] child

support obligation during this period of time was $439.28.

3

3. From July 7, 2009 until September 28, 2009, [Father’s]

income was $3,186.22. This is a period of twelve weeks.

Pursuant to the child support worksheet . . . [Father’s] weekly

child support obligation during this period of time was $136.85.

Therefore, [Father’s] child support obligation during this period

of time was $1,642.20.

We note that, although the April 30, 2012 order references an attached child support worksheet,

3

this attachment is not found in the record. 

-10-
5. Considering the calculations as based on [Father’s] actual

income from August 22, 2008 until September 28, 2009,

[Father’s] total child support obligation during this period of

time was $5,706.64. [Father] actually paid $8,083.12 during this

time period. Therefore, [Father] overpaid $2,376.48 during this

time. Deducting this sum from the $10,654.83 he owes from the

previous time period, [Father] owes a child support arrearage to

[Mother] in the amount of $8,278.35.

On May 17, 2012, Father filed a motion, asking the court to reconsider, arguing that

the April 30 order is incorrect in that it relies upon the August 18, 2008 order, which was

allegedly based upon erroneous facts as discussed above. The court denied Father’s motion

by order of May 30, 2012, stating:

The Court of Appeals in its remand specifically ordered a new

calculation of [Father’s] income. It did not order

reconsideration of any other variables, therefore the court feels

constrained to revisit the only issue it was ordered to do, i.e.,

[Father’s] income, not other child support variables.

Father appeals. The sole issue for review is whether the trial court misinterpreted the

law of the case, based upon this Court’s holding in Jaiden I, to limit its review to Father’s

income and to preclude it from considering other child support variables.

The law of the case doctrine in Tennessee has been clearly established:

[U]nder the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court's

decision on an issue of law is binding in later trials and appeals

of the same case if the facts on the second trial or appeal are

substantially the same as the facts in the first trial or appeal. The

doctrine applies to issues that were actually before the appellate

court in the first appeal and to issues that were necessarily

decided by implication. The doctrine does not apply to dicta.

Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 383 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Memphis Publ'g Co. v.

Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998)). As

explained in Memphis Publishing, the doctrine is not constitutionally mandated, nor is it a

limitation on the court's power, but “it is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice

which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided

by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. (citing Ladd by

-11-
Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd, 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citations

omitted)). The purpose of the rule is to promote “the finality and efficiency of the judicial

process, avoid[ ] indefinite relitigation of the same issue, foster [ ] consistent results in the

same litigation, and assure[ ] the obedience of trial courts to the decisions of appellate

courts.” Id. The exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are limited and a reconsideration

of an issue is permitted only if: (1) the evidence produced on remand is substantially different

than the evidence produced at the initial proceeding; (2) the earlier findings of law are

“clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice if allowed to stand”; (3) the prior

ruling is “contrary to a change in controlling law that occurred between the first and second

appeal.” Memphis Publ'g Co., 975 S.W.2d at 306.

As discussed above, in Jaiden I, this Court remanded only the issue of Father’s child

support arrearage to the trial court for determination. Our holding was based upon the

statement of the issue presented in the first appeal, i.e., “whether the juvenile court correctly

calculated Father’s child support arrearage from August 22, 2008, to September 28, 2009,

based upon an annual income of $107,000.” In the first appeal, no issue was raised

concerning other variables, e.g. insurance premiums, additional children, or child care

credits. Accordingly, this Court did not specifically address these additional variables, but

limited its review only to the question of whether the trial court had relied upon Father’s

actual income in making its calculations. As noted above, the law of the case doctrine only

applies to issues that were actually before the appellate court in the first appeal and to issues

that were necessarily decided by implication. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d at 383.

Because the question of variables other than Father’s actual income were not actually before

this Court in Jaiden I, the trial court’s interpretation of our opinion is, respectfully, myopic.

The gravamen of our holding in Jaiden I is that the parties’ actual circumstances

should dictate the calculation of their respective support obligations. In the first appeal, we

determined, based on the stated issue, that Father’s actual income was not used to calculate

his support obligation for the period August 22, 2008 to September 28, 2009. But, contrary

to the trial court’s interpretation, this Court said nothing about limiting the review only to

Father’s actual income. Rather, we clearly stated that, “[i]f the evidence at trial demonstrates

developments subsequent to the entry of the temporary order undermine its calculation, the

court should modify the award to reflect the parties’ actual circumstances.” The mandate,

then, was for the trial court to determine the parties’ actual circumstances, within the

parameters set in the opinion. For example, in Jaiden I, this Court specifically affirmed the

imputation of income to Mother from October 1, 2007 until August 22, 2008. Accordingly,

on remand, the trial court, under the law of the case doctrine, would be precluded from

revisiting that specific question. Likewise, under our holding in Jaiden I, the trial court is

precluded from revisiting the issue of attorney’s fees.

-12-
In addition, Jaiden I only addresses child support obligations and arrears arising on

or after August 22, 2008. In this regard, Jaiden I gave the trial court a specific mandate to

consider Father’s actual income only from August 22, 2008 going forward. However,

contrary to the trial court’s interpretation, this Court did not otherwise limit the trial court’s

review on remand concerning its consideration of factors and variables that may have

changed since the August 22, 2008 date. In fact, in Jaiden I, we cited extensively from the

case of Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), for the proposition

that the trial court retains discretion in determining support obligations. Jaiden I, 2011 WL

2306057, at *1–*2. Again, the gravamen of our holding in Jaiden I is that, in exercising its

discretion, the trial court should endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ actual

circumstances, which will necessarily change over the course of time, e.g., people remarry,

have more children, insurance premiums rise and fall, and child care needs change.

Accordingly, it was not this Court’s intention to limit the court’s discretion or its ability to

review all relevant variables that may have arisen or changed from August 22, 2008 until the

date of the hearing on remand. Rather, our opinion was intended to encourage the trial court

to ascertain the parties’ actual circumstances and to calculate the support obligations in

accordance with their respective realities. Upon remand, the court should not limit its

review, butshould allow evidence, from both sides, concerning changesin circumstances and

other relevant variables, from August 22, 2008 until the date of the hearing, in an effort to

ground its calculation of child support and any arrearage thereon on the totality of the actual

circumstances that exist, which is the only way to reach a just result.

Mother asks this Court to award her attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal.

Mother’s appellate brief makes no argument concerning the grounds for her request,

requesting only that “her attorney fees and costs be paid as a result of defending this appeal.”

An award of appellate attorney's fees is a matter within this Court's sound discretion. Archer

v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In considering a request for

attorney's fees on appeal, we consider the requesting party's ability to pay such fees, the

requesting party's success on appeal, whether the appeal was taken in good faith, and any

other equitable factorsrelevant in a given case. Darvarmanesh v. Gharacholou, No. M2004-

00262-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1684050, at * 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2005). There is no

doubt that Father owes a child support arrearage in this case. The only question is the

amount thereof. Because the trial court misinterpreted our opinion in Jaiden I, Mother has

incurred additional costs and fees in having to defend a second appeal of this matter. It

appears, from the record, that Father is in a better position to bear the burden of these costs

than Mother. Accordingly, we grant Mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred

in defense of this appeal, and remand for a calculation of the reasonable amount of these

fees.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further

-13-
proceedings consistent with this Opinion, including, but not limited to a determination of the

reasonable costs and fees associated with this appeal. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the

Appellant, Greg W., and his surety.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

-14-