alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>



<S>                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>               12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>           DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                DEC-31-1999

<CASH>                                 6,318,944
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                            122,699
<ALLOWANCES>                                0
<INVENTORY>                                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       6,441,643
<PP&E>                                13,349,416
<DEPRECIATION>                        (7,115,991)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        12,745,693
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                  2,342,768
<BONDS>                               18,408,189
<COMMON>                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                           (19,958,852)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>          12,745,693
<SALES>                                5,605,074
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       6,110,138
<CGS>                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          4,020,500
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                         238,337
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     1,900,432
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          (49,131)
<INCOME-TAX>                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (297,683)
<DISCONTINUED>                         5,998,474
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         (174,784)
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                           5,526,007
<EPS-BASIC>                              72.69
<EPS-DILUTED>                              72.69




</TABLE>
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 27, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
134431 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Marilyn Kelly Plaintiff-Appellee, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, v SC: 134431 Justices COA: 266078 Berrien CC: 2005-402405-FH THOMAS RAY SPANGLER, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH and KELLY JJ., would grant leave to appeal.

M ARKMAN , J., dissents and states as follows:

I would grant leave to appeal in this case to consider when offense variable (OV) 19 is properly scored. Ten points are sco red for OV 19 where the defendant has “interfered with or attempted to interfere with th e administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). In this case, d efendant hid himself and items used in methamphetamine production in a closet when the police arrived at the house to investigate a crime committed by another person. For doing so, he was scored ten points under OV 19. Given that it would be extraord inary for a criminal perpetrator not to attempt to hide evidence of his or her crime or to make such crime less det ectable, it would seem that OV 19 would almost always be scored under the tr ial court’s interpretation. Perhaps this is consistent with OV 19, but, if that was the Legislature’s intention, it would seem that it would have simply increased th e base level for theft offense s and other criminal offenses involving contraband. Becau se the guidelines are more than hortatory, and must be construed in the same fashion as any other binding law of this state, I would grant leave to enable a closer review of the Legislature’s intentions. See People v Barbee , 470 Mich 283 (2004).

p1120 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 27, 2007

Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

Misc. No. 5-05

In Re: RECOGNITION OF COURT'S THIRD CHIEF JUDGE

Before STEINBERG, Chief Judge, and GREENE, KASOLD, HAGEL, MOORMAN,

LANCE, DAVIS, and SCHOELEN, Judges.

O R D E R

Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7253(d)(3) and (d)(4), the term of a chief judge shall be for five

years or until the judge reaches age 70, unless before that time the chief judge leaves regular active

service as a judge of the Court or otherwise terminates service as chief judge. The Honorable

Donald L. Ivers began service as a judge of the Court on August 6, 1990, and became the Court's

third chief judge on September 15, 2004. His judicial term concludes on August 5, 2005; he

accordingly leaves regular active service on that date and is terminating his service as chief judge

at noon on that date. On consideration of the foregoing, and as provided under section

7253(d)(4)(B), it is

ORDERED that the Court recognizes the conclusion of active service by its third chief judge.

The Court acknowledges with gratitude the fifteen years of service of the Honorable Donald L. Ivers

as judge and chief judge. He departs with the thanks and good wishes of the Court. 

DATED: August 5, 2005 BY THE COURT:

JONATHAN R. STEINBERG

Chief Judge
NOTE : This order is nonprecedential.



# United States Court of Appeals

**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

NASDAQ, INC.,

Appellant

v.

INVESTORS EXCHANGE LLC,

Appellee

______________________

2022

- 1629

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. CBM2018

-

00039

.

______________________

O R D E R

The parties having so agreed, it is ordered that:

(1) The proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed. R. App.

P. 42 (b). Case: 22-1629 Document: 10 Page: 1 Filed: 06/09/2022N ASDAQ

, I NC

. V

. I NVESTORS E XCHANGE LLC 2

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

FOR THE COURT

June 9, 2022

Date /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: June 9, 2022 Case: 22-1629 Document: 10 Page: 2 Filed: 06/09/2022
FIRST AMENDMENT
                                       TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

First  Amendment to  Employment  entered  into as of the 28th day of June,  1999
between   HydroChem   Industrial   Services,   Inc.,  a  Delaware   corporation,
("Employer"), and Donovan Boyd, an individual ("Employee").

WHEREAS,  Employer and Employee are parties to an Employment  Agreement dated as
of September 26, 1997 (the "Employment Agreement"); and

WHEREAS,  Employer  and  Employee  desire to amend the  Employment  Agreement as
hereinafter set forth;

NOW  THEREFORE,  in  consideration  of the  premises and other good and valuable
consideration,  the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the
parties hereto agree as follows:

1. The fourth  paragraph of section 3 of the Employment  Agreement  shall be and
hereby is deleted, and the following shall be inserted in lieu thereof:

        " Employee shall be a participant in the Employer's  Deferred Bonus Plan
        (the "Plan").  Subject to all terms and conditions of the Plan, Employee
        shall be awarded  deferred  bonuses  thereunder as of May 1, 1999 in the
        amount of Eighty Thousand Dollars  ($80,000) and as of May 1, 2000 in an
        amount equal to his Performance  Bonus for 1999. Any further awards of a
        deferred  bonus  under the Plan shall be in the sole  discretion  of the
        Employer's board of directors."

2. Exhibit A to the Employment Agreement shall be and hereby is deleted.


IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  Employer and Employees have signed this First Amendment to
Employment Agreement as of the date first hereinabove set forth.

EMPLOYER                                                  EMPLOYEE

HydroChem Industrial Services, Inc.                    /s/ Donovan Boyd
                                                       ------------------
                                                          Donovan Boyd

By: /s/ Gary D. Noto
--------------------
   Gary D. Noto, President and
   Chief Operating Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Agriculture

###### Economic Research Service

# AGENCY:

Economic Research Service, USDA.

# ACTION:

Notice and request for comments; correction.

# SUMMARY:

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations at 5 CFR part 1320 (60 FR 44978, August 29, 1995), this notice announces the Economic Research Service's (ERS) intention to request approval for a new information collection from Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) State agencies. The study will collect existing data from the State agencies related to administrative cost reimbursement of sponsoring organizations that administer the family day care homes (FDCH) portion of the Program.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Linda Ghelfi, 202-694-5437.

## Correction

                        In the                         **Federal Register**                         issue of March 26, 2001, in FR Doc. 01-7396, on page 16441, in the second column, correct the “Dates” caption to read:                    

# DATES:

Comments on this notice must be received by May 30, 2001 to be assured of consideration.

Dated: April 16, 2001.

Susan Offutt.

Administrator, Economic Research Service.

[FR Doc. 01-10526  Filed 4-26-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-18-M
(86 South. 926)

#### Ex parte CLEMMONS.

(6 Div. 125.)

(Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 30, 1920.)

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals.

Paine Denson and P. E. St. John, both of Cullman, for appellant.

J. Q. Smith, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SAYRE, J.

Petition of Oscar Clemmons for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment of said court rendered in the case of Oscar Clemmons v. State, 86 South. 177. Writ denied.
#### Estate of Mary C. Russell, Deceased.

*Decedent's estate*— Desertion *by husband*— Bar *to participation in toife’s estate.*

A husband who has wilfully deserted his wife for a period of six years .prior to her death is not entitled to share in her estate.

Argued November 17, 1925.

Appeal No. 330, October T., 1925, by Gabriel Russell, from decree of O. C. Chester County, March T., 1925, dismissing exceptions to Auditor’s report in the estate of Mary O. Russell, deceased.

Before Porter, Henderson, Tbexler, Keller, Linn and Gawthrop, JJ.

Affirmed.

Exceptions to Auditor’s report.

Before Hattse, J.

The facts .are stated in the following opinion of the court below:

This decedent was the wife of Gabriel Russell. In the distribution of her estate, he claimed his share as surviving husband. His claim was contested on the ground that for more than a year prior to the wife’s death, he had wilfully and maliciously deserted her and had wilfully neglected to provide for her.

*495December 14, 1925:

The auditor found as a fact, from sufficient testimony that desertion had taken place and that it was wilful and malicious, “and he further found a wilful neglect on the part of the husband to provide for his wife.” This conduct continued for some six years prior to the wife’s death.

In November, 1917, the husband came to his home one night with a friend. Both were intoxicated and their conduct resulted in the husband’s arrest on the following day. His trouble was adjusted by the parties. A few weeks later, without explanation or warning, he disappeared from the home taking all his clothing and personal effects with him, and he remained away since that time. His wife died in December, 1923, and from the time he left until her death, he contributed nothing toward her support.

“No admissible testimony was submitted by him to' the auditor to excuse his going or to indicate that it was with his wife’s consent” and, under the testimony present and the facts found as to the act of his leaving, the law presumes that his desertion was wilful and malicious. Whelan v. Whelan, 183 Pa. 293; Hedderson v. Hedderson, 35 Pa. Sup. 629; Philips’ Est., 271 Pa. 129; Schreckengost’s Est., 77 Pa. Sup. 235.

The exceptions are dismissed and the report of the auditor is confirmed.

Exceptant appealed.

*Error assigned*was the decree of the court.

*W. S. Harris,*for appellant.

No appearance and no printed brief for appellee.

Per Curiam,

The decree is affirmed on the opinion of Judge Haxtse, dismissing exceptions to the report of the auditor.
#### General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Appellant, v David Farkos et al., Respondents.

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover possession of an automobile pursuant to the provisions of a retail installment contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Ritter, J.), dated March 3, 1986, which denied its application for an order of seizure pursuant to CPLR 7102.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff is the assignee of a retail installment contract and has a perfected security interest in New Jersey on the subject of the contract, an automobile which had been purchased in New Jersey. The automobile’s owner lived in New York and somehow procured a New York certificate of title which did not show the plaintiffs security interest. The automobile broke down and the owner had it towed to a garage. The garageman told the owner that the engine needed to be replaced. There was no further communication between the owner and the garageman after that. The garageman ultimately found the clear title and sold the automobile at a lien sale to satisfy his bill.

*739Meanwhile, the plaintiff attempted to recover the automobile because the owner defaulted in his payments. It discovered that the automobile had been sold to satisfy the garage-man’s and storage lien *(see,*Lien Law § 184). Since the automobile had been sold to the lienholder for the amount of the lien, the plaintiff moved to seize the automobile.

The court denied the plaintiff’s application for an order of seizure. It attributed the failure of the garageman to give notice to the plaintiff to either the plaintiff’s negligence in not perfecting its security interest in New York, or to the negligence of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles in issuing a clear title.

On appeal, the plaintiff seeks to assert statutory defenses to the notice the garageman gave the owner. These defenses are those of the owner, and the appellant should not be permitted to assert them *(cf., Ettlinger v National Sur. Co.,*221 NY 467 [in which a surety was not permitted to raise his principal’s defenses]).

The appellant, at the time of perfecting its security interest in New Jersey, was aware of the owner’s New York residence; nevertheless, the appellant failed to perfect its security interest in New York pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2118 (c) (1). Therefore, the lien sale in New York did in fact terminate the plaintiff’s New Jersey security interest.

We have considered the plaintiff’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Niehoff, J. P., Mangano, Bracken and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### Jesse WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. FANNON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-17530.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2011.*

Filed April 27, 2011.

Jesse Washington, Delano, CA, pro se.

Kenneth R. Williams, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: B. FLETCHER, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, and therefore denies Washington's request for oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesse Washington, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a jury trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an *655abuse of discretion a district court’s evidentiary rulings. *Tritchler v. Cnty. of Lake,*358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding witnesses who were not identified in Washington’s original pretrial statement because the topics upon which he alleged they would testify were not relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). To the extent that Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony may have been relevant, the district court properly exercised its discretion because the nature of that testimony should have been anticipated prior to the pretrial conference, and therefore should have been included in Washington’s pretrial statement pursuant to the court’s previous order. See *Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,*302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“‘Trial courts have broad authority to impose reasonable time limits.’ ” (citation omitted)).

Contrary to Washington’s contention, defendants were not judicially estopped from denying the use of excessive force based on testimony by another person in another case concerning different events. *See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,*270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir.2001) (explaining doctrine of judicial estoppel).

Washington’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6341 

To establish a loan program to promote energy conservation in rural areas. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

Mr. HOLDEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To establish a loan program to promote energy conservation 

in rural areas. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. GROWING RURAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY NET4 WORKS. 

5 The Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 901 

6 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 313A the 

7 following: 

8 ‘‘SEC. 313B. GROWING RURAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY NET9 WORKS. 

10 ‘‘(a) DEFINITION.—In this section the term ‘eligible 

11 borrower’ means— 


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2 

•HR 6341 IH

1 ‘‘(1) an entity that has received a loan or loan 

2 guarantee under this Act; or 

3 ‘‘(2) a cooperative that is eligible to receive a 

4 loan or loan guarantee under this Act. 

5 ‘‘(b) INTEREST-FREE LOANS.—The Secretary shall 

6 establish an initiative to promote energy efficiency by pro7 viding interest-free loans for the purposes of— 

8 ‘‘(1) making energy efficiency improvements; 

9 and 

10 ‘‘(2) achieving energy conservation. 

11 ‘‘(c) LOAN PURPOSES.—To promote the purposes de12 scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary shall make inter13 est-free loans to eligible borrowers to encourage such bor14 rowers to— 

15 ‘‘(1) invest in and facilitate consumer energy ef16 ficiency improvements; or 

17 ‘‘(2) increase energy conservation. 

18 ‘‘(d) REPAYMENT TERMS.—In carrying out this sec19 tion, the Secretary shall establish such reasonable terms 

20 and conditions as necessary to ensure participation by eli21 gible borrowers. 

22 ‘‘(e) FUNDING.—The Secretary shall use the fees col23 lected pursuant to section 313A(c) to provide the interest24 free loans authorized under this section. 


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3 

•HR 6341 IH

1 ‘‘(f) LIMITATIONS.—In carrying out this section, the 

2 Secretary shall— 

3 ‘‘(1) use only those fees required under section 

4 313A(c) that are collected for loans guaranteed 

5 under section 313A after the date of the enactment 

6 of this section; and 

7 ‘‘(2) require that the amount of the annual fee 

8 paid for the guarantee of a bond or note under sec9 tion 313A be equal to 50 basis points of the amount 

10 of the unpaid principal of the bond or note guaran11 teed under such section, and an additional loan 

12 origination fee equal to 50 such basis points shall be 

13 paid at the time the guarantee is approved. 

14 ‘‘(g) PROGRAM LEVEL.—The Secretary shall approve 

15 $3,000,000 in loan guarantees under this section to quali16 fied lenders as described in section 313A(b)(3) for the fis17 cal year ending September 30, 2010. 

18 ‘‘(h) SUNSET.—Subsection (f) shall not be effective 

19 on or after September 30, 2011.’’. 

Æ 


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