(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 

OF EDUCATION v. MURPHY ET VIR. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

No. 05–18. Argued April 19, 2006—Decided June 26, 2006 

After respondents prevailed in their Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) action to require petitioner school board to pay for

their son’s private school tuition, they sought fees for services rendered by an educational consultant during the proceedings, relying 

on an IDEA provision that permits a court to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to prevailing parents, 20 U. S. C.

§1415(i)(3)(B). The District Court granted their motion in part. Affirming, the Second Circuit noted that, under Crawford Fitting Co. v. 

J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, 

Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, a cost- or fee-shifting provision will not be

read to permit recovery of expert fees without explicit statutory authority, but concluded that a congressional Conference Committee 

Report relating to §1415(i)(3)(B) and a footnote in Casey referencing

that Report showed that the IDEA authorized such reimbursement. 

Held: Section §1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize prevailing parents to

recover expert fees. Pp. 3–12.

(a) The resolution of this question is guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause. While 

Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the States, any conditions it attaches to a State’s acceptance of such funds must be set out “unambiguously.” Pennhurst 

State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. Fund recipients are bound only by those conditions that they accept “voluntarily and knowingly,” ibid., and States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are “unaware” or which they are “unable to

ascertain,” ibid. Thus, the question here is whether the IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding expert fees. Pp. 3–4. 
2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Syllabus 

(b) The Court begins with the IDEA’s text, for if its “language is

plain,” the courts’ function “ ‘“is to enforce it according to its terms.” ’” 

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 

U. S. 1, 6. While §1415(i)(3)(B) provides for an award of “reasonable

attorneys’ fees,” it does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds

makes a State responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for the

services of experts. “Costs” is a term of art that does not generally 

include expert fees. The use of “costs” rather than “expenses” 

strongly suggests that §1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be an openended provision making States liable for all expenses. Moreover, 

§1415(i)(3)(B) says not that a court may award “costs” but that it may

award attorney’s fees “as part of the costs.” This language simply

adds reasonable attorney’s fees to the list of recoverable costs set out 

in 28 U. S. C. §1920, the general statute covering taxation of costs,

which is strictly limited by §1821. Thus, §1415(i)(3)(B)’s text does not 

authorize an award of additional expert fees, and it certainly fails to

present the clear notice required by the Spending Clause. Other 

IDEA provisions point strongly in the same direction. Of little significance here is a provision in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 requiring the General Accounting Office to collect

data on awards to prevailing parties in IDEA cases, but making no

mention of consultants or experts or their fees. And the fact that the 

provision directed the GAO to compile data on the hours spent by

consultants in IDEA cases does not mean that Congress intended for

States to compensate prevailing parties for fees billed by these consultants. Pp. 4–8. 

(c) Crawford Fitting Co. and Casey strongly reinforce the conclusion that the IDEA does not unambiguously authorize prevailing

parents to recover expert fees. Crawford Fitting Co.’s reasoning supports the conclusion that the term “costs” in §1415(i)(3)(B), like

“costs” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), the provision at issue 

there, is defined by the categories of expenses enumerated in 28 

U. S. C. §1920. This conclusion is buttressed by the principle, recognized in Crawford Fitting Co., that no statute will be construed to authorize taxing witness fees as costs unless the statute “refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.” 482 U. S., at 445. The conclusion that the IDEA 

does not authorize expert fee awards is confirmed even more dramatically by Casey, where the Court held that 42 U. S. C. §1988, a

fee-shifting provision with wording virtually identical to that of 20 

U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B), did not empower a district court to award expert fees to a prevailing party. 482 U. S., at 102. The Second Circuit 

misunderstood the meaning of the Casey footnote on which it relied. 

That footnote did not state that the Conference Committee Report set 

out the correct interpretation of §1415(i)(3)(B) or provided the clear 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Syllabus 

notice required under the Spending Clause. Its thrust was simply

that “attorneys’ fees,” standing alone, is generally not understood as

encompassing expert fees. Pp. 8–11. 

(d) Respondents’ additional arguments are unpersuasive. The 

IDEA’s goals of “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have 

available to them a free appropriate public education,” 

§1400(d)(1)(A), and of safeguarding parents’ right to challenge adverse school decisions are too general to provide much support for

their reading of the IDEA. And the IDEA’s legislative history is insufficient help, where everything other than that history overwhelmingly suggests that expert fees may not be recovered. Pp. 11–12. 

402 F. 3d 332, reversed and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed an 

opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. SOUTER, J., 

filed a dissenting opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 

which STEVENS and SOUTER, JJ., joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–18 

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 

OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER v. PEARL 

MURPHY ET VIR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2006]

 JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA 

or Act) provides that a court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents who prevail in 

an action brought under the Act. 111 Stat. 92, 20 U. S. C. 

§1415(i)(3)(B). We granted certiorari to decide whether 

this fee-shifting provision authorizes prevailing parents to

recover fees for services rendered by experts in IDEA 

actions. We hold that it does not. 

I 

Respondents Pearl and Theodore Murphy filed an action

under the IDEA on behalf of their son, Joseph Murphy, 

seeking to require petitioner Arlington Central School 

District Board of Education to pay for their son’s private 

school tuition for specified school years. Respondents

prevailed in the District Court, 86 F. Supp. 2d 354 (SDNY

2000), and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

affirmed, 297 F. 3d 195 (2002).

As prevailing parents, respondents then sought $29,350

in fees for the services of an educational consultant, 
2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

Marilyn Arons, who assisted respondents throughout the 

IDEA proceedings. The District Court granted respondents’ request in part. It held that only the value of Arons’ 

time spent between the hearing request and the ruling in

respondents’ favor could properly be considered charges

incurred in an “action or proceeding brought” under the 

Act, see 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B). 2003 WL 21694398, *9 

(SDNY, July 22, 2003). This reduced the maximum recovery to $8,650. The District Court also held that Arons, a 

nonlawyer, could be compensated only for time spent on

expert consulting services, not for time spent on legal 

representation, id., at *4, but it concluded that all the 

relevant time could be characterized as falling within the 

compensable category, and thus allowed compensation for 

the full $8,650, id., at *10. 

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

402 F. 3d 332 (2005). Acknowledging that other Circuits 

had taken the opposite view, the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit held that “Congress intended to and did

authorize the reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA actions.” Id., at 336. The court began by discussing two

decisions of this Court holding that expert fees could not

be recovered as taxed costs under particular cost- or feeshifting provisions. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987) (interpreting Fed. Rule Civ. 

Proc. 54(d) and 28 U. S. C. §1920); West Virginia Univ. 

Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991) (interpreting 42

U. S. C. §1988 (1988 ed.)). According to these decisions, the

court noted, a cost- or fee-shifting provision will not be read

to permit a prevailing party to recover expert fees without 

“‘explicit statutory authority’ indicating that Congress

intended for that sort of fee-shifting.” 402 F. 3d, at 336.

Ultimately, though, the court was persuaded by a statement in the Conference Committee Report relating to 20

U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B) and by a footnote in Casey that 

made reference to that Report. 402 F. 3d, at 336–337 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(citing H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986)). Based on 

these authorities, the court concluded that it was required 

to interpret the IDEA to authorize the award of the costs

that prevailing parents incur in hiring experts. 402 F. 3d, 

at 336. 

We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. ____ (2006), to resolve

the conflict among the Circuits with respect to whether

Congress authorized the compensation of expert fees to

prevailing parents in IDEA actions. Compare Goldring v. 

District of Columbia, 416 F. 3d 70, 73–77 (CADC 2005); 

Neosho R-V School Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F. 3d 

1022, 1031–1033 (CA8 2003); T. D. v. LaGrange School 

Dist. No. 102, 349 F. 3d 469, 480–482 (CA7 2003), with

402 F. 3d 332 (CA2 2005). We now reverse. 

II 

Our resolution of the question presented in this case is

guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause. U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1; 

see Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. ____ (2005). Like its 

statutory predecessor, the IDEA provides federal funds to

assist state and local agencies in educating children with 

disabilities “and conditions such funding upon a State’s 

compliance with extensive goals and procedures.” Board of 

Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester 

Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179 (1982).

Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it

disburses federal money to the States, see, e.g., South 

Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 206–207 (1987), but when

Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of

federal funds, the conditions must be set out “unambiguously,” see Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981); Rowley, supra, at 204, n. 26. 

“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is

much in the nature of a contract,” and therefore, to be bound 

by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds 
4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

must accept them “voluntarily and knowingly.” Pennhurst, 

451 U. S., at 17. States cannot knowingly accept conditions

of which they are “unaware” or which they are “unable to 

ascertain.” Ibid. Thus, in the present case, we must view

the IDEA from the perspective of a state official who is

engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should 

accept IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those

funds. We must ask whether such a state official would 

clearly understand that one of the obligations of the Act is 

the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert 

fees. In other words, we must ask whether the IDEA 

furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in 

this case. 

III 

A 

In considering whether the IDEA provides clear notice, 

we begin with the text. We have “stated time and again

that courts must presume that a legislature says in a

statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 

there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 

253–254 (1992). When the statutory “language is plain, the

sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition

required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according

to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union 

Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United 

States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 

(1989), in turn quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 

470, 485 (1917); internal quotation marks omitted). 

The governing provision of the IDEA, 20 U. S. C. 

§1415(i)(3)(B), provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding

brought under this section, the court, in its discretion,

may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs”

to the parents of “a child with a disability” who is the 

“prevailing party.” While this provision provides for an

award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” this provision does 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds makes a 

State responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for 

services rendered by experts.

Respondents contend that we should interpret the term

“costs” in accordance with its meaning in ordinary usage

and that §1415(i)(3)(B) should therefore be read to “authorize reimbursement of all costs parents incur in IDEA

proceedings, including expert costs.” Brief for Respondents 17. 

This argument has multiple flaws. For one thing, as the

Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged, “‘costs’ is a

term of art that generally does not include expert fees.”

402 F. 3d, at 336. The use of this term of art, rather than 

a term such as “expenses,” strongly suggests that 

§1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be an open-ended provision that makes participating States liable for all expenses

incurred by prevailing parents in connection with an

IDEA case—for example, travel and lodging expenses or 

lost wages due to time taken off from work. Moreover, 

contrary to respondents’ suggestion, §1415(i)(3)(B) does 

not say that a court may award “costs” to prevailing parents; rather, it says that a court may award reasonable 

attorney’s fees “as part of the costs” to prevailing parents. 

This language simply adds reasonable attorney’s fees

incurred by prevailing parents to the list of costs that 

prevailing parents are otherwise entitled to recover. This 

list of otherwise recoverable costs is obviously the list set

out in 28 U. S. C. §1920, the general statute governing the 

taxation of costs in federal court, and the recovery of 

witness fees under §1920 is strictly limited by §1821, 

which authorizes travel reimbursement and a $40 per 

diem. Thus, the text of 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B) does not 

authorize an award of any additional expert fees, and it

certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required

under the Spending Clause.

Other provisions of the IDEA point strongly in the same 
6 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

direction. While authorizing the award of reasonable 

attorney’s fees, the Act contains detailed provisions that 

are designed to ensure that such awards are indeed reasonable. See §§1415(i)(3)(C)–(G). The absence of any 

comparable provisions relating to expert fees strongly

suggests that recovery of expert fees is not authorized. 

Moreover, the lack of any reference to expert fees in 

§1415(d)(2) gives rise to a similar inference. This provision, which generally requires that parents receive “a full 

explanation of the procedural safeguards” available under 

§1415 and refers expressly to “attorneys’ fees,” makes no

mention of expert fees. 

B 

Respondents contend that their interpretation of 

§1415(i)(3)(B) is supported by a provision of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 that required the

General Accounting Office (GAO) to collect certain data, 

§4(b)(3), 100 Stat. 797 (hereinafter GAO study provision), 

but this provision is of little significance for present purposes. The GAO study provision directed the Comptroller 

General, acting through the GAO, to compile data on, 

among other things: “(A) the specific amount of attorneys’

fees, costs, and expenses awarded to the prevailing party” in

IDEA cases for a particular period of time, and (B) “the 

number of hours spent by personnel, including attorneys

and consultants, involved in the action or proceeding, and

expenses incurred by the parents and the State educational agency and local educational agency.” Id., at 797– 

798. 

Subparagraph (A) would provide some support for respondents’ position if it directed the GAO to compile data 

on awards to prevailing parties of the expense of hiring 

consultants, but that is not what subparagraph (A) says. 

Subparagraph (A) makes no mention of consultants or 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

experts or their fees.1 

Subparagraph (B) similarly does not help respondents. 

Subparagraph (B), which directs the GAO to study “the

number of hours spent [in IDEA cases] by personnel, 

including . . . consultants,” says nothing about the award 

of fees to such consultants. Just because Congress directed the GAO to compile statistics on the hours spent by

consultants in IDEA cases, it does not follow that Congress meant for States to compensate prevailing parties 

for the fees billed by these consultants. 

Respondents maintain that “Congress’ direction to the

GAO would be inexplicable if Congress did not anticipate

that the expenses for ‘consultants’ would be recoverable,” 

Brief for Respondents 19, but this is incorrect. There are 

many reasons why Congress might have wanted the GAO

to gather data on expenses that were not to be taxed as 

costs. Knowing the costs incurred by IDEA litigants might

be useful in considering future procedural amendments

(which might affect these costs) or a future amendment 

regarding fee shifting. And, in fact, it is apparent that the 

—————— 

1Because subparagraph (A) refers to both “costs” and “expenses” 

awarded to prevailing parties and because it is generally presumed that

statutory language is not superfluous, it could be argued that this provision manifests the expectation that prevailing parties would be awarded

certain “expenses” not included in the list of “costs” set out in 28 U. S. C.

§1920 and that expert fees were intended to be among these unenumerated “expenses.” This argument fails because, whatever expectation this 

language might seem to evidence, the fact remains that neither 20 U. S. C.

§1415 nor any other provision of the IDEA authorizes the award of any 

“expenses” other than “costs.” Recognizing this, respondents argue not

that they are entitled to recover “expenses” that are not “costs,” but that

expert fees are recoverable “costs.” As a result, the reference to awards of 

both “expenses” and “costs” does not support respondents’ position. The 

reference to “expenses” may relate to IDEA actions brought in state court, 

§1415(i)(2)(A), where “expenses” other than “costs” might be receivable. 

Or the reference may be surplusage. While it is generally presumed that 

statutes do not contain surplusage, instances of surplusage are not 

unknown. 
8 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

GAO study provision covered expenses that could not be

taxed as costs. For example, the GAO was instructed to

compile statistics on the hours spent by all attorneys

involved in an IDEA action or proceeding, even though the 

Act did not provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees by a

prevailing state or local educational agency.2 Similarly,

the GAO was directed to compile data on “expenses incurred by the parents,” not just those parents who prevail 

and are thus eligible to recover taxed costs. 

In sum, the terms of the IDEA overwhelmingly support

the conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the 

costs of experts or consultants. Certainly the terms of the

IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed

to attach such a condition to a State’s receipt of IDEA

funds. 

IV 

Thus far, we have considered only the text of the IDEA, 

but perhaps the strongest support for our interpretation of 

the IDEA is supplied by our decisions and reasoning in 

Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S. 437, and Casey, 499 U. S. 83. 

In light of those decisions, we do not see how it can be said

that the IDEA gives a State unambiguous notice regarding 

liability for expert fees. 

In Crawford Fitting, the Court rejected an argument

very similar to respondents’ argument that the term

“costs” in §1415(i)(3)(B) should be construed as an openended reference to prevailing parents’ expenses. It was 

argued in Crawford Fitting that Federal Rule of Civil 

—————— 

2 In 2000, the attorneys’ fees provision provided only an award to 

prevailing parents. See 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B). In 2004, Congress

amended §1415(i)(3)(B) to include two additional awards. See §101, 

118 Stat. 2724. The amendments provided awards “to a prevailing

party who is a State educational agency or local educational agency” 

where the complaint filed is frivolous or presented for an improper 

purpose, such as to harass, delay, or increase the cost of litigation. See 

20 U. S. C. A. §§1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III) (Supp. 2006). 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Procedure 54(d), which provides for the award of “costs” to

a prevailing party, authorizes the award of costs not listed 

in 28 U. S. C. §1821. 482 U. S., at 439. The Court held, 

however, that Rule 54(d) does not give a district judge 

“discretion to tax whatever costs may seem appropriate”; 

rather, the term “costs” in Rule 54(d) is defined by the list

set out in §1920. Id., at 441. Because the recovery of

witness fees, see §1920(3), is strictly limited by §1821, the 

Court observed, a broader interpretation of Rule 54(d)

would mean that the Rule implicitly effected a partial 

repeal of those provisions. Id., at 442. But, the Court 

warned, “[w]e will not lightly infer that Congress has

repealed §§1920 and 1821, either through Rule 54(d) or

any other provision not referring explicitly to witness

fees.” Id., at 445. 

The reasoning of Crawford Fitting strongly supports the 

conclusion that the term “costs” in 20 U. S. C. 

§1415(i)(3)(B), like the same term in Rule 54(d), is defined 

by the categories of expenses enumerated in 28 U. S. C. 

§1920. This conclusion is buttressed by the principle,

recognized in Crawford Fitting, that no statute will be 

construed as authorizing the taxation of witness fees as

costs unless the statute “refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.”

482 U. S., at 445; see also ibid. (“absent explicit statutory

or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant’s witness as costs, federal courts are

bound by the limitations set out in 28 U. S. C. §1821 and 

§1920”).

Our decision in Casey confirms even more dramatically

that the IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees. 

In Casey, as noted above, we interpreted a fee-shifting

provision, 42 U. S. C. §1988, the relevant wording of which 

was virtually identical to the wording of 20 U. S. C.

§1415(i)(3)(B). Compare ibid. (authorizing the award of

“reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to prevailing parents) with 42 U. S. C. §1988(b) (1988 ed.) (permit-
10 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

ting prevailing parties in certain civil rights actions to be

awarded “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). 

We held that §1988 did not empower a district court to

award expert fees to a prevailing party. Casey, supra, at 

102. To decide in favor of respondents here, we would 

have to interpret the virtually identical language in 20

U. S. C. §1415 as having exactly the opposite meaning. 

Indeed, we would have to go further and hold that the 

relevant language in the IDEA unambiguously means

exactly the opposite of what the nearly identical language 

in 42 U. S. C. §1988 was held to mean in Casey. 

The Court of Appeals, as noted above, was heavily influenced by a Casey footnote, see 402 F. 3d, at 336–337 (quoting 499 U. S., at 91–92, n. 5), but the court misunderstood 

the footnote’s meaning. The text accompanying the footnote argued, based on an analysis of several fee-shifting 

statutes, that the term “attorney’s fees” does not include 

expert fees. Id., at 88–91. In the footnote, we commented 

on petitioners’ invocation of the Conference Committee 

Report relating to 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B), which stated: 

“‘The conferees intend[ed] that the term “attorneys’ fees as 

part of the costs” include reasonable expenses and fees of 

expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or

evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . case.’” 499 U. S., at 91–92, n. 5 (quoting 

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5; ellipsis in original). 

This statement, the footnote commented, was “an apparent effort to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a 

term of art.” 499 U. S., at 92, n. 5. The footnote did not 

state that the Conference Committee Report set out the 

correct interpretation of §1415(i)(3)(B), much less that the 

Report was sufficient, despite the language of the statute,

to provide the clear notice required under the Spending

Clause. The thrust of the footnote was simply that the

term “attorneys’ fees,” standing alone, is generally not

understood as encompassing expert fees. Thus, Crawford 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

Fitting and Casey strongly reinforce the conclusion that

the IDEA does not unambiguously authorize prevailing 

parents to recover expert fees. 

V 

Respondents make several arguments that are not 

based on the text of the IDEA, but these arguments do not 

show that the IDEA provides clear notice regarding the 

award of expert fees.

Respondents argue that their interpretation of the 

IDEA furthers the Act’s overarching goal of “ensur[ing]

that all children with disabilities have available to them 

a free appropriate public education,” 20 U. S. C. 

§1400(d)(1)(A) as well as the goal of “safeguard[ing] the 

rights of parents to challenge school decisions that adversely affect their child.” Brief for Respondents 20.

These goals, however, are too general to provide much 

support for respondents’ reading of the terms of the IDEA.

The IDEA obviously does not seek to promote these goals 

at the expense of all other considerations, including fiscal 

considerations. Because the IDEA is not intended in all 

instances to further the broad goals identified by the

respondents at the expense of fiscal considerations, the 

goals cited by respondents do little to bolster their argument on the narrow question presented here.3 

Finally, respondents vigorously argue that Congress

clearly intended for prevailing parents to be compensated 

for expert fees. They rely on the legislative history of

§1415 and in particular on the following statement in the 

—————— 

3Respondents note that a GAO report stated that expert witness fees 

are reimbursable expenses. See Brief for Respondents 19 (citing GAO, 

Special Education: The Attorney Fees Provision of Public Law 99–372,

p. 13 (Nov. 1989)). But this passing reference in a report issued by an 

agency not responsible for implementing the IDEA is plainly insufficient to provide clear notice regarding the scope of the conditions 

attached to the receipt of IDEA funds. 
12 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of the Court

Conference Committee Report, discussed above: “The

conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of

the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert 

witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of

the . . . case.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5. 

Whatever weight this legislative history would merit in

another context, it is not sufficient here. Putting the

legislative history aside, we see virtually no support for 

respondents’ position. Under these circumstances, where 

everything other than the legislative history overwhelming suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the 

legislative history is simply not enough. In a Spending

Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly 

told regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those funds. Here, in the face of the unambiguous

text of the IDEA and the reasoning in Crawford Fitting 

and Casey, we cannot say that the legislative history on

which respondents rely is sufficient to provide the requisite fair notice. 

* * * 

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–18 

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 

OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER v. PEARL 

MURPHY ET VIR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2006] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and concurring in 

the judgment. 

I agree, in the main, with the Court’s resolution of this 

case, but part ways with the Court’s opinion in one respect. The Court extracts from Pennhurst State School and 

Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), a “clear 

notice” requirement, and deems it applicable in this case

because Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as it did the legislation at issue 

in Pennhurst, pursuant to the Spending Clause. Ante, at 

3–4. That extraction, in my judgment, is unwarranted. 

Pennhurst’s “clear notice” requirement should not be

unmoored from its context. The Court there confronted a 

plea to impose “an unexpected condition for compliance—a

new [programmatic] obligation for participating States.” 

Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 790, n. 17 (1983). The 

controversy here is lower key: It concerns not the educational programs IDEA directs school districts to provide,

but “the remedies available against a noncomplying [district].” Ibid; see post, at 9–11 (BREYER, J., dissenting).

The Court’s repeated references to a Spending Clause

derived “clear notice” requirement, see ante, at 3–4, 6, 8, 

11, and n. 3, 12, are questionable on other grounds as well. 

For one thing, IDEA was enacted not only pursuant to 
2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

Congress’ Spending Clause authority, but also pursuant to

§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith v. Robinson, 

468 U. S. 992, 1009 (1984) (IDEA’s predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act, was “set up by Congress to

aid the States in complying with their constitutional 

obligations to provide public education for handicapped 

children.”). Furthermore, no “clear notice” prop is needed

in this case given the twin pillars on which the Court’s 

judgment securely rests. First, as the Court explains, 

ante, at 4–6, the specific, attorneys’-fees-oriented, provisions of IDEA, i.e., 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)–(G);

§1415(d)(2)(L), “overwhelmingly support the conclusion 

that prevailing parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants,” ante, at 8. Those provisions place 

controls on fees recoverable for attorneys’ services, without

mentioning costs parents might incur for other professional services and controls geared to those costs. Second, 

as the Court develops, prior decisions closely in point

“strongly suppor[t],” even “confir[m] . . . dramatically,”

today’s holding that IDEA trains on attorneys’ fees and 

does not authorize an award covering amounts paid or

payable for the services of an educational consultant. 

Ante, at 9 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 

482 U. S. 437 (1987), and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. 

v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991)). 

For the contrary conclusion, JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent 

relies dominantly on a Conference Report stating the

conferees’ view that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the 

costs” includes “expenses and fees of expert witnesses” and

payments for tests necessary for the preparation of a case. 

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).1 Including costs of consultants and 

—————— 

1The relevant statement from the Conference Report reads in its

entirety: 

“The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

tests in §1415(i)(3)(B) would make good sense in light of 

IDEA’s overarching goal, i.e., to provide a “free appropriate public education” to children with disabilities, 

§1400(d)(1)(A). See post, at 5–8 (BREYER, J., dissenting). 

But Congress did not compose §1415(i)(3)(B)’s text,2 as it 

did the texts of other statutes too numerous and varied to 

ignore, to alter the common import of the terms “attorneys’ 

fees” and “costs” in the context of expense-allocation legislation. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1988(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. 

III) (added in 1991 specifically to “include expert fees as

part of the attorney’s fee”); Casey, 499 U. S., at 88–92, and 

n. 4 (citing variously composed statutes that “explicitly 

shift expert . . . fees as well as attorney’s fees”). Given the 

—————— 

costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the 

reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the action or

proceeding, as well as traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating a case.” H. R. Conf. Rep. 99–687, at 5.

Although the Conference Report goes on to consider other matters,

including controls on attorneys’ fees, nothing further is said on expert

witness fees or test costs. 

2At the time the Conference Report was submitted to the Senate and 

House, sponsors of the legislation did not mention anything on the floor 

about expert or consultant fees. They were altogether clear, however,

that the purpose of the legislation was to “reverse” this Court’s decision

in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984). In Smith, the Court held 

that, under the statute as then designed, prevailing parents were not

entitled to attorneys’ fees. See 132 Cong. Rec. 16823 (1986) (remarks of 

Sen. Weicker) (“In adopting this legislation, we are rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Smith versus Robinson.”); id., at 16824 

(remarks of Sen. Kerry) (“This vital legislation reverses a U. S. Supreme Court decision Smith versus Robinson[.]”); id., at 17608–17609 

(remarks of Rep. Bartlett) (“I support those provisions in the conference 

agreement that, in response to the Supreme Court decision in . . . Smith

versus Robinson, authoriz[e] the awarding of reasonable attorneys’ fees

to parents who prevail in special education court cases.”); id., at 17609 

(remarks of Rep. Biaggi) (“This legislation clearly supports the intent of 

Congress back in 1975 and corrects what I believe was a gross misinterpretation of the law. Attorneys’ fees should be provided to those 

individuals who are being denied access to the educational system.”). 
4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

constant meaning of the formulation “attorneys’ fees as

part of the costs” in federal legislation, we are not at liberty to rewrite “the statutory text adopted by both Houses 

of Congress and submitted to the President,” id., at 98, to 

add several words Congress wisely might have included.

The ball, I conclude, is properly left in Congress’ court to 

provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing 

expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations already authorize,3 along with any specifications, 

conditions, or limitations geared to those fees and expenses 

Congress may deem appropriate. Cf. §1415(i)(3)(B)–(G);

§1415(d)(2)(L) (listing only attorneys’ fees, not expert or

consulting fees, among the procedural safeguards about

which school districts must inform parents).

In sum, although I disagree with the Court’s rationale to

the extent that it invokes a “clear notice” requirement tied

to the Spending Clause, I agree with the Court’s discussion

of IDEA’s terms, ante, at 4–6, and of our decisions in Crawford and Casey, ante, at 8–11. Accordingly, I concur in part

in the Court’s opinion, and join the Court’s judgment. 

—————— 

3Under 34 C. F. R. §300.502(b)(1) (2005), a “parent has the right to

an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent

disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency.” 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

SOUTER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–18 

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 

OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER v. PEARL 

MURPHY ET VIR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2006] 

JUSTICE SOUTER, dissenting. 

I join JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent and add this word only

to say outright what would otherwise be implicit, that I 

agree with the distinction he draws between this case and 

Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181 (2002). See post, at 10–11 

(citing Barnes, supra, at 191 (SOUTER, J., concurring)). 

Beyond that, I emphasize the importance for me of §4 of

the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 100 

Stat. 797, as amended, 20 U. S. C. A. §1415 note, which

mandated the study by what is now known as the Government Accountability Office. That section, of equal

dignity with the fee-shifting provision enacted by the same 

statute, makes JUSTICE BREYER’s resort to the related 

Conference Report the reasonable course. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–18 

ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 

OF EDUCATION, PETITIONER v. PEARL 

MURPHY ET VIR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2006] 

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and 

JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting. 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA 

or Act), 20 U. S. C. A. §1400 et seq., (Supp. 2006), says that 

a court may “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of 

the costs to the parents” who are prevailing parties. 

§1415(i)(3)(B). Unlike the Court, I believe that the word 

“costs” includes, and authorizes payment of, the costs of 

experts. The word “costs” does not define its own scope. 

Neither does the phrase “attorneys’ fees as part of costs.”

But Members of Congress did make clear their intent by, 

among other things, approving a Conference Report that 

specified that “the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ 

include[s] reasonable expenses of expert witnesses and 

reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to 

be necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the action or proceeding.” H. R. Conf. Rep. 

No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986); Appendix A, infra, at 19. No 

Senator or Representative voiced any opposition to this

statement in the discussion preceding the vote on the 

Conference Report—the last vote on the bill before it was 

sent to the President. I can find no good reason for this

Court to interpret the language of this statute as meaning

the precise opposite of what Congress told us it intended. 
2 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

I 

There are two strong reasons for interpreting the statutory phrase to include the award of expert fees. First, that 

is what Congress said it intended by the phrase. Second, 

that interpretation furthers the IDEA’s statutorily defined 

purposes. 

A 

Congress added the IDEA’s cost-shifting provision when 

it enacted the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 

1986 (HCPA), 100 Stat. 796. Senator Lowell Weicker 

introduced the relevant bill in 1985. 131 Cong. Rec. 1979–

1980 (1985). As introduced, it sought to overturn this

Court’s determination that the then-current version of the 

IDEA (and other civil rights statutes) did not authorize

courts to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parents in

IDEA cases. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984). 

The bill provided that “[i]n any action or proceeding 

brought under this subsection, the court, in its discretion,

may award a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs

to a parent or legal representative of a handicapped child 

or youth who is the prevailing party.” 131 Cong. Rec. 

1980; see S. Rep. No. 99–112, p. 2 (1985). 

After hearings and debate, several Senators introduced

a new bill in the Senate that would have put a cap on 

attorneys’ fees for legal services lawyers, but at the same

time would have explicitly authorized the award of “a

reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable witness fees, and 

other reasonable expenses of the civil action, in addition to 

the costs to a parent . . . who is the prevailing party.” Id., 

at 7 (emphasis added). While no Senator objected to the 

latter provision, some objected to the cap. See, e.g., id., at 

17–18 (Additional Views of Senators Kerry, Kennedy, Pell,

Dodd, Simon, Metzenbaum and Matsunaga) (accepting 

cost-shifting provision, but objecting to cap and other 

aspects of the bill). A bipartisan group of Senators, led by 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Senators Hatch and Weicker, proposed an alternative bill 

that authorized courts to award “a reasonable attorney’s

fee in addition to the costs to a parent” who prevailed. Id., 

at 15–16 (Additional Views of Senators Hatch, Weicker,

Stafford, Dole, Pell, Matsunaga, Simon, Kerry, Kennedy, 

Metzenbaum, Dodd, and Grassley); 131 Cong. Rec. 21389.

Senator Weicker explained that the bill: 

“will enable courts to compensate parents for whatever reasonable costs they had to incur to fully secure 

what was guaranteed to them by the EHA. As in other 

fee shifting statutes, it is our intent that such awards

will include, at the discretion of the court, reasonable 

attorney’s fees, necessary expert witness fees, and other 

reasonable expenses which were necessary for parents 

to vindicate their claim to a free appropriate public 

education for their handicapped child.” Id., at 21390 

(emphasis added). 

Not a word of opposition to this statement (or the provision) was voiced on the Senate floor, and S. 415 passed 

without a recorded vote. Id., at 21393. 

The House version of the bill also reflected an intention 

to authorize recovery of expert costs. Following the House 

hearings, the Committee on Education and Labor produced a substitute bill that authorized courts to “award 

reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs” to prevailing parents. H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, pp. 1, 5 (1985) (emphasis added). The House Report stated that 

“The phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes expenses of 

expert witnesses; the reasonable costs of any study, report, test, or project which is found to be necessary for 

the preparation of the parents’ or guardian’s due process hearing, state administrative review or civil action;

as well as traditional costs and expenses incurred in 

the course of litigating a case (e.g., depositions and interrogatories).” Id., at 6 (emphasis added). 
4 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

No one objected to this statement. By the time H. R. 1523 

reached the floor, another substitute bill was introduced. 

131 Cong. Rec. 31369 (1985). This new bill did not change 

in any respect the text of the authorization of expenses 

and costs. It did add a provision, however, that directed

the General Accounting Office (GAO)—now known as the 

Government Accountability Office, see 31 U. S. C. A. §731 

note (Supp. 2006)—to study and report to Congress on the 

fiscal impact of the cost-shifting provision. See id., at 

31369–31370. The newly substituted bill passed the

House without a recorded vote. Id., at 31377. 

Members of the House and Senate (including all of the 

primary sponsors of the HCPA) then met in conference to

work out certain differences. At the conclusion of those 

negotiations, they produced a Conference Report, which

contained the text of the agreed-upon bill and a “Joint 

Explanatory Statement of the Committee of the Conference.” See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687 (1986), Appendix 

A, infra. The Conference accepted the House bill’s GAO 

provision with “an amendment expanding the data collection requirements of the GAO study to include information 

regarding the amount of funds expended by local educational agencies and state educational agencies on civil 

actions and administrative proceedings.” Id., at 7. And it 

accepted (with minor changes) the cost-shifting provisions 

provided in both the Senate and House versions. The 

conferees explained: 

“With slightly different wording, both the Senate bill 

and the House amendment provide for the awarding 

of attorneys’ fees in addition to costs. The Senate recedes to the House and the House recedes to the Senate with an amendment clarifying that ‘the court, in

its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees 

as part of the costs . . .’ This change in wording incorporates the Supreme Court[’s] Marek v. Chesny deci-
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

sion [473 U. S 1 (1985)]. The conferees intend that the 

term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the 

reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is 

found to be necessary for the preparation of the parent 

or guardian’s case in the action or proceeding, as well 

as traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating 

a case.” Id., at 5 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

The Conference Report was returned to the Senate and

the House. A motion was put to each to adopt the Conference Report, and both the Senate and the House agreed to 

the Conference Report by voice votes. See Appendix B, 

infra, at 22 (Senate); Appendix C, infra, at 23 (House). No 

objection was raised to the Conference Report’s statement

that the cost-shifting provision was intended to authorize 

expert costs. I concede that “sponsors of the legislation did

not mention anything on the floor about expert or consultant fees” at the time the Conference Report was submitted. Ante, at 3, n. 2 (GINSBURG, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in judgment). But I do not believe that silence 

is significant in light of the fact that every Senator and 

three of the five Representatives who spoke on the floor 

had previously signed his name to the Conference Report—a Report that made Congress’ intent clear on the 

first page of its explanation. See Appendix A, infra, at 19. 

And every Senator and Representative that took the floor 

preceding the votes voiced his strong support for the Conference Report. 132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986) (Senate); id., at 17607–17612 (House). The upshot is that

Members of both Houses of Congress voted to adopt both

the statutory text before us and the Conference Report 

that made clear that the statute’s words include the expert

costs here in question. 

B 

The Act’s basic purpose further supports interpreting 
6 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the provision’s language to include expert costs. The 

IDEA guarantees a “free” and “appropriate” public education for “all” children with disabilities. 20 U. S. C. A. 

§1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 2006); see also §1401(9)(A) (defining 

“free appropriate public education” as one “provided at

public expense,” “without charge”); §1401(29) (defining 

“special education” as “specially designed instruction, at 

no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with

a disability” (emphasis added)). 

Parents have every right to become involved in the Act’s

efforts to provide that education; indeed, the Act encourages their participation. §1400(c)(5)(B) (IDEA “ensur[es]

that families of [disabled] children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at

school”). It assures parents that they may question a

school district’s decisions about what is “appropriate” for

their child. And in doing so, they may secure the help of 

experts. §1415(h)(1) (parents have “the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with

special knowledge or training with respect to the problems

of children with disabilities”); see generally Schaffer v. 

Weast, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 3–4) (detailing 

Act’s procedures); Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central 

School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 205– 

206 (1982) (emphasizing importance of Act’s procedural 

guarantees).

The practical significance of the Act’s participatory

rights and procedural protections may be seriously diminished if parents are unable to obtain reimbursement for 

the costs of their experts. In IDEA cases, experts are 

necessary. See Kuriloff & Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair

Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 35, 40 (1997)

(detailing findings of study showing high correlation between use of experts and success of parents in challenging 

school district’s plan); Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Process?: Affecting the Outcome of Special Education 

Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 Law & Contemp. Prob. 89, 

100–101, 109 (1985) (same); see also Brief for National

Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae 6–15 

(collecting sources); cf. Schaffer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 

5) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (“[T]he vast majority of 

parents whose children require the benefits and protections provided in the IDEA lack knowledge about the 

educational resources available to their child and the 

sophistication to mount an effective case against a districtproposed IEP” (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted)).

Experts are also expensive. See Brief for Respondents 

28, n. 17 (collecting District Court decisions awarding 

expert costs ranging from $200 to $7,600, and noting three 

reported cases in which expert awards exceeded $10,000). 

The costs of experts may not make much of a dent in a 

school district’s budget, as many of the experts they use in

IDEA proceedings are already on the staff. Cf. Oberti v. 

Board of Ed. Clementon School Dist., 995 F. 2d 1204, 1219 

(CA3 1993). But to parents, the award of costs may matter enormously. Without potential reimbursement, parents may well lack the services of experts entirely. See 

Department of Education, M. Wagner et al., The Individual and Household Characteristics of Youth With Disabilities: A Report from the National Longitudinal Transition Study–2 (NLTS–2), pp. 3–5 (Aug. 2003) (finding 

that 25% of disabled children live in poverty and 65%

live in households with incomes less than $50,000); see

Department ofEducation, M. Wagner et al., The Children We Serve: The Demographic Characteristics of Elementary and Middle School Students with Disabilities 

and Their Households, p. 28 (Sept. 2002), available at 

http://www.seels.net/designdocs /SEELS_Children_We_ 

Serve_Report.pdf (as visited June 23, 2006, and available 

in Clerk of Court’s case file) (finding that 36% of disabled 
8 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

children live in households with incomes of $25,000 or 

less).

In a word, the Act’s statutory right to a “free” and “appropriate” education may mean little to those who must 

pay hundreds of dollars to obtain it. That is why this

Court has previously avoided interpretations that would

bring about this kind of result. See School Comm. of 

Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359 

(1985) (construing IDEA provision granting equitable 

authority to courts to include the power to order reimbursement for parents who switch their child to private 

schools if that decision later proves correct); id., at 370 

(without cost reimbursement for prevailing parents, “the 

child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the

parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper 

individualized education plan (IEP), and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete”); Florence 

County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, 13 (1993) 

(holding that prevailing parents are not barred from reimbursement for switching their child to a private school 

that does not meet the IDEA’s definition of a free and 

appropriate education). In Carter, we explained: “IDEA

was intended to ensure that children with disabilities 

receive an education that is both appropriate and free. To 

read the provisions of §1401(a)(18) to bar reimbursement 

in the circumstances of this case would defeat this statutory purpose.” Id., at 13–14 (citation omitted). 

To read the word “costs” as requiring successful parents

to bear their own expenses for experts suffers from the 

same problem. Today’s result will leave many parents and 

guardians “without an expert with the firepower to match

the opposition,” Schaffer, supra, at __ (slip op., at 11), a far

cry from the level playing field that Congress envisioned. 

II 

The majority makes essentially three arguments against 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

this interpretation. It says that the statute’s purpose and

“legislative history is simply not enough” to overcome: (1) 

the fact that this is a Spending Clause case; (2) the text of 

the statute; and (3) our prior cases which hold that the 

term “costs” does not include expert costs. Ante, at 12. I 

do not find these arguments convincing. 

A 

At the outset the majority says that it “is guided by the

fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the

Spending Clause.” Ante, at 3. “In a Spending Clause

case,” the majority adds, “the key is not what a majority of 

the Members of both Houses intend but what the States 

are clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with 

the acceptance of those funds.” Ante, at 12. Thus, the 

statute’s “conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’” 

Ante, at 3–4 (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 

Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) and Rowley, 458 U. S., at 

204, n. 26). And “[w]e must ask” whether the statute

“furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in 

this case.” Ante, at 4. 

I agree that the statute on its face does not clearly tell 

the States that they must pay expert fees to prevailing 

parents. But I do not agree that the majority has posed 

the right question. For one thing, we have repeatedly

examined the nature and extent of the financial burdens 

that the IDEA imposes without reference to the Spending

Clause or any “clear-statement rule.” See, e.g., Burlington, supra, at 369 (private school fees); Carter, supra, at 13 

(same); Smith, 468 U. S., at 1010–1011 (attorneys’ fees); 

Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 

U. S. 66, 76–79 (1999) (continuous nursing service); but 

see id., at 83 (THOMAS, J., joined by KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Those cases did not ask whether the statute “furnishes clear notice” to the affirmative obligation or liability at issue. 
10 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

 MURPHY 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

For another thing, neither Pennhurst nor any other case 

suggests that every spending detail of a Spending Clause

statute must be spelled out with unusual clarity. To the 

contrary, we have held that Pennhurst’s requirement that

Congress “unambiguously” set out “a condition on the 

grant of federal money” does not necessarily apply to 

legislation setting forth “the remedies available against a 

noncomplying State.” Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 

790, n. 17 (1983) (emphasis added) (rejecting Pennhurstbased argument that Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 did not unambiguously provide that the 

Secretary could recover federal funds that are misused by

a State). We have added that Pennhurst does not require

Congress “specifically” to “identify” and “proscribe each 

condition in [Spending Clause] legislation.” Jackson v. 

Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 183 (2005) (rejecting argument that Pennhurst precluded interpreting Title

IX’s private cause of action to encompass retaliation (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also 

Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 665–666 

(1985). And we have denied any implication that “suits

under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or

that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they

raise.” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 188–189, n. 2 

(2002) (emphasis added).

These statements and holdings are not surprising. After 

all, the basic objective of Pennhurst’s clear-statement 

requirement does not demand textual clarity in respect to

every detail. That is because ambiguity about the precise

nature of a statutory program’s details—particularly 

where they are of a kind that States might have anticipated—is rarely relevant to the basic question: Would the 

States have accepted the Federal Government’s funds had 

they only known the nature of the accompanying conditions? Often, the later filling-in of details through judicial 

interpretation will not lead one to wonder whether fund-
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ing recipients would have agreed to enter the basic program at all. Given the nature of such details, it is clear 

that the States would have entered the program regardless. At the same time, to view each statutory detail of a 

highly complex federal/state program (involving say, 

transportation, schools, the environment) simply through

the lens of linguistic clarity, rather than to assess its 

meanings in terms of basic legislative purpose, is to risk a

set of judicial interpretations that can prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objectives or that

might well reduce a program in its details to incoherence. 

This case is about just such a detail. Permitting parents

to recover expert fees will not lead to awards of “indeterminate magnitude, untethered to compensable harm” and 

consequently will not “pose a concern that recipients of 

federal funding could not reasonably have anticipated.” 

Barnes, 536 U. S., at 191 (SOUTER, J., joined by O’Connor,

J., concurring) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Unlike, say, punitive damages, an award of 

costs to expert parties is neither “unorthodox” nor “indeterminate,” and thus does not throw into doubt whether 

the States would have entered into the program. Id., at 

188. If determinations as to whether the IDEA requires

States to provide continuing nursing services, Cedar Rapids, supra, or reimbursement for private school tuition, 

Burlington, supra, do not call for linguistic clarity, then

the precise content of recoverable “costs” does not call for

such clarity here a fortiori. 

B 

If the Court believes that the statute’s language is

unambiguous, I must disagree. The provision at issue 

says that a court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as 

part of the costs” to parents who prevail in an action

brought under the Act. 20 U. S. C. A. §1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp. 

2006). The statute neither defines the word “costs” nor 
12 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

points to any other source of law for a definition. And the 

word “costs,” alone, says nothing at all about which costs 

falls within its scope.

Neither does the statutory phrase—“as part of the costs

to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party”—taken in its entirety unambiguously foreclose an award of expert fees. I agree that, read literally, 

that provision does not clearly grant authority to award 

any costs at all. And one might read it, as the Court does,

as referencing another federal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1920, 

which provides that authority. See ante, at 5; see also 

§1920 (federal taxation of cost statute). But such a reading is not inevitable. The provision (indeed, the entire 

Act) says nothing about that other statute. And one can, 

consistent with the language, read the provision as both

embodying a general authority to award costs while also

specifying the inclusion of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” as

part of those costs (as saying, for example, that a court

“may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of [a] costs 

[award]”). 

This latter reading, while linguistically the less natural, 

is legislatively the more likely. The majority’s alternative

reading, by cross-referencing only the federal general costawarding statute (which applies solely in federal courts),

would produce a jumble of different cost definitions applicable to similar IDEA administrative and state-court 

proceedings in different States. See §1920 (“A judge or

clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the 

following. . . .” (emphasis added)). This result is particularly odd, as all IDEA actions must begin in state due 

process hearings, where the federal cost statute clearly 

does not apply, and the overwhelming majority of these

actions are never appealed to any court. See GAO, Report

to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Health, 

Education, Labor and Pensions, U. S. Senate, Special 

Education: Numbers of Formal Disputes are Generally 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 13 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Low and States Are Using Mediation and Other Strategies 

to Resolve Conflicts (GAO–03–897), p. 13 (2003) (approximately 3,000 administrative hearings annually; under

10% appealed to state or federal court); see also Moore v. 

District of Columbia, 907 F. 2d 165, 166 (CADC 1990) (en

banc) (joining other Circuits in holding that IDEA authorizes an “award of attorney fees to a parent who prevails in 

[IDEA] administrative proceedings”). And when parents

do appeal, they can file their actions in either state or 

federal courts. 20 U. S. C. A. §1415(i)(2)(A) (Supp. 2006). 

Would Congress “obviously” have wanted the content of 

the word “costs” to vary from State to State, proceeding to 

proceeding? Ante, at 5. Why? At most, the majority’s

reading of the text is plausible; it is not the only possible 

reading. 

C 

The majority’s most persuasive argument does not focus

on either the Spending Clause or lack of statutory ambiguity. Rather, the majority says that “costs” is a term of art.

In light of the law’s long practice of excluding expert fees 

from the scope of the word “costs,” along with this Court’s

cases interpreting the word similarly in other statutes, the 

“legislative history is simply not enough.” Ante, at 12. 

I am perfectly willing to assume that the majority is

correct about the traditional scope of the word “costs.” In 

two cases this Court has held that the word “costs” is 

limited to the list set forth in 28 U. S. C. §1920 and does 

not include fees paid to experts. See Crawford Fitting Co. 

v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987) (interpreting Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. 

Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991) (interpreting 42 U. S. C. §1988

(1988 ed.)). But Congress is free to redefine terms of art. 

See, e.g., Casey, 499 U. S., at 88–90 (citing examples of 

statutes that shift “‘costs of litigation (including . . . expert 

witness fees)’”). And we have suggested that it might well 
14 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

do so through a statutory provision worded in a manner 

similar to the statute here—indeed, we cited the Conference 

Report language here at issue. Id., at 91–92, n. 5 (characterizing language as an “apparent effort to depart from 

ordinary meaning and to define a term of art” and noting

that Congress made no such “effort” in respect to 42 U. S. C.

§1988).

Regardless, here the statute itself indicates that Congress did not intend to use the word “costs” as a term of 

art. The HCPA, which added the cost-shifting provision

(in §2) to the IDEA, also added another provision (in §4) 

directing the GAO to “conduct a study of the impact of the 

amendments to the [IDEA] made by section 2” over a 31⁄2 

year period following the Act’s effective date. §4(a), 100

Stat. 797. To determine the fiscal impact of §2 (the costshifting provision), §4 ordered the GAO to submit a report

to Congress containing, among other things, the following

information: 

“Data, for a geographically representative select sample of States, indicating (A) the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses awarded to the prevailing party, in each action and proceeding under

[§2] from the date of the enactment of this Act

through fiscal year 1988, and the range of such fees, 

costs and expenses awarded in the actions and proceedings under such section, categorized by type of

complaint and (B) for the same sample as in (A) the 

number of hours spent by personnel, including attorneys and consultants, involved in the action or proceeding, and expenses incurred by the parents and the

State educational agency and local educational 

agency.” §4(b)(3), id., at 797–798 (emphasis added). 

If Congress intended the word “costs” in §2 to authorize

an award of only those costs listed in the federal cost 

statute, why did it use the word “expenses” in §4(b)(3)(A) 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

as part of the “amount awarded to the prevailing party”?

When used as a term of art, after all, “costs” does not cover 

expenses. Nor does the federal costs statute cover any 

expenses—at least not any that Congress could have 

wanted the GAO to study. Cf. 28 U. S. C. §1920 (referring

only once to “expenses,” and doing so solely to refer to

special interpretation services provided in actions initiated 

by the United States).

Further, why did Congress, when asking the GAO (in 

the statute itself) to study the “numbers of hours spent by 

personnel” include among those personnel both attorneys 

“and consultants”? Who but experts could those consultants be? Why would Congress want the GAO to study the 

hours that those experts “spent,” unless it thought that it 

would help keep track of the “costs” that the statute 

imposed?

Of course, one might, through speculation, find other 

answers to these questions. One might, for example, 

imagine that Congress wanted the GAO to study the

expenses that payment of expert fees engendered in statecourt proceedings where state, but not federal, law requires that “‘expenses’ other than ‘costs’ might be receivable.” Ante, at 7, n. 1; but see supra, at 12-13. Or one 

might think that the word “expenses” is surplusage. Ante, 

at 7, n. 1; but see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 

(2001) (expressing Court’s “‘reluctan[ce] to treat statutory 

terms as surplusage in any setting,’” but especially when 

they play “a pivotal role in the statutory scheme”). Or one 

might believe that Congress was interested in the hours

these experts spent, but not in the fees they obtained. 

Ante, at 7. But these answers are not necessarily consistent with the purpose of the GAO study provision, a purpose revealed by the language of the provision and its 

position in the statute. Its placement and its reference to 

§2 indicate that Congress ordered the study to help it keep

track of the magnitude of the reimbursements that an 
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BREYER, J., dissenting 

earlier part of the new statute (namely, §2) mandated.

See 100 Stat. 797 (stating that purpose of GAO study was 

to determine the “impact” of “section 2”). And the only

reimbursement requirement that §2 mandates is the

payment of “costs.”

But why speculate about this? We know what Congress 

intended the GAO study to cover. It told the GAO in its 

Conference Report that the word “costs” included the costs

of experts. And, not surprisingly, the GAO made clear

that it understood precisely what Congress asked it to do. 

In its final report, the GAO wrote: “Parents can receive 

reimbursement from state or local education agencies for 

some or all of their attorney fees and related expenses if 

they are the prevailing party in part or all of administrative hearings or court proceedings. Expert witness fees, 

costs of tests or evaluations found to be necessary during 

the case, and court costs for services rendered during administrative and court proceedings are examples of reimbursable expenses.” GAO, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Special Education: The Attorney Fees 

Provision of Public Law 99–372 GAO/HRD–22BR, p. 13

(Nov. 1989). At the very least, this amounts to some indication that Congress intended the word “costs,” not as a

term of art, not as it was used in the statutes at issue in 

Casey and Crawford Fitting, but rather as including certain additional “expenses.” If that is so, the claims of 

tradition, of the interpretation this Court has given other 

statutes, cannot be so strong as to prevent us from examining the legislative history. And that history could not be

more clear about the matter: Congress intended the

statutory phrase “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to

include the costs of experts. See Part I, supra. 

III 

For the reasons I have set forth, I cannot agree with the 

majority’s conclusion. Even less can I agree with its fail-
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 17 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ure to consider fully the statute’s legislative history. That 

history makes Congress’ purpose clear. And our ultimate 

judicial goal is to interpret language in light of the statute’s 

purpose. Only by seeking that purpose can we avoid the

substitution of judicial for legislative will. Only by reading 

language in its light can we maintain the democratic link

between voters, legislators, statutes, and ultimate implementation, upon which the legitimacy of our constitutional 

system rests.

In my view, to keep faith with that interpretive goal, we 

must retain all traditional interpretive tools—text, structure, history, and purpose. And, because faithful interpretation is art as well as science, we cannot, through rule or 

canon, rule out the use of any of these tools, automatically 

and in advance. Cf. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. 2d 809, 

810–811 (CA2 1934) (L. Hand, J.).

Nothing in the Constitution forbids us from giving

significant weight to legislative history. By disregarding a 

clear statement in a legislative report adopted without 

opposition in both Houses of Congress, the majority has

reached a result no Member of Congress expected or

overtly desired. It has adopted an interpretation that

undercuts, rather than furthers, the statute’s purpose, a 

“free” and “appropriate” public education for “all” children 

with disabilities. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

532 U. S. 105, 133 (2001) (STEVENS, J., joined by SOUTER, 

GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., dissenting) (“A method of

statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, 

and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is

consistent with a court’s own views of how things should

be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a

provision was enacted”). And it has adopted an approach

that, I fear, divorces law from life. See Duncan, supra, at 

193 (BREYER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
18 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. 

[Text of Act omitted.] 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 19 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 
20 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 21 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 
22 ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF ED. v.

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Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J. 

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. 

Excerpts from Congressional Record 

132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986) (Senate) 

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN’S PROTECTION 

ACT—CONFERENCE REPORT 

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I submit a report of the

committee of conference on S. 415 and ask for its immediate consideration. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows: 

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of 

the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the 

bill (S. 415) to amend the Education of the Handicapped 

Act to authorize the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to 

certain prevailing parties, and to clarify the effect of the 

Education of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, 

and remedies under other laws relating to the prohibition 

on discrimination, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to 

their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of

the conferees. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the 

Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference 

report. 

[Floor statements omitted.] 

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move adoption of the 

conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to. 

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the 

vote by which the conference report was agreed to. 
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 23 

Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J. 

APPENDIX C TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. 

Excerpts from Congressional Record 

132 Cong. Rec. 17607–17612 (House) 

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 415, HANDICAPPED 

CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ACT OF 1986 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference 

report on the Senate bill (S. 415) to amend the Education

of the Handicapped Act to authorize the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to certain prevailing parties, and to

clarify the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act

on rights, procedures, and remedies under other laws 

relating to the prohibition of discrimination.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill. 

[Floor statements omitted.] 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance 

of my time, and I move the previous question on the conference report.

The previous question was ordered. 

The conference report was agreed to.