Judge Miri am G oldman Cedarbaum , of the United States DistrictCourt for the * Southern Distr ict of New York, sitting by de signation. 1 09- 1396- pr P ig n a ta ro v . P o o le UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T SUMMARY ORD ER
R ULI NG S B Y S UM M ARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE P RE CE DENT I AL E F F E CT . C I TATI ON TO A SUM M AR Y O RD ER F I LE D O N O R A FT ER J ANU AR Y 1, 2007, I S P E RMI T T E D AN D I S GOV E RN E D B Y F EDERAL R U LE O F A P P E L L ATE P RO CEDU RE 3 2 .1 A N D TH I S C OURT ’ S L OC AL R ULE 32. 1. 1. W HEN CI TI NG A S UM M AR Y OR DER I N A D OC UM ENT F I LE D W I TH TH I S C OURT , A PARTY M UST CI TE EI TH ER THE F EDERAL A PP ENDI X O R A N ELECTRONI C D ATAB ASE ( W I T H T HE NOT AT I ON “ SUM M AR Y O RD ER ”). A PARTY CI TI NG A SUM M AR Y O RD ER M UST S ERVE A C OPY O F I T ON A NY PARTY N OT REPRES ENTED BY CO UN SE L . A t a s t at ed t er m of

t he U ni t ed St at es C our t of A ppeal s f

or t he Sec ond C i r cui t , he l d at t he D ani el Pat r i ck M oyni han C our t house , 500 Pear l St r eet , i n t he C i t y of N ew Y or k, on t he 18 day of J une , t w o t housa nd t en. th PRES ENT: RALP H K. W I NTE R,

PE TER W
. HA LL, C i rc ui tJudge s , MI R I A M G O L D MA N C E D A R B A U M, *

D i st ri ctJudge
.

_______________________________________________ A n th o n y S . P ig n a ta ro , Pet i t i oner - Appel l ant ,

v. N o. 09- 1396- pr Thom as Pool e, Respondent

- Appel l ee .

______________________________________________ F o r A p p e llan t: A N T H O N Y S . P IG N A T A R O , pro se , M al one, N ew Y or k. For A ppel l ee: M I C H A EL J
. H I L L E R Y , A ssi st ant D i st r i ct A t t or ney (F R A N K A . S E D IT A III, D istric t A ttorn e y , on t he bri ef ) , E r i e C ount y D i st r i ct A t t or ney’ s O f f i ce, B uf f al o, N ew Y or k. Ap pe al fr om

a ju dg m ent o f the Unit ed

St ate s D ist

ric t C ourt f

or t he W est ern

Di str ict of Ne w Yo rk ( Sc ott , M .J .).2

UP ON DU E C ON SI DE RA TI ON , it is her eby ORDERED , ADJUDGED AND DECRE ED that th e ju dg m ent of the dis tri ct c ourt b e an d h ere byis AFFIRMED
. Pe tit ion er- Ap pe lla

nt Anth ony S . P ign ataro, ap pe als pro s e from a March 2009 judgment of t he di st ri ctco ur t d en yi ng hi s 2 8 U. S. C. § 22 54 pe ti ti onfora w ri t o f habe as co rp us . We pre vio us ly g ranted

a ce rti fi cat e o f a

pp eal ab ili ty w ithres pe ct t o whe the r: ( 1) A pp ell ant’s ple a was involuntary because he was not i nform ed of a m andatory te rm of post rele ase supervi sion (“P RS ”); (2) Ap pe llant r ece ive d in ef fe cti ve ass ist an ce o f a

pp ell ate co un sel ; an d (3 ) App ell ant’s ple a w as i nv olu

ntary b eca

us e h e w as u

nd er the inf

lue nc e o f p sy ch iatric m ed icatio n whe n ple ad ing gu ilty. W e as sum e th e p art ies ’ f am ili ari ty w iththe rel ev ant f act s an d p roc ed

ura l history. In an appeal from an order denying § 2254 r elief, we review concl usions of law deno vo
an d f ind ing s o f f

act fo r cl ear err or. Se e C

ha lm ers v. Mitch ell , 73 F.3d 1262, 1266 (2d Cir. 1996). Because a § 2254 peti tion seeks t o overturn “a presumptively valid j udgment of conviction,” the petiti oner bears t he burden of proof throughout the habeas procee ding. Pinkney v. Keane , 920 F.2d 1090, 1094 (2d Cir. 1990) (ci ting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). An adequate and independent finding of procedural defaultwill bar federa l habe as review of a consti tutional claim unless the pe tit ion er c ande m on str ate : (1 ) ca us e f or t he de fa ult an d re su lti ngpre

jud ice ; or (2) that f ail ure to consider t he claim will resul t in a fundamental miscarriage of justi ce. Se e H arris v. Re ed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). Appellant cont ends that hi s appellat e counsel was const itutiona lly ineffective for fail ing to p erf ect Ap pe llant’ s d ire ct a

pp eal an d th at the ine ff

ect ive ass ist an ce o f a

pp ell ate co un sel provided cause and prejudic e for his procedur al default. To preva il on a cla im of ineffective3

assista nce of counsel, a peti tioner must demonstrate that : (1) counse l’s repr esentati on fell below an objecti ve standard of rea sonableness; and (2) ther e is a rea sonable probabi lity tha t, but for counsel’s e rrors, t he resultof the proceeding would have been different. Se e S tri ckl an d v

. Washington , 4 66 U. S. 66 8, 69 4 (1 98 4). A r eas on ab le p rob ab ili ty i s a p rob ab ili ty s uf fi cie nt t o undermine confidence in the outc ome. See id. at 6 94 . T he Strickl and te stis al so us edforcl ai ms of ineffective assist ance of appellat e counsel. See Mayo v. Henderson , 1 3 F .3 d 5 28 , 5 33 (2d Ci r. 19 94 ). T o d em on str ate pre jud ice in t

he co nte xt o f a

pp ell ate co un sel ’s i ne ff

ect ive ass ist an ce, pe tit ion er m

us t sh owthat “the re w as a rea so na ble pro ba bil itythat [ his ] c lai m

wo uld have be en
su cce ssf ul b ef ore the [s tat e’s hig he st c ourt] .” Id. at 534 (int ernal quota tion and cit ation omitted). Ap pe llate c ouns el i s n ot r eq uir ed to r ais e ev ery

no nf riv olo us arg um ent on

ap pe al, but a p eti tio ne r
can de m on str ate ap pe llate c ouns el’ s in ef fe cti ve ne ss b y s ho wi ng that ap pe llate c ouns el “ om itt ed sig nif icant and ob vio us iss ue s whil e p urs uin g is su es t hat w ere cle arl y and

sig nif icantl y w eak er. ” Id. at 533. Appellant ar gues that t he attorne y who represente d him on direct appeal shoul d have argued, before the Appel late Divis ion, that hi s guilty pl ea should be setaside becaus e neitherthe tri al c ourt n or h is tria l co un sel advis ed him that hi s co nv ict ion

car rie d w ithit a

m an dator

y f ive

ye ar t erm of PR S. Co nc lud ing , f

or t he rea so ns that f

oll ow , th at A

pp ell ant cann ot d em on str ate pre jud ice fr om

any s uc h e rro r, w e f

ind it unn ece ssary t o c on sid er whe the r ap pe llate c ouns el’ s fa ilure f ell be low an ob jec tiv e st an dard o f r eas on ab len ess . The sentencing t ranscri pt and origi nal judgment of conviction both show tha t Appellant was sentenced t o a determinate ter m of 15 years’ i mprisonm ent. Further more, there was no dis cu ssi on

of the PR S t erm

durin g s enten cin g o r in

the jud gm ent ev entho ug h N ewYo rk l aw4

mandates a period of PRS whenever a determinate ter m of imprisonm ent is imposed, see Ne w Yo rk P en al L aw§ 7 0. 45 , and the Ne w Y ork

Co urt of Ap pe als ha s re co gn ize d th at, un de r st ate law, PRS is a directconsequence of a guilt y plea, seePe op le v . C atu , 4 N.Y. 3d 242, 245 (2005). In o rde r f or A pp ell ant to ob tai n f

ed era l ha be as r eli ef

, h ow ev er, he m

us t es tab lis h th at the tri al
co urt ’s f ail ure to i nf

orm him of a P RS ter

m wa s “c ontrary t o, or i nv olv ed anunrea so na

ble applicat ion of, clearly e stablis hed Fe de ra l law, as deter mined by the Supreme C ourt of the Un ite d S tat es. ” 2 8 U .S .C . § 22 54 (d) (1) (em ph asi s ad de d). Th e S up rem e C ourt h as h eld that a g uil ty p lea

m us t be a “v olu

ntary and int ell ige nt c ho ice
am on g th e al ter

nativ e co urs es o f a cti on

op ento t he de fe nd ant.” No rth Ca ro lin a v . A lfo rd, 400 U. S. 25 , 3 1 (1 97 0); seeals o Wi lso n v . Mc Gi nn is , 413 F.3d 196, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2005) ( applying Al for d to a § 2254 petit ion). A guilty pl ea is consi dered volunta ry and intel ligent i f the de fe nd an t enter s th e p lea

wi th “ fu ll awaren ess of

its ‘di rec t co ns eq

ue nc es. ’” Wilson , 4 13 F. 3d at 199 (quoting Brad

y v. Un ite d S

tates , 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1969)). The Supreme Court has not de fi ne d whic h c on seq

ue nc es o f a

gu ilty p lea

are dir ect

an d whic h are c oll ate ral . T his Co urt , however, has explai ned that dir ect consequenc es are thos e that have a “definite, immediate and lar ge ly a uto m ati c ef

fe ct o n th e rang e o f t

he de fe nd ant’s punis hm ent.” Id. at 199 (quoti ng Un ite d Sta tes v. U. S. Cu rre nc

y , 8 95 F. 2d

90 8, 91 5 (2 d C ir. 19 90 )). Th ere can be no unrea so na

ble ap pli cat ion

of cle arl y e sta

bli sh ed fe de ral lawas d ete rm ine d b y th e S up rem e C ourt whe re the re i s an absence of a decis ion on the iss ue by the Supreme Court. Se e H ine s v. Mil ler , 318 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, although § 70.45 mandated a ter m of PRS, PRS w as not “definit e, imm ediate, and lar ge ly a uto m ati c” b eca

us e it wa s su bje ct t o c hang e. In 2 00 6, we he ld t hat, whe re a

PR S t ermThe New York Court of Appeals has refused to dete rmine whether the imposition of 1 the origi nal term of im

prisonment without a PRS term was sufficient to cure t he deficiency of the plea al locution dur ing which the defendant was notinformed of a PRS term, explaining 5 was not imposed as a part of the sent ence at the time of sentencing, that t erm was not a part of the judgment, and the defendant was only s ubject to t he written t erm of im prisonment. Se e Earley v. Murr ay(“Ea rle y I ”) 4 51 F. 3d

71 , 7 5-7 6 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ) (h old ingthat, whe re the tri al
co urt did no t or all y im

po se a PR S t erm , later

adm ini str ati ve im

po sit ion of a P RS ter

m wa s a vio lat ion of the § 2 25 4 p eti tio ne r’s du e p roc ess rig hts be cau se t he on ly c og niz ab le s enten ce i s the on e im

po sed bythe jud ge ); Earley v. Murr ay( “E ar ley II ”), 462 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (co nf irm ingup on

reh ear ingthat a j ud ici all y im po sed senten ce i nc lud es o nly

tho se e lem ents
expli cit ly o rde red

bythe senten cin g ju dg e an d re co gn izi ng that, a lth ou ghthe ori gin al s enten ce
co uld arg ua bly be “unlawf

ul” be cau se a

tri al c ourt f

ail ed to p ron ounc e a P RS ter

m , n on eth ele ss the only sent ence to which the defendant actual ly would be subjectwould be the ter m of im pri so nm ent as art icu lat ed bythe tri al c ourt) . T hu s, Ap pe llant’ s “s enten ce” wa s co m pri sed
on ly o f a ter m of im pri so nm ent, and

the St ate co uld

no t ad m ini str ati ve ly i m

po se a PR S t erm up onhi m. Moreover, i n Ea rle

y II , we specificall y recognized t hat a PRS term could later be modif ied upon resent encing by the t rial cour t. Se e E ar ley II , 462 F.3d at 149. Subsequently, t he New York Court of Appeals held that, where a trial court failed t o pronounce a PRS term, the matter must be rem itted t o the tri al court for r esentenci ng. Pe op le v . S pa rb er , 10 N.Y.3d 457, 46 5 (2 00 8). Th ere af

ter , th e N ewYo rk l eg isl ature e na cte d a pro vis ion

that autho riz ed

a tr ial court to r esentence a defendant who was not informed of PR S to impose the original term of imprisonm ent without a PRS ter m, upon consent of the districtattorney. Se e N. Y. Pe na l L aw 1that th e co ns tit uti on ali ty o f a

pp lyi ng § 7 0. 85 ha d n ot y et b een co ns ide red

bythe tri al c ourt, and, thus, the i ssue was not sufficientl y developed for conside ration by t he Court of Appeals. Pe op le v . B oy d , 1 2 N .Y . 3 d 3 90 , 3 94 (20 09 ). A pp ell ant ha s n ot f

ile d an a pp eal fr om

his resentenc ing to rai se the iss ue of the constitutionali ty of § 70.85. Additionally, a s there i s no Supreme Court holding that cas ts doubt on the c onstitut ionalit y of applying § 70.85, applicat ion of the provisi on would not be a basis for habeas reli ef. Se e 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4(d )(1 ). 6 § 7 0. 85 (20 08 ). I n a

su pp lem ental su

bm iss ion to t his Co urt , th e S tat e h as p rov ide d e vid en ce t hat this opti on has been invoked i n this case , in the form of an am ended sentence and comm itment order date d in May 2010 stat ing specifical ly that Pigna taro has bee n sentenced t o zero months of PRS. Se e Hillery Aff. at Exh. A. In l ight of § 7 0. 85 an d th e ca ses cit ed ab ov e, as w ell as t

he fa ct that th e tr ial co urt ha s de let ed the PR S t erm

fr om Ap pe llant’ s se nte nc e, PR S w as n ot “ de fi nit e, ” n or w as i t “l arg ely
autom ati c. ” Wilson , 413 F.3d at 199. PRS, therefore, was not a di rect conse quence of Appellant’s guilty ple a. Moreover, i n the absence of a Supreme Court ruli ng on the issue of wh eth er P RS (or

a si m ilar st ate -im

po sed po st- im pri so nm ent te rm

of su pe rvi sio n, su chas p aro le)
co uld be a d ire ct c on seq

ue nc e o f a

gu ilty p lea , th e tr ial co urt ’s a cce ptanc e o f A pp ell ant’s gu ilty plea was not cont rary to oran unreasonabl e applicat ion of federal law. Se e 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4(d )(1 ); seeals o H

ine s , 3 18 F. 3d

at 1 64 . In

oth er w ord s, ev enif

ap pe llate c ouns el w as deficient in fail ing to perfect t he directappeal, such defici ency did not pre judice Appell ant, who is in the e xact posit ion for which he bargai ned when entering a guilty ple a. Accordingly, Ap pe llant i s n ot e nti tle d to ha be as r eli ef

on his ine ff ect ive ass ist an ce o f a

pp ell ate co un sel cla im
an d, fo r th e sam e re aso ns , h as n ot s ho wn pre jud ice su ff

ici ent to ex cu se t

he pro ced ura l de fa ult as to hi s P RS c la im. Fi na lly , to the ex tent th at A pp ell ant cl aim s th at h is p lea wa s invo luntar

y d ue to t he ef fe ct7

of m edicati on, this iss ue has not been exha uste d in state court. The quest ion of whether a plea of gu ilty w as e nte red

vo luntar ilywi thi n th e m ean ingof the Co ns tit

uti on is a m ixe d q ue sti on of law and fact. Se e Ma tus iak

v. Ke lly , 786 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1986) . For the plea t o be voluntary, the defendant must at leasthave been competent to proce ed and must have been aware of the true nature of the char ge against hi m. Id. The defendant’s competence is a que stion of fact, while the question of whether a pl ea was voluntary is a questi on of federal law. Id. at 5 44 . Afe de ral ha be as c ourt n eed

no t de fe r to a st ate co urt ’s f act ua l de ter m inatio n if

the rec ord

as a wh ole do es not fairly suppor t the dete rmination. Id. (reviewing s tate tr ial court ’s implicit finding of de fe nd an ts’ co m

pe ten ce)
. In order t o present a c hallenge t o mental com petence, Appell ant must show that the medicines “deprive[d] [him] of the abilit y to consult wit h his lawyer ‘ with a reasonable degree of rat ion al u nd ers tan din g’ and

to u nd ers tan d th e p roc eed ing s ag ain st h im rat ion all y a s w ell as fa ctu all y. ” Se e U

nited Sta tes v. Ni ch ols , 56 F.3d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (quot ing Du sky v. Un ite d S tates , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). We have recognized thatimproper administration of psychiatr ic medication can re nder an indivi dual temporarily i ncompetent. Un ite d S tates v . Qu int ier i , 3 06 F. 3d

12 17 , 1 23 3 (2 d C ir. 20 02 ). H ow ev er, a re vie w o f t he senten cin g m inutes shows that Appella nt understood t he proceedings against hi m. F irst, i t is notabl e that Appell ant
wa s takin g E lav il f

or i ns om nia . D uri ng the ple a al loc uti on , m ore ov er, Ap pe llant w as a ble to consult his attorney on multiple occasions, pr ovided information regardi ng his resi dence and the loc ati on of his cri m e, an d c lar if

ied that he kn ewhe wa s g ivi ng his ex -w if e a d an ge rou s su

bs tan ce in o rde r to harm

he r but di d n ot k

no w that th e su

bs tan ce w as arse nic . App ell ant co rre ctl y
an sw ere d q

ue sti on s, an d n oth ingin t he ple a tr an scr ipt

sh ow s th at h e w as c on fu sed or u na ble to8

un de rst an d th e p roc eed ing s. Thus , App ell ant ha s n ot e sta bli sh ed that hi s in ge sti on

of El av il made him incompetent. Se e Ni ch ols , 5 6 F .3 d at 41 2; Matusiak , 7 86 F. 2d at 5 43 . T he ref

ore , reg ard les s o f whe the r ap pe llate c ouns el c ou ld h av e ra ise d th e is su e o f A pp ell ant’s co m

pe ten ce
on ap pe al and

thu s ex ha

us ted it, Ap pe llant s uf

fe red no pre jud ice be cau se o f c ouns el’ s f ail ure to do so. W e have consider ed Appellant’ s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reas ons stated above, the judgment of the distri ct court i s AFFIRMED.

FO R T HE CO UR T: Cathe rin e O ’H ag anW olf e, Cl erk