Filed 1/22/24 Friends of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FRIENDS OF WESTWANDA 

DRIVE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent;

KARLA SHAHIN et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and

Appellants.

 B314932

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 19STCP04113)

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.

Channel Law Group, Jamie T. Hall and Julian K. 

Quattlebaum for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Luna & Glushon and Kristina Kropp for Real Parties in 

Interest and Appellants.
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Hydee Felstein Soto, City Attorney, Timothy McWilliams, 

Managing City Attorney, and Steven G. Martin, Deputy City 

Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________________

Friends of Westwanda Drive (Friends), an unincorporated 

association, sought to set aside a determination by the City of Los 

Angeles (City) that a tree-removal permit and proposed 

construction of a home (Project) were exempt from environmental 

review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). The trial court denied the 

writ petition, concluding, in part, the action is moot. We affirm 

the decision, concluding the case is moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Karla Shahin owns a lot on the corner of Westwanda Drive 

and Stovell Lane in Benedict Canyon. The lot is surrounded by 

existing single-family homes in a hillside residential 

development. Real parties in interest Shahin and her husband, 

Armen Melkonians, (collectively real parties) planned to build a 

two-story single-family home with a footprint of 1,500 square feet 

(the Project) on the lot.

As relevant here, the Project required the removal of three 

City-protected Coast Live Oak trees and six “remnant” California 

Black Walnut tree stumps.1 The Project was designed to 

accommodate the four remaining Coast Live Oak trees on the lot.

1 California Black Walnut trees are also protected, but not 

as stumps. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 46.01.) Apparently, the prior 

owner of the lot had the trees cut down because they had died or 

were in poor condition due to the draught.
3

On September 26, 2017, Shahin applied to the Bureau of 

Street Services (BSS) for a tree-removal permit and included an 

arborist’s report as required by the City’s Protected Tree 

Ordinance. BSS recommended the tree-removal permit be 

approved, the Project be found exempt from CEQA 

environmental review, and 12 replacement trees be planted 

pursuant to the ordinance.

On March 7, 2018, the Board of Public Works held a 

hearing to consider the tree-removal permit. Two speakers 

opposed removing the protected trees, arguing that doing so 

would harm the Benedict Canyon ecosystem and a wildlife 

corridor in the area. They claimed “dozens” of residents were 

against the tree-removal.

During the hearing, the Board of Public Works discussed 

how the Project was to be constructed to avoid harming the 

remaining and replacement protected trees and to minimize any 

negative impacts on the environment caused by removing the 

trees. When the hearing concluded, the Board of Public Works 

voted to approve Shahin’s permit application and found the 

Project was exempt under CEQA. Issuance of the permit was 

conditioned on the planting of replacement trees. On March 14, 

2018, BSS issued the tree-removal permit. On March 15, 2018, 

the three trees and six stumps were removed.

II. Administrative Appeals

On August 31, 2018, Friends appealed the Board of Public 

Works’s decision. BSS submitted a report recommending the 

appeal be denied.

The appeal was forwarded to the City Council’s Public 

Works and Gang Reduction Committee. Following an August 7, 
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2019 hearing, the appeal was then forwarded to the City Council

without recommendation.

On August 20, 2019, the City Council heard and denied the 

appeal. The same day, the City filed a Notice of Exemption 

(NOE) with the recorder’s office of Los Angeles County. As 

pertinent here, the NOE stated the Project was approved and 

included the removal of three protected trees and six tree stumps 

with the planting of replacement trees pursuant to the Protected 

Tree Ordinance. The NOE also stated the Project qualified for 

construction under CEQA categorical exemptions and no CEQA 

exceptions applied.

III. Writ Proceedings

Friends sought a writ of mandate compelling the City to 

vacate and set aside the tree-removal permit, among others, and 

to prepare and certify a legally adequate environmental review 

under CEQA for the project.

The petition pleaded traditional mandamus (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 1085) and, in the alternative, administrative mandamus 

(id., § 1094.5).

The trial court clearly viewed the petition as seeking 

administrative mandamus, given that Friends had pursued an 

administrative appeal before the City Council and the court had 

an administrative record before it. (See Stanford Vina Ranch

Irrigation Co. v. State of California (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 976, 

995–996.)

Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied the writ 

petition on April 23, 2021. In its written ruling, the court 

concluded the Project fell into one but not both category 

exemptions found by the City and there were no applicable 

exceptions. The court also concluded the entire action was 
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moot; the trees had been removed. On June 21, 2021, the trial 

court entered judgment for the City. This appeal followed on 

August 19, 2021.

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of the Appeal

We reject the City’s threshold contention Friends’s appeal 

must be dismissed as untimely. Relying on Meinhardt v. City of 

Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43, review granted June 15, 

2022, S274147 (Meinhardt), and cases cited therein, the City 

argues Friends failed to file the notice of appeal within the 

requisite 60 days after service of the trial court’s April 23, 2021 

order denying the petition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.104(a)(1)(B).)

The appellate court in Meinhardt, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 

43, review granted, held when “a court has entered a ruling on a

writ petition that constitutes a final judgment, any party seeking

appellate review of that ruling must timely appeal from that final

judgment—and the time to file a notice of appeal is not restarted

by the trial court’s subsequent entry of a document styled as a

‘judgment’ that merely reiterates the prior final judgment.” (Id.

at p. 50.) Here, by contrast, the trial court’s order of April 23, 

2021 was not a final judgment. Instead, the court ordered the 

City to prepare and serve a judgment, and also allowed Friends

10 days in which to object and prepare an alternative form of 

judgment for the court’s consideration. The time for Friends to 

appeal began running when the court entered its final judgment 

on June 21, 2021. Friends timely filed a notice of appeal on 

August 19, 2021, 59 days from the entry of judgment.
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II. CEQA Overview

CEQA “establishes a comprehensive scheme to provide

long-term protection to the environment. It prescribes review

procedures a public agency must follow before approving or

carrying out certain projects.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v.

City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1092.) “Under CEQA

and its implementing guidelines, an agency generally conducts

an initial study to determine ‘if the project may have a significant

effect on the environment.’ ” (Friends of College of San Mateo

Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016) 1

Cal.5th 937, 945.) “If there is substantial evidence that the 

project may have a significant effect on the environment,” then 

the agency must generate an environmental impact report (EIR) 

prior to approving the project. (Ibid.)

“For policy reasons, the Legislature has expressly exempted 

several categories of projects from review under CEQA.

[Citation.] By statute, the Legislature has also directed the 

Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency . . . to establish ‘a list 

of classes of projects that have been determined not to have a 

significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt 

from’ CEQA.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley, 

supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) There are 33 categorical

exemptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15300–15333.2) Among 

them is the Class 3 exemption for small structures (Guidelines, 

§ 15303) and the Class 32 exemption for infill development 

2 Sections 15000 et seq. of title 14 of the California Code of 

Regulations are the implementing administrative regulations, 

and are referred to as “Guidelines.” (See Muzzy Ranch Co. v. 

Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 

380, fn. 2.)
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projects (Guidelines, § 15332). The City decided the Project fell 

into both categorical exemptions, thereby obviating the need for 

an EIR. (Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of 

Arcadia (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, 429 [“If an exemption applies, 

the project is excused from environmental review”].)

Categorical exemptions, however, can be subject to certain

exceptions. If an exception applies, the exemption is foreclosed,

and an EIR is necessary. (Arcadians for Environmental 

Preservation v. City of Arcadia, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 436;

Guidelines, § 15300.2.)

Before the City Council and the trial court, Friends 

maintained, in part, that based on the Project’s “location” and/or 

“unusual circumstances” the Class 3 and Class 32 category 

exemptions were unavailable, thereby requiring an EIR. (See 

Guidelines, § 15300.2, subds. (a) [location exception] & (c)

[unusual circumstances exception].3) In a nutshell, Friends’s 

3 The “location exception” provides: “Location. Classes 3, 

4, 5, 6, and 11 are qualified by consideration of where the project 

is to be located—a project that is ordinarily insignificant in its 

impact on the environment may in a particularly sensitive 

environment be significant. Therefore, these classes are 

considered to apply in all instances, except where the project may 

impact on an environmental resource of hazardous or critical 

concern where designated, precisely mapped, and officially 

adopted pursuant to law by federal, state, or local agencies.” The 

“unusual circumstances exception” provides: “Significant Effect. 

A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where 

there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a 

significant effect on the environment due to unusual 

circumstances.” (Guidelines, § 15300.2, subds. (a) & (c), 

respectively.)
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theory was removing the protected trees not only damages the 

trees, but also destroys the habitat (the Coast Live OakCalifornia Black Walnut woodland) created by having trees on 

the lot, which, in turn, diminishes the number of wildlife species 

depending on the woodland for survival.

III. Mootness

Generally, courts do not issue advisory opinions based on

hypothetical facts or controversies that are merely academic. 

(People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084; Sweeney v.

California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61

Cal.App.5th 1093, 1135.) A case “ ‘should be dismissed as moot

when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the

appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.’ ” (Santa 

Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538, 

1547.) This rule has been applied to CEQA challenges. 

(Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 880, 888; Parkford Owners for a Better Community v.

County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722–723 [writ

petition].)

Relying on our decision in Hixon v. County of Los Angeles

(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 370 (Hixon) the trial court concluded the 

“entire action is moot.” In Hixon, county residents petitioned for 

a writ of mandate to compel the county to obtain an EIR for 

street-widening projects that involved the removal of numerous 

roadside trees and the replacement of new, younger trees. (Id. at 

pp. 373, 376.) The trial court declined to order an EIR because 

the trees had already been removed and replaced and “no public 

benefit would be gained by requiring an EIR.” (Id. at p. 377.) We 

agreed, explaining: “The project is ended, the trees are cut down 

and the subject is now moot insofar as resort to a planning or 
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informational document, which is what an EIR is.” (Id. at 

p. 378.)

Here, the trial court properly concluded the case is moot. 

Just as in Hixon, the court is unable to grant Friends any 

effective relief. Friends’s administrative appeal requested the 

City Council to “revoke and set-aside the approval of the tree

removal permit.” Friends’s writ petition commanded the City to 

“[v]acate and set aside approvals of the Project, including but not 

limited to, the Tree-Removal Permit for the Project.” The 

petition also sought an injunction “prohibiting any actions by [the 

City] until [the City] has complied with all applicable state, 

federal and local laws and requirements of CEQA.”

Whether preserving the trees (and their woodland) on the 

lot qualified as an exception has long been rendered moot by the 

permitted removal of the trees five months before the Board of 

Public Works’s decision was appealed. We cannot turn back the 

clock and restore those trees and their woodland.

Friends resist this conclusion by arguing that reversing the 

City’s decision would allow: (1) the California Black Walnut 

stumps to be replanted either elsewhere or on the Project’s lot; 

(2) similar woodland to be preserved in another location, or 

(3) the Project to be altered—by bird-safe glass, no night lighting, 

and changed fencing—or eliminated entirely so the trees could be 

replaced and the woodland restored.

We are not persuaded. That a ruling by this court could 

provide effective relief because preparation of an EIR might

possibly result in Project modifications or other mitigation 

measures is wholly speculative. Further, the record shows the 

Project was substantially finished at the time of the writ 

proceedings in April 2021. At this late date, preparation of an 
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EIR would not serve any meaningful purpose. Finally, it is 

unclear how mitigation measures undertaken off the lot would 

redress any purported environmental losses that occurred on the 

lot, which is the relief Friends has sought.

There are three discretionary exceptions to the rules

regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad

public interest that is likely to recur; (2) when there might be a

recurrence of the controversy between the parties; and (3) when

material questions remain. (Cucamongans United for Reasonable 

Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 

473, 479–480.) None of these exceptions apply. No issues of

broad public importance are implicated. As the trial court noted,

Friends’s claim that the dispute was whether proposed homes in

the Santa Monica Mountains zone, and particularly within

designated habitat blocks, can bypass environmental review is

both an overstatement and a misstatement. The issue here was

limited to a single-family residence at a specific location in the

Santa Monica zone. Because the subject trees are gone, a

recurrence of a dispute over the tree-removal permit is unlikely. 

For the same reason, no material questions of significant import 

remain. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that any 

opinions in this case would be purely advisory.

CEQA was not designed to require generation of

meaningless paperwork (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com.

(1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 283), and it would not be reasonable to

interpret the statute as compelling preparation of an EIR that

would be a pointless waste of Californians’ limited tax dollars. 

Thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision that the case is moot.
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Because we affirm the judgment on the ground of mootness, 

we do not reach the issues whether exceptions barred both the 

Class 3 and Class 32 category exemptions in this case.4

4 Real parties do not join in the City’s arguments on appeal 

that the City Council properly rejected Friends’s challenge to the 

City’s reliance on the Class 32 category exemption. Instead, they 

have filed an opening brief as “cross-appellants” to advance 

essentially the same arguments as the City. We note the core of 

these arguments—whether Los Angeles Municipal Code section

12.21.C.10(i)(3) supported the City’s issuance of building and 

grading permits—is the subject of the related appeal, Friends 

of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Angeles (Jan. 22, 2024, 

B321479) [nonpub. opn.].
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DISPOSITION

The judgment that the entire action is moot is affirmed. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.