United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 2020 Decided August 17, 2021

No. 20-5032

GUNAY MIRIYEVA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 

AND TRACY RENAUD, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 

AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY 

ONLY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cv-03351)

Jennifer M. Wollenberg argued the cause for appellants. 

With her on the briefs was Douglas W. Baruch.

Catherine M. Reno, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Ethan P. 

Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Colin A. Kisor, 

Deputy Director, Elianis N. Perez, Assistant Director, and C. 

Frederick Sheffield, Senior Litigation Counsel. 
2

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, ROGERS and WALKER, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.

WALKER, Circuit Judge: In 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), Congress 

set out the path for judicial review of certain claims intertwined 

with denied naturalization applications. Miriyeva strayed 

from that path when she filed suit in the District of Columbia. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Miriyeva’s 

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

I

When this case began, Gunay Miriyeva and three others 

were seeking naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440. Since 

then, all but Miriyeva became naturalized citizens. The claims 

of the three naturalized citizens are moot. See Foretich v. 

United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Because 

Miriyeva has yet to become a naturalized citizen, we proceed 

with the question in this case under Miriyeva’s facts. 

Miriyeva is a citizen of Azerbaijan who lawfully entered 

the United States and, at the time she appeared in the district 

court, was a resident of San Diego, California. Hoping to 

become a naturalized United States citizen, she enlisted in the 

United States Army in 2016 through the Military Accessions 

Vital to the National Interest program. Under this initiative, 

noncitizens can follow an expedited path to citizenship by 

serving honorably in the military without having to first gain 

lawful permanent residence. Specifically: 
3

Any person who, while an alien or a 

noncitizen national of the United States, has 

served honorably as a member of the Selected 

Reserve of the Ready Reserve or in an activeduty status in the military, air, or naval forces of 

the United States . . . and who, if separated 

from such service, was separated under

honorable conditions, may be naturalized as 

provided in this section . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (emphasis added). 

In 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services initially approved Miriyeva’s application for 

naturalization under the program. Miriyeva then needed to

complete the oath of citizenship to become a naturalized 

citizen. But before the agency scheduled Miriyeva’s oath 

ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. And while at 

training, a medical condition abruptly ended her service.

When a soldier’s service ends, the Army assigns one of 

four separation categories: (1) “honorable,” (2) “general 

(under honorable conditions),” (3) “under other than honorable 

conditions,” or (4) “uncharacterized.” See Army Reg. 135-

178, ch. 2, § III, 2-7. A soldier’s separation can be 

“uncharacterized” if she is at “entry-level” status, meaning she 

“served less than 180 days of . . . active duty service.” Compl. 

¶ 6 (cleaned up). The Army described Miriyeva’s separation 

as “uncharacterized” since her service ended while she was still 

at “entry-level” status. 

After her medical discharge, Miriyeva eventually

succeeded in getting the agency to schedule her oath ceremony. 

But then the agency wavered. It ultimately reversed its prior 

approval of her naturalization application because the military 
4

did not describe her separation as “honorable.” The agency 

determined that her “uncharacterized” separation did not meet 

§ 1440’s “separated under honorable conditions” requirement. 

8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).

Miriyeva sued in the District Court for the District of 

Columbia. Among other reasons, she argued that the military

refers to “uncharacterized” as “separated under honorable 

conditions,” when required to do so. She says the agency 

should have likewise recognized her “uncharacterized” 

separation as honorable and approved her naturalization 

application. She claims that the Army’s policy of treating an 

uncharacterized separation as not under honorable 

conditions — which led to the denial of her naturalization 

application — violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the 

Constitution’s Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the 

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); 

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. Const. amend. V. Miriyeva 

sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 

The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which 

provides that an individual with a denied naturalization 

application “may seek review of such denial before the United 

States district court for the district in which such person resides

in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5.” See Miriyeva v. U.S. 

Citizenship & Immigration Services, 436 F. Supp. 3d 170, 186 

(D.D.C. 2019). The district court determined that § 1421(c) 

precluded Miriyeva’s Administrative Procedure Act and 

constitutional claims. Id. at 178-86. The court also 

concluded that the Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed 

without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. And it 

rejected the count in which Miriyeva requested injunctive 

relief, which was not actually a separate claim but merely a 
5

request for a certain remedy purportedly required by other 

counts. Id. at 186 & n.19.

Miriyeva appealed. This court has jurisdiction to review 

de novo the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Arch Coal, 

Inc. v. Acosta, 888 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 

II 

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-

1537, sets out the path for becoming a naturalized citizen. It

also provides for judicial review of a denied naturalization 

application. That provision states in full: 

A person whose application for naturalization 

under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing 

before an immigration officer under section

1447(a) of this title, may seek review of such 

denial before the United States district court for 

the district in which such person resides in 

accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such 

review shall be de novo, and the court shall 

make its own findings of fact and conclusions 

of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, 

conduct a hearing de novo on the application.

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Here, Miriyeva claims she isn’t seeking

review of her denied naturalization application. See

Appellants’ Br. 21 (Miriyeva “does not seek review of 

any . . . naturalization decision or an order of naturalization.”). 
6

She says her statutory and constitutional claims therefore fall 

outside the judicial review provision of the Act. 

We disagree. Miriyeva could have brought challenges to 

the agency’s policy in her home district. And § 1421(c) 

implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction. 

III

The Supreme Court has provided “a framework for 

determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and 

judicial review forecloses parallel district-court jurisdiction.” 

Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Thunder 

Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994)). “Under 

Thunder Basin’s framework, courts determine that Congress 

intended that a litigant proceed exclusively through a statutory 

scheme of administrative and judicial review when (i) such 

intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme, and (ii) the 

litigant’s claims are of the type Congress intended to be 

reviewed within the statutory structure.” Id. at 15 (quoting 

Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212) (cleaned up). 

A

We begin by asking if it’s “fairly discernible” that

Congress intended to preclude judicial review outside a special 

statutory review scheme. Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 

U.S. at 207). Here, the answer is yes.

In Elgin v. Department of Treasury, the Supreme Court 

concluded that the Civil Service Reform Act laid out in 

“painstaking detail . . . the method for covered employees to 

obtain [judicial] review of adverse employment actions.” 567 

U.S. 1, 11-12 (2012). The Court reasoned that, through five 

sections of the statute, Congress explained the scope of the 
7

Act’s application, made clear the procedures an employee 

should enjoy before agency action, and outlined the review 

system. Id. at 11. 

Likewise, in Jarkesy v. SEC, this court concluded that 

“[t]he securities laws contain a[] . . . comprehensive structure 

for the adjudication of securities violations.” 803 F.3d at 16. 

That scheme dictates an agency review process starting with a

decision by an administrative law judge, allowing an appeal of 

the administrative law judge’s decision, and lastly, allowing for 

judicial review in a court of appeals. Id.

Here, the statutory review scheme is similarly “elaborate.” 

Elgin, 567 U.S. at 11 (cleaned up). Codified §§ 1421, 1446, 

and 1447 of the Immigration and Nationality Act “exhaustively 

detail[]” the review process for a naturalization application. 

Id. After an individual submits a naturalization application

under § 1445, an agency employee will investigate the 

applicant and determine whether to grant or deny the 

application. 8 U.S.C. § 1446. If the agency denies the 

application, “the applicant may request a hearing before an 

immigration officer.” Id. § 1447(a). And if the immigration 

officer also denies the application, the applicant can seek 

review of the denial in the district court in which the applicant 

resides. Id. § 1421(c). 

Because Congress intended these sections to collectively 

(and exclusively) direct the review process of naturalization 

application denials, it is no coincidence they repeatedly cross 

reference each other: 

• Section 1446(b) refers to § 1447(a): “The record of the 

examination authorized by this subsection shall be 

admissible as evidence in any hearing conducted by an 

immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this title. 
8

Any such employee shall, at the examination, inform 

the applicant of the remedies available to the applicant 

under section 1447 of this title.”

• Section 1447(a) points back to § 1446: “If, after an 

examination under section 1446 of this title, an 

application for naturalization is denied, the applicant 

may request a hearing before an immigration officer.”

• Section 1447(b) also points back to § 1446: “If there is 

a failure to make a determination under section 1446 

of this title before the end of the 120-day period after 

the date on which the examination is conducted under 

such section, the applicant may apply to the United 

States district court for the district in which the 

applicant resides for a hearing on the matter.”

• Section 1447(d) refers to § 1446(b): “Such subpenas 

may be enforced in the same manner as subpenas under 

section 1446(b) of this title may be enforced.” 

• Finally, § 1421(c) refers to § 1447(a): “A person 

whose application for naturalization under this 

subchapter is denied, after a hearing before 

an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this 

title, may seek review of such denial . . . .”

Thus, the sections are intertwined and, as in Elgin, 

“elaborate[ly]” explain the procedure for an applicant to 

follow. 567 U.S. at 11 (cleaned up). Both the text and 

structure make clear that Congress intended this multistep 

review scheme to be the only path to judicial review for certain 

types of claims.
9

B

Next, are Miriyeva’s claims of the type Congress intended 

to be reviewed within the statutory scheme? See Thunder 

Basin, 510 U.S. at 212. Again, yes.

When determining whether a plaintiff’s “claims are of the 

type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory 

structure,” the Supreme Court has provided three factors to 

consider: (i) whether a finding that jurisdiction is precluded 

would “foreclose all meaningful judicial review,” (ii) whether 

the suit is “wholly collateral to a statute’s review provisions,” 

and (iii) whether the claims are “outside the agency’s 

expertise.” Id. at 212-13 (cleaned up). 

1

First, finding that the District Court for the District of 

Columbia does not have jurisdiction over Miriyeva’s claims 

does not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review.” Id. 

Miriyeva can file claims challenging the agency’s policy in her 

home district. If her claims are meritorious, she will 

“eventually obtain review and relief” there. American 

Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 

929 F.3d 748, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

What’s more, by specifying de novo review and the ability 

for the district court to “make its own findings of fact and 

conclusions of law,” the relevant district court is not limited to 

the administrative record upon review. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). 

Thus, an inadequate administrative record will not hamper the 

district court’s ability to review Miriyeva’s challenges.

The parties debate whether this result will lead to 

piecemeal litigation and frustrate the ability of classes or 
10

organized plaintiffs to bring similar suits. Perhaps it will. 

But what matters is that Miriyeva’s claims can be reviewed,

and she can obtain relief from the alleged unlawful policy as it 

relates to her. She can seek such relief in the district court in 

which she resides. See American Federation of Government 

Employees, 929 F.3d at 756-57 (unpersuaded by a lack of 

nationwide relief and concluding that there existed meaningful 

“review and relief”). Bringing challenges through § 1421(c) 

does not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review,” even if it 

does foreclose the review that Miriyeva wants. Thunder 

Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13.1 “It is the comprehensiveness of 

1 The parties argue over whether § 1421(c) provides an adequate 

alternative remedy to Administrative Procedure Act review. See 5 

U.S.C. § 704 (“final agency action for which there is no other 

adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review”). But that 

is not a jurisdictional question. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 

183-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The APA . . . is not a jurisdictionconferring statute.”); Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 

620-21 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (The “adequate remedy bar of § 704 

determine[s] whether there is a cause of action under the APA, not 

whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction.”). And even if 

the issue of an adequate alternative remedy could inform the 

jurisdictional inquiry into meaningful judicial review, there is an 

adequate alternative remedy here. 

At least with regard to Miriyeva specifically, she will enjoy in her 

home district APA-like review and relief. Section 1421(c) specifies 

that the court’s review is “in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Chapter 7 of title 5 — a codified portion of the 

Administrative Procedure Act — allows courts to “hold unlawful and 

set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse 

of discretion,” “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 

immunity,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,” “without 

observance of procedure required by law,” or “unwarranted by the 
11

the statutory scheme involved, not the adequacy of specific 

remedies thereunder, that counsels judicial abstention.” 

American Federation of Government Employees, 929 F.3d at 

757 (cleaned up).

2

Second, Miriyeva’s suit is not “wholly collateral” to the 

review provisions regarding the denial of her naturalization 

application. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212 (cleaned up). 

A claim is not wholly collateral to the claims meant to go 

through the review scheme if that claim is “at bottom” an 

attempt to accomplish what’s contemplated by the review 

scheme. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614 (1984). Even 

if that claim challenges the “procedure” the agency used to 

reach its decision (here, whether an uncharacterized discharge 

precludes naturalization) that claim is not wholly collateral 

facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 

reviewing court.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D), (F). 

What’s more, in determining “whether an alternative remedy is 

adequate and therefore preclusive of APA review,” we may consider

whether the “alternative . . . provides for de novo district-court 

review of the challenged agency action.” Citizens for Responsibility 

& Ethics in Washington v. DOJ, 846 F.3d 1235, 1244-45 (D.C. Cir. 

2017) (cleaned up). Here, it does. That is “further evidence of 

Congress’ will” to provide an “alternative remedy and thereby bar 

APA review,” “given the frequent incompatibility between de novo

review and the APA’s deferential standards.” Id. (cleaned up). 

“Congress did not intend to permit a litigant challenging an 

administrative denial to utilize simultaneously both the [de novo] 

review provision and the APA.” Id. at 1245 (quoting El Rio Santa 

Cruz Neighborhood Health Center, Inc. v. HHS, 396 F.3d 1265, 1270 

(D.C. Cir. 2005)) (cleaned up).
12

when it is “inextricably intertwined” with the claim referenced 

in the review scheme (here, the denial of a naturalization 

application). Id.

That is one of the principles of Heckler v. Ringer. There,

the Department of Health and Human Services had a policy of 

not paying for a particular surgery under Medicare. Id. at 607. 

Several patients wanted the Department to cover the cost of that 

surgery. Id. at 609-10. They sought money for the surgeries 

and “the invalidation of the . . . current policy and a 

‘substantive’ declaration . . . that” the Department pay for their 

surgeries. Id. at 614. The Supreme Court determined that the 

patients’ procedural claims were not collateral to their claims 

seeking payment for their surgeries. Id. Instead, they were 

“inextricably intertwined.” Id. So all aspects of the patients’

claims belonged where “Congress has provided for the 

determination of claims for benefits.” Id. 

Jarkesy faithfully applied Heckler’s principle that, at 

times, challenges to agency procedures that lead to an agency’s 

decision are not collateral to challenges of that decision. 803 

F.3d at 23. In Jarkesy, the SEC made several decisions 

adverse to Jarkesy, an investment advisor, including a decision 

to bring an administrative enforcement proceeding against him. 

Id. at 13. Before that proceeding concluded, Jarkesy sued the 

SEC in a separate action. Id. He challenged the agency’s 

procedures and sought to terminate the administrative 

proceeding against him. Id. at 13-14. 

This court held that Jarkesy’s challenges to the SEC’s 

procedures “were not collateral to” the SEC’s decisions. Id. at 

23 (cleaned up). Instead, his challenges were “an attempt to 

reverse the agency’s decisions” outside the system Congress 

created for adjudicating those decisions. Id.
13

So too here. Recall that under § 1421(c), an applicant 

may seek judicial review of the denial of her naturalization 

application. If the plaintiff is seeking to have her denied 

application overturned, a claim regarding the process and 

policies that dictated that denial is not “wholly collateral” to

“such denial.” Heckler, 466 U.S. at 618 (cleaned up); 8 

U.S.C. § 1421(c). That is this case. Miriyeva ultimately 

seeks to overturn the denial of her naturalization application by 

challenging an agency policy about the classification of 

“uncharacterized” separation statuses. See Compl. ¶ 146

(asking the court to stop the agency from “maintaining the 

denial of any naturalization application, including each 

Plaintiff’s application, on the grounds” of the 

“uncharacterized” discharge) (emphasis added); id. (asking 

that the agency “be enjoined from denying naturalization 

applications . . . on [those] grounds”). Since she is “at 

bottom” trying to reverse her denied application, her claims are 

not wholly collateral. Heckler, 466 U.S. at 614.2 

2 That distinguishes this case from McNary v. Haitian Refugee 

Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), which we discuss more below. If 

the McNary plaintiffs succeeded in challenging the procedures at 

issue, those plaintiffs still might not have received special 

agricultural worker status. Id. at 495. But Miriyeva says that the 

agency’s interpretation of her “uncharacterized” discharge status was 

the only reason she wasn’t naturalized. 

Also, we note that Miriyeva has repeatedly insisted she is not 

challenging her denial but rather the agency’s policy. She also 

emphasizes that she is not seeking an order for naturalization but 

rather an injunctive order against the agency’s policy. But because 

the policy was the basis given for her denial, these are distinctions 

without a difference.
14

3

The third factor also weighs against the district court’s 

jurisdiction. That factor asks whether the disputed claims are 

“outside the [agency’s] area of expertise.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d

at 28. In Jarkesy, that depended on whether an agency is 

better equipped than a court to first adjudicate a claim. Id. at 

28-29. But here, Miriyeva does not rely on this factor. She 

does not — and could not plausibly — argue that the District 

Court for the District of Columbia has more expertise than the 

district court where she lives. 

* * *

To sum up, if Miriyeva had sued in her home district, she 

would have received (1) meaningful judicial review (2) on her 

non-collateral claims (3) before a district court with as much 

expertise as any other district court. These three factors are 

not “three distinct inputs into a strict mathematical formula,” 

but “general guideposts.” Id. at 17. As applied here, they

suggest that Miriyeva’s “claims are of the type Congress 

intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure” of 

§§ 1421, 1446, and 1447. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212. 

C

Miriyeva’s other arguments do not change our conclusion 

that the statutory review scheme, as set out in §§ 1421, 1446,

and 1447, forecloses the District Court for the District of 

Columbia’s subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. In 

particular, Miriyeva’s reliance on McNary v. Haitian Refugee 

Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), is misplaced. 

McNary considered whether a provision of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act — 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e) —
15

“precludes a federal district court from exercising general 

federal-question jurisdiction over” the plaintiffs’ constitutional 

and statutory claims. Id. at 483. McNary alleged the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service administered a 

legalization program for “special agricultural workers” through 

“unlawful practices and policies.” Id. at 483, 487 (cleaned 

up). 

In McNary, the provision regarding review of denials of

applications for special agricultural worker status provided:

“There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the 

judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation . . . .” 8 

U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A). And McNary noted that, according to 

the statute, “the courts of appeals constitute the only fora for 

judicial review of deportation orders.” 498 U.S. at 486. 

Section 1160(e) further provided: 

Such judicial review shall be based solely upon 

the administrative record established at the time 

of the review by the appellate authority and the 

findings of fact and determinations contained in 

such record shall be conclusive unless the 

applicant can establish abuse of discretion or 

that the findings are directly contrary to clear 

and convincing facts contained in the record 

considered as a whole.

8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(B) (emphases added). 

McNary held that the provision regarding review did not 

prevent the district courts from retaining their usual federal 

question jurisdiction over claims alleging constitutional 

patterns and practices. 498 U.S. at 494. The Court reasoned 

that the limitations from that section only refer to review of 
16

denials of applications, not any “general collateral challenges,”

like unconstitutional pattern and practice claims. Id. at 492. 

To be fair to Miriyeva, § 1421(c) likewise does not 

mention policy claims. But Miriyeva’s case is distinguishable 

from McNary for four reasons. 

First, the Court in McNary said that the provision 

regarding review applies only to claims that were “subjected to 

administrative consideration and that have resulted in the 

creation of an adequate administrative record.” Id. at 493. 

For special agricultural worker applicants like the plaintiffs in

McNary, it was impossible to develop constitutional challenges 

in the administrative records of their applications. Id.3 So 

the Court allowed federal courts to consider those 

constitutional challenges, even in the absence of an order of 

exclusion or deportation. 

No such problems are present in this case. The statute 

requires the district court where the plaintiff resides to “make 

its own findings of fact and conclusions of law” and, “at the 

request of the petitioner,” to “conduct a hearing de novo on the 

application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Unlike in McNary, the 

court is thus not handcuffed to the administrative record at all

or otherwise constrained by the agency’s resolution. See id.;

McNary, 498 U.S. at 496-97.

Second, the review provision in McNary specified an 

abuse of discretion standard, which “would make no sense” for 

constitutional and statutory questions. 498 U.S. at 493. 

Courts typically consider those questions de novo. The 

3 When we refer to the McNary plaintiffs, we mean specifically the 

individual plaintiffs whose applications were denied — not the 

organizational plaintiffs. See 498 U.S. at 487.
17

specified standard of review thus afforded “substantial 

credence to the conclusion” that the limited judicial review 

provision did “not apply to challenges to [Immigration and 

Naturalization Service’s] practices and procedures.” Id. at 

493-94.

In contrast, the statute here specifically prescribes the type 

of review common for constitutional and statutory claims — de 

novo review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). The standard thus 

“lends substantial credence to the conclusion” that the review 

scheme applies to Miriyeva’s challenges. McNary, 498 U.S. 

at 493.

Even more telling is § 1421(c)’s reference to the relevant 

Administrative Procedure Act sections. It says the court shall 

review the denial of naturalization “in accordance with chapter 

7 of title 5.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).4 By broadly referring to 

these sections, Congress included APA-type review within the 

district court’s review of the denial of Miriyeva’s naturalization 

application. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. 

Third, McNary emphasized that the plaintiffs’ claims were 

collateral to review of a denied application, thus freeing the 

plaintiffs from the directives of the review provision.

McNary, 498 U.S. at 494-99. If the plaintiffs like those in 

McNary prevailed on their procedural objections, that victory

would not have reversed the denial of their applications for 

special agricultural worker status. Id. at 495. Rather, it 

4 Again, part of chapter 7 of title 5 allows courts to “hold unlawful 

and set aside agency action[s]” that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 

abuse of discretion,” “contrary to constitutional right, power, 

privilege, or immunity,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,” 

“without observance of procedure required by law,” or “unwarranted 

by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by 

the reviewing court.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D), (F). 
18

would allow only for their applications to be reconsidered with 

new procedures in place — such as allowing applicants to 

challenge adverse evidence or allowing applicants to call 

witnesses on their behalf. Id. at 487-88, 495. It’s possible the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service still would have 

denied their applications despite the new procedures.

But here, Miriyeva says that the agency’s treatment of her 

“uncharacterized” separation status is the only reason the 

agency denied her application. Compl. ¶ 45. So Miriyeva is 

in effect seeking a reversal of her naturalization denial. If she

prevails, and the court gives her the requested relief, the agency 

will be enjoined from “maintaining the denial” of her 

naturalization application on that ground. Id. ¶ 146. A 

favorable ruling for her on the merits removes the only reason

for her denial.

Fourth, because judicial review was possible only when 

deportation proceedings were occurring, applicants seeking 

special agricultural worker status would have to turn 

themselves in for deportation if they wanted a court to consider 

their policy and practice claim. McNary, 498 U.S. at 496-97. 

That “bet the farm” scheme would have forced them to risk 

“their ability to reside in the United States” — all for a chance 

at judicial review. Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 21. “[T]hat price 

[was] tantamount to a complete denial of judicial review for” 

the plaintiffs. McNary, 498 U.S. at 496-97.

Compare that to other cases, like Jarkesy, where the court 

said Jarkesy had to raise his claims within the exclusive review 

scheme at issue. 803 F.3d at 15-16, 29. There, deportation 

was not a risk, and no one needed to “bet the farm.” Id. at 21. 

This informed the court’s conclusion that Jarkesy had access to 

meaningful judicial review. Id. at 20-22.
19

Miriyeva’s case is much more like Jarkesy than McNary. 

She need not “bet the farm” by filing suit pursuant to § 1421(c). 

She faces no risk from filing that is comparable to deportation. 

Through § 1421(c), she can obtain meaningful judicial review.5

* * *

Congress channeled claims like Miriyeva’s into an 

exclusive statutory scheme established by § 1421(c). The 

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Miriyeva’s 

claims that the agency’s policy violates the Constitution and 

the Administrative Procedure Act. 

IV

That leaves us with Miriyeva’s final two counts in which 

she requests injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. 

As the district court properly noted, the count in which 

Miriyeva requests injunctive relief is not actually a count or a 

separate claim — it is simply a request for a certain remedy. 

See Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, 436 

F. Supp. 3d 170, 186 n.19 (D.D.C. 2019). So the district court 

properly rejected that count.

And as for Miriyeva’s Declaratory Judgment Act claim, it

is a “well-established rule that the Declaratory Judgment Act is 

not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.” C&E 

5

In General Electric Co. v. Jackson, this court implied that the 

“collateral” and “meaningful judicial review” analyses in McNary

were provided by the Supreme Court as ways of distinguishing 

Heckler, not as reasons for determining jurisdiction. 610 F.3d 110, 

125-27 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But even if we limit ourselves to the first 

and second factors, they alone are sufficient to distinguish 

Miriyeva’s case from McNary.
20

Services, Inc. of Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Authority, 

310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Schilling v. 

Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)) (cleaned up). Since the 

district court otherwise lacked jurisdiction over Miriyeva’s 

claims, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 

her Declaratory Judgment Act claim either.

* * *

We affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.