Filed 2/10/23 In re T.C. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re T.C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 D080529

 (Super. Ct. No. EJ4570)

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions. 

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant, T.C. 

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant, C.H. 
2

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County 

Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

T.C. (Father) and C.H. (Mother) appeal the juvenile court’s order 

terminating their parental rights to their son, T.C., under Welfare and 

Institutions Code1section 366.26. The sole issue on appeal is whether the 

San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the 

juvenile court failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under section 

224.2 into T.C.’s possible Native American ancestry, as defined by the Indian 

Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The Agency concedes 

error but contends that remand for additional investigation is unnecessary

because it subsequently conducted further inquiry in cases involving the 

same parents and T.C.’s full siblings, K.C. and C.H., which showed T.C. was 

neither enrolled nor eligible for membership in the identified tribes. In a 

separately filed motion, the Agency requests that we augment the record 

with documents from these cases that demonstrate the Agency’s further 

inquiry efforts with extended family members and the tribes. The Agency 

submits that the augmented record would show that the ICWA errors in this 

case have been rendered moot or harmless. 

As we shall discuss, we agree that the Agency and juvenile court erred, 

deny the augmentation request, conclude that the initial inquiry errors were

prejudicial, conditionally reverse the termination order, and remand the 

matter for further proceedings. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In October of 2020, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on behalf of then three-month-old T.C., alleging

that the parents repeatedly exposed him to violent confrontations, and that

Mother continued to allow Father to care for T.C. despite Father’s ongoing 

abuse of methamphetamine. At about the same time, a social worker 

completed an ICWA-010(A) form, indicating that the Agency had spoken with 

both parents and had no reason to believe the child was an Indian child.

Mother, Father, and the maternal grandfather participated in the 

subsequent detention hearing. Counsel for Mother indicated that Mother

had “no Native American Indian heritage,” and that she would submit the 

appropriate form to the court at a later date. There is no indication in the 

record that Mother ever submitted an ICWA-020 form. 

Counsel for Father also stated that his client denied any known Native 

American ancestry. The court did not ask the maternal grandfather whether 

he had any reason to believe T.C. had Indian heritage. The court then 

determined that the ICWA did not apply. 

It appears from the record that the Agency conducted no further ICWA 

inquiries after this hearing. Several of the Agency’s subsequent reports 

simply indicate that “[o]n 10/15/2020, the [c]ourt found that the Indian Child 

Welfare Act does not apply.” The juvenile court also did not further address 

T.C.’s potential Indian ancestry. 

2 Because the parents’ sole contention on appeal challenges the Agency’s 

and the juvenile court’s compliance with their section 224.2 inquiry duties, 

we limit our discussion of the facts and procedural history to information 

necessary to determine those issues. 
4

On December 16, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the petition, as 

amended (the allegations remained substantially the same). 

In the course of investigating T.C.’s case, the Agency communicated 

with the maternal grandfather, the maternal grandmother and her husband, 

a maternal uncle, the paternal grandmother, and the paternal greatgrandmother regarding various issues including safety planning, providing 

temporary childcare, and possible placement of T.C. The Agency also sent 

letters to the maternal grandmother and paternal grandmother, as well as

nine additional relatives, asking if they would be interested in placement. 

Although the letters are not included in the record, the Agency’s 

jurisdiction/disposition report summarizes the placement-related information 

relayed to these individuals. The summary does not include any ICWArelated inquiries. Nor is there any indication elsewhere in the record that the 

Agency ever asked any of these relatives about T.C.’s possible Native 

American ancestry. 

On January 20, 2022, the Agency placed T.C. and his sibling, K.C., with 

caregivers who seek to adopt T.C. The court terminated Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights on June 8, 2022, at a contested section 366.26 

hearing. Father and Mother separately filed timely appeals from the order, 

challenging only the court’s ICWA finding, made at the time of the detention 

hearing.3

3 Neither parent appealed from the juvenile court’s October 2020

detention order in which the court expressly found that ICWA did not apply. 

Ordinarily, “California follows a ‘one shot’ rule under which, if an order is 

appealable, appeal must be taken or the right to appellate review is 

forfeited.” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8.)

However, because the duty of inquiry under ICWA is a continuing one, the 

one-shot rule does not apply here. (See § 224.2, subd. (a); In re Isaiah W. 

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 6 (Isaiah W.) [“Because ICWA imposes on the juvenile 
5

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Law

Congress enacted the ICWA to address rising concern that Indian 

children were being separated from their tribes through adoption or foster 

care and placed with non-Indian families. (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

p. 7.) California subsequently enacted its own statutes specifying the steps 

the Agency and juvenile courts are required to take to determine whether a 

child is an Indian child before making placement decisions. (In re D.S. (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (In re D.S.).) Under these statutes, the juvenile 

court and the Agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”

during dependency proceedings whether a child “is or may be an Indian 

child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “This continuing duty can be divided into three 

phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty 

to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 

(In re D.F.).) 

The Agency’s initial inquiry duty, which is at issue in this appeal, 

includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal guardian, 

Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in 

the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, 

or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian 

custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) ICWA defines “ ‘extended family 

member’ ” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such 

law or custom, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is 

the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-incourt a continuing duty to inquire whether the child is an Indian child, we 

hold that the parent may challenge a finding of ICWA’s inapplicability in an 

appeal from the subsequent [termination of parental rights] order, even if she 

did not raise such challenge in an appeal from the initial [detention] order”].) 
6

law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” 

(25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c) [“ ‘extended family 

member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA].) 

If the initial inquiry reveals a reason to believe the child is an Indian 

child, then further inquiry into whether there is a reason to know the child is 

an Indian child is required. (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) If 

there is reason to know that a child is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (d)), 

then notice must be sent to the pertinent tribe to allow the tribe to make a 

determination regarding the child’s tribal membership. (In re D.F., at 

pp. 567–568.) 

We review ICWA findings for substantial evidence, “[b]ut where the 

facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s 

requirements have been satisfied.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1051.)

II. Analysis

A. Insufficient Initial ICWA Inquiry

In this case, the parents assert, and the Agency concedes, that the 

Agency failed to comply with its initial ICWA inquiry obligations under 

section 224.2 because it did not question the extended family members 

available to it about possible Native American ancestry. We agree. 

Over the course of the dependency proceedings, the Agency failed to 

take advantage of many opportunities to make ICWA inquiries of readily 

available relatives. The Agency had telephonic contact with the maternal 

grandfather, the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather, a maternal 

uncle, and the paternal grandmother, but did not ask any of these extended

family members whether the child “[was] or may be an Indian child” as 

required in an initial ICWA inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b); In re Benjamin M. 
7

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 (Benjamin M.) [failure to ask father’s known 

relatives about possible Indian ancestry violated ICWA requirements].) The 

Agency also spoke with the paternal great-grandmother without inquiring 

about Indian ancestry. Although great-grandparents do not fall within the 

definition of “extended family members,” the duty of inquiry also extends to 

“others who have an interest in the child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b); see also In 

re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 564, fn. 2, 567 [requiring initial 

inquiry of a maternal great-grandfather who served as the dependent’s 

caregiver because he was included under “others who have an interest in the 

child”]; In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303, 314 (In re S.R.) [“[t]he statute 

obligates the court and child protective agencies to ask all relevant involved 

individuals . . . ‘whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child’ ”].) In this 

case, both parents requested that the Agency evaluate the paternal greatgrandmother as a placement option. She initially declined to be considered,

but volunteered to speak with her daughter about possibly taking T.C. Later, 

she called back and requested that the Agency assess her for placement. 

Thus, the paternal great-grandmother demonstrated an obvious interest in 

the child and should have been questioned by the Agency as to whether she 

was aware of any Indian ancestry. Finally, although the Agency sent 

placement letters to nine other relatives, it does not appear the letters 

included any ICWA inquiries. As a result, we are left to conclude that the 

Agency did not satisfy its inquiry duties. 

The juvenile court also did not fully comply with its ICWA inquiry 

obligations. “At the first appearance in court of each party, the court shall 

ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or 

has reason to know that the child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (c), italics 

added), and “[o]rder the parent . . . to complete” the ICWA-020 form. (Cal. 
8

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).) 4 Here, although Mother’s counsel 

indicated that Mother would submit the appropriate form later, the juvenile

court did not order the parents to complete the ICWA-020 form. Nor did the 

court inquire of the maternal grandfather at his first appearance at the 

detention hearing whether he knew or had reason to know that T.C. is an 

Indian child.

In sum, because neither the Agency’s nor the court’s initial ICWA 

inquiries were adequate, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply. Such an error requires 

reversal if we find that the error was prejudicial. (Benjamin M., supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at p. 742.) 

The Courts of Appeal have applied varying analytical frameworks to 

evaluate whether ICWA initial inquiry errors are prejudicial or harmless. 

We need not address these various approaches because this division has 

adopted the approach articulated in Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 735. 

(In re Y.M. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 901, 916 (In re Y.M.).) Under this 

approach, “a court must reverse where the record demonstrates that the 

agency has not only failed in its duty of initial inquiry, but where the record 

indicates that there was readily obtainable information that was likely to 

bear meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child.” (Benjamin M., 

at p. 744.) This “standard does not require ‘proof of an actual outcome (that 

the parent may actually have Indian heritage).’ [Citation.] The missing 

information need only be relevant to the ICWA inquiry, ‘whatever the 

outcome will be.’ ” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 679 (Ricky R.); 

id. at p. 680 [applying Benjamin M. standard and finding reversible initial 

4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 
9

inquiry error where agency “asked the parents about Indian ancestry” but 

“failed to ask extended family members about it”].) 

On this record, we cannot say the Agency’s failure to comply with its 

initial inquiry duties was harmless. Extended family members and a relative 

with an interest in the child—including the maternal grandfather, maternal 

grandmother, maternal step-grandfather, maternal uncle, paternal greatgrandmother, and paternal grandmother—were readily available, and their 

responses would likely have borne meaningful information, regardless of the 

outcome of the inquiry. (Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) 

Furthermore, the fact that the parents denied any Indian heritage does not 

relieve the Agency of its “broad duty” to inquire of readily ascertainable 

extended family members whether the child was an Indian child. (In re Y.W.

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 554.) A contrary rule would “ignore[ ] the reality 

that parents may not know their possible relationship with or connection to 

an Indian tribe.” (Ibid.; In re S.R., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 314 [“the 

children’s parents apparently had no idea of their family’s connection to 

the . . . tribe . . . , even though the children’s great-grandmother was a 

member”]; see also In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 295 [noting that 

ICWA’s “expansive” duty of inquiry “is premised on the commonsense 

understanding that, over time, Indian families, particularly those living in 

major urban centers . . . , may well have lost the ability to convey accurate 

information regarding their tribal status”].) Accordingly, we conclude that 

the Agency’s error was prejudicial. 

B. Motion to Augment the Record

By separate motion, the Agency moves to augment the record with 

information obtained during the ICWA inquiries the Agency conducted in 

dependency cases involving T.C.’s full-siblings, K.C. and C.H. The Agency 
10

contends that these additional documents demonstrate that remanding the 

case for further inquiry would be futile, thus rendering the case moot or the 

error harmless. 

According to the Agency, both the Agency and the juvenile court 

conducted an initial inquiry with the parents in C.H.’s case. The court also

questioned the paternal grandfather directly during C.H.’s detention hearing. 

At the same hearing, Mother apparently claimed ancestry with the “Taino” 

tribe, and said she was waiting to hear from other family members about 

additional tribal ancestry. The paternal grandfather believed his 

grandfather was “ ‘half-Indian’ ” and his great-grandmother was “ ‘all

Indian,’ ” and Father opined that T.C.’s grandmother or great-grandmother 

might have further information. 

The Agency then prepared a jurisdiction/disposition report 

documenting its further inquiry efforts with the tribes as well as its 

discussions with various extended family members. At a subsequent hearing, 

the court ordered Father to complete the ICWA-020 form. It is not clear from 

the Agency’s motion whether the Agency or the juvenile court ever followed 

up on the ICWA information in C.H.’s case, and it does not appear the court

ever made a finding as to C.H.’s ICWA status. 

In K.C.’s case, it is not apparent from the motion whether the Agency 

and the court conducted their own initial inquires or whether they built off

the proceedings involving C.H. The Agency references only a summary of two 

special hearings in K.C.’s case during which the court evaluated the Agency’s 

further ICWA inquiry with the family, its notices to the tribes, and the tribes’

responses. At some point, the Cherokee Nation sent a response requesting 

the middle name and date of birth of the maternal grandfather. The Agency 

provided it and received word from the tribe’s enrollment designee that none 
11

of the family members were eligible to enroll in the tribe. The Agency noted 

that the juvenile court found that reasonable inquiry had been made as to 

whether K.C. was an Indian child, and that the court concluded that ICWA 

did not apply. 

Mother responds that augmentation is not appropriate because the 

materials were not before the trial court and it is for the juvenile court, not 

the appellate court, to decide questions of fact. Father did not oppose the 

motion. 

“It has long been the general rule and understanding that ‘an appeal 

reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a 

record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.’ ” (In 

re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 (Zeth S.).) Under certain circumstances, 

a reviewing court may “take additional evidence of or concerning facts 

occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal” and may make 

factual determinations, particularly when doing will result in final disposal of 

a matter in a single appeal without further proceedings in the trial court. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 909.) However, this authority “should be exercised 

sparingly” and only under “exceptional circumstances.” (Zeth S., at p. 405

[noting that “[t]here is no blanket exception to the general rule for juvenile 

dependency appeals”].) 

We do not believe that such exceptional circumstances exist in this 

case. Indeed, if this case is exceptional, then nearly all cases in which the 

Agency belatedly conducts the required ICWA inquiry and seeks to 
12

supplement the appellate record will qualify.5 Here, the Agency asks us to 

augment the record with 180 pages of additional information. The records 

include a detention hearing transcript, Mother’s ICWA-020 form, Agency 

reports, and court minute orders filed in two separate cases involving two 

different children. None of the material has been filed in the juvenile court in

T.C.’s case. It is not the province of appellate courts to sift through a 

voluminous collection of documents that were filed piecemeal in two different 

cases, weigh the evidence, and decide whether the Agency conducted a 

sufficient ICWA inquiry. (Cf. In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 

703 [“[m]aking the appellate court the trier of fact is not the solution”].)

Rather, “[i]t is a trial court function to receive evidence of the [Agency’s]

notice efforts and to determine if they measure up to ICWA standards.” (In 

re Nikki R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 852.) If the Agency is to concede 

ICWA inquiry and notice error, the better practice is for the parties to 

“stipulate to a conditional ICWA reversal and an immediate issuance of the 

remittitur.” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 683.) 

The Agency nonetheless argues that we should accept the additional 

evidence because it is not being offered for the purpose of reversing the 

court’s order on substantive grounds, but to demonstrate a lack of prejudice. 

Because the Agency contends the subsequent ICWA inquiry evidence shows 

there is no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome should the case be 

5 How appellate courts should handle this issue may eventually be 

answered. Our Supreme Court recently granted review of a case to consider 

the question of whether an appellate court may take additional evidence to 

remedy the failure of the child welfare agency and the trial court to comply 

with the inquiry, investigation, and notice requirements of the ICWA (25 

U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.), and if so, what 

procedures must be followed. (See In re Kenneth D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 

1027, 1030 review granted Nov. 30, 2022, S276649.) 
13

remanded, it submits that augmentation promotes the strong policy of 

resolving dependency cases expeditiously. In support of this point, the 

Agency relies on In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 832 (In re A.B.) and In re 

Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282 (In re Z.N.). 

While posttermination6 evidence has been considered by appellate 

courts under limited circumstances, we do not believe that these cases 

require us to consider it in this matter. Our review reveals that the appellate 

courts in In re A.B. and In re Z.N. augmented the record or took judicial 

notice of subsequent ICWA inquiries because the results definitively showed 

that the child would not be eligible for tribal membership. (In re A.B., supra,

164 Cal.App.4th at p. 843 [augmenting the record to include the mother’s 

Parental Notification of Indian Status form from a half-sibling’s case which, 

together with the father’s form denying Indian heritage, showed A.B. had no 

such ancestry]; In re Z.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [judicially 

noticing tribal notification letters and responses filed in the cases of two halfsiblings that showed the children were not members or eligible to be such].) 

In that situation, even a limited remand would be “an empty exercise with a 

preordained outcome,” would not further the strong policy favoring resolving 

dependency cases expeditiously, and would not benefit tribes. (In re Z.N. at 

p. 301.) 

We do not believe the outcome of further ICWA inquiry is clearly 

preordained here. Unlike in In re A.B. where the court augmented the record 

with one document disclaiming Indian heritage, the instant case involves 180 

pages of documents that were assembled because both parents claimed

Indian ancestry. As the In re A.B. court acknowledged, “[w]hen a parent 

6 We refer to evidence obtained after the juvenile court issued its order 

terminating parental rights. 
14

indicates he or she may have Indian heritage, ‘ “it is preferable to err on the 

side of giving notice and examining thoroughly whether the juvenile is an 

Indian child.” ’ ” ( In re A.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.)7 

Furthermore, we have concerns about the completeness of the ICWA 

inquiries conducted in C.H. and K.C.’s cases. From what is before us, it 

appears the court in C.H.’s case was not yet satisfied that the ICWA inquiry 

was complete. The briefing also does not make clear the Agency’s basis for 

providing further notice to the Blackfeet tribe. Initially, the Agency listed the 

paternal grandmother as the individual who suspected the family had 

Blackfeet heritage. The Agency asserts that a social worker “began further 

inquiry correspondence with the Blackfeet tribe on October 20, 2022,” but 

that the tribe had not responded by December 14, 2022, when the court in 

7 This case is also distinguishable from In re A.B. because, whereas the 

agency in In re A.B. filed the new evidence in the juvenile court evaluating 

A.B.’s case before seeking to augment the record on appeal, there is no 

indication that any of the proffered documents in this case have been filed in 

the court below. This is relevant because we are not convinced that we may 

augment the record with documents that were not filed in the case below. 

(See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 484 [“[t]he function of the 

augmentation procedure is to supplement an incomplete but existing 

record . . . [a]ugmentation is not available, however, for the purpose of adding 

material that was not a proper part of the record in the trial court”]; cf.

Kenneth D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 review granted Nov. 30, 2022, 

S276649 [augmenting the record where the child welfare department filed 

the document in the juvenile court below]; In re A.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 839, 843 [same].) The Agency’s motion is filed pursuant to rules 

8.155(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (a)(2), as well as 8.340(c), of the California Rules 

of Court. Rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) pertains to “[a]ny document filed or lodged in 

the case in superior court” (italics added) and none of the other rule 

provisions suggest that they apply to documents lodged in other cases or 

other courts. Moreover, even if the Agency had filed the proffered documents 

in the court below, the motion to augment is untimely under rule 8.416(d)(2), 

and the Agency has not provided “an exceptional showing of good cause” (rule

8.416(f)) to excuse the delay. 
15

K.C.’s case made its ICWA determination. However, on December 8, 2022, 

the Agency again contacted the Blackfeet tribe, this time providing the 

maternal grandfather’s full name and date of birth. It is not evident from the 

Agency’s briefing if Mother subsequently heard back from relatives about 

possible Blackfeet ancestry or if the Agency simply provided this information 

at the same time it provided it to the Cherokee Nation out of an abundance of 

caution. And, because the Blackfeet tribe has not responded to either 

inquiry, we cannot rely upon a definitive tribal response. (See § 224.2, subd. 

(h) [“[a] determination by an Indian tribe that a child is or is not a member 

of, or eligible for membership in, that tribe, or testimony attesting to that 

status by a person authorized by the tribe to provide that determination, 

shall be conclusive”].) The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee tribe also 

has not yet responded, though the Agency argues that a social worker’s 

notation implies the tribe “received and/or responded to the Agency’s 

correspondence.” Ultimately, given the number of omissions and 

uncertainties in this submission, we cannot confidently conclude that T.C. 

would not be eligible for tribal membership. 

Although we do not wish to delay permanency for T.C., taking 

additional evidence pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is 

generally warranted only when doing so will finally dispose of a matter in a 

single appeal without further trial court proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 909.) Even if we were to consider the supplemental records, we do not 

believe they are sufficient to allow us to fully resolve the matter. Therefore, 

we deny the Agency’s motion to augment the record. 
16

Because the documents from C.H. and K.C.’s cases are not before us, 

there is no basis for dismissing the appeal as moot. 

DISPOSITION

The June 8, 2022 order terminating parental rights under section 

366.26 is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile 

court with directions that, within 30 days of the remittitur, the Agency must 

file a report demonstrating its compliance with the initial inquiry provisions 

of section 224.2, subdivision (b), and, if applicable, the duty of further inquiry 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e)) and the duty to provide notice to the pertinent tribes (25 

U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3). Within 45 days of the 

remittitur, the juvenile court must conduct a hearing to determine whether 

the Agency’s investigation satisfied its affirmative duty to investigate. The 

juvenile court has the discretion to adjust these time periods on a showing of 

good cause. 
17

If neither the Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to believe or to 

know that T.C. is an Indian child, the order issued at the June 8, 2022 

contested section 366.26 hearing shall be reinstated by the juvenile court. 

Alternatively, if after completing the inquiry the Agency or the juvenile court 

has reason to believe that T.C. is an Indian child, the court shall proceed 

accordingly. 

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

IRION, J.