1

 Some commentators take the view that an affidavit used in summary judgment is not hearsay. See James Joseph

Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1545 (1995) (“[A] judge

using an affidavit as a basis for granting or denying summary judgment is not using it in any way as proof of its contents;

she is merely using it as evidence of what the affiant would be likely to say if called as a witness at trial (much as she

might use it for the nonhearsay purpose of deciding whether the affiant can speak English or hold a pen).”); see also

Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After

the Trilogy, 63 WASH. &LEE L.REV. 81, 130 (2006) (“Materials offered in opposition to summary judgment, however,

MEMORANDUM

DATE: October 25, 2008

TO: Judge Michael Baylson

Professor Edward Cooper

Judge Mark Kravitz

Judge Lee H. Rosenthal

FROM: Andrea Kuperman

SUBJECT: Admissibility Requirements for Summary Judgment Affidavits

This memorandum addresses research regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and

whether the requirement in the rule that affidavits “set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence” has caused confusion about admissibility requirements for affidavits submitted in

connection with summary judgment motions. Specifically, an issue arose during the June 2008

Standing Committee meeting as to whether that language in current Rule 56(e), which is carried

forward in proposed Rule 56(c)(6), may cause confusion as to whether district courts are permitted

to consider affidavits at the summary judgment stage that contain facts that would be admissible at

trial but not through the affiant.

The following example has been used to illustrate the issue: In opposition to a motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff submits an affidavit stating: “I heard Jones say the light was red.”

Although Rule 56 clearly permits courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate on

the basis of affidavits, despite the fact that affidavits are arguably hearsay,1

 the question at issue is
are not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. They are offered to establish a genuine issue of material fact

for trial.”) (citing Duane, supra, at 1532, 1535).

2

 Because a search for cases addressing the admissibility of hearsay within affidavits considered on summary judgment

returned over a thousand results, I have focused my research on a sampling of appellate and district court cases from a

range of circuits to survey how courts have considered this issue in a variety of contexts.

2

whether Rule 56 also permits consideration of Jones’s statement contained within the affidavit.

Although Rule 56(e) requires affidavits to set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, since

Jones could theoretically testify at trial that the light was red, it might be argued that the facts in the

affidavit are admissible even though neither the affidavit itself nor testimony from the affiant would

be admissible at trial to prove those facts. However, it could also be argued that Rule 56(e) allows

for consideration of evidence in the form of an affidavit even though the affidavit itself would be

inadmissible at trial, but requires that the contents of the affidavit must be admissible at trial if

testified to by the affiant.

The Civil Rules Committee requested that I research whether the cases have permitted

consideration on summary judgment of affidavits containing facts that would be inadmissible if

testified to by the affiant at trial but that might be admissible if submitted in another manner at trial.

I have reviewed cases discussing the admissibility of affidavits containing hearsay and other

evidence that would be inadmissible at trial.2

 The research revealed that most courts will not

consider hearsay evidence contained within an affidavit on summary judgment, but that some courts

have stated that they will consider summary judgment evidence if it is “reducible to admissible

evidence at trial.” There has been some variation in the cases as to what is meant by evidence that

can be reduced to admissible evidence at trial. Most courts using this language appear to mean that

an affidavit can be considered on summary judgment assuming that the affiant can testify live at trial

to the same facts contained in the affidavit, even though the affidavit itself would not be admissible
3

at trial. However, some courts appear to use language regarding the “reducibility” of evidence to

admissible form to mean that an affidavit or other summary judgment evidence containing hearsay

could be considered even if testimony from the affiant would not be admissible at trial, as long as

there is some indication that the out-of-court declarant will be available and willing to testify in

accordance with the hearsay statements in the summary judgment affidavit. A few courts have

considered hearsay at the summary judgment stage as long as there is an absence of evidence

showing that the out-of-court declarant would not testify in accordance with the hearsay statements

at trial.

I. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

The potential for confusion as to the admissibility of hearsay evidence in an affidavit on

summary judgment may stem from one of the cases in the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary-judgment

trilogy, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). In Celotex, the Court held that if a defendant

makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, “Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving

party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The Court explained: “We do not mean that the nonmoving party must

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.

Obviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses.” Id. The

Court remanded, noting that the appellate court had “declined to address either the adequacy of the

showing made by respondent in opposition to petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, or the

question whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry

respondent’s burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
4

Celotex’s statements regarding admissibility of evidence have led some commentators to

conclude that summary judgment evidence does not necessarily have to be admissible at trial. See

Steinman, supra, at 130–31 (stating that “[t]he precise basis for importing trial evidentiary standards

at the summary judgment phase is unclear,” and that “the plaintiff’s response [to a no-evidence

motion for summary judgment] is sufficient only if her materials are ‘reduc[ible] to admissible

evidence.’”) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327). Other commentators have declined to find that

Celotex imported a lower evidentiary standard into Rule 56. See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon,

Essay, Responding to Summary Judgment, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 815, 830 (2008) (finding that

“Celotex has nothing to say about an adverse party’s burden in response to a motion for summary

judgment,” and concluding that “mere reducibility to admissible evidence is not the proper standard

for assessing the adequacy of the materials presented by the adverse party at summary judgment.

Rather, the adverse party must present materials that are themselves admissible.”). A review of the

cases shows that most courts will consider affidavits with testimony that is either admissible at trial

or “reducible” to admissible form at trial, but courts generally will not consider evidence that is

incapable of being reduced to admissible evidence. The cases generally fall into one of three

categories: (1) cases finding that evidence within affidavits must be admissible to be considered on

summary judgment; (2) cases finding that hearsay within an affidavit can be considered on summary

judgment if the hearsay statement would be submitted in an admissible form at trial; and (3) cases

finding that hearsay contained within an affidavit can be considered on summary judgment unless

it is apparent that the hearsay could not be submitted in an admissible form at trial.

II. Cases Finding that Evidence Within Affidavits Must Be Admissible to Be Considered

on Summary Judgment

Most of the cases I reviewed concluded that a court may not consider inadmissible evidence
5

contained within an affidavit on summary judgment. Some courts finding that it is not permissible

to consider hearsay contained in an affidavit in ruling on a summary judgment motion hold that

evidence must be capable of being reduced to admissible evidence at trial, but mean that a court can

consider an affidavit on summary judgment even though an affidavit would not be admissible at

trial, not that the affidavit may contain hearsay. The cases falling within this first category have held

that it is inappropriate to consider hearsay contained within an affidavit on summary judgment

unless the only defect in admissibility is the form, and not the content, of the evidence. See, e.g.,

Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008) (“‘‘[H]earsay

testimony . . . that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth

in [the Rule 56(e)] affidavit.’’”) (quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986)

(quoting 6 MOORE’S FED. PRACTICE ¶ 56.22[1], at 56-1312 to 56-1316 (2d ed. 1985))) (additional

citations omitted); Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2008) (“‘When an affidavit

contains an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the statement that is inadmissible

hearsay, the statement may not be used to support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.’”)

(quoting Brooks v. Tri-Sys., Inc., 425 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005)); Woods v. Newburgh

Enlarged City Sch. Dist., No. 07-0610-cv, 2008 WL 3841497, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2008)

(unpublished) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that relied on hearsay could not be considered

on summary judgment ) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1); Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 155 n.17

(2d Cir. 2004); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 222 (2d Cir. 2004)); United States v.

$92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court erred

by not striking the affidavit used to support summary judgment because “the affidavit clearly

contained hearsay, was not based on personal knowledge, and, under normal summary judgment
3

 Although the court indicated that it was permissible to consider hearsay because the facts “may” ultimately be

presented in admissible form, it is likely that the court was approving only of the use of affidavits at summary judgment

and not of the use of hearsay statements within affidavits at summary judgment because the court found that it could only

consider evidence that would be available to the jury in some form.

6

procedures, is not admissible”) (citing Bolen v. Dengel, 340 F.3d 300, 313 (5th Cir. 2003); FED.R.

CIV. P. 56(e)(1)); Ward v. Int’l Paper Co., 509 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 2007) (declining to consider

affidavits containing inadmissible hearsay on summary judgment because “nothing in the affidavits

indicates a hearsay exception applies”); Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007)

(“Martin Alpert’s statement [in an affidavit used to oppose summary judgment] regarding the

writing off of debts by Microsoft and CCA Advertising was apparently based solely upon

information that he received from elsewhere and is thus inadmissible hearsay.”); Fisher v. Okla.

Dep’t of Corr. Unknown State Actor and/or Actors, 213 F. App’x 704, 708 (10th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished) (“We determine that the affidavits are insufficient to withstand summary judgment

because they are based on either hearsay or speculation or both, and are therefore inadmissible.”)

(citing Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 195 (10th Cir. 1996)); Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1160

(10th Cir. 2006) (“[P]arties may submit affidavits even though affidavits are often inadmissible

hearsay at trial on the theory that the same facts may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible

form. However, ‘[t]o determine whether genuine issues of material fact make a jury trial necessary,

a court may consider only the evidence that would be available to the jury’ in some form.”)3

 (internal

citation omitted); Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.

2006) (“The requirement that the substance of the evidence must be admissible is not only explicit

in Rule 56, which provides that ‘[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall . . . set forth such facts

as would be admissible in evidence,’ FED.R.CIV. P. 56(e), but also implicit in the court’s role at the

summary judgment stage. To determine whether genuine issues of material fact make a jury trial
4

 The court noted that “[p]arties may . . . submit affidavits in support of summary judgment, despite the fact that

affidavits are often inadmissible at trial as hearsay, on the theory that the evidence may ultimately be presented at trial

in an admissible form.” Argo, 452 F.3d at 1199 (citation omitted). The court explained: “Thus, for example, at summary

judgment courts should disregard inadmissible hearsay statements contained in affidavits, as those statements could not

be presented at trial in any form.” Id. (citing Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. Co., 185 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.5 (10th Cir.

1999)).

5

 The court found two statements submitted by the plaintiff to be inadmissible. The plaintiff’s allegation of a statement

from an unnamed coworker that other employees told him to stay away from the plaintiff was hearsay if offered to show

the other coworkers’ harassing behavior. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 85 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801, 802; Vazquez v. LopezRosario, 134 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1998)). The court also found that the plaintiff’s assertion that a tow truck driver had

said that another person had been circulating a petition to have the plaintiff fired was hearsay. See id. (citing LaRou v.

Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 663 (1st Cir. 1996)).

7

necessary, a court necessarily may consider only the evidence that would be available to the jury.”)4

(citing Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004)); Smith v. Potter,

445 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2006) (affidavits executed by the plaintiff’s coworkers, alleging that

the plaintiff had told them about a phone call she made, were not sufficient to avoid summary

judgment because the affidavits were “clearly offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and

thus constitute inadmissible hearsay”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 801); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398

F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Those facts [presented by a nonmovant to avoid summary judgment],

typically set forth in affidavits, depositions, and the like, must have evidentiary value; as a rule,

‘[e]vidence that is inadmissible at trial, such as inadmissible hearsay, may not be considered on

summary judgment.’”)5

 (quoting Vazquez v. Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1998));

Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement that

the affiant have personal knowledge and be competent to testify to the matters asserted in the

affidavit also means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admissible at trial if

testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”) (citing Sarno v. Douglas

Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 1999)); Williams v. York Int’l Corp., 63

F. App’x 808, 814 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (refusing to consider a statement in the plaintiff’s
6

 Macuba disapproved of a district court case within the Eleventh Circuit that had indicated that hearsay could be

considered on summary judgment:

We are, however, somewhat concerned about Coker v. Tampa Port Authority, 962

F. Supp. 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1997). In Coker, plaintiff had charged defendant, his

former employer, with a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. One of

the issues at the summary judgment stage was whether plaintiff was “disabled” for

purposes of the Act. Plaintiff had submitted the testimony of his physician, but he

also submitted a letter from defendant’s insurance company, written to plaintiff,

which stated that “[y]our doctor has reported that you have completed treatment and

may return to work, but that you will have some permanent impairment from your

on-the-job-accident.” The court held that it could consider this hearsay because

“there is no suggestion that the hearsay statement regarding plaintiff’s permanent

impairment cannot be reduced to admissible form at trial through the doctor’s

testimony.” This is not a correct statement of the law. Plaintiff’s doctor certainly

could not testify at trial to what an insurance company said to plaintiff in a letter,

because, aside from the letter, the doctor would have no personal knowledge of that.

What the district court should have said was that plaintiff had demonstrated a

genuine issue of material fact by submitting evidence (the testimony of the doctor)

which could later be given in an admissible form (by the doctor testifying at trial).

Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1324 n.18 (internal citations omitted).

8

affidavit that described a doctor’s diagnosis of the plaintiff’s condition because “[h]earsay is

inadmissible in affidavits submitted in conjunction with, or in opposition to, motions for summary

judgment”) (citing Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1994)); Macuba v. DeBoer,

193 F.3d 1316, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We believe that the courts have used the phrases

‘reduced to admissible evidence at trial’ and ‘reduced to admissible form’ to explain that the out-ofcourt statement made to the witness (the Rule 56(c) affiant or the deposition deponent) must be

admissible at trial for some purpose. For example, the statement might be admissible because it falls

within an exception to the hearsay rule, the statement does not constitute hearsay at all . . . , or the

statement is used only for impeachment purposes . . . .”) (footnotes omitted);6 Moore v. Gramley,

151 F.3d 1033 (Table), 1998 WL 322663, at *3 (7th Cir. May 14, 1998) (unpublished) (an affidavit

from an inmate in the plaintiff’s prison stating that another inmate had said that others paid him to

attack the plaintiff constituted inadmissible hearsay insufficient to oppose summary judgment
7

 The court noted: 

Some courts have, it is true, allowed letters, articles, and other unattested hearsay

documents to be used as evidence in opposition to summary judgment—provided

some showing is made (or it is obvious) that they can be replaced by proper

evidence at trial. An example would be a letter inadmissible only because the

signature on it had not been verified and there was no doubt that it could and would

be. Any broader dispensation to disregard the rules of evidence in summary

judgment proceedings would make it impossible ever to grant summary judgment,

and . . . is not supported by the Supreme Court’s statement in [Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324,] that a party opposing summary judgment need not do so with evidence that

is in a form that would make it admissible at trial. In context, the reference is to

affidavits and depositions.

Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 742–43 (internal citations omitted). The court continued:

There are many exceptions to the rule that makes hearsay evidence inadmissible

at a trial; if none of them is applicable, the “evidence” submitted in opposition to

summary judgment is likely to be pretty worthless. No doubt there should be an

exception for the cases just mentioned in which it hasn’t been feasible to obtain

better evidence but it is reasonably clear that such evidence will be available at trial.

That exception (possibly implicit in the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . as well as the

case law) isn’t applicable here.

Id. at 743. The court concluded that “[i]t would be an abuse of discretion to admit the [newspaper] article as evidence

because of the doubt about what it means and about whether it is an accurate report of what Centel said and because the

author was available to be deposed, or give an affidavit, and clear up these questions.” Id. at 745.

9

because “[t]he law is well established that ‘a party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay in an

affidavit or deposition to oppose a motion for summary judgment’”) (citing Bombard v. Fort Wayne

Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996)); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742

(7th Cir. 1997) (“And hearsay is inadmissible in summary judgment proceedings to the same extent

that it is inadmissible in a trial, except that affidavits and depositions, which (especially affidavits)

are not generally admissible at trial, are admissible in summary judgment proceedings to establish

the truth of what is attested or deposed, provided, of course, that the affiant’s or deponent’s

testimony would be admissible if he were testifying live.”)7

 (internal citations omitted);

Kapetanovich v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., No. 92-3018, 1994 WL 530912, at *3 n.4 (3d Cir. July 15,

1992) (unpublished) (approving of the magistrate judge’s striking of an affidavit because it was
8

 The court explained that even though affidavits could be considered on summary judgment despite their

inadmissibility at trial, “‘the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible.’” Aludo, 2008 WL 2782734, at

*1 (quoting Thomas, 48 F.3d at 485). The court concluded: “‘Thus, for example, at summary judgment courts should

disregard inadmissible hearsay statements contained in affidavits as those statements could not be presented at trial in

any form.’” Id. (quoting Argo, 452 F.3d at 1199).

10

based on inadmissible hearsay and could not be considered under Rule 56(e)); Gell v. Town of

Aulander, 252 F.R.D. 297, 301 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (striking an unsigned draft affidavit attached to an

investigator’s notarized affidavit because even though “should [the proposed author of the unsigned

affidavit] testify as forecast by plaintiff at trial, it is possible that, at that time, the unsigned affidavit

might be admissible pursuant to Rule 613(b),” that was “not the situation before the court at this

time” because “[c]urrently the court is confronted with [a] bona fide affidavit (Waller’s) that seeks

to enter into evidence the unsworn, unsigned affidavit of a third party which contains material that

is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”); Adams v. Gardner Constr. Group,

No. CIV-07-722-C, 2008 WL 2944932, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008) (“‘[H]earsay testimony

that would be inadmissible at trial may not be included in an affidavit to defeat summary judgment

because ‘[a] third party’s description of [a witness’[s]] supposed testimony is not suitable grist for

the summary judgment mill.’’”) (quoting Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir.

1995)); Aludo v. Denver Area Council, No. 06-cv02257-LTB-MJW, 2008 WL 2782734, at *1 (D.

Colo. July 8, 2008) (“‘Parties may, for example, submit affidavits in support of summary judgment,

despite the fact that affidavits are often inadmissible at trial as hearsay, on the theory that the

evidence may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form.’”)8

 (quoting Argo, 452 F.3d at

1199); cf. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e need not decide whether

the diary [submitted to oppose summary judgment] itself is admissible. It would be sufficient if the

contents of the diary are admissible at trial, even the diary itself may be inadmissible. At the
9

 The court further explained:

The contents of the diary are mere recitations of events within Fraser’s personal

knowledge and, depending on the circumstances, could be admitted into evidence

at trial in a variety of ways. Fraser could testify to all the relevant portions of the

diary from her personal knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 602. If she forgets the exact

dates or the details of the event, she may be able to use the diary to refresh her

recollection. FED. R. EVID. 612. Indeed, even inadmissible evidence may be used

to refresh a witness’s recollection. United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1376

(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 1997). If the diary fails

to refresh her recollection, she might still be able to read the diary into evidence as

a recorded recollection under FED. R. EVID. 803(5).

Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1037.

10 The court was not considering the admissibility of hearsay within an affidavit, but granted a motion to strike a paper

and an article submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment, finding that they “do not constitute materials

which may be considered on a motion for summary judgment because they contain hearsay for which no exception

exists.” Summers, 2008 WL 576489, at *5.

11

summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. We instead

focus on the admissibility of its contents.”)9

 (citing Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410,

418–19 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1991));

Summers v. Winter, No. 5:07cv28/RH/EMT, 2008 WL 576489, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 29, 2008)

(“The general rule regarding the consideration of hearsay statements included in verified pleadings,

affidavits, documents, and other materials submitted pursuant to Rule 56 is that inadmissible

hearsay, meaning out-of-court statements presented for the purpose of establishing the truth of the

content of the statement and that [do] not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, may not be

considered on a motion for summary judgment”)10 (citing Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322), report and

recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 783582 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2008); Murphy v. County of

Yavapai, No. CV-04-1861-PCT-DGC, 2006 WL 2460916, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2006) (noting

that “[a]t the summary judgment stage, courts focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s content

rather than its form,” and that “[c]ourts thus may consider hearsay evidence contained in an expert
11 In Murphy, it was undisputed that the expert whose testimony was at issue would not be available to testify at trial

because of a confidentiality agreement. 2006 WL 2460916, at *5. The court found that “[b]ecause Plaintiff has made

no argument or showing that the evidence contained in Mr. Sullivan’s reports and affidavit can be presented in

admissible form at trial . . . , the Court may not consider the evidence for summary judgment purposes.” Id. (citing

Bortell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2005); Metro. Enter. Corp. v. United Techs. Int’l Corp., No.

Civ. 303CV1685JBA, 2005 WL 2300382, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2005); Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681, 682 (2d

Cir. 2001)). The court considered whether the affidavit could be considered on summary judgment despite the fact that

the affiant would be unavailable at trial, and was not faced with the issue of whether it could consider a hearsay statement

within an affidavit.

12

report or affidavit where the expert ‘could later present that evidence through direct testimony, i.e.,

‘in a form that would be admissible at trial.’’”).11

In Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit attempted to

clarify the standard for evidence considered on summary judgment. The court noted that the district

court did not deal with the problem of hearsay contained within an affidavit, possibly “because of

apparent confusion in the federal courts on the extent to which hearsay may be considered in ruling

on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 1322. The Macuba court explained that “[t]he general

rule is that inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.’” Id.

(footnote omitted) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). The court

noted that “[s]ome courts, including our own, appear to have restated the general rule to hold that

a district court may consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if

the statement could be ‘reduced to admissible evidence at trial’ or ‘reduced to admissible form.’”

Id. at 1323 (citing Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999); Pritchard v. S. Co.

Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th Cir. 1996); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584–85 (11th

Cir. 1996); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1246

(3d Cir. 1993); Raby v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1353–54 n.9 (M.D. Ala. 1998);

Coker v. Tampa Port Auth., 962 F. Supp. 1462, 1466–67 (M.D. Fla. 1997)). The court explained

the confusion:
12 One commentator has noted that “[u]nder the majority’s holding, the testimony contained in such documents

[affidavits, deposition transcripts, or similar written forms of testimony] must itself be admissible. In other words, the

question is whether the hearsay statement in an affidavit would be admissible if the affiant were testifying ‘live’ in court

rather than by affidavit.” Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L.REV. 1165, 1186 (2000). Mr. Treadwell argues

that “[i]f this is the majority’s holding, it arguably does not address squarely the issue before the court. It would appear

that the phrases ‘reduced to admissible evidence at trial’ and ‘reduced to admissible form,’ if they mean anything, must

stand for something more than the simple proposition that affidavits can be considered even though affidavits would be

inadmissible at trial.” Id. at 1186–87.

13

We believe that the courts have used the phrases “reduced to

admissible evidence at trial” and “reduced to admissible form” to

explain that the out-of-court statement made to the witness (the Rule

56(c) affiant or the deposition deponent) must be admissible at trial

for some purpose. For example, the statement might be admissible

because it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, or does not

constitute hearsay at all (because it is not offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted), or is used solely for impeachment purposes

(and not as substantive evidence).12

Id. at 1323–24 (footnotes omitted). The Macuba court concluded that the affidavit containing

hearsay could not be considered on summary judgment because the hearsay statements were being

offered for their truth, none of the statements would be admissible at trial under an exception to the

hearsay rule, and even though some of the statements allegedly made to the affiant might be

admissible for impeachment purposes, they would not be admissible as substantive evidence. Id.

at 1325.

The view that hearsay within affidavits cannot be considered on summary judgment has been

endorsed by many commentators. One article argues that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 . .

. is best interpreted as imposing a strict standard with respect to the admissibility of materials

presented by parties at summary judgment, a standard that approximates a party’s evidentiary burden

at trial.” Shannon, supra, at 815–16. Professor Shannon takes the position that “Celotex really has

nothing definitive to say about an adverse party’s response to a motion for summary judgment,” id.

at 826, arguing that “there is no doubt that anything the Court might have said with respect to the
13 Professor Shannon’s essay is a rebuttal to the arguments made in Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of

Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81

(2006).

14

adverse party’s burden was dicta,” id. at 825. Professor Shannon contends that “mere reducibility

to admissible evidence is not the proper standard for assessing the adequacy of the materials

presented by the adverse party at summary judgment. Rather, the adverse party must present

materials that are themselves admissible.”13 Id. at 830. Professor Shannon explains his theory as

follows:

Admittedly, Rule 56(e) permits a party to present affidavits in

connection with a motion for summary judgment, and as Steinman

observes, affidavits themselves generally are not admissible at trial.

But Rule 56(e) does require that the contents of the affidavits consist

of admissible evidence, and it makes little sense to impose this

requirement on affidavits and not on anything else that might be

presented in response. It also makes little sense to permit a party to

avoid summary judgment—the purpose of which is to avoid a

needless trial—with materials that would not be admissible at trial.

How may one determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial

other than by the consideration of that evidence that would be

admissible at trial? An exception (as to form) has been created for

affidavits so as to permit a party to present non-deposition testimony

on paper. There are no other exceptions.

Id. at 830–32 (footnotes omitted).

Similarly, in William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & David J. Barrans, The Analysis &

Decision of Summary Judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 441, 481 (1992), the authors argue that “[w]hile one court relied on this

language [in Celotex regarding the form of summary judgment evidence] to hold that inadmissible

evidence may be considered on a motion for summary judgment, apparently without regard to

whether the facts can be proved at trial, the better view is that Celotex merely clarifies the

nonmovant’s right to oppose a summary judgment motion with any of the materials listed in Rule
14 In Garside, the court found that an interrogatory answer stating what the plaintiff’s expert would testify to at trial

was insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Garside, 895 F.2d at 50 (“A third-party’s description of an expert’s

supposed testimony is not suitable grist for the summary judgment mill.”). The court noted that interrogatory answers,

like affidavits, must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. Id. at 49–50. The court found that “expert

opinion is admissible and may defeat summary judgment only where it appears that the affiant is competent to give an

expert opinion.” Id. at 50 (citation omitted). The court held that “[i]n short, what we have here—the Garsides’ account

of what they think (or hope) that Dr. Theodarides’ testimony might be—amounts to inadmissible hearsay. . . . Hearsay

evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted).

15

56(c), including affidavits of its own witnesses that may contain testimony in a form not admissible

at trial.” (footnotes omitted). The authors explain that “[t]he fact that a witness affidavit is hearsay

does not make the testimony it contains inadmissible when offered at trial by that witness. That such

affidavits are permitted, therefore, does not justify considering evidence that would be inadmissible

at trial.” Id. at 481–82. This article distinguishes between affidavits of a party’s own witness and

a statement of the proposed testimony of an independent or adverse witness:

To permit an opposition [to a summary judgment motion] to be based

on evidence that would not be admissible at trial would undermine

the goal of the summary judgment procedure to prevent unnecessary

trials, since inadmissible evidence could not support a jury verdict.

A distinction must be drawn, therefore, between the affidavit of [a]

party’s own witness—which can be converted into admissible

testimony at trial—or an opponent’s admission, and a statement

reciting the testimony of an independent or adverse witness that

would be barred as hearsay. (The testimony of such a witness would

normally have to be submitted in the form of a deposition.)

Id. at 482. The article argues that there must be some showing that summary judgment evidence

would be admissible at trial, stating: “Of course, a nonmovant’s mere promise to produce admissible

evidence will not suffice to defeat summary judgment. And unauthenticated documents or hearsay

evidence should not be considered without adequate assurance that their contents can be proved by

admissible evidence at trial.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Garside, 895 F.2d at 49, 50;14 Hal

Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990)). Although this article

could be interpreted to support the position that a court may consider a hearsay statement within an
16

affidavit if there is sufficient assurance that the declarant will testify in accordance with the affidavit

at trial, it seems more likely that the authors are arguing that an affidavit may be considered on

summary judgment despite the fact that the affidavit itself might not be admissible at trial, but that

an affidavit containing another person’s out-of-court statement could not be considered on summary

judgment because there would be no guarantee that the declarant would testify the same way at trial.

Another commentator has taken the view that it is never permissible to consider hearsay on

summary judgment, but that this problem does not usually arise because affidavits offered on

summary judgment are not offered to prove the truth of the statements in the affidavits. See Duane,

supra, at 1532. Professor Duane disapproves of what he deems an inconsistency in the traditional

view that permits consideration of affidavits on summary judgment, despite the fact that they are

out-of-court statements, while prohibiting consideration of statements that are hearsay within

affidavits:

[T]he standard “explanation” for this apparent inconsistency is that

an affidavit considered on a summary judgment motion may be

hearsay but may not include hearsay. To put the matter in slightly

more technical terminology, the almost universally received view is

that Rule 56 allows a judge to consider hearsay (in the form of an

affidavit), but not “multiple hearsay.” The hearsay words of the

affidavit, we often are told, may be accepted in lieu of oral testimony

from the affiant himself as long as they describe a matter within his

personal knowledge, but his words about what another has told him

may not be accepted in lieu of a statement from that other person.

Id. at 1529 (footnotes omitted). Professor Duane argues: 

Why would the framers of the federal rules trust a judge on a

summary judgment motion to use and consider all hearsay evidence

in the form of an affidavit—no matter what the source—but never

multiple hearsay? At best, the two differ only in degree of reliability,

not in kind, and everyone knows that some forms of multiple hearsay

are infinitely more reliable than some simple hearsay.

Id. at 1530. Professor Duane contends that “the truth of the matter is that judges ruling upon
17

summary judgment motions are not authorized to consider hearsay in the form of affidavits, they do

not do so, and Rule 56 is not an exception to the hearsay rules at all.” Id. at 1530–31. Professor

Duane explains his theory as follows:

(1) An assertion made out of court—including an affidavit—is not

hearsay at all and, therefore, not even subject to exclusion under Rule

802 unless it is “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” (2) When does that description apply to affidavits

submitted in a summary judgment motion? Never. In the landmark

case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court stated

that a judge ruling upon a summary judgment motion “is not himself

to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter” involved

in the litigation which, of course, includes the matter asserted in the

parties’ pleadings, depositions, and affidavits. So, those affidavits

are not hearsay, they are not excluded under Rule 802, and they

would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence even if

Rule 56 said nothing about them.

Id. at 1532–33 (footnotes omitted). Professor Duane argues that “the fact is that a judge ruling on

such a motion is neither permitted nor required to draw any conclusions about what happened in the

past—that is, the truth of the matter asserted in the parties’ pleadings and affidavits—but what will

happen at a future trial if there is one.” Id. at 1535. He further explains that a summary judgment

motion “merely requires the judge to assume that the parties and their witnesses would testify at a

hearing just as they have in their affidavits and then to decide whether such testimony would entail

a conflict that might be decided more accurately after observing the witnesses’ demeanor at a live

hearing. . . . [W]hen an affidavit is used solely to predict what witnesses are likely to say, its

significance lies solely in the fact that it was made, and it is therefore not hearsay.” Duane, supra,

at 1544. Professor Duane concludes that “Rule 56 does not authorize a judge to consider hearsay

in any form, not even in part; it allows consideration of affidavits (and other statements, such as

deposition transcripts) solely for predicting what those witnesses are likely to say at trial and not for
15 Professor Duane recommends that the Advisory Committee Notes to Evidence Rules 802 and 104(a) be amended

“to delete any reference to summary judgment affidavits as an example of ‘hearsay made admissible by other rules’ or

‘an important judicial determination’ made on the basis of otherwise inadmissible hearsay.” Duane, supra, at 1546. 

16 It is not entirely clear whether Professor Duane’s theory would allow consideration of the statement of a third party

contained in an affidavit on summary judgment. His theory permits consideration of an affidavit as nonhearsay because

it is not considered for the truth of the matter asserted, and his theory might arguably extend to statements made by third

parties contained within an affidavit because, under his theory those statements may not be offered for their truth, but

merely as a prediction of what that third party would say if testifying at trial. However, it could be argued that an

affiant’s recitation of a third party’s statement is not a reliable method of predicting what that third party would say if

testifying at trial, particularly if it is not clear that the third party is available and willing to testify.

18

resolving the truth of the matter asserted in those statements.”15 Id. at 1547. He notes that the

statement from Celotex indicating that “a nonmovant is not required to ‘produce evidence in a form

that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment,’” id. at 1548, “has unleashed

a torrent of academic and judicial debate and commentary, most of it devoted to whether the Court

thereby overrode the apparent requirement in Rule 56(e) that all supporting and opposing affidavits

set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,” id. at 1549. Professor Duane states:

I respectfully submit that Justice Rehnquist’s statement can be

understood far better by reading it with the emphasis supplied

elsewhere, to say that the nonmoving party is not required to

“produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order

to avoid summary judgment”—but without altering in any way Rule

56(e)’s requirement that the affidavit be admissible, both in content

and form, at the summary judgment stage, where the court is deciding

an altogether different question. As we have seen, where an affidavit

is being considered on a summary judgment motion and is based on

the personal knowledge of the affiant, it is not hearsay at all, either

in content or form, even though the same affidavit will be hearsay if

it is later offered at trial to prove the truth of the events described in

the affidavit.16

Id. at 1550–51.

III. Cases Finding that Hearsay Within an Affidavit Can Be Considered on Summary

Judgment if the Hearsay Statement Would Be Submitted in Admissible Form at Trial

Some courts will consider a hearsay statement contained within an affidavit on summary
17 The court denied a request to strike certain declarations supporting summary judgment that discussed the declarant’s

receipt of complaints against the plaintiff by other employees, indicating that they may not be offered for their truth, and

that “to the extent that matters in the subject paragraphs may constitute hearsay, the Court is satisfied that Defendant

could later present the evidence contained therein through direct testimony, i.e. in a form that would be admissible at

trial . . . .” Cutrona, 2008 WL 4446710, at *6.

19

judgment if there is a showing, or at least a possibility, that the statement would be submitted in

admissible form at trial. See, e.g., Cutrona v. Sun Health Corp., No. CV 06-2184-PHX-MHM, 2008

WL 4446710, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (“‘[H]earsay evidence produced in an affidavit . . . may

be considered if the out-of-court declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony,

i.e. in a form that would be admissible at trial.’”)17 (citing J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc.,

909 F.2d 1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990); Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 465 n.12 (3d

Cir. 1989)); DeBiasi v. Charter County of Wayne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 903, 911 (E.D. Mich. 2008)

(“[T]he majority of circuits interpret Celotex to permit consideration of evidence submitted at

summary judgment in non-admissible form when the evidence ‘will be reduced to admissible form

at trial.’”) (citing McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996); Gleklen v. Democratic

Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000); J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1542;

Garside, 895 F.2d at 50); cf. McCann v. Astrue, No. 07-3804, 2008 WL 4298835, at *2 (3d Cir.

Sept. 16, 2008) (unpublished) (considering testimony by a third-party, including testimony as to

what that third-party was told by others and what another third-party was told, and noting that

“‘hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the

out-of-court declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony, i.e., ‘in a form that

would be admissible at trial.’’”) (quoting Williams, 891 F.2d at 466 n.12).

In DeBiasi, the plaintiff opposed summary judgment on his discrimination claim by relying

on his personal log notes, which mentioned a phone conversation the plaintiff had with one of his

superiors in which that superior recounted a statement by one of the defendants. The court noted
18 In J.F. Feeser, the Third Circuit held that the district court had erred by refusing to consider testimony from Spagnola

that he had received complaints from his salespeople that they were losing sales. 909 F.2d at 1542. The court noted that

it had previously concluded that “hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be

considered if the out-of-court declarant could later present the evidence through direct testimony, i.e., in a form that

‘would be admissible at trial.’” Id. (quoting Williams, 891 F.2d at 465–66 n.12). The J.F. Feeser court appeared to take

20

that “[e]vidence containing multiple levels of hearsay is inadmissible for its truth unless each layer,

analyzed independently falls within an established hearsay exception or is treated as nonhearsay.”

DeBiasi, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (citations omitted). The court found that “inadmissible hearsay

evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment,” but that “at the summary judgment stage,

the focus is not on the admissibility of the evidence’s form.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

The court explained that “[t]he majority of circuits interpret Celotex to permit consideration of

evidence submitted at summary judgment in non-admissible form when the evidence ‘will be

reduced to admissible form at trial.’” Id. (citations omitted). As a result, the court concluded that

it did not need to decide whether the plaintiff’s log itself is admissible, but only whether the contents

of the log were admissible and stated that “[i]f the contents of DeBiasi’s log could be presented in

an admissible form at trial, the Court may consider the log’s contents in deciding Defendants’

summary judgment motion.” Id. at 911–12 (citing Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.

2003)). The court also relied on J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir.

1990), which had held that “‘hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment

may be considered if the out-of-court declarant could later present the evidence through direct

testimony, i.e., in a form that ‘would be admissible at trial.’’” DeBiasi, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 912

(quoting J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1542). The J.F. Feeser court held that “‘there is no indication that

Spagnola’s salesforce would be unavailable to testify at trial. The averments of Spagnola’s affidavit

are capable of proof through admissible evidence and we will consider them now on de novo

review.’”18 Id. (quoting J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1542 (emphasis added by DeBiasi court)). The
the position that a hearsay statement in an affidavit made by someone other than the affiant could be considered on

summary judgment unless the declarant of the hearsay statement would be unavailable at trial to provide direct testimony.

The DeBiasi court’s reliance on J.F. Feeser may endorse this view.

21

DeBiasi court concluded that the statements within the plaintiff’s log were not capable of proof

through admissible evidence at trial because the superior denied having had the conversation with

the defendant mentioned in the plaintiff’s log and denied telling the plaintiff about that conversation.

Id. at 912–13. The court held that “since [the superior] has denied making the statements attributed

to him by Plaintiff, the statements are not capable of proof at trial through his first-hand testimony.

They are inadmissible hearsay statements that may not be considered by the Court in deciding

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 913. The court refused to consider the hearsay

statements within the log on summary judgment because there was evidence that those statements

could not be admitted through direct testimony at trial. However, the court did not decide whether

the statements would have been admissible on summary judgment if it had been less clear whether

the superior would testify in accordance with the plaintiff’s log at trial. The court’s discussion of

the statements made by the superior that showed that he would not testify in accordance with the log

and the court’s discussion of the J.F. Feeser opinion indicate that the court might have been willing

to consider the hearsay statements on summary judgment if there had been some indication that the

superior would testify in accordance with the plaintiff’s log, or possibly even if there had been no

indication that he would testify contrary to the statements in the log.

In Lorenzo v. Seeley, No. 06-cv-1682(PGS), 2008 WL 939623 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2008), the

court confronted the issue of how likely it would have to be that hearsay could be converted to

admissible evidence at trial in order for the court to consider it on summary judgment. On summary

judgment, the court refused to consider one of the plaintiff’s contentions because in depositions, the
19 The Arce court noted that “‘[a] party must respond to a hearsay objection by demonstrating that the material would

be admissible at trial under an exception the hearsay rule, or that the material is not hearsay.’” 2008 WL 375159, at *14

n.11 (quoting Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., No. 02-CV-2104, 2005 WL 2106582, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005)).

22

plaintiff had conceded that the allegation was based on a statement from a third party and that he did

not have paperwork to support the statement. Lorenzo, 2008 WL 939623, at *5. The court pointed

out that the plaintiff had not argued that the statement fell within an exception to the hearsay rule

and that the plaintiff did not conduct discovery to determine whether there was any support for the

allegation. Id. The court relied on Arce v. U-Pull-It Auto Parts, Inc., No. 06-5593, 2008 WL

375159, at *14 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2008), for the proposition that “‘[w]hile, ‘[h]earsay evidence

produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the out-of-court

declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony, . . . the mere possibility that [a]

hearsay statement will be presented in [the] form of admissible evidence at trial does not warrant

consideration of hearsay evidence at [the] summary judgment stage.’’” Lorenzo, 2008 WL 939623,

at *5 (quoting Arce, 2008 WL 375159, at *14 n.11).19 The court declined to consider the allegation

at issue because its only support came from a hearsay statement from an unidentified third party.

Similarly, in Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681, 682 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam), the court

required the party offering hearsay at the summary judgment stage to show that the witness would

testify in that party’s favor at trial. In Santos, the plaintiff, Angel Santos, had been a suspect in the

murder of a seven-year-old girl. Id. On the day of the murder, the police had questioned Santos and

performed physical tests on him, but did not arrest him. Id. The police later arrested Santos’s stepuncle, Ernesto Diaz Gonzalez, on an outstanding, unrelated warrant. Id. While in custody, Gonzalez

executed a sworn statement that Santos had admitted to Gonzalez that he had killed the girl. Id.

Based on Gonzalez’s sworn statement, Santos was arrested and jailed during the criminal
20 The Second Circuit required an affirmative showing that the affiant would testify in accordance with the affidavit,

but did not specifically address the fact that the Gonzalez affidavit appeared to contain hearsay regarding what the

23

proceedings. Id. Although Gonzalez repeated his implication of Santos at the probable cause

hearing, Gonzalez later recanted his earlier statements implicating Santos and executed an affidavit

prepared by Santos’s lawyer stating that the police had coerced him into implicating Santos by

threatening him with a nine-year prison sentence. Santos, 243 F.3d at 682–83. Santos was released

based on this affidavit and brought suit alleging violation of his constitutional rights in connection

with his arrest. Id. at 683. Gonzalez was deposed twice during discovery about his statement

incriminating Santos. Id. During one deposition, Gonzalez invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege

and refused to testify, but during the next deposition, Gonzalez testified that he had not been coerced

by the officers and had falsely implicated Santos in order to obtain favorable police treatment. Id.

The police officers moved for summary judgment and Santos responded by submitting the Gonzalez

affidavit in which Gonzalez stated that he had been coerced into implicating Santos. Id. The district

court rejected the theory that this affidavit showed that Gonzalez might testify consistently with that

affidavit at trial. See id. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the defendants had shown,

through the deposition testimony of Gonzalez, that Gonzalez would testify that he was not coerced.

Santos, 243 F.3d at 684. Notably, the court pointed out that “Santos, on the other hand, provides

nothing that would affirmatively indicate that Gonzalez is prepared to testify in a manner consistent

with the affidavit. Absent such a showing, a nonmoving party’s claim cannot survive a motion for

summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing McMillian, 88 F.3d at1584). The court

explained: “[A]s Rule 56 and our cases suggest, an implicit or explicit showing that the affiant is

prepared to testify in a manner consistent with an affidavit is required to oppose summary

judgment.”20 Id. (citations omitted).
officers told Gonzalez in order to coerce him to implicate Santos. The court may not have needed to address that issue

because it had already determined that the affidavit was inadmissible based on the facts that it would only be admissible

at trial for impeachment purposes and that it did not show that Gonzalez would testify in support of Santos at trial.

However, the court’s statement that Santos “provides nothing that would affirmatively indicate that Gonzalez is prepared

to testify in a manner consistent with the affidavit,” Gonzalez, 243 F.3d at 684, could be interpreted to indicate that the

court would have considered the Gonzalez affidavit had there not been conflicting deposition testimony and had it been

apparent that Gonzalez would testify in a manner consistent with his affidavit, despite the existence of hearsay within

the affidavit. Because the court did not need to reach the issue of the hearsay within the affidavit, the case may be better

taken for the proposition that an affidavit may be considered on summary judgment if it appears likely that the affiant

will testify in accordance with the affidavit at trial, and not for the proposition that an affidavit containing hearsay may

be considered on summary judgment.

24

Some commentators have argued that if a party presents evidence that is “reducible” to

admissible evidence at trial, the party can survive summary judgment. For example, one

commentator argues that the statement in Celotex that the plaintiff does not have to use materials

“in a form that would be admissible at trial” has been misunderstood. See Steinman, supra, at 112.

Professor Steinman disagrees with the argument that the next sentence in Celotex stating that “Rule

56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses,” means that “Rule 56 does

require the nonmoving party to obtain affidavits of her witnesses.” Id. (footnotes omitted). He

argues that “[t]he term ‘depose,’ . . . frequently refers not only to the taking of a deposition as

provided for in the federal rules, but also to the swearing of an affidavit.” Id. (citing Duane, supra,

at 1551 n.93). Professor Steinman concludes that “the majority’s statement that ‘Rule 56 does not

require the nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses’ may plausibly be read as rejecting the

notion that a plaintiff must obtain affidavits of her witnesses in order to avoid summary judgment.”

Id. at 112–13 (footnote omitted). Professor Steinman notes that most courts seem to follow what

he refers to as the “paper trial myth,” requiring the plaintiff to satisfy its burden in response to a

summary judgment motion by producing trial-quality evidence, id. at 121, but notes that some courts

“have read Celotex as allowing a plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact using materials that

fall short of the admissibility standards that would govern at trial,” id. Professor Steinman takes the
21 It is unclear if Professor Steinman’s theory permits consideration of hearsay within an affidavit on summary

judgment. Professor Steinman argues that Rule 56 imposes an admissibility requirement on affidavits, but not on other

summary judgment evidence, see Steinman, supra, at 129, but he also argues that a responding party does not have to

produce an affidavit from a witness who would be competent to testify at trial, id. at 133, and that a responding party’s

materials “must be sufficient to carry her burden of proof at trial ‘if reduced to admissible evidence,’” id., implying that

an affidavit may be considered on summary judgment if it contains hearsay statements that the declarant is likely to

directly testify to at trial. However, Professor Steinman also argues that

[t]he drafters knew what language to use when they wanted to require trial-quality

evidence. For affidavits, the drafters imposed explicit requirements of personal

knowledge, competence, and the ability to be admitted at trial if that testimony

were provided live. But when describing the general burden to be imposed on

25

position that while “Rule 56 imposes no general standard of admissibility, . . . [w]ith respect to

affidavits, . . . Rule 56(e) requires that they ‘shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is

competent to testify to the matters stated therein.’” Steinman, supra, at 128 (citation omitted).

Professor Steinman’s analysis seems to draw a distinction between affidavits and other forms of

evidence submitted on summary judgment, pointing out that “Rule 56 does not impose any

admissibility requirement, except for affidavits.” Id. at 129. Professor Steinman argues that “[t]he

precise basis for importing trial evidentiary standards at the summary judgment phase is unclear,”

and agrees with Professor Duane that “[m]aterials offered in opposition to summary judgment . . .

are not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted,” but “are offered to establish a genuine

issue of material fact for trial.” Id. at 130 (citing Duane, supra, at 1532). Professor Steinman

summarizes his theory as follows:

[W]hen a defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis that there

is an absence of evidence, the plaintiff does not have to produce trialquality evidence such as an affidavit from a witness who would be

competent to testify at trial or deposition testimony that itself would

be admissible at trial. She does, however, need to provide material

sufficient to refute the absence of evidence indicated by the

defendant’s showing. If, for example, the defendant had asked her to

identify supporting witnesses and she failed to do so, then her

responsive material must identify such witnesses.21
nonmovants, the drafters required only “specific facts.” Juxtaposed against the

language used to define the admissibility of affidavits, the “specific facts”

requirement can hardly be read to require trial-quality evidence in all circumstances.

Id. at 137 (emphasis added). Although Professor Steinman believes that summary judgment evidence may be considered

if it can be reduced to admissible evidence at trial, he appears to believe that Rule 56 makes an exception for the content

of affidavits, which must be admissible.

26

Id. at 133.

Similarly, another commentator has argued that Celotex created a new summary judgment

standard that allows consideration of evidence on summary judgment if it could be reduced to

admissible evidence at trial. See Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary

Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 60 (1988) (“[T]he majority in the Supreme Court [in

Celotex] lent support, without elaboration, to the idea that inadmissible evidence could be

considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion, creating yet another obscurity in the law

of summary judgment.”). According to Professor Nelken, the statement in Celotex that its holding

“‘does not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible

at trial in order to avoid summary judgment,’” id. at 71, “opened the door to evidence that was not

already reduced to admissible form, but merely was reducible to such form before the time of trial,”

id. Evaluating the results shortly after Celotex, Professor Nelken states that “the new-found license

to consider procedurally inadmissible evidence on summary judgment seems to have largely escaped

notice, even though the result in Celotex III depended on it. Among the courts that have discussed

the subject, responses have ranged from incredulity that such a major change could have been

intended to docile acceptance of a new standard.” Id. at 77. Professor Nelken differentiates between

the evidence that a moving party can use and the evidence that a nonmoving party can use, where

the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial:

There is no indication that Celotex III authorizes the use of
22 While Professor Nelken’s interpretation of Celotex approves of the consideration of inadmissible evidence at

summary judgment if it would be “reducible” to admissible evidence at trial, it is not clear whether this interpretation

would permit consideration of hearsay within an affidavit. Professor Nelken recognizes that consideration of

inadmissible evidence is not supported by the text of Rule 56 and, given her disapproval of statements in Celotex that

she contends opened the door to consideration of inadmissible evidence, would likely argue that Celotex did not open

the door to considering inadmissible hearsay within an affidavit even if the declarant could testify at trial because the

Celotex court was not confronted with such an affidavit and only considered the admissibility of hearsay in other forms,

including letters and a deposition from another case.

27

inadmissible evidence by a moving party in support of its motion; the

Celotex III majority discussed only what evidence will be accepted

from a nonmoving party. It would be difficult to justify allowing the

party that will have the burden of proof at trial to avoid trial and to

win summary judgment with anything but admissible evidence, since

the results at trial might well turn on whether certain proffered

evidence was admissible. Thus, Celotex III should not affect the

moving party’s initial burden or its obligation to use only admissible

evidence in this situation. The nonmoving party on such a motion,

however, apparently would be able to defeat the motion by producing

inadmissible evidence, ‘reducible’ to admissible form at trial, if a

genuine issue of material fact is raised.

Id. at 81–82. Where the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, Professor Nelken

asserts that the nonmoving party may respond to a motion with evidence that is “‘reducible’ to

admissible form at trial and . . . sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on that

issue.” Id. at 83. Professor Nelken concludes that the suggestion in Celotex that “evidence in

opposition to summary judgment will be acceptable even if it is merely ‘[reducible]’ to admissible

evidence at trial . . . has no support in Rule 56,” Nelken, supra, at 84, and urges “[t]he Court . . . [to]

forsake the misguided position that evidence merely reducible to admissible form is also adequate

to oppose a summary judgment motion once the moving party has met its initial burden,” id. at 85.

She proposes that once the moving party has met its initial burden, “only evidence already reduced

to admissible form, or otherwise provided for by Rule 56, should be considered so that the trial judge

can make a reliable decision about the nonmoving party’s ability to get to the jury at trial.”22 Id.

Another article examines the Texas counterpart to Rule 56—Rule 166a(i)—and notes that
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some federal courts have considered the contents of affidavits if they are reducible to admissible

evidence. See Sarah B. Duncan, No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment: Harmonizing Rule

166a(i) and its Comment, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 873, 899–900 (2000). Judge Duncan argues

“[s]ummary judgment evidence is . . . usually contained within a writing that is, in the strictest sense

of the word, hearsay—an out-of-court-declarant’s statement that is offered to prove the truth of the

matters asserted therein,” and that “[i]t is thus demonstrably untrue—and extremely confusing—to

state that summary judgment evidence is evidence that would be admissible at trial.” Id. at 895.

Judge Duncan’s article provides an analogy for distinguishing between evidence that may be

considered on summary judgment and evidence that may not:

(1) A document in which evidence is contained is a “box.” A

box is either “procedurally admissible” or “procedurally

inadmissible,” depending upon whether it is among the forms of

“summary judgment evidence” listed in the applicable rule. If a box

is defective, but not so defective that it has lost its identity as one of

the types of boxes listed in the applicable rule, it is “a functional

equivalent of a procedurally inadmissible box.”

(2) The evidence contained in the box makes up the “contents

of a box.” The contents of a box are either “admissible” or

“inadmissible,” depending upon whether the contents, in whole or in

part, would be admissible at trial.

(3) If a box is not procedurally admissible but could

theoretically be made so, or if the contents of a box are not in a form

that would be admissible at trial but could be made so, the box or

contents are “reducible” to a procedurally admissible or admissible

form.

Id. at 896 (footnotes omitted). Judge Duncan argues that “[b]efore Celotex, the federal courts

interpreted Rule 56 in much the same way as the Texas courts interpret Rule 166a—‘summary

judgment evidence’ consisted of the admissible contents of procedurally admissible boxes or their

functional equivalents.” Id. at 898. Judge Duncan argues that “courts have developed at least three

interpretations of Celotex, depending upon whether one is discussing the procedural admissibility
29

of boxes or the admissibility of the boxes’ contents.” Id. at 899. Judge Duncan argues that

“[d]espite the growing acceptance of procedurally inadmissible boxes, a majority of the federal

courts of appeals appear to require that, whatever the box, its contents must be in a form that would

be admissible at trial or at least reducible to an admissible form.” Id. at 899–900. Judge Duncan

contends that “fully one-third of the circuits have considered inadmissible contents that are

‘reducible’ to a form that would be admissible at trial.” Duncan, supra, at 900. Judge Duncan

differentiates the federal practice from Texas practice, stating: “[W]hile the Texas courts almost

always require that boxes be procedurally admissible and their contents be in a form that would be

admissible at trial, a majority of the federal courts of appeals will consider boxes that are

procedurally inadmissible, and fully one-third will consider contents that are ‘reducible’ to a form

that would be admissible at trial.” Id.

IV. Cases Finding that Hearsay Contained Within an Affidavit Can Be Considered on

Summary Judgment Unless it Is Apparent that the Hearsay Could Not Be Submitted

in an Admissible Form at Trial

I came across a few cases that have gone even further than the cases allowing consideration

of hearsay evidence if it would likely be reduced to admissible evidence at trial and that have found

that hearsay evidence could be considered on summary judgment unless it clearly would not be

admissible at trial. See, e.g., MDL Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., Nos. 05cv1396, 06cv0389,

2008 WL 2944890, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008) (“Hearsay evidence contained in affidavits

and deposition testimony may be sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion unless such

evidence clearly would not be admissible at trial.”) (citing Clark v. Commonwealth of Pa., 885 F.

Supp. 694, 709 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1995)); Kenawell v. DuBois Bus. College, Inc., No. 3:2005-429, 2008

WL 768139, at *6 (W.D. Pa. March 20, 2008) (same); cf. Davis v. City of E. Orange, No. 05-3720
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(JLL), 2008 WL 4328218, at *9 n.19 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (agreeing that “Plaintiff’s brief and

statement of facts are replete with hearsay statements and that a certification or declaration from the

declarant of such statements would have been preferable,” but finding that “since there is no

indication that the declarants of the hearsay statements Plaintiff proffers will be unavailable to testify

at trial, the Court will consider such statements in adjudicating this motion”) (citing FED.R.CIV. P.

56(e); Williams, 891 F.2d at 466 n. 12; King v. City of Philadelphia, No. 02-2845, 2003 WL

1705967, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2003)).

In Kenawell, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s discrimination

claim by submitting several documents, including, among others, an affidavit of the defendant’s

president attesting to the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s termination, an incident report

recording the plaintiff’s misconduct, a statement of a subordinate who claimed to have been harassed

by the plaintiff, and email correspondence between the plaintiff and the subordinate. Kenawell,

2008 WL 768139, at *5. The court denied a request to strike the incident report, finding that it fell

within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at *7. The court also declined to strike

the subordinate’s statement and the email correspondence, finding that “this lack of authentication

and presence of hearsay can be cured at the time of trial should [the subordinate] testify as to her

personal knowledge of the documents.” Id. at *8 (citing Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423

F.3d 318, 329 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005)). The court concluded: “despite an absence of authentication and

the presence of hearsay, these matters may be a part of the summary judgment record before the

Court. Therefore, these documents are admissible evidence.” Id.

V. Conclusion

Most courts appear to be unwilling to consider hearsay within an affidavit on summary
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judgment. However, some courts have found that inadmissible evidence may be considered on

summary judgment if the evidence can be reduced to admissible evidence at trial, and there appears

to be some variation in the cases as to what it means to be capable of being reduced to admissible

evidence. Most courts interpret this requirement to mean that an affidavit can be considered on

summary judgment even though the affidavit itself may not be admissible at trial, but that the

statements within the affidavit must be admissible if the affiant were to testify to them at trial. Other

courts have indicated that it might be appropriate to consider statements within an affidavit that

would be inadmissible if the affiant were to testify to them at trial as long as there is sufficient

assurance that the hearsay declarant would testify in accordance with the affidavit at trial. A few

courts have implied that it would be permissible to consider statements that would be inadmissible

if testified to by the affiant as long as there is no showing that the out-of-court declarant would

testify contrary to the affidavit at trial.