An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-774

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 June 2014

NICOLE HARTFORD SHACKLEY,

Plaintiff

v.

Pitt County

No. 13 CvD 537

NORMAN HENRY SHACKLEY,

Defendant

Appeal by defendant from order entered 15 March 2013 by 

Judge Ericka Y. James in Pitt County District Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.

Nicole Shackley, pro se. No brief filed.

David C. Sutton for Defendant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Norman Henry Shackley, Jr., appeals from a 

domestic violence protective order entered against him as the 

result of acts of domestic violence that he was alleged to have

committed against his former wife, Plaintiff Nicole Hartford 

Shackley. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s 

findings that he committed acts of domestic violence against 

Plaintiff lack adequate evidentiary support and that the trial 
-2-

court was biased against him. After careful consideration of 

Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s order in light of 

the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial 

court’s order should remain undisturbed.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

Plaintiff and Defendant were married from 2006 to 2009 and

were living together as of 4 March 2013. According to

Plaintiff, Defendant threatened to kill her during the course of 

numerous phone conversations that occurred between 28 February 

and 3 March 2013.1 At the time that Defendant made these 

threatening phone calls, Plaintiff was in Raleigh and Defendant 

was in Greenville and wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet 

that would have notified law enforcement officers if he changed 

locations. Even so, Plaintiff testified that she was terrified

by Defendant’s threats because she believed that Defendant would 

cut off the bracelet and “hunt [her] down and kill [her].”2

 

1As a result of the fact that none of these conversations 

were recorded, the only evidence of the threats that Defendant 

allegedly made against Plaintiff was contained in Plaintiff’s 

testimony.

2On cross-examination, Defendant questioned Plaintiff 

concerning the existence of certain recorded phone conversations 

between Plaintiff and Defendant and argues on appeal that the 

trial court violated the “best evidence” rule by refusing to 

require the production of these recordings and related 

transcripts. However, Plaintiff testified that the calls in 
-3-

According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s threats were motivated 

by a number of factors. For example, Plaintiff testified that 

Defendant had been charged with impersonating a police officer

and threatened to kill her if she did not present false 

testimony in his favor in that criminal proceeding. In 

addition, Plaintiff testified that Defendant had told her that, 

in the event that she failed to repay $35,000 that he claimed 

she owed him in connection with a plastic surgery-related bill 

by the time that he was ready to move to South Carolina, he 

would kill her or force her to move with him and work off the 

debt. As a result of these threats, Plaintiff was “really 

scared, because [she] believe[d] he [would] do it.”

In addition, Plaintiff described other incidents in which 

Defendant engaged in acts of domestic violence against her that 

had occurred prior to the incidents upon which Plaintiff relied 

in support of her effort to obtain the issuance of a DVPO. In 

2012, while Plaintiff and Defendant were having an argument, 

Defendant threw Plaintiff against a closet, put her in a 

headlock, twisted her neck, threw her on a bed, jumped on top of 

 

question did not contain Defendant’s threats to kill her and had 

not led to her request for the issuance of a DVPO. As a result,

since these recordings and transcripts do not relate to the 

conversations that underlie Plaintiff’s request for the issuance 

of a DVPO, we need not address the validity of Defendant’s 

challenge to the trial court’s refusal to require the production 

of these items.
-4-

her, and threatened to kill her. On another occasion, Defendant

jumped on top of Plaintiff and threatened to kill her while 

holding her by the neck. As a result of these prior 

experiences, Plaintiff testified that she believed that, in the 

event that Defendant were to find her, he would kill her.

B. Procedural History

On 5 March 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the 

entry of a domestic violence protective order against Defendant.

On the same day, Judge David Leech entered an ex parte domestic 

violence protective order against Defendant and scheduled a 

hearing concerning the issues raised by Plaintiff’s complaint 

for 15 March 2013. At the conclusion of the 15 March 2013 

hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant had committed 

acts of domestic violence against Plaintiff and entered an order 

prohibiting Defendant from committing or threatening to commit

any further acts of domestic violence against Plaintiff, 

ordering Defendant to refrain from having any contact with 

Plaintiff and to avoid being present at Plaintiff’s residence 

and workplace, and requiring Defendant to surrender any firearms 

in his possession. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from 

the trial court’s order.3

 

3Although the domestic violence protective order from which 

Defendant has appealed expired on 14 March 2014, this Court has 

held that, since a “protective order could have collateral legal 
-5-

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

A. Validity of Trial Court’s Findings of Domestic Violence

In his first challenge to the trial court’s order, 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred on the ground that 

its determination to the effect that Defendant had committed 

acts of domestic violence against Plaintiff lacked adequate 

record support. More specifically, Defendant asserts that the

record does not support the trial court’s determination that he 

engaged in acts of domestic violence against Plaintiff as 

alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint given that Plaintiff’s 

complaint alleged that the acts of domestic violence that he 

allegedly committed against Plaintiff occurred on a single date 

rather than over a period of time and given that the trial court 

denied Plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint to conform to 

the evidence. Defendant is not entitled to any relief on the 

basis of this argument.

1. Standard of Review

When the trial court sits without a jury 

regarding a [domestic violence protective

order], the standard of review on appeal is 

whether there was competent evidence to 

support the trial court’s findings of fact 

and whether its conclusions of law were 

proper in light of such facts. Where there 

 

and non-legal consequences—including the stigma of judicial 

determination of domestic violence—this appeal [of an expired 

domestic violence protective order] is not moot.” Eagle v. 

Johnson, 159 N.C. App. 701, 703, 583 S.E.2d 346, 347 (2003).
-6-

is competent evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings of fact, those findings are 

binding on appeal.

Kennedy v. Morgan, __ N.C. App. __, __, 726 S.E.2d 193, 195 

(2012) (quoting Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 59, 685 

S.E.2d 541, 544 (2009)). In the event that “‘different 

reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence, the 

determination of which reasonable inferences shall be drawn is 

for the trial [court],’” since “‘the trial judge is present for 

the full sensual effect of the spoken word, with the nuances of 

meaning revealed in pitch, mimicry and gestures, appearances and 

postures, shrillness and stridency, calmness and composure, all 

of which add to or detract from the force of spoken words.’” 

Brandon v. Brandon, 132 N.C. App. 646, 651-52, 513 S.E.2d 589, 

593 (1999) (quoting Elec. Motor & Repair Co. v. Morris & 

Associates, 2 N.C. App. 72, 75, 162 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1968), and 

State v. Sessoms, 119 N.C. App. 1, 6, 458 S.E.2d 200, 203 

(1995), aff’d, 342 N.C. 892, 467 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 519 

U.S. 873, 117 S. Ct. 191, 136 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1996)) (alteration 

in original). As a result, “[t]he trial court’s findings turn 

in large part on the credibility of the witnesses, [and] must be 

given great deference by this Court.” Brandon, 132 N.C. App. at 

652, 513 S.E.2d at 593 (quotation omitted). To support entry of 

a domestic violence protective order, the trial court must also
-7-

make a conclusion of law “‘that an act of domestic violence has 

occurred.’” Kennedy, __ N.C. App. at __, 726 S.E.2d at 196 

(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a)). An act of domestic 

violence is defined, in pertinent part, as “[p]lacing the 

aggrieved party or a member of the aggrieved party’s family or 

household in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50B-1(a)(2). “The test for whether the aggrieved party 

has been placed ‘in fear of imminent serious bodily injury’ is 

subjective; thus, the trial court must find as fact the 

aggrieved party ‘actually feared’ imminent serious bodily 

injury.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 145 N.C. App. 434, 437, 

549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2001) (quoting Brandon, 132 N.C. App. at 

654, 513 S.E.2d at 595). In the event that the trial court 

determines “that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the 

court shall grant a protective order restraining the defendant 

from further acts of domestic violence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B3(a). We will now utilize this standard of review to evaluate 

Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s order.

2. Adequacy of Support for Trial Court’s Findings

In this case, the trial court found that Defendant placed 

Plaintiff in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by 

threatening to kill her. The trial court also found that 

Defendant possessed, owned, or had access to several firearms;
-8-

that Defendant made threats to seriously injure or kill 

Plaintiff; and that “Defendant has [engaged in] a pattern of 

prior conduct involving the use of violence against 

[P]laintiff.” These findings are clearly sufficient to support 

the issuance of a domestic violence protective order.

According to the evidence that Plaintiff presented before 

the trial court, Defendant threatened to kill Plaintiff over the 

phone on multiple occasions. The threats that Plaintiff claimed 

that Defendant had made against her stemmed from Defendant’s 

demand that she perjure herself in a criminal proceeding in 

which Defendant was charged with impersonating a police officer.

In addition, Defendant threatened to kill Plaintiff if she did 

not pay the $35,000 that he claimed she owed him in connection 

with a plastic surgery-related bill. As a result of these 

threats, Plaintiff testified that she feared for her life, 

asserting that she was “really scared,” and “terrified” that 

Defendant was going to kill her. As a result of the fact that 

trial court findings “turn in large part on the credibility of 

the witnesses” and “must be given great deference by this 

Court,” Brandon, 132 N.C. App. at 652, 513 S.E.2d at 593, we 

hold that Plaintiff’s testimony supports the trial court’s 

determination that Defendant placed Plaintiff in fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury. Moreover, given that, “where 
-9-

the trial court finds that a plaintiff is actually subjectively 

in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, an act of domestic 

violence has occurred pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50B1(a)(2),” Id. at 654-55, 513 S.E.2d at 595, we further hold that 

the trial court’s finding of fact that Plaintiff was “placed in 

fear of imminent serious bodily injury” supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that Defendant committed acts of domestic 

violence against Plaintiff so that a domestic violence 

protective order should be entered.

In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, 

Defendant argues that the trial court’s findings lack adequate 

evidentiary support on the grounds that, while Plaintiff’s 

complaint alleges that the relevant acts of domestic violence 

occurred on 4 March 2013, Plaintiff testified that the phone 

calls in question actually took place between 28 February and 3 

March 2013 and notes that the trial court denied Plaintiff’s 

request to amend her complaint to conform to the evidence

concerning the dates upon which these acts of domestic violence 

occurred.

4 Defendant has not, however, cited any authority in 

 

4Admittedly, the only date mentioned in the complaint is 4 

March 2013. However, Plaintiff testified that the reference in 

the complaint to 4 March 2013 related to the date upon which she 

wrote the factual statement that she submitted in support of her 

request for the issuance of a DVPO rather than to the dates upon 

which the acts of domestic violence upon which her complaint 

rested actually occurred.
-10-

support of his contention that the discrepancy between the daterelated allegations contained in the complaint and the dates 

specified in Plaintiff’s testimony deprives the domestic 

violence protective order at issue here of adequate evidentiary 

support. According to well-established North Carolina law, an 

argument in support of which no authority is cited will be

deemed abandoned. State v. Sinnott, 163 N.C. App. 268, 273, 593 

S.E.2d 439, 442-43, appeal dismissed, 358 N.C. 738, 602 S.E.2d 

678 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 962, 125 S. Ct. 1740, 161 L. 

Ed. 2d 604 (2005). As a result, given that the record evidence 

supports the trial court’s determination that Defendant 

committed acts of domestic violence against Plaintiff and given 

that Defendant has failed to cite any authority in support of 

his challenge to the trial court’s findings based upon the 

difference between the date specified in the complaint and the 

dates set out in Plaintiff’s testimony, we decline to address 

this argument, State v. Latham, 157 N.C. App. 480, 486, 579 

S.E.2d 443, 448, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 509, 588 S.E.2d 

376 (2003); N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6), and conclude that the 

record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding that Defendant placed Plaintiff in fear of imminent 

serious bodily injury by threatening to kill her and had, by 

doing that, committed an act of domestic violence against her.
-11-

B. Judicial Bias

Secondly, Defendant argues that he was deprived of his 

right to a fair hearing in connection with Plaintiff’s request 

for the issuance of a domestic violence protective order on the 

grounds that the trial court was biased against him. In support 

of this contention, Defendant argues that the trial judge’s 

statement to the effect that “[b]lood is not going to be on my 

hands” demonstrates that the trial court was biased against him. 

Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s order 

on the basis of this contention either.

“On motion of any party, a judge should disqualify 

himself/herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s 

impartiality may reasonably be questioned, including but not 

limited to instances where . . . [t]he judge has a personal bias 

or prejudice concerning a party[.]” Code of Judicial Conduct

Canon 3C(1)a. Canon 3 does not, however, impose an affirmative 

duty upon members of the trial bench to disqualify themselves on

their own motion. In re Key, 182 N.C. App. 714, 719, 643 S.E.2d 

452, 456, disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 428, 648 S.E.2d 506 

(2007) (stating that, “[w]hile [Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial 

Conduct] certainly encourages a judge to recuse himself or 

herself in cases where his or her ‘impartiality may reasonably 

be questioned’ upon [his or her] own motion, [he or she is] not 
-12-

required to do so in the absence of a motion by a party”). In 

the event that a party fails to move to disqualify the trial 

judge during the course of the proceedings in the court below, 

the issue of whether the trial judge should have disqualified 

himself or herself is not properly preserved for purposes of 

appellate review. Id. (citing State v. Love, 177 N.C. App. 614, 

627–28, 630 S.E.2d 234, 243, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 580, 

636 S.E.2d 193 (2006)). A careful review of the record 

presented for our review in this case indicates that Defendant

never moved to disqualify the trial court or raised the issue of 

the trial court’s alleged bias in the court below in any other 

manner. As a result, given Defendant’s failure “to move that

the trial judge recuse h[er]self,” he is not entitled to “raise 

on appeal the judge’s alleged bias based on an undesired 

outcome.” Sood v. Sood, __ N.C. App. __, __, 732 S.E.2d 603, 

608, disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 417, 735 S.E.2d 336 (2012). 

As a result, we hold that Defendant is not entitled to an award 

of appellate relief based upon the trial court’s alleged bias in 

favor of Plaintiff.

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 

none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s order 

provide any basis for an award of appellate relief. As a 
-13-

result, the trial court’s order should be, and hereby is, 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).