alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                   5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
condensed consolidated financial statements included herein and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1
       
<S>                                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                         JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                                 5,584,998
<SECURITIES>                                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            405,679
<ALLOWANCES>                                                  57
<INVENTORY>                                            4,765,642
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      11,000,191
<PP&E>                                                 5,673,648
<DEPRECIATION>                                        (1,675,756)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        16,746,207
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  2,064,384
<BONDS>                                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                2,143
<COMMON>                                                  40,410
<OTHER-SE>                                            12,358,038
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          16,746,207
<SALES>                                                  845,619
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         917,434
<CGS>                                                    816,775
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          5,132,201
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          37,799
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                           793
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (3,737,839)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   (3,737,839)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (3,737,839)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                              (1.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                              (1.04)

        

</TABLE>
#### PEOPLE v. BETTS et al.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.

May 17, 1894.)

Motion by Carlton H. Betts, principal, and Alois E. Keim, surety, to vacate judgment entered on a forfeited recognizance.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER, BISCHOFF, and PRYOR, JJ.

John R. Fellows, for the People.

Joel M. Marx, for defendants.

No opinion. Motion granted. See 27 N. Y. Supp. 1123.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 60156 Summary Calendar

CARLOS CORTINA ,
Petitioner

v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL , Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A205 684 654

Before BARKSDALE, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
P roceeding pro se , Carlos Cortina , a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal and denial of discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Cortina contends the IJ and BIA erred in finding he did not satisfy the exceptional

- and

- extremely

- unusual

- hardship standard for

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED July 5, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-60156 Document: 00514059195 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/05/2017N o. 16

- 60156

2 cancellation of removal . He contends : the IJ failed to consider a ll the factors in his case; his case does present a compelling case of exceptional and

extr emely unusual hardship to his children ; and the IJ applied a different
standard of unconscionable hardship. Cortina further asserts the IJ failed to : inquire a bout the health of his children; consider the “s eparatio n of family”
facto r; or allow him to fully present his evidence. Our jurisdiction over immigration proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips us of jurisdiction to review an immigration court’s discretionary decision t o deny cancellation of removal under § 1229b or the findings of fact made in support of that decision. Sung v.
Keisler , 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2007). We have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D), however, to consider de novo any “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in a petition for review of such a decision. Id. Cortina has not raised any claim of constitutional or legal error in connection with the denial of his request for cancellation of removal. His
contentions merely disagree with the weighing of the factors underlying the discretionary decision whether he merited cancellation of removal

. As noted, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits us fro m reviewing that decision or its factual

findings bases

. See Sattani v. Holder , 749 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2014); Rueda v. Ashcroft , 380 F.3d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 2004). Cortina ’s attempt to co n vert his challenge to the non

- reviewable, discretionary decision into a question of law does not create jurisdict ion

. See Sung , 505 F.3d at 377. DISMISSE D. Case: 16-60156 Document: 00514059195 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/05/2017
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________ No. 07 - 12 - 0 0 359 - CV

________________________ UNIT PETROLEUM COMPANY , APPELLANT

V . D AVID POND WELL SERVICE, INC., D/B/A, D.W.P. PRODUCTION , APPELLEE On Appeal from the 31 st District Court Lipscomb County, Texas Tri a l Court No. 11 - 04 - 4287 ; Honorable Steven Emmert , Presiding July 25 , 201 4 

### ORDER OVERRULING APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. On May 19, 2014, this Court issued its Opinion and Judgment in this cause, reversing the judgment of the trial court and declaring the rights of the parties. 1

1 See Unit Petroleum Co. v. David Pond Well Serv. , No. 07 - 12 - 00359 - CV, 201 4 Tex. App. LEXIS 5354 (Tex. App. — Amarillo May 19, 2014 , no pet. h.)2

Appellee , David Pond Well Service d/b/a D.W.P. Production, has filed a Motion for Rehearing rela ting to that portion of the opinion and judgment which grants Appellant, Unit Petroleum Company, the “exclusive executive right to establish a proration unit encompassing any of its leasehold estate.” Remaining convinced that our original opinion and judg ment are correct, we write to address Appellee’s primary argument. Appellee ’s concern focuses on language in this Court’s opinion and judgment stating that Appellant has the “exclusive” right to establish a proration unit encompassing its own leasehold es tate. A s used in our opinion and judgment, “exclusive” means exclusive as between Appellant and Appellee , as opposed to being held by Appellee alone or by Appellee and Appellant jointly. Our opinion and judgment should not be read as limiting the well - established authority of the Texas Railroad Commission. Appellee ’s motion for rehearing is overruled . Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
#### ARCHER et al. v. IMPERIAL MACH. CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

August 5, 1913.)

No. 251.

On motion for'reargument.

Denied.

See 207 Fed. 81.

Before LACOMBE and COXE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

One of the judges who concurred in majority-opinion. resigned before motion was made for reargument. The remaining judges being divided in opinion, as they were on original argument, motion for reargument is denied.
Form of Letter Agreement



 Exhibit 10.2 

DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH 

[Address] 
 [Date] 

Jeffrey Baer 
 Stuart Clarke 

Thomas Fiato 
 Donna Milrod 

 

	Re:	Nevada Property 1 LLC 

 Lady and
Gentlemen: 
 This letter will set forth the agreement (the “Agreement”) between Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch (“Deutsche
Bank”) and Jeffrey Baer, Stuart Clarke, Thomas Fiato and Donna Milrod (collectively, and so long as they remain Members of Nevada VoteCo LLC, the “Independent Managers”). The Independent Managers are officers of Deutsche Bank.

 On August 29, 2008, Nevada Property 1 LLC, which is an indirect 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Bank, acquired ownership of the mortgage
loan on The Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas (the “Property”) from an affiliate of Deutsche Bank. Nevada Property 1 LLC then acquired the Property at a Trustee foreclosure sale on September 3, 2008, and is the current owner of the Property.
In furtherance of their responsibilities and duties as officers of Deutsche Bank, the Independent Managers have acquired all of the membership interests in Nevada VoteCo LLC (“VoteCo”) which holds 100% of the voting units of Nevada
Property 1 LLC (the “Voting Units”). Deutsche Bank understands that the Independent Managers have applied to the Nevada Gaming Commission for approval to participate in the management of the gaming operations of the Property (the
“Gaming Operations”) in conjunction with the acquisition of the Voting Units. 
 Deutsche Bank agrees that it will not take any action
to influence the Independent Managers in the exercise of their management or voting rights in respect of the Gaming Operations at the Property, and Deutsche Bank hereby authorizes the Independent Managers to exercise such rights independently of,
and without consultation with, Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank further agrees that the terms of this Agreement shall be binding on any successor Independent Manager of VoteCo. 

If you are in agreement with the foregoing, please so indicate by signing and returning one copy of this letter, whereupon this letter will constitute
our agreement with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall terminate with respect to any Independent Manager if, and at such time as, such Independent Manager is no longer a member of VoteCo. 








			
	 INDEPENDENT MANAGERS

		
	 By:
	 	  

	 Jeffrey Baer

		
	 By:
	 	  

	 Stuart Clarke

		
	 By:
	 	  

	 Tom Fiato

		
	 By:
	 	  

	 Donna Milrod

	
	 DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH

		
	 By:
	 	  

		
	 Name:
	 	  

		
	 Title:
	 	  

		
	 By:
	 	  

		
	 Name:
	 	  

		
	 Title:
EXHIBIT 31.1

                     CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Gary H. Schlatter certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of OraLabs Holding
Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Acts Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial reporting.


     DATED DECEMBER 19, 2005            /S/ GARY H. SCHLATTER
                                        ---------------------
                                        PRESIDENT
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1976

EUGENE GRAY, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Honorable, Secretary Department of Defense; U. S. DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY; RICHARD E. BEALE, Executive Director, in his individual and official capacity; CROSBY JOHNSON, Director of Contracts, in his individual and official capacity; VICKIE ARCHILLETTI, Manager, Contracts Business Unit, in her individual and official capacity; LARRY HAHN, Director, Contract Equipment Division, in his individual and official capacity; HAROLD WHITE, Supervisor, Contract EquipmentBranch, in his individual and official capacity; ARAM DARAKAJUIAN, Supervisor, Personnel Relations Specialist, in his individual andofficial capacity; PHIL KOREN, General Counsel, in his individual and official capacity;JOHN SCHERE, II, General Counsel, in his individual and official capacity; KATHY HAWTHORNE, Contract Specialist, in her individual and official capacity; MEDICAL COLLEGE OFVIRGINIA; JOEL SILVERMAN, Doctor, in his individual and official capacity; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-99-255-3)2 Submitted: November 18, 1999 Decided: November 23, 1999
Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eugene Gray, Appellant Pro Se. Joan Elizabeth Evans, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia; David Lee Ross, VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY, Richmond, Virginia; Jean Freeman Reed, MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA HOSPITALS AUTHORITY, Richmond, Virginia; Sharon Maitland Moon, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Eugene Gray appeals the district court’s July 6, 1999 orders denying his motion for summary judgment without prejudice, denying his motions for default judgment, and granting defendant Joel Silverman and the Medical College of Virginia additional time to file responsive pleadings and to respond and to object to Gray’s discovery requests. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the orders are not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The orders here appealed are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### *In re*LOIBEN, Alan Arthur

(MR 21035)

Chicago, IL

Order of the Court:

The motion by Alan Arthur Loiben to strike his name from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Illinois pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 762(a) is allowed, effective immediately.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          20,995
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  149,638
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     35,788
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               353,333
<PP&E>                                       1,295,999
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,992,019
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,145,204
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     7,086,614
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,992,019
<SALES>                                        559,156
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               559,156
<CGS>                                          405,287
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  880,641
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              62,900
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (726,771)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (726,771)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.08)


</TABLE>
#### BAKER v. BRUNDAGE. COLLINS v. SAME.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

June 18, 1894.)

Supplementary Proceedings—Irregularities—Who may Object.

Irregularities in appointing a receiver can 'be taken advantage of only by the judgment debtor, and not by another judgment creditor.

Appeal from special term, Orange county.

Two actions, one by Fred Baker against Edward Brundage, and the other by Charles Collins against the same defendant. From an order denying a motion by plaintiff Collins, to vacate supplementary proceedings had by plaintiff Brundage, said Collins appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before DYKMAN and CULLEN, JJ.

L. S. Sterrit, for appellant.

A. H. F. Seeger, for respondent.

*793DYKMAN, J.

The plaintiff in the first of these actions obtained a judgment against the defendant therein, on the 16th day of January, 1893, for $1,145.90, and an execution was issued thereon to the sheriff of Orange county on the same day. On the 27th day of July, 1893, proceedings supplementary to execution were instituted upon the judgment. The affidavit upon which such proceedings were based stated that the execution upon the judgment had been returned unsatisfied, but the fact was otherwise. The judgment debtor was examined under the proceedings, and a receiver was appointed by his consent. On the 20th day of November, 1893, the plaintiff in the second action obtained a judgment against the defendant for $493, and execution thereon was issued to the sheriff of Orange county, which was returned unsatisfied on the same day. Thereafter, on the 8th day of February, 1894, proceedings supplementary to execution were instituted upon that judgment, which were adjourned to afford time for a motion on behalf of Collins, the plaintiff in the second judgment, to set aside the order appointing a receiver in the first action, upon the ground that the execution issued upon the judgment therein had not been returned at the time when the proceedings were commenced. The motion was denied, and an appeal has been taken from the order of denial. It is unnecessary to examine the irregularities set up by the appellant, because none but the judgment debtor can take advantage of them. Underwood v. Sutcliffe, 10 Hun, 453, and cases cited. The defendant himself has waived all irregularities by. consenting to the appointment of the receiver in the first action. The order should be afffrmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
EXHIBIT 99(i)

                             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
                           TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection   with  the  Annual  Report  of  Lincorp   Holdings,   Inc.  (the
"Registrant")  on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 11, 2003, hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned officers certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchanges Act of 1934, and

(2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material
      respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of the
      Registrant.

                                                  Lincorp Holdings, Inc.


Date: April 11, 2003                              By: /s/ Jack R. Sauer
                                                      --------------------------
                                                      Jack R. Sauer
                                                      President and
                                                      Chief Executive Officer