alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     The undersigned  executive  officers of the Registrant  hereby certify that
this  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended  September 30, 2003
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report
fairly presents,  in all material respects,  the financial condition and results
of operations of the Registrant.


                               By:/s/ Larry D. Smith
                                  -------------------------------------------
                                  Name:    Larry D. Smith
                                  Title:   President and Chief Executive Officer


                               By:/s/ Frances Pasquale
                                  -------------------------------------------
                                  Name: Frances Pasquale
                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer


Date: November 12, 2003
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6257 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt certain emergency 

medical devices from the excise tax on medical devices. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

Mr. TURNER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt 

certain emergency medical devices from the excise tax 

on medical devices. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEALING FIRST RESPONDERS EMERGENCY 

4 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT TAX. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (2) of section 4191(b) 

6 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by strik7 ing ‘‘and’’ at the end of subparagraph (C), by redesig8 nating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E), and by in9 serting after subparagraph (C) the following new subpara10 graph: 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6257 IH

1 ‘‘(D) qualified emergency medical devices, 

2 and’’. 

3 (b) QUALIFIED EMERGENCY MEDICAL DEVICE.— 

4 Subsection (b) of section 4191 of such Code is amended 

5 by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

6 ‘‘(3) QUALIFIED EMERGENCY MEDICAL DE7 VICE.—The term ‘qualified emergency medical de8 vice’ means any medical device of a type furnished 

9 by first responders or ambulance services in pro10 viding out-of-hospital or pre-hospital care, or trans11 port to a medical care facility, for individuals— 

12 ‘‘(A) with illnesses, injuries, or other med13 ical emergencies, or 

14 ‘‘(B) in need of medical transport, extri15 cation, or evacuation.’’. 

16 (c) CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS MADE APPLICABLE.— 

17 (1) The last sentence of subsection (a) of sec18 tion 4221 of such Code is amended by striking 

19 ‘‘(4),’’. 

20 (2) The last sentence of paragraph (2) of sec21 tion 6416(b) of such Code is amended by striking 

22 ‘‘(C),’’. 

23 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

24 this section shall apply to sales after December 31, 2012. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00265-CV

JEFFREY D. WESTBROOK APPELLANT

V.

DAVID F. FONDREN, FRANK D. 

HOKE, GARY L. JOHNSON, JOHN 

PATRICK, RODNEY COOPER, 

GARY WEST, DEBORAH FORD, 

JAMES MOONEYHAM, JIMMY 

WEBB, PRISCILLA MORALES, 

JIMMY BOWMAN, VICKIE

BARROW, KELLI WARD, PATSY 

BELL, DANNY HORTON, ROY 

MONROE, AND SHERILYN TRENT

APPELLEES

----------

FROM THE 30TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

On July 28, 2010, this court received a notice of appeal from Appellant 

Jeffrey D. Westbrook, pro se. 

On October 22, 2010, we notified the parties that this court may lack 

jurisdiction because the trial court’s order in this case did not appear to be a final 

judgment. That is, the order disposing of Westbrook’s request for a preliminary 

injunction did not also dispose of Westbrook’s request for a declaratory 

judgment, which Westbrook indicated he wished to incorporate into this appeal in 

his letters filed on September 22, 2010, October 13, 2010, and November 9, 

2010. On October 1, 2010, the trial court indicated that no ruling could be made 

on Westbrook’s motion for declaratory judgment because it had never been set 

for trial. 

Our October 22, 2010 letter informed the parties that they had until 

Monday, November 1, 2010, to furnish this court with a response showing 

grounds for continuing the appeal or it would be dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). 

Westbrook responded to our letter, stating that “[t]he only thing to do is 

sever the declaratory judgment . . . and proceed with the preliminary injunction 

portion.” Therefore, to the extent Westbrook has attempted to appeal a claim for 

declaratory judgment that is not currently appealable, we dismiss that portion of 

his appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). 

Compare Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon 2009) 

(stating that a person may appeal from an interlocutory order that refuses a 
3

temporary injunction), with Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 

2001) (“[T]he general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an 

appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.”). 

The remainder of Westbrook’s appeal shall continue, and Westbrook’s 

appellate brief is due in this court on Monday, January 24, 2011.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: December 23, 2010
(86 South. 926)

#### BYARS et al. v. BYARS.

(6 Div. 144.)

(Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 4, 1920.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Hugh A. Locke, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed by appellant.
UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. GREGORY E. GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellant. No. 12-8064 (D.C. No. 2:05-CR-00078-ABJ-2) (D. Wyo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , Chief Judge, EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

Defendant Gregory E. Graham appeals from a district court order denying, for lack of jurisdiction, his mo tion for release pending the di sposition of a prior appeal (Appeal No. 12-8031). As th e government concedes, the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdicti on to consider the motion. See United States v. Meyers , 95 F.3d 1475, 1488-89 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996). The government asks us to decide the

* This panel has determined that oral ar gument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It ma y be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32. 1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 26, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - matter in the first instance, but that would entail a de parture from the procedure contemplated in Fed. R. App. P. 9(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), and leave us to assess

the relevant factors without the aid of the st atement of reasons from the district court mandated by Rule 9. Our case law does not support this circumvention of the procedures specified for the orde rly resolution of bail matters. See, e.g. , United

States v. Fisher , 55 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hart , 779 F.2d 575, 576 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Affleck , 765 F.2d 944, 954 (10th Cir. 1985). Because of the district court’s ju risdictional misundersta nding, it did not even

consider the merits of Mr. Graham’s motion for release pending appeal, and a remand of the matter is appropriate.

The order of the district court de nying Mr. Graham’s motion for release pending appeal for lack of jurisdiction is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED

for consideration of the motion on the me rits. Mr. Graham’s motion for release pending the disposition of the instan t appeal is DENIED as moot.

Entered for the Court Per Curiam
#### Philson Painting Co., Inc., Appellant, v Board of Education of the City of New York, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Goldstein, J.), dated June 27, 1985, as, upon renewal and reargument, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for failure to timely file a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law § 3813 (1), and denied the plaintiffs cross motion to strike the defendant’s second affirmative defense with respect to the failure to timely file a notice of claim, and for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Compliance with Education Law § 3813 is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against the Board of Education *(see, Public Improvements v Board of Educ.,*56 NY2d 850). This statutory mandate requires that a notice of claim be filed within 90 days after the accrual of a cause of action. It is well established that a claim accrues for the purposes of Education Law § 3813 upon substantial completion of work performed pursuant to a contract with the board (in this case, removal of asbestos from school ceilings) *(see, Crescent Elec. Installation Corp. v Board of Educ.,*50 NY2d 780; *Amsterdam Wrecking & Salvage Co. v Greater Amsterdam School Dist.,*56 NY2d 828). It is undisputed that the work which constitutes the basis of this claim was substantially completed by October 3, 1983. Additionally, the plaintiff was aware of its extra costs three weeks prior to October 3, 1983, as it had sent the defendant a letter, dated September 11, 1983, setting forth the additional compensation sought. Since the plaintiff failed to file its notice of claim until January 6, 1984, more than 90 days after its claim accrued, said filing was untimely. The mere fact that communications were exchanged between the parties is insufficient to relieve the plaintiffs of its statutory duty *(see, Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ.,*60 NY2d 539). Further, as the plaintiff failed to seek leave to file a late notice of claim within the one-year Statute of Limitations, the relief provisions of Education Law § 3813 (2-a) are unavailable. Weinstein, J. P., Rubin, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 23.1****Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.333-124999) pertaining to the Emageon Inc. 2005 Equity Incentive Plan, Emageon Inc. 2005Non-Employee Director Stock Incentive Plan, Emageon Inc. 2000 Equity Compensation Plan, ImageonSolutions, Inc. 2000 Equity Incentive Plan and Ultravisual Medical Systems Corporation 2000 StockOption Plan of our reports dated March 15, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financialstatements and schedule of Emageon Inc., Emageon Inc.management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting of Emageon Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the yearended December 31, 2006./s/ Ernst & Young LLPAtlanta, Georgia
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6217 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6217

 To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 with respect to 
             levee certifications, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 23, 2010

   Mr. Walz introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 with respect to 
             levee certifications, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERFORMANCE OF SPECIALIZED OR TECHNICAL SERVICES.

    Section 211 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (31 
U.S.C. 6505 note) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f) Levee Certifications.--The requirements of this section do 
not apply to activities conducted by the Corps of Engineers to evaluate 
a levee system that was designed or constructed by the Corps if the 
activities--
            ``(1) are conducted at the request of a State or local 
        government; and
            ``(2) the State or local government agrees to reimburse the 
        Corps for all costs associated with the performance of the 
        activities.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants.

Nos. 71 Civ. 3427, 71 Civ. 3432.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

Aug. 3, 1971.

*793Arthur L. Winn, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Sidney Goldstein, New York, City, of counsel), for Port of New York Authority.

Martin S. Snitow, Asst. Corp. Counsel, City of New York (J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel, City of New York, and Norman Redlich and Sheila A. Mahony, Asst. Corp. Counsels, of counsel), for the City of New York.

Geraldine R. Keyes, I. C. C., Washington, D. C. (Fritz R. Kahn, Gen. Counsel, I. C. C., Richard W. McLaren, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John H. D. Wigger, Atty., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. N. Y., of counsel), for the United States and Interstate Commerce Comm.

MEMORANDUM

TENNEY, District Judge.

It appears to this Court, after due consideration, that it is without jurisdiction to temporarily restrain the June 28, 1971 order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which order vacated its prior order suspending increased tariffs of Penn Central for its lighterage service in the Port of New York. Clearly, the reasons for the vacating of the Commission’s prior order are excepted from judicial review. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F.Supp. 977 (W.D.Wis.1967). Indeed, the Commission need not even state its reasons for vacating a prior suspension order. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F.Supp. 913, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Since the vacating of its prior order is a matter wholly within the Commission’s discretion and expertise, this Court cannot enjoin the Commission’s order. There is no showing that the Commission’s action exceeded its powers or that it constituted a gross abuse of discretion.

In addition, inasmuch as none of the plaintiffs would be compelled to pay the increased tariffs, they have no standing to attack the vacating order of the Commission. Since plaintiffs suffer no legal injury by reason of the Commission’s action, they cannot maintain an injunctive attack upon it. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, *supra*at 917.

Furthermore assuming there were jurisdiction plaintiffs would appear to have little likelihood of ultimate success and the irreparable harm which plaintiffs complain they will suffer from the June 28, 1971 order is at best speculative and cannot justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Finally, since this case is clearly not ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as the order of the Commission is interlocutory, the convening of a three-judge court is not warranted. A-1 Coach Tours, Inc. v. United States, 260 F.Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y.1966).

Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order is hereby denied and the within complaint dismissed.

So ordered.
#### In the Matter of Kathleen R. McHale, Appellant, v Philip D. Smolinski et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of Erie County, et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and petition granted. Memorandum: Candidate Francina J. Cartonia filed a 68-page designating petition for Democratic nomination for Erie County Legislator (Fifteenth District) containing 998 signatures. The questionable and irregular signature-collecting process permeated the petition with fraud and it should be invalidated. Numerous violations of Election Law § 6-132 occurred. Five subscribing witnesses, whose petition sheets accounted for 656 signatures, were not, on a number of occasions, in the presence of the signatories when the signatories signed the petition as required by Election Law § 6-132 (2) *(see, Matter of Tani v Luddy,*32 Misc 2d 53, 55). Nine different sheets contain the signatures of at least 17 persons who testified that someone other than the subscribing witness witnessed their signatures *(see, Matter of Metzger v Eagan,*24 AD2d 719, *affd*16 NY2d 837). Further, we find it incredible that two of the subscribing witnesses could have collected 160 and 101 signatures, respectively, in a period of a few hours in one evening. In addition, the record reveals at least nine clearly forged signatures. Finally, undisputed testimony shows that the candidate and those closely connected to her (her mother and father) participated in this fraudulent signature-collecting process *(see, Matter of Villafane v Caban,*104 AD2d 579). The combination of these improprieties permeates the petition with fraud and casts the validity of the entire petition into doubt *(see, Matter of Haskell v Gargiulo,*51 NY2d 747; *Matter of Proskin v May,*40 NY2d 829). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Honan, J.—Election Law.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Balio and Davis, JJ. (Order entered Aug. 21, 1987.)
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 9 (Friday, January 12, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2896-2897]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-1042]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER01-566-000]


Duke Energy McClain, LLC; Notice of Issuance of Order

January 8, 2001.
    Duke Energy McClain, LLC (Duke McClain) submitted for filing a rate 
schedule under which Duke McClain will engage in wholesale electric 
power and energy transactions at market-based rates. Duke McClain also 
requested waiver of various Commission regulations. In particular, Duke 
McClain requested that the Commission grant blanket approval under 18 
CFR part 34 of all future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability by Duke McClain.
    On January 3, 2001, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director, 
Division of Corporate Applications, Office of Markets, Tariffs and 
Rates,

[[Page 2897]]

granted requests for blanket approval under part 34, subject to the 
following:
    Within thirty days of the date of the order, any person desiring to 
be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities 
or assumptions of liability by Duke McClain should file a motion to 
intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 
and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 
385.211 and 385.214).
    Absent a request for hearing within this period, Duke McClain is 
authorized to issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities as 
a guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security 
or another person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for 
some lawful object within the corporate purposes of the applicant, and 
compatible with the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate for such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that 
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by 
continued approval of Duke McClain's issuances of securities or 
assumptions of liability.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to 
intervene or protests, as set forth above, is February 2, 2001.
    Copies of the full text of the Order are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426. The Order may also be viewed on the Internet at  
http://
www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-1042 Filed 1-11-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of GoldSpring, Inc. (the Company) for the
year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Robert T. Faber, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, to my
best knowledge and belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and(2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ ROBERT T. FABERRobert T. FaberChief Financial Officer
 April 14, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Lorenzo Adrian MACIAS-MARTINEZ, also known as Adrian Macias-Martinez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-51051

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

M. Carolyn Fuentes, Henry Joseph Bemporad, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Lorenzo Adrian Macias-Martinez presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by *United States v. Gomez-Herrera,*523 F.3d 554, 562-63 (5th Cir.2008), which held that the disparity between sentences of defendants who can participate in a fast-track program and defendants who cannot is not “unwarranted” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, its alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 10.81 

**MEETING OF THE COMPENSATION AND**

**HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE OF**

**THE BOARDS OF**

**NORTEL NETWORKSCORPORATION AND**

**NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED**

**FEBRUARY 19, 2009**

**EXTRACT**

**Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited**

Amendmentto Severance Arrangements for David Drinkwater 

RESOLVED, That the amendment to the severance arrangements for Mr. DavidDrinkwater, Senior Advisor of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited, to change his Employment Termination Date, as defined in the agreement between Nortel Networks Corporation and David Drinkwater dated November 11, 2008, toMarch 31, 2009, on the terms and conditions as recommended to the Committee, be approved.