MEMORANDUM

DATE: November 16, 2009

TO: Discovery Subcommittee

FROM: Andrea Kuperman

CC: Judge Lee H. Rosenthal

SUBJECT: Case Law Regarding Compelling Party Officers to Attend Trial in Distant Fora

This memorandum addresses an issue that has been raised in connection with the Discovery

Subcommittee’s consideration of possible amendments to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 45. There

is a split of authority as to whether Rule 45 permits a court to issue a subpoena requiring a party or

a party’s officers to travel more than 100 miles to testify at trial. Two judges within the same federal

district have recently reached opposite conclusions, both stating that their decisions are based on the

text of the rule. In In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. La. 2006),

the court held that Rule 45 permits requiring a party’s officer to attend trial in a distant forum. In

Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 213 (E.D. La. 2008) (“Big Lots Stores”), the court held

that Rule 45 does not permit requiring a party’s officer to attend trial at a distant courthouse if the

officer was not served within 100 miles of that courthouse. The Big Lots Stores court rejected the

view expressed in Vioxx, but noted that Vioxx adhered to the majority rule.

In considering whether to amend Rule 45 to resolve the split of authority, the Subcommittee

is interested in determining whether the Vioxx interpretation is in fact the majority rule or whether it

is a unique holding. The Subcommittee requested that I review the case law on this issue. I have

focused largely on cases after the most recent substantive amendments to Rule 45 in 1991 because

many of the cases finding that Rule 45 allows compelling a party’s officer to travel to trial from a
2

distant location support this construction by relying on the 1991 amendments. The case law reveals

that the Vioxx holding is not unique and that a number of courts have referred to it as the majority

view of Rule 45, but that there are also a number of cases that have disapproved of this view. Cf.

Don Zupanec, Subpoena – Attendance at Trial – Geographical Limitation – Parties and Officers,

FED.LITIGATOR,Sept. 2008, at 13 (“[W]hile [the Vioxx view] remainsthe predominant view, several

courts have recently rejected it, concluding instead that Rule 45(b)(2) specifies requirements for

proper service of a subpoena to compel attendance while Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) sets forth

circumstances under which a subpoena must be quashed, but does not alter the requirements for

proper service.”) (citing Lyman v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 05-C-122, 2008 WL 2224352 (E.D.

Wis. May 27, 2008); Mazloum v. Dist. of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 248 F.R.D. 725 (D.D.C.

2008)). The Vioxx view seems difficult to reconcile with the current language in the rule, but the fact

that many courts have taken a similar view may indicate that many courts believe that they should be

able to compel a party’s officer to attend trial, at least as a matter of policy.

I. Relevant Language in Rule 45

In resolving thisissue, two interrelated provisions of Rule 45 are relevant. The first provision

focuses on service:

(2) Service in the United States. Subject to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), a

subpoena may be served at any place:

(A) within the district of the issuing court;

(B) outside the district but within 100 miles of the place

specified for the deposition, hearing, trial, production, or

inspection;

(C) within the state of the issuing court if a state statute or

court rule allows service at that place of a subpoena issued
3

by a state court of general jurisdiction sitting in the place

specified for the deposition, hearing, trial, production, or

inspection; or

(D) that the court authorizes on motion and for good cause, if

a federal statute so provides.

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). The second provision focuses on quashing or modifying a subpoena:

(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena

(A) When Required. On timelymotion, the issuing court must

quash or modify a subpoena that:

. . . .

(ii) requires a person who is neither a party nor a party’s

officer to travel more than 100 miles from where that

person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts

business in person—except that, subject to Rule

45(c)(3)(B)(iii), the person may be commanded to

attend a trial by traveling from any such place within the

state where the trial is held;

. . . .

(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or

affected by a subpoena, the issuing court may, on

motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:

. . . .

(iii) a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer to

incur substantial expense to travel more than 100 miles

to attend trial.

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).

II. The View that Rule 45 Permits Compelling a Party’s Officer to Attend Trial More than

100 Miles Away

The Vioxx case purportedly describes the majority view of the interplay between subsections
4

(b)(2) and (c)(3)(A)(ii) of Rule 45. Vioxx was a multidistrict litigation case in which the court

considered a motion to compel the appearance of a Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) representative at

one of the trials. The representative requested was Mr. Anstice, who was President of Human Health

for Canada, Latin America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and who had previously served as

Merck’s President of Human Health for the United States. Vioxx, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 664. In his

prior position, “Mr. Anstice was responsible for the marketing activities and commercial operations

of Merck during the time Vioxx was being developed and marketed.” Id. The court had previously

ruled that the plaintiff could compel Mr. Anstice to appear and testify at the trial, compel Mr. Anstice

to testify at the trial from a remote location via video transmission, or present Mr. Anstice’s former

testimony from a state court trial involving Vioxx. Id. at 665. Merck’s counsel agreed to accept

service on Mr. Anstice’s behalf and received the subpoena via email in Chicago; the parties agreed

that service would be considered effectuated on Mr. Anstice at his home in Pennsylvania. Id. The

subpoena’s caption listed both the Eastern District of Louisiana and the District of New Jersey, and

sought to compel Mr. Anstice to testify live at the trial in New Orleans. Id. Merck and Mr. Anstice

moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that Mr. Anstice was beyond the court’s subpoena power.

Id. Merck based its argument on the fact that Rule 45(b)(2) requires service within 100 miles from

the place of trial, and that New Orleans is more than 100 miles from Pennsylvania. Vioxx, 438 F.

Supp. 2d at 665. The plaintiff argued that “the interplay between Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule

45[(c)](3)(A)(ii) grants district courts authority to subpoena parties or officers of parties—such as

Mr. Anstice—to testify at trial regardless of where they might be served.” Id. Merck responded that

“Rule 45(b)(2) defines the Court’ssubpoena power; whereas, Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) allows a Court to

quash a subpoena within its subpoena power,” and the plaintiff countered that “the ‘person who is
5

not a party or an officer of a party’ language ofRule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) permitsthe inverse inference that

parties and their officers are subject to compulsion to attend trials that occur outside the 100 mile

limit otherwise available to non-parties.” Id. at 666.

The court agreed with the plaintiff:

The plain, unambiguous language of Rule 45 supports the PSC’s

position. Rule 45(b)(2), which imposesthe 100 mile rule, is expressly

limited by Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) mandates that a

district court must quash a subpoena if it requires “a person who is not

a party or an officer of a party” to travel more than 100 miles from

his residence or place of employment. (emphasis added). In this case,

Mr. Anstice is a Merck officer. Accordingly, Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)

does not require the Court to quash the subpoena. Instead, Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii) supports the inverse inference that Rule 45(b)(2)

empowers the Court with the authority to subpoena Mr. Anstice, an

officer of a party, to attend a trial beyond the 100 mile limit.

Id. at 667. The court “acknowledge[d] that nothing in the history or adoption of current Rule

45(b)(2), the substance of which was located in Rule 45(e) prior to December 1, 1991, or Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii), the substance of which was newly adopted in 1991, conveys any intention to alter the

100 mile rule,” and that “the 1991 advisory committee’s notes to Rule 45(b) and 45(c) reinforce[d]

Merck’s argument.” Id. (citations omitted). But the court concluded that it could not “consider the

history or intent behind the 1991 amendment to Rule 45 as the rule [wa]s plain and unambiguous on

its face.” Id. (citation omitted). The court held that looking solely at the language in the rule

compelled the finding that “the interaction between Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) vest[ed]

the Court with the authority to subpoena Mr. Anstice to testify at trial in New Orleans.” Vioxx, 438

F. Supp. 2d at 667.

The Vioxx court noted that while the text of the rule resolved the issue, its understanding was

“bolstered by the realities of modern life and multi-district litigation.” Id. The court found the 100-
6

mile rule to be antiquated:

Realistically, the purposes behind the 100 mile rule no longer

justify its existence. While a cross-country trip may have been

deemed impossible in 1793 [when Congress enacted a statute allowing

courts to issue trial subpoenas if the witness did not live more than

100 miles from the issuing court] or harassing and economically

burdensome in 1964 [when the Supreme Court found the justifications

for the 100 mile rule to be to protect witnesses from long trips and to

minimize costs], it is now commonplace and a necessary incident to

multi-district litigation. Additionally, the current costs borne by a

witness traveling cross-country to testify at trial are generally much

less than the costs incurred by an army of attorneys and their

respective entourages traveling cross-country to depose the very same

witness. Moreover, in the present case, the PSC will bear Mr.

Anstice’s travel expenses[,] eliminating any case-specific value to the

rule’s second goal. While these twin rationales were laudable in 1793,

the[y] are now questionable, if not anachronistic. Modern day

litigation should not be restrained by antiquated relics of a bygone era.

Certainly, our founding fathers could not have envisioned a world

of superhighways, commercial jet airlines, or high speed commuter

trains, just as they most likely could not have envisioned a single,

consolidated lawsuit consisting ofthousands ofparties seeking billions

of dollars in damages allegedly caused by an allegedly defective

prescription drug prescribed to millions of patients across the country

and world. See Cathaleen A. Roach, It’s Time to Change the Rule

Compelling Witness Appearance at Trial: Proposed Revisions to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), 79 GEO. L.J. 81, 83–84

(1990). Yet, while superhighways, jet airliners, and commuter trains

have provided access to the vast expanses of our nation and beyond

and allowed the United States to flourish socially and economically,

our federal court system’ssubpoena power is still bound by a 100 mile

colonial leash.

Id. at 668. The court also found that the 100-mile rule “actually inhibits the truth seeking purpose

of litigation” because without live testimony, the jury must rely on deposition testimony, “‘a secondbest.’” Id. (quoting Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1939) (Learned Hand, J.)). The

court described a deposition as “a sedative prone to slowly erode the jury’s consciousness until truth

takes a back seat to apathy and boredom,” and found that “[t]he 100 mile rule forces this predicament
7

upon the jury.” Id. The court noted that “[w]hatever minimal benefits the 100 mile rule provides

witnesses, it is severely outweighed by its detrimental effect upon the trial process.” Id. The court

“believe[d] that the 100 mile rule as it currently exists has little utility,” and “suggest[ed] that an

amendment to [Rule 45] would be wise.” Vioxx, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 668 (citing James B. Sloan &

William T. Gotfryd, Eliminating the 100 Mile Limit for Civil Trial Witnesses: A Proposal to

Modernize Civil Trial Practice, 140 F.R.D. 33, 40–44 (1992); Roach, supra, at 109–117). The court

took “comfort in knowing that its ruling [was] supported by the realities of our present world . . .

[and] in knowing that the majority of courts that have been faced with the same issues have ruled

likewise.” Id. at 669. Finally, the court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the objectives

of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the statute governing multidistrict litigation, explaining that “[i]f one court is

going to be legislatively mandated to handle thousands of cases from throughout the nation, it needs

some national reach at least as to the parties.” Id. But, “[h]aving found that Rule 45 alone g[ave]

[the court] authority to subpoena Mr. Anstice, the Court f[ound] that it [did not] need . . . [to] reach

the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1407 expand[ed] the Court’s trial subpoena power.” Id. at 669 n.2.

Many courts considering this issue have concluded that a court has the power to subpoena

parties or parties’ officers who live or work more than 100 miles from the courthouse. See, e.g.,

Seiter v. Yokohama Tire Corp., No. C08-5578 FDB, 2009 WL 3663399, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov.

3, 2009) (“The Court agrees with the majority position that corporate officers of a party may be

subpoenaed and required to travel more than 100 miles from where they reside, are employed, or

regularly transact business.”); Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, ---

F.R.D. ---, 2009 WL 2972518, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009) (same); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl

Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358 (SAS), 2009 WL 1840882, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
8

Jun. 24, 2009) (“The majority of courts to reach the issue have determined that this rule, by reverse

inference, permitsthe service of a subpoena on a party or a party’s officer who is beyond the 100 mile

radius, provided no undue prejudice results. This Court agrees.”); Clark v. Wilkin, No. 2:06 cv 693

TS DN, 2008 WL 648542, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2008) (“The express application of [Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii)] to persons who are not parties suggests that parties do not fall under the 100 mile

rule.”); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Educ. Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-1053, 2007 WL 2127798, at *3 (E.D. La.

Jul. 25, 2007) (concluding that “requiring an appearance by a corporate representative of Scottsdale

[who waslocated more than 100 miles from the courthouse] [wa]s not a violation of Rule 45(b)(2)”

because “the provisions of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) specify that the 100 mile restriction applies only to

persons who are not a party or an officer of a party”); Creative Sci. Sys., Inc. v. Forex Capital

Markets, LLC, No. C 04-3746 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3826730, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2006) (“The

majority view and more persuasive analysis, however, is found in Vioxx. Although there is tension

between the two portions of the rule, the better reading of the rule as a whole is to give effect and

meaning to the phrase ‘who is not a party or an officer of a party’ in paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii).”);

Williams v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 3:05-cv-479-J-33MCR, 2006 WL 2598758, at *2 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 11, 2006) (rejecting the argument that a court “cannot expand its subpoena power to reach

corporate officers outside the 100 mile limit” and noting that “a majority of cases have found a

distinction between ordinary employees and high-level representatives of a corporation”); Ferrell v.

IBP, Inc., No. C98-4047-MJM, 2000 WL 34032907, at *1–2 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2000)

(disapproving of Johnson v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (“Land O’

Lakes”), because it “does not follow the majority of courts which have addressed the issue,” and

concluding that the equities favored requiring the party’s officers to travel to trial); NWL Holdings,
 The authors argued that their construction “is supported by the [Advisory Committee’s] Notes which indicate 1

that the change in subparagraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) permits a court to order trial attendance from anywhere in-state

regardless of the local state law.” Brennan & Krieg, supra, at 20. The authors predicted that “[t]he ambiguity

regarding service in Rule 45(b) will no doubt result in litigation concerning this issue.” Id.

9

Inc. v. Eden Ctr., Inc. (In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc.), No 01-42217 (REG), 2004 WL 1661983, at

*1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2004) (“Though the case[ ]law and commentary are not uniform—in

no small part by reason of reliance by courts and commentary on case[ ]law preceding 1991

amendments to the Federal Rules—this Court believes that the correct view is that limitations on

subpoenas on non-parties are not applicable when the subpoenaed person is a party, or an officer of

one.”); cf. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 922 v. Ashcroft, 354 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915 (E.D.

Ark. 2003) (“American Federation”) (concluding that the court would have the authority to compel

a party’s officer or high-level employee to appear to testify at an arbitration hearing, even if the

employee lived outside the district and beyond the 100-mile limit in Rule 45); Michael B. Brennan

& Todd M. Krieg, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, WIS. LAW, Mar. 1992, at

20 (1992) (discussing the 1991 amendments and noting that “a party wanting to serve a subpoena on

a nonparty who lives outside the district and more than 100 miles from the court in a state that has

no law permitting service, can argue that the express reference in Rule 45(b)(2) to subparagraph

(c)(3)(A)(ii) incorporates the latter provision into the service provision”).1

In reaching the view that courts have the power to compel parties and their officers to attend

trial in distant fora, the cases have focused on a variety of considerations. For example, in Creative

Science Systems, the court concluded that the Vioxx view was correct because “[f]ollowing [Land

O’ Lakes], and refusing to see that phrase [‘who is not a party or an officer of a party’ in Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii)] as affecting the analysis, would result in the phrase being pure surplusage, without
 Arguably, it is possible to read Rule 45(b)(2) and (c)(3)(A)(ii) without creating surplusage by viewing Rule 2

45(b)(2) as setting out the requirements for proper service of a subpoena and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) as creating

a limit on properly served subpoenas. Under this construction, the limits on service would apply to all

subpoenas, whereas the limits on travel would apply only to persons not parties or officers of a party. An

example is given in Big Lots Stores. In Big Lots Stores, the court explained that “if both a nonparty witness

and a party, both residents of Texas, in a case before this Court [in New Orleans] were served with trial

subpoenas at their depositions in New Orleans, the Court would have to grant the nonparty witness’s motion

to quash under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), but under that same rule, the party could be compelled to appear at trial.”

251 F.R.D. at 219. In that example, both witnesses would have been properly served under Rule 45(b)(2)

because they were served within the district of the trial court, but the subpoena to the nonparty witness would

have to be quashed under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) as requiring a nonparty to travel more than 100 miles. The

subpoena issued to the party’s officer would not have to be quashed under that section. This construction gives

effect to the phrase “a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer” in Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).

 The Creative Science court focused on the fact that paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) expressly applies to witnesses 3

who are not parties or a party’s officer, but did not expressly resolve the difference between proper service

under paragraph (b)(2) and the requirement to quash certain subpoenas under paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii). Those

courts holding the minority view of the rule do not seem to disagree with the proposition that paragraph

(c)(3)(A)(ii) excludes parties and their officers from the requirement to quash subpoenas requiring travel of

more than 100 miles, but instead focus on the fact that despite this exception, paragraph (b)(2) requires proper

service on all subpoenaed persons.

10

effect under any circumstances,” and concluded that “[s]uch constructions are to be avoided, when

possible.” 2006 WL 3826730, at *2 (citation omitted). The court noted that in Land O’ Lakes, the 2

court had concluded that “‘[t]here simply is no ‘negative implication,’’ arising from paragraph

(c)(3)(A)(ii) that parties and officers of parties are subject to a different rule,” but the Creative

Science Systems court “respectfully disagree[d], both in light of the words ofthe statute and the hoary

principle that ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’” Creative Sci. Sys., 2006 WL 3826730, at *2 3

n.2 (first alteration in original).

In Ferrell, the court noted that the majority of courts considering the issue had found that

subpoenas could be issued to distant parties and their officers, and concluded that the specific equities

of its case required that result. See Ferrell, 2000 WL 34032907, at *1–2. The court explained that

the case was originally scheduled at a location well within the 100-mile range for subpoena service
 In Edelman, the Second Circuit considered “whether a foreign national temporarily in the United States is 4

subject to being subpoenaed and deposed here as an aid to ongoing litigation in France,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782(a). 295 F.3d at 173. The court considered Rule 45 because section 1782(a) provides: “‘The district

court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or

to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . . To the

extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document

or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Id. at 175 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1782(a)) (Edelman alteration omitted)(emphasis added). The court noted that Rule 45(b)(2) provides

for a subpoena to “‘be served at any place within the district of the court by which it is issued,’” id. at 178

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2)), and that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) “states that unless a person is a party to the

litigation or an officer of a party, he cannot be compelled to travel more than 100 miles from where he resides

or works to be deposed,” id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)). The court then explained: “That

particular subdivision of Rule 45 gives nonparty deponents protection from expending time and money to

comply with a subpoena. The purpose of the 100 mile exception is to protect such witnesses from being

11

under Rule 45(b)(2), but that the judge and the parties had agreed to hold the trial in a different

location. Id. at *2. The court concluded that “[i]t would seem inequitable, at best, to allow the

defendant to stipulate to transfer of the trial, and then to rely on the trial location in an attempt to

avoid the presence of its key officers at trial.” Id.

In Aristocrat Leisure, the court also seemed to focus on equitable factors. The court

“agree[d] with the majority position that corporate officers of a party may be subpoenaed and

required to travel more than 100 miles from where they reside, are employed, or regularly transact

business,” and concluded that “[h]aving chosen to avail themselves of the many benefits of th[e]

forum, it [wa]s disingenuous for the Bondholders and their corporate officers to reverse course . .

. and contend that they [we]re beyond the reach of this Court’s subpoena power.” 2009 WL

2972518, at *9. The court explained that its “view f[ound] support in the purpose behind the Rule’s

geographic limitation, which ‘gives nonparty deponents protection from expending time and money

to comply with a subpoena’ and is intended to ‘protect [nonparty] witnesses from being subjected to

excessive discovery burdens in litigation in which they have little or no interest.’” Id. (quoting

Edelman v. Taittinger (In re Edelman), 295 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2002)). With respect to 4
subjected to excessive discovery burdens in litigation in which they have little or no interest.” Id. (internal

citation omitted) (emphasis added). In context, the court’s discussion of the 100-mile limitation appears to

refer to paragraph 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)’s requirement to quash certain subpoenas served on persons who are not

parties or officers of a party, but does not address whether that provision expands the court’s ability to serve

subpoenas on persons outside of Rule 45(b)’s limits. The Second Circuit directed the district court on remand

to consider whether Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) would require quashing the subpoena based on the argument that the

witness qualified as an officer of a party in the French litigation and therefore could be compelled to travel

more than 100 miles. Id. at 181. The Second Circuit held that if the witness was found to be an officer, the

subpoena may be sustained, id., but the court did not need to address the interplay between Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)

and Rule 45(b) because it appears that the witness was served within the district of the issuing court.

12

subpoenas served on non-officer employees of parties who resided more than 100 miles from the

courthouse, the Aristocrat Leisure court found that such subpoenas had to be quashed, “declin[ing]

to classify non-officer employees as ‘parties’ for purposes of evading the clear language of Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii).” Id. at *10 (citation omitted). The court explained that Rule 45 provides an

exception to the 100-mile rule only for parties and their officers. Id. (citation omitted). With respect

to subpoenas served on the corporate parties themselves, the court concluded that “there [wa]s no

basis under the 100-mile rule to quash the subpoenas seeking testimony of the Bondholders’

corporate representatives,” and found that “[t]he Bondholders, as parties to this action, affirmatively

have taken advantage of the benefits of this forum, and the Court has the power to require these

parties to produce corporate representatives to testify on their behalf at trial.” Id. (citation omitted).

The court noted that “[i]fthe Bondholders’ position [that corporate representative subpoenas require

non-corporate-officers to travelmore than 100 milesto attend trial] were correct, parties responding

to trial subpoenas would have an incentive to avoid the subpoena simply by producing employees that

are not corporate officers as their party representatives.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]his type

of evasive behavior by parties that have affirmatively chosen to pursue their claims in this forum is

clearly not what Rule 45 was intended to promote.” Aristocrat Leisure, 2009 WL 2972518, at *10.

In Ames Department Stores, the court found that the language ofthe rule required finding that
13

a subpoena could extend further for parties and officers of parties:

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) grants the ability to quash, based on a travel

obligation of more than 100 miles, where the subpoenaed person “is

not a party or an officer of a party.” Since that provision easily could

have been drafted, if it had been the rulemaking intent, to simply omit

the italicized language and make its provisions applicable to “a

person” generally, the compelling interpretation isthat its application

is limited to those persons who are particularly described—i.e., to

non-parties or their officers.

Then, the ability to serve a subpoena in the first place—granted

under Rule 45(b)—is expressly made subject to the provisions of

subparagraph (c)(3)(A). The Court notes that FED.R.CIV. P. 45 was

amended in 1991, at which time the present paragraph (c) was added,

as was the qualifying condition in paragraph (b) that refers to

subparagraph (c)(3)(A). Eden Center properly observes, in its letter

reply, that the Committee Notes to the 1991 amendments say that

subparagraph (c)(3)(A) “restates the former provisions with respect

to the limits of mandatory travel that are set forth in the former

paragraphs (d)(2) and (e)(1) with one important change,” and that the

change the Advisory Committee referred to was a different one,

unrelated to this controversy. But it is noteworthy, in this Court’s

view, that the pre-1991 Rule did not by its terms make distinctions

between parties and non-parties, and thereafter it did.

That suggests to this Court either that the Rule always

contemplated such a distinction (and that the 1991 amendments

confirmed or codified it), or that it was an additional change not

mentioned. In any event, it seems clear to this Court that the addition

of the words “who is not a party or an officer of a party,” as part of

the 1991 amendments, to language that did not previously include it,

was not inadvertent, and is significant.

2004 WL 1661983, at *1–2 (footnotes omitted). The court acknowledged the contrary authority,

but found that most of the contrary cases relied on pre-1991 authority:

As noted, the case[ ]law and commentary is mixed, and there is

some that does indeed support Eden Center’s position. But only one

of Eden Center’s cases or secondary authority sources even addresses

the “who is not a party or an officer of a party” language. The others

either predated the 1991 amendments, and thus had no opportunity to

address the significance of the “who is not a party or an officer of a
 The 1967 case is Steel, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 41 F.R.D. 337 (D. Kan. 1967). In

5

Steel, the court held that a plaintiff can be required to attend a deposition in the district in which it chose to sue,

but cannot be compelled to attend trial beyond the limits set out in Rule 45. Id. at 339. The court stated that

“[w]ith respect to [a party plaintiff’s] attendance at trial, his status is that of any other witness,” and “[i]f he

resides outside the district and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, his attendance cannot be required.”

Id.

14

party” language, or failed to address it for unknown reasons. In re

Vienna Park Properties, [120 B.R. 320 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990),

vacated on other grounds, 125 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),] relied on

by Eden Center in its motion, is in the former category. As that

decision (which quoted the relevant portion of Rule 45 at the time)

makes clear, the key language was not then in the Rule. Another case

upon which Eden Center relies, Smith v. Chason, [No. Civ. A. 96-

10788-PBS, 1997 WL 298254 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 1997),] while

decided after the 1991 amendments, did not discuss the “who is not

a party or an officer of a party” language, and relied only on pre-1991

authority. Similarly, while Wright & Miller, relied on by Eden Center

in its motion, does indeed say that the 100-mile limit “applies to a

party as well as to an ordinary witness,” it cites only a single 1967

case for that view, and inexplicably fails to address either the “who 5

is not a party or an officer of a party” language, or the later contrary

case[ ]law, discussed above. Its observations in thisrespect cannot be

regarded as persuasive for that reason.

Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). The Ames Department Stores court found the contrary authority in

Land O’ Lakes unpersuasive for several reasons:

This Court initially disagrees with the Land O’ Lakes court’s

conclusion, reached without reference to authority, thatsection (b) did

indeed have the purpose or effect of defining a kind of jurisdictional

reach, in a section captioned “Service,” and in each of whose

subsections mechanical aspects ofthe service of process are discussed.

But even assuming, arguendo, that section (b) did have the additional

purpose or effect of defining jurisdictional reach, the asserted

jurisdictional reach was made expressly conditional on a separate

subsection (c)(3)(A)(ii), which had the very different subject matter,

much more relevant here, of “Protection of Persons Subject to

Subpoena,” so that protective provisions, which granted substantive

(or at least procedural) rights to some—but less than all—of those

required to travel more than 100 miles to testify, were incorporated

into Rule 45(b). And the Land O’ Lakes court found no “negative

implication” in subsection (c)(3)(A)(ii)’s drafting; this Court cannot
15

agree. The drafting scheme, in this Court’s view, is a classic example

of what judges and lawyersthink of under “expressio unius.” Finally,

as noted, Land O’ Lakes has beensubsequentlycriticized and rejected,

in its own court, by later authority, which, with lengthy citations, has

observed that Land O’ Lakes “does not follow the majority of courts

which have addressed the issue.”

Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). The Ames Department Stores court noted that many other cases have

reached a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Land O’ Lakes court, some expressly addressing

the language of Rule 45 and others not expressly relying on the rule. See id. & n.17. Finally, the

court noted that commentary on Rule 45 suggests that courts have the ability to compel a party’s

officer to travel from a distant location:

Among the parties themselves, there is the general assumption

that each will appear at the trial, which relieves Rule 45 of any special

concern about that. If it should for any reason become necessary to

have a party appear at the trial who it turns out will not appear

voluntarily—including a person who isin the control of a party, which

sweeps the corporation under this category as well—the court has all

the leverage it needs to compel the party’s appearance. If the court

directs the attendance of the party, disobedience can be compelled

with something the seeking party would enjoy even more than the

invoking of the contempt penalty: a default judgment against the

recalcitrant party. Hence Rule 45 shows little tension when a party is

involved.

It more than compensates for that relaxation by working hard,

and often, on the nonparty witness, addressing at several points the

protections erected for the convenience of nonparties and then adding

a provision that allows even the nonparty to be directed to travel far

to the courthouse, apparently even across the country if need be, but

only on a very strong showing.

Id. at *3–4 (quoting David D. Siegel, Commentary on Rule 45 at C45-16, in 28 U.S.C.A. (quotation

marks omitted)). The court rejected the argument that it should quash the subpoena because the

officer’s videotaped deposition could be taken, noting that credibility was at issue. Id. at *4.

In Clark, the court found that the majority view was “supported by the Second Circuit’s
16

observation that ‘[t]he purpose of the 100 mile exception is to protect such witnesses from being

subjected to excessive discovery burdens in litigation in which they have little or no interest,’” 2008

WL 648542, at *1 (quoting Edelman, 295 F.3d at 178) (footnote omitted) (alteration and emphasis

added by Clark court), and explained that “[p]arties to a suit have great interest in its outcome;

therefore, the purpose behind the 100 mile rule does not apply to them,” id. The court further

explained that “other parties and the Court have an interest in the appearance of parties at trial, which

is a further reason the 100 mile limitation should not apply to parties.” Id. The court rejected the

argument that “the majority rule would provide ‘unfettered discretion’ for counsel to ‘impose undue

burdens and expenses on opposing parties for improper purposes,’” noting that “[t]his concern . . .

has not been shared by the majority of federal courts because Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court

to modify or quash a subpoena in order to ‘protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). The court

concluded that special fairness considerations required compelling the defendant’s attendance at trial

because the defendant was alleged to be the sole witness to the accident at issue, the defendant was

the only witness with knowledge of the condition of his trailer at the time of the accident, and the

defendant’s live testimony was needed because certain evidence was provided to the plaintiffs only

after the defendant’s deposition. Id. The court held that “[b]ecause Wilkin [wa]s a party to the

action, Rule 45(b)(2) d[id] not protect him from being served with a trial subpoena even though he

live[d] outside the district and further than 100 miles [from] th[e] Court,” and that the court had

inherent power to order the defendant’s appearance. Id.

In American Federation, the court considered the issue ofwhether an arbitrator had authority

to subpoena the director of the agency involved in the arbitration to appear and testify in an
17

arbitration hearing held in Forrest City, Arkansas, when the director lived in Dallas, Texas, more than

100 milesfrom Forrest City. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 922, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 911.

The subpoena was served on the record keeper in Forrest City, rather than the party whose

attendance was sought, but the court concluded that the subpoenaed party at least tacitly agreed to

service in this manner. See id. at 916. The court found, assuming the arbitrator’s subpoenas had to

comply with Rule 45, that it had authority to compel a high-level representative of a party to the

arbitration to attend the arbitration hearing, relying on the fact that the majority of courts have

allowed compelling trial testimony of a party’s high-level employees even when the person lives more

than 100 miles from the courthouse. Id. at 915–16. Although the court found that compelling the

party’s director to attend the arbitration hearing did not violate the 100-mile rule in Rule 45, it is

noteworthy that the court separately found service on a record keeper in the same city where the

arbitration hearing was to be held to be proper. Because service was effected within the area

permitted under Rule 45(b)(2), the situation arguably fell within the exception in Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)

for a party’s officers. However, because the court found that the subpoena was properly served, the

court did not need to resolve whether Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) allowed for nationwide service on party

officers.

In Scottsdale, the court considered a motion to quash a subpoena issued to the plaintiff

corporation where all representatives of the corporation were located more than 100 miles from the

courthouse. The issuing party argued that “because Scottsdale filed suit in the Eastern District of

Louisiana[,] it ha[d] consented to th[e] Court’sjurisdiction and should be required to appear at trial.”

2007 WL 2127798, at *3. The court concluded that “[b]ecause the subpoena was directed to

[plaintiff] Scottsdale and not the former corporate representative . . . , and because the provisions of
18

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) specify that the 100 mile restriction applies only to persons who are not a party

or an officer of a party, there is no problem with issuing a subpoena to a party in the litigation who

is outside of the geographic area.” Id. Although the court found that the subpoena complied with

Rule 45(b)(2), it found that lack of personal service on Scottsdale violated Rule 45(b)(1), and

concluded that because a corporate representative would not be able to offer testimony on the

remaining issue in the case, it was unnecessary to require a corporate representative to travel 1,500

miles, particularly since deposition testimony on the issue for which the representative was requested

was available. See id.

In Seiter, the defendant moved to quash a trial subpoena served on a former corporate officer

who had been designated as a corporate representative and who lived outside the district and more

than 100 miles from the courthouse. 2009 WL 3663399, at *1. The court noted that a majority of

courts have found that Rule 45(b)(2)(B) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) permit service of a subpoena on a

party’s officer beyond the 100-mile limit. Id. The court agreed with the majority and concluded that

the subpoena to the former officer, who was not a current officer and who resided outside the

geographic area permitted in Rule 45, had to be quashed. Id. (citing Aristocrat Leisure, 2009 WL

2972518). Because the court concluded that the subpoenaed person was not a corporate officer, it

arguably did not need to decide whether Rule 45 permitted service on party officers residing outside

Rule 45’s geographic scope.

Many of the cases stating that they are applying the majority rule with respect to subpoenas

issued to parties or officers of parties rely on cases that indirectly support the conclusion that Rule

45 permits compelling officers to attend trial more than 100 miles away, but that do not directly
 For example, Vioxx cites American Federation; Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1472, 1504 (D. Kan. 6

1990); Ferrell; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 578, 587 (D. Minn. 1999);

Younis v. American University in Cairo, 30 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 n.44 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Prudential

Securities, Inc. v. Norcom Development., Inc., 1998 WL 397889, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 1998); Stone v.

Morton International, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 498, 500–01 (D. Utah 1997); Venzor v. Chavez Gonzalez, 968 F.

Supp. 1258, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Nat’l Property Investors VIII v. Shell Oil Co., 917 F. Supp. 324, 329

(D.N.J. 1995); and M.F. Bank Restoration Co. v. Elliott, Bray & Riley, No. Civ. A. 92-0049, 1994 WL

719731, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1994). See Vioxx, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 666. Aristocrat Leisure cites MTBE

Prods. Liab. Litig., Younis, Ames Department Stores, and American Federation. See Aristocrat Leisure,

2009 WL 2972518, at *9. Seiter cites American Federation, Younis, and Creative Science. See Seiter, 2009

WL 3663399, at *1. American Federation cites Archer Daniels Midland, Younis, Venzor, and National

Property Investors. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 922, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 915–16. Williams

cites Ferrell. See Williams, 2006 WL 2598758, at *2. Clark cites American Federation, Ames Department

Stores, Mason, Ferrell, Archer Daniels Midland, Younis, Prudential Securities, Stone, Venzor, National

Property Investors, and M.F. Bank Restoration. See Clark, 2008 WL 648542, at *1 n.10. Ames Department

Stores relies on Ferrell; Younis; Prudential Securities; Stone; Venzor; National Property Investors; Exxon

Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994); and M.F. Bank Restoration. See

Ames Dep’t Stores, 2004 WL 1661983, at *3 n.17. Ferrell relies on Archer Daniels Midland, Younis,

Prudential Securities, Stone, Venzor, National Property Investors, Exxon Shipping, and M.F. Bank

Restoration. See Ferrell, 2000 WL 34032907, at *1. MTBE Products Liability Litigation notes that the

majority of courts follow the Vioxx rule and cites Vioxx for its collection of cases reaching the same conclusion.

See MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 1840882, at *1 & n.2. However, many of the cases cited by courts

as expressing the majority view of Rule 45 do not actually examine the correlation between Rule 45(b)(2) and

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). For example, in Exxon Shipping, the court examined whether a federal housekeeping

statute permitted a federal agency to withhold government information or prevent employees from complying

with valid subpoenas, and noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide adequate limits on discovery.

See Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 779. The court noted that “[t]he Federal Rules . . . afford nonparties special

protection against the time and expense of complying with subpoenas,” id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

45(c)(3)(A)(ii)), but did not discuss the service requirements in Rule 45 or the rule’s application to party

officers.

19

address the interplay between Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). For example, in National 6

Property Investors, the court considered Rule 45 in the context of analyzing a motion to transfer

venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and found that “the number of potential non-party North Carolina

witnesses, and the fact that, unlike party witnesses, FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), non-party

witnesses cannot be compelled to testify before this Court [in New Jersey], weigh in favor of

transferring venue in this case.” Nat’l Prop. Investors, 917 F. Supp. at 329. The court did not

address whether paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) places a limit on subpoenas that are properly served under
20

paragraph (b)(2). As a result, it is just as consistent with the minority view, which does not appear

to disagree with the construction that paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) excludes parties and party officers, but

instead concludes that despite the fact that (c)(3)(A)(ii) excludes parties and their officers, paragraph

(b)(2) requires proper service.

In Venzor, the court refused to admit hearsay statements in connection with a motion for

summary judgment under the exception for statements against penal interest, rejecting the argument

that “Rule 804’s requirement that the declarant be unavailable is met because [defendant] Houk lives

and works outside the 100-mile range of a civil subpoena.” Venzor, 968 F. Supp. at 1267. The court

explained that the “limitation on a trial subpoena applies only to ‘a person who is not a party,’” id.

(quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added by Venzor court)), and found that there was

“no reason to believe that Houk will be unavailable to testify at trial, and thus Rule 804(b)(3) is not

a basisto admit Houk’s statements,” id. Although this statement supports the conclusion that parties

can be compelled to travel more than 100 miles for trial, the court did not analyze the interplay

between paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) and did not address service or party officers.

In Archer Daniels Midland, the court considered the appropriate location for depositions of

the plaintiff’s officers, directors, representatives, and employees. The defendant sought to compel

these witnesses to travel for their depositions to Minnesota because the plaintiff had chosen to file

suit there. Archer Daniels Midland, 187 F.R.D. at 587. The court noted that there is a distinction

between a party’s ordinary employees, who “are subject to the general rule that a deponent should

be deposed near his or her residence, or principal place of work,” id. at 587 (citing Metrex Research

Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)), and

a party’s officers, directors, managing agents, and Rule 30(b)(6) designees, id. at 588. The court
21

noted that as to the latter category, “there is a well-recognized, generalrule that a plaintiff is required

to make itself available for a deposition in the District in which the suit was commenced, because the

plaintiff has chosen the forum voluntarily, and should expect to appear there for any legal

proceedings, whereas the defendant, ordinarily, has had no choice in selecting the action’s venue.”

Id. (citations omitted). Despite this general rule, the court held that the plaintiff had demonstrated

that “the equities require[d] that the exception, and not the general rule, govern the place where its

corporate directors, officers, and Rule 30(b)(6) designees, should be taken,” and concluded that

“Decatur, Illinois, where the bulk of these corporate representatives work and reside” was the proper

location. Id. Although the court found that officers of a plaintiff can be required to travel to the trial

forum for depositions and relied on Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) to conclude that ordinary employees should

be deposed near their residence or place of employment, the court did not directly address whether

officers of a party can be compelled to travel more than 100 miles even if they are served outside the

limits in Rule 45(b)(2).

In Younis, the court concluded, in the context of considering a motion to dismiss based on

forum non conveniens, that the majority of witnesses were located in Egypt and that “[t]heir

testimony, like that of the few who reside elsewhere in the United States, cannot be compelled by this

Court.” 30 F. Supp. 2d at 395. The court noted that “[o]nly officers of [defendant] AUC could be

compelled to appear here.” Id. at 395 n.44 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)). Although this

statement supports the inference that officers could be served outside the limits in Rule 45(b)(2), the

court did not directly address the service issue.

In Prudential Securities, the court considered a motion to transfer under section 1404(a).

In that context, the court noted that the only nonparty witness whose testimony had been identified
22

as being needed at trial was located in Florida, which was far enough to make the witness outside the

subpoena power of either of the potential venues—New York and North Carolina. 1998 WL

397889, at *5 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)). The court did not

specifically address compelling a party’s officer to attend trial.

In Stone, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to produce a particular officer for a

deposition in Utah. 170 F.R.D. at 499. The officer had been the plaintiff’s supervisor in Utah at the

time of the events at issue in the lawsuit, but was located in Germany at the time of the lawsuit. See

id. The court considered its subpoena power under Rule 45:

Rule 45, F.R.C.P. is the usual rule for compelling a non-party

witness to appear for deposition or trial. Rule 45(b)(2) provides for

service of a subpoena for a deposition and provides for a 100 mile

limitation as to the place of appearance, subject to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)

F.R.C.P. Rule 45[(c)](3)(A) allows a court, on motion, to quash or

modify the subpoena. Subsection (c)(3)(A)(ii) provides the subpoena

may be quashed or modified if it requires “a person who is not a party

or an officer of a party to travel to a place more than 100 miles from

the place where that personresides, is employed, or regularly transacts

business in person.” Rule 45 F.R.C.P. allows a corporate officer of

a party to be subpoenaed to appear beyond the 100 mile limitation.

. . . Rule 45, F.R.C.P. does extend the subpoena power more broadly

to a corporate officer than to a non-party because the corporate

officer of a party may be considered the corporate alter ego.

However, the question of the application of Rule 45, F.R.C.P. to

corporate officers is particularly important in light of the fact that

many corporations have a variety of officers and businesslocations in

various places with many outside the United States. Rule 45 would

seem to answer the issue as to requiring a corporate officer of a party

to appearin a remote location. However, the rule does not expressly

state that a subpoena is the method to obtain the presence of a

nonparty corporate officer of a party for deposition.

Id. at 500–01 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Although the court concluded that Rule 45

permits requiring a party’s officer to travelmore than 100 milesto a deposition, it did not address the

issue of whether a party’s officer may be served outside the 100-mile limit. The court noted that Rule
23

45(b)(2) provides a 100-mile limitation as to the place of appearance, subject to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii),

id. at 500, but Rule 45(b)(2) addresses the proper place for service rather than the place of

appearance. The court found the rules confusing as to whether a corporation is required to produce

a director, officer, or managing agent pursuant to notice under Rule 30(b)(1), and stated that

“[b]ecause of the ambiguity in the Rules, and the possible confusion, as well as the need for clear

guidance for the courts, the Judicial Conference of the United States should clarify the Rules of Civil

Procedure on this issue.” Id. at 503–04, 503 n.3. With respect to the place of the deposition, the

court noted that “the deposition of a corporate officer ‘should ordinarily be taken at its principal place

of business,’ or at the deponent’s residence or place of business as a matter of convenience,” and

found that the defendant’s principal place of business in Chicago was an appropriate place for the

deposition of the corporate officer from Germany. See id. at 504 (internal citation omitted).

In M.F. Bank Restoration, the plaintiff moved to quash trial subpoenas served by the

defendant on the plaintiff’s employees who lived more than 100 miles from Philadelphia, the location

for trial. 1994 WL 719731, at *8. The plaintiff relied on Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). Id. The court held

that “[b]ecause none of these six employees is represented to be an officer of [the plaintiff], and

because [the defendant] has not supported the subpoenas on an independent basis, the motion will

be granted.” Id. The court concluded that non-officer employees could not be compelled to travel

more than 100 miles for trial, but did not address whether a party’s officer could be served outside

the 100-mile limit or compelled to travel more than 100 miles.

In Mason, a pre-1991 amendments case, the court concluded that there was no error in

requiring one of the defendant’s employees to attend trial for the plaintiff’s case in chief. 741 F.

Supp. at 1504. The court concluded that although the employee “reside[d] more than 100 miles from
 Before the 1991 amendments, subsection (e) contained the 100-mile limit on service for any witness at trial. 7

24

th[e] district, he [wa]s Texaco for purposes of th[e] lawsuit, and thus a party to the action.” The

court did “not believe that the limitation of FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e) applie[d] to this situation, 7

particularly considering defendant’s stated intention to call this key witness in any event.” Id.

Because it was before the 1991 amendments, Mason did not analyze the rule text that existed after

the 1991 amendments that seems to permit a party or a party’s officer to travel more than 100 miles

for trial, at least if properly served. In addition, Mason focused on the equitable factor that the

defendant already planned to call the witness itself. See id.

III. The View that Rule 45 Does Not Authorize Nationwide Service on a Party’s Officers

The view contrary to the Vioxx court’s view regarding the interplay between Rules 45(b)(2)

and 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) is expressed in Big Lots Stores. In that case, the plaintiffs moved to quash

subpoenas the defendants had served on nine opt-in plaintiffs who lived outside the state and more

than 100 milesfromthe courthouse. 251 F.R.D. at 214. The plaintiffs argued that the court’s power

to issue subpoenas waslimited to those placeslisted in Rule 45(b)(2). Id. The defendant argued that

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), particularly as interpreted by Vioxx, “effectively provides for nationwide service

ofsubpoenas on parties and party officers.” Id. There court observed that “[t]here is disagreement

among courts about whether Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) authorizes courts of the United States to issue

subpoenas to parties and party officers in places outside the territorial limits defined in Rule

45(b)(2),” but noted that a majority of courts have held that it does. Id. at 215 (citing Vioxx, 438 F.

Supp. 2d at 666 (citing cases)). The court explained that “[a] minority of courts have ruled the other

way, essentially holding that Rule 45(b)(2) defines the scope of a court’s subpoena power and the

places where a trial subpoena may be properly served,” and that “Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) imposes a
25

limitation on that power but does nothing to expand the scope of the power beyond the parameters

set forth in 45(b)(2).” Id. at 215–16. The court noted that there was no circuit court authority on

this issue and concluded that the minority position is the better view. Id. at 216. The court stated

that “[o]ddly, both the Vioxx court and courts adopting the minority position hinged their decisions

on the ‘plain meaning’ of the words in the rules, yet they came out very different ways.” Big Lots

Stores, 251 F.R.D. at 216.

The court explained that its construction was based on the text of Rule 45:

Nothing in the language of Rule 45(b)(2) itself provides for

service at any place other than those locations specified in the rule

itself. As the authors of an authoritative treatise on federal practice

and procedure explain, Rule 45(b)(2) “states only that a subpoena may

be served at any place listed in subdivisions (b)(2)(A)–(D). The

provisions concerning the possibilitiesfor proper service” are listed in

45(b)(2). WRIGHT AND MILLER, 9A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2451 at 387 (emphasis added). The terms of Rule

45(b)(2) themselves do not provide for nationwide service of a

subpoena. The Rule provides only that a subpoena may be served (A)

within the judicial district of the issuing court; (B) in areas outside the

district but within the 100-mile “bulge” from the location of the

district court; (C) within the state of the issuing court consistent with

state rules governing the power ofstate courts of general jurisdiction

to issue trial subpoenas; or (D) under circumstances specifically

provided for in a federal statute.

To read the “subject to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)” clause as expanding

the territorial reach of where a party or party officer may be served

with a trial subpoena ignores the ordinary meaning of the phrase

“subject to.” The phrase “subject to” ordinarily operates to limit a

power or right, not expand it. Webster’s defines “subject to” as

meaning “dependent upon something,” asin “His consent issubject to

your approval.” When a rule or statute defining a judicial power or a

legal right is “subject to” a cross-referenced rule or statute, the

ordinary sense of that construction is that the power or right is limited

by the cross-referenced provision. Another familiar example is a

cause of action that is “subject to” a statute of limitations. Courts also

frequently use the phrase “subject to” in judicial decisions to explain

a limitation or subordinating effect.
26

Id. at 216–17 (internal citations omitted). The court concluded that “[n]othing in the text [of Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii)] affirmatively expands the geographic scope of where the Court may issue

subpoenas,” and that this section “spells out only the conditions under which a court must quash a

subpoena.” Id. at 217.

The court disagreed with the result reached in Vioxx:

To reach that result the Court would have to turn a clause

intended as a limiting clause on its head and ignore the territorial

restrictions on where a trial subpoena may be properly served. The

position of Big Lots would essentially require the Court to read the

limiting (“subject to”) clause of Rule 45(b)(2) as stating “In addition

to the provisions of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), a subpoena may be served

at any place[.]” The Court would then have to impute, when Rule

45(b)(2) does not so provide, that a subpoena for a party or its officer

may be properly served anywhere in the country. Reading Rule

45(c)(A)(3)(ii) as creating a scheme of nationwide subpoena service,

if only on parties, would have the effect of rendering Rule 45(b)(2)

pointless with respect to parties and party officers. Under the majority

view, it does not matter whether a subpoena is served on a party or

party officer in any of the places listed in 45(b)(2). In other words,

there is no requirement that service must be made in accordance with

those territorial limitations in order for it to be proper. But as Wright

and Miller explain, Rule 45(c) establishes permissible limits on a

properly served subpoena. See WRIGHT AND MILLER, 9A FEDERAL

PRACTICE § 246[3] at 476 (explaining that Rule 45(c)[(3)(A)](ii)

“authorizes the district court to limit the use of subpoenas even when

they comply with Rule 45(a) and (b)”). Thus, in orderfor a subpoena

to be properly served and have force, it must be served in accordance

with the terms set forth in Rule 45(b)(2). Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) spells

out circumstances when a court must quash a subpoena, but it does

not alter the requirements for proper service of a subpoena.

Id. at 217–18 (emphasis added) (additional internal citations omitted). The court found that its

construction was supported by the intent behind the rule:

It strikes the Court as exceedingly odd that Congress would

create a system of nationwide subpoena service in the backhanded

manner that Big Lots suggests. It is even odder that Congress would

do so in a subsection with the heading “Protecting a Person Subject
27

to a Subpoena.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c). Although a subsection

heading or title is not necessarily determinative of a statute’s meaning,

it may be considered to clarify ambiguities. The Court’s perspective

is further informed by the observation that when Congress has sought

to provide for service of subpoenas in places other than those listed in

Rule 45(b)(2), it has done so with unmistakable clarity.

Id. at 218 (internal citation omitted). The court held:

The better reading of subdivisions (b)(2) and (c)(3)(A)(ii) of Rule

45 is that the territorialscope of a court’s subpoena power is defined

by subdivision (b)(2), subject to the limitations spelled out in

subdivision (c)(3)(A)(ii). Thus, to compel a person to attend trial, the

person must be served with a subpoena in one of the places listed in

Rule 45(b)(2) and not be subject to the protection in Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which protects nonparty witnesses who work or reside

more than 100 miles from the courthouse, but not parties or party

officers. Thus, for example, if both a nonparty witness and a party,

both residents of Texas, in a case before this Court were served with

trial subpoenas at their depositions in New Orleans, the Court would

have to grant the nonparty witness’s motion to quash under Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii), but under that same rule, the party could be compelled

to appear at trial. A similar situation presented itself in this case. A

number of opt-in plaintiffstraveled to New Orleans to give videotaped

depositions for perpetuation purposes. Even though Big Lots could

have issued subpoenas to those individuals at their depositions to

compel their attendance at trial, it did not. Had it done so, the Court

would have no trouble in denying plaintiffs’ motion to quash. But the

Court will not acrobatically interpret Rule 45 to give force to Big

Lots’ procedurally improper subpoenas.

Id. at 218–19.

The court also concluded that “[t]he broader context of the Federal Rules . . . militate[d] in

favor of quashingBig Lots’ subpoenas,” noting that the defendant could present the video depositions

and transcripts of the plaintiffs it sought to subpoena, as provided in the Federal Rules. Big Lots

Stores, 251 F.R.D. at 219. The court explained: “That the rules provide procedures for presenting

testimony in situations like the one that exists here further counsels against reading Rule 45(b)(2)’s

cross-reference to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) as creating nationwide subpoena service for parties and party
28

officers.” Id.

The court noted that while it did not need to examine Rule 45’s history to reach its

conclusion, the history “support[ed] the Court’s reading that Rule 45(b)(2) limits the places in which

proper subpoena service may be made and that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) functions to limit a court’s

subpoena power once the subpoena is properly served within the court’s assigned territorial

boundaries.” Id. The court further noted that “courts’ powers to issue subpoenas have long been

geographically restricted.” Id. The court found that while the majority view is in part derived from

the addition of paragraph (c)(3)(A)(ii) in the 1991 amendments, “there is no substantive difference

in the territorial limits for proper subpoena service between the pre-1991 version of Rule 45, Rule

45 as amended in 1991, and the current version amended as of December 1, 2007.” Id. at 220. The

court “discern[ed] nothing in the 1991 textual revision of Rule 45 that created nationwide subpoena

service.” Id. In addition, the court found that the advisory committee notes associated with the 1991

amendments did not “signal that the 1991 amendments created a system of nationwide subpoena

service for parties and party officers.” Big Lots Stores, 251 F.R.D. at 221. In reviewing the

committee notes, the court stated that “[t]he committee explained that the revision of subdivision (c)

enlarged and clarified the protections afforded to persons subject to subpoena that had emerged in

court decisions[,] . . . [b]ut it said nothing about expanding the scope of the places where proper

subpoena service might be made.” Id. Moreover, the court found that “before the 1991 amendments,

courtsrecognized not only that they did not have the power to compel the presence of witnesses who

lived beyond the 100-mile bulge or outside of the state in which they sat, but also that service of a

subpoena had to be made in accordance with the terms of Rule 45(e) in order to be valid.” Id. The

court concluded that “[i]n light of the widespread recognition among courts that their subpoena
 Professor Roach proposed, prior to the 1991 amendments, that Rule 45 be amended to differentiate between 8

party and nonparty witnesses and between multidistrict litigation and single-district litigation. See generally

Roach, supra.

29

powers were limited to the places listed in old Rule 45(e), if the 1991 amendments created a system

of nationwide subpoena service, it would be reasonable to expect that the rule itself would

unambiguously say so, as FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 17(e)(1) does, and that the committee

would have so stated.” Id. at 221.

The Big Lots Stores court emphasized that while the 1991 amendments expanded the reach

of properly served subpoenas with respect to parties and party officers, it did not expand the scope

of permissible service:

Before the 1991 amendments to Rule 45, several commentators

drew attention to the shortcomings of the 100-mile rule of Rule 45(e)

with respect to parties and party officers in the context of complex

and multidistrict litigation. See generally Cathaleen A. Roach, It’s

Time to Change the Rule Compelling Witness Appearance at Trial:

Proposed Revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), 79

GEO. L.J. 81 (1990); Richard J. Oparil, Procuring Trial Testimony 8

from Corporate Officers and Employees: Alternative Methods and

Suggestions for Reform, 25 AKRON L. REV. 571 (1991); Rhonda

Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74

MINN. L. REV. 37 (1989) (criticizing state court systems for holding

onto 100-mile rule); Carolyn Hertzberg, Note, Clever Tool or Dirty

Pool? WPPS Closed Circuit Testimony and the Rule 45(e) Subpoena

Power, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1989). As the rule stood before the

1991 amendments, parties and party officers could avoid appearing at

trial simply because they lived more than 100 miles from the

courthouse. To be sure, the 1991 amendments addressed that

problem with the addition of subdivision (c)(3)(A)(ii): parties and

party officers can no longer escape the force of a trial subpoena

merely because they live far away from the site of trial. But as

discussed supra, the 1991 amendments did not change the

well-recognized requirement that the subpoena itself must still be

served within the territorial boundaries demarcated in the rule in

order to be valid. Indeed, less than a year after the 1991 amendments

to Rule 45 became effective, commentators were decrying the
30

inadequacies of the amendments, noting that under the 1991

amendments the “archaic 100 mile Rule itself remains untouched and

unimproved.” James B. Sloan and William T. Gotfryd, Eliminating

the 100 Mile Limit for Civil Trial Witnesses: A Proposal to

Modernize Civil Trial Practice, 140 F.R.D. 33, 34 (1992) (emphasis

added). To eliminate the 100-mile rule, those commentators proposed

that Rule 45(b)(2) be amended to read: “A subpoena requiring the

attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial . . . may be served at any

place within the United States.” Id. at 40. That language, which

closely resembles Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(e)(1), would

appear to provide for nationwide subpoena service. But it is not part

of the Federal Rules, and the 1991 amendments retained the

well-established limitations on the territorial scope of courts’

subpoena powers. Moreover, courts considering the effect of the

1991 amendments—even courts adopting the majority view—have

acknowledged that “nothing in the history or adoption of current Rule

45(b)(2) . . . conveys any intention to alter the 100 mile rule.” Vioxx,

438 F. Supp. 2d at 667. See also JamSports [& Entm’t, LLC v.

Paradama Prods., Inc.], [No. 02 C 2298,] 2005 WL 14917, at *1

[(N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2005)]. The “realities of modern life and

multi-district litigation,” Vioxx, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 667, may present

compelling reasons for nationwide subpoena service, but until the

Rules provide for such a scheme, the Court is bound to apply the

Rules as they are written.

Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added).

Several courts, including a number of recent decisions, have reached a similar conclusion to

that expressed in Big Lots Stores. See, e.g., Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 05cv633

JLS (CAB), 2009 WL 3415689, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009) (“Rule 45 does not give the Court

the power to serve subpoenas to appear at trial on party officers outside the 100-mile radius, absent

any other state or federal law providing otherwise . . . .”); Dolezal v. Fritch, No. 08-1362-PHXDGC, 2009 WL 764542, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2009) (“The Court has read Vioxx, [Big Lots

Stores], and related cases, and finds [Big Lots Stores] to be persuasive.”); Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

255 F.R.D. 556, 559 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“The Court finds that the minority interpretation of Rule 45

described in Big Lots and other similar cases is correct.”); Maryland Marine Inc. v. United States,
31

No. H-07-3030, 2008 WL 2944877, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 23, 2008) (in considering a motion to

transfer under section 1404(a), concluding that “[w]hile Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides specific

circumstances under which a court must quash a subpoena, ‘it does not alter the requirements for

proper service of a subpoena’”) (quoting Big Lots Stores, 2008 WL 1977507, at *5) (additional

citation omitted); Lyman v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734 (E.D. Wis. 2008)

(“The Court agrees with the reasoning in Big Lots Stores and the other courts that adhere to the

purported minority interpretation of the interplay between Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).”);

Mazloum v. Dist. of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 248 F.R.D 725, 728 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]here

does not appear to be a basis in the text of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) to authorize valid service of a

subpoena upon a party witness beyond the normal 100-mile range of a federal court’s subpoena

power.”); JamSports, 2005 WL 14917, at *1 (“Read in context, the cross-reference of Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii) in Rule 45(b)(2) is meant to reflect that even if service of a subpoena is otherwise

proper under Rule 45(b)(2), the subpoena is to be quashed if it imposes a requirement identified in

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).”); Land O’ Lakes, 181 F.R.D. at 397 (“Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) simply does not

extend the range of this court’s subpoena power, although it does provide that the court may quash

a subpoena, otherwise within its power, for a non-party witness, under certain circumstances.”)

(emphasis added); see also David T. Maloof & Barbara Sheridan, Taking Evidence at the Flood Tide:

How to Obtain the Testimony of Departing, Departed and Unavailable Admiralty Witnesses, 34 J.

MAR. L. &COM. 55, 69 n.69 (2003) (“With respect to deposing witnesses visiting the U.S., keep in

mind that, pursuant to Rule 45, a court may issue a subpoena compelling a party or an officer of a

party to travel more than 100 miles from their place of residence, employment or place from which

they regularly conduct business in person in order to comply with that subpoena, providing the
 The Guidance Endodontics case arguably supports the minority position because it considered service of

9

the subpoena separately from whether it had to be quashed. The court concluded that service was improper

without regard to whether the employees were officers of a party, implying that service would have been

improper for both non-officer employees and officers. The court only considered the employees’ non-officer

status in concluding that even if service had been proper, it would be necessary to quash the subpoenas.

32

subpoena wasserved pursuant to the requirements of Rule 45(b).”) (emphasis added); cf. Guidance

Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. CIV 08-1101 JB/RLP, 2009 WL 3672499, at *2

(D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2009) (noting that Rule 45(b)(2) did not “appear to permit Guidance to serve a

subpoena upon the Defendants’ employees” because they were located “outside of the district, in

excess of 100 miles from the courthouse, outside the boundaries of the state of New Mexico,” and

Guidance had “not provided the Court with good cause nor a federal statute providing for subpoena

beyond those limitations,” but concluding that “[e]ven if the . . . employees could be subpoenaed, rule

45 provides that the Court would be required to quash that subpoena on motion by the Defendants”

because the employees were not officers of the defendants); Square D Co. v. Breakers Unlimited, 9

Inc., No. 1:07-cv-806-WTL-JMS, 2009 WL 1702078, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 11, 2009) (“In that sense,

then, the relevant question essentially is whether a party may be compelled to attend trial and testify

if that party is not subject to being subpoenaed under Rule 45. While the Court recognizes the cases

cited by Square D that suggest the contrary, the Court does not believe that Rule 45—or any other

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—provides the last word regarding the situation here.”); Paul D.

Friedland & Lucy Martinez, Arbitral Subpoenas Under U.S. Law and Practice, 14 AM. REV. INT’L

ARB. 197, 226 (2003) (discussing Rule 45(b)(2) and noting that “a federal district court has no

jurisdiction to compel compliance with an arbitral order or subpoena served on a person (party or

non-party) who resides outside of the forum of the arbitration, or at least more than 100 miles from
 This article does not discuss Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). 10

 Mr. Oparil argues that “the court has power to compel the corporate party to testify through particular 11

officers, directors, and managing agents, by means of a subpoena served on the corporation to testify through

the designated officials,” but notes that “[w]hile logical and persuasive, most courts have not adopted this

argument.” Oparil, supra, at 576 (footnote omitted). The article further notesthat some courts have concluded

that “federal courts have ‘inherent power’ to compel testimony by party representatives,” but that “[o]ther

courts reject this approach.” Id. at 578–79. Mr. Oparil suggests several possible reforms for having party

officers testify at trial, arguing that “[t]he most straightforward amendment would be a blanket rule requiring

corporate parties to produce key officials at trial or risk entry of an adverse judgment,” noting that Washington

and California have adopted similar approaches. Id. at 587. He advocates modifying Rule 45 to track the

Washington rule, which provides:

A party, or anyone who at the time of the notice is an officer,

director, or other managing agent (herein collectively referred to as

“managing agent”) of a public or private corporation, partnership or

association which is a party to an action or proceeding may be examined at

the instance of any adverse party. Attendance of such deponent or witness

may be compelled solely by notice (in lieu of a subpoena) given in the

manner prescribed in Rule 30(a) to opposing counsel of record. Notices for

the attendance of a party or of a managing agent at the trial shall be given

not less than 10 days before . . . . [F]or good cause . . . the court may make

orders for the protection of the party or managing agent to be examined.

Id. at 587–88 (quoting WASH. CIV. R. 43(f)(3)) (quotation marks and footnote omitted) (alterations made by

Oparil). However, Mr. Oparil notes that “a majority of the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of

the Bar of the City of New York rejected such an approach,” finding that “‘[t]he disadvantage of being

compelled to rely on deposition testimony at trial, particularly given the availability of video-taped depositions,

does not justify the increased inconvenience to witnesses, and increased expense and complexity of litigation,

that would be entailed by authorizing nationwide service on a case by case basis.’” Id. at 589–90 (quoting

REPORT ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO RULE 45(e)(1) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Feb. 17,

1989)) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Oparil argues that the Federal Courts Committee

“did not adequately consider that videotaped depositions are more expensive and may be more time consuming

33

the place of the hearing”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); Richard J. Oparil, Procuring Trial 10

Testimony from Corporate Officers and Employees: Alternative Methods and Suggestions for

Reform, 25 AKRON L. REV. 571, 573 (1992) (noting that the 1991 amendments to Rule 45 “do not

directly address the problem of obtaining subpoena power over officers of a corporate party who are

outside of the judicial district” and that the “rule changes essentially left the geographic limitations

on trial subpoenas intact”).11
for the court in having to rule on objections,” and that “[a] systematic, easy to apply, general rule seems far

preferable.” Id. at 590 (footnote omitted). The second possible approach suggested by Mr. Oparil was to

amend Rule 45 “to apply Rule 30(b)(6) deposition procedures to trials.” Oparil, supra, at 591. The third

suggested approach “would be to give trial courts discretion to require corporate parties tomake their officers,

directors and managing agents (who as individuals are outside the subpoena power) available for examination

at trial upon a showing of need.” Id. at 592.

34

The cases arriving at the same conclusion as Big Lots Stores have largely focused on the text

of the rule. In Land O’ Lakes, the plaintiffs sought to compel one of the defendant’s officers to

testify at trial even though he lived and worked more than 100 miles from the trial court’s location.

181 F.R.D. at 396. The court rejected the argument that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) created nationwide

service for subpoenas addressed to parties and party officers:

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) simply does not extend the range of this court’s

subpoena power, although it does provide that the court may quash

a subpoena, otherwise within its power, for a non-party witness,

under certain circumstances. There simply is no “negative

implication,” upon which the Johnsons appear to rely, that Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii) subjects to subpoena officers of parties who are more

than 100 miles from the place of trial whether or not they are within

the range of the subpoena power defined in Rule 45(b)(2).

Id. at 397. The court explained:

In short, Rule 45(b)(2) defines the court’s subpoena power, and

David Seehusen is beyond it, while Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) allows for

quashing a subpoena otherwise within the court’s subpoena power,

but in circumstances not applicable here. This is what is meant in Rule

45(b)(2) by the statement that the court’s subpoena power as defined

in that subsection of the rule is “subject to” the provisions of Rule

45(c)(3)(A).

Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that the rules provide an alternative in situations where a

party’s officer is outside the court’s subpoena power, noting that the officer’s “unavailabilityto testify

in person falls precisely within Rule 32(a)(3), which provides that ‘[t]he deposition of a witness,

whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds . . . that the
35

witness is at a greater distance than 100 milesfromthe place of trial or hearing[.]’” Id. (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B)) (alteration added by Land O’ Lakes court).

Similarly, in JamSports, the court considered a motion to quash a trial subpoena seeking the

attendance of the defendant’s executive vice president and chief financial officer, who lived and

worked in Texas, at a trial in Illinois. 2005 WL 14917, at *1. The officer “was not served within [the

court’s] district, the 100-mile ‘bulge,’ or the state of Illinois.” Id. The court rejected the argument

that the cross-reference in Rule 45(b)(2) to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) “expands the geographic reach of

a court’ssubpoena power with regard to a person who is ‘a party or an officer of a party.’” Id. The

court explained:

Nothing in the history of the adoption of Rule 45(c)(3)(A) suggests

that it was intended to alter the longstanding geographic limitations on

the reach of a district court’s subpoena power. Nor does the text of

the Rule support the reading proposed by JamSports or in the cases

upon which it relies. Rule 45(c)(3)(A) does not confer authority for

service of a subpoena; it confers authority to quash or modify a

subpoena. It provides an exception to Rule 45(b)(2), not an addition

to that Rule. See Johnson v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 388,

396–97 (N.D. Iowa 1998).

Read in context, the cross-reference of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) in

Rule 45(b)(2) is meant to reflect that even if service of a subpoena is

otherwise proper under Rule 45(b)(2), the subpoena is to be quashed

if it imposes a requirement identified in Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).

Specifically, even if a subpoena is served within the geographic

boundaries of a district, outside the district but within 100 miles of the

place of trial, or outside the state in which the district lies, it must be

quashed if it requires a non-party witness to travel more than 100

miles from where he or she resides, employs, or regularly transacts

business. To provide a concrete example, a witness who lives and

works in Galena, Illinois can properly be served with a subpoena

under Rule 45(b)(2) to appear at a trial in Chicago, because Galena is

within the Northern District of Illinois. But if the witness is not a

party or officer of a party, she is entitled under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) to

have the subpoena quashed, because it would require her to travel

more than 100 miles.
36

Id.

In Mazloum, the court considered a motion in limine to preclude the defendants from using

portions of a nominal defendant’s deposition testimony at trial in lieu of his live appearance. 248

F.R.D. at 725–26. The defendants argued that using the deposition testimony was permitted because

the witness was an “unavailable witness” under Rule 32(a)(4)(B) since he resided in Florida, more

than 100 miles from the place of trial. Id. at 726. The plaintiff argued that because the witness was

still a party to the litigation, was designated as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and was a “managing agent”

of one of the defendants, he was “‘by definition available even if he happen[ed] to be literally outside

the 100-mile limit set forth in Rule 32.’” Id. at 726–27 (record citation omitted) (emphasis in

original). The court concluded that the witness was unavailable and that his deposition testimony

could be used under Rule 32. Id. at 727. Even though it found that sufficient to resolve the pending

issue because the plaintiff had not attempted to serve a trial subpoena on the witness, the court

analyzed Rule 45 because it seemed likely that the plaintiff might attempt to serve a trial subpoena

and that a motion to quash would follow. Id. The court noted that “the majority of federal district

courts that have addressed the interaction between Rule 45(b)(2)(B) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) have

held that the latter authorizes a federal court to issue a trial subpoena upon a party witness outside

ofthe 100-mile radiuslimitation contained in Rule 45(b)(2)(B).” Id. (citing Clark, 2008 WL 648542,

at *1 (“collecting cases from ten different federal courts that reflect the ‘majority’ position”). But

the court stated that “there are reasons to question that majority position.” Mazloum, 248 F.R.D.

at 727.

The Mazloum court explained:

To begin with, based simply on the text of Rule 45(b)(2) it would

seem that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) functions as a limitation on the scope
37

of Rule 45(b)(2)(B) rather than an expansion of authority. In relevant

part, Rule 45(b)(2) states: “Subject to Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), a

subpoena may be served at any place . . . ” See FED. R. CIV. P.

45(b)(2) (emphasis added). The phrase “subject to,” of course,

commonly refers to a constraint, and there is no reason to believe that

it does not do so here. The majority position, however, appears to

interpret that phrase as if it read: “In addition to the provisions of

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), a subpoena may be served at any place . . . ”

That is an odd construction.

But even if one were to accept the apparent majority

reading—that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) could somehow be an expansion

of the reach of Rule 45(b)(2)—the terms of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) do

not appear to support the conclusion that the majority of courts have

reached. The logical jump that those decisions make, as this Court

understandsit, begins with Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which mandates that

a court quash any subpoena served upon a non-party (or an employee

of a party who is not an officer) that would require that witness to

travel more than 100 miles “from where that person resides, is

employed, or regularlytransacts businessin person.” See FED.R.CIV.

P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). From that proposition, those courts have

concluded that a party witness may be served with a subpoena beyond

100 miles from the place of trial pursuant to Rule 45(b)(2)(B).

But that may not logically follow from the text of the Rule.

Indeed, the upshot of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) with respect to party

witnesses is, as this Court sees it, that a court is not required to quash

a properly served subpoena even if it required a party witness to travel

more than 100 miles. If, for instance, Mazloum had served Fiorito

with a trial subpoena while he was present in the District for his

30(b)(6) deposition, Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) would not compel this Court

to quash that subpoena (assuming Fiorito is in fact a party) even if he

had to travel from Florida to attend the trial. But there does not

appear to be a basis in the text of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) to authorize

valid service of a subpoena upon a party witness beyond the normal

100-mile range of a federal court’s subpoena power. Two other

federal courts, which evidently comprise the “minority” position, have

reached this conclusion. See Jamsport & Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama

Prods., Inc., 2005 WL 14917 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2005); Johnson

v. Land O’ Lakes, 181 F.R.D. 388, 397 (D. Iowa 1998).

Id. at 728 (fourth, fifth, and sixth emphasis added). The court expressed concern about reading

extensive deposition transcripts into the trial record, noting that “it is unusual to present such an
38

important witness’s testimony through lengthy deposition excerpts,” and urged the parties to agree

to videotape the witnesses’ testimony or otherwise present it in a “live” manner. Id. Finally, the

court noted that “[a]t least one other federal court has suggested that ‘the court’s inherent power

enables the court to order’ that a party witness appear at trial notwithstanding the fact that the

witness resides outside of the 100-mile service radius authorized by Rule 45(b)(2),” id. at 728 n.4

(citing Clark, 2008 WL 648542, at *2), but the court was “not inclined to exercise its inherent power

in a manner that would conflict with the structure and terms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”

id.

In Lyman, the court noted that “[t]he majority of courts interpret these provisions [in Rule

45(b)(2)(B) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)] together to mean . . . that a court may compel the trial

testimony of a party or a party’s officer even when the person to be compelled resides beyond the

100-mile range for subpoenas.” 580 F. Supp. 2d at 733 (citations omitted). The court disagreed with

the majority view, explaining:

Rule 45(b)(2) sets forth certain requirements for a subpoena to be

properly served and to have the force to compel attendance. Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides specific circumstances under which a court

must quash a subpoena, “but it does not alter the requirements for

proper service of a subpoena.” Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 251

F.R.D. 213, 217–18 (E.D. La. 2008). Therefore, to compel

attendance at trial, the person “must be served with a subpoena in one

of the places listed in Rule 45(b)(2) and not be subject to the

protection in Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which protects nonparty witnesses

who work or reside more than 100 miles from the courthouse, but not

parties or party officers.” Id. at 218 (emphasis in original).

The Court agrees with the reasoning in Big Lots Stores and the

other courts that adhere to the purported minority interpretation of the

interplay between Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). As one

court noted, the majority position makes a “jump” that “may not

logically follow from the text of the Rule.” Mazloum v. District of

Columbia Metropolitan Police Dep’t, 248 F.R.D. 725, 727–28
39

(D.D.C. 2008). “There is simply no ‘negative implication’ . . . that

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) subjects to subpoena officers of parties who are

more than 100 miles from the place of trial whether or not they are

within the range of the subpoena power defined in Rule 45(b)(2).”

Johnson v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 388, 397 (N.D. Iowa

1998).

Ultimately, the “upshot of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) with respect to

party witnesses is . . . that a court is not required to quash a properly

served subpoena even ifit required a partywitnessto travel more than

100 miles.” Id. at 728 (emphasis in original); see also JamSports and

Entertainment, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., No. 02 C 2298, 2005

WL 14917 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ( “Read in context, the cross-reference of

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) in Rule 45(b)(2) is meant to reflect that even if

service of a subpoena is otherwise proper under Rule 45(b)(2), the

subpoena is to be quashed if it imposes a requirement identified in

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)”).

Id. at 733–34. The court explained that because service of the subpoena was not proper under Rule

45(b)(2), the subpoena had to be quashed, but noted that Rule 32(a)(4)(D) allows the introduction

of videotaped deposition testimony when a witness is outside the scope of a subpoena. Id. at 734

(citation omitted).

In Iorio, the court found the Big Lots Stores reasoning persuasive and concluded that “Rule

45 does not expand the Court’s subpoena power beyond the 100-mile radius for party officers.” 2009

WL 3415689, at *3. The court explained that “[t]he use of the phrase ‘subject to’ has routinely been

used by Congress to limit the scope of legislation, not expand it” and “[t]here [wa]s no persuasive

rationale for why ‘subject to’ would be used differently in this context and inversely serve to expand

the court’s subpoena power.” Id. The court noted that the legislative history supported its view

because the 1991 advisory committee’s notes “clarified the amendments in subdivision (c) and stated

that the only expansion of subpoena power was that the court may now subpoena a witness outside

the 100 mile radius so long as the witness was located within the State of the district.” Id. at *4
40

(footnote omitted). The court held: “Rule 45 does not give the Court the power to serve subpoenas

to appear at trial on party officers outside the 100-mile radius, absent any other state or federal law

providing otherwise . . . .” Id. The court also quashed subpoenas issued to former employees

because the subpoenas required the witnesses to travel more than 100 miles to attend trial and none

were traveling from within the state. Id. at *5. To resolve the inequity that would result if the

defendant produced any of the subpoenaed witnessesfor its own case, the court held that “if Plaintiffs

are forced to show the videotaped depositions or read the transcript into the record of any of the

movants in this action because Defendants have failed to produce them, Defendants will thereafter

be precluded from producing the same witnesses in person.” Id. at *6.

In Chao, the court recognized that the “majority of courts have held that Rule 45(b)(2)’s 100-

mile rule does not apply to a party,” but concluded that the language of the rule supported the

minority position. 255 F.R.D. at 558, 559 (citations omitted). The court explained

Rule 45(b)(2)’s use of the phrase “subject to” in cross-referencing

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) indicates that it is only intended to limit the

court’s power, not expand it. It is also too tenuous an inference to

conclude that because a court is not required to quash a subpoena

issued to a party or a party’s officer under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), it

therefore has the power to compel the attendance of a party witness

who was served beyond the explicit geographical limitations of Rule

45(b)(2) and that service of a subpoena is valid on a nationwide basis

whenever the person served is a party or the officer of a party. Thus,

the Court rejectsthe position accepted by a majority of district courts

holding that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) supports the “inverse inference that

parties and their officers are subject to compulsion to attend trials that

occur outside the 100 mile limit otherwise available to non-parties.”

In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 2d 664, 666

(E.D. La. 2006). The Court cannot compel persons, whether or not

“parties” or officers of Tyson, to appear in court when they have not

been properly served with a trial subpoena.

Id. at 559.
41

In Dolezal, the court considered a subpoena issued by the District of Arizona and served on

the defendants in Colorado that required the defendants to appear for depositions and document

production in Phoenix. 2009 WL 764542, at *1. The plaintiff argued that service was proper

because the defendants were parties to the litigation and the Vioxx case allowed service on parties

outside the district and more than 100 miles from the place for appearance and production. Id. The

court cited Big Lots Stores, and noted that “[o]ther courts have disagreed with Vioxx, holding that

Rule 45(b)(2) specifies where subpoenas may be served and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) merely makes clear

that nonparties cannot be required to travel more than 100 miles except for trial within the district

where they are served.” Id. The court agreed with the analysis in Big Lots Stores:

The Court has read Vioxx, [Big Lots Stores], and related cases,

and finds [Big Lots Stores] to be persuasive. The clear language of

Rule 45(b)(2) states that a subpoena issued by this Court may be

served only within this district or outside of the district but within 100

miles of where the event for which the subpoena is issued will occur,

unlessstate or federal law provide otherwise (they do not in this case).

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) creates a limitation on this scope of service,

stating that nonparties may not be required to travel more than 100

miles for a nontrial event, and not even for trial if undue expense

would be incurred. Thus, for example, even though the scope of

service in Rule 45(b)(2) would permit a party before this Court to

serve a subpoena for a deposition or document production on a

nonparty witness in Page, Arizona, which is within this district but

more than 100 miles from Phoenix, the limitation in Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii) would make clear that the witness could not be

required to travel to Phoenix for the deposition or production. The

witness could be compelled by the subpoena to appear in Page, or

within 100 miles of Page, but not in areas of the district beyond a

100-mile radius. Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) also makes clear that the

nonparty could be required to attend trial in Phoenix only if undue

expense would not be incurred. A party residing in Page, by contrast,

is not protected by Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) and could be required by

subpoena to travel to Phoenix for a deposition, production, or trial.

Id. at *2. The court noted that its construction was supported by another provision in Rule 45:
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That Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) seeks to protect nonparties from

inconvenience that might arise from the Rule 45(b)(2)

scope-of-service provision—rather than to expand that scope of

service—is supported by the contempt provision of the rule. Rule

45(e) provides that a person who fails to comply with a properly

served subpoena may be held in contempt, and then contains this

exception: “[a] nonparty’s failure to obey must be excused if the

subpoena purports to require the nonparty to attend or produce at a

place outside the limits ofRule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).” This provision makes

clear that the intent of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) is to protect[] nonparties,

even if the subpoena otherwise complies with the scope-of-service

provision in Rule 45(b)(2). Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) constitutes a

limitation on the scope-of-service provision for the benefit of

nonparties, not a negatively implied expansion of that provision for

parties. As [Big Lots Stores] notes, this interpretation comports with

the 1991 amendments to Rule 45 (which added Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii))

and the advisory committee notes that accompanied those

amendments. 251 F.R.D. at 220–21.

Id.

In Square D, the defendant had served trialsubpoenas on two employees of the plaintiff, and

the plaintiff sought to quash the subpoenas because the employees lived and worked more than 100

miles from the trial location. 2009 WL 1702078, at *1. The court found that the plaintiff had no

standing to challenge the subpoenas, and denied the motion to quash on that basis, but noted that if

the subpoenaed employees moved to quash, “their motions would be well-taken and, in fact, the

granting of those motions would be mandatory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

45(c)(3)(A)(ii).” Id. The court explained that because the employees had been designated by the

plaintiff as Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses, the defendant was “seeking to call Square D itself to testify

through the two individuals that Square D has designated to speak for it on the witness stand in this

case.” Id. The court defined the issue as “whether a party may be compelled to attend trial and

testify if that party is not subject to being subpoenaed under Rule 45.” Id. The court acknowledged

“the split among courts with regard to the interplay between Rule 45(b)(2)(B), which limits service
43

of a subpoena to within 100 miles of the place of trial, and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which requires the

quashing of a subpoena that requires a ‘person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer to travel

more than 100 miles,’” but did “not believe that Rule 45—or any other Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure—provide[d] the last word regarding the situation . . . .” Id. The court relied on the

commentary by David Siegel (quoted earlier in this memorandum in connection with the Ames

Department Stores case), and concluded that while the witnesses were not subject to the court’s

subpoena power under Rule 45, and the court had no jurisdiction over them, the court did have

jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Id. at *1–2. The court found that it had “inherent authority that

extends beyond the authority provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Square D, 2009 WL

1702078, at *2. The court held: “In this case, the rules do not expressly provide that attendance at

trial can be secured only by a subpoena, and the notion that the Court has the inherent authority to

order a party to appear and testify—or, in the case of a corporation, to order it to produce a witness

on its behalf—seems rather uncontroversial.” Id. The court noted that an order compelling a

corporate witness would sometimes be inappropriate, such as if the Rule 30(b)(6) designee is no

longer employed by the party, if it would impose an undue burden on the witness beyond the

imposition of travel, or if live testimony would not add anything to the proceedings. See id. The

court ordered the defendant to file a notice explaining what testimony it sought from the witnesses

and its relevance to the case. Id. at *3.

In Maryland Marine, the court considered a transfer under section 1404(a). The plaintiff

opposed transfer and argued that two of its former employees could be compelled to attend a trial

in the original district—the Southern District ofTexas—under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) because they lived

in Texas. 2008 WL 2944877, at *4. The court held that “[w]hile Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides
44

specific circumstances under which a court must quash a subpoena, ‘it does not alter the requirements

for proper service of a subpoena.’” Id. at *5 (citing Big Lots Stores, 2008 WL 1977507, at *5;

JamSports, 2005 WL 14917, at *1). The court explained that “[t]o compel a person to attend trial,

the person must be served with a subpoena in one of the places listed in Rule 45(b)(2) and not be

subject to the protection in Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which protects nonparty witnesses who work or

reside more than 100 miles from the courthouse, but not parties or party officers.” Id. at *6. The

court found it unclear whether the nonparty witnesses could be compelled to attend trial in the

Southern District of Texas because each lived in Texas but outside the district and more than 100

miles from the courthouse. Id. But the court concluded that “the fact that many of the nonparty

witnesses knowledgeable about the [relevant issues] [we]re subject to compulsory process in the

Northern District of Alabama, while the few witnesses in Texas could challenge any trial subpoena

requiring them to attend trial in the Southern District of Texas, weigh[ed] in favor of transfer.” Id.

IV. Conclusion

 Many courts have concluded that Rule 45 permits nationwide service of trial subpoenas to

parties and party officers, as the Vioxx court held, and the cases describe the Vioxx view as the

majority rule. However, the Big Lots Stores court is far from being alone in its holding that Rule 45

does not permit nationwide service of trial subpoenas on parties and party officers. A number of

cases, including some recent decisions, have agreed with the interpretation in Big Lots Stores of the

interplay between Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) and Rule 45(b)(2). In addition, many of the cases noting that

a majority of courts have found that Rule 45 permits compelling parties or officers of partiesto travel

more than 100 miles for trial cite cases that do not specifically address the issue of whether service

must be made within the limits of Rule 45(b)(2). In sum, while the Vioxx interpretation of Rule 45
45

has been described by many courts as the “majority” rule, many cases that have closely examined the

language in Rule 45(b)(2) and Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) have disagreed with the Vioxx court’s

interpretation.