alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           6,775
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,267
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,562
<INVENTORY>                                      3,848
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                52,251
<PP&E>                                          74,345
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,540
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 181,222
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,563
<BONDS>                                         52,106
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           130
<OTHER-SE>                                      95,714
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   181,222
<SALES>                                         47,242
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                47,851
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   38,867
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 3,082
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,855
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,047
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,772
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,275
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,275
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1  CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM  We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 333-165418, 333-157685, 333-149203, 333-145074, 333-139555, 333-125490, 333-121584 and Form F-3 No. 333-165472) of Sanofi, of our reports dated March 6, 2013, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Sanofi and its subsidiaries and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Sanofi and its subsidiaries, included in this Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the year ended December 31, 2012.  Paris-la Défense, France  March 6, 2013  Ernst & Young et Autres  Represented by Christian Chiarasini
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-1-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         88
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  36,438
<ALLOWANCES>                                   136
<INVENTORY>                                    16
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               48,182
<PP&E>                                         22,592
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (13,497)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 76,081
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          23,100
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1,055
<OTHER-SE>                                     39,004
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   76,081
<SALES>                                        164,602
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               164,602
<CGS>                                          138,770
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  138,770
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               16,574
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,215
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                8,043
<INCOME-TAX>                                   863
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            8,906
<DISCONTINUED>                                 225
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   9,131
<EPS-BASIC>                                  1
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  1



</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
condensed consolidated financial statements included herein and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>      1
       
<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                         DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                                 2,847,326
<SECURITIES>                                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            593,494
<ALLOWANCES>                                             (24,054)
<INVENTORY>                                            4,026,882
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       7,544,629
<PP&E>                                                 6,081,590
<DEPRECIATION>                                        (2,163,529)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        13,289,214
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  1,926,680
<BONDS>                                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                2,143
<COMMON>                                                  40,599
<OTHER-SE>                                             9,813,770
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          13,289,214
<SALES>                                                   74,194
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         235,084
<CGS>                                                    101,098
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            101,098
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       1,575,144
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                           217
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (1,259,310)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   (1,259,310)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (1,259,310)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                               (.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                  0
        

</TABLE>
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6330 

To make permanent the reduced individual income tax rate on dividends. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr. COFFMAN of 

Colorado, Mr. SHADEGG, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. 

GINGREY of Georgia, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. SAM

JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. PENCE, Mr. PITTS, Mr. MARCHANT, Mr. 

HENSARLING, Mr. CARTER, Mrs. SCHMIDT, and Mr. POSEY) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and 

Means 

A BILL 

To make permanent the reduced individual income tax rate 

on dividends. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserving American 

5 Income on Dividends Act of 2010’’. 


erowe on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6330 IH

1 SEC. 2. REDUCED INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE ON DIVI2 DENDS MADE PERMANENT. 

3 The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 

4 of 2003 (relating to sunset of title) is amended by striking 

5 section 303. 

Æ 


erowe on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### Terry Quinn, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, dated April 29, 1987, which affirmed an order of the Civil Court, Richmond County (Messina, J.), entered January 21, 1986, granting the motion of the defendants, City of New York, Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, and the College of Staten Island (Sunnyside Campus) to dismiss the complaint as against them for failure to state a cause of action.

Ordered that the order of the Appellate Term is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

*676Contrary to the plaintiffs contentions, the allegations of the complaint, as amplified in the bill of particulars, do not stem from the defendants’ failure to fulfill their proprietary duties, but rather derive from the defendants’ exercise of their governmental function *(see, Marilyn S. v City of New York,*134 AD2d 583, *affd*73 NY2d 910; *Weinstein v Board of Educ.,*127 AD2d 655; *Pugliese v City of New York,*115 AD2d 465). Accordingly, the Appellate Term properly affirmed the dismissal of the complaint since the plaintiff failed to allege the existence of a special duty upon which municipal liability can be predicated *(see also, Bisagnano v City of New York,*136 AD2d 671; *Salmond v Board of Educ.,*131 AD2d 829; *Brown v City of New York,*130 AD2d 701; *Glick v City of New York,*53 AD2d 528, *affd*42 NY2d 831). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### *Ex Parte*Fletcher, *in re*Fletcher *v.*The State.

*Violating Prohibition Law.*

(Decided July 25, 1914.

66 South. 148.)

*Intoxicating Liquors; Jury Trial; Statute; Presumption.*— Where defendant wrote on his appearance bond, “I, Shell Fletcher, defendant in this case, prefer a jury, Sept. 8, 1913,” the statement was a substantial compliance with the requirement of Acts 1909, p. 63, for a demand for a jury; it being presumed that the sheriff duly returned the bond to the clerk as required by section 6291, Code 1907, so that the demand for a jury was filed with the bond.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Petition of Shell Fletcher for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court in the case of *Shell Fletcher v. State,*11 Ala. App. 180, 65 South , 683.

Writ granted and judgment of the Court- of Appeals reversed and the cause remanded.

Parks & Prestwood, for appellant.

The provisions of the Fuller bill, and the provisions of the act creating the court in which this cause was tried are in direct conflict, and the former must prevail. — 109 U. S. 504; 22 Mich. 322; Endlich on Interpretation, § 216. The endorsement on the bail bond was a sufficient demand and *2a sufficient *filing.*— Freeman *v. Bridges,*123 Ala. 287; 6 Words & Phrases, 5498;. 102 Ga. 506. Under section 6291, Code 1907, the sheriff was bound to return the bail bond and under section 3272, the clerk was bound to file it.

R. C. Brickeee, Attorney General, and T. H. Seay, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

For brief see the report of this case in 11 Ala. App. 180, 65 South. 683.

PER CURIAM.

We may concede, without deciding, that section 32 of the act of 1907, special session, page 63, was not repealed by the local act of 1911, page 315, and that the defendant had to demand a jury as there provided, yet we are of the opinion that the defendant substantially Complied with this *requirement*.—Free*man v. Bridges,*123 Ala. 287, 26 South. 512. It is true that it affirmatively appeared in the case supra that the bond upon which the demand was made was returned and filed Avith the clerk, but section 6291 of the Code of 1907 required, the sheriff to return the bond in question to the clerk, and, this being a ministerial act, the laAV presumes that the sheriff discharged his duty.—*Guesnard v. L. & N. R. R. Co.,*76 Ala. 453; *Smith v. State,*88 Ala. 73, 7 South. 52; Mechem on Public Officers, § 579. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendant did not show a legal demand for a. jury, and was therefore not entitled to one in the trial court, and the judgment of affirmance is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Reversed and remanded.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor Manuel DIAZ-OZUNA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10435.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2011.

Filed April 15, 2011.

Serra Marie Tsethlikai, Assistant U.S., Robert Lally Miskell, Assistant U.S., USTU-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel L. Kaplan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: REINHARDT, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Victor Manuel Diaz-Ozuna (“Diaz”) appeals his conviction for illegal reentry after a prior deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, arguing the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when it admitted a Certificate of Nonexistence of Record (“CNR”) to prove the lack of consent to reentry element without providing for cross-examination of the certifying officer. The government concedes that admission of the CNR was erroneous under *United States v. Orozco-Acosta,*607 F.3d 1156, 1161 & n. 3 (9th Cir.2010), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 946, 178 L.Ed.2d 782 (2011). Nonetheless, the conceded error was rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by other substantial evidence confirming Diaz’s lack of permission to enter the United States. *See id.*at 1162.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 85 (Wednesday, May 2, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 21921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-10907]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER01-1336-000]


Mountain View Power Partners II, LLC; Notice of Issuance of Order

April 26, 2001.
    Mountain View Power Partners II, LLC (Mountain View) submitted for 
filing a rate schedule under which Mountain View will engage in 
wholesale electric power and energy transactions at market-based rates. 
Mountain View also requested waiver of various Commission regulations. 
In particular, Mountain View requested that the Commission grant 
blanket approval under 18 CFR part 34 of all future issuances of 
securities and assumptions of liability by Mountain View.
    On April 6, 2001, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director, 
Division of Corporate Applications, Office of Markets, Tariffs and 
Rates, granted requests for blanket approval under part 34, subject to 
the following:
    Within thirty days of the date of the order, any person desiring to 
be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities 
or assumptions of liability by Mountain View should file a motion to 
intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 
and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 
385.211 and 385.214).
    Absent a request to be heard in opposition within this period, 
Mountain View is authorized to issue securities and assume obligations 
or liabilities as a guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in 
respect of any security of another person; provided that such issuance 
or assumption is for some lawful object within the corporate purposes 
of the applicant, and compatible with the public interest, and is 
reasonably necessary or appropriate for such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that 
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by 
continued approval of Mountain View's issuances of securities or 
assumptions of liability.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to 
intervene or protests, as set forth above, is May 7, 2001.
    Copies of the full text of the Order are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426. The Order may also be viewed on the Internet at
http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for 
assistance). Comments, protests, and interventions may be filed 
electronically via the internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR 
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's web site 
at 
http://www.fer.fed.us/efi/doorbell.htm.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-10907 Filed 5-1-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 96-30799

_________________

KENNETH J. GUILBEAUX,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GRAND CASINOS, INC.; GRAND CASINOS OF

LOUISIANA, INC.-COUSHATTA; GRAND CASINOS OF

LOUISIANA, INC.-TUNICA-BILOXI; and KEVIN KEAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

(95-CV-1167)

April 7, 1997

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff Kenneth J. Guilbeaux sued Grand Casinos, Inc., Grand

Casinos of Louisiana, Inc.-Coushatta, Grand Casinos of Louisiana,

Inc.-Tunica-Biloxi, and Kevin Kean (“the defendants”) alleging

violation of (1) certain provisions of the Sherman and Clayton

Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15, and 22; (2) the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ;

and (3) Louisiana law regarding unfair competition and trade-2-

practices as well as defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss

the federal claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and also requested

that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the pendent state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The

district court granted the motions.

On appeal, Guilbeaux contends that the district court erred in

dismissing his antitrust and RICO claims. In reviewing a district

court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),

we accept all factual allegations in the pleadings as true and

examine whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to avoid

dismissal. K ans a Reins. Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp. , 20

F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994). We may uphold a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal only if it appears that, unde r any set of facts that

could be proven consistent with the allegations in the pleadings,

no relief could be granted. I d. While we must accept all factual

allegations as true, we need not resolve unclear questions of law

in favor of the plaintiff. G risham v. United States

, 103 F.3d 24,

25 (5th Cir. 1997).

For the reasons given by the district court, we AFFIRM the

judgment below.
order does not sanction petitioner's attorney, such that the attorney could 

challenge it personally through a writ petition. 

Having considered the parties' arguments, we summarily deny 

the writ petition, as it challenges a substantively appealable order. See 

NRAP 3A(b)(8) (permitting an appeal from a special order entered after 

final judgment, except for an order "granting a motion to set aside a 

default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1) when the motion was filed and 

served within 60 days after entry of the default judgment"); Lindblom v. 

Prime Hospitality Corp., 120 Nev. 372, 374 n.1, 90 P.3d 1283, 1284 n.1 

(2004) (explaining that an order setting aside a default judgment is 

appealable as a special order after final judgment if the motion to set aside 

is made more than 60 days after entry of the judgment). In particular, 

real party in interest's motion for relief from the judgment was filed more 

than six months after entry of the judgment, and in granting the motion, 

the district court specifically rejected real party in interest's "excusable 

neglect" argument under NRCP 60(b)(1), noting that the motion was filed 

well beyond the six-month window for moving for such relief under NRCP 

60(b)(1). 

While the order granting relief from the judgment based on a 

finding of fraud was subject to challenge by appeal, notice of that order's 

entry was served by mail on August 13, 2014, and petitioner did not file a 

notice of appeal within the 33-day appeal period. See NRAP 4(a)(1); NRAP 

26(c). Instead, petitioner filed this writ petition on September 17, 2014, 35 

days after the order's notice of entry was served. See Pan v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224-25, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting 

that an appeal provides an adequate remedy that generally precludes writ 

relief, and regardless, "writ relief is not available to correct an untimely 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 19(I7A 
arraguirre 

J. 

Douglas 

Ova 

Cherry 

notice of appeal"). Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of this 

writ petition, NRAP 21(b), and instead 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge 

Aldrich Law Firm, Ltd. 

Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. (Utah) 

John Ohlson 

Nye County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Tier Technologies, Inc., (the“Company”), for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, David E. Fountain, Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that: 1. This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.  2. The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.     Dated: November 21, 2006 /s/ David E. Fountain         David E. Fountain, Chief Financial Officer