COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Causey

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

DAWN MONROE

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0051-23-2 JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.

APRIL 9, 2024

MARY WASHINGTON HEALTHCARE

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG

Sarah L. Deneke, Judge

David L. Epperly, Jr. (Epperly & Follis, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant.

(Robyn P. Ayres; Brian B. Vieth; Goodman Allen Donnelly, PLLC, 

on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.

Dawn Monroe (“Monroe”) appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her suit against the 

corporate entity Mary Washington Healthcare (“Healthcare”). She argues on appeal that Healthcare 

was a proper party, or in the alternative, that the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg (“circuit 

court”) erred in denying her motion to add a different party defendant to the suit. Finding no error, 

we affirm the order of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND

Monroe filed a personal injury action against two corporate entities, Mary Washington 

Hospital, Inc. (“Hospital, Inc.”) and Healthcare, for a slip and fall that took place at the 

Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza (“Medical Plaza”) in Fredericksburg. Her complaint described 

both defendant corporations, subsequently referring to them as either “Defendant Hospital” or 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

UNPUBLISHED
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“Defendant Healthcare.” Monroe further asserted that the Medical Plaza was “owned by, and/or 

under the control of” the named defendants. 

The defendants filed a motion to drop and dismiss Hospital, Inc. and Healthcare as 

improper parties pursuant to Code § 8.01-5, alleging that both corporate defendants were 

“improperly misjoined parties” as a result of Medical Plaza actually being owned by a separate 

corporate entity, Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza LLP (“Tompkins-Martin”), and maintained by 

MediCorp Properties, Inc. In support thereof, the defendants attached Exhibit A to the motion to 

dismiss which reflected that the information regarding ownership of the Medical Plaza property 

where the accident occurred was publicly available online through a Fredericksburg website 

property search. In response, Monroe contended on brief that the distinction between Healthcare 

and Tompkins-Martin should be disregarded as intending to “defraud and wrong” Monroe. 

Monroe cited the relevant incident report, which used the language “Mary Washington 

Healthcare Security Report.” She also attached the defendants’ interrogatory answer that 

identified the name of the security guard on duty at the time of the incident and stated that he 

may be contacted through defense counsel. 

During oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Monroe further asserted that she was 

entitled to amend her complaint and substitute Tompkins-Martin for Healthcare because she had

simply misnamed Healthcare as a defendant. Healthcare objected to Monroe’s misnomer 

argument as being made without prior notice. Following oral argument, the circuit court held 

that the defendants, Hospital, Inc. and Healthcare, were, in fact, misjoined as defendants and 

orally granted their motion to dismiss.1 The circuit court also held that since Monroe’s 

misnomer claim had not been properly noticed, the matter was not properly before the circuit 

1 Monroe conceded at oral argument that Hospital, Inc. was an improper party but argued 

that Healthcare should remain in the suit. 
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court. Monroe then stated her intent to file an amended complaint to argue the misnomer issue,

but the defendants objected on the grounds that the suit had been dismissed against both 

defendants, making any further action, including filing an amended complaint, improper. The 

circuit court entered an order dismissing Hospital, Inc. on November 7, 2022. This order stated 

that this dismissal did not apply to Healthcare.

The circuit court requested additional briefing on the issue of whether Monroe could add 

additional parties to the suit following the oral dismissal of the suit against the misjoined 

defendants. Monroe then contended on brief that Code § 8.01-5 gave statutory authority to the 

trial court to add new parties “at any time as the ends of justice may require” and as a result, 

requested leave to amend her complaint. In this brief, Monroe noted that “[a]ccording to the 

Defendants, the appropriate Defendants are Medicorp Properties, Inc. . . . and Tompkins-Martin 

Medical Plaza, LLP.” She further argued on brief that “[t]here is no prejudice to an amendment 

adding Defendants.” Monroe made no argument on brief concerning the misnomer issue. A 

letter opinion dated November 21, 2022, stated that “[t]his is not a case of misjoinder or 

nonjoinder, this is quite simply a suit filed against the wrong corporate entities.” The circuit 

court subsequently entered a final order on December 12, 2022, dismissing the suit against 

Healthcare with prejudice and denying Monroe’s motion to add an additional party.2 Monroe 

appeals from that order.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

In filing a complaint, a plaintiff must “express the nature of the claim being asserted, and 

the identity of the party against whom it is asserted, in clear and unambiguous language so as to 

2 The order dismissing the suit against Hospital, Inc. with prejudice was entered on 

November 7, 2022, by way of party consent.
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inform both the court and the opposing party of the nature of the claim.” Ray v. Ready, 296 Va. 

553, 558 (2018) (quoting Est. of James v. Peyton, 277 Va. 443, 450 (2009)); see Rule 1:4. 

“Whether a pleading has adequately identified the proper party to be sued is a question of law, 

which we review de novo.” Id. (citing James, 277 Va. at 447). If the identification is incorrect, 

whether it constitutes “misnomer or misjoinder is a question of law reviewed de novo.” 

Hampton v. Meyer, 299 Va. 121, 127 (2020) (citing Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 64-65 

(2016)).

“The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.” Kimble v. Carey, 279 Va. 652, 662 (2010). “[I]t is in the discretion 

of the court, at any time before verdict is rendered, to allow amendments of the pleadings which 

will operate in favor of justice.” Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins, 294 Va. 544, 561 (2017) 

(quoting Whitley v. Booker Brick Co., 113 Va. 434, 437 (1912)).

B. The circuit court did not err in dismissing Healthcare.

Monroe argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in dismissing Healthcare from the 

suit. We disagree.3

“Misjoinder . . . arises when ‘the person or entity identified by the pleading was not the 

person by or against whom the action could, or was intended to be, brought.” Marsh v. Roanoke 

City, 301 Va. 152, 155 (2022) (quoting Volk, 291 Va. at 64). Code § 8.01-5(A) states that:

No action or suit shall abate or be defeated by the nonjoinder or 

misjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, but whenever such 

nonjoinder or misjoinder shall be made to appear by affidavit or 

3 Healthcare argues that the case was over the moment the circuit court orally granted the 

motion to dismiss for misjoinder and no further action could be taken on a case without a 

defendant. This argument contradicts “the firmly established law of this Commonwealth that a 

trial court speaks only through its written orders” which “speak as of the day they were 

entererd.” Kosko v. Ramser, 299 Va. 684, 689 (2021) (quoting Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 

148 (1996)). The circuit court’s oral pronouncement did not dismiss the defendants outright, and 

Healthcare’s argument on appeal to that effect can be disregarded. We therefore fully address 

Monroe’s claims on the merits.
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otherwise, new parties may be added and parties misjoined may be 

dropped by order of the court at any time as the ends of justice may 

require.

“[A] misjoinder is simply not subject to being legitimized by substituting the correct 

party. The only resolution in such a case, in the absence of a statute of limitations bar, is to 

commence a new action against the proper party.” Ray, 296 Va. at 559 (quoting James, 277 Va. 

at 456). When misjoinder occurs, the proper party cannot “be substituted for [the improper 

party] under the concept of correcting a misnomer.” Id. at 559 (quoting Swann v. Marks, 252 

Va. 181, 184 (1996)). “The key distinction between a misnomer and misjoinder is whether the 

incorrectly named party in the pleading is, in fact, a correct party who has been sufficiently 

identified in the pleadings.” Hampton, 299 Va. at 128 (quoting James, 277 Va. at 455). 

The record supports the circuit court’s determination that Monroe filed suit against the 

wrong entity by way of misjoinder, not misnomer. Paragraph three of Monroe’s complaint 

emphasizes the identity of the party being sued:

The Defendant, Mary Washington Healthcare (hereinafter 

“Healthcare”) is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a 

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, engaged in the business of providing 

healthcare to the public and is located at 2300 Fall Hill Avenue 

Fredericksburg, VA 22401. 

Monroe’s identification of Healthcare as a corporate entity demonstrates her clear intent to sue 

that specific entity. Further, the circuit court concluded in its final order that both Hospital, Inc. 

and Healthcare were misjoined parties in the action. As such, it was not error for the circuit 

court to determine the parties were misjoined and to then grant Healthcare and Hospital, Inc.’s 

motion to dismiss.

The record also fails to support Monroe’s claim that Healthcare was a proper party to the 

suit. “The separate corporate entities of corporations will be observed by the courts unless a 

corporation is shown to be the ‘adjunct, creature, instrumentality, device, stooge, or dummy of 
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another corporation.’” Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., Inc., 263 Va. 624, 634 

(2002) (quoting Beale v. Kappa Alpha Ord., 192 Va. 382, 399 (1951)). Courts may only 

disregard this distinction “when one is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrongs, protect 

fraud or crime of the other.” Id. (quoting Beale, 192 Va. at 399). The party seeking to hold a 

parent company liable bears the burden of providing sufficient facts to justify disregarding the 

separation of entities. Id. Whether this burden is met is a question of fact, and “we will only 

reverse the finding of the trial court if it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id. 

at 631 (citing W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 385 (1996)). 

Here, the record similarly supports the circuit court’s finding that Tompkins-Martin and 

Healthcare are separate corporate entities for purposes of the suit. The facts Monroe contends 

support her claim include: 1) that the top of the relevant incident report listed “Mary Washington 

Healthcare”; 2) that in discovery, Healthcare’s defense counsel identified the security guard as a 

witness; 3) that a Google search for Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza leads to the Mary 

Washington Healthcare website; 4) that the State Corporation Commission has records for 

“Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza, LP” and “Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza, LLLP” but none 

for an “LLP”; and 5) that Healthcare has the same officers and directors as Medicorp Properties, 

Inc., which is the corporate entity that maintains Tompkins-Martin Medical Plaza which is 

owned by Tompkins-Martin LLP. 

While Monroe’s claims could potentially show that Healthcare “may dominate or control 

[Medical Plaza], or may treat it as a mere department [or] instrumentality,” the trier of fact may 

conclude the evidence insufficient as a basis to disregard their corporate separation. Eure, 263 

Va. at 634 (second alteration in original) (quoting Beale, 192 Va. at 399). Here, the circuit court 

was entitled to determine that Monroe failed to establish that the entities’ separation was “used to 

defeat public convenience, justify wrongs, protect fraud or crime of the other.” Id. (quoting 
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Beale, 192 Va. at 399). In addition, Monroe failed to perform a simple online property search; 

the results of this search would have shown Tompkins-Martin was the owner of Medical Plaza. 

In Eure, the plaintiff argued that an application for credit that used a different corporate entity’s 

name at the top while also having no board of directors showed that the one entity was the “alter 

ego” of the other entity, to which the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that such 

evidence was insufficient “to allow the trial court to disregard the corporate form.” Id. at 

634-35. Similarly, here Monroe fails to meet the burden for piercing the corporate veil on the 

basis that “Mary Washington Healthcare” was listed at the top of incident report and that 

membership overlapped between the two entities’ (Healthcare and MediCorp Properties, Inc.) 

boards of directors. The circuit court’s decision is therefore not “plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support” it, and we will not disturb that decision on appeal. Id. at 631.

C. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monroe’s motion to add 

additional party defendants to the suit.

Monroe argues pursuant to Code § 8.01-5 that the circuit court erred in denying her 

motion to add Tompkins-Martin and Medicorp Properties, Inc. as party defendants. Monroe also 

appears to raise a misnomer argument.4 We disagree. 

Code § 8.01-5(A) by its plain language “would permit the joinder of . . . an additional 

party plaintiff at any time as the ends of justice may require. The statute is remedial in nature 

and therefore should be liberally construed.” Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 210 (2011) 

(emphasis omitted) (citing Carroll v. Johnson, 278 Va. 683, 693 (2009)). “Section 8.01-5 carries 

forward the policy of former § 8-96 by providing that parties may be added to or dropped from 

4

“[A] misnomer occurs where the proper party to the underlying action has been 

identified, but incorrectly named.” Marsh, 301 Va. at 155 (alteration in original) (quoting Volk, 

291 Va. at 64). To the extent that Monroe attempts to frame her misjoinder claim as a misnomer

claim, such an error could not be corrected through a motion to amend her complaint to 

substitute an entirely different corporate entity. Ray, 296 Va. at 558-59; see also Swann, 252 Va. 

at 184; James, 277 Va. at 456. 
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an action without prejudice until all parties necessary for the just disposition of the case are 

before the court.” Michael E. Siska Revocable Tr. ex rel. Siska v. Milestone Dev., LLC, 282 Va. 

169, 178 (2011).

While Code § 8.01-5(A) is a liberally construed statute that “would permit the joinder of 

. . . an additional party,” this is to be construed within the ends of justice for all parties, not just 

for the sake of the party making this request. See Addison, 281 Va. at 210. Here, in balancing 

the equities, it cannot be said that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Monroe leave 

to amend her complaint. Monroe only raised the oral motion to add an additional party while the 

circuit court was considering Healthcare and Hospital, Inc.’s motion to dismiss and drop for 

misjoinder. Additionally, Monroe’s initial case was filed in April of 2018, before being 

nonsuited in August of 2020. This present action was filed on January 21, 2021. Considering 

that it has been almost eight years since the initial personal injury event occurred in April of 

2016 and that the circuit court found that neither Healthcare nor Hospital, Inc. were proper party 

defendants, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Monroe leave to 

amend her complaint to add additional parties.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.