Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC2015-1628

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GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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No. SC2018-0392

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GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,

Respondent.

May 25, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Guillermo Octavio Arbelaez, a prisoner under sentence of 

death, appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his 

successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under 
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Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.203. Arbelaez also 

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have 

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.

In 1991, a jury convicted Arbelaez of first-degree murder and 

kidnapping. We affirmed Arbelaez’s convictions and sentence of 

death on direct appeal. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez I), 626 So. 2d 

169 (Fla. 1993). We upheld the denial of his initial motion for 

postconviction relief on all but one claim, which we remanded for 

an evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez II), 775 So. 2d 

909 (Fla. 2000). We upheld the denial of his second postconviction 

motion after the evidentiary hearing and denied his petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez III), 898 So. 2d 

25 (Fla. 2005).

In 2004, Arbelaez filed his third postconviction motion, in 

which he raised an intellectual disability claim under Florida Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 

(2002). We reversed the denial of his intellectual disability claim

and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State

(Arbelaez IV), No. SC2005-1610 (Fla. order Nov. 14, 2006). We 

upheld the denial of his fourth postconviction motion after an
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evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez V), 72 So. 3d 745 

(Fla. 2011). We also upheld the denial of his fifth postconviction 

motion. Arbelaez v. State (Arbelaez VI), 88 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2012).

In May 2015, Arbelaez filed his sixth postconviction motion 

under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.203. Within 

his motion, Arbelaez sought relief based on Hall v. Florida (Hall), 

572 U.S. 701 (2014), and Atkins. In June 2015, the circuit court 

issued an order summarily denying Arbelaez’s intellectual disability 

claim in light of this Court’s decision in Arbelaez V. This appeal 

followed. While Arbelaez’s postconviction case was pending in this 

Court, this Court permitted Arbelaez to file supplemental briefing in 

light of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S 92 (2016), and Hall v. State (Hall v. 

State), 201 So. 3d 628 (Fla. 2016). Arbelaez subsequently filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that 

chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right that 

must be retroactively applied under the United States and Florida 

Constitutions.

First, Arbelaez is not entitled to postconviction relief based on 

his intellectual disability claim. As this Court stated in Phillips v.

State, 299 So. 3d 1013, 1024 (Fla. 2020), Hall does not apply 
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retroactively. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order 

summarily denying Arbelaez’s successive motion for postconviction 

relief.

Second, Arbelaez is not entitled to Hurst relief because the jury 

unanimously found that Arbelaez was guilty of kidnapping Julio 

Rivas. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 489, 508 (Fla. 2020) (“The jury 

in Poole’s case unanimously found that, during the course of the 

first-degree murder of Noah Scott, Poole committed the crimes of 

attempted first-degree murder of White, sexual battery of White, 

armed burglary, and armed robbery. Under this Court’s 

longstanding precedent interpreting Ring v. Arizona [536 U.S. 584 

(2002)] and under a correct understanding of Hurst v. Florida, this 

satisfied the requirement that a jury unanimously find a statutory 

aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Arbelaez I, 

626 So. 2d at 174 (“[T]he jury found Arbelaez guilty of kidnapping 

and the first-degree murder of Julio Rivas.”).

This Court has consistently rejected as without merit the claim 

that chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right 

that must be retroactively applied. See, e.g., Thomas v. Jones, 

SC2017-2268, 2018 WL 3198373, at *1 (Fla. June 29, 2018)
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(unpublished order); Rodriguez v. Jones, SC2018-0352, 2018 WL 

1673423, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished order); Hannon v. 

State, 228 So. 3d 505, 513 (Fla. 2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 

112, 113 (Fla. 2017); Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 703 (Fla. 2017). 

Arbelaez’s arguments do not compel departing from our precedent. 

Consequently, we deny Arbelaez’s petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus.

Any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 

FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

SASSO, J., did not participate.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

In light of my dissent in Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 

2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and 

holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), does not apply 

retroactively), I dissent to the majority’s decision to the extent that 

it affirms the summary denial of Arbelaez’s successive motion for 

postconviction relief.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,

Diane Valentina Ward, Judge
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Case No. 131988CF0055460001XX

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Todd 

Scher, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern

Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. 

Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent