COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DAVID J. HOWELL 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0955-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 MAY 1, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

 DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 

ex rel. LINDA FISHER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Gary A. Hicks, Judge 

 David J. Howell, pro se. 

 Nicholas S. Murphy, Special Counsel (Mark L. 

Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor, 

Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B. 

Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney 

General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special 

Counsel, on brief), for appellee. 

 David J. Howell appeals from the rulings of the trial court 

dismissing his appeal from the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in 

ruling that (1) his contempt was civil rather than criminal, (2) 

the issue of his driver's license suspension was moot, and (3) an 

appeal bond was required. Howell further contends that he was 

denied due process and equal protection of the law. Finding 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
appellate review procedurally barred, we affirm the decisions of 

the trial court.1

BACKGROUND 

 David J. Howell was ordered to pay child support to Linda 

Fisher pursuant to various court orders, the current one providing 

for the payment of $75 per week. Payments were ordered to be made 

through the Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE). 

 On October 21, 1998, DCSE filed a motion for a show cause 

summons against Howell in the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court, alleging that Howell was in arrears and seeking an 

adjudication of contempt. On that same date, DCSE also filed a 

petition seeking an order suspending Howell's driver's license 

because of his delinquency in child support payments. The clerk 

of the juvenile and domestic relations district court issued a 

show cause summons on February 19, 1999. On May 5, 1999, Howell 

filed a motion to reduce his child support obligation. On 

December 7, 1999, the juvenile and domestic relations district 

court entered orders (1) establishing an arrearage of $26,882.22 

as of November 30, 1999; (2) finding Howell in civil contempt of 

court; (3) suspending Howell's driver's license for failure to 

provide support; and (4) denying Howell's motion to modify his 

 1

 Because we conclude that Howell's appeal is procedurally 

barred, we do not address whether the trial court's order of 

February 10, 2000 was an appealable order pursuant to Code 

§ 17.1-405 or whether Howell's notice of appeal therefrom was 

timely filed pursuant to Rule 5A:6. 

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child support obligation. The juvenile and domestic relations 

district court also sentenced Howell to twelve months in jail, but 

provided for his release from custody upon payment of $5,000 

toward his child support arrearage. 

 On December 8, 1999, after purging himself of contempt by 

paying $5,000 toward his arrearage, Howell filed a notice of 

appeal with the clerk of the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court, indicating his intention to appeal the juvenile 

court's December 7, 1999 orders, including the court's 

establishment of the arrearage. The clerk's office required that 

Howell post an appeal bond equal to the arrearage. The following 

day, Howell filed a second notice of appeal. Unlike the first 

one, the second notice of appeal did not indicate an intention to 

appeal the establishment of the arrearage. No appeal bond was set 

for the second notice of appeal. The record does not reflect 

whether Howell withdrew the first notice of appeal, but it was not 

filed in the circuit court. The second notice of appeal was 

received in the clerk's office of the circuit court on December 

29, 1999. 

 At a hearing before the circuit court on January 10, 2000, 

amidst confusion over what had been appealed from the lower court, 

Howell's counsel advised the trial court that Howell was appealing 

the juvenile court's finding of civil contempt of court, the 

suspension of Howell's driver's license, the establishment of the 

arrearage, and the denial of Howell's motion to amend child 

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support. The trial court ruled that the issues of civil contempt 

and the suspension of Howell's driver's license were moot because 

Howell had purged his contempt. An order memorializing this 

ruling was entered on February 10, 2000, without objection by 

Howell. The trial court continued the issues of the establishment 

of the arrearage and Howell's motion to reduce his child support 

obligation, and granted Howell until April 10, 2000 to post an 

appeal bond of $26,882.22. 

 On April 10, 2000, the trial court dismissed Howell's appeal 

of the establishment of the arrearage and of the denial of his 

motion to modify child support because of Howell's failure to post 

the appeal bond. An order reflecting the dismissal of Howell's 

appeal and remanding the case back to the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court was entered on June 5, 2000. Howell's 

attorney endorsed the order "Seen and Objected to" and noted 

Howell's objections as follows: 

(1) David J. Howell was tried and convicted 

of criminal failure to appear by the Juvenile 

Court as opposed to civil contempt for 

failure to pay child support. It was the 

incorrect criminal failure to appear which he 

appealed to this Circuit Court; and (2) David 

J. Howell agreed there was/is an outstanding 

arrearage of $26,000 [approximately]. 

However, $19,000 [approximately] was stayed 

by the Circuit Court. The stay has never 

been recognized by Support Enforcement. The 

$26,000 [approximately] is inclusive of the 

$19,000 [approximately]. 

 On April 26, 2000, Howell filed his notice of appeal of, in 

part, the trial court's order of February 10, 2000 and, in part, 

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the rulings from the hearing of April 10, 2000, subsequently 

memorialized in the trial court's order of June 5, 2000. 

ANALYSIS 

 On appeal to this Court, Howell challenges the trial 

court's "civil" contempt ruling and the order suspending his 

driver's license. He also alleges that his rights of due 

process and equal protection were violated. He further contends 

that an appeal bond was not required because he did not appeal 

the establishment of the arrearage. 

 In support of this last contention, Howell asserts that, 

when informed by the clerk of the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court that he was required to post an appeal 

bond of $26,882.22 to appeal his entire case, he "cancelled" his 

notice of appeal dated December 8, 1999. He then, his argument 

continues, returned the following day to the clerk's office to 

"renote [sic] his appeal," indicating that he wished to appeal 

to the trial court only the "criminal" jail sentence, the 

suspension of his driver's license, and the denial of his motion 

to amend his child support obligation. 

 However, at the January 10, 2000 hearing on Howell's 

appeal, Howell told the trial court that he was appealing the 

juvenile court's finding of civil contempt, the suspension of 

his operator's license, the establishment of the arrearage, and 

the denial of his motion to modify child support. Furthermore, 

on February 10, 2000, the trial court entered, without objection 

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by Howell, an order memorializing its January 10, 2000 rulings 

disposing of the issues of civil contempt and the suspension of 

Howell's license. Howell made no objection (1) to the trial 

court's finding in that order that the nature of the contempt of 

court issue before it was civil rather than criminal, (2) to the 

court's finding that Howell had not posted the required appeal 

bond and that the appeal would be dismissed unless the bond was 

posted within thirty days, or (3) to the court's dismissal of 

his appeal of the contempt and license suspension issues as 

being moot. 

 On April 10, 2000, the trial court then dismissed Howell's 

appeal of the remaining issues--the establishment of the 

arrearage and Howell's motion to modify child support. Howell's 

only objections to the June 5, 2000 order memorializing those 

rulings were that the conviction he had appealed was criminal 

failure to appear rather than civil contempt for failure to pay 

child support and that a portion of his arrearage had been 

previously stayed by the circuit court. Moreover, at no point 

did Howell make the argument to the trial court that his 

constitutional rights had been violated. 

 Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o ruling 

of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for 

reversal unless the objection was stated together with the 

grounds therefor at the time of the ruling." (Emphasis added.) 

Thus, we will not consider a claim of trial court error as a 

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ground for reversal "where no timely objection was made." 

Marshall v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 627, 636, 496 S.E.2d 120, 

125 (1998). Nor will we "consider an argument on appeal which 

was not presented to the trial court. Rule 5A:18 applies to bar 

even constitutional claims." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 

299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1988) (citations omitted). 

The main purpose of requiring timely 

specific objections is to afford the trial 

court an opportunity to rule intelligently 

on the issues presented, thus avoiding 

unnecessary appeals and reversals. In 

addition, a specific, contemporaneous 

objection gives the opposing party the 

opportunity to meet the objection at that 

stage of the proceeding. 

Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991). 

 We hold, therefore, that, because they were either not 

timely presented or never presented to the trial court, the 

arguments Howell makes before us on appeal are procedurally 

barred by Rule 5A:18. Furthermore, our review of the record in 

this case does not reveal any reason to invoke the "good cause" 

or "ends of justice" exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's rulings. 

 Affirmed. 

 

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