Judge Winter was appointed by the Chief Justice to fill a *

vacancy due to recusals, pursuant to Rule 21(c).

1

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY

OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

__________

C.C.D. No. 09-01

__________

IN RE: COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

__________

PROCEEDING IN REVIEW OF THE MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF

THE THIRD CIRCUIT J.C. No. 03-08-90106

__________

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

__________

(Filed October 26, 2009)

Present: Judges John M. Walker, Jr., Chair, Joseph A. DiClerico,

David M. Ebel, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Ralph K. Winter*

This appeal to the Committee on Judicial Conduct and

Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States

(“Committee”) is taken under Rule 21(b)(1)(A) by the Petitioner

from the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Third Circuit

Judicial Council (“Judicial Council”) dismissing the Complaint in

J.C. No. 03-08-90106 (“Complaint”) filed by the Petitioner

alleging judicial misconduct. The Judicial Conduct and
2

Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 and the Rules for JudicialConduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings promulgated

thereunder (“Act” and “Rules”, respectively) govern the

proceedings before the Judicial Council and this Committee.

The Complaint in this matter was filed with and received by

the Third Circuit Judicial Council as it related to a separate

complaint in J.C. 03-08-90050 against the same respondent that

had been transferred to the Third Circuit Judicial Council from

the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council by the Chief Justice, as

explained in the Judicial Council’s Memorandum Opinion. The

Judicial Council issued a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order

in J.C. 03-08-90050, finding misconduct accompanied by

“appropriate corrective action”.

The events in 2001 that are the principal focus of the

Complaint are summarized in the Report of the Proceedings of the

Judicial Conference of the United States, September/October 2001,

a public document containing the official minutes of Judicial

Conference action, available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sept01proc.pdf. The Report

provides the following background for the events at issue in this

Complaint:

In September 1997, the Judicial Conference approved a

judiciary-wide policy aimed at protecting the security

of the judiciary’s electronic systems and information,

requiring that, for computers connected to the

judiciary’s data communications network, access to the

Internet would be provided only through national
3

gateway connections approved by the Administrative

Office pursuant to procedures adopted by the Automation

and Technology Committee. It also urged all courts to

adopt their own policies establishing local

responsibility for managing employee access to the

Internet and providing guidance on appropriate Internet

use. In December 2000, concerned with the explosive

growth in Internet usage within the judiciary, the

Committee asked the Administrative Office to conduct an

analysis of such use. The analysis revealed that a

significant factor contributing to the growth of

Internet traffic in the courts appeared to be related

to personal, rather than business usage.

Informed of the Automation and Technology Committee’s

efforts, of the AO’s analysis, and of subsequent steps

taken to advise chief judges of potentially

inappropriate Internet use, the Executive Committee, in

March 2001, asked the Committee on Automation and

Technology to develop a comprehensive plan for

improving information technology security in the

judiciary. The Executive Committee later expanded its

request, urging the Automation Committee, on an

expedited basis, to develop policies and procedures to

protect the confidentiality of electronic judiciary

communications and work product, including appropriate

controls on monitoring.

Id. at 43 (citations omitted).

The Report includes the following account of the series of

events discussed in the Complaint:

In March 2001, the Executive Committee was advised

that, consistent with Judicial Conference policy, the

Administrative Office was confidentially informing

chief judges of potentially inappropriate use of the

Internet by court personnel, so that the chief judge

could take action, if appropriate. The Committee

supported these actions, and asked the Committee on

Automation and Technology to develop a comprehensive

plan for improving information technology in the

judiciary. In late May, upon hearing of objections by

certain judges to the judiciary’s Internet access

policy as managed by the AO, the Executive Committee

urged the Committee on Automation and Technology, on an

expedited basis, to develop policies and procedures to
4

protect the confidentiality of electronic judicial

communications and work product, including appropriate

controls on monitoring.

The Executive Committee subsequently learned that the

Ninth Circuit Judicial Council had directed the

disconnection of intrusion detection software installed

at the Ninth Circuit Internet gateway (which also

serves the Eighth and Tenth Circuits). This software

made possible, among other things, the identification

of high-volume music and movie files. Concerned that

the security of judiciary data in these circuits was

jeopardized, the Committee determined to ask that the

Ninth Circuit Council reactivate the intrusion

detection software immediately, and agreed that if this

was done, the identification of high-volume files (to

which the Ninth Circuit Council had objected) would

cease in all three judiciary gateways, pending the

previously requested development of policies and

procedures by the Automation and Technology Committee. 

The Ninth Circuit Council agreed.

In June, and again in August 2001, the Executive

Committee was informed by the Chair of the Automation

and Technology Committee of the latter committee’s

efforts to develop procedures on appropriate Internet

use and the management of such use and on

recommendations to be presented to the Conference for

actions to be taken pending further development. In

August 2001, the Executive Committee, with the

concurrence of the Automation and Technology Committee,

agreed to release to the public prior to the Conference

session the latter committee’s addendum to its report,

which deals with this matter.

Id. at 39-40 (citations omitted).

Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, of the Third Circuit

Judicial Council appointed a Special Committee to investigate the

Complaint by Petitioner, who until 2006 was the Director of the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, against the

Subject Judge-Respondent and two other judges, all of whom were
The three judges were referenced in the Judicial Council’s **

Memorandum Opinion as Subject Judge I, II and III. The

Petitioner only appeals the dismissal of the Complaint as to

Subject Judge I, whom we refer to herein as the “Subject Judge”

and “Respondent”.

5

members of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Petitioner **

alleges that the three were principally responsible for the Ninth

Circuit Judicial Council’s authorization to disable the intrusion

detection software at the Ninth Circuit internet gateway and the

temporary shut-down of the detection system from May 24 to June

2, 2001. Following an investigation and the receipt of the

Special Committee’s report, the Judicial Council issued its

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the Complaint on May 28,

2009. 

The Judicial Council based its dismissal on two grounds: (1)

the subject matter of the Complaint had been addressed and

resolved by the Judicial Conference in 2001 and (2) the

Petitioner’s seven-year wait in filing the Complaint amounted to

unreasonable delay. The reasoning of the Judicial Council may be

summarized as follows:

1. The dispute was addressed and resolved in 2001

The Judicial Council determined that the dispute in 2001

between the Subject Judge and Petitioner over the operation of

the intrusion detection software for the internet gateway for the

Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, housed in San Francisco in the

Ninth Circuit, had received “[e]xtensive review by the Executive
The then-Chair has informed this Committee that the ***

statement was issued in response to press inquiries.

6

Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the

Judicial Conference Committee on Automation and Technology, and

the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administrative Office.”

The Judicial Council determined further that in 2001 “the full

Judicial Conference of the United States, by formal action,

addressed and resolved these issues by voting to adopt specific

recommendations relating to the issues raised in the Complaint.” 

As the Judicial Council’s Memorandum Opinion states:

[t]o summarize, a policy disagreement and

misunderstandings concerning the nature, scope and

extent of the Administrative Office’s monitoring policy

with respect to Internet use escalated into a public

dispute, reflecting some of the institutional tensions

between regional and national authorities responsible

for court administration. The Judicial Conference of

the United States reached a proper and final resolution

in 2001 by adopting policies that addressed and

resolved the arguments and objectives of the interested

parties.

The Judicial Council also noted that on February 12, 2008, 

the then-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial

Conference released the following statement on behalf of the ***

Judicial Conference:

Seven years ago, there was an issue involving the

detection of increased bandwidth use on computers in

the Judiciary, the Judiciary’s monitoring of such use,

and the need to maintain security within the

Judiciary’s electronic communications and work product. 

The matter was thoroughly reviewed and resolved

completely at that time by the Executive Committee of

the Judicial Conference of the United States. The
7

Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a

national policy on internet use which was coordinated

with its already-existing use of filters and controls

over access to music and movies on computers within the

Judiciary, much like those utilized in many other

public and private organizations. The matter was

properly concluded seven years ago, there was no

finding of judicial misconduct, and the Executive

Committee finds no reason to revisit today those

decisions.

 The Judicial Council Memorandum Opinion concluded with

respect to its first ground for dismissal of the Complaint as

follows:

The Complaint will be dismissed with respect to the

actions of Subject Judge I and the Judicial Council of

the Ninth Circuit in 2001, which were widely reported

and thoroughly examined at the time. The matter was

resolved in 2001 through formal action and a vote by

the full Judicial Conference of the United States. The

Judicial Conference found no reason to inquire further

into the events of 2001 that preceded its official

action, nor did it make any finding of judicial

misconduct. Chief Judge Hogan, then-Chair of the

Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the

United States, reaffirmed this conclusion in 2008. The

Complaint seeks to reopen this final resolution and

will be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1)(B); Rule

20(b)(1)(A)(iv).

 

2. Unreasonable Delay in Filing the Complaint

The Judicial Council also determined that dismissal was

appropriate due to the Petitioner’s unreasonable delay in filing

the Complaint on November 24, 2008, more than seven years after

the relevant events in 2001. In this regard, the Judicial

Council noted that while there was no statute of limitations that

barred the filing of a complaint, the complaint should be

dismissed under Rule 9 which states that “[i]f the passage of
8

time has made an accurate and fair investigation of the complaint

impractical, the complaint must be dismissed” and the Commentary

to Rule 11 which specifies that dismissal is “appropriate when a

complaint is filed so long after an alleged event that memory

loss, death, or changes to unknown residences prevent a proper

investigation.” The Judicial Council also referenced the

commentary to a predecessor rule, Rule 1(d)(2000), that specified

that “[A] complaint may be dismissed, for reasons analogous to

laches, if the delay in filing a complaint would prejudice the

ability of the Judicial Council to give fair consideration to the

matter.” Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial

Misconduct and Disability, Commentary on Rule 1(d)(2000). 

Expanding on the laches analogy, which it found “apt”, the

Judicial Council concluded that the laches doctrine properly

applies to proceedings under the Judicial Conduct and Disability

Act and arises from the responsibility of all fact-finding bodies

to “arrive at accurate conclusions as to the truth.” Henson v.

United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 581, 591 (1993). See Serdarevic v.

Advanced Med. Optics, Inc.., 532 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(recognizing that unreasonable delay may “undermin[e] the court’s

ability to judge the facts” (quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.

Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992))). The

Judicial Council also cited the Report of the House Committee on

the Judiciary with reference to 28 U.S.C. § 358(c) (barring the
9

promulgation of a rule limiting the time for filing a complaint)

that explained that, while only Congress and not a judicial

council can create a statute of limitations, “dismissal – on a

case by case basis – may be appropriate considering individual

equities involved.”

The Judicial Council found that the Petitioner had waited

seven years to file the Complaint and had brought no circumstance

to the Judicial Council’s attention that would have precluded a

filing “soon after [the Subject Judge] allegedly engaged in the

actions at issue.” The Judicial Council noted the absence of

“any indication that any information in the Complaint was not

available to Complainant at the time of the alleged events” in

2001. The Judicial Council also found that the Complaint

contained “numerous allegations regarding statements, actions and

intent of witnesses to the 2001 events who are now deceased,”

including the Chief Justice of the United States and the former

chairs of both the Committee on Automation and Technology and the

Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United

States as well as a former member of the Executive Committee of

the Judicial Conference. The absence of these witnesses, the

Judicial Council concluded, “whose statements, actions and intent

are relevant to the complaint, combined with other typical

consequences of the passage of time, pose steep impediments to a

fair and accurate investigation and prejudice [the subject
10

judge’s] ability to rebut the allegations of the Complaint.” 

Accordingly, the Judicial Council determined that “because the

passage of time has made a fair and accurate investigation of the

Complaint impractical, the Complaint will also be dismissed under

Rule 9." 

The Judicial Council concluded with respect to both grounds

for dismissal that the Complaint was “not appropriate for

consideration under ‘the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act’”

and therefore had to be dismissed, under 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1)(B)

and Rule 20(b)(1)(A)(iv) as well as under Rule 9.

Following the dismissal, the Petitioner filed a timely

“Request” that this Committee review the Complaint and its

disposition by the Judicial Council.

DISCUSSION

We agree with the decision of the Judicial Council

dismissing the Complaint for the reasons set forth in the

Council’s Memorandum of Decision, which we adopt, and for the

additional reasons that follow.

The Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability acts on

behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 357 in reviewing petitions that appeal misconduct

complaint determinations by a Judicial Council. As the Judicial

Council’s Memorandum Opinion makes clear, this is not the first

time that the events of 2001 pertaining to the operation of the
11

intrusion detection software at the judiciary’s internet gateway

in San Francisco have been before the Judicial Conference. In

2001, after the dispute between the Administrative Office and the

Ninth Circuit occurred and was publicly disclosed, the Judicial

Conference took action to remedy the situation by announcing

policy recommendations that had been formulated by the Committee

on Automation and Technology. The dispute between the

Administrative Office, of which Petitioner was the Director, and

the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, of which the Respondent was a

member, was completely resolved. No ultimate harm to the

judiciary arising from the Ninth Circuit’s temporary closing of

the gateway sensors was identified by the Conference and no

member of the Judicial Conference, including the Chief Justice,

its Chair, or the Petitioner, all of whom could have done so if

any thought it warranted, initiated a misconduct complaint under

the Act against the Subject Judge. The matter was considered on

a second occasion in early 2008 by the Judicial Conference, this

time acting through the Executive Committee whose Chair announced

that the matter had been properly concluded in 2001 “without any

finding of judicial misconduct” and that “the Executive Committee

finds no reason to revisit today those decisions.” Under these

circumstances, this Committee agrees with the Judicial Council’s

decision declining Petitioner’s invitation to again revisit the

events of 2001.
12

The Complainant argues to us that “none of the many

complaints and charges I raised against [the Subject Judge] were

considered at all let alone disposed of with finality by the

Judicial Conference in 2001 or by any subsequent conference or by

any official entity of the federal judicial branch of

government.” This argument is misleading and, when the mistaken

impression is corrected, of no assistance to the Complainant.

The argument intimates that the Complainant’s “many ...

charges” were “raised” at the time. In fact, none were the

subject of a misconduct complaint in 2001 (or for that matter

until late 2008) which is why the Executive Committee Chair

stated accurately in early 2008 that “the matter was properly

concluded seven years ago” with “no finding of judicial

misconduct.”

It is true that no specific allegations of misconduct

against the Subject Judge were considered by the Judicial

Conference in 2001, but that is because none was filed. The Act

specifies that anyone may file a complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 351(a);

yet no member of the Judicial Conference, all of whom were fully

familiar with the Subject Judge’s actions, chose to do so,

including, if the Complaint is to be credited, the two people

most motivated to bring the Subject Judge to account: the former

Chief Justice and the Petitioner, who was the Secretary to the

Conference. We can only assume from the absence of a misconduct
13

complaint filing, that both of these individuals were content

with the Judicial Conference’s complete resolution of the dispute

between the Ninth Circuit and the Administrative Office as an

administrative matter.

We also agree with the Judicial Council’s reasoning that the

laches doctrine may be applied on a case-by-case basis to dismiss

misconduct complaints under the Act, notwithstanding the

prohibition of § 358 of the Act that “[n]o rule promulgated under

this section may limit the period of time within which a person

may file a complaint under this chapter.” That provision

prohibits judicial councils and this Committee from adopting a

flat rule that specifies a limitation period for the filing of

complaints under the Act, but it does not foreclose a judicial

council from determining that the passage of time accompanied by

an unreasonable delay in filing a misconduct action justifies

dismissal in a particular case. Here prejudice to a full and

fair investigation of the Complaint from the seven-year delay is

manifest. The Complaint relies extensively upon purported

statements by the former Chief Justice to support the Complaint’s

credibility, to excuse Petitioner’s failure to file a complaint

for seven years, and to justify the Petitioner’s actions in

pursuing the Complaint in 2008. The Chief Justice was the

Petitioner’s superior and direct supervisor and we have no doubt

that his views would govern whether Petitioner’s filing a
14

misconduct complaint against the Subject Judge at the time would

have been appropriate. Yet during the four years from 2001 until

the death of the Chief Justice in 2005, no complaint was filed by

the Petitioner (or anyone else). The circumstances surrounding

this inaction would be highly relevant to any current

investigation, which would likely entail a defense by the

Respondent that the Chief Justice believed that the dispute was

essentially a bureaucratic one and that the Respondent’s conduct

was not deserving of a misconduct complaint. The Complaint

alleges a diametrically opposite position by the Chief Justice,

replete with alleged statements by the Chief Justice that,

Petitioner says, justify his seven-year delay in filing the

Complaint. With the Chief Justice unavailable as a witness,

however, a full and fair investigation into this aspect of the

matter is not possible.

The Petitioner argues that before a rule change in 2008, a

judicial misconduct complaint arising in the Ninth Circuit could

only be made to the Chief Judge (or Acting Chief Judge) of the

Ninth Circuit for resolution by that Circuit’s Judicial Council

and that, in this case, such an action would have been futile

because that Judicial Council had sided with the Subject Judge in

the dispute and authorized his actions. This argument is based

on speculation only. Petitioner makes no showing that a

Complaint against the Respondent could not have been
15

appropriately considered by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council,

composed of Article III judges whose duty would have been to

determine whether the Complaint raised an issue of misconduct

consisting of conduct “prejudicial to the effective and

expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” In

any event, the Petitioner’s assertion that, prior to the 2008

Rules adoption, his Complaint could not have been decided by a

Judicial Council other than that of the Ninth Circuit is

incorrect. While before 2008 no formal rules under the Act

provided for the transfer of judicial misconduct complaints

between judicial councils and the statute was silent on the

question, in fact such transfers had occurred on several

occasions. The Breyer Committee Report, issued in 2006,

identified “eight instances since 1980 in which the Chief Justice

designated a circuit judge to handle a Complaint in another

circuit pursuant to the intercircuit assignment statute [28

U.S.C. § 291(a)].” The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study

Committee, Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability

Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice 116 (2006), available

at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/breyercommitteereport.pdf.

 We have no doubt that the Petitioner, as the chief

administrative officer of the federal judiciary under the Chief

Justice, was aware of this procedural course or that he could

have acquired such knowledge, either from the Chief Justice, who
16

had made such assignments in the past, or from his subordinates. 

The Complaint, in addition to its primary focus on the

events of 2001 pertaining to the computer gateway portals in San

Francisco, also references allegations of possible misconduct

against the Subject Judge that are the subject matter of the

separate complaint before the Third Judicial Council in J.C. 03-

08-90050. To the extent that the Petitioner brings issues to our

attention that are the subject of that complaint, an extended

discussion is unnecessary because we agree with the Judicial

Council of the Third Circuit. The Complaint in J.C. 03-08-90050

was thoroughly investigated by the Judicial Council, resulted in

a finding of misconduct, accompanied by corrective action

consisting of a full admission of error and apology by the

Respondent, and appropriate action by the Judicial Council

against the Subject Judge pursuant to § 354(a)(1)(c) of the Act

and Rule 20(b)(1)(B),(D) and (E). See In Re: Complaint of

Judicial Misconduct(J.C. 03-08-90050), Memorandum Opinion at 11-

12 (3rd Cir. Jud. Council June 5, 2009), available at

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/089050p.pdf. 

The Petitioner, in addition to appealing from the Judicial

Council’s disposition of his misconduct allegations arising from

the 2001 San Francisco gateway intrusion detection software

dispute and citing matters that were appropriately resolved in

the disposition of Complaint in J.C. No. 03-08-90050, alleges in
17

the Complaint and to this Committee that an unidentified “Ninth

Circuit Judge” has said that the respondent improperly appointed

his wife to be a bankruptcy referee; that “persistent

authoritative reports” have been received that the respondent

“persuaded or compelled one or more Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals technical experts” to wire his house, at no cost to him,

install computers and other related equipment and that these

reports were conveyed by the Ninth Circuit to Administrative

Office staff; and that the Respondent, “according to what appear

to be authoritative reports” improperly used his official staff

in a campaign to promote personal publicity on Respondent’s

behalf.

These three allegations were not addressed in the Judicial

Council’s Memorandum Opinion and may not have been considered by

the Judicial Council. There is no need, however, to remand them

for further consideration because they do not meet the pleading

requirements of Rule 6(b) and must be dismissed.

The most these allegations accomplish is to put the Judicial

Council on notice of possible misconduct by the Respondent. Rule

6(b), however, requires what amounts to fact pleading, not notice

pleading. Rule 6(b) in relevant part provides:

(b) A complaint must contain a concise statement that

details the specific facts on which the claim of

misconduct or disability is based. The statement of

facts should include a description of:

(1) what happened;
18

(2) when and where the relevant events happened;

(3) any information that would help an

investigator check the facts; ...

(emphasis added).

Rule 6(b) makes clear that the complaint must be more than a

suggestion to a Chief Judge that, if he opens an investigation

and the investigating body looks hard enough in a particular

direction, he might uncover misconduct. It must contain a

specific allegation of misconduct supported by sufficient factual

detail to render the allegation credible. The three allegations

in the Complaint fall far short of the mark and are based on

little more than rumor and gossip that at most could be leads

into possible misconduct. The Petitioner refers to anonymous

“reports” without any attempt to identify the reporting

individuals or to explain why such identification is not

feasible. One report is by an unidentified “Ninth Circuit

Judge,” a second by “Ninth Circuit Staff” as reported to “AO

Staff” with no staffers identified, and a third is based on no

more than “what appears to be authoritative reports” with no

suggestion even as to the nature of the reporter, much less the

reporter’s identity. There is no specificity in any of these

allegations beyond the most general claim as to “what happened”

and nothing is said as to “when and where the relevant events

happened.” Plainly, these allegations are insufficiently pled
The Third Circuit Judicial Council also addressed in  

footnote 10 of its Memorandum Opinion an additional claim by

Petitioner, filed as a separate complaint, No. 03-09-90009, that

Respondent maintained a “gag list” file on a university e-mail

account, some of which allegedly included tasteless material. 

The Judicial Council found that appropriate corrective action had

been taken in the form of an apology offered by the Subject Judge

to the Special Committee investigating the complaints. There is

no basis to disturb this finding by the Judicial Council. 

19

and must be dismissed. 

In addition to the foregoing allegations, there is a

suggestion from amendments to the Complaint filed by the

Petitioner with this Committee that there might be ongoing

approval by the Subject Judge of the transmission of pornographic

images over the judiciary’s computers. While this allegation, if

properly stated under Rule 6(b), could have been presented to the

Judicial Council, it was not; and for that reason and based on

its lack of specificity, we will not consider it.** **

Finally, this matter has raised questions pertaining to the

circumstances under which recusal is required by a judicial

officer charged with the responsibility of administering judicial

misconduct complaints. The Rules specify certain mandatory

disqualifications from judges who otherwise would have

responsibility for deciding a judicial misconduct complaint at

one or more levels of review. A judge who files a complaint is

disqualified, unless it is a chief judge who has identified a

complaint under Rule 5. Rule 25(a). The subject judge is also

disqualified. Rule 25(b). And a member of the Committee on
20

Judicial Conduct and Disability is disqualified if the member is

from the same circuit as the subject judge. Rule 21(c). 

On the other hand, a chief judge is not disqualified from

reviewing, as a member of a judicial council, an order entered by

the chief judge. Rule 25(c). A member of a judicial council is

not disqualified from considering a report of a special committee

in which that member participated. Rule 25(d). And no member of

the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability is disqualified

in any proceeding under the Act because of prior consultations

with a chief judge, a member of a special committee or a judicial

council unless the member believes that the consultation would

prevent fair-minded participation. Rule 25(h).

The rules for recusal that pertain to judges performing

their ordinary judicial function, 28 U.S.C. § 455, are not a

template for recusals in misconduct proceedings under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 351-354. Misconduct proceedings are administrative, and not

judicial, in nature. Accordingly, as Rule 25 makes clear, there

is no requirement for a chief judge, or for that matter any

judge, to be recused from performing a function under the Act

even if the judge has performed an earlier function under the Act

with regard to the same complaint. See Report and Recommendations

of the Judicial Conference Comm. On Judicial Conduct and

Disability 18 (U.S. Jud. Conf. June 2008)(“The performance of one

function does not render a chief circuit judge disqualified to
21

perform the others.”), available at

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/news/news/PorteousOrder/CERTIFICATE%2

0TO%20THE%20SPEAKER.PDF; In re Memorandum of Decision of Judicial

Conference Comm. on Judicial Conduct and Disability, 517 F.3d

563, 568 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2008)(concluding that participation in

earlier administrative proceedings “in no way constitutes

recusable bias”). Thus, a chief judge may identify a complaint

and, having done so, serve as chair of the judicial council that

reviews the complaint and chair of the special committee making

recommendations to the judicial council. The fact that the judge

has prior, even intimate, knowledge of the subject matter of the

complaint, and has even formulated an opinion of the subject

judge’s conduct is of no moment. By the same token, a judge who

is a witness to the events upon which a complaint is based, but

who has no personal interest in its disposition, need not recuse

himself from the determination of that complaint at one or more

levels of review. 

While Rule 25(a) permits disqualification “if the judge, in

his or her discretion, concludes that circumstances warrant

disqualification,” the appropriate standard for exercising

discretion in this context should reflect the administrative

nature of the proceeding. If under all of the circumstances,

including prior knowledge of the case and even a previously held

opinion, the judge believes that he or she can be “fair-minded”
22

in his or her participation, see Rule 25(h), recusal is not

warranted and the judge should fulfill his or her duty to

participate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we deny the petition for

review.

Respectfully Submitted,

Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Chair

Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico

Hon. David M. Ebel

Hon. Eugene E. Siler, Jr.

Hon. Ralph K. Winter