2020 WI 39

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2018AP1781-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Robert B. Moodie, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Robert B. Moodie,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MOODIE

OPINION FILED: April 22, 2020 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: January 13, 2020 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY: 

JUDGE: 

JUSTICES:

ZIEGLER, J. dissents, joined by ROGGENSACK, C. J.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. did not participate. 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by 

Terry E. Johnson and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. Oral 

argument by Terry E. Johnson.

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Thomas Laitsch and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison. Oral 

argument by Thomas Laitsch.
2020 WI 39

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2018AP1781-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Robert B. Moodie, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Robert B. Moodie,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

APR 22, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. This disciplinary matter comes to the 

court on Attorney Robert B. Moodie's appeal of a report and 

recommendation of Referee James W. Mohr, Jr. The referee based 

his report in part on Attorney Moodie's stipulation to the two 

counts of misconduct alleged in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's 

(OLR) complaint involving his conversion of fees belonging to his 

law firm to his personal use. Attorney Moodie reserved his right 

to be heard on the matter of sanctions. After holding a hearing 

on sanctions and receiving post-hearing briefs, the referee issued 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

2

a report recommending that the court suspend Attorney Moodie's law 

license for a period of six months, and order Attorney Moodie to 

pay the full costs of this proceeding, which total $6,081.63 as of 

January 15, 2020.

¶2 When we review a referee's report and recommendation in 

an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's findings of 

fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review 

the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 

Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the appropriate level of 

discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 

independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 

it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 

¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶3 After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 

Moodie's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and legal 

conclusions based on the parties' stipulation. We agree with the 

referee's recommendation that a six-month suspension is 

appropriate, despite Attorney Moodie's arguments to the contrary. 

We order Attorney Moodie to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 

hearing.

¶4 The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with the 

filing of a two-count complaint. Attorney Moodie filed an answer 

in which he generally admitted the factual allegations of the 

complaint, as well as the two counts of alleged misconduct. 

Attorney Moodie later entered into a stipulation in which he pled 

no contest to the misconduct alleged in the complaint, and agreed 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

3

that the referee could use the allegations of the complaint as an 

adequate factual basis for a determination of misconduct.

¶5 The referee's report accepted the parties' stipulation 

and determined that the stipulated facts supported legal 

conclusions that Attorney Moodie had engaged in the two counts of 

misconduct alleged by the OLR. The referee's factual findings and 

conclusions of law are described in the following paragraphs.

¶6 Attorney Moodie was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1982. He practiced at a law firm in Waukesha, 

Wisconsin for over 30 years. He has no disciplinary history. 

¶7 In September 2016, Attorney Moodie suffered a serious 

health event resulting in a lengthy hospitalization. During 

Attorney Moodie's absence, other members of the firm assumed 

responsibility for his client files, including the management of 

his billing. While handling Attorney Moodie's files and billing, 

the firm discovered that over an 18-month period, Attorney Moodie 

had converted fees in five client matters for his personal use. 

It is undisputed that in some matters, he received billed fees 

directly from the client and failed to tender them to the firm; in 

others, he collected money directly from the client and then wroteoff his billable time. The converted fees totaled $8,665. Had 

Attorney Moodie not converted these fees, he would have ultimately 

received 55-60 percent of them under the terms of the firm's 

compensation system. 

¶8 In November 2016, after the firm discovered Attorney 

Moodie's misappropriations, Attorney Moodie consented to the 

redemption of his shares in the firm, ending his employment there. 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

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As part of the redemption, any claims by the firm against Attorney 

Moodie were settled.

¶9 The firm reported Attorney Moodie's conduct to the OLR, 

and the OLR commenced this disciplinary matter. As noted earlier, 

Attorney Moodie stipulated to the two counts of misconduct alleged 

by the OLR: 

 Count 1: By converting at least $8,665 in fees belonging 

to his law firm for his own personal use, Attorney Moodie 

violated SCR 20:8.4(c). That rule provides: "It is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation." 

 Count 2: By failing to tender and report to his law 

firm fees that he received, and by misrepresenting 

write-offs of billable time to his firm, Attorney Moodie 

breached his fiduciary duty to his firm, and his duty of 

honesty in his professional dealings with the firm, in 

violation of the standard of conduct set forth in In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 

527 N.W.2d 314 (1995). See SCR 20:8.4(f) (providing 

that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 

violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 

order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct 

of lawyers.")

¶10 Referee Mohr held a sanctions hearing. Attorney Moodie 

testified, and was at a loss to explain his actions. His household 

was not short of money. He and his law partners had had 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

5

professional disagreements, but he declined to categorize his 

misappropriations as a form of retribution. He had health issues 

and gambling issues during the period of his misconduct, but he 

did not cite them as a reason for his misconduct, and he has not 

raised a medical defense in these proceedings. Attorney Moodie 

also confirmed that, under his firm's compensation system, he would 

have ultimately collected between 55-60 percent of the $8,665 in 

fees that he misappropriated, making his actions, in his words, 

"just wrong and dumb." 

¶11 In post-hearing briefing, the OLR asserted that a oneyear suspension was appropriate, whereas Attorney Moodie argued 

that no more than a 60-day suspension was appropriate.

¶12 In his report, the referee recommended that the court 

suspend Attorney Moodie's law license for six months. In making 

this recommendation, the referee discussed various mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances. On the mitigating side, the referee 

noted that Attorney Moodie had been a member of his law firm for 

over 30 years, without any past disciplinary issues. The amount 

of the misappropriation was relatively small, and Attorney Moodie 

has repaid it. He has admitted his misconduct, cooperated with 

the OLR, and expressed sincere remorse. On the aggravating side, 

the referee noted that Attorney Moodie converted fees over a period 

of 18 months, without any obvious motive. Considering these 

circumstances together with the range of discipline imposed in 

previous cases involving the misappropriation of firm funds, the 

referee concluded that a six-month suspension was in order.
No. 2018AP1781-D 

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¶13 On appeal, Attorney Moodie argues that the referee's 

recommended six-month suspension is excessive. He claims that 

this case is most analogous to In Re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Casey, 174 Wis. 2d 341, 496 N.W.2d 94 (1993), where the 

court imposed a stipulated 60-day suspension on a lawyer who 

misappropriated three client retainers totaling $2,300. Attorney 

Moodie argues that his case involves a similar amount of clients 

and money, and that he, like the respondent-lawyer in Casey, 

stipulated to the misconduct in question. Thus, he reasons that 

a 60-day suspension is as appropriate here as it was in Casey. 

Attorney Moodie also argues that his conduct is mitigated by a 

variety of factors, including that it was an inexplicable departure 

from his normal character and from common sense. This is an 

"unusual and baffling" case, he says, because "there was no cause, 

basis[,] or motivation for the conversions." Attorney Moodie also 

notes that a six-month suspension will require him to go through 

the reinstatement process, see SCR 22.28(3), which can add as much 

as 18 months on to a suspension period. Attorney Moodie claims 

that an "effective suspension" of two years "may well be the 

equivalent of revocation" given his age and health issues. 

¶14 The OLR responds that the facts and the law support the 

recommended six-month suspension. The OLR argues that Attorney 

Moodie engaged in an 18-month period of deceit and dishonesty, and 

he presents no excuse for his behavior. His reliance on Casey is 

misplaced, the OLR says, because the respondent-lawyer in Casey

was an inexperienced first-year associate, not a shareholder and 

trusted 30-year member of the firm. Moreover, the Casey court 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

7

announced that, going forward, the court would sanction a 

misappropriation of firm funds as severely as a misappropriation 

of client funds. Casey, 174 Wis. 2d at 341-43. The court has 

held true to its word, the OLR says, as evidenced by such cases as 

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Olson, 216 Wis. 2d 483, 574 

N.W.2d 245 (1998) (one-year suspension for lawyer who wrote 

himself unauthorized law firm checks totaling $11,250 from the 

firm's bank account, and then deleted some of them from the firm's 

check register), and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Schaller, 2006 WI 40, 290 Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (two-year 

suspension for lawyer who retained about $4,300 in client funds 

for his own use, failed to report that money on his tax returns, 

and practiced law for three-and-a-half months while his license 

was administratively suspended). Finally, the OLR acknowledges 

that a six-month suspension would require Attorney Moodie to go 

through the formal reinstatement process——a positive consequence, 

the OLR says, given that Attorney Moodie has no rational 

justification for his behavior. His inability to explain his own 

actions makes it prudent to require him to prove his moral 

character and fitness for re-licensure.

¶15 As we view the matter, the OLR has the better of the two 

arguments. We agree with the OLR that Attorney Moodie's reliance 

on Casey——where we imposed a 60-day suspension for the 

misappropriation of three client retainers totaling $2,300——is 

misplaced. Our modest 60-day suspension imposed in Casey came 

with an explicit disclaimer: we issued it "on the basis of 

discipline previously imposed for similar misconduct." Casey, 174 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

8

Wis. 2d at 341 (emphasis added). "[L]est attorneys rely on our 

disposition of this proceeding or prior proceedings involving 

similar attorney misconduct," we explicitly directed the State Bar 

to "bring to the attention of its members" the fact that "in the 

future the court will treat an attorney's misappropriation of funds 

belonging to another lawyer, associate or firm in practice with 

that lawyer no differently than it treats misappropriation of funds 

belonging to a lawyer's client," and this behavior "will be 

disciplined severely." Id. at 341-43. In other words, we warned 

in Casey that when it comes to modest 60-day suspensions for 

misappropriation of firm funds, that was then, this is now, and 

things have changed. And so they have: since Casey, we have 

consistently imposed suspensions of at least six months for 

misappropriations of firm funds.1 The six-month suspension imposed 

here fits comfortably within this caselaw.

 

1 See In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curran, 180 

Wis. 2d 540, 509 N.W.2d 429 (1994) (imposing two-year suspension); 

In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 

N.W.2d 314 (1995) (imposing six-month suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Olson, 216 Wis. 2d 483, 574 

N.W.2d 245 (1998) (imposing one-year suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown, 2005 WI 49, 280 

Wis. 2d 44, 695 N.W.2d 295 (imposing 18-month suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peterson, 2006 WI 41, 290 

Wis. 2d 74, 713 N.W.2d 101 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schaller, 2006 WI 40, 290 

Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, 345 

Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812 (imposing one-year suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig, 2015 WI 16, 361 

Wis. 2d 16, 859 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hotvedt, 2016 WI 93, 372 

Wis. 2d 68, 888 N.W.2d 393 (imposing 18-month suspension); In Re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trupke, 2018 WI 43, 381 

Wis. 2d 136, 911 N.W.2d 361 (imposing one-year suspension).
No. 2018AP1781-D 

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¶16 We also hold that the fact that we only know what 

Attorney Moodie did (misappropriate firm funds) and how he did it 

(billing improprieties), and have no idea why he did do so, cuts 

against an argument of mitigation. When it comes to evaluating 

the discipline owed for a lawyer's misconduct, the "why" is often 

as important as the "what" and the "how." We decline to establish 

a precedent whereby the lack of a rational explanation for a 

lawyer's misconduct serves to mitigate the sanction owed for it. 

A shrug of the shoulders is not a defense.

¶17 If anything, Attorney Moodie's inability to explain his 

behavior weighs in favor of a six-month suspension, which will 

require him to successfully complete the formal reinstatement 

process in order to regain his Wisconsin law license. See SCRs 

22.29–22.33. This process will require Attorney Moodie to fully 

account for his moral lapses and explain how they have been 

addressed to ensure they will not happen again. See SCR 22.31; 

see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 

40, ¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910 (lawyer disciplinary 

system aims to prevent unethical lawyers from repeating their 

misconduct). As for Attorney Moodie's claim that the length of 

the reinstatement process may preclude him from practicing again 

given his age and health, we have made clear that we will not 

"countenance a rule that would soft-pedal the discipline owed to 

attorneys" who commit misconduct "so long as they do so in the 

twilight of their careers." In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Carter, 2014 WI 126, ¶26, 359 Wis. 2d 70, 856 N.W.2d 595. 
No. 2018AP1781-D 

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¶18 We do not, however, impose the condition of 

reinstatement recommended by the referee:

that in the event Attorney Moodie's law license is 

restored and he resumes practice, it be on the condition 

that for a period of three years following such 

restoration, he practice only as a sole proprietor or as 

an employee, and not as a partner or shareholder in a 

law firm. 

Neither party has voiced support for this condition. It is 

unclear how requiring Attorney Moodie to practice as a sole 

proprietor, with no collegial oversight, or as an employee would 

deter future misconduct of the type that occurred here. 

Consequently, we decline to impose this recommended condition of 

reinstatement.

¶19 Because Attorney Moodie has already made full 

restitution to his former firm, no restitution award is sought, 

and none is ordered.

¶20 Finally, as is our general practice, we impose full costs 

on Attorney Moodie, which total $6,081.63 as of January 15, 2020. 

Neither the OLR nor Attorney Moodie challenges the imposition of 

full costs.

¶21 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Robert B. Moodie to 

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months, 

effective June 3, 2020.

¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of

this order, Robert B. Moodie shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $6,081.63 as of 

January 15, 2020.
No. 2018AP1781-D 

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¶23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent that he has 

not already done so, Robert B. Moodie shall comply with the 

provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 

license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.

¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions with this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.29(4)(c).

¶25 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate.
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

1

¶26 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (dissenting). I 

respectfully dissent because I believe that when it comes to lawyer 

discipline, courts should say what they mean and mean what they 

say, and here the discipline imposed will far exceed that which is 

stated. While we have consistently said there is no fixed formula 

for determining the "right" amount of lawyer discipline, that 

amounts to lip service because here we abdicate the responsibility 

we have to individualize our determinations when it comes to lawyer 

discipline and should not instead default to a mandatory minimum 

set in another case based upon other facts. See, e.g., In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, ¶33, 345 

Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812, (acknowledging that the imposition of 

discipline in attorney disciplinary cases "is not an exact 

science"). Each case is different, we say, and discipline must be 

tailored to each case's unique facts. See id., ¶¶31-32. Here, 

the court imposes what it views as a mandatory minimum six-month 

suspension of Attorney Moodie's license even though, in reality, 

a six-month suspension may very well be three or four times that 

amount because of the required reinstatement process. See SCRs 

22.29-22.33. In other words, for Attorney Moodie, a six-month 

suspension could be two years and perhaps the equivalent of 

revocation. Here, that is excessive. We should decide each case 

independently.

¶27 The referee concluded that here any suspension must be 

for a minimum period of six months because a previous case stated 

as much and the cases in its wake have gone no lower. See In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Casey, 174 Wis. 2d 341, 341-42, 
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

2

496 N.W.2d 94 (1993); see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 572, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995). I 

disagree that this court, when essentially acting as the 

"sentencing" decision maker in a lawyer discipline case, is forever 

hamstrung from exercising any discretion. I disagree that we are 

bound to a mandatory minimum six-month penalty because of other 

fact-dependent cases. I disagree that we should have judicially 

imposed automatic mandatory minimum penalties for all such cases 

going forward no matter the evidence. If we so constrain 

ourselves, there is little room for judicial decision making or 

case-specific determinations, and we abdicate our responsibility 

to weigh and consider what is appropriate discipline in each 

individual case. We should not be so robotically confined. 

¶28 The record below demonstrates that absent this perceived 

constraint, the referee's recommendation would likely have been 

less than six months and definitely not for up to two years. The 

record makes clear that Attorney Moodie's case was notably 

different than the cases relied upon by the OLR. For example, 

Attorney Moodie's conduct is less severe than that in Shea. In 

fact, as the referee noted, there are numerous mitigating 

circumstances present in this case:

[Attorney Moodie] was the senior partner in a wellestablished and well-respected firm, having been a 

member of the firm for over 30 years, he has no prior 

disciplinary record, the amount taken by [Attorney 

Moodie] which should have gone to his partners 

(approximately $3,000 to $3,500) was relatively small 

and has been fully repaid, he and his firm have resolved 

all issues between them[.]
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

3

¶29 The referee's findings further reflect that Attorney 

Moodie was forthright and sincere. The referee noted:

[Attorney Moodie] has admitted his misconduct, is 

extremely and sincerely remorseful for it, and has fully 

cooperated in the OLR investigation, stipulating to all 

of the relevant facts. 

¶30 In addition, Attorney Moodie apparently had a heart 

attack and resultant health issues that will affect his practice 

of law, may have played a role in the violation at issue, and ought 

to be considered to some degree. From the record, it appears that 

his conduct is completely out of character and will not occur 

again. There is virtually no chance Attorney Moodie will work 

with other lawyers in a law firm setting again. He is not then a 

threat to taking other lawyers' money. The record also reflects 

that the amounts he converted may have ultimately been due to him. 

The evidence here reveals that unlike some, Attorney Moodie is not 

a threat to the legal profession, clients, or others as his 

practice will be significantly limited because of his health. A 

suspension less than six months is appropriate in this case, and 

therefore I would suspend Attorney Moodie's license for five months 

and 28 days, which really is six months.

¶31 This court ties its hands when it claims that Wisconsin 

precedent establishes a six-month suspension floor. In fact, in 

Casey, this court imposed a 60-day suspension for an attorney who 

misappropriated three client retainers rather than those funds 

going to his partners. 174 Wis. 2d at 342. Like this case, 

Attorney Casey stipulated to his wrongful conduct and the court 

agreed and suspended him for 60 days. Id. The referee in this 

case, however, felt constrained by the fact that this court has 
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

4

not imposed discipline shorter than six months since Casey. The 

referee explained how Shea was distinguishable because the amount 

converted in Shea far exceeded that in the case at issue; unlike 

Attorney Moodie, Attorney Shea engaged in misconduct for years; 

and unlike Attorney Moodie, Attorney Shea justified and concealed 

the conversions by misrepresenting facts to the partners of his 

firm. See, e.g., Shea, 190 Wis. 2d at 561-62, 572.

¶32 We should not shirk our duty to carefully consider each 

matter independently, taking into account the gravity of Attorney 

Moodie's offense, its nature, implications on the legal 

profession, and the need to protect the public. Reasonable and 

appropriate discipline should be determined on a case-specific 

basis. What is necessary to protect the public from a part-time, 

limited solo practitioner who works primarily for friends and longtime clients? Does Attorney Moodie understand the gravity of his 

behavior and misconduct? Has he admitted to the wrongdoing, 

stipulated to the facts, cooperated fully, and has since seemingly 

done everything the right way? The answers to these questions and 

the evidence in this case should impact what is fair and 

appropriate. The six-month suspension imposed by this court could 

very well be the equivalent of two years and/or a revocation, given 

Attorney Moodie's age and health issues. Six months is too much; 

I would impose the equivalent of what the court says it is imposing 

as discipline, or five months and 28 days. 

¶33 Just as I recently stated in my dissent to this court's 

order denying Rule Petition 19-10, In the Matter of Amending 

Supreme Court Rules Pertaining to Permanent Revocation of a License 
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

5

to Practice Law in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, we should 

say what we mean and mean what we say. See S. Ct. Order 19-10

(issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting). We should not 

be creating false perceptions to both the public and to the lawyer 

seeking to practice law again. When this court ties its own hands 

by instead of providing individualized consideration for a 

disciplinary matter, setting a mandatory minimum six-month 

suspension (which amounts to far more, perhaps four times that 

length), the court abdicates its responsibility. 

¶34 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

¶35 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 

DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent.
No. 2018AP1781-D.akz

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