IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Veronesi Building and Remodeling, :

Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Corvin, Deceased, Corvin), : No. 2002 C.D. 2014

Respondents : Argued: June 17, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge1

HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: January 29, 2016

Veronesi Building & Remodeling, Inc. (Employer) petitions from the 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the 

Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) dismissal of Employer’s Petition to 

Review and Suspend Anita Corvin’s (Claimant) fatal claim benefits.2

I. Petition To Review And Suspend Benefits.

Employer’s Petition to Review and Suspend Claimant’s benefits 

alleged that “Claimant is capable of self-support and is no longer entitled to

 

1

This case was assigned to the opinion writer on or before December 31, 2015, when 

President Judge Pellegrini assumed the status of senior judge.

2 Claimant is the surviving spouse of David Corvin (Decedent).
2

compensation benefits.” Petition to Review and Suspend Benefits, August 28, 

2012, at 1-2; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a-2a.

Claimant filed an Answer and responded:

It is denied Claimant widow is capable of self-support 

without her workers’ compensation widow’s death 

benefit entitlement as was awarded by the WCJ’s 

Decision of April 28, 2000. It is further denied that 

supersedeas and/or the Suspension and/or the Review 

Petition is/are warranted or legally appropriate. Same 

should be denied and penalties and unreasonable contest 

fee awarded to Claimant. 

Claimant’s Answer, September 12, 2012, at 1; R.R. at 5a.

II. The WCJ’s Decision.

The WCJ made the following relevant findings of fact3:

1. Anita Corvin, the Claimant, filed a Fatal Claim 

Petition on December 22, 1997, and alleged that the 

Decedent [David Corvin] was involved in a fatal 

automobile accident on July 11, 1997.

2. In a Decision and Order circulated on April 8, 2000 

the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge granted 

the Claimant’s Fatal Claim Petition. The Workers’ 

Compensation Judge found the Claimant was living with 

her deceased husband [David Corvin] at the time of his 

death....Workers’ compensation benefits were awarded.

3. On August 28, 2012 the Employer filed a Petition to 

Review and a Petition to Suspend workers’ compensation 

benefits to the Claimant widow, Anita Corvin. The 

 

3

The parties agree that there is no dispute as to the facts and that the WCJ “bifurcated the 

legal issues presented from a decision on the merits.” Brief of Claimant at 3.
3

averment of the Employer’s petition is that the Claimant 

is capable of self-support so that her right to 

compensation has ceased.[4]

4. At the hearing held in this matter on October 3, 2012 

the Claimant moved to dismiss the Employer’s petition 

on the basis that the Section 307 [of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Act)]

[5]

remedy under which the 

Employer seeks relief is extinguished by operation of 

Commonwealth Court precedent in Oknefski v. Workers’ 

[sic] Compensation Appeal Board (Louisiana Pacific 

Corporation), 439 A.2d 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981)....

DISCUSSION

Regarding the initial eligibility provision set forth above

[Section 307(7) of the Act, 77 P.S. §562], Oknefski

decided on equal protection grounds that a widower must 

be treated the same as a widow. Accordingly, a widower 

is initially eligible for compensation if he was living with 

his deceased wife at the time of her death or was then 

actually dependent upon her and receiving from her a 

substantial portion of his support. Following Oknefski, 

the Employer’s remedy is to establish that a spouse is not 

initially eligible for benefits if he or she is capable of 

self-support at the time of his or her spouse’s death and is 

not dependent upon the decedent for support was 

extinguished.

The Employer argues that the second clause found in 

Section 307(7), which provides benefits cease when a 

widower becomes capable of self-support, survives 

Oknefski. Clearly it does not, because to do so would 

perpetuate an equal protection violation. As stated by the 

Court: ‘Moreover, extension of the widow’s standard (in 

this case allowing no remedy of suspension of benefits of 

a widow allegedly capable of self-support) produces a 

less disruptive effect on the administration of the Act 

than invalidation of the Act, as Respondent urges 

application of the more restrictive widower’s criteria, 

 

4 Claimant maintains the she is not capable of self-support.

5 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 562.
4

because the extension will not result in a termination of 

benefits to widows who are currently receiving 

compensation under the less stringent standard.[’] 

[Oknefski] (439 A.2d at 849).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Section 307(7) remedy upon which the Employer 

seeks to rely in its Petition for Review or Suspension of 

workers’ compensation benefits does not survive 

application of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in 

Oknefski. Because the Claimant’s Review and 

Suspension Petition does not state a cause of action upon 

which relief can be granted, the Review and Suspension 

Petition should be dismissed. (Emphasis added.)

WCJ’s Decision, July 15, 2003, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1-4, Discussion and 

Conclusion of Law No. 1 at 1-2; R.R. at 30a-31a. The WCJ dismissed Employer’s 

Review and Suspension Petitions.

Employer appealed to the Board and alleged as error:

The discussion following Finding of Fact 4, to the extent 

it contains and includes factual allegations, is not 

consistent with the evidence of record and is erroneous as 

a matter of law.

....

Conclusion of Law 1 is erroneous as a matter of law, 

insofar as the Judge misinterprets and misapplies the 

Commonwealth Court’s holding and reasoning in 

Oknefski v. WCAB (Louisiana Pacific 

Corp.)....Oknefski is confined to its facts and does not 

justify the broad reading it has been given by the 

workers’ compensation judge. To the extent the 

discussion in the Judge’s decision following Finding of 

Fact 4 contains conclusions of law, the discussion is also 

contrary to the Court’s holding in Oknefski and 

erroneous as a matter of law.
5

Employer’s Appeal From Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-2; 

R.R. at 33a-34a.

III. The Board’s Decision.

The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision on other grounds:

At a hearing on October 3, 2012, Claimant moved for 

dismissal. The WCJ bifurcated the action and accepted 

briefs from both parties. By a decision and order 

circulated July 11, 2013, he concluded that Defendant’s 

petition does not state a cause of action upon which relief 

can be granted. The WCJ concluded that the 

Commonwealth Court’s decision in Onefski [Oknefski] 

v. WCAB (Louisiana Pacific Corp.), 439 A.2d 846 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1981), which invalidated the disparate treatment 

of widows and widowers in establishing eligibility for 

fatal claim benefits, also invalidated the disparate 

treatment of widows and widowers in disqualifying a 

surviving spouse if the surviving spouse becomes capable 

of self- support. The Oneksi [Oknefski] court, after 

concluding that applying different eligibility criteria to 

widows and widowers was unconstitutionally 

discriminatory, determined the appropriate correction 

was to apply the less-stringent eligibility criteria to all 

surviving spouses equally....

The WCJ reasoned that allowing an employer to petition 

to suspend payment of fatal claim benefits to a widower 

who allegedly becomes self-supporting, but not to a 

widow who allegedly becomes self-supporting, would 

perpetuate an equal protection violation and that 

accordingly, no surviving spouse’s entitlement to fatal 

claim benefits can be challenged on that basis. The WCJ 

therefore dismissed the petition....

Defendant [Employer] argues that the WCJ’s 

interpretation and application of Onefski [Oknefski] is 

erroneous. We agree.

....
6

Upon review, we cannot agree with the WCJ’s analysis 

and extension of the holding in Onefski [Oknefski] from 

the explicit issue stated, whether the disparate treatment 

of widows and widowers in the Act’s criteria for receipt 

of fatal claim benefits, to the issue presented here. The 

provisions of the Act are severable. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1925. 

That portion of Section 307(7) which states the eligibility 

criteria for fatal claim benefits is not inseparably 

connected with or dependent upon the portion which 

permits termination of fatal claim benefits. Therefore, 

the invalidation of the provision of Section 307(7) 

treating widows and widowers differently with regard to 

eligibility for fatal claim benefits, does not require 

invalidation of the later clause stating different rules for 

suspending or terminating fatal claim benefits. We 

therefore agree with Defendant [Employer] that the WCJ 

erred by dismissing its petition pursuant to Onefski

[Oknefski].

Nevertheless, the language of the contested provision, 

‘Should the widower become capable of self-support, the 

right of such...widower to compensation under this 

section shall cease,’ is not ambiguous and therefore, the 

letter of the statute is not to be disregarded. 1 Pa. C.S. § 

1921(b). There is no dispute that Claimant is a widow; 

therefore, the provision does not apply to her. An 

appellate tribunal may affirm a lower tribunal’s order on 

different grounds where the basis for the correct ruling 

and order is not clear on the record. Tynan v. WCAB. 

(Assoc. Cleaning Consultant & Servs.), 639 A.2d 856 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Accordingly, we affirm the 

dismissal of Defendant’s [Employer’s] petition and do 

not reach the equal protection issue.

Board’s Decision, October 8, 2014, (Decision) at 3-6; R.R. at 40a-43a. (Emphasis 

added.)

IV. Issues.

A. Whether the Board erroneously concluded that the benefits payable 

under Section 307 of the Act are survivorship benefits rather than dependency 

benefits?
7

Initially, Employer contends6that the Board erroneously concluded 

that the benefits payable under Section 307 of the Act, 77 P.S. §562, are 

survivorship benefits rather than dependency benefits. 

Specifically, Employer asserts that “[b]enefits payable under Section 

307 of the Act are paid in certain situations and to certain persons as a result of 

dependency. Eligible individuals identified in Section 307 of the Act are 

consistently identified throughout as dependents.” Brief of Employer at 10. 

Employer concludes that Oknefski is limited to the initial eligibility of widows or 

widowers for death benefits, not the continued eligibility of persons receiving 

dependency benefits. See Employer’s Brief at 12.

Claimant responds that “the evident intent of the Legislature was at 

the time of the statute’s enactment, and remains, to bestow lifetime benefits on 

widows of workers killed in the course of employment, irrespective of whether 

they subsequently become capable of self-support....” (Emphasis added.) Brief of 

Claimant at 9. Claimant argues that continued dependency is not an issue.

Section 307 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 562, in relevant part, provides:

No compensation shall be payable under this section to a 

widow, unless she was living with her deceased husband 

at the time of his death, or was then actually dependent 

upon him and receiving from him a substantial portion of 

 

6

This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether there has been a 

violation of constitutional rights, or an error of law committed, and whether necessary findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Lehigh County Vo-Tech School v. Workmen's 

Compensation Appeal Board (Wolfe), 652 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1995).
8

her support. No compensation shall be payable under 

this section to a widower, unless he be incapable of selfsupport at the time of his wife’s death and be at such time 

dependent upon her for support....

Should any dependent of a deceased employe die or 

remarry, or should the widower become capable of selfsupport, the right of such dependent or widower to 

compensation under this section shall cease except that if 

a widow remarries, she shall receive one hundred four 

weeks compensation...in a lump sum after which 

compensation shall cease...Provided, however, That if, 

upon investigation and hearing, it shall be ascertained 

that the widow or widower is living with a man or 

woman, as the case may be, in meretricious relationship 

and not married, or the widow living a life of 

prostitution, the board may order the termination of 

compensation payable to such widow or widower....

(Emphasis added.)

In Oknefski, this Court addressed the issue of whether the eligibility 

criteria for widowers and widows seeking compensation benefits upon the death of 

a spouse violated equal protection pursuant Section 307 of the Act:

The facts as found by the referee, and affirmed by the 

Board, are not in dispute. Petitioner’s wife died directly 

as the result of a work-related incident in the course of 

her employment. Until the time of her demise, 

Petitioner’s wife was married to and living with 

Petitioner.

....

‘[I]n considering the equal protection clause we evaluate 

the disparity of treatment by the state between classes of 

individuals whose situations are arguably 

indistinguishable.’ McCoy M.D. v. State Board of 

Medical Education and Licensure, 37 Pa. Commonwealth 

Ct. 530, 537, 391 A.2d 723, 726 (1978). To survive a 

constitutional challenge, ‘gender-based discriminations 

must serve important governmental objectives and...the 

discriminatory means employed must be substantially 
9

related to the achievement of those objectives.’ Wengler 

v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150...;

Leap v. Department of Labor and Industry, 14 Pa. 

Commonwealth Ct. 324, 322 A.2d 398 (1974).

....

‘The burden...is on those defending the discrimination to 

make out the claimed justification, and this burden is not 

carried simply by noting that [when the act was passed] 

the state legislature thought widows to be more in need 

of prompt help than men or that today ‘the substantive 

difference in economic standing of working men and 

women justifies the advantage’ given to widows....[T]he 

bare assertion of this argument falls far short of justifying 

gender-based discrimination on the grounds of 

administrative convenience.’ Wengler v. Druggists 

Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. at 151...(quoting 

Wnegler [sic] v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 583 

S.W.2d 162, 168 (Mo. Supreme Ct. 1979.))

....

‘Where a statute is defective because of under-inclusion 

[as in this case] there exists two remedial alternatives: a 

court may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order 

that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature 

intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the 

statute to include those who are aggrieved by the 

exclusion.’ Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 

361...(1970)....

....

Here, the legislative policy underlying Section 307, i.e., 

protection against the loss of decedent’s income, is 

evidenced by the fact that benefits payable to the survivor 

are calculated as a percentage of the deceased wage 

earners salary....Thus, extension of the widows’ standard 

to widowers comports with the remedial purpose of the 

Act by protecting widowers as well as widows against 

the loss of a deceased wage earner’s income. 

Moreover, extension of the widows’ standard produces a 

less disruptive effect on the administration of the Act 

than invalidation of the Act or, as Respondent urges, 

application of the more restrictive widower’s criteria, 

because the extension will not result in a termination of 
10

benefits to widows who are currently receiving 

compensation under the less stringent standard. 

Oknefski, 439 A.2d at 847-849. (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.)

Employer argues that under Section 307 of the Act, the General 

Assembly intended to only compensate for dependency, rather than just 

survivorship. To effectuate that legislative intent, Employer contends that fatal 

claim benefits should be terminated when either the widow or widower becomes 

capable of self-support, and the termination provision should apply equally to both 

genders. However, this argument is without merit. 

There is no legal basis to suspend a widow’s continued entitlement to 

established spousal death benefits premised on the argument that the widow is now 

capable of self-support. Section 307 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 562, clearly states that 

“should the widower become capable of self-support, the right to...compensation 

shall cease.” Section 307 of the Act does not provide any legal basis to terminate a 

widow’s spousal death benefits. In fact, our Legislature’s intent at the time of the 

enactment of Section 307 of the Act, and presently, is to bestow lifetime benefits to 

widows of workers killed in the course of employment regardless of whether they 

become capable of self-support. 

In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory 

Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991. Commonwealth v. McCoy, 

962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009). “The object of statutory interpretation is to 

determine the intent of the General Assembly.” Pa. Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Weaver, 912 A.2d 259, 264 (Pa. 2006) (citing 1 Pa. 
11

C.S. § 1921(a)). The touchstone of statutory interpretation is that where a statute is 

unambiguous, the judiciary may not ignore the plain language “under the pretext of 

pursuing its spirit,” for the language of a statute is the best indication of legislative 

intent. Weaver, 912 A.2d at 264 (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)). Words and 

phrases should be construed in accordance with their common and approved usage. 

1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a). When the words of a statute are clear, there is no need to 

look beyond the plain meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McClintic, 

909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (Pa. 2006) (citing Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 909 

(Pa. 2005), and Ramich v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Schatz Elec., Inc.),

770 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 2001)). If a statute is deemed ambiguous, however, resort 

to principles of statutory construction is appropriate. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c); 

Commonwealth v. Packer, 798 A.2d 192, 196 (Pa. 2002). 

Here, Employer’s proposed remedy contravenes both the plain 

language and intent of Section 307 of the Act and would, in effect, rewrite Section 

307 to include a new reason for terminating a widow’s benefits, something our 

General Assembly has not intended. 7 This Court concludes that there is no basis in 

Section 307 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 562, to suspend a widow’s continued entitlement 

to established spousal death benefits even if she is capable of self-support. 

B. Whether the Board’s Decision denies equal protection of the law by incorrectly 

and unconstitutionally supporting a gender based bias for the standards applicable 

to the continued receipt of death benefits under Section 307 of the Act?

 

7

This Court notes that subsequent to our holding in Oknefski in 1981, our General 

Assembly has enacted numerous amendments to the Act. However, the General Assembly has 

seen fit not to change the statutory language in Section 307 which permits widows to retain 

spousal benefits.
12

Employer also argues that the Board denied it equal protection of the 

law by incorrectly and unconstitutionally supporting a gender based bias for the 

standards applicable to the continued receipt of death benefits under Section 307 of 

the Act.

This Court concurs with the Board’s determination that there is no 

need to address the equal protection issue.8

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

 

 

8

Assuming arguendo that this Court were to reach the merits concerning Employer’s 

constitutional argument, this Court would still find no basis to cut off Claimant’s entitlement to 

death benefits pursuant to Oknefski. Here, as in Oknefski, this Court would extend the same 

standard for widows to widowers so that widowers do not lose their fatal claim benefits if they 

become capable of self-support which “comport[s] with the remedial purpose of the Act by 

protecting widowers as well as widows against the loss of a deceased wage earner’s income.” 

Oknefski, 439 A.2d at 849. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Veronesi Building and Remodeling, :

Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Corvin, Deceased, Corvin), : No. 2002 C.D. 2014

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 2016, the order of the Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge