alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PARKERVISION, INC.,

Appellant

v.

TCL INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS CO., LTD., LG 

ELECTRONICS INC.,

Appellees

______________________ 

2023-1417

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2021-

00985, IPR2022-00246.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

JASON SCOTT CHARKOW, Daignault Iyer LLP, Vienna, 

VA, argued for appellant. Also represented by RONALD M.

DAIGNAULT, CHANDRAN IYER. 

 EDWARD JOHN MAYLE, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton 

LLP, Denver, CO, argued for appellees. TCL Industries 

Holdings Co., Ltd. also represented by KRISTOPHER L.

REED, Dallas, TX. 

Case: 23-1417 Document: 52 Page: 1 Filed: 06/05/2024
 DAVID S. CHUN, Ropes & Gray LLP, East Palo Alto, CA, 

for LG Electronics Inc. Also represented by STEVEN PEPE,

MATTHEW R. SHAPIRO, New York, NY; SCOTT S. TAYLOR, 

Boston, MA.

 ______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (PROST, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

June 5, 2024

Date

Case: 23-1417 Document: 52 Page: 2 Filed: 06/05/2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS 

MISC. NO. 07-17 

IN RE: RECALL OF RETIRED JUDGE

O R D E R 

Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1), eligible retired Judges of the Court may be recalled 

by the Chief Judge when further service is needed by the Court. Retired Judge Kenneth B. 

Kramer, having complied with 38 U.S.C. § 7257, is designated a recall-eligible retired Judge. 

The Chief Judge of the Court has determined that, if recalled, Judge Kramer would provide 

substantial service necessary to meet the needs of the Court. 

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is 

ORDERED that, effective August 14, 2017, through August 15, 2017, recall-eligible 

retired Judge Kramer is recalled from retired status in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1). 

Judge Kramer shall have and exercise all the judicial powers and duties of the office of a Judge 

in active service and shall otherwise perform substantial service for the Court as requested by the 

Chief Judge. 

DATED: August 11, 2017 BY THE COURT: 

ROBERT N. DAVIS 

Chief Judge
Exhibit 32


                    CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Public Storage  Properties,
Ltd. (the  "Partnership") for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  Ronald L.
Havner,  Jr., as Chief Executive  Officer of Public Storage,  corporate  general
partner, and John Reyes, as Chief Financial Officer of Public Storage, corporate
general  partner,  each  hereby  certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as
adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) of the
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of  the
     Partnership.


/s/  Ronald L. Havner, Jr.
------------------------------------
Name:    Ronald L. Havner, Jr.
Title:   Chief Executive Officer and President of Public Storage,
         Corporate General Partner
Date:    March 25, 2009

/s/  John Reyes
------------------------------------
Name:    John Reyes
Title:   Chief Financial Officer of Public Storage,
         Corporate General Partner
Date:    March 25, 2009

This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the  Partnership for purposes of
ss.18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A  signed  original  of  this  written  statement  required  by  ss.906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 has been  provided to the  Partnership,  and will be
retained and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 4.3


 


 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We have issued our
report dated November 22, 2019, with respect to the financial statement of SmartTrust 451 contained in Amendment No. 1 to the Registration
Statement on Form S-6 (File No. 333-233549) and related Prospectus. We consent to the use of the aforementioned report in the Registration
Statement and Prospectus, and to the use of our name as it appears under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting
Firm”.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


 


Chicago, Illinois


November 22, 2019
#### Joseph Vinci, Respondent, v County of Oneida et al., Appellants.

Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, judgment vacated and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: The judgment against the county must be vacated. The plaintiff offered no proof of a contract or written agreement between him and the Department of Social Services obligating the county for the payment of rent. Absent such an agreement, the county cannot be held liable for payment of rent on behalf of plaintiff’s tenant *(Marks v City of New York,*121 Mise 2d 303, 305; *see also, Jackson v County of Monroe Dept.*
      *1014
      *of Social Servs.,*138 Misc 2d 950). (Appeal from order of Oneida County Court, Murad, J. — breach of lease agreement.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Pine and Davis, JJ.
1036.572
#### In the Matter of Albert Lemishow et al., Respondents, v Alice Sachs et al., Respondents, and Ulises Giberga, Appellant.

— Motion by the petitioners Albert Lemishow and Estelle Cooper for reargument of an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Le Vine, J.), dated August 6, 1987, which was reversed by decision and order of this court dated August 19, 1987 *(see, Matter of Lemishow v Sachs,*133 AD2d 197).

Ordered that the motion for reargument is granted, and, upon reargument, this court’s decision and order dated August 19, 1987, is recalled and vacated, and the following decision and order is substituted therefor:

In a proceeding to validate a petition designating, *inter alia,*Albert Lemishow and Estelle Cooper as candidates for the respective party positions of Male and Female Member of the *631Republican State Committee from the 28th Assembly District, Queens County, in the Republican Party primary election to be held on September 15, 1987, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Le Vine, J.), dated August 6, 1987, which granted the application.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the Board of Elections of the City of New York is directed to certify Albert Lemishow and Estelle Cooper to the respective positions of Male and Female Member of the Republican State Committee from the 28th Assembly District, Queens County.

The petitioners’ contentions concerning the adequacy under the requirements of Election Law § 6-134 (2) of certain language appearing on the cover sheet of their designating petition were neither raised before the court of first instance nor previously advanced in this court. However, upon review of the issue in the interest of justice, we conclude that the language suffices in providing the notice and information mandated by the Election Law *(see, Matter of Meehan v Wolf,*133 AD2d 199). Hence, in light of the petitioners’ status as unopposed candidates, we direct the Board of Elections of the City of New York to certify them to the aforementioned respective party positions of Male and Female Member of the Republican State Committee. Bracken, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.
#### Jack Lubelle, Appellant, v City of Rochester, Respondent.

— Motion to settle record denied. Memorandum: The rules pertaining to the stipulation or settlement of a record on appeal or of a record in a CPLR article 78 proceeding transferred to this court (22 NYCRR 1000.5 [a], [b] [2]) do not apply to a proceeding initiated in this court. Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 99-1472

ELIE HALPERN, APPELLANT,

V.

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

Before FARLEY, IVERS, and STEINBERG, Judges.

O R D E R

On December 12, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)

held that this Court erred when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the appellant's

application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d), in Halpern v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 416 (2002) (per curiam order). Halpern v. Principi,

313 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Federal Circuit then reversed this decision, and remanded the

matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id.

The Court notes that the appellant submitted his original EAJA application on October 12,

2000. The Secretary submitted a response to the appellant's application on January 9, 2001. The

appellant submitted a reply to the Secretary's response on January 17, 2001. During the more than

two years since the parties submitted their original EAJA pleadings, significant changes have

occurred in this Court's EAJA caselaw. See generally Sumner v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 256 (2001)

(en banc); Flemming v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 52 (2002); Sachs v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 414 (2002).

In light of those changes the Court will seek supplemental memoranda from the parties addressing

any such changes in caselaw and their impact upon this case. 

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that, not later than 30 days from the date of this order, both parties file with the

Court supplemental memoranda addressing the changes in the Court's EAJA case law since the

submission of the original EAJA pleadings and the impact of those changes upon the outcome of this

case. 

DATED: March 10, 2003 PER CURIAM.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6137 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the possession of a firearm by a person who is adjudicated to have committed 

a violent act while a juvenile. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2010 

Mr. ISRAEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to 

prohibit the possession of a firearm by a person who 

is adjudicated to have committed a violent act while 

a juvenile. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preventing Gun Vio5 lence Act’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6137 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A 

2 PERSON WHO IS ADJUDICATED TO HAVE 

3 COMMITTED A VIOLENT ACT WHILE A JUVE4 NILE. 

5 (a) POSSESSION BAN.—Section 922(g) of title 18, 

6 United States Code, is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of paragraph 

8 (8); 

9 (2) by striking the comma at the end of para10 graph (9) and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

11 (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol12 lowing: 

13 ‘‘(10) who has been adjudicated by a court of 

14 the United States to have committed a violent juve15 nile act,’’. 

16 (b) VIOLENT JUVENILE ACT DEFINED.—Section 

17 921(a) of such title is amended by adding at the end the 

18 following: 

19 ‘‘(36)(A) The term ‘violent juvenile act’ means 

20 an act by a person before the person attains 18 

21 years of age that, if committed by an adult, would 

22 be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 

23 one year, and— 

24 ‘‘(i) has as an element the use, attempted 

25 use, or threatened use of physical force against 

26 another person; or 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6137 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) that by its nature, involves a substan2 tial risk that physical force against another per3 son may be used in the course of committing 

4 the act.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
Order entered September 26, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01143-CV

CLINTON ADAMS, Appellant

V.

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-00321-B

ORDER

Before the Court is the City of Dallas’s September 15, 2014 motion to dismiss this accelerated 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellee notes the notice of appeal was 

filed outside the twenty-day deadline established in rule of appellate procedure 26.1(b) but within the 

fifteen-day extension period allowed under rule 26.3. See id. 26.1(b), 26.3. Appellee further notes 

that appellant has not filed an extension motion under rule 26.3 nor offered a reasonable explanation 

for the late filing. See id. 10.5(b), 26.3. 

We ORDER appellant to file, no later than October 6, 2014, an extension motion reasonably 

explaining why the notice of appeal was untimely filed. We caution appellant that failure to comply 

may result in dismissal of the appeal without further notice. See id. 25.1(b), 26.2, 42.3; Garza v. 

Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 227 S.W.3d 233, 233 (Tex. App.-–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

/s/ CRAIG STODDART 

JUSTICE
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       1,265,427
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,495,627
<ALLOWANCES>                                   119,413
<INVENTORY>                                  1,920,972
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,938,887
<PP&E>                                       1,183,369
<DEPRECIATION>                                 523,223
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,599,033
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,137,353
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,160
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,438,119
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,599,033
<SALES>                                      9,791,449
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,827,955
<CGS>                                        5,586,071
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                8,248,995
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   586,347
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            992,613
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   992,613
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .10





</TABLE>
#### Starr Brier, Respondent, v D. R. Chambers & Sons, Inc., et al., Appellants, and T. V. Stone, et al., Respondents.

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for malicious prosecution, the defendants D. R. Chambers & Sons, Inc., and *803John Chambers appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowd, J.), dated January 27, 1987, which denied their motion for a change of venue from Kings County to Otsego County.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff-respondent.

The Supreme Court, Kings County, properly exercised its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for a change of venue from Kings County to Otsego County. Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Rubin, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.
(Letterhead of {Perrella & Associates, P.A.)


                                                           555 S. Powerline Road
                                                    Pompano Beach, Florida 33069

(954) 979-5353 Office
(954) 979-6695 fax

To the Board of Directors and Stockholders:
Xenicent, Inc.
18 Brookmont Dr
Wilbraham, MA

March 29, 2002

Gentlemen:

We hereby consent to the use of our audit report of Xenicent, Inc. for the year
ended December 31, 2001 in the Form 10-KSB of Xenicent dated March 29, 2002.









/s/ Perrella & Associates
-------------------------
Exhibit 99.4



Exhibit 32.2CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Active Power, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, David S. Gino, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ David S. GinoDavid S. Gino Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial OfficerJuly 24, 2003
(86 South. 926)

#### BEARD v. STATE.

(6 Div. 122.)

(Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 30, 1920.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1920.)

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

P. E. St. John, of Cullman, for appellant.

J. Q. Smith, Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM.

Petition is dismissed, as it is not accompanied with brief of petitioner, as required by amended rule 42, Supreme Court Practice (198 Ala. xiv, 77 South, vii).
ORDER

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0116

IN THE MATTER OF 

D.P., A.P., and A.P,

Youths in Need of Care

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Upon consideration of Appellant Mother D.M.P.’s, Motion to 

Consolidate, and good cause appearing therefore, Appellant’s motion is 

GRANTED and Cause Nos. DA 22-0116, DA 22-0117 and DA 22-0118 are 

hereby consolidated under Cause No. DA 22-0116 and henceforth captioned 

as above.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 28 2022

04/28/2022
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6421 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6421

 To eliminate the learned intermediary defense to tort claims based on 
               product liability, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 17, 2010

  Mr. Filner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To eliminate the learned intermediary defense to tort claims based on 
               product liability, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Consumer Protection Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DEFENSE.

    (a) In General.--It shall not be a defense to any tort claim in any 
court in the United States that a manufacture of a product has 
fulfilled that manufacturer's duty of care when the manufacturer 
provides all of the necessary information to a learned intermediary who 
then interacts with the consumer of the product.
    (b) Definition.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``learned intermediary'' means a person, 
        licenced under applicable State or Federal law, to advise a 
        consumer whether or not to use the product in question; and
            (2) the term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia, 
        Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession, or 
        territory of the United States.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000202953
<NAME>                        Public Storage Properties, Ltd.
<MULTIPLIER>                                                          1
<CURRENCY>                                                           US

<S>                                                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                    12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                           Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                              Jan-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                                Dec-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                                       1
<CASH>                                                          153,000
<SECURITIES>                                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    73,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                226,000
<PP&E>                                                       11,122,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                              (6,569,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                4,873,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                         9,459,000
<BONDS>                                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                                           0
<COMMON>                                                              0
<OTHER-SE>                                                  (4,586,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                  4,873,000
<SALES>                                                               0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                              4,978,000
<CGS>                                                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                 1,440,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                649,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                              601,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                               2,288,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                           2,288,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                       0
<CHANGES>                                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                                  2,288,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                                      113.25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                    113.25


</TABLE>