J-A18031-18

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

**Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.W.G.,

 Appellant

 v.

L.F.,

 Appellee

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 4084 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 0C1601574

BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER, J.**

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2018

D.W.G. (Father) appeals from the order entered November 14, 2017,

which awarded shared legal and physical custody of Father’s minor son, N.G. 

(Child), born in December 2015, to Father and Child’s biological mother, L.F. 

(Mother), and denied Mother’s relocation. After review, we affirm.

The parties, who have never been married, lived together in 

an apartment located in the Northeast section of Philadelphia for 

approximately one month before Mother gave birth to [Child] in 

December of 2015. They continued to live together until midDecember of 2016, at which time Father moved out of the parties’ 

shared residence and began to live with his parents who have a 

residence nearby in Philadelphia.1 On December 19, 2016, Mother 

left the parties’ Philadelphia apartment with [Child] and moved to 

her parents’ home in Greencastle, Franklin County, an 

approximate three-hour drive from Philadelphia.2 Mother testified 

that she left Philadelphia in December of 2016 due to arguments 

and fighting between the parties. She moved to Greencastle 

where she grew up and where her parents, sister and brother-inlaw live. Other than [Child], Mother has no familial ties to 
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Philadelphia. Mother currently works full-time as an insurance 

agent in Hagerstown, Maryland.

__________

1 Father testified that he stopped living at the parties’ 

apartment on December 13, 2016, due to an incident 

between them which resulted in police intervention.

2 Because Mother left Philadelphia with [Child] on 

December 19, 2016, Father spent neither [Child’s]

first birthday nor Christmas with [Child].

On December 21, 2016, Father filed a complaint for shared 

legal custody and primary physical custody of [Child]. On 

December 27, 2016, Father filed a petition for expedited relief.3 

On February 3, 2017, the [family court] held a hearing on the 

petition for expedited relief and entered a temporary custody 

order providing for shared legal custody and shared physical 

custody. Pursuant to the temporary custody order, physical 

custody was on a week[-]to[-]week basis with exchanges to take 

place at noon on Sundays at a designated police district in 

Philadelphia. If Mother remained in Philadelphia, the custody 

exchanges were to occur every two days and on alternate 

weekends. The non-custodial parent was entitled to have daily 

“facetime” contact with [Child] at 6:00 p.m. for ten minutes. The 

matter was directed to be rescheduled for a relocation hearing, 

along with Father’s complaint.4 (Father had already filed a 

counter-affidavit to Mother’s relocation on February 2, 2017.)

_________

3 On December 29, 2016, Mother sought and obtained 

a temporary protection from abuse order against 

Father. That order was vacated after a hearing on 

January 13, 2017. 

4 Mother filed a pro se petition to modify on May 8, 

2017, which petition was heard by a Master in August 

of 2017, and scheduled for trial in April 2018. That 

trial was cancelled after the entry of the instant order 

on appeal, which addressed all then-pending custody 

pleadings.

Both parties appeared before the [family court] with their 

respective counsel for the custody/relocation hearing on 

November 14, 2017. At that time, Father was thirty-one (31) 

years old. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in science and 
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psychology and he testified that he works for an agency providing 

services to adults with intellectual disabilities. His typical work 

schedule is Sunday, Monday, Friday, and Saturday, from 4:00 

p.m. to 12:00 a.m. When Father is working, [Child] is with 

Father’s parents, and they all continue to reside in the same 

residence. Father has two sisters, and they and their families live 

near Father and his parents.

During the summer of 2017, Father spent his days off, 

Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, with [Child] and his 

extended family at their shore home in North Wildwood, New 

Jersey. The drive from Philadelphia to North Wildwood takes 

approximately one and a half hours. Father also took vacation 

time to spend with [Child] and his family at the New Jersey shore.

Regarding medical care for [Child], Father testified that 

[Child] is treated by physicians at Tri-County Pediatrics in 

Philadelphia. In May of 2017, Mother advised Father that she was 

switching [Child’s] care to a pediatrician located in Waynesboro, 

Pennsylvania, approximately three hours from Philadelphia. 

Father objected to changing doctors because he alleged that a 

change would not be beneficial for [Child], and because Mother 

never gave Father information about the Waynesboro pediatrician. 

Father prefers for [Child] to be treated at an urgent care facility 

when [Child] is in Mother’s care in Greencastle. Mother testified 

that she would like [Child] to have a pediatrician in both 

Philadelphia and Greencastle/Waynesboro. 

Father testified that [Child] has no medical problems. 

However, Father testified that [Child] has had two ear infections

over the past three to four months and hives in January 2017. In 

January of 2017, Mother took [Child] to St. Christopher’s Hospital 

in Philadelphia without prior notice to Father in order to obtain a 

second opinion regarding the origin of the hives. Father stated 

that while [Child] has not yet begun to speak, he was advised by 

the [Child’s] pediatrician that there was no cause for concern 

about speech until [Child] reached the age of three. Mother 

testified that she is concerned with the development of [Child’s] 

speech.

Father testified that he planned for [Child] to start attending 

pre-school in September of 2018, on a part-time basis, on 

Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Two of the pre-schools 

Father had contacted advised him that [Child] would not be 
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eligible to attend either one in September 2018 since he would 

not yet be three years old. Father visited two other pre-school 

programs and he formed a preference for “Over the Rainbow” 

[school] for [Child] starting in September 2018 on a part-time 

basis, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Father has not 

discussed the prospect of [Child’s] going to pre-school with 

Mother. Mother testified that she did not think that [Child] had to 

go to pre-school and that she and Father had not yet discussed 

the matter. Mother does not consider it impossible for [Child] to 

attend either daycare or pre-school while he is in her custody and 

to attend [] pre-school while in Father’s custody.

In anticipation of sending [Child] to kindergarten in 

Philadelphia, Father identified two schools, a charter school and 

the elementary school that [Father] and his siblings attended. 

Father and Mother have never discussed with each other where 

[Child] would go to school. Mother testified that she would want 

[Child] to go to an elementary school in Greencastle.

Father’s preferred custodial arrangement would be for him 

to have primary physical custody with Mother having partial 

physical custody every other weekend. Father testified that the 

prospect of [Child] living primarily with Mother in Greencastle 

causes him to be afraid because he does not know what Mother 

would tell [Child] about him. Father stated, “It scares me a lot, 

as he gets older, what they’re going to say about me, who I am, 

as a person and as a dad.”

Mother’s suggested custodial schedule would be for Father 

to have partial physical custody every Tuesday, Wednesday, [and] 

Thursday in Philadelphia. Mother would pick up [Child] on Friday 

and do all the driving for both drop off and pick up. The custody 

exchange would take place at a location approximately half way 

between Greencastle and Philadelphia, near exit 266 of the 

Pennsylvania Turnpike.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 4/19/2018, at 1-5 (citations to the record omitted).

Following the custody and relocation hearing, the family court issued an 

order awarding Father and Mother shared legal and physical custody of Child, 

and finding that “Mother ha[d] not met her burden in establishing that the 
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proposed relocation of [] Child from Philadelphia, PA to Greencastle, PA is in 

the best interest of [] Child.” Order, 11/14/2017, at 1-2. The court ordered 

each parent to have shared physical custody of Child on an alternating weekly 

basis, with exchanges taking place on Tuesdays at 5:00 p.m. at a midpoint 

between the parties’ locations. Id. at 1. The family court permitted Mother 

to exercise her physical custody in Greencastle, permitted the parents to use 

different pediatricians for Child in their respective locations, and set a holiday 

schedule. Id. at 2. 

On December 14, 2017, Father filed a notice of appeal, as well as a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The family court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

April 19, 2018.

Father raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether the [family] court erred as a matter of law by 

concluding that “Mother has not met her burden in establishing 

that the proposed relocation of [Child] from Philadelphia, PA to 

Greencastle, PA is in the best interest of [Child]” yet avoiding 

making a decision on the very claim at issue, relocation, by 

specifically stating, “I’m not doing it today, but eventually, 

either the living arrangements are going to change – the 

location, you’re going to have another custody trial or you’re 

going to make a resolution.”

2. Whether the [family] court erred as a matter of law by 

concluding that “Mother has not met her burden in establishing 

that the proposed relocation of [Child] from Philadelphia, PA to 

Greencastle, PA is in the best interest of [Child]” yet specifically 

allowing each parent to utilize [his or her] own selected 

pediatrician during [his or her] weeks of physical custody such 

that the result is that [Child’s] primary pediatrician will be 

located in Greencastle, PA during Mother’s every other custody 
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weeks despite the [family court’s] express disapproval of 

relocation.

3. Whether the [family] court erred as a matter of law by 

concluding that “Mother has not met her burden in establishing 

that the proposed relocation of [Child] from Philadelphia, PA to 

Greencastle, PA is in the best interest of [Child]” which 

conclusion clearly disapproved the proposed relocation yet 

allowed said relocation to occur as the [family] court 

established [Child] as a half[-]time resident of the disapproved 

geographical area by ordering that Mother could exercise her 

shared physical custody in Greencastle, PA and ordering that 

Father, the non-relocating party, be responsible for half of the 

transportation time of [Child] to Greencastle, PA.

Father’s Brief at 12-13 (reordered and unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We address Father’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. This Court must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. We defer to the credibility 

determinations of the presiding trial judge, who viewed and 

assessed the witnesses first-hand. We, however are not bound 

by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual 

findings, and ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s 

conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. 

We may reject the trial court’s conclusions only if they involve an 

error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable 

findings of the trial court.

P.J.P. v. M.M., 185 A.3d 413, 417 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

“When a trial court orders a form of custody, the best interest of the 

child is paramount.” Id., quoting S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. 
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Super. 2014). The factors to be considered by a court when awarding custody 

are set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party 

or member of the party’s household, whether there is 

a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused 

party and which party can better provide adequate 

physical safeguards and supervision of the child. 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on 

behalf of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life. 

(5) The availability of extended family. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships. 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based 

on the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against 

the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence 

where reasonable safety measures are necessary to 

protect the child from harm. 

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, 

stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the 

child adequate for the child’s emotional needs. 

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and 

special needs of the child. 
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(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or 

ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements. 

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with 

one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from 

abuse by another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party. 

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household. 

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household. 

(16) Any other relevant factor. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

When a party seeks to relocate, he or she bears the burden of proving 

that relocation will serve the best interests of the child, as determined by a 

consideration of the following factors. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h), (i)(1).

(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a 

proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors, 

giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the 

safety of the child:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and 

duration of the child’s relationship with the party 

proposing to relocate and with the nonrelocating 

party, siblings and other significant persons in the 

child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child

and the likely impact the relocation will have on the 

child’s physical, educational and emotional 

development, taking into consideration any special 

needs of the child.
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(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship 

between the nonrelocating party and the child through 

suitable custody arrangements, considering the 

logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration 

the age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct 

of either party to promote or thwart the relationship 

of the child and the other party.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general 

quality of life for the party seeking the relocation, 

including, but not limited to, financial or emotional 

benefit or educational opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general 

quality of life for the child, including, but not limited 

to, financial or emotional benefit or educational 

opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for 

seeking or opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party 

or member of the party’s household and whether 

there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an 

abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the 

child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h). 

In this case, with both relocation and custody at issue, consideration of

both sets of factors was required. A.M.S. v. M.R.C., 70 A.3d 830, 836 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (“The trial court must consider all ten relocation factors and all 

sixteen custody factors when making a decision on relocation that also 
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involves a custody decision.”). “[O]n issues of credibility and weight of the 

evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial [court, which] has had the 

opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses. A.V. 

v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

After considering the custody and relocation factors, the family court 

determined it was in Child’s best interest to award Mother and Father shared 

legal custody, and to award them shared physical custody on an alternating 

weekly basis. TCO, 4/19/2018, at 6-11. The court further concluded that 

Mother had not met her burden to establish that the proposed relocation of 

Child from Philadelphia to Greencastle was in Child’s best interest. Id. With 

respect to shared physical custody, the court set forth the day, time, and 

location of exchanges, and permitted Mother to exercise her physical custody 

of Child in Greencastle. Id. at 11.

On appeal, the crux of Father’s arguments is that the family court’s 

award of shared physical custody, which allows Mother to exercise her physical 

custody in Greencastle, amounts essentially to a de facto relocation by Mother 

to Greencastle. Father’s Brief at 26-27. Specifically, Father claims the family

court abused its discretion when it ordered a custody schedule that will need 

to be revisited when Child is of school age, permitted the parents to use 

different pediatricians for Child in their respective locations, and required 
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Father to be responsible for half of the transportation for custody exchanges. 

Id. at 19-32. 

We address these claims together as they all relate to Father’s 

contention that the family court allowed a de facto relocation to occur. With 

respect to the school issue, the family court addressed Father’s claims as 

follows.

Father fails to identify how the maintenance of continued shared 

physical custody does not serve the best interests of [Child]. 

Father’s objections articulated at the hearing to shared physical 

custody are for the most part anticipatory of the time that [Child] 

would begin either pre-school or kindergarten, or both.

As stated by Father in response to Mother’s counsel’s 

question regarding his objection to shared physical custody:

Well, I think the sooner we – I think, with preschool 

soon to come up, and then eventually, in a couple of 

years, it’ll be kindergarten, I think the sooner we can 

establish him – some grounds for stability for our son 

[] and get him transitioned into the new routine, it 

might benefit him more than back and forth to 

Greencastle on the weekends.

N.T.[, 11/14/2017,] at 91.

Responding to his own counsel’s question regarding his 

objection to shared physical custody if Mother remains in 

Greencastle, Father stated:

Because for [Child], when pre[-]school, kindergarten 

and elementary school come along, it just wouldn’t be 

– there’s no way that he could attend school for a 

week down here in Philadelphia, as well as a week up 

in Greencastle.

So once he is enrolled here – when he’s enrolled here, 

it just provides more stability and more routine and 

it’s just to his benefit because, obviously, you can’t –
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you can’t be in school in two different places, so, an 

adjustment would have to be made for that.

N.T.[, 11/14/2017,] at 105-06.

The [family court] rejected Father’s preference primarily 

because it was based upon concerns about the future and not 

based upon current circumstances. Certainly, as [Child] goes 

from being a toddler to an older child, the arrangements regarding 

physical custody may require modification of the [family court] 

order to accommodate [Child’]s educational needs. That in no 

way demonstrates that [the family court’s] order is not currently 

in the best interest of [Child] during a time in his young life that 

he is not even eligible to attend preschool. Rather, for a child just 

over the age of two, [Child’s] best interests are served by 

sustained weekly contact with each of his loving parents. Father’s 

focus upon inevitable changes that will occur in the future is 

misplaced as the [family court] is bound to look at the situation 

as it currently exists.

Father’s emphasis upon pre-school [] fails to take into 

account Mother’s role in the decision as to whether [Child] should 

attend pre-school. Father testified that he had not discussed the 

prospect of [Child’s] going to pre-school with Mother, and she 

testified that she had not come to any conclusion [Child] would go 

to pre-school and that the issue had not been discussed between 

the parties. Additionally, Father’s proposed part-time pre-school 

schedule is accommodated by the order during the weeks that 

Father has custody. Since Father has physical custody on 

Wednesdays, Fridays, and Mondays every other week, [Child] 

would be able to attend pre-school on the precise days that Father 

anticipates sending [Child] to pre-school. There is no evidence 

that [Child] would be barred from attending a pre-school where 

his attendance would be on an every other week basis rather than 

every week.

TCO, 4/19/2018, at 13-15 (emphasis in original).

In addressing Father’s next claim relating to pediatricians, the family

court concluded that

Father’s contention that [Child] should not have a pediatrician in 

both Philadelphia and Greencastle [] does not serve [Child’s] best 
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interests. The [family court] discerns no principled basis upon 

which Father bases his preference for [Child’s] going to the 

pediatric practice of Father’s choice in Philadelphia and visits to an 

urgent care facility in Greencastle. [Child’s] best interest is served 

by having an established relationship with a health care provider 

in each of the locations in which [Child] will be spending half of 

his time.

Id. at 15.

And finally, the family court addressed Father’s last claim relating to 

transportation by stating

Father’s objection [] to his sharing the transportation of [Child] to 

a mid-way exchange location between Greencastle and 

Philadelphia is based upon Father’s own convenience. He does 

not explain how [Child’s] interests would be better served riding 

the entire three-hour trip between Greencastle and Philadelphia 

with Mother rather than splitting the trip by riding an hour and a 

half with each parent. The [family court] determined that Father 

would not bear an undue burden in driving once a week on one of 

his three days off for the hour and a half each way to the Manheim, 

Pennsylvania exchange point. Father routinely drove an 

equivalent distance from his home in Philadelphia to North 

Wildwood, New Jersey to spend time at the shore with [Child] and 

his family during the summer months.

Id. at 15.

Considering our standard of review and the great deference it affords to 

the family court, we find no error in the court’s conclusions. Our review of the 

record reveals the court adequately considered the statutory factors and 

Father’s claims, and set forth its reasoning, supported by the record, for 

awarding shared legal and physical custody. While recognizing that the 

custody order will likely need to be modified when Child is of school-age, the 

family court analyzed correctly Child’s best interest at the time of the hearing. 
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That the parties may need to modify the custody order in the future does not 

amount to an abuse of discretion by the family court. Once a custody order 

is in place, a court may modify it on petition “to serve the best interest of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338(a). Further, we find no error in the family court’s 

determination relating to Child’s pediatricians. Because Child’s time is split 

equally between the two locations and it provides continuity of care, it was 

within the family court’s discretion to determine that establishing a 

relationship with a pediatrician in each place serves Child’s best interest. We 

likewise find no abuse of discretion in the family court’s order that the parents 

meet at a midpoint between their locations for custody exchanges. Father has 

not shown that such an arrangement is unduly burdensome for him, and in 

fact, at the time of the hearing, the parties had already been doing just that 

for several months.

Despite Father’s protestations concerning Mother exercising her physical 

custody in Greencastle, the family court, presiding over the trial and reviewing 

all the testimony and evidence, found “for a child just over the age of two, 

[Child’s] best interests are served by sustained weekly contact with each of 

his loving parents.” Id. at 14. The family court determined that both parents 

are capable of handling parental duties and maintaining a relationship with 

Child to support his emotional needs; both parents offer stability and 

continuity, are engaged in activities with Child, and have families available to 

care for Child while they are working. Id. at 6-9. It found Child is well-taken 
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care of by both parents. Id. at 7. The family court was clearly aware that 

both parents are loving, have supportive families, and maintain beneficial 

relationships between Child and their extended families, and thus, determined 

it is in Child’s best interests to spend equal amounts of time with each parent. 

Recognizing how difficult these custodial decisions are for family courts when 

dealing with two loving and caring parents, we find that the court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing Mother to exercise her shared physical custody 

in Greencastle.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the family court did not 

abuse its discretion when it analyzed the factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 5328 and 5337 to deny Mother’s proposed relocation and to award the 

parties shared legal and physical custody of Child to serve Child’s best 

interests. Because we find no abuse of discretion and conclude that none of 

Father’s claims entitles him to relief, we affirm the order of the family court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/18