UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4635

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MISAEL AVELLANEDA-CAMPOS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00298-WO-1)

Submitted: April 25, 2013 Decided: April 29, 2013

Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE E. CRUMP, III, 

Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett 

Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Misael Avellaneda-Campos (“Campos”) pled guilty, 

without a plea agreement, to illegal reentry following a 

conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006), and was sentenced to seventy-two 

months’ imprisonment. He appeals. Campos’ attorney has filed a 

brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), in which he asserts that there are no meritorious issues 

for appeal but challenges Campos’ sentence. Although advised of 

his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, Campos has not 

done so. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Counsel first questions whether the district court 

plainly erred by failing to compel the Government to move for a 

reduction in offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 3E1.1(b) (2011) for acceptance of 

responsibility. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 

(1993) (applying plain error standard for unpreserved error). 

At sentencing, the court applied a two-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1(a). An 

additional one-level acceptance of responsibility reduction was 

possible only if the Government moved for the reduction. See

USSG § 3E1.1(b). The district court did not plainly err by 

refusing to compel the Government to move for this additional 

reduction because Campos did not plead guilty until the day of 
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trial. See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6. (“[t]o qualify under 

subsection (b), the defendant must have notified authorities of 

his intention to enter a plea of guilty at a sufficiently early 

point in the process so that the government may avoid preparing 

for trial and the court may schedule its calendar 

efficiently.”). 

Counsel also challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of Campos’ within-Guidelines sentence. We review Campos’ 

sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This 

review requires consideration of both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. We assess 

whether the district court properly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the 

parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.

at 49–50; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th 

Cir. 2010). If there is no procedural error, we review the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the 

totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing 

court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it 

chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United 

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 

If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we apply a 
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presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 346–56 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for 

within-Guidelines sentence). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable. Moreover, Campos has failed to overcome the 

presumption of reasonableness we accord his within-Guidelines 

sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Campos’ conviction and sentence. This court 

requires that counsel inform Campos, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Campos requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Campos. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED