J-S01016-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.A.K.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2313 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000012-2019, 

FID No. 51-FN-004337-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.A.K.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2314 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002196-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T.L.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2315 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000013-2019, 

FID No. 51-FN-004337-2013
J-S01016-20

- 2 -

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T.L.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2316 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002194-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.R.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2317 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000014-2019, 

FID No. 51-FN-004337-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2318 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002197-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L.D., A 

MINOR

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S01016-20

- 3 -

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 2319 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000015-2019, 

FID No. 51-FN-004337-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2320 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002198-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2020

In this difficult matter, T.D. (Mother) appeals the orders terminating her 

parental rights to her four children: 12-year-old son K.T.L.S.; 11-year-old 

daughter T.A.K.D.; 10-year-old daughter T.R.D.; and seven-year-old son 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S01016-20

- 4 -

T.L.D. (collectively, the Children).1, 2 After the underlying dependency cases 

lingered for nearly five years, the trial court asked the parties to brief the issue 

of whether the Children were still dependent, or alternatively, whether the 

matter was essentially a custody dispute between Mother and Paternal 

Grandmother, the placement caregiver. Soon thereafter, the Children’s 

guardian ad litem filed termination petitions, and the Philadelphia Department 

of Human Services (DHS) filed petitions for Permanent Legal Custodianship. 

Following a two-day hearing, the court granted the termination petitions 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) and denied the 

petitions for permanent legal custodianship. Although DHS supports Mother’s 

appeal, arguing that a Permanent Legal Custodianship would be in the 

Children’s best interests, DHS did not file its own appeal. After careful review, 

we affirm.

The trial court set forth the extensive factual background and procedural 

history of this case in its thorough opinion filed on September 13, 2019, 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). See Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/19, at 1-36; see 

generally at 1-57. Pertinently, the case came to the attention of DHS in 2013 

following a general protective services report. The report indicated neglect,

____________________________________________

1 The court also terminated the rights of K.N.D.S. (Father), who does not 

appeal.

2

 Mother appealed from both the termination and dependency dockets, 

suggesting that Mother intended to appeal not only the termination of her 

rights, but also the court’s decision to change the goal of the litigation from 

parental reunification to adoption. As we clarify below, Mother’s brief confined 

her challenges only to the terminations.
J-S01016-20

- 5 -

truancy, unsafe shelter, and emotional harm from the circumstances 

surrounding the alleged maltreatment.

Complicating matters were the facts that Mother admitted to having 

mental health issues, and that three of the four Children suffered from a 

variety of medical problems, some significant. T.L.D. was diagnosed with 

Down Syndrome, among a slew of other ailments, and requires a gastrostomy 

tube (G-tube) in order to safely consume liquids. K.T.L.S. had a congenital 

skull defect such that only skin was protecting a portion of his brain. He also 

has severe allergies, asthma, and ocular issues. T.A.K.D. also has ocular 

issues and attends a school for the visually impaired. The court adjudicated 

the Children dependent in November 2013.

The court placed the Children in the home of the Paternal Grandmother. 

To reunify Mother with the Children, the court identified several objectives for 

Mother to achieve in her Single Case Plan. Specifically, Mother had to 

complete a parenting class, sign up for job placement, and obtain suitable 

housing. The court further ordered Mother to receive medical training prior to 

having unsupervised visits with T.L.D. because of his medical needs. The 

court granted Mother liberal supervised visits with the Children at Paternal 

Grandmother’s home on a bi-weekly basis.

Over the next 17 months, Mother made slow but steady progress. By 

April 2015, Mother had appropriate housing and she was employed. Mother 

received medical training and completed parenting classes. She was 

permitted to participate in the Children’s school meetings and medical 
J-S01016-20

- 6 -

appointments. Thus, the dependency court permitted Mother unsupervised 

day visits in the community and in her home.

However, in late July 2015, T.L.D. suffered second-degree burns on his 

chest and stomach during an unsupervised, overnight visit at Mother’s home. 

T.L.D. was evidently scalded by hot water in a kitchen accident. Mother did 

not tend to the injury, and T.L.D. only received medical attention after the 

Children returned to Paternal Grandmother, who then took T.L.D. to the 

hospital. The court reduced Mother’s visits following the incident.

By February 2016, the court granted Mother weekly supervised 

visitation in the community and ordered Mother to attend family therapy. In 

May 2016, the court determined Mother was substantially compliant with her 

objectives and granted Mother unsupervised visits.

At the November 2016 permanency review hearing, the court noted that 

DHS did not plan to file termination petitions because termination did not 

serve the Children’s needs and welfare. DHS’s compelling reason was that 

permanent legal custodianship was a more appropriate goal.

Over the next two years, Mother’s visitation vacillated between 

unsupervised and supervised. The Children did not want to engage in therapy 

with Mother, nor did they always want to visit with her. Additional safety 

concerns also arose. For example, Paternal Grandmother alleged that the 

Children once told her T.L.D. almost drank bleach; Mother explained that 

T.L.D. had been in the bathroom where there was an uncapped bleach bottle, 

but that T.L.D. had not attempted to drink it. T.A.K.D. also testified that 
J-S01016-20

- 7 -

Mother had called her a liar for alleging that Mother’s stepdaughter was 

sexually inappropriate with her. 

At the October 2018 permanency review hearing, the two oldest children 

(12-year-old K.T.L.S. and then-10-year-old T.A.K.D.) testified that they did 

not wish to visit Mother, but wished to remain with Paternal Grandmother on 

a permanent basis. T.A.K.D. stated she was open to mending her relationship 

with Mother sometime in the future, but that did not presently want to 

participate in family therapy. At the conclusion of the October 2018 

permanency review hearing, the trial court asked the parties to brief the issue 

of whether dependency still existed or whether the case was merely a custody 

matter.

On January 3, 2019, the Children’s guardian ad litem filed terminations 

and goal change petitions; DHS filed permanent legal custodianship petitions 

on January 18, 2019. The court conducted a hearing over two dates on April 

17 and July 18, 2019. At the hearing, the Children were appointed legal 

counsel in addition to their guardian ad litem. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the court entered its termination and goal change orders, and denied the 

petitions for permanent legal custodianship.

Mother timely filed these appeals.

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, 

when it involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental 

rights where such determination was not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence under the [A]doption 

[A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (2)[?]
J-S01016-20

- 8 -

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 

when it involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental 

rights without giving primary consideration to the 

effect that the termination would have on the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs of the 

[C]hildren as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence 

was overwhelming and undisputed that [M]other 

demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere, 

persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a 

parent-child relationship with her [C]hildren[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4.

In reviewing an appeal from the termination of parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court's determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of 

the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the 

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for 

an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., 

there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. [The Supreme Court] 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties 

during the relevant hearing and often presiding over 

numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite 
J-S01016-20

- 9 -

result, as is often the case in dependency and termination 

cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second 

guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the 

trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by 

the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the 

result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal 

citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 

837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

Before we begin our analysis, we must address a number of defects with

Mother’s appeals:

First, we note an error in Mother’s concise statement as it pertains to 

T.A.K.D. There, Mother listed K.T.L.S.’s name in the caption, but kept 

T.A.K.D.’s name in the body of the statement. Because this is a self-evident 

clerical error, and because Mother correctly appealed from each Child’s correct 

docket, we conclude that the error is harmless.

Second, notwithstanding notices of appeal from each child’s respective 

dependency and termination docket, we must assume Mother challenges only 
J-S01016-20

- 10 -

the termination orders. Viewing the argument section of her brief in a

generous light, it appears Mother consolidated her third appellate issue with 

her second issue, which pertains to Section 2511(b). Viewed another way,

however, Mother completely abandons the third issue, rendering us 

completely unable to decipher whether she intended to challenge the court’s 

goal change orders in addition to the termination orders. See 

Commonwealth v. McCree, 854 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“When a 

court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough 

for meaningful review.”). We conclude that if Mother did intend to challenge 

the Children’s goal change orders, those challenges are waived.

Third, and most fatal to her appeals, Mother’s brief only preserves her 

challenges to the court’s terminations under Section 2511(a)(1) and (2), even 

though the court terminated Mother’s rights under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (8). Although Mother’s concise statement challenged all four 

termination grounds, her brief has no mention of Section 2511(a)(5) or (8) in 

either the statement of questions involved, or in the argument section. 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116 provides that the statement of the 

questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved; and no 

question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions 

involved or is fairly suggested thereby. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Rule 2119 provides 

that the argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions 

to be argued; and each part shall be followed by such discussion and citation 

of authorities as are deemed pertinent. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). It is well 
J-S01016-20

- 11 -

established that failure to adhere to these rules may constitute waiver. See 

Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Gurley 

v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 A.3d 283, 288 n.11 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (issue is waived for purposes of appellate review when an appellant 

does not develop it in brief).

Here, we must find waiver. We cannot ignore this defect by concluding 

that the missing issues – Section 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) – are “fairly 

suggested” by the issues Mother briefed. Each ground for termination under 

Section 2511(a) is unique and has developed a distinct body of case law. 

Indeed, Mother seems to appreciate this, as the argument portion of her brief 

concerning Section 2511(a) is divided into subparts: one to address Section 

2511(a)(1) and another to address (a)(2). Noticeably absent, however, are 

subparts addressing Section 2511(a)(5) or (a)(8).

Mother’s failure to argue these sections is significant, because 

termination requires a bifurcated analysis. The party seeking termination 

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfied the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

The court only engages in the second part of the analysis under Section 

2511(b) if the court determines that a parent’s conduct warrants termination 

under Section 2511(a). See In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261 (Pa. Super. 

2019). Importantly, this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding 

the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 
J-S01016-20

- 12 -

Thus, Mother’s failure to address Section 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) effectively 

means the trial court’s decisions under those sections stand. As such, Mother

forfeits her entire challenge under Section 2511(a) and confines the success 

of her appeals to the arguments under Section 2511(b).

Even if we did not find waiver, the termination of Mother’s rights would 

still be warranted under Section 2511(a)(2).

3

 In sum, Mother concedes that 

past incapacity has caused the Children to be without parental care, but 

contends that such incapacity has been remedied. She argues that she availed 

herself of every service available to her in order to be reunified with the 

Children. See Mother’s Brief at 17-18; see also, e.g., C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 

____________________________________________

3 Section 2511 provides, in relevant part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2).
J-S01016-20

- 13 -

262 (providing three requirements to prove termination under Section 

2511(a)(2)).4 Notwithstanding Mother’s efforts to overcome her incapacity, 

the trial court determined Mother was not capable of parenting these Children 

with specialized needs, nor could Mother remedy such incapacity. We agree. 

Thus, even if Mother did not forfeit her challenge to the terminations under 

Section 2511(a)(5) and (8), we would conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s rights under Section 2511(a)(2).

Next, we turn to the second prong of the termination analysis under 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under 

the standard of the best interests of the child. C.M.K. 203 A.3d at 262 (citation 

omitted). That section provides: 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b).

____________________________________________

4 To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party must 

prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” Id. at 

262.
J-S01016-20

- 14 -

Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in 

the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). One major aspect of the needs and 

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262 (citation 

omitted).

Mother argues that the record “does not reflect clear and convincing 

evidence that there was no parent bond.” Mother’s Brief at 18-19. She also 

points to Section 2511(b)’s instruction that no termination can be based solely 

on “environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, 

clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.” 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Finally, if we are to consider Mother’s third claim 

as an ancillary component of her Section 2511(b) challenge, Mother claimed 

that the evidence was overwhelming and undisputed that she demonstrated 

a genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain 

a parent-child relationship with the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 4. These

arguments are largely misplaced.

For one, Mother’s own feelings are unconnected to this portion of the 

analysis. As stated above, this portion of the analysis no longer concerns her 

conduct. See C.M.K., supra. More to the point, “[a] parent’s own feelings 

of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental 

rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
J-S01016-20

- 15 -

Moreover, Mother misconstrues the inquiry into the parental bond. The 

question is not simply whether a bond exists. As we have said:

While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of 

parental rights. Rather, the orphans' court must examine 

the status of the bond to determine whether its termination 

would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 (quotations and citations omitted).

Additionally, consideration must be paid to the continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child. Id. With the relevant standards 

properly identified, we address Mother’s claim that the court erred by granting 

termination under Section 2511(b).

We begin our analysis by noting the Children’s extensive issues and the 

necessity for specialized care. Seven-year-old T.L.D.’s care is the most 

involved. Dr. Mary Fabio, his physician, has treated T.L.D. since his birth and 

described him at the termination hearing as “a very complex patient and has 

a lot of different needs.” N.T., 4/17/19 (Day 1), at 60. His diagnoses include: 

Down Syndrome; obstructive sleep apnea; reflux; asthma; allergies; and 

severe developmental delays. Id. at 44. He is prescribed medications for 

allergies, reflux with aspiration, and behavioral issues. While T.L.D. was 

nearly eight years old, he functions at a much lower level, which is difficult to 
J-S01016-20

- 16 -

quantify because his language is impaired. He needs support in his daily living

beyond simply needing help to dress and undress. Id. at 84. T.L.D. cannot 

be left unattended because he does not possess the problem-solving skills to 

keep himself safe. Id.

He’s treated by a number of medical specialists including occupational 

and physical therapists. Because of his obstructive sleep apnea, T.L.D. uses 

a CPAP machine to keep his airway open. Id. at 45-46. His caregiver needs 

to be trained on how to use the mask, how to keep it on him, and how to clean 

and maintain the machine. Id. at 46-47. Because of T.L.D.’s reflux, liquids 

were going into his lungs making it unsafe for him to consume any liquids by 

mouth. Id. at 48. He had to have surgery to have a G-tube and ear tubes 

placed, along with a tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. Id. at 48-49. His 

caregiver must be trained on how to connect the G-tube to the feeds, how to 

keep it clean, and how to protect and replace the tube if T.L.D. pulls it out. 

Id. at 49. Since the Children were placed with Paternal Grandmother, T.L.D. 

has had 120 medical appointments. Id. at 51. Of those, Paternal 

Grandmother has attended all of them; Mother has only attended 10, although 

that number could be as high as 16 as there were six visits where the doctor’s 

notes did not specify who accompanied T.L.D. Id. at 50-51.

Twelve-year-old K.T.L.S. had a congenital defect where portions of 

bones were absent from his skull, resulting in only skin covering his brain. Id.

at 61, 64. Although Mother was aware of this condition while K.T.L.S. was in 

her care, Mother did not appreciate the danger and the condition was not 
J-S01016-20

- 17 -

surgically corrected until he was out of Mother’s care. Id. at 63-65. K.T.L.S. 

also suffers from vision loss, severe asthma, eczema and a behavior disorder. 

He also has a number of food allergies, which led to multiple episodes of 

anaphylaxis while he was with Mother. Id. at 61-62. His allergies require 

immunotherapy in the form of injectable medication every two weeks. Id. at 

62-63. Since being in Paternal Grandmother’s care, K.T.L.S. has received 

treatment and his conditions have been controlled. 

Eleven-year-old T.A.K.D. has severe myopia and requires care by an 

ophthalmologist. She attends a special school for the visually impaired, and 

will be eligible for corrective eye surgery when she turns 12. Ten-year-old 

T.R.D. does not have any medical issue requiring a specialist, but she does 

have an IEP at school, as do T.A.K.D. and T.L.D.

Mother largely ignored these issues, or perhaps more accurately, she 

failed to appreciate them, sometimes putting the Children’s safety in jeopardy. 

In one incident, when Mother was finally entrusted with unsupervised visits in 

her home, T.L.D. returned to Paternal Grandmother’s care with untreated 

second-degree burns from a kitchen accident, which required immediate 

medical attention. Id. at 58-59. Mother contends that the deplorable housing 

conditions which had led to the Children’s removal have remedied (she now 

lives with her husband). However, the Children do not feel safe in Mother’s 

home, nor do they feel safe with Mother.

At the permanency review prior to the termination hearing, K.T.L.S. 

testified Mother lives in a house where one of his cousins was sexually 
J-S01016-20

- 18 -

assaulted by a neighbor. See N.T., 7/18/19 (Day 2), at 30-33. T.A.K.D. 

testified that Mother’s stepdaughter sexually assaulted her while in this home. 

Id. at 92. T.A.K.D. also recounted incidents where T.L.D. almost drank 

bleach, and where K.T.L.S. had gotten sick (presumably on account of the 

food allergies) and was bitten by bedbugs. Id., at 88. It was clear from the 

11-year-old’s testimony that she fears for her and her siblings’ safety.

Having articulated the Children’s unique developmental, physical and 

emotional needs, we observe that the three older children all expressed a 

desire to be adopted by Paternal Grandmother. At the termination hearing, 

the court heard testimony from Victoria Fernandez, the psychotherapist who 

had been involved with the family since December 2013. She specifically 

worked with the oldest siblings, K.T.L.S. and T.A.K.D. 

Ms. Fernandez testified that therapy sessions with K.T.L.S. were positive 

because he was able to express his needs, his feelings, his health and his 

relationship with Mother. See N.T. (Day 1), at 103. However, he refused to 

participate in family therapy with Mother, and he expressed a desire to stay 

with Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 36-37. Indeed, K.T.L.S. testified at the 

termination hearing that Paternal Grandmother “became more of a parent to 

me than basically I even felt with my parents before. So in my opinion 

adoption would be the best thing for me to like handle.” N.T. (Day 2), at 83.

He had also expressed to Ms. Fernandez that if he had to return to Mother he 

would run away. N.T., (Day 1), at 107. Ms. Fernandez concluded that 

termination and adoption would be in K.T.L.S.’s best interest because, “it is 
J-S01016-20

- 19 -

time for him to have something stable and for him to have his life where he’s 

not fearful of his circumstances.” Id. at 107-108.

Ms. Fernandez’s sessions with T.A.K.D. focused on her imbalanced 

relationship with Mother, because Mother told T.A.K.D. that she was the result 

of an unwanted pregnancy. Id. at 95-97. T.A.K.D. said she knew her mom 

didn’t want her. Id. at 96. She also expressed that she and her siblings are 

safer with Paternal Grandmother than with Mother. In one incident during a 

visit in Mother’s home, T.A.K.D. alleged that Mother’s stepdaughter was 

sexually inappropriate with her. Id. at 97-100. T.A.K.D. claimed that Mother 

called her a liar. N.T. (Day 2), at 92. Like K.T.L.S., T.A.K.D. also wished to 

be adopted by Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 90. Ms. Fernandez concluded 

that both of these siblings were totally bonded to Paternal Grandmother, and 

that they would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated.

Melissa Martin, the child advocate social worker assigned to the family’s 

case, testified that she has spoken with K.T.L.S., T.A.K.D., and ten-year-old 

T.R.D. Like the two oldest siblings, T.R.D. also expressed to Ms. Martin that 

she wanted to be adopted by Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 174. To that end, 

Julie Rose, Esq., the Children’s child advocate, explained to the court that she 

addressed the concept of adoption with T.R.D., and that T.R.D. wanted to be 

adopted.

Seven-year-old T.L.D. could not express his thoughts because of his 

intellectual disability. Dr. Alison Downes, a physician in the Department of 

Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 
J-S01016-20

- 20 -

also treats T.L.D. for his intellectual disability, as well as his ADHD, muscle

weakness and ligament laxity. At the termination hearing, all parties 

stipulated to her expertise in developmental pediatrics. See N.T. (Day 1), at 

74-76. Dr. Downes noted that T.L.D. was nearly eight years old, but functions 

at a lower level, which is hard to quantify because his language is impaired. 

Id. at 80.

She testified that Mother has never attended T.L.D.’s appointments, nor 

has she ever been contacted by Mother to discuss his condition or treatments. 

Id. at 83-84. However, Dr. Downes testified that she observed Paternal 

Grandmother with T.L.D., that they are very well-connected, that T.L.D. is 

very affectionate with her and responds well to all of her directions. Dr. 

Downes opined that T.L.D’s needs are significant and must be understood. 

Id. at 86. She indicated that Paternal Grandmother is an excellent advocate 

for his special needs, and that T.L.D.’s development has been due in large 

part to Paternal Grandmother’s emphasis on learning. Id. at 83. She opined 

further that he is quite attached to Paternal Grandmother, as well as his 

siblings, and cannot imagine what it would be like if that support system 

changed. Id. at 86.

Although the courts do not defer termination decisions to the children 

involved in the proceedings, we note that these Children’s preferences were 

essential to the court’s decision to favor termination over permanent legal 

custodianship. See T.C.O. at 54. It is of no surprise that the Children all 

favor termination and adoption (with the exception of T.L.D., of course) 
J-S01016-20

- 21 -

because Paternal Grandmother has attended to their significant 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs.

Mother argues that termination is not warranted, because 

environmental factors like “medical care” and “inadequate housing” cannot be 

the basis for termination if they are beyond her control, pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). See Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother misreads the statute. 

Section 2511(b) provides that the rights shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (emphasis added). 

But these factors are relevant to the analysis, especially here, where the 

Children’s needs are atypically more involved.

More concerning is that Mother has never evinced a meaningful intention 

to address the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. She 

has hardly attended any of the Children’s many medical appointments or 

educational meetings, nor had she reached out to the specialists to discuss 

treatment or progress. See N.T. (Day 2), at 254-255. And contrary to her 

statement, Mother has not availed herself of the services that would have 

provided her the ability to attend. Consequently, the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that termination was warranted under Section 2511(b).

To conclude: we find Mother waived her challenge to Section 2511(a)

for failure to address termination under Section 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8), 

although we would have concluded termination was warranted under Section 

2511(a)(2). Likewise, we conclude Mother waived her challenge to the court’s 

goal change, if she meant to bring one at all. Finally, we conclude that the 
J-S01016-20

- 22 -

record support’s the court’s determination that termination was warranted 

under Section 2511(b). We discern no abuse of discretion.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2020