In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-2675 

WILLIE FLOWERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

NICHOLAS RENFRO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:18-cv-03250-RM-TSH — Richard Mills, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2022 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Springfield, Illinois police officer 

Nicholas Renfro asserts that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars Willie Flowers’ suit against him for excessive use of 

force during an arrest. Because the district court held that 

there are genuine issues of disputed fact that are material to 

Flowers’ claim against Officer Renfro, and the reasonableness 

of the use of that force would inform a decision on qualified 
2 No. 21-2675 

immunity, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the 

district court’s denial of summary judgment.

I.

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Flowers, 

as we must at the summary judgment stage. Torres v. Madrid, 

141 S. Ct. 989, 994 (2021). Were this fiction, we might be accused of writing the most hackneyed of plots: In the small 

hours of the morning, in a bar called Dirty South, located in a 

rough part of town, a man grabs the rear end of another man’s 

girlfriend, and a kerfuffle ensues. Fortunately, unlike in the 

old western movie saloons, the altercation was not a physical 

one. Instead, the owner of the bar asked both patrons, Flowers 

and the rear-grabber, to leave. After Flowers protested, one 

bouncer told Flowers he had to leave, but another told him he 

could remain. Nevertheless, Flowers left the bar accompanied 

by a third bouncer and Officer Terrance Davis, an off-duty 

police officer employed as a security guard at the bar. While 

Flowers waited outside in the parking lot for his girlfriend to 

join him, he and Officer Davis discussed why Flowers had 

been asked to leave the bar. As they talked, Officer Renfro, 

another off-duty police officer employed as part of the security team at Dirty South, without any warning or provocation, 

grabbed Flowers from behind and slammed him to the pavement face first, knocking out Flowers’ tooth. Officer Renfro 

then placed Flowers under arrest. At the time Renfro brought 

Flowers to the ground, Flowers was not verbally or physically 

threatening the officers, and was not showing any indication 

that he would resist if the officers told him he was under arrest. Officer Renfro admitted that Flowers never made a fist, 

got into a fighting stance, took a swing at any officer, or made 

any verbal threats. The only conduct that Officer Renfro 
No. 21-2675 3

claims justified slamming Flowers to the ground was that 

Flowers questioned the command to leave the bar and then 

once outside, turned around to face Officer Davis “man to 

man” or “face to face” within one to two feet of him. Flowers, 

however, disputes that he ever turned to face Officer Davis in 

an aggressive manner, or that he turned to face him at all. He 

claims the two of them had exited the bar talking and were 

standing face to face the whole time. R. 26 at 2 (citing R. 26-1 

at 13 (Flowers Dep. p. 47)). 

Flowers eventually filed suit against the City of Springfield, Officer Renfro, and Officer Davis for excessive use of 

force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for state law battery against Officers Renfro and Davis, and for state law respondeat superior 

and indemnification claims against the City. The defendants 

moved for summary judgment asserting that the officers did 

not violate Flowers’ civil rights and were entitled to qualified 

immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for 

Davis and for the City of Springfield on all of the claims based 

on Davis’ conduct, and denied summary judgment for the 

claims against Renfro as well as the relevant state law claims 

against the City that were based on Renfro’s conduct. Renfro 

appeals only the district court’s finding that he was not entitled to qualified immunity. 

II.

As a court of appeals, our jurisdiction is limited to final 

appealable decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As a general rule, a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment is a 

nonappealable interlocutory order. Ortiz v. Jordon, 562 U.S. 

180, 188 (2011). Such an order is, after all, a court saying that 

there is more to be done—that is, factual issues that must be 

determined at trial. The Supreme Court has recognized a 
4 No. 21-2675 

limited exception to this rule when a court denies summary 

judgment on the ground that the defendants are not entitled 

to qualified immunity. Id. “Because qualified immunity protects the public officer from the expense and distraction of 

having to stand trial when the conduct in question did not violate clearly established law, the unavailability of an immediate interlocutory appeal” would take away the very benefit 

that qualified immunity was created to provide. Bayon v. 

Berkebile, 29 F.4th 850, 853 (7th Cir. 2022). The exception to the 

rule, however, is a very narrow one. The denial of qualified 

immunity is only appealable if it turns on an issue of law. Id.

at 854. If a determination of qualified immunity in a summary 

judgment motion depends on the resolution of fact questions, 

the order denying qualified immunity generally is not appealable. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995) (“[W]e hold 

that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment 

order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.”). In 

short, we do not have jurisdiction to reconsider the district 

court’s determination that there are genuine issues of material 

fact that preclude summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. See Bayon, 29 F.4th at 854. 

When determining whether the district court’s denial was 

based on a nonappealable factual dispute or an appealable legal question, “[w]e first review the district court’s decision to 

see if it identifies factual disputes as the reason for denying 

qualified immunity. And we consider the arguments (or stipulations) offered by those appealing to see if they adopt the 

plaintiff’s facts, or instead make a ‘back-door effort’ to use disputed facts.” Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 736 (7th Cir. 2021). 

In this case we need look no further than the district court 
No. 21-2675 5

opinion which definitively concluded that there were factual 

disputes preventing it from granting qualified immunity to 

Renfro: 

[T]he Court concludes there is a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether Renfro’s use of 

force was objectively reasonable. ... Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim as 

to Renfro. ... Because of these genuine issues of 

material fact pertaining to whether Flowers resisted and concerning the nature of the 

takedown, Renfro is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

... 

The Court has determined there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the Plaintiff’s excessive 

force claim asserted against Officer Renfro. Because there is a factual dispute regarding Renfro’s liability, the Court will deny the City’s motion for summary judgment under the Illinois 

Tort Immunity Act to the extent that the City 

seeks immunity for Renfro’s alleged actions.

Flowers v. City of Springfield, No. 18-3250, 2021 WL 3573359, at 

*3, 4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2021). The district court reasoned that 

there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Renfro’s use of force was objectively reasonable when considering the factors that the Supreme Court identified for such an 

inquiry, such as “‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether 

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
6 No. 21-2675 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. at *2 (quoting Graham 

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)); see also Gupta v. Melloh, 19 

F.4th 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2021). And because there were genuine issues of material fact as to the reasonableness of the use 

of force—in particular whether Flowers was resisting and 

how Officer Renfro effectuated the takedown—Renfro was 

not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at *3. It is clear that the 

determination of qualified immunity in this summary judgment motion depends on the resolution of fact questions, 

therefore the order denying summary judgment is not appealable. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. 

The defendant’s briefs also make clear that resolution of 

the question of qualified immunity depends on resolving 

questions of disputed fact. Renfro’s argument is that he used 

an objectively reasonable amount of force to maintain control 

of Flowers. To come to this conclusion, he relies on a version 

of the facts favorable to the defendants. For example, Officer 

Renfro asserts that Flowers was repeatedly told to leave the 

establishment, he remained until he was physically escorted 

out of the building, and he was informed he was under arrest 

but resisted by “abruptly” turning to face Officer Davis, 

within one to two feet of him “face to face” and “man to man.” 

Renfro Brief at 12–13 (citing R. 25-1 at 68 (Flowers Dep. pp. 68, 

70–71)). In addition, Renfro alleges that Flowers was given 

many lawful commands and continued to refuse to submit to 

those commands and that his “resistance and refusal to comply posed a potential threat to the safety of the officers and 

others.” Id. at 13. Renfro also asserts that the force he used was 

“measured, brief, and appropriate to accomplish the purpose 

of establishing and maintaining control of the Plaintiff.” Id. at 

14. 
No. 21-2675 7

Flowers disputes each of these points. He disputes that he 

was told numerous times to leave Dirty South, instead asserting that he began to leave when told. Under his version of 

events, he did not argue with Officer Davis and made clear to 

both the officer and a bouncer that he did not want any problems. He also asserts that he never turned to face Officer Davis 

abruptly or otherwise, as they were face to face having a discussion as they walked out the door of the establishment. 

Flowers denies that Officer Davis ever told him he was under 

arrest or asked him to turn around and place his hands behind 

his back. He also cites to Officer Davis’ and Officer Renfro’s 

depositions in which the officers themselves assert that he 

never clenched his fists, got into a fighting stance, took a 

swing at anyone, or made threats to anyone, and that before 

the takedown, the officers never told him he was under arrest 

or to turn around and place his hands behind his back. R. 26-

3 at 20 (Renfro Dep. pp. 73, 76); R. 26-2 at 25–26 (Davis Dep. 

pp. 96–97); R. 26-3 at 20 (Renfro Dep. pp. 74–75).1 In sum, he 

disputes that he engaged in any behavior that would indicate 

a lack of cooperation or a threat of any kind that could have 

justified Renfro’s use of force. 2

1 Officer Davis testified that he did not recall whether he told Flowers 

that he was under arrest and agrees that it was not documented in his report. R. 26-2 at 25–26 (Davis Dep. pp. 96–97).

2 If it is Renfro’s position that Flowers made confusing or contradictory statements in his deposition, these are issues of credibility for the fact 

finder at trial. Although a party opposing summary judgment may not 

create disputes of material facts by submitting an affidavit that contradicts 

other sworn testimony, contradictory statements within testimony are 

matters of credibility for trial. Cf. Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 688, 

n.5 (7th Cir. 2008).
8 No. 21-2675 

Each of the factual disputes above is material and critical 

to the question of qualified immunity. That is because qualified immunity under § 1983 extends to police officers unless 

(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, 

and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established” at the time. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). 

Whether an officer violated a suspect’s rights depends on the 

reasonableness of the use of force. “This inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 

broad general proposition.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S.

Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (internal citation omitted). A proper application 

of the test of reasonableness, “requires careful attention to the 

facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. Having looked carefully at the specific facts and 

circumstances here, the district court found material disputes 

of fact, including about the actions of both Renfro and Flowers, and the reasonableness of the force used for the arrest.

The district court, of course, could not resolve these disputes of fact that would inform a decision on qualified immunity because the case stood before it on a motion for summary judgment. At summary judgment, the district court 

could not weigh credibility, balance the relative weight of 

conflicting evidence, choose between competing inferences, 

or resolve swearing contests. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 

(7th Cir. 2003). It had one task only—to determine whether 

there were any disputes of material fact that required a trial 

and upon which a reasonable jury might rely to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The district court found that 

there were such disputes and denied summary judgment. 
No. 21-2675 9

As we explained, a denial of summary judgment based on 

a finding of disputed fact does not fall into the narrow exception rendering nonappealable orders reviewable on qualified 

immunity grounds. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. Because 

the district court found there were genuine issues of material 

fact as to Flowers’ excessive force claim against Renfro, the 

district court’s ruling is an interlocutory one and cannot be 

appealed. Instead, this appeal must be DISMISSED for lack of 

appellate jurisdiction.