IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN DIVISION

PATRICK MCKENNA, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

JAVIER SOTO, A DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY CANDIDATE FOR ARIZONA HOUSE 

OF REPRESENTATIVES IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 3, ET AL., 

Defendants/Appellees. 

 

No. CV-20-0123-AP/EL

Filed February 17, 2021 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

No. CV2020-004839 

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL:

Roopali H. Desai, Marvin C. Ruth, Kristen Yost, Coppersmith Brockelman 

PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Patrick McKenna

Javier Soto, In Propria Persona, Tucson

Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney, Civil Division, Daniel Jurkowitz, 

Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for F. Ann Rodriguez and the 

Pima County Board of Supervisors, Ally Miller, Ramon Valadez, Sharon 

Bronson, Steve Christy, and Betty Villegas
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2 

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF

JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK and LOPEZ joined. 

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case concerns Patrick McKenna’s challenge to 

nomination petitions filed by Javier Soto, a candidate for the Democratic 

Party’s nomination for the Arizona House of Representatives in Legislative 

District 3. McKenna appealed from a superior court judgment finding that 

Soto obtained enough valid signatures to qualify for placement on the 

primary election ballot. This Court issued an order affirming the superior 

court’s judgment in this election case. We now explain the basis for our 

decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 To qualify for the primary ballot, Soto needed 413 valid 

signatures on his nomination petitions. See A.R.S. § 16-322(A)(3)

(“Nomination petitions shall be signed by a number of qualified signers 

equal to: . . . If for a candidate for the office of member of the legislature, at 

least one-half of one percent but not more than three percent of the total 

number of qualified signers in the district from which the member of the 

legislature may be elected.”). Soto submitted petition sheets that contained

460 signatures. 

¶3 McKenna, a qualified elector, challenged approximately 200 

of these signatures pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(A).1 As relevant here, 

1 McKenna’s complaint initially challenged 205 signatures, but 

McKenna later submitted a supplemental exhibit challenging only 204 

signatures. The Recorder later determined that McKenna’s exhibits only 

challenged 200 signatures. Because we conclude McKenna’s challenges to 

the signatures fail, infra ¶ 29, this issue is not determinative of Soto’s

placement on the ballot.
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3 

McKenna alleged that 40 signatures were invalid because they included an 

“incomplete date” and 160 signatures were invalid because they included 

an “incomplete address” for the signer. While all of the “incomplete date” 

signatures listed a day and month, none of them listed a year. Likewise, 

while all of the “incomplete address” signatures contained a house number 

and street name, none of them contained a city/town, state, or zip code. 

¶4 The Pima County Recorder (“Recorder”) reviewed the 

challenged signatures and summarized its findings in a memorandum 

(“Memorandum”). See § 16-351(E). The Recorder invalidated 10 of the 40 

“incomplete date” signatures, relying on the Arizona Secretary of State 2019 

Elections Procedures Manual (“2019 EPM”), which directs county recorders

to reject signatures with “no date or an incomplete date.” See Ariz. Sec’y of 

State, 2019 Elections Procedures Manual A58 (2019). However, it validated 

130 of the 160 “incomplete address” signatures because those 130 signers 

provided sufficient information for the Recorder to determine that they 

were eligible to sign the petition. Ultimately, the Recorder determined that 

Soto had seven more signatures than was required for the ballot.

¶5 After a hearing, the trial court found in relevant part that six

of the ten signatures invalidated by the Recorder due to “date issues” were, 

in fact, valid, and the Recorder properly concluded that the 130 “incomplete 

address” signatures were valid. Soto therefore had enough signatures to 

qualify for placement on the ballot, and the court denied McKenna’s

requested relief.

¶6 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

article 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and § 16-351(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶7 McKenna argues the trial court erred by finding the 

“incomplete date” and “incomplete address” signatures valid. Typically, a 

nomination petition need only substantially comply with the statutory 

requirements; strict compliance is not necessary “[a]bsent a clear statement 

that the legislature intended a particular form requirement to be 

indispensable.” Bee v. Day, 218 Ariz. 505, 507 ¶ 10 (2008); accord Adams v. 
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4 

Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 322 (1954). When there is a challenge to the content of a 

nomination petition, we review de novo whether “‘a petition substantially 

complies with the statutory requirements’ before denying access to a 

ballot.” Bee, 218 Ariz. at 507 ¶ 8 (quoting Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 101–

02 ¶ 40 (2006)). 

I.

¶8 In Arizona, candidates seeking placement on an election 

ballot “must gather signatures from qualified electors and file them with 

the appropriate elections official.” Jenkins v. Hale, 218 Ariz. 561, 562 ¶ 6 

(2008) (citing § 16-322(A)). The signatures ensure candidates have 

“adequate support from eligible voters to warrant being placed on the 

ballot.” Id. (quoting Lubin v. Thomas, 213 Ariz. 496, 498 ¶ 15 (2006)). 

¶9 Nomination petitions must contain the following information

for each signatory: signature; printed name; actual residence address, 

description of place of residence or Arizona post office box address, city or 

town; and date of signing. A.R.S. § 16-315(A)(4)(a)–(d). 

¶10 McKenna argues the trial court erred by finding the 

“incomplete date” signatures valid because: (1) § 16-315(A)(4) and the 2019 

EPM require a complete date; (2) a partial date cannot “substantially 

comply” with the complete date requirement; and (3) Soto failed to 

affirmatively proffer evidence supporting the court’s rehabilitation of the 

“incomplete date” and “incomplete address” signatures. We disagree. 

II.

¶11 A prospective candidate who wishes to be placed on an 

election ballot must collect the signatures of qualified electors on 

“nomination petitions,” which must contain enumerated statutory 

requirements, including a “date of signing.” See A.R.S. 

§§ 16-314(B), -315(A)(4). “Date of signing” is not defined in the statute. 

Therefore, we must first determine what information the legislature 

intended a qualified signer provide in order to comply with the statutory 

obligation.
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

5 

¶12 In interpreting a statute, our goal is to effectuate the 

legislature’s intent. SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 243 Ariz. 477, 

480 ¶ 8 (2018). “When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous,” 

it controls unless an absurdity or constitutional violation results. State v. 

Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6 (2003). But when, as here, the “text alone does 

not resolve the parties’ dispute,” we must “attempt to glean and give effect 

to the legislature’s intent, considering the statute’s context, effects and 

consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 229 

Ariz. 487, 490–91 ¶ 10 (2012). 

¶13 The intent and purpose for requiring a nomination petition to

contain the information set forth in § 16-315(A)(4) is to ensure that the signer 

is a qualified elector. Jenkins, 218 Ariz. at 564 ¶ 19. “Indeed, ‘[t]he ultimate 

substantive question . . . is whether the signer is in all respects a qualified 

elector, and all the requirements in regard to residence, date of signing, 

verification and the like are to assist interested parties to ascertain this 

fact.’” Id. at 564–65 ¶ 19 (quoting Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 225 (1942)). 

Additionally, the date of signing is important and necessary to determine 

whether the signature was collected before the date the candidate filed his 

or her statement of interest. See A.R.S. § 16-311(H) (“Any nomination 

petition signatures collected before the date the statement of interest is filed 

are invalid and subject to challenge.”). 

¶14 In order to ascertain whether a petition signer is a qualified 

elector, it is essential that the information collected in the nomination

petition be thorough and complete. Accordingly, we conclude the 

legislature intended that the signer provide a complete date, consisting of 

the day, month, and year, on the nomination petition. Because Soto’s 

nomination petitions did not contain complete dates, the signatures did not 

strictly comply with the requirements of § 16-315(A)(4).

¶15 Although it is uncontroverted that Soto’s nomination

petitions included signatures that did not contain a complete date, we must 

nevertheless determine whether the trial court was correct that these 

signatures substantially complied with § 16-315(A)(4). See Dedolph v. 
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6 

McDermott, 230 Ariz. 130, 133 ¶ 17 (2012). We conclude that the questioned 

signatures substantially complied with the “date of signing” obligation. 

¶16 In ascertaining whether the non-compliant signatures 

substantially comply with the statute, we look at the petition as a whole to 

determine whether the omission frustrates the purpose of the statute. See 

Bee, 218 Ariz. at 508 ¶ 13 (“[T]o determine whether Bee’s petitions 

substantially comply we look at the nominating petition form as a whole

and focus on whether ‘the omission of’ the date on which the vacant term 

expired ‘could confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.’” (quoting 

Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102 ¶ 42)). Because the purpose and intent underlying 

the “date of signing” requirement is to ensure that petition signers are 

qualified electors, we do not believe the legislature intended to disqualify a 

signature if a complete date accompanying the signature can be sufficiently 

established by other information contained in the petition. See Jenkins, 218 

Ariz. at 565 ¶ 21 (“Invalidating signatures of duly registered electors does 

not further the purpose, intent, or spirit of Arizona’s nominating petition 

statutes.”). 

¶17 Applying this approach here, the trial court did not err by 

concluding the signatures were valid. After reviewing the petition sheet 

containing the eight signatures Soto sought to have restored, the court 

concluded six of the signatures were valid because “a review of the petition 

sheets as a whole . . . le[ft] no doubt that 2020 [was] the year in which each 

of these six signatures was provided.” It based its conclusion on two 

observations: first, that the challenged signatures appeared on the same 

page as other signatures that had the same month and day but also included 

the year; and second, that the words “Revised 07/31/2019, Secretary of 

State” were printed along the bottom margin of the petition sheet, meaning 

it was impossible for signers to sign before that date. We agree with the 

court that a review of the information contained in the petition sheet 

revealed the validity of the questioned signatures. The court accordingly 

did not err by finding that these signatures substantially complied with 

§ 16-315(A)(4). 

¶18 In reaching this conclusion, we reject McKenna’s argument 

that Soto failed to present evidence to rehabilitate the challenged 
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

7 

signatures. Once the presumption of validity regarding the questioned 

signatures is displaced, the burden shifts to the proponent of the signatures 

to prove the signer was a qualified elector and eligible to sign the petition. 

See Jenkins, 218 Ariz. at 565–66 ¶ 23. 

¶19 Here, the parties stipulated to the admission of the 

nomination petitions in evidence. Relying on the petitions, Soto asserted 

the signatures containing the day and month substantially complied with 

the “date of signing” requirement. As previously indicated, the trial court’s 

review of the petitions allowed it to properly conclude that the questioned 

signatures substantially complied with § 16-315(A)(4). Because Soto relied 

on the evidence in the record, he met the burden of proving that the signers 

were eligible to sign the petition.

¶20 Similarly, McKenna’s reliance on the 2019 EPM as authority 

to reject the non-compliant signatures fails. The purpose of the 2019 EPM 

is to ensure election practices are consistent and efficient throughout 

Arizona. The EPM is promulgated pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-452, which 

requires that the Secretary of State “prescribe rules to achieve and maintain 

the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency 

on the procedures for early voting and voting, and of producing, 

distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots.” § 16-

452(A). The EPM also contains guidance on matters outside these specific 

topics, including candidate nomination petition procedures, see 2019 EPM

at 107–23, and the regulation of petition circulators, see id. at 250–54. These 

other topics, however, fall outside the mandates of § 16-452 and do not have 

any other basis in statute. Because the statute that authorizes the EPM does 

not authorize rulemaking pertaining to candidate nomination petitions, 

those portions of the EPM relied upon by McKenna to invalidate the 

signatures without a complete date were not adopted “pursuant to” § 16-

452. 

¶21 Accordingly, the 2019 EPM’s directive to reject a signature 

without a complete date does not have the force of law, and simply acts as 

guidance. Soto’s noncompliance with the 2019 EPM did not render the 

questioned signatures invalid.
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

8 

III.

¶22 Next, McKenna asserts the trial court erred by finding the 

“incomplete address” signatures valid because: (1) neither Soto nor the 

Recorder presented evidence to rehabilitate the signatures; and (2) the trial 

court relied on an unsupported statement by the Recorder that “all 130 

[signers] were . . . eligible to sign the nomination petition.” He also claims 

the court erred in finding the challenged “incomplete address” and 

“incomplete date” signatures valid without reviewing them for overall 

validity. We disagree.

¶23 We have previously held that “the legislature intended [a] 

signer to identify, on the nominating petition form, the signer’s actual 

residence address or some description of its location, whether by reference 

to ‘[a] place,’ or to the relevant ‘city, town or post office.’” Jenkins, 218 Ariz. 

at 564 ¶ 17. However, we also concluded that signatures need not be 

invalidated for failing to strictly comply with this requirement. Id. ¶ 18. 

¶24 “Actual residential address” is not defined by statute or our 

caselaw. As mentioned above, when the language of a statute is not clear 

and unambiguous, “we apply secondary interpretive principles, such as 

considering ‘the statute’s subject matter, historical background, effect and 

consequences, and spirit and purpose.’” Molera v. Hobbs, 250 Ariz. 13, 24 

¶ 34 (2020) (quoting Rosas v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 249 Ariz. 26, 28 ¶ 13 

(2020)). 

¶25 Similar to the “date of signing” requirement, the purpose of 

requiring a signer’s address is to “provide a means of identifying [the 

signer] as a person entitled to sign such [a] petition and prevent forgeries 

of names, as well as to indicate the precinct in which he lives.” Jenkins, 218 

Ariz. at 564 ¶ 19 (quoting Adams, 77 Ariz. at 321). Accordingly, considering 

the purpose of requiring an “actual residence address,” we conclude the 

legislature intended signers to provide a street address and a city or town, 

or a street address and a zip code. Because of this, a signer must provide a 

city/town or zip code under “actual address” so the election official can 

ascertain whether the signer was eligible to sign the petition.
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

9 

¶26 However, as with the “date of signing” requirement, an 

election official need not necessarily invalidate signatures without a 

city/town or a zip code. See id. ¶ 18. If the official can verify the eligibility 

of a voter using the incomplete address, the purpose of the requirement is 

fulfilled. See § 16-351(E)–(F); Lohr v. Bolick, 249 Ariz. 428, 431 ¶ 10 (2020) 

(holding that a legislative candidate that failed to comply with the statutory 

requirement to list her actual residence address on her nomination petition 

nonetheless substantially complied by listing a private mailbox address). 

¶27 As applied here, the trial court did not err by finding the 

signatures valid. The Recorder’s Memorandum and testimony provided at 

the hearing established that the Recorder had been able to use the 

information provided by the signers to locate the signers’ voter registration 

records. Based on this review, the Recorder determined that all 130 signers 

were eligible to sign. Accordingly, the court did not err by finding the 

signatures valid.

¶28 As with the “incomplete date” signatures, we reject 

McKenna’s argument that Soto had to affirmatively present evidence that 

the signers were eligible to sign his nomination petition. It is true that we 

have stated that, once the presumption of validity disappears, “[t]he 

proponent [of the signatures] . . . may demonstrate to the trier of fact that 

the challenged signatures are those of qualified electors.” Jenkins, 218 Ariz. 

at 565 ¶ 22. We now clarify that the proponent need not present additional 

evidence if sufficient evidence in the record demonstrates the signatures are 

valid. The court may rely on the information in the record before it in

making its determination. Cf. § 16-351(E) (“The county recorder . . . shall

perform petition signature verifications for nomination petition challenges 

. . . and shall provide testimony and other evidence on request of any of the 

parties to the challenge.”). 

¶29 Further, we reject McKenna’s argument that the trial court’s

reliance on the Recorder’s testimony was erroneous because she did not 

determine whether the 130 signatories resided in the correct legislative 

district. McKenna only challenged nine signatures for both listing an 

incomplete address and for being signed by an out-of-district signer, and 

the Recorder invalidated all nine signatures under the out-of-district 
MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

10 

ground. Although the Recorder must verify signatures against challenges 

pursuant to § 16-351(E), it need not conduct a review to ascertain the overall 

validity of a questioned signature. The Recorder may “invalidate signatures 

for legitimate reasons other than those specifically alleged in the 

challenger’s complaint,” but is “not obligate[d] . . . to search for defects 

other than those asserted by the challenger.” McClung v. Bennett, 225 Ariz. 

154, 157 ¶ 13 (2010) (quoting Lubin, 213 Ariz. at 499 ¶ 19). For the same 

reason, McKenna’s argument that the Recorder did not review the 

“incomplete date” signatures for overall validity fails. The challenger bears 

the burden of establishing that the challenged signatures are invalid, and 

requiring the Recorder to search for other reasons to invalidate the 

signatures would defeat the presumption of validity that attaches to 

petition signatures.

CONCLUSION

¶30 We conclude that on this record: (1) the signatures dated by a 

signer with a month and day but no year substantially complied with the 

requirement of a “[d]ate of signing”; and (2) the signatures that listed the 

signer’s street address but no municipality, state, or zip code substantially 

complied with the requirement of an “actual residence address.” The 

Recorder was able to verify voter eligibility on the basis of the information 

that was provided. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding the 

signatures valid, and we affirm its ruling.