IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30468

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GEORGE WILLIAM JARMAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

George Jarman conditionally pleaded guilty to the receipt and attempted 

receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1). 

He challenges the district court’s denial of both his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained in the search of his home and his motion for reconsideration. He 

contends that the district court erred because: (1) it should not have applied 

the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule; (2) the search-warrant 

affidavit for his home does not establish probable cause; and (3) the 

Government’s delay in searching the computers seized from his home violated 

the Fourth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Because 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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the good faith exception applies and the Government’s post-seizure delay did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment, we AFFIRM.

I.

The FBI began investigating Jarman when Jason Collins, the co-owner 

of a computer repair store, called FBI Special Agent (“SA”) Larry Jones in 

November 2007. Collins told SA Jones that he suspected one of his customers 

had child pornography on his hard drive. He said that the customer had 

purchased a new computer and asked him to transfer the data from an old 

computer’s hard drive onto it and to wipe the old hard drive clean. Collins’s 

part-time employee, Charlie Wilson, performed the transfer at the customer’s 

home. During the transfer, Wilson, who could see the file names, but not the 

actual files being copied, noticed file names which appeared to indicate child

pornography. Wilson told Collins what he had seen, and Collins asked Wilson 

to bring the old hard drive back to the store. 

Collins inspected that hard drive, finding several file names suggestive 

of child pornography that he could not open and a video file in the root directory 

depicting a male performing anal sex on a prepubescent male child. Collins 

did not tell SA Jones the names of any of the alleged child pornography 

computer files. But he told SA Jones that he did not believe that the video file 

had been transferred to the new computer because it was on the hard drive’s 

root directory. At the end of the interview, SA Jones asked Collins to keep the 

customer’s hard drive until the FBI contacted him. 

SA Jones requested that an investigation be opened into the allegations, 

and SA Thomas Tedder was assigned the case. Shortly thereafter, SA Tedder

began collaborating with Department of Justice (“DOJ”) attorneys on the case.

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In January 2008, SA Tedder re-interviewed Collins. Collins gave SA 

Tedder the customer’s hard drive1 and told him generally the same story he 

told SA Jones. This time, however, Collins identified the customer as Jarman. 

He also provided more detail about the video file he had seen. When he went 

through the hard drive, Collins explained, he selected one suspected file and 

copied it to his computer to view. That file contained a grainy image of an 

adult male sodomizing a pre-pubescent child whom Collins believed to be under 

the age of twelve. After viewing that file, Collins stopped looking at the drive 

and contacted the FBI. Notably, Collins now claimed that he believed that 

Wilson copied all of the old data—including the possible child pornography—

to Jarman’s new computer, even though he had previously stated that the video 

file containing possible child pornography was not transferred to the new 

computer. SA Tedder testified that he asked Collins about this inconsistency

and that Collins stood by his new conclusion. 

By March 2008, DOJ prosecutor Michael Yoon and SA Tedder had begun 

drafting a search-warrant affidavit for Jarman’s home. While Yoon did most 

of the drafting, SA Tedder corrected misunderstandings of fact and revised

language at least once. 

As of late March 2008, SA Tedder was aware of two investigations by 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that implicated Jarman. 

In the first investigation, which concerned the child pornography site 

“illegal.CP,” ICE obtained Jarman’s email address when it acquired the email 

addresses of those who had purchased access to the website. In the second 

 

1 The district court suppressed the evidence found on this hard drive, holding that 

“the government’s yearlong, warrantless seizure of [it] was unreasonable, and thus, violated 

the Fourth Amendment.” Because that ruling is not challenged on appeal, we do not discuss 

facts specifically relevant to that issue; we address only the court’s rulings on the suppression 

of evidence acquired in a search of Jarman’s home pursuant to a warrant, which are

explained below. 

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investigation, which concerned the child pornography site “Home Collection,” 

ICE determined that Jarman purchased subscriptions to three child 

pornography sites in seven transactions from October 2006 to January 2007.

SA Tedder testified that he talked to ICE agents about these 

investigations and reviewed all of the relevant evidence to ensure that the 

screen captures ICE took from these websites were of prepubescent children 

and that Jarman was, in fact, the person identified in the investigations. 

Moreover, he served a subpoena on Cox Communications to confirm that the 

email address that ICE tied to Jarman’s home was an active account belonging 

to Jarman. However, SA Tedder testified that he did not have any direct 

knowledge that Jarman actually downloaded files from these child 

pornography sites when drafting the search-warrant affidavit. 

In December 2008, SA Tedder submitted a search-warrant affidavit for 

Jarman’s home. A magistrate judge signed the search warrant on December 

5th. Three days later, the FBI executed the warrant, seizing several hard 

drives and computers from Jarman’s home.

Because Jarman was an attorney, the FBI used a “taint process” to 

review the seized data. In this process, a “taint team,” which consisted of a 

DOJ attorney and a FBI computer expert, initially screened the seized data for 

any potentially privileged material before turning it over to the prosecution 

team. The taint team reported the results of their review on August 6, 2009. 

The prosecution team received the hard drives and computers from the 

taint team on September 2, 2009, and July 9, 2010, and the Computer Analysis 

Response Team (“CART”) began its forensic examination. CART completed its 

examination on November 5, 2010, and reported that it found “sexually explicit 

images and videos of minors on the computer hardware.” 

A grand jury subsequently charged Jarman with, among other things,

the receipt and attempted receipt of child pornography (“Count 1”).

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In September 2013, Jarman moved to suppress the fruits of the search 

of his home and for a Franks hearing, arguing that SA Tedder’s affidavit did 

not establish probable cause, omitted material information, and contained 

misrepresentations and unreliable information. The district court held a 

Franks hearing in April 2014. Jarman then sought, and was granted, 

additional discovery because, the court found, there were material

inconsistencies between SA Tedder’s testimony and his draft affidavits. 

In October 2014, the district court denied Jarman’s motion to suppress. 

Because of the effect of the passage of time on one’s memory, the court found, 

SA Tedder’s incorrect statements at the Franks hearing were not deliberate. 

Moreover, the Government’s actions did not give rise to a reckless disregard 

for the truth. Consequently, the court held that, although the “investigation 

may have been less than ideal,” “the good faith exception [to the exclusionary 

rule] applies.” 

Jarman promptly moved for reconsideration and for a second Franks

hearing. The district court granted a second Franks hearing in May 2015. But, 

in August 2015, the court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground 

that the good faith exception still applied. Although it “remain[ed] 

uncomfortable with the [G]overnment’s conduct,” the court still did “not believe 

that Jarman ha[d] established that [SA] Tedder’s conduct was in bad faith.” 

Jarman then conditionally pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, 

reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress the evidence

found in the search of his home. 

Now on appeal, Jarman asserts that the district court erred by denying 

his motions to suppress and for reconsideration because: (1) the good faith 

exception is inapplicable; (2) SA Tedder’s affidavit does not establish probable 

cause; and (3) the Government’s delay in searching the data from his home 

violated the Fourth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.

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II.

This Court reviews the “[f]actual findings in a ruling on a motion to 

suppress . . . for clear error” and questions of law de novo. United States v. 

Moore, 805 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “The clearly 

erroneous standard is particularly deferential where, as here, denial of a 

suppression motion is based on live oral testimony . . . because the judge had 

the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” United States v. 

Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). But “the 

constitutionality of law enforcement action” and the “determination of the 

reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s reliance upon a warrant issued 

by a magistrate . . . for purposes of determining the applicability of the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule” are questions of law that are reviewed 

de novo. United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, “[t]he evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, here,” the Government. Moore, 805 F.3d at 593 (citation 

omitted). 

This Court “generally review[s] the denial of a motion to reconsider for 

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rabhan, 540 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). 

We hold that the district court did not err in denying suppression of the 

evidence the Government seized from Jarman’s home because: (1) Jarman 

failed to carry his burden to show that the good faith exception does not apply;

and (2) Jarman was not entitled to suppression based on the Government’s 

delay in completing its search of the evidence because: (a) Jarman waived the 

claim that the Government violated Rule 41; and (b) the Government did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment because it acted reasonably under the 

circumstances.

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A.

We begin by considering whether the district court erred by applying the 

good faith exception. Moore, 805 F.3d at 593 (citation omitted).

The good faith exception bars the application of the exclusionary rule to 

exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant if law enforcement officers 

act under an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that the search warrant 

in question is valid—even if it, in fact, is not. Robinson, 741 F.3d at 594 

(citation omitted). But the good faith exception is not applicable if “the issuingjudge was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false 

or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” 

United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

“[T]he initial burden here is upon the defendant.” United States v. Cavazos, 

288 F.3d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, in attempting to impeach the warrant, 

the defendant must establish: (1) “a knowing or reckless falsehood” by omission 

or commission; (2) “that without the falsehood there would not be sufficient 

matter in the affidavit to support the issuance of the warrant”; and that (3) 

“[t]he omitted material [is] . . . dispositive, so that if the omitted fact were 

included, there would not be probable cause.” Robinson, 741 F.3d at 595 

(citations omitted); United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Jarman avers that the district court erred in holding that the good faith 

exception applies, challenging more than a dozen statements in and omissions 

from the search-warrant affidavit for his home.2 The Government, on the other 

 

2 Specifically, Jarman asserts that the good faith exception does not apply because SA 

Tedder: (1) made false statements at the Franks hearings; (2) falsely stated in the searchwarrant affidavit that members of the taint team would not be involved in the investigation 

when Yoon was involved with both; (3) made a false statement when he swore to the affidavit 

and led the magistrate to believe that he had sufficiently corroborated and verified the 

information in it; (4) acted in bad faith when he described child-pornography offenders’ 

characteristics in the affidavit and asserted and relied upon the nexus between them and the 

assertion that Jarman likely hoarded child pornography; (5) included file names in the 

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hand, argues that the district court correctly held that the good faith exception 

applies because Jarman has not shown that any statements in the affidavit 

were knowingly or recklessly false. Moreover, the Government asserts, 

Jarman has not identified any material omissions from the affidavit, let alone 

any omissions constituting knowing or reckless falsehoods. 

The district court heard all of the evidence and received extensive 

briefing. The court then found that Jarman failed to satisfy the requirements 

for attacking the good faith exception because, it determined, the Government 

and SA Tedder did not act in bad faith and the statements and omissions that 

Jarman calls material knowing or reckless falsehoods and omissions were 

neither deliberate nor made in reckless disregard for the truth. After hearing

oral argument and studying the briefs, applicable parts of the record, and the 

relevant law, we can find no error in the district court’s application of the good 

faith exception. We especially recognize that the district court had the 

opportunity to observe witnesses. Robinson, 741 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). 

 

affidavit that he had no basis for including; (6) should not have implied in the affidavit that 

Collins easily selected one file and observed the grainy image of an adult male sodomizing a 

male child; (7) deliberately inserted in the affidavit the false statement that “[p]er JARMAN’s 

request, all data from the old computer, to include the files depicting suspected child 

pornography, was transferred over to the new computer at JARMAN’S residence”; (8) 

knowingly and recklessly inserted in the affidavit the false statement that “Jarman retained 

images of child pornography from October 2006 to November 2007 on the computer located 

at his residence”; (9) did not mention in the affidavit that accessing or viewing child 

pornography was not illegal before October 2008 or that the inadvertent downloading of child 

pornography into temporary internet files did not necessarily constitute possession; (10) did 

not mention in the affidavit that: (a) there was no evidence that Jarman accessed or 

downloaded child pornography; (b) there was nothing showing that Jarman’s home 

computers were linked to child pornography; and (c) the illegal.CP subscription information 

was not associated with Jarman’s home; (11) made a false statement by swearing to the 

affidavit without explaining that Yoon drafted most of it; (12) showed a reckless disregard 

for the truth by re-interviewing Collins instead of interviewing Wilson and at least recklessly 

omitted any mention of SA Jones’s initial interview of Collins and Collins’s initial statement 

regarding what data was transferred; and (13) at least recklessly failed to include in the 

affidavit the facts that Collins only found a single, grainy image of child pornography in the 

root directory and that the only suggestive file names Collins saw were located in temporary 

internet files that were not viewable.

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Furthermore, evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the”

Government. See Moore, 805 F.3d at 593 (citation omitted). We thus uphold 

the application of the good faith exception to any defects alleged by Jarman. 

B.

We now turn to Jarman’s contention that the district court erred by

rejecting his argument that the duration of the Government’s post-seizure 

review of his computer data requires the suppression of the seized evidence. 

The district court did not explicitly rule on this issue as it relates to the 

evidence that is the subject of the warrant. The court, however, necessarily 

rejected this claim when it denied Jarman’s motions to suppress. And “this

court may . . . independently review the record to determine whether the 

district court’s decision is supported by any reasonable review of the evidence.” 

United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs [the] Fourth 

Amendment analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant.” E.g., 

United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998). As “many circuits have 

recognized,” the Fourth Amendment “contain[s no] requirements about when 

the search or seizure is to occur or the duration.” United States v. Cote, 72 M.J. 

41, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (citation omitted); United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 

1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993). Courts have therefore consistently “permitted 

some delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers because of

the complexity of the search” and they often restrict their “analysis of the delay 

in executing . . . warrants [to] consider[ing] only whether the delay rendered 

the warrants stale.” E.g., United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005). 

Jarman contends that the district court erred by not granting 

suppression because the Government violated the Fourth Amendment and 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 by taking twenty-three months to finish 

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searching the data it seized. His overarching argument is that this delay was

unreasonable. 

The Government counters that Jarman is not entitled to suppression on 

this basis. Jarman, the Government asserts, waived the claim that its actions 

violated Rule 41. Moreover, the Government argues, it acted reasonably under 

the circumstances, and the only case Jarman relies upon, United States v. 

Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), is distinguishable.

We hold that the district court did not err by not granting suppression

based on the duration of the Government’s post-seizure review of the data it 

seized from Jarman’s home. First, Jarman waived the claim that the 

Government’s actions violated Rule 41 because he merely mentions the issue 

in a footnote with little or no argument. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 

F.3d 433, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (summarizing this Court’s 

appellate briefing requirements). 

Second, Jarman is not entitled to suppression under the Fourth 

Amendment because the duration of the Government’s review of the seized 

data was reasonable under the circumstances. The taint process here was 

designed to protect Jarman’s clients’ privileged information. Courts have 

recognized that, in such circumstances, it is appropriate to screen privileged 

information. See, e.g., Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 215. Moreover, the taint team 

review only took eight months. And the Government completed its forensic 

examination less than four months after it received the last of the hard drives 

and computers from the taint team. These periods are within the typical 

periods of delay in executing warrants that courts have permitted due to the 

complexity involved in searching computers. See, e.g., Syphers, 426 F.3d at 

469.

Moreover, Jarman has not argued that the delay caused the warrant to 

become stale. Even if he had, “[n]umerous cases hold that a delay of several 

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months” or even years “between the seizure of electronic evidence and the 

completion of the government’s review of [it] . . . is reasonable” and does not 

render the warrant stale, especially in child-pornography cases. Metter, 860 F. 

Supp. 2d at 215 (emphasis omitted).3 

Additionally, the one case Jarman relies upon—an out-of-circuit district 

court opinion—is inapposite. In Metter, the Government had not even begun 

to “conduct[] its [privilege] review of the [electronic] evidence seized” fifteen 

months after the warrant was executed and had “no plans whatsoever to begin

review of that data.” Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 211, 215. Here, by contrast, 

the Government completed its privilege review in eight months. Then, by the 

end of twenty-three months, it completed its entire review of the evidence. 

Further, in Metter, the court found that the Government displayed a “lack of 

good faith” because it “failed to commence the review [of the evidence], despite 

repeated requests from defense counsel and directions from the Court to do so,” 

and it “indicate[d] that it had no intention of fulfilling its obligations” to do so. 

Id. at 216. Here, however, Jarman does not accuse the Government of 

similarly acting in bad faith. Thus, Jarman is not entitled to suppression based 

on the duration of the Government’s post-seizure review of his computer data. 

 

3 Accord, e.g., United States v. Kleinkauf, 487 F. App’x 836, 838–39 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(finding that a nine-month delay did not render information stale); United States v. Allen, 

625 F.3d 830, 842–43 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that an eighteen-month delay did not render 

information stale); United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding 

that a sixteen-month delay did not render information stale); United States v. Morales–

Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that a three-year delay did not render 

information stale); Syphers, 426 F.3d at 469 (finding that a five-month delay was reasonable); 

United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that a five-year delay 

did not render information stale); United States v. Newsom, 402 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(“Information a year old is not necessarily stale as a matter of law.”); United States v. Gorrell, 

360 F. Supp. 2d 48, 55 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that a ten-month delay was reasonable).

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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