alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10726

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 and

DALLAS MORNING NEWS, INC.,

 Intervenor-Appellant,

versus

JOSEPH EDWARD CHAVIS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:96-CR-015-P

- - - - - - - - - -

March 20, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joseph Edward Chavis, Jr. was convicted for robbing a

federally insured bank. The district court originally sealed

Chavis’s combined motion for downward departure based upon

“aberrant behavior” and sentencing memorandum with exhibits. The

district court subsequently entered its order unsealing a
No. 96-10726

-2-

redacted version of Chavis’s motion. The Dallas Morning News,

Inc. (the News) appeals this action.

“In exercising its discretion to seal judicial records, the

court must balance the public’s common law right of access

against the interest favoring nondisclosure.” Securities &

Exchange Commission v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th

Cir. 1993). The district court considered the factors weighing

in favor of nondisclosure and noted that the case presented no

peculiar circumstances which would compel disclosure. The

district court’s order is not general in nature, but is very

specific to particular information, in one particular document,

in this defendant’s sentencing proceeding. The News has not

shown that the district court abused its discretion in redacting

certain portions of Chavis’s sentencing memorandum. 

The News invites this court to dispense with the abuse of

discretion standard for releasing judicial documents enunciated 

in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99

(1978). To accept such an invitation would require that Nixon be

overruled, which is beyond the power of this court. 

AFFIRMED.
Join U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) subject matter experts, including Fire Administrator Dr. Lori Moore-Merrell, as we participate in discussions on, and provide resources for, the promotion of safety standards and practices in the fire and emergency medical services.

## USFA presenters

## Dr. Lori Moore-Merrell

U.S. Fire Administrator

Dr. Moore-Merrell will speak at the General Session on Jan. 17 from 7:40 a.m. to 10 a.m. on the unique and difficult leadership challenges of maintaining a fire department's culture of unity and bridging the generation gap.

## Eriks Gabliks

Superintendent, National Fire Academy

Superintendent Gabliks will present on Jan. 20 from 8‑8:45 a.m. on fire service behavioral health, including peer support, employee assistance, line-of-duty death, culture change and resources available to help and support departments of all types.

## USFA health, safety and wellness resources

Download or order

Download or order

Download or order

More resources
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 81 (Thursday, April 26, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 21001]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-10354]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases Special Emphasis Panel.
    Date: May 21, 2001.
    Time: 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Four Points by Sheraton, 8400 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, 
MD 20814.
    Contact Person: Robert C. Goldman, PhD, Scientific Review 
Administrator, Scientific Review Program, Divisions of Extramural 
Activities, NIAID, NIH, Room 2217, 6700-B Rockledge Drive, MSC 7610, 
Bethesda, MD 20892-7610, 301 496-2550, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#61130650545816210f08094f060e17"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5c2e3b6d69652b1c323534723b332a">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.855, 
Allergy, Immunology and Transplantation Research; 93.856, 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Research, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: April 20, 2001.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 01-10354 Filed 4-25-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed June 14, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ Nos. 3D22-1130, 3D22-1131 Lower Tribunal Nos. F17-12421B, F19-3602A

________________ 

### Chentee Key, Appellant,
vs. 

### The State of Florida, Appellee.
Appeals under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lody Jean, Judge. Chentee Key, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, SCALES and HENDON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
#### *In re*KRAWITZ, Michael James

(MR 21684)

Chicago, IL

Order of the Court:

The motion by Michael James Krawitz to strike his name from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Illinois pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 762(a) is allowed, effective immediately.
# Final Raw Data - Website
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-16-0000074 09-FEB-2017 08:01 AM
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dante Prestigiacomo, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from judgment of Ontario County Court, Reed, J. — burglary, third degree.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5
<LEGEND>
The Schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from the balance sheet and income statement and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                 MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                         10,338
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  29,794
<ALLOWANCES>                                      162
<INVENTORY>                                    66,198
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              120,992
<PP&E>                                         15,750
<DEPRECIATION>                                  9,024
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                130,079
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          15,701
<BONDS>                                        17,145
<COMMON>                                        8,407
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                     82,137
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  130,079
<SALES>                                       259,797
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              259,797
<CGS>                                         236,071
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 236,071
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               12,366
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              3,112
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 8,248
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (2,970)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            12,100
<DISCONTINUED>                                    618
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   11,482
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    1.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.53


</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.16

SUMMARY OF COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THECOOPERATIVES NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND DIRECTORS

Compensation Arrangement for the Cooperatives
Named Executive Officer

Following is a description of the compensation arrangement for Stephen R. Wright, the Cooperatives Named Executive Officer:

|                  |  |                                                       
|----------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------
|Stephen R. Wright |  | $160,000 annual base salary beginning August 19, 2007,
|                  |  | pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement with
|                  |  | the Cooperative.                                      

Compensation Arrangements for
Directors

Directors of the Cooperative are paid an annual retainer. Each director who is a member-grower receives an annual retainer of $8,000, except Mr. Call, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Cooperative, receives an annual retainer of $12,000. Each non-member grower director, namely Mr. Harrington Jr., Mr. Lipinski and Mr. Stotz receive a retainer at an annual rate of $20,000.

---
#### Milo D. BURROUGHS, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF the ARMY, Respondent.

No. 2011-3187.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Sept. 6, 2011.

*999Milo D. Burroughs, Yelm, WA, for Petitioner.

Vincent D. Phillips, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

PER CURIAM.

ORDER

Milo D. Burroughs moves for reconsideration of the court's previous rejection of his petition for review as untimely.

On April 27, 2011, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Burroughs’ petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. Burroughs received the decision on April 30, 2011. The court received Burroughs’ petition for review on July 6, 2011, or 66 days after Burroughs received the Board’s final order.

A petition for review must be received by the court within 60 days of receipt of notice of the Board’s final order. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). To be timely filed, the petition must be received by this court on or before the date that the petition is due. *Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management,*931 F.2d 1544, 1546 (Fed.Cir.1991) (petition is filed when received by this court; court dismissed petition received nine days late). Because Burroughs’ petition was not timely received by this court, it must be dismissed. *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived).

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

Burroughs’ motion for reconsideration is denied and this petition for review is dismissed as untimely filed.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6254 

To amend the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to provide for certain 

exceptions to the mandatory 30-day waiting period before new or modified flood insurance coverage takes effect. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to 

provide for certain exceptions to the mandatory 30-day 

waiting period before new or modified flood insurance 

coverage takes effect. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6254 IH

1 SECTION 1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE MANDATORY 30-DAY 

2 WAITING PERIOD FOR NEW FLOOD INSUR3 ANCE COVERAGE TO TAKE EFFECT UNDER 

4 THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PRO5 GRAM. 

6 (a) WAIVER BY THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SE7 CURITY.—Section 1306(c)(2) of the National Flood Insur8 ance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4013(c)(2)) is amended— 

9 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and 

10 inserting ‘‘;’’; 

11 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period 

12 and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

13 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

14 paragraph: 

15 ‘‘(C) the purchase of flood insurance cov16 erage for which the Secretary of Homeland Se17 curity waives the 30-day waiting period referred 

18 to in paragraph (1) due to an occurrence that 

19 the Secretary determines has caused the area 

20 covered by such flood insurance to be more sus21 ceptible to flooding than before such occurrence, 

22 which waiver the Secretary may apply retro23 actively.’’. 

24 (b) RETROACTIVE WAIVER FOR CERTAIN PROP25 ERTIES IN AREAS NEWLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLOODING.— 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6254 IH

1 (1) WAIVER.—Notwithstanding section 1306(c) 

2 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 

3 U.S.C. 4013(c)), the Administrator of the Federal 

4 Emergency Management Agency shall ensure that 

5 flood insurance coverage of a covered property under 

6 a covered contract takes effect beginning on the date 

7 that all obligations for such coverage (including com8 pletion of the application and payment of any initial 

9 premiums owed) were satisfactorily completed. 

10 (2) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 

11 (A) COVERED CONTRACT.—The term ‘‘cov12 ered contract’’ means a new contract for flood 

13 insurance coverage under the National Flood 

14 Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.) 

15 entered into on or before July 20, 2010, or any 

16 modification to coverage under an existing flood 

17 insurance contract under such Act made on or 

18 before that date. 

19 (B) COVERED PROPERTY.—The term ‘‘cov20 ered property’’ means a property that is located 

21 in an area that, due to a wildfire that began on 

22 June 20, 2010, became more susceptible to 

23 flooding than before the occurrence of such 

24 wildfire. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of Lazare Kaplan International Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Leon Tempelsman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

| Date: August 29, 2008 |   |      |
|-----------------------|--------|-----------|
|                       |   | By:  | /s/  Leon Tempelsman |
|                  |   |      |  |
|                  |   |      | Leon TempelsmanPresident and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOSE MARTINEZ,

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-17-00165-CR

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 1

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20160C07540)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant’s third motion for extension of time within which to 

file the brief until January 19, 2018. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Ruben P. Morales, the Appellant’s attorney, 

prepare the Appellant’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before January 19, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of December, 2017.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Titus, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gallagher, J.), rendered August 31,1984, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress certain physical evidence.

Ordered that judgment is affirmed.

The arresting officer, the only witness at the *Mapp*hearing, testified that, on October 31, 1983, at about 10:50 p.m., he and his partner were on radio motor patrol in the vicinity of Liberty Avenue between 148th and 150th Streets in Queens County. They were flagged down by an identified citizen who informed them that his friend had been robbed across the street. The officers approached the alleged victim, Michael Williams, who told them that the defendant, standing next to *429him, had just robbed him of his jacket and some cash. The defendant’s hand was in his right jacket pocket and, when the officer told him to remove it, an umbrella handle fell to the ground. The defendant was then placed under arrest.

We find that the hearing court properly declined to suppress the physical evidence. Probable cause to arrest a suspect may be based upon information provided to the police by an identified informant that a particular individual has committed a crime *(see, People v Murphy,*97 AD2d 873; *People v Sanders,*79 AD2d 688). In any event, the defendant was not arrested solely upon the initial information provided but only after the victim, who was clearly competent to identify the defendant as the perpetrator, had informed the police as to what had transpired *(see, People v Brown,*117 AD2d 741, 742; *People v Joyner,*109 AD2d 753).

Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must *(see, People v Malizia,*62 NY2d 755, *cert denied*469 US 932), we find that the verdict was rationally based upon proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of every element of the crime charged *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620). The various inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses merely posed questions of credibility which were for the trier of the fact to resolve *(see, People v Herriot,*110 AD2d 851; *People v Bigelow,*106 AD2d 448). A reasonable doubt did not arise solely because these witnesses had criminal records *(see, People v Peterson,*112 AD2d 172; *People v Sutton,*108 AD2d 942).

We find that the defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Niehoff, J. P., Rubin, Kunzeman and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Malinowski, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Cowhey, J.), rendered June 7, 1984, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the second degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that because there was a possibility that during an emergency evacuation of the courthouse the jury might have seen him in handcuffs, the court erred in denying his request for a mistrial or alternatively for a voir dire of the jury concerning this event. The defendant adduced no evidence to show that members of the jury did see him, but instead relied upon the statement of his trial counsel, who claimed that during the evacuation he saw the defendant through a courthouse window. Our review of the record indicates that the defendant’s allegations regarding his viewing by the jury are unsubstantiated, and therefore we find that there was no improvident exercise of discretion by the trial court in not allowing a voir dire of the jury *(see, People v Harper,*47 NY2d 857, 858; *People v Volpe,*116 AD2d 609, 610) or in refusing to declare a mistrial *(Hall v Potoker,*49 NY2d 501; *People v Michael,*48 NY2d 1). As to the defendant’s remaining contention, we find that the mere possibility that the jury might have seen the defendant in handcuffs did not involve prejudice to the defendant so as to require a curative instruction *sua sponte.*Since there was no application by the defendant for a curative instruction, this issue is unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). Mangano, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6311 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6311

  To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to authorize the United States Trade 
  Representative to take discretionary action if a foreign country is 
 engaging in unreasonable acts, policies, or practices relating to the 
                  environment, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 29, 2010

 Mr. Blumenauer (for himself, Ms. Linda T. Sanchez of California, Mr. 
Lewis of Georgia, and Mr. Doggett) introduced the following bill; which 
            was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to authorize the United States Trade 
  Representative to take discretionary action if a foreign country is 
 engaging in unreasonable acts, policies, or practices relating to the 
                  environment, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN TRADE RELATIONS.

    Section 301(d)(3)(B) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
2411(d)(3)(B)) is amended--
            (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in clause (iii)(V), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new clause:
                            ``(iv) constitutes a persistent pattern of 
                        conduct that--
                                    ``(I) fails to effectively enforce 
                                the environmental laws of a foreign 
                                country;
                                    ``(II) waives or otherwise 
                                derogates from the environmental laws 
                                of a foreign country or weakens the 
                                protections afforded by such laws;
                                    ``(III) fails to provide for 
                                judicial or administrative proceedings 
                                giving access to remedies for 
                                violations of the environmental laws of 
                                a foreign country; or
                                    ``(IV) fails to provide appropriate 
                                and effective sanctions or remedies for 
                                violations of the environmental laws of 
                                a foreign country.''.
                                 <all>
```