### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 14, 200 4

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . SHERI DAN ARMSTRONG

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-12797 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2003-02100-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 20, 2004

The defe ndant, Sheridan Armstrong
, was convicted of felony murder and ag g ravated chi l d abuse. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d c on c ur

re nt s e nte nc e s o f l if

e wi th the po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le a ndtw e nty

y e ars , re sp e c ti v e l y

. I n t h i s ap p e a l o f r i g h t , t h e d e f

e n d a n tc o n t e n d s t h a t

t h e t r i a l c o u r te rr e d b y

f a i l i n g to suppress h i s s t at em ent t o police and a rg ues that the e vidence supporting e ach c onviction was insufficient. The judgme nts of the trial court are aff irmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Ga rl a ndEr g ud e n ( on app e a l)
, Phy lli s Al uk o ( a t tria l) , a ndKa re n M a sse y

(at tria l) , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe n d er s , fo r t h e a p p el l an t , S h er i d an Ar m s t ro n g.

Paul G. Summers. A ttorney Gene ral & Re porter; Miche lle Chapman McIntire, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Linda Kirklen a nd J ames Wax
, Assistant D istrict A ttorney s Gene ral, for the a ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I n Jan ua ry of 20 01 , T a me ka

Stu c ke y , th e mothe r o f the tw e nty -t wo -m on th- oldma le vic tim
, J ay lon Stucke y , resided with he r two children and the defe ndant in a n apartment in Memphis. After

an ar g ument, the def

endant pr ovided her

with the money nece ssary to purcha se m edication for the victim, who had a cold. When Ms. Stuckey returne d an hour or two af ter he r depa

rture, he r mother was pre sent and informed her that the victim had bee n taken to the hospital. The de fenda nt had te le ph on e d 9 11 a nda c c omp a nie d th e vic tim to the ho sp ita l in the a mbu la nc e

. Th re e ho ur s la te r, Ms. Stuckey learned fr om hospital personnel that the victim’s hea rt had stopped.-2-

L ie ute na nt R e g ina ld M or g a n o f the Me mph is Pol ic e De pa rt me nt int e rv ie we d the de fe nd a nt. After initiallydeny ing that he had ha rmed the vic tim, the defenda nt later c onfesse d in a typewritten state me nt tha t pr ov ide d, in p art , a s f oll ow s:

I g ot home, me and [Ms

. Stuckey ] wa s arg uing and she was talkin[g] about moving to Missi ssippi to work at Walmart and I told [ her] I

was g onna g et my

clothes and move bac k home wit h my mom. I tried to talk to her a

bout our problems bec ause I didn’t want her

to go.

We w or ke d it ou t a ndsh e a sk e d me fo r s ome mon e y to g o to g e t [th e vic tim ] som e medicine. [Ms. St uckey ] l eft a nd me and [the victim] was lef t at the h o u s e. Iwas cle a n in g u p th e h o u s e a f

te r s h e le f t a n d [t h e v ic ti m] g o t u p o u t th e b ed and he was
c r y in g a n d h e w a s g e tt ing to me an d I a s k e d h im

to b e q u ie t. I

to ld[t h e v ic ti m] I loved him and af

ter that I kicked him once in his chest and he fell on the floor . He g ot up on his own and he was crying. I kicked him ag ain and he fell on the dresser and b u m p ed the bac k of his head a nd he fe ll to the floor. I picked him up and put him on the couch and called his g randma and tol d her he wasn’t r esponding to me.

. . .

T h e S h e l b y C o u n t y M e d i c a l E x a m i n e r , D r

. O ’ B r i a n C l ar y S m i th
, w h o p e rf o rm e d th e a u t o p s y, found “blunt trauma

to the head, blunt trauma to the che st that produce d injury to the i nterna l org ans o[f] the che st, blunt trauma to the abdomen that produce d internal inj uries to the abdomen, with . .

. e xten siv e te ari ng of

the liv e r, [an d] a sso c ia te d b le e din g that pu t th e c hil d in to s ho c k” re su lti ng in death. Dr . Smit h found t hat t he inj uries were compara ble t o those expected in a fall from twenty -two fee t or an automobile accide nt at twenty -five miles pe r hour. It was his opinion that the nature of the injuries was c onsistent with the victim’s having be en kicke d twice by an adult and ha ving struc k his he a d o n a

pie c e of fu rn itu re . D r. Smith c on c lud e d that the vic tim wo uld ha ve sh ow n s y mpt oms of his injuries immediately and would have been in shock within a matter of minutes, dy ing no mor e than two hours later . I t was his belief tha t the death wa s a homicide.

At trial, Fr ank Cole, the victim’ s b io lo g ic a l father , testified on beha lf of the de fense , imply ing that Ms. Stuckey may have been responsible for the injuries. He stated that he observe d a burn on the victim’s leg in May of 2000 and took him to the doctor in spite of Ms. Stuckey ’s wishes to the

c o n tr ar y

. Co le a c k n o w le d g e d d u r in g c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n th a t h e h a d n e v e r s e e n M s

. Stu c k e y

“ r a is e [] a hand to e ither one of

her c hildren.”

The de fenda nt, testify ing on his own be half, prof essed his love for the victim and denied that he ha d k ic ke d h im. He state d th a t he me t T a me ka Stu c ke y a t Wa l- Ma

rt , the ir pla c e of

e mpl oy me nt, and moved in with her

some months later. The de fenda nt testified that on t h e m o rn i n g o f the victim’s death, he inter viewed f or a se cond job at McD onald’s and then s t o p p ed at his m other’s residenc e bef

ore returning to the apartment he shared with Ms. Stuckey and her family

. He r eca lled that he and Ms. Stuckey watche d a movi e before he returned to his mother’s re sidence . He c laimed that late r, Ms. S tu ckey te le ph on e d, a sk ing that he re turn h e r c ar. Ac c or din g to the de fe nd a nt, his-3-

y ou ng e r b ro the r, wh o ha d spe nt the nig ht, a nd Ms. Stu c ke y ’s old e r ch ild ha d lef t the apa rt me nt w ith Ms. Stuckey ’s aunt by

the time of his return. He maintained that beca use the victim had be en sick for a wee k, he g ave Ms. Stuckey money to purcha se m edicine. T he def endant c ontended that a fter she left, he was c leaning the house whe n he noticed something wrong with the vi ctim. He c laimed that aft er ca l l ing both his mother a nd Ms. Stuckey ’s mother, he telephoned 911 twic e and

acc ompanied the victim to the hospital. The def endant testifi ed t h at whil e the victim was be ing tr e a te d a t th e ho sp ita l, h e a sk e d to bo rr ow Ms. Stu c ke y ’s c ar t o p ic k u p h is m oth e r. Ac c or din g to the def endant, he stopped at his residenc e to drop off some g roce ries Ms. Stuckey had lef t in the car
, phoned his mother, and the n learned that the victim had died. The defenda nt acknow ledg ed that ea ch detail he ha d provided in his f ive-pa g e statement to the police wa s truthful with the exception that he had not kicked t he victim

. He ex plained that he c onfesse d to kicking the victim onlybeca use he felt threa tened by the office rs, one of whom had a g un on the table, a nd beca use they had promised he would be r elea sed.

I

I nitially , the def

endant c ontends that the trial court e rre d by failing to suppress his pre- trial state me nt t o p oli c e . T he state dis a g re e s.

At the hea

ri n g o n the motion to suppress, L ieutenant Robert Shemwell, who assisted L ieutenant Morg an w it

hth e in terview of the defe ndant, conduc ted eig ht day s after the victim’s death,

c on fi rm e d th a t Lie ute na nt M or g a n a dv ise d the defe nd ant o f h is M ir a nd a ri g hts . A c c or din g to L ieutenant Shemwe ll, while the defe ndant informed the office rs that he ha d a tenth gra de educ ation

a ndc ou ld n ot r e a d w e ll, he wa s a ble to r e a d th e a dv ic e of

ri g hts fo rm

a lo ud be fo re a ff

ixing his sig na tur e . I t wa s his re c oll e c tio n tha t the de fe nd a nt wa s not und e r the inf lue nc e of a lc oh ol o r d ru g s,
w a s n o ta c t i n g i n a n u n u s u a l m a n n e r , u n d e r s t o o d t h e q u e s t i o n s , a n d c o n v e r s e d c o h e r e n t l y. L ieutenant Shemwe ll testified that the defendant ini tially denied involvement in the victim’s death, bu t c on fe sse d to ha vin g kic ke d th e vic tim wh e n c on fr on te d withthe me dic a l e xami ne r’ s f ind ing s. He r eca lled that the def

endant a g ree d to give a wr i t ten statement a nd that Anne L ang ford, a transcriptionis t with the department, typed the que stions and the response s. He testified that af ter the interrog ation, another

department employ ee r ead the statement to the def endant, who then sig ned it. Accor ding to Lieutenant Shemwe ll, the statement was beg un at 4:30 p.m. on J anuary 11, 2001,

a nde nd e d at 6: 10 p. m. He a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt’ s a rm wa s h a nd c uf

fe d to his c ha ir during questioning, but de nied that either he or Lieutenant M o rga n h ad ever thre atene d the defe ndant, beha ved in a phy sically ag g ressive manner with the defe ndant, or promised the defe ndant that he would be rele ased if he g ave a statement. The lieute nant, who stated tha t he was una rmed during the int er ro gat i o n , testified that the def endant ne ither re quested a n attorney nor g ave a ny indication that he wa s in phy sical di scomfort. He testified that the s tatement wa s not tape re corde d beca use it was depa

rtment policy

to take a w ritten statement when a transc riptionist was available.

L ieutenant Morg an gene rally confirme d the t estimony of L ieutenant Shemwell. He re called that afte r he a dvised the def endant of his Miranda rig hts, the defe ndant re ad the first three lines of the advice of rig hts form aloud and the remainder to himself. The off icer testified that the def

endant-4-

was c ohere nt, understood his rig ht s , and wa s fre e fr om the influence of any drug s or alcohol. He

re c a lle d th a t du ri ng the c ou rs e of the int e rv ie w, the y

pr ov ide d th e de fe nd a nt w ith a so ft dr ink , p otato

c hip s, a nd ba thr oo m br e aks

. L ie ute na nt Mo rg a n state d that th e de fe nd a nt w a s c a lm d ur ing the fi rs t two to three hour s, but showed ner vousness when the y beg an discussing his involvement in the vic tim ’s inj ur ie s. He de nie d be ing arm e d d ur ing the int e rr og a tio n a ndfu rthe r d e nie d th re a te nin g to “fry [t he def endant] for this.” Ac cording to L ieutenant Morg an, the defe ndant “starte d crying at the emotion he fe lt f

or the child

. . . . And he made the statement to us that if they do char g e me, I

hope they . . . char g e me with murde r one be cause of wha t I have done .”

Dr . Fre d St e inb e rg , a c lin ic a l a nd fo re ns ic ps y c ho log ist , te sti fi e d o n b e ha lf of the de fe nd a nt. He state d th a t a ft e r p e rf

or min g a fo re ns ic ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n o f the defe nd ant , it w a s h is opinion that the defe ndant suffe red f rom mild mental retar dation. The doctor determined that the defe ndant had a

verba l I Q of 64 a nd a full-sc ale I Q o f 6 1
, ac companied by a consistent leve l of

rea ding c omprehe nsion difficulty . He r elated that the defe ndant re ad on a third- g rade level and tha t the advice of rig hts form provided f or his signature wa s written on a f ifth-g rade level. Dr . Steinberg te s ti f ie d th a t it w a s h is o p in io n th a t th e d e f e n d a n t “ w a s n o t a

b le to r e a d a n d u n d e r s ta n d h is a d v i[ c ]e of ri g hts .” I t w a s a lso his op ini on that th e de fe nd a nt wa s in the thi rd pe rc e nti le of the po pu la tio n in listening compre hension. Upon questioning, he conce ded that it wa s “har d to say ” what impact the de fe nd a nt’ s p ri or

e xpe ri e nc e wi th the c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m ha d o n h is co mpr e he ns ion of his Mir a nd a ri g hts

.
Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t he did no t re c a ll be ing a dv ise d of his Mir a nd a ri g hts a t a ny

tim e or having any one rea d his f ive-pa g e statement to him. He stated that the off icer s who interrog ated him were “rude ” and spoke to him like they wer e “upset.” The defenda nt contended that one offic er, wh o mh e c o u l d n o ti d en t i fy
, t h re at en ed t o “s h o o t [ h i s ] as s ” an d t h at t h eyp ro m i s ed h i mh e c o u l d go home if he c ooperated. He insisted that had he understood his rig hts, he would have re fused to spea k to police and would ha ve re quested a n attorn ey

. Al t houg h the def endant c ould not reca ll signing

a nythi ng , h e a c kn ow le dged th at hi s si g na tur e app e are d o n th e ty pe writt e n s ta te me nt. An g e la Armstrong , the defendant’s mother, was also a witness at the suppre ssion hearing . She testified that the twenty -three -y ear -old defe ndant could not re ad and ha s a short attention span.

Dr. Ly nn Z ag er, a Ph.D. psy cholog ist and the fore nsic service s direc tor of Mi d-Town Me ntal Hea lth Center, provided rebuttal testimony on behalf of the state. While Dr. Z ag er a cknowledg ed that th e de fe nd a nt w a s mil dly re tard e d, sh e did no t be lie ve that he wa s a s “ low fu nc tio nin g ” a s h is school rec ords indicated. D r. Z ag er te stified that afte r she told the def endant that he r examination was not conf

idential, the def

endant c orre ctly

interpre ted her

comment to mean, “ Whatever I show y ou, y ou show the [j] udg e, the pr osecutor a nd the lawy er.”

At the conc lusion of the suppression hea ring , the trial court found that the def endant

u n d e r s t o o d h i s M i r a n d a

r i g h t s a n d t h a th i s c o n f

e s s i o n t o p o l i c e w a s k n o w i n g a n d v o l u n t ar y:

I am .

. . g oing to consider the fac t based on the proof f rom the juvenile c ourt file that [the de fenda nt] has been throug h the juvenile sy stem. He wa s repr esente d-5-

by an attorne y

a t th a t t im e

. A n d s o h e h a s s o me f a mi li ar it y n o t o n ly w ith

. . . the le g a l s y s te m, b u t h e h a s s o me f a mi li ar it y w ith th e f

a c t th a t h e

. . . is e n ti tle d to a lawy er. I also note that both doctors, Dr . Z ag er a nd Dr. Stei nberg , ag ree d that [t he defe ndant] showed some signs of malinge ring

. . . . Id i d n o t e

. . . t h a t[th e d e f e n d a n ti s ] a

b l e t o d r i v e a n a u t o m o b i l e

. . . . I d id note that he wa s able to cite a nd g ive his soc ial security number, his phone number
, h i s a d d r e s s

. H e w a s ab l e t o g i v e [ t h a t ] i n f o r m a t i o n c l e ar l y a n d c o n c i s e l y. * * * [I ]t’ s o bv iou s to the c ou rt that [ th e def

e nd a nt] h a s th e abil ity

to r e c a ll d e ta ils
, sp e c if ic a lly sp e ll tho se de ta ils ou t, r e pe a t th os e de ta ils to l a w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs

. So that in myopinion he has t he abilit y to hear
, exis t, live, and compr ehend w hat’s g oing on a

round him a nd to f

eed that information back. So it’s obvious to the court that [t he def

endant], althoug h having a lower than normal I Q, is able to func tion and

car ry on a daily

lifesty le within our society

.

* * * The c ourt must note from the advice of rig hts form that

. . . there is nothing about this . . . form that is complicated or that is complex

. * * * I must add . . . [t hat] in t his c o u rt ’s o p i n ion, it was obvious that [ the de fe nd a nt] w a s b e ing e va siv e in s ome of his a ns we rs

. * * * T h e c o u r t f

in d s th a t [t h e d e f

e n d a n t] is ab le to

. . . r a ti o n a ll y c o n clude wha t

answe rs he wa nts to give a nd what answers he doesn’t wa nt to give. . . . T he court is of the opinion that [t he defe ndant] unde rstood the rig hts tha t were rea d to him by the offic ers in this case . That [t h e defenda nt] acknow ledg ed and unde rstood . . . tho se ri g hts a ndthat he a c kn ow le dg e d a nd state d wi lli ng ly a nd fr e e ly a ndvo lun tari ly that he wa s w ill ing to g ive tho se ri g hts up a ndto g ive a state me nt t o th e of

fi c e rs

.

I t is the dutyof the trial judg e to determine the voluntariness a nd the admi s s i b ilityof a defe ndant’s pre trial statement. State v. Pursley , 550 S.W .2d 949, 952 (Tenn. 1977) . The trial c ourt’s de te rm inatio n th a t a

c on fe ssi on wa s g ive n k no wi ng ly a ndvo lun tari ly

is b ind ing on the app e llate courts unles s t h e evidence pr eponder ates other wise. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Que stions about wit ness credibility and “resolution of conf licts in the evidence are matters

e ntr us te d to the tr ia l ju dg e .” I d. Te sti mon y pr e se nte d a t t ri al may be con sid e re d b y a n a pp e llate

co u rt i n d ec i d i n g t h e p ro p ri et y o f t h e tr i al co u rt ’s ru l i n g o n a mo t i o n t o s u p p re s s

. S t at e v

. He n n i n g, 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

. I f the “g reater we ight” of the e vidence supports the court’ s ruling , it will be u p h eld. I d. Yet, this court must conduct a de novo re view of the trial court’ s application of la w to fac t. State v. Bridg es, 963 S.W.2 d 4 8 7 (T en n

. 1 997); State v. Yea rg an, 958 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. 1997)

.

I n Miranda v. A rizona, 384 U. S

. 4 3 6 (1 9 66), the United States Supre me Court ruled that befor e a c ustodial interrog ation, police off icer s must advise a def

endant of the rig ht to remain silent-6-

a ndthe ri g ht to co un se l. I f the se wa rn ing s ar e no t gi ve n, a ny state me nt el ic ite d fr om a d e fe nd a nt i s not admissible in trial. Dicker son v. United S tates, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 31 8
, 3 2 2 ( 1 9 9 4 )

. A d e f e n d a n t’ s r ig h ts to c o u n s e l a n d a g a in s t s e lf

- in c r im in a ti o n maybe

wa ive d a s lo ng a s th e wa ive r i s ma de “ vo lun tari ly , k no wi ng ly , a ndint e lli g e ntl y .” Mir a nd a , 3 84 U. S. at 479; State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992) . I n order for a n acc used to eff

ect

a wa i v er , he must be ade quately appra ised of his rig ht to remain silent and the c onsequenc e of deciding t o ab andon it. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994) . I n determining whether a conf ession was voluntary

and knowing , the totality of the c ircums t an ce s must be examined. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997).

I n our view, the re cord supports the trial court’s de termination that the conf ession was knowing ly

and voluntarily made. Although the mental hea lth ex perts conc luded that the def endant

wa s mi ldl y me nta lly re tard e d, e a c h ch ara c te ri zed him a s “hi g h f un c tio nin g .” Th e de fe nd a nt w a s a ble to drive, hold down a job, a nd otherwise function in soc iety on a day -to-day basis. The off icer s who interrog ated the de fenda nt testified that he wa s coher ent and appea red to unde rstand his rig hts. The defe ndant had, in fa ct, had pr evious experience with the police and the court sy stem as a juvenile. Under these c ircumstance s, the trial court did not err by admitting the c onfession. The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s determination that the statement was knowing and

v o l u n t ar y.

II

Next, the defenda nt contends that the evidenc e prese nted at trial wa s insufficient to support

e ith e r o f h is tw o c on vic tio ns

. On app e a l, of c ou rs e , the state is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s which mig ht be dra wn there from. State v. Cabbag e, 571 S. W

. 2 d 8 3 2 , 835 (Tenn. 1978) . The c redibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be g iven t heir testim ony , and the rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entr usted to the jury as the trier

of fact. B yrg e v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter r eviewing the evidenc e in t h e l i gh t m o s t favor able to the state , any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Willi a ms, 65 7 S. W.2 d 4 05 , 4 10 (T e nn . 1 98 3) . Q ue sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, as w ell as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. L iakas v. State, 199 Te nn. 298, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). B eca use a ve rdict of g uilt removes the pre sumption of innocenc e an d raises a presumption of g uilt, the convicted

c ri min a l de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n of sho wi ng tha t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in a g uiltyverdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

Chi ld a bu se oc c ur s whe n “ [a]n y

pe rs on

. . . k no wi ng ly , o the r tha n b y a c c ide nta l me a ns , tr e a ts a child under

eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e in such a manner as to inflict injury .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-401( a). Child abuse be comes a g g ravated when it either results in serious bodi ly injury to the

c hil d o r a de a dly we apo n is us e d to a c c omp lis h th e a ct. Ten n. Cod e An n. § 3 9- 15 -4 02 (a ). F ir st-7-

deg ree murder is the “killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpe trate . . . ag g ravated child abuse .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a) (2).

The de fenda nt’s arg ument is based primarily upon his contention that

h is c o n f e ssion to poli ce sh ou ld h a ve be e n e xclu de d. As we ha ve al read y stat e d, ho we ve r, the c on fe ssi on wa s p ro pe rl y admitted and conside red by the jury . The autopsy

reve aled that the vic tim died of multiple internal injuries cause d by

blunt trauma to the head and chest. I t w as the medica l examiner’s opinion that the injuries would have manifested the mselves immediately and re sulted in the victim’s death in no more than two hour s. The victim’s mother, Tameka Stuckey , testified that the victim was uninjured when she left the re sidence to purcha se m edicine for him and run other erra nds. Whil e she was g one, he wa s in the so le c are of the de fe nd a nt. Th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d to po lic e that, s tr e sse d b y the state of his rela tionship wit h Ms. Stuckey , he kicke d the victim twice in the che st, causing him to st rike his he a d on a pie c e of fu rn itu re

. Th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt to e sta

bli sh the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t bey ond a re asonable doubt of both ag g rav at ed child abuse and fe lony murder. D ual convictions under the se circ umstances do not violate double jeopar dy principles. State v. Godse y , 60 S.W .3d 759 (Tenn. 2001)

.
Acc ording ly , the judg ments of the trial c ourt areaff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE