REPORT OF THE

UNITED STATES COMMISSION

ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

MAY 1, 2001
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

800 North Capitol Street, NW 

Suite 790 

Washington, DC 20002 

202-523-3240 

202-523-5020 

www.uscirf.gov 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

The Honorable Elliott Abrams 

Chairman

Firuz Kazemzadeh 

Vice Chairman

Laila Al-Marayati, M.D. 

The Honorable John R. Bolton 

Theodore Cardinal McCarrick 

Rabbi David Saperstein 

Nina Shea 

Justice Charles Z. Smith 

Dean Michael K. Young 

Ex-Officio Member

Ambassador Robert A. Seiple (resigned September, 2000) 

Executive Director

Steven T. McFarland 
STAFF OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM 

May, 2000 through April, 2001 

CURRENT STAFF 

Lawrence J. Goodrich, Director of Communications 

Christy Hines, Director of Government Affairs 

Tracy Shycoff, Director of Administration 

Tad Stahnke, Director of Research 

Melissa Coffey, Communications Assistant 

Patricia Carley, Senior Policy Analyst 

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist 

Khaled Elgindy, Policy Analyst 

Marti Flacks, Government Affairs Assistant 

Bina Hanchinamani, Policy Analyst 

George Irani, Senior Policy Analyst 

Jackie Mitchell, Executive Assistant 

Christina Regule, Special Asst. to the Director of Research 

Eileen Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications 

John Tai, Policy Analyst 

FORMER STAFF 

Tuong Do 

Susan Gong 

Barbara Haile 

Inna Naletova 

Peter Wyckoff 

INTERN 

Molly Hagen 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 1, 2001

The PRESIDENT 

The White House 

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the ten-member United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual May 1 Report, prepared 

in compliance with section 205 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this Report, and the policy recommendations 

the Commission makes in it, with you. 

 Sincerely, 

 ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

Chairman 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 1, 2001 

Hon. COLIN L. POWELL 

Secretary of State 

Department of State

 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the ten-member United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual May 1 Report, prepared 

in compliance with section 205 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this Report, and the policy recommendations 

the Commission makes in it, with you. 

 Sincerely, 

ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

Chairman 

 Enclosure 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 1, 2001 

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT 

Speaker of the House 

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the ten-member United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual May 1 Report, prepared 

in compliance with section 205 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this Report, and the policy recommendations 

the Commission makes in it, with you. 

 Sincerely, 

ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

Chairman 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 1, 2001 

Hon. STROM THURMOND 

President Pro Tempore 

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. THURMOND: On behalf of the ten-member United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual May 1 Report, prepared 

in compliance with section 205 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this Report, and the policy recommendations 

the Commission makes in it, with you. 

 Sincerely, 

ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

Chairman 

 Enclosure
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................... 1

I. COMMISSION ACTIVITIES....................................................................................... 1 

II. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ............................................................................. 2 

III. INDIA................................................................................................................... 3 

IV. INDONESIA .......................................................................................................... 4 

V. IRAN..................................................................................................................... 6 

VI. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA .................................................... 6 

VII. NIGERIA............................................................................................................. 7 

VIII. PAKISTAN......................................................................................................... 9 

IX. RUSSIA.............................................................................................................. 10 

X. SUDAN................................................................................................................ 11 

XI. VIETNAM .......................................................................................................... 13 

XII. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS.................................................................................. 15 

XIII. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ............................................................................ 16 

XIV. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT AND THE STATE 

DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM – 2000.............. 16 

I. THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM: ACTIVITIES FROM MAY 2, 2000 TO MAY 1, 2001 ............................... 19

A. OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 19 

B. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ........................................................................... 21 

C. INDIA.................................................................................................................. 21 

D. INDONESIA .......................................................................................................... 22 

E. IRAN ................................................................................................................... 22 

F. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA .................................................... 23 

G. NIGERIA ............................................................................................................. 23 

H. PAKISTAN........................................................................................................... 23 

I. RUSSIA................................................................................................................. 24 

J. SUDAN................................................................................................................. 24 

K. VIETNAM............................................................................................................ 25 

L. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS..................................................................................... 26 

M. THE MIDDLE EAST............................................................................................. 26 

N. THE FREEDOMS TO CHANGE RELIGION AND ENGAGE IN PUBLIC RELIGIOUS 

EXPRESSION AND PERSUASION............................................................................................. 27 

O. OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................. 30 

P. WEB SITE............................................................................................................ 31 

Q. COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES ............................................................. 31 

R. COMMISSIONERS’ TERMS EXPIRE........................................................................ 32 

II. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.............................................................. 35

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 35 

B. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.......................................................................................... 35 

1. Legal/Policy Developments............................................................................ 35
2. Unregistered Religious Organizations........................................................... 36

3. Tibet................................................................................................................ 38

4. Uighur Muslims.............................................................................................. 38

5. Registered Religious Communities................................................................. 39

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 39 

III. INDIA .............................................................................................................. 49

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 49 

B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 49 

1. Demographic Information.............................................................................. 49

2. Religious Freedom ......................................................................................... 50

3. Hindu Nationalism and the BJP.................................................................... 55

4. Secessionist Movements and the Kashmir Conflict........................................ 56

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 57 

IV. INDONESIA.................................................................................................... 65

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 65 

B. BACKGROUND ON INDONESIA AND THE MOLUCCAS........................................... 66 

1. Indonesia: Background Information .............................................................. 66

2. The Moluccas ................................................................................................. 67

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 71 

V. IRAN.................................................................................................................. 81

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 81 

B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 81 

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 83 

VI. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.............................. 87

A. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 87 

B. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 87 

VII. NIGERIA ....................................................................................................... 91

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 91 

B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 92 

1. Demography................................................................................................... 92

2. Religious Freedom ......................................................................................... 92

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 95 

VIII. PAKISTAN................................................................................................. 101

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 101 

B. RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 101 

C. AHMADIS.......................................................................................................... 102 

D. THE SEPARATE ELECTORATE SYSTEM FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES................. 103 

E. ABUSES OF THE BLASPHEMY LAWS .................................................................. 104 

F. RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE ....................................................................................... 105 

G. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................... 106 

IX. RUSSIA.......................................................................................................... 113
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 113 

B. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM........................................................................................ 113 

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................... 117 

X. SUDAN ............................................................................................................ 123

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 123 

B. HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABUSES IN SUDAN........................ 123 

1. Aerial Bombardments of Civilian and Humanitarian Targets..................... 124

2. Interference with Humanitarian Assistance................................................. 124

3. Slavery and Abductions................................................................................ 125

4. Religious Freedom ....................................................................................... 125

5. Oil and Foreign Investment.......................................................................... 126

C. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................... 127 

CONCURRENCE WITH QUALIFICATIONS TO RECOMMENDATIONS 3 AND 5.............. 133 

XI. VIETNAM ..................................................................................................... 139

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 139 

B. RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 140 

C. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM........................................................................................ 140 

1. Legal Framework ......................................................................................... 140

2. State Control of Religious Activities ............................................................ 141

D. THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT AND NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS STATUS

........................................................................................................................................... 144 

E. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 145 

XII. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS DISCLOSURE ............................................ 155

A. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 155 

1. Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs)..................................................... 155

2. Securities Transactions of Concern to the Commission .............................. 156

3. U.S. Economic Sanctions ............................................................................. 158

4. SEC Disclosure Requirements ..................................................................... 159

B. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................... 161 

XIII. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ................................................................ 169

A. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 169 

B. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................... 170 

XIV. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT AND THE 

STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM – 2000............................................................................................................... 171

A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 171 

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

........................................................................................................................................... 172 

C. REPORTING ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM..... 172 

D. SELECTING COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN.......................................... 173 

E. REPORTING ON U.S. ACTIONS TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM................... 175 

F. U.S. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CPC DESIGNATION ......................................... 175 
G. OTHER U.S. ACTIONS TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM............................... 176 

H. THE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM..... 180 

I. OTHER ISSUES.................................................................................................... 180 

APPENDIX 1: BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS ................................................ 183

APPENDIX 2: THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT....... 187
1 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

I. Commission Activities 

The Commission considerably broadened its activities in its second full year, 

monitoring religious-freedom violations worldwide and increasing the number of countries it 

would study in depth. In July, the Commission wrote to the Secretary of State to recommend 

that Laos, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan be 

added to the list of “countries of particular concern” as provided for in the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). It also recommended that Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, 

Sudan, the Milosevic regime in Serbia and the Taliban in Afghanistan remain on the list. In 

addition, it wrote that India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are serious violators of 

religious freedom deserving careful State Department monitoring; it also expressed concerns 

about sectarian violence in Indonesia and Nigeria. 

Commissioners testified several times before congressional committees; met with 

high-ranking State Department officials; held hearings on India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and 

Indonesia; traveled to several countries; met with foreign diplomats and officials (with State 

Department concurrence); interviewed numerous representatives of victims of religiousliberty violations; and received background briefings from U.S. diplomats, intelligence 

officials, and academic experts on the countries it studied for this report. Commissioners 

wrote several letters during the report period to Presidents Clinton and Bush; the 

Departments of State and the Treasury; the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; the 

Agency for International Development; the National Endowment for Democracy; and others 

making policy recommendations or requesting information on issues related to religious 

freedom discussed in this report. 

The Commission studied the freedoms to change religion and to engage in public 

religious expression and persuasion and found them often under restrictions that in some 

cases are egregious. In several countries the law prohibits a change in one’s religion, and the 

violator is subject to criminal penalties, including death. The Commission explored several 

examples and degrees of restrictions on these freedoms and the difficult challenges they pose 

for U.S. policymakers. The Commission believes that these restrictions merit further 

investigation and careful consideration and will recommend to their successors that they 

continue substantial efforts to study and recommend policies to protect this important aspect 

of religious freedom. 

The Commission reported last year that it had not gained full access to cables to and 

from embassies because of the State Department’s assertion of a legal position with which 

the Commission does not agree. The Department has since constructed a cumbersome and 

lengthy process whereby Commission staff are able to review cables after they have been 

redacted. The Commission has tried this system in good faith and concludes that it does not 

meet the Commission’s needs. It can no longer acquiesce to this situation and will propose a 

more-expeditious process to the State Department. 

The Commissioners’ terms expire on May 14, 2001. They thank those who appointed 

them for the privilege of serving on this first Commission on International Religious 
2 

Freedom and look forward to close cooperation with their successors. 

II. People’s Republic of China 

In the last year, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) 

has expanded its crackdown on unregistered religious communities and tightened its control 

on official religious organizations. The government has intensified its campaign against the 

Falun Gong movement and its followers. It apparently has also been involved in the 

confiscation and destruction of up to 3,000 unregistered religious buildings and sites in 

southeastern China. Government control over the official Protestant and Catholic churches 

has increased. It continues to interfere in the training and selection of religious leaders and 

clergy. At the same time, the government continues to maintain tight control over Uighur 

Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists. Finally, cases of torture by government officials reportedly 

are on the rise. 

Recommendations 

1. In its bilateral relations with China, the U.S. government should persistently urge 

the Chinese government to take the following steps to protect religious freedom: 

1.1. Establish the freedom to engage in religious activities (including 

the freedom for religious groups to govern themselves and select their 

leaders without interference, worship publicly, express and advocate 

religious beliefs, and distribute religious literature) outside statecontrolled religious organizations and eliminate controls on the 

activities of officially registered organizations. 

1.2. Permit unhindered access to religious persons (including those 

imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest and surveillance) by U.S. 

diplomatic personnel and government officials, the U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom, and respected international human 

rights organizations. Release persons from imprisonment, detention, 

house arrest, or intimidating surveillance who are so restricted on 

account of their religious identities or activities. 

1.3. Permit domestic Chinese religious organizations and individuals 

to interact with foreign organizations and individuals. 

1.4. Cease discrimination against religious followers in access to 

government benefits, including education, employment, and health 

care. 

1.5. Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

2. The U.S. government should continue to work vigorously for the 

resumption of a high-level unconditional human rights dialogue with the PRC 

government when the Chinese government demonstrates its commitment to 

protecting religious freedom, for example, by addressing the items listed as 
3 

1.1 to 1.5 above. 

3. Until religious freedom significantly improves in China, the U.S. 

government, led by the personal efforts of the President of the United States, 

should initiate a resolution to censure China at the annual meeting of the UN 

Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and should support a sustained 

campaign to convince other governments at the highest levels to support it. 

4. Companies that are doing business in China should be required to disclose 

the nature and extent of that business in connection with their access to U.S. 

capital markets. 

5. The U.S. government should raise the profile of conditions of Uighur 

Muslims by addressing religious freedom and human rights concerns in 

bilateral talks, by increasing the number of educational opportunities available 

to Uighurs, and by increasing radio broadcasts in the Uighur language. 

6. The U.S. government should use its diplomatic influence with other 

governments to ensure that China is not selected as a site for the International 

Olympic Games until it has made significant and sustained improvements in 

religious freedom and human rights. 

7. The State Department should identify specific individuals and entities 

involved in violations of religious freedom in China. 

III. India 

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has directed its attention to 

India in light of the disturbing increase in the past several years in severe violence against 

religious minorities in that country. The violence is especially troubling because it has 

coincided with the increase in political influence at the national and, in some places, the state 

level of the Sangh Parivar, a collection of exclusivist Hindu nationalist groups of which the 

current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, is a part. 

India is religiously a very diverse country that generally respects religious freedom. 

India has a democratically elected government and is governed by the rule of law. However, 

although the BJP-led government may not be directly responsible for instigating the violence 

against religious minorities, there is concern that the government is not doing all that it could 

to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to counteract the prevailing climate of hostility, 

in some quarters in India, against these minority groups. Moreover, the increase of violence 

against persons and institutions based entirely on religious affiliation is an alarming 

development in India. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should persistently press India to pursue perpetrators 

of violent acts that target members of religious groups. 
4 

2. The U.S. government should make clear its concern to the BJP-led 

government that virulent nationalist rhetoric is fueling an atmosphere in which 

perpetrators believe they can attack religious minorities with impunity. While 

fully protecting freedom of expression, firm words and actions from the 

government of India are required to counteract this belief. 

3. The U.S. government should support the stated policy of the BJP to oppose 

any move toward the nationalization of any religious institutions in India. The 

U.S. government should also press the government of India to oppose any 

attempts to interfere with or prohibit ties between religious communities 

inside India and their co-religionists outside the country, and any government 

efforts to regulate religious choice or conversion. 

4. As the U.S. government pursues greater engagement with India on a full 

range of issues, it should take advantage of new opportunities for governmentto-government cooperation and communication on human rights, including 

religious freedom. 

5. The U.S. should press India to allow official visits from government 

agencies concerned with human rights, including religious freedom. 

6. The U.S. government should encourage and facilitate private-sector 

communication and exchanges between Indian and American religious groups 

and other non-governmental organizations interested in religious freedom. 

The U.S. government should also press India to allow visits from nongovernmental human rights organizations and other groups concerned with 

religious freedom. 

7. The U.S. government should allocate funds from its foreign assistance 

programs for the promotion of education on religious toleration and 

inclusiveness in India. 

8. In the course of working toward improvements in U.S.-Indian economic 

and trade relations, the U.S. government should take into account the efforts 

of the Indian government to protect religious freedom, prevent and punish 

violence against religious minorities, and promote the rule of law. If progress 

is made, the U.S. should seek ways in which it can respond positively through 

enhanced economic ties. 

IV. Indonesia 

In recent years in Indonesia, numerous serious and tragic conflicts have emerged, 

including disputes in which religion or religious freedom is a factor. But only in the 

Moluccas did religion quickly become the defining factor behind the fighting that broke out 

in January 1999 between the Muslim and Christian communities there. Since the fighting in 

the Moluccas began, from 5,000 to 8,000 people, Christians and Muslims, have been killed. 

Houses of worship of both communities have been destroyed. More than 500,000 people, 

both Christians and Muslims, have been forced to flee in fear of their lives. As this has 
5 

transpired, there are numerous reports that elements from the Indonesian military and local 

police forces have done little to stop the fighting. Rather, it is alleged that they have 

contributed to – and perhaps even initiated – it. In addition, in the spring of 2000, thousands 

of fighters from an Indonesian Muslim group, called Laskar Jihad, arrived on the islands, 

raising the fighting there to new and more-deadly levels. The Indonesian government has 

also made little effort to halt the conflict; indeed, many observers contend it has not even 

given it serious attention. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should put sustained pressure on the Indonesian 

government and the Indonesian military to pay serious attention to the brutal 

conflict in the Moluccas and to make concerted efforts to pursue a 

reconciliation program that ensures security for both sides and that 

perpetrators most responsible for the killings are brought to justice. 

2. The U.S. government should press the government of Indonesia to attend 

to the immediate removal of all outside militia forces on the Moluccas, 

Muslim or Christian. The U.S. government should also press Indonesia to see 

that these and other groups are disarmed. Moreover, rogue elements in the 

Indonesian security forces must be brought under control. 

3. The U.S. government should support the reconciliation efforts of 

indigenous or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 

Moluccas, including by increasing its funding for such efforts through support 

for USAID’s democracy and good-governance programs, interreligious 

programs in educational institutions, and other programs in Indonesia. This 

should include working with respected Indonesian human rights lawyers and 

academics to devise an emergency program for restoring the rule of law in 

Indonesia, including in the Moluccas. Within its assistance program to 

Indonesia, the U.S. government should also increase assistance geared 

specifically to both Christian and Muslim victims and refugees of the conflict. 

The U.S. government should also press the government of Indonesia to allow 

more access to the Moluccas for humanitarian relief organizations, as well as 

for official representatives or human rights monitors from such groups as the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

4. The U.S. government should ensure that, if resumed, U.S.-Indonesian 

military ties be directed toward reform of the Indonesian military. 

5. The U.S. government should earmark funds for the training of Indonesian 

police and prosecutors in human rights, rule of law, and crime investigation. 

6. The U.S. government should help support the safeguarding of a free press 

in Ambon and other major areas in the Moluccas. 
6 

V. Iran 

The conditions of religious freedom are very poor in Iran, particularly with respect to 

minority religious groups that are not officially recognized by the state and those perceived to 

be attempting to convert Muslims. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides 

that the official religion of Iran is Islam of the doctrine of the Twelver Jaafari School and 

stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, must be based on 

Islamic criteria. Members of the Baha’i community suffer the worst forms of religious 

persecution at the hands of the state. The Iranian government does not recognize Baha’is as 

a religious minority; rather in its view, Baha’is constitute a political organization that was 

associated with the Shah’s regime, is opposed to the Iranian Revolution, and engages in 

espionage activities on behalf of foreign countries, including Israel. Members of the 

officially-recognized non-Muslim minorities – Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians – are 

subject to legal and other forms of official discrimination. Iranian Sunni leaders have alleged 

widespread abuses and restrictions on their religious practice. A number of senior Shiite 

religious leaders who have opposed various religious and/or political tenets and practices of 

the Iranian government have also reportedly been targets of state repression. 

Recommendations 

1. The President or Secretary of State should reaffirm to the government of 

Iran that improvement in religious freedom and other human rights in that 

country is a prerequisite for the complete relaxation of sanctions by and the 

normalization of relations with the United States. 

2. The U.S. government should consistently, continuously and vigorously 

press the government of Iran to improve conditions of religious freedom, and 

should urge its European and other allies to support advocacy for religious 

freedom in Iran. Voice of America Farsi-language broadcasting into Iran 

should include regular reporting on religious freedom in Iran and religiousfreedom issues in general. 

3. The U.S. administration should continue to sponsor annual resolutions of 

the United Nations Commission on Human Rights condemning Iran’s 

egregious and systematic violations of religious freedom and should recruit 

the support of other Commission member countries, until such violations 

cease. 

4. The United States should facilitate (through issuance of visas) and remove 

barriers (such as the U.S. Department of Justice policy of fingerprinting 

Iranians at ports of entry) to unofficial cultural exchange – e.g., academic, 

religious, athletic, and scientific – between the United States and Iran. 

VI. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or the DPRK), despite 

the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on conditions in the country, it is apparent that 

religious freedom is non-existent. As the State Department Annual Report on International 
7 

Religious Freedom - 2000 states: “Genuine religious freedom does not exist.” The 

government has imprisoned religious believers and apparently suppresses all organized 

religious activity except that which serves the interests of the state. Since July 1999, there 

have been reports of torture and execution of religious believers, including between 12 and 

23 Christians on account of their religion. 

Recommendations 

1. In the course of further discussions with the North Korean government, the 

U.S. government should strongly urge the DPRK to reaffirm publicly its 

commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

2. The U.S. government should press the DPRK to immediately establish 

conditions whereby the status of religious freedom can be assessed and 

progress be monitored. 

3. The U.S. government should ensure that any permanent peace treaty 

between the parties to the Korean War include provisions on religious 

freedom and non-discrimination in the treatment of religious minorities. 

4. The U.S. government should communicate to government of the DPRK 

that substantial improvements in religious freedom and other human rights in 

North Korea is a prerequisite for the normalization of relations with and the 

complete relaxation of sanctions by the United States. 

5. The U.S. government should communicate to the DPRK government that 

when any U.S. diplomatic presence is opened in North Korea, diplomatic 

personnel should have reasonable access within the country to assess the state 

of religious freedom and to monitor developments, and that a religiousfreedom dialogue should begin and take place at the highest policymaking 

levels. 

6. U.S. government officials should raise the issue of religious freedom – and 

the point that improvement of religious freedom is a central component of the 

improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations – in all high-level diplomatic exchanges 

with the DPRK. 

7. The U.S. government should urge the Republic of Korea and Japan, as part 

of trilateral coordination among the United States and those two countries, to 

press human rights and religious freedom in their talks with the DPRK as 

well. 

VII. Nigeria 

Religious life in Nigeria is public, vigorous, and diverse. Nevertheless, Nigeria 

continues to suffer outbursts of violent communal conflict along religious and ethnic lines, 

pervasive mistrust among religious and ethnic communities, and reportedly serious lapses in 

the protection of human rights generally. The threats to religious freedom, including reports 
8 

of religious discrimination, are serious and ongoing. Moreover, recent events portend a 

possible deterioration in the conditions of religious freedom. Serious outbreaks of MuslimChristian violence – exacerbated by social, economic, and political conditions that foster 

religious and ethnic tensions – threaten to divide further the populace along religious lines 

and undermine the foundations of religious freedom in Nigeria. 

The movement in several northern Nigerian states to expand the legal application of 

Shariah has sparked communal violence and is a source of continuing volatility and tension 

between Muslims and Christians at both the national and local levels. The manipulation of 

religious doctrines and religious sentiments for political ends by any party poses real dangers 

to religious freedom, as ethnic, tribal, or communal violence take on more explicitly religious 

overtones, and religious belief, identity, and practice become more of the target. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should make the promotion of religious freedom a 

high priority in its diplomatic discussions with the Nigerian government and 

urge President Olusegun Obasanjo to condemn – publicly, forcefully, and 

consistently – religious intolerance and discrimination, and to promote 

religious freedom and mutual understanding between Muslims and Christians. 

2. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to counter 

religiously-based discrimination by doing the following: 

2.1. Investigate alleged discriminatory obstacles to establishing and 

repairing places of worship and work with state and local governments 

to remove such obstacles where they exist; 

2.2. Where offered in public schools, provide religious instruction on 

a non-discriminatory basis and without compelling any student with a 

religious objection to attend; and 

2.3. Ensure equal access to state-run radio and other government 

media resources to all religious groups without discrimination. 

3. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to monitor 

closely the implementation of Shariah-based criminal law in northern states: 

(a) to ensure that it does not apply to non-Muslims and respects the religious 

freedom rights of all citizens, and (b) to prevent law enforcement activities in 

northern states by any quasi-official or private corps of Shariah enforcers. 

4. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to take 

effective steps to prevent and contain acts of communal violence, prevent 

reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for such violence to justice. 

5. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance programs: 

5.1. Support programs aimed at preventing communal conflict, 
9 

defusing inter-religious tensions, and promoting religious tolerance 

and respect for religious freedom and the rule of law; and 

5.2. Support programs that foster objective, non-inflammatory, and 

non-biased reporting by the Nigerian media in a manner consistent 

with the right to free expression. 

6. The U.S. government should make the promotion of religious freedom a 

high priority and should strengthen its information-gathering efforts 

throughout Nigeria, particularly in northern states and areas plagued by 

communal violence. 

VIII. Pakistan 

Although the government of Pakistan does not appear to be engaged in a systematic 

effort to persecute religious minorities, it is clearly not doing enough to adequately protect 

the religious freedom of all of its citizens. Members of the Ahmadi religious community are 

prevented by law from engaging in the full practice of their faith. Religious minority groups 

(including Christians, Ahmadis, and Hindus) complain that they are politically marginalized 

by a system of separate electorates, and that this system exacerbates other religious-freedom 

problems. The criminal laws against blasphemy are abused, resulting in detention of and 

sometimes violence against religious minorities as well as the targeting of numerous Muslims 

on account of their religious beliefs. Finally, there is a substantial amount of sectarian 

violence, largely targeting Shia Muslims, committed by organized groups of religious 

extremists. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to sign and 

ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

2. The U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Pakistani 

government should take the position that the separate electorate system for 

religious minorities is inconsistent with democratic principles, the right to 

equal citizenship, and the protection of political rights without discrimination 

on the basis of religion as provided in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

3. The U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Pakistani 

government should take the position that the existence and enforcement of 

laws targeting Ahmadis that effectively criminalize the public practice of their 

faith violates the right to freedom of religion guaranteed in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights. The State Department should closely monitor the application 

and enforcement of laws targeting Ahmadis. The U.S. government should 

also urge the Pakistani government to effectively prevent discrimination 

against Ahmadis in government and military employment, and education. 
10 

4. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to implement 

procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce and aim at 

ultimately eliminating their abuse. The State Department should monitor the 

application and enforcement of the blasphemy laws. 

5. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to take 

effective steps to prevent sectarian violence and punish its perpetrators, 

including disarming militant groups and any religious schools that provide 

weapons training. The U.S. government should also urge the Pakistani 

government to establish and support mechanisms of interfaith dialogue that 

encompass all religious communities in Pakistan, and facilitate widespread 

dissemination of the work and findings of this dialogue. 

6. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to complete 

the denationalization of Christian schools and colleges in Punjab province. 

7. The U.S. government should, through its own foreign assistance and in 

conjunction with other donors, support the following in Pakistan: 

7.1. teacher training and other educational programs in religious 

tolerance; 

7.2. non-governmental organizations engaged in legal advocacy to 

protect the right to freedom of religion, in particular defense of persons 

charged under the blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws; 

7.3. judicial reform and law-enforcement training; 

7.4. improvements in the public education system in order to promote 

the availability and quality of education for all Pakistanis. 

IX. Russia 

The future of religious freedom in Russia remains uncertain at a critical moment in 

that nation’s history. The Russian federal government has yet to articulate a policy regarding 

the situation created by its decision not to extend once again the deadline for registration 

under a 1997 law that required religious organizations to register in order to operate as legal 

entities. Thus, some 1,500 unregistered religious organizations are subject to “liquidation” 

by the state. In addition, the government of President Vladimir I. Putin has yet to establish 

an effective way to ensure that local and regional laws, policies, and practices do not abridge 

religious freedom. 

The Putin government appears to be committed to the principle of religious freedom, 

and, like the government of Boris Yeltsin before it, has taken several steps to mitigate 

religious-freedom violations. Moreover, the Russian courts, led by the Russian 

Constitutional Court, have in some cases protected the right to religious freedom and 

provided remedies for the violation of that right, at times overturning local decisions and 

ameliorating some of the worst features of the 1997 law. Nevertheless, it is uncertain how 
11 

vigorous the Putin government will be in dealing with Russia’s many religious-freedom 

problems. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should continue to closely and carefully monitor 

religious-freedom issues and raise them forcefully with the Russian 

government at the highest levels. The U.S. government should pay particular 

attention to the Russian government’s handling of: 

1.1. unregistered religious organizations; 

1.2. discriminatory laws, policies, and practices at the local and 

provincial level; 

1.3. anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and other extremist activities targeting 

religious minorities; 

1.4. visa, residence, and citizenship decisions regarding foreign 

missionaries and other religious workers; 

1.5. internal disputes of religious communities; and 

1.6. demands for a closer cooperation between any arm of the state 

and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) that would result in 

preferential treatment for the ROC or official discrimination against 

other religious communities. 

2. In light of the current conditions in Russia, the Commission believes that 

all of its recommendations from May 2000 would still contribute to the 

promotion of religious freedom there, and therefore reaffirms them. They 

include supporting programs by Russians aimed at preventing religious 

intolerance and discrimination and promoting exchanges between U.S. and 

Russian religious leaders, as well as judges, lawyers, and legal rights 

organizations. Moreover, the U.S. government should make the humanitarian 

and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high priority issue in its bilateral 

relations with Russia. 

3. The Smith Amendment is an effective tool for promoting religious freedom 

in Russia. The Commission recommends that in weighing whether to make 

the certification required under that law, the President should use the factors 

listed in Recommendation 1, above. 

X. Sudan 

The situation in Sudan has grown worse since the release of the Commission’s May 

2000 report. The government of Sudan continues to commit egregious human rights abuses 

– including widespread bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets, abduction and 
12 

enslavement by government-sponsored militias, manipulation of humanitarian assistance as a 

weapon of war, and severe restrictions on religious freedom. The relationship between oil 

and the government’s actions has become clearer. The Clinton administration did take some 

steps to address the situation, including successfully working to prevent Sudan from taking a 

seat at the UN Security Council and earmarking aid to communities in southern Sudan and to 

the political opposition (the National Democratic Alliance, or NDA). But the issue of Sudan 

for the most part remained on the back burner of U.S. policy, as the government’s own 

interagency report acknowledged last year. Its actions fell well short of the comprehensive, 

sustained campaign that the Commission believes is commensurate with the Sudanese 

government’s abuses. The Commission urges the Bush administration to mount such a 

campaign. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should appoint a nationally prominent individual – 

who enjoys the trust and confidence of President Bush and Secretary of State 

Colin L. Powell, and who has appropriate authority and access – whose sole 

responsibility is directed to bringing about a peaceful and just settlement of 

the war in Sudan and an end to the religious-freedom abuses and humanitarian 

atrocities committed by the Sudanese government. The United States should 

not appoint an ambassador to Sudan at this time. 

2. The U.S. government should continue to increase the amount of its 

humanitarian assistance that passes outside of Operation Lifeline Sudan 

(OLS) and should press OLS to deliver aid wherever it is needed, especially 

the Nuba Mountains, with or without the approval of the Sudanese 

government. 

3. The U.S. government should increase its assistance to southern Sudan and 

the NDA. 

4. The U.S. government should launch a major diplomatic initiative aimed at 

enlisting international pressure to stop the Sudanese government’s bombing of 

civilian and humanitarian targets; ground attacks on civilian villages, feeding 

centers, and hospitals; slave raids; and instigation of tribal warfare. 

5. The U.S. government should strengthen economic sanctions against Sudan 

and should urge other countries to adopt similar policies. The U.S. should 

prohibit any foreign company from raising capital or listing its securities in 

U.S. markets as long as it is engaged in the development of oil and gas fields 

in Sudan. The U.S. government should not issue licenses permitting the 

import of gum arabic from Sudan to the United States. 

6. Companies that are doing business in Sudan should be required to disclose 

the nature and extent of that business in connection with their access to U.S. 

capital markets. 

7. The U.S. government should intensify its support for peace negotiations 
13 

and for the Declaration of Principles, and make a just and lasting peace a top 

priority of this administration’s global agenda. 

8. The U.S. government should work to increase human rights and media 

reporting on abuses in Sudan, including supporting, diplomatically and 

financially, the placement of human rights monitors in southern Sudan and in 

surrounding countries where refugee populations are present. 

XI. Vietnam 

Despite a marked increase in religious practice among the Vietnamese people in the 

last 10 years, the Vietnamese government continues to suppress organized religious activities 

forcefully and to monitor and control religious communities. The government prohibits 

religious activity by those not affiliated with one of the six officially recognized religious 

organizations. Individuals have been detained, fined, imprisoned, and kept under close 

surveillance by security forces for engaging in “illegal” religious activities. In addition, the 

government uses the recognition process to monitor and control officially sanctioned 

religious groups: restricting the procurement and distribution of religious literature, 

controlling religious training, and interfering with the selection of religious leaders. 

Recommendations 

1. The U.S. Congress should ratify the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 

Agreement (BTA) only after it passes a sense of the Congress resolution 

calling for the Vietnamese government to make substantial improvements in 

the protection of religious freedom or after the Vietnamese government 

undertakes obligations to the United States to make such improvements. 

Substantial improvements should be measured by the following standards: 

1.1. Release from imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or 

intimidating surveillance persons who are so restricted due to their 

religious identities or activities. 

1.2. Permit unhindered access to religious leaders by U.S. diplomatic 

personnel and government officials, the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, and respected international human 

rights organizations, including, if requested, a return visit by the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. 

1.3. Establish the freedom to engage in religious activities (including 

the freedom for religious groups to govern themselves and select their 

leaders, worship publicly, express and advocate religious beliefs, and 

distribute religious literature) outside state-controlled religious 

organizations and eliminate controls on the activities of officially 

registered organizations. Allow indigenous religious communities to 

conduct educational, charitable, and humanitarian activities. 

1.4. Permit religious groups to gather for annual observances of 
14 

primary religious holidays. 

1.5. Return confiscated religious properties. 

1.6. Permit domestic Vietnamese religious organizations and 

individuals to interact with foreign organizations and individuals. 

2. If Congress ratifies the BTA and approves conditional Normal Trade 

Relations status for Vietnam, it should review Vietnam’s progress on the 

protection of religious freedom as part of an annual review of that status. 

3. The United States should withhold its support for International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans to Vietnam (except those providing for 

basic human needs) until the government of Vietnam agrees to make 

substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom, as measured 

by the standards itemized in 1.1 through 1.6 above. 

4. The U.S. government should make the protection of religious freedom a 

high-priority issue in its bilateral relations with Vietnam, including in the 

annual human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government and in future 

trade negotiations, advocating substantial improvement in the protection of 

religious freedom as measured by the standards itemized as 1.1 through 1.6 

above. The U.S. Department of State should advise the office of the U.S. 

Trade Representative (USTR) on the state of religious freedom and other 

human rights in Vietnam, and should request that the USTR advance the U.S. 

government’s interests in human rights in and through the negotiations and the 

provisions of any further trade agreement or companion agreement between 

the two countries. 

5. The U.S. government should insist that the Vietnamese government permit 

domestic Vietnamese religious and other non-governmental organizations to 

distribute their own and donated aid. 

6. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance and exchange 

programs, support individuals (and organizations, if they exist) in Vietnam 

that are advocating human rights (including religious freedom), the rule of 

law, and legal reform. It should also support exchanges between Vietnamese 

religious communities and U.S. religious and other non-governmental 

organizations concerned with religious freedom in Vietnam. 

7. Until religious freedom significantly improves in Vietnam (as measured by 

the standards itemized as 1.1 through 1.6, above), the U.S. government should 

initiate or support a resolution to censure Vietnam at the annual meeting of the 

UN Commission on Human Rights and should engage in a sustained 

campaign to persuade other governments to support it. 

8. The U.S. government should continue to support the Association for 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Working Group, and 
15 

should encourage the Vietnamese government to join the working group. 

9. The United States should continue to support Radio Free Asia broadcasts 

into Vietnam as a vehicle for promoting religious freedom and human rights 

in that country. 

XII. U.S. Capital Markets 

The Commission is concerned that significant and material information about 

companies doing business in Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) is being withheld from 

the U.S. investing public. Foreign companies appear to be able to raise capital in U.S. 

markets without disclosing their business interests in CPCs, the risks associated therewith, 

and whether or not the proceeds from the sale of securities will be used to support its 

business in the CPC (and perhaps to support a foreign government that has been found to 

engage in or tolerate egregious religious-freedom violations). The problem is especially 

acute in the case of foreign companies because, unlike U.S. companies, foreign companies 

are generally permitted under U.S. law to do business in CPCs that are subject to 

comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions. Moreover, these companies can, in a wide range of 

circumstances, raise capital in U.S. markets without violating those sanctions. Thus, the 

issue of adequate disclosure is particularly important. Most important, however, is that 

reasonably prudent investors in U.S. financial markets may and should deem the information 

described above as material to their investment decisions. 

Recommendations 

1. The United States should require any U.S. or foreign issuer of securities 

that is doing business in a country that has been designated as a CPC under 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 to disclose in any 

registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for 

any new offering of securities the following information as to each such 

country: 

1.1. The nature and extent of the business that it and its affiliates are 

conducting in the particular CPC, (i) including any plans for expansion 

or diversification and any business relationships with agencies or 

instrumentalities of the government of the CPC and (ii) specifying the 

identity of such agencies or instrumentalities; 

1.2. Whether it plans to use the proceeds of the sale of the securities in 

connection with its business in the CPC and, if so, how; and 

1.3. All significant risk factors associated with doing business in the 

CPC, including, but not limited to: (i) the political, economic, and 

social conditions inside the CPC, including the policies and practices 

of the government of the CPC with respect to religious freedom; (ii) 

the extent to which the business of the issuer and its affiliates directly 

or indirectly supports or facilitates those policies and practices; and 

(iii) the potential for and likely impact of a campaign by U.S. persons 
16 

based on human rights concerns to prevent the purchase or retention of 

securities of the issuer, including a divestment campaign or 

shareholder lawsuit. 

2. The United States should require any issuer that is doing business in a CPC 

to disclose the information specified in items 1.1 and 1.3 above in its filings 

with the SEC, including its annual proxy statement or annual report, in the 

case of a U.S. issuer, or its U.S. markets annual report, in the case of a foreign 

issuer. 

3. The U.S. government, including Congress, should examine how the 

structuring of securities transactions or the manipulation of corporate 

relationships by non-U.S. issuers can be used to circumvent U.S. economic 

sanctions. 

XIII. U.S. Foreign Assistance 

In its first two years, the Commission has found significant religious-freedom 

violations in some countries that receive U.S. foreign assistance. Foreign aid can be an 

important tool to promote religious freedom either directly or indirectly. Foreign assistance 

can support programs directly concerned with promoting religious freedom, such as legal 

advocacy, technical assistance, or human rights education. It can also support religious 

freedom indirectly by supporting programs that promote, for example, democracy, civil 

society, rule of law, professional law enforcement, and judicial independence. 

Recommendations 

1. No U.S. foreign assistance should be provided to any U.S. or foreign 

person (governmental or non-governmental) who, in a foreign country and at 

any time during the preceding 24-month period, has (a) committed acts of 

violence targeting individuals on account of their religious belief or practice, 

or (b) served as an instrumentality of official government policies of invidious 

religious discrimination. Furthermore, no U.S. foreign assistance should be 

provided to any program that discriminates against recipients or beneficiaries 

on the basis of religion. 

2. The State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom 

Report (or in the classified addendum) should identify (a) agencies or 

instrumentalities of foreign governments engaged in violations of religious 

freedom, and (b) non-governmental entities engaged in violations of religious 

freedom and describe the nature and extent of those violations. 

XIV. The International Religious Freedom Act and the State Department’s Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom – 2000 

Most of the mechanisms established by IRFA are now in their second year of 

existence, and in September 2000, four significant events occurred with respect to IRFA and 

U.S. foreign policy related to international religious freedom. First, the State Department 
17 

issued its Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000 (2000 Annual Report), 

finding that: “Much of the world's population lives in countries in which the right to religious 

freedom is restricted or prohibited.” Second, then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 

announced those countries designated as “countries of particular concern” (CPC) – the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom. Disappointingly, only those countries named as 

CPCs in 1999 were so designated in 2000, despite ample evidence that others had met the 

statutory threshold. Third, Secretary Albright announced the actions that she would take 

pursuant to IRFA to promote religious freedom in those countries designated as CPCs. 

Again disappointingly, no additional action was taken against any CPC. And fourth, Robert 

A. Seiple, the first Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, stepped down 

from his office – leaving his post vacant through the date this report went to print. 

The State Department has done a highly commendable job in its second annual report 

of telling the tragic story of religious persecution around the globe. This year=s report 

generally shows a more complete understanding of religious-freedom issues and extensive 

fact-finding and verification. It reflects hard work on the ground. 

In other respects as well, this year’s report is an improvement over last year, and the 

Commission is pleased that some of the recommendations made in its first annual report 

appear to have been adopted by the Department. The Commission’s review of the 

Department’s instruction cable sent to the embassies earlier this year also shows that the 

Department incorporated many of the Commission’s suggestions in what information it 

solicited from embassy officials. 

However, problems remain. In some of the reports, the main thrust of what is 

happening and why is lost in detail and through omissions of important context. Another 

notable problem is that this year=s report includes a section in the executive summary 

entitled “Improvements in International Religious Freedom,” the contents of which is also 

reported in the individual country chapters. The Commission believes that the reporting of 

such “improvements” must be carefully handled in order to avoid misrepresentation of the 

conditions of religious freedom. 

This report is the yardstick with which to measure the U.S. government’s progress in 

meeting the goals of the statute. The Commission urges all those interested in promoting 

religious freedom to review carefully what the 2000 Annual Report says U.S. policy is 

toward violators of religious freedom and what the United States is doing to promote 

religious freedom. Unfortunately, the report shows that in several key countries – those in 

which significant religious-freedom violations occur – U.S. policies and actions do not reflect 

the gravity of the situation. 

The Commission is very disappointed that the Secretary did not name Laos, the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan as CPCs. On July 

28, 2000, the Commission wrote to the Secretary concluding that the governments of each of 

these four countries have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom and 

thus meet the statutory threshold for designation as CPCs. The Commission=s conclusion 

was based on the information that was available to it at that time. The information contained 

in the 2000 Annual Report only confirms that these countries should be designated as CPCs. 
18 

The Commission regrets the departure in September of Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom Robert A. Seiple. The Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom is a very important part of U.S. policy initiatives to promote 

religious freedom abroad – the 2000 Annual Report calls his office “the fulcrum of the effort 

to promote religious freedom.” A prolonged vacancy in this crucial position threatens U.S. 

progress in promoting religious freedom. The Commission has urged President Bush to 

move quickly to fill this vacancy. 

The Commission reported last year that it had not gained full access to cables to and 

from embassies because of the Department’s assertion of a legal position (executive privilege 

as to deliberative process within the administration) with which the Commission does not 

agree. The Department has since constructed a time-consuming, cumbersome, and lengthy 

process whereby Commission staff are able to review some cables after they have been 

redacted. This process means the Commission cannot see cables until months after they are 

sent, making it difficult for the Commission to formulate timely policy recommendations in 

fast-moving situations overseas. The Commission has tried this system in good faith and 

concludes that it does not meet the Commission’s needs. It can no longer acquiesce to this 

situation and will propose a more-expeditious process to the State Department. 

International religious freedom has become an important foreign-policy issue. The 

growing interest in the United States in the conditions of religious freedom around the globe 

and in the promotion of religious freedom through U.S. foreign policy is exemplified not 

only by the passage of IRFA but also by increasing public awareness of religious-freedom 

violations in countries such as China and Sudan. Secretary of State Powell has publicly 

stated that, in his view, the State Department has not been given adequate resources to 

perform its functions. The Commission believes that this is particularly true in the religiousfreedom area. We further believe that in order to meet its obligations under IRFA and to 

ensure that the promotion of religious freedom remains a foreign-policy priority, adequate 

staff must be devoted to these tasks. The Commission urges the State Department to review 

its staffing of religious-freedom issues in U.S. embassies and in its regional and functional 

bureaus, particularly in the Office of International Religious Freedom, and provide an 

increase in staffing adequate to perform the important task of promoting international 

religious freedom. 
19 

I. THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 

ACTIVITIES FROM MAY 2, 2000 TO MAY 1, 2001 

A. Overview 

The first Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom on May 1, 2000 – provided for in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA) – prompted a great deal of interest and activity. 

Commissioners testified about the report in May 2000 before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. In addition, the 

Commission met with senior State Department officials and consulted with other government 

agencies, notably the Treasury Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC), regarding the report’s recommendations. 

In June the Commission announced a broadening of its activities to include more 

countries and issues for its second Annual Report on May 1, 2001. Among the goals set by 

the Commissioners were: 

-- to monitor religious-freedom violations worldwide; 

-- to evaluate U.S. foreign-policy responses and make recommendations as to 

how U.S. policy can be more effective in combating religious persecution; 

-- to expand the number of countries it would study in depth and make policy 

recommendations for each; 

-- to press for implementation of the May 2000 Annual Report’s 

recommendations regarding China, Sudan, and Russia, while continuing to 

follow developments in those countries; 

-- to deliver further recommendations on the extent to which capital-market 

sanctions and other diplomatic leverage should be used as a diplomatic tool to 

promote religious freedom in other countries; and 

-- to recommend to the Secretary of State additional countries that should be 

placed on the list of “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) called for in 

IRFA. 

During the period of this report (May 2, 2000 to May 1, 2001), Commissioners and 

staff met with representatives of religious communities, human rights groups, and other nongovernmental organizations regarding the conditions of religious freedom in more than 20 

countries. The Commission held public hearings on religious freedom and U.S. policy in 

India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Commissioners testified before Congress on 

religious freedom in China and Sudan, and on the Department of State’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom 2000. Commissioners and/or staff traveled to Egypt, 

Germany, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. 

Commissioners and staff also received background briefings from U.S. diplomats, 
20 

intelligence officials, and academic experts on the countries it studied for this report. Finally, 

the Commission sent several letters to the President and Secretary of State with 

recommendations to raise religious-freedom issues during their official visits with specific 

foreign leaders. 

The Commission held a series of meetings throughout the year with Thomas 

Pickering, then-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; Frank Loy, then-Undersecretary 

of State for Global Affairs; the Assistant Secretaries of State or their deputies for Africa, East 

Asia, South Asia, and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; the Ambassador-at-Large for 

the Newly Independent States; and the director of the Foreign Service Institute. The 

Department agreed to the Commission’s request to hold semiannual meetings at the 

Undersecretary level, with additional consultations as necessary. 

Commissioners wrote to the Secretary of State in July to recommend that the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Laos, Saudi Arabia, and 

Turkmenistan be added to the list of CPCs because of their egregious violations of religious 

freedom. The Commission also recommended that Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, the 

Milosevic regime in Serbia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, all named as CPCs or egregious 

religious-freedom violators by the State Department in October 1999, remain on the list.1

 In 

addition, the Commission wrote that India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are serious 

violators of religious freedom and deserve careful State Department monitoring; it also 

expressed concern about sectarian violence in both Indonesia and Nigeria.2 Nevertheless, the 

State Department’s 2000 list of egregious violators named the same seven as in 1999 with no 

additions. 

In September the Commission testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee and the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the 

House International Relations Committee regarding the State Department’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom 2000, issued in September 2000. In December it further 

issued an evaluation of the Clinton administration’s implementation of IRFA, the findings of 

which are contained in Chapter XIV of this report. 

Commissioners wrote to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on February 16, 2001, to 

ask that he make “vigorous efforts” to ensure passage of resolutions at the UN Commission 

on Human Rights Commission session in Geneva condemning China, Sudan, Iran, and other 

countries for religious-freedom violations. The letter also urged him to seek European Union 

support for the resolutions and to make religious-freedom issues a prominent talking point in 

his discussions with Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen in March. 

In September 2000, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, 

Robert A. Seiple, resigned to return to the private sector. Ambassador Seiple made a 

significant contribution to the work of the Commission, on which he sat as an ex-officio 

nonvoting member. The Commissioners valued him as a colleague and regretted his 

departure. The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom is a very important 

part of U.S. policy initiatives to promote religious freedom abroad – the State Department’s 

annual report for 2000 calls his office “the fulcrum of the effort to promote religious 

freedom.” The prolonged vacancy in this crucial position as this report went to press 
21 

threatens U.S. progress in promoting religious freedom. The Commission strongly urges 

President Bush to move quickly to fill the vacancy with a person as knowledgeable and 

distinguished as Ambassador Seiple. 

B. People’s Republic of China

The Commission spent a good deal of time during the year monitoring and 

commenting on the serious deterioration of religious freedom in the People’s Republic of 

China. In its May 2000 Annual Report, the Commission recommended that Congress grant 

China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status only after China makes substantial 

improvements in respect for freedom of religion. Commissioners were invited to testify 

before the House Ways and Means Committee and the House International Relations 

Committee on the granting of PNTR status to China prior to the congressional vote on that 

bill. Two of the Commission’s policy recommendations on China were proposed in 

congressional legislation. 

Many hoped China would ease up on religious persecution following the Congress’s 

decision to grant PNTR, but unfortunately the opposite occurred. Following the execution of 

several ethnic-Uighur Muslims in China in June and July, the Commission issued a statement 

pointing out the increasing persecution of Uighur Muslims as part of China’s crackdown on 

religion and recommended actions the U.S. government should take in response. As the 

situation in China continued to deteriorate, the Commission recommended to the State 

Department that China again be included on the list of CPCs for its egregious violations of 

religious freedom. It also issued a statement in September recounting China’s repressive 

behavior. 

Following reports that the government of China intended to offer a $1 billion 

sovereign-bond issue on the world market, the Commission in November wrote President 

Clinton to express its view that IRFA empowers the President to prohibit U.S. financial 

institutions – such as underwriters, mutual funds, and pension plans – from purchasing China 

sovereign bonds. It asked the President if he agreed with the Commission’s legal conclusion 

and, if so, whether he intended to use his authority to block the bond issue. After public 

release of the Commission’s letter to the President, China reportedly decided to postpone 

issuing the bonds. In March 2001, the Commission wrote to President Bush with the same 

inquiry that it had made to President Clinton. 

This report contains further recommendations regarding China in Chapter II.

C. India 

The Indian central government appears unable (and possibly unwilling) to control 

growing violence by self-proclaimed Hindu nationalists targeting religious minorities, 

particularly Muslims and Christians. Priests and missionaries have been murdered, nuns 

assaulted, churches bombed, and converts intimidated in scores of violent incidents over the 

past year. Hindu nationalists continue to threaten to build a temple on the site of a mosque in 

Ayodhya destroyed by a Hindu-nationalist mob in 1992. 

Commissioners wrote the Secretary of State in July noting serious religious-freedom 
22 

violations in India and asking the State Department to keep that country under close watch. 

They also wrote President Clinton in September asking him to raise religious-freedom issues 

with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee during the latter’s visit to the U.S. The 

Commission held a public hearing on religious freedom and U.S. policy in India in 

September, at which Hindu, Christian, and Muslim witnesses testified along with academics 

and former U.S. diplomats. In addition, the Commission is attempting to arrange a trip to 

India but has been unable as yet to obtain the Indian government’s permission. Its report and 

recommendations regarding India are contained in Chapter III. 

D. Indonesia 

Continued religious fighting in Indonesia deeply concerns the Commission. The 

current communal violence in the Moluccas region has reportedly claimed the lives of 

between 5,000 and 8,000 Christians and Muslims since January 1999. There is evidence that 

the Indonesian government is not controlling its armed forces, resulting in murder, forced 

mass resettlement, and torture. 

As sectarian violence continued after thousands of Muslim Laskar Jihad fighters 

traveled to the Moluccas and expanded the fighting there, the Commission wrote to the 

Secretary of State in July asking for a more energetic U.S. response to the killings, including 

the deployment, if necessary, of an international peacekeeping force. The Commission held 

a February hearing on Indonesia in Washington at which Moluccan Muslim and Christian 

witnesses testified along with experts in the region and former U.S. diplomats. The 

Commission’s report and recommendations regarding Indonesia are found in Chapter IV. 

E. Iran 

The Commission continued to be deeply concerned about religious freedom in Iran, 

where conditions of religious freedom are very poor, particularly with respect to minority 

religious groups that are not officially recognized by the state and those perceived to be 

attempting to convert Muslims. Persecution of members of the Baha’i faith continues apace. 

Evangelical Christians suffer from a series of repressive measures. A number of Jews were 

convicted in 2000 on trumped-up espionage charges. For the last two years, the Secretary of 

State has determined that the government of Iran has engaged in or tolerated particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detentions and executions based 

primarily or entirely upon the religion of the victims, thereby designating Iran as a CPC. 

In her address to the American-Iranian Council in March 2000, then-Secretary of 

State Madeleine K. Albright announced that the U.S. was open to taking steps toward 

improving relations with Iran, if Iran were to take steps to address the issues that the U.S. has 

identified as prerequisites to better relations, such as desisting from the development of 

nuclear weapons and support for international terrorism. The Commission believes that 

human rights, including religious freedom, must remain an essential element of U.S. policy 

toward Iran. 
23 

In November, the Commission issued policy recommendations in a letter to the 

administration and the Congress regarding Iran. Those recommendations are included in 

Chapter V of this report. 

F. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), 

notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on conditions in the country, 

it is apparent that religious freedom is non-existent. The government has imprisoned 

religious believers and suppresses all organized religious activity except that which serves 

the interests of the state. 

The Commission wrote to the Secretary of State in July asking her to add the DPRK 

to the list of CPCs. Commissioners believe that the failure to do so would effectively reward 

its government for suffocating free speech, press, and travel so thoroughly that information 

on religious persecution is limited. The announcement of the Secretary of State’s 

groundbreaking trip to Pyongyang in October prompted a letter from the Commission asking 

her to take up religious-freedom issues there. The Secretary included Assistant Secretary of 

State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Harold Hongju Koh in her delegation and 

raised human rights and religious-freedom issues with her North Korean interlocutors. 

The Commission made recommendations on the DPRK in a letter to President 

Clinton in December; these are included in Chapter VI of this report. 

G. Nigeria 

In Nigeria, disputes surrounding the actual and proposed enactment of elements of 

Islamic law into the criminal codes of many states in the northern part of the country have 

sparked a cycle of violence between Muslims and Christians in many areas. The 

Commission released a public statement expressing concern about an outbreak of MuslimChristian violence in Nigeria in May. Commissioners wrote to President Clinton in August 

asking that he bring the matter up with President Olusegun Obasanjo during his visit to 

Nigeria; the President advised that he did so in remarks before the Nigerian parliament. 

Commission staff traveled to Nigeria in September, interviewing more than 40 government 

officials and religious leaders in four northern states and Abuja, the capital. The 

Commission’s report and recommendations regarding Nigeria are found in Chapter VII. 

H. Pakistan 

In Pakistan, large numbers of Sunni Muslims, Sufis, Ahmadis, and Christians have 

been harassed, detained, and imprisoned on account of their religion under laws that prohibit 

blasphemy and essentially criminalize adherence to the Ahmadi faith. In April 2000, the 

military government abandoned its expressed intent to reform the procedure by which 

changes are brought under the blasphemy laws. Intercommunal violence between Sunni and 

Shiite Muslims continues. Religious minorities claim they are marginalized by a system of 

separate electorates, a system that appears to exacerbate other religious-freedom problems. 

The Commission held a public hearing on Pakistan in September on Capitol Hill on 
24 

the same day as that on India, hearing testimony from Pakistani witnesses as well as 

academic experts and a former U.S. diplomat. After consultation with the State Department, 

Commissioners and staff also met with the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. and a Cabinet 

minister to discuss religious-freedom issues in Pakistan. Commission staff traveled to 

Pakistan in December and interviewed scores of government officials, religious leaders, and 

others. The Commission’s report and recommendations regarding Pakistan are found in 

Chapter VIII. 

I. Russia 

The Commission made policy recommendations in its May 2000 Annual Report 

regarding Russia, where it believes religious freedom is under threat from a 1997 law 

requiring the re-registration of religious groups and from discriminatory and arbitrary actions 

by local officials. The law requires that any group not re-registered by December 31, 2000, 

be “liquidated.” In June, several Commissioners met with the Russian ambassador to the 

U.S. to discuss religious-freedom conditions in Russia. In October, Commissioners wrote to 

the President asking him to raise the re-registration issue with Russian President Vladimir I. 

Putin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit – specifically, to ask President Putin 

to postpone the deadline in light of the large number of organizations that reportedly 

remained unregistered. Despite similar pleas from Russia’s official human rights 

ombudsman, the Russian government and parliament made no move to extend the deadline, 

but instead appeared to concentrate on speeding up the registration process. The 

Commission continues to monitor the situation closely; it is not yet clear what the policy of 

the Putin government will be regarding the liquidation of unregistered groups. In any event, 

the status of religious freedom in Russia continues to vary widely among local jurisdictions. 

The Commission’s updated recommendations regarding Russia are contained in Chapter IX 

of this report.

J. Sudan 

The continuing persecution of Christians, animists, and dissident Muslims by the 

government of Sudan as part of the 18-year civil war attracted much Commission attention. 

In July, Commissioners in a public statement urged the administration and the Congress not 

to ease sanctions until the Sudanese government takes verifiable steps to end religious 

persecution and engage in serious negotiations to end the war. The statement also called on 

the administration to make every effort to prevent Sudan from gaining a seat on the UN 

Security Council. The administration pursued a vigorous and successful diplomatic 

campaign to defeat Sudan’s bid. The Commission also wrote the Secretary of State in July 

recommending that Sudan again be included on the list of CPCs for its egregious violations 

of religious freedom. 

As a follow-up to its May 2000 recommendations regarding a public securities 

offering in the U.S. by the China National Petroleum Company (which is heavily involved in 

oil extraction in Sudan) and its subsidiary PetroChina, Ltd. (PetroChina), in August the 

Commission wrote the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) 

inquiring whether that transaction violated U.S. economic sanctions against Sudan. OFAC 

replied in November that it did not find any violation of the existing sanctions regime. 
25 

At the invitation of the State Department, a Commissioner met with the Sudanese 

foreign minister in September at the United Nations in New York to discuss Sudan’s 

religious-freedom violations. The Commission also testified on Sudan before the 

Congressional Human Rights Caucus in September. In October the Commission wrote to the 

SEC to recommend it investigate the accuracy and adequacy of material disclosures by the 

China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (known as Sinopec) about its holdings in Sudan in 

a registration statement filed in connection with a securities offering in the U.S. In 

November the Commission wrote to the SEC again to recommend that it investigate whether 

the China National Petroleum Company and PetroChina have used the proceeds of their 

April 2000 sale of PetroChina stock in accordance with their disclosures in the registration 

statement for that offering. Under Commission sponsorship, former Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs Dr. Susan Rice briefed members of Congress and their staffs in 

January 2001 on her recent trip to southern Sudan. In March, the Commission testified 

before a joint hearing on Sudan held by the Subcommittees on Africa and on International 

Operations and Human Rights of the House International Relations Committee. 

In March the Commission issued a follow-up report and recommendations on Sudan, 

which are found in Chapter X of this report. 

K. Vietnam 

In Vietnam the law provides for extensive regulation of religious organizations by the 

state. Leaders and members of the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, Hoa Hao 

Buddhists, Cao Dai followers, as well as Protestants and Roman Catholics have been 

detained without charge, imprisoned, heavily fined, harassed, or subjected to government 

surveillance. 

The Commission’s Chairman and Executive Director met in June with Vietnamese 

officials at the State Department to discuss conditions of religious freedom in that country. 

In October, the Commission wrote to President Clinton before his trip to Vietnam, outlining 

religious-freedom issues there and asking the President to take them up during his visit. The 

President addressed religious-freedom issues in a public speech and met with the Catholic 

Archbishop of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). Although the Vietnamese government last year 

told the Commission that it “welcomed” a visit, it later stated that Vietnam’s Commission on 

Religious Affairs should host such a visit and that it would be unable to do so until at least 

May – the month when Commission membership changes and a trip is almost impossible. 

The Commission held a February hearing on religious freedom and U.S. policy in 

Vietnam at which a Hoa Hao Buddhist, a representative of the Unified Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam, and Vietnamese Catholic and Protestant Christians testified, along with American 

experts and former U.S. diplomats. The Vietnamese government responded with 

condemnatory language and proceeded to place under house arrest a Catholic priest who 

submitted written testimony for the hearing. In March the Commission wrote to Secretary of 

State Colin L. Powell and Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill recommending actions in 

response to religious-freedom violations in Vietnam. The Commissioners recommended to 

Treasury Secretary O’Neill that the United States should withhold its support for 

International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to the government of Vietnam (except 
26 

those providing for basic human needs) until the government of Vietnam agrees to make 

substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom. In its letter to Secretary of 

State Powell, the Commission urged the Secretary to prominently raise religious-freedom 

issues in his proposed visit to Vietnam in July, and recommended that until religious freedom 

significantly improves in Vietnam, the U.S. government should initiate or support a 

resolution to censure Vietnam at the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission on 

Human Rights in Geneva and should engage in a sustained campaign to convince other 

governments to support it. 

The Commission’s report and recommendations regarding Vietnam are found in 

Chapter XI of this report. 

L. U.S. Capital Markets 

The Commission studied economic tools that could impact international religious 

freedom, focusing on access to U.S. capital markets by companies doing business in CPC 

countries and the disclosure required in connection with those companies’ securities 

transactions. The Commission found that foreign corporations, including Chinese petroleum 

companies, are vital investors in the oil industry of Sudan – a country subject to U.S. 

sanctions and known as one of the world’s most egregious violators of religious freedom. 

Because of the direct connection between oil development and the Sudanese government’s 

human rights abuses, the Commission recommended in March that corporations doing 

business in Sudan’s petroleum industry be prohibited from issuing or listing their securities 

in U.S. capital markets. As described above in the sections on China and Sudan, the 

Commission has also expressed its concerns at various points throughout the year with regard 

to U.S. securities transactions involving the Chinese government and companies with 

business activities in Sudan.

Concerned that significant and material information is being withheld from the U.S. 

investing public, the Commission also studied carefully the disclosure requirements under 

U.S. law in connection with securities transactions of companies that have business activities 

in CPCs. The Commission’s recommendations for heightened disclosure requirements in 

such transactions are contained in Chapter XII of this report. 

M. The Middle East 

Observing with great apprehension the increasingly religious nature of the ArabIsraeli conflict following the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians last fall, 

the Commission wrote to then-Secretary of State Albright in December 2000. The 

Commission requested that the U.S. government denounce forcefully the targeting of holy 

places of any religion and condemn those who call for violence in the name of religion. The 

Commission wrote that the U.S. government should further call for restoration of access to 

holy sites when legitimate security concerns are met, restoration of damaged sites, and 

prosecution of those who perpetrate desecration of religious sites. The Commission further 

expressed its belief that the United States should take the lead in calling upon government 

and religious leaders everywhere to repudiate all attempts to turn the already grave situation 

in the Middle East into a conflict among religions. 
27 

The Commission returned to the United States March 31 from a two-week trip to 

gather information on religious-freedom issues in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel and the 

Occupied Territories. During the course of the trip, the Commission delegation wrote to 

President Bush to ask him to raise religious-freedom issues with Egyptian President Hosni 

Mubarak during the latter’s state visit to the United States in April and to express the concern 

that progress on religious freedom for all Egyptians accelerate. As this report went to press, 

it was not possible to include here a full review of that trip.

N. The Freedoms to Change Religion and Engage in Public Religious Expression and 

Persuasion 

The freedom to change one’s religion is a cornerstone of religious freedom.3 

Likewise, the freedom to manifest one’s religion through public expression – including 

expression intended to persuade another to change his or her religious beliefs or affiliation – 

is a primary component of the right to freedom of religion.4 Such expression is an essential 

manifestation of religious belief for members of many faith communities. Indeed, for some 

religious faiths it is a mandatory injunction upon adherents. Moreover, the freedom to 

change religion would be greatly diminished if the freedom to engage in public religious 

expression and persuasion were not fully ensured. 

Unfortunately, these freedoms are subject to restrictions – in some cases egregious 

restrictions – by law, official policy or action, or societal attitudes in many countries around 

the globe. 

The freedom to change one’s religion, to adopt a religion, and to have a religion (or 

no religion) without coercion is absolute, and not subject to limitations of any kind by the 

state.5

 Nevertheless, in several countries the law prohibits a change in one’s religion, and the 

violator is subject to criminal penalties, including death. Whatever its status in religious law 

or practice, to regard apostasy as a criminal offense is a violation of religious freedom. In 

some cases these legal restrictions on apostasy are rarely enforced, but their very existence 

threatens those who wish to choose their religious beliefs or affiliation freely. In a number of 

countries particular faiths are banned, and the practice of these faiths is punishable by law. 

In Afghanistan and Indonesia, being an atheist is apparently prohibited. Also disturbing are 

reports in some countries that persons are forced, through violence or through withholding of 

essential humanitarian assistance, to profess a religion not of their choice. 

The freedom to engage in public religious expression and persuasion is also severely 

curtailed in several countries. For example, in Saudi Arabia the public expression of any 

religion other than Wahhabi Islam is prohibited. In a number of countries, the law prohibits 

religious expression and persuasion under a wide variety of circumstances. In some cases, 

these restrictions specifically target noncitizens. There are also legal prohibitions in several 

countries on the importation and distribution of religious literature that effectively restrict 

religious expression and persuasion. 

Governments have put forward a variety of justifications for such restrictions, 

including the protection of national security, the maintenance of public order and morality, 

and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others – including the freedom of those who 
28 

are exposed to or targeted by religious expression to have a religion. Such justifications must 

be considered with extreme care and some measure of suspicion. They are broad, vague, and 

can mask the intention to silence unpopular religious expression, to vitiate the right of some 

groups or individuals to freedom of religion, or even to persecute groups of religious 

believers. Restrictions of this sort can also be applied in a capricious or discriminatory 

manner (i.e., to unpopular or disfavored groups). 

Limitations on the freedom of public religious expression are also sometimes justified 

as furthering the protection of a dominant political ideology or religion. Any limitation 

grounded in such a justification, standing alone, would not be consistent with protection of 

religious freedom. 

Governments restrict religious expression and persuasion through direct and indirect 

means. In some countries, religious expression and persuasion are restricted directly by laws 

targeting such activity. In other cases, a variety of mechanisms is used by governments to 

restrict religious expression and persuasion or can have that effect: withholding official 

recognition or registration for religious communities and their institutions; withholding 

permits for the building or repair of places of worship; restricting the production, 

importation, and distribution of literature; restricting access to media; restricting the use of 

public or government property for assembly; restricting contact with coreligionists outside 

the country; controlling the solicitation of funds by private organizations and the provision of 

charitable, humanitarian, and social services; interfering with the selection of religious 

leaders; and interfering with the religious education of children. 

Rather than being an unintended consequence of legitimate government activity, in 

some countries the desire to suppress public religious expression or persuasion underlies the 

decisions in these areas. Moreover, official and societal attitudes against public religious 

expression or groups that are perceived to engage in religious persuasion can lead to violence 

or discrimination. Thus, the issues of conversion and religious expression and persuasion are 

underlying factors in numerous religious-freedom violations. In the words of one expert who 

addressed the Commission, “In every country where there are significant restrictions on 

religious persuasion, there are other religious-freedom violations as well.” 

Numerous complex factors contribute to the restriction of these important freedoms. 

The circumstances differ in any given country as a result of political, social, and economic 

relations among different religious communities that often have long-standing historical 

roots. At times, the state power is used to promote and enforce ideological principles (such 

as atheism by Communist governments) to the exclusion of other belief systems, including 

religion. The promotion of a dominant, state-sanctioned religion or ideology is often 

incompatible with alternative belief systems, which the state may view as forms of resistance 

or dissidence and may attempt to repress. Efforts to persuade individuals to change their 

belief systems may therefore be considered a threat to the status quo and consequently to the 

power structure, especially in totalitarian regimes. 

Beyond official government policy, societal factors may also greatly affect the 

response to religious expression and persuasion. This societal response can be shaped by 

perceptions and attitudes regarding historical events or regarding religious beliefs that are 
29 

new or linked to foreign influences. Differing religious views regarding conversion, efforts 

to gain converts, and the circumstances that justify state intervention to curtail these activities 

also affect the response to religious expression and persuasion. All of these factors may 

combine to form social tensions that can be expressed by harassment, ostracism, and at times, 

violence. 

These are important, complex, and sensitive issues, and thus can present difficult 

challenges for U.S. policymakers charged, as they are under IRFA, with opposing violations 

of religious freedom. During this annual cycle, the Commission has considered and 

addressed the freedoms to change religion and engage in public religious expression and 

persuasion in its public hearings and private briefings, in its fact-finding trips, and in 

connection with its reports and policy recommendations on particular countries. The 

Commission has also heard from two panels of experts about conflicts and restrictions in 

various countries on the freedom to engage in religious expression and persuasion, the effect 

of those restrictions on religious communities (including foreign missionary activity), and 

implications for U.S. foreign policy. 

The Commission believes that restrictions on the freedom to change one’s religion 

violate international law and merit continuing special attention. Restrictions of public 

religious expression and persuasion deserve further scrutiny and careful consideration. The 

current Commissioners will recommend to their successors that they continue substantial 

efforts to study and recommend policies protective of this important aspect of religious 

freedom. 

The Commission is very concerned with specific situations in certain countries where 

enforced restrictions on these freedoms are clear, egregious violations of religious freedom.6

 

These include, for example, situations where: 

-- apostasy or conversion (from one or more faiths) is punishable by law (as is 

the case in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iran, Mauritania, Nepal, Malaysia, and 

Sudan);7

 

-- a religion is legally banned or its public profession is prohibited by law (as 

is the case in China, where numerous religious groups are banned and public 

religious activity outside of officially controlled religious institutions is 

prohibited; Iran, where Baha’is are banned; Maldives, where the public 

profession of non-Islamic religions is prohibited; Saudi Arabia (as mentioned 

above); Singapore, where the Jehovah’s Witnesses are banned; and 

Turkmenistan, where only the official Soviet-era Sunni Muslim Board and the 

Russian Orthodox Church are recognized by the state as legal religious 

communities); 

-- religious expression and persuasion or the distribution of religious literature 

is virtually prohibited under all circumstances for one or more faiths (as is the 

case in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where virtually no public 

religious activity is permitted; Laos, where the printing and distribution of 

religious literature is prohibited outside of officially-controlled religious 
30 

institutions; Nepal and Tunisia, where an attempt to convert another are 

prohibited by law; and Vietnam, where religious expression and persuasion 

are restricted to regularly scheduled services in places of worship of officially 

controlled groups);8 and 

-- there are reported systematic instances of the use of physical force intended 

to coerce the renunciation of one’s faith or the adoption of another (as is 

reportedly the case in Burma, where security forces operating in religious 

minority areas are accused of coercing conversions to Buddhism through the 

threat of detention and harassment; in Indonesia where – in the face of 

inadequate government control – religious militants in the Moluccas are 

accused of coercing conversion to Islam through threat of violence; in Laos, 

where government officials reportedly force Protestant Christians to sign 

renunciations of their faith or face imprisonment; and in Sudan, where 

according to the State Department, children from non-Muslim families who 

have been captured and sold into slavery are forced to convert to Islam.9

The categories and examples given above are offered by way of example only, and 

are not intended to be exhaustive of the problem; there may be other situations of similar 

severity. Nevertheless, the seriousness of these violations necessitates attention and a 

response. The Commission urges the U.S. government to oppose these violations of religious 

freedom vigorously by raising them prominently and regularly in bilateral diplomatic 

discussions with the relevant governments and in multilateral forums, and by taking action 

with respect to each country as required by IRFA. 

O. Other Activities 

Section 104 of IRFA provides for improved training of U.S. Foreign Service officers 

in issues of international religious freedom. Commission staff attended sessions at the 

Foreign Service Institute to observe and initiate discussions with the State Department about 

how the Institute instructs diplomats on religious-freedom issues. On several occasions, the 

Commission’s Executive Director instructed classrooms of officers on international religious 

freedom and other Commission staff briefed junior officers undergoing orientation. The 

Commission Chairman and Executive Director also met with Ambassador Ruth Davis, 

Director of the Foreign Service Institute, in October 2000 to stress the importance of training 

on this topic for ambassadors-designate and senior diplomats, and to explore ways the 

Commission could assist the Institute in providing such training. 

The Commission undertook preparations for an independent expert study of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service’s expedited-removal program and how it affects 

potential refugees applying for asylum based on a fear of religious persecution, as authorized 

in IRFA. It has commissioned a leading immigration expert to develop a detailed blueprint 

and budget for conducting an independent and statistically reliable study at the Commission’s 

expense. In preparation, Commission staff also reviewed the General Accounting Office 

study on expedited removal, which was mandated by IRFA and released in September, and 

consulted with its authors and with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
31 

As noted above, the Commission conducted numerous individual meetings with 

human rights monitors, faith communities, relief agencies (religious and secular), and other 

non-governmental organizations to discuss and receive information about international 

religious-freedom issues. The Commission recognizes the great value of interchanges with 

these groups, and is working on plans to establish regular joint meetings with interested 

parties. The first meeting of this kind was held in March; more than 80 representatives of 

more than 50 organizations attended. 

P. Web Site 

The Commission’s Web site, at www.uscirf.gov, contains its Annual Reports; the 

State Department’s annual reports on international religious freedom and human rights; all 

prepared and oral testimony from the Commission’s hearings on Sudan (February 2000), 

China (March 2000), India (September 2000), Pakistan (September 2000), Vietnam 

(February 2001) and Indonesia (February 2001); copies of testimony prepared for delivery by 

Commissioners to congressional committees; its statements and press releases; international 

human rights documents; and information about the Commission, the Commissioners, and 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 and related amendments. 

Q. Cooperation With Other Agencies 

As noted in the Commission’s first Annual Report, the IRFA conferred upon the 

Commission the power to 

secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as 

the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this 

section. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Commission, the head of 

such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission, 

subject to applicable law.10

The Commission is pleased to report that the Treasury Department’s Office of 

Foreign Assets Control and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission staff have been 

most helpful and cooperative in responding to this Commission’s requests for information 

and clarification as it explored issues of capital-market access. Likewise, the Central 

Intelligence Agency has responded positively to Commission requests for briefings. 

The Commission reported last year that it had not gained full access to cables to and 

from embassies because of the State Department’s assertion of a legal position (executive 

privilege as to deliberative process within the administration) with which the Commission 

does not agree. The Department has since constructed a time-consuming, cumbersome, and 

lengthy process whereby Commission staff are able to review some cables after they have 

been redacted. This process means the Commission cannot see cables until months after they 

are sent, making it difficult for the Commission to formulate timely policy recommendations 

in fast-moving situations overseas. The Commission has tried this system in good faith and 

concludes that it does not meet the Commission’s needs. It can no longer acquiesce to this 

situation and will propose a more-expeditious process to the State Department. 
32 

R. Commissioners’ Terms Expire 

The Commissioners’ terms expire on May 14, 2001, just a few days after the release 

of this report. The Commissioners would like to take this opportunity to thank those who 

appointed them for the privilege of serving on this first Commission on International 

Religious Freedom and to express their appreciation to each other for the bipartisan and 

cooperative atmosphere in which the Commission conducted its business. They look forward 

to close cooperation with their successors in this vitally important work. 

 

1

 Commissioner John Bolton dissented, and Commissioner Laila Al-Marayati abstained, from 

the Commission’s decision to recommend that Saudi Arabia be designated a CPC. 

2

 Commissioner Michael K. Young, joined by Commissioner Nina Shea, dissented from the 

Commission’s decision not to recommend that India should be designated as a CPC. 

3

 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience and religion includes “freedom to change . . . religion or belief.” Article 

18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “No one shall be 

subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 

his choice.” The Human Rights Committee, the monitoring body of the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has observed that “the freedom ‘to have or to adopt’ 

a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including, 

inter alia, the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt 

atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief.” See Human Rights 

Committee, General Comment No. 22 (48) (Art. 18), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 

(1993), ¶ 5. 

4

 A number of terms are used that encompass persuasive activity in the matter of religious 

beliefs and affiliation, such as proselytism, evangelism, and public witnessing. The use of 

these terms can be confusing. The term proselytism, in particular, is sometimes used to refer 

to actions intended to bring about an entirely voluntary change in religious beliefs and 

sometimes to refer pejoratively to efforts to convert others by coercive, deceptive, or 

manipulative means. The terms evangelism and witnessing are closely associated with 

Christianity, and do not necessarily work well to describe activity related to other religions. 

The term “religious persuasion” is not used in this report to mean one’s religious faith, but 

rather the act of persuading another to change his religion or beliefs. The term is meant to be 

a neutral one: i.e., whether particular methods of religious persuasion are “improper,” in the 

sense that a government may restrict them without violating religious freedom, depends upon 

a variety of specific factors and the context in which they are used and is not inherent in the 

definition itself.

5

 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18), U.N. Doc. 

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993), ¶ 8; Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the 

Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales 

No. 60.XIV.2 (1960). 
33 

 

6

 There may be cases where legal provisions, through lack of enforcement, are so archaic that 

they no longer have the effect of restricting religious expression and persuasion. This 

assessment, however, requires careful examination. 

7 For example, a provision in the Penal Code in Mauritania imposes the death sentence for 

“any Muslim who abandons his faith and does not repent within three days.” However, this 

law has never been enforced. See House Committee on International Relations and Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, Annual Report: International Religious Freedom 2000,

report prepared by U.S. Department of State, 106th Cong., Joint Committee Print, 51. 

Section 126 of the Sudan Criminal Act (1991) provides for the death penalty for “every 

Muslim who propagates for the renunciation of the Creed of Islam or publicly declares his 

renunciation thereof by an express statement or conclusive act.” The last reported 

prosecution for this offense was in 1998. See 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Sudan,” 77. 

In Nepal, Article 19 (1) of the Constitution provides that “every person shall have the 

freedom to profess and practice his own religion as handed down to him from ancient times 

having due regard to the traditional practices: Provided that no person shall be entitled to 

convert the religion of any person.” Reprinted in Blaustein and Flanz, Constitutions of the 

Countries of the World (1987). According to the State Department, arrests for conversions in 

Nepal and engaging in religious expression and persuasion are rare.

8

 For example, in Vietnam the government’s decree related to religious activities states that 

“religious activities [such as prayer sessions, celebration of ceremonies, preaching, and 

religious instruction] that overflow from the place of worship, or not previewed in the 

program presented each year [to the government for approval], must obtain authorization of 

the appropriate organs of State.” Moreover, the printing and dissemination, import and sale 

of religious artifacts must be submitted for government approval. See Vietnam: Decree of 

the Government Concerning Religious Activities No. 26/1999/ND-CP (1999), Arts. 8, 14. 

According to the State Department, Tunisia “does not permit proselytizing.” The government 

of Tunisia reportedly views proselytism as “an act against the public order for which foreign 

missionaries may be expelled. . . . There were no reported cases of official action against 

persons suspected of proselytizing during the period covered by this report [July 1999 

through June 2000].” See 2000 International Religious Freedom, “Tunisia,” 482-83.

The State Department, in its reporting on these types of restrictions, should be precise as to 

what actions or forms of expression are prohibited under what circumstances, both in law and 

in practice. This information is important to assess the nature and extent of religious freedom 

violations. 

9

 See U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Sudan,” 

February 2001, 14. 

10 IRFA § 203(b), 22 U.S.C. § 6432a(b). 
34 
35 

II. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

A. Introduction 

In the last year, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) 

has expanded its crackdown on unregistered religious communities and tightened its control 

on official religious organizations. The government has intensified its campaign against the 

Falun Gong movement and its followers. It apparently has also been involved in the 

confiscation and destruction of up to 3,000 unregistered religious buildings and sites in 

southeastern China. Government control over the official Protestant and Catholic churches 

has increased. It continues to interfere in the training and selection of religious leaders and 

clergy. At the same time, the government continues to maintain tight control over Uighur 

Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists. Finally, cases of torture by government officials reportedly 

are on the rise. 

In its May 2000 Annual Report, the Commission on International Religious Freedom 

recommended that Congress approve Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status for 

China only after the Chinese government had made substantial improvements in the 

protection of religious freedom. Congress did approve PNTR, and the Commission was 

concerned that by doing so – without substantial action with regard to religious freedom and 

at a time when conditions of religious freedom have sharply deteriorated – the Chinese 

government could be led to believe that the United States does not attach significant 

importance to the right to freedom of religion. The Commission’s concern has been 

validated by the deteriorating religious-freedom situation in China over the last year. Thus, 

the Commission urges the U.S. government to work vigorously to promote religious freedom 

in China by making its concern known to the Chinese government and by working to secure 

substantial improvements. 

Since the publication of its May 2000 Annual Report, the Commission and its staff 

have continued to monitor the condition of religious freedom in China. The Commissioners 

and the Commission staff have interviewed human rights and religious non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) with expertise on China, individual experts, and U.S. government 

officials. In February 2000, the Commission requested permission from the Chinese 

government to visit that country. However, the Chinese government never responded to this 

initial request. The Commission renewed its request in recent months, to which the Chinese 

embassy in the United States responded that such a visit would be “highly inappropriate.” 

B. Religious Freedom 

1. Legal/Policy Developments 

In the last year, the government has promulgated additional rules that restrict 

religious activities. It was disclosed that in September 2000, the Religious Affairs Bureau 

issued rules governing the religious activities of foreigners within China, which codified 

existing regulations that restrict the religious activities of foreigners and their contacts with 

Chinese citizens.1

 The rules provide that foreigners are allowed to “preach and expound the 

scripture” only at the invitation of official Chinese religious organizations, and only at 
36 

registered religious sites. Foreigners are not allowed to distribute religious literature, develop 

followers among Chinese citizens, or engage in “other missionary activities.” 

Also in the last year, the Chinese government apparently has established official 

mechanisms to coordinate its national campaign against “cults,” focusing specifically on the 

Falun Gong movement and its followers.2 The government and official media have disclosed 

that an “Office for Preventing and Handling Cults” was established in September 2000 under 

the State Council.3 Moreover, the government reportedly has created a Politburo-level 

permanent office in the Communist Party of China (CPC) that is responsible for the 

coordination of government efforts to crack down against the Falun Gong movement.4

 

According to the report, Vice Premier Li Lanqing, a member of the CPC Politburo Standing 

Committee, would head the new office. Finally, as an indication of the central government’s 

resolve to crack down on the Falun Gong movement, in March 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji, in 

his report to the National People’s Congress, stated: 

We need to continue our campaign against the Falun Gong cult, and further 

expose and condemn the anti-human, anti-social and anti-science nature of the 

cult, which has become a tool for domestic and overseas forces hostile to our 

socialist government. We need to mete out severe punishment to the small 

number of criminals while making unremitting efforts to unite, educate and 

rescue the vast majority of people who have been taken in.5 

2. Unregistered Religious Organizations 

The Chinese government has intensified its campaign to crack down on unregistered 

religious communities and those that it has identified as “cults,” including the Falun Gong 

and some Protestant house-church movements. The government reportedly has detained and

tortured religious prisoners, raided homes and independent churches, and closed, confiscated, 

or destroyed unregistered religious properties. 

Since the second half of 1999, thousands of Falun Gong practitioners reportedly have 

been arrested and remain in some form of detention.6

 According to the Falun Gong 

organization, since the second half of 1999, 162 followers have died as a result of torture and 

mistreatment by officials while in custody.7

 The State Department and Amnesty 

International reported that police officials have tortured Falun Gong members who were 

detained or imprisoned. The official Chinese press has confirmed that nearly 200 Falun 

Gong practitioners have received sentences of up to 10 years for using the movement to 

“create social chaos” or to “obstruct the law.”8

 On October 1, 2000 (which was China’s 

National Day), security forces reportedly beat and detained hundreds of Falun Gong 

practitioners (perhaps up to 1,000) for holding peaceful demonstrations in Beijing’s 

Tiananmen Square, protesting government policy against the group and official treatment of 

its followers.9

 Hundreds of other followers reportedly have been confined to mental 

hospitals. More recently, as a part of the government’s intensified campaign against the 

Falun Gong, police and security forces reportedly raided the homes of more than 1,000 

grassroots leaders of the movement in an effort to obtain evidence that these individuals have 

been conducting “cult-like practice,” engaging in economic crimes, or causing bodily harm to 

other Falun Gong followers.10 Another Qigong group, the Zhong Gong (which was banned 
37 

by the government in 1999), reports that more than 30 of its leaders continue to be 

imprisoned by the Chinese authorities.11 

The official crackdown on the Falun Gong has been extended to Hong Kong residents 

and foreign citizens. In September 2000, a Hong Kong-resident Falun Gong practitioner, 

along with a Chinese mainlander, reportedly were arrested nine days after they filed a legal 

complaint in Beijing against Chinese President Jiang Zemin and other high-ranking 

government officials for their part in the official crackdown.12 In November, a U.S.-resident 

Falun Gong practitioner reportedly was arrested on charges of providing national security 

information to foreigners. In December, she was sentenced to three years in prison.13 Also 

in November, a Canadian citizen was sentenced to three years of re-education through labor 

for practicing Falun Gong.14 He was reportedly tortured by police officials while in custody 

and was released in January 2001. 

Members of unregistered Protestant house churches have been detained, tortured, and 

subjected to other forms of government harassment. In some areas of China, properties 

belonging to or used by such unregistered groups have been confiscated, closed, or 

destroyed. The government crackdown on “cults” has placed increased pressure on 

unregistered Christian churches.15 It has been reported that in some parts of China, 

unregistered churches are routinely classified as “cults,” and the Chinese central government 

reportedly has designated 14 unregistered Protestant movements as “cults.”16 The 

unregistered churches also face difficulties when attempting to register with the government, 

and in some cases, local officials have refused to register them.17 Furthermore, unregistered 

churches continue to face obstacles in obtaining Bibles and other Christian literature, and are 

not allowed to operate independent training institutions. 

In August 2000, local public security officials arrested 130 followers of the China 

Fangcheng Church in Henan Province because the church was officially labeled as an “evil 

cult,” and the government charged that its members were engaging in an illegal assembly 

that, according to the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, was “seriously violating the 

normal life of the local people here.”18 Among them were three U.S. citizens who were born 

in Taiwan, who reportedly were subjected to strip searches while in detention. They were 

eventually expelled from the country. Eighty-five of the 130 arrested reportedly were sent to 

re-education labor camps; they have since been released.19 In October 2000, a 21-year-old 

itinerant missionary of the China Evangelical Fellowship reportedly died of torture and 

mistreatment while under detention in Henan Province.20 It was reported that he was arrested 

in September while worshipping in an underground house church. Hundreds of Protestants 

reportedly remain in labor camps and prisons. Many of these individuals allegedly have been 

subjected to torture and other extreme forms of punishment.21 Furthermore, government 

officials reportedly have imposed severe fines on unregistered Protestant organizations and 

their followers on account of their belief.22 

The relationship between the unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Roman Catholic Church 

and the Chinese government has deteriorated in the last year. The State Department reports 

that an August 1999 CPC document called on the authorities to eliminate the underground 

Catholic Church.23 A number of Catholic bishops and priests reportedly remain in prison or 

in detention while the status of other priests and lay members remain unknown.24 On 
38 

October 1, 2000, the anniversary for the founding of the PRC, the Vatican canonized 120 

saints with ties to China. Eighty-seven of the new Chinese saints were killed during the 

Boxer Rebellion of 1900.25 In response, the Chinese government accused several of the 

newly canonized saints of committing crimes of rape and extortion against the Chinese 

people.26 

Finally, in November-December 2000, local government officials destroyed, closed, 

or confiscated approximately 400 unregistered Protestant and Catholic church buildings in 

the Wenzhou area (located in the southeastern province of Zhejiang) as a part of the most 

destructive campaign to crack down on unregistered religious buildings and sites since the 

late 1970s.27 There are reports that overall as many as 3,000 churches, temples, and shrines 

(Christian, Buddhist, and Daoist) in the area have been demolished, blown up, or confiscated 

for government use. China’s state-run media have confirmed these reports. 

3. Tibet 

Chinese authorities maintain tight control over religious activity and places of 

worship in Tibet and reportedly have increased some restrictions in the last year. The 

government remains suspicious of Tibetan Buddhism because of its link with the Dalai 

Lama. The Tibet Information Network reports that monks and nuns comprised 74 percent of 

the 266 Tibetan political prisoners it had identified as of January 2001.28 There have been 

reports of torture and other extreme forms of punishment meted out to imprisoned Buddhist 

monks and nuns.29 According to the State Department, Tibetan monks and nuns are required 

to undergo “patriotic education,” and monks are forced to renounce the Dalai Lama and the 

Dalai Lama-recognized Panchen Lama.30 “Monks and nuns failing to accept these precepts 

can face formal expulsion from monasteries and nunneries, prohibition from any further 

religious activity, and restricted rights to education, employment and travel.”31 Restrictions 

on religious practice have been extended to ordinary citizens in private homes: homes were 

searched for shrines, Tibetan religious paintings, and Dalai Lama pictures; school children 

were told not to visit monasteries and temples to pray or to attend religious ceremonies on 

threat of expulsion.32 Tibetan Buddhists reportedly are not permitted to observe the Dalai 

Lama’s birthday and in the summer of 2000 strict measures were taken by the government to 

prevent public participation in other religious festivals.33 Government employees and party 

officials in Tibet have been prohibited from participating in religious activities (including 

having altars and religious materials in their homes) and have been ordered to withdraw their 

children from monasteries, nunneries, and Tibetan schools in India.34 

4. Uighur Muslims35

Government restrictions on the religious activities of Uighurs continue to be tight. 

Islamic institutions and prominent individuals in the Muslim community have become the 

target of oppressive, often brutal measures. Chinese authorities apparently have been 

unwilling or unable to differentiate between religious exercise or ethnic identity and 

“separatist” aspirations. As a result, government officials reportedly continue to restrict 

religious activities, including the building of mosques, in areas where ethnic unrest has 

occurred.36 The government controls the appointment of imams. According to one account, 

imams are required to undergo political indoctrination and their sermons are censored by 
39 

government officials.37 Uighurs reportedly are also prohibited from congregating in large 

numbers, including gathering family members to observe traditional religious holidays.38 

Government employees, teachers, and students must abide by government restrictions. For 

example, it has been reported that students, teachers, and government officials are not 

allowed to observe the daily act of praying five times.39 Mosques apparently are required to 

record the names of the individuals attending each day’s religious activities.40 Students that 

are found to have attended mosques more than three times reportedly can be permanently 

expelled from school.41 Children who are found to have been taught Islam reportedly could 

also be expelled from school.42 Uighur Muslims appear to be the only Chinese citizens who 

are subject to capital punishment for political crimes. In 2000, according to Human Rights 

Watch, at least 24 Uighur Muslims were executed.43 Finally, prison officials reportedly have 

tortured Uighur prisoners. In October 2000, one Uighur prisoner reportedly died as a result 

of torture and other mistreatment.44 

5. Registered Religious Communities 

Over the past year, the government reportedly has also tightened its control over 

official religious organizations, especially the official Protestant and Catholic churches. The 

Chinese government, through state-sanctioned religious bodies, has increased its control over 

religious doctrine, seminary curricula, and the training and selection of leaders and clergy. 

Bishop Ding Guangxun, the concurrent honorary president of the official Three Self Patriotic 

Movement (TSPM) for the Protestant churches in China and the Christian Council of China, 

reportedly has introduced a “new theology” that seeks to de-emphasize the differences 

between believers and non-believers and to ensure that doctrines of the official Chinese 

Protestant Churches are compatible with socialist ideology.45 One important feature of this 

theology is the denial of the fundamental Christian doctrine of salvation by faith.46 This new 

theological construct was introduced into seminary curricula, which resulted in the departure 

(both voluntary and involuntary) of many faculty members and students.47 

In addition to the government’s attempt to exert control over theology, the TSPM 

churches face other government restrictions. According to reports, they are not permitted to 

teach fundamental Christian doctrines such as creation and resurrection. They are not 

allowed to minister to those under the age of 18, and church members cannot preach outside 

their own village and province. Moreover, pastors that do not follow official guidelines may 

be relocated, removed from current positions, and stripped of salaries and accommodations.48 

The official Catholic Church apparently also faces increased government restrictions. 

The same August 1999 party document that called for the elimination of underground 

Catholic churches also called for the tightening of government control over the official 

church. According to the State Department, many clerics and members of the official church 

refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of bishops who were appointed by the government, but 

not approved by the Vatican.49 

C. Commission Recommendations 

In its May 2000 Annual Report the Commission recommend that the U.S. Congress 

should grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status only after the Chinese 
40 

government had made substantial improvements in respect to religious freedom, as measured 

by a number of specific standards.50 Congress, of course, did approve PNTR status for China 

without any such religious-freedom preconditions. As detailed above, there has been a 

marked deterioration of the protection of religious freedom in China since the Commission’s 

last report and since Congress approved PNTR. China has not ratified the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Chinese government has not provided 

information or permitted unhindered access to religious leaders who are in prison, in 

detention, under house arrest, or under surveillance. Nor, to the Commission’s knowledge, 

has it released any such prisoners. As noted above, the Chinese government has refused to 

grant permission for the Commission to visit the country, rejecting the proposed visit as 

“highly inappropriate.” The U.S.-China bilateral human rights dialogue has not resumed, 

apparently because of U.S. concerns regarding the commitment of the Chinese government to 

substantive discussions and follow-up actions. 

Even with the PNTR issue settled, the Commission believes that Congress should pay 

careful attention to the conditions of religious freedom in China and to the persistent failure 

of the Chinese government to protect religious freedom. In granting PNTR, Congress did 

establish a commission to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in 

China.51 The Commission welcomes the establishment of this body and looks forward to 

working with it on human rights matters of mutual interest and responsibility once it begins 

to function. The Commission recommended last year that Congress invite the Dalai Lama to 

address a Joint Session of Congress and continues to urge the Congress to do so.52 

The Commission recommended last year that President Clinton personally lead 

efforts to pass a resolution censuring the Chinese government for its human rights violations 

at the annual session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).53 Although thenSecretary of State Madeleine K. Albright attended the UNCHR session in Geneva and 

advocated such a resolution, U.S. efforts were defeated. In February 2001, the Commission 

wrote Secretary of State Colin L. Powell urging him to initiate a China resolution at this 

year’s UNCHR session and to mount a sustained campaign at the highest levels to convince 

other governments to support it. On February 26, the State Department announced that it 

would sponsor a resolution; however, as of the date this report went to press, the United 

States has not formally introduced one. 

At the same time that China’s protection of religious freedom continues to 

deteriorate, the Chinese government sought to raise capital from U.S. investors. In 

September and October 2000, the press reported that the government of China was 

considering offering sovereign bonds in a total amount of $1 billion in the near future, at 

least in part to U.S. investors. In November, the Commission wrote to President Clinton that, 

in its view, the President has the authority under the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) to prohibit the purchase of China sovereign bonds by U.S. financial 

institutions.54 It asked the President if he agreed with the Commission’s conclusion and, if 

so, whether he intended to use his authority to prevent the China sovereign bond issue until 

the Chinese government made substantial improvements in respect for religious freedom and 

provided sufficient assurances to guarantee that the proceeds were never used to support 

religious persecution. The President’s response did not address the question of his authority 

under IRFA, but he said that he did not favor prohibiting the sale. Also, in November, plans 
41 

to offer China sovereign bonds were reportedly shelved. In March 2001, the Commission 

wrote to President Bush with the same inquiry that it had made to President Clinton. If and 

when China sovereign bonds are offered to U.S. investors, the Commission will examine the 

circumstances and consider whether to recommend that the President exercise his authority to 

prevent such a sale. 

In light of this background, the Commission makes the following recommendations: 

1. In its bilateral relations with China, the U.S. government should 

persistently urge the Chinese government to take the following steps to 

protect religious freedom: 

1.1. Establish the freedom to engage in religious activities 

(including the freedom for religious groups to govern themselves 

and select their leaders without interference, worship publicly, 

express and advocate religious beliefs, and distribute religious 

literature) outside state-controlled religious organizations and 

eliminate controls on the activities of officially registered 

organizations. 

1.2. Permit unhindered access to religious persons (including 

those imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest and 

surveillance) by U.S. diplomatic personnel and government 

officials, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

and respected international human rights organizations. Release 

persons from imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or 

intimidating surveillance who are so restricted on account of their 

religious identities or activities. 

1.3. Permit domestic Chinese religious organizations and 

individuals to interact with foreign organizations and individuals. 

1.4. Cease discrimination against religious followers in access to 

government benefits, including education, employment, and health 

care. 

1.5. Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights. 

In the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Congress stated that it was the policy of the 

United States to encourage the Chinese government to protect the human rights of its people 

and to seek the support of other governments in urging Chinese improvements in human 

rights practices.55 As one of the rights most abridged and abused by the Chinese 

government, religious freedom must be a key element of U.S. initiatives to promote human 

rights in China. American diplomats should consistently and prominently raise religiousfreedom abuses with Chinese officials and advocate substantial improvements (as measured 

by the above standards) at the highest levels and at every available opportunity. In addition, 

the U.S. should urge other governments to raise the issue of religious freedom in their 
42 

bilateral contacts with the Chinese government. In an effort to keep religious freedom high 

on the agenda of U.S.-China relations, the State Department should continue to report in 

detail on the conditions of religious freedom in China. 

2. The U.S. government should continue to work vigorously for the 

resumption of a high-level unconditional human rights dialogue with the 

PRC government when the Chinese government demonstrates its 

commitment to protecting religious freedom, for example, by addressing 

the items listed as 1.1 to 1.5 above. 

In November 2000, PRC President Jiang Zemin reportedly verbally committed to 

resume the annual human rights dialogue with the United States that had been suspended 

since May 1999. The dialogue has not resumed, apparently because of U.S. concerns 

regarding the commitment of the Chinese government to substantive discussions and followup actions. The Commission believes that the dialogue should be resumed when the Chinese 

government has demonstrated its commitment to protecting religious freedom. Once 

resumed, religious-freedom issues should be prominent and the U.S. government should 

persistently advocate substantial action in the areas itemized as 1.1 through 1.5, above. 

3. Until religious freedom significantly improves in China, the U.S. 

government, led by the personal efforts of the President of the United 

States, should initiate a resolution to censure China at the annual meeting 

of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and should support a 

sustained campaign to convince other governments at the highest levels to 

support it. 

The Commission welcomes the U.S. government’s decision to introduce a resolution 

regarding China’s human rights practices at the UNCHR during its 2001 session in Geneva. 

The Commission would like to restate the importance of an early decision by the U.S. 

government each year on whether a resolution condemning China’s human rights practices is 

warranted. Such U.S. resolutions will likely continue to fail in Geneva unless the President 

makes their adoption a high priority of the administration. The Commission urges the 

President to personally solicit support for the resolution from the leaders of UNCHR member 

countries. The success or failure of this referendum on China’s standing in the international 

community is likely to depend on whether the President makes liberal use of the “bully 

pulpit” and effective diplomacy at every opportunity. 

4. Companies that are doing business in China should be required to 

disclose the nature and extent of that business in connection with their 

access to U.S. capital markets. 

There is a significant, undesirable gap in U.S. law regarding China and other 

“countries of particular concern” under IRFA (i.e. egregious religious-freedom violators): In 

some cases, companies that are doing business in China can sell securities on U.S. markets 

without having to disclose fully (1) the details of the particular business activities in China, 

including plans for expansion or diversification; (2) the identity of all agencies of the Chinese 

government with which the companies are doing business; (3) the relationship of the business 
43 

activities to violations of religious freedom and other human rights in China; or (4) the 

contribution that the proceeds raised in the U.S. debt and equity markets will make to these 

business activities and hence, potentially to those violations.56 Across-the-board full 

disclosure of these details would prompt corporate managers to work to prevent their 

companies from supporting or facilitating these violations. It also would aid (1) U.S. 

investors in deciding whether to purchase the securities; (2) shareholders in exercising their 

ownership rights (including proposing shareholder resolutions for annual meetings and proxy 

statements); and (3) U.S. policymakers in formulating sound policy with respect to China and 

U.S. capital markets. The Commission recommends that the United States require such 

disclosure. As discussed in the Commission’s recommendations with regard to U.S. capital 

markets disclosure, this requirement would also apply to those Chinese companies that are 

doing business in Sudan and issuing or listing securities in the United States. 

5. The U.S. government should raise the profile of conditions of Uighur 

Muslims by addressing religious-freedom and human rights concerns in 

bilateral talks, by increasing the number of educational opportunities 

available to Uighurs, and by increasing radio broadcasts in the Uighur 

language. 

The deteriorating condition of Uighur Muslims over the last year makes it especially 

important for the U.S. government to document the abuses against Uighurs and raise these 

abuses with the Chinese government. Moreover, the Commission recommended last year 

that the U.S. government increase the number of educational and cultural exchange 

opportunities available to Uighurs. It also recommended that there be increased radio 

broadcasts in the Uighur language. 

The Commission understands that the ability to document the condition of Uighurs is 

limited. However, it is because information on the condition of Uighurs is limited that the 

U.S. government should expand its efforts to address their religious-freedom problems, 

including through increases in educational and cultural opportunities and radio broadcasts. 

The U.S. government apparently has not increased its support for these activities since May 

2000. 

6. The U.S. government should use its diplomatic influence with other 

governments to ensure that China is not selected as a site for the 

International Olympic Games until it has made significant and sustained 

improvements in religious freedom and human rights. 

7. The State Department should identify specific individuals and entities 

involved in violations of religious freedom in China. 

In a letter to Congress in 1999, in connection with the State Department’s designation 

of China as a “country of particular concern” under IRFA, the Department stated that it 

would “identify specific individuals and entities” involved in violations of religious freedom 

in China as that information becomes available.57 The Commission believes that the State 

Department should include that information in its human rights reports to Congress.58
44 

 

1

 Xinhua News Agency, “Full Text on Rules of Religious Activities of Aliens Within China,” 

September 26, 2000 (in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)).

2

 In July 1999, the CPC Central Committee issued a circular banning Falun Gong practices 

among party members. In October, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 

Congress (NPC) adopted a resolution to ban all “heretic cult organizations.” Earlier in the 

same month, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued 

judicial explanations (titled “Several Issues Concerning the Concrete Application of Laws in 

Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Making Use of Cult Organizations”) on laws 

regarding crimes committed by “cults.” Article 1 of the explanations vaguely define “cult” 

organizations (which are mentioned in Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law) as “illegal 

organizations that are set up using religions, Qigong or other things as a camouflage, deify 

their leading members, and confuse, poison and deceive people, recruit and control their 

members, and endanger the society by fabricating and spreading superstitious heresies.” 

Xinhua News Agency, “Judicial Explanations Text on Cult Crimes,” October 30, 1999 (in 

FBIS); Xinhua News Agency, “Judicial Explanations on Crimes by Cults,” October 30, 1999 

(in FBIS); Xinhua News Agency, “CPC Circular Banning Falun Gong Practices,” July 22, 

1999 (in FBIS). 

3

 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “China Bans 

Falun Gong to Protect Human Rights,” (http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/8819.htm, 

accessed March 2, 2001); People’s Daily, “Chinese Official on Handling of Falun Gong 

Cult,” February 28, 2001 

(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200102/27/eng20010227_63592.html, accessed March 23, 

2001).

4

 Ming Pao, “Li Lanqing Heads CPC’s New Office in Charge of Cracking Down on 

Falungong,” February 12, 2001 (in FBIS). 

5

 Xinhua News Agency, “Text of Zhu Rongji’s Report on Outline of 10th Five-year Plan,” 

March 16, 2001 (in FBIS). 

6

 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “China,” 

February 2001 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/index.cfm?docid=684, 

accessed February 26, 2001); Human Rights Watch, “China and Tibet,” World Report 2001, 

December 2000, 184. 

7

 Falun Dafa Info Center, “Death Toll in China,” (http://www.faluninfo.net, accessed March 

6, 2001). Also see Amnesty International, Torture – A Growing Scourge in China – Time for 

Action, February 12, 2001 

(http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/ASA170042001?OpenDocument, accessed February 26, 

2001). 

8

 Xinhua News Agency, “China Convicts 151 Falun Gong-related Criminals,” August 23, 

2000 (in FBIS); Paul Eckert, “China jails 37 who spread Falun Gong Fliers,” Reuters, March 

2, 2001. 
45 

 

9

 Philip P. Pan, “Falun Gong Protesters Stun Beijing; Hundreds Disrupt Celebration Despite 

Heightened Security,” Washington Post, October 2, 2000; Jeremy Page, “Falun Gong 

Protests Marr China’s National Day,” Reuters, October 1, 2000 

(http://www.faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.asp?ID=894, accessed March 22, 2001). 

10 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Raids as China tracks Falun Gong worldwide,” CNN.com, February 

10, 2001 (http://www.cnn.com, accessed March 6, 2001). 

11 Interview with Zhong Gong representative by USCIRF staff, March 28, 2001. 

12 South China Morning Post, “Hong Kong Man Arrested in Falungong Bid to Sue Jiang 

Zemin,” October 10, 2000 (in FBIS). 

13 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); Falun Dafa Info Center, “Ms. Teng Chun Yan – 

Jailed for Exposing the Crimes of Others,” (http://www.faluninfo.net/appeals/dr_teng.asp, 

accessed March 7, 2001). 

14 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); David Ljunggren, “Released Canadian Falun 

Gong Follower Reports Torture in China,” Reuters, January 21, 2001 

(http://www.faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.asp?ID=2764, accessed March 22, 2001). 

15 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Protestant Christianity and Religious Freedom in China: 

Report from Fact Finding Mission, December 2000 

(http://www.csw.org.uk/china_december_2000.html, accessed April 4, 2001). 

16 Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy, “130 Followers of China Fangcheng 

Church Arrested in Henan Province,” August 24, 2000 (Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service, accessed March 2, 2001). According to this report, the 14 Protestant movements 

designated as cults are the China Evangelistic Fellowship, the China Fangcheng Church, the 

Total Scope Church, the Shouters Sect, the Disciples Sect, the Three Shifts of Servants Sect, 

the Established King Sect, the Eastern Lightening Sect, the Supreme Spirit Sect, the Lingling 

Sect, the New Testament Church, the Absolute Sect, the Cold Water sect, and the Blood 

Water and Sacred Spirit Bless Preaching Group. 

17 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Protestant Christianity and Religious Freedom in China; 

Forum 18, Freedom of Religion: A report with special emphasis on the right to choose 

religion and registration systems, 28-29. 

18 Agence France Presse, “Embassy Says U.S. Citizens Freed, Underground Church Seeks 

End to Persecution,” August 25, 2000 (in FBIS); Information Center for Human Rights & 

Democracy, “3 Chinese American Christians Expelled from China,” August 28, 2000 (in 

FBIS); Agence France Presse, “PRC FM Spokesman Confirms Detention of 130 

Underground Protestants,” September 5, 2000 (in FBIS); 2000 Country Reports, “China” 

(Internet). 

19 Agence France Presse, “PRC FM Spokesman Confirms Detention of 130 Underground 
46 

 

Protestants.” 

20 Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy, “Protestant Beaten to Death in 

Detention Center in Henan,” October 19, 2000 (in FBIS); Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 

“Worsening Religious Persecution: Church Destructions & Martyrdom,” December 21, 2000 

(http://www.csworldwide.org/21-12-2000.html, accessed March 15, 2001). 

21 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Protestant Christianity and Religious Freedom in China; 

Amnesty International, Torture. 

22 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Protestant Christianity and Religious Freedom in China. 

23 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet). 

24 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); Human Rights Watch, “China and Tibet,” 185. 

According to the Cardinal Kung Foundation, as of October 31, 2000, more than 20 bishops 

and priests of the underground Catholic Church were in prison, under house arrest, or placed 

under strict police surveillance while the status of 37 priests and lay members remained 

unknown. The Cardinal Kung Foundation, “Prisoners of Religious Conscience for the 

Underground Roman Catholic Church in China,” October 31, 2000 

(http://www.cardinalkungfoundation.org/prisoners/index.html, accessed March 2, 2001). 

25 Philip P. Pan, “‘Saints’ in Rome are ‘Henchmen’ to Beijing,” September 30, 2000; 

Associated Press, “China Denounces Pope’s Sainthoods,” October 1, 2000; 2000 Country 

Reports, “China” (Internet); Forum 18, Freedom of Religion, 30. 

26 Xinhua News Agency, “RMRB Signed Article ‘Exposing True Colors of ‘Saints,’” 

October 2, 2000 (in FBIS); Reuters, “Pope Canonizes Chinese Martyrs; Beijing Upset,” 

October 1, 2000. 

27 Hangzhou Zhejiang Ribao, “Zhejiang’s Ouhai District Cracks Down on ‘Illegal’ Religious 

Buildings,” December 8, 2000 (in FBIS); Agence France Presse, “PRC Officials tell AFP 

1,200 Temples Destroyed or Closed During Crackdown,” December 13, 2000 (in FBIS); 

Philip P. Pan, “Crackdown at Christmas Dims Holiday for Chinese: Regional Assault on 

Illegal Churches Worst in Decades,” Washington Post, December 18, 2000; Information 

Center for Human Rights & Democracy, “3000 Temples, Churches in Wenzhou Reportedly 

Closed Down, Demolished,” December 27, 2000 (in FBIS). 

28 Steven D. Marshall, Suppressing Dissent: Hostile Elements II – Political Imprisonment in 

Tibet, 1987-2000 (Tibet Information Network, February 2001), 7. 

29 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); Steven D. Marshall, Rukhag 3: The Nuns of 

Drapchi Prison (Tibet Information Network, 2000); Amnesty International, Torture. 

30 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet). According to the State Department, the Chinese 

government has denied repeated requests (including that of the UN High Commissioner for 
47 

 

Human Rights) for access to the 12-year-old Gendun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama 

recognizes as the 11th Panchen Lama. Government officials have stated that he is being held 

for his own safety and that he is attending classes in Tibet. The government continues to 

insist that the 11-year-old Gyaltsen Norbu, who it recognized, is the Panchen Lama. 

31 Marshall, Suppressing Dissent, 8. 

32 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); Tibet Information Network, News Review: 

Reports from Tibet, 2000, 2001, 30. 

33 Marshall, Suppressing Dissent, 8. 

34 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet); Marshall, Suppressing Dissent, 8. 

35 The official designation for the area where most Uighurs in China reside is the “Xinjiang 

Autonomous Region.” (Xinjiang means “New Territories” in Chinese.) Most Uighurs, 

however, prefer to call this area “East Turkestan.” 

36 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet). 

37 Interview with Uighur representative by USCIRF staff, January 31, 2001. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Interview with Uighur representative by USCIRF staff, January 31, 2001. 

40 Ibid. 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet). 

41 Interview with Uighur representative by USCIRF staff, January 31, 2001. 

42 Ibid. 

43 Human Rights Watch, “China and Tibet,” 186. 

44 Amnesty International, Torture. 

45 Paul Davenport, “Testimony of a Teacher Expelled from Nanjing Seminary,” Compass 

Direct, January 2001. 

46 “A Closer Look at the Church in China,” Ethics and Public Policy Center meeting, January 

31, 2001. (USCIRF staff notes.) 

47 Ibid. 

48 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Protestant Christianity and Religious Freedom in China. 

49 2000 Country Reports, “China” (Internet). 
48 

 

50 See Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 

2000 (“USCIRF 2000 Annual Report”), Recommendation 2.1, 41-44. 

51 See U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, § 302. 

52 See USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 2.2.b, 44-45. 

53 See USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 2.3, 45-46. 

54 Letter from Elliott Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF to President William J. Clinton, November 

1, 2000. 

55 U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, § 203. 

56 See Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 

2001, 155-167. 

57 See Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, State 

Department, to U.S. Congress, October 22, 1999. 

58 See IRFA § 402(b)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 6442(b)(2), which provides the President shall seek to 

identify agencies or instrumentalities, as well as specific officials, of the government of each 

country designated as a country of particular concern that are responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom. 
49 

III. INDIA 

A. Introduction 

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has directed its attention to 

India in light of the disturbing increase in the past several years in severe violence against 

religious minorities in that country. The violence is especially troubling because it has 

coincided with the increase in political influence at the national and, in some places, the state 

level of the Sangh Parivar, a collection of exclusivist Hindu nationalist groups of which the 

current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, is a part. 

India is religiously a very diverse country that generally respects religious freedom. 

India has a democratically elected government and is governed by the rule of law. However, 

although the BJP-led government may not be directly responsible for instigating the violence 

against religious minorities, there is concern that the government is not doing all that it could 

to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to counteract the prevailing climate of hostility, 

in some quarters in India, against these minority groups. Moreover, the increase of violence 

against persons and institutions based entirely on religious affiliation is an alarming 

development in India. 

Over the past year, the Commission has extensively examined and studied the 

situation in India. In September 2000, the Commission held a public hearing on religious 

freedom in India, which included testimony from Indian nationals of various religious 

traditions as well as American and Indian U.S. officials, academics, and a former senior U.S. 

diplomat. The Commission has also received numerous private briefings from academic and 

other experts, and conducted personal interviews with representatives of victimized groups 

from India, India experts, academics, former policymakers, and others intimately involved 

with events in that country. Finally, the Commission made every effort to travel to India to 

examine the situation directly, but has not yet gained permission from the Indian 

government. (A formal invitation is required if the Commission is to travel to India in an 

official capacity, and is the only way of securing the necessary meetings with government 

officials.) In October 2000, initial inquiries were made to the Indian Embassy in Washington 

about an invitation, but there was no response. After a meeting with India’s ambassador to 

the U.S. in December, the Commission was assured that inquiries would be made to New 

Delhi, but nothing more has yet been heard in official channels. 

B. Background 

1. Demographic Information 

India is an extraordinarily diverse country that is home to more than 1 billion people. 

Approximately 81.3 percent of the population is Hindu, 12 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent 

Christian, 1.9 percent Sikh, and 2.5 percent other religious groups, including Buddhist, Jain, 

and Parsi.1

 Tribal religious groups also exist, particularly in the middle and northeastern 

areas of the country. Approximately 68 million of India’s citizens are members of these 

groups, whose religious practices are as varied as are the hundreds of tribes. Although there 

are sizeable Muslim minorities in nearly all Indian states, the state of Kashmir (or Jammu and 
50 

Kashmir) is the only one in which Muslims are in the majority, though Muslims are also 

concentrated in the states of Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, as well as in the 

southwest. About 90 percent of India’s Muslim population is Sunni and 10 percent Shia. 

Christians are sizeable minorities in the states of Goa, Kerala, and Manipur, and are the 

majority in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Several Christian denominations are found 

in India today, including Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Eastern Orthodox, and, more 

recently, groups of Baptists and other Protestants. Sikhs form the majority in Punjab. 

Hinduism is considered indigenous to India and dates back at least 3,500 years. 

Buddhism and Jainism originated in India around the 6th century BCE. Christianity, 

according to tradition and legend, is thought to have first come to India through the Apostle 

Thomas in the 1st century. The spread of Islam in India began in the 8th century, primarily 

through interaction with Arab traders. Sikhism began in the 16th century in what is now the 

state of Punjab. 

2. Religious Freedom 

a. Legal framework 

The Indian Constitution guarantees that religion and national identity are separate and 

distinct entities. Indeed, the preamble of the Indian Constitution proclaims India to be a 

“sovereign socialist secular democratic republic” that ensures all citizens their right to 

“liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship.” Other articles of the Constitution 

prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion, and guarantee the right to establish 

religious organizations, the right for religious denominations to manage their own affairs, and 

the right of religious minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. In 

addition, Article 25 provides for “the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate 

religion.” Moreover, a special act adopted in 1991, the Places of Worship (Special 

Provisions) Act, prohibits the conversion of any place of worship of any religious 

denomination into a place of worship of a different religious group and provides for the 

preservation of the religious nature of places of worship as they existed at the time of 

independence. 

b. Violence targeting religious minorities 

i. Muslims 

Post-independence India has experienced significant violence between different 

religious groups. Indeed, Hindu-Muslim tensions go back centuries, and the emergence of 

both India and Pakistan was colored by the vicious fighting between Hindus and Muslims 

that accompanied partition; tensions between the two groups have long simmered and 

sporadic violence against Muslims still occurs. 

As Hindu nationalist groups have gained ground in India (see below), the concerns of 

the Muslim community have heightened. In December 1992, Hindu nationalists destroyed 

the 16th century Babri mosque in Ayodhya (in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh), and the 

ensuing nationwide riots left up to 3,000 dead, mostly Muslims, who were reportedly singled 

out for attack by police. The Srikrishna Commission established to investigate the violence 
51 

found that the nationalist Shiv Sena party government in Maharashtra state (where Mumbai – 

previously called Bombay – is located, and which has a significant Muslim minority) 

engaged in a deliberate and systematic effort to incite violence against Muslims. However, 

the Shiv Sena-dominated government in Maharashtra called the report “anti-Hindu” and 

refused to implement the Commission’s recommendations. 

Despite the deadly riots in the aftermath of its destruction, the Ayodhya mosque site 

remains a live issue, with persistent calls from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or RSS, a 

Hindu nationalist organization, to build a Hindu temple there. In December 2000, the Indian 

Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proclaimed that the building of a temple on the site 

was “an expression of national feeling” and part of the “unfinished agenda” of his 

government. Within two weeks, however, after opposition parties called for the resignation 

of several of his ministers and a censure vote, he stated that the destruction of the mosque 

was wrong and “against the Hindu ethos,” and that his government would “not allow any 

illegal attempt to build a Hindu temple” on the site.2

 Technically, the matter rests with the 

Indian courts, though tensions between the two sides remain very high and both Hindu and 

Muslim groups have vowed to move ahead with plans to build or re-build their place of 

worship on the site. 

In recent years, friction over other holy sites in India has intensified. In many regions 

of the country, other mosques have been vandalized or destroyed, frequently with the aim of 

building a Hindu temple on the site. There are numerous shrines in India that are sacred to 

both Muslims and Hindus, and both groups have generally been able to worship and 

celebrate at these sites. In the past two years, however, there are increasing reports of 

extremist Hindu groups threatening to take over and occupy these places, such as, for 

example, a joint Muslim and Hindu shrine in the southern state of Karnataka. In November 

2000, members of the nationalist Hindu cultural organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (or 

World Hindu Council, known by its acronym in Hindi, VHP), and its militant youth wing, 

Bajrang Dal, forced their way into a mosque in New Delhi and attempted to perform Hindu 

rituals on the site, claiming that Hindu temples existed on the site before the mosque was 

built. The VHP promotes the building of temples at hundreds of historic locations, most of 

which are currently Islamic cultural or sacred sites. 

ii. Christians 

Since January 1998, violence against Christians has increased dramatically in India. 

In fact, there has been more violence recorded against the Christian community in India in 

the past two years than in the previous 52 years since independence. The Indian Parliament 

reported that 116 attacks occurred against Christians between January 1998 and February 

1999, and unofficial figures may be higher. Roman Catholic Church leaders in India put the 

number of attacks on Christian ministers and churches at 400 (by the end of 2000). These 

attacks included killings, torture, rape and harassment of church staff, destruction of church 

property, disruption of church events, and attempts to force renunciation of Christianity and 

“reconversion” to Hinduism. Many of the incidents involve states in the middle of the 

country, where Christian organizations provide missionary, humanitarian, and education 

services to tribal groups or members of India’s lower castes. 
52 

Perhaps the most notorious attack occurred in January 1999 in the state of Orissa, 

when a mob shouting Hindu nationalist slogans set fire to and killed Australian Christian 

missionary Graham Staines and his two sons while they were sleeping in their car. (Staines 

had worked in India caring for lepers for more than 30 years.) The Wadhwa Commission, a 

judicial commission of inquiry, found that the government failed to employ adequate 

resources to find the culprits. The Wadhwa Commission also exonerated Hindu extremist 

organizations of complicity. Although some suspects were arrested, Bajrang Dal member 

Dara Singh, who was implicated in the Staines murder, remained “at large,” despite his 

subsequent television appearances and his participation in further attacks in public places. 

Singh was eventually arrested in January 2000 after he had led a mob killing of a Muslim 

man, although his trial and that of 13 others for the Staines murder has been postponed four 

times since then. 

Since the Staines murder, the attacks on Christians have continued; indeed, very 

recent reports indicate renewed attacks on churches, priests, and ministers, particularly in the 

state of Gujarat. Churches have been broken into, ransacked, looted, and burned both in that 

state and in the state of Uttar Pradesh by gangs of “sword and knife-wielding extremists.”3

 

Particularly troubling are the continued reports that religious institutions are being pointedly 

desecrated by militant groups, groups that several Christian leaders describe as associated 

with the Sangh Parivar. These attacks by militant Hindu groups increased after the RSS’s 

anniversary gathering in October 2000, at which speakers voiced nationalist rhetoric against 

“foreign” religions. 

iii. Sikhs 

Sikhs, followers of a 16th century religious teacher from India’s Punjab region, have 

been targets of societal violence and mistreatment by security authorities. The issue is both 

political and religious, as some Sikh groups in Punjab battle for their own independent nation 

called Khalistan or Sikhistan. In the struggle, Sikhs have been both perpetrators and victims 

of violence. In the course of suppressing militant secessionist Sikhs, the Indian army and 

government officials have been accused of engaging in extra-judicial killings, 

disappearances, and acts of torture, specifically targeting Sikhs (and Muslims) in the region. 

Violence between Sikhs and Hindus intensified in 1984 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 

sent troops into the Sikhs’ holiest shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. More than 1,000 

Sikhs died during this operation and more than 3,000 Sikhs died in ensuing riots. The 

government declared presidential rule in Punjab from 1987 to 1992 to help restore order; 

however, violence between militant Sikh and Hindu groups and security forces has 

continued. Human rights organizations have concluded that much of the current violence 

against Sikhs and Muslims in Punjab stems from propaganda by the Sangh Parivar. 

iv. Hindus in Tripura State 

The majority religious community has also been the subject of attack on the basis of 

religion. A Christian insurgent group in the northeastern state of Tripura called the National 

Liberation Front of Tripura, or NLFT, is reported to have banned Hindu and Muslim festivals 

in areas under its control. The NLFT has also been accused of burning Hindu temples and 

intimidating tribal peoples to convert to Christianity. The group contends that the dominance 
53 

of Hinduism has resulted in the marginalization of Christians in Tripura. At the same time, 

Christian organizations in the northeast region claim an increase in attacks by militant Hindu 

groups against missionary schools, churches, and facilities in recent years. 

c. Government response 

Reports from human rights and other groups, including the State Department’s 1999 

and 2000 Annual Reports on International Religious Freedom, do not implicate the Indian 

government in organizing or carrying out any of these violent attacks. However, in many of 

these cases, the government has failed to prosecute the individuals and organizations 

involved. Security forces have also failed to protect members of religious communities, even 

in cases where violence was likely. The National Commission on Minorities is frequently 

tasked with investigating these incidents, but its independence has been called into question, 

as it all too frequently exonerates the extremist nationalist groups, even in cases where 

evidence of their involvement is compelling. 

Though the BJP-led government has not been directly implicated, many have accused 

the government of hesitating to prosecute responsible persons or groups, thereby helping to 

foster a climate in which extremists believe that violence against religious minorities will not 

be punished. Though the worst of the extremist groups do not have official power, they are 

closely aligned with those who are in power in India, and they are seen by human rights 

organizations to be deliberately encouraging an environment of increasing hostility toward 

religious minorities. 

A prominent example of the government’s failure adequately to act against those 

associated with communal violence was this past summer’s controversial decision by a Shiv 

Sena-BJP government magistrate in the state of Maharashtra to dismiss charges against Shiv 

Sena leader Bal Thackeray for his role in inciting violence against Muslims in the riots 

following the destruction of the Babri Mosque.4

 Similarly, as noted above, Bajrang Dal 

member Dara Singh remained at large even after he was directly implicated in orchestrating 

the mob that murdered the Staineses; he was finally arrested only after another mob killing. 

Moreover, the Wadhwa Commission set up to investigate the Staines killing accused the 

government of hindering its efforts while not making serious efforts of its own to find the 

guilty parties. 

Admittedly, the national government in India is restricted in its ability to pursue those 

responsible for the violence because of the limits on its ability to control state law 

enforcement, the primary mechanism to bring perpetrators of communal violence to justice. 

Federal statutory mechanisms designed to protect human rights, including the National 

Minorities Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, have been hampered 

by limited authority, lack of cooperation by state governments, and, in the case of the 

Minorities Commission, decisions of questionable objectivity. In addition, virtually all India 

observers point to grave deficiencies in the country’s judicial and law enforcement 

infrastructure, suggesting that even a decision to take legal action against perpetrators would 

be hampered by gross shortages of law enforcement officials, lawyers, and judges. 
54 

d. Religious conversion 

Generally speaking, Hindus do not believe that there is only one path to spiritual 

salvation or that Hinduism alone upholds that one path.5

 Hinduism maintains that all 

religions contain elements of truth. Thus, to a Hindu, someone who embraces Christianity 

can still remain a Hindu and need not sever his ties to the Hindu culture. Moreover, some 

Hindus apparently are deeply offended by what they perceive to be the claim that only one 

particular religion contains religious truth and that others (including Hinduism) are 

erroneous. It would seem that these different ideas about the nature of religious faith and 

claims to religious truth have contributed to some of the tensions among the religious 

communities in India.6 

India’s commitment to a secular state, as well as the right to profess and propagate 

one’s religion, are plainly stated in India’s Constitution. However, in 1977, the Indian 

Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to propagate religion did not include a right 

to convert (or attempt to convert) another. This decision upheld two laws that criminalized 

conversions under certain circumstances in the states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. In 

November 1999, the Orissa government passed an order preventing conversions without 

permission from the local police and the District magistrate. (This order is apparently being 

implemented; at the urging of Hindu groups, police in the Balasore district of Orissa 

reportedly stopped six tribals from converting to Christianity because a police investigation 

into their conversion was not yet completed.7) In January 2000, in Uttar Pradesh, the state 

passed a law restricting the use and construction of places of worship, a law the local 

Christian community believes could be used to prevent them from meeting legally. More 

recently, a bill that would punish “conversion through allurement” by a minimum three-year 

prison sentence was circulated in the state of Gujarat. There are still reports of various local 

or municipal governments attempting to put obstacles in the way of religious conversion, 

though these have thus far not been seen on a national scale. 

The Indian Constitution authorizes special benefits for the members of the lower 

castes (including those referred to as Dalits, meaning “oppressed peoples,” the name the 

untouchables, or lowest caste, have taken for themselves), with the aim of promoting the 

welfare of those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. A certain number of 

government jobs, for example, by law are reserved for lower-caste members (thus the 

benefits are referred to as “reservations”). Dalits who convert to Christianity or Islam, 

however, lose the affirmative action benefits Indian law provides. Those who defend this 

loss of benefits argue that the caste system only exists within the context of the Hindu 

religion and thus the denigrated status no longer applies once the person in question converts 

to another religion. However, even after their conversion, lower-caste members remain 

burdened with the same socio-economic hardships as before. In 1956, the benefits were 

extended to Sikhs also. More recently, some legal preferences were extended to Buddhists 

and Jains as members of religious communities closely related to Hinduism, but thus far to 

no other religions (though there have been numerous legal challenges on the issue). 

Since the 1977 Supreme Court decision against conversion, there have been attempts 

to introduce national bills that would ban conversion of Dalit and indigenous tribal peoples, 

but they have so far been unsuccessful. Hindu nationalist groups are particularly critical of 
55 

proselytizing among Dalits and tribal peoples, claiming that Christian and Muslim groups 

exploit the tribals’ low socio-economic status and tear them from their traditional culture and 

way of life. However, fierce opposition to conversion to any religion other than Hinduism (or 

other India-born religions) is an essential element of that nationalist ideology (see section 

below). In response to such perceived threats, Sangh Parivar members engage in 

“reconversion” activities to bring tribals back to Hinduism and Hindu culture, even though 

many were not Hindus before they converted to Christianity or Islam. Though Christians 

represent a very small fraction of the population (just over 2 percent), nationalist groups 

maintain that through conversions, aided by foreign missionaries, the Hindu majority will 

soon be overwhelmed by Christian converts. They have also called for strict limits on the 

activities of foreign and other Christian missionaries, blaming the country’s policy of 

secularism on their continued presence in India. The RSS and other Sangh Parivar members 

generally consider Christian missionaries to be a threat to Hinduism, and in the northeastern 

region of the country, they accuse Christian groups of inciting insurgencies and separatist 

movements through their missionary activities. 

3. Hindu Nationalism and the BJP 

The recent increase in violence against religious minorities has been associated with 

the rise in power of Hindu nationalist organizations, including the Vishna Hindu Parishad 

(VHP), the Bajrang Dal, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), as well as their 

political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These groups are collectively known as the 

Sangh Parivar. The BJP has led the national government since 1998 in coalition with 

regional parties (some without nationalist leanings). The BJP also controls the local 

government in several states, including in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and 

Maharashtra, where it is the junior partner in a coalition with Shiv Sena. 

The ideology of the Sangh Parivar holds that only Hindus are “real” Indians, 

suggesting that non-Hindus are foreigners and thus deserving of suspicion and even attack.8

 

Sangh Parivar groups argue that the previous leaders of India failed to create a nation 

sufficiently grounded in Hindu culture (“Hindutva”), and that Western thought, including the 

concept of secular government, is dangerous and detrimental to India, along with conversion 

to what they claim are “foreign” religions such as Islam and Christianity. Members of other 

religious communities are thus portrayed as foreign implants, and their patriotism and status 

as true Indian citizens are frequently called into question by Sangh Parivar groups.9

Conversion to Islam or Christianity is designated in the Sangh Parivar literature as a “social 

evil.” Nationalist groups call for the “Hinduization” of education and culture, efforts that 

have brought protests from Muslim and Christian leaders. The VHP website proclaims that 

“the teaching of Bharatiya culture (Bharat is the motherland of the Hindu nation) and dharma

[should] be made compulsory” and that “Hindu interest is the national interest.” The VHP 

also calls for the repeal of the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provision) Act. These groups 

are also responsible for attacks on artists who do not conform to their understanding of what 

it means to be Indian. 

Yet, though Sangh Parivar ideology on the surface appears Hindu in nature, it is 

noticeably more nationalist than spiritual in content. Many observers and human rights 

groups draw a distinction between the Hindu religion and Hindutva, the nationalist ideology, 
56 

and contend that it is the nationalist rather than the religious crusade that has led many of 

these groups to, for example, undertake “reconversion” campaigns against those who convert 

to non-Hindu religions.10 

One alarming development in the past year was the call by RSS leader K. S. 

Sudarshan at the group’s meeting in October 2000 for the government to “nationalize” the 

minority religions in India. “It is advisable,” he said, “to have a totally Indian church like the 

one in China,” a church that would promote “Indian” values and not recognize foreign 

authorities such as the Vatican. Muslims, he said, should embrace their “Hindu origins.” The 

statements by Sudarshan raised protests throughout India, including from the BJP 

government, which made great efforts to distance itself from the remarks.11 Nevertheless, in 

February 2001, Sudarshan repeated his call for the “Indianization” of Islam, saying Muslims 

in India should join the “cultural mainstream.”12

Some have suggested that rising tensions between the ruling BJP and its associate 

members of the Sangh Parivar are at least partly behind the government’s reluctance to 

pursue perpetrators of sectarian violence in India. On the one hand, the BJP is apparently 

experiencing the pressure – and desire – to moderate its views in order to broaden its appeal 

and power base, and thereby maintain power. On the other, the party is disinclined to 

alienate the very constituencies that helped bring it to power. 

Even in forming the ruling coalition, known as the New Democratic Alliance (NDA), 

before the elections, the BJP had to win allies in parts of the country where Hindu 

nationalism has limited influence. Almost immediately upon coming to power, the BJP 

backed away from three key RSS demands: the building of a temple on the site of the Babri 

Mosque in Ayodhya, the repeal of the law giving special status to the region of Jammu and 

Kashmir, and the implementation of a uniform civil code (which would establish national 

civil laws for personal status matters now covered by various religious codes). Many believe 

that the BJP is under constant pressure from its “ideological wing” in the RSS and other 

groups to make good on these demands, and is regularly criticized by the Sangh Parivar 

groups for having compromised in order to form the coalition government. 

The strains between the BJP and the RSS and other groups were perhaps most evident 

during and after a recent RSS “camp meeting” in October 2000. At the meeting, RSS leader 

Sudarshan made rousing speeches filled with fiery nationalist rhetoric about the threats to 

India from Christian and Muslim Indians who have refused to embrace their Hindu heritage. 

Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani, who may succeed Vajpayee as leader of the BJP, 

attended this meeting, and was clearly participating in many of the RSS’ “drills.” Later, 

Advani asserted that the bonds between the BJP and the RSS are “unbreakable.” However, 

at the same time, then-BJP President Bangaru Laxman vociferously refuted Advani’s 

assertions, and sought to distance his party from the meeting and its forceful rhetoric.13 

4. Secessionist Movements and the Kashmir Conflict 

India is wrought with numerous secessionist and other power struggles in many of its 

states and regions, some of which have become violent. States in India have formed along 

linguistic and ethnic lines since independence, and ethnic and other loyalties have been 
57 

sporadically exploited by numerous political parties and movements. There have been 

demands to form territorial units within states not only along linguistic, ethnic, and religious 

lines but also, in some cases, based on a feeling of the distinctiveness of a particular region or 

its cultural or economic interests. The violence in some areas, which regularly takes dozens 

or even hundreds of lives per year, is usually carried out in the name of a struggle for greater 

autonomy or independence. In some areas, rival secessionist factions fight each other, with 

innocent citizens caught in the crossfire. 

Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in India, is perhaps the most widely known 

and protracted secessionist struggle in India. For decades, human rights organizations have 

accused the Indian government of committing atrocities against civilians in the process of 

subduing militant secessionist groups in Kashmir. These violations include indiscriminate 

shootings, assault, rape, disappearances, custodial killings, torture, and forced confessions. 

More recently, militant Muslim separatist groups have often targeted Kashmiri Hindus 

(called Pandits), who have been resented since a Hindu ruler ceded Kashmir to India. The 

Indian government accuses Pakistan of funding militant groups in Kashmir, while Pakistan 

insists that it only offers political support for such groups. 

The conflict intensified in the late 1980s, when Indian rule became harsher and 

Pakistan stepped up its support of certain militant groups. Pakistani and Indian troops have 

exchanged fire on several occasions, most recently in 1999. Indian security forces intensified 

their crackdown on Muslims in the Kashmir valley, and have been increasingly implicated in 

massacres of civilians, arbitrary arrests, rape, and torture. Thousands of Kashmiri Muslims 

have been killed since the conflict has heightened, many while in government detention.14 At 

the same time, Muslim militants have targeted Hindus (and sometimes Sikhs), resulting in a 

number of killings and approximately 200,000-250,000 Hindus displaced from the Kashmir 

valley (though there are also Kashmiri Muslim and Sikh refugees).15 Though the Kashmiri 

Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh civilian populations often co-exist peacefully in their 

neighborhoods, they are victims of abuse by militant groups and armed forces from all sides. 

Sikhs, who comprise a small minority in Kashmir, have generally not been targeted for 

violence. However, 35 Sikhs were killed while worshipping in a Sikh temple in March 2000, 

reportedly by militants, representing a new and dangerous direction in the conflict. 

The conflict in Kashmir does not appear fundamentally to be a religious war, but 

rather a fight over who will, in the end, govern the region – Pakistan, India, or the Kashmiris 

themselves. More than anything else, the conflict has reflected the bitter and obsessive 

rivalry between India and Pakistan. However, the nature of the fighting in the past decade 

has indicated a greater tendency to bring religion directly into the conflict. 

C. Commission Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should persistently press India to pursue 

perpetrators of violent acts that target members of religious groups. 

Violent attacks against members of minority religious communities and their 

institutions, and sometimes against the majority community, have increased in India in recent 

years. The Indian government has repeatedly maintained that it is doing what it can to 
58 

apprehend the aggressors. But many observers believe that these efforts have not been 

adequate and that the government simply has not committed the necessary resources and 

force of will to the issue. Also, even in cases where there were early warnings of violence, 

police officers have often failed to provide adequate protection of targeted communities. 

American concerns about violence against religious minorities should thus continue 

to be forcefully expressed, not least within the context of India’s desire to be accepted and 

treated by the U.S. as a major regional leader and functioning democracy. If India wants to 

be received as such, it must do more to demonstrate that it is a country governed by the rule 

of law, with legitimate and functioning law-enforcement structures. The government should 

also do more to make explicit its commitment to its own laws with regard to religious 

freedom and toleration. The U.S. government should make clear that the Indian 

government’s failure to do all it can to protect religious minorities from violent attacks raises 

serious questions about its commitment to abide by its own constitutional provisions and its 

obligations under international law. A continued decline in respect for religious freedom 

would present a serious obstacle in U.S.-Indian relations. 

2. The U.S. government should make clear its concern to the BJP-led 

government that virulent nationalist rhetoric is fueling an atmosphere in 

which perpetrators believe they can attack religious minorities with 

impunity. While fully protecting freedom of expression, firm words and 

actions from the government of India are required to counteract this 

belief. 

The BJP leaders in the government have consistently claimed that the growing 

influence of the RSS and other Hindu nationalist organizations is not connected to the 

outbreak of violence against Christians and Muslims in recent years. Yet, the ruling BJP is a 

Hindu nationalist party that, as part of the Sangh Parivar, seeks to spread the concept of 

Hindutva. According to Hindutva, a truly Indian identity includes adhering to the Hindu 

religion (including Buddhism and Jainism, which nationalists perceive as Hindu in origin), 

the only religion that is not a foreign import to India. Since members of minority religious 

communities such as Islam and Christianity are described as outsiders, their loyalty as Indian 

citizens is frequently challenged by Sangh Parivar groups. 

Taking note of the BJP’s recent attempts to distance itself from the more extremist 

demands of the RSS and other nationalist groups, the U.S. government should nevertheless 

make clear its concern that even if there is no official encouragement of violence against 

religious minorities, there is much within the “culture” of the Sangh Parivar that encourages 

it. Moreover, though it has not been directly implicated, some have accused the BJP-led 

government of tolerating the nationalist rhetoric and looking the other way concerning the 

involvement of nationalist groups in incidents of violence, thereby helping to foster the 

climate in which extremists believe that violence against religious minorities will be 

condoned. The National Commission on Minorities, for example, frequently tasked with 

investigating these incidents, invariably finds that the nationalist groups are not implicated in 

any way, even in cases where forceful evidence indicates precisely the reverse. 

While on occasion BJP leaders distance themselves from extreme statements and 
59 

legal actions exonerating perpetrators, the BJP cannot claim with any credibility that this 

kind of nationalist rhetoric from Sangh Parivar members is not related at all to the violent 

attacks on religious minorities in India. For this reason, the U.S. government should urge the 

government of India to speak and act in ways that make clear its lack of sympathy or support 

for religious intolerance and persecution. 

3. The U.S. government should support the stated policy of the BJP to 

oppose any move toward the nationalization of any religious institutions 

in India. The U.S. government should also press the government of India 

to oppose any attempts to interfere with or prohibit ties between religious 

communities inside India and their co-religionists outside the country, 

and any government efforts to regulate religious choice or conversion. 

In October 2000 and again in February 2001, RSS leader K. S. Sudarshan called on 

the government to “nationalize” the Christian churches and to “Indianize” the Muslim 

community in India. The statements by Sudarshan, however, raised protest throughout India, 

including from the BJP government. 

In light of these recent statements from RSS leaders, the Indian government must 

continue to make absolutely clear its opposition to any moves toward establishing 

“nationalized churches” or state-controlled religious institutions, or to interfere improperly 

with relations between Indian religious communities and their foreign co-religionists. The 

Indian government should also continue to oppose any attempt on the part of nationalist 

groups to determine the appropriate cultural context of the faith of the minority communities. 

Such actions would be inconsistent with the democratic principles enshrined in India’s 

constitution and its international human rights commitments, and would threaten to degrade 

further the protection of religious freedom in India. 

As noted above, the U.S. government should express its concern that politically 

significant forces in India are actively promoting a national, patriotic identity in what can be 

viewed as religiously exclusive terms and defining national values on the basis of those 

terms. Likewise, the U.S. government should make clear that it views with concern any 

attempt by the Indian government to control or regulate religious communities and their 

institutions to promote or protect such national values. The Indian government should 

reaffirm its policy that it does not initiate or tolerate any attempt to interfere with or regulate 

the ability to choose or change one’s religious identity or affiliation. 

4. As the U.S. government pursues greater engagement with India on a 

full range of issues, it should take advantage of new opportunities for 

government-to-government cooperation and communication on human 

rights, including religious freedom. 

Though India and the United States have often been at odds for much of the past 50 

years, the relationship has improved greatly and may become even warmer. Key issues 

between the U.S. and India have come to include regional stability, progress on a peaceful 

resolution to the conflict in Kashmir, security and nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism, 

trade and investment, environmental protection, clean energy production, counter-narcotics 
60 

activities, disease control, and human rights, including religious freedom. In March 2000, 

President Clinton visited India as part of a major initiative to set U.S.-Indian relations on a 

new foundation of cooperation on shared concerns. In September 2000, Indian Prime 

Minister Vajpayee returned the visit by traveling to Washington. During the visit, President 

Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms 

control and in combating terrorism and AIDS. 

In the post-Cold War era, there is great opportunity for government-to-government 

cooperation on such issues as human rights and the protection of religious freedom. More 

channels of communication should be opened at all levels to achieve these aims. An 

appropriate role for the growing Indian-American community in this process should also be 

explored. 

5. The U.S. should press India to allow official visits from government 

agencies concerned with human rights, including religious freedom. 

In 1999 and 2000, India refused to permit an official visit from the U.S. Ambassadorat-Large for International Religious Freedom. As discussed above, although the Commission 

first sought to visit India in the fall of 2000, as of the date of this report it has not received 

permission from the Indian government to do so. India consistently proclaims itself to be an 

important member of the international community, and if it wants to be accepted as such, it 

must act in accordance with international norms of democratic practice, which includes 

internal – and external – scrutiny. The U.S. government should press for the acceptance of 

official visits by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and by the 

Commission. 

6. The U.S. government should encourage and facilitate private-sector 

communication and exchanges between Indian and American religious 

groups and other non-governmental organizations interested in religious 

freedom. The U.S. government should also press India to allow visits 

from non-governmental human rights organizations and other groups 

concerned with religious freedom. 

India is a functioning democracy and an extremely complex country and society. 

There is an active community of religious groups and other NGOs concerned with human 

rights, including religious freedom, that operates relatively freely in India. Thus, wherever 

possible, American groups concerned about these issues should be encouraged to work 

together with their Indian counterparts. The activities of the Indian NGOs make plain that 

the Commission’s concerns about religious freedom do not represent “outside interference,” 

but reflect instead concerns of many of India’s own citizens – from all religious traditions. 

The U.S. government should also make clear that its commitment to religious freedom as an 

element of its foreign policy is not a judgment on the effectiveness of India’s own human 

rights organizations. The U.S. government should thus take an active role in facilitating 

cooperation and exchanges between religious communities and NGOs on the subjects of 

religious freedom and tolerance. 

At the same time, India stands out among democratic countries in its refusal of 
61 

regular, unrestricted visits from internationally recognized non-governmental human rights 

organizations and its refusal also to permit their official presence in country. This conduct is 

not in accordance with India’s international human rights commitments or with a transparent, 

functioning democracy that allows its citizens access to internationally recognized human 

rights monitors. 

7. The U.S. government should allocate funds from its foreign assistance 

programs for the promotion of education on religious toleration and 

inclusiveness in India. 

Independent India was founded on, and since independence has generally been 

committed to, secularism, understood as the separation between religion and citizenship and 

the prevention of sectarian conflict. The Indian Constitution guarantees that religion and 

national identity are separate and distinct. In addition, there are numerous articles in the 

Constitution and other legal codes ensuring religious freedom in India. 

U.S. funds earmarked for democratization efforts should be used specifically to 

promote a greater understanding of India’s different religious communities, its religiously 

inclusive tradition, its constitutional commitment to the separation of religion and 

government, and the ways in which India has been successful as a multicultural and 

multitraditional society. 

8. In the course of working toward improvements in U.S.-Indian 

economic and trade relations, the U.S. government should take into 

account the efforts of the Indian government to protect religious freedom, 

prevent and punish violence against religious minorities, and promote the 

rule of law. If progress is made, the U.S. should seek ways in which it can 

respond positively through enhanced economic ties. 

In the last decade, India has begun to shift away from its socialist and statist 

economic policies and pursue American trade and investment, seeking ways to improve its 

foreign investment climate. Abandoning some of its strictest protectionist policies, India now 

allows foreign ownership of Indian firms and major American brands have begun to enter (or 

re-enter) the Indian marketplace. Bilateral trade by the end of the decade had reached $12 

billion annually, with the balance of trade in India’s favor at $6 billion. 

However, trade and other relations were interrupted when the United States imposed 

comprehensive sanctions on India after its May 1998 nuclear weapons tests. The economic 

and political sanctions on India, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act, cut off all but 

humanitarian aid. Today, sanctions technically remain in place, and cannot be removed until 

current U.S. laws mandating them are repealed. However, in 1998 and 1999, Congress gave 

the president authority to waive several economic sanctions, with the result that some have 

been lifted temporarily, such as non-military sanctions involving agricultural exports and 

export credits. For example, in July 1998, President Clinton signed the Agriculture Export 

Relief Act, thereby amending the Arms Export Control Act by exempting food and other 

agricultural commodity purchases from nuclear non-proliferation sanctions for one year. In 

October, the President was given the authority to waive economic sanctions on India (and 
62 

Pakistan) for one year. And in November 1998, the President reduced sanctions against India 

in response to positive steps taken by it to address U.S. non-proliferation concerns. This 

action restored Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Trade 

and Development Agency programs, and also repealed the restrictions on the activities of 

American banks there. Most of these sanctions were waived once again in 1999. 

During President Clinton’s March 2000 visit to India, U.S. companies signed $4 

billion in projects with Indian (and Bangladeshi) firms, and the President announced $2 

billion in financial support for U.S. exports to India through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. 

During the September 2000 visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Washington, U.S. 

officials announced $900 million in Export-Import Bank financing to help Indian businesses 

purchase American goods and services. Agreements were also signed by American 

companies to construct three large power projects as part of increased energy cooperation. 

American aid to India is modest in comparison to the country’s size and population. 

American aid peaked in the mid-1960s and dropped steadily through the 1980s. American 

leverage through foreign assistance is thus admittedly low. For fiscal year 2000, $48.5 

million in development assistance was earmarked for India, and $82.4 million in PL-480 

food assistance, both of which are exempt from sanctions. 

Should the U.S. government continue to waive economic sanctions against India and 

promote greater trade and investment, the implementation of our economic policies should 

take into account the progress of the Indian government on protecting religious freedom, 

ensuring the safety of religious minorities, and promoting the rule of law. The U.S. 

government should make clear to India that a stronger determination to address its law and 

order problems would do much to demonstrate that India is a stable society with legitimate 

institutions capable of dealing with those problems. In that case, the U.S. should review its 

economic engagement with India to determine how it can further promote such progress. 

Evidence of the improvements discussed above should be a factor in determining the level of 

U.S. assistance through the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 

Commodity Credits Corporation, and Trade and Development Agency. 

 

1

 Department of State, “Background Notes: India,” Bureau of South Asian Affairs, March 

2000 (www.state.gov/www/background_notes/india_0003_bgn.htm, accessed December 5, 

2000).

2

 The quotes are from numerous articles in the Indian press. 

3

 Press statement from the All India Christian Council, December 1, 2000. 

4

 India’s Central Bureau of Investigation and the Srikrishna Commission, formed to 

investigate the Bombay riots, had accused Mr. Thackeray of “criminal conspiracy, intentional 

destruction and defiling of a place of worship, criminal trespass and intimidation of public 

servants on duty.” Although the case was registered against Mr. Thackeray in 1993 and 

permission was sought from the government to prosecute him in 1994, the government did 

not grant permission to prosecute him until July 20, 2000. Riot police had surrounded the 
63 

 

courtroom and taken up key positions throughout the city of Bombay, amid threats of 

widespread violence by Thackeray supporters if he was remanded to custody. Despite 

credible evidence against him, the case was dismissed in court days later because of the 

prosecution’s “failure” to complete the investigation within the prescribed time period. 

5

 Arvind Sharma, “Religious Freedom: a Hindu Perspective,” U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, Hearings on Religious Freedom in India and Pakistan, 

September 18, 2000. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 “Conversion of Six Tribals to Christianity Put Off,” Times of India, February 24, 2001. 

8

 Hindu nationalist groups consider all religions that originated in India to be embraced by 

Hinduism. Thus Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism are viewed as authentic Indian religions. 

The VHP website refers to the “Semitic” religions of Christianity and Islam as part of a 

“foreign onslaught.” 

9

 Ibid. 

10 For a description of the movement and the nationalist nature of its ideology, see S. 

Prasannarajan, “Vision Hindutva,” India Today International, October 30, 2000. 

11 After the incident, the BJP released a statement saying, “We wish to categorically state 

that what Sudarshan said about Christians and Muslims in India are the views of the RSS. 

They do not represent the views of the BJP.” Moreover, the statement said, “the BJP’s 

commitment to principles of secularism is “complete, unconditional, and irreversible.” 

Then-BJP President Laxman also said that the “RSS chief’s recommendations for Indianizing 

the two religions would have no bearing on the functioning of the Vajpayee government.” 

See “Laxman’s Salvo: NDA is Secular,” The Times of India News Service, October 19, 2000, 

“BJP Washes Hands of RSS Crusade, Times of India, October 19, 2000. 

12 “Sudarshan Kicks Up Fresh Controversy,” The Economic Times of India, February 25, 

2001; Stanley Pinto, “RSS Chief Seeks Indianisation of Islam,” The Times of India, January 

25, 2001. 

13 Laxman was forced to resign in March 2001 as a result of corruption allegations. 

14 Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces 

and Militant Groups Continue,” March 2000, Summary, 2 

(http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/Kashmir/summary.htm, accessed December 5, 2000). 

15 US Committee for Refugees, “Displacement from Kashmir,” 2000, 1 

(http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/Kashmir_displaced_India.htm, accessed January 18, 

2001). 
64 
65 

IV. INDONESIA 

A. Introduction 

In recent years in Indonesia, numerous serious and tragic conflicts have emerged, 

including disputes in which religion or religious freedom is a factor. In Aceh, hostility to the 

central government has resulted in a groundswell of support for holding a referendum on the 

region’s political status, and an armed group has formed to fight for that aim. Non-violent 

activists as well as armed rebels have been the targets of government forces. In Irian Jaya, 

called Papua since January 2000, an independence movement has gained ground, resulting in 

serious clashes with Indonesian security forces. In Kalimantan, ethnic Madurese migrants 

have been the object of attacks by the local Dayaks, who, frustrated by economic 

impoverishment they believe is caused by the migrants’ presence, have rampaged against 

them. And in the Moluccas, severe sectarian fighting between Muslims and Christians on the 

islands has resulted in appallingly high numbers of casualties and refugees fleeing the 

violence. 

The sources of these conflicts are many and varied. These include: 

-- economic and cultural dislocation resulting from the previous government’s 

transmigration program (which, in an effort to alleviate overcrowding on 

some islands, brought large numbers of people to the less-populated ones); 

-- vast development projects that often did little to alleviate poverty but 

greatly disrupted traditional economic and cultural practices; 

-- political reorganization that frequently left ethnic groups and religious 

communities that had cooperated in the past competing for political power; 

-- the determination by some elements in the Indonesian military to foment 

unrest to destabilize the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid and 

thereby forestall military reform and accountability; 

-- regional resentments of Jakarta’s heavy-handed methods of control. 

The ethnic and other tensions caused by these events, largely suppressed during the 

32-year reign of former President Suharto, have surfaced with the fall of his regime. 

Though religion or tensions between different religious communities has been an 

element, to varying degrees, in several of these conflicts, it is only in the Moluccas that 

religion quickly became the defining factor behind the fighting that broke out in January 

1999 between the Muslim and Christian communities there. While the causes behind the 

initial conflict were numerous and multifaceted, the fighting almost immediately took on a 

sectarian character, and the ensuing violence has, for the most part, been based principally on 

religious affiliation. Moreover, unlike in the other conflicts, houses of worship in the 

Moluccas have been pointedly and extensively targeted, and hundreds of mosques and 

churches have been destroyed. 
66 

In addition, in the spring of 2000, an Indonesian Muslim group of fighters, called 

Laskar Jihad, from outside the Moluccas arrived on the islands, raising the fighting there to 

new and more deadly levels. Beginning in October of last year, there have been increasing 

reports of people being forced to convert to Islam or be killed.1 In addition, there have been 

reports of forced circumcision of both men and women.2 (The Commission has more recently 

received reports that Muslims were forced to attend church services and eat pork under threat 

of death on parts of the Islands as early as December 1999.)3 Thus, the clearly sectarian 

nature of the violence, the fact that people are being killed solely on the basis of their 

religion, and the evidence of apparent forced conversions prompted the Commission to give 

particular consideration to the Moluccan conflict. The fact that the other conflicts in 

Indonesia are not addressed in this report does not reflect the Commission’s lack of concern 

for the bloodshed in those regions, but reflects instead its mandate to examine situations in 

which religious freedom – or religiously-based violence – is a central factor. The 

Commission will continue to monitor the other conflicts in Indonesia, and will turn its 

attention to them if it becomes clear that religion is emerging as a principal motivating force. 

Since the fighting in the Moluccas began, from 5,000 to 8,000 people, Christians and 

Muslims, have been killed. Houses of worship of both communities have been destroyed. 

More than 500,000 people, again, both Christians and Muslims, have been forced to flee in 

fear of their lives. As this has transpired, there are numerous reports that elements from the 

Indonesian military and local police forces have done little to stop the fighting. Rather, it is 

alleged that they have contributed to – and perhaps even initiated – it. The Indonesian 

government has also made little effort to halt the conflict; indeed, many observers contend it 

has not given it serious attention. 

In July 2000, the Commission wrote then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 

about the religion-based fighting generating alarmingly high casualties on the Moluccas. It 

expressed particular concern about evidence that the Indonesian government was tolerating 

levels of violence and killing that indicated egregious violations of religious freedom. Since 

then, the Commission has held several private briefings with specialists on Indonesia, 

including current and former American officials expert on that country, and has conducted 

personal interviews with individuals and groups from Indonesia, including from the 

Moluccas. In February 2001, the Commission held a public hearing on the situation in the 

Moluccas at which testimony was heard from representatives of the Moluccan Muslim and 

Christian communities as well as American academics and other experts. 

B. Background on Indonesia and the Moluccas 

1. Indonesia: Background Information 

Indonesia is a country of approximately 210 million people, making it the world’s 

fourth-largest country by population (and the largest Muslim country). A vast archipelago, 

Indonesia covers an area of 1,100 miles from north to south and 3,200 miles from west to 

east, and cartographers have counted up to 17,000 islands within its borders (though only 

about 6,000 are inhabited). There are more than 300 different ethnic groups in Indonesia, 

each with its own language.4
67 

Islam had gained a strong foothold in Indonesia by the 12th century, replacing 

Hinduism throughout much of the country by the 16th century. (In a few areas, such as Bali, 

Hinduism is still prevalent.) Indonesian Islam has historically been influenced more by 

mystical traditions than legal precepts.5

 Christian influences arrived in the 16th century, but 

never heavily penetrated the larger islands. Today Christianity is found predominantly in the 

smaller islands in eastern Indonesia. About 85 percent of the country’s population is 

Muslim, 10 percent Christian (approximately 7 percent Protestant and 3 percent Catholic), 2 

percent Hindu, 1 percent Buddhist, and 2 percent other religions.6

a. Religious freedom 

The Constitution of 1945 established an Indonesian state philosophy called 

Pancasila. There were groups at the time that wanted an ethnically and religiously narrower 

definition of Indonesian identity, but “the framers of the Pancasila insisted on a culturally 

neutral identity ... overarching the vast cultural differences of the heterogeneous 

population.”7 According to the website of the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, 

“Pancasila comprises five principles: belief in the one and only God; a just and civilized 

humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity 

arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and social justice for the whole of the 

people of Indonesia.”8

 

Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom apply to the five religions recognized 

by the state, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. 

Confucianism, though “embraced” by the government, is not included on this constitutional 

list. The practice of Confucianism was restricted by legislation passed in 1967, though in 

January 2000 President Wahid revoked that law.9 In some remote areas, animism is still 

practiced.10 Though the Constitution officially recognizes only these religions, it also states 

that other religions, including Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism are not 

forbidden, and the practices of other religions are permitted. The law allows for conversions 

between faiths.11 Some faiths, however, are banned, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and some 

Islamic groups that are deemed to be unorthodox. The Baha’i faith was officially banned in 

1962 and its adherents have experienced considerable persecution, including incarceration. 

However, the ban was revoked by President Wahid in the same January 2000 decree that 

abolished restrictions on Confucianism. In addition, according to the ideology of Pancasila, 

all Indonesians must believe in one God, making atheism technically forbidden. 

2. The Moluccas12

Once known as the Spice Islands, the Moluccas or Moluccan Islands are located in 

the northeast region of the Indonesian archipelago, bordered by the Philippines to the north, 

Irian Jaya or West Papua to the east, and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi to the west. There 

are more than 20 large islands in the archipelago, the largest of which include Halmahera, 

Seram, and Buru, and the province is spread out over great distances of ocean. The 

population of the entire Moluccas is approximately 2 million, with a large concentration of 

people in Ambon, capital of the southern region. (Ambon refers also to the island on which 

the city is located.) The Arabs first brought Islam to the Spice Islands in the 13th century; the 

Spanish and Portuguese arrived in the 16th century, bringing Christianity with them, followed 
68 

in the next century by the Dutch. In 1990, the proportion of Muslims was 56 percent and 

Christians approximately 44 percent, the overwhelming majority of whom were Protestant.13 

(In 1971, the split between Muslims and Christians on the province was more even at about 

50 percent each.14 The difference reflects in part the results of former President Suharto’s 

transmigration program.) Most of the islands in the Moluccas have long had mixed 

populations of Muslims and Christians, though the two were usually separated by choice or 

custom into their own villages. 

a. Fighting erupts 

In January 1999, serious fighting erupted between the Christian and Muslim 

communities on the Islands. Though there have been occasional lulls in the fighting, over the 

past two years 5,000-8,000 people have been killed and 500,000 people displaced from their 

homes. The conflict has divided Moluccans along religious lines, though its origins involve 

ethnic, economic, and political rivalries also.15 Houses of worship were pointedly targeted 

and more than 100 mosques and churches have been destroyed or damaged. During the first 

15 months of the crisis, the fighting between the two groups, largely cyclical reprisals, 

resulted in more or less equal numbers killed on each side. In May 2000, however, fighters 

from the Laskar Jihad – a group based in Java outside of the Moluccas – arrived on the 

islands, obtained arms, and began attacking Christian villages. Since then, the balance has 

tipped decidedly against the Christian population there.16 

The fighters from the Laskar Jihad, who have taken control of the other Muslim 

militia groups fighting on the Islands, have access to sophisticated weapons and 

communications equipment, and have thus taken the fighting to new levels. These moreextremist groups from outside the Moluccas, recruited purportedly to protect the Muslim 

population, have since declared their aim of “cleansing” the Islands of Christians, and have 

succeeded in clearing Christians out of villages throughout the Moluccas, either by killing 

them or driving them away under the threat of being killed. By October, there were reports 

that hundreds and perhaps thousands of Christians were forced to convert to Islam or be 

killed, especially on the islands of Seram, Kesui, and Teor.17 There are allegations also that 

some, both men and women, have been forced to undergo circumcision as part of their 

“conversion.”18 The Commission has also received reports that as far back as December 

1999, Muslims in Halmahera were held captive for a time and were subjected to violent and 

humiliating episodes, including being forced to attend church services and eat pork 

(forbidden to Muslims).19 

Though North Maluku has remained calm in recent months, the other central and 

southern islands of Maluku are described as being in a state of civil war, with nightly gunfire 

and bombs routinely going off in the streets.20 Muslims as well as Christians continue to be 

killed, since although they are now outnumbered and to some extent outgunned, the 

Christians there are not helpless, and have formed their own militia groups. (Indeed, there 

are reports that a Christian counterpart to Laskar Jihad, called Laskar Kristus – the Army of 

Christ – has organized to fight Muslims.21) Many of the hundreds of thousands of refugees 

(both Christians and Muslims) have fled to various parts of Sulawesi, a province that is 

already strained by the presence of displaced persons from East Timor, Irian Jaya, and as far 

away as Aceh.22
69 

b. Reasons behind the fighting 

Despite centuries of living together, tensions between Muslims and Christians had 

been growing steadily sharper in recent decades. This was so not least because of the large 

influx of Muslim immigrants from other provinces as part of Suharto’s transmigration 

program, including Butonese from southwest Sulawesi, and Bugis and Makassaris from 

south Sulawesi.23 

The incursion of non-Moluccan Muslim immigrants did much to upset the longstanding balances of economic and political power on the Islands, and also undermined 

traditional loyalty and alliance systems to which both Moluccan Muslims and Christians had 

long adhered.24 It also upset the population balance on the Islands in favor of Muslims, 

leaving many Christians to feel that their political, economic, and cultural existence was 

threatened. Thus, the fighting, at least at the beginning, was caused as much by economic 

and political concerns as by religious differences. Moreover, the administrative split of the 

Moluccas into two provinces, Maluku and North Maluku, in 1999 contributed to the tensions, 

especially in North Maluku, as the immediate result was fierce competition for political 

dominance in the newly made provinces.25

Indonesia as a whole has been experiencing a chronic crisis stemming in part from the 

end of Suharto’s 30-year dictatorial reign. Some experts view the fighting in the Moluccas as 

part of the general “disintegration of law and order.” The military is in disarray and “all that 

is left are local civil-defense groups organized by communities.”26 The transmigration 

program resulted in serious disruptions of traditional ways of life and sowed acute bitterness 

among different ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, “grinding poverty and 

unemployment make recruits [for vigilante or other community militia groups] easy to 

find.”27 Secessionist movements and other ethnic, economic, and religious resentments, long 

suppressed by the Suharto regime, finally reached the surface at the same time when the 

country fell into a financial crisis and political and economic confusion. Thus, the violence 

on the Moluccas must be viewed in part within the wider context of the crisis facing 

Indonesia as a whole. 

The apparent spark that led to the outbreak of fighting is reported to have been an 

argument in Ambon city between a Christian public transport driver and at least one Muslim 

passenger. The argument soon deteriorated into a brawl and then spiraled into several days 

of mob violence.28 The fighting then spread to other islands, thus beginning the cyclical 

pattern. Much of the initial anger on the Christian side was directed at the Bugi, Butonese, 

and Makassari immigrants rather than Moluccan Muslims. In North Maluku, the fighting was 

not initially along religious lines at all but was between rival supporters of the two leading 

sultans in the region. However, all the fighting, according to a report of the International 

Crisis Group, an international non-governmental organization (NGO), was “quickly 

subsumed by religious rhetoric and confessional hatred.” Whatever the source of the original 

outbreak of fighting in the Moluccas, the conflict escalated and intensified with the 

appearance of the Laskar Jihad and other outside militia groups on the Islands in the spring of 

last year. Indeed, the violence is now seen to be led by the Laskar Jihad, despite several 

known reconciliation efforts by Moluccan Muslim and Christian representatives. One 

incident that reportedly encouraged the involvement of the Jihad was a particularly bloody 
70 

battle in December 1999 on the island of Halmahera in the north in which 500 Muslims were 

killed and the district “cleansed” of 10,000 others who were forced to flee.29 This incident, 

as one report notes, “was pivotal in galvanizing national Muslim calls for Jihad.”30 

Another historical event is a contributing factor to the tensions in the Moluccas. In 

1950, in the first years of Indonesian independence, a group of Christians in the southern 

Moluccan islands, backed by Moluccan Christian soldiers from the Dutch colonial army, 

proclaimed the independent Republik Maluku Selatan (or RMS, Republic of the South 

Moluccas). The Indonesian Army quelled the uprising, though guerilla forces continued to 

fight for years after. Several RMS leaders escaped to Holland, where they established an 

RMS “government in exile.” While the vast majority of Christians on the Moluccas today do 

not support independence, the memory of the RMS and its separatist aims still resonates in 

Indonesia, and Moluccan Christians today are accused by Muslim groups of having 

independence as their goal. This accusation has been useful in galvanizing Muslims to fight, 

and the situation has not been aided by the fact that some diaspora Moluccan Christian 

groups have taken up the RMS banner. 

c. The government response and the role of the military 

The Indonesian government under President Wahid has been resoundingly criticized 

for failing to take the necessary steps to end the fighting in the Moluccas. It is true that 

Wahid did not take office until October 1999, 10 months after the fighting had erupted. But 

upon taking power, he apparently did not grasp the seriousness of the situation there or the 

military did not obey him. Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri was appointed to lead 

reconciliation efforts, but she was equally uninterested and ineffectual in dealing with the 

crisis.31 Though Wahid threatened to arrest Laskar Jihad members if they went to the 

Moluccas, they went anyway, and no police or military action was taken either to prevent or 

punish them.32 To this date, the government has still taken no effective action against the 

Laskar Jihad and other militias on the Islands. 

In June 2000, Wahid declared a state of civil emergency (one step below the 

imposition of martial law), giving the military and the police wide room to act, though under 

civilian command. However, this has apparently done little to change the situation on the 

ground. Many speculate that Wahid is reluctant to take firm action against the militant 

groups because of his own shaky position, since a significant portion of the country’s 

population is sympathetic to the plight of the Muslims on the Islands. Another concern is 

that if the Laskar Jihad fighters leave the Moluccas, they will take their fight elsewhere in 

Indonesia and pose an even greater threat. 

Many have suggested that the unrest in the Moluccas, if not provoked, has at least 

been encouraged and supported by elements in the Indonesian military (though not 

necessarily the military as an institution), primarily in order to discredit and destabilize the 

Wahid government.33 The army is seen as a prime beneficiary of the fighting, since once the 

population is devastated by conflict, it is the army that can go in and restore order, rather than 

the democratically elected government in Jakarta. According to Human Rights Watch, many 

contend that the conflict in the Moluccas (together with other outbreaks of violence 

throughout Indonesia) was deliberately provoked by forces loyal to former President Suharto, 
71 

with the aim of disrupting the situation to such an extent that a state of emergency would be 

declared, thus effectively returning the military to power.34 Thus far, there is no clear

evidence that could prove or disprove these contentions, but allegations have been made not 

only by outside observers, including several high-ranking American officials, but also by 

senior Indonesian officials.35

Whatever the role of the military in causing the conflict, most observers agree that it 

has been anything but impartial since the fighting broke out two years ago. All over the 

Islands, military personnel have been seen to join in the conflict, especially, the Christians 

contend, against the Christian side.36 Yet, some local police forces are said to have fought on 

the side of the Christians.37 The reasons for the military’s involvement vary, from its 

eventual aim of usurping power from the civilian government to the economic benefits that 

armed forces members have accrued since the fighting began.38 Yet most experts are also 

agreed that the military is somehow necessary to bring an end to the fighting, as it is the only 

group that has the means necessary to halt the activities of the jihad groups and remove them 

from the Islands. Hence, the military is seen both as part of the problem and the solution. 

Yet, after the violence in the aftermath of the referendum on East Timor, many in and outside 

the government are reluctant to give the military more power to act. Even if the military 

were given such power, however, the armed forces would face severe institutional and 

logistical constraints, since the soldiers are inadequately trained, supplied, and paid.39

C. Commission Recommendations 

For many decades during the Cold War, U.S. and Indonesian security concerns 

coincided to make for cordial relations between the two countries. Military-to-military 

engagement was strong, a connection that continued even after the Cold War ended. 

However, relations deteriorated markedly in 1998 after the massacres in East Timor by forces 

associated with the Indonesian military, and military-to-military engagement between the 

two countries was suspended fully in 1999 (it had been partially suspended in 1992). As a 

result, U.S. influence in Indonesia is not as great as it once was, though some military 

contacts were renewed later by the Clinton administration (participation in peacekeeping 

exercises, for example). In addition, other issues had come to divide the two countries by this 

point, as there was increasing pressure on Washington throughout the 1980s and 1990s to 

give more weight to human rights issues in its relations with Jakarta. However, U.S. aid to 

Indonesia has increased in recent years, particularly in response to Indonesia’s severe 

economic collapse in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 

Recent U.S. policy toward Indonesia has been within the framework of the U.S. 

government’s goal of supporting the democratically elected government of President Wahid 

and a successful democratic transition after 30 years of authoritarian rule under Suharto.40 In 

January 2000, the Clinton administration designated Indonesia one of four “key 

democracies” that would be the focus of U.S. aid during their democratic transition. In 

October 2000, however, U.S.-Indonesian relations deteriorated significantly after the 

American ambassador in Jakarta became involved in a series of high-profile disputes with 

Indonesian officials. 

Many Indonesians contend that the West and particularly the U.S. are concerned 
72 

about the Moluccan conflict only because Christians are involved.41 In fact, any involvement 

from the United States is likely to be viewed through this lens. In addition, American and 

other Western concern for the Moluccas is sometimes seen by some Muslim groups as proof 

that the Christian West aims to break up the Moluccas and separate the Christian parts from 

Indonesia.42 This makes any direct American action extremely difficult, as Muslims 

throughout Indonesia have come to believe that the United States is potentially biased in its 

approach. As noted above, the Commission recognizes that there are serious conflicts 

elsewhere in Indonesia (e.g., in Aceh, Irian Jaya/Papua, and Kalimantan), some of which do, 

while others do not, involve religious-freedom violations. 

As of this writing, it remains unclear what the government in Indonesia will look like 

in the near future. Since 1999, President Wahid has introduced several democratic reforms, 

but has not effectively managed to secure power in the country. He is increasingly seen as 

weak and ineffectual, particularly in the midst of the crises and ethnic and religious conflicts 

battering the country. By January 2001, there were growing demands for his resignation, not 

least because of allegations of corruption. Wahid claims that opponents within the military 

and political establishment are working to undermine his authority and the reform process, 

particularly reforms of the military itself. 

1. The U.S. government should put sustained pressure on the Indonesian 

government and the Indonesian military to pay serious attention to the 

brutal conflict in the Moluccas and to make concerted efforts to pursue a 

reconciliation program that ensures security for both sides and that 

perpetrators most responsible for the killings are brought to justice. 

Despite the shocking number of casualties in the Moluccan fighting and the wider 

repercussions for Indonesia as a whole, neither President Wahid nor Vice-President 

Megawati appear to appreciate the reasons the fighting began or the seriousness of the 

conflict, and the government’s response – or lack of one – has demonstrated this indifference. 

Nor are they or other high-level government officials sufficiently aware of the significance of 

not seizing the initiative in resolving the conflict, leaving that role to be played by various 

military leaders who have stepped in to fill the void. 

Though the Indonesian government has not to date shown itself capable of resolving 

the conflict, it should nevertheless be encouraged to make a greater effort in this regard. The 

United States should be prepared to provide technical assistance to these reconciliation 

efforts as necessary. The government of Indonesia should be advised that any plan must 

provide for the security of both communities on the Islands, including the removal of all 

outside militia groups and the disarming of the internal militias. However, this reconciliation 

effort should not be seen as a military action. 

Human rights groups and other observers point out that, after 30 years of dictatorship, 

there is no effective judicial system functioning in Indonesia. While establishing a legitimate 

system based on the rule of law would be a lengthy and very difficult process, the country 

needs some method of immediately bringing to justice those most responsible for the killings 

in the Moluccan conflict. For the most part, instigators of the deadliest massacres on the 

Moluccas have gone free and the Indonesian government has made no attempt to go after 
73 

them. It would do much to help the reconciliation process in the Moluccas if the most 

prominent ringleaders of the violence, including leaders of both Muslim and Christian 

militias, could be seen to receive just punishment. 

2. The U.S. government should press the government of Indonesia to 

attend to the immediate removal of all outside militia forces on the 

Moluccas, Muslim or Christian. The U.S. government should also press 

Indonesia to see that these and other groups are disarmed. Moreover, 

rogue elements in the Indonesian security forces must be brought under 

control. 

It is agreed by virtually all observers and human rights groups that only with the 

arrival of such outside groups as the Laskar Jihad did the fighting on the Islands become 

severe, and religion become an uglier tool in the conflict. As the ICG report notes, “the 

Laskar Jihad is not the cause of Maluku’s problems, but they are now the greatest instigator 

and beneficiary of the violence.”43 It is not only Muslim militias that have entered the 

conflict from outside the Moluccas, though, as there are also Christian militia groups, some 

associated with gangsters from cities outside the Islands, that played a central role in the 

conflict until spring of last year.44 According to the same ICG report, the Muslim militias, 

led by the Laskar Jihad, are more organized, while the Christian groups “tend to be 

fragmented ... with only a nebulous sense of the larger provincial picture.”45

President Wahid’s government has made no effort to apprehend the Laskar Jihad and 

other militia members, despite his threat to do so if they went to the Islands. The Muslim and 

Christian populations on the Moluccas have demonstrated that they want peace and have 

attempted several times to negotiate their own settlement to the conflict. These efforts are 

reportedly thwarted, however, by the extremist outside groups that have transformed this 

sectarian conflict into their own wider struggle. 

3. The U.S. government should support the reconciliation efforts of 

indigenous or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 

the Moluccas, including by increasing its funding for such efforts through 

support for USAID’s democracy and good-governance programs, 

interreligious programs in educational institutions, and other programs 

in Indonesia. This should include working with respected Indonesian 

human rights lawyers and academics to devise an emergency program for 

restoring the rule of law in Indonesia, including in the Moluccas. Within 

its assistance program to Indonesia, the U.S. government should also 

increase assistance geared specifically to both Christian and Muslim 

victims and refugees of the conflict. The U.S. government should also 

press the government of Indonesia to allow more access to the Moluccas 

for humanitarian relief organizations, as well as for official 

representatives or human rights monitors from such groups as the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Since the government of Indonesia has not demonstrated the willingness or ability to 

deal appreciably with the Moluccan conflict, the U.S. should consider supporting the 
74 

reconciliation efforts of international and indigenous NGOs on the ground. 

In addition to reconciliation efforts on the Moluccas, the U.S. government should 

continue and increase its support for democratization and civil-society building programs 

more generally in Indonesia, including developing public accountability, political party 

building, education in religious tolerance, and the promotion of a free media. After an 

emergency rule-of-law program is established to deal with the worst conflicts, the U.S. 

government should help promote a broader program to build a credible, independent judicial 

system in Indonesia. This support could include assistance and training for police, lawyers, 

and judges, as well as indigenous human rights and watchdog organizations that provide 

accountability. 

In addition to the many who have been killed in the Moluccas, massive destruction of 

property has occurred and more than 500,000 have had to flee their homes, either to other 

islands in the Moluccas or neighboring islands such as Sulawesi. The refugees are currently 

in a desperate situation; even if the fighting were to end and they were allowed to return to 

their homes, many of them no longer have homes to return to. Not only food is needed but 

jobs and corresponding equipment also. The U.S. government should work with the 

government of Indonesia to ensure that the funds earmarked for the Moluccan refugees 

actually reach them. 

Moreover, many NGOs have reported restricted access to crisis spots on the Islands. 

The most common pretext is security; however, there is some concern that access is restricted 

in order to limit the amount of news about the Moluccan situation that reaches the outside 

world, particularly outside Indonesia. Humanitarian aid and reconciliation projects are 

desperately needed. Thus, the government of Indonesia should ensure that human rights and 

humanitarian aid groups are not prevented from travel to the Islands and can access all the 

victim and refugee communities there. 

4. The U.S. government should ensure that, if resumed, U.S.-Indonesian 

military ties be directed toward reform of the Indonesian military. 

Under the Suharto regime, the military enjoyed considerable political and economic 

power to which it has become accustomed. Many observers contend that a number of the 

conflicts plaguing Indonesia, including that in the Moluccas, were generated or at least 

stoked by elements in the military that do not want to relinquish that power. Moreover, there 

is widespread corruption within the military, exacerbated by the poor conditions in which 

lower ranks must subsist. According to a witness at the Commission’s February 2001 

hearing, “Soldiers have not only taken sides in the Moluccas with little fear of punishment, 

providing cover for attacks and sometimes weapons, but they have actively benefited from 

the conflict by, for example, charging exorbitant fees for safe passage from one part of 

Ambon to another.”46

Clearly, the Indonesian military is in need of reform, and American-led education and 

training programs may be beneficial in this regard. There have recently been calls on the 

U.S. government to end the ban on providing military equipment and training, and to reestablish contacts with the Indonesian military. The Commission takes no position on this 
75 

question, but any education and training support that the United States is prepared to offer 

should be directed toward assisting the Indonesian military in integrating reforms that 

involve the acceptance of civilian control and the upholding of international human rights 

standards. Such reform should also include allowing officers and others to be held 

responsible for the serious abuses that have been seen in conflicts such as in the Moluccas. If 

willingness to reform is confirmed, technical and other material assistance may become 

appropriate. To date, such willingness has not been demonstrated, and Indonesian security 

forces continue to encourage and participate in conflicts throughout Indonesia with impunity. 

U.S. military assistance should not contribute to this in any way. 

5. The U.S. government should earmark funds for the training of 

Indonesian police and prosecutors in human rights, rule of law, and 

crime investigation. 

In the Moluccas, the police have been both unprepared and unwilling to deal with the 

violence, frequently doing little or nothing to oppose either local mobs or the outside militia 

groups involved in the fighting. Most reports indicate that they have also not been impartial 

in situations where they have taken action. 

Until April 1999, the police forces in Indonesia were a branch of the armed forces and 

considered to be the most corrupt branch.47 The police have now been separated from the 

military, but the forces are in dire need of training and reform. In order for democratization 

efforts in Indonesia to succeed, the integrity and credibility of the police must be established. 

6. The U.S. government should help support the safeguarding of a free 

press in Ambon and other major areas in the Moluccas. 

Commission hearing witnesses indicated that broadcast media in certain regions in 

the Moluccas are monopolized by one community and that the other side is routinely denied 

access. There are also reports that the one-sided broadcasting often distorts events in ways 

that serve to exacerbate the conflict. The U.S. government should urge the government of 

Indonesia to ensure equal access to broadcast media to all religious communities on the 

Islands. 

 

1

 These reports indicated that men, women, and children were compelled to declare openly 

their allegiance to Islam or face death, torture, or destruction of their homes. Many were 

then renamed with “Muslim” names. As part of the process of “conversion,” some, though 

not all, were forced to undergo circumcision, regardless of gender or age, in what were 

reportedly extremely primitive and unsanitary conditions. 

2

 Islamic scholars consider any form of unwilling circumcision to be contrary to Islamic 

teachings. In addition, the “circumcision” (or genital mutilation) of females is not considered 

by historians of Islam to be an Islamic practice but a cultural one, a local ritual that precedes 

the adoption of Islam in those regions where it is practiced. 

3

 It should be noted that Muslim and Christian scholars maintain that any element of coercion 
76 

 

in the conversion to Islam or Christianity is contrary to the teachings of both faiths. 

4

 Paul Michael Taylor, “The Indonesian Archipelago,” in Islands: the Illustrated Library of 

the Earth, Rodale Press: Emmaus Pa., 1994, 110, 112. 

5

 Robert W. Hefner, “Profiles in Pluralism: Religion and Politics in Indonesia,” in Religion 

on the International News Agenda, Mark Silk ed., 2000, 84. 

6

 US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000, 

“Indonesia,” September 2000, 2 

 (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_indonesi.html, accessed 

January 30, 2001). 

7

 Library of Congress, “Pancasila: The State Ideology,” A Country Study: Indonesia, 1992, 1 

(http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+id0141, accessed February 

1, 2001). 

8 http://www.kbri.org/(accessed February 1, 2001). 

9 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Indonesia,” 2 (Internet). 

10 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, “Indonesia,” October 2000, 1 

(http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/indonesia_0010_bgn.html, accessed January 

18, 2001). 

11 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Indonesia,” 4 (Internet). 

12 Many reports refer to Maluku, the Maluku Islands or the Malukus, as well as Moluccas. 

According to some Indonesia experts, the term “Moluccas” is more functional to refer to the 

entire group of islands, as “Maluku” refers now only to the central and southern islands and 

“North Maluku” to the islands in the north. (The Moluccas were divided into two separate 

provinces in 1999.) 

13 Less than 7 percent of the population of the Moluccas is Catholic. 

14 Blair Palmer, “Liminal Subjects and Subjective Memory in Indonesia: Butonese Migrants 

Returning to Buton After Fleeing the Ambon War, 1999-2000,” unpublished paper, 

December 2000, 3. 

15 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, ICG 

Asia Report No. 10, December 2000, iii. 

16 Additional information about this group can be obtained from its website at 

http://www.laskarjihad.or.id.

17 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Indonesia,” 
77 

 

February 2001, 30 

 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/index.cfm?docid=707, accessed March 6, 

2001). 

18 See for example Chris Brummitt, “Christians Allege Forced Circumcision in Troubled 

Indonesia Province,” Associated Press, January 31, 2001, and Richard C. Paddock, 

“’Purified in the Name of Allah,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2001. As mentioned, even 

women are allegedly being forced to undergo “circumcision” in the form of genital 

mutilation, even though this practice is, according to a Moluccas expert, not generally 

common to Moluccan Muslims (though among other Muslim groups in Indonesia, there has 

existed a symbolic, that is, non-mutilating, circumcision ceremony to which Muslim girls are 

sometimes subject). Moderate Muslim leaders have condemned the forced conversions and 

circumcisions as contrary to Islamic teachings. See Lindsay Murdoch, “Brutal Religious 

War Leaves Paradise Soaked in Blood,” Sidney Morning Herald, January 27, 2001. 

19 Two witnesses at the Commission’s hearing on the Moluccas discussed this. The 

Commission also received a report from a respected Muslim leader in the Moluccas that such 

incidents had occurred in Halmahera, then a Christian stronghold, in December 1999. This is 

the same month and same area that the large massacre against Muslims occurred, an event 

that helped incite militant Muslim groups in other parts of Indonesia to go to the Moluccas to 

defend Muslims there. See also U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports, 

“Indonesia,” 30 (Internet). 

20 The fighting in the Moluccas should be viewed in two different contexts, as the Maluku 

province in the south, long dominated politically by Christians, has had an experience of 

fighting different from that in North Maluku. The latter is about 80 percent Muslim, and 

political power reflected a centuries-old rivalry between two local sultanates, one of which, 

the Sultan of Ternate, was largely supported by the Christian population there. See ICG, 

“Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, 6-7. 

21 See “Holy War in the Spice Islands,” The Economist, March 15, 2001. 

22 U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report, “Indonesia,” 2000, 9 

(http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia_pacific/Indonesia.htm, accessed January 

18, 2001). 

23 Human Rights Watch, Report, “Indonesia: the Violence in Ambon,” March 1999, 4 

(http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ambon/amron-01.htm, accessed October 31, 2000). 

24 Local resentment as a result of the transmigration policy, kept under the surface during the 

Suharto era, has emerged and apparently played a role in a number of regional conflicts in 

Indonesia, including the gruesome fighting that erupted in Borneo in February 2001. The 

indigenous Dayaks increasingly grew to resent the presence of the Madurese, the newcomers 

who, it was claimed, took their land and their jobs. 
78 

 

25 One scholar lists dozens of factors that have been cited as the cause of the conflict in the 

Moluccas, factors that can be grouped under the following headings: religion; local politics; 

national politics; migration; regional autonomy; history; institutional concerns; provocateurs, 

local beliefs; and economic considerations. See Palmer, “Liminal Subjects and Subjective 

Memory in Indonesia, 8-10. 

26 James Castle, “Business and Investment Climate in Indonesia,” USINDO Open Forum, 

June, 2000 (http://www.usindo.org/sub/brief_5.htm, accessed January 22, 2001). 

27 Louise Williams, “Violent Shadows Darken Democracy,” Sydney Morning Herald, 

December 27, 2000. 

28 ICG, “Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, 5. 

29 Ibid., 8. See also 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Indonesia,” 9 (Internet). 

30 Ibid., 8. 

31 Ibid., 17. 

32 Ibid., 9. See also Robert W. Hefner, U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, Hearings on the Moluccas, February 13, 2001. 

33 See, for example, Dana R. Dillon, “Too Soon to Resume Military-to-Military Engagement 

with Indonesia,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, September 2000; ICG, “Overcoming 

Murder and Chaos in Maluku,” pp. 19-21; Human Rights Watch, “Violence in Ambon,” 5 

(Internet). See also USCIRF, Hearings on the Moluccas (Hefner testimony). 

34 One Indonesia expert asserts that “the bulk of the funding for the jihad campaign has been 

provided by businessmen linked to former President Suharto.” See USCIRF, Hearings on 

the Moluccas (Hefner testimony). 

35 Human Rights Watch, “Violence in Ambon,” 1 (Internet). 

36 John A. Titaley, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearings on the 

Moluccas, February 13, 2001. 

37 H. M. Jusuf Ely, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearings on the 

Moluccas, February 13, 2001. See also 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Indonesia,” 5 

(Internet). 

38 According to one former diplomat, soldiers in Indonesia make so little money that “they 

are tempted to sell their services or weapons and have done so in Maluku.” See Paul 

Gardner, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearings on the Moluccas, 

February 13, 2001. 
79 

 

39 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: the Issues,” Indonesia Briefing, 

July 2000, 8. 

40 Larry Niksch, “Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh,” Congressional Research 

Service Report, January 2001, 5. 

41 USCIRF, Hearings on the Moluccas (Gardner testimony). 

42 Paul Michael Taylor, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearings on 

the Moluccas, February 13, 2001. 

43 ICG, “Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,” 13. 

44 USCIRF, Hearings on the Moluccas (Ely testimony). 

45 ICG, “Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,” 15. 

46 Sidney Jones, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearings on the 

Moluccas, February 13, 2001. 

47 Ibid. 
80 
81 

V. IRAN 

A. Introduction 

The conditions of religious freedom are very poor in Iran, particularly with respect to 

minority religious groups that are not officially recognized by the state and those perceived to 

be attempting to convert Muslims. For the last two years, the Secretary of State has 

determined that the government of Iran has engaged in particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom, including prolonged detentions and executions based primarily or entirely 

upon the religion of the victims, thereby designating Iran as a “country of particular concern” 

pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. 

In her address to the American-Iranian Council in March 2000, then-Secretary of 

State Madeleine K. Albright announced that the United States was open to taking steps 

toward improving relations with Iran, if Iran were to take steps to address the issues that the 

United States has identified as prerequisites to better relations, such as desisting from the 

development of nuclear weapons and support for international terrorism. Secretary of State 

Colin L. Powell has indicated that the Bush administration, while continuing to insist that 

Iran end its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, and human rights 

abuses, would seek to “nuance” its Iran policy in order to encourage Iranian moderates. The 

Commission believes that human rights, including religious freedom, must remain an 

essential element of U.S. policy toward Iran.1

B. Background 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides that the official religion of 

Iran is Islam of the doctrine of the Twelver (Jaafari) School and stipulates that all laws and 

regulations, including the Constitution itself, must be based on Islamic criteria. The 

Constitution also provides that other Islamic schools of doctrine are to be accorded full 

respect in matters of religious rites, religious education, and personal status. It recognizes 

Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as the only religious minorities who, as such, are free to 

engage in religious practices and act according to their own rules in matters of personal status 

and religious education “within the limits of the law.” 

Current, reliable statistics on the religious composition of Iranian society are not 

available. Shia Muslims are reported to comprise 89 percent of the population, 10 percent 

are Sunni Muslim, and one percent are non-Muslims, including Baha’is (300,000), Christians 

(250,000, including 150,000 Armenian Orthodox, 30,000 Assyrians-Chaldeans and small 

communities of Catholics and Protestants), Zoroastrians (30,000), and Jews (30,000). 

Members of the Baha’i community suffer the worst forms of religious persecution at 

the hands of the state. More than 200 Baha’is were executed in the first six years following 

the 1979 revolution. Since 1983, the Baha’i community has been barred from assembling in 

public or operating administrative institutions. The Iranian government does not recognize 

Baha’is as a religious minority, rather in its view Baha’is constitute a political organization 

that was associated with the Shah’s regime, is opposed to the Iranian Revolution, and 

engages in espionage activities on behalf of foreign countries, including Israel. Baha’is are 
82 

effectively prevented from (1) teaching or practicing their religion; (2) communicating with 

or sending funds to Baha’i world headquarters; (3) attending public or private universities; 

and (4) holding government jobs (all Baha’is were removed from government positions in 

the 1980s). Baha’i holy places, cemeteries, and administrative properties were seized after 

the 1979 revolution, and many places have been destroyed. Much of the personal and 

business property belonging to Baha’is has also been seized. 

According to the State Department, as of June 30, 2000, 11 Baha’is were under arrest 

for the practice of their faith, including four persons who have been sentenced to death – two 

for alleged “Zionist Baha’i activities” and two for apostasy. In addition, a number of Baha’is 

– particularly those engaged in educational activities – were harassed and detained over the 

preceding year. 

Members of the officially-recognized non-Muslim minorities – Christians, Jews, and 

Zoroastrians – are subject to legal and other forms of official discrimination. They are 

reportedly (1) prohibited from being elected to a representative body (except for reserved 

seats in the National Parliament); (2) prohibited from serving in the army, the security 

services, and the judiciary, and from becoming school principals (even in private minority 

schools); (3) limited in their access to higher education; and (4) suffer discrimination in legal 

proceedings. 

The trial and conviction of a group of Iranian Jews in 2000 on charges of espionage 

and cooperating with Israel, under conditions that fell far short of international standards, 

illustrates the continued vulnerability of that group to harassment and imprisonment. 

In addition to the problems faced by other Christians in Iran, Evangelical Christians 

are subjected to a number of further repressive measures. This harsher treatment is 

reportedly due, in part, to the Western origins of Iranian Protestant churches, their continued 

links with Evangelical churches outside Iran, and their willingness to seek out and accept 

converts from other religions. Iranian Evangelicals operating in Iran are subject to 

harassment and close surveillance and many are reported to have fled the country. 

Evangelical services are allowed only on Sundays and government officials require 

notification when a new member joins a church. Some Protestant associations have been 

unable to officially register since 1979, while a number of Protestant places of worship 

remain closed by government order since the 1980s. There are also allegations that the 

government played a role in the murders or disappearances of a number of Evangelical 

Christian leaders in the past ten years. 

Members of the Sunni Muslim minority face a number of difficulties. Sunni Iranians, 

for example, claim that the government has prevented them from building a Sunni mosque in 

Tehran. They also point to the 1994 murder of a Sunni imam who had been critical of the 

regime and to the destruction of the only Sunni mosque in the eastern town of Mashhad as 

evidence of official and popular hostility toward Sunnis. Iranian Sunni leaders have alleged 

widespread abuses and restrictions on their religious practice, including detentions and 

torture of Sunni clerics and bans on Sunni teachings in public schools and Sunni religious 

literature, even in predominantly Sunni areas. 
83 

A number of senior Shiite religious leaders who have opposed various religious 

and/or political tenets and practices of the Iranian government have also reportedly been 

targets of state repression, including house arrest, detention without charge, unfair trials, 

torture and other forms of ill treatment. In addition, the government has closed and 

confiscated educational and charitable institutions associated with these leaders. In some 

cases, these clerics have been targeted for their opposition to reported restrictions on 

controversial religious practices and state control of religious institutions. 

C. Commission Recommendations 

In light of the preceding description of the situation in Iran, the Commission makes 

the following recommendations: 

1. The President or Secretary of State should reaffirm to the government 

of Iran that improvement in religious freedom and other human rights in 

that country is a prerequisite for the complete relaxation of sanctions by 

and the normalization of relations with the United States. 

In the past, the State Department has articulated four conditions for the improvement 

of relations with Iran: (1) Iran should not develop weapons of mass destruction, (2) Iran 

should not sponsor terrorism, (3) Iran should not impede the “peace process” in the Middle 

East, and (4) Iran should improve its human rights record. With regard to human rights, 

including religious freedom, for example, the State Department spokesman stated on July 23, 

1998 that U.S. concerns about religious freedom in Iran “will play an important role in any 

future dialogue with the government of Iran.” Statements made late in the previous 

administration appear to have dropped reference to the fourth condition. In her March 2000 

speech, then Secretary of State Albright articulated only two conditions to the full 

normalization of diplomatic relations with Iran and the elimination of sanctions: halting 

nuclear weapons development and ending support of terrorism. As the new administration 

continues to review and reformulate its Iran policy, the Commission recommends that the 

fourth condition – improvement in the area of human rights – be prominently and publicly 

reinstated as an essential part of U.S. relations with the government of Iran, and that religious 

freedom be clearly included in such advocacy of human rights in Iran. 

2. The U.S. government should consistently, continuously, and 

vigorously press the government of Iran to improve conditions of 

religious freedom, and should urge its European and other allies to 

support advocacy for religious freedom in Iran. Voice of America Farsilanguage broadcasting into Iran should include regular reporting on 

religious freedom in Iran and religious-freedom issues in general. 

Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran, the U.S. 

government should use every opportunity available to press the government of Iran to 

improve the protection of religious freedom, including public statements and diplomacy in 

multilateral forums. The Commission recognizes statements made in the past by the White 

House and the State Department concerning persecution against members of the Baha’i 

community and the arrest and trial of the members of the Iranian Jewish community, and 
84 

believes that such statements made at the highest levels should continue as events dictate. 

The U.S. government also should urge others, in particular the European Union and those 

European allies that are engaged in trade and investment relations with Iran, to press for 

improvements in the conditions of religious freedom in their bilateral relations. 

3. The U.S. government should continue to sponsor or support annual 

resolutions of the United Nations Commission On Human Rights 

(UNCHR) condemning Iran's egregious and systematic violations of 

religious freedom and should recruit the support of other Commission 

member countries, until such violations cease. 

Support for a strong resolution condemning human rights violations in Iran is 

reportedly diminishing among members of the UNCHR. The United States should continue 

its support for annual resolutions by the UN General Assembly and the UNCHR regarding 

the human rights situation in Iran, including condemning the Iranian government’s egregious 

and systematic violations of religious freedom, and calling upon the government of Iran to 

extend an invitation to the Special Representative of the UNCHR on human rights in Iran to 

visit the country. 

4. The United States should facilitate (through issuance of visas) and 

remove barriers (such as the U.S. Department of Justice policy of 

fingerprinting Iranians at ports of entry) to unofficial cultural exchange – 

e.g., academic, religious, athletic, and scientific – between the United 

States and Iran. 

Former Secretary Albright in her March 2000 address stated that Americans should 

work to expand and broaden person-to-person exchanges of academics and civil society 

leaders between the United States and Iran. The Commission believes that such exchanges 

should be encouraged. Iranian religious leaders in particular may benefit from travel in the 

United States and exposure to American religious leaders who concern themselves with the 

process of the protection and promotion of religious freedom and with interreligious dialogue 

and action in the United States. 

One impediment to cultural and religious exchanges appears to be an order of the 

Justice Department that all non-immigrants bearing Iranian travel documents that are seeking 

entry into the United States must be registered, photographed, and fingerprinted at the port of 

entry. This policy applies to essentially all Iranians seeking to enter the United States. 

Iranian scholars, athletes, and others have protested the application of this policy, and in 

some cases have declined invitations to the United States or have returned home after 

refusing to be fingerprinted upon arrival. The current, broad fingerprinting policy has 

frustrated efforts to engage in person-to-person exchanges with Iran, and appears to be more 

restrictive than is necessary to meet U.S. security objectives. In addition, the publicity in 

Iran surrounding the use of this policy is reportedly used by those in Iran who oppose the 

improvement of relations with the United States to criticize those who favor increased ties. 
85 

 

1

 In November 2000, the Commission wrote to President Clinton to express its deep concern 

over the conditions of religious freedom in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and made the 

recommendations contained herein with respect to U.S. policy toward Iran. 
86 
87 

VI. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 

A. Background 

Notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on conditions in the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), it is apparent that religious 

freedom is non-existent in that country. As the State Department concludes: “Genuine 

religious freedom does not exist.”1 The government has imprisoned religious believers and 

apparently suppresses all organized religious activity except that which serves the interests of 

the state. Since July 1999, there have been reports of torture and execution of religious 

believers, including between 12 and 23 Christians on account of their religion.2 

There have been significant developments in U.S.-DPRK relations in the last year, 

including a visit to Washington by the first vice chairman of the DPRK National Defense 

Commission, then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright’s historic visit to North Korea, 

and the announcement that certain sanctions against the country would be lifted. In March 

2001, Republic of Korea (South Korea) President Kim Dae-Jung visited the United States, 

and President Bush expressed U.S. support for the South Korean efforts to engage North 

Korea. However, President Bush also indicated that the United States would not resume 

missile talks with the DPRK soon and that North Korea remains a threat to U.S. security. 

B. Commission Recommendations 

U.S. policy toward North Korea has focused on concerns with the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. 

Nevertheless, in light of recent developments and the grievous religious-freedom situation 

there, the Commission believes that the United States must place significant emphasis on the 

protection of religious freedom in the DPRK. Therefore, the Commission makes the 

following recommendations: 

1. In the course of further discussions with the North Korean 

government, the U.S. government should strongly urge the DPRK to 

reaffirm publicly its commitments under the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 

The DPRK acceded to the ICCPR in 1981. In August 1997, however, the North 

Korean government indicated its intention to withdraw from the treaty in protest against a 

resolution of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 

Protection of Minorities that criticized the government’s human rights performance. 

Although the North Korean government apparently stated in August 1999 that it was ready to 

honor its obligations under the ICCPR, it has yet to submit the required reports. The 

Commission recommends that the United States urge the North Korean government to 

reaffirm publicly its commitments under the ICCPR. 

2. The U.S. government should press the DPRK to immediately establish 

conditions whereby the status of religious freedom can be assessed and 

progress be monitored. 
88 

As a result of extensive government control, very little reliable information on the 

status of religious freedom has emerged from North Korea, as is true with regard to 

information on conditions in the country generally. The State Department notes that the 

North Korean government “does not allow representatives of foreign governments, 

journalists, or other invited visitors the freedom of movement that would enable them to fully 

assess human rights conditions there.”3 The DPRK government has not responded to a 

request by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance for an official invitation to 

visit the country. As an indication of the importance of religious freedom and other human 

rights to the process of normalization of bilateral relations, the U.S. government should insist 

that the DPRK immediately establish conditions whereby the status of religious freedom can 

be assessed and progress be monitored. Immediate actions that the North Korean 

government should take to address this issue include an invitation to the U.N. Special 

Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance; an invitation to the Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom and the Commission; and granting entrance to and sufficient 

freedom of movement by U.S. and foreign officials, journalists, as well as humanitarian and 

other appropriate non-governmental organizations. 

3. The U.S. government should ensure that any permanent peace treaty 

between the parties to the Korean War include provisions on religious 

freedom and non-discrimination in the treatment of religious minorities. 

The 1953 Armistice Agreement is an interim cease-fire agreement signed by the 

military commanders of the North Korean People’s Army, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, 

and the United Nations Command, which was represented by the commander-in-chief of the 

U.S. forces. The so-called “Four-Party Talks” (comprising the United States, the People’s 

Republic of China, the DPRK, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)) have as one of its 

goals the conclusion of a “permanent peace treaty” that would formally end the Korean War. 

The U.S. government should strongly advocate the inclusion in any permanent peace treaty 

of provisions safeguarding religious freedom and non-discrimination in the treatment of 

religious minorities. Such provisions are included, for example, in various peace treaties 

concluded at the end of the First and Second World Wars. 

4. The U.S. government should communicate to the government of the 

DPRK that substantial improvements in religious freedom and other 

human rights in North Korea is a prerequisite for the normalization of 

relations with and the complete relaxation of sanctions by the United 

States. 

5. The U.S. government should communicate to the DPRK government 

that when any U.S. diplomatic presence is opened in North Korea, 

diplomatic personnel should have reasonable access within the country to 

assess the state of religious freedom and to monitor developments, and 

that a religious-freedom dialogue should begin and take place at the 

highest policymaking levels. 

6. U.S. government officials should raise the issue of religious freedom – 

and the point that improvement of religious freedom is a central 
89 

component of the improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations – in all high-level 

diplomatic exchanges with the DPRK. 

Disputes over security concerns and weapons proliferation have dominated the 

bilateral dialogue between the United States and the DPRK. Also of great concern is the 

humanitarian situation in the DPRK and the massive suffering that the North Korean people 

have apparently endured there. Despite the grave human rights situation, it does not appear 

that concern with human rights, including religious freedom, has yet played a role in the U.S. 

government’s policy toward North Korea. The Commission therefore recommends that 

substantial improvements in religious freedom and other human rights in the DPRK be made 

a prerequisite for the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea. 

The United States should insist that a U.S. diplomatic presence in the DPRK must include the 

ability of U.S. personnel to monitor religious-freedom conditions. Moreover, as part of 

increased ties with the DPRK, the United States should insist that a regular religious-freedom 

dialogue take place at the highest policymaking levels. Finally, the issue of religious 

freedom should be raised in all high-level diplomatic exchanges with the DPRK, as former 

Secretary of State Albright did during her visit in October 2000. 

7. The U.S. government should urge the Republic of Korea and Japan, 

as part of trilateral coordination among the United States and those two 

countries, to press human rights and religious freedom in their talks with 

the DPRK as well. 

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group was created in April 1999 to 

facilitate greater policy coordination between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 

After the Trilateral Foreign Minister’s Meeting that followed her visit to Pyongyang in 

October, former Secretary Albright remarked that it is essential that the three countries carry 

on the discussions with North Korea “in parallel, and that we reinforce each other in terms of 

making sure that each country’s special concerns are met.” One special concern with respect 

to North Korea for the trilateral group is the “abductee” issue (i.e. Japanese claims that 

between the late 1970s and early 1980s, North Korean agents abducted as many as 20 

civilians from Japan). Former Secretary Albright stated that she raised this issue with DPRK 

officials during her visit. Likewise, the United States should urge the Republic of Korea and 

Japan, as part of trilateral coordination among the United States and these two countries, to 

press human rights and religious freedom in their talks with the DPRK. 

 

1

 House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000, report prepared by U.S. 

Department of State. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2001, Joint Committee Print, 195. 

2 2000 Religious Freedom Report, 197. 

3 2000 Religious Freedom Report, 195. 
90 
91 

VII. NIGERIA 

A. Introduction 

The Commission’s concern with the conditions of religious freedom in Nigeria was 

substantially heightened in the first half of 2000 by reports of violent clashes between 

Muslims and Christians. The conflict, sparked by the controversy surrounding the adoption 

of Shariah in several northern Nigerian states, resulted in several thousand deaths. In late 

September, Commission staff traveled to Nigeria and met with Nigerian federal and state 

government officials and religious leaders in the capital and four northern states (Kano, 

Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kaduna) to assess the state of religious freedom in northern Nigeria. 

The Commission extends its appreciation to the government of Nigeria and to the U.S. 

diplomatic mission for their assistance in connection with this trip. In addition, the 

Commission and its staff have met or communicated with Nigerian religious leaders 

(including those from the southern portion of the country) and other experts on Nigeria and 

U.S.-Nigerian relations. 

Religious life in Nigeria is public, vigorous, and diverse. Nevertheless, Nigeria 

continues to suffer from outbursts of violent communal conflict along religious and ethnic 

lines, pervasive mistrust among religious and ethnic communities, and reportedly serious 

lapses in the protection of human rights generally. The threats to religious freedom, 

including reports of religious discrimination, are serious and ongoing. Moreover, recent 

events portend a possible deterioration in the conditions of religious freedom. Serious 

outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence – exacerbated by social, economic, and political 

conditions that foster religious and ethnic tensions – threaten to divide further the populace 

along religious lines and undermine the foundations of religious freedom in Nigeria. 

The movement in several northern Nigerian states to expand the legal application of 

Shariah has sparked communal violence and is a source of continuing volatility and tension 

between Muslims and Christians at both the national and local levels. According to Muslim 

leaders, the expansion of Shariah is a grassroots popular demand and is rooted in a number of 

religious, historical, and social factors. Christian leaders and Muslim critics of the Shariah 

movement, as well as some federal government officials, have attributed the push for Shariah 

to northern political elites displaced by the advent of democracy and seeking to undermine 

President Olusegun Obasanjo’s rule. Defenders of the expansion of Shariah state that its 

provisions, both as proposed and as enacted thus far, will not apply to non-Muslims in the 

north. However, Christians in the north fear that an expanded application of Shariah in their 

states could expose their communities to increased violence and discrimination. President 

Obasanjo has been criticized, both inside and outside Nigeria, for not responding more 

decisively to the religious violence and communal tensions brought about by the Shariah 

controversy. Regardless of the motivation for the expansion, the Shariah movement – how it 

is implemented and/or exploited – has the potential to spark renewed violence (and a cycle of 

violent reprisals), to undermine fragile relations between communities, to fuel intolerance, 

fear, and incitement, and to undercut equal treatment under the law. The manipulation of 

religious doctrines and religious sentiments for political ends by any party poses real dangers 

to religious freedom, as ethnic, tribal, or communal violence take on more explicitly religious 

overtones, and religious belief, identity, and practice become more of the target. 
92 

Current U.S. policy is based on support for Nigeria’s democratic transition and its 

potentially stabilizing role in the region. Central to these goals is the ability of the Nigerian 

government and people to deal peacefully with religious conflict and its underlying causes, 

thereby promoting the protection of religious freedom. The U.S. government should assist 

the Nigerians in their efforts to deal effectively with these problems.

B. Background 

1. Demography 

Nigeria is a complex multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society. Nigeria’s roughly 

115 million inhabitants comprise more than 250 ethnic groups speaking more than 500 

languages. While there are no accurate modern counts, the CIA World Fact Book estimates 

that roughly 50 percent of Nigerians are Sunni Muslims, while approximately 40 percent are 

Christians, predominantly Catholics, but also Protestants.1 Muslims, most of who are HausaFulani, Nigeria’s largest “ethnic” group, make up roughly 90-95 percent of the population of 

the northernmost states. Christians are heavily concentrated in the southeast (Igboland) 

where they make up roughly 90-95 percent of the local population. In the southwest 

(Yorubaland), meanwhile, Muslims and Christians are roughly evenly split. The remaining 

10 percent of the population follow traditional-indigenous beliefs and are scattered 

throughout the southeast, southwest, and the “Middle Belt.” 

2. Religious Freedom 

a. Shariah-based criminal laws in northern Nigeria 

A system of Shariah law and courts covering the personal status of Muslims (e.g., 

marriage, divorce, inheritance) has existed in northern Nigeria since before independence in 

1960. Since October 1999, eleven northern Nigerian states have expanded or announced 

plans to expand the application of Shariah. Although the particulars vary from state to state, 

each has adopted, or plans to adopt, a Shariah-based penal code and provisions to extend the 

jurisdiction of Shariah courts beyond personal status matters to include Shariah crimes and 

punishments.2

 These new codes generally ban the sale and distribution of alcohol, 

criminalize adultery and gambling, and provide for Shariah punishments such as amputation 

of the hand for theft or stoning for adultery. Apostasy from Islam is not criminalized. There 

are also reports that in some states, as part of the Shariah expansion, public schools and 

transportation systems are being segregated by sex, and that in Zamfara state there are plans 

to segregate health facilities. 

While laws based on Shariah are not new in northern Nigeria, the current move to 

expand Shariah in the criminal area has become a contentious and volatile issue throughout 

Nigeria, and a source of tension, division, and violence between Muslims and Christians.3

 

There is growing concern, inside and outside Nigeria, over how the expansion of Shariah will 

affect the rights of individual Muslims and non-Muslims and relations between the religious 

communities. 

The states that have implemented, or plan to implement, Shariah-based criminal law 

assert that the laws apply only to Muslims. According to U.S. Embassy officials, Shariah 
93 

courts have no formal jurisdiction over non-Muslims except in civil matters where a 

Christian expressly consents to the jurisdiction. Some states allow Muslims to opt out of the 

Shariah courts and have their cases tried in the civil magistrate court, while others do not. In 

states that do not allow Muslims to opt out, all Muslims are subject to Shariah-based criminal 

codes regardless of their personal preference or of their particular interpretation of Islamic 

law (which may conflict with the interpretation adopted by state law).4 In addition, in 

January 2001, a quasi-official corps of volunteer Shariah enforcers in Zamfara state was 

reportedly given full powers of arrest and prosecution by Governor Ahmed Sani, on the basis 

that local police had failed to enforce Shariah laws.5 This raises the possibility that Shariah 

provisions may be enforced against some Nigerians to whom they should not apply. In Kano 

state, official Shariah enforcers (known as the Hizbah) are acting as a kind of “shadow” 

police force, and there are several reports of criminal elements masquerading as Shariah 

enforcers in order to perpetrate assaults and other crimes, further threatening the rule of law.

Northern Christians fear that the Shariah-based laws will be applied to them. They 

also are generally fearful that the extension of Shariah will have a negative impact on their 

communities: exacerbating what they assert to be an atmosphere and legacy of discrimination 

and “second class” status; creating the potential for violence from Muslim vigilantes taking 

the law into their own hands; restricting evangelism efforts; raising the possibility of the loss 

of livelihoods and exposure to criminal penalties as a result of prohibitions on the sale and 

distribution of alcohol; and restricting Christian women’s access to public transportation 

(which affects all women). 

Shariah represents a powerful symbol for both Nigerian Muslims and Christians, and 

the issue has been politicized and subsumed within the country’s broader competing political 

interests. Nigerian Christians and others with whom the Commission delegation met view 

the drive for Shariah as a political scheme by northern elites, now finding themselves out of 

power, aimed at destabilizing the current government of President Obasanjo. In contrast, 

most Nigerian Muslims with whom the delegation met argued that the drive for Shariah 

stems from a genuine grassroots desire by Muslims to live according to Islamic norms. Some 

politicians, most notably Governor Sani of Zamfara, claim to have run for office and been 

elected on a platform of implementing Shariah. Independent observers have suggested that 

the popularity of Shariah may also be rooted in frustration with rampant corruption, 

lawlessness, and the lack of genuine justice in the state courts. Others suggest that the 

Shariah movement is the product of Nigeria’s democratic transition, which has provided new 

opportunities for expression and organization. 

The question of whether the new Shariah-based criminal laws violate the Nigerian 

constitution is a contentious and sensitive one. The current constitution prohibits state and 

local governments from adopting an “official religion,” but authorizes state Shariah courts 

and confers on them jurisdiction “in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic 

personal law” (such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance). The constitution also confers on 

Shariah appellate courts “such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of 

the State.”6

 Many Christians argue that the expansion of Shariah represents a prohibited 

“official religion.” On the other hand, many Muslims argue that the expansion falls within 

the enumerated state power to confer additional jurisdiction on Shariah courts and is an 

expression of the religious freedom of Muslim Nigerians. A number of legal challenges to 
94 

the new Shariah-based criminal laws were dismissed by the Zamfara state High Court in 

February 2001 on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing.7 Northern Nigerian Muslim 

political and religious leaders with whom the Commission met did not acknowledge that the 

Nigerian Supreme Court would be the final arbiter of appeals involving Shariah law. This 

raises the possibility of an additional constitutional crisis with respect to the expansion of 

Shariah. 

b. Religiously-based discrimination 

According to the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom 2000: “In general, states with a clear Christian or Muslim majority explicitly favor 

the majority faith.” Christians in the northern states complain of what they view as officially 

sanctioned discrimination at the hands of Muslim-controlled governments and describe their 

communities as “second class citizens.” Most complaints predate the recent initiatives 

regarding Shariah, and include allegations of official discrimination in denial of applications 

for building or repairing religious institutions, education, access to state-run media, 

representation in government bodies, and government employment. Christians report that 

they have difficulty obtaining permits to build churches and religious schools, and in some 

cases, to buy or lease land and buildings. They also claim that Christian students are 

sometimes required to attend instruction in Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) and that the 

requirements (where they exist) for providing Christian students with Christian Religious 

Knowledge (CRK) are often not met.8

 There appear to be no restrictions on open-air public 

preaching and distribution of Biblical literature, at least in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kaduna 

states. However, Christians report that they are barred from access to state-owned media.9 

According to Christians with whom the Commission delegation met in Zamfara and Sokoto, 

much of the purported discrimination was due to the fact that these Christian communities 

are not adequately represented in important state and local government agencies, such as the 

Ministry of Religious Affairs and agencies dealing with zoning and land use. 

Minority Muslim communities in southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small 

fraction of the population, echo some of the complaints of minority Christian communities in 

northern Nigeria.10 Southern Muslim leaders, such as those at the Nigerian Supreme Council 

for Islamic Affairs, report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the media, 

education, and representation in government institutions. They claim that Muslims are 

treated unfairly by what they perceive to be Christian-dominated media in the south, both in 

terms of access of Muslim religious groups to state-run media and in how issues that touch 

Muslims, including communal violence, are presented in the local media. Muslim 

community leaders complain that Muslim students in public schools have been denied access 

to Islamic Religious Knowledge, whereas Christian Religious Knowledge is provided. 

Southern Muslim leaders report, however, that they have the freedom to propagate their faith 

and do so openly. According to local press reports, U.S. embassy officials and leaders of the 

Muslim community in the south, southern Muslims also claim that they are not fairly 

represented in public institutions such as state legislatures, judicial bodies, and local 

councils,11 and that Muslims face discrimination in law enforcement as a result of prevalent 

negative attitudes and stereotypes about Muslims.12
95 

c. Communal violence 

In February and May of 2000, violence between Nigerian Muslims and Christians 

erupted, sparked by events connected to the ongoing Shariah controversy. Several thousand 

Nigerians, both Muslims and Christians, died in these outbursts of violence. According to 

several reports, in February thousands of Christians assembled in Kaduna city to protest 

against the Kaduna state assembly’s announcement that it had formed a committee to 

investigate the possibility of adopting a Shariah-based criminal law.13 Unruly elements of 

the crowd returning from the demonstration reportedly attacked local Muslims, prompting 

counter-attacks and sparking an uncontrollable wave of communal violence all throughout 

the Kaduna metropolitan area. The violence resulted in tremendous loss of life among both 

Muslims and Christians, attacks on mosques and churches, and the destruction of property 

belonging to both communities. Following the violence in Kaduna, there were reprisal 

attacks against northern (i.e., non-indigene) Muslims in the southeastern part of the country. 

In addition to violence associated with the controversy surrounding Shariah, there are 

periodic instances of violence in several areas of Nigeria targeting particular religious 

communities or religious sites, and there is reported to be a religious component to a 

continuing cycle of Hausa-Yoruba violence that claimed more than 100 lives in Lagos in 

mid-October 2000.14 

C. Commission Recommendations 

In order to protect and promote religious freedom in Nigeria, the objectives of U.S. 

policy should be threefold: (1) to prevent further conflict between religious communities; (2) 

to encourage a political settlement of the Shariah controversy in a manner that protects the 

sensibilities and the right to religious freedom of individuals from all religious communities; 

and (3) to support social, economic, and political development programs by Nigerians that 

enhance the protection of religious freedom, strengthen law enforcement, improve relations 

between religious communities, and resist efforts to politicize religion, religious identity, and 

the exercise of religious freedom. 

A stable and economically viable Nigeria is vital to U.S. strategic and economic 

interests and warrants U.S. government involvement. Stability helps maintain a climate 

favorable to U.S. trade and investment and promotes greater stability throughout West 

Africa, where Nigeria has considerable influence. In order to help prevent further religious 

conflict, the U.S. government should urge all Nigerians, and others active in Nigeria, to 

diffuse rather than inflame religious intolerance. 

Against this background, the Commission makes the following recommendations: 

1. The U.S. government should make the promotion of religious freedom 

a high priority in its diplomatic discussions with the Nigerian government 

and urge President Olusegun Obasanjo to condemn – publicly, forcefully, 

and consistently – religious intolerance and discrimination, and to 

promote religious freedom and mutual understanding between Muslims 

and Christians. 
96 

President Obasanjo should be strongly encouraged to use his position and leadership 

to speak out against sectarian violence, religious intolerance, and religious discrimination 

throughout civic life, and to promote religious freedom and greater understanding between 

Muslims and Christians. Strong, consistent, and unequivocal statements from his “bully 

pulpit” on these issues will help create a national consensus to address these problems.

2. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to counter 

religiously-based discrimination by doing the following: 

2.1. Investigate alleged discriminatory obstacles to establishing 

and repairing places of worship and work with state and local 

governments in order to remove such obstacles where they exist; 

2.2. Where offered in public schools, provide religious instruction 

on a non-discriminatory basis and without compelling any student 

with a religious objection to attend; and 

2.3. Ensure equal access to state-run radio and other government 

media resources to all religious groups without discrimination. 

Members of religious minority communities in Nigeria complain that they sometimes 

face difficulty in obtaining permission to build or repair places of worship, religious schools, 

and other religious properties. While such delays may at times result from bureaucratic 

problems, many minority representatives allege that such obstacles are often the result of 

religiously-based discrimination on the part of local and state authorities responsible for 

issuing such permits. The national government should be urged to investigate these 

complaints, and to work closely with state and local governments to resolve them by 

eliminating such discrimination where it exists. Both Christians and Muslims in states where 

they are in the minority complain that their children who attend public schools are denied 

meaningful access to teachers or instruction of their religion. Unlike in the United States, 

religious instruction in Nigeria is permitted in the public schools, and there is government 

involvement in the provision of such instruction. Wherever this is the case, it is critical that 

there be no discrimination against any Nigerian on the basis of religion and that religious 

minorities attending those public schools be granted access to teachers and instruction of 

their religion. In addition, in January 2001, Nigerian lawmakers approved a proposal by the 

Nigerian Inter-Religious Council to make religious education compulsory at the elementary 

and secondary school levels. If and when this is implemented, students with religious 

objection to such instruction should not be compelled to attend. Lastly, both Christian and 

Muslim leaders claim that their religious groups are improperly restricted in their access to 

state-run media in those areas where they are in the minority. The U.S. government should 

urge the Nigerian government to address this problem effectively and in a manner consistent 

with the right to free expression. 

3. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to 

monitor closely the implementation of Shariah-based criminal law in 

northern states: (a) to ensure that it does not apply to non-Muslims and 

respects the religious-freedom rights of all citizens, and (b) to prevent law 
97 

enforcement activities in northern states by any quasi-official or private 

corps of Shariah enforcers. 

In each case that the Commission is aware of, non-Muslims are said to be exempt 

from the application of Shariah-based penal codes and not subject to the jurisdiction of the 

corresponding court systems. The Nigerian federal government should be urged to ensure 

that persons charged, tried, and punished for criminal offenses in Shariah-based systems are 

treated fairly and equitably, including with respect to the determination of whether or not 

they are Muslim. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that any accused person, Muslim 

or not, may opt out of the Shariah court system. Further, the enforcement of the criminal law 

should not be in the hands of untrained, unauthorized “Shariah enforcers” outside the police 

force. Rather, law enforcement (both at command and operational levels) should be 

structured and implemented in a professional, non-sectarian manner. 

4. The U.S. government should urge the Nigerian government to take 

effective steps to prevent and contain acts of communal violence, prevent 

reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for such violence to justice. 

Critical to the protection of religious freedom in Nigeria is the ability of all levels of 

government to effectively prevent communal violence, contain and defuse violence once it 

arises, and bring the perpetrators of violence to justice. Although the Nigerian federal 

government has taken some steps to prevent tensions and has acted to quell violence, it has 

apparently made little progress in arresting and charging those responsible for the violence in 

Kaduna, and subsequent reprisal attacks in the south. 

5. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance programs: 

5.1. Support programs aimed at preventing communal conflict, 

defusing inter-religious tensions, and promoting religious 

tolerance and respect for religious freedom and the rule of law; 

and 

5.2. Support programs that foster objective, non-inflammatory, 

and non-biased reporting by the Nigerian media in a manner 

consistent with the right to free expression. 

To the extent that it provides foreign assistance to Nigeria, the United States should 

support programs by religious communities, inter-religious dialogue forums, and other nongovernmental organizations throughout Nigeria that seek to prevent communal violence, 

defuse inter-religious tensions, and promote religious tolerance and respect for religious 

freedom. Such programs can disseminate accurate, objective news and information on such 

topics as religious communities, conditions of religious freedom, and the adoption and 

implementation of Shariah. This will help to reduce the atmosphere of mistrust, ignorance, 

and innuendo in which conflict and violence can so easily erupt. Such programs can also be 

used to mediate conflict and prevent or manage outbreaks of violence should they occur. 

Current threats to religious freedom in Nigeria are related, at least in part, to the 

perceived failure of administrative, judicial and law enforcement institutions to operate 
98 

fairly, effectively, and according to the rule of law. The United States, through its foreign aid 

programs, should work with Nigerians on training those involved with law enforcement and 

criminal law adjudication in transparency and public accountability, due process, equal 

protection, legal ethics, and the rule of law. Lessons or expertise could be drawn from U.S.-

based and other organizations that operate effective programs in judicial training, law reform, 

and professional law enforcement training in other parts of the world. 

It is alleged that Nigerian media reporting about religious issues, including intercommunal violence, can be biased. The lack of objective news and information is said by 

some to contribute to the volatility of relations between religious communities. Special 

emphasis should be placed on working with Nigerian media and through Voice of America 

broadcasting, which should include regular reporting on religious freedom, religious 

tolerance, and relations between religious communities in Nigeria. 

6. The U.S. government should make the promotion of religious freedom 

a high priority and should strengthen its information-gathering efforts 

throughout Nigeria, particularly in northern states and areas plagued by 

communal violence. 

The diplomatic presence of the United States throughout Nigeria has diminished in 

recent years. The Commission is concerned that this not hamper the ability of the United 

States to monitor religious freedom and communal violence, and engage Nigerians both in 

and out of government on these issues. For example, a U.S. consulate in Kaduna (closed in 

1999) might have allowed U.S. officials better access to firsthand information regarding 

communal and religious violence in February and May and greatly enhanced the mission’s 

ability to respond to the unfolding crisis. Because many of the religious-freedom problems 

in Nigeria are local in nature, an adequate presence throughout Nigeria is essential. 

 

1

 No reliable recent data exists for religious demography in Nigeria. Most current estimates 

are extrapolated from the last official census conducted in 1963, which put Muslims at 47 

percent, Christians at 35 percent, and followers of traditional-indigenous religions at 18 

percent of the population (“Nigeria: A Country Study,” Library of Congress, 191). A survey 

conducted in February 2000 by Professors Peter Lewis of American University and Michael 

Bratton of Michigan State University, which drew from a representative sample of the 

Nigerian population, suggests that no religious group constitutes a majority of the population 

(see Lewis and Bratton, “Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria: Report of a 

National Opinion Survey January-February 2000,” April 2000). 

2

 As of April 10, 2001, Zamfara, Sokoto, Niger, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, and Yobe states have 

implemented new Shariah criminal laws. Bauchi, Borno, and Jigawa states have adopted but 

have not yet implemented them. Kogi, Gombe, and Nassarawa states have announced that 

they intend to adopt Shariah criminal laws, while Plateau, Kwara and Ondo have rejected 

their adoption. Meanwhile, Kaduna state, the site of last spring’s sectarian violence, has 

announced a ‘modified form’ of Shariah, providing for concurrent jurisdiction of customary 

and Shariah courts (based on choice), devolution of powers to local governments to 
99 

 

determine the application of Shariah in their districts, and designation of areas that are 

exempt from prohibitions on the sale and distribution of alcohol. 

3

 Most of the existing Northern Nigerian Penal Code is based on Shariah but omits severe 

punishments such as amputation, stoning, and caning. Northern Muslims have campaigned 

to implement an expanded form of Shariah for Muslims since independence in 1960. 

4

 As of April 10, 2001, several Shariah-based sentences had been handed down in Zamfara 

state and include a hand amputation (for theft) and two cases of flogging (for fornication). In 

Fall 2000 a Sokoto man was convicted of theft and sentenced to have his hand amputated – a 

sentence that had not yet been carried out as of April 10, 2001.

5

 Africa News, “Zamfara Gets Alternative To Nigeria Police Force,” January 31, 2001. 

6

 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Article 277. 

7

 Interestingly, 14 year-old Bariya Magazu, who was caned in January 2001 in Zamfara state 

for fornication in apparent violation of a court-issued legal stay of execution, may have legal 

standing to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the new Shariah-based criminal law. 

8

 Unlike in the United States, the Nigerian government allows and provides for religious 

instruction in public schools. While courses in CRK and IRK are currently not compulsory 

at any level, states and schools may choose (and usually do) to provide either CRK or IRK 

(or, in some instances, both) in public schools. Teachers of IRK and CRK are employed and 

paid by the state; however, there are apparently no regulations or guidelines established by 

either state or federal officials for certifying or training religious instructors, or for regulating 

the curricula they choose. In January 2001, however, Nigerian lawmakers approved a 

proposal by the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) to make religious education, both 

Muslim and Christian, compulsory at the elementary and secondary school levels, and a 

Ministry of Education commission has been charged with developing a religious curriculum. 

9

 Given widespread illiteracy, radio is a particularly important medium in Nigeria. 

10 Relations between Muslims and Christians in the southwest (Yorubaland), where they are 

roughly evenly split, are reportedly generally amicable. 

11 Dr. Abdul Lateef Adegbite, “Overview of Religious Freedom in the Southern States of 

Nigeria,” Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (no date). 

12 Based on correspondence between USCIRF staff and the Nigerian Supreme Council for 

Islamic Affairs, January 2001. 

13 Kaduna’s Gov. Makarfi claims that he had convened a meeting of Kaduna’s religious 

leaders, both Muslim and Christian, and that they had arrived at a consensus to create a 

committee to investigate the issue. 
100 

 

14 Christian churches in Sokoto were attacked in March. However, there were no deaths and 

local Christians agreed that the motive was robbery, not religion. 
101 

VIII. PAKISTAN 

A. Introduction 

Although the government of Pakistan does not appear to be engaged in a systematic 

effort to persecute religious minorities, it is clearly not doing enough to adequately protect 

the religious freedom of all of its citizens. Members of the Ahmadi religious community are 

prevented by law from engaging in the full practice of their faith. Religious minority groups 

(including Christians, Ahmadis, and Hindus) complain that they are politically marginalized 

by a system of separate electorates, and that this system exacerbates other religious-freedom 

problems. The criminal laws against blasphemy are abused, resulting in detention of and 

sometimes violence against religious minorities as well as the targeting of numerous Muslims 

on account of their religious beliefs. Finally, there is a substantial amount of sectarian 

violence, largely targeting Shiite Muslims, committed by organized groups of religious 

extremists. 

General Pervaiz Musharraf, who took power in a military coup in October 1999, 

made some announcements early in his tenure that appeared to indicate that his government 

was going to begin to address some of these problems. Unfortunately, his government has, 

so far, failed to live up to many of the expectations that it had raised. Moreover, it has been 

criticized in Pakistan for capitulating to, and thus emboldening, political and other societal 

forces that advocate policies that are antagonistic to the protection of religious freedom for 

all Pakistanis and the equal citizenship of all religious communities. 

In September 2000, the Commission held a public hearing on religious freedom and 

U.S. policy in Pakistan at which it heard the testimony of witnesses from the region as well 

as academic experts and a former U.S. diplomat. In December, two members of the 

Commission’s staff visited Pakistan at the invitation of the Pakistani government. The 

Commission delegation held extensive meetings with Pakistani government officials, 

representatives of religious communities, religious political parties, and human rights nongovernmental organizations, legal advocates, religious scholars, journalists, humanitarian aid 

workers, and U.S. and other foreign diplomats in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Chenab 

Nagar (formerly known as Rabwah, the center of the Ahmadi community). The Commission 

extends its appreciation to the government of Pakistan as well as the U.S. diplomatic mission 

for their assistance in connection with this trip. In addition to these efforts, the Commission 

met with the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, and received private briefings from 

representatives of religious communities in Pakistan, academic and other experts, and State 

Department and other U.S. government officials. 

B. Religious Demography

The population of Pakistan is approximately 138 million. Official population 

statistics are based on the last completed census from 1981. A new census was conducted in 

1998, but, as of the date of this report, the government has not released the results as they 

relate to the religious composition of Pakistan’s population. Estimates place Muslims at 

approximately 97% of the population. Sunni Muslims predominate at 77%, while Shiite 

Muslims make up about 20% of the population. The Shia are concentrated in Karachi, 
102 

Lahore, and in the northwestern border zone with Afghanistan. According to the State 

Department, current estimates of the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan are between 3 and 4 

million. Christians and Hindus each constitute about 1.5 percent of the population. 

Christians, primarily belonging to the Church of Pakistan (Anglican/Presbyterian) and the 

Roman Catholic Church, are centered in Lahore but live throughout the country. Hindus are 

found primarily in Sindh province and in the vicinity of Quetta. There are small numbers of 

Buddhists, Parsis (Zoroastrians), Sikhs, and followers of traditional tribal religions. 

C. Ahmadis 

Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who founded a religious community 

in the late nineteenth century in what was then British India. Although Ahmadis consider 

themselves to be Muslim, some Muslims in Pakistan hold the opposite view because of the 

Ahmadis’ claim that their founder was a recipient of divine revelation and a prophet of God. 

This claim is believed by some Muslims to violate a basic Islamic tenet regarding the finality 

of the prophet Muhammad.1

 This religious difference has been used in the past by certain 

Pakistani governments to justify a number of legal restrictions on the Ahmadis’ practice of 

their faith. 

In 1974, during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime and after a number of days of debate 

in the National Assembly, a constitutional amendment was passed that declared Ahmadis to 

be non-Muslims for purposes of the Constitution and law. Beginning in 1984, a number of 

criminal provisions were promulgated that specifically targeted Ahmadis, essentially 

punishing any Ahmadi who “poses” as a Muslim.2

Because the religious practices of the Ahmadis apparently are essentially the same as 

those of most Sunni Muslims, these legal prohibitions have the effect of a far-reaching ban 

on the public practice of their faith. As these laws have been interpreted and applied, it is 

illegal for Ahmadis to call their places of worship "mosques," to worship in non-Ahmadi 

mosques or public prayer rooms (otherwise open to all Muslims), to perform the Muslim call 

to prayer, to publicly quote from the Quran, to wear on their person the medallion carrying 

the Kalima which states the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith, to preach in public, to seek 

converts, to use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, and to produce, publish, and 

disseminate religious materials. Ahmadis have reportedly been arrested for all of these acts. 

The Ahmadis report that since 1984, approximately 3,000 individuals, including their 

current religious leader who lives in London, have been charged under anti-Ahmadi laws 

and/or with blasphemy or other religious offenses. As of December 2000, 11 Ahmadis were 

reportedly being detained under such charges, while approximately 20 others have been 

charged but are not in detention. The major Ahmadi religious organization has not been able 

to hold an official meeting since 1974. Ahmadis also report that they are prevented from 

advancing to high posts in the government and the military, and that they are unable to obtain 

government scholarships to, or sometimes even admission into, colleges and universities. In 

addition, Pakistani Muslims who apply for a passport must declare that they consider the 

Ahmadi founder to be an “imposter” and that his followers are non-Muslims. This means that 

Ahmadis are unable to obtain a passport or to travel abroad without violating their 

conscience, i.e. declaring themselves to be non-Muslim.3
103 

In the Ahmadis’ view, the enforcement of criminal laws and other discriminatory 

measures against them is not primarily the result of a direct campaign of the current 

government or of widespread social enmity, but results from pressure by small groups of 

religious extremists on local government officials to initiate and prosecute cases against 

Ahmadis. However, the current government is criticized for not opposing the activities of 

these extremists or adequately supporting local officials in their efforts to resist such 

pressures. Recent incidents of violence against Ahmadis in October 2000 (discussed below) 

were attributed to the activities of these extremist groups, and to the atmosphere of 

intolerance that their activities – and the government’s acquiescence – had created. In 

addition, given the alleged endemic corruption in the Pakistani legal system, the threat of 

prosecution under the anti-Ahmadi laws, like the blasphemy and many other laws, can be 

used to settle personal disputes that have nothing to do with religion. 

D. The Separate Electorate System for Religious Minorities 

By an amendment adopted in 1985, the Constitution provides that a certain number of 

seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies are set aside for four categories of nonMuslims: Christians, Ahmadis, Hindus, and others (Parsis, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others). 

Religious minority Assembly members are elected on an at-large basis from voting rolls 

made up solely of members of their communities. Muslims (and no others) vote for Muslim 

Assembly members on a territorial basis.4

The representatives of Ahmadi, Christian, and Hindu religious communities that 

testified before the Commission and with whom the Commission delegation met in Pakistan 

were virtually unanimous in stating that this “separate electorate” system for religious 

minorities was the most significant problem that they faced, one that was at the root of many 

of their other religious-freedom problems, and thus eliminating the separate electorate was a 

necessary step in addressing those problems. Many asserted that this electoral system 

rendered religious minorities "second-class citizens" and placed them outside the mainstream 

of Pakistani political life; some termed it "religious apartheid." Moreover, it has the effect of 

completely disenfranchising the Ahmadis, as they reportedly do not participate at all in 

elections because they believe that to vote under the separate system is an explicit declaration 

that they are non-Muslims. 

Minority representatives consistently stated that they believed they would be better 

represented by Assembly members elected by the total voting population of a particular 

locality, even if the numerical strength of religious minorities prevented the direct election of 

Christian, Hindu, or Ahmadi legislators.5

 Under the separate electorate system, it is alleged 

that local Muslim legislators do not respond to the concerns of religious minorities in their 

districts, but would do so if they identified minorities as part of their constituency and had to 

rely on their votes. Also, religious minority representatives elected under the separate 

electorate are typically based in major urban centers, far away from the dynamics of local 

problems. Because many religious-freedom problems are asserted to be essentially local 

ones, such as the abusive enforcement of the blasphemy (see below) and anti-Ahmadi laws, 

and local intolerance, violence and discrimination, it is believed that having local 

representatives (regardless of their religion) who were responsive to local concerns would 

help prevent abuses and defuse tensions. Many minority representatives also believed that 
104 

moving to a joint electorate might help set in motion a long-term political process that would 

ultimately reduce the enforcement of discriminatory laws and incidents of religious 

intolerance and violent extremism. 

One measure of the strength of the dissatisfaction of religious minorities with the 

separate electorate system is their conscious boycott of the recent phase of local elections 

held in December 2000. Notwithstanding what is alleged to be a promise made by General 

Musharraf to representatives of religious minorities to hold local elections with a joint 

electorate, the first round of elections for local governing councils employed a scheme of 

representation based on separate electorates. Acknowledging that minority communities had 

generally boycotted the local elections in protest against the separate electorate system, 

federal Minister for Local Government and Rural Development Omer Asghar Khan has 

reportedly asked the government and policymaking institutions to give serious consideration 

to introducing the joint electorate system in general elections.6

 

E. Abuses of the Blasphemy Laws 

There appears to be widespread agreement among government officials, legal 

advocates, and leaders of many religious communities in Pakistan that the criminal 

provisions against blasphemy are being abused. The Pakistani Penal Code contains 

provisions dating from the British colonial period that punish words and acts intended to be 

injurious to religious feelings (of followers of any religion). During military rule under Zia 

ul-Haq, provisions were added that penalize defamation of the Prophet Muhammad 

(punishable by death), persons associated with the Prophet, and the Quran.7

Those who testified before the Commission and with whom the Commission 

delegation met in Pakistan describe the nature of these abuses in the following way. To 

initiate a blasphemy case, any person can file a First Information Report (FIR) at the local 

police station. By doing so in a public way, a crowd of angry persons can be assembled and 

the police will take the accused into custody, ostensibly (and at times sensibly) for his or her 

own safety. Once local feelings have been aroused, local officials are reluctant to release the 

accused before trial. The instigators of such charges (alleged to be almost always false) are 

reported to fall into three categories: (1) those who have a personal dispute with the accused 

that is unrelated to religion (but the blasphemy law is a convenient way to attack them); (2) 

representatives of small but active organizations characterized as "fundamentalists" and 

"extremists" that operate throughout the country that target "deviant" Muslims, Ahmadis, 

Christians, and other religious minorities for prosecution; and (3) local Muslim religious 

leaders who are either ideologically or organizationally aligned with or sympathetic to the 

aforementioned groups. 

Numerous Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims have been charged under the 

blasphemy laws. There has reportedly been an increase in recent years in abuses of the 

blasphemy laws against Muslim religious targets, including Sufis and Muslim religious 

scholars.8

 Blasphemy cases continue to be filed under the Musharraf government, and the 

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports that a total of 38 blasphemy cases were filed 

in the first 10 months of 2000 against 40 Ahmadis, 26 Muslims, and six Christians. 
105 

Many of those charged with blasphemy are eventually acquitted at trial (but only after 

serving long detentions), or cleared on appeal to the High Court.9 However, the judicial 

process typically takes years. Courts have handed down sentences ranging from two years 

imprisonment to death for blasphemy law violations. The appeal of the one person who has 

been sentenced to death, a Christian, has been pending since 1996. In 1998, a Shiite Muslim 

convicted of blasphemy was given the death sentence. His case is still pending. Moreover, 

there have been several well-publicized cases of mob and terrorist violence (sometimes fatal) 

against those accused of blasphemy (including those in police custody), and some accused 

have reportedly fled the country on account of harassment and threats. 

Many of those with whom the Commission consulted believed that abuses of the 

blasphemy law could be mitigated with a change in the procedure for registering, 

investigating, and prosecuting cases. Many believed that the proposal announced by General 

Musharraf in April 2000 to require an investigation and approval by the local Deputy 

Commissioner prior to allowing the filing of an FIR (and taking the accused into custody) 

would have been effective in curbing at least some of the abuses.10 Others believed that the 

decision to move forward with a blasphemy arrest should rest with a central authority in 

Islamabad, because, as a local official, the Deputy Commissioner would still be subject to 

local pressures. Nevertheless, the government’s reform proposal was withdrawn soon after it 

was announced, reportedly as a result of pressure from some Muslim religious groups. An 

additional meaningful reform that was suggested to the Commission was that the most 

commonly-used blasphemy provision (i.e. Pakistan Penal Code sec. 295-A) should be 

removed from the list of crimes that are tried by the special anti-terrorist courts, where the 

accused has fewer procedural protections, and more restricted rights to appeal, than in normal 

criminal courts.11

F. Religious Violence 

There are dozens of cases each year of deadly violence between Sunni and Shiite 

Muslims.12 In many cases, prominent Shiite figures (both political and religious) are targeted. 

On numerous occasions, multiple killings (including of children) have taken place at Shiite 

mosques during religious services. According to Shiite and Sunni political leaders, as well as 

government officials, this violence is not the result of societal intolerance between these 

religious communities, but is organized and carried out by a small group of extremists on 

both sides of the sectarian divide. Pakistanis, including government officials, with whom the 

Commission met blamed a variety of outside instigators, including the Taliban in 

Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and India, for supporting 

extremist activities.13

Although this situation is a very complex one, there is reportedly a religious 

component to the violence, in that a small minority of Sunni Muslim religious leaders 

preaches that the Shia are heretics and justifies violence against them in religious terms. 

However, others consider the violence to be primarily political or criminal in nature, as there 

are high levels of both types of violence in Pakistan. According to one Shiite leader with 

whom the Commission delegation met, the government was not cracking down hard enough 

on terrorist activities targeting Shia; the authorities have not made sufficient arrests nor was 

capital punishment carried out against those who were arrested. 
106 

Pakistan has a large number of Islamic religious schools that play an important role in 

the country’s educational system. There have been reports that a very small percentage of 

these schools provide weapons training and thus contribute to religious violence. A scholar 

who testified before the Commission and who has studied Islamic religious schools has 

concluded that some of these schools run by particular religious groups provide ideological 

training and motivation to those who go on to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and take 

part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan as described above. The 

government has been criticized in Pakistan for not taking steps to disarm these schools and to 

put a stop to their involvement in acts of violence. 

In September and October 2000, there were two instances of deadly violence against 

Ahmadis. In both instances, Ahmadi groups were attacked at prayer and a total of 10 people 

were killed. In one case, the perpetrator was a local person who had a history of harassing 

Ahmadis – a possibly deranged individual who was known to, but not restrained by, the local 

authorities. He was reported to have incited an angry group of local people who 

subsequently destroyed the Ahmadi mosque. In the second case, the attack was carried out 

by a group of men unknown to the local community. Arrests have been made in at least one 

case. 

G. Commission Recommendations 

1. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to sign 

and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

2. The U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Pakistani 

government should take the position that the separate electorate system 

for religious minorities is inconsistent with democratic principles, the 

right to equal citizenship, and the protection of political rights without 

discrimination on the basis of religion as provided in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights. 

Pakistan is almost unique in its system of separate electorates for religious minorities. 

The only other country that the Commission is aware of that employs separate electorates on 

the basis of religion is Iran. Members of religious minorities and others in Pakistan told the 

Commission they believe that this system renders them second-class citizens, which 

contradicts the promise made by the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that 

persons of all faiths were equal citizens of the country. In addition, they consider it to be 

discriminatory and detrimental to the protection of religious freedom. Moreover, the system 

violates the internationally recognized political rights of both religious minorities and 

Muslims. 

Because the separate electorate system as regards to Provincial and National 

Assemblies is a constitutional issue, only the National Assembly should make changes to it. 

Thus, the current military government should not be encouraged to make such changes 

unilaterally. Nevertheless, the U.S. government should take the position that a transition to 

democratic rule in Pakistan will not be considered by the United States to be complete unless 
107 

and until all Pakistanis have equal political rights regardless of their religion, i.e. elections 

are held by universal and equal suffrage. In addition, the U.S. government should urge the 

Pakistani government to allow local elections to go forward on the basis of a joint electorate 

including religious minorities. In the event that this change is not made, the State 

Department should monitor closely the participation of religious minorities in the ongoing 

local elections that are scheduled to run until mid-2001. 

3. The U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Pakistani 

government should take the position that the existence and enforcement 

of laws targeting Ahmadis that effectively criminalize the public practice 

of their faith violates the right to freedom of religion guaranteed in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights. The State Department should closely 

monitor the application and enforcement of laws targeting Ahmadis. The 

U.S. government should also urge the Pakistani government to effectively 

prevent discrimination against Ahmadis in government and military 

employment, and education. 

As described in detail above, laws targeting Ahmadis in effect criminalize the public 

practice of their faith. The existence and enforcement of these laws is a denial of religious 

freedom. Government officials that the Commission delegation met with in Pakistan 

expressed the view that the Ahmadis were free to practice their faith, as long as they did not 

claim to be Muslims. Without regard to the veracity of that view, such a condition is not 

consistent with the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief. Few question that Ahmadis 

sincerely consider themselves to be Muslim. When individuals sincerely refuse, as a matter 

of conscience, to accept a government determination of the character of their faith, it is a 

violation of religious freedom to expose those individuals to criminal penalties or to withhold 

important government benefits (such as a passport) from them. The U.S. government should 

express this concern to the Pakistani government and, in that connection, closely monitor the 

application and enforcement of laws targeting Ahmadis. In addition, regardless of the 

Ahmadis’ status as Muslims or non-Muslims as far as the Constitution of Pakistan is 

concerned, or that community’s acceptance of that decision, there can be no legitimate 

justification for the official discrimination to which they are reportedly subject. The U.S. 

government should therefore urge the Pakistani government to take effective steps to prevent 

discrimination against Ahmadis. 

4. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to 

implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce 

and aim at ultimately eliminating their abuse. The State Department 

should monitor the application and enforcement of the blasphemy laws. 

Abuse of the blasphemy laws is a problem that successive Pakistani governments 

have identified as such, but have yet to address in an effective manner.14 As a result of this 

failure, Muslims (particularly non-Sunni Muslims), Christians, Ahmadis, and others have 

been charged as criminals, tried in special anti-terrorist courts, and punished for the public 

expression of their religious beliefs and because of their religious identity. In addition, 

private citizens are using the Pakistani legal system as a weapon of intolerance and 
108 

discrimination, and to settle personal disputes – a problem not limited to the blasphemy laws. 

The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to take effective steps to 

reduce abuses of the blasphemy laws, including procedural reforms that will limit, and 

eventually eliminate, those abuses. In order to draw the attention of the Pakistani 

government to particular instances or patterns of abuse, the State Department should continue 

to actively monitor the application and enforcement of the blasphemy laws. Some 

representatives of religious minorities in Pakistan have expressed the view that public, 

international attention given to individual blasphemy cases can be counter-productive and 

potentially lead to violence. The State Department should take this concern into 

consideration in choosing the most effective way to advocate with the Pakistani government 

on this issue. 

5. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to take 

effective steps to prevent sectarian violence and punish its perpetrators, 

including disarming militant groups and any religious schools that 

provide weapons training. The U.S. government should also urge the 

Pakistani government to establish and support mechanisms of interfaith 

dialogue that encompass all religious communities in Pakistan, and 

facilitate widespread dissemination of the work and findings of this 

dialogue. 

Religious extremism is acknowledged as a serious problem in many sectors of 

Pakistani society. Dozens of Muslims die every year in inter- and intra-sectarian violence. 

The Pakistani government appears to have taken some steps to address the problem, 

including a recent announcement regarding its intention to disarm militant groups. While the 

Musharraf government has paid some attention to this problem, it has also been criticized for 

not doing enough to prevent sectarian violence, punish its perpetrators, and disarm religious 

militants. Some have charged that the government has supported, or at least turned a blind 

eye toward, religious militants because such groups provide fighters that implement 

government foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and Afghanistan. 

The Pakistani government should be urged to do all that it can – consistent with the 

freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association – to prevent sectarian violence 

and to punish the perpetrators of that violence. The United States should encourage these 

efforts. 

6. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to 

complete the denationalization of Christian schools and colleges in 

Punjab province. 

In 1972, the government nationalized without compensation a number of private 

educational institutions in Sindh and Punjab provinces, including all private Christian schools 

and colleges. Although all of the schools in Sindh apparently have been returned, the 

progress of denationalization in the Punjab has been very slow. In 2000, there were more 

than 40 Christian schools still under government control.15 Moreover, in some cases the 

government has reportedly demanded extensive prepayment of teachers’ salaries before they 
109 

will return the schools. The U.S. government should urge the Pakistani government to 

expeditiously return nationalized Christian schools and colleges in the Punjab to their former 

owners. 

7. The U.S. government should, through its own foreign assistance and 

in conjunction with other donors, support the following in Pakistan: 

7.1. teacher training and other educational programs in religious 

tolerance; 

7.2. non-governmental organizations engaged in legal advocacy to 

protect the right to freedom of religion, in particular defense of 

persons charged under the blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws; 

7.3. judicial reform and law-enforcement training; 

7.4. improvements in the public education system in order to 

promote the availability and quality of education for all 

Pakistanis. 

U.S. government assistance to Pakistan is quite limited, in part due to the sanctions 

imposed following the 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests. Current U.S. assistance is primarily in 

the form of aid to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Pakistan working in the fields 

of health and education, with a goal toward building the capacity of those NGOs. This NGO 

initiative, which has been providing about $3 million in aid annually since 1994, is scheduled 

to wind down in 2002. Recently, the State Department has been authorized by Congress to 

provide government-to-government assistance for education. According to USAID, aid 

assessments are currently being made in the areas of education and democratic political 

development. 

Although U.S. assistance to Pakistan is modest, some part of it should be employed to 

help Pakistanis develop their own solutions to religious-freedom problems. The U.S. can 

also coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral donors to address these issues. Most 

directly, U.S. aid in the area of education should include support for programs designed to 

promote religious tolerance, conflict resolution, and greater awareness and understanding 

among religious communities. In addition, in terms of capacity building, the United States 

should support NGOs in Pakistan engaged in legal advocacy to protect the right to freedom 

of religion. Where open support by the United States might expose such NGOs to criticism 

or harassment by others opposed to their missions, appropriate intermediaries should be 

found. These organizations play an important role in the protection of religious freedom in 

Pakistan, particularly because so many religious-freedom problems there are legal in nature 

and many victims of legal abuses apparently cannot afford adequate representation. In 

addition, legal advocates are not always willing to defend those charged under the blasphemy 

and anti-Ahmadi laws because they reportedly fear being stigmatized or harassed for doing 

so. 

More generally, many religious-freedom violations in Pakistan stem from abuses of 

law enforcement in the Pakistani legal system and the failure of that system to protect 
110 

fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of religion, in a timely manner. Thus, 

improvements in the transparency, accountability, ethics, and independence of law 

enforcement and the judicial system will have significant derivative benefits to the protection 

of religious freedom. The United States should devote some of its assistance and expertise to 

this area. 

Furthermore, the Pakistani public education system is by all accounts in a deplorable 

state. The 1998 census put the total illiteracy rate at 45 percent; for adults it is below 33 

percent. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports that primary school 

participation in Punjab is only 38 percent. Most of the Commission’s interlocutors in 

Pakistan strongly suggested that tolerance and the protection of religious freedom in Pakistan 

would be promoted in the long term by increasing the capacity and quality of education for 

all Pakistanis. 

Finally, U.S. foreign assistance in all areas should not contribute to religious tensions 

in Pakistan, and all programs should be carefully reviewed to determine if cooperation 

among different religious communities could be integrated into such programs. Moreover, 

the United States should not support through its democracy and governance programs local 

elections in Pakistan that are conducted on the basis of separate electorates. 

 

1

 There are two separate groups of Ahmadis: the Qadiani group (Qadian, in India, was the 

place where Ahmadis were concentrated before partition) and the Lahori group. The 

Qadianis believe that the founder of the movement was essentially a prophet of God. The 

Qadianis are by far the larger of the two groups, and they have adherents all over the world. 

Their spiritual leader is currently in London. The Lahori group, smaller in number and 

generally living in the area around Lahore, do not consider the founder of the Ahmadis to be 

a “prophet (nabi)” as such, but a “reformer (mujaddid).” Despite this distinction, the Lahori 

group is subject to the same legal restraints as the Qadianis and they report the same 

problems. 

2

 In 1984, Sections 298-B and 298-C were added to the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 298-B 

prohibits Ahmadis from using certain descriptions and titles that are references reserved to 

the Prophet Muhammad in either spoken or written form, with any other person. It also 

prohibits Ahmadis from calling their place of worship masjid or their call to prayer an azan. 

Section 298-C prohibits Ahmadis “ from calling themselves Muslims or posing as Muslims; 

from referring to their faith as Islam; from preaching or propagating their faith; from inviting 

others to their fold and from insulting the religious feelings of Muslims.” 

3

 One of the declarations on the passport application in the case of Muslims reads: “I consider 

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani to be an imposter nabi [i.e. prophet] and also consider his 

followers whether belonging to the Lahori or Quadiani group to be non-Muslim.” 

4

 Following the military takeover in October 1999, the National and Provincial Assemblies 

were dissolved. Although the Pakistan Supreme Court has determined that National 

Assembly elections must be held by October 2002, Chief Executive Musharraf recently 
111 

 

affirmed that elections for the National Assembly would be held before this deadline. No 

date has been set for Provincial Assembly elections. Elections for local councils from village 

to district levels are due to be concluded by mid-2001. 

5

 Some in Pakistan argue that if the joint electorate fails to produce adequate representation 

for religious minorities, additional Assembly members can be selected or appointed; 

however, in their view, the principle of the joint electorate should not be sacrificed to achieve 

this result. 

6 The Dawn, January 2, 2001. As a result of the “conscious boycott” of minorities in Pakistan 

all the non-Muslims who filed their nominations for the contest were returned unopposed in 

16 to 18 districts. The number of those returning to these councils without contest is 383 in 

the Punjab, 96 in Sindh, 31 in (NWFP) North West Frontier Province and three in 

Baluchistan Provinces. The total number of seats in these provinces is 550, 205, 135, and 67, 

respectively. Electronic correspondence from Father James Channan, Lahore. 

7

Offenses in the Pakistan Penal Code touching on blasphemy include performing acts or 

uttering words intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings of others (secs. 295-A and 

298); blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad (sec. 295-C); defiling a copy of the Quran 

(sec.295-B); and making derogatory statements concerning other Muslim holy personages 

(298-A). 

8

 Sufi figures arrested under the blasphemy laws include Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf Ali and 

Ahmed Gohar Shahi. Shaykh Yusuf Ali was convicted of defiling the name of Prophet 

Muhammad. In January 2001, the Supreme Court of Pakistan refused on technical grounds 

to hear his bail petition. Ahmed Gohar Shahi is the leader of a Sufi sect called Anjuman 

Sarfrosh-e-Islam. He was convicted in absentia because in one of his publications he claims 

that his face appeared on the Kaaba of Mecca. Gohar Shahi fled to England, allegedly 

because of the blasphemy accusation against him. Several of his followers are currently in 

jail for or charged with blasphemy law violations. Dr. Yunus Shaykh, an Islamic scholar was 

arrested in October 2000 because of statements he made about the Prophet Muhammad and 

his early wives. Pakistani government officials with whom the Commission delegation met 

cited Dr. Shaykh’s case as an example of abuse of the blasphemy laws. 

9

 On January 25, 2001, a Pakistani High Court acquitted three Christians of blasphemy 

charges. They had been in detention since 1998. 

10 Some hoped that if effective procedural reforms were implemented, enforcement attempts 

would dwindle and the laws would fall into disuse, as they have in certain European 

countries that still have blasphemy laws on the books. 

11 In its meeting with the minister for Religious Affairs, the Commission delegation was told 

that the official Council on Islamic Ideology was considering a proposal to amend the 

blasphemy laws to include a specific punishment for intentionally filing false charges 

because filing such charges is contrary to the injunction of Islam. Apparently, there is 

already a similar provision that applies to all offenses in the Penal Code. This existing 
112 

 

provision has reportedly not helped to reduce the types of abuses described above. 

12 In 1997, the toll for inter-sectarian killings was the highest for several years. One hundred 

sixty-five people were killed that year, 95 Shias and 70 Sunnis. In 1998, the total number of 

those killed in sectarian violence was around 150. In 1999, in addition to inter-sectarian 

conflicts between Sunni and Shias, intra-Sunni conflicts flared up between rival political 

factions. Up to 100 were killed that year. Data from the Human Rights Commission of 

Pakistan’s State of Human Rights in 1997, 1998, 1999. 

13 The Commission has no evidence to support such accusations. 

14 The Dawn, 14 January 2001. 

15 National Commission for Justice & Peace, Communal Violence and Human Rights 

Violations (With special reference to rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan, causes of its 

dominance and the churches’ response) (2000). 
113 

IX. RUSSIA 

A. Introduction 

The future of religious freedom in Russia remains uncertain at a critical moment in 

that nation’s history. The Russian federal government has yet to articulate a policy regarding 

the situation created by its decision not to extend once again the deadline for registration 

under a 1997 law that required religious organizations to register in order to operate as legal 

entities. Thus, some 1,500 unregistered religious organizations are subject to “liquidation” 

by the state. In addition, the government of President Vladimir I. Putin has yet to establish 

an effective way to ensure that local and regional laws, policies, and practices do not abridge 

religious freedom. 

The Putin government appears to be committed to the principle of religious freedom, 

and, like the government of Boris Yeltsin before it, has taken several steps to mitigate 

religious-freedom violations. Moreover, the Russian courts, led by the Russian 

Constitutional Court, have in some cases protected the right to religious freedom and 

provided remedies for the violation of that right, at times overturning local decisions and 

ameliorating some of the worst features of the 1997 law. Nevertheless, it is uncertain how 

vigorous the Putin government will be in dealing with Russia’s many religious-freedom 

problems. 

It also remains uncertain how the Putin government will respond over time to U.S. 

government concerns and pressure on religious-freedom issues. The U.S. government has 

been monitoring and has engaged the Russian government on religious-freedom concerns. 

The Commission believes that the United States should continue its efforts to monitor, 

engage at the highest levels, and provide assistance where useful to promote religious 

freedom in Russia. 

The Commission has monitored religious-freedom developments in Russia since its 

May 2000 Annual Report, consulting with representatives of several religious communities 

in Russia, human rights organizations, academic experts, and U.S. officials. Following the 

release of the Commission’s report, several Commissioners met with the Russian ambassador 

to the United States to discuss religious-freedom conditions in Russia. The Commission 

hopes that the international attention it helped to bring to the conditions of religious freedom 

in Russia will continue to have a positive effect on the policies of the Russian government. 

B. Religious Freedom 

The protection of the right to freedom of religion took a significant step backward in 

1997 when Russia enacted a federal law (the 1997 Religion Law) that replaced legislation 

adopted in 1990 that provided broad protections for the exercise of the right to freedom of 

religion and for the equality of religious communities. The 1997 Religion Law created a 

hierarchy of religious organizations and effectively restricted the rights, powers, and 

privileges of smaller, newer, and foreign religious communities. It also established an 

onerous and intrusive registration process and other mechanisms of state interference with 

the activities of religious organizations. As noted above, the negative impact of the 1997 
114 

Religion Law appears, thus far, to have been mitigated to some extent by the Russian federal 

authorities and by decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court. 

In March 2000, the 1997 Religion Law was amended to extend the registration 

deadline for religious organizations until December 31, 2000. The amendment provided that 

unregistered groups be “liquidated” after that date. In its May 2000 Annual Report, the 

Commission expressed concern that the expiration of the deadline would leave organizations 

that had not been able to register subject to arbitrary and discriminatory liquidation by the 

state. The Commission also noted that regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion 

Law reportedly had prevented the registration of some unpopular religious communities. A 

recent example of this problem is the refusal of local Moscow officials to register that city’s 

branch of the Salvation Army, apparently on the bizarre grounds that it is a paramilitary and 

potentially subversive organization, and notwithstanding the fact that local branches had been 

registered in a number of other Russian cities, including St. Petersburg. Despite diplomatic 

efforts by the United States, the registration deadline was not extended.1

According to the State Department and a report by Keston News Service, Russian 

Ministry of Justice officials have stated that approximately 10 percent of those religious 

organizations registered before the adoption of the 1997 Religion Law (between 1,500-2,000 

organizations), had not been re-registered.2

 As this report went to print, however, there were 

no detailed statistics regarding which organizations had failed to re-register.3

 

A segment of those organizations that have not been re-registered are reportedly no 

longer in existence or operation. Also included in this group, however, are organizations that 

have been denied registration for allegedly invidious or discriminatory reasons. In addition, 

there are several reports that religious organizations were unable to re-register for financial 

reasons, because of bureaucratic difficulties, or because they were not sufficiently aware of 

the requirement or process of re-registration.4 Furthermore, several religious bodies have 

apparently refused to register under the 1997 Religion Law because of the bureaucratic 

difficulties and interference that they perceive to come along with official registration or, in 

some cases, as a matter of conscience.5 

It is still unclear what the policy of the Russian central government will be with 

regard to the liquidation of unregistered religious organizations. This apparently leaves 

regional and local officials without guidance or accountability as to how to deal with such 

organizations and their legal status and rights. However, there are reports that the central 

Ministry of Justice has instructed local officials to continue to process re-registrations for 

those organizations that had filed applications, but did not complete registration, before the 

deadline’s expiration. 

Other religious-freedom problems exist in Russia both in addition to and as a 

consequence of the 1997 Religion Law and its registration process. The problems vary in 

intensity from region to region, but most appear to relate to local government officials’ 

treatment of religious communities that are, or are perceived to be, new, foreign-influenced, 

or non-Russian – such as Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ 

of Latter-day Saints, certain Pentecostals, and other Protestant groups. Even so, “traditional” 

religious communities such as Buddhists, Jews, and Muslims also experience problems, 
115 

particularly where they constitute a small minority of the local population. Disturbingly, one 

area where numerous problems have occurred is the city of Moscow. 

Local officials have harassed and interfered with the activities of religious 

communities, preventing them from constructing, renovating, or renting suitable places for 

worship; distributing religious publications; and conducting religious education.6 Protestant, 

Catholic, and Muslim indigenous believers and foreign missionaries have been harassed by 

security officials, denied re-entry visas, and even expelled, for propagating their faith.7 

Regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion Law have denied registration and sought 

the liquidation of unpopular religious communities – including Baptists, Buddhists, 

Catholics, Charismatic Christians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Jews, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, and Orthodox groups not associated 

with the Moscow Patriarchate – in some cases using panels of “experts” to examine the 

beliefs and activities of the targeted group. In addition, one-third of Russia’s constituent 

regions have enacted legal regulations on religious activities that are more restrictive and 

discriminatory than the 1997 Religion Law and that the federal government believes may 

violate the Russian Constitution.8 The central government has yet to develop an effective 

method of disciplining local officials or bringing regional or local laws into line with federal 

law and the Russian Constitution. 

There have been several violent attacks targeting religious minorities in the last year. 

In March 2001, several armed men attacked the Pentecostal Church of Lipetsk, one of the 

oldest churches of the Russian Pentecostal Union. The police reportedly arrived 

approximately 12 hours after the attack. Reports speculate that the attack was provoked by 

media publications targeting the Pentecostals of Russia, as well as heightened intolerance 

provoked by the labeling of Pentecostals as a “totalitarian sect.”9

 In August and September 

2000, there were attacks on a Jewish Sunday School in Ryazan and on gatherings of the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Volgograd.10 

Anti-Semitic acts continue, as does anti-Muslim activity, and, according to the State 

Department, the Russian federal government has taken “only limited steps” to advance its 

promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism.11 

The Jehovah’s Witnesses have re-registered 97 percent of their organizations.12 

However, officials in two regions in Russia – Moscow and Kabardino-Balkaria – have not reregistered Jehovah’s Witness organizations within their jurisdiction. The local Department 

of Justice in Moscow continues to refuse to re-register the local Jehovah’s Witness group, 

despite a February 2001 Municipal Court decision that denied the local prosecutor’s request 

to liquidate that group.13 In the Kabardino-Balkaria region, two cases are pending. First, the 

prosecutor in the city of Prokhladny has filed a motion to liquidate the local community of 

Jehovah’s Witnesses. Second, in Maysky, where the Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been 

registered as a legal entity, the local prosecutor has brought a legal action to ban their 

activities.14

The Roman Catholic Church has completed its legal registration since the passage of 

the 1997 Russia Religion Law, including a September 2000 full and independent registration 

for the Jesuit community.15 However, the Catholic Church had experienced difficulties in 

legally registering the dioceses of Southern Russia and Eastern Siberia, since the bishops of 
116 

those dioceses – Most Rev. Klemens Pickel (Apostolic Administrator of Catholics in 

European Russia) and Most Rev. Jerry Mazur (Apostolic Administrator of Eastern Siberia) – 

are not legally Russian citizens and have been allegedly denied citizenship arbitrarily.16 In 

February 2001, Father Stanislaw Opiela, a Polish Jesuit priest who is the secretary of the 

Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Russia, was refused a Russian entry visa for the third time 

in six months.17 Additionally, the paralysis of property-restitution claims contributes to the 

cost of establishing new parishes and renting space. In March 2001, the Russian Duma had 

its Committee for International Affairs ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for information 

regarding measures taken to “prevent the spread of Catholicism” in Russia and other 

Orthodox states.18 

There are allegations that the Putin government is attempting to influence the 

selection of Jewish community leaders and is promoting divisions in the Jewish community, 

as it apparently has become involved in the struggle between two rival claimants to the post 

of chief rabbi of Russia: Adolf Shayevich (of the Russian Jewish Congress) and Berl Lazar 

(of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia). Putin has allegedly thrown his support 

behind Lazar in opposition to Shayevich; the latter is reportedly aligned with the media 

tycoon Vladimir Gusinky (who has himself experienced legal difficulties with the Putin 

government).19 In March 2001, Putin reportedly signed a decree that changed the 

composition of his advisory council on religious organizations to include Lazar and omit 

Shayevich.20 

In February 2001, the Justice Ministry of the Russian Federation registered the 

Salvation Army at the national level as a centralized religious organization (CRO). 

However, the local authorities in Moscow have refused to register that city’s branch of the 

Salvation Army, and a local court has upheld this refusal. According to a high-level federal 

Ministry of Justice official, the legal struggle to register the Moscow branch is apparently not 

affected by registration as a CRO at the national level.21 The Salvation Army has local 

religious organizations registered in five Russian cities; nine unregistered branches, however, 

including Moscow, have been threatened with liquidation.22

Muslims in Russia continue to encounter religious-freedom problems, including 

difficulties in building mosques, recovering confiscated religious property, and ministering to 

Muslim members of the armed forces, as well as allegations of religious stereotyping in the 

official media.23 

There continue to be allegations that a close relationship between the Russian 

Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (“ROC”) and state officials – particularly on the 

regional and local levels – has resulted in preferential treatment for the ROC in connection 

with public funding for building and renovating churches and official discrimination against 

other religious communities in the areas of registration, property disputes (especially those 

involving property claims by other Orthodox Churches such as the Old Believers), and 

interference with missionary activity and public religious gatherings of non-Orthodox 

groups.

24 According to the State Department, the ROC has “special arrangements with 

government agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual counseling to 

members of the armed forces” that have not been made available to other religious 

communities.25 In October 2000, the Russian Interior Minister reportedly called for closer 
117 

cooperation between his ministry and “the clergy” in order to “prevent the further spread in 

Russia of religious sects whose aim is undermining Russian statehood.” The “clergy” in this 

statement was generally interpreted to mean ROC clergy.26 

C. Commission Recommendations 

The U.S. government should continue to monitor religious-freedom issues closely and 

carefully and to raise them forcefully with the Russian government at the highest levels. U.S. 

efforts appear to have had a positive impact on the situation in the past. Moreover, the 

responsiveness of the Putin government to U.S. concerns regarding religious freedom is an 

important indicator of the Russian government’s commitment to uphold its international 

human rights obligations. The U.S. government should pay particular attention to the 

Russian government’s handling of: 

-- unregistered religious organizations; 

-- discriminatory laws, policies, and practices at the local and provincial level; 

-- anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and other extremist activities targeting religious 

minorities; 

-- visa, residence, and citizenship decisions regarding foreign missionaries and other 

religious workers; 

-- internal disputes of religious communities; and 

-- demands for a closer cooperation between any arm of the state and the Russian 

Orthodox Church that would result in preferential treatment for the Russian Orthodox 

Church or official discrimination against other religious communities. 

In its May 2000 Annual Report, the Commission made several recommendations as 

to how the U.S. government could promote religious freedom in Russia. Several of these 

recommendations concerned the importance of the U.S. government in (1) monitoring 

religious-freedom conditions in Russia, and (2) urging the Russian government to take 

effective steps to protect religious freedom.27 In light of the current conditions in Russia, the 

Commission believes that all of its recommendations from May 2000 would still contribute 

to the promotion of religious freedom there, and therefore reaffirms them. Indeed, in some 

cases, the need for the recommended action is even more compelling as a result of the 

expiration of the registration deadline. 

Beginning in 1997, successive foreign operations appropriation acts have included a 

provision that prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to the Russian government unless the U.S. 

President certifies that it has implemented no law that discriminates against religious groups 

in Russia in violation of international human rights agreements to which Russia is a party.28 

The Commission recommended last year that this provision (formerly known as the “Smith 

Amendment” after its original author, Sen. Gordon Smith) be reenacted until it was clear that 

the Russian government would work to ensure that Russian laws did not discriminate on the 

basis of religion.29 The Commission continues to believe that the Smith Amendment is an 
118 

effective tool for promoting religious freedom in Russia. In the aftermath of the expiration of 

the registration deadline and because the Putin government’s policy on the liquidation of 

unregistered groups has yet to emerge, this provision sends a strong signal that the United 

States attaches substantial importance to the Russian government’s commitment to apply its 

laws consistent with its international obligations. The Commission recommends that in 

weighing whether to make the certification required under that law, the President should use 

the factors listed above. 

In 2000, the Commission also recommended a number of positive steps that the U.S. 

government could take to promote religious freedom in Russia, including supporting 

programs by Russians aimed at preventing religious intolerance and discrimination and 

promoting exchanges between U.S. and Russian religious leaders, as well as judges, lawyers, 

and legal-rights organizations.30 These programs continue to be needed. In particular, the 

Commission recommended last year that the U.S. government support the activities of 

Russian public-interest organizations that defend the right to freedom of religion or belief in 

Russian courts.31 Given the expiration of the registration deadline and the consequent threat 

of legal action against religious organizations, as well as the effectiveness in some cases of 

the Russian judicial system in protecting religious freedom, such programs are especially 

important now. 

Noting that religion appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict in the 

Caucasus, the Commission recommended in May 2000 that the U.S. government should 

make the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high priority issue in its 

bilateral relations with Russia.32 In August 2000, the State Department announced that it was 

contributing $2.6 million to assist the more than 250,000 people displaced by the conflict in 

Chechnya, and also called on the Russian government to implement a resolution of the UN 

Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) regarding Chechnya, calling for the establishment 

of a broad-based, independent commission of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights 

violations and breaches of international humanitarian law.33 According to the State 

Department, the Russian government has not complied with the provisions of this UNCHR 

resolution.34 Therefore, the Commission reiterates its recommendation of last year regarding 

Chechnya and supports the actions noted above that the State Department has taken. 

 

1

 Late in 2000, Oleg Mironov, the official Russian human rights ombudsman who in 1999 

determined that several of the provisions of the 1997 Religion Law violated international 

human rights standards, urged President Putin to extend the registration deadline to 

December 31, 2003. See NTV/Radiotserkov, “Plenipotentiary For Human Rights Advocates 

Extension For Re-registration of Religious Organizations,” December 20, 2000, and 

“Religious Deadline,” The Moscow Times, December 21, 2000 

(http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0012d.html, accessed March 30, 2001). 

2

 Viktor Korolyov, head of the department for re-registration of religious organizations, cited 

in Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Re-registration Figures for Religious Organizations,” Keston 

News Service, April 2, 2001. Korolyov stressed, “however, that no one was rushing to 

liquidate them, but that this would take place ‘in accordance with the law’.” 
119 

 

3

 A high-level official in the Russian Ministry of Justice has released the following 

information on the numbers of religious organizations, by denomination, that were registered 

prior to 1997 and have successfully re-registered by the December 31, 2000 deadline: 

Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (10,912), Islamic (3,048), Pentecostal 

(1,323), Evangelical Christian-Baptist (975), Evangelical Christian (612), Adventist (563), 

Jehovah’s Witnesses (330), Old Believers (278), Roman Catholic (258), Lutheran (213), 

Jewish (197), Buddhist (193), Presbyterian (192), non-denominational Christian (156), Hare 

Krishna (106), Methodist (85), True Orthodox Church (65), Full Gospel Church (62), 

Evangelical Christians in the Spirit of the Apostles (54), Pagan (41), Church of Jesus Christ 

of Latter-day Saints (33), Church of the Sovereign Mother of God (28), Baha’i (19), 

Unification Church (17), Church of the Last Testament (15). See Viktor Korolyov, head of 

the department for re-registration of religious organizations, cited in Geraldine Fagan, 

“Russia: Re-registration Figures for Religious Organizations,” Keston News Service, April 2, 

2001. 

4

 Moscow Helsinki Group, The Human Rights Situation in the Russian Federation, 1999, 

September 2000 (http://www.fsumonitor.com/MHG_99/MHG_cover.shtml, accessed April 3, 

2001). 

5

 Ibid. For example, the Council of Churches (Initsiativniki Baptists) reportedly determined 

not to re-register their 32 organizations by the December 31, 2000 deadline. See Geraldine 

Fagan, “Russia: Re-registration Figures for Religious Organizations,” Keston News Service, 

April 2, 2001. 

6

 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Russia,” 

February 26, 2001, 26-27 

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=877, accessed April 2, 

2001). 

7

 Ibid. 

8

 For an example of a further attempt to tighten control over religious groups through local 

law, see Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Attempt to Toughen 1997 Law on Religion,” Keston 

News Service, March 15, 2001 (discussing draft law proposed by the parliament of Voronezh 

region). 

9

 Slavic Center for Law and Justice, “Pentecostal Church Attacked In Lipetsk; Police Stay 

Idle,” March 26, 2001. 

10 U.S. Department of State, “Russia: Recent Acts of Intolerance and Anti-Semitism,” 

Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, October 3, 2000 

(http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps001003.html, accessed April 6, 

2001). 

11 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Russia,” 

February 26, 2001, 28 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=877, 
120 

 

accessed April 2, 2001). Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia and 

Religious Persecution in Russia’s Regions 1999-2000, February 2001 

(http://www.fsumonitor.com/2000 report/toc.html, accessed March 30, 2001). 

12 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Russia,” 

February 26, 2001 

(http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/2000_hrp_report/Russia.html accessed 

April 2, 2001). 

13 In this case, the judge also ordered the prosecution to pay approximately U.S. $2,800 for 

the expert commission of five specialists who considered evidence during the trial, which 

spanned over two years. See Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Associations, March 26, 2001, 7-8; Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Jehovah’s Witnesses Win 

Moscow Court Case,” Keston News Service, February 23, 2001. 

14 Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 

1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, March 26, 2001, 6-7. 

15 Tatyana Titova, “Russia: Jesuits Finally Receive Re-Registration,” Keston News Service, 

September 18, 2000. 

16 Meeting of USCIRF Staff with Archbishop Thaddaeus Kondrusiewicz and representatives 

of the U.S. Catholic Conference, November 16, 2001. Letter to USCIRF from Walt Grazer, 

U.S. Catholic Conference Policy Advisor for Religious Freedom, Human Rights, and Europe, 

March 23, 2001. 

17 Tatyana Titova, “Russia: Senior Catholic Priest Refused Visa for Third Time,” Keston 

News Service, March 5, 2001. 

18 The inquiry originated with deputy chairman of the State Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 

whose press office verified that the inquiry was connected to the impending visit to Ukraine 

in June 2001 by Pope John Paul II, and also with a February meeting in the Vatican between 

the Pope and the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. Tatyana Titova, “Russia: Duma 

Investigates Measures to ‘Prevent the Spread of Catholicism,’” Keston News Service, March 

19, 2001 and Frank Brown, “Russian Parliament Asks Government To Combat Catholic 

Expansion,” Catholic News Service, March 13, 2001. 

19 2000 Country Reports, “Russia,” 28 (Internet). 

20 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Radical Overhaul of Presidential Religion Committee,” Keston 

News Service, March 23, 2001. 

21 Viktor Korolyov cited in Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Salvation Army Receives Status of 

‘Centralized Religious Organization,” Keston News Service, February 26, 2001. 
121 

 

22 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Shut-Down Begins of Salvation Army Programmes,” Keston 

News Service, December 22, 2000. The Salvation Army currently has local religious 

organizations registered in five Russian cities: St. Petersburg, Petrozavodsk, Vyborg, 

Volgograd, and Rostov-on-Don. 

23 Moscow Helsinki Group, The Human Rights Situation in the Russian Federation, 1999, 

September 2000 (http://www.fsumonitor.com/MHG_99/MHG_cover.shtml, accessed April 3, 

2001); 2000 Country Reports, “Russia,” 39 (Internet). 

24 Moscow Helsinki Group, The Human Rights Situation in the Russian Federation, 1999, 

September 2000 (Internet). 

25 2000 Country Reports, “Russia,” 27 (Internet). 

26 Julie A. Corwin, “Interior Minister Calls For Joint Efforts With Orthodox Church Against 

Sects,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (RFE/RL Newsline), Vol. 4, No. 195, Part 

I, October 9, 2000 (citing ITAR-TASS report). 

27 Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF 

2000 Annual Report”), May 1, 2000, Recommendations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.10, 50-51, 53, 55-56. 

The Commission also recommended that the U.S. government encourage the Russian 

government to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to 

visit Russia. See ibid., Recommendation 3.9, 55. In his 2001 Report to the UN Commission 

on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance reported that the Russian 

government has not responded to his request for a visit to that country. See UN Special 

Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious 

Intolerance, E/CN.4/2001/63, February 13, 2001, ¶ 169. 

28 U.S. Congress, Public Law 106-429, Sec. 565, Making Appropriations for Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 

30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, 106th Cong., 2d sess. (November 2000). 

29 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 3.4, 52-53. 

30 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendations 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, 53-54. 

31 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 3.8, 54-55. 

32 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 3.3, 51-52. 

33 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributes $2.6 Million to UN Humanitarian Efforts in 

Chechnya,” Press Statement by Richard Boucher, August 11, 2000 

(http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000811.html, accessed April 6, 

2001); U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (DPB #67), “Council of Europe’s 

Committee of Ministers Decide Against Suspending Russia for Human Rights Abuses in 

Chechnya/U.S. Calls on Russia to Implement the UN Human Rights Resolution,” June 29, 
122 

 

2000 (http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000629db.html, accessed April 6, 2001). 

34 2000 Country Reports, “Russia,” 17 (Internet). 
123 

X. SUDAN 

A. Introduction 

In its first annual report issued May 2000, the Commission found that the government 

of Sudan was the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. 

The Commission also found that religion was a major factor in the ongoing civil war, and 

that religion and religious-freedom violations were intertwined with other human rights and 

humanitarian abuses in Sudan. In the Commission’s view, the Sudanese government was 

committing genocidal atrocities against civilian populations in the southern part of the 

country and in the Nuba Mountains. In light of these conditions, the Commission 

recommended, among other things, that the Clinton administration launch a comprehensive 

program of diplomatic and economic pressures to stop human rights abuses in Sudan. 

Moreover, the Commission was disturbed by the reported connection between oil 

development and the Sudanese government’s abuses, as well as by an initial public offering 

of securities in the United States by a subsidiary of one of the government’s joint-venture 

partners in the development of Sudan’s oil fields. Therefore, the Commission recommended 

that foreign companies engaged in the development of Sudan’s oil and gas fields be 

prohibited from raising money in U.S. capital markets. 

The situation in Sudan has grown worse in the year since the release of the 

Commission’s report. The government of Sudan continues to commit egregious human 

rights abuses – including widespread bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets, abduction 

and enslavement by government-sponsored militias, manipulation of humanitarian assistance 

as a weapon of war, and severe restrictions on religious freedom. The relationship between 

oil and the government’s actions has become clearer. While the Clinton administration did 

take some steps to address the situation, including successfully working to prevent Sudan 

from taking a seat at the UN Security Council and earmarking aid to communities in southern 

Sudan and to the political opposition (the National Democratic Alliance, or NDA), the issue 

of Sudan for the most part remained on the back burner of U.S. policy as the government’s 

own interagency report acknowledged last year.1

 Its actions fell well short of the 

comprehensive, sustained campaign that the Commission believes is commensurate with the 

Sudanese government’s abuses. The Commission urges the Bush administration to mount 

such a campaign, as detailed more fully in Section C. 

B. Human Rights and Religious Freedom Abuses in Sudan 

The following is a brief description of some of the Sudanese government’s egregious 

human rights abuses, focusing primarily on events since the Commission’s last report.2

The civil war that has cost the lives of some 2 million people and displaced 4 million 

others over the last 18 years continues unabated, with no significant movement for peace. 

The political opposition to President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir’s ruling National 

Congress Party (NC) boycotted national elections held in December 2000, which continued 

the NC’s grip on power. Shifting alliances among the ruling party and the political 

opposition – including a reported agreement between Hassan al-Turabi (head of the recently 

formed Popular National Congress and former ally of President al-Bashir) and the Sudan 
124 

People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – have not, as yet, resulted in any 

significant change in the political order. The Sudanese government continues to suppress 

forcefully any political opposition, and commit grave human rights abuses both in its 

prosecution of the war and more generally throughout the areas of the country under its 

control. The SPLA and forces aligned with it continue to control much of the southern 

portion of the country and have reportedly committed some human rights abuses in areas 

they control. 

1. Aerial Bombardments of Civilian and Humanitarian Targets 

Since the Commission’s May 2000 Annual Report, the government of Sudan has 

intensified its deliberate bombing attacks on civilian and humanitarian targets. Bombings 

include hospitals, schools, churches, markets, relief-organization compounds, and other 

clearly civilian and humanitarian installations.3 Organizations that have carefully tracked 

civilian bombings have compiled reports of more than 150 incidents in the year 2000.4

 For 

example, in July and August 2000, Sudanese government warplanes bombed facilities of 

humanitarian groups operating under the UN’s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) umbrella. In 

December, two persons were reportedly killed and a church was destroyed in a bombing in 

Lui. It is believed that additional bombings go unreported because international aid workers 

are generally absent from the Nuba Mountains and areas east of Khartoum.5

 These bombings 

not only kill and injure civilians (including children) and destroy property, but also disrupt 

humanitarian-relief activities and economic and social life and generally terrorize local 

populations. There is also evidence suggesting that the Sudanese government is using 

increasingly sophisticated, deadly, and damaging weapons.6

 

The government’s bombing of civilian targets continued despite international 

awareness of the problem and public assurances by President al-Bashir in April 2000 that 

such bombings would cease. Because of the continued bombings, the Sudan Council of 

Churches, the New Sudan Council of Churches, and the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference 

have all called for an internationally enforced no-fly zone. 

2. Interference with Humanitarian Assistance 

The Sudanese government continues to deny access for humanitarian relief 

distribution, particularly in the state of Western Upper Nile, through its control over relief 

flights pursuant to its agreement with the UN’s OLS. This denial of access threatens the 

lives of many in the region who reportedly face critical food shortages.7

 In addition, as noted 

above, the government has targeted humanitarian facilities for bombing and other attacks. In 

June 2000, an attack by government forces near a Roman Catholic mission in Gumriak 

reportedly killed 32 persons, including women and children. In January 2001, governmentsponsored militias destroyed an International Committee of the Red Cross compound in the 

southern Sudan village of Chelkou.8 As a result of government bombings of humanitarian 

facilities, the UN, on its own initiative, suspended OLS relief flights in August for several 

weeks. 

The government also allegedly has tolerated the use of humanitarian assistance for 

religious purposes. The Commission has received reports from credible sources – Anglican 
125 

and Catholic bishops in Sudan – that UN-provided humanitarian aid to the country’s 

displaced and needy population is being distributed on the condition that the recipients

convert to Islam. 

There are reports of instances where opposition forces have also interfered with the 

delivery of humanitarian aid. In February 2001, forces allied with the SPLA looted and 

damaged a UNICEF compound in the town of Nyal in southern Sudan.9

3. Slavery and Abductions 

Government security forces and government-sponsored militias continue to abduct 

women and children into conditions of slavery. For example, in early January 2001,

government-sponsored militias raided villages in Bahr al-Ghazal, killing 11 people and 

abducting 122 women and children, according to UNICEF officials in Khartoum.10

According to the State Department, some 12,000-15,000 women and children, mostly Dinka, 

remained in captivity at the end of 2000.11 Some non-governmental organizations place the 

number of slaves significantly higher.12 

Although the Sudanese government denies that slavery even exists in Sudan (much 

less its own involvement or complicity in the practice), in May 1999 it established the 

Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC). 

CEAWAC has been generally criticized for not operating in good faith and for being largely 

ineffectual in light of the extent of the problem. According to Human Rights Watch, 

although the CEAWAC has retrieved some slaves from their owners, the government made a 

deliberate decision “not to record the identity of the abductors or forced labor owners, let 

alone prosecute anyone involved.”13 In addition, according to UNICEF, the government has 

refused to give permission to transport 60 children who have been waiting for six months to 

be reunited with their families in SPLA-controlled areas.14

4. Religious Freedom 

The Sudanese government has continued its assault on the religious freedom of nonMuslims as well as some Muslims (particularly those associated with the political 

opposition). In September 2000, the State Department named Sudan (for the second 

consecutive year) as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998, finding that the government of Sudan had engaged in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. 

Religious groups must be registered by the government to operate legally, and 

approval can be difficult to obtain. Unregistered groups cannot build places of worship or 

meet in public. Even registered groups face difficulties. For example, the government 

continues to deny permission to construct Roman Catholic churches. Certain Islamic orders 

– including orders associated with the political opposition – are denied permission to hold 

public assemblies. Government forces have bombed Christian churches, schools, hospitals, 

and mission facilities in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan. Apostasy from Islam is a 

crime punishable by death. According to the State Department, children from non-Muslim 

families who have been captured and sold into slavery are forced to convert to Islam. 15 As 
126 

noted above, there are reports that humanitarian aid is used to coerce conversions. There are 

reports that security forces have harassed and detained persons on account of their religion.16 

In February 2001, security forces entered the compound of the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ 

Conference (SCBC) in Khartoum and confiscated six vehicles.17

5. Oil and Foreign Investment 

The connection between oil development (and oil revenues) and the Sudanese 

government’s human rights abuses has become increasingly apparent over the last year. 

First, the discovery and the drilling of oil reserves in the Upper Nile province has led to a 

“scorched earth” policy by the government to remove civilian populations from areas 

surrounding oil installations. Second, the government reportedly uses the oil facilities 

themselves (e.g., airstrips and roads) in staging military operations.18 Third, according to the 

State Department, oil revenues have allowed the government to increase its investment in 

military hardware.19 

Despite growing international awareness of this connection, oil development has 

attracted significant foreign investment in Sudan. U.S. economic sanctions prohibit U.S. 

companies from investing or doing business in Sudan. Current sanctions, however, do not 

prohibit foreign companies from doing so, and the U.S. Department of Energy reports that 

the following are active in Sudan’s oil and gas industry: AGIP (Italy), China National 

Petroleum Corporation (People’s Republic of China),20 Gulf Petroleum Corporation (Qatar), 

Lundin Oil Corporation (Sweden),21 National Iranian Gas Company (Iran),22 OMV (Austria), 

Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Malaysia),23 Royal Dutch Shell and Trafigura Beheer B.V. 

(Netherlands), Talisman Energy Corporation (Canada), and TotalFina/Elf (France). In 

February 2001, Russian oil companies reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding 

with the Sudanese government regarding exploration and export of oil from two areas of the 

country.24

As detailed in the Commission’s first Annual Report, U.S. economic sanctions 

generally do not prohibit these foreign companies from issuing securities in U.S. markets or 

listing their shares on U.S. exchanges.25 Two Chinese companies involved in Sudan oil 

raised money in U.S. capital markets in 2000. In April, the China National Petroleum 

Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiary, PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina), offered 

shares in PetroChina to U.S. investors. In October 2000, the China Petroleum & Chemical 

Corporation (known as Sinopec) offered shares in large quantities for sale on U.S. markets.26 

The Wall Street Journal reported on October 11 that a Sinopec subsidiary (Zhongyuan 

Petroleum Corporation) had a joint venture in Sudan’s oil fields with a unit of CNPC; that 

last summer Sinopec gave its entire interest in the Sudan venture to CNPC, the major 

shareholder of its chief domestic rival, PetroChina; that Sinopec had not disclosed the value 

of any assets received from CNPC in return for this transfer; and that there was evidence that 

Sinopec’s subsidiary continues to do business in Sudan’s oil fields.27 In addition to these 

initial public offerings, companies such as Talisman, Royal Dutch Shell, Lundin Oil, and 

TotalFina/Elf all list securities on the New York Stock Exchange. 

Some of the companies noted above that are doing business in Sudanese oil are 

reportedly under public or shareholder pressure to divest their Sudan business interests. In 
127 

February 2001, the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, a coalition of Canadian nongovernmental organizations, called for a divestment campaign against Talisman. According 

to Canadian news sources, the Royal Bank of Canada, which is one of the largest Talisman 

shareholders, is also being targeted for a boycott and other consumer action if it does not 

divest itself of Talisman shares. In addition, BP Amoco Corporation(which has no direct 

business activities in Sudan) is reportedly under pressure from activists and its shareholders 

to divest its stake in PetroChina, CNPC’s subsidiary.28 

C. Commission Recommendations 

The Commission concludes that the actions of the U.S. government toward the 

government of Sudan in the past year, while mixed, have not been commensurate with the 

appalling violations of religious freedom and other human rights by that government, 

violations which have already reached genocidal proportions and have only worsened since 

this Commission’s report last May. 

In its first annual report of May 2000, the Commission proposed that the U.S. 

government launch a comprehensive 12-month plan that would immediately respond to the 

crisis in Sudan and reward measurable improvement or punish deterioration in the Sudanese 

government’s record on religious freedom and other human rights.29 The administration did 

not implement any comprehensive initiative of the scale that the Commission believes is 

necessary to address the situation. While the Clinton administration did take some initiatives 

in line with the Commission’s recommendations, key elements of the Commission’s plan 

appear to have been neglected. 

Despite at least 150 reported aerial bombings of civilian hospitals, markets, churches, 

and schools by Khartoum’s air force, the continued abduction and enslavement of women 

and children, and the government’s “scorched earth” policy designed to remove populations 

from around oil facilities, President Clinton did not adequately employ the “bully pulpit” of 

his office to inform the American public or enlist international opposition to such crimes.30 

Any efforts to raise multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure on the Sudanese 

government had little apparent impact on Sudan’s non-U.S. trade, foreign investment in its 

oil fields, or the government’s acquisition of military hardware.31 While we hold European 

and other nations responsible for their foreign policies regarding Sudan, which have too often 

displayed indifference to the human rights violations there, we also believe that the U.S. 

government should have put more energy into diplomatic efforts to gain support for a more 

assertive policy. 

Regrettably, the U.S. government has done nothing to advocate an internationally 

enforced ban on aerial bombardment of civilians in Sudan nor has it requested an 

investigation and adjudication of whether the Sudanese government has violated the 

Chemical Weapons Convention.32 The State Department has not given its opinion whether 

the government of Sudan has violated the 1948 Genocide Convention.33 Nor has the U.S. 

government implemented the Commission’s recommendations that companies active in

Sudan’s petroleum industry not be allowed further access to U.S. capital markets and that 

American investors be informed if the proceeds of their investments in foreign corporations 

will help finance that industry.34 
128 

Given the close connection between development of Sudan’s oil resources (which 

would be minimal without foreign investment) and the Sudanese government’s human rights 

abuses, the Commission continues to believe that the United States should not grant access to 

its capital markets to any foreign company involved in Sudan’s oil industry, and in general 

should require greater disclosure by all companies doing business in Sudan so that U.S. 

investors are apprised of the nature and extent of that business. This year the Commission 

expands its recommendation on disclosure to all companies doing business of any kind in 

Sudan so that investors can make fully informed decisions.35 Regarding our recommendation 

that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigate the adequacy and reliability 

of filings made by a foreign corporation whose parent is the largest stakeholder in Sudan’s 

oil pipeline, the SEC advised us that it does not independently investigate the accuracy of 

information in such filings.36 In response to the Commission’s recommendations to the 

Treasury Department that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) investigate possible 

violations of U.S. Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, OFAC notified the Commission that it 

did not find any violation of the existing sanctions regime.37 Because the Commission 

concludes that these regulations are too porous, it recommends they be tightened.38

The Clinton administration – with support from Congress – did approve a number of 

steps that reflect the Commission’s recommendations. Among these steps that were 

approved but not yet implemented were providing communities in southern Sudan with 

radios, evacuation vehicles, and other equipment to warn and protect noncombatants against 

aerial bombings.39 The administration also approved administrative aid to the political 

opposition (NDA).40 U.S. aid to rebuild the civil and economic infrastructure of the south 

through the Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program has 

expanded.41 The administration laudably continued to increase the portion of U.S. aid to 

Sudan that is delivered outside of the United Nations’ OLS, thus unbound by Khartoum’s 

bans on humanitarian delivery to rebel-controlled areas of need.42 Nevertheless, most U.S. 

aid continues to flow through OLS. The Commission recommends below that the U.S. 

government continue to expand all of these forms of aid outside the UN system. However, 

the forest should not be lost for the trees. While all of these aid programs are needed to help 

ameliorate some of the effects of the Sudanese government’s abhorrent policies, they do not 

by themselves represent the kind of coordinated public, diplomatic, and economic pressure 

that the Commission believes is necessary to change the Sudanese government’s policies. 

The Commission continues to believe that a comprehensive, coordinated strategy led 

on a priority basis by those at the highest levels of the U.S. government is necessary to 

address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Sudan. Essential elements of this 

strategy include raising public awareness of the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses, 

consistent condemnation of those abuses, and employing and advocating a variety of bilateral 

and multilateral pressures on the Sudanese government until it makes substantial and 

systematic improvements. The Commission urges the President and the Secretary of State to 

implement and lead such a strategy. In light of the worsening situation in Sudan, and 

building on the policies it proposed last year, the Commission makes the following 

recommendations:

1. The U.S. government should appoint a nationally prominent 

individual – who enjoys the trust and confidence of President Bush and 
129 

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and who has appropriate authority and 

access – whose sole responsibility is directed to bringing about a peaceful 

and just settlement of the war in Sudan and an end to the religiousfreedom abuses and humanitarian atrocities committed by the Sudanese 

government. The United States should not appoint an ambassador to 

Sudan at this time. 

The U.S. government needs a high-level, high-profile individual devoted full-time to 

carrying out diplomatic initiatives as well as coordinating policy among U.S. government 

agencies. Specifically, this envoy would seek to exert influence on the government of Sudan 

and Sudanese opposition factions in order to bring about a cessation of human rights abuses 

and a peaceful and just settlement of the conflict. The Special Envoy for Sudan appointed by 

the Clinton administration, Harry A. Johnston, despite good intentions and hard work, did not 

have the international prominence, the high-level access, or a mandate sufficiently broad to 

command the attention of the Sudanese government, or to engage regional leaders and 

European allies at the highest diplomatic levels. All of these attributes are necessary to make 

progress on ending the war in Sudan. In addition, because the issues in the Sudan conflict 

cut across different regions of the world, as well as touch on international financial markets, 

the envoy should have both the stature and the authority to work within and across U.S. 

government agencies. 

Because the situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate and its government has not 

taken effective steps to address any of the serious concerns of the United States over 

religious freedom and other human rights, the United States should not at this time appoint an 

ambassador to Sudan. Any embassy activity should be directed by a chargé d’affaires. If the 

government of Sudan demonstrates substantial, sustained, and comprehensive improvement 

in the human rights conditions for the people throughout the country, the U.S. government 

should seriously consider raising the level of diplomatic representation. 

2. The U.S. government should continue to increase the amount of its 

humanitarian assistance that passes outside of Operation Lifeline Sudan 

(OLS) and should press OLS to deliver aid wherever it is needed, 

especially the Nuba Mountains, with or without the approval of the 

Sudanese government. 

In order to limit the Sudanese government’s ability to employ food assistance as a 

weapon against its opponents, the U.S. government should work vigorously to ensure that its 

food aid gets to the people in Sudan who need it. The government of Sudan continues to 

restrict access to certain areas of the country by OLS. Famine also continues and in midFebruary 2001 it was reported that famine led to the displacement of 98,000 people in the 

eastern part of the country.43 In part because of the ongoing restrictions on access, the United 

States has been increasing the percentage of aid that it has provided outside of the OLS 

system, from 14 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 34 percent in fiscal year 2000. A further 

increase reportedly is planned for fiscal year 2001. As long as OLS is regularly prevented 

from reaching those in need, this shift to increasing reliance on non-OLS aid should continue. 

Moreover, U.S. efforts to strengthen the capacity of humanitarian groups delivering aid 

outside of OLS should also continue. In addition, the United States should urge other donor 
130 

countries to provide aid outside of the OLS framework. Khartoum’s bans on humanitarian 

flights apparently have the effect of limiting some non-OLS relief flights as well. In addition 

to the increase in non-OLS aid, the United States – which is OLS’s largest contributor – 

should support OLS efforts to expand and maintain its access throughout the country,

especially the Nuba Mountain area. Also, the U.S. government should continue to work with 

the SPLM/A to ensure that it does not interdict, divert, or obstruct the provision of 

humanitarian assistance in areas under its control. Finally, the United States should stop 

using non-governmental organizations that discriminate on the basis of the religion of 

recipients in their distribution of aid and services. 

3. The U.S. government should increase its assistance to southern Sudan 

and the NDA. 

The State Department approved but did not implement the authority granted to it by 

Congress to provide non-lethal aid directly to communities in opposition-controlled areas of

Sudan through local organizations. However, in fiscal year 2000 approximately $3 million in 

aid was given to local communities in southern Sudan under the STAR program. The 

purpose of this aid is to stimulate a market economy and increase food production and 

security. Such aid is critically important to improving living conditions and promoting civil 

society in southern Sudan, and the U.S. government should increase its support for these 

programs. 

In addition to the STAR program, the Clinton administration had plans to provide $3 

million of assistance to the political opposition in Sudan – the NDA – for building its 

capacity to participate in the peace process. Congress has authorized up to $10 million in aid 

to southern Sudan for fiscal year 2001; the State Department is actively considering whether

to use these authorized funds. This type of aid is consistent with the Commission’s 

recommendations from last year and should be increased. However, aid should not be given 

to any opposition group unless it is making substantial and verifiable efforts to adhere to 

international human rights norms.44

4. The U.S. government should launch a major diplomatic initiative 

aimed at enlisting international pressure to stop the Sudanese 

government’s bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets; ground 

attacks on civilian villages, feeding centers, and hospitals; slave raids; 

and instigation of tribal warfare. 

There are numerous reports of the escalating frequency, accuracy, and deadliness of 

the Sudanese government’s bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets. It is 

unconscionable that the regime in Khartoum can engage in such flagrant violations of human 

rights and humanitarian law on a regular basis without significant negative reactions from 

governments committed to respect for religious freedom and human rights. 

The U.S. government should work vigorously to develop international support for 

diplomatic and economic pressure on the government of Sudan to stop bombing civilian and 

humanitarian targets. The United States should introduce resolutions at the UN, including in 

the UN Commission on Human Rights, condemning the government of Sudan and should 
131 

initiate a debate in the UN Security Council on Khartoum’s egregious violations of the 

Geneva Convention, such as bombings and ground attacks on civilian villages, feeding 

centers, and hospitals; slave raids; and instigation of tribal warfare. 

5. The U.S. government should strengthen economic sanctions against 

Sudan and should urge other countries to adopt similar policies. The 

United States should prohibit any foreign company from raising capital 

or listing its securities in U.S. markets as long as it is engaged in the 

development of oil and gas fields in Sudan. The U.S. government should 

not issue licenses permitting the import of gum arabic from Sudan to the 

United States. 

U.S. economic sanctions against Sudan should be strengthened and not reduced. 

They should be strengthened by (a) prohibiting access to U.S. capital markets for those nonU.S. companies engaged in the development of the Sudanese oil and gas fields, and (b) not 

issuing further licenses for the import of gum arabic to the United States. 

The Commission is aware of the current debate both internationally and in the United 

States on the effectiveness of economic sanctions generally. Unilateral economic sanctions 

by the United States have not prevented foreign investment in Sudan’s oil business, which 

has, in turn, provided the Sudanese government with significant financial support for its 

egregious human rights and humanitarian abuses. However, it has not been established that 

U.S. sanctions have been completely ineffective. They can continue, for example, to slow the 

rate of increase of foreign investment in Sudan and oil revenues to the Sudanese government. 

One way to increase the potential effectiveness of the sanctions is to convince other 

economic powers to adopt similar policies. In this regard, the Commission urges the U.S. 

government to encourage economic pressure on the Sudanese government in its bilateral 

relations at all levels with countries that engage in substantial trade with or provide 

significant foreign investment to Sudan.45 

Current sanctions prohibit investment by U.S. companies in Sudan. They also 

prohibit transactions between U.S. companies and the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 

Company (Sudan’s oil consortium) or Sudapet (Sudan’s petroleum company). 

In the absence of multilateral economic sanctions, however, preventing access to U.S. 

capital markets by foreign companies engaged in the oil-development business in Sudan 

targets a specific weakness in the current U.S. sanctions regime. The Commission 

recommends that foreign corporations doing business with Sudan’s petroleum industry be 

prohibited from issuing or listing its securities on U.S. capital markets. 

The Commission does not lightly recommend these significant restrictions on U.S. 

capital markets access, but believes that the specific conditions in Sudan warrant them.46 The 

government of Sudan is committing genocidal humanitarian and human rights abuses. There 

is a direct connection between oil production and those abuses. Foreign investment is critical 

to the development of Sudan’s oil fields and maintaining oil revenues.47 Expanding U.S. 

sanctions in the area of capital markets access specifically targets what is likely the most 

significant resource that the Sudanese government has to prosecute the war. 
132 

Moreover, the issue of continuing economic sanctions against Sudan is one of 

principle as well as effectiveness. Reducing sanctions against Sudan at this time – after the 

Sudanese government has made no concessions but rather has increased its civilian bombings 

and other atrocities – would be to reward it for worsening behavior. This will send the wrong 

message to the government of Sudan and the international community. 

With respect to licenses granted in 1999 and 2000 to permit U.S. imports of gum 

arabic, the purpose of granting those licenses was to allow U.S. importers time to identify 

alternative sources of supply. Because a reasonable amount of time has elapsed, no further 

licenses should be granted, and efforts should be continued to identify alternate suppliers of 

this product. 

If the government of Sudan demonstrates substantial, sustained, and comprehensive 

improvement in the human rights conditions for people throughout the country, the U.S. 

government should seriously re-evaluate its sanctions regime. 

6. Companies that are doing business in Sudan should be required to 

disclose the nature and extent of that business in connection with their 

access to U.S. capital markets. 

There is a significant, undesirable gap in U.S. law regarding Sudan and other CPC 

countries: In many cases, foreign companies that are doing business in Sudan can sell 

securities on U.S. markets without having to disclose fully (1) the details of the particular 

business activities in Sudan, including plans for expansion or diversification; (2) the identity 

of all agencies of the Sudanese government with which the companies are doing business; (3) 

the relationship of the business activities to violations of religious freedom and other human 

rights in Sudan; or (4) the contribution that the proceeds raised in the U.S. debt and equity 

markets will make to these business activities and hence, potentially to those violations.48

Across-the-board full disclosure of these details would prompt corporate managers to work to 

prevent their companies from supporting or facilitating these violations. It also would aid (1) 

U.S. investors in deciding whether to purchase the securities; (2) shareholders in exercising 

their ownership rights (including proposing shareholder resolutions for annual meetings and 

proxy statements); (3) the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in 

enforcing existing sanctions; and (4) U.S. policymakers in formulating sound policy with 

respect to Sudan and U.S. capital markets. The Commission recommends that the United 

States require such disclosure. 

7. The U.S. government should intensify its support for peace 

negotiations and for the Declaration of Principles, and make a just and 

lasting peace a top priority of this administration’s global agenda. 

Peace negotiations under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on 

Development have produced no significant results in the past year, and indeed no longer 

continue. The Sudanese government remains publicly committed to negotiations using the 

framework of the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The U.S. government should support any 

viable peace process under the DOP and should encourage the inclusion of the NDA in peace 

negotiations. The United States should also consider direct involvement in negotiations with 
133 

both the Sudanese government and the opposition. Moreover, as the Commission 

recommended last year, the U.S. government should use its diplomatic influence to urge 

Egypt to be a constructive partner in peace negotiations. 

8. The U.S. government should work to increase human rights and 

media reporting on abuses in Sudan, including supporting, diplomatically 

and financially, the placement of human rights monitors in southern 

Sudan and in surrounding countries where refugee populations are 

present. 

Humanitarian and religious groups, human rights organizations, and journalists have 

labored under very difficult conditions to bring to light the human suffering and human rights 

abuses in Sudan. Their efforts are severely hampered by the Sudanese government’s 

restrictions on access to many parts of the country. As a result, the full extent of the abuses 

being committed in Sudan is still not known. The U.S. government should urge the Sudanese 

government to allow human rights monitors and the media to operate throughout the country, 

and should work with opposition groups to ensure such access in the areas under their 

control. The United States should support the deployment of human rights monitors in 

southern Sudan (including monitoring teams that can verify reports of bombings) and in 

surrounding countries where Sudanese refugees are concentrated. 

Concurrence with Qualifications to Recommendations 3 and 5 

Dr. Laila Al-Marayati 

Recommendation 3: The U.S. government should increase its assistance 

to southern Sudan and the NDA. 

This recommendation differs from that in the Commission’s May 2000 report, which 

advocated aid to the SPLA, and other opposition groups including the NDA, in the event that 

the Khartoum government failed to make substantial improvements during a six-to-12 month 

period with respect to human rights abuses (see USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, II.A., 

Recommendations 1.2e-f). However, due to the dominance of the SPLA in southern Sudan, 

it is possible to assume that non-lethal aid to opposition forces will also fall into the hands of 

the SPLA, which is responsible for human rights abuses that should preclude any support by 

the U.S. government (see Al-Marayati Dissent to II.A., Recommendations 1.2e-f, USCIRF 

2000 Annual Report). 

In addition, the current statement by the Commission mentions that aid should not be 

given to “any opposition group unless it is making verifiable efforts to adhere to international 

human rights norms.” Due to the degree of documented human rights abuses by the SPLA 

(e.g. manipulation and diversion of humanitarian aid, conscription of child soldiers into 

combat, arbitrary arrests, abductions, etc.), actual compliance with international norms (not 

simply “efforts”) must be significant and sustained before any aid would be considered. At 

this time, no such improvements have been verified by either the U.S. government or 

credible non-governmental human rights organizations in the region. 

Finally, aid to the opposition, unless to a much greater degree than heretofore applied 
134 

by the U.S. government, is unlikely to shift the balance of power enough to pose a significant 

threat to the Khartoum government and thereby lead to an end to the fighting. Therefore, 

recommendations for assistance to opposition groups (other than humanitarian aid) should be 

considered in light of their overall effect on the civil war. 

Recommendation 5: The U.S. government should strengthen economic 

sanctions against Sudan and should urge other countries to adopt similar 

policies.... 

The Commission’s report rightly points out that unilateral sanctions have not 

prevented foreign investment in Sudan, particularly in the oil industry whose revenues have 

enabled the Sudanese government to strengthen its position with respect to the war. While 

one approach is to push for broader, multilateral support and to close loopholes at least with 

respect to U.S. financial markets, the lack of effectiveness of sanctions to date requires 

serious analysis by the U.S. government to determine if the sanctions regime itself is a useful 

tool for effecting change and improving the situation with respect to religious freedom in 

Sudan. 

Therefore, in addition to the Commission’s recommendations in the report, I would 

urge the administration to review the sanctions policy as part of an overall approach to 

helping solve the problems that plague Sudan at this time. First, the U.S. government should 

determine if current sanctions against Sudan and their expansion will have the desired result 

with respect to human rights in general and religious freedom in particular. Second, if the 

U.S. government deems that strengthening the sanctions regime is indicated, it also needs to 

determine when such sanctions could be lifted, such as in an incremental fashion as Sudanese 

government policy and practice show satisfactory progress in ending widespread human 

rights abuses. 

 

1

 U.S. Department of State, Interagency Review of U.S. Civilian Humanitarian and 

Transition Programs, Annex 3 (January 2000). 

2

 See Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 

2000 (“USCIRF 2000 Annual Report”); Staff Memorandum for the Chairman: Religious 

Freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, May 1, 2000 (“Staff Memorandum”). Recent human 

rights reports on Sudan include Amnesty International, Sudan: Oil in Sudan: Deteriorating 

Human Rights (March 5, 2000) 

(http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/ai.nsf/index/AFR540012000, accessed February 5, 2001) 

(“Oil in Sudan”); Amnesty International, Report 2000; Human Rights Watch, World Report 

2001; “Sudan”; U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 

“Sudan,” February 2001; John Harker, Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian 

Assessment Mission, prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 2000 (“Harker 

Report”); Leonardo Franco, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on 

Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, September 11, 2000, U.N. Doc. No. 

A/55/374. 
135 

 

3

 According to the State Department, the Sudanese government “bombed a hospital run by 

the NGO Samaritan’s Purse in Lui in Western Equatoria. Norwegian People’s Aid reported 

that on April 16, government forces dropped bombs near a child feeding compound. On July 

28, in Akhuem in northern Bahr el-Ghazal, several bombs landed close to a Doctors Without 

Borders plane and near its health center, prompting the medical team to evacuate the area.” 

2000 Country Reports, “Sudan.” 

4

 Information supplied by U.S. Committee for Refugees and Sudan Focal Point – Europe. 

5

 See “Sudan’s Human Rights and Humanitarian Emergency,” testimony of Roger Winter, 

Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees, before the Congressional Human Rights 

Caucus, September 28, 2000. 

6

 Sudan Focal Point - Europe (2000). 

7

 According to Human Rights Watch, early in 2001 inter-factional fighting among the Nuer 

and between the Nuer and the Dinka – ignited by the government in Khartoum and the 

SPLM/A – reached dangerous proportions and aggravated conditions of famine and food 

availability in southern Sudan. See Human Rights Watch, Analysis of the Current Fighting 

and its Relation to Famine, March 2001, (http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/sudananalysis.html, accessed March 2, 2001). 

8

 Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference (SCBC), Message to IGAD (September 15, 2000) 

(provided to USCIRF by SCBC). 

9

 See U.S. Department of State, “ Report of Attack on UN Relief Base in Southern Sudan,” 

March 1, 2001 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.cfm, accessed March 20, 2001); 

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001, “Sudan.” 

10 Reuters, “Sudan Raiders Abduct 122 Women and Children in South,” January 10, 2001. 

11 2000 Country Reports, “Sudan,” 4. 

12 Private organizations that have engaged in redemption or “buy-back” and retrieval of 

slaves report that their efforts have targeted thousands of slaves in the past year. Christian 

Solidarity International, with the assistance of black African community leaders and Arab 

retrievers, claims to have liberated more than 38,000 Sudanese slaves since 1995. These 

“buybacks” have been criticized by some aid agencies, human rights groups, and by 

UNICEF. 

13 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001, “Sudan,” at 82-83. See also, 2000 Country 

Reports, “Sudan” (Internet), 4. 

14 Reuters, “Sudan Raiders Abduct 122 Women and Children in South,” January 10, 2001. 

15 2000 Country Reports, “Sudan” (Internet), 14. 
136 

 

16 Ibid. 

17 Charles Omondi, “Armed Policemen Storm the Compound of the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ 

Conference (SCBC),” (http://SudanInfonet.tripod.com, accessed February 17, 2001). 

18 See Harker Report. 

19 2000 Country Reports, “Sudan,” 4 (Internet); Christian Aid (UK), The Scorched Earth: Oil 

and War in Sudan, March 15, 2001 (http://www.christian-aid.org.uk, accessed March 15, 

2001). In this report, Christian Aid warns “what is happening in Upper Nile is only a 

foretaste of what could happen all across the south if the international community continues 

to turn a blind eye to attacks on civilians in the name of profit.” See also UN Special 

Rapporteur on Sudan, Oral Statement on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan Mr. 

Gerhart R. Baum. Commission on Human Rights 57th session (19 March-27 April 2001). 

20 CNPC is the state-owned oil company of the People’s Republic of China. It owns a 40 

percent interest in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). CNPC is also 

very active in the Adar Yel concession area in eastern Upper Nile. 

21 This small oil company operates south of Bentiu. Lundin Oil is a prime beneficiary of the 

newly completed road that extends 60 miles south of Bentiu and allows not only oil 

equipment but also heavy military equipment to move south. Communication to USCIRF 

from Dr. Eric Reeves dated January 14, 2001. 

22 According to Amnesty International, the following non-Sudanese companies are involved 

in the building of Sudan’s oil pipeline: Allen Power Engineering Ltd (UK), Denim Pipeline 

Construction Ltd (Canada), Mannesmann (Germany), Roll’n Oil Field Industries (Canada), 

Weir Pumps Ltd (UK). See Oil in Sudan. It is also reported that Rolls Royce (UK) is 

involved in the pipeline. See The Observer, March 11, 2001. 

23 Petronas is the state-owned oil company of Malaysia. An original GNPOC partner, 

Petronas reportedly has a 30 percent stake in the consortium. Petronas has also the “right of 

refusal” on Talisman Energy Corporation’s 25 percent share in GNPOC, should Talisman 

withdraw. 

24 Agence France-Presse, “Russian Companies to Start Oil Operations in Sudan,” February 9, 

2001. 

25 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, 37-39. 

26 See SEC Registration Statement, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Reg. No. 

333-12502); Far Eastern Economic Review, November 8, 2000. 

27 The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2000. 

28 Agence France-Presse, February 15, 2001. 
137 

 

29 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.2, 29-33.

30 In contrast, then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright condemned Sudan’s aerial 

bombings on several occasions, including after a meeting arranged by the Commission with a 

Sudanese bishop in February 2000. In addition, Dr. Susan Rice, then U.S. Assistant 

Secretary of State for African Affairs, bravely toured southern Sudan in November 2000. Dr. 

Rice interviewed civilian victims of Khartoum’s bombing and enslavement campaigns, and 

publicly reported on and condemned them. 

31 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.2.b, 30. 

32 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendations 1.5 and 1.6, 34-35.

33 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.7, 35. 

34 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendations 1.8 and 1.9, 35-37.

35 Recommendation 6, infra at p. 132. 

36 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.13, 39; letter dated January 9, 2001, 

from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and 

Exchange Commission, to Elliott Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF. 

37 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendations 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12, 37-39; letter dated 

November 15, 2000, from R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 

Department of the Treasury, to Elliott Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF. See USCIRF 2000 

Annual Report, 26-27, 35-39; Staff Memorandum, 65-80. 

38 Recommendation 5, infra at p. 131. 

39 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.5, 34. 

40 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.2.e, 32.

41 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.4, 34.

42 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.1, 28-29.

43 Michel Sailhan, “Two Million Sudanese Displaced,” The Mail and Guardian, February 20, 

2001. 

44 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.2.e, 32. 

45 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.2.b, 30.

46 As of the date of this report, the Commission has not determined if a policy against issuing 

or listing securities on U.S. markets should apply to companies doing business in other 
138 

 

countries designated as Countries of Particular Concern under IRFA. 

47 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Sudan, November 2000, 

(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan2.html accessed November 11, 2000). 

48 Staff Memorandum, 65-80. 
139 

XI. VIETNAM 

A. Introduction 

Despite a marked increase in religious practice among the Vietnamese people in the 

last 10 years, the Vietnamese government continues to suppress organized religious activities 

forcefully and to monitor and control religious communities.1 The government prohibits 

religious activity by those not affiliated with one of the six officially recognized religious 

organizations. Individuals have been detained, fined, imprisoned, and kept under close 

surveillance by security forces for engaging in “illegal” religious activities. In addition, the 

government uses the recognition process to monitor and control officially sanctioned 

religious groups: restricting the procurement and distribution of religious literature, 

controlling religious training, and interfering with the selection of religious leaders. 

There have been significant developments in U.S. policy toward Vietnam in the past 

year. In July 2000, after a one-year delay by the Vietnamese government, the United States 

and Vietnam signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement, which, if ratified by the U.S. Congress, 

would pave the way for the granting of conditional normal trade relations status to Vietnam. 

In November 2000, President Clinton visited Vietnam, marking the first visit to that country 

by a U.S. president in more than 30 years. 

In February 2001, the Commission held a public hearing in Washington, D.C., on 

religious freedom and U.S. policy in Vietnam. The Commission heard testimony from 

representatives of a number of Vietnamese religious communities, as well as experts on 

Vietnam and its relations with the United States. In addition, the Commission and its staff 

have met with representatives of the Vietnamese government, Vietnamese religious 

communities, and human rights organizations with expertise in Vietnam (including 

Vietnamese-American organizations), as well as academic experts and U.S. government 

officials. It has also solicited information from organizations and individuals that were 

unable to meet with the Commission or its staff. Moreover, at the invitation of Ambassador 

Dinh Thi Minh Huyen, Director of the International Organizations Department at the 

Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, the Commission made a formal request in November 2000 to 

visit Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese government has “welcomed” the Commission’s 

visit, it has informed the Commission that such a visit should be hosted by Vietnam’s 

Commission on Religious Affairs, which would be unable to accommodate the Commission 

until at least May 2001. This fact has prevented the Commission from traveling to Vietnam 

prior to the release of this report. 

The Commission invited Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, a Roman Catholic priest 

based near Hue, Vietnam, to testify at its February hearing and Fr. Ly submitted written 

testimony. Fr. Ly has been persistently critical of the Vietnamese government’s failure to 

protect religious freedom – activity that led to his imprisonment for close to a decade. On 

March 5, 2001, the Vietnamese official media confirmed that the government placed Fr. Ly 

under administrative detention (i.e. house arrest) for “publicly slandering” the Vietnamese 

Communist Party and “distorting” the government’s policy on religion.2

 The Commission

remains deeply concerned that the Vietnamese government may be punishing Fr. Ly for his 

response to the Commission’s invitation. The action of the Vietnamese government is 
140 

clearly a demonstration of the government’s continued suppression, not only of religious 

freedom, but of other fundamental human rights as well. Moreover, the Commission 

believes that the United States has the moral responsibility to support and protect those 

Vietnamese citizens, including Fr. Ly, who have the courage to speak to us in the pursuit of 

the realization of fundamental human rights. 

B. Religious Demography 

Vietnam is the world’s 13th most populous country, with a population of nearly 80 

million people.3

 The oldest and largest religion is Buddhism, and approximately 50 percent 

of Vietnamese are Buddhists. The Roman Catholic Church in Vietnam has a following of 

approximately 6 million people. The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao Buddhists are two 

indigenous religious communities, each of which has from 1 to 3 million adherents. The Cao 

Dai religion was formally organized in the 1920s and its religious center is located in Tay 

Ninh province in southern Vietnam. It is syncretic in nature, combining elements of 

Catholicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and the traditional worship of spirits and ancestors. The 

Hoa Hao religion is considered by many of its followers as a “reformed” branch of 

Buddhism. Huynh Phu So founded the religion in 1939 at Hoa Hao Village in the southern 

province of An Giang, and most Hoa Haos continue to live in that region of the Mekong 

River Delta. The Hoa Hao religion does not have priests, builds few temples, and eschews 

many of the ceremonial aspects of other Buddhist traditions. Protestants in Vietnam 

reportedly number approximately 700,000 to 800,000. About two-thirds of the Protestant 

population are members of ethnic minority groups, including the Montagnards in the Central 

Highlands and the Hmong in the northwestern provinces. By all accounts, the number of 

Protestants in the country has grown substantially in recent years. There is also a small, 

primarily Sunni, Muslim population estimated at 50,000 persons spread throughout Vietnam. 

Finally, there are between several hundred and 2,000 Vietnamese Baha’i followers, who are 

largely concentrated in the south.4 

C. Religious Freedom 

1. Legal Framework 

The Constitution of Vietnam provides for the freedom of religion and belief for 

citizens of the country.5

 However, the Constitution also permits restrictions on these 

freedoms in furtherance of vaguely defined interests of the state and the Vietnamese 

Communist Party (VCP). The Constitution guarantees that all aspects of the polity and 

society are controlled by the VCP (“the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class” and the 

“faithful representative” of the whole nation) and the Fatherland Front (the umbrella 

organization of non-communist elements, which along with its member organizations 

“constitute the political base of people’s powers”).6 Several constitutional provisions also 

allow the government to punish “severely” all acts that violate the undefined “interests of the 

motherland and the people.”7 

In April 1999, the Vietnamese government issued a Decree Concerning Religious 

Activities (1999 Religion Decree), which establishes the basic legal framework within which 

religious activities take place and codifies state control over religious organizations. The 
141 

1999 Religion Decree defines the extent of the Vietnamese government’s control of religious 

communities and activities. Article 5 states: 

All activities which threaten freedom of religious belief, all activities using 

religious belief in order to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of 

Vietnam, to prevent the believers from carrying out their civic responsibilities, 

to sabotage the union of all the people, to go against the healthy culture of our 

nation, as well as superstitious activities, will be punished in conformity with 

the law.8 

The decree stipulates that religious organizations must be registered with the state and 

religious activities must be approved by the relevant levels of government, including, in 

some cases, the prime minister. For example, the “printing and dissemination,” and “the 

production, the commercialization, and the export and import” of religious products and 

literature “must be submitted to the regulation of the State.”9 The government must also 

approve the nomination, ordination, and the transfer of clergy and lay “specialists.”10 

Furthermore, religious organizations and officials must report, and obtain when necessary the 

authorization of the Bureau of Religious Affairs for, their interactions with foreign 

organizations and individuals, and their activities abroad.11 Finally, the decree essentially 

ensures that the Vietnamese government need not return confiscated religious properties to 

their original owners.12 

In addition to the 1999 Religion Decree, the government decree on administrative 

detention is frequently used to detain and harass religious believers for unofficial religious 

activities.13 This decree permits the use of administrative detention without trial for six 

months to two years as a means to punish those who contravene national security.14 

Activities that contravene national security are further defined in the Vietnamese Criminal 

Code to include activities seeking to overthrow the Communist government and attempts to 

undermine national unity, such as promoting division between religious believers and 

nonbelievers.15 

The Vietnamese government’s Religious Affairs Bureau is reportedly preparing a 

new ordinance on religion for consideration by the National Assembly.16 The draft law 

apparently contains provisions similar to the 1999 Religion Decree. One addition in the 

proposed ordinance is that religious organizations may apply for recognition by the state. 

However, the proposed definition of a religious organization – “an organization founded with 

a religious objective, endowed with a Charter in conformity with state law and a leadership 

approved by the State” – essentially precludes the recognition of religious organizations that 

are not controlled by the government.17

2. State Control of Religious Activities 

In Vietnam, as one witness before the Commission testified, “there is no freedom of 

religion, because the freedom of religion is controlled by the governmental authorities at all 

levels.”18 The preconditions of official recognition constitute the primary mechanism for this 

pervasive state control of religious communities and activities. The utilization of this 

mechanism as a means of control reportedly stems from the Vietnamese Communist Party’s 
142 

fear, due in part to historical factors, that independent, organized religions and religious 

communities could serve as alternative bases of loyalty, social organization, and political 

power.19 Hence, religion “is controlled by its incorporation as an organ of state and by 

denying it any autonomy.”20 

a. Officially recognized religious groups 

The Vietnamese government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic, 

Protestant, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations. The recognized 

Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao religious organizations were created and are operated by the 

government. The official Buddhist organization, the Vietnamese Buddhist Church, was 

created by the government in 1981 to put into place an officially controlled Buddhist 

organization that would subsume the popular Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), 

which has been effectively banned since that time. Hoa Hao organizations were dissolved 

after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and no Hoa Hao institution was recognized by the state until 

1999. At that time, the government created the Committee of Hoa Hao Representatives 

(CHHR). This organization is made up almost entirely of Communist Party members and 

apparently is not recognized as legitimate by the vast majority of Hoa Haos. Nevertheless, 

the CHHR has sought to control all Hoa Hao religious activity, particularly at the Hoa Hao 

village, which is the center of Hoa Hao religious life. 

Although the government has recognized some Cao Dai denominations, the large 

majority of Cao Dai organizations and their followers reportedly are opposed to the 

government-appointed committee that manages all Cao Dai affairs.21 Indeed, the 

government continues to control the official Cao Dai denominations tightly and to suppress 

the unofficial ones through this committee. A number of independent Cao Dai followers 

reportedly have been imprisoned for their opposition to government interference.22 In 

October 1998, two Cao Dai followers apparently were arrested and imprisoned after 

attempting to meet with the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance during his visit 

to Vietnam.23 The government also prohibits spiritist practices, which are key elements in 

the religion’s leadership selection process.24 Finally, the Vietnamese government reportedly 

confiscated much of the Cao Dai religious properties after 1975.25 

Although the Roman Catholic Church has generally fared better than other religious 

communities, they continue to face significant government restrictions. For example, the 

government controls the organization, agenda, and publications of the annual Pastoral 

Assembly of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Vietnam (CBCV); intervenes in the 

selection process of bishops, priests, and seminary students (resulting in a shortage of 

bishops and priests); influences the content of seminary instruction; and prohibits CBCV 

publications at the national or local levels.26 The government has reportedly imprisoned or 

detained a number of Catholic priests who have carried out pastoral activities without 

government permission or who were ordained without government approval. The 

government has confiscated thousands of Catholic Church properties, including churches, 

schools, hospitals, and seminaries in the north (since the 1950s) and in the south (since 

1975). A great number of these properties have not been returned and have been converted 

into meeting halls, storage facilities, and Communist education centers. 
143 

The state-controlled Buddhist organizations and the Protestant Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam (the officially recognized Protestant community in northern Vietnam) share many of 

the problems the Catholic Church faces, including government influence over the selection of 

religious leaders and the management of religious properties, prohibitions on religious 

publications, and the failure to return confiscated property. 

In April 2001, the Vietnamese government reportedly recognized the Evangelical 

Church of Vietnam in the south and its member churches.27 Legal status would be granted to 

300 individual churches, which apparently represent just a fraction of the Protestant churches 

in the country. The government would not recognize the majority of the ethnic minority 

Protestant churches in the Central Highlands. It has been reported that not all southern 

Protestants support the government’s planned recognition for fear it would mean the end of 

the Church’s autonomy, a concern that has been substantiated by reports that the Church’s 

new constitution must be approved by the Vietnamese government.28 

b. Unrecognized religious communities 

Notwithstanding the extensive state control over recognized religious communities, 

the Vietnamese government’s harshest repression is reserved for members of unrecognized 

communities, including the UBCV, the Hoa Hao, and independent Protestant churches. 

Over the past three years, the Vietnamese government has adopted what one witness 

who testified before the Commission called “a subtle, insidious strategy” to isolate UBCV 

clergy and followers.29 Although no longer in prison, several prominent UBCV leaders, 

including Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and Venerable Thich Quang Do, are under house 

arrest or strict police surveillance and are denied the ability to register their respective 

temples as their place of residence, thereby making their stay at their own temples illegal. 

Even when UBCV leaders manage to travel, they suffer from police harassment (including 

detention and strip searches).30 The Vietnamese government also prohibits works of charity 

and humanitarian relief by UBCV clergy; it blocked a recent attempt by UBCV leaders to 

provide relief to flood victims in the Mekong Delta. Moreover, the government continues to 

“demolish religious buildings, architectures, and statues; and confiscate church properties, 

some of which were then used as storage or transformed into government buildings.”31 In 

February 2001, UBCV monk Thich Thai Hoa (who submitted written testimony to the 

Commission hearing) organized a weeklong interfaith religious event near the city of Hue. 

Local officials reportedly set up roadblocks, forced students to attend school on the weekend 

that fell during the event, and engaged in other forms of harassment to prevent people from 

attending the gathering. Local officials reportedly also placed Father Ly under temporary 

house arrest in order to prevent his attendance at the event.32 

The Vietnamese government restricts the activities of the unofficial Hoa Hao 

Buddhist organizations and their members. Many Hoa Hao Buddhists cannot obtain permits 

to visit Hoa Hao village, the birthplace and center of the religion. The Vietnamese 

government also interferes with the Hoa Haos’ efforts to conduct charitable works (including 

recent attempts to provide relief to flood victims), which apparently is one of the four central 

principles of Hoa Hao Buddhism.33 Moreover, the government prohibits the public 

celebration of major ceremonies, such as the ceremony to commemorate the disappearance of 
144 

the religion’s founder, as well as the public display of important religious symbols, such as 

the Hoa Hao Buddhist flag.34 The government actively harasses and arrests Hoa Haos who 

seek to participate in religious celebrations or appeal for religious freedom. For example, in 

September 2000, five Hoa Hao Buddhists were sentenced to prison terms of one to three 

years for appealing to the central government against local police brutality that occurred 

during a December 1999 meeting to plan for the celebration of the founder’s birthday. In 

March 2001, local police officials arrested Le Quang Liem, a Hoa Hao leader in Ho Chi 

Minh City. It was reported that he was severely beaten and that the arrest was in anticipation 

of the planned March 19 commemoration of the Hoa Hao founder’s disappearance. Liem 

was released shortly after his arrest; however, he reportedly was later placed under 

“administrative surveillance,” which went into effect on March 17 and restricts his ability to 

travel in Vietnam for a period of two years.35 The government has not returned any of the 

hundreds of Hoa Hao properties confiscated after 1975.36 

The government continues to repress forcefully the activities of Protestants who are 

ethnic minorities or who are members of independent house churches (these groups make up 

the large majority of Vietnamese Protestants). Official documents recently published by 

Freedom House indicate that the Vietnamese government is conducting a campaign to co-opt 

and suppress the growth of the Protestant community, especially among the Montagnards, the 

Hmong, and other ethnic minorities.37 Independent Protestants face constant harassment 

from the Vietnamese authorities, including police raids on homes and house churches, 

detention and imprisonment, confiscation of religious and personal property, physical and 

psychological abuse, and fines for engaging in unapproved religious activities (such as 

collective worship, public religious expression and distribution of religious literature, and 

performing baptisms, marriages, or funeral services).38 In addition, it is reported that ethnic 

Hmong Protestants have been forced by local officials to agree to abandon their faith.39 

Finally, none of the 398 Montagnard Protestant Church properties seized by the Communist 

Party after 1975 have been returned. 

The ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces of 

Vietnam have a long history of strained relationship with the ethnic Vietnamese and 

successive governments, including during French rule and during the Vietnam War. After 

1975, the relationship between the Communist regime and the Montagnards in the Central 

Highlands was further strained by the mass migration of ethnic Vietnamese (at times 

encouraged and approved by the government) into the region. These migrants came to 

occupy lands traditionally held by ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic 

minorities constitute approximately two-thirds of the Protestant population in Vietnam 

introduced another volatile element into the already tense relationship. Indeed, the tenuous 

nature of the relationship between the government and ethnic minorities was demonstrated in 

February 2001, when thousands of Central Highlanders protested, seeking the return of 

ancestral lands and the freedom to practice their religion.40 

D. The Bilateral Trade Agreement and Normal Trade Relations Status 

For three consecutive years, from 1998 to 2000, President Clinton granted Vietnam a 

waiver from the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 

that restrict economic aid to countries with non-market economies that also have restrictive 
145 

emigration policies. Each year, congressional efforts to disapprove the presidential waiver 

have failed. 

In July 1999, the United States and Vietnam announced an “agreement in principle” 

on a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). The agreement was not officially signed until a year 

later (due to internal divisions among the VCP leadership) and must be ratified by the U.S. 

Congress. If the Congress approves the BTA, the United States would extend temporary 

normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam, which would significantly reduce U.S. tariffs 

on most imports from Vietnam. In addition, it would grant Vietnam access to U.S. 

government financial facilities that extend credits, credit guarantees, or investment 

guarantees. In return, Vietnam agreed to undertake a wide range of market-liberalization 

measures, including extending NTR treatment to U.S. exports, reducing tariffs on goods, 

easing barriers to U.S. services, committing to protect certain intellectual-property rights, and 

providing additional inducements and protections for foreign direct investment. The 

agreement does not address the Vietnamese government’s interference with the distribution 

of literature, multi-media broadcasts, and other forms of transmission into Vietnam, for 

example Radio Free Asia broadcasts. 

However, notwithstanding an approved BTA, Vietnam would be still subject to the 

Jackson-Vanik restrictions, unless they are waived by the President (and the waiver is not 

overturned by Congress). In other words, even with the BTA in place, the President can 

suspend NTR by not promulgating a Jackson-Vanik waiver or the Congress can suspend 

NTR by overturning a presidential waiver. 

E. Commission Recommendations 

With a new administration in place and as Congress prepares to consider the 

ratification of the Bilateral Trade Agreement, the time is ripe for the U.S. government to 

assess how the promotion of religious freedom factors into U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The 

Commission believes that approval of the BTA without any U.S. action with regard to 

religious freedom risks worsening the religious-freedom situation in Vietnam because it may 

be interpreted by the government of Vietnam as a signal of American indifference. We note 

that after approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations status for the People’s Republic of 

China, unaccompanied by any substantial U.S. action with regard to religious freedom in that 

country, religious freedom in China has declined markedly in the past year. With this 

background in mind, the Commission makes the following recommendations: 

1. The U.S. Congress should ratify the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 

Agreement (BTA) only after it passes a sense of the Congress resolution 

calling for the Vietnamese government to make substantial improvements 

in the protection of religious freedom or after the Vietnamese government 

undertakes obligations to the United States to make such improvements. 

Substantial improvements should be measured by the following 

standards: 
146 

1.1. Release from imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or 

intimidating surveillance persons who are so restricted due to 

their religious identities or activities. 

1.2. Permit unhindered access to religious leaders by U.S. 

diplomatic personnel and government officials, the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom, and respected 

international human rights organizations, including, if requested, 

a return visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious 

Intolerance. 

1.3. Establish the freedom to engage in religious activities 

(including the freedom for religious groups to govern themselves 

and select their leaders, worship publicly, express and advocate 

religious beliefs, and distribute religious literature) outside statecontrolled religious organizations and eliminate controls on the 

activities of officially registered organizations. Allow indigenous 

religious communities to conduct educational, charitable, and 

humanitarian activities. 

1.4. Permit religious groups to gather for annual observances of 

primary religious holidays. 

1.5. Return confiscated religious properties. 

1.6. Permit domestic Vietnamese religious organizations and 

individuals to interact with foreign organizations and individuals. 

The items listed in Recommendation 1 above are standards by which the progress of 

the Vietnamese government in the protection of religious freedom can be measured. The 

Commission believes that the BTA should not be approved until the Congress calls on the 

government of Vietnam to make substantial improvements in protecting religious freedom or 

until that government has demonstrated its commitment to protecting religious freedom as 

measured by these standards. 

The BTA does not currently include any provision that would safeguard human rights 

and religious freedom in Vietnam. The Commission believes that the seriousness and extent 

of religious-freedom violations in Vietnam warrant a commitment on the part of the 

Vietnamese government to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious 

freedom. The Commission does not endorse a particular method of securing such a 

commitment, but notes that IRFA authorizes the President to “negotiate and enter into a 

binding agreement with a foreign government to cease, or take substantial steps to address 

and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom.”41 

2. If Congress ratifies the BTA and approves conditional Normal Trade 

Relations (NTR) status for Vietnam, it should review Vietnam’s progress 

on the protection of religious freedom as part of an annual review of that 

status. 
147 

Upon ratification of the BTA, Vietnam’s conditional NTR status would still be 

subject to review by Congress on an annual basis if and when the President issues a JacksonVanik waiver for Vietnam. Should Congress decide to approve the BTA, the Commission 

urges that it examine Vietnam’s progress on the protection of religious freedom and human 

rights as part of this annual review. 

3. The United States should withhold its support for International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans to Vietnam (except those 

providing for basic human needs) until the government of Vietnam agrees 

to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom, 

as measured by the standards itemized in 1.1 through 1.6 above. 

The IMF and the World Bank reportedly are considering loans to the Vietnamese 

government of up to $800 million to further Vietnam’s economic reform programs. The 

proposed loan package would provide up to $400 million during the first two to three years 

of the program. An additional $400 million would be conditional upon the Vietnamese 

government making satisfactory progress in the implementation of its economic reforms 

during the program’s initial period. While these loans are part of the two organizations’ 

ongoing assistance to the Vietnamese government, they reportedly would represent the first 

set of IMF and World Bank loans to Vietnam in five years. Officials of the IMF and the 

World Bank apparently are hopeful that their respective executive boards will approve the 

loans in April 2001, with implementation to follow in May. As of the date that this report 

went to print, no decision has been made. 

As mentioned above in connection with congressional approval of the BTA, the 

Commission believes that supporting economic aid through international financial 

institutions that primarily benefits the Vietnamese government without requiring that 

government to make a commitment to substantially improve its protection of religious 

freedom may be interpreted as a signal of U.S. indifference. The Commission recognizes 

that Congress has set down policy guidelines for the withholding of U.S. support for IMF or 

World Bank loans on human rights grounds in both the International Financial Institutions 

Act of 1977 and IRFA.42 The Commission believes that the severity of the Vietnamese 

government’s violation of religious freedom, and its apparent unwillingness to make 

sustained improvements in the protection of religious freedom, warrants the use of this 

sanction. The United States, as a member of the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards, 

should withhold its support for loans to the government of Vietnam until that government 

agrees to make substantial improvement in the protection of religious freedom. The U.S. 

should not withhold its support for loans made for the purpose of providing for the basic 

human needs of the Vietnamese people.43 

4. The U.S. government should make the protection of religious freedom 

a high-priority issue in its bilateral relations with Vietnam, including in 

the annual human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government and 

in future trade negotiations, advocating substantial improvement in the 

protection of religious freedom as measured by the standards itemized as 

1.1 through 1.6 above. 
148 

The U.S. Department of State should advise the office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative (USTR) on the state of religious freedom and other 

human rights in Vietnam, and should request that the USTR advance the 

U.S. government’s interests in human rights in and through the 

negotiations and the provisions of any further trade agreement or 

companion agreement between the two countries. 

The United States and Vietnamese governments have held bilateral human rights 

dialogues since 1995. The U.S. government should ensure that the discussion of religious 

freedom receives high-priority attention in these annual dialogues, as well as in other 

bilateral contacts. The United States should press vigorously for substantial improvement in 

the protection of religious freedom in Vietnam, as measured by the specific standards 

referred to above. 

The State Department should ensure that the USTR, as the executive branch’s 

interagency coordinator of U.S. trade policy and the lead trade negotiator, is advised of the 

state of religious freedom and other human rights in Vietnam prior to and during its trade 

negotiations with its Vietnamese counterpart. Furthermore, the State Department should 

request that the USTR advance the U.S. government’s interests in promoting human rights 

and religious freedom in the conduct of its trade negotiations with the Vietnamese 

government and that such interests should be reflected in the provisions of any further trade 

agreement or companion agreement between the two countries. 

5. The U.S. government should insist that the Vietnamese government 

permit domestic Vietnamese religious and other non-governmental 

organizations to distribute their own and donated aid. 

One important aspect of many Vietnamese religious communities is their 

commitment, as a matter of conscience, to humanitarian relief and other works of charity. 

However, the Vietnamese government has prohibited indigenous religious groups and their 

members from providing relief and social services to the Vietnamese people.44 For example, 

in October 2000 the Vietnamese government barred UBCV leaders such as the Venerable 

Thich Quang Do and the Venerable Thich Khong Tanh from providing much-needed relief to 

victims of one of the largest floods in Vietnam’s recent history, despite the fact that the 

Vietnamese government was incapable of providing sufficient relief and was openly courting 

international relief aid. The Hoa Hao Buddhists were also prevented from providing flood 

relief. 

While the U.S. government should continue to provide humanitarian and relief aid to 

Vietnam should the need arise, the Commission believes that the United States should insist 

that the Vietnamese government permit domestic religious and other non-governmental 

organizations to distribute their own and donated aid. 

6. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance and 

exchange programs, support individuals (and organizations, if they exist) 

in Vietnam that are advocating human rights (including religious 

freedom), the rule of law, and legal reform. It should also support 
149 

exchanges between Vietnamese religious communities and U.S. religious 

and other non-governmental organizations concerned with religious 

freedom in Vietnam. 

The United States currently gives Vietnam around $8 million in direct foreign 

assistance, primarily humanitarian aid and support for economic reform. Although there are 

individuals in Vietnam who advocate for legal reform and human rights (including religious 

freedom), the Vietnamese government generally prohibits independent human rights, 

humanitarian, and other such organizations. In order to promote religious freedom in 

Vietnam, the U.S. government should support such individuals (and organizations, if they 

exist) in these efforts. This could be done through direct support as well as educational and 

other exchanges with appropriate U.S. partners. 

7. Until religious freedom significantly improves in Vietnam (as 

measured by the standards itemized as 1.1 through 1.6, above), the U.S. 

government should initiate or support a resolution to censure Vietnam at 

the annual meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights and should 

engage in a sustained campaign to persuade other governments to 

support it. 

8. The U.S. government should continue to support the Association for 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Working Group, and 

should encourage the Vietnamese government to join the working group. 

In 1993, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization adopted a Declaration on 

Human Rights that included a provision encouraging the ASEAN member states to form a 

regional human rights mechanism.45 Following this formal declaration, ASEAN – through 

consultations among representatives of the ASEAN member states, regional organizations, 

and Southeast Asian non-governmental organizations – established the Working Group for 

an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group). The Working Group is comprised 

of national working groups in member states which in turn are made up of representatives 

from the academe, non-governmental organizations, government, business, media, and 

“national human rights institutions.” To date, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 

Thailand have formed national working groups, and Singapore is in the process of forming 

one. In July 2000, the Working Group submitted to ASEAN a draft agreement that calls for 

the establishment of a permanent human rights commission. 

The Commission believes that the U.S. government should continue to support the 

Working Group and its efforts to promote the creation of a permanent ASEAN human rights 

organization. The U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to join the 

Working Group and establish its own national working group as a sign of its commitment to 

protecting religious freedom and other human rights. The establishment of such an 

organization in Vietnam would lay the foundation for regular discussions on human rights 

between Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. The Vietnamese government 

discussed with Working Group officials the possibility of forming such a national body in 

Vietnam during a recent visit to Hanoi. 
150 

9. The United States should continue to support Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

broadcasts into Vietnam as a vehicle for promoting religious freedom and 

human rights in that country. 

It is widely reported that the Vietnamese government jams RFA broadcasts into 

Vietnam. The reported efforts by the Vietnamese government to block RFA transmissions 

reflect RFA’s importance to the Vietnamese people as a source of news and information 

about Vietnam that is independent of the Vietnamese government. The Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should continue to support RFA broadcasts into 

Vietnam not only as a source of news and information but also as a vehicle for promoting 

religious freedom and human rights in that country. 

 

1

 The increase in religious practice in Vietnam has coincided with a loosening of government 

restrictions over social life in Vietnam. 

2

 Associated Press, “Vietnam detains Catholic priest for testimony against U.S. trade pact,” 

March 5, 2001; Steve Kirby, “Vietnam punishes priest who dared to speak out to US 

freedoms panel,” Agence France Presse, March 4, 2001. 

3

 Information pertaining to ethnic and religious demography is based on the following 

sources: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000, Washington, D.C., 2000; 

House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000, report prepared by U.S. 

Department of State. 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, Joint Committee Print, 231-233; Amnesty 

International, Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Religious Intolerance – Recent Arrests of 

Buddhists, January 2, 2001; Embassy of Vietnam, Some Facts on Religious Freedom in 

Vietnam, Washington, D.C., February 2001; Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, ed., Freedom of 

Religion and Belief – A World Report, (1997). 

4

 According to the State Department, an estimated 130,000 Baha’i followers resided in 

Vietnam prior to 1975. 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Vietnam,” 233. 

5

 Vietnam Constitution, art. 70. 

6

 Vietnam Constitution, art. 4, 9. 

7

 Vietnam Constitution, art. 3. 

8

 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Decree of the Government Concerning Religious Activities 

(April 19, 1999), trans. Stephen Denney. [Translated from Vietnamese to French by Eglise 

D’Asie.] 

9

 Ibid., art. 14. 

10 Ibid., art. 20, 21. 
151 

 

11 Ibid., art. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26. 

12 Ibid., art. 11, sec. 3 states, “The buildings, land and other items transmitted by these 

organizations or by religious officials to the organs of the State for it to manage and use, in 

application of the political line of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of the Provisional 

Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or 

given or offered to the State, are now the property of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” 

13 UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 

Question of Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, December 29, 1998, ¶ 17, 18, 19. 

[Government Decree CP/31.] 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Vo Van Ai, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearing on Vietnam, 

February 13, 2001, 26; Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Projet d’une Ordonnace sur la 

Religion (2000), trans. International Buddhist Information Bureau (2000). 

17 Ibid. 

18 The Rev. John Tran Cong Nghi, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

Hearing on Vietnam, February 13, 2001, 44. 

19 In the 1940s, from their base in southern Vietnam, the Hoa Hao Buddhists actively 

participated as a key group in the fight for independence from the French. However, the 

relationship between the Hoa Haos and the Vietnamese Communists was strained when the 

Communists reportedly attacked Hoa Haos without provocation in 1945. In 1947, the 

Communists reportedly killed Huynh Phu So, the founder of the religion, when he attended a 

meeting of the Vietnamese pro-independence forces convened by the Communists. Nguyen 

Long Thanh Nam, “Hoa Hao Buddhism, A Revolutionary Religion,” 1987 (E-mail message 

received December 13, 2000). 

20 Zachary Abuza, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearing on 

Vietnam (written testimony), February 13, 2001, 5. 

21 Sergei Blagov, The Cao Dai: A New Religious Movement (1999), 130-151. 

22 2000 Religious Freedom Report, “Vietnam,” 237. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Hum D. Bui, written statement submitted to the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, March 9, 2001. Blagov, The Cao Dai, 130-151. 
152 

 

25 Blagov, The Cao Dai, 132. 

26 The Rev. Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, written testimony submitted to the U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom, Hearing on Vietnam, February 13, 2001, 2-4. 

27 David Brunnstrom, “Hanoi recognizes southern protestant church branch,” Reuters, April 

3, 2001. 

28 USCIRF Interview with Protestant representative, December 6, 2000; Reuters, “Vietnam 

Protestants gather for historic conference,” February 7, 2001; Reuters, “Vietnam Protestants 

to pass ‘conforming’ chapter,” February 8, 2001. 

29 Vo Van Ai, Hearing on Vietnam (written testimony), 12. 

30 Ibid., 23. On February 4, 2001, prior to the Commission’s February 13, 2001 hearing, the 

Ven. Thich Quang Do, the UBCV deputy head, and his colleagues were arrested, 

interrogated, and strip-searched by local security personnel on their return from a traditional 

Lunar New Year visit to Ven. Thich Huyen Quang, the UBCV supreme patriarch. 

31 The Ven. Thich Thai Hoa, written testimony submitted to the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, Hearing on Vietnam, February 13, 2001, 2. According to 

one source, only 5 to 10 percent of the confiscated Buddhist properties in the south have been 

returned. USCIRF, Hearing on Vietnam (Abuza written testimony), 6. 

32 Bhikkhu Thich Thai Hoa, Report No. 1 of the Week of Prayer, Free Vietnam Alliance, 

February 9, 2001 (E-mail message received February 14, 2001); USCIRF Interview with 

Vietnamese-American organization, February 12, 2001; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam 

clamps down on religious fete in Hue,” February 14, 2001. 

33 The four principles are: Respect parents and ancestors; serve the country; maintain one’s 

faith in Hoa Hao Buddhism; and serve humanity. Huynh-Mai Nguyen, U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, Hearing on Vietnam, February 13, 2001, 1. 

34 USCIRF, Hearing on Vietnam (Huynh-Mai Nguyen written testimony), 3-4. 

35 David Brunnstrom, “Vietnam sect leaders allowed home, status unclear,” Reuters, March 

19, 2001; David Brunnstrom, “Vietnam restricts travel by dissident Buddhist,” Reuters, 

March 25, 2001. The Vietnamese authorities recently sentenced two other Hoa Hao 

Buddhist leaders to prison terms of two and five years, respectively. Nguyen Van Diem, Le 

Quang Liem’s deputy, was sentenced to two years in prison after he was arrested in March 

2001, in connection with Liem’s arrest. Ha Hai, the third highest-ranking Hoa Hao leader, 

was sentenced to five years in prison in January for violating house arrest rules and “abusing 

democratic rights of the state.” Hai was placed under house arrest in March 2000 for 

attempting to hold a commemoration of the founder’s disappearance. In November, he was 

re-arrested when he attempted to visit Ho Chi Minh City on the eve of President Clinton’s 

visit to Vietnam. 
153 

 

36 USCIRF, Hearing on Vietnam (Huynh-Mai Nguyen written testimony), 6; Central Council 

of Administrators of the Hoa Hao Buddhist Church in the United States, “List of Confiscated 

Hoa Hao Buddhist Church Properties in Vietnam,” February 2001. 

37 Center for Religious Freedom, “Directions for Stopping Religion”: Official Secret 

Vietnamese Documents on How to Arrest the Spread of Christianity and other Evidence of 

Religious Persecution, Freedom House, October 2000. 

38 The Rev. Paul Ai, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearing on 

Vietnam, February 13, 2001, 36-42. 

39 Religious Liberty Commission, “Exhibit 1,” On the Cruel Edges of the World: The Untold 

Story of the Persecution of Christians Among Vietnam’s Minority Peoples, World 

Evangelical Fellowship, Bangkok, Thailand, March 1999. 

40 Margot Cohen, “Thunder From the Highlands,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 1, 

2001 (http://www.feer.com/_0103_01/p024region.html, accessed March 26, 2001). 

41 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, § 404(c), 22 U.S.C. § 6444. 

42 Sec. 701, International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. § 262d; IRFA § 

405(a)(12), 22 U.S.C. § 6445. 

43 In March 2001, the Commission wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury communicating this 

recommendation. 

44 This appears to be in conflict with the government’s own regulations. Article 17 of the 

1999 Religion Decree provides that “the clergy and religious can carry out economic, cultural 

and social activities as all other citizens.” 

45 Association for Southeast Asian Nations, Bangkok Declaration, March – April 1993 

(http://www.rwgmechanism.com/asia.html, accessed March 26, 2001). 
154 

 
155 

XII. U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS DISCLOSURE 

There is a significant, undesirable gap in U.S. law regarding the most egregious 

religious-freedom violator countries: In many cases, foreign and domestic companies that are 

doing business in these countries can sell securities on U.S. markets without having to 

disclose fully (1) the details of the particular business activities in those countries, including 

plans for expansion or diversification; (2) the identity of all agencies of the governments of 

these countries with which the companies are doing business; (3) the relationship of the 

business activities to violations of religious freedom and other human rights; or (4) the 

contribution that the proceeds raised in the U.S. debt and equity markets will make to these 

business activities and hence, potentially to those violations. Across-the-board full 

disclosure of these details would prompt corporate managers to work to prevent their 

companies from supporting or facilitating these violations. It also would aid (1) U.S. 

investors in deciding whether to purchase the securities; (2) shareholders in exercising their 

ownership rights (including proposing shareholder resolutions for annual meetings and proxy 

statements); (3) the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 

enforcing existing sanctions; and (4) U.S. policymakers in formulating sound policy with 

respect to religious-freedom violator countries and U.S. capital markets. The Commission 

recommends that the U.S. require such disclosure. 

A. Background 

1. Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) 

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) contains a formal 

mechanism for identifying those foreign governments that have especially abysmal records 

of protecting religious freedom. Section 402(b)(1) of IRFA specifically directs the President 

at least annually to designate each country in which the government has engaged in or 

tolerated “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” as “a country of particular 

concern” (CPC).1

 According to section 3(11), the phrase “particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom” means violations that are systematic, ongoing, and egregious, including 

torture, prolonged detention without charges, disappearances, and other flagrant denials of 

human rights on account of an individual’s religious belief or practice.2

IRFA further directs the President to promote religious freedom in a designated CPC 

by taking one or more of the actions specified in section 405, unless the President determines 

that pre-existing sanctions are satisfactory or otherwise waives the requirement.3

 Such 

actions include the suspension of U.S. development assistance or security assistance under 

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; restrictions on the activities of the Export-Import Bank 

of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the Trade and 

Development Agency with respect to the foreign government involved (and certain related 

entities); U.S. opposition to loans by international financial institutions primarily benefiting 

the foreign government; the restriction of certain licenses for exports to the foreign 

government; prohibitions on certain transactions of U.S. financial institutions; and 

prohibitions on U.S. government procurement activities. 

The President, through his delegate, the Secretary of State, designated the following 
156 

countries as CPCs in October 1999 and again in September 2000: Burma, the People’s 

Republic of China (“China”), Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. In response to those designations, the 

President pursuant to IRFA has taken no additional actions, expressly relying instead on preexisting sanctions.4

2. Securities Transactions of Concern to the Commission 

The genocidal levels of destruction and religious persecution in Sudan first 

galvanized the Commission’s concern over securities transactions in the United States. The 

Commission views the government of Sudan as being the world’s most violent abuser of 

religious freedom; its murderous behavior is financed directly by the development of oil 

fields in south-central Sudan. Development of those fields has given the government both 

the incentives and the resources for waging a campaign of death and destruction against its 

own people. Development of the fields has been conducted, in league with the Sudanese 

government, by a joint venture that includes the China National Petroleum Company 

(CNPC), Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas), and Talisman Energy Corporation 

(Talisman). Each is a foreign company.5 CNPC is organized under Chinese law and 

controlled by the Chinese government. Petronas is Malaysia’s national petroleum 

corporation and is wholly owned by the Malaysian government. Talisman is a private 

corporation organized under Canadian law. 

In view of the specific circumstances in Sudan, including the close connection 

between oil development and the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses, the 

Commission has recommended that the U.S. government prohibit any foreign company from 

raising capital or listing its securities in U.S. markets as long as it is engaged in the 

development of oil and gas fields in Sudan. Although the Commission does not at this time 

recommend a general rule broadening these capital-market-access restrictions to all CPC 

governments or to U.S. or foreign companies with business activities in other CPCs, it will 

continue to examine such restrictions as U.S. policy options in light of the circumstances 

pertaining to each country.6

Because of CNPC’s heavy involvement in Sudan, the Commission was alarmed in 

1999 by press reports that CNPC wished to raise capital on U.S. markets. Indeed, CNPC 

eventually did do that. In April 2000, CNPC and its subsidiary, PetroChina Company 

Limited (PetroChina), offered shares in PetroChina to U.S. investors, saying that they would 

use the proceeds in part to retire debt CNPC had incurred previously. Concerned that CNPC 

might use U.S. capital to retire debt it had incurred in developing the Sudanese oil fields, the 

Commission studied (1) the current sanctions applicable to Sudan (the Sudanese Sanctions 

Regulations);7 and (2) the registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC) for the offering of PetroChina shares. The Commission learned that the 

Sudanese Sanctions Regulations contain a loophole. According to the interpretation of those 

regulations by OFAC, a U.S. person may purchase shares offered by a foreign company that 

does business in Sudan so long as the proceeds are not “earmarked” for a project in Sudan 

and the company’s business in Sudan is not a predominant part of its overall business.8

 

The registration statement filed in connection with the offering reflected no 

earmarking of proceeds for operations in Sudan. Rather, it contained a commitment by 
157 

CNPC to use an elaborate and murky procedure for channeling the proceeds so as to avoid 

any violation of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. Further, the registration statement 

indicated that CNPC’s business in Sudan was not a predominant part of its overall business. 

Thus, U.S. investors appeared to have been insulated from the sanctions regulations, even 

while the Sudanese government may be benefiting from the proceeds of the CNPC offering. 

However, it still was, and still remains, not entirely clear what CNPC’s true intentions were 

with respect to retiring any Sudan-related debt. Nor is it known yet that CNPC in fact did not 

use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related debt.9

In considering this loophole, the Commission came to appreciate that Talisman, 

whose shares are already traded on U.S. markets, would be able to make further offerings of 

securities, so long as it avoided any earmarking of the proceeds for Sudan, because 

Talisman’s business in Sudan is not a predominant part of its overall business. As a result, 

the Commission in May 2000 (and again in March 2001) formally recommended a flat ban 

against the sale of securities on U.S. markets by any foreign company that is engaged in 

developing the oil and gas fields in Sudan. The Commission also recommended that, short of 

such a ban, the United States should require any such company in offering securities to 

describe those development activities in Sudan and disclose whether it plans to use the 

proceeds to support them. The Commission explained that, in its view, such disclosures 

would be important for investment decisions and government policymaking.10 Today’s 

recommendation is an extrapolation of that second recommendation. 

Since the CNPC offering, the signs have increased that Chinese corporations will be 

trying to raise even greater amounts of capital on U.S. markets and may use that capital to 

support business not only in China, but in other CPCs. First, in October 2000, the China 

Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (known as Sinopec) offered shares in large quantities for 

sale on U.S. markets.11 The Wall Street Journal reported on October 11 that a Sinopec 

subsidiary (Zhongyuan Petroleum Corporation) had a joint venture in Sudan’s oil fields with 

a unit of CNPC; that last summer Sinopec gave its entire interest in the Sudan venture to 

CNPC; that it has not disclosed the value of any assets from CNPC in return for this transfer; 

and that there is evidence that Sinopec’s subsidiary continues to do business in Sudan’s oil 

fields. Moreover, Dow Jones reported in January 2001 that Sinopec had concluded an 

agreement and begun work on a $150 million project in Iran to upgrade petroleum facilities 

there. This activity may put Sinopec in violation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.12 Neither 

Sinopec’s business in Sudan nor its impending deal in Iran was disclosed in the Sinopec 

prospectus filed in connection with the offering.13 

Second, according to Reuters, an executive vice-president of the New York Stock 

Exchange (NYSE) stated that six or seven other Chinese corporations had plans to offer 

shares for sale on U.S. markets during 2001.14 According to the same executive, the 

PetroChina and Sinopec offerings had helped to increase the value of shares of Chinese 

corporations traded on the NYSE to $6.1 billion, a tenfold increase since the end of 1999. 

Finally, according to another press account, one of those Chinese corporations, the China 

National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), may invest some of the proceeds from its 

offering in another CPC, Iran, as well as in other countries that have experienced violations 

of religious freedom, including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.15
158 

Although the efforts of foreign companies (e.g., CNPC and Sinopec) to obtain capital 

on U.S. markets have seized the Commission’s attention, it is apparent that the efforts of U.S. 

companies deserve attention too. For example, many U.S. companies have made, or wish to 

make, investments in China and may work to raise capital on U.S. markets to support such 

investments. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, direct foreign investment in 

China by U.S. companies equaled approximately $7.7 billion in 1999.16 Although U.S. 

sanctions imposed in 1997 have virtually eliminated all U.S. investments in Burma, the 

Unocal Corporation (Unocal) still has significant operations there.17 

In sum, judging by the recent offerings of Chinese companies and increasing 

investments by U.S. and foreign companies in China, potentially large amounts of U.S. 

capital can flow into business activities in CPCs through sales of securities on U.S. markets 

by U.S. and foreign companies. A prime example is the possibility that the proceeds from 

sales of CNOOC’s shares will be used in two CPCs – China and Iran.18 

3. U.S. Economic Sanctions 

U.S. economic sanctions present the only significant legal constraint, albeit a porous 

one, on the flow of U.S. capital into CPCs through sales of securities on U.S. capital markets. 

Some U.S. economic sanctions apply to all CPC countries. Those sanctions govern the 

behavior of U.S. persons – for example, U.S. citizens, entities organized under the laws of 

jurisdictions within the United States, or persons located in the United States.19 Each set of 

those sanctions varies substantially one from another. At one extreme, the sanctions 

foreclose most forms of direct economic interaction between U.S. persons and the CPC. The 

sanctions for Sudan offer an example of that extreme.20 At the other end of the scale, the 

sanctions in question permit most forms of economic interaction. The sanctions for China 

are the prime example.21 

The key point, however, is that none of the current sanctions entirely forecloses U.S. 

persons from purchasing securities offered by a company that is doing business in a CPC. 

Thus, in varying degrees, they allow U.S. capital to flow into the economies of the CPCs. In 

particular, U.S. persons are free to purchase shares from offerings by foreign companies 

where the only CPC in which they do business is China. For the other CPCs, the situation is 

more restrictive. For example, U.S. persons are free to purchase shares offered by non-U.S. 

companies where the CPC in which they do business is: 

-- Burma, but only so long as the company does not derive its profits predominantly 

from its own involvement in the economic development of resources located in 

Burma;22 or 

-- Sudan, but only so long as the proceeds are not earmarked for use in Sudan, the 

company’s business in Sudan is not the predominant part of its overall business, and 

the company is not controlled by the government of Sudan.23 

In short, there are pathways through the sanctions thicket by which U.S. persons are 

able to invest in foreign companies that do business in CPCs. The pathway in the case of 

China is wide open, and, in the case of the other CPCs, more restricted but nevertheless 
159 

available. We have not yet found comprehensive statistics on how much capital is raised 

from U.S. markets by foreign companies that do business in CPCs, and therefore recommend 

that the executive branch collect and maintain statistics on the nature and extent of U.S. 

business interests in CPCs and U.S. capital markets activity by foreign companies that 

conduct business activities in CPCs. Prominent examples include oil and gas companies 

such as TotalFina/Elf, S.A., BP Amoco Corporation and Royal Dutch/Shell.24

While investment in foreign companies is the principal way by which U.S. capital can 

flow into CPCs, investment in U.S. companies is another, but much less substantial, way. 

U.S. persons are free to purchase shares from offerings by U.S. companies that do business in 

China or, in the case of at least one U.S. company, in Burma.25 However, the various 

sanctions restrict to a trickle the level of business U.S. companies may do lawfully in the 

other CPCs. Hence, as a practical matter, there are no opportunities for significant amounts 

of U.S. capital to flow through U.S. companies into those quarters. 

4. SEC Disclosure Requirements 

The SEC’s disclosure regulations are generally designed to provide investors in U.S. 

markets with “material” information about the companies offering securities and the 

securities being offered. However, materiality turns on whether the information in question 

would be likely to be significant to a reasonable investor in the total mix of available 

information, and the SEC has generally viewed “significance” from an economic 

standpoint.26 Thus, the overall mix of available information would determine whether a 

company necessarily would or would not have to describe the details of its involvement in 

the CPC, the relationship of that involvement to violations of religious freedom, and the 

specific use of the proceeds to support the involvement. 

It is certainly possible to imagine a case where all of that information would be 

material from a purely economic standpoint. Talisman, one of the partners in the 

development of the Sudanese oil fields, is a good example. Its activities in Sudan may not be 

the predominant part of its business, but they may nevertheless be large enough potentially to 

affect the company’s overall financial health. If so, the relationship of Talisman’s business, 

including use of the proceeds, to the murderous behavior of the Sudanese government may 

well be of significance to a reasonable investor because the behavior has generated civil war, 

instability, deterioration of the population and the national infrastructure, poor relations with 

foreign governments, and an international divestment campaign. With respect to the last 

factor, in February 2001, the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, a coalition of Canadian 

NGOs, called for a divestment campaign against Talisman.27 According to Canadian news 

sources, the Royal Bank of Canada, which is one of the largest Talisman shareholders, is also 

being targeted for a boycott and other consumer action if it does not divest itself of Talisman 

shares. 

On the other hand, it is certainly possible to imagine a case where all the information 

would not be material from a purely economic standpoint – for example, where the level of 

business in the CPC were only a tiny fraction of the overall business of the company. Of 

course, in absolute terms, the investment may still be substantial, so that the data could still 

be important for reasons other than valuation of the offered securities. 
160 

The point is that current SEC requirements for both foreign and U.S. issuers do not 

necessarily call for all of the data in all cases.28 An examination of two central sets of 

disclosure requirements underscores this point. 

Risk Factors. One provision applicable to foreign private issuers calls for a 

disclosure of those “risk factors that are specific to the company or its industry and make an 

offering speculative or one of high risk,” including “factors relating to the countries in which 

it operates.”29 Similarly, the comparable provision for U.S. issuers calls for a discussion of 

“the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.”30 Unfortunately, 

however, China’s egregious violations of religious freedom by themselves are not likely to be

factors that make an offering risky in the case of a company that does business in China, yet 

they are part of an overall set of policies and practices that arguably create a shaky political 

and business environment. 

Use of Proceeds. Another provision applicable to foreign issuers calls for a statement 

of “the estimated net amount of the proceeds broken down into each principal intended use 

thereof.” It adds: “If the company has no specific plans for the proceeds, it should discuss 

the principal reasons for the offering.”31 The comparable provision for U.S. issuers is 

identical substantively. It calls for “the principal purposes for which the net proceeds ... 

from the securities to be offered are intended to be used and the approximate amount 

intended to be used for each such purpose.”32 The provision adds: “Where registrant has no 

current specific plan for the proceeds, or a significant portion thereof, the registrant shall so 

state and discuss the principal reasons for the offering.”33 

This means that there are situations in which Talisman can make an offering without 

having to discuss the extent to which an infusion of U.S. capital into it might end up 

supporting the behavior of the government of Sudan. It could keep any use of the proceeds 

in Sudan to a minor level in relative terms, or it could simply postpone specific planning. 

That, however, would leave prospective investors and government policymakers who care 

about the persecution in Sudan completely in the dark. The same is true about a U.S. 

company that is doing business in China. As another example, in Unocal’s prospectus filed 

with the SEC in August 1999, the entire “use of proceeds” section reads as follows: “We will 

use the net proceeds from the sale of the common stock purchased from us pursuant to the 

plan for our general corporate purposes, including investments in, contributions to, or 

extensions of credit to our subsidiaries.”34 

Disclosure Example. Upon preliminary research, the Commission is concerned that 

U.S. and foreign companies with significant business interests in CPCs are not disclosing the 

nature and extent of these interests, as well as the risks associated with the abhorrent human 

rights records of these countries and their designation as CPCs. 

One example is Nike, Inc. (Nike). According to the annual report filed by Nike with 

the SEC for the fiscal year ending May 31, 2000, 43 percent of Nike’s footwear and an 

unspecified percentage of its apparel is manufactured by independent contractors in China.35 

Although China-specific revenue figures are not reported, fiscal year 2000 revenues for the 

Asia/Pacific region for Nike footwear and apparel were $928.2 million. Nike also reported 

that it had a branch office or subsidiary in China. However, the identity of these 
161 

“independent contractors” in China or their relationship with the Chinese government is not 

disclosed. Likewise, the Nike Form 10-K does not discuss the Chinese government’s 

dreadful human rights record, its designation by the U.S. government as an egregious violator 

of religious freedom under IRFA, or the potential sanctions associated with such designation. 

Indeed, there is no mention of human rights in the entire filing.36

In Nike’s prospectus filed with the SEC in April 1999 in connection with a $500 

million offering of debt securities, no information is provided on Nike’s business in China or 

on any risks associated with that business as a result of China’s record on human rights, or 

specifically on religious freedom.37 Nor are potential investors told whether or not Nike will 

use the proceeds from its debt offering to support its business in China. The entire “Use of 

Proceeds” section of the prospectus reads as follows: 

Unless we indicate otherwise in the applicable prospectus supplement, we 

intend to use the net proceeds from the sale of the debt securities for general 

corporate purposes, which may include, but are not limited to, refinancing of 

debt, working capital, capital expenditures and investments in subsidiaries.38 

Thus, potential investors in the Nike debt offering were not made aware of the nature 

and extent of Nike’s business in China (including the identity of its Chinese business 

partners) or the potential risks that flow from China’s human rights record. 

B. Commission Recommendations 

The Commission is concerned that significant and material information is being 

withheld from the U.S. investing public. Foreign companies appear to be able to raise capital 

in U.S. markets without disclosing their business interests in CPCs, the risks associated 

therewith, and whether or not the proceeds from the sale of securities will be used to support 

their business in the CPC (and perhaps to support a foreign government that has been found 

to engage in or tolerate egregious religious-freedom violations). The problem is especially 

acute in the case of foreign companies because unlike U.S. companies, foreign companies are 

generally permitted under U.S. law to do business in CPCs that are subject to comprehensive 

U.S. economic sanctions. Moreover, these companies can, in a wide range of circumstances, 

raise capital in U.S. markets without violating those sanctions. Thus, the issue of adequate 

disclosure is particularly important. Most important, however, is that reasonably prudent 

investors in U.S. financial markets may and should deem the information described above as 

material to their investment decisions. 

Against that background, the Commission makes the following recommendations: 

1. The United States should require any U.S. or foreign issuer of 

securities that is doing business in a country that has been designated as a 

“country of particular concern” (CPC) under the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998 to disclose in any registration statement filed with 

the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for any new offering 

of securities the following information as to each such country: 
162 

1.1. the nature and extent of the business that it and its affiliates 

are conducting in the particular CPC, (i) including any plans for 

expansion or diversification and any business relationships with 

agencies or instrumentalities of the government of the CPC and 

(ii) specifying the identity of such agencies or instrumentalities; 

1.2. whether it plans to use the proceeds of the sale of the 

securities in connection with its business in the CPC and, if so, 

how; and 

1.3. all significant risk factors associated with doing business in 

the CPC, including, but not limited to: (i) the political, economic 

and social conditions inside the CPC, including the policies and 

practices of the government of the CPC with respect to religious 

freedom; (ii) the extent to which the business of the issuer and its 

affiliates directly or indirectly supports or facilitates those policies 

and practices; and (iii) the potential for and likely impact of a 

campaign by U.S. persons based on human rights concerns to 

prevent the purchase or retention of securities of the issuer, 

including a divestment campaign or shareholder lawsuit. 

2. The United States should require any issuer that is doing business in a 

CPC to disclose the information specified in items 1.1 and 1.3 above in its 

filings with the SEC, including its annual proxy statement or annual 

report, in the case of a U.S. issuer, or its U.S. markets annual report, in 

the case of a foreign issuer. 

The benefits of these recommended disclosures would be substantial. They would 

give corporate managers strong incentives to ensure that their organizations are not 

participating in, or in any way facilitating, religious persecution in CPC countries. And they 

would provide information upon which prospective investors, shareholders, OFAC, and 

government policymakers could all make wiser decisions for their particular purposes. On 

the other side of the balance, the costs of the disclosures would be modest from the 

standpoint of preparing them. Of more concern is the potential for complicating and even 

increasing issuers’ legal liabilities. While that potential warrants close examination, the 

Commission believes that it does not outweigh the benefits of disclosure, particularly 

because it would expect economic materiality to continue to be the core principle from which 

those liabilities would arise. 

3. The U.S. government, including Congress, should examine how the 

structuring of securities transactions or the manipulation of corporate 

relationships by non-U.S. issuers can be used to circumvent U.S. 

economic sanctions. 

The CNPC/PetroChina securities offering discussed above is an example of a 

significant possible loophole in U.S. sanctions law. In that case, a newly-created subsidiary 

company (PetroChina) was able to sell securities to U.S. investors despite the fact that its 
163 

parent company (CNPC) did significant business in Sudan. According to OFAC, this 

securities transaction fell outside the Sudan sanctions apparently because the predominant 

part of PetroChina’s business was not in Sudan, and the proceeds of the sale were not 

earmarked for use in Sudan. Under current law, CNPC may indeed not have been able to sell 

its securities to U.S. investors, whereas the newly-created PetroChina subsidiary could, and 

did. 

The Commission is concerned that transactions may be structured or corporate 

relationships manipulated (as, for example, between a parent and one of its subsidiaries) so as 

to sell securities to U.S. investors notwithstanding U.S. economic sanctions. The 

Commission therefore recommends that the administration and Congress examine carefully 

the nature and extent of this potential problem and the legal tools necessary or available to 

address it, with a view toward ensuring that one of the central purposes of U.S. economic 

sanctions – preventing the target country from obtaining funds from U.S. investors – is not 

circumvented. 

 

1

 22 U.S.C.§6442(b)(1). 

2

 22 U.S.C.§6402(11). 

3

 See IRFA §§ 402(c)(5), 405, 407, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(c)(5), 6445, 6447. 

4

 See Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, State 

Department, to U.S. Congress, October 22, 1999; Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant 

Secretary For Legislative Affairs, State Department, to U.S. Congress, September 26, 2000. 

5

 The remaining joint venture partner is Sudapet, which is Sudan’s national petroleum 

company. A number of other companies are reportedly active in Sudan’s oil and gas 

industry, including TotalFina/Elf (France), Royal Dutch Shell and Trafigura Beheer B.V. 

(Netherlands), AGIP (Italy), Lundin Oil Corporation (Sweden), OMV (Austria), Gulf 

Petroleum Corporation (Qatar), and National Iranian Gas Company (Iran). See Energy 

Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Sudan, November 2000 

(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan2.html, accessed November 11, 2000); Amnesty 

International, Sudan: Oil in Sudan: Deteriorating Human Rights, March 5, 2000 

(http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/ai.nsf/index/AFR540012000, accessed February 5, 2001). 

6

 In September and October 2000, the press reported that the government of China was 

considering offering sovereign bonds in a total amount of $1 billion in the near future, at 

least in part to U.S. investors. In November, the Commission wrote to President Clinton that, 

in its view, the President has the authority under IRFA to prohibit the purchase of China 

sovereign bonds by U.S. financial institutions. It asked the President if he agreed with the 

Commission’s conclusion and, if so, whether he intended to use his authority to prevent the 

China sovereign bond issue until the Chinese government made substantial improvements in 

respect for religious freedom and provided sufficient assurances to guarantee that the 

proceeds were never used to support religious persecution. The President’s response did not 

address the question of his authority under IRFA, but he said that he did not favor prohibiting 
164 

 

the sale. Also in November, plans to offer China sovereign bonds were reportedly shelved. 

In March 2001, the Commission wrote to President Bush with the same inquiry that it had 

made to President Clinton. If and when China sovereign bonds are offered to U.S. investors, 

the Commission will examine the circumstances and consider whether to recommend that the 

President exercise his authority to prevent such a sale. 

7

 31 C.F.R. Part 538. 

8

 See Letter dated March 27, 2000, from Newcomb (OFAC) to Wyckoff (USCIRF) (FAC 

No. SU-180427). 

9

 For a detailed discussion of the Commission’s investigations, see U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, Staff Memorandum to the Chairman: Religious Freedom in 

Sudan, China, and Russia, May 1, 2000, 65-80 (“Staff Memorandum”). The Commission 

recommended that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigate the 

adequacy and reliability of CNPC’s filings, and the SEC responded that it does not 

independently investigate the accuracy of information in such filings. Report of the United 

States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2000, Recommendation 

1.13, 39 (“USCIRF 2000 Annual Report”); letter dated January 9, 2001, from David .H. 

Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission, to Elliott Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF. The Commission also recommended to 

the Treasury Department that OFAC investigate possible violations of the Sudanese 

Sanctions Regulations, and OFAC notified the Commission that it did not find any violation 

of the existing sanctions regime. USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendations 1.10, 

1.11, and 1.12, 37-39; letter dated November 15, 2000, from R. Richard Newcomb, Director, 

Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, to Elliott Abrams, Chairman, 

USCIRF. 

10 USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, Recommendation 1.9, 36-37. 

11 See SEC Registration Statement, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Reg. No. 

333-12502); Far Eastern Economic Review, November 8, 2000. 

12 50 U.S.C. §1701. 

13 In October 2000, the Commission wrote to the SEC to recommend that it investigate the 

adequacy and accuracy of the disclosures in Sinopec’s registration statement filed with the 

SEC in connection with its securities offering. 

14 Reuters, “N.Y. Stock Exchange expects several Chinese IPOs,” December 1, 2000. 

15 Bloomberg, “CNOOC Plans to Double Profit in 5 Years by Pumping Oil Overseas,” 

November 23, 2000. 

16 Data received by USCIRF from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. According to the U.S.-

China Business Council and the China Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
165 

 

Cooperation, the figure for 1999 U.S. direct investment in China is approximately $6 billion. 

This figure first appeared in the November-December 2000 issue of The China Business 

Review. 

17 Unocal Corporation was able to maintain its activities in Burma because these activities 

predated the implementation of sanctions in 1997. Unocal’s 1999 Annual Report indicates 

that it has “an approximate 28 percent non-operating working interest in natural gas 

production from the Yadana field, offshore Myanmar [Burma] in the Andaman Sea.” 

Revenues from this interest in 2000 were reported by Unocal at $72 million. See Unocal 

Form 10-K filed for fiscal year 2000. A few other U.S. companies reportedly have some 

presence in Burma. See Investor Responsibility Research Center, “Multinational Business in 

Burma (Myanmar),” December 2000.

18 The CNOOC initial public offering opened on the New York Stock Exchange on February 

27, 2001. 

19 For an example of a definition of “U.S. persons” for sanctions purposes, see 31 C.F.R., § 

538.315. 

20 See 31 C.F.R., Part 538. 

21 See for example the highly selective sanctions imposed in response to the Tiananmen 

Square massacre, which appear at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note (P.L. 101-246, title IX, § 902, 104 

Stat. 83 (Feb. 16, 1990); P.L. 102-549, Title II, § 202(e), 106 Stat. 3658). 

22 See 31 C.F.R. § 537.405. 

23 See Letter dated March 27, 2000, from Newcomb (OFAC) to Wyckoff (USCIRF) (FAC 

No. SU-180427); Staff Memorandum, 65-80. 

24 According to its 1999 Annual Report, TotalFina/Elf S.A., a French company, has 

operations in Iran and Burma. According to its website, BP/Amoco has business activities in 

China and Iran. According to its website and its most recent Form 20-F filed with the SEC, 

Royal Dutch Shell has business activities in China, Iran, and Sudan. 

25 See generally 31 C.F.R. Part 537. 

26 See, e.g., Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 

Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (April 1999). 

27 See Statement by the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, February 13, 2001 

(www.web.net/~iccaf/huanrights/sudaninfo/harker1year.htm, accessed March 28, 2001). 

28 The Commission has asked the SEC for its views on whether the nature and extent of 

disclosure recommended by the Commission below is already required by existing law. In 

March 2000, the Commission received a detailed response from the SEC, in which it stated 
166 

 

that disclosure of a company’s connections with CPCs “will or will not be required 

depending on the materiality of the financial impact of conducting that business.” It went on 

to say that a company selling its securities in a public offering is not required to disclose the 

use that it will make of the proceeds of such sales when the offering is made in response to 

favorable market conditions, rather than to fund specific actions. Letter dated March 26, 

2001 from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC to Elliott 

Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF. The Commission is concerned that because many public 

offerings are made on the basis of market conditions, companies can raise funds in U.S. 

capital markets to support business activities in CPC countries without having to disclose 

this. In addition, the failure to require disclosure of use of proceeds under these 

circumstances may have an impact on the enforcement of sanctions regulations. In the case 

of Sudan, as discussed above, U.S. persons are free to purchase shares offered by non-U.S. 

companies that have business activities in Sudan as long as those activities are not the 

predominant part of their overall business and as long as the proceeds of the sale are not 

earmarked for use in Sudan. Enforcement of the latter requirement may be more difficult in 

some cases because there is no disclosure requirement. 

29 SEC Final Rule, International Disclosure Standards, Form 20-F, Part I, Item 3(D) 

(http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-41936.htm). 

30 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). 

31 SEC Final Rule, International Disclosure Standards, Form 20-F, Part I, Item 3(C)(1) 

(http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-41936.htm). 

32 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.504. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Unocal Corporation, Form S-3 Registration Statement, filed with the SEC August 2, 1999. 

This prospectus was filed in connection with a dividend reinvestment and common stock 

purchase plan. 

35 See Nike, Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2000, filed with the SEC 

August 29, 2000, 4. 

36 In Nike’s Form 10-K filed for the previous fiscal year ending May 31, 1999, China’s 

human rights record was obliquely mentioned in the section on “Trade Regulation:” “While 

the U.S. continues to have foreign policy as well as human rights concerns with China, the 

Clinton administration and Congress have opposed using China’s [Normal Trade Relations] 

status as a means of addressing those concerns.” Nike 1999 10-K, p. 5. This reference does 

not appear in Nike’s fiscal year 2000 annual report, notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s 

designation of China as a CPC in September of that year. 

37 Nike’s other public filings are incorporated by reference into the prospectus. Prospectus, p. 

4. 
167 

 

38 Prospectus, p. 6. According to a search in the SEC’s electronic database, EDGAR, no 

prospectus supplement appears to have been filed for this offering. 
168 
169 

XIII. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

A. Background 

In its first two years, the Commission has found significant religious-freedom 

violations in some countries that receive U.S. foreign assistance. Foreign aid can be an 

important tool to promote religious freedom either directly or indirectly. Foreign assistance 

can support programs directly concerned with promoting religious freedom, such as legal 

advocacy, technical assistance, or human rights education. It can also support religious 

freedom indirectly by supporting programs that promote, for example, democracy, civil 

society, rule of law, professional law enforcement, and judicial independence. 

The provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) explicitly 

endorse the use of foreign assistance funds to promote religious freedom. In IRFA, Congress 

made a finding that in connection with its foreign assistance programs, the U.S. “should 

make a priority of promoting and developing legal protections and cultural respect for 

religious freedom.”1

 Congress also recommended that in countries where religious-freedom 

violations occur U.S. missions develop a strategy, as part of their annual program planning, 

to promote religious freedom and to allocate funds to programs “deemed to assist in the 

promotion of the right to religious freedom.”2 

In the course of examining the conditions of religious freedom and U.S. policy in 

several countries, the Commission has made recommendations regarding the specific areas in 

which religious freedom could be promoted through U.S. foreign assistance.3 In addition, in 

November 2000, the Commission wrote to the heads of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy to inquire about the 

extent to which the promotion of religious freedom is a part of their programs and activities 

in such countries as Russia, Nigeria, Egypt, Turkey, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Laos, 

Turkmenistan, and Indonesia. Members of the Commission’s staff have met with USAID 

staff regarding aid programs in Nigeria and Pakistan, as well as with representatives of nongovernmental organizations who contract with USAID to operate programs in those countries 

and in Indonesia. Further, in December 2000, the Commission recommended that the State 

Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom should include a complete 

description of the nature and magnitude of programs funded by the U.S. government that 

touch on the promotion of religious freedom or religious tolerance (including person-toperson exchanges with the United States) in each country that has significant religiousfreedom violations but nevertheless receives U.S. foreign aid. 

Concomitant with the emphasis on using U.S. foreign assistance to promote religious 

freedom is the principle that such assistance should not serve to undermine the protection of 

religious freedom or contribute to religious intolerance. In that regard, IRFA provides that it 

is U.S. policy to channel foreign assistance to governments other than those found to be 

engaged in “gross violations” of the right to freedom of religion.4

In addition, the Commission is concerned that U.S. foreign assistance is not used to 

support organizations that engage in violence that targets individuals on the basis of religion 

or that support official government policies of religious discrimination, or programs that 
170 

discriminate against recipients or beneficiaries on the basis of religion. Therefore, the 

Commission makes the following recommendations. 

B. Commission Recommendations 

1. No U.S. foreign assistance should be provided to any U.S. or foreign 

person (governmental or non-governmental) who, in a foreign country 

and at any time during the preceding 24-month period, has (a) committed 

acts of violence targeting individuals on account of their religious belief 

or practice, or (b) served as an instrumentality of official government 

policies of invidious religious discrimination. Furthermore, no U.S. 

foreign assistance should be provided to any program that discriminates 

against recipients or beneficiaries on the basis of religion. 

2. The State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom 

Report (or in a classified addendum) should identify (a) agencies or 

instrumentalities of foreign governments engaged in violations of 

religious freedom, and (b) non-governmental entities engaged in 

violations of religious freedom and describe the nature and extent of 

those violations.5

 

1

 IRFA § 501(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 2151n note. 

2

 IRFA § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 6415. 

3

 See the recommendations on India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and Vietnam in 

Report of the Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2001. 

4

 IRFA § 2(b)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (b)(2). 

5

 See IRFA §§ 102(b)(1)(B), 402(b)(2), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6412(b)(1)(B), 6442(b)(2). 
171 

XIV. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT AND THE STATE 

DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM – 2000

A. Introduction 

One of the guiding purposes and principles behind the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA) is to make the issue of international religious freedom an integral part 

of this nation’s foreign policy agenda. The conditions of religious freedom in certain 

countries may be grave and deteriorating – in many instances on account of factors beyond 

the control of the United States – but not, if the IRFA process is working properly and 

vigorously, on account of a lack of attention paid to the issue as a matter of U.S. foreign 

policy. This report assesses the vitality and effectiveness of certain parts of the IRFA process 

as it is functioning in its second year.1

IRFA sets out a number of interrelated mechanisms to further U.S. promotion of 

international religious freedom: 

-- the creation in the State Department of an Office of International Religious 

Freedom headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; 

-- an annual report by the State Department on the conditions of religious freedom in 

each foreign country and U.S. actions to promote religious freedom; 

-- a requirement that the President designate those countries that are the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom and generally take action to oppose 

violations; and 

-- the creation of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

The Commission was created both to monitor the international religious-freedom 

situation and to make recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and the 

Congress as to how the United States can further the protection and promotion of religious 

freedom. 

Most of the mechanisms established by IRFA are now in their second year of 

existence, and in September 2000, four significant events occurred with respect to IRFA and 

U.S. foreign policy related to international religious freedom. First, the State Department 

issued its Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000 (2000 Annual Report), 

finding that: “Much of the world's population lives in countries in which the right to religious 

freedom is restricted or prohibited.” Second, then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 

announced those countries designated as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) – the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom.2

 Disappointingly, only those countries named as 

CPCs in 1999 were so designated in 2000, despite ample evidence that others had met the 

statutory threshold. Third, Secretary Albright announced the actions that she would take 

pursuant to IRFA to promote religious freedom in those countries designated as CPCs. 

Again disappointingly, no additional action was taken against any CPC. And fourth, Robert 

A. Seiple, the first Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, stepped down 
172 

from his office – leaving this post vacant through the date this report went to print. 

B. Importance of the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 

The Annual Report on International Religious Freedom is an important means of 

keeping religious freedom high on the foreign policy agenda and promoting religious 

freedom abroad. It brings to light the facts on the ground, and – perhaps just as significant – 

it describes what the U.S. government is doing to promote religious freedom around the 

world. In the International Religious Freedom Act, Congress stated that it was the policy of 

the United States to oppose violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by 

governments of foreign countries and to promote religious freedom through specific actions 

targeting violators. In other words, the law requires that U.S. foreign policy take into 

account the nature and severity of religious-freedom violations, and be adjusted accordingly. 

This report is the yardstick with which to measure the U.S. government’s progress in meeting 

the goals of the statute. The Commission urges all those interested in promoting religious 

freedom to review carefully what the 2000 Annual Report says U.S. policy is toward 

violators of religious freedom and what the United States is doing to promote religious 

freedom. Unfortunately, the report shows that in several key countries – those in which 

significant religious-freedom violations occur – U.S. policies and actions do not reflect the 

gravity of the situation. 

C. Reporting on the Facts and Circumstances of Religious Freedom 

The State Department has done a highly commendable job in its second annual report 

of telling the tragic story of religious persecution around the globe. As the Commission 

noted in its own first annual report released in May 2000, as important as the report itself is 

the impact that its preparation has had on the State Department and our embassies. This 

year’s report generally shows a more complete understanding of religious-freedom issues and 

extensive fact-finding and verification. It reflects hard work on the ground. 

In other respects as well, this year’s report is an improvement over last year, and the 

Commission is pleased that some of the recommendations made in its first annual report 

appear to have been adopted by the Department.3

 Each country report now has an 

introduction generally identifying the most significant religious-freedom problems in that 

country. There is a separate subsection detailing relevant law. The Commission’s review of 

the Department’s instruction cable sent to the embassies earlier this year also shows that the 

Department incorporated many of the Commission’s suggestions in what information it 

solicited from embassy officials.4

 

However, problems remain. In some of the reports, the main thrust of what is 

happening and why is lost in detail and through omissions of important context. 

For example, the 2000 Annual Report, in its dozen or so pages relating to Sudan, does 

not adequately address the linkage between oil development in Sudan and government 

persecution of religious minorities. Nor does the report address the Sudanese government’s 

pattern of interference with humanitarian aid deliveries as a long-standing problem of 

religious discrimination. The Commission has asserted these important linkages, and 
173 

believes that the State Department should address them as well. 

Another notable problem is that this year’s report includes a section in the executive 

summary entitled “Improvements in International Religious Freedom,” the contents of which 

is also reported in the individual country chapters. The Commission believes that the 

reporting of such “improvements” must be carefully handled in order to avoid 

misrepresentation of the conditions of religious freedom. Such positive developments 

deserve to be noted, but labeling what are really positive developments as “improvements” 

confuses positive steps with real and fundamental progress in eliminating religious 

persecution. The mention of such positive steps in the executive summary can overshadow 

an overall negative situation. The executive summary should be the place to report on 

fundamental, lasting change in the protection of religious freedom (as may be the case, for 

example, in Azerbaijan) but not particular events that may be positive. Severe persecutors 

can make a positive gesture without improving the overall conditions of religious freedom. 

On occasion they do it to deflect criticism and mislead foreign observers. 

In the case of Sudan, for instance, the positive developments highlighted in the 

executive summary are changes of a shallow nature, and not the type of developments that 

would signal a change in the regime under which many religious believers suffer horribly. 

Another example is Laos, where the release of religious prisoners – a welcome event – is 

characterized in the executive summary as “significant improvement.” But the Laos country 

chapter noted that “the government’s already poor record for religious freedom deteriorated 

in some aspects.” These contradictory messages are found in the report’s discussion of 

Vietnam as well. 

Another persistent problem with the 2000 Annual Report is the failure to elaborate 

religious-freedom problems that stem from state control of institutions of majority religious 

communities, which can be significant. For example, nothing is mentioned regarding state 

control of Shiite Muslim institutions by the state in Iran. Very little is mentioned of methods 

of state control of Muslim religious institutions in the report on Egypt. The Commission 

noted this problem last May with respect to the 1999 Annual Report. 

D. Selecting Countries of Particular Concern 

The Commission is pleased that the State Department has listed for a second year 

Burma, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan as “countries of particular 

concern,” as well as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Milosevic regime in Serbia – 

which, while technically not states or governments under IRFA, also remain “particularly 

severe violators of religious freedom.” This year’s Annual Report affirms that the conditions 

in those countries have not changed sufficiently so as to warrant a change in designation. 

While the Milosevic regime is no longer in place in Serbia, the State Department should pay 

close attention to the religious-freedom situation there and the ability and willingness of the 

governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as newly elected 

officials in Kosovo, to protect religious freedom, and the Department should make further 

designations under IRFA as appropriate. 

The Commission is very disappointed that the Secretary did not name Laos, the 
174 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan as CPCs.5 

On July 28, 2000, the Commission wrote to the Secretary concluding that the governments of 

each of these four countries have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom and thus meet the statutory threshold for designation as CPCs. The Commission’s 

conclusion was based on the information that was available to it at that time. The 

information contained in the 2000 Annual Report only confirms that these countries should 

be designated as CPCs. 

In Laos, during the 12 months preceding the Secretary’s CPC designations, increasing 

numbers of Protestants, Baha’is, and Catholics were subjected to detention, arrest, and 

harassment, and more than 50 persons had been reportedly imprisoned for the peaceful 

practice of their faith. Moreover, the State Department reported that in 2000, government 

authorities arrested and detained (sometimes for months) more than 95 Christians and their 

spiritual leaders.6

In the DPRK, notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on 

conditions in the country, it is apparent that religious freedom is non-existent. As the 2000 

Annual Report states: “Genuine religious freedom does not exist.” The government has 

imprisoned religious believers and apparently suppresses all organized religious activity 

except that which serves the interests of the state. Not identifying this repressive government 

as a CPC effectively rewards it for suffocating free speech, press, and travel so thoroughly 

that information on religious persecution is limited. 

In Saudi Arabia, the government brazenly denies religious freedom and vigorously 

enforces its prohibition against all forms of public religious expression other than that of 

Wahhabi Muslims. Numerous Christians and Shiite Muslims continue to be detained, 

imprisoned, and deported. As the Department's 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports both bluntly 

summarize: "Freedom of religion does not exist." How then can Saudi Arabia not be deemed 

a country of particular concern? 

In Turkmenistan, where the ruling regime is reminiscent of Stalin’s, only the official 

Soviet-era Sunni Muslim Board and the Russian Orthodox Church are recognized by the 

state as legal religious communities. Members of unregistered communities – including 

Baha’is, Christians, Hare Krishnas, and independent Muslims – have been reportedly 

detained, imprisoned, deported, harassed, fined, and have had their services disrupted, 

congregations dispersed, religious literature confiscated, and places of worship destroyed. 

The 2000 Annual Report notes a decline in the Turkmenistan government’s overall respect 

for religious freedom and notes “severe restrictions” on minority religious groups. 

In Ambassador Seiple’s testimony before Congress following the release of the 2000 

Annual Report, he noted the importance of diplomacy as the context in which decisions take 

place about which country qualifies as a CPC and what actions to take as a consequence 

thereof.7

 The Commission notes that under IRFA, the designation of a CPC is dependent 

solely on the facts and circumstances of religious freedom; the consideration of other factors 

should come into play with respect to what policies to adopt and what actions to take in 

response to such a designation. 
175 

In addition to the four countries that the Commission recommended be named as 

CPCs, the Commission advised the Secretary of State that another four governments are 

close to earning the CPC label for their countries. India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam 

are among those countries that have attracted the Commission’s particular scrutiny, and they 

deserve the Department’s as well.8 The 2000 Annual Report bears this out. 

E. Reporting on U.S. Actions to Promote Religious Freedom 

The label of CPC is important; it brings into the spotlight the egregious violators. But 

the act of labeling is only one aspect of the statute. IRFA requires policy responses, and the 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom is a report on U.S. policies and actions to 

promote religious freedom and not only a report on facts and circumstances. 

F. U.S. Actions in Response to CPC Designation 

Nowhere in the 2000 Annual Report does the State Department mention the sanctions 

it may have imposed as a result of a country’s designation as a “country of particular 

concern.” Unfortunately, this is consistent with State’s previous practice: it has, to the 

Commission’s knowledge, done nothing to publicize the sanctions imposed under IRFA in 

October 1999. The Department continues this practice in spite of the statutory mandate in 

IRFA to state in the Annual Report what actions were taken in response to CPC designation.9

In September 2000, following the redesignation of Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and 

Sudan as CPCs, the State Department reported in a letter to the Congress that “the Secretary 

has decided to take no further action with respect to these countries since the action taken last 

year for each of the countries in question is still in effect.”10 Although this non-action by the 

Secretary may be authorized under IRFA, the Commission believes that it is indefensible 

policy in the cases of Sudan and China. Not surprisingly, the State Department has not 

submitted to the Congress the required evaluation of the effectiveness of the prior actions 

against CPCs.11

In the cases of Sudan and China, the sanctions the Secretary of State identified in 

1999 as meeting the requirements of IRFA are inadequate and have been ineffective. 

Regarding Sudan, the Department stated in October 1999 that “the sanction that the Secretary 

of State has determined satisfies the requirements of [IRFA] is the use of the voice and vote 

of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of funds of international financial 

institutions to or for Sudan.”12 The situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate, and there is 

no evidence to suggest that the identified sanction has had any effect on the religiousfreedom policies of the government of Sudan. More-effective actions that the Commission 

has recommended include closing U.S. capital markets to third country companies that 

participate in the development of Sudanese oil fields (the revenue from which helps to fund 

the Sudanese government’s war effort) and taking steps to end Sudan’s ability to control 

foreign food aid and use it as a weapon of war.13 

Regarding China, the Department stated in 1999 that the Secretary of State “restricts 

exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment.”14 It is difficult to believe 

that this sanction sends a strong message to Beijing on religious freedom. In September 
176 

2000, the Secretary took no further action against China, despite the Department’s own 

finding of a marked deterioration of religious freedom and the manifest failure of the 

Department’s initial response. 

The Commission also notes that under IRFA, the President must take action (or issue 

a waiver of the requirement to take such action) with regard to all countries the government 

of which engages in or tolerates violations of religious freedom, and not only CPCs.15 These 

actions do not appear to be so recorded in the 2000 Annual Report. The State Department 

should identify in the Annual Report each of the actions taken pursuant to IRFA in response 

to CPC designation or in response to a finding that a foreign government has engaged in or 

tolerated a violation of religious freedom. 

G. Other U.S. Actions to Promote Religious Freedom 

In general, the 2000 Annual Report shows that U.S. embassy personnel in a number 

of countries have been working to raise the issue of religious freedom with their foreign 

counterparts. Embassy personnel have also made inquiries and sought to monitor the legal 

proceedings of some religious detainees. Ambassador Seiple and his staff have traveled 

widely to reinforce the message of the importance of religious freedom to the United States. 

Political officers in U.S. embassies are investigating-religious-freedom issues. For 

example, U.S. embassy staff accompanied Commissioners and staff on fact-finding missions 

in September 2000 to northern Nigeria, in December 2000 to Pakistan, and in March 2001 to 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel and the Occupied Territories. A representative of the Office 

of International Religious Freedom accompanied commission staff on its trip to Nigeria. The 

Commission wishes to thank the U.S. officials that provided assistance on these trips, and 

notes that the expertise and engagement on religious-freedom issues that they demonstrated 

reflects an important goal of the statute. 

The Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom reportedly maintains 

some prisoner lists and issue briefs on religious freedom, as required by section 108 of 

IRFA.16

The Commission applauds these actions. However, progress in the promotion of 

religious freedom also requires that steps be taken at the highest levels of interaction between 

the U.S. and foreign governments. Religious prisoners and persecution must be prominently 

raised in virtually every meeting between American diplomats and violator governments. 

The Commission notes that in the executive summary of the 2000 Annual Report, 

actions taken by the Commission itself are listed in the section on what the U.S. government 

has done with respect to a number of countries. This practice should not be continued. The 

Commission is not empowered by Congress to implement U.S. foreign policy, but to make 

policy recommendations. Congress has required the Commission to report on its activities 

separately from the State Department. Including Commission actions in the Annual Report 

may blur the distinction between it and the State Department – in the minds of the American 

public, non-governmental organizations, religious communities, and foreign governments. 

The State Department’s 2000 Annual Report describes a number of countries where 
177 

the conditions of religious freedom have deteriorated yet U.S. policy toward those countries 

has not been adjusted as a result. 

In the case of China, the report bluntly and accurately reports that the Chinese 

government’s attitude toward religious freedom has deteriorated and persecution of religious 

minorities has increased. The report reflects this situation in almost excruciating detail. 

Arrests of Falun Gong and Zhong Gong practitioners and a crackdown on Protestants and 

Catholics worshipping in unregistered groups have accelerated dramatically since June of last 

year. At least eight Uighur Muslims were executed in June and July 2000 on charges of 

“splitting the country.” The receptivity of the Chinese government to U.S. concerns about 

religious freedom in China also appears to have deteriorated. The Chinese government 

refused to reinstate official bilateral dialogue on human rights and religious freedom until 

recently. Government officials have refused to meet with U.S. embassy officials who 

intended to raise religious-freedom issues with them. The Department’s Special Coordinator 

for Tibet and a member of her staff were denied visas for travel to Tibet. It is distressing that 

the Clinton administration and majorities of both houses of the Congress were willing to 

overlook all of this in pursuing a campaign for Permanent Normal Trade Relations status for 

China.17 

In a 1999 report to Congress, the State Department stated that: “As a matter of policy, 

the Department of State, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies as appropriate, will continue 

vigorously to pursue all other available means of altering Chinese behavior with respect to 

religious freedom.”18 Judging from the 2000 Annual Report and then-Secretary Albright’s 

failure to take further action against China under IRFA in September 2000, it is not at all 

apparent that the executive branch has vigorously pursued “all . . . available means” of 

altering Chinese behavior toward religious freedom. 

Of particular concern to the Commission is the current ability of the Chinese 

government to obtain capital on U.S. markets. In 1998, the government sold bonds in large 

quantity to U.S. investors, without having to disclose with specificity how it planned to use 

the proceeds. It stated merely that it planned to use the money “for general governmental 

purposes, including infrastructure projects.”19 Those purposes, however, include oppressive 

regulation of domestic religious activity and development of oil resources in Sudan. 

In September and October 2000, the press reported that the government of China was 

considering offering sovereign bonds in a total amount of $1 billion in the near future, at 

least in part to U.S. investors. In November 2000, the Commission wrote to President 

Clinton that, in its view, the President has the authority under IRFA to prohibit the purchase 

of China sovereign bonds by U.S. financial institutions.20 It asked the President if he agreed 

with the Commission’s conclusion and, if so, whether he intended to use his authority to 

prevent the China sovereign bond issue until the Chinese government made substantial 

improvements in respect for religious freedom and provided sufficient assurances to 

guarantee that the proceeds were never used to support religious persecution. The 

President’s response did not address the question of his authority under IRFA, but he said 

that he did not favor prohibiting the sale. Also, in November, plans to offer China sovereign 

bonds were reportedly shelved. If and when China sovereign bonds are offered to U.S. 

investors, the Commission will examine the circumstances and consider whether to 
178 

recommend that the President exercise his authority to prevent such a sale. 

Also of concern is the current ability of Chinese corporations to sell their securities to 

U.S. investors. The proceeds from these sales could end up supporting the repressive 

policies of the government, inasmuch as it controls the corporations. But, in addition, the 

money might be used directly or indirectly to support development of the oil fields in Sudan, 

where at least one Chinese corporation is heavily involved.21 In light of this problem, the 

Commission has recommended more specific disclosure in registration statements filed with 

the Securities and Exchange Commission about business activities in CPC countries such as 

China and about the use of proceeds of securities offerings in the United States. 

Turkmenistan is another example of where the State Department concludes that 

conditions of religious freedom have worsened and yet the reported U.S. actions do not 

appear to reflect any change in U.S. policy. A promise in May 1999 by President Niyazov to 

the State Department to allow minority religious groups to register, thus legalizing their 

activities, has yet to be fulfilled. 

A third example is France, where the report describes in detail some disturbing recent 

events that threaten the protection of religious freedom of minority religious groups in that 

country. In particular the National Assembly in June 2000 passed a bill targeting so-called 

“sects” for dissolution and establishing a new crime of “mental manipulation.” As of the 

date this report was sent to the printer, the proposed law is pending in France’s Senate. 

However, a comparison of this year’s report on what the United States has done, in 

comparison to last year’s report on what the United States did, shows that despite worsening 

conditions, the United States appears to have done less. This deserves an explanation. 

The report also illustrates a number of instances where U.S. policy does not appear to 

be in line with the gravity of religious-freedom problems in a particular country. 

The report on Sudan does not reflect that the U.S. government has made a high-level 

priority of implementing any comprehensive plan to deal with the atrocities being committed 

there. Neither does it evaluate the effectiveness of current and previous U.S. policy toward 

promoting religious freedom. When the Commission studied that situation over the past 18 

months, it was struck by the huge disparity between the scale of atrocities being committed 

by the government of Sudan and the response of the U.S. government. Yes, atrocity-byatrocity, the Clinton administration expressed outrage and disapproval. The administration 

also worked with great success to prevent Sudan from taking a seat on the UN Security 

Council. But we did not see from the U.S. government evidence of the kind of consistent 

high-level commitment to a comprehensive policy that would be necessary to achieve results. 

Consequently, in its recommendations on Sudan released in March 2001, the 

Commission stated that it continued to believe that a comprehensive, coordinated strategy led 

on a priority basis by those at the highest levels of the U.S. government is necessary to 

address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Sudan. Essential elements of this 

strategy include raising public awareness of the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses, 

consistent condemnation of those abuses, and employing and advocating a variety of bilateral 

and multilateral pressures on the Sudanese government until it makes substantial and 
179 

systematic improvements. The Commission urged the President and the Secretary of State to 

implement and lead such a strategy. 

With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 2000 Annual Report 

notes that the United States does not have diplomatic relations with that country. 

Nevertheless, the United States does have a policy with respect to North Korea and one that 

has undergone significant change since January 2000, including the announcement of the 

lifting of certain sanctions against the country and then-Secretary of State Albright’s historic 

visit to the country in October 2000. The Commission is not taking a position on the wisdom 

of these actions. However, it is apparent from the 2000 Annual Report and subsequent 

events that human rights and religious freedom have not yet played a significant role in the 

development of policy with respect to one of the world’s worst religious-freedom violators. 

With respect to Iran, again a country with which the United States has no diplomatic 

relations and where there have been significant developments in U.S. policy since March 

2000, it is reported that U.S. officials have raised religious-freedom issues and problems 

facing religious minorities in international forums and in public statements at the highest 

levels. However, the United States can and should make clear to the government of Iran that 

improvement in religious freedom and other human rights in that country is a prerequisite for 

the complete relaxation of sanctions by and the normalization of relations with the United 

States. 

The Executive Summary and the individual country reports contain what are 

essentially lists of particular actions the State Department has taken in each country with 

respect to religious freedom. While this type of report is necessary and illuminating, an 

important piece is missing. The 2000 Annual Report does not contain a good description of 

State Department policies – on a Department-wide, regional, or even individual country basis 

– to promote religious freedom. The report does not explain how the promotion of religious 

freedom as a foreign policy objective is integrated into regional and bilateral affairs, into 

foreign aid and U.S. mission funding priorities, or into U.S. activity in multilateral human 

rights forums such as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe. The reader is thus left with the impression that the 

Department is without a plan as to how to implement IRFA’s central statutory purpose: the 

integration of religious freedom into U.S. foreign policy. 

As a final point, IRFA encourages the State Department to take positive steps to 

promote religious freedom. For example, Congress recommended in the statute that U.S. 

diplomatic missions in violator countries give particular consideration to programs and 

activities that promote religious freedom in its own funding decisions and its 

recommendations of projects to receive U.S. government funding.22 The State Department’s 

Annual Report should include a complete description of the nature and magnitude of 

programs funded by the U.S. government that touch on the promotion of religious freedom or 

religious tolerance (including person-to-person exchanges with the U.S.) in each country that 

has significant religious-freedom violations but nevertheless receives U.S. foreign aid. Some 

information of this type was provided in the reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, 

and especially Egypt, but not in the reports of other relevant countries that receive substantial 

funding allocations under the democracy and governance programs of the U.S. Agency for 
180 

International Development, such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Nigeria, Russia, and Ukraine. 

H. The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 

The Commission commends the hard work that Ambassador Robert A. Seiple and his 

staff have put not only into the Annual Reports on International Religious Freedom, but also 

their substantial efforts throughout the year to keep religious freedom on the foreign policy 

agenda. Ambassador Seiple also made a significant contribution to the work of the 

Commission, on which he sat as an ex-officio nonvoting member, and the Commissioners 

have valued him as a colleague. 

The Commission regrets his departure. The Ambassador-at-Large for International 

Religious Freedom is a very important part of U.S. policy initiatives to promote religious 

freedom abroad – the 2000 Annual Report calls his office “the fulcrum of the effort to 

promote religious freedom.” A prolonged vacancy in this crucial position threatens U.S. 

progress in promoting religious freedom. The Commission has urged President Bush to 

move quickly to fill this vacancy. 

I. Other Issues 

The Commission reported last year that it had not gained full access to cables to and 

from embassies because of the Department’s assertion of a legal position (executive privilege 

as to deliberative process within the administration) with which the Commission does not 

agree. The Department has since constructed a time-consuming, cumbersome, and lengthy 

process whereby Commission staff are able to review some cables after they have been 

redacted. This process means the Commission cannot see cables until months after they are 

sent, making it difficult for the Commission to formulate timely policy recommendations in 

fast-moving situations overseas. The Commission has tried this system in good faith and 

concludes that it does not meet the Commission’s needs. It can no longer acquiesce to this 

situation and will propose a more-expeditious process to the State Department. 

International religious freedom has become an important foreign-policy issue. The 

growing interest in the United States in the conditions of religious freedom around the globe 

and in the promotion of religious freedom through U.S. foreign policy is exemplified not 

only by the passage of IRFA but also by increasing public awareness of religious-freedom 

violations in countries such as China and Sudan. Secretary of State Powell has publicly 

stated that, in his view, the State Department has not been given adequate resources to 

perform its functions. The Commission believes that this is particularly true in the religiousfreedom area. We further believe that in order to meet its obligations under IRFA and to 

ensure that the promotion of religious freedom remains a foreign-policy priority, adequate 

staff must be devoted to these tasks. The Commission urges the State Department to review 

its staffing of religious-freedom issues in U.S. embassies and in its regional and functional 

bureaus, particularly in the Office of International Religious Freedom, and provide an 

increase in staffing adequate to perform the important task of promoting international 

religious freedom.23 
181 

 

1

 The Commission issued this report in similar form as it appears here on December 8, 2000. 

2

 In August 1999, President Clinton delegated many of his powers and responsibilities under 

the IRFA to the Secretary of State. 

3

 See Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 

2000 (“USCIRF 2000 Annual Report”), “State Department Annual Reports,” 59-66. 

4

 In addition, each country chapter in the annual religion report addresses the existence of 

government policies concerning forced religious conversion of minor U.S. citizens, as 

required by IRFA section 102(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

5

 Commissioner John Bolton dissented, and Commissioner Laila Al-Marayati abstained, from 

the Commission’s decision to recommend that Saudi Arabia be designated a “CPC.” 

6

 See U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Laos,” 

February 2001. 

7

 In his testimony on September 7, 2000, before the Subcommittee on International 

Operations and Human Rights of the House International Relations Committee, Ambassador 

Seiple stated that “as we apply [the IRFA] criteria in deciding what action to take, we try to 

place them in the context of diplomacy. Is diplomacy working? Are there trends in one 

direction or another? Is a particular action likely to help, to hinder, our diplomatic efforts to 

improve the situation?” 

8

 Commissioner Michael K. Young, joined by Commissioner Nina Shea, dissented from the 

Commission’s decision not to recommend that India should be designated as a CPC. 

9

 IRFA § 102(b)(1)(F)(i), 22 U.S.C. § 6412(b)(i)(F)(i). 

10 Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of 

State, to U.S. Congress, September 26, 2000. 

11 See IRFA §§ 402(c)(4), 404(a)(4), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(c)(4), 6444(a)(4). 

12 Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of 

State, to U.S. Congress, October 22, 1999. 

13 See Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 

2001, 131, 129. 

14 Ibid. 

15 See IRFA § 401(a)(1)(B), 22 U.S.C. § 6441(a)(1)(B). 

16 22 U.S.C. § 6417. 
182 

 

17 See USCIRF 2000 Annual Report, 41-45. 

18 Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of 

State, to U.S. Congress, October 22, 1999. 

19 People’s Republic of China, Prospectus: Debt Securities and/or Warrants to Purchase 

Debt Securities, November 24, 1998. 

20 Letter from Elliott Abrams, Chairman, USCIRF to President William J. Clinton, November 

1, 2000. 

21 See Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2001, 

“U.S. Capital Markets,” 156-158. 

22 IRFA § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 6415. 

23 See IRFA, § 101(d), 22 U.S.C. § 6411. 
183 

APPENDIX 1: BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS 

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Elliott Abrams, the Commission’s Chairman, is President of the Ethics and Public 

Policy Center in Washington, D.C. After serving on the staff of Sens. Henry M. Jackson and 

Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the 1970s, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Organization Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 

Humanitarian Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the 

Reagan administration. He was a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute from 1990 to 1996, 

when he moved to the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He is a member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations and the National Advisory Council of the American Jewish Committee. 

Firuz Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., of Alta Loma, California, current Vice Chairman of the 

Commission, is a Senior Advisor for the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the 

United States. He is Professor Emeritus of History at Yale University, having taught Russian 

history there from 1956 until his retirement in 1992. During his tenure at Yale, Dr. 

Kazemzadeh also served variously as Director of Graduate Studies in Russian and Eastern 

European Studies; Chair of the Committee on Middle Eastern Studies; Director of Graduate 

Studies in History; and Master of Davenport College. He is the author of several books 

relating to Russia and Central Asia. 

Laila Al-Marayati, M.D., is a founding member and past president of the Muslim 

Women’s League, a Los Angeles-based nonprofit organization focusing on the dissemination 

of accurate information about Islam and Muslims, particularly regarding women. Dr. AlMarayati has written articles and participated in numerous conferences addressing issues 

related to Islam and women such as reproductive health and sexuality, challenges facing 

Muslim women in the United States and abroad, stereotyping, and the abuse of the rights of 

Muslim women. Dr. Al-Marayati served as a member of the State Department’s Advisory 

Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad. She has addressed the issue of religious 

discrimination and persecution against Muslims in Europe before Members of Congress and 

at the OSCE Conference on Human Dimension Issues held in Warsaw, Poland in 1998 as a 

member of the U.S. Delegation. She is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist based in Los 

Angeles. 

John R. Bolton has been Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research since January 1997. In the administration of President George 

Bush, Mr. Bolton was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He 

served in the Reagan administration as Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division from 

1988 to 1989. Before that, he was Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative 

Affairs (1985-88), where he was responsible for obtaining Senate confirmation of the 

President’s nominees to the Supreme Court and lower Federal benches. He also served as 

General Counsel (1981-82) and Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy 

Coordination (1982-83) of the Agency for International Development. 
184 

Theodore Cardinal McCarrick, Ph.D., D.D, Archbishop of Washington, was 

elevated to the College of Cardinals on February 21, 2001. Before Pope John Paul II named 

him as Archbishop of Washington in November 2000, he served as the Fourth Archbishop of 

Newark, New Jersey (1986-2000). The National Conference of Catholic Bishops elected 

Archbishop McCarrick to head its Committee on Migration in 1986 and in 1992. In 1992, he 

was also named to head the Committee for Aid to the Church in Central and Eastern Europe, 

and was elected in 1996 as Chair of the Committee on International Policy. He was elected 

one of l5 U.S. bishops to serve as a member of the Synod for America held in 1997. At the 

conclusion of that Synod, the bishops elected him to serve on the Post Synodal Council. In 

November 1996, Archbishop McCarrick was invited to serve on the Secretary of State’s 

Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom. 

Rabbi David Saperstein is Director of the Religious Action Center of Reform 

Judaism, which represents the Reform Jewish Movement to Congress and the administration. 

He served as the first Chairman of the Commission from June 1999 to June 2000. He has 

headed several religious coalitions and served on the boards of numerous national 

organizations, including Common Cause, the NAACP, and People for the American Way. He 

currently co-chairs the Coalition to Preserve Religious Liberty, comprised of more than 60 

national Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and educational groups opposing school-prayer 

amendments and legislation. Also an attorney, Rabbi Saperstein teaches seminars in both 

First Amendment church-state law and Jewish law at Georgetown University Law School. 

Robert A. Seiple (ex-officio) joined the State Department in August 1998 as 

Principal Advisor to the President and Special Representative to the Secretary of State for 

International Religious Freedom. In May 1999, he was named the first U.S. Ambassador-atLarge for International Religious Freedom. Before that, he spent 11 years as President of 

World Vision, Inc., the largest privately funded relief and development agency in the world. 

He founded within World Vision the Institute for Global Engagement, a strategic think tank 

for global advocacy. Seiple, who was President of Eastern College and Eastern Baptist 

Theological Seminary from 1983 to 1987, was named “Churchman of the Year” in 1994 by 

Religious Heritage America. He resigned as ambassador-at-large in September 2000. 

Nina Shea is the Director of the Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House in 

Washington, D.C. She has been an international human rights lawyer for 22 years and has for 

15 years focused specifically on the issue of religious persecution. Before her appointment to 

the Commission, Ms. Shea served on the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom to the 

U.S. Secretary of State. Ms. Shea has organized and sponsored numerous fact-finding 

missions to Sudan, China, Egypt, and elsewhere and has testified regularly before Congress 

on the governments of these and other countries. She is the author of In the Lion’s Den, a 

book on anti-Christian persecution around the world. She was appointed as a public delegate 

on the U.S. delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2001. 

The Honorable Charles Z. Smith, of Seattle, Washington, is a Justice of the 

Washington State Supreme Court. He was originally appointed in July 1988, to fill an 

unexpired term, and was elected, unopposed, in 1988 and 1990, and most recently in 1996 to 

another term of six years. Justice Smith served from 1965 to 1995 on the General Board of 

the American Baptist Churches, USA, and was President of the American Baptist Churches 
185 

from 1975 to 1977, and Immediate Past President from 1977 to 1979. He has served in 

several local, national, and international organizations concerned with religious freedom and 

human rights, including active participation with the national Interreligious Task Force on 

Soviet Jewry, monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords during the period from 1977 

to 1985. 

Dean Michael K. Young served as the Commission’s Vice Chairman from June 

1999 to June 2000. He joined the George Washington University Law School as Dean in 

1998 after serving as the Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions at the 

School of Law of Columbia University. He also served as Director of the Center for Japanese 

Legal Studies, the Center for Korean Legal Studies, and the Project on Religion, Rights, and 

Religious Freedom at Columbia University. During the administration of President George 

Bush, he served as Ambassador for Trade and Environmental Affairs, Deputy Under 

Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, and Deputy Legal Adviser to the U.S. 

Department of State. 
186 
187 

APPENDIX 2: THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT1

SELECTED PROVISIONS 

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402) 

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—

The term ``particularly severe violations of religious freedom'' means systematic, ongoing, 

egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations such as— 

A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 

(B) prolonged detention without charges; 

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of 

those persons; or 

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of 

religious freedom'' means violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of 

religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred 

to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as— 

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, 

including arbitrary registration requirements; 

(ii) speaking freely about one's religious beliefs; 

(iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; 

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 

(v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice; or 

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious 

belief or practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced 

labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, 

mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution. 

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY 

SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442) 

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.— 
188 

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the 

President shall review the status of religious freedom in each foreign country 

to determine whether the government of that country has engaged in or 

tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom in that country 

during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review of that 

country under this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President 

shall designate each country the government of which has engaged in or 

tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a country of particular 

concern for religious freedom. 

 

1

 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of the Act can be found 

on the Commission’s Web site, www.uscirf.gov.