United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 2021 Decided July 6, 2021

No. 20-5216

EDWARD BANKS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

QUINCY L. BOOTH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS AND 

LENNARD JOHNSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN,

D.C. DEPT. CORRECTIONS,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 21-5033

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:20-cv-00849)

Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause 

for appellants. With him on the briefs were Karl A. Racine, 

Attorney General, Loren L. Alikhan, Solicitor General, and 

Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General.
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Steven Marcus argued the cause for appellees. With him 

on the brief were Scott Michelman, Arthur B. Spitzer, Jonathan 

W. Anderson, Jenna Cobb, Jonathan S. Meltzer, Jeremy S. 

Kreisberg, Brendan B. Gants, and Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler.

David M. Shapiro was on the brief for amicus curiae the 

Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center in support of 

appellees.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: The Director and 

Warden of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections 

(collectively “Corrections”) appeal from the district court’s 

order of a preliminary injunction requiring the Department of 

Corrections to take certain actions to reduce the threat of 

COVID-19 within its correctional facilities. Appellants 

contend that under the governing provisions of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2), the preliminary 

injunction has expired, and the cases are now moot. Because 

we agree that the preliminary injunction has expired, 

challenges to the order imposing that injunction are moot and 

we must dismiss the appeal.

I.

On March 11, 2020, the mayor of the District of Columbia

declared a public health emergency due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. The Department of Corrections responded by 

instituting policies intended to protect its employees and 

inmates from the coronavirus. 
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On March 30, pretrial and postconviction inmates at D.C.

correctional facilities filed a class action complaint and habeas 

petition, seeking relief on behalf of all inmates in D.C.

facilities. The plaintiffs’ complaint asserted causes of action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of 

the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Plaintiffs immediately 

moved for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary 

injunction, and for the district court to certify the class.

Before ruling on the motions for preliminary relief, the 

district court appointed two amici to investigate and report on 

the conditions at D.C. correctional facilities. Amici reported 

that while suspected-positive inmates were appropriately 

quarantined, quality-of-life in quarantine units was 

substantially worse than for the general population. Moreover,

inmates had delays in receiving care, personal protective 

equipment was scarce, social distancing was not enforced, 

cleanliness varied by unit, and inmates lacked access to 

confidential legal phone calls. Incorporating the amici’s report 

in its findings of fact, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ 

motion for a temporary restraining order on April 19. The order 

generally required Corrections to address the problems amici 

identified. After granting the temporary restraining order, the 

district court ordered amici to reevaluate the facilities to 

determine compliance with its order and provide further 

recommendations. Amici reported that Corrections had taken 

several appropriate steps, but not all reasonable precautions, to 

protect inmates. Although COVID cases in the correctional 

facilities decreased following mid-April, significant problems

remained. For example, sanitation remained deficient and 

social distancing remained imperfect.

Two months later, on June 18, 2020, the district court 

granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The 
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preliminary injunction ordered the defendants, inter alia, to 

ensure inmates receive medical attention within 24 hours after

reporting of medical problems, to contract for COVID-19 

cleaning services, ensure quarantine isolation units are 

nonpunitive, and provide access to confidential legal calls. 

Corrections immediately took steps to comply with the order. 

One month later, Corrections filed a motion to vacate the 

preliminary injunction due to changed circumstances under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), and 60(b). In 

response, the court asked amici once again to report on 

conditions in D.C. jails. Amici reported substantial 

improvement in Corrections’ COVID protocols, but also

imperfect compliance with the district court’s preliminary 

injunction. Based on that report, the district court determined 

that changed factual circumstances did not justify vacating the 

injunction.

On appeal, Corrections argue that their appeal is moot 

because the preliminary injunction expired after 90 days under 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act. In the alternative, they 

challenge the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction 

in the first instance and its failure to vacate the injunction based 

on changed circumstances. Although appellants also argue that 

the district court made distinct errors in the issuance of the 

preliminary injunction, because appellants’ mootness 

argument is dispositive, we need not address the other issues.

II.

The mootness argument tests the jurisdiction of the court. 

Therefore, we must address this issue before even considering 

any other. In addressing this issue, we must determine whether 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 90-day expiration period for 

preliminary relief applies to the order under review. If it does, 

this appeal is moot and we must order dismissal.
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The relevant provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

states:

In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the 

extent otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a 

temporary restraining order or an order for preliminary 

injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctive relief must be 

narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 

correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, 

and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that 

harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any 

adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a

criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief 

and shall respect the principles of comity set out in

paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any preliminary relief. 

Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on 

the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court 

makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the 

entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before 

the expiration of the 90-day period. 

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). More briefly put, if a judge enters a 

preliminary injunction in a suit covered by this section, that 

injunction will terminate on its 90th day unless the court has 

rendered it permanent and made specific findings that the 

restraint is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary 

to correct the violation of federal right, and is the least intrusive 

means necessary to correct that violation.

The statute defines the term “civil action with respect to 

prison conditions” as “mean[ing] any civil proceeding arising 

under Federal law with respect to the conditions of 

confinement or the effects of actions by government officials 

on the lives of persons confined in prison, but does not include 
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habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of 

confinement in prison.” Id. § 3626(g)(2).

The statute further defines the term “prison” as “mean[ing] 

any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains 

juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” Id.

§ 3626(g)(5).

Appellants’ mootness argument is straightforward. The 

statute covers civil actions addressing prison conditions. This 

action is a civil action addressing conditions in District of 

Columbia Department of Corrections facilities. The statute 

requires the making of certain findings. Appellees concede that 

the district court did not make the findings required under 

section 3626(a)(1) or make the order final before 90 days after 

the entry of the preliminary injunction. See Appellees’ Br. 13–

25.

There can be no serious argument that this statute does not 

govern this case. This litigation is quintessentially the case to 

which the statute applies. The statute describes a civil action 

“with respect to prison conditions.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

This case arises on a complaint that alleges claims based on 

conditions in the District of Columbia prisons and nothing else. 

The statute addresses a preliminary injunction affecting those 

conditions, and we have before us a preliminary injunction 

addressing those claims. While we hardly need precedent for 

the proposition that this is a civil action addressing covered 

conditions, we note that the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit 

Courts of Appeals have considered the issue in passing and 

summarily concluded or assumed that section 3626(a)(2) 

applies to similar cases. See Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 

972 F.3d 310, 317–18 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020); Swain v. Junior, 961 
7

F.3d 1276, 1294 n.10 (11th Cir. 2020); Valentine v. Collier, 

956 F.3d 797, 805–06 (5th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff-appellees’ arguments to the contrary are based on 

their having joined with the civil action a claim under habeas 

corpus challenging the fact of their confinement. While the 

allegations of the complaint may not be sufficient to support 

the claim of habeas in any event, which we need not currently 

decide, the joinder is hardly adequate to defeat the plain 

meaning of the statute. We have frequently stated that Congress 

says what it means and means what it says. In this statute

Congress clearly meant for preliminary injunctions in civil 

actions respecting prison conditions to last no longer than 90 

days. In this case the 90th day ended on September 16, 2020. 

Congress meant this so strongly that it made out very specific 

conditions under which the limitation to 90 days would not 

apply. These conditions were the findings that everyone agrees 

the district judge did not make. Appellees would have us hold 

that after having gone to this trouble with specificity to state 

exactly what it meant, Congress sub silentio created a further 

exception to its clear meaning for any case in which creative

plaintiffs added a second claim. We can hardly accuse 

Congress of such roundabout drafting. We have stated before 

that Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes. Am. Bar 

Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).

In this case, we are not going to hold that Congress enumerated

the mice and then unleashed an invisible elephant to trample 

the field. Indeed, our precedent avoids sanctioning strategic 

pleading used to evade the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 

requirements. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (“[I]t would defeat the purpose of the [Prison Litigation 

Reform Act] if a prisoner could evade its requirements simply 

by dressing up an ordinary civil action as a petition for 

mandamus or prohibition or by joining it with a petition for 
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habeas corpus.”); see also Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 

1041–42 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

As we noted, the allegations attempting to allege habeas 

may not be sufficient to clearly state a habeas corpus claim. 

Habeas corpus tests the fact or duration of the confinement, 

rather than conditions. Again, though, we need not decide 

anything with reference to that claim. We only determine that 

such a claim cannot change the nature of the actions to which 

it is attached.

Therefore, we hold that appellants’ claim of mootness is 

well taken, and we dismiss the appeals of the order imposing 

the preliminary injunction and the order denying the motion to 

vacate the injunction based on changed circumstances. We 

will, however, remand the cases for any further proceedings 

that may be necessary to determine the viability of any 

remaining claims.

So ordered.