Report on Local Rules 

Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 

Judicial Conference of the United States 

February 1, 2004

 28 U.S.C. § 2071 authorizes district courts to promulgate local rule of procedure, 

but requires that such rules must be “consistent with” acts of Congress and the national 

rules of procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 83 provides further that local rules shall be “consistent 

with” but not “duplicative of” the national rules of procedure. 

 The Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 

has undertaken a Local Rules Project to assure that the local rules throughout the United 

States are in compliance with section 2071 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 83. The Standing 

Committee has conducted a review of local civil rules that pertain to or purport to 

implement selected national rules of civil procedure or federal statutes. 

 This report constitutes the final findings and recommendations of the Standing 

Committee, and as such it represents the completion of the Local Rules Project. 

 The Standing Committee has determined that the district courts should be made 

aware of local rules in their respective districts that fall within one of five categories: 1) a 

local rule that is in direct conflict with national law; 2) a local rule that is in arguable 

conflict with national law, i.e., the local rule does not present a direct textual conflict, but 

may create a conflict as applied or may be in tension with the principles and practices 

underlying national law; 3) a local rule that tries to duplicate national law but arguably 

does so in a confusing or unhelpful manner; 4) a local rule that is outmoded because it 

regulates a practice or form of action that no longer arises in the federal courts; and 5) 

local rules that do not conform with the uniform numbering system, as required by Rule 

83. 

 This report provides a listing of and description of the local rules that appear to fit 

into the above categories. The report groups the local rules under their Federal analogs. 

The report is being sent to the Chief Judge of each district court in which one or more 

local rules in the above categories have been found. 
2

It is important to note several provisos in this analysis of local rules:

 1. Local rules are not included if they are inconsistent with case law, because 

neither section 2071 nor Rule 83 prohibits local rules that are inconsistent with case law. 

 2. Rule 83 states that local rules must not be “duplicative of” one of the 

Federal Rules. There are many local rules that refer to a national rule but do not repeat

the text of that Rule. Those local rules are not problematic and are not prohibited by Rule 

83. Moreover, the Standing Committee has determined that there is probably little harm 

and actually much good to be found in duplicating some of the Federal provisions, as it is 

possible that practitioners will look to the local rules first to determine the governing 

standards. On the other hand, if the local rule’s attempt at “duplication” is flawed, i.e., by 

poor paraphrasing or selective duplication, the local rule may well do more harm than 

good. Thus, the list of “duplicative” rules in this report covers only those local rules that 

purport to replicate the text of a national rule in a way that might be more confusing than 

helpful to the practitioner. 

 3. The local rules were taken from the websites of the respective districts. 

The working assumption is that the local rules posted on the website are the actual rules 

currently applicable in the district. 

 

 4. The Standing Committee does not claim perfection. It is thus possible, if 

not likely, that the report is underinclusive in uncovering offending local rules. The fact 

that a local rule is not cited should not be taken as an absolute affirmation that the rules of 

a particular district are in compliance with section 2071 and Rule 83. 

 5. There are a large number of civil rules on which no report is made. 

Examples include local rules governing class actions and summary judgment. The Local 

Rules project tried to pinpoint those areas in which problematic divergence from a 

national standard was most likely. Time and resources did not permit a review of all of 

the local rules for every Federal Rule analog. 

 6. The local rules are a moving target. This report sets forth the problematic 

local rules as of February 1, 2004. 

What follows is an analysis of local rules grouped under the Federal Civil Rule 

referent. 
3

Rule 1

No local rules to report. 

Rule 3–Filing Fee

 No local rules to report. 

Rule 3–Civil Cover Sheet

 No local rules to report. 

Rule 3–In Forma Pauperis

Arguable Conflict:

 1. Form Requirement: Four courts have local rules requiring that a form 

application must be used in seeking in forma pauperis status.1

 These rules do not appear 

to allow for the use of an equivalent affidavit but rely solely on the form affidavit. 

 It could be argued that the form requirement is inconsistent with the in forma 

pauperis statute, which requires only the submission of an affidavit “that includes a 

statement of all assets such prisoner possesses [and a statement] that the person is unable 

to pay such fees or give security therefor.”2

 On the other hand, it could be argued that 

these local rules require nothing but what the statute requires, albeit in a particular form; 

this is especially so if the actual practice in the jurisdiction allows the litigant to conform 

an original submission to the mandated form without prejudice. 

 

Rule 5 – Proof of Service

 

Arguable Conflicts: 

1. Certificate of Service: W.D.Pa. LR 5.2 provides that “the filing or submission 

to the court by a party of any pleading or paper required to be served by other parties 

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 shall constitute a representation that a copy thereof has been 

served upon each of the parties upon whom service is required. No further proof of 

service is required unless an adverse party raises a question of notice.” 

 This local rule is arguably inconsistent with the text of Rule 5(d), which envisions 

a separate certificate of service to be filed with the court. But the inconsistency is not all 

that clear, because the local rule could be read as simply a way to define the form or 

content of proof of service by declaring that the filing is a proof of service. Moreover, the 

 

1

 N.D.Cal. LR3-10; E.D.Mo. LR2.05(A); D.Utah LR3-2(a)(1)-(2); W.D.Wash. LRCR3(b). 

2

 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). 
4

local rule contains a safety valve that allows an adverse party to raise a question of 

notice. Thus, the local rule arguably conflicts with the “spirit” of the Federal Rule, but 

there is no clear inconsistency with the text of the Federal Rule. 

 2. Timeliness of service: Rule 5(d) provides: “All papers after the complaint 

required to be served upon a party, together with a certificate of service, shall be filed 

with the court within a reasonable time after service....” Two courts have local rules that 

allow the proof of service to be filed anytime unless material prejudice would result.3 

One court’s local rule provides that the court may refuse to take action on a document 

until the proof of service is filed.4 Another court provides that the clerk may permit 

papers to be filed without proof of service but shall require such proof of service to be 

filed “promptly.”5

 An argument can be made that these timing rules are inconsistent with 

the Rule 5 provision requiring that the filing occur “within a reasonable time after 

service.” However, none of these rules are facially inconsistent with the “reasonable 

time” requirement of Rule 5; indeed they could be seen as giving more specific content to 

what is a “reasonable time,” elaborating in a way that provides some guidance to 

practitioners. 

Rule 5 – Filing of Discovery Materials

 

Conflict:

 1. E.D.Wis. GR LR 5.1(a) provides that all papers in the action must be filed, 

with no exceptions for discovery materials. This provision conflicts with the recently 

amended Federal Rule 5(d), which provides that discovery materials “must not be filed 

until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing.” The Standing Committee 

recognizes, however, that the change to Rule 5(d) was relatively recent and that the 

district may be in the process of changing its local rule to accord with the amendment to 

the national rule. 

 

 Arguable Conflict:

1. Three courts have local rules providing that the original deposition must be 

maintained by the party seeking it. These courts are: 

N.D.Ga. LR5.4(A); D.Idaho LR 5.4; M.D.Pa. LR5.4.

 These rules may be inconsistent with Rule 30 (f)(1) as applied in certain cases. 

Rule 30(f)(1) provides that a deposition transcript or recording must be stored by the 

attorney who arranged for the transcript or recording. The attorney who arranged for the 

transcript or recording may not be the attorney who sought the deposition. Rule 30(f)(1) 

directs that "the deposition" be sent to the attorney who arranged for the transcript or 

 

3

 D.Neb. LR5.2(b); D.Nev. LR5-1(b). 

4

 D.Nev. LR5-1(a). 

5

 W.D.Tex. CV-5(b). 
5

recording. The local rule could therefore conflict when the attorney who arranged for the 

transcript or recording is not the one who noticed the deposition. 

Rule 9 – Three Judge Courts

Conflict:

1. D.Ariz. LR 2.3 is a local rule concerning the number of copies to be filed in a 

three-judge court. This local rule complements federal practice; however, the text of that 

rule refers to “A District Court Composed of Three District Judges.”6 This definition is 

inconsistent with the clear language of 28 U.S.C. § 2284, governing the practice of threejudge courts. The statute requires three judges “at least one of whom shall be a circuit 

judge.” 

Rule 9 – RICO Cases 

 

Arguable Conflict: 

1. RICO Case Statement: Five courts have local rules relating to civil actions 

brought under the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).7 For 

example, three of these courts have local rules explaining that a RICO case statement is 

needed within thirty days of filing the complaint.8 Another court requires that the 

statement be filed with the complaint.9

 Five courts explain that the statement must 

include facts relied upon to initiate the claim.10 One court provides a long list of the facts 

that must be set forth.11 Two courts provide that a failure to submit a statement may 

mean dismissal.12 

 These rules may serve courts and litigants well in some instances, by emphasizing 

the particularized procedural requirements for RICO actions. On the other hand, some of 

these rules may be applied inconsistently with the detailed requirements of the statute or 

with the national rules governing pleading requirements, e.g., Rules 8, 9, 12(e) and 56. 

Rule 9 – Social Security and Other Administrative Appeal Cases

Conflict: 

1. Extension of Time to Answer: Local rules in two jurisdictions purport to extend 

the time within which the Secretary of Health and Human Services may answer the 

 

6

 D.Ariz. LR2.3. 

7

 S.D.Cal. LR11.1; S.D.Fla. LR12.1; S.D.Ga. LR9.1; D.Haw. LR 9.1, 9.2, 9.3; N.D.N.Y LR 9.2. 8

 S.D.Cal. LR11.1; S.D.Fla. LR12.1; N.D.N.Y. LR9.2. 

9

 D.Haw. LR9.1. 

10 S.D.Cal. LR11.1; S.D.Fla. LR12.1; S.D.Ga. LR9.1; D.Haw. LR 9.1; N.D.N.Y. LR 9.2. 11 S.D.Fla. LR12.1. 

12 S.D.Cal. LR11.1; D.Haw. LR 9.2. 
6

complaint from sixty days to within thirty days after the record is filed13 or within ninety 

days after service.14 Both of these rules are inconsistent with Rule 12(a)(3)(A) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the agency head to file an answer within 

sixty days after service. This is not to say that the local rules embody bad policy. But in 

the absence of amendment either to the Social Security Act or to the Federal Rule, a local 

rule extending time to answer is in conflict with the time period mandated by national 

law. 

Arguable Conflict: 

 1. Placing Social Security Numbers in the Complaint: Nine courts have local 

rules requiring that the social security number be set forth in the complaint.15 These rules 

appear to be in tension with the Social Security Administration Act, which discusses the 

confidential nature of the social security number: 

Social security account numbers and related records that are obtained 

or maintained by authorized persons pursuant to any provision of law, 

enacted on or after October 1, 1990, shall be confidential, and no 

authorized person shall disclose any such social security account 

number or related record.16

“Authorized persons” include employees of the federal government. Local rules requiring 

that the social security number be set forth in the complaint do not directly violate the 

statute, however, as the statute requires authorized persons to maintain confidentiality 

once the record is obtained or maintained. This would not explicitly prohibit a rule 

requiring a party to include a social security number on a filed document, so long as 

confidentiality were maintained thereafter. 

 Local rules requiring disclosure of a social security number are also in tension 

with the Judicial Conference policy adopted in 2002, which requires that social security 

numbers, though filed with the court, must be redacted or modified so that the full 

number is not available to the public. However, this Judicial Conference policy is not 

embodied in a Federal Rule or a federal statute, and therefore conflicting local rules are 

not violative of Rule 83. Nonetheless, it would seem that district courts would welcome 

notification that a local rule as applied might be in conflict with the published policy of 

the Judicial Conference. Redaction of social security numbers in court filings is also 

consistent with the policy embodied in the E-Government Act of 2002. 

 

13 W.D.Mo. LR9.1(d) (defendant files answer within thirty days after filing record). 14 D.N.H. LR9.1 (defendant files answer and record within ninety days after service of complaint). 15 E.D.Cal. LR8-206; E.D.Ky. LR9.1(a); W.D.Ky. LR9.1(a); M.D.La. LR9.2; W.D.La. LR9.2; 

E.D.Mich. LR9.1(e); N.D.Ohio LR9.1; E.D.Okla. LR9.1(A); N.D.Tex. LR9.1(a). 

16 42 U.S.C. §405(c)(2)(C)(viii). 
7

Rule 15 – Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Arguable Conflicts: 

 1. Time for Answer: The District Court of Nevada has a local rule providing that 

the date for a party to answer shall run from the date of filing the order allowing the 

pleading to be amended or, where there was no order, from the date of service of the 

amended pleading.17 Specifically, the local rule provides: 

 The time under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) for an entity already a party to answer or reply 

to an amended pleading shall run from the date of service of the order allowing 

said pleading to be amended, or where no order is required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 

15(a), from the date of service of the amended pleading. 

This rule might create tension with Rule 15(a), which states that the responding party 

must plead “within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 

days after service of the amended pleadings, whichever period may be longer....” The 

conflicts are indicated by three possible problems in the application of the local rule. 

First Problem. The complaint is served on Day 0. On Day 2, the plaintiff files an 

amended complaint. On Day 5, the plaintiff moves for leave to amend. The motion is 

granted and the order is served on the defendant on Day 8. Rule 15(a) allows the 

defendant to answer as late as day 20 (or, if the United States is defendant, on day 60). 

The local rule seems to set the time to answer running from day 8, but does not say how 

much time there is: does it mean to allow the full time set by Rule 15(a), so the provision 

running from service of the order is irrelevant after all? 

 Second Problem. A complaint is filed and the defendant answers. The plaintiff 

moves for leave to amend without attaching an amended complaint. The order granting 

leave is served on the defendant. Fifteen days later the plaintiff serves an amended 

complaint on the defendant. Was the defendant supposed to file an answer 10 days after 

service of the order allowing amendment? 

Third Problem. A complaint is served and an answer filed. The plaintiff attaches 

an amended complaint to the motion for leave to amend. The order granting leave to 

amend is served on the defendant. Because the defendant already has the amended 

complaint, it may make sense to set the time to answer running from service of the order. 

 All three of these questions arise because the Nevada local rule provides that "the 

time under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)" runs from the date of serving the order allowing the 

amendment. But the time periods set by Rule 15(a) are measured by the time to respond 

to the original pleading (first problem) or (ten days) from service of the amended 

pleading (second problem and third variation). A time measured by service of the order 

allowing amendment is not the time under Rule 15(a). Thus, there is a problem in 

 

17 D.Nev. LR15-1(b). 
8

matching the local rule to the time periods in Rule 15(a) that results in an arguable 

conflict, depending on how the local rule is applied. 

 2. Limitation on Acts That Can Be included in the Motion: Northern District of 

New York Local Rule 7.1.4 states that a motion to supplement a pleading must be limited 

to acts occurring after the filing of the original complaint. Civil Rule 15(d) provides that a 

court may permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading “setting forth transactions or 

occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be 

supplemented.” The Federal Rule is thus less inclusive as to the acts that can be included 

in a supplemental pleading. If the local rule is read literally, this might result in a conflict 

in certain circumstances. For example, assume the plaintiff files a complaint. One year 

later the plaintiff files an amended complaint. Still later the plaintiff seeks to supplement 

by adding something that happened between filing the original complaint and filing the 

supplemental complaint. The local rule would appear to permit this practice while the 

Federal rule would not. 

 It is unlikely, however, that the local rule means what it says, because it explicitly 

refers to Civil Rule 15(d): 

Where leave to supplement a pleading is sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), the 

proposed supplemental pleading must be limited to acts that occurred subsequent 

to the filing of the original pleading. 

Thus, any “conflict” may only be the result of imprecise drafting that may not have an 

effect on local practice. 

Rule 16 – Arbitration

Conflicts: 

 1. Automatic Arbitration: At least six courts provide that some cases are 

automatically referred to arbitration18 while three of those courts provide relief from the 

automatic referral for good cause.19 

 The rules providing for automatic arbitration, regardless of the parties’ consent, 

would appear to be in conflict with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 

which authorizes referral to arbitration only “when the parties consent.”20 However, 28 

U.S.C. § 648 in effect “grandfathers” compulsory arbitration plans that existed under the 

original arbitration statute (Public Law 100-702). That statute established a pilot 

program of mandatory arbitration in a number of district courts. The districts in which 

mandatory arbitration is grandfathered include: N.D. Cal., M.D. Fla., N.J., W.D. Mich., 

 

18 D.Ariz. LR2.11(b); N.D.Cal. ADR 4-2(a); M.D.Fla. LR8.02(a); W.D.Mich. LR16.6(b); 

D.N.J. LR201.1(d); W.D.Okla.LR16.3 Supp R. 5.2(b). 

19 N.D.Cal. ADR 4; D.N.J. LR201.1(d); W.D.Okla. LR16.3 Supp. 

20 See 28 U.S.C. §652(a) (“Any district court that elects to require the use of alternative dispute resolution 

in certain cases may do so only with respect to mediation, early neutral evaluation, and, if the parties 

consent, arbitration.”). 
9

and W.D. Okla. Thus, the only district with a mandatory arbitration program that is not 

grandfathered is D.Ariz. That district’s arbitration rule is in conflict with federal law, as it 

is mandatory rather than permissive. 

2. Burdens on Seeking Trial de novo: Eight courts require a party to deposit an 

amount equal or approximate to the arbitrator’s fee when seeking a trial de novo.21 Four 

of these courts further provide that, if the trial de novo amount is not “substantially more 

favorable” than the award, the opposing party may be awarded costs and fees pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §655(e).22 Eight of these courts explain that the arbitrator’s fee is assessed to 

the party demanding a trial de novo if the trial award is not more favorable than the 

arbitration award.23 One court provides a formula for preventing assessment of costs if 

award is rejected and trial de novo sought.24 These local rules were undoubtedly passed 

to supplement the old statute that allowed the arbitrator’s fee to be taxed as costs against 

the party demanding a trial de novo under certain enumerated circumstances.25 Under the 

current Act, all of these rules, to the extent they impose a burden on seeking a trial de 

novo, are probably inconsistent with the statutory provision of 28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2), 

which provides that on demand for trial de novo the action “shall be . . . treated for all 

purposes as it if had not been referred to arbitration.” 

Rule 17 – Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Capacity

Arguable Conflict: 

 1. Action by Guardian or Guardian ad litem: The local rule in one court states 

that minors or incompetent persons may sue or defend only by a general or testamentary 

guardian or by a guardian ad litem.

26 To the extent this requirement seeks to distinguish 

between an appointed guardian as one who can bring an action and a “next friend” who 

cannot, this local rule might run afoul of Rule 17(c). Rule 17(c) seeks to eliminate any 

distinction between appointed guardians and a “next friend”, permitting either to be a 

representative. It is unclear, however, whether this local rule actually purports to make 

that distinction. It may be that the rule is targeted only toward representative actions 

brought by guardians, and the question of an action brought by a “next friend” was 

simply not considered; next friend actions are not explicitly prohibited in the local rule. 

At any rate, local rules regulating representatives seem justified by the need to require 

some formal review of the purported representative–either by appointment under state 

law or confirmation by the federal court. 

 

21 D.Ariz. LR2.11(k)(4); M.D.Fla. LR8.06(a); W.D.Mich. LR16.6(j)(i); W.D.N.Y. LR16.2(i); 

N.D.Ohio LR16.7(j)(1); W.D.Okla. LR.Civ.R16.3 Supp. 5.10(b); E.D.Pa. LR53.2.7(E); D.N.J. LR201.1(h) 

(requiring a $150.00 deposit to be made upon request for a trial de novo). 22 N.D.Ohio LR16.7(j)(4); W.D.Mich. LR16.6(j)(ii); D.N.J. LR 201.1(h); E.D.Wash.LR 16.2(c)(2)(d)(13). 

23 D.Ariz. LR2.11(k)(4); M.D.Fla. LR8.06(d); W.D.Mich. LR 16.6(j)(i); W.D.N.Y. LR16.2(i)(5); 

N.D.Ohio LR16.7(j)(2); W.D.Okla. LR16.3 Supp. 5.10(c); E.D.Pa. LR53.2; D.N.J. LR201.1(h). 

24 W.D.Mich. LR16.6(j)(ii). 

25 See 28 U.S.C. §655(d) (1988). 26 M.D.N.Car. LR17.1(a). 
10

Rule 24 – Intervention–Claim of Unconstitutionality

Conflict:

1. Notice Requirement Imposed on Litigant: Three courts have local rules that 

require the litigant to carry out the court’s responsibility under Rule 24 to provide notice 

to the government of a claim of unconstitutionality. These rules require that notice be 

served on the judge, the parties, and the designated government official.27 Currently, 

these local rules appear inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and Rule 24(c), both of which 

place the burden on the court to provide the government with notice of a claim of 

unconstitutionality. It should be noted, however, that the Civil Rules Committee has 

published a proposed amendment that would require both the litigant and the court to 

notify the attorney general of a claim of unconstitutionality. 

 

Arguable Conflicts:

 1. Content of the Notice: Twelve courts have local rules setting forth particular 

requirements for the content of the notice of a claim of unconstitutionality, e.g., that the 

notice must state the title of the cause, a reference to the questioned statute sufficient for 

its identification, the respect in which it is claimed that the statute is unconstitutional, and 

the like.28 The relevant statute and Federal Rule do not set forth specific requirements for 

the content of the notice. But local rules setting forth specific requirements for the notice 

are not necessarily inconsistent with national law. These local rules generally do not 

require the particularized information to be set forth in a pleading, and so in that respect 

they do not appear to be inconsistent with the permissive pleading standards of Federal 

Rule 8. As to Rule 24, that Rule simply states that the party shall call the court’s 

attention to its duty to inform the government of the claim of unconstitutionality. It does 

not prevent local courts from placing procedural requirements on the notice, and there 

appears to be no inconsistency between Rule 24 and procedural requirements that will 

assist the court in complying with its duty. More importantly, most of the notice 

requirements are written specifically with the intent of aiding the court in giving the 

notice required under the Federal Rule; and none appear to require excessive or onerous 

detail. 

Rule 34 – Production of Documents, etc.

 Arguable Conflict: 

 1. Limiting the Number of Requests For Production: Two courts have local rules 

that impose a limit on the number of requests for production that can be served, unless 

court permission is obtained. The limit in one court is 10,29 and in the other is 30.30 It 

could be argued that these numerical limits conflict with the “spirit” of the Federal Rules 

by reasoning that Rule 34 “intimates” that unlimited requests are permissible by referring 

to “any” documents or tangible things. One could also reason that Rule 34 has been 

 

27 E.D.Cal. LR 24-133; D.Colo. LR24(A).1; D.Kan. LR24.1. 

28 D.Ariz. LR2.4; E.D.Cal. LR24-133; S.D.Cal. LR24.1; D.Colo. LR24.1(A); N.D.Fla. LR24.1(A); 

S.D.Fla. LR24.1; D.Kan. LR24.1; D.N.J. LR24.1(a); W.D.N.Y. LR24; M.D.Pa. LR4.5(a); D.Utah LR24-

1(a); E.D.Wash. LR24.1. 

29 M.D.Ga. LR34. 

30 D.Md. LR104.1. 
11

amended recently and yet no limitation on the number of requests for production was 

added to the Rule. 

 On the other hand, it could be argued that nothing in the national rules specifically 

says that requests can be made in unlimited number; accordingly, there is nothing 

specifically in the national law that prohibits local courts from imposing such a number. 

But even more importantly, these local rules do not prohibit discovery requests beyond a 

certain number; rather, they require court permission for discovery requests beyond a 

designated number. There seems to be nothing in Rule 34 that specifically prohibits a 

local court from establishing a regime of court control over excessive discovery requests. 

Rule 35 -- Physical and Mental Examinations 

No local rules to report. 

Rule 36 – Requests for Admission 

 Arguable Conflicts: 

1. Objections Made Earlier Than Responses: E.D.Va. LR 26(C) requires that 

objections to requests for admission be made earlier than responses to the requests, unless 

the court otherwise provides.31 To the extent the timing period in the local rule is not 

extended by the judge, it is inconsistent with Rule 36, which sets the same time limit for 

the parties to respond either by admitting, denying, or objecting. Thus, the local rule as 

applied has a potential to conflict with the national rule. 

Arguably Problematic Duplication: 

 1. Objections to Requests for Admission: Rules in nine courts require that any 

objection to a request for admission must be specific and must contain the reasons for the 

objection.32 These rules cover the same ground as Rule 36(a), requiring that the answer 

“shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering 

party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter.” Whether this is a problematic 

duplication or a helpful reminder is a matter for debate. 

Rule 38 – Jury Trial of Right 

No local rules to report. 

Rule 39 – Trial by Jury or the Court

No local rules to report. 

Rule 41 – Dismissal of Actions

 Arguable Conflicts: 

1. Requirement of Seeking Leave to Refile: Three courts have local rules that 

require a party to seek permission to refile after a voluntary dismissal.33 This 

 

31 E.D.Va. LR26(C). 

32 E.D.Ark. LR33.1(b); W.D.Ark. LR33.1(b); E.D.Cal. LR36-250(b); S.D.Ga. LR26.5; 

D.Mass. LR36.1(a)(3); D.Or. LR36.2; M.D.Pa. LR36.2; D.R.I. LR13(b); E.D.Va. LR26(C). 33 E.D.La. LR41.1; M.D.La. LR41.1; W.D.La. LR41.1. 
12

requirement appears to be inconsistent with Rule 41, unless the practice in the court is to 

grant such permission as a matter of routine. Rule 41 provides that a voluntary dismissal 

is “without prejudice”, and this at least implies that there is no constraint on the party’s 

ability to file a subsequent action. However, Rule 41 does not specifically prohibit a 

requirement that the plaintiff seek permission to refile, and at any rate, if the permission 

is granted as a matter of course, there would seem to be no direct conflict between the 

local and national rule. In sum, there is a potential conflict in the rule as applied. 

 2. Reversing the Presumption as to Involuntary Dismissals: Rules in three 

jurisdictions indicate that an involuntary dismissal is made without prejudice unless the 

court states otherwise.34 These rules reverse the presumption of Rule 41(b) that an 

involuntary dismissal is with prejudice unless the court orders otherwise. This could 

result in a conflict in the rules as applied. It would depend on the local practice. 

Rule 42 – Consolidation – Separate Trials

No local rules to report. 

Rule 47– Selection of Jurors

No local rules to report. 

Rule 48 – Number of Jurors

No local rules to report. 

Rule 51 – Instructions to Jury; Objections

Cautionary Note: Federal Rule 51 was amended effective December 1, 2003. 

It is possible that the districts with the local rules discussed below are in the process 

of amending their rules, if necessary to account for the change in Federal law. 

Almost all of the districts responded to the Federal discovery amendments within 

two years, and one could expect the same reaction to the amendment to Rule 51. The 

discussion below compares the local rules to the national rule as amended. 

Arguable Conflicts: 

1. Limiting the Number of Instructions: M.D.Pa. LR 51.1 provides that a party 

may submit more than 12 instructions only with leave of court. It can be argued that a 

rule limiting the number of instructions is inconsistent with the amended Rule 51, which 

allows a party to submit requests without any specific limit. The M.D.Pa. rule allows 

more requests upon leave of court, so there is no absolute limit on number. But unless 

leave of court is routinely granted, the requirement is a limitation in practice that is 

inconsistent with the Federal rule. 

 

 2. Timing Requirements For Submitting Instruction Requests: The amended Rule 

51 states that the court may direct an “earlier reasonable time” for submission of requests 

for instructions. Four jurisdictions require that proposed instructions must be submitted at 

least five days before trial.35 Four jurisdictions require they be submitted seven days 

before trial–though the Western District of Louisiana rule specifically states that the 

 

34 C.D.Cal.LR 41-2; S.D.Cal.LR41.1; E.D.Pa. LR41.1(a). 35 C.D.Cal. LR 51-1 (unless the court otherwise provides); E.D.Va. LR51 (unless the court otherwise 

provides) ; E.D.Wash. LR51.1(c) (or such other time as fixed by the court); D.Wyo. LR51.1. 
13

seven-day period “shall not be interpreted or enforced to prevent a party from filing 

written requests pursuant to FRCP 51 at the close of evidence or at such earlier time 

during trial as the court may reasonably direct”.36 One court requires that proposed 

instructions be submitted three days before the pretrial conference.37 Three courts require 

them to be submitted ten days before trial.38 The District of Idaho requires proposed 

instructions to be submitted fourteen days before trial.39

 It could be argued that all of these timing rules are inconsistent with Rule 51, 

which provides that instructions should be submitted at the close of the evidence or at an 

earlier reasonable time that the court directs. But an argument can be made that most if 

not all of these local rules are not in conflict with the Rule as amended. First off, many 

of these rules (e.g., C.D.Cal., E.D.Wash.) allow the court to fix an alternative time period. 

Thus, the court can operate on a case-by-case basis, just as it does under Rule 51. At 

most, these rules add a presumption that might possibly be problematic under local 

practice. Second, the Rule in Western District Louisiana specifically provides for an 

alternative time period if mandated by Rule 51–no conflict there. 

 But more importantly, all of these rules can be seen as simply defining the 

“reasonable” time period set forth in Rule 51. There seems to be nothing objectionable 

about local rules that give definition to an open-ended federal standard, so long as the 

rule chosen is itself reasonable. It can certainly be argued that all of the time periods set 

forth in these local rules are reasonable. 

Rule 54 – Jury Cost Assessment

No local rules to report. 

Rule 65 – Temporary Restraining Orders

Arguably Problematic Duplications: 

1. Affidavit Requirements: Two courts require that a party seeking a TRO must 

submit an affidavit that speaks to irreparable injury.40 One of these courts also requires 

that the affidavit explain any efforts used to give notice to the opposing party.41 These 

rules repeat requirements that currently are found in Rule 65. Such duplication could be 

seen as helpful, however, given the presumably emergency circumstances that surround 

the filing of a TRO. It may be useful to have a ready source of authority and applicable 

standards in two separate places. [Note also that the E.D. Cal. Local Rule may be in 

tension with Rule 65, as the local rule provides that the statement about irreparable injury 

is to be made in an affidavit, while Rule 65 allows it to be made in a verified complaint as 

well; the M.D. Fla. Rule does permit the filing in a verified complaint.] 

 2. Standard for Issuing a No-notice TRO: Local rules in five courts require that no 

temporary restraining order issue without notice except in extraordinary circumstances.42

Rule 65(b) provides that a TRO may be issued without notice “only if (1) it clearly 

 

36 D.Guam LR 51.1; D.Haw. LR51.1; W.D.La. LR51.1; D.Vt. LR51.1(a). 37 D.Del. LR51.1(a). 

38 D.Alaska LR 51.1(a); N.D.Miss. LR51.1(A); S.D.Miss. LR51.1(A). 

39 D.Idaho LR51.1(a). 

40 E.D.Cal. LR65-231(c); M.D.Fla. LR4.05(b)(4). 

41 E.D.Cal. LR65-231(c). 

42 E.D.Cal. LR65-231(a) (“most extraordinary of circumstances”); D.D.C. LR65.1(a) (“emergency”); 

M.D.Fla. LR4.05(a) (“emergency”); M.D. La.LR 65.1 (“emergency”); W.D.La. LR65.1 (“emergency”). 
14

appears ... by affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, 

loss, or damage will result ... [before any hearing in opposition] and (2) the applicant’s 

attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, ... made to give notice and the 

reasons ... that notice should not be required.” 

 There is no indication in any of these local rules that there is an intent to provide a 

standard different from that set forth in Rule 65. So if these local rules are problematic at 

all, it would have to be on grounds of unhelpful duplication. One could argue that these 

local rules serve as helpful reminders that no-notice TRO’s are to be a rarity. But one 

could also argue that if the local rule is to be a reminder, it should refer specifically to the 

national rule or use the same terminology as is used in the national rule. 

Rule 81 – Naturalization

Outmoded Rules: 

 1. Naturalization Petition Procedures: The district court’s role with respect to 

naturalization petitions is to administer the oath of allegiance if requested by the 

applicant.43 Seven courts have more extensive rules concerning naturalization petitions, 

enacted at a time when such petitions were heard in the district court.44 Those rules 

purport to govern practices other than administering the oath of allegiance. Although 

these courts may only be administering the oath of allegiance in practice, the rules 

themselves are outmoded and should be abrogated or amended to clarify the actual 

practice of the court. This should probably include general provisions, such as found in 

Alaska and in all the districts of Louisiana, that “All petitions for naturalization shall be 

heard as directed by the court.” 

 Rule 81 – Jury Demand in Removed Case

 Conflicts:

 1. Different Time Limits: N.D.Okla. LR 81.2 sets forth time periods for filing a 

jury demand after removal that differ from those set forth in Rule 81(c). As such it 

conflicts with the Federal Rule. 

 2. Obligation to Reassert a Jury Demand: Local rules in two district courts 

require a party to reassert its demand for a jury trial after removal. A rule requiring a jury 

demand to be made in a removed case, no matter the circumstances, does conflict with 

Rule 81(c), which provides that a party is under no obligation to reassert a demand for 

jury trial if a demand was properly made under state law. The Nebraska rule (D.Neb. LR 

81.2), which appears to admit of no exception, therefore conflicts with federal law. But, 

the N.D.Okla. rule is not so clearly in conflict on this point. It states that a demand need 

not be made if the demand “is in the removed case file.”45 

 

43 See 8 U.S.C §§ 1421, 1445-47. 44 D.Alaska LR81.2; N.D.Ga. LR83.10(A); E.D.La. LR83.1; M.D.La. LR83.1; W.D.La. LR83.1; 

M.D.N.Car. LR77.1(c); D.Wyo. LR83.8. 

45 N.D.Okla. LR81.2. 
15

Rule 83 – Promulgation of Local Rules

 Arguable Conflicts: 

 1. Amendments: D.Mass. LR 83.1 states that the court, by majority vote, may 

amend or rescind local rules.46 It could be argued that this rule conflicts with Federal 

Rule 83 because it omits any reference to the need for public comment, as required for 

local rulemaking under Rule 83. Reasonable minds can differ about whether this is a 

conflict on paper. It is not, however, a conflict in application, as research indicates that 

the district has complied with the public comment requirements in promulgating 

amendments. 

 2. Suspending or Modifying Local Rules: N.J. LR 83.2 permits the Chief Judge, 

after a recommendation from the advisory committee and with court approval, to relax or 

modify a local rule on a temporary basis for up to one year. It can be argued that this rule 

is in conflict with the national law, which provides that once a local rule is enacted, it 

remains in effect “unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant 

circuit.”47 The D.N.J. rule allowing the chief judge to suspend a local rule on a 

temporary basis may be quite useful in some circumstances; and because it is part of all 

of the local rules and qualifies them all, it may not be inconsistent with § 2071. The part 

of the rule that allows the chief judge to modify a local rule on a temporary basis does 

seem inconsistent with § 2071. 48

 

46 D.Mass. LR83.1(a). 

47 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1). 

48 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(e) (“If the prescribing court determines that there is an immediate need for a rule, 

such court may proceed under this section without public notice and opportunity for comment, but such 

court shall promptly thereafter afford such notice and opportunity for comment.”). 
16

Conclusion

The Local Rules that are clearly in conflict with Federal law are as follows: 

1. E.D.Wisc. GR LR 5.1: requires all papers in the action to be filed, with no 

exception for discovery materials. This is an apparent conflict with Rule 5(d). 

2. D.Ariz. LR 2.3: refers to “A District Court Composed of Three District Judges” 

and so is inconsistent with the clear language of 28 U.S.C. § 2284, governing the practice 

of three-judge courts. The statute requires three judges “at least one of whom shall be a 

circuit judge.” 

3. W.D.Mo.LR 9.1 and D.N.H. LR 9.1: extending the time to answer in a Social 

Security action, inconsistent with Rule 12(a)(3)(B). 

4. D.Ariz. LR2.11: providing for mandatory arbitration, in conflict with the 

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. This district was not grandfathered as a pilot 

district for mandatory arbitration.. 

5. D.Ariz.LR2.11(k)(4); M.D.Fla. LR8.06; W.D.Mich. LR16.6(j); D.N.J. LR 

201.1(h); W.D.N.Y. LR16.2(i); N.D.Ohio LR16.7(j); W.D.Okla. LRL.Civ.R 16.3 Supp. 

5.10; E.D.Pa. LR53.2; E.D.Wash. LR 16.2(c)(2)(d)(13): imposing burdens on trial de 

novo after arbitration, in conflict with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. 

6. E.D.Cal. LR 24-133; D.Colo. LR24.1; D.Kan. LR24.1: requiring the litigant to 

carry out the court’s responsibility under Rule 24 to provide notice to the government 

when there is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional. These local rules conflict with 28 

U.S.C. § 2403 and Rule 24(c), both of which place the burden on the court to provide 

notice to the government of a claim of unconstitutionality. 

7. N.D.Okla. LR 81.2: establishes a time period within which the parties must file 

jury demands after removal, which time periods are different from those set forth in Rule 

81(c). 

8. D.Neb. LR 81.2: requiring a party to reassert a demand for jury trial in a removed 

case, apparently even if a jury trial was properly demanded in state court. This rule 

conflicts with Federal Rule 81, under which a new demand is not required if a demand 

was properly made in state court. 

The Local Rules purporting to govern practice no longer occurring in the Federal 

Courts are as follows: 

D.Alaska LR81.2; N.D.Ga. LR83.10; E.D.La. LR83.1; M.D.La. LR83.1; 

W.D.La. LR83.1; M.D.N.Car.LR77.1(c); D.Wyo. LR83.8: referring to 

naturalization proceedings that are no longer conducted in the federal 

district courts. 
17

In addition, the following districts do not comply with the Uniform Numbering System, as required by federal law:

 1. District of Arizona 

 2. Middle District of Florida

3. District of Maryland (though it does have a cross-reference to the 

Uniform Numbering System on its website). 

4. Middle District of Tennessee 

 5. Southern District of West Virginia

Other rules listed in this report as “arguably in conflict” or “arguably 

problematic duplication” should be considered by the respective districts on a caseby-case basis. Whether the local rules cited under these headings are in fact 

problematic will usually depend on how the rules are actually applied by the 

respective districts.