Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed June 8, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00091-CV

JANE NELSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

NEAL DIKEMAN, SHAWN KELLY, ROY ERIKSEN, JARED WISSEL, 

SCOTT FORD, BILLY PIERCE, CHRISTINA FORD, CHARLIE 

STEVENS, AND NEKO ANTONIOU, Appellees

On Appeal from the 11th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2019-76841

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jane Nelson, in her official capacity as Secretary of the State of 

Texas,

1 appeals from the denial of her motion to dissolve a temporary injunction 

1 The officeholder of the Secretary of State of Texas has changed several times during 

this case. We have substituted the current officeholder for the prior officeholders named in the 

trial court and on appeal. See Tex. R. App. 7.2(a.). 
2

after the Legislature amended the statute upon which the injunction was based. 

We agree with the Secretary that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

dissolving the injunction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and 

render a judgment dissolving the temporary injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal is the second regarding a temporary injunction against the 

Secretary. Appellees were members and candidates within Texas’s Libertarian 

party. The Secretary issued an advisory that required candidates nominated by 

convention, such as appellees, to pay a filing fee or submit a petition in lieu thereof 

by a date that predated a nomination convention. Appellees sought, and the trial 

court granted, a temporary injunction that enjoins the Secretary from refusing to 

accept or rejecting applications for nomination from third-party candidates and 

refusing to certify third-party nominees for a general election ballot on the grounds 

that the applicants and nominees did not pay a filing fee or submit a petition in lieu

thereof at the time of filing. See Hughs v. Dikeman, 631 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). 

This court affirmed the temporary injunction in part, reasoning that the 

Secretary’s advisory conflicted with the section of the Election Code that was 

applicable at the time because the requirement of a filing fee or petition only

applied to candidates who had actually been nominated at a convention, but the 

Secretary’s advisory proposed applying the requirement to candidates seeking 

nomination by convention, i.e., candidates who had not yet been nominated. See 

Hughs, 631 S.W.3d at 381 (citing Tex. Elec. Code § 141.041(a)) (“The Advisory 

therefore exceeds the bounds of authority granted under section 141.041.”).2

2 This court reviewed other rulings of the trial court and modified the temporary 

injunction, noting that candidates who ultimately secure their party’s nomination as a result of 
3

At the time of the trial court’s temporary injunction and the prior appeal, the 

applicable statute provided: 

(a) In addition to any other requirements, to be eligible to be placed on 

the ballot for the general election for state and county offices, a 

candidate who is nominated by convention under Chapter 181 or 182 

must:

(1) pay a filing fee to the secretary of state for a statewide or 

district office or the county judge for a county or precinct

office; or

(2) submit to the secretary of state for a statewide or district 

office or the county judge for a county or precinct officer a 

petition in lieu of a filing fee that satisfies the requirements 

prescribed by Subsection (e) and Section 141.062.

Act of May 20, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, § 1, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 2282

(amended and transferred 2021) (current version at Tex. Elec. Code § 181.0311)

(emphasis added). Based on the language in the statute, this court held that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the Secretary “insofar as the 

Advisory required compliance with section 141.041’s fee/petition requirements by 

minor-party candidates who have not been nominated by the convention process.” 

Hughs, 631 S.W.3d at 362. This court explained further, “Candidates who 

ultimately secured their party’s nomination as a result of the convention process, 

however, must comply with section 141.041.” Id. 

Subsequently, the Legislature amended subsection (a) of the statute:

(a) In addition to any other requirements, to be considered for 

nomination by convention, a candidate must:

Act of May 13, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 149 

the convention process must then comply with the Election Code by paying the filing fee or 

submitting a petition. See Hughs, 631 S.W.3d at 383. After remand, the trial court issued an

amended temporary injunction that was consistent with this court’s mandate.
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(to be codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 181.0311(a)) (emphasis added). The Secretary 

filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, arguing that there had been a 

material change in the law because the Election Code now requires candidates to 

comply with the petition/fee requirement before any nominating convention. 

The trial court denied the motion, and the Secretary appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

In their sole issue on appeal, the Secretary contends that a changed 

circumstance—amendment of the statute—compels dissolution of the temporary 

injunction against enforcement of the fee/petition requirement for political 

candidates. Appellee Eriksen responds3 that (1) no change in the law renders the 

temporary injunction unnecessary or improper; (2) the amendment did not change 

the circumstances regarding the advisory, which remains an ultra vires act 

inconsistent with current law; (3) Eriksen’s pending motion to enforce the 

temporary injunction precludes dissolution; and (4) the Secretary’s appeal seeks to 

have this court prejudge the constitutionality of the new law.

A. Standard of Review

We generally review a trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction for an 

abuse of discretion. Jelinis, LLC v. Hiran, 557 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). However, we will apply a de novo 

standard of review when the issue turns on a pure question of law. Id. Statutory 

interpretation involves questions of law that we consider de novo. Aleman v. Tex. 

3 The other appellees did not file a brief. Although some of the appellees were omitted 

from the detailed list of parties in subsequent amended petitions, they remained listed as parties 

in the caption. See Abramcik v. U.S. Home Corp., 792 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (“Although we agree the omission of a defendant acts as a 

voluntary dismissal, we find the ‘omission’ rule inapplicable to plaintiffs who have been 

individually named in prior pleadings and have been generically referred to in a subsequent 

pleading.”).
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Med. Bd., 573 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2019).

B. Changed Circumstances

A trial court may dissolve a temporary injunction upon a showing of 

changed circumstances. Gruss v. Gallagher, No. 14-21-00178-CV, 2023 WL 

1975016, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 14, 2023, no pet. h.). 

Changed circumstances may include a change in the law that makes the temporary 

injunction unnecessary or improper. Id. 

In the prior appeal in this case, this court upheld the temporary injunction on 

the basis that the former statute conflicted with the Secretary’s advisory that 

required appellees to comply with the fee/petition requirement before they were 

nominated by convention because the statute only applied to a candidate “who is 

nominated.” See Hughs, 631 S.W.3d at 381, 383 (citing former Tex. Elec. Code 

§ 141.041). The amended statute, however, requires a candidate to comply with 

the fee/petition requirement “to be considered for nomination.” Tex. Elec. Code 

§ 181.0311(a). Thus, the amended fee/petition requirement applies as a 

prerequisite to nomination rather than only after a candidate is actually nominated. 

Cf. Hughs, 631 S.W.3d at 381. This change in the law nullifies this court’s basis

for upholding the temporary injunction. See id. at 383. Thus, the change in the 

law makes the temporary injunction improper. The trial court erred by not 

dissolving the injunction.

C. Motion to Enforce

Eriksen contends that he filed a motion to enforce the temporary injunction, 

so the injunction is “necessary and should stay in place until the Secretary’s 

violation of the injunction is addressed by the trial court.” Eriksen cites no 

authority in support of this argument, and we see no reason the temporary
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injunction must remain in place for the court to address any violations that may 

have occurred while the temporary injunction was valid. Cf. Propst v. Propst, No. 

No. 13-18-00291-CV, 2019 WL 5609964, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburgh Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reasoning that a pending motion for 

contempt prevented conclusion that appeal was moot even if injunction had 

expired).

D. Underlying Merits

Finally, Eriksen contends that the Secretary’s appeal is an attempt to have 

this court prejudge the constitutionality of the new law. The Secretary contends 

that it is not asking for any relief that would dispose of the case below and is not 

asking this court to address any claims asserted in Eriksen’s live pleading.

We agree with the Secretary. We do not address any issue other than 

whether the change in the law vitiates the temporary injunction. We do not address 

in this appeal any of Eriksen’s constitutional challenges to the amended statute.

III. CONCLUSION

The Secretary’s sole issue is sustained. The trial court erred by not 

dissolving the temporary injunction following the change in the law. The trial 

court’s January 1, 2022 order denying the Secretary’s motion to dissolve is 

reversed, and we render a judgment dissolving the September 15, 2020 amended 

temporary injunction.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.