alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Instructions Form B1310 (12/23)

EXEMPLIFICATION CERTIFICATE

This form is required by some states when a document is certified by a federal court for 

filing with a state or local authority. It is only necessary for the clerk to execute the form when

a person requests that the form be completed. It is suggested, however, that the clerk keep a 

record of the situations in which a request is made, so that the clerk can anticipate the need for 

the form in the future.

At its September 1997 meeting, the Judicial Conference fixed the fee for preparation of 

an Exemplification Certificate at twice the fee for certifying a document. As of December 1, 

2020, the fee for exemplification is $24. Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, Item 2.

Remember that the exemplification is for use with state courts. Pursuant to treaty, for 

certification of documents to be filed in a foreign country an apostille must be employed. Only a 

district court clerk can issue an apostille.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

MISC. NO. 14-16

IN RE: RECALL OF RETIRED JUDGE

O R D E R

Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1), eligible retired Judges of the Court may be recalled by

the Chief Judge when further service is needed by the Court. Retired Judge William A. Moorman,

having complied with 38 U.S.C. § 7257, is designated a recall-eligible retired Judge. The

Chief Judge of the Court has determined that, if recalled, Judge Moorman would provide substantial

service necessary to meet the needs of the Court. 

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that, effective January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017, recall-eligible

retired Judge Moorman is recalled from retired status in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1). 

Judge Moorman shall have and exercise all the judicial powers and duties of the office of a Judge

in active service and shall otherwise perform substantial service for the Court as requested by the

Chief Judge. It is further

ORDEREDthat Judge Moorman shall serve in recalled status in calendar year 2017 to review

and decide appeals, motions, and other filings with the Court and to perform other substantial service

at the request of the Chief Judge and he shall so serve throughout the calendar year for up to 90 days

or its equivalent. With his consent, Judge Moorman's service may be extended beyond 90 days. 

DATED: December 21, 2016 BY THE COURT:

ROBERT N. DAVIS

Chief Judge
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 12

- 00 793

- CR Mauricio B ALDERAS , Appellant

v. The S TATE of Texas, Appellee From the 290 th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011

- CR

- 0555 Honorable Melisa Skinner , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez , Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena Chapa , Justice Delivered and Filed: March 27, 2013
DISMISSED
On February 14, 2013 , this court issued an order stating this appeal would be dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) unless an amended trial court certification that shows appellant has the right of appeal was made part of the appellate record within thirty d ays. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; see also Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174, 175

– 76 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, order). Appellant did not file an amended certification. The clerk’s record does not contain a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal; to the contrary, the trial court certification in the record states “this criminal case is a plea

- bargain case, and the04

- 12

- 00793

- CR

- 2

- defendant has NO right of appeal.” The clerk’s record contains a written plea bargain, and the punishment asse ssed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant; therefore, the clerk’s record supports the trial court’s certification that defendant has no right of appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 25.2(a)(2). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH
<PAGE>
 
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1





                                LOGILITY, INC.

            Statement re:  Computation of Per Share Earnings (Loss)
                   (In thousands, except per share amounts)
                                        
<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                                Three Months Ended                    Nine Months Ended
                                                   January 31,                           January 31,
                                           -----------------------------         ----------------------------
                                             1999                 1998             1999                1998
                                           --------             --------         --------            --------
<S>                                        <C>                  <C>              <C>                 <C> 
Common Stock:
   Weighted average common             
     shares outstanding                     13,468               13,798            13,500              12,697

Dilutive effect of outstanding         
     stock options *                           176                    7                -                    7
                                           -------              -------           -------             -------
                Total                       13,644               13,805            13,500              12,704
                                           -------              -------           -------             -------
Net income (loss)                          $   287              $   471           $(8,487)            $ 1,656
                                           =======              =======           =======             =======
Income (loss) per common
   and common equivalent share*            $  0.02              $  0.03           $ (0.63)            $  0.13
                                           =======              =======           =======             =======
</TABLE> 

                                                                
* Stock options are not included in the nine months ended January 31, 1999
  calculation due to the anti-dilution to the net loss.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Heriberto CHAIREZ-ACEVES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50335.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2011.*

Filed April 20, 2011.

*716W. Mark Conover, I, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frank T. Morell, Esquire, Chula Vista, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: B. FLETCHER, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Heriberto Chairez-Aceves appeals from the 41-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Chairez-Aceves first contends that the district court erred in denying him a minor role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). Although Chairez-Aceves was a passenger in the car during the border crossing, the record reflects that the drug load on that trip was substantial, that he voluntarily made the trip, that he suspected or knew he was engaging in criminal activity, and that he tried to allay the suspicions of the border agent. Furthermore, the record permits the inference that this was Chairez-Aceves’ second trip across the border with drugs. On this record, the court’s denial of a minor role adjustment was not clearly erroneous. *See United States v. Cantrell,*433 F.3d 1269, 1282-83 (9th Cir.2006) (stating standard of review and holding that denial of *717minor role adjustment was not clear error where evidence showed that the defendant, although not a principal, voluntarily went to pick up large quantities of drugs on more than one occasion).

Chairez-Aceves next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court imposed a sentence at the bottom end of the Guidelines range, after departing downward eight levels on the basis of Chairez-Aceves’ substantial assistance and a combination of other factors. In light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3558(a) factors, the sentence is not substantively unreasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  each of the  undersigned  officers  GS  AgriFuels
Corporation (the "Company"), certifies that:

1.   The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 1) of the Company for the
     twelve months ended  December 31, 2006 (the  "Report")  fully complies with
     the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
     of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

2.   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



             /S/  Kevin Kreisler
                  -------------------------
                  Kevin Kreisler
                  Chief Executive Officer

             /S/  Edward R. Carroll
                  -------------------------
                  Edward R. Carroll
                  Chief Financial Officer


Date:            December 20, 2007


This  certification  is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,
subject  to the  knowledge  standard  contained  therein,  and not for any other
purpose.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Annual  Report of Secured Data,  Inc. on Form 10-KSB for
the period ending  December 31, 2004 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof,  I, Jingan Wang,  Chief Executive  Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Date:  April 15, 2005

/s/    Jingan Wang
------------------------
Jingan Wang,
Chief Executive Officer
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Covad Communications Group,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Charles E. Hoffman, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18. U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

|                   |  |  |                                  |                                                                   |  | 
|------------------ |  |  | -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|                   |  |  | COVAD COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC.
|                  
|                   |  |  |                                  |                                                                   |  | 
|                   |  |  | By:                              | /s/ CHARLES E. HOFFMAN                                            |  | 
|                   |  |  |                                  |                                                                   |  | 
|                   |  |  |                                  | Charles E. HoffmanPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Director |  | 
|Date: May 15, 2003 |  |  |                                  |                                                                   |  |
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 99-1547

MARCELLA C. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,

V.

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

Before FARLEY, HOLDAWAY, and STEINBERG, Judges.

O R D E R

The appellant, Marcella C. Johnson, appeals, through counsel, a May 1999 decision of the

Board of Veterans' Appeal (Board) which determined that the veteran's son, Robert W. Johnson, Jr.,

may not be recognized as a helpless child. 

On November 9, 2000, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No.

106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was enacted. On April 10, 2001, the Secretary, pursuant to an order

by the Court to show cause, filed a motion for remand in light of the enactment of the VCAA.

Pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the VCAA, the amendment to section 5107 is applicable to "any claim

. . . filed before the date of the enactment of [the VCAA] and not final as of that date." See Holliday

v. Principi, 14 Vet.App. 280 (2001) (holding all sections of VCAA are retroactive). In Karnas v.

Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308, 312-13 (1991), this Court held that where a statute or regulation changes

during the appellate process, the version most favorable to the claimant will apply. Moreover, it is

not the function of this Court to determine in the first instance which version of the law is most

favorable to the claimant. See Baker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 163 (1998); Dudnick v. Brown, 10

Vet.App. 79 (1997). Accordingly, a remand is required in order to provide the Board with an

opportunity to readjudicate the appellant's claim. 

On remand, the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and arguments necessary for

the resolution of his claim. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369, 372 (1999). The Board shall

proceed expeditiously. See Veterans Benefits Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108

Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994) (found at 38 U.S.C. § 5101 note) (requiring Secretary to provide for

"expeditious treatment" of claim remanded by Board or Court); Drosky v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 251,

257 (1997). 
2

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Secretary's motion is granted, the Board's May 1999 decision is

VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for further adjudication.

DATED: October 26, 2001 PER CURIAM.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

MAURICE SHOATZ, COREY TAFT, JOHN 

DANTZLER, KAREEM JONES, CLINTON 

HITNER, DANNY HORTON, FRANKLIN 

STUMPHOFER, JOHN DITO, TONY 

BURTON, JOEL BEVENS, WARREN 

ANDERSON, ERIC TAULTON, EDWARD 

JONES, ANTHONY JONES, LESLIE 

PETTIS, ANTON CARTER, DWAYNE 

JONES, MARC STATEN, GERALD KALE, 

JASON DAVIS, JOSE MARTINEZ, 

HECTOR AVILEZ, COREY BURRELL, 

PETER MOBLEY, MARK MELTON, 

ROBERT TUCKER, MARTY BOANES, 

MATTHEW LAWTON, ODELL BALMER, 

MCDANIEL WALKER, JALIK PEAY, 

LAFAYETTE MILLER, VIRGIL CARSON, 

CORNELIUS HAROLD, ADAM BUTLER, 

BRANDON MILLER, KEVIN GILMORE, 

JAMAR GIBBS, JAMES RIGGINS, 

MARVIN JONES,

Petitioners

v.

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT AND ALL 

OTHER JUDICIAL DISTRICTS OF 

PENNSYLVANIA COURTS OF COMMON 

PLEAS,

Respondents

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No. 63 EM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of August, 2018, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the “Petition for Review Original Action (Writ of 

Mandamus)” is DENIED.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 60410 Summary Calendar

ONESIMO CONTRERAS

- GONZALEZ , Petitioner

v. LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL , Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A205 073 996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
Onesimo Contreras

- Gonzalez, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) deny ing his application for withholding of removal. He had argued that he had a credible fear of future persecution based on his membership in a particular s ocial group. Because Contreras has not challenged the BIA’s conclusion that he was not entitled to

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 25, 2016 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-60410 Document: 00513521245 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/25/2016N o. 15

- 60410

2 relief under the Convention Against Torture, any such claims are abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft , 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003). On appeal, Co ntreras argues that he presented evidence showing that
his brothers had been robbed and assaulted in Mexico an d that such conduct
was attributable to cartel members. He maintains that his family constitutes a particular social group and that he faces persecution on his return to Mexico
based on his family relationship with individuals who were targeted by cartels. We generally review only the BIA’s decision, although we will consider the IJ’s underlying opinion to the extent it influenced the BIA. Ontunez

Tursios v. Ashcroft , 303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de nov o and its findings of fact for substantial evidence. Efe v. Ashcroft , 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002). Under that standard, the applicant must establish “that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion .” Chen v. Gonzales , 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). An applicant for withholding of removal must establish that it is “more likely than not” that his life or freedom would be threatened by persecution on account of a protected status, including mem bership in a particular social

group. Roy v. Ashcroft , 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004). The evidence presented does not establish that all reasonable factfinder s would conclude
that Contreras will more likely than not be persecuted based on his
members hip in a particular social group if he returns to Mexico. See Orellana

Monson v. Holder , 685 F.3d 511, 521

– 22 (5th Cir. 2012); Chen , 470 F.3d at 1134; Roy , 389 F.3d at 138. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in dismissing the administrative appeal. See Ro y , 389 F.3d at 138. The petition for review is DENIED. Case: 15-60410 Document: 00513521245 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/25/2016
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Veronica Cotton, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from judgment of Erie County Court, Wolfgang, J. — assault, first degree.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Green, Pine and Lawton,. JJ.
1 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge David Piester. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 02-1412

___________ United States of America * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for District v. * of Nebraska * Lynn J. Replogle * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 14, 2002 Filed: August 30, 2002

___________ Before RILEY, BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________ MELLOY, Circuit Judge. Lynn J. Replogle, having entered a conditional guilty plea and having received sentence, now exercises his reserved right to appeal the district court's 1 denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence. Mr. Replogle also appeals the district court's2 denial of his motion for reconsideration and motion to vacate his conditional guilty plea. We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but review underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving "due weight" to the inferences of the district court and law enforcement officials. United States v. Wheat , 278 F.3d 722, 725-26 (8th Cir. 2001). Law enforcement officials accompanied by Mr. Replogle's Nebraska Probation Officer seized evidence during an unconsented and warrantless search of a house under Mr. Replogle's possession and control. The district court correctly determined that no search warrant was required because the search was conducted pursuant to Mr. Replogle's Nebraska Order of Probation. The terms of Mr. Replogle's probation required him to grant probation officers and accompanying law enforcement officials consent to search property under his ownership, possession, or control. Mr. Replogle argues that, upon his refusal to consent to the search in this case, officials could have revoked his probation, but could not rightfully carry out the search. The district court rejected this argument, finding that warrantless search requirements in probation orders are generally considered reasonable, United States v. Vincent , 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1999), and that the requirement to grant consent did not actually impose on the probation officer a duty to obtain consent. The district court also correctly determined that the search was conducted for a probationary purpose and not merely for investigative purposes under the pretense of furthering the goals of probation. Finding no clear error in the factual determinations of the district court, and concurring in the district court's legal analysis based on those facts, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
#### In the Matter of Stephen R. Hunter, Appellant, v Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Blooming Grove, Respondent, and Joseph Rick, Intervenor-Respondent.

Appeal by the petitioner from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated April 22, 1986.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the intervenor, for reasons stated by Justice Green in the Supreme Court, Orange County. Mollen, P. J., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

MISC. NO. 05-14

IN RE: EFFECT OF 2013 PHILIPPINES TYPHOON ON MAIL SERVICE

Before KASOLD, Chief Judge, and HAGEL, MOORMAN, LANCE, DAVIS, 

SCHOELEN, PIETSCH, BARTLEY, and GREENBERG, Judges.

O R D E R

The devastation caused by the November 2013 typhoon (Typhoon Haiyan, also known as

Typhoon Yolanda)that struck portions of Southeast Asia, including the Republic of the Philippines,

resulted in disruption of postal operations. As a result, the Court issued Miscellaneous Order

No. 01-14, staying appeals where the appellant resides in the affected area, absent specific requests

by such appellant that his or her case proceed. According to a recent U.S. Postal Service

international service alert, postal operations have now resumed, although delays may be possible as

a result of ongoing construction of roads and relocation of residents. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that any stay resulting from Misc. Order 01-14 is hereby LIFTED. Any party

who continues to be affected by postal service delays associated with this natural disaster may

request appropriate relief on a case-by-case basis.

DATED: August 5, 2014 PER CURIAM.