Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2016-188

OCTOBER TERM, 2016

In re R.L., Juvenile } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Franklin Unit,

 } Family Division

}

} DOCKET NO. 164-10-14 Frjv

Trial Judge: Alison S. Arms

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother and father separately appeal termination of their parental rights to their son R.L., 

born in July 2014. On appeal, mother argues that the court failed to engage in a forward-looking 

analysis and abdicated its responsibility to review the case plan. Father argues that the evidence 

does not support the court’s findings that termination was in the child’s best interests. We affirm.

R.L. is parents’ third child. Parents stipulated that their older two children, K.L. and S.L., 

were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS) in December 2013 due to parents’ substance 

abuse. Shortly after R.L.’s birth, on July 22, 2014, the State filed a petition alleging that R.L. was 

CHINS. The court granted custody to the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and R.L. 

was placed with his mother at the Lund home. Due to safety concerns by Lund staff, R.L. was 

discharged from Lund on August 12, 2014. He was placed with a foster mother. That CHINS 

petition was dismissed on October 3, 2014, and R.L. was returned to his parents that same day. 

On October 16, 2014, this CHINS petition was filed, and custody was again transferred to DCF. 

DCF placed him back with his foster mother, where he has since remained. 

In March 2015, the court adjudicated R.L. as CHINS. The court concluded that mother 

had demonstrated an inability to care for R.L. while at Lund, finding among other things that

mother did not follow diaper change instructions, R.L. developed a diaper rash so severe that it 

bled and mother sought treatment only after staff intervened, mother’s sedation from her 

methadone impacted her ability to care for R.L. in that she would not wake at night to tend to R.L. 

and would pass out on occasion, mother had difficulty meeting expectations and would leave the 

property without notifying staff, and mother did not engage in discharge planning. Further the 

court found that within a week of returning to mother’s care in October 2014, R.L. experienced a 

significant weight loss of fourteen ounces, which was due to not getting enough calories. Father 

and mother were both on a methadone maintenance program, but father continued to use 

nonprescribed drugs. Mother allowed father to be present with R.L. despite his ongoing drug use. 

In April 2015, mother applied for a relief-from-abuse order against father. It described six 

years of emotional and physical abuse by father, including several incidents of violent physical 

abuse. Mother withdrew the application three days later. 
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DCF filed a case plan with a goal of termination and adoption, and the parents contested

the plan. Despite the termination recommendation, the plan contained recommended services for 

parents and was similar to the prior case plans for parents’ older children. The court initially 

scheduled a contested disposition hearing for September 2015, but the matter was continued 

because father’s attorney had withdrawn from the case and the case plan called for termination, 

but no petition had yet been filed. In October 2015, DCF filed a petition to terminate parents’ 

rights. The case plan was never formally approved by the court. A hearing was held over three 

days in January and March 2016. Both parents testified. Father denied that his inability to care 

for R.L. was due to his drug use and said there was no reason R.L. should have been taken. Mother 

also said that R.L. was taken based on false allegations. At trial, she conceded some statements in 

the RFA affidavit and denied others. Father denied any abuse. 

In May 2016, the court issued a written order terminating parental rights. The court 

credited the statements in mother’s RFA affidavit and found that there was domestic violence in 

the home and that it posed an ongoing risk to mother and any children that would be placed in the 

home. The court analyzed the child’s best interests and found that parents would not be able to 

parent R.L. within a reasonable period of time. The court explained that despite participation in 

services, parents had failed to make meaningful changes necessary to parent R.L. Father denied 

that parents’ drugs use impacted their parenting and denied that there was domestic violence in the 

household. He did not make progress in his parenting skills and was unable to safely parent R.L. 

The court similarly found that mother minimized the severity of domestic violence in the 

household and denied that drug use impacted her parenting. The court found that mother had been 

unable to safely parent R.L. during the time period she was at Lund and the two weeks she cared 

for R.L. in October 2014 and had not made the meaningful changes necessary to safely parent. 

She had difficulty recognizing the child’s needs and placing his needs ahead of her own. R.L. had 

a strong bond with his foster mother and foster brother and had adjusted well to his home, school, 

and community. Thus, the court concluded that termination was in R.L.’s best interests. Both 

parents appeal.

The family court may terminate parental rights at initial disposition if the court finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re J.T., 166 Vt. 

173, 177, 179 (1997). In assessing the child’s best interests, the court must consider the statutory 

criteria. 33 V.S.A. § 5114. The most important factor is whether the parent will be able to resume 

parenting duties within a reasonable period of time. In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.). 

On appeal, we will uphold the family court’s conclusions if supported by the findings and affirm 

the findings unless clearly erroneous. In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 178 (1993). 

Mother argues that the court failed to engage in a forward-looking analysis with respect to 

the TPR petition, and that the court erred in failing to accept or reject DCF’s proposed case plan 

prior to termination at initial disposition. Father joins these arguments, and also challenges the 

sufficiency of the State’s evidence and, in particular, argues that the trial court improperly relied 

on testimony from a caseworker that mostly related to a prior case involving the parents’ older 

children.

We begin with mother’s appeal, which father joins. Mother first argues that the court failed 

to engage in a forward-looking analysis. In assessing whether a parent will be able to parent within 

a reasonable period of time, the court must focus on a parent’s prospective ability, but “past events 

are relevant in this analysis.” In re D.S., 2014 VT 38, ¶ 22, 196 Vt. 325. The reasonableness of 
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the time period must be measured from the child’s perspective, In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 337 (1996), 

and may take account of the child’s young age or special needs, In re J.S., 168 Vt. 572, 574 (1998) 

(mem.). Here, the court findings reflect that the court properly focused on parents’ prospective 

ability to parent. The court looked at mother’s past demonstration of her ability to parent, including 

the time period she was with R.L. at Lund and the time in October when R.L. was returned to her 

care. The court then considered whether mother had made changes since then to demonstrate that 

she would be able to parent within a reasonable period of time. The court found that neither parent 

had made the necessary changes to demonstrate that they could safely parent R.L., despite the 

services provided. The court credited the testimony of the family time coach and parent educator 

that neither parent had made any progress in parenting skills. Further, parents failed to 

acknowledge the impact of their drug use and the domestic violence in the home on their ability to 

parent. Father continued to deny the impact of his drug use, denied domestic violence in the home, 

and failed to make progress in parent education. Mother similarly denied the impact of her drug 

use and minimized the severity of the domestic violence. Given this lack of progress and 

considering R.L.’s young age, the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that parents would not 

be able to parent within a reasonable period of time. 

Mother also argues that the court erred in failing to accept or reject DCF’s case plan. At 

the time, the statute required DCF to file a disposition case plan with the family court twenty-eight

days following a CHINS adjudication.* 33 V.S.A. § 5316. This case plan is considered by the 

court at the disposition hearing and, depending on the outcome of the disposition proceeding, 

evaluated by the court to determine if it is “designed to achieve the permanency goal.” Id. 

§ 5318(b). Here, the court fully complied with the statute. The court did not consider the case 

plan prior to the termination hearing because termination was sought at the initial disposition. 

Further, because the outcome of disposition was termination of parental rights, the court was not 

required to either accept or reject the case plan. Id. For these reasons, we conclude that the court 

did not err in granting the termination petition at initial disposition without first accepting or 

rejecting the case plan. 

Mother contends that the delay in holding a disposition hearing prejudiced her because the 

court had not reviewed the plan of services and expectations for mother. However, the court did 

not base its termination on either parent’s failure to comply with the expectations in the not-yetapproved plan, but instead properly focused on the best-interests analysis and concluded that 

termination at initial disposition was in the child’s best interests. The services recommended and 

offered by DCF were relevant insofar as the court’s conclusion that the parents were not reasonably 

likely to be able to assume parental responsibilities in a reasonable time from the perspective of 

the child took into account the efforts already made to help them do so. In addition, although the 

disposition hearing did not take place within the thirty-five-day time frame set by statute, id. 

§ 5317(a), the timeline is directory not mandatory. In re A.S., 2016 VT 76, ¶ 8. The critical 

question when termination is sought at the initial disposition proceeding is whether there is “clear 

and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re C.P., 2012 VT 100, 

¶ 30, 193 Vt. 29. Here, the court made extensive findings on R.L.’s best interests and those 

findings support the court’s conclusion that termination was in R.L.’s best interests. 

 

*

13 V.S.A. § 5316 was recently amended to allow seven days to file a disposition case 

plan. 2015, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 30.
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Next, we turn to father’s argument. Father claims that the court abused its discretion in 

crediting the testimony of the first DCF caseworker over the testimony of other professionals who

worked with father, including the family time coach and parent educator. He suggests that the 

caseworker was biased, and argues that much of her testimony related to his conduct in connection 

with his older children addressed in a different proceeding. 

We conclude there was no error. “[I]t is the exclusive role of the family court to weigh the 

evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re M.L., 2010 VT 5, ¶ 29, 187 Vt. 291. 

Therefore, to the extent there was a conflict between the evidence presented by different witnesses, 

the court did not err in crediting the account of the DCF caseworker over that of other witnesses. 

Further, while some of the court’s findings on father’s lack of ability to parent R.L. were 

supported by the testimony of the first DCF caseworker, many of the findings concerning father’s 

lack of readiness to parent were independently supported by other sources, including the testimony 

of the individuals father describes as more credible. The family time coach testified that father 

missed a quarter of family time visits, and that neither parent had made progress during the time 

she provided coaching. The parent educator also testified that father’s attendance was inconsistent 

and that his parenting skill level stayed the same from beginning to end. Further, the court’s 

findings that father failed to appreciate how his drug use and domestic violence had impacted his 

parenting were supported by father’s own testimony. Thus, the court’s findings that father is 

unable to safely parent R.L. and will not be able to do so within a reasonable period of time are 

well supported by the evidence. 

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice