SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2042-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

KEITH I. HUNT, a/k/a 

KEITH HUNT, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________

Submitted April 16, 2024 – Decided May 9, 2024 

Before Judges Mayer and Augostini. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 22-03-0293. 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Timothy P. Kerrigan, Chief

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2042-22

 Defendant Keith I. Hunt appeals from his conviction and sentence after 

pleading guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm without a 

permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). He contends the gun seized by police should 

have been suppressed. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the 

applicable legal standards, we reject defendant's contentions and affirm. 

I.

We briefly recount the procedural history and relevant facts. In March 

2022, a Passaic County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant 

with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); 

second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(a)(1); fourth-degree endangering of another person, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.1(a); 

and third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless 

search of defendant's apartment1

 and of his person. The State contended the 

search of defendant's person was lawful based on reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 

1

 The denial of the suppression motion as to the warrantless search of 

defendant's apartment is not challenged on appeal. 
3 A-2042-22

An evidentiary hearing was scheduled in November 2022. In lieu of 

testimony, the parties stipulated to the judge's consideration of written reports 

authored by two police officers, Officer Noel Irizarry and Officer Juan Capellan 

and the officers' body camera videos capturing the incident. After oral 

argument, the judge reserved her decision and subsequently rendered an oral 

opinion on December 5, 2022 denying the suppression motion. 

Approximately a week later, defendant pled guilty to second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon. In February 2023, defendant was sentenced 

a degree lower, pursuant to his plea agreement, to three-and-a-half years with 

three-and-a-half years of parole ineligibility and the remaining counts were 

dismissed. 

Defendant raises one issue for our consideration: 

THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE 

BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE [DEFENDANT'S] 

FLIGHT WAS NOT REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 

STOP AND FRISK HIM. 

 II. 

In the early morning hours on January 1, 2022, Paterson police responded 

to the area of 188 21st Avenue after receiving shot spotter notification of shots 

fired. Officers responded to the location and began canvassing the area. Within 

minutes of arriving, officers heard three to four gunshots. They began running 
4 A-2042-22

in the direction where they believed the shots were fired. Officers discovered 

shell casings on the ground and on a white Jeep parked below an apartment 

window.

2

 After receiving an emergent call to "clear the air," Officer Irizarry ran 

in the direction of other officers in the area. Officer Irizarry saw a male, later 

identified as defendant, and a female standing on the street. Upon seeing the 

officers, defendant immediately turned and ran from the officers. 

The officers initially shouted at defendant, "why are you running?" As 

defendant fled, Officer Irizarry "observed [defendant] reaching into his right 

front pocket." Officer Irizarry noted in his police report that "[m]ultiple officers 

advised [defendant] to stop running but [defendant] did not obey the 

commands." Officer Irizarry, along with other officers, stopped defendant and 

placed him in handcuffs. 

Another officer conducted a pat down search of defendant and located a 

black handgun in defendant's right front jean pocket. The officers arrested 

defendant. 

The judge denied defendant's suppression motion, finding in pertinent 

part: 

2

 Some officers entered the apartment building and searched the apartment. 
5 A-2042-22

[T]here is reasonable articulable suspicion for the 

investigative detention of [] defendant based upon the 

totality of the circumstances. 

First, the [c]ourt finds that the police are lawfully 

in the area canvassing due to a report of gunshots 

fired/ShotSpotter at that location. 

Within minutes of arrival, the officers hear three 

to four gunshots while on scene. The [c]ourt therefore 

finds that the police are dealing with an active threat to 

public safety. 

Moreover, while canvassing the area, the police 

observed what they believed to be a live round and/or 

shell casing on top of a white Jeep Compass, as well as 

shell casings on the ground directly underneath a 

certain apartment located at 188 21st Ave. 

During this ongoing investigation, there is an 

emergent radio transmission to clear the air. Officers 

the[n] immediately begin to run towards the apartment 

building where they just observed the shell casings and 

where they believe the shots came from. 

Again, the [c]ourt notes that as the police are 

approaching the area where [] defendant is standing, it 

is still an emergent and ongoing shooting investigation 

that poses a danger to both officer safety and public 

safety. 

The instant facts are completely divergent from a 

situation where a shooting occurred earlier that evening 

or even an hour prior to police arrival. 

The [c]ourt emphasizes that the police just heard 

three to four gunshots minutes before their encounter 

with [] defendant.
6 A-2042-22

The [c]ourt further finds that the credible 

evidence . . . reveals that upon seeing the police 

approach the defendant not only moves but begins to

run. 

These actions are antithetical to the actions of the 

other male observed . . . and, more important, to the 

actions of the female who was literally standing right 

next to [] defendant as the police are rapidly 

approaching her. 

As such, the [c]ourt is not persuaded by the 

defendant's argument that he was running in 

compliance with the officer's statement to, "watch out, 

bro,” nor is the [c]ourt persuaded by [] defendant's 

argument that his flight is the sole basis for his 

investigative detention. 

In addition to running away, "when no other person engaged in such 

conduct," the motion judge found that defendant continuously disobeyed the 

officers' commands to stop, and one officer observed defendant "reaching into 

his right front pocket." Based upon the totality of these circumstances, together

with rational inferences from those facts, the motion judge concluded 

defendant's investigative detention was reasonable. We agree that the actions 

of the police in this swiftly unfolding scenario were reasonable and lawful. 

We begin our analysis by acknowledging general principles governing 

motions to suppress physical evidence. When reviewing a motion to suppress 

evidence, we "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 
7 A-2042-22

decision, so long as those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record.'" State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018) (quoting State v. Elders, 

192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We defer to the trial judge's factual findings, as the 

trial judge has a better opportunity for a "feel" of the case. Elders, 192 N.J. at 

244. In contrast, because issues of law "do not implicate the fact-finding 

expertise of the trial courts, appellate courts construe the Constitution, statutes, 

and common law 'de novo—with fresh eyes—owing no deference to the 

interpretive conclusions' of trial courts, 'unless persuaded by their reasoning.'" 

State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017) (quoting State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 

308 (2016)). 

Generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable and 

prohibited under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions absent a 

recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156,

164-65 (2023). This case involves the investigative stop exception, also known 

as a Terry3 stop, "which is a procedure that involves a relatively brief detention 

by police during which a person's movement is restricted." State v. Goldsmith, 

251 N.J. 384, 399 (2022) (citing State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017)). 

3

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8 A-2042-22

"An investigative stop or detention does not offend the Federal or State 

Constitution, and no warrant is needed, 'if it is based on "specific and articulable 

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts," give rise 

to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. 

Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 

Reasonable suspicion "is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Ibid. 

However, "[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's subjective 

good faith" will satisfy this constitutional requirement. Ibid. (quoting State v.

Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)). 

"[I]n determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing 

court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen 

encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the 

individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police 

intrusions.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 

104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986)). Thus, a judge must consider the entire picture rather 

than each fact in isolation. State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554-55 (2019). "[T]he 

touchstone for evaluating whether police conduct has violated constitutional 

protections is reasonableness." State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 157 (App. 

Div. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
9 A-2042-22

On appeal, defendant argues the motion judge erred by relying on 

defendant's flight alone, without any additional suspicious circumstances, to 

support the stop and frisk of defendant. State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 173 

(1994) ("[F]light of defendant alone, without other articulable suspicion of 

criminal activity, . . . does not meet the Terry standards . . . .") 

Given the totality of the circumstances during the early morning hours on 

January 1, 2022, defendant's arguments are unavailing. 

It is well-settled that flight alone does not justify a Terry stop. State v. 

Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 457-58 (2002) (citing Tucker, 136 N.J. at 169). 

However, flight "in combination with other circumstances . . . may support 

reasonable and articulable suspicion" required to justify a stop. State v. Pineiro, 

181 N.J. 13, 26 (2004) (citing State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 281 (1998)). 

Here, the motion judge properly found that defendant's flight alone was 

not the sole basis for the investigatory stop. She described the "other compelling 

circumstances," which included police responding to and investigating an active 

shooter; hearing gunshots within minutes of arriving on scene; and locating live 

shell casings in the area. Additionally, within proximity to this dangerous scene, 

officers saw defendant run and refused to halt in response to the police 

commands. 
10 A-2042-22

In rejecting defendant's argument that he ran to comply with the officer's 

statement "watch out, bro," the motion judge noted only defendant, unlike the 

others on the street, fled. Moreover, as defendant ran, an officer observed 

defendant reaching into his right front pocket. Another officer observed a "large 

bulge in defendant's clothing" prior to frisking defendant. 

Defendant further contends that the motion judge erred in failing to 

identify the precise moment defendant was stopped and relying on erroneous 

facts occurring after defendant was stopped to support reasonable suspicion. We 

are not persuaded by these arguments. 

As the motion judge correctly observed, defendant's actions and the 

officers' observations occurred rapidly and simultaneously. The facts in this 

scenario, together with defendant's failure to comply with the commands to halt 

in the context of this active shooter investigation, together with all reasonable 

inferences, and the fluidity of the situation, the officers had more than a hunch 

to support articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Here, while investigating 

an active threat to public safety, the officers saw defendant, who immediately 

ran from the police and refused to stop. Based on these circumstances, the 

motion judge found the officers were justified in temporarily detaining 

defendant. In addition, as he was fleeing, one of the officer's observed defendant 
11 A-2042-22

reach into his pocket. Thus, in the context of this highly charged scenario, the 

officers had a reasonable basis to stop the defendant, and once stopped, the 

officers were justified in conducting a frisk of defendant's person to secure to 

their safety. 

The facts of this case are distinguishable from State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. at

172-73. First, unlike in Tucker, the police were not on routine patrol but rather 

were responding to an active shooter scene. The facts of this case are more 

analogous with State v. Dunbar, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 524 (App. Div. 2014), 

where the police responded to a report of "shots fired"; and with State in the 

Interest of J.B., 284 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1995), where the police 

responded to an anonymous citizen complaint involving the sale of drugs. In 

Tucker, unlike this case, nothing "untoward had occurred." Dunbar, 434 N.J. 

Super. at 527. 

Moreover, the police in Tucker never commanded the defendant to stop. 

In this regard, the case aligns with the facts in State v. Doss, 254 N.J. Super. 

122 (App. Div. 1992), where the police repeatedly commanded the fleeing 

defendant, who acted suspiciously, to stop but the defendant continued to flee. 

In Doss, a case similar to the facts here, we held the "defendant's refusal to obey 

[the officer's] orders together with all of the other circumstances . . . gave the 
12 A-2042-22

police reasonable cause to believe" criminal activity was afoot. Id. at 130. We 

stated the officers "would have been remiss if they had not attempted to stop and 

interrogate" the defendant give the circumstances. Id. at 127. 

 In sum, "[t]he reasonableness of police conduct [must be] assessed with 

regard to circumstances facing the officers, who must make split second 

decisions in a fluid situation." Bard, 445 N.J. Super. at 157. As the motion 

judge properly concluded, the officers were faced with a serious risk to their 

safety and the safety of the community and the circumstances here satisfied 

Terry, justifying a stop and frisk of defendant. 

 Affirmed.