Crime Victims’ Rights Report 2015 

Summary – uscourts.gov

This is the eleventh annual report to Congress on crime victims' rights under§ 104(a) of 

the Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405. Section 104(a) requires the Administrative 

Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report "the number of times that a right established in 

Chapter 237 of title 18, United States Code, is asserted in a criminal case and the relief requested 

is denied and, with respect to each such denial, the reason for such denial, as well as the number 

of times a mandamus action is brought pursuant to Chapter 237 of title 18, and the result 

reached." Title I of the Justice for All Act is commonly referred to as the Crime Victims' Rights 

Act (CVRA) and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

In the federal trial courts, there were more than 61,200 criminal cases filed involving 

more than 80,000 defendants during fiscal year 2015. In the past year, the AO has received 

reports from the appellate courts on 7 mandamus actions brought per the provisions of the

CVRA and has similarly identified 11 district court cases that meet the statute's reporting criteria. 

Summaries of those mandamus and trial court actions follow, including the reasons provided for 

the decisions in each of the cases. Related cases are combined into one summary.

United States v. Hernan Giraldo-Serna, 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-1 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2015).

Defendant, leader of a paramilitary group in Colombia, pled guilty to "one count of conspiring to 

manufacture and distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, with the intent or knowledge that 

the cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States from Colombia." Children of an 

individual who was killed by the paramilitary group filed a motion seeking to be recognized as 

crime victims in this case. To qualify as a victim under the CVRA, a person must be directly and 

proximately harmed as a result of the commission of the offense. In this case, the court observed 

that neither the indictment nor the statement of facts made any reference to the use of force or 

violence in the charged conspiracy. Although the movants attempted to show a causal connection 

between their father's death and the defendant's charged conspiracy, the court ruled that it was 

insufficient. The death of movants' father was too factually attenuated from the conspiracy, so

the court denied the motion for victims' rights under the CVRA.

In re: Estate of Arthur Barrett, No. 14-1236 (1st Cir. Nov. 20, 2014). Petitioner Barrett 

sought a petition for a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the First 

Circuit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), challenging the terms of the district court's judgment 

that was handed down on November 19, 2013, and directing the district court to reopen the 

underlying case of United States v. James J Bulger, No. 1:99-cr-10371-DJC-3 (D. Mass. 2013). 

The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of diligent prosecution. After reviewing 

petitioner's submissions and relevant portions of the record, the court determined that petitioner
missed deadlines and filed her opening brief "months out of time." Accordingly, the court 

granted the government's motion and dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus.

In re: Armando Pons, Nos. 14-2101, 14-2102, and 14-2320 (1st Cir. Oct. 23, 2014, and 

Dec. 11, 2014). Petitioner Pons sought a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals 

for the First Circuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d), claiming that he had been victimized 

"during eleven (11) years AND twenty two (22) months of involuntary and unjust 

imprisonment." Similar allegations were made in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit. See In re: Armando D. Pons infra. In denying the petitions, the court stated, 

"These filings, while invoking 18 U.S.C. § 377l(d), do not come within its terms."

United States v. Gary Lee Sampson, 1:01-cr-10384-MLW-l (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2014).

Defendant pled guilty to carjackings resulting in death and received a death sentence, which was 

affirmed on appeal. The sentence was later vacated upon a finding of juror misconduct. On 

remand, a second jury trial commenced to determine whether the death penalty was justified, and 

the defendant sought a continuance. The government objected, emphasizing the rights of the 

families of the victims to proceedings "free from unreasonable delay" under the CVRA. The 

court noted that the victims' families have a significant interest in this case, including the right to 

a retrial without "unreasonable delay" and a "right to be treated with fairness and with respect for 

[their] dignity and privacy." See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7), (8). The court, however, concluded that 

a seven-month continuance was warranted. The court stated that "A reasonable continuance will 

provide time for Sampson's counsel to prepare properly. It will also afford an opportunity for 

issues to be properly presented to the court and to be decided thoughtfully. This process should 

maximize the likelihood that the result of the retrial will be both fair and final--a result which 

will serve the interest of everyone so deeply concerned about this case."

United States v. Harry K. Roche, 1:13-cr-00060-SLR (D. Del. Mar. 13, 2015). Defendant 

was charged with various child pornography offenses and pled guilty to transportation of child 

pornography. Before the plea was entered, a victim requested restitution. The defense objected, 

arguing that the government did not establish that defendant's behavior was the proximate cause 

of victim's harm. The government conceded that the victim, who submitted the request prior to 

the plea, was not a victim of the offense of conviction. Accordingly, the court denied the victim's 

request for restitution.

United States v. Kevin J Wick, 5:15-cr-00039-JPB-JES (N.D. W.Va. July 24, 2015).

Defendant was charged with various child sex abuse offenses. On behalf of the minor victims, 

the government filed a motion for a protective order related to discovery materials which 

included statements about the victims. In doing so, the government asserted rights to "privacy" 

and "welfare" under the CVRA and the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3771 and 18 U.S.C. § 3509. The court observed that the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure provide the defendant with access to discovery materials, but allow a court "for good 

cause" to "deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief." Fed.

R. Crim. P. 16(d)(l). Finding that existing statutes already provide protections to minor victims 

that require the defendant to safeguard the documents, the court determined that the 

government's vague justifications of "privacy" and "welfare" failed to demonstrate good cause 

for the protective order. As such, the motion for a protective order was denied.

In re: Steven Sewell (formerly Sealed Petitioner), No. 15-30325 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2015). 

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to bribe a public official and false certification of financial 

reports in the underlying case of United States v. Fradella, No. 2:12-cr-00207-SM-JCW-1 (E.D. 

La. 2015). Petitioner sought restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, claiming 

that the false certifications led to a large loss in a business venture he had with defendant.

Approximately two months after the district court denied restitution and the defendant was 

sentenced, petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). The appellate court observed that one of the 

statutory requirements for mandamus review states that the petition must be filed in the appellate 

court no later than 14 days after the plea or sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5)(B). Because 

petitioner waited nearly two months after sentencing to file his petition, the court held that he 

was not statutorily eligible for a writ of mandamus. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

In re: William Stephens. Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional 

Institutions Division, No. 15-41079 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2015). In a death penalty case, defendant 

Gardner filed a motion seeking additional federal habeas counsel in the Eastern District of Texas 

in August of 2013 (see Gardner Jr. v. Director, TDCJ-CID, 1:10-cv-00610). Two years later, 

petitioner Stephens sought a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 377l(d)(3), asserting the right to proceedings free from 

unreasonable delay and directing the district court to lift a stay and rule on the pending motion·. 

While the petition was pending in the Fifth Circuit, the district court granted defendant's motion 

for supplemental counsel. Therefore, the appellate court denied the petition for a writ of 

mandamus as moot.

In re: Danielle Davian, No. 15-3092 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015). Defendant pled guilty to 

multiple counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in the 

underlying case of United States v. Davian, No. 5:14-cr-00081-1 (N.D. Ohio 2014). The 

government notified the defendant's wife (petitioner) that she was a victim under the CVRA and 

advised her of her rights. Eight weeks after entry of the final judgment, petitioner attempted to 

file a motion to accelerate the production of the sentencing transcript and to expedite the 

consideration of a Freedom of Information Act request she submitted to the Department of
Justice. Determining that petitioner was not a 'party' to the action, the district court declined to 

docket her motion.

Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), ordering the district court to recognize her interest in 

this case as a crime victim and allow her to file a post-judgment motion to enforce her rights 

under the CVRA. The CVRA gives victims certain rights to participate in the criminal trial 

process, but those rights are limited. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). In order to prevail at the appellate 

level, petitioner must demonstrate that she has a clear and indisputable right to the writ. The 

appellate court observed that the district court did not find that petitioner was not a victim, but 

rather that she was not a 'party' to the case. The court further noted that the criminal trial 

proceeding had already concluded, and any attempt to intervene after the fact may "fall outside 

the scope of protection provided by the CVRA." In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, the court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated a clear and indisputable 

right to the writ and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus.

In re: Armando D. Pons, No. 14-3372 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2014). Petitioner Pons sought a 

writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), claiming that he had been victimized "during eleven (11) years AND

twenty two (22) months of involuntary and unjust imprisonment." Similar allegations were made 

in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See In re: Armando D. Pons supra. 

The court noted that petitioner did not specify which of his rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)

were being denied, and further noted that the CVRA provides rights to victims only. Determining 

that petitioner was not a victim of any offense, the court declined to grant petitioner any relief 

pursuant to the CVRA.

United States v. Julia R. Thiemann, 4:14-cr-3051 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 2015). In a child 

pornography case, the court granted restitution to one victim. Minutes before the imposition of a 

sentence, the government submitted a new restitution claim for another victim. The court 

determined that the restitution claim was untimely and would have caused an unwarranted 

sentencing disparity because the more culpable offender, who had been previously sentenced, 

escaped the restitution claim altogether because of the untimely nature of the submission.

Therefore, the request for restitution was denied.

In re: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, No. 15-71346 (9th Cir. May 12, 2015). 

Defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of conspiracy and wire fraud involving a United States 

program for renewable fuel and energy credits in the underlying case of United States v. Nathan 

"Nati" Stoliar, No. 2:14-cr-0006-APG-GWF (D. Nev. 2015). The Canadian government, 

succumbing to a similar fraud by defendant in its biofuel subsidy program, sought restitution in 

the amount of$1,233,065.32 CAD under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA 18 

U.S.C. § 3663A). Finding that Canada was not a victim of the offenses defendant was convicted 

of in the United States, the district court denied the request for restitution.
Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), challenging the denial of restitution. The court noted 

that in order to issue a writ of mandamus, it must find an abuse of discretion or legal error in the 

district court's order. In this case, defendant was convicted of offenses that established a 

"scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity," so the court found that victims directly 

harmed by the entire scheme were entitled to restitution, not just those individuals that were 

harmed by the particular counts of conviction. The schemes, however, in the United States and 

Canada were different. "The schemes were accomplished by different means, had different 

victims, and took place in primarily different countries." Accordingly, the court ruled that 

Canada's claim for restitution was based on events that were not causally linked to the schemes 

that led to the defendant's conviction. Thus, the petition for a writ of mandamus was denied.

United States v. Christopher Darrell (2), 2:14-cr-00500-JAT (D. Ariz. May 5, 2015). 

Defendant, charged with three counts of assault and robbery, requested a 30-day continuance 

because defense counsel was still reviewing mitigation material. Although the government did 

not object to the motion, the victim opposed the continuance. Finding that the defendant's need to 

prepare effectively for sentencing outweighed the best interests of the public in a speedy 

disposition, the court granted the continuance.

United States v. Delores Reeves, 3:15-cr-00055-VC-1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015).

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and ID theft. Several individuals asserted the right to full 

and timely restitution under the CVRA claiming that they had been defrauded by the defendant. 

They wrote letters and spoke at the sentencing hearing. At sentencing, the judge awarded 

restitution in the amount of $150,000 to the victim of the ID theft offense. Determining that the 

other individuals were not victims of any of the offenses the defendant was charged with, the 

court concluded that they were not victims in this case and declined to grant restitution.

United States v. Charles Pete Eyle, 1:14-cr-02058-WFN-1 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2015). In 

a child sex abuse case, defendant requested a continuance and the government indicated that one 

of the victims objected to any further continuance. Finding that the defendant needed time to 

review discovery and prepare for trial, the court held that the need to grant a continuance in this 

trial outweighed the best interests of the victim, the public, and the defendant's right to a speedy 

trial. Thus, the victim's objection was overruled and the continuance was granted.

United States v. Christopher Thiessen, 5:14-cr-40106-01-DDC (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2015).

In a child sexual exploitation case, a victim asserted the right to "full and timely restitution" 

under the CVRA, seeking restitution in the amount of $58,415. After careful consideration, the 

judge determined that the victim was entitled to some restitution, but not the full amount
requested. The victim was awarded $3,000 in restitution. Thus, the victim's request was granted 

in part and denied in part.

United States v. Neal D. Kasper, et al., 1:12-cr-00413-MV (D.N.M. Nov. 16, 2014).

Defendants, all employees of the Laguna Construction Company, Inc. (LCC), were charged with 

various counts of wire fraud for allegedly siphoning money from LCC to themselves and other 

officers. As a result of the alleged misconduct, LCC could no longer operate as an ongoing 

business and is "in the process of dissolving." Pueblo of Laguna, a federally recognized tribal 

government and the sole shareholder of LCC, sought to be recognized as a crime victim so that it 

could assert rights under the CVRA, including the right to "proceedings free from unreasonable 

delay." According to 18 U.S.C. § 377l(e), a crime victim is a "person directly and proximately 

harmed as a result of the federal criminal offense." The court observed that the general definition 

of a person includes "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 

joint stock companies, as well as individuals." Finding that the Pueblo of Laguna did not fall into 

any of these categories because of its inherent sovereign authority, the court declined to 

recognize the tribal government as a crime victim.

United States v. Matthew Lane Durham, 5:14-cr-00231-R (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2015). 

Defendant was charged with 24 counts of child sexual abuse. Prosecutors were concerned that 

the defendant had discovery documents in his jail cell which contained victim information. They 

were also concerned that images of the victims were on the internet. On behalf of the victims, the 

government sought a protective order asserting the right to be reasonably protected from the 

accused and the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and 

privacy. See 18 U.S.C. § 377l(a)(l),(8). After defense counsel confirmed that the defendant did 

not have any discovery documents in his jail cell and that the defendant did not have control over 

any of the images that were posted on the internet, the judge denied the government's motion for 

a protective order.