UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4611

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH BASSETT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:11-cr-00512-WDQ-1)

Submitted: March 27, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Julie L.B. Johnson, OFFICE 

OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Antonio 

J. Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joseph Bassett pled guilty to possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon and was sentenced as an armed career 

criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years 

prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). 

Bassett appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the 

fifteen-year sentence was error because mandatory minimum 

sentences conflict with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) to impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than 

necessary.” He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is 

greater than necessary in his case to achieve the sentencing 

goals of § 3553(a). We affirm.

The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part, 

dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with 

its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept 

as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) 

(2006). Courts have generally held that statutorily-mandated 

minimum sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus 

do not conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater 

than necessary” clause. See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 

526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 

289 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [statutory] mandatory minimum 

sentences [the defendant] was exposed to . . . clearly fit 

within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion 
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of § 3551(a).”). “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that 

§ 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language authorizes a 

district court to sentence below the statutory minimum.” United 

States v. Cirilo-Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per 

curiam) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 

499 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors 

do not apply to congressionally mandated sentences”); United 

States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(acknowledging tension between § 3553(a) and statutorilymandated sentences, but holding that § 3553(a) is a “very 

general statute [that] cannot be understood to authorize courts 

to sentence below minimums specifically prescribed by 

Congress.”). In United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th 

Cir. 2005), we held that, even after United States v. Booker, 

543 U.S. 220 (2005), except in limited circumstances not present 

here, “a district court still may not depart below a statutory 

minimum.” Id. at 862. Bassett’s reliance on United States v. 

Raby, 575 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case 

provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED