Filed 10/26/22 Tahir v. Shah CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ABU TAHIR,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RAFIQ SHAH,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B312028

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VC067211)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.

Abu Tahir, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of Henry B. LaTorraca and Henry B. LaTorraca 

for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Appellant Abu Tahir and respondent Rafiq Shah entered 

into a contract in 2012 regarding their purchase of a market and 

its subsequent operation by their corporate entity, H.P. Palomino, 

Inc. (Palomino). In 2018, Tahir filed a breach of contract action 

in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Shah and 

Palomino (the contract action). 

Shah subsequently filed a small claims action against Tahir 

in the Small Claims Division of Los Angeles County Superior 

Court. In 2019, Tahir and Shah entered into a settlement 

agreement, under which Shah agreed to dismiss his small claims 

action and Tahir agreed to, among other things, “withdraw” his 

“claim” against Shah and Palomino. 

Shah immediately dismissed the small claims action 

pursuant to the settlement agreement. At the time of the 

dismissal, the small claims court stated that it was reserving 

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6.1

In 2020, Shah filed a motion in the contract action for 

judgment of dismissal pursuant to the settlement agreement. 

The superior court granted the motion and denied Tahir’s 

subsequent motion for reconsideration. 

Tahir appeals from the dismissal of the contract action. He 

contends that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 

motion because the small claims court reserved exclusive 

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. Tahir also 

argues that language in the settlement agreement requiring him 

to “withdraw” his “claim” against Shah was not an agreement to 

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3

dismiss the contract action. We find that Tahir forfeited both 

arguments by failing to raise them below. Moreover, even if we 

reached the merits, we would conclude that Tahir has failed to 

establish any error. We therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Tahir’s Complaint

Tahir, in propria persona,

2 filed a complaint in superior 

court on June 15, 2018 against Shah and Palomino. As alleged in 

the operative first amended complaint, Tahir brought causes of 

action for breach of written contract, open book account, account 

stated, conversion, accounting, and involuntary dissolution of 

corporation. Tahir alleged that he and Shah entered into a 

written agreement in February 2012 to purchase a grocery store, 

for which Tahir would contribute $100,000, Shah would 

contribute $50,000, and Shah would obtain a construction loan of 

$570,000 in Tahir’s name to be repaid with the profits. The 

contract also provided that Shah would pay Tahir $5,000 per 

month. Tahir and Shah agreed that they would be partners in 

the store, which they renamed the Palomino Market. They 

operated the store under their corporate entity Palomino, with 

Tahir serving as the chief executive officer and Shah as the 

secretary. 

Tahir further alleged that Shah breached the agreement by 

failing to deliver Tahir’s $5,000 monthly payments. He sought 

actual damages “in excess of $836,500,” as well as punitive 

damages and costs. 

2 Tahir represented himself in the trial court and does so 

again on appeal.
4

II. Small Claims Action and Settlement

On March 26, 2019, Shah filed an action against Tahir in 

small claims court, case number 19BFSC01553.

3 On June 12, 

2019, at the small claims courthouse, the parties entered into a 

handwritten agreement stating the following (errors in the 

original):

“Abu Tahir agrees to perform and satisfy following 

conditions, in return Rafiq Shah will drop the case 

#19BFSC01553:

(1)Send all necessary document to USDA in relates to 

EBT renewal on or before 6/18/2019.

(2) Cooperate in future administrative mater of H.P. 

Palomino Inc. such as WIC renewal.

(3) Will withdraw the claim in relates to Toyota Tundra.

(4) Palomino Market will pay $500/month for 6 months, 

total $3000.

(5) Abu Tahir to bring proof of contribution above and 

beyond $29,000, which he claims to be not 

documented as his loan to H.P. Palomino Inc. toward 

completion of remodeling and/or operational expense.

(6) Abu Tahir to 1st offset his deffered salary equivalent 

to Rafiq Shah’s deffered salary then cut that 

remaining amount in 1/2. Tahir will consider that 

amount as a loan to the company.

(7) Rafiq Shah to make sure to keep all accounting 

related document all the time in business office.

3 The record contained no information regarding the basis of 

the small claims action. In his briefing, Tahir alleges that it was 

“unrelated” to the contract action.
5

(8) Abu Tahir will withdraw claim against H.P. 

Palomino Inc and Rafiq Shah on or before June 25, 

2019.” 

The contract contained signatures for Tahir and Shah, 

along with a witness. 

The same day, the small claims court held a hearing at 

which both Tahir and Shah were present.

4 According to the 

minute order of the hearing, the court noted that the settlement 

agreement was a “mediated agreement” and incorporated a copy 

of the agreement into the minutes by reference. The court 

dismissed Shah’s small claims action without prejudice pursuant 

to the settlement agreement. The court further stated it was 

retaining jurisdiction “to make orders to enforce any and all 

terms of settlement, including judgment,” pursuant to section 

664.6.

III. Dismissal of Contract Action

In July 2019, Shah filed a motion for summary judgment in 

the contract action based on the settlement agreement. Tahir did 

not file an opposition. On October 31, 2019, the court denied the 

motion as moot in light of the parties’ settlement. The court 

ordered Tahir to file either a request for dismissal of the action or 

a notice of settlement indicating when such a dismissal would be 

filed. The court also set a hearing on an order to show cause re: 

dismissal for November 13, 2019. 

At the hearing on the court’s order to show cause, Tahir 

stated that the case did not settle. The court notified the parties 

that they could file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement 

4 The record contains a minute order of the hearing. No 

court reporter was present.
6

and rescheduled a trial setting conference. 

On October 1, 2020, Shah filed a motion for judgment in 

the contract action pursuant to section 664.6. He argued that he 

had complied with his portion of the settlement agreement, but 

Tahir had not, as he had not dismissed the contract action. Shah 

submitted a declaration in support of the motion, in which he 

stated that he and Tahir had signed the agreement on June 12, 

2019 and that Shah had dismissed his lawsuit and made periodic 

payments to Tahir pursuant to that agreement. Shah also 

declared that Tahir had agreed in paragraph eight of the 

settlement to dismiss the contract action, but had failed to do so. 

Shah attached a copy of the settlement agreement to his 

declaration. He also attached the minute order dismissing the 

small claims action, as well as documents purporting to 

demonstrate his compliance with the remaining terms of the 

settlement. At the same time, Shah filed a renewed motion for 

summary judgment, citing Tahir’s failure to comply with the 

court’s order to file a request for dismissal or notice of settlement. 

Tahir opposed the renewed motion for summary judgment, 

arguing that there were triable issues of fact on his claims and 

that Shah had failed to produce necessary accounting documents. 

In his opposition to the separate statement of undisputed facts, 

Tahir disputed Shah’s claims regarding the settlement 

agreement by stating that Shah filed a “fraudulent” small claims 

case “to get my signature.” He did not otherwise dispute the fact 

that his signature appeared on the settlement agreement. He 

also did not dispute Shah’s contention that the agreement 

required him to dismiss the contract action by June 25, 2019; in 

his response to that fact, he stated that “it was a Fraudulent 

case,” and claimed that Shah had failed to do everything required 
7

under the settlement agreement. 

Tahir also filed an opposition to the motion for judgment. 

His opposition brief largely echoed his opposition to summary 

judgment and focused on the merits of his breach of contract 

claims. Tahir also stated in the opposition that he “did not enter 

into any settlement agreement with Defendants and is not bound 

by any obligation to Defendants.” He provided no further 

elaboration or factual citation supporting this statement. Tahir 

verified his opposition brief but did not provide a supporting 

declaration. Additionally, Tahir’s opposition did not raise either 

point he now raises on appeal. 

Shah replied, objecting that the opposition was untimely

and did not provide any facts to rebut the showing in the motion. 

Shah also argued that Tahir implicitly admitted signing the 

settlement agreement and retaining the payments made by Shah 

in satisfaction of that agreement. 

The court held a hearing on the motion for judgment on 

January 12, 2021.5 Tahir did not appear. The court granted the 

motion, finding that the parties entered into a settlement 

agreement and that the terms were sufficiently definite. 

Although Tahir claimed he did not enter into an agreement, the 

court noted that the settlement was reached at the small claims 

courthouse, Tahir appeared before the small claims court on that 

date, and the agreement bore his signature. Further, Tahir 

failed to present any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the 

5 The record on appeal contains the minute orders for the 

superior court’s order to show cause hearing on November 13, 

2019 and the motion for judgment hearing on January 12, 2021. 

There was no court reporter present for either hearing.
8

court dismissed Shah and Palomino as defendants from the 

contract action pursuant to the settlement agreement. The court 

also denied the summary judgment motion as moot. Shah served 

the notice of ruling by mail on Tahir on January 13, 2021. 

Tahir filed a motion for reconsideration on February 4, 

2021. He claimed he had not received the court’s order granting 

the motion for judgment. Tahir also stated that he had been 

unable to attend the January 12 hearing because of illness. In 

his motion, Tahir no longer denied the existence of the 

settlement. Instead, he contended that only the small claims 

court retained jurisdiction over enforcement of the settlement. 

He also argued that the defendants had breached the settlement 

by failing to provide certain documents. 

The court entered judgment of dismissal on February 18, 

2021. The court subsequently denied the motion for 

reconsideration on March 23, 2021. The court found that the 

motion was untimely, that the new arguments were waived, and 

on the merits, that Tahir failed to provide any authority that the 

small claims court had exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, Tahir 

did not dispute entering into the agreement or its terms. Finally,

the court noted that it no longer had jurisdiction to reconsider 

interim orders once the judgment was entered. 

Tahir timely appealed from the judgment of dismissal. 

DISCUSSION

Tahir raises two contentions on appeal. First, he argues 

that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the terms of 

the settlement agreement because the small claims court had 

reserved jurisdiction under section 664.6. Second, he contends 

that even if the superior court had jurisdiction, it erred in 

interpreting the settlement agreement to require dismissal of the 
9

contract action. Shah contends that both arguments are 

forfeited, as Tahir failed to raise them below. We agree that both 

arguments are forfeited.

6 Further, even if we considered the 

merits of Tahir’s appeal, we would conclude that he has not met 

his burden to establish error.

I. Section 664.6

“Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary 

procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without 

the need for a new lawsuit.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. 

Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809 (Weddington).) At issue 

here is section 664.6, subdivision (a), which provides, “If parties 

to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties 

outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for 

settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, 

may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If 

requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over 

the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of 

the terms of the settlement.”

A court acting under section 664.6 may “receive evidence, 

determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement 

6 Although the parties use the term “waived,” the correct 

term in this circumstance is “forfeited.” As our Supreme Court 

has explained, “‘waiver’ means the intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right,” while “forfeiture” “results when 

a party fails to preserve a claim by raising a timely objection.” 

(Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

798, 805, fn. 4, quoting Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 

Cal.5th 470, 475–476; see also People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

1082, 1097, fn. 9 [“‘forfeiture’ is used to refer to the loss of a right 

resulting from the failure to assert it in a timely fashion”].)
10

agreement as a judgment.” (Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 810; see also Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 

566.) Section 664.6’s “express authorization for trial courts to 

determine whether a settlement has occurred is an implicit 

authorization for the trial court to interpret the terms and 

conditions to settlement.” (Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc. 

(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 884, 889, citing Fiore v. Alvord, supra, 182 

Cal.App.3d at p. 566.) 

We affirm the factual determinations made by the trial 

court if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Weddington, 

supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc., 

supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 889.) We review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. (See Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 

37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.) 

II. Jurisdiction

Tahir contends that the superior court lacked jurisdiction 

to hear or rule on Shah’s motion for judgment because the small 

claims court had retained jurisdiction under section 664.6 to 

enforce the settlement. We agree with Shah that this contention 

has been forfeited.

“It is well established that issues or theories not properly 

raised or presented in the trial court may not be asserted on 

appeal, and will not be considered by an appellate tribunal.” (In 

re Marriage of King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117.) A party who 

fails to raise an issue in the trial court has therefore forfeited the 

right to do so on appeal. (Ibid.; see also Kern County Dept. of 

Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 

1038 [“It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court 

are forfeited on appeal.”]; Kashmiri v. Regents of University of 

California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 830 [“‘[I]t is fundamental 
11

that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made 

for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not 

presented to the trial court.’”].)

Here, Tahir failed to raise the jurisdictional issue in his 

opposition to Shah’s motion for judgment. While he asserted it in 

his subsequent motion for reconsideration, he gave no basis for 

his failure to do so in a timely manner in his opposition to the 

motion for judgment. As such, the issue has been forfeited.

Moreover, even if we were to consider the merits of Tahir’s 

claim, he failed to provide any authority to support his argument 

that the small claims court had exclusive jurisdiction over 

enforcement of the settlement agreement. In essence, Tahir 

contends that the superior court was barred from ordering 

dismissal of its own case despite the evidence presented, and that 

dismissal of the contract action would have to be handled by the 

small claims court. He cites no authority supporting that 

contention. Tahir’s unsupported assertion cannot meet his 

burden to demonstrate error on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. 

Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“‘[E]very brief should contain 

a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. 

If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it 

as waived, and pass it without consideration.’”]; Keyes v. Bowen

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [appellant must meet burden by 

“presenting legal authority on each point made and factual 

analysis, supported by appropriate citations to the material facts 

in the record; otherwise, the argument may be deemed 

forfeited”].) “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate 

procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to 

be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on 

the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the 
12

trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the 

judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608.) Tahir 

has failed to make such a showing.

We also note that Tahir’s status as a self-represented 

litigant does not excuse his failure to timely raise arguments or to 

provide sufficient authority to support his claims. A party 

proceeding in propria persona must “‘be treated like any other 

party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration 

than other litigants and attorneys.’ . . . Indeed, “‘the in propria 

persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure 

as an attorney.’”’” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 

108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.) “A doctrine generally requiring 

or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent 

themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and 

would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. 

Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.)

III. Interpretation of the Contract

Tahir argues that the terms of the settlement agreement 

reflected only his assent to “withdraw” some unspecified “claim” 

against Shah and Palomino, but did not require the dismissal of 

the contract action. He also failed to raise this argument below, 

instead claiming that no settlement agreement existed. As such, 

he has forfeited this claim on appeal. (See In re Marriage of 

King, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 117; Kashmiri v. Regents of 

University of California, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)

Tahir asserts that we may consider this issue for the first 

time on appeal because “all the facts necessary to address the 

point are before the court as fully as if the issue had been raised 

at trial.” Even if we were to consider the merits of Tahir’s claim, 

however, we would conclude that he has failed to demonstrate 
13

error.

The superior court found that the parties had entered into 

a valid settlement agreement, the terms were sufficiently 

definite, and paragraph eight of that agreement called for 

dismissal of the contract action. These findings were consistent 

with the plain language of the settlement agreement. “A 

settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles 

which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.”

(Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 810; see also In re 

Marriage of Hibbard (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013 

(Hibbard).) “‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation 

is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.]

If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.” (People 

v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767; see also Civ. Code, § 1636.) 

“On the other hand, ‘[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect 

ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in 

which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the 

promisee understood it.’ “The mutual intention to which the 

courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the 

parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as 

well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the 

surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or 

entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of 

the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.””

(Hibbard, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013, quoting People v. 

Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767; accord, In re Marriage of 

Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518 [“The basic goal of 

contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual 

intent at the time of contracting.”].) “‘Extrinsic evidence is 

admissible to prove a meaning to which the contract is 
14

reasonably susceptible.’” (Iqbal v. Ziadeh (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 

1, 8.) 

Here, the evidence submitted by Shah in support of his 

motion for judgment included the written settlement agreement, 

his dismissal of the small claims action, his payments made to 

and accepted by Tahir in compliance with the agreement, and his 

statement that the parties’ intention at the time of the agreement 

was mutual dismissal of the respective lawsuits. By contrast, 

Tahir offered no evidence that at the time of the settlement, he 

contemplated any “withdrawal” of a “claim” against Shah and 

Palomino other than the contract action. Indeed, he offered no 

evidence about his intent at all, as he did not submit a 

declaration or other evidence relevant to the interpretation of the 

settlement agreement. As such, we find the evidence in the 

record supports the superior court’s dismissal of the contract 

action pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.

7

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Shah is awarded his costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, ACTING P.J. CURREY, J.

7 We need not reach Shah’s arguments about Tahir’s motion 

for reconsideration, as Tahir has not appealed from the denial of 

that motion.