F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT March 16 , 2 007 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -

N o. 06- 1231 1 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D. C. Docket N o. 04-00797 -CV -W -N ROSEMARY C. RILEY, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us FAIRB ANKS CAPITAL CORPORATION, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r t h e M i d d l e D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -

(M ar ch 16, 200 7) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, A N D E RS O N a nd B IR CH , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Plaintiff-Appellant Rosem ary Riley , a ppearing pro se, appeals the district
co urt’ s gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t t o F ai rb an ks C ap ita l C or por at ionIn her c omplaint, Riley clea rly separ ated the se ction of her “fe dera l claims” fr om her a sserted 1 “state c laims.” In her order , the mag istrate specifie d that “Plaintiff may not incorporate any

alleg ations of her 2 initial complaint by

ref ere nce - - the amended c omplaint mustinclude all of [Pl aintiff’s] claims for relief and all of the fac ts she contends support those c laims.” 2 (“ Fa ir banks” ). R ev er sib le e rr or e xis ts; w e va cate the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t and
rem and for the district court to dism iss Riley ’ s case w ithou t prej udice. Ri le y f ile d ac om

pla int a ga ins t F ai rb an ks i n di str ic t c ourt a lle gin g vi olatio ns of f ed er al law- - unde r the F ai r D eb t C oll ec tio n P ra ct ic es A ct , 15 U
. S. C. § 16 92 (“ FD CP A ”) , the Re al E state S ettle m en t P ro ce dur es A ct , 12 U
. S. C. § 26 01 (“ RE SP A ”) , a nd the T ru th i n L en din g A ct , 15 U
. S. C. § 16 01 ( “ T IL A ”) - - an d raising m any

state lawclaim s, including b reac h of conduct, intentio nal
m isr ep re se ntatio n, ne gli ge nc e, a nd unj ust e nr ic hm en t. R ile y

a sse rt ed , a m ong 1 other thing s, that the district court had feder al question j urisdictio n over her fe de ra l l awc la im s, pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 13 31, a nd s uppl em en ta l j ur isd ic tio n ove r he r state lawc la im s, pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 13 67. A m agistrate j udge ordered Riley to file an am ended com

plaint with factual allegations on Fairbanks’ s allegedly unlawful ac ts. In her f

irst am ended 2
co m pla int , Ri le y

r ai se d on ly

f our c la im s - - br ea chof

c ontra ct , f

ra ud and supp re ssi on, ne gli ge nc e, a nd unj ust e nr ic hm en t - - al l of

w hic h ari se und er

state law . A lth oughRi le y

c ont inu ed

to as se rt that the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d e xe rc ise3

federa l questio n jurisdiction over her fe deral lawclaim s and sup plem ental j ur isd ic tio n ov er

he r state lawc la im s, he r fi rs t am en de d c om pla int r ai se d no c la im ari si ng un de r fed eral law. T he m ag istrate or de re d th at Ri le y a m en d he r fi rs t am en de d c om pla int to ple ad he r fr au d c la im

w iththe part ic ulari ty

r equir ed by F ed
. R. Ci v. P. 9( b)
. A nd the
m ag istrate a ga in o rd er ed

that R ile y ’ s se co nd am en de d c om pla int c oul d no t incorporate by

ref erence allegations raised in her initial or first am ended
co m pla int s. R i l e y t h e n f

i l e das e c o n da me n d e dc o mp l a i n t , i n w h i c h s h e a l l e g e dt h e s a me four state lawclaim s raised in her fir st am ended com plaint. A lthou gh Riley

listed
som e fe de ra l st at

ute s inthe c om

pla int ’ s pr eam

ble a nd a ga in a sse rt ed

that the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d f

ed er al que sti on j ur isd ic tio n ov er he r FD CP A , RE SP A , a nd TI LAclaim s, her

second am ended com

plaint di d not con tain such claim s or other cl ai m s “ ar isi ng unde r the Co nst itu tio n, law s, or tr eatis es of

the U nit ed

S ta te s. ” 28 U . S. C. § 13 31. F ai rb an ks f ile d am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t ona ll cl ai m s. T he m ag istrate iss ue d ar ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n onF ai rb an ks’ s m oti on for sum m ary j udgm ent, e xplaini ng that Riley raised only

state lawclaim s in her second am ended com

plaint. But the m agistrate concluded that, because Riley originallybrought both federal and state lawclaim s against Fairbanks, the district4

co urt r et ai ne d su

ppl em en ta l j ur isd ic tio n ov er he r state lawc la im s. T he m ag istrate recom m ended that summ ary

j udgm ent be granted to Fairbanks; and the dis trict
co urt a dopt ed

the m ag istrate ’ s r ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n. O n a ppe al , the part ie s a ddr es s on ly w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in gr an tin g su m

m ar y j udgm en t t o F ai rb an ks. B ef or e w e can c onsi de r the se argum ents, however , w e m ust first address whether the district court had subje ct
m atter j urisdictio n in thi s case. See Rolling Greens MH P, L. P. v. Com cast SCH H old ing s L . L . C. , 374 F . 3d 1 020, 102 1 ( 11th C ir
. 200 4) ( ex pla ini ng tha t w e w ill
ex am in e th e su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on of d is tri ctco ur ts in cas es th atwe rev ie w). Although we liberally

construe the pleadings drafted by pro se litigants, such as Ri le y , see Tann en ba um

v. Un it edSta te s, 1 48 F.3d 12 62 , 12 63 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ), we sti ll re qui re the m

to “ co nf orm to pr oc ed

ur al r ule s. ” L or env. S as se r, 309 F . 3d 1296 , 1304 (11th Cir. 2002).

“ An am ended pleading supersedes the form er pleading; the original p l ea d i n g i s ab an d o n ed b y t h e a m en d m en t , a n di s n o l o n g era p ar to f t h e p l ea d er ’s
averm ents against hi s adversary .” D resdner Bank AG v. M/VOly m pia Voy ager, 463 F. 3d 1 210, 121 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6) ( int er na l qu otatio n om itt ed ); se e al so F ri tz v. St an dard S ec . L if e In s. Co
. , 676 F . 2d 1 356, 135 8 ( 11th C ir
. 198 2) ( “ U nde r the Federa l Rules, an am ended com plaint su persedes the original com plaint.”).5

Under 28 U .S .C. § 1367 (a), a district court can exer cise supplem ental j urisdictio n over claim s “ that are so re lated to claim s in the action within su ch
or igi na l j ur isd ic tio n th at

the y f orm part of the sam e ca se or

c ontro ve rs y

. . . . ” Bu t

“ when the fe deral-lawclaim s have dropped ou t of the law suit in its early stages
an d on ly state -l awc la im s r em ai n, the f ed er al c ourt sh oul d de cl ine the e xe rc ise of j ur isd ic tio n by

dis m iss ing the c as e w ith out pr ej udi ce . ” Carn eg ie -M el lonU niv
. v. Co hil l, 108 S
. Ct
. 614 , 619 ( 1988 ); se e Sc ar fo v. G ins be rg , 175 F . 3d 9 57, 962 ( 11th Cir. 1999 ) (e xplaini ng that “ once the district court determ ines that sub j ect m atter j ur isd ic tio n ov er

apla int if f’ s f ed er al c la im s do es not

e xis t, c ourts m

ust dis m iss a plaintiff’ s state lawclaim s”). He re, Riley ’ s second am ended com plaint di d not in clude the federa l law claim s raised in her initial com plaint. In fa ct, during h er deposition in this case, Ri le y te sti fi ed that he r se co nd am en de d c om pla int onl y r ai se d f our c la im s a ga ins t Fa ir banks
-- f or br ea chof

c ontra ct , f

ra ud and s uppr es sio n, ne gli ge nc e, a nd unj ust enrichm ent. A lthou gh we ar e m indful of the lib eral c onstructio n we apply to pro se ple ad ing s, w e be lie ve that R ile y abandon ed

he r fe de ra l l awc la im s a t an e ar ly stage of this case because her second am ended com

plaint -- w hich sup erseded her previous com

plaints -- raised only

state lawclaim s. F or this reason, the districtWe note that, in the statement of jurisdiction cont ai n ed i n its brief, F airba nks asserts that the 3 district c ourt proper ly exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties a re dive rse a

nd the amount in controve rsy exceeds the juri s d ictional minimum . But the district court did not rely

o n d i v er s i t y

jurisdiction in thi s case ; instead, as we have disc ussed, the dis tr ic t c ourt

e xpla ine d th at it

wa s e xer c isi ng su

pp le me nta l jur isd ic tio n ov e r Rile y ’s state law c la ims be c a us e he r i nit ia l c omp la int

ha d in c lud e d fed eral law c la ims . Ri le y -- wh o h a d th e burd e n to establish subject matter jur isdiction -- never asser ted diversity

jurisdiction. See Fe d.R.Civ.P . 8(a) (providing , amongother thing s, that complaint must c o ntain “a shor t and plain statement of the g rounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction de pends”) ; Swe et Pea Marine, L td. v. APJ Marine, I nc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 ( 11th Cir. 2005) (“The burden f or establishingfede ra l s u b j ect matter jurisdiction rests with the party bring ing the claim.”) . Diversity jurisdiction -- and, in par

ticular, the require d amount in controve rsy -- is not evident from the f ace of Riley ’s complaint. See F eder ated Mut. I ns. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L L C, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (“ [T] o invoke a f eder al c ourt ’s div e rs ity

jur isd ic tio n, a

pla int if f m ust cla im, amon goth e r t hin g s, that th e amou

nt i n controve rsy

exceeds $75,000. . . . A pla intiff satisfies the amount in controve rs y re quirement by claiming a suff

icient sum in good f

aith.”). The parties c annot cr eate subject matter jur isdiction by a g re e me nt, se e Ea g e rton v. Va luatio ns , Inc ., 69 8 F .2 d 1 11 5, 11 18 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 3) (“ [I ]t is w e ll established that subjec t matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or confe rre d on a court by consent of the par ties. ”); and we c onclude that the district c ourt did not have subjec t matter jurisdiction over Riley ’s ca se pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . § 1332. The Seve nth Circuit reac hed this conclusion in a similar ca se. In Wellness Com munity National 4 v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46 ( 7th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff filed a complaint alleg ing both f eder al and state law c la ims on

a c on tr a c t dis pute . I d. at 48
. Pla int if f’ s ini tia l c omp la int a sse rt e d that bo th fede ral que stion and diversity jurisdiction ex isted. I d. But plaintiff’ s amende d complaint dropped a ll f e de ra l la w c la ims and

a sse rt e d o nly

div e rs ity jur isd ic tio n. I d. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ind ic ate d th at, even if it did not have diversity

jurisdiction over the case, the court sti ll could exercise supple mental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. I d. at 50. B ut the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judg ment, explaining that, because plaintiff abandone d its fede ral law claims befor e trial, the district court er

red in de termining that it could rely on supplemen t al j u ri sdiction to consider plaintiff’s state la

w claims. I d. 6 co urt di d no t have sub

j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n inthi s c as e a nd c oul d no t e xe rc ise 3 supp lem ental j urisdictio n over Riley ’ s state lawclaim s. See Cohill, 108 S.Ct. at 4 61 9. Ther efore, because w e conclude that the district court did not have federal que sti on j ur isd ic tio n purs uant t o 28 U . S. C. § 13 31 o ve r the c la im s r ai se d in7

Ri le y ’ s se co nd am en de d c om pla int , the sup ple m en ta l j ur isd ic tio n pr ovi sio ns o f 28 U . S. C. § 13 67 d id n ot a

ppl y he re . W e va cate the j udgm en t be lowa nd r em an d f or the district court to dis m iss this case w ithou t prej udice for lack of j urisdictio n. S ee Cr otw el l v. H oc km an -L ew is L td. , 734 F . 2d 7 67, 769 ( 11th C ir
. 198 4) ( ex pla ini ng that di str ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of c as e fo r la ck

of sub j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n sh oul d be without prej udice). VACATED AN D REMANDED.