UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS 

NO. 21-1323 

CHARLES J. LOVE, JR., PETITIONER, 

V. 

DENIS MCDONOUGH, 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT. 

Before MEREDITH, FALVEY, and LAURER, Judges. 

O R D E R 

On March 2, 2021, Army veteran Charles J. Love, Jr., through counsel, petitioned the Court 

for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus. Mr. Love, whose 100% rating for 

prostate cancer was discontinued and replaced with a new 20% rating for prostate cancer residuals, 

argues that the Secretary may not implement that discontinuance until all appeals have been 

exhausted. He asks the Court to order the Secretary "to cease unlawfully withholding disability 

compensation" and "to pay him all amounts due consistent with [his] pre-reduction rating 

evaluation until his challenge to the reduction has run its course." Petition (Pet.) at 1. Because 

38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) provides our sole source of jurisdiction and the petitioner has not shown that 

a writ would be in aid of that jurisdiction, we will dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Love served on active duty from January 1968 to March 1971. Pet., Exhibit (Ex.) 1 at 

Appendix (App.) 2. He is service connected for prostate cancer and was rated 100% disabled. Pet., 

Ex. 1 at App. 4, Ex. 5 at App. 24; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.115b, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7528 (2021). In 

February 2019, the VA regional office (RO) proposed to "reduce" Mr. Love's evaluation for 

prostate cancer, status post radical prostatectomy, from 100% to 20%, and to discontinue special 

monthly compensation (SMC) based on the housebound criteria.1 Pet., Ex. 1 at App. 2-5. On 

1

 The note accompanying DC 7528 provides that, 6 months after treatment for prostate cancer, VA must 

provide an examination and any change in the 100% rating must be evaluated "subject to the provisions of § 3.105(e) 

of this chapter." § 4.115b. Section 3.105(e) states that when "a reduction or discontinuance of compensation 

payments" is considered, the beneficiary 

will be given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that compensation 

payments should be continued at their present level . . . . [and,] if additional evidence is not received 

within that period, final rating action will be taken and the award will be reduced or discontinued 

effective the last day of the month in which a 60–day period from the date of notice to the beneficiary 

of the final rating action expires. 

38 C.F.R. § 3.105(e) (2021). This Court's recent decision in Foster v. McDonough characterizes the change in ratings 

under DC 7528 not as a "rating reduction" but as a "discontinuance" of the 100% prostate cancer rating and a grant of 

a prostate cancer residual rating. 34 Vet.App. 338, 345 (2021). Even so, the relevant law here does not distinguish 

between a "reduction" or a "discontinuance." See, e.g., § 3.105(e) ("[A] rating proposing the reduction or 
2 

February 13, 2019, VA sent a letter notifying Mr. Love of the proposed change in rating that would 

reduce his monthly payments from $3,530.47 to $3,165.70. Secretary's (Sec'y's) Response (Resp.), 

Attachment (Attach.) A at 1-3. He was informed that he had 60 days to submit additional evidence 

and 30 days to seek a hearing to contest the change. Id. at 2; see § 3.105(e), (i). On April 3, 2019, 

Mr. Love challenged the proposed change, arguing that VA had not complied with 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.344(a). Pet., Ex. 2 at App. 7-10. 

In September 2019, the RO issued a decision that discontinued the 100% prostate cancer 

rating and SMC, and granted a 20% rating for prostate cancer residuals, effective December 1, 

2019. Pet., Ex. 3 at App. 12-15. In October 2019, VA sent Mr. Love a letter notifying him of the 

RO's decision. Sec'y's Resp., Attach. B. In December 2019, Mr. Love filed a Notice of 

Disagreement and requested direct review. Pet., Ex. 5 at App. 22-31. In December 2020, the Board 

of Veterans' Appeals decided that the discontinuance of the 100% rating and SMC at the 

housebound rate, effective December 1, 2019, was proper. Pet., Ex. 6 at App. 37-50. Mr. Love 

appealed to this Court in February 2021, and his appeal is pending as Love v. McDonough, U.S. 

Vet. App. No. 21-1265 (Notice of Appeal filed Feb. 26, 2021). 

On March 2, 2021, Mr. Love petitioned for extraordinary relief, arguing that VA may not 

decrease his payments until his appeals are exhausted and that thus the Secretary is unlawfully 

withholding payment in the pre-discontinuance amount. Pet. at 1-2. On October 22, 2021, the 

Court heard oral arguments, and the parties later submitted supplemental briefing. 

II. ARGUMENTS 

In his petition for a writ of mandamus, Mr. Love asks this Court to find that the Secretary's 

reduction in benefits was unlawfully premature and order the Secretary to resume payment in the 

pre-discontinuance amount until his appeals are exhausted. Pet. at 2. He advances three grounds 

for this Court to exercise its authority to grant extraordinary relief. First, he argues that the 

Secretary's action (refusing to continue payment in the pre-discontinuance amount) has precluded 

a future appeal of any potential overpayment dispute, thereby thwarting this Court's prospective 

jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) and warranting a writ in aid of our jurisdiction under the 

All Writs Act (AWA). Pet. at 11, 14; see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Second, he argues that, having 

"opened the jurisdictional door" with the AWA, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) authorizes this Court to 

"compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld." Pet. at 12 & n.1; Petitioner's (Pet'r's) 

Supplemental (Suppl.) Resp. at 8. Third, he argues that this Court has jurisdiction and may issue a 

writ "in aid of Federal Circuit jurisdiction" based on section 7252(c). Pet. at 3-11; Pet'r's Reply at 

2-7. 

The Secretary responds that Mr. Love is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because the 

ordinary appeals process provides him with adequate alternative means to obtain his requested 

relief. Sec'y's Resp. at 11-17. He argues that the Secretary's action to implement a discontinuance 

is either a ministerial act that flows from that discontinuance decision, and thus not a separate 

decision under 38 U.S.C. § 511, Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 2-3, or a separate question that falls under 

discontinuance will be prepared.") (emphasis added). Although the parties refer to "reduction" and "discontinuance" 

interchangeably, we will use "discontinuance" to describe the VA action. 
3 

a law that affects the provision of benefits such that Mr. Love would be entitled to a decision on 

the matter if he had appealed the effective date of the discontinuance, id. at 3-5. In either case, the 

Secretary maintains that issuance of a writ is unwarranted because Mr. Love has launched no action 

before the Agency to challenge the implementation date nor has he requested an appealable 

decision. Id. at 5-7. The Secretary also argues that section 7252(c) is not an independent source of 

jurisdiction for the Court and that this matter falls outside our only statutory source of jurisdiction 

in section 7252(a). Sec'y's Resp. at 4-11. 

III. ANALYSIS 

For the reasons below, we reject Mr. Love's arguments and find that extraordinary relief 

would not be in aid of our jurisdiction. 

A. The Court's Jurisdiction & AWA Authority 

This Court is a statutory creation, 38 U.S.C. § 7251, and thus we can have no jurisdiction 

beyond what Congress has conferred by statute, Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 156, 180 (2019) (en 

banc order); see Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) ("'Courts 

created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.'" (quoting Sheldon v. 

Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850))). If a matter does not fall within our statutory jurisdiction, then we 

cannot address that matter. 

This Court has only one source of jurisdiction: 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). Skaar, 32 Vet.App. at 

180. That provision grants us the "exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of 

Veterans' Appeals." § 7252(a). Thus, "a final Board decision operates as the jurisdictional 'trigger' 

that gives us the authority to hear a particular appeal." Skaar, 32 Vet.App. at 180; see Ledford v. 

West, 136 F.3d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

This matter is not before the Court on appeal from a final Board decision, and Mr. Love 

does not argue that it is. Thus, we have no basis to act according to our express statutory grant of 

jurisdiction. But under the AWA, we can act, even with no final Board decision, when it is in aid 

of our jurisdiction. 

The AWA provides that "all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs 

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 

principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

("The [AWA] unquestionably applies in the Veterans Court."); Gardner-Dickson v. Wilkie, 

33 Vet.App. 50, 54 (2020) (noting that the AWA gives this Court "the authority to hear petitions 

and issue writs in aid of our jurisdiction"), aff'd sub nom. Gardner-Dickson v. McDonough, 

No. 2021-1462, 2021 WL 5144367 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2021) (per curiam judgment). That includes 

the power of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus, Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

1998), including in aid of our prospective jurisdiction, where "an alleged refusal to act would 

forever frustrate the ability of [this Court] to exercise its appellate jurisdiction," Erspamer v. 

Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 3, 8 (1990); see Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 54-55; see also Roche v. 

Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (noting that the "function of mandamus in aid of 

appellate jurisdiction is to remove obstacles to appeal"). 
4 

But a court cannot "assert jurisdiction on the basis of hypothetical scenarios" and 

prospective jurisdiction cannot depend on a "speculative chain of events." Moms Against Mercury 

v. Food & Drug Admin., 483 F.3d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 523, 529 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (establishing that, where no action has been taken that puts a matter on the path 

to a potential appeal, a future appeal remains hypothetical and so does not invoke a court's 

prospective jurisdiction); see Wolfe v. McDonough, 28 F.4th 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (applying 

the standard from In re Tennant to a case appealed from this Court). 

Thus, the threshold question for this Court is whether it has authority under the AWA to 

grant the relief Mr. Love requests. See Erspamer, 1 Vet.App. at 6. As the party invoking the Court's 

power, Mr. Love must show that we may exercise that power here. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors 

Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 55 ("The 

AWA 'permits federal courts to fill gaps in their judicial power where those gaps would thwart the 

otherwise proper exercise of their jurisdiction.'" (quoting Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318 

(Fed. Cir. 2017))). And, "because the AWA 'is not an independent basis of jurisdiction, . . . the 

petitioner must initially show that the action sought to be corrected by mandamus is within this 

court's statutorily defined subject matter jurisdiction.'" Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 55 

(quoting Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 

1983)); see Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (noting 

that the AWA is a "residual source of authority"). 

B. The Writ Sought Is Not in Aid of Our Jurisdiction 

1. Prospective Jurisdiction Through an Overpayment 

Mr. Love argues that this Court has authority under the AWA to compel the Secretary to 

restore payments to their prior level. Pet. at 11. He argues that the Secretary, by implementing the 

rating discontinuance when he did, has precluded even "the possibility of an overpayment ever 

being created in connection with the rating reduction[] [t]hat, in turn, forecloses Mr. Love's ability 

to appeal any denial of overpayment relief that he seeks." Id. Mr. Love asserts that if an 

overpayment were created and the Secretary sought to collect it, then he would seek this 

overpayment relief. Id. He asks this Court to issue a writ under the AWA in aid of our prospective 

jurisdiction over some potential future appeal of overpayment proceedings. Id. at 11-12. Mr. Love's 

argument hinges on his assertion that the Secretary must make payments that could become 

overpayments. See Pet. at 11-12, 14; Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 7-8. Thus, he argues, the way to 

preserve this Court's jurisdiction is to order the Secretary to make payments in a particular amount, 

which in turn could cause an overpayment. Pet. at 2, 11. 

As the party seeking a writ of mandamus, Mr. Love bears the burden of showing that we 

have the authority to issue a writ in his case. See Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 55 ("The burden 

of showing entitlement to a writ of mandamus rests with the petitioner."). We do not find that Mr. 

Love has shown that a writ would be in aid of our jurisdiction. See id. at 54-55. This is because he 

has not shown, by the argument presented here, that he is entitled to an overpayment. And if he is 

not entitled to an overpayment, he cannot show that preclusion of an overpayment would frustrate 

the future exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. See Erspamer, 1 Vet.App. at 8. 
5 

Should there be an overpayment of benefits to a claimant, the Secretary has a statutory duty 

to recoup the amount overpaid. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5314(a), 5316(a)(1). But a claimant may seek a 

waiver by establishing "that recovery [of the overpayment] would be against equity and good 

conscience." 38 U.S.C. § 5302(a). According to Mr. Love, this shows that "Congress has 

anticipated that, for a variety of reasons, there will be times when the Secretary must create an 

overpayment of benefits." Pet. at 14 (emphasis added). He argues that the Secretary, by acting to 

prevent an overpayment "foreclose[d] [his] ability to appeal any denial of overpayment relief that 

he seeks," which he could do as of right if there was a dispute over overpayments. Id. at 11. He 

argues that in this way the burden of loss rests on VA, and not on the veteran, who would otherwise 

be out the money unless he wins his appeal and the discontinuance is overturned. Id. at 18-20; 

Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 7-8. 

The Secretary argues that Mr. Love's interpretation is incorrect and that nothing requires 

the creation of overpayments. Sec'y's Resp. at 15-16. He notes that overpayment relief is never a 

matter of right but granted only if warranted by "'equity and good conscience.'" Id. (quoting 

section 5302(a)). The Secretary argues that continuing payments in the pre-discontinuance amount 

in hopes of collecting the difference later would force VA to pay out money to which Mr. Love is 

no longer entitled, and thus would make VA a poor steward of taxpayers' money. Id. 

Whether Congress has guaranteed recipients of VA benefits the right to an overpayment is 

a matter of statutory interpretation, and so we begin with the text of the statute. McGee v. Peake, 

511 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "The statute's plain meaning is derived from its text and its 

structure." Id.; see Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 584, 586 (1991) ("Determining a statute's 

plain meaning requires examining the specific language at issue and the overall structure of the 

statute."), aff'd sub nom. Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff'd, 513 U.S. 115 

(1994). The "plain meaning must be given effect unless a 'literal application of [the] statute will 

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.'" Gardner, 1 Vet.App. at 

586-87 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see Roper v. 

Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 173, 180 (2006), aff'd, 240 F. App'x 422 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

Here, we conclude that the petitioner has not shown that the plain meaning of the statutes 

he cites establishes a right to an overpayment. In that regard, although the statutes (subject to 

possible waiver) explicitly require the Secretary to recoup overpayments, see §§ 5314(a) ("the 

Secretary shall . . . deduct the amount of the indebtedness"), 5316(a)(1) ("[t]he Secretary shall take 

appropriate steps to authorize" suits "to recover any indebtedness"), they do not explicitly require 

the Secretary to create overpayments. And, although a payee may seek waiver of overpayment 

recovery and the Secretary may grant a waiver if the recovery is against "equity and good 

conscience," § 5302(a), that provision does not speak to whether an overpayment should exist in 

the first place. Thus, the plain text of the statutes does not establish a "right" to an overpayment. 

Next, the petitioner has not explained how his assertion that Congress established a right 

to an overpayment aligns with the statutory scheme and the general purposes of chapter 53. For 

example, while the purpose of chapter 11 is to compensate disabled veterans under certain 

circumstances and establish the amount of that compensation, and though chapter 51, in part, sets 

forth the effective dates for the award of compensation, the start of payments, and the effective 

dates for reductions and discontinuances, see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1114, 5110, 5111, 5112, 
6 

the specific provisions in chapter 53 in the main appear to focus on controls to avoid waste, fraud, 

and abuse of government funds, see, e.g., §§ 5301 (Nonassignability and exempt status of 

benefits); 5302 (allowing waiver of recovery only when it would be against "equity and good 

conscience"); 5303 (certain bars to benefits); 5311, 5313, 5313A, and 5313B (limiting or 

prohibiting payment under certain circumstances); 5314-5316 (authorizing collection of debts, 

including interest and associated administrative costs); and 5317-5318 (authorizing the Secretary 

to obtain income information and to terminate, deny, suspend, or reduce any benefit under certain 

circumstances). Without a more developed argument, the Court is not persuaded by Mr. Love's 

construction of sections 5302, 5314, and 5316 as requiring VA to purposely create an overpayment 

so that a recipient of VA benefits could potentially benefit from overpayment-related protections. 

Likewise, the Secretary's regulation construing the statutory provisions does not explicitly 

require the Secretary to create overpayments.2 Like the statute, the regulation prohibits collection 

of an overpayment if that would be against "equity and good conscience." 38 C.F.R. § 1.962 

(2021); compare § 5302. But in the same regulation, the Secretary defines "overpayment" as "those 

benefit payments made to a designated living payee or beneficiary in excess of the amount due or 

to which such payee or beneficiary is entitled." 38 C.F.R. § 1.962. Mr. Love emphasizes the pasttense nature of the word "made" in the regulation, implying that overpayments can be made 

routinely. Pet. at 15. But the past-tense word "made" suggests a truism: if no payment has been 

made, then there can be no overpayment. The regulation does not speak in a prescriptive, future 

tense, e.g., "shall make" or "must make." Given that the regulation defines an overpayment as an 

amount that exceeds what a recipient is entitled to, this would suggest that overpayments are not

meant to routinely happen. 

Mr. Love essentially argues that, by creating procedures for the Secretary to collect 

overpayments and creating procedures by which veterans may seek waiver of overpayments, 

Congress intended that the Secretary at times must create overpayments just so that veterans would 

have the chance to seek overpayment waivers. Pet. at 14. But the petitioner has provided no support 

for his suggestion that the mere existence of these procedures mandates that they be made available 

in every situation. And, as indicated above, the plain text of the statutes does not command that 

the Secretary make payments in amounts that preserve the possibility of overpayments. Absent 

such a command and any developed argument that the overall structure of title 38 contemplates 

such a right, we are not persuaded that the petitioner has shown that the Secretary barred a possible 

overpayment, foreclosing Mr. Love's ability to appeal any potential denial of overpayment relief.3

Thus, we cannot say that the Secretary frustrates this Court's future jurisdiction when he 

precludes the possibility of overpayment. If there is an overpayment and the Secretary moves to 

2

 To be clear, the Court is not suggesting that VA by regulation could create an entitlement to payments that 

are not authorized by Congress. 

3

 Mr. Love also argues that the possible preclusion of a future overpayment violates fair process. Pet. at 

19-20. But his argument regarding fair process rests on the same premise as his other arguments: that the existence of 

statutory overpayment protections means they must be made available to him. Id. at 20 ("[T]he Secretary's unilateral, 

unwanted withholding leaves Mr. Love unable to seek a waiver or deferral of overpayment . . . . [T]he Secretary's 

withholding to avoid a possible overpayment unfairly leaves Mr. Love bereft of [overpayment protections.]"). But Mr. 

Love has failed to establish that his premise, that the law entitles him to an overpayment, is correct, and so we find it 

unnecessary to address his fair process arguments based on that same premise. 
7 

collect it, then of course the waiver process in section 5302 would be available to a veteran. But 

because Mr. Love has not established an advance guarantee that there will be an overpayment, 

then whether there would ever be a dispute over overpayment relief that could come before this 

Court remains purely hypothetical. A hypothetical overpayment dispute would not come within 

our statutorily defined jurisdiction. See Moms Against Mercury, 483 F.3d at 827; In re Tennant, 

359 F.3d at 529 (finding it inappropriate for a court to use its AWA "power solely on the basis that 

events might lead to a filing before an agency or lower court, which might lead to an appeal to this 

court"); see also Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1359. Therefore, we conclude that granting Mr. Love's petition 

would not be "in aid of" our jurisdiction and permissible under the AWA. 

2. Other Grounds for Exercise of Our AWA Authority

The AWA provides us with a "broad and flexible tool" that we may exercise when 

necessary to protect our jurisdiction. Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 57. Thus, if there are any 

other obstacles to our jurisdiction, we could act to remove them. See Roche, 319 U.S. at 26. 

Mr. Love argues that he cannot obtain judicial review of the issue at hand (the propriety of VA's 

payment of compensation at the post-discontinuance rate before he has exhausted his appellate 

rights) except by this petition because the payment of compensation is an action rather than a 

"decision" within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Pet'r's Reply at 6; Pet'r's Suppl. Response at 

2-5. But the parties agree, and we accept, that the issue Mr. Love raises about the implementation 

date for reduced payments can be presented to the Secretary and thus be put on the path to potential 

appeal to this Court. See Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 6-7; Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5. If that path were 

blocked, our jurisdiction would need aid, and a writ could be the remedy to clear the path. See

§ 1651. But that would depend on the petitioner showing that the path was blocked, and we find 

that he has not done so. Thus, we find no other grounds to exercise our AWA authority. 

As noted, this Court's authority under the AWA must be in aid of its jurisdiction; it cannot 

expand that jurisdiction. Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 55-56; see Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 

1, 42 (2019) (Falvey, J., dissenting). And our jurisdiction is limited to review of final Board 

decisions. Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 56; see § 7252(a). Thus, our authority to issue a writ 

under the AWA must help remove obstacles to the ordinary process for review of veterans benefits 

decisions. Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 55-56; see Roche, 319 U.S. at 26. First in that process 

is a decision of the Secretary as meant in section 511(a). 

Section 511 provides: "The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary 

to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to 

veterans," and that such decisions may be subject to review as provided in chapter 72 of title 38, 

that is, review by the Board and this Court. § 511(a), (b)(4); see §§ 7104(a), 7252(a). 

Mr. Love argues that the Secretary's action—paying Mr. Love at the post-discontinuance 

rate—is not a "decision" under section 511(a), and thus he has no avenue to challenge the 

Secretary's action except by an extraordinary writ. Pet. at 16; Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 1, 2-6. The 

Secretary agrees that the action here is not a "decision" under the meaning of section 511. Sec'y's 

Suppl. Resp. at 2-3. Thus, the parties understand the Secretary's action to be a "ministerial act" to 
8 

give effect to the Secretary's discontinuance decision.4 Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 5; Sec'y's Suppl. 

Resp. at 2. 

The parties agree, however, that this ministerial act involves a question under a law that 

affects the provision of benefits. Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 6-8; Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5; see Bates 

v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The ultimate question before us is whether 

this case arises 'under a law that affects the provision of benefits.'" (quoting section 511(a))); 

accord Rosinski v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 183, 188 (2018) (per curiam order). 

But they disagree as to which precise statutory enactment that question arises under. Pet'r's 

Suppl. Resp. at 6; Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-4. Mr. Love points to 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1114, 

which establish that, once the Secretary grants service connection for a disability and assigns a 

rating, the claimant is entitled to payment in the amount set out for that rating; Mr. Love 

emphasizes the monthly nature of the payments. Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 6-7. He also refers to 

38 U.S.C. § 5302(a), which provides for a waiver of overpayments in some circumstances, 

contending that the Secretary's implementation of the discontinuance before he exhausts his appeal 

will forever bar his ability to seek a waiver. Id. at 6. The Secretary points to 38 U.S.C. § 5112(b)(6), 

the ultimate statutory authority for VA to discontinue a rating, as happened here, and he asserts 

that the proper implementation date of the discontinuance therefore arises under that statutory 

provision. Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5. 

Though they disagree on the statutory authority, the parties agree that the proper date to 

implement the discontinuance is a question under a law that affects the provision of benefits. Pet'r's 

Suppl. Resp. at 6-8; Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5; see Bates, 398 F.3d at 1361; see also Rosinski, 

29 Vet.App. at 188. The parties thus agree that the proper implementation date could be the subject 

of a decision under section 511(a), and they supply their preferred outcomes of that decision. 

Mr. Love argues that he is entitled to a decision by VA on the proper implementation date for the 

discontinuance of his 100% rating, but argues that this is beside the point; he argues that he has a 

right to be paid in the pre-discontinuance amount pending his appeals, that VA's failure to pay him 

at that rate is harmful because it deprives him of the alleged overpayment-related rights discussed 

above, and that, as a result, the ordinary appellate process is not adequate to provide the relief 

sought by this petition. Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 7-8.5 The Secretary argues that the "implementation 

date" of a VA decision is synonymous with its "effective date," and nothing precludes Mr. Love 

from challenging the effective date of his discontinuance through the ordinary appellate process, 

but notes that he has not yet done so. Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5. 

4

 In the parties' view, the "decision" under section 511(a) was the September 2019 RO decision to discontinue 

the 100% rating for prostate cancer and assign a 20% rating for prostate cancer residuals, and to discontinue SMC, 

effective December 1, 2019. Pet., Ex. 3 at App. 12-15. That decision is not at issue but is the subject of an appeal 

pending under Docket No. 21-1265. 

5

 Mr. Love argues that the Secretary is acting unlawfully because the Secretary is no longer paying him the 

amount specified for a 100% rating under section 1114. Pet. at 12-13; Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 7. The Court notes that, 

under the September 2019 RO decision, his prostate cancer residuals are rated as 20% disabling, effective December 1, 

2019. Pet., Ex. 3 at App. 12-13. Mr. Love argues that the September 2019 RO decision is not final—and thus VA 

cannot implement it—until all of his appeals are exhausted. Pet. at 17-18; Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 7. Because this Court 

is dismissing this petition, we will not address the substance of that issue. 
9 

The Court finds it unnecessary to choose between sections 1110 and 1114 on the one hand, 

and section 5112(b)(6) on the other hand, because they all lead to the same conclusion: The proper 

implementation date of the discontinuance decision is a question under a law affecting the 

provision of benefits. See Pet'r's Suppl. Resp. at 6-8; Sec'y's Suppl. Resp. at 3-5. Although the 

action of paying a lower amount of benefits is not a "decision" that may be appealed, assignment 

of a date when that action will take place is an agency decision that could be appealed to the Board 

and then to this Court. See Bates, 398 F.3d at 1361; see also Chisholm v. McDonald, 28 Vet.App. 

240, 243 (2016) (per curiam order) (finding that "decisions regarding access to claims files[, 

though not a direct decision on benefits,] are rendered pursuant to a law affecting the provision 

[of] veterans' benefits" and thus amenable to appeal to the Board and this Court). 

By the same token, the Court finds it unnecessary under the circumstances to decide 

whether Mr. Love or the Secretary presents the correct understanding of "implementation" and 

"effective date." The parties' arguments in that regard essentially pertain to whether Mr. Love has 

the right to an overpayment, which we rejected above. Again, it is sufficient that the parties 

concede, and we so conclude, that the proper implementation date of the discontinuance decision 

generally is a matter that can be resolved by turning to the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) 

and thereby obtaining a decision under section 511(a). But because it is undisputed at this point 

that Mr. Love has initiated no proceedings at the AOJ that may implicate our prospective 

jurisdiction, see §§ 7104(a), 7252(a), mandamus would be improper, see In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 

at 529; see also Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1359 (noting that "mandamus does not aid prospective 

jurisdiction where a party has not initiated any proceeding whatsoever"). 

Should Mr. Love seek a section 511(a) decision that could be appealed to the Board and 

then this Court, see §§ 7104(a), 7252(a), his ability to obtain a decision of the Secretary would 

involve our prospective jurisdiction. See In re Tennant, 359 F.3d at 529; see also Wolfe, 28 F.4th 

at 1359. But he has not requested that the Court compel VA to issue a section 511(a) decision 

regarding the proper date to implement the discontinuance, i.e., whether payments must continue 

in the pre-discontinuance amount, pending his appeal on the merits of the discontinuance. And, by 

extension, he has not shown that any action of the Secretary prevented him from seeking that 

decision. Instead, Mr. Love apparently wishes to circumvent the Agency process, requesting that 

the Court decide whether he is entitled to payments at the pre-discontinuance amount until he 

exhausts his appeals. But see Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1357-58 ("[M]andamus . . . could only compel 

action on the appeal[;] [i]t could not dictate a particular outcome."). The ordinary appellate process 

provides a path to this Court, and if Mr. Love has not shown that VA has blocked his pursuit of a 

decision on that path, then issuing a writ would not be in aid of our jurisdiction, and so would be 

outside our authority under the AWA. See Roche, 319 U.S. at 26; Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. 

at 55-56; see also Wolfe, 32 Vet.App. at 42-43 (Falvey, J. dissenting). Thus, the Court cannot 

exercise its authority under the AWA to assess whether a writ is warranted here. 

C. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2): Authority to Compel Action of the Secretary Unlawfully Withheld 

Mr. Love also argues that "the Court must act under [section] 7261(a)(2) even if the statute 

that 'opens the jurisdictional door' here is the [AWA]." Pet. at 12 & n.1. Section 7261(a)(2) 

provides that this Court shall "compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed." He argues that section 7261(a)(2) therefore requires this Court to issue a writ of 
10 

mandamus here to "compel an action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld," the "action" being 

payments in the pre-discontinuance amount. Pet. at 12. He further argues that section 7261(a)(2) 

"provides an ordinary-course basis to compel unlawfully withheld action." Pet. at 12 n.1. But he 

argues that, once this Court's AWA authority has been properly invoked, this Court may exercise 

"supplemental jurisdiction" akin to our chapter 72 authority, the scope of which is governed by 

section 7261. Pet. at 12. He then analogizes this Court's scope of review under section 7261(a)(2) 

to the scope of review afforded Article III courts under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 

5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and argues that the Court must compel agency action unlawfully withheld, 

without any discretion. Pet. at 12-13 & n.2. He goes so far as to say that this mandate of 

section 7261(a)(2) negates the otherwise applicable standard that issuance of a writ of mandamus 

is always a matter of the issuing court's discretion. Pet. at 13 n.2; Pet'r's Reply at 8; see Kerr v. 

U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (noting that "issuance of the writ is in large part a 

matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed"). 

But as explained above, we find that the AWA's "jurisdictional door" is closed. That the 

writ be "in aid of" our jurisdiction or our prospective jurisdiction is the sine qua non of AWA 

authority. See § 1651(a); Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1354; Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 54. Here, Mr. 

Love has not demonstrated, either by showing a right to an overpayment or that he cannot obtain 

a section 511(a) decision on the implementation issue, that this Court's jurisdiction is impeded. See 

III.B, supra. Simply put, our jurisdiction is not in need of aid, and therefore we have no authority 

under the AWA to issue a writ. Thus, there is no need to turn to section 7261 to determine our 

scope of action because we do not have jurisdiction under the AWA to act. Likewise, although Mr. 

Love argues that section 7261 relates to our "supplemental jurisdiction," Pet. at 12, there is nothing 

here to supplement. Whatever section 7261 would require of us in other cases, it has no role to 

play here. 

Because we find that 38 U.S.C. § 7261 is inapplicable here, we need not address Mr. Love's 

argument that our scope of action under that section is analogous to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

Likewise, we find no need to determine whether section 7261 affects the discretionary nature of 

mandamus as laid out in Kerr. 

D. Purported 38 U.S.C. § 7252(c) Jurisdiction 

Mr. Love makes the novel argument that section 7252(c) is an independent grant of 

jurisdiction empowering this Court to act in aid of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.6 As the party 

asserting jurisdiction, Mr. Love must show that this jurisdiction exists. See McNutt, 298 U.S. at 

189. He fails. 

When interpreting a statute, the Court must first look to its plain meaning. Gardner, 

1 Vet.App. at 586-87. And "[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of 

a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 

6

 Mr. Love's counsel, John Niles, appears to have made this argument in several cases before the Court. See, 

e.g., Aumiller v. McDonough, U.S. Vet. App. No. 21-3565 (submitted to a panel Sept. 16, 2021); Furtick v. 

McDonough, U.S. Vet. App. No. 20-4638 (Nov. 18, 2021, dismissed, mandate issued); Johnson v. Tran, No. 20-7918, 

2021 WL 416449, at *5 (Vet. App. Feb. 8, 2021) (decided on other grounds). This is the first case to address the issue 

on the merits. 
11 

scheme." Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see Hornick v. Shinseki, 

24 Vet.App. 50, 51 (2010) ("The meaning of a statutory word or phrase cannot be determined in 

isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used."). 

As noted, "[w]e have only one source of jurisdiction: 38 U.S.C. § 7252." Skaar, 

32 Vet.App. at 180. The statute, which is titled "Jurisdiction; finality of decisions," reads: 

(a) The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 

review decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The Secretary may not seek 

review of any such decision. The Court shall have power to affirm, modify, or 

reverse a decision of the Board or to remand the matter, as appropriate. 

(b) Review in the Court shall be on the record of proceedings before the Secretary 

and the Board. The extent of the review shall be limited to the scope provided in 

section 7261 of this title. The Court may not review the schedule of ratings for 

disabilities adopted under section 1155 of this title or any action of the Secretary in 

adopting or revising that schedule. 

(c) Decisions by the Court are subject to review as provided in section 7292 of this 

title. 

§ 7252(a)-(c). 

A plain reading of this section shows that it contains a singular grant of jurisdiction in 

subsection (a), followed by limits on how and what we can review in subsection (b), with the 

statutory scheme rounded out by subsection (c) providing that this Court's decisions are subject to 

the Federal Circuit's appellate review as provided in section 7292. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) ("After 

a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is entered in a case, any party 

to the case may obtain a review of the decision with respect to the validity of a decision of the 

Court [of Appeals for Veterans Claims] . . . ."). 

Subsection (a) of section 7252 sets out our jurisdiction: "The Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals." 

Section 7292(c) has comparable language: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review [certain legal matters in resolving appeals of 

decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]." Congress was explicit about jurisdiction 

in section 7252(a) and section 7292, setting up independent sources of jurisdiction for two 

different courts in relation to veterans' claims. 

Yet Mr. Love would have us believe that Congress chose to be more cryptic in subsection 

(c) of section 7252, which does not use the word "jurisdiction." But "[i]f Congress had intended 

the court's jurisdiction to be broader than that conferred by [subsection] 7252[(a)], Congress would 

have expressed that intention legislatively." Matter of Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 373 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

In support of his argument that section 7252(c) is a separate grant of jurisdiction, Mr. Love 

argues that the language of section 7252(b), because it does not specify that it applies exclusively 
12 

to subsection (a), "applies to cases that are within this Court's jurisdiction on a basis other than 

[section] 7252(a)." Pet. at 5 (emphasis added). His only support for this is the fact that subsection 

(b) does not qualify the Court's review with the words "under subsection (a)." Id. But subsection 

(b)'s placement and the overall structure of section 7252 does not require qualifying language to 

understand its plain meaning. Subsection (b) limits the Court's jurisdiction, confining our review 

to the record before the Secretary and the Board and to the scope provided in section 7261, and 

forbidding review of the schedule of ratings for disabilities adopted by the Secretary. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7252(b). The Court's singular grant of jurisdiction is in subsection (a), giving this Court the 

power to "review decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals." 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). That is the 

only "[r]eview in [this] Court," and thus the only "review" to which subsection (b) could apply. 

To the extent that Mr. Love suggests that subsection (b) is itself a grant of jurisdiction, and 

thus by analogy suggests that subsection (c) is too, that contravenes the established interpretation 

that subsection (b) is not a grant of jurisdiction but limits the jurisdiction established in subsection 

(a). See Larson v. McDonough, 10 F.4th 1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ("Section 7252 establishes 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans Court to review decisions of the Board. However, the 

Veterans Court [has the limits to its jurisdiction found in section] 7252(b)."); Ledford, 136 F.3d at 

779 ("The statute that confers jurisdiction upon the Court of [Appeals for Veterans Claims is] . . . 

38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). Thus, the court's jurisdiction is premised on and defined by the Board's 

decision concerning the matter being appealed [per] [section] 7252(b)."). If subsection (b) is not a 

grant of jurisdiction, that does not bode well for Mr. Love's argument that subsection (c) is a grant 

of jurisdiction. 

References to section 7252(c) as jurisdictional do exist—but referring to the Federal 

Circuit's own jurisdiction, not this Court's jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has noted that 

section 7252(c) complements its own grant of jurisdiction in section 7292. See Stillwell v. Brown, 

46 F.3d 1111, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The boundaries of this limited jurisdictional grant are set 

out at 38 U.S.C. § 7292.") & id. at n.3 ("38 U.S.C. § 7252(c) provides that decisions by the Court 

of [Appeals for Veterans Claims] 'are subject to review as provided in [section] 7292 . . . .'"). Even 

courts outside the veterans appeals system refer to sections 7252(c) and 7292 in tandem as sources 

of Federal Circuit jurisdiction, not that of this Court. See Bell v. Veterans Admin., 946 F. Supp. 

479, 480 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing sections 7252(c) and 7292 for the proposition that the "United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of 

the Court of [Appeals for Veterans Claims]"). 

Mr. Love argues that such a construction of section 7252(c) would render it superfluous 

next to section 7292, Pet. at 4-5 (citing Sharp v. United States, 580 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) ("[Courts] must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute and should 

avoid rendering any of the statutory text meaningless or as mere surplusage.") (quotations 

omitted)), and reduce subsection (c) to a "statutory heading." Pet'r's Reply at 3. 

But a proper construction of subsection (c) does not reduce it to "mere surplusage" or a 

"statutory heading." Subsection (c) notes that our decisions are not necessarily final but subject to 
13 

Federal Circuit review; then, that court's jurisdiction is positively granted in section 7292. 7

§ 7252(c). The two provisions work in tandem, tying the statutory scheme together by laying out 

that appeals come first to this Court and then to the Federal Circuit. See Davis, 489 U.S. at 809; 

Hornick, 24 Vet.App. at 51. 

Mr. Love argues that the legislative history of section 7252 supports construing its 

provisions broadly to give as many opportunities for judicial review as possible to veterans. Pet. 

at 6-8. We note that "'[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the 

legislative history] would justify a limitation on the "plain meaning" of the statutory language.'" 

Talley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 282, 286 (1992) (second alteration in original) (quoting Garcia v. 

United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). But here the petitioner has identified no conflict between 

the plain meaning and the legislative history. The Senate at first did not envision a separate 

veterans court, wanting Board decisions instead reviewed by the geographic Circuit Courts of 

Appeal; the Senate's legislative history cannot support any grant of jurisdiction to this Court when 

it did not even envision this Court's existence. See S. REP. NO. 100-418, at 17, 151 (1988). The 

House of Representatives envisioned a veterans court with broad jurisdiction "to consider all 

questions involving benefits under laws administered by the Veterans Administration [now 

Department of Veterans Affairs]." H. R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. I, at 4, 62 (1988). But even this 

broad talk of "all questions involving benefits" still does not speak to whether this Court could 

somehow act in aid of Federal Circuit jurisdiction. Moreover, neither the House nor the Senate's 

proposals survived in the final version of the law. Ultimately, Congress created a separate veterans 

court, but without so wide a jurisdiction; the final form of the bill reads the same as the statute 

does today. Veterans' Judicial Review Act (VJRA), Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105, 

4113-14 (1988) ("Decisions by the Court are subject to review as provided in [section] 4092 [now 

section 7292] of this title."). Mr. Love has identified nothing in the legislative history that shows 

that Congress intended for us to have jurisdiction "in aid of" another court's jurisdiction, and thus 

the legislative history gives us no grounds to construe section 7252(c) as such a grant of 

jurisdiction. 

Mr. Love's remaining arguments in favor of a "section 7252(c) jurisdiction" also fail. He 

argues that "'provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be construed in the 

beneficiaries' favor.'" Pet. at 9 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991)). 

He argues that it would be more favorable to claimants to interpret section 7252(c) to provide 

another kind of judicial review for those claimants to pursue, and in this case to provide Mr. Love 

a means to "review the withholding of payments at the pre-reduction level while Mr. Love 

challenges the reduction." Id. As discussed above, see III.B.2, because the proper implementation 

date is a section 511(a) matter, it may be challenged through the same process as the underlying 

discontinuance decision. It must be remembered that the statutory scheme as it is already 

understood is favorable to claimants because not only is review of VA decisions by a court 

dedicated solely to veterans law available, but review of that review is available to the claimant. 

See §§ 7252(c), 7292. 

7

 Indeed, section 7252's heading reads, "Jurisdiction; finality of decisions." 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (emphasis 

added). Although statutory headings cannot contravene the statutory text, they do serve as a reference guide for the 

statute's subject matter. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947); see United 

States v. Jac Natori Co., 108 F.3d 295, 299 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
14 

Mr. Love also argues that a "'strong presumption favor[s] judicial review.'" Pet. at 9 

(quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 489 (2015) (stating that there is "a strong 

presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action" (quotations omitted)). Thus, he 

argues that this presumption should be attached to section 7252(c). Pet. at 9-10. But we find that 

the presumption of judicial review is inappropriate and unnecessary here. Refusing to apply the 

presumption would not leave veterans without judicial review—there is an explicit provision for 

judicial review (only of final Board decisions) in section 7252(a). This fact contrasts veterans law 

with areas with no specific congressional authorization of judicial review of any kind. The case he 

cites for the presumption of judicial review, Mach Mining, in fact readily demonstrates this 

distinction. There, the Supreme Court dealt with a situation in which a statute required an agency, 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to take certain action, but that requirement to 

act was not explicitly subject to judicial review in the same statute. 575 U.S. at 486-88; see

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. There, without the presumption favoring judicial review, "the Commission's 

compliance with the law would rest in the Commission's hands alone." 575 U.S. at 488. But here, 

there is no need to resort to a presumption to establish judicial review of VA decisions—that is 

explicitly provided for in section 7252(a). The situation here is unlike Mach Mining or any other 

case in which judicial review of agency action is not explicitly provided for by statute; matters 

here are not left in the agency's hands alone. And we need not rely on any presumption when 

Congress has explicitly provided for when and how this Court will exercise judicial review of 

agency action. 

Mr. Love argues that judicial review must be presumed unless it is clear that Congress 

intended to preclude it. Pet. at 9. Although that proposition is correct, it does not mean that 

anything less than an explicit denial of judicial review in the statute will do. Limitations on judicial 

review are not only determined by the express language of a statute, "but also from the structure 

of the statutory scheme." Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Here, the 

statutory scheme shows that Congress has provided for judicial review of VA action, but only in a 

specific manner. First, judicial review can be done by this Court, but only of final Board decisions. 

§ 7252(a). Then, the Federal Circuit can review decisions of this Court. § 7292. Those statutory 

provisions show that this Court and the Federal Circuit possess separate, distinct grants of 

jurisdiction. Absent from the statutory scheme is any provision by which this Court could 

somehow act in defense of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction rather than its own. But within that 

scheme, the only statutory basis for judicial review by this Court is section 7252(a), in which 

Congress commands that we "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review" final Board decisions. 

We cannot and will not add to our congressional marching orders. 

Finally, Mr. Love argues that the fact that no prior cases decided by this Court have rested 

on this "[section] 7252(c) jurisdiction" is because "at most[,] as to [section] 7252(c), . . . [prior] 

claimants failed adequately to plead [section] 7252(c) jurisdiction." Pet'r's Reply at 5. But this is 

not because prior claimants somehow missed raising this argument; it is because section 7252(c) 

is not a source of jurisdiction for this Court independent of section 7252(a). Mr. Love is asking the 

Court to create a new kind of jurisdiction not authorized by statute and in aid of a different court's 

jurisdiction, no less. This is something we cannot do. See Gardner-Dickson, 33 Vet.App. at 56 

("We may not craft a judicial expansion of section 7252 to circumvent binding precedent or the 

statute itself."). 
15 

E. Summary 

In sum, Mr. Love has not shown that the Secretary's preclusion of the possibility of 

overpayment presents an obstacle to this Court's future jurisdiction, nor any other basis on which 

we could issue a writ under the AWA in aid of our jurisdiction. Without authority under the AWA, 

there is no need to turn to section 7261 to determine our scope of action. We also find that there is 

no separate jurisdiction under section 7252(c) allowing the Court to act in aid of the Federal 

Circuit's potential jurisdiction. There are thus no jurisdictional grounds for this Court to compel 

the Secretary to restore payments to the pre-discontinuance amount pending completion of Mr. 

Love's appeal. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the above, it is 

ORDERED that Mr. Love's March 2, 2021, petition is DISMISSED. 

DATED: June 23, 2022 PER CURIAM.