1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES MANU EL ANT O NIO NORIE GA v. GE OR GE PAST RA NA , WARDE N ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATE S COU R T OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NT H CIRCUIT No. 09–3 5. Dec i ded Jan u a r y25, 2010 

### The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. J USTICE 

### T HOMAS 

### , wi th whom J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari. “[I]n our tripartite syst em of gover n ment,” it is the dut y of this Court to “say ‘what the law is.’ ” Boumedienev. Bush , 553 U. S. ___ (2008) (slip op., at 36) (quoting Marburyv. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 1 77 (1803)). This duty is particularly compellingin cases th at present an opportu

nity to decide the constitu tionality or enforceability of federal statutes in a m anner “insulated from the pressures of the moment,” and intime to guide courts a n d the politi

cal branches in resolving difficult questions concerning the proper “ex e rcise of governmental power.” Hamdanv. Rumsfeld , 548 U. S. 557, 637 (200 6) (K ENN E DY 

### , J., concu r ring in part); see generally Sanchez-Llamasv. Oregon , 54 8 U. S. 331, 353–354 (2006); Ham dan , supra , at 588 (quot

ing Ex pa rte Qui r in , 31 7 U. S. 1, 1 9 (1942)). This is such a case. The questio ns presented are, in the Solicitor General’s words: “1. Whether Section 5 of the Military Commissions Act of 200 6, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2631, pre

cludes petitioner from invok i ng the Geneva Conventio n Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, as a source of rights in a habeas corpus proceeding”; and “2. Wh ether, assuming petiti oner can as sert a clai m based on the Geneva Convention, his extradition to France would violate the Convention.” Brief in Opposition i (som e2 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### citations omitted). 1 

### Answering just the first of these qu e s tions would provide much-needed guidance on two impor

tant issues with whichthe political branches and federa l courts have struggled since we decided Boumediene

. Th e first is the extent, if an y, to whi c h provisions like Section 5 affect 28 U. S. C. §2241 in a manner that i m plicates the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus. T h e second is whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable. It is incum b ent upon us to provide what gu idance we can on thes e issues now. Whatever conclusion we reach, our opinionwill help the political branches and the courts discharge their responsibilities over detainee cases, and will spare detainees and the Government ye ars of unnec

essary litigation. These consider ations alon e justify re

view. Th at petitioner was co nvicted infederal court (rather tha nin a military commission) in criminal pro

ceedings uncomplicated by cla ssified information or issues relating to extra terri torial detention is an additional reason to grant certior ari. It is our duty to say what t h e law is on important m a tters withi nour jurisdiction. That is what we should do. I Petitioner General Manuel Noriega is the former head of the Panamanian Defense Forces. In 1988, a federal grand jury indicte d Noriega, and the U. S. military thereafter brought hi m to Florid a. A feder a l jury convicted him of various federal narcoti cs-related offenses, and the Dist ric t Court sentenced him to a 30-ye ar prison term. In re

sponse to Noriega’s concerns about the type of care he

——————

1 We ro ut inelygra n t cert ior a ri onquestions the Solicitor Gene ral presents in a brief in opposi tion, see, e. g ., Weyhra uchv. United Sta t es , 557 U. S. __ (200 9), orinan amicusbrief, see, e.g ., Hamiltonv. Lanning , ante , p. ___; Republic of Philippinesv. Pimental , 552 U. S 106 1 (20 07).Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) 3
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### would receive in the cu stody of the Bureau of Prisons, the District Court designa t ed Noriegaa prisoner of war (P OW) entitled to th e protections of the Ge neva Conventions. See UnitedS t a t esv. Nori ega , 808 F. Supp. 791 (SD Fla., 1992). 2

### Nori ega’s conviction and sentence were affirmed in proceedings not relevant here. See United Sta t esv. Noriega , 117 F. 3d 12 06 (CA11 1997), cert. denied, 5 2 3 U. S. 1060 (1998). In July 2007, two months before Noriega was scheduled to be releas ed on parole, he filedahabeas cor p us petition under 28 U. S. C. §2255. Relying on the Dis trict Court’s POW designation, Noriega alleged that the United Sta t es violated the Geneva Conventions when it acquiesced in the French Government’s re quest to extra dite him to France so he could face criminal charges th ere upon his release fro mU. S. custody. See United Sta t esv. Noriega , No. 88

− 0079

− CR, 2007 WL 2947572 (SD Fl a., Aug. 24, 2007). The District Court agreed with Noriega that his

——————

2 Citin gIn ter n ation a l Re d C r oss an d ac ad emicc o mmen t ar yinsu p port of its “belie[f] [that the Thir d] Geneva [Convention] is self

executing and provides Gene ral Noriega with a r i gh t of a c tion in a U. S

. court for viol ation of i t s provisio n s , ” t h e D i str i c tC o u r t addr esse d Noriega’s status under thetreaty. United Stat esv. Noriega , 808 F. Su pp., at 794. Th e Di str i c tJu dg e f o u n dth at th e h o stili tie s i n Panamac o nst i tuted an “ ‘ar m ed conflict’ ” within the me aningof Ar tic l e 2 of the Third Geneva Convention, that N o r i eg a was a memberof th e a r m e d forces of apa rt y t o t h e conf lic t underAr tic l e 4 of the Thi r d Conv ention, a n d that the Distr i c tCour t was a “ ‘competent trib una l’ ” t o determine No riega’s POW status underArticle 5 of the Third Conven

tion. See id. , at 7 93– 79 6. Ac c o r d in gl y, th e c o u r t con c lu ded th at, notwithstandi n g vario u s separation -of-po w ers and justiciab ility con

c e r n s , “ N o r i e g ai s i nf a c ta p r i s o n e ro f w a ra s d e f i n e d b yG e n e v aI I I , an d as su c hmu st be affor d ed th e pr otections establishe dbythe tr eaty” while in federal custody. Id. , at 79 6. Th e c o u r t th en identified Conven

tion r i gh ts tha tit believ e d w o uld govern Noriega’s confinement, see id. , at 79 9– 803, a n d observ ed th at “[w]h e th eror n o t th ose r i gh ts c a n be fully provided in a m a xi mum sec u r i typenitentiar yset t ingis open t o serious questi on,” id. , at 803

.4 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### POW statu s entitled him to the Conventions’ protecti on until his “ final releas e and repa triation,” b u t dismissed his §2255 petition on the ground that his extra dition challenge was not directed to “any defect in [his] sen

tence,” and thus was not cognizable under §2255. Id. , at *1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Noriega th en filed the same claims under 28 U. S. C. §2241, andthe District Court ul timately 3

### stayed his ex

tradition pe nding appe al on the ground that h i s challenge rested on “ credible arguments .

. ., particula rly withre gard to th e interpretation of certain provisions of the Geneva Convention[s],” on which “no other federal court has ruled.” No. 07

− CV

− 22816

− PCH, 2008 WL 331394, *3 (SD Fla., Ja n. 31, 2008). On appeal, Noriega argued tha this extradition to France would violate several provisions of th e Third Con

vention and that the DistrictCo urt erredin concluding otherwise. In response, the Go ver n ment asserted tha tth e court lacke djurisdicti on ov er Noriega’s claims becaus e §5(a) of th e Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) establishes that “[t]he Geneva Conventions are not self

executing” or judicially enforceab le in habeas corpus a c tions. Brief for United States in No. 08–11021–F (CA1 1), p. 13 (hereinafter Brief for United States). 4 

### MCA §5(a) provides:

——————

3 The Dis t rictCourtdis m is sed Nori eg a’ s i n itial § 2 2 41 petition be

ca us e t h e courtconcluded t h a tit la cked j u ris d ict i on t o cons ider t h e petition’s extradition challe nge in No rieg a ’ s crim i na l ca s ea s oppos e d t o as e pa ra t e a c t i on cha llenging his ce rtificate of extra d itab ili ty. Se e United States v. Nori ega , No . 88

− 007 9

− CR , 2007 WL 29 479 81, *1 (SD Fla., Sept. 7, 200 7) (dis mi ssingthe pet i tion without pr ejudic e but r e iter atingthe mer i ts c o ncer ns wi th No riega’s Gene va Convention c l aims th a tt h e c o ur t ar tic u lated indic t a indismi s sin gh i s §225 5 petition).

4 The Go vernm e nta l s ocha l lenged No riega ’ s cla i m s a s merit l es s a n d outside the scope of habeas re view under C i rcuit precede n t.5 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### “No person may invo k e the Geneva Conventions or any protoco l s thereto in any habe as corpus o rother civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, em ployee, me mber of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a part y as a source of rights in any cour t of th e United Sta t es or its States or territories. 120 Stat. 2631, note f o llowing 28 U. S. C. §2241.” 5 

### Emphasizing that a no n-self-executing treaty “ ‘addresses itself to th e political, no t the judicial department,’ ” the Government observed that “n o court of appeals has held that the provisions of the GenevaConventions are judi

cially enforceable in any context. ” Brief for United Sta t es 13 (quoting Medellínv. Texa s , 55 2 U. S. 491, 516 (2008)). The Government then argued that “confirmation of th is [view] can be f o und in the ena ctment of [MCA §5(a)], which “codifie[d] the principle that the Geneva Conven

tions [a]re not judicially enforceable by private parties,” but did so i na narrow way that d oes not purport to st rip courts of ha beas jurisdiction, and thus does “not implicate” the Suspension Clause analysis in Boumedien e . Brief for United States 14, n. 6. 6

——————

5 Recent amendments to the Militar yCom m iss i ons Act of 2006, collec

tively titled t h e Military Commis s io ns Ac t of 200 9, se e Nationa lDe

fen s e Au th or i z ationAc t forFisc al Ye ar 201 0, see §§1801 –1 807, 12 3 S t at . 25 7 4

– 261 4 , do not a f fectMC A §5 (a). The 20 09am endm ents principally update provisi o ns rele v a nt to the Guantanamo habe a s corpus ca s e s pending in t h e U.S

. Di s t rictCourtfor the Dis t rictof Columbi aandclarify the due process protections avail a ble in those and other no ncitizen detainee cases to wh ic h the c o nstitutional and tr eaty issues in this case relate. See ibid

. ; see a l so J. Else a, C R S Re por tfor Congress, Comparison of Rights in Military Commi s s ion Trials a n d Tr ials inFeder a l Cr imin al C o u r t, 2–4 (Nov . 19, 2009).

6 Althoughthe Gov e rnment disting u ishes MCA §5(a) from the juris

diction-strippi ng provision the Court invalidate din Boumediene , it stops sh or t of asser t in gth at§5(a) is c o nsti tutional. See Br ief in Oppo

sition 8, n.6 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### The Eleventh Cir c uit accepted th e DistrictC o urt’s des

ignation of Noriega as a POW, bu t agreed with the Gov

ernment’s interpretati on of MCA §5(a): “We affirm and hold that §5 of the Military Commis

sions Act o f 2006 pre c ludes Noriega from i nvoking the GenevaConvention as a source of rights in a ha

beas proceeding and th erefore den yNoriega’s habeas petition.

. . . . . “The issues present in Boumedien ev. Bushco ncerning the constit u tionality of §7 of the MCA, are not pre

sented by §5 .

. . . In Bo umediene , the Supreme Court found §7 of the MCA, which explicitly removed the ju

risdiction of courts to consider habeas actions by en

emy combatants, to be unconstitu t ional .

. . . Section 5, in contrast, as discussed more f u lly, infra , at most changes one substantive provision of law upon which a party mi ght rely in seeking habeas relief. We are [thus] not presented with a situation in which poten

tial petitioners are ef fectively banned from seeking habeas relief becaus e any constitutional rights or claims are made unavailable. 564 F. 3d 1290, 1292, 1294 (CA11 200 9) (citation s and pare nthetical omitted).” 7 

### Noriega’s p e tition challenges both the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretati on of MCA §5(a) and the provision’s constitu

tionality. Noriega begins byasserting thatthe Court of Appeals erred in holdin g “that [MCA §5(a)] abs olutely and unambiguously prohibits persons from raisi n g any clai m based upon the four Geneva Conventions” in a habea s

——————

7 The Court of Appeals al so concluded that, “assuming arguendo ” Noriegais correctt h a t“ § 5 of t h e MCA does notpreclude [his ] cla i m , ” Noriega , 564 F. 3d, at 129 7, th e Th ir d Ge n e v aConv en tiondoes n o t ba r his ex tr aditio n to Fr anc ea n d the “United State s has fullyc o mplied with” the tr eaty , id ., at 1298.7 Cite as: 55 9 U

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T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### corpus acti on. Pet. for Cert. 10; see also id

. , at 12 (“At best, the statutory sch e me is ambiguous”). Noriega next asserts that, if the Eleventh Circuit’s inter p retation of §5(a) is correct, the provision v i olates the Supremac y Clause, see id ., at 11
− 12, and the Suspension Clause, s ee Reply to B r ief in Op position 2. Noriega’s Suprema c y Clause argument is that, to the extent MCA §5(a) governs his Geneva Convention claims, th e provision impermis si

bly effects a “complete repudiatio n” of the treaty. Pet. for Cert. 11. The Government responds that this argument suffers from two fata l flaws. First, this Co urt has held that a tre aty, whichis “ ‘prima rily a compact bet w een independen t nations,’ ” remains in force as the supreme law of the land even where its enforcement is left to “in

ternational negotiations” rath er than “dom estic courts .” Brief in Opposition 7(quoting Head Mone y Cases , 1 12 U. S. 580, 598 (1884)); see Medel lín , supr a , at 505, an d n. 3. Second, “[w]hatever the do mestic effect of the Thi r d Geneva Convention b e fore the enactment of the MCA,” this Court has held that ‘it is within Congress’ power to change domestic law, even if the law originally arose from a self-executing treaty. ’ ” Br ief in Opposition 7 (quoting Noriega , su pra , at 129 5–1296); see also Medellín , supra , a t 509, n. 5. Accordin gly, the Government agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that MCA §5(a) “does not change th e international obligations of the United States under the Geneva Conventions,” but does “supersed[e] whatever domestic effect the Ge neva Conventions may have had in actions such as this.” Brief in Opposition 7–8 (internal quotation marks andcitation omitted). That bring s Noriega to his Suspension Clause argument. He replies that, if MCA §5(a) operates in th e manner the Govern

ment describes and the Eleventh Circuit held, the provi

sion is un constitutional under Boumedien ebecause it “effectively works a sus p ension of the writ.” R e ply to B r ief in Opposition 2 (asserting that“t o divorce t h e writ fro m8 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### the law is to destroy the writ”). II As the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion makes clear, the threshold question in this case is whether MCA §5(a) is valid. Ans w ering that question this Term would provide courts and the politica lbranches with much needed guid

ance on i s s u es we l e ft open in Boumediene

. See Boumediene , 553 U. S, at ___, ___ (sl i p op. at 64

− 66, 6 8

− 70). Pro

viding tha tguidance i nthis case would allow us to sa y what the law is without the unnecessary dela y and other complications that could burden a decision onthese ques

tions inGuantanamo or other detainee litigation arisin g out of the conflict with Al Qaeda. Boumedien einvalidated MCA §7’s attempt to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over claims by a specified class of non-citizen deta inees (“unlawful enemy combatants”), but did not determine the “content of the law that g o verns petitioners’ detention,” id. , at ___ (sl i p op. at 69), or the extent to wh ich §2241’s substantive provisions affect the c o nstituti onal “procedu ral protecti ons of habeas corpus,” id. , at ___ (slip op. at 70). Section 2241 broadly con f ers jurisdiction over a habeas corpus action by any person who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See Rasul v. Bush , 542 U. S. 466, 473 (2004). MCA §5(a) eliminates the Geneva Conventions as a s o urce of rights u p on which §2241 petitioners may rely in ch al

lenging their detentions. Statutory amendments to an existing law ordinaril y involve nothing more than a va lid exercise of Congress’ Arti cle I au thority. See, e.g. , Chew Heo n g

v. United S t a t es , 112 U. S. 536, 56 2–563 (188 4). Noriega asserts that th e difference in this case is that th e statutory a m endment narrows th e scope of §2241. Assu m ing that is correct, th e indeterminate interplay between the constitutional an d statutory guarantees of habea s9 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### corpus und er our precedents permits Noriega to arg u e that the m anner in which MCA §5(a) affects §2241 pro

ceedings im plicates the Suspensio nClause. Only we can determine whether the Eleventh Circuit corr ectly reject ed that argum e nt. The Suspension Clauseprovides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the p ublic Safety may require it.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2. Because the Clause addresses only the suspension—not the content or existence—of the “Privilege of the Writ,” ibi d ., we have long recogn ized the “obligation” the first Congress “mu s t have felt” to “provid[e] efficient means by which this grea t constitutional privilege should receive life and activit y . ” Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cranch 75, 95 (1807). But we ha ve also steadf astly declined to adopt a date of reference by which the writ’s const i tutional content, if any, is to be judged, see Boumedien e , supr a , ___ (slip op. a t15

− 17), and thus have left open the quest ion whether sta t utory efforts to limit §22 41 implicate the Suspension Cla u se, see, e.g. , INS v. St . C y r , 533 U. S. 289, 300 –301 (2001). This ques

tion, which has already divided the Court in other con

texts, see ib id ., 8

### is clearly presented here. Noriega asserts

——————

8 Compare St. Cyr , 533 U. S., at 300 –3 01 ( 200 1) (dec lin in gto iden tify a specific date of reference for judging the constitutional scope of the writ, b u t conc luding tha tthe Cour t nonetheless should c o nstr ue the Illeg a l Immigr ationRefor man d Immigr an t Respon sibili t yAc t of 1996 (IIRIRA) to allow §22 41 j u r i sdic tionov erc e r t ainh abeas pe tit i on s because doing so would av oid the Su spe n sion Clause question tha t otherwise would arise), wi th id ., at 33 5 –34 1 (S CALIA , J., diss enting) (emph a siz i n gth at, alth ou ghIIRIRA displac e s § 224 1 ju r i sdic tion una mb iguous ly a n d thus re nders the ca n o n of co ns titutiona lav oida nce inapplicab le, t h ere is no constitut i on al qu estionto av oid, bec a u s e th e Su spen sionClau se is addr essed on lyto su spen sion( i.e. , tempor ary withholding of the operation) of the writ on the terms authorized by the h abeas c o r p u s st atu t e, n o tt oCon gr e ss’ po werto al tert h e subst a n c e of th e h abeas r i gh ts th e sta t u t e c o n f er s) an d id. , at 340

− 3 41, n

. 5 (“If, as10 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### that MCA §5(a) is unc onstitutional because it “effectively works a suspension of the writ” by imposing the same type of statutory limitation the Court addressed in St. Cyr

. Reply to Brief in Opposition 2 (implicitly equating the constitutional scope of the writ with §2241’s grant of habeas corpus jurisdicti on over individuals allegedly “held in violationof the Constitution, laws, or treaties of th e United States”). The Eleventh Circuit, however, saw no constitutional problem with the statute and upheld it as valid and distinguishable from the pro vision deem ed unconstitutional in Boumediene

. See 564 F. 3d, at 1294. Addressing Noriega’s challeng e to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision would resolve the importa nt statuto r y and consti

tutional questions her e and would guide co urts and the political br anches in addressing the sam eand simila r issues in other detainee cases. Se e, e.g., Al-Bihani , sup r a , at *5 (“The Supreme Court hasprovided scant guidance on these questions, consciously leaving the con t ours of th e substantive and procedural law of detention open for lower courts to shape in a common law fashion.”). Recent cour t decisions, a s well as recent Executive Branch court filings and policy determinations, spec ifi c ally invoke the Geneva Conventions as part of the law that gove rns detainee treatment in the United States an d abroad. For example, in September 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a redacted version of a classified memorandum opinion in which it granted ha beas corpus relief in the oldest of the pending Guan tanamo cases because the petitioner’s indefinite detention was based “almost exclusively” onunreliable“confessio n s” obtaine d “using abusive techniques thatviolated the Army Fi eld

—————— the Court concedes, the wri tcould not be suspended within the mean

ing of the Suspension Clause until Congre ss affirmativel y provided for h abeas byst at u t e, th ensu r e lyCon gr e ss ma ysubsequ e n t l yalterwh at it had initia lly provided for, l e st th e Cl au s ebec o me a on e-wayr a tc h e t.” (inter nal quotation mar k s a n d c i tations omitted)).11 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### Manual an d the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to th e Treatment of Prisoners of War.” Al Rabiahv. United Sta t es, Civ. Action No. 02

− 828, Unclassified M e m. Op. (DC Sept. 17, 2009), pp. 1–2, 43. Several rec e nt D. C. C i rcuit decisions, one of which i s now pending before us, similarly implicate th e importance of the Geneva Conventi on and MCA §5(a) questions in this case. In Kiyembav. Obama , 55 5 F. 3d 1022 (2009) (Kiyemba I) , cert. gran ted, ante , p. ___, the petitioners, Guan

tanamo detainees who prevailed on their habeas corpus claims infederal court but c annot return to their h o me country, re ly on the Geneva Conventions in claiming a right to be released in the territ o rial United States, s e e Pet. for Cert. in No. 08–1234, pp. i, 34. Although the D. C. Circuit did not address MCA §5(a) in rejecting this claim, the Government contends be fore this Court that MC A §5(a) bars petitioners’ reliance o nthe Conventions, s ee Brief in Opposition in No. 08-1234, pp. 23–2 4, and Judge Rogers’ opinion concurring in the D. C. Circui t ’s judgmen t relies up on the same r e patriation language inArticle 118 of the Thir d Convention that Noriega raises here, se e 5 5 5 F. 3d, at 10 33, n. 2. In Al-Bihani , supra , the D. C. Circui t directly in vokes MCA §5(a) in rejecting a Guantanamo detainee’s claim that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief becau s e his detention violated, inter ali a , the Third Geneva Convention, s ee id ., at *2 –3; *6 (stating that MC A §5(a), “a provision not altered by the MCA of 2009, explic

itly precludes detainees from clai ming the Geneva Con

ventions—which incl ude criteri a to deter m ine who is entitled to P.O.W. stat us—as a source of rights”). Finally, the D. C. Circuit’s de cision in Kiy e mba v. Obama , 56 1 F. 3d 509 (2009) (Kiyemba II) , im plicates the issues her e in holding, contrar yto severa l recent distric tcourt deci

sions, 9

### that another MCA provision (MCA §7(a)(2), codified

——————

9 See Khadrv. Bush , 587 F. Su pp. 2d 22 5, 235 (DC 2 0 0 8) (Bates, J.);12 NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### at 28 U. S. C. §2241(e)(2)), does not deprive fe deral habeas corpus cour ts of jurisdiction to consider claims in which certain classes of detainees challenge their c o nditions of confinemen t under th e Geneva Conventions. See 561 F. 3d, at 512–513. The extent to which noncitizen detainees may rely o n the Geneva Conventions as a sou rce of rights against the United States has also been the subject of increasing debate in th e political branches. Recent Exe c utive Bran ch Orders and court filings cite the C o nventions in articulat

ing the legal standards that go vern detainee treatment. See, e.g ., Exec. Order No. 13491, §3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4894 (2009) (making “Common Article 3 standards” the “min i

mum baseline” for the treatment of any individual who, in the course of “any arm e d conflict,” comes into the “custod y or under the effectivecontrol of an officer, employee, or other agent of theUnited States” or is “detai ned within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States”) ; Brief for United States in Misc. No. 08–442 (TFH), p. 1 (M ar. 13, 2009) (apprising the court of the Gover n ment’s decision to tr eat detainees formerly designated as “ unlawful enemy combatants” under new standards that dra won the “laws of war,” as those laws have “developed over time and h ave periodi

cally been c o dified in treaties such as the Geneva Conven

tions”). 10 

### Congress, in turn, is considering new legislation

—————— In re Gua n ta namo Bay Detainee Liti gatio n , 577 F. Su p p . 2d 3 12, 3 1 4 (DC 2008) (Hog a n , J.); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation , 5 70 F. Su pp. 2d 13, 18 (DC 2008) (Urb in a, J.).

10 This standardpresumably w ill contro l the Government’s position in hab e a s corpus a c t i ons t h ata r is e in other ci rcuit s purs ua ntt ot h e President’s recent decision to pros ecute or imprison (or both) certain Guantanamo detainees in New York an dIllinois. See Hearings Before the Senate Co mmit t ee on the Judic i ar y, T e stimony of Attorney Ge neral Er icHolderpp. 8–9 ( N ov . 18, 200 9); Fede r a l News Serv ic e, Remar k s by Form er At t o rney Gene ra l Micha e l Muka s e y (Nov. 1 3 , 2 0 0 9 ) ; Pres iden

tial Memoran d um, Closure of Detent ion Facilitie s a tt h e Guantanamo13 Cite as: 55 9 U

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T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### that wouldfurther cl arify the extent to which detainees can enforce Geneva Convention obligations against the United States in federal courts, but progress on the s e proposals has been complicated by uncertai n ty over th e statutory a n d constitutional questions in this c a se. 11 

### As noted, a d dressing these qu esti ons now, 12

### if only the statutory issues, wouldavoid years of litigation and uncer

tainty no matter what we conc lude on the merits. A deci

sion uphol d ing MCA §5(a) would obviate the need for detainees, th e Government, and federal courts to struggle

—————— BayNav a l B a se (Dec . 15, 2009); Some Gu an tan a mo Det a in ees to M o v e to Illinoi s Pris on, Am. Forces Press Serv . (Dec. 15, 2009) ; Letter to Pa t Quirin, Go vernor of Illinois, from th e At to rney Ge neral, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Secu rity, and the Dire ctor of National Intellig ence, at 2 (Dec. 15, 2009) (a ll s o urces av ailable in Clerk of Cou r t’ s c a se file).

11 See, e. g ., J. E l s e a, K. Thomas , & M. Garc ia, CRS Report for Con

gress, Enemy Combatant Detainees: H abea s Corpus Challeng es i n Feder a l Cou r t, 36, 41-43 ( 200 9).

12 Because the D. C. Circuit’smajori ty opinion in Kiyemba I does not address MCA §5(a), the pr ovision’s validi t y is not squarel ypresented in that c a se. Se e Kiyembav. Obama , 55 5 F. 3d 102 2 (C ADC 20 09) (Ki

yemba I) , cert . gra n t e d, ante , p. ___ (2009). And gr anting review of the D. C. Circuit’s decision in Al-Bihani , which does address MCA §5(a), would not gua r antee a decisi on onthe statute’s validity. See Al-Bihani v. Obama , No. 09

− 50 51, 2 010 WL 1 041 1 (CADC 20 1 0 ). Al-Bihani addresse s MCA §5(a) in rej e cting onlyone of man yc l aims forh abeas c o r p us r e lief, so it i s not c l ea rthat the Cou r t would need to addr es s the sta t ute’s valid ity in deciding the case . And even if theCourt we re t o address § 5 (a), the decision would co me nex tTer m , th us pr ov idin gno g u idan c eto c o u r ts th at mu s tadju dic a te p e n d in gh abeas c o r p u s ac tion s th is spr i n gan d su mmer . Inc o n t r a st, add r essin gM CA §5(a)’ s v a lid it y in this ca se w o uld time ly provide su ch gu ida n ce. Doing s ocould a l so aid our dispo s ition of Kiyemba I because answering the questions presented here could clarify the cons titutional scope of the writ of h abeas c o r p u s ina man n e rth at c o u l d affe c tth e Kiyemba I petitioners’ a r gument ab o ut the inhe re nt remedia lpower of hab e a s corpus co urt s . See Pet. for Cer t . inNo. 08– 12 34, pp. 14– 16, 22– 23; see g e n e r a ll y Kiyemba I , 5 55 F. 3d, at 1 026–1 027; St. Cyr , 533 U. S., at 3 35– 34 0 (S CALIA , J., dis s e nting).14NORIEGA v. PASTRANA
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### (as they di d here) wi th GenevaConvention claims in habeas corpus proceedings. 13

### An d , i tw o u l dgi v e t h e p o l i t i

cal branche s a clearer sense of the constitutio nal limits to which new legislative or policy i n itiatives must adhere. The latter benefit would also fo llow if we were to invali

date MCA §5(a). In addition, such a ruling could well allow us to reach the question we left open in Hamd an— whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable—because this case is not governed by the Uni f orm Code of Military Justice provisions on which the Hamdanmajority relied in h o ldi n g Common Article III applicable to the proce e dings in that case. S ee Hamdan , 5 48 U. S., at 627–628; see also id. , at 637, 642– 643 (K EN NEDY 

### , J., concurring i npart). F i nally, if the Court were to conclude that th e Conventions are self

executing and judicia lly enforceable in habeas corpu s proceedings, this case would pres ent two ad ditional ques

tions relev ant to non c itizen detainee litigation: whether federal courts may classify such detainees as POWs under the Third Convention, and whether any of the Conve n tions requires the Unit ed States i mmediately to repat r iate detainees entitled to release from U. S. custod y. 14 

### Against th ese consid erations, the Govern ment pro

vides no compelling reason to decline review. 15

### Ac cord

-

——————

13 MCA §5(a) ap plies not only to indi viduals who, like Noriega, have (rightly or not) been designated POWs, b u t also to “ a nyper s on” who invokes the Conventions as a source of rights in any “habeas or other c iv il ac tion” to wh ic hth e Un ited Sta t es is a par t y , see 1 20 Sta t . 2 631, n o te followin g 28 U. S. C. §2241.

14 Both question s are subsume din the second question in the Solicitor Gener a l’ s br ief: “[w]hether , assumi ng pet i t i oner ca n a s s e rtacla i m based on the Gene va Convention, his extra d ition to Fra n cewoul d violate the Convention.” Brief in Opposition i.

15 The Solicitor General’s principal gr ound f o r oppos i ng c e rt iora ri is that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision does not c o nflic t with the dec i sio n of any othe r Circuit. See Brief in O pposition 6. That is tr ue but not surprising. The original version of the MCA is only th ree years old and,15 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### ingly, I would take the case an d decide the questions presented in the Solicitor General’s brief. 16

—————— as the Solici t o rGeneral is careful tonote, Noriega is “the only person cur ren tlydetained by the U n ited Stat e s as a prisoner of war.” Ibid

. (em p ha s i s a d ded). Accordin gly, t h e la ck of acircuits p liton t h e q u es tion whether MCA §5(a) bars POWs infederal custody in the United States from i nvoking the Geneva Conventions in habeas proceedings does not nega te the compelling reas ons to grant review. Indeed, the Court ha s ta ken ca s e s in th is a r ea wi thout the benefit of any opinion from a court of appeal s, se e Ex parte Quirin , su pra , and in splitle ss ca s e s involving ra re fa ct s a n d ongo ing diplom atic negotiations, se e Kiyemba I , ante , p . ___. T h e Court has also granted re view of separa

tion-of-powers and other important le gal questions on r e cords far less developed than that here, see, e.g ., Robertsonv. Unite d States ex re l. Watson , ante , p. ___; Chri stian Legal So c. Chapt er of Univ. of Cal. Hasting College of Law v. Martin ez , ante , p. ___; on petitions that ha v e required us to reformulate th e question s pr esented, see, e. g ., Rob ert son , supra ; Re ed Elsevi er, In c . v. Much nick , 555 U. S. ___ (2 009); and eve n on petitions w einitia lly denied, see Boumedienev. Bush , 551 U. S. 11 60 (200 7). Th e S o lic itorGen e ral also c l ai ms (ag a inbased o nth e fac tth at Noriega is “currently” the o n l yP O Wi nU

. S

. c u s t o dy) t h a tr e v i e wi s n o t warranted because the Elev enth Circuit’s decision is of “li m ited ongoing significance.” Ibid

. This as sert ion is notpers ua s ive for the rea s ons s e t for t habov e .

16 As noted, the Solicitor General’s fi rst question presentedis whether MCA §5(a) “precludes petitioner fr om inv o king” the Thir d Geneva Convention “as a source of ri ghts ina h abeas c o r p u s pr oceedin g . ” Br ief in Opposition i. Such statut ory qu estions do not automa tic a lly , orev en ty pic a lly , r e quir e a c o ur t to c o nsiderthe statute’ s c o nstitutiona lit y . Here, ho weve r, Noriegaha s cons is tentlya r gued tha t , if the s t a t ute precludes him from invoking the Gene vaConventions in the ma nner the Solicitor General’s que s tion de scribe s and the El eventh Circuit held, the statute would violate the Suspe n sion Clause. See supra , at 6

− 7. Th u s , th e Su spen sionClau se is su e mayinth is c a se fair lybe viewed as imp licit in the st atutory question presented.