No. 83-440 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

FRED J. RUPLE, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsBOB PETERSON LOGGING COMPANY, Employer, 

and 

GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE COI@Z~NY, 

Defendant and Respondent 

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy 

Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF PXCORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry N. Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Larry E. Riley; Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, 

Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 2, 1934 

Decided: April 19, 1984 

Filed: 4PR 1 9 I984 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Fred Ruple appeals from a judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court denying conversion of his future disability benefits into a lump sum payment. We affirm. 

The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. 

Ruple was injured in 1977 during the course of his employment 

with Rob Peterson Logging Company. He was awarded weekly 

temporary total disability benefits on account of his injuries, but these were later reduced to partial disability 

benefits. After a trial before the Workers' Compensation 

Court in 1979, Ruple was awarded permanent total disability 

benefits. In 1981, a decision was made by the Administrator 

of the Workers' Compensatj.on Division to reduce the claimant's weekly benefits on account of his being awarded Social 

Security disability benefits. This decision has effectively 

reduced his weekly workers' compensation benefits to $70.79. 

In 1982, Ruple decided to seek a conversion of his 

weekly benefits into a lump sum payment. Ruple contends that 

a lump sum award will permit him to eliminate outstanding 

d.ebts connected with his mobile home, truck and one personal 

expense loan and to purcha.se a lot for his mobile home so 

that he need not pay for rental space. By eliminating monthly loan repayment and rental expenses, Ruple maintains that 

his financial interests would be best served, and that this 

should entitle him to the lump-sum conversion. 

The insurance company handling Ruple's benefits rejected his proposal, so he brought the matter before the Workers' 

Compensation Court in late 1982. Following a hearing and 

submission of briefs, the court denied conversion of his 

weekly benefits into a lump sum payment, finding no pressing 
need for granting such a proposal. Nevertheless, the court 

acknowledged the advantages of paying off the indebtedness on 

the truck and personal loans, and indicated that Ruple could 

petition the Workers' Compensation Division for a partial 

lump sum advance for the remaining balance on those debts. 

In the event the Division agreed to such an advance, Ruple's 

weekly benefits would be reduced according1.y. 

Ruple appeals from the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court, raising two issues: 

(1) Whether it was proper to consider the income of 

Ruple's wife in determining his need for a lump sum award; 

and 

(2) whether it was proper for the court to refuse the 

conversion of all of Ruple's disability benefits to a lump 

sum. 

CONSIDERATION - OF WIFE'S INCOME 

During the hearing, it was determined that Ruple receives $492 per month in Social Security benefits and approximately $283 per month in workers' compensation benefits. 

Ruple's wife, a baker for a local school district, receives 

$950 per month over a ten-month school year, with a net 

income per month of approximately $640. In determining 

Ruple's claim for lump sum conversion, the court took the 

wife's income into consideration. Ruple argues that this was 

improper and that the proposed conversion should be evaluated 

solely in light of his income. We disagree. 

It is true, as Ruple maintains, that the Montana law of 

husband and wife generally protects one spouse from liability 

for the debts of the other spouse. See sections 40-2-106 and 

40-2-205, MCA. Nevertheless, both provisions recognize that 
expenses for necessities of the family are chargeable upon 

the property of both husband and wife. In this case, Ruple 

seeks a lump sum award in order to discharge debts and better 

provide for the necessities of food and lodging. Given this 

position, we cannot say that the general rule and not the 

exception embodied in the above-cited statutes applies here. 

Moreover, we emphasize that examination of a claimant's 

needs requires the lower court to consider all of the assets 

plus needs and abilities of both spouses. To permit otherwise allows for an absurd treatment of the realities of a 

marital or family association. In the past we have considered both the favorable - and unfavorable situations of a 

spouse in calculating the needs of a claimant. Compare, 

Rundtrock v. Duff Chevrolet (Mont. 19821, 647 P.2d 856, 39 

St.Rep. 1211 (consideration of spouse's income in conjunction 

with claimant's to determine need) with Polich v. Whalen's OK 

Tire Warehouse (Mont. 19811, 634 P.2d 1162, 38 St.Rep. 1572 

(consideration of wife's ill health i.n determining need for 

converting husband's disability benefits to lump sum award). 

In the immedia.te case, it was proper to consider the income 

of Ruple's wife in evaluating the best interests of the 

parties and the need for a lump sum benefit. 

THE PROPRIETY ---- OF A LUMP SUM AWARD 

The standard for review of a workers' compensation 

decision respecting lump sum awards was carefully set forth 

in Krause v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (Mont. 1982) I 641 P.2d 458, 

"The general rule is that disability 

payments under the Workers' Compensation 

Act are biweekly. They may, however, a.t 

the discretion of the Workers' Compensation Division, be converted into a lump 
sum settlement. While lump sum settlements are an exception to the general 

rule, they are not looked upon with 

disfavor and should be awarded without 

hesitancy where the claimant's interest 

would be best served. FJilloughby v. 

Arthur G. McKee & Co. (1980), Mont., 609 

P.2d 700, 702, 37 St.Rep. 620; Utick v. 

Utick (1979), Mont., 593 P.2d 739, 741, 

36 St.Rep. 799; Laukaitis v. Sisters of 

Charity of Leavenworth (1959), 135 Mont. 

469, 472-73, 342 P.2d 752, 755. The 

denial of a lump sum settlement will not 

be reversed on appeal unless the Workers' 

Compensation Court is shown to have 

abused its discretion. Willouqhby, 

supra; Utick, supra; Kuehn v. National 

Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. 

(1974), 164 Mont. 303, 521 P.2d 921; Kent 

v. Sievert (1971), 158 Mont. 79, 489 P.2d 

104; Legowik v. Montgomery Ward (1971), 

157 Mont. 436, 486 P.2d 867." 

In the instant case, claimant Ruple expends approximately $598 per month in payments for his mobile home, truck, 

a personal loan and lot rental. By converting his disability 

benefits into a lump sum, which at his life expectancy from 

January 1, 1983 would entitle him to about $51,000, Ruple 

hopes to retire his indebtedness and purchase a lot for his 

mobile home at a cost of between $15,000 and $20,000. He 

contends that the result will permit him to "better live on 

the Social Security disability benefits he receives." 

The Workers' Compensation Court noted that Ruple is 

capable of meeting his monthly expenses on his current income 

notwithstanding his indebtedness and concluded that there was 

no "pressing need." for the kind of lump sum conversion requested, although the court gave him the option of seeking a 

partial lump sum award to cover indebtedness on the truck and 

personal loans. We find no abuse of discretion in the formulation of this judgment. The record clearly supports the 

court's findings concerning Ruple's financial condition. 

Ruple is capable of meeting his current expenses, and there 
is no evidence of increased and burdensome expenses in the 

near future. The court was also justified in concluding that 

a partial lump sum payment might be in Ruple's best interests. Ruple offered no testimony on the specifics of any 

proposed transaction for the purchase of a mobile home lot, 

other than to say that he thought he knew where he could. 

purchase land. As far as the other loa.ns were concerned, the 

court was obviously quite generous in permitting Ruple to 

prove his case for a partial lump sum before the Division. 

The facts of this case are unquestionably distinguishable from those in cases like Utick, supra, where we held 

that it was an abuse of discretion to deny conversion of 

benefits to a lump sum award. Ruple ha.s not been treated 

unfairly by compensation authorities and has not presented 

the kind of detailed investment plan which compensated for 

claimant Utick's failure to demonstrate a pressing need for 

conversion of his disability benefits. The mere fact that 

Ruple is indebted does not require either the Workersf Compensation Court or this Court to convert some or all of his 

benefits. To do so would be to stretch our decision in Kuehn 

v. Natll Farmer's Union Property and Cas. Co. (1974), 164 

Mont. 303, 521 P.2d 921, Ruple's primary authority, far 

beyond its facts. 

Because the evidence of Ruplefs wife's income was 

properly considered and because the judgment of the lower 

court does not reflect an abuse of discretion, we affirm the d 

decision of the Workersf Compensation Court, 

We concur: