J-S15009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

OUSSAMA MEDALLEL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1676 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-35-SA-0000067-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 20, 2023

Oussama Medallel appeals from the judgment of sentence of a $300 fine 

and court costs after the trial court convicted him of summary harassment 

following a trial de novo. We affirm.

The trial court offered the following succinct summary of the underlying 

facts of this case:

This case arises out of contentious divorce and custody 

matters involving [Appellant] and Jamie Medallel. [Appellant] and 

Ms. Medallel share two minor children, A.M. and N.M. At trial, 

there was extensive testimony about the animosity between 

[Appellant] and Ms. Medallel and Ms. Medallel’s father, Allan 

McAndrew, the victim in this matter.

The conflict in this family is not isolated to one incident, but 

the focus in this matter is an incident that occurred on March 20, 

2022 where [Appellant] was cited by the Scranton Police 

Department for harassment. The police responded to a doctor’s 

office parking lot after Mr. McAndrew called 911. Mr. McAndrew 

was watching N.M. in Ms. Medallel’s car, while Ms. Medallel was 

seeking medical care for A.M. At trial, the Commonwealth proved 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] followed Ms. Medallel 

and Mr. McAndrew in his vehicle to the doctor’s office from a 

restaurant after an earlier confrontation and, rather than assist 

Ms. Medallel with their sick child, [Appellant] took the opportunity 

to pace around the vehicle Mr. McAndrew sat in with his grandchild 

N.M., stating to Mr. McAndrew, on two occasions, “I am going to 

take care of you.”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/23, at 2 (citation omitted). 

Police arrived at the scene and issued a non-traffic citation to Appellant 

for harassment. See Non-Traffic Citation, 7/11/22. Appellant pled not guilty, 

was convicted by the magisterial district court, and appealed to the 

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. At a de novo trial, the 

Commonwealth presented Mr. McAndrew as its only witness. Appellant, 

appearing pro se,

1

testified on his own behalf and called as witnesses 

Ms. Medallel, who was inside the doctor’s office when the incident occurred, 

and two police officers who arrived in response to the 911 call. At the 

conclusion of the trial, the court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him as 

indicated above. See N.T. Trial, 11/2/22, at 104.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered him to 

file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) and Appellant, through retained counsel, timely complied. Appellant 

presents two questions for this Court’s review: (1) “Did the Commonwealth 

fail to establish jurisdiction?” and (2) “Was the Commonwealth’s evidence 

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1 Appellant declined to seek hired or appointed counsel following a colloquy 

by the court. See N.T. Trial, 11/2/22, at 4-5.
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insufficient to sustain guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt against 

Appellant?” Appellant’s brief at 6 (cleaned up).

Appellant’s first claim of error is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

to entertain this case. Subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question to which 

we apply de novo, plenary review. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 

1066, 1071 n.5 (Pa. 2003). 

Appellant’s jurisdictional challenge is as follows:

While the witnesses did state they were going to a 

physician’s office in Scranton, and most of the relevant conduct 

occurred at the physician’s office, there is nothing to connect 

Scranton to Lackawanna County. . . . [N]ever did anyone 

stipulate or prove that these events occurred in Scranton City, 

Lackawanna County. The only time Lackawanna County was 

mentioned, it was in a general, disconnected way to the instant 

offense. Even when the prosecutor introduced the case, he failed 

to link the City of Scranton to Lackawanna County. [Appellant] 

submits that while the case is merely a summary offense, that 

does not negate the [Appellant]’s rights nor somehow mitigate the 

prosecution’s role to establish jurisdiction.

Appellant’s brief at 12-13 (cleaned up). 

Jurisdiction is a substantive issue that concerns “the competency of a 

court to hear and decide the type of controversy presented.” Bethea, supra

at 1074. It is well-settled that “all courts of common pleas have statewide 

subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising under the Crimes Code.” Id. 

Whether a criminal case should be heard in a particular judicial district, on the 

other hand, is a question of venue and is a procedural matter. Id. Venue for 
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criminal cases “belongs in the place where the crime occurred.”

2

Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 28, 33 (Pa. 2014) (cleaned up). 

“Jurisdiction of subject matter can never attach nor be acquired by consent or 

waiver of the parties, while venue may always be waived.” Bethea, supra

at 1073 (cleaned up). 

Based upon the above, it is plain that the Lackawanna County Court of 

Common Pleas had subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal case. See 

Bethea, supra at 1074. To the extent that Appellant is challenging venue in 

Lackawanna County, he waived the claim by raising it for the first time on 

appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515, 520 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (holding, after noting challenge to a county’s jurisdiction over the case 

was meritless due to the court’s statewide jurisdiction over criminal cases, 

that a challenge to the propriety of venue in that county was waived pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) for failure to raise it in the trial court). 

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2 The harassment statute provides as follows in relevant part as to venue:

(1) An offense committed under this section may be deemed to 

have been committed at either the place at which the 

communication or communications were made or at the place 

where the communication or communications were received.

(2) Acts indicating a course of conduct which occur in more than 

one jurisdiction may be used by any other jurisdiction in which an 

act occurred as evidence of a continuing pattern of conduct or a 

course of conduct.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(b.1).
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In any event, the citation issued to Appellant, which is included in the 

certified record, indicates that the incident occurred at 3 W. Olive Street in 

the City of Scranton, Lackawanna County. See Non-Traffic Citation, 7/11/22. 

Furthermore, at the de novo trial, Mr. McAndrew testified that the doctor’s 

office was in Scranton and Appellant referenced the Olive Street address as 

the site where the police arrived. See N.T. Trial, 11/2/22, at 14, 23, 66. We 

take judicial notice of the fact that 3 W. Olive Street, Scranton, Pennsylvania 

is in Lackawanna County. See Emert v. Larami Corp., 200 A.2d 901, 902 

n.1 (Pa. 1964) (“Courts will take judicial notice of geographical facts such as 

the county in which a town or city is located.”). Additionally, Appellant 

testified that he had opted to stay with his children in Lackawanna County 

rather than return to his prior home in New York. See N.T. Trial, 11/2/22, at 

94. For any and all of the above reasons, Appellant is entitled to no relief on 

his claim that the case should not have been heard in Lackawanna County. 

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

conviction. Our standard of review of that claim is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 
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may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. 

Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned 

up).

Appellant was convicted pursuant to the following provision of the 

harassment statute: “A person commits the crime of harassment when, with 

intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person . . . engages in a course 

of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose[.]” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3). “An intent to harass may be inferred from the 

totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (cleaned up). The term “course of conduct” is defined as 

follows:

A pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period 

of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct. The 

term includes lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words, 

language, drawings, caricatures or actions, either in person or 

anonymously. Acts indicating a course of conduct which occur in 

more than one jurisdiction may be used by any other jurisdiction 

in which an act occurred as evidence of a continuing pattern of 

conduct or a course of conduct.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(f). “A course of conduct intended to harass, annoy or alarm 

a person can be based on words alone.” Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 

949, 961 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up). 
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Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence, namely the 

testimony of Mr. McAndrew, was legally insufficient to establish his guilt. 

Specifically, Appellant asserts that he “did not threaten to kill [Mr. McAndrew], 

provoke a fight, or publicly post false information.” Appellant’s brief at 14. 

Rather, the statements that he made “came under the context of concerned 

family members taking a child to the hospital.” Id. While Mr. McAndrew 

testified that Appellant “made clear, unequivocal threats in the past,” on the 

day in question, Mr. McAndrew “didn’t even know what the statements meant, 

though he took them as a threat.” Id. (footnote omitted). Appellant posits 

that the ambiguity of the statements in the context of “concerned family 

members waiting to hear back from a doctor’s visit” renders the evidence 

insufficient to prove an intent to annoy, harass, or alarm. Id. at 15. 

The trial court summarized the pertinent evidence, which it deemed to 

be credible, as follows:

Mr. McAndrew testified that he went to breakfast with 

Ms. Medallel, and his minor grandchildren A.M., and N.M. that 

morning at a restaurant in Taylor, Pennsylvania. One of the 

children, A.M., was experiencing stomach discomfort. While at 

the restaurant, Mr. McAndrew observed Ms. Medallel take a phone 

call from [Appellant]. Per Mr. McAndrew, [Appellant] was yelling 

on the phone at Ms. Medallel and Mr. McAndrew described 

[Appellant]’s tone as “belligerent.” Mr. McAndrew testified that 

[Appellant] was advised over the phone that Ms. Medallel and 

Mr. McAndrew would be taking A.M. to a doctor’s office after 

finishing breakfast.

[Appellant] later arrived at the restaurant and a 

confrontation between [Appellant] and Ms. Medallel occurred in 

the parking lot, while Mr. McAndrew and the children were in the 

vehicle. Mr. McAndrew testified that [Appellant] pushed 
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Ms. Medallel and tried to get into the car to get to A.M. Per 

Mr. McAndrew, [Appellant] referred to Mr. McAndrew and 

Ms. Medallel as “two pieces of shit” in front of the children. 

[Appellant] stated that he did not want Mr. McAndrew going to the 

doctor’s office with the children, per Mr. McAndrew’s testimony. 

Mr. McAndrew testified that [Appellant] followed them from 

Taylor to the doctor’s office in Scranton and parked by them.

According to Mr. McAndrew, [Appellant]’s conduct and his 

comments toward Mr. McAndrew made A.M. upset on the ride to 

the doctor’s office. Mr. McAndrew and Ms. Medallel tried to calm 

her down. At the doctor’s office, [Appellant] pulled in behind 

Ms. Medallel’s vehicle and again tried to get in the car, according 

to Mr. McAndrew. Ms. Medallel and A.M. then went into the 

doctor’s office and Mr. McAndrew stayed in the vehicle with N.M. 

Per Mr. McAndrew, N.M. is three years old, has autism, and is nonverbal. Mr. McAndrew testified that [Appellant] did not go inside 

the doctor’s office and that [Appellant] told A.M. that he needed 

to stay outside because Mr. McAndrew was “a bad guy.”

[Appellant] then stood outside of the vehicles with his arms 

folded, staring. Mr. McAndrew testified that the doors in the 

vehicle he was occupying were intentionally locked by Ms. Medallel 

due to the earlier circumstances and that the windows were rolled 

down slightly. At one point, per Mr. McAndrew’s testimony, 

[Appellant] walked by the vehicle Mr. McAndrew was in, looking 

at Mr. McAndrew and said: “I am going to take care of you.”

[Appellant] then walked back and forth between the two vehicles 

and around to the front of Mr. McAndrew’s vehicle, and said to 

Mr. McAndrew a second time, “I am going to take care of you.”

Based on [Appellant]’s conduct and the size and age of 

[Appellant] versus Mr. McAndrew, who is 68 years old with a 

history of open-heart surgery, Mr. McAndrew then called 911, per

Mr. McAndrew’s testimony. Mr. McAndrew testified that he did not 

know what was going to happen when Ms. Medallel and A.M. came 

out of the doctor’s office and unlocked the vehicle. Mr. McAndrew 

believed there was a possibility that [Appellant] would grab him 

when the vehicle was unlocked. Mr. McAndrew perceived that the 

words directed at him by [Appellant] were threats. Mr. McAndrew 

testified that [Appellant] was yelling and screaming when the 

Scranton Police Department responded to the 911 call. 

. . . .
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Mr. McAndrew also testified about prior incidents involving 

[Appellant], related to the ongoing family conflict. During a 

custodial exchange at Ms. Medallel’s home in December 2021, 

approximately four months prior to the March 2022 incidents, 

[Appellant] came into the kitchen and, per Mr. McAndrew’s 

testimony, said to Mr. McAndrew in front of the grandchildren, 

A.M. and N.M., “I am going to kill you, you piece of shit, you 

fucking piece of shit.” Mr. McAndrew also described a similar 

incident where [Appellant] made the same profane and 

threatening comments directed at Mr. McAndrew, yelling and 

screaming in Ms. Medallel’s kitchen in front of N.M. and A.M. 

Mr. McAndrew testified that [Appellant] has threatened to kill him 

on several occasions. 

Mr. McAndrew also testified that [Appellant] made threats 

against Mr. McAndrew, Ms. Medallel, and Ms. Medallel’s siblings 

prior to these incidents, stating to Ms. Medallel that he would be 

coming in to their hometown from the Bronx to slit their throats. 

Ms. Medallel also testified about these threats. 

As a result of these incidents, Mr. McAndrew keeps pepper 

spray in his vehicle and carries it on him at all times.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/23, at 2-5 (cleaned up). 

From our review of the certified record, the trial court’s recitation of the 

testimony is accurate and its credibility determinations supported. As such, 

the Commonwealth’s evidence was plainly sufficient to establish that on the 

day in question Appellant engaged in a course of conduct that served no 

legitimate purpose with the intent to harass Mr. McAndrew. Accord Lutes, 

supra at 961 (affirming § 2709(a)(3) convictions where intent to harass was 

shown by evidence that the defendants blocked the victim’s path, poked him 

in the chest, and told him that they “would take [him] around the corner and 

beat him,” and course of conduct was established because they “engaged in 
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more than one act over a short period of time”). Consequently, we have no 

cause to disturb Appellant’s conviction or sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/20/2023