FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT APR 6 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Thomas M. Reavle y , United States Circuit J udg e for the Fif th Circuit, sit ting by * desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 04- 1512 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 04-20299 -CR- DMM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us MICH AE L W IL LI AMS , D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ (A pr il 6, 200 6) Be fo re BA RKE T T , W IL SO N and RE A V L E Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * RE AV LE Y, Circuit Judge:2

Mi ch ae l W ill iam s a

ppe al s hi s c onvi ct ionf

or pr om oti on o f ch ild pornog raphy

under 18 U. S. C. § 225 2A(a )(3)( B) on the grounds of fac ial
unc onst itu tio na lity . F or

thi s r ea son, w e re ve rs e that c onvi ct ion
. W ill iam s w as a lso convicted of pos session of child pornog raphy under 18 U. S. C. § 225 2A(a )(5)( B), and he appeals his sentence for that offense on the grounds that the court
unc onst itu tio na lly

e nhanc ed

his se nte nc e unde r a m an da tor y gui de lin es sc he m e in violatio n of United States v. B ooker , 54 3 U.S. 2 20 , 12 5 S . Ct. 7 38 (20 05 ). Beca use there w as no reversible Booker e rr or , w e af

fi rm W ill iam s’ s se nte nc e of 60- m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t. I. T he C harges O n Apr il 26, 200 4, a s part of an un de rc ove r ope ratio n a im ed a t c om ba tin g ch il d e xp lo it at io n o n t he Int ern et , Uni te d S ta te s Se cret Serv ic e Sp eci al Agen t (S A) T i mo t h y D e v i n e e n t e r e dan I n t e rn e t“c h a t ” r o o m u s i n g th e s c r e e n n a me

“ Lisa_n_Miam i” (L MN)
. SADe vine obs erved a public m essage posted bya user em plo y ing ase xua lly

gr ap hic sc re ennam e, w hic h w as la te r tr ac ed to the de fe ndant W illiam s. W illiam s’ s publ ic m essage stated that “ Da d of toddl er has ‘ good ’ pics of he r an [si c] m e fo r swap o f y ou r to dd le r pi cs , or l iv e cam .” SA Devi ne as LNM
en ga ge d W ill iam s inapr ivate I nte rn et c ha t duri ng whic h th ey

sw ap pe d no npornog raphic photo graphs. W illiam s provid ed a photog raph of a tw o to three-3

y ear- old f em al e ly ing on a

c ouc h inhe r ba thi ng s uit , and f ive pho tog ra

phs of aone to tw o- y ear- old

f em al e in v ar iou s no n- se xua l po se s, one of w hic h de pic te d th e ch il d wi th he r br eas t ex po se d a nd he r pa nt s d own jus t b el ow h er wai st li ne . LNM sent a non-sexual ph oto of a college-aged fe m ale digitally regre ssed to appear ten to twelve y ears old, who LN M claim ed wa s her daughter. A ft er the ini tia l ph oto e xc hange , W ill iam s c la im ed that he ha d nu de phot ographs of his four-y ear- old daug hter, stating “ I’ ve got hc [hard core] pictures of m e an d da

u, and o the r guy s e at ing he r out - do y ou??” W ill iam s a ske d f or ad dit ion al pic tur es of

LN M’ s da

ught er . W

he n th es e pic tur es w er e not r ec ei ve d, W ill iam s a cc use d LN M o f be ing ac op. LN M r es pond ed by a cc usi ng W ill iam s of b e i n g ac o p . A f

t e r r e p e a t i n g th e s e a c c u s a t i o n s i n th e p ub l i c p a rto f th e c h a tr o o m, W illiam s post ed a m essage stating “ HE RE RO OM; I CA N P UT UP LINK

CU Z I M FO R RE A L - SH E CA

N T
. ” T he m es sa ge w as f oll ow ed by ac om put er hy pe rl ink , which SADe vine accessed. T he com puter hy perlink contain ed, am ong o ther thi ngs, se ve n im ag es of

a ct ua l m ino rs e nga gin g inse xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t. T he nude c hil dr enin the pho tos w er e ap pr oxi m at el y f ive to fi ft ee n y ears old , di sp la y in g t he ir g en it al s an d/ oren ga ge d i n s ex ua l ac ti vi ty. Secr etServ ic e ag en ts ex ecu te d asea rch warran t o f W il li am s’s h om e. Two
co m put er hard dr ive s se iz ed

dur ing the se ar chhe ld at l ea st tw en ty -tw o im ag es of4

ac tua l m ino rs e nga ge d inse xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t or

la sc ivi ous dis play

of genitalia. Most of the im ages depicted prepubescent children and also d epicted
sa do -m as oc hi st ic co nd uc t o r ot he r de pi ct io ns of p ai n. W il li am s was ch arg edwit h o ne co un t o f pr om ot in g, o r “ pa nd eri ng ,”
m at er ia l “ in a

m an ne r that r ef

le ct s th e be lie f, or

that i s in te nde d to c au se anothe r to be lie ve , ” that the m at er ia l c ont ai ns i lle ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy in vio la tio n of

18 U
. S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 3) (B ), w hic h c ar ri es asix ty -m onth m an da tor y m ini m um se nte nc e. W ill iam s w as a lso c harg ed w ithone c ount

of pos se ssi on o f ch ild po rn og rap hy un de r 18 U.S.C. § 2 25 2A( a)(5 )(B)
. W illiam s filed a m otion to dism iss the pand ering charge on the grounds that 18 U
. S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 3) (B ) is unc onst itu tio na lly ove rb ro ad

and v ag ue . Whil e the
m oti on w as pe ndi ng b ef

or e the tr ia l c ourt, the part ie s r ea ch ed aple a ag re em en t by
w hic h W ill iam s w oul d pl ea d gu ilty to both c ount s bu t r es er

ve his r igh t t o challenge the constitu tionalit y of the pandering provis ion on appeal. The court
se nte nc ed W ill iam s to six ty -m onths’ im pr iso nm en t f

or the pande ri ng c harg e an d si xt y m on th s fo r th e p os se ss io n c ha rg e, to be ser ve d c on cu rren tl y . II. William s’s Facial C hallenge to 18 U. S. C. § 2252 A( a)(3)(B )

A. Stan dard of R eviewUn ite d S tates v . Pan

fil , 338 F.3d 1299, 1300 ( 11th Cir. 2003). 1 “ Pand e ri ng ” is d e fi ne d a s th e c ate ri ngto o r e xploi tatio n o f t he we akn e sse s o f o the rs , 2 espec ially “to provide gratifica

tion for others' desires.” See M E R R I AM W EBSTER O NL I NE D I CT I O N A RY , http:// www.m-w .com (last visited Marc h 23, 2006). As a le g al conc ept, pande ring is most commonl y

associate d with prostituti on. In that context, panderingprovisions are statutes penalizing va

rious acts by

intermediar ies who eng ag e in the commer cial exploitation of prostitution and are a imed at those who, a s ag ents, promote prostitution rather tha n ag ainst the prostitutes themselves. The ter m pander ing, in some instanc es, is applied by Congr ess and the courts to the promotion of obsce nity
. See, e .g., 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (prohibiting pande ring adver tisements of sexually

provocative materia ls by mail), Ginzburg v. United .States , 3 83 U. S. 463, 86 S. Ct . 942 (1966) ( consideringobscene nature of er otically adver tised publications). Con g re ss h a s c ha

ra c te ri zed bo th t he c hil d p or

no gra phy re gulatio n at is su e in t

his c a se (1 8 U .S. C. 2252A(a )(3) (B )) a

nd its unconstitut ional prede cessor (18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D ) (1996) ) as “ pa nd e ri ng ” pr ov isi on s. 5 W e re view a district court’ s conclusio n as to the consti tutio nality of a ch al le nge d st at

ute de nov o. 1 B. The Ch ild P ornography Pr oblem Inthi s c as e, w e co nsi de r the c onst itu tio na lity of alawa im ed

a t c ur bin g th e prom otion , or “ pandering,” of child pornog raphy
. Relevant to this case, ther e ar e 2 tw o ty pe s of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
. R ough ly spe ak ing , "a ct

ua l" or “ re al ” ch ild por nogr ap hy de pic ts tru e m ino rs e nga ge d inse xua l c ondu ct . I n c ontra st, "v irtua l" child po rnography

depicts what appear

to be actual m inors engaged in sexual
co nduc t, but

in re al ity c onsi sts of

c om put er -g en er at ed

or e nhanc ed

im ag es . C hil d po rn og rap hy im ag es of b ot h t y pe s ar e typi cal ly circu la te d t hr ou gh th e In te rn et . Whil e soc ie ty

ha s be ne fi tte d gr eatly

f ro m the te ch nol ogi ca l a dvanc es of the la stTotal fede ral prose cutions of child pornography case s increa sed more tha n 452% fr om 3 1997 to 2004. Statement of L aura H. Parsky , Deputy

Asst. Attorney

Gene ral, Criminal Division befor e the Comm. On Commerce , Science , and Tra nsportation, United States Senate Conce rning ProtectingChildren on the Interne t. J anuar y 19, 2006. In 1998, police cr acke d the “Wonderla nd Club,” an Interne t child pornog raphy ringthat 4 involved members a cross twe lve countrie s, and whose “ chair man” wa s an Amer ican, unc overing so me 75 0, 00 0 im a g e s o f c hil dr e n. Me mbe rs hip ru le s r e qu ir e d e a c h me mbe r t o p os se ss at le a st 10,000 imag es of pr e-te en childre n and to agree to exchang e them with other me mbers. Other ri ng s p ro mot e the wo rs t im a g ina ble fo rm s o f c hil d p or

no g ra phy , s uc h a s “ c us tom ” c hil d po rn ogra phy (i ma g e s o f c hil d r a

pe c re ate d to or de r f

or the c on sume r) and

“ re a l ti me ” c hil d pornog raphy , wher e member s may watch the online rape of childre n as it occur s. In ear ly 2006, fede ral a uthorities shut down an Interne t web site ca lled “Kiddy pics & Kiddy

vids” that streamed video of live c hild molestations i nvolving c hildren as youngas eighteen months. 6 de ca de , an un fo rt

una te by pr oduc t of

sop his tic at ed

im ag ing te ch nol ogy

and the r ise of the I nte rn et

ha s be enthe pr oli fe ratio n of por nogr ap hy inv olv ing c hil dr en . 3 The anonym ity

and availability

of the online world draw s thos e w ho view children in sexuallydeviant way s to websites and chat room s where they m ay co m m uni cate and e xc hange im ag es w ithoth er li ke -m ind ed

ind ivi dua ls. T he r es ult ha s be enthe de ve lop m en t of adange ro us c ott ag e ind

ustry f or the pr oduc tio n of ch ild por nogr ap hy a s w el l a s th e ac cr et ionof e ve r- w ide nin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy dis tr ibu tio n r ing s. O ur

c onc er n is not c onf ine d to the im

m ed ia te abuse of

the 4 ch ildre n de pic te d inthe se im ag es , but is al so t o e nlarg em en t of the m ar ke t and the uni ve rs e of

thi s de viant c ondu ct

that, in tur

n, r es ult s inm or e explo itatio n and ab use of c hil dr en . R eg ulatio n is m ad e dif fi cu lt, not onl y by the va st and s he lte ri ng landsc ap e of

c y be rs pa ce , but

a lso by the f ac t tha t m ai nstre am

and o the rw iseButler v. Mic higan, 352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S. C t. 524, 526 (1957). 5 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. C t. 2607 (1973). The Miller test defines obsc enity

as a w ork that (1) 6 taken a s a whole, a

ppeals to the prur ient interest under contempora

ry community

standards, ( 2) 7 inn oc uous im ag es of

c hil dr enare vie w ed

and tra de d by

pe doph ile s a s se xua lly st im ul at in g. Over the y ears, Congress has, by large bipartisan m aj orities, enac ted le gis la tio n de sig ne d to pun ishtho se w ho p ro duc e, pe ddl e, or pos se ss c hil d por nogr ap hy
. C ongr es s ha s stru ggl ed to dr af t l eg isl at ionthat c ap tur es the tr uly obj ec tio nable c hil d- explo itativ e m at er ia ls whil e stay ing w ith in the boundari es of the S upr em e Co urt’ s F ir st A m en dm en t j ur isp ru de nc e. T he pr ote ct ionof our children against sexu al abuse and predatory pedoph iles is of extraordinary im portanc e. W e do n ot que sti on tha t stro ng f ed er al law s are ne ed ed , but the y m ust pa ss c onst itu tio na l m

ust er . I n othe r w or ds, Co ngr es s m ay not “ bur n th e hous e to
ro as t the pig
. ” Whe the r that di ff ic ult ba lanc e ha s be enstr

uc k inthe ins tant 5 le gis la tio n is the iss ue be fo re us.

C. The Law and C hild P ornography W e be ginw ithabr ie f ove rv ie wof c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

law , w hic h a s a dis tin ct body , is of

r el at ive ly

r ec en t vi nta ge . T he r eg ulatio n of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
w as ini tia lly

r oot ed in the S upr em e Co urt’ s ob sc en ity doc tr ine
. I n Miller v. Ca lif orni a , the Co urt se t f

orth the thr ee -p ro ng s oc ia l m er it te st f or de te rm ini ng 6depicts or de scribes, in a patently offe nsive way , sexual conduct specif ically define d by

the applicable state law, a

nd (3) take n as a whole, lacks se rious literary , artistic, political, or scientific va lue. 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S. Ct. at 2615. 394 U.S. 557, 568, 89 S. C t. 1243, 1259-50 (1969). 7 See U nited States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973). 8 Pub. L . No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) ( codified a s amende d at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423, 2251- 9 2253). 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. C t. 3348 (1982).

10 8 w he the r m at er ia ls are obs ce ne , and the re fo re pr osc ri bable a s ac at eg or y of unpr ote ct ed

spe ec h. I n Sta nle

y v. G eo rgi a , the Co urt he ld tha t pr iva cy int er es ts 7 pr ote ct the r igh t t o po sse ss o bsc en e m at er ia ls i n on e’ s own ho m e, but sub se que ntl y cl ar if ie d th at thi s sanc tio n do es not

e xte nd t o th e dis tr ibu tio n or r ec ei pt o f obsc en ity , w hic h m ay

be r eg ulate d onint er state c om m er ce gr ound s e ve n if

the tr an spor ta tio n is f or the r ec ipi en t’ s pe rs ona l us e. A ga ins t this ba ck dr op, Co ngr es s 8 pa sse d it s f

ir st c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

le gis la tio n, the P ro te ct ionof Ch ildre n a ga ins t Sexual E xplo itation Act, in 197 7. It w as key ed to the Miller standard , out law ing 9 the use of c hil dr enin the pr oduc tio n of obs ce ne m at er ia ls and c ri m ina liz ing the know ing dis tr ibu tio n of

suc h m at er ia ls f

or c om m er ci al pur

pose s. In198 2, the S upr em e Co urt f ir st d ea lt dir ec tly

w iththe iss ue of

c hil d por nogr ap hy
. I n New York v. Fe rber , aunanim ous Co urt pr oc la im ed that c hil d 10 por nogr ap hy w as adis tin ct

ne wc at eg or

y of spe ec h w ith out

F ir st A m en dm en tId. at 758, 102 S. Ct. at 335. 11 Id. at 759, 102 S. Ct. at 3355-56. 12 Pub. L . No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) ( codified a s amende d at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251- 13 2254, 2256, 2516). Pub. L . No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) ( codified a s amende d in scattere d sections 14 9 pr ote ct ion , hol din g th at

the gov er

nm en t m ay

c onst itu tio na lly

pr ohi bit the c re at ion or prom otion of pornographyfeaturing real children even thoug h it does no t m eet the Miller standard. T he prim ary

rationale of Fe rber

w as that c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
m ust be pr ohi bit ed

be ca use of the intri nsi c harm

don e to c hil dr enin its productio n. T he Court rea soned th at child porno graphy not on ly docum ents an 11 underly ing act of abuse — the sexual use of a child — but the recording of the act and subs equent circulation of the im ages perpetuates the injur y to the depicted ch ild
. 12 Inr es pons e to Fe rber , Co ngr es s pa sse d th e Ch ild P ro te ct ionA ct

of 198 4 (C PA ), w hic h w as m ode le d onthe N ewY ork st at ute uph el d in Fe rber
. The C PA 13
expande d th e de fi nit ionof c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

to inc lud e non- obsc en e but se xua lly sugg estive pictures of children and elim inated the com m ercia l purpos es req ui rem en t o f ear li er p ro sc rip ti on s. Interstate c omm erce advertisem ents and sol icitations for child po rnography we re banne d by

the Ch ild S ex ua l Abuse and P or

nogr ap hy A ct of 198 6. 14of 18 U.S.C.).

Pub. L . No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988) ( codified a s amende d at 18 U.S.C. §§ 15 2251, 2252). 495 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990). 16 10 Co ngr es s f

ir st a ddr es se d th e co nne ct ionbe tw ee n c hil d po rn ogr ap hy and
em er gin g c om

put er te ch nol ogy

in the Ch ild

P ro te ct ionand O bsc en ity E nf or ce m en t A ct of 198 8, w hic h pr ohi bit ed the use of

c om put er s to tr an spor

t, dis tr ibu te , or 15
re ce ive c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
. S hortly the re af te r, the Co urt he ld i n O

sborne v . O hio 16 that the Stan leyr igh t t o pr ivate pos se ssi on d oe s no t e xte nd t o c hil d po rn ogr ap hy i n v o l v i n g a c tu a l c h i l dr e n b e c au s e , u n l i k e a du l to b s c e n i t y, i ts p r i n g s f r o m a gr ie vous harm

to ch ildre n. In the wake of F

erbe r an d su

bse que nt l eg isl at ion , m

uc h of the c hil d pornog raphy

indus try wa s driven und erground. T hen, during the 199 0s, advances in p hot ogr ap hic and c om put er -i m ag ing te ch nol ogy m ad e pr oduc tio n of

c hil d por nogr ap hy pos sib le w ith out

dir ec tly e m plo y ing c hil dr en . V isu al de pic tio ns o f what appear ed to be children engaging in sexuallyexplicit condu ct, and that wer e virtually indist ingu ishable from

im ages of actual c hildren engagin g in such
co nduc t, c oul d be ge ne rate d. F urthe r, w iththe a dve nt o f the I nte rn et , the se

“ virtua l” c hil d po rn ogr ap hy im ag es , a lon g w ith“ re al ” ch ild por nogr ap hy im ag es , could be readily

distribu ted. H owever , bec ause the Fe rber standard onl yFerber , 458 U.S. at 764-65, 102 S. Ct. at 3358. 17 Pub. L . No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ( codified a s amende d at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 18 et seq.) 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B ) (1996) (invalidated 2002, a mended 2003)
. 19 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (1996) ( invalidated 2002, ame nded 2003). 20 United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 ( 5th Cir. 2001), vacate d by53 5 U .S. 10 14 , 1 22 S. 21 Ct. 16 02 (2 00 2) ; United States v. Me nto, 23 1 F .3 d 9 12 (4 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; United States v. Hilton , 16 7 F .3 d 6 1 ( 1s t Cir . 1 99 9) ; United States v. Ac heson, 195 F.3d 645 ( 11th Cir. 1999). 11 ad dr es se d “ liv e pe rf

orm an ce s, ” an d th e vis ua l r ec or da tio n of sam e, the e xis tin g lawle ft loo phol es f

or the c om put er -g en er at ed

im ag es . 17 T o ke ep pa ce w iththe se te ch nol ogi ca l de ve lop m en ts, Co ngr es s pa sse d th e Child PornographyPre vention Ac t of 1996 (CPPA ). Congress reasoned that 18 the se im ag es , w hil e not

inv olv ing the use of

a ct ua l c hil dr enin the ir

pr oduc tio n,
w o u l ds t i l l c au s e s u f

f i c i e n th a rm t o c h i l dr e n t o j u s t i f y b a n n i n g th e m i n th e s a me
w ay a s “ re al ” ch ild

por nogr ap hy
. U nde r the CP PA , the de fi nit ionof c hil d por nogr ap hy w as e xte nde d to c ove r an y vis ua l i m ag e that “ is, or

appe ar s to be , of
a m ino r en ga gin g inse xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t” or

that ha s be enpr om ote d ina 19
m an ne r that “ co nve y s th e im pr es sio n” that a

m ino r en ga gin g inse xua lly e xpl ic it
co n du ct i s d ep i ct ed
. Th e l at t erp ro h i b i t i o n wa s re fe rr ed t o as th e C PP A’s 20

“ pandering” provis ion. T he circuit courts that considered challenges to the CPPA
w er e spl it, w ithf

our c ir cu its sus ta ini ng the A ct a s c onst itu tio na l w hil e the N inth 21Free Spe ech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 ( 9th Cir. 1999). 22 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. C t. 1389 (2002). 23 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B ) (1996) (invalidated 2002, a mended 2003)
. 24 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (1996) ( invalidated 2002, ame nded 2003). 25 See F ree Spe ech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 240, 251, 122 S. Ct . at 1396, 1402 (c iting 26 Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. C t. 2607 (1973), and Ferber , 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. C t. 3348 (1982)). 12 Circuit struck it down as overbroad and vague. T he Suprem e Court granted 22 cert io rari in th e Nin th Cir cu itcas e to res ol ve th e ci rcu itsp li t. D. The Sup rem e C ourt’ s Dec ision in Free S peech C oalit ion In A shc rof

t v . F re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on , the Suprem e Court struck down as

23
u n co n s t i tu t i o n al l y o v erb ro ad th e t wo ab o v e- re fe re n ce ds ub s ec t i o n s o f t h e C PP A’s definition of child pornog raphy
. The f irst defined child po rnography as any visual depiction , including a com puter-generated depiction that “ is, or a ppears to be, of a
m ino r en ga gin g inse xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t. ” T he se co nd, CP PA ’ s “pande ri ng” 24 pr ovi sio n, de fi ne d c hil d po rn ogr ap hy a s a“ vis ua l de pic tio n [ that] is adve rt ise d, pr om ote d, pr es en te d, de sc ri be d, or dis tr ibu te d insuc h am an ne r that c onve y s th e im pr es sio n th at

the m at er ia l i s or

c ont ai ns a

vis ua l de pic tio n of

am ino r en ga gin g in sexuallyexplicit condu ct.” T he Court held that these definitio ns reached m ore 25 than w ha t c oul d c onst itu tio na lly be banne d a s unpr ote ct ed spe ec h un de r curr en t ob sc en it y law. 26The Court noted that, a lthough they clea rly could not be conside red obsc ene unde r 27 Miller , Renaissanc e painting s, productions of Shakespe are ’s “Romeo a nd J uliet,” and notew orthy films such as “Tr aff

ic” a nd “Amer ican B eauty” could be swept within the ambit of the CPPA, sin c e argua

bly the y c onta in s ome g ra

ph ic de pic tio ns that “ a

pp e ar t o b e ” of

min or s e ng a g ingin sexual activity

(eve n though suc h imag es neither involve nor har

m children in the produc tion proce ss), and be cause the CPP A provided no pa use for inquiry into the work’s re deemingvalue considere d in totality . 535 U.S. at 246-48, 122 S. Ct. at 1400. 13 The f irst definition wa s deem ed overbroad because it prohibited s peech (v irtua l or

c om put er de pic tio ns, art ist ic w orks, or c ine m at ic de pic tio ns o f y outhf ul actors) that w as not obs cene under Mil le r, an d w hic h r ec or de d no c ri m e an d
cr eate d no vic tim s th ro ugh its pr oduc tio n, a s di d th e “ re al ” ch ild por nogr ap hy in Fe rber
. T he second definitio n, the “pandering” provis ion, wa s deem ed

27 overbroad because it defined as child pornog raphy m aterials that had been pr om ote d “ co nve y [i ng] the im pr es sio n” that se xua lly

e xpl ic it de pic tio ns i nvol vin g
m inors would be foun d within the m aterial, even when, in fact, there w ere no such
scenes. This subsection thus crim inalized downstream possess ion of m aterial de sc ri be d, or

pande re d, a s c hil d po rn ogr ap hy by som eo ne e ar lie r in the di st rib ut io n c ha in ev en if n o m in or s wer e act ua ll y in vo lv edin th e p ro du ct io n. Finding the governm ent’ s evidence insufficient to sho w any harm in m aterial
m er el y pande re d a s c ont ai nin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy , the Co urt c ri tic iz ed theId. . at 257, 122 S. Ct. at 1405-06. 28 Id. at 251-53, 122 S. Ct. at 1402-03. 29 Id. at 251-54, 122 S. Ct. at 1402-04. 30 14 pr ovi sio n be ca

use it c ri m ina liz ed

spe ec h ba se d so le ly

“ on h owthe spe ec h is pr es en te d” rat he r th an on “ wha t i s d ep ic te d.” 28 A lth oughthe Co urt f

ound the CP PAinc onsi ste nt w ith Miller and l ac kin g supp ort i n Fe rber , the governm ent attem pted to justify

the definitions in other
w ay s. T he gov er

nm en t arg ue d th at

vir tua l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

c anbe use d to
se duc e ch ildre n in to p ar

tic ipatin g inse xua l a ct ivi ty , and tha t su chm at er ia ls a lso

“ whets the appetites” of pedophiles, encouraging them to engage in illegal conduct. T he Court rej ected these ar gum ents, noting th at other law s, such as

29 tho se that pr ohi bit

unl aw fu l so lic itatio n of

am ino r, m or e cl ose ly

r eg ulate the
unsavor y use of vir tua l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy ; and tha t the gov er nm en t m ay

not prohibi t speech on the groun ds that it m ay m erely encourage, and not in cite, pe doph ile s to e nga ge in ill ic it co nduc t. 30 T he gov er

nm en t ne xt arg ue d th at

it s ob j ec tiv e of e lim inatin g th e m ar

ke t f or

“ re al ” ch ild

por nogr ap hy ne ce ssi ta te s apr ohi bit ionon v irtua l i m ag es a s w el l be ca use , sin ce the y

are of te n in dis tin gui sha

ble and tra de d inthe sam e m ar ke t, the sy nth et ic im ag es pr om ote the tr af fi ck ing of w orks p ro duc ed

thr oughtheId. at 254, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. 31 Id. (c i t i n g Osborne v. O hio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-110, 110 S. Ct. 1691(1990)). 32 Id. at 255, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. The Court also found that the CPPA’s affirmative 33 defe nse, which a llowed offe nders in some c ases to avoid c onviction for nonpossession offe nses by sh ow ingthat mate ri a ls w e re pr od uc e d u sin gon ly

a du lts and

we re no t ot

he rw ise dis tr ibute d in a manne r conve ying the impression that they depicted r eal c hildren, wa s insufficient to re scue the statut e fr om o ve rb re a dth

be c a us e it w a s in c omp le te and sh if te d th e burd e n to the de fe nd ant t o prove his spee ch wa s not unlawful. Id. 15 e x p l o i t a t i o n o f

r e a l c h i l dr e n . Th e C o u rtr e je c t e dth i s mark e td e t e rr e n c e th e o ry, 31
n o t i n g th a t , “ [ i ]n th e c a s e o f th e mat e r i a l c o v e r e db y Fe rber [depictions of actual
m ino rs e nga ge d inse xua l a ct s] , the c re at ionof the spe ec h is it se lf

the c ri m e of child abuse; th e prohibitio n deters the crim e by rem ovin g the profit m otive.” In 32 oth er w or ds, be ca

use no c ri m e unde rl ie s th e pr oduc tio n of vir tua l c hil d por nogr ap hy , the pr oduc tio n- ba se d r at ion al e se t f orth i n Fe rber

doe s no t a

ppl y to synth et ic im ag es . Finally , the C ourt rej ected the governm ent’ s argum ent that, since advanced technolog y

m akes it difficult to tell whether pictures w ere m ade w ith real children
or com puter im aging, thus th warting prosecuto rial ef forts, both kinds of im ages
m ust be bann ed. The C ourt stated that the argum ent, “ that protected speech m ay be banne d a s am eans t o ban unpr ote ct ed spe ec h .
. . . tur

ns the F ir st A m en dm en t up si de do wn.” 33 E. The PR OTEC T A ctThe Senate introduce d S. 151, the Prosecutorial Remedie s and Other Tools to End the 34 Expl oit atio n o f C hil dr e n T od a y Ac t of 20 03 (P RO TE CT A c t) , a nd the Ho us e int

ro du c e d H .R. 1161, the Child Obscenity and Pornog raphy

Prevention Ac t of 2003 (COPPA). To ill us tr ate , a ft e r t

he Ho us e re vie we d th e Se nate ’s ve rs ion , it of fe re d a n “ ame ndme nt” 35 to the Senate bill on Marc h 27, 2003, which, in re ality , was a rec ommendation that the Senate’ s languag e be r eplac ed in its entirety with the House’s ve rsion found in the COPPA. (Compare House Ame ndment to S. 151, Tit le §§ 501-512 (Ma rch 27, 2003) with H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. at §§ 1-4 (2003) (identica l languag e))
. 16 Alm ost imm ediately

after the F re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on decision was handed dow n, Co ngr es s be gan an e ff ort t o c ra ft

r es pons ive le gis la tio n. T w o pi ec es of propos ed legislation aim ed at re visin g the objectionable provisio ns of the CPPA
w er e intro duc ed

in the S en at e an d th e H ouse . T he re w as sig nif ic an t de ba te about 34 ke y pr ovi sio ns i n th e co m

pe tin g bi lls , inc lud ing the pr opos ed r ev isi ons to the pandering prov ision
. D espite ongo ing di sagreem ent, the houses com prom ised 35
an d p as se d t he PROTECT Act, n ow co di fie d i n s cat te redsec ti on s o f 18 U.S.C. The r evised pandering p rovisio n of the PRO TE CT Ac t at issue in thi s case, 18 U
. S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 3) (B ), pr ovi de s th at any pe rs on who know ing ly

— (B ) a dve rt ise s, pr om ote s, pr es en ts, dis tr ibu te s, or sol ic its thr oughthe m ai ls, or in inter state or f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by

c om put er , any

m at er ia l or

pur porte d m at er ia l i n a m anner that ref

lects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to be lie ve , that the m at er ia l or pur porte d m at er ia l i s, or

c ont ai ns

— ( i ) an obsc en e vis ua l de picti on of a m in or

en ga gin g inse xua lly

e xpl ic it co nduc t; or18 USC § 2256(1). 36 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). 37 18 USC § 2252A(b)(1)
. 38 17

(i i) a vis ua l de pic tio n of an a ct ua l m ino r en ga gin g in s ex ua lly

e xpl ic it co nduc t;
co m m its ac ri m ina l of

fe nse . F or

the pur pose s of thi s pr ovi sio n, a“ m ino r” m eans

“ an y pe rs on unde r the a ge of

e igh te eny ears ” and “ se xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t” is 36 de fi ne d a s “ ac tua l or

sim ulate d — (i ) se xua l i nte rc our se , inc lud ing ge nit al -g en ita l, or al -g en ita l, ana lge nit al , or

or al -ana l, w he the r be tw ee n pe rs ons of the sam e or

opp osi te se x; ( i i ) b e s t i a l i t y; (i ii) m as tur

ba tio n; (i v) sa dis tic or

m as oc his tic abuse ; or (v ) la sc iv io us ex hi bi ti on of t he ge ni ta ls or p ub ic area of a ny pers on .” 37 A ny pe rs on who v iol at es , or

a tte m pts or c onsp ir es to vio la te , the pande ri ng pr ohi bit ionis subj ec t t o af ine and i m

pr iso nm en t f

or am ini m um of f ive y ears and up t o tw en ty

y ears . I t i s an a ff

irm at ive de fe nse f

or c er ta in r ep ro duc er s, 38 distribu tors, re cipients, and possess ors of child porno graphy charged under other subs ec tio ns o f § 22 52Athat the a lle ge d c hil d po rn ogr ap hy de pic ts a ct

ua l a dul ts18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). 39 Id. 40 535 U.S. at 257-58, 122 S. Ct. at 1405-06 (“Materials fa lling within the proscr iption 41 are tainted and unlaw ful in the hands of a ll who rec eive it, thoug h they bear no responsibility

for how it was marke ted, sold, or desc ribed.” ). 18 rathe r than m ino rs or

that no “ ac tua l” m ino rs w er e inv olv ed in the pr oduc tio n. 39 H ow ev er , the a ff

ir m at ive de fe nse e xpr es sly doe s no t a

ppl y to the pande ri ng pr ovi sio n. 40 F . Wh atC on gr es s H as D on e D if fe re nt ly A t the out se t of

our dis cu ssi on, w e not e that the ne wpande ri ng p ro vis ion al lay s c er ta in c onc er

ns v oic ed by the Co urt i n Free Sp eech Co al it io n. F ir st, the Court’ s prim ary

objec tion to the CPP A’ s pandering prov ision wa s that pandered
m aterials w ere crim inalized for all purposes in the hand s of any possess or based on h owthe y

w er e or igi na lly

pande re d. B y

m ovi ng the pande ri ng p ro vis ionf ro m 41 the de fi nit ion s se ct ionto a stand- al one status , and u sin g langua ge that t ar ge ts o nly the a ct of pande ri ng, the ne wpr ovi sio n ha s sh if te d f ro m r eg ulatio n of

the unde rl y ing m at er ia l t o r eg ulatio n of the spe ec h r el at ed

to the m at er ia l. T his
re m ed ie s th e pr obl em

of pe na liz ing ind ivi dua ls f

ar the r down th e dis tr ibu tio n c ha in fo r poss es sin g im ag es that, de spi te howthe y w er e m ar ke te d, are not

il le ga l c hil d po rn og rap hy.Congr essional Finding s, § 501 at (15). 42 Id. at (4)- (13). 43 Th e de fi nit ion

of se xua lly e xplic it c on du c t f

or “ ind ist inguis ha

ble ” ima g e s is sli g htl y 44 narr ower than the one attached to the pa nderingprovision as set out above, r equiringthat depictions of sexual intercour se or lasc ivious ex hibitions of the g enital or pubic a rea also be “ g ra ph ic ” (1 8 U .S. C. § 22 56 (2 )( B )) , me anin g“ that a vie we r c an o bs e rv e any

pa rt of the g e nit a ls 19 W ithr es pe ct

to its le gis la tiv e fi ndi ngs fo r the P RO T E CT A ct , Co ngr es s larg el y abandon s th e se co ndary

e ff ec ts and m ar

ke t de te rr en ce j ust if

ic at ion s f ound
w an tin g by

the Co urt i n F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on, althoug h it does reiterate the nee d to ensure that the result of Fe rber — dri vin g il le ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy f ro m the book she lve s —

is ex te nde d to e xti ngui sh the “ ope n and n oto ri ous tr af fi ck ing in
suc h m at er ia ls” on the I nte rn et . C ongr es s in ste ad f oc use s pr im ar ily

on b ee fi ng 42 up its find ings th at technologi cal advancem ents since F re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on have inc re as ed the pr ose cu tor ia l di ff

ic ult ie s r ai se d by

the r ea dy a va ila bil ity of technolog y

able to disgu ise depictions of rea l children (proscribable under Fe rber ) to m ake them

unident ifiable or to m ake them appear c om

puter-generated (defensible under F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on ). 43 F i n a l l y, t h e P R O TE C T A c tp r o v i d e s an e wd e f i n i t i o n f o r c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y, which in addition to “ real” child im ages includes (1) any digital or com

puterge ne rate d im ag e that i s “ ind ist ing uis hable ” fr om that of am ino r en ga gin g in
se xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t, and ( 2) avis ua l de pic tio n th at ha s be enc re at ed

or 44or

pu bic are a of any de pic te d p e rs on

or anim a l du

ri ngany pa rt of the tim e that th e se xua lly expli cit conduct is beingdepicted . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(10). 18 U. S.C. § 2 25 6( 8) . A s d isc us se d a bo ve , th e a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e that no re a l c hil d 45 was involved in the produc tion of child pornog raphy , which the Court found inc omplete under the CPP A, has be en extended to most possessors and distributors of these de fined mate rials. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)- (d). The enumer ated a cts are “g raphic bestiality , sadistic or 46 masochistic abuse or sexual intercourse , including g enital-g enital, ora l ge nital, anal-g enital, or oral-a nal, whethe r betwe en per sons of the same or opposite sex . . .” Id. at § 1466A(a )(2) (A). The g ener al obsce nity

statute provides no a ffirmative defe nse that no re al child was 47 involved in the production of the imag e. 20 m odi fi ed to ap pe ar a s an id en tif

ia ble m ino r en ga gin g inse xua lly e xpl ic it
co nduc t. T he P RO T E CT A ct a lso a m en de d th e ge ne ra l ob sc en ity statut e to 45 define a newcategory

of unprotected synthetic child p ornographythat incorporates, in part, the Miller de fi nit ion
. T ha t l awnowpr ohi bit s th e pr oduc tio n, distribu tion, rece ipt or pos session , in an interstate c omm erce setting, of (1) obsc en e vis ua l de pic tio ns o f an y kin d th at de pic t a m ino r en ga gin g inse xua lly
expli ci t c ondu ct , and ( 2) any vis ua l de pic tio n th at

is, or appe ar s to be , of

am ino r engaging in certain enum erate d “ hard core” acts and lacks serious literary , artistic, pol iti ca l, or

sc ie nti fi c va lue
. T hus a virtua l de pic tio n of am ino r inv olv ed

in an y 46 of the expressly

listed acts is outl aw ed even wher e only one of the three Miller prongs is explicitlysatisfied. Bec ause the m aterials W illiam s poss essed wer e 47 unqu es tio nably

de pic tio ns o f “ re al ” ch ildre n, the se ne wvir tua l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy definition s are not directly at issue in this case, but the lim itations of their re achFree Spe ech Coalition, 5 3 5 U. S
. at2 5 5 , 1 2 2 S
. C t . at1 4 0 4 (c i t i n g Broadrick v
. 48 Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. C t. 2908 (1973)). 21 ha ve im pli catio ns r eg ar din g C ongr es s’ s purp ose f or e na ct ing the pande ri ng provisi on, as w e discuss belo w. For e xam ple, the def

initio ns do n ot capture i n n o c e n tp i c tu r e s o f

c h i l dr e n th a tp e d o p h i l e s v i e w , c o l l e c t , an dtr a d e a s “ d i rt y” pic tur es . A nd i t r em ai ns t o be se enw he the r the S upr em e Co urt w ill f ind
acce ptable the PRO TE CT Ac t’ s truncation of the Miller obs ce nity

standard w ith
r e s p e c tt o c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y.

G. Wi lli am s’ s O ve rb re ad th C ha lle ng e U nde r the ove rb re adth d oc tr ine , astatut e that pr ohi bit s asub stanti al a m ount of constitu tionallyprotected speech is invalid on its face. W illiam s asserts that 48 the P RO T E CT A ct

pr ohi bit ionof

spe ec h th at

“ re fl ec ts the be lie f, or

that i s int en de d to c au se anothe r to b el ie ve ” that m at er ia ls c ont ai n il le ga l c hil d por nogr ap hy is no d if fe re nt than th e CP PA ’ s pr ohi bit ionof im ag es that “ ap pe ar

to be” or “ convey

the im pression” of m inors engaged in sexually explicit condu ct that w as str

uc k do w n a s ov er

br oa d in Free Sp eech Co al it io n. W e be ginour

ana ly sis w iththe r ec ogni tio n th at sub se ct ion s ( i) and ( ii) of the P RO T E CT A ct

pande ri ng p ro vis ionc ap tur e pe rf ec tly w ha t r em ai ns c le ar ly
re str ic ta ble c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

und er pr e- and p ost - F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on S up r e meOr ito , 413 U.S. at 141, 93 S. Ct . at 2676. 49 Osborne. 49 5 U .S. at 11 0, 11 0 S. Ct. at 16 96 ; Ferber , 458 U.S. at 760, 102 S. Ct . at 50 3359. See B d. of Tr. of the State Univ. of New Y ork v. Fox , 4 92 U. S. 4 69 , 4 77 -8 1, 10 9 S. Ct. 51 30 28 , 3 03 3- 35 (1 98 9) (h old ingthat th e “ le a st r e str ic tiv e me ans ” te st d oe s n ot a pp ly to c omm e rc ia l sp e e c h c a se s) ; see also Ohralik v . Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 463 n.20, 98 S. Ct . 1 91 2, 19 22 (1 97 8) (o bs e rv ingthat “ the jus tif ic atio n f or a pp lyingov e rb re a dth

ana ly sis a pp lie s w e akly , if

at a ll, in t

he or din ary

c omm e rc ia l c onte xt” b e c a us e “ [c]o mme rc ia l sp e e c h is not as likely

to be deter

red a s noncommerc ial speec h” and the ref ore doe s not require the adde d 22 Co urt j ur isp ru de nc e: obs ce ne sim ulatio ns o f m ino rs e nga ge d inse xua lly e xpl ic it
co nduc t and d ep ic tio ns o f ac tua l m ino rs e nga ge d insam e. A s r ev ie w ed above , the gove rn m en t m ay

c onst itu tio na lly

r eg ulate , on i nte rs ta te c om m er ce gr ound s, the tr an spor ta tio n and d istri but ionof obs ce ne m at er ia l, e ve n if it is le ga l t o ho ld pr ivate ly ( i. e. non -r ea l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy ), and m ay out law“ re al ” ch ild 49 por nogr ap hy f or a ll pur pose s, inc lud ing pr ivate pos se ssi on. H ow ev er , the 50 PR O T E CT A ct

pande ri ng p ro vis ionc ri m ina liz es not the spe ec h e xpr es se d inthe unde rl y ing m at er ia ls d es cr ibe d in( i) and ( ii) , but the spe ec h pr om oti ng and solicitin g such m aterials. T he question before us is w hether the restric tion o n that sp eech is to o b ro ad
. 1. Th e Go ve rn m en t m ay whol ly p ro hi bi t co m m er ci al s pe ec h th atis false or proposes an illegal transaction.
We r e c o g n i z e th a t , i f

we c o n s i d e r

th e p a n d e r i n g p r o v i s i o n a s p u r e l y a re str ic tio n of

c om m er ci al spe ec h, w e do n ot a ppl y str ic t ov er

br ea dthana ly sis
. 51protec tion affor ded by the over brea dth doctrine to third par ties not before the bar). Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Se rv. Comm’n, 44 7 U .S. 55 7, 10 0 S. Ct. 52 2342 (1980) ( setting out the c onstitut ional test for re strictions on commercia l speec h).

See V irginia St ate Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Cit izens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 53 U.S. 748, 770, 96 S. C t. 1817 , 1829-30 (1976)
. 23 In ste ad , w e de te rm ine w he the r the gov er nm en t ha s narr ow ly

ta ilo re d any

c ont en tba se d r eg ulatio n onpr ote ct ed spe ec h, that i s ne ith er

m isl ea din g no r re la te d to unl aw fu l a ct ivi tie s, to ac hie ve it s de sir ed le git im at e obj ec tiv es . U nde r thi s 52
an al y sis , the gov er

nm en t m ay

pr ohi bit c om ple te ly the a dve rt ise m en t or

sol ic itatio n of an il le ga l pr oduc t or

a ct ivi ty a s w el l a s f

al se or m isl ea din g a dve rt ise m en t because neither is protected speech. If a person possessi ng or seeking eith er 53 obsc en e sy

nth et ic c hil d po rn ogr ap hy or “ re al ” ch ild

por nogr ap hy , of

fe rs to se ll or buy it, this is unlawful com

m ercia l activity

that the governm ent m ay co nst itu tio na lly

pr osc ri be
. I f a pe rs on d oe s no t have obs ce ne or “ re al ” ch ild por nogr ap hy but of fe rs suc h th ing s f

or sa le , the n th e of

fe ro r is e nga ge d inf

al se or
m is le ad in g a dv ert is in g, wh ic h t he go ve rn m en t m ay li ke wis e p un is h. If a ll that the pande ri ng p ro vis ionsto od f or w as that i ndi vid

ua ls m ay not
co m m er ci al ly of fe r or sol ic it ill eg al c hil d po rn ogr ap hy nor f al se ly a dve rt ise non obscene m aterial a s thou gh it were , the G overnm ent need not sh ow that it has
narr ow ly ta ilo re d it s r es tr ic tio n be ca use ne ith er

of the se sc en ar ios inv olv eThe mate rials touted by Wil liams in thi s case wer e cle arly illega l child pornog raphy 54 and we do not, in the commerc ial context, consider the over brea dth chilling ef

fec t on third pa rt ie s n ot b e fo re the c ourt . 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)
. 55 24 protected speech. W e observe, however, that false or m isleading comm ercia l advertising is alrea dy

addressed under other state and feder al law s, which are aim ed at protecting consum ers fr om fra ud. H ere, under legislation aim ed at pr ote ct ing c hil dr en , the onl y pe rs on who i s harm ed

by m isl ea din g sp ee ch , e ve n if it pr ey s onthe ba se st o f m oti ve s, is the w oul d- be buy er of il le ga l c hil d por nogr ap hy , and tha t i ndi vid ua l i s sc ar ce ly

in a posi tio n to c om

pla in. A lso , al tho ugh the the pe na lti es f or f al se c om m er ci al a dve rt isi ng are not spe ci fi ca lly raised here, we note that a m ere false com m ercia l advertiser is punish ed on par 54 with an actual c hild p ornographer, w ithou t regard to the ac tual content or even
ex ist en ce of

und er ly ing m at er ia l. T hus, ape rs on o ff er ing f or sa le ac opy

of Disney ’ s Snow White on false claim s that it contains depictions of m inors engaged in sexuallyexplicit condu ct has com m itted a crim e punish able by a fine and at le as t f ive - an d up to tw en ty -y ears ’ im pr iso nm en t, ade ci de dly dis pr opor

tio na te 55
a n ddr a c o n i a n p e n a l t y. Be ca use the F ir st A m en dm en t a llo w s th e ab sol ute pr ohi bit ionof both tr uth fu l a dve rt isi ng o f anil le ga l pr oduc t and f al se a dve rt isi ng o f an y

pr oduc t andUnited States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc
. , 529 U.S. 803, 120 S. C t. 1878 (2000). 56 25 be ca use , in the c om

m er ci al c ont ex t, w e ha ve be fo re us n o c ha lle nge to the se ve ri ty of pun ish m en t m et ed

out f or suc h be ha vio r, the pande ri ng p ro vis ionw oul d li ke ly pa ss o ur m ust er a s apr ohi bit ionof

unp ro te ct ed

f orm s of c om m er ci al spe ec h, if that wer e all it proscribed. How ever, the lawis not lim ited to comm ercia l
ex pl oi ta ti on an d c on ti nu es to swee p i n n on -co m m erci al sp eech . Accor di ng ly, we
m ust m ove to the qu estion of whether the re striction on such non -com m ercia l sp eech is co ns ti tu ti on al ly ove rb ro ad
. 2. Th e P R OT EC T A ctp an de ri ng p ro vis ion c on ti nu es t o swee p in protec ted non-com m ercial spee ch. Be ca use it is not li m ite d to c om

m er ci al spe ec h bu t e xte nds al so t o no ncom m ercia l prom otion , pre sentation, distribu tion, and solicitatio n, w e m ust su bje ct the content-based restriction of the PRO TE CT Ac t pandering prov ision to strict scrutiny , dete rm ining whether it represe nts the least restrictive m eans to advance the gov er nm en t’ s c om

pe lli ng i nte re st o r ins te ad sw ee ps i n asub stanti al a m ount of pr ote ct ed spe ec h. U nde r thi s ana ly sis , w e fi nd the langua ge of the pr ovi sio n 56 pr ob le m at ic forth ree r eas on s. Fi rs t, that pande re d c hil d po rn ogr ap hy ne ed onl y be “pur porte d” to fa ll unde r the pr ohi bit ionof

§22 52A (a )( 3) (B ) m eans tha t pr om oti ona l or spe ec h isS. R EP . N O . 108-2, title VI I I , at 23 (2003). 57 See Free Spe ech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 253, 122 S. Ct . at 1403 ( citing Brandenburg v. 58 Oh io , 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. C t. 1827 (1969) (holdingadvoca cy of ra cist violence pr otected speec h)). Se e als o Kings le yIn t’ l P ic tures Co rp . v . R e ge nts o f th e U n i v . o f S ta t e o f N
. Y. , 3 60 U. S. 684, 79 S. Ct . 1362 (1959) ( holding a dvocac y of immoral ac tiviti es wa s protecte d speec h). 26 cr im ina liz ed

e ve n w he n th e tou te d m at er ia ls are c le anor non -e xis te nt. W e ec ho Se na tor L eahy ’ s c onc er

n th at the pr ovi sio n thus “ fe de ra lly c ri m ina liz e[ s] ta lki ng dirty ove r the I nte rn et

or the te le phon e whe n th e pe rs on n ev er pos se sse s any mat e r i a l a ta l l
. ” I n an o n - c o mm e r c i a l c o n t e x t , an y p r o mo t e r — b e th e y a 57 br ag gart , e xa gge rator , or

outri ght li ar — who c la im s to have il le ga l c hil d por nogr ap hy m at er ia ls i s ac ri m ina l punis hable by up t o tw en ty

y ears in pr iso n, even if w hat he or she actually has is a video of “ Our G ang,” a dirty handkerchief,
or an e m pty poc ke t. Furthe r, w hil e the c om

m er ci al a dve rt ise m en t of

an un law fu l pr oduc t or
s er v i ce i s n o tco n s t i tu t i o n al l y p ro t ec t ed , t h i s fe at u re o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s
co m m er ci al spe ec h do ctri ne doe s no t a ppl y to non- co m

m er ci al spe ec h, w he re the de sc ri pti on o r advoc ac y

of il le ga l a ct s is f

ull y pr ote ct ed

unl es s un de r the narr ow ci rc um stanc es , not

appl ic ab le he re , of

im m ed ia te inc ite m en t. T he F ir st A m en dm en t pl ai nly

pr ote ct s sp ee cha dvoc at ing or e nc our ag ing or

appr ovi ng o f oth er w ise il le ga l a ct ivi ty , so l ong as it doe s no t r ise to “ fi ght ing w or d” status . 5818 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)( 3)(B )(ii), 2256(2) (A)( v). 59 A MER I C AN H ER I TA GE D I CTI ONA RY OF THE E NGL I S H LANGUAG E 4th Ed. (2000) 60 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (v). 61 27 Th u s , th e n o n - c o mm e r c i a l , n o n - i n c i t e f u l p r o mo t i o n o f

i l l e g a l c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y, ev en if re pu gn an t, i s p ro te ct edsp eech un de r th e Fi rs t Am en dm en t. Finally , w e find particularly objec tionabl e the cr im inalization of speech that

“ re fl ec ts the be lie f” that m at er ia ls c onst itu te obs ce ne sy nth et ic or “ re al ” ch ild pornog raphy
. Beca

use no regard is given to th e actual nature or even the existence of the und er ly ing m at er ia l, li ab ili ty c anbe e sta

bli she d ba se d pure ly

on pr om oti ona l sp ee chr ef

le ct ing the de lud ed

be lie f that r ea l c hil dr enare de pic te d in legal child erotica, or on prom otion al or solicitous speech ref lecting that an ind ivi dua l f

ind s c er ta in d ep ic tio ns o f ch ildre n la sc ivi ous. 59 Be ca use la sc ivi ous is n ot d ef

ine d un de r the P RO T E CT A ct , w e ap ply it s or din ar y m eanin g of

“ ex ci tin g se xua l de sir es ; sa la ci ous. ” Wha t e xa ct ly 60
co nst itu te s af

or bid de n “ la sc ivi ous ex hib iti on o f the ge nit al s or pub ic are a” and

61 howthat di ff

er s f ro m an in noc uous pho tog ra

ph o f a na ke d c hil d ( e. g. af am ily phot ograph of a child taking a bath, or an artistic m asterpiece portray ing a naked ch ild m ode l) is not

c onc re te . G en er al ly , c ourts m ust de te rm ine thi s w ithr es pe ct toVirtually all lower c ourts that have a ddresse d the meaningof “la scivious exhi bition” 62 have e mbrac ed the wide ly followed “ Dost” test, orig inally develope d by

a California

district court a nd aff irmed in an opinion by

the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986) judgm’t aff’d, United States v. W iegand , 812 F.2d 1239 ( 9th Cir. 1987). The test identifies six factors that ar e re levant to the dete rmination of whethe r a pic ture constitutes a “lasc ivious ex hibition of the ge nitals or pubic ar ea” under c hild pornog raphy law. The Third Circ uit has held that a de piction can c onstitut e “la scivious exhi bition of the 63 g enitals” e ven if a

child is wear ing c lothes. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 746 ( 3d Cir. 1994) (discussingthe discer nability of youngg irls’ g enitals throug h “thin but opaque c lothing”)
. Although the materia l was purc hased by Knox for sex ual stimulation, t he videotape s seized from him did not portray

expli cit sexual acts nor eve n depict nudity ; rather , they contained “ vigne ttes of tee nag e and pr etee n fema les” e ng ag ed in baton twirlingand g y mnastics routines and sometimes “striking pr ovocative pose s for the c amer a.” Id. We note that the re quirement that lascivious exhibi tions be “g raphic ” under the PROTECT Act’s ame nded obsce nity definition likely eliminates a Knox result under the obsce nity

statute. See n.46, supra. Howeve r, that narr ower definition does not apply to the pander ing pr ovision.

28 the a ct ua l de pic tio ns the m se lve s. Whil e the pic tur es ne edn’ t a lw ay s be “ dirty ” or 62 even nude depictio ns to qu alify , scr eening m aterials through the ey es of a neutral fa ct fi nde r lim its the pot en tia l un ive rs e of obj ec tio nable im ag es . 63 Inthi s c as e, how ev er , the lawdoe s no t se ek to atta chli ab ili ty

to the
m at er ia ls, but

to the ide as and i m ag es c om m uni cate d to the vie w er

by tho se
m at er ia ls. T his shi ft s th e fo cu s f ro m ac om m uni ty standard to the pe rv er

te d bu t pr ivate ly he ld b el ie f that m at er ia ls are la sc ivi ous. T hr oughthi s le ns, vir tua lly a ll de pic tio ns o f ch ildre n, w hom to pe doph ile s are hig hly

e ro tic iz ed

se xua l ob

j ec ts,
ar e lik el y to dr awade viant r es pons e. Many pe doph ile s c oll ec t and are se xua lly sti m ulate d by nonpor nogr ap hic de pic tio ns o f ch ildre n su cha s c om m er ci al ly pr oduc ed im ag es of

c hil dr enin cl oth ing c at al ogs, te le vis ion , c ine m a, ne w spa pe rs ,Amy Adler, The Perve rse Law of C hild Pornography , 101 C OL UM . L. R EV . 209, 259- 64 260 (2001). The highly

eroticized use of

children in fa shion, television, and adver tising is now the “soft por

n” of c hild pornog raphy
. Id. Members of the North Ame rica

n Man B oy

L ove Association (NA MBLA — an or g anization for pedophiles, many of whom ar e in prison) repor tedly find erotic stimulation by watchingchildren on ne twork television, the Disney channe l, and mainstream films. Id. at 260
. As one investig ator put it: “Ihad found N MBLA’s ‘porn’ and it was Holly

wood. Id. (citation omitted)

29 and m agazines — otherw ise innocent p ictures that are not tradition ally seen as child po rnography

and which non-pedop hiles consi der innocuou s. A s illust rated 64 in this c as e, r el at ive ly

inn oc en t c an did

sna psho ts o f ch ildre n, suc h a s th ose ini tia lly e xc hange d by

the de fe ndant W ill iam s and the und er co ve r ag en t, are a lso
co lle ct ed and u se d a s am ed ium

of e xc hange . W e cannot , how ev er , out lawtho se le ga l and m ai nstre am

m at er ia ls and w e m ay

not out lawthe tho ught s c onj ur ed up by tho se leg al m at eri al s. Fr ee dom of the m ind oc cu pie s ahig hly -p ro te ct ed

pos iti on i n our constitu tional heritage. E ven when an individ ual’ s ideas concern im m oral thou ghts abo ut im ages of children, the Suprem e Court has steadfastly m aintained the r igh t t o th ink

f re el y . A s th e Co urt st at ed in Free Sp eech Co al it io n, “ Fi rs t A m en dm en t f

re ed om s are m ost

in dange r w he n th e gove rn m en t se ek s to c ontro l tho ught or j ust if y it s law s f or that i m pe rm iss ibl e en d. T he r igh t t o th ink is the be gin nin g of

f re ed om , and s pe ec h m

ust be pr ote ct ed

f ro m the gov er

nm en t be ca

use535 U.S. at 253, 122 S. Ct . at 1403 (findingthat the fa ct that possession of non- 65 obscene virtual child pornog raphy may cause sexually

immoral thoughts about c hildren wa s not enoug h to justi fy

banningit). Id. 66 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566, 89 S. Ct . at 1249 (statingthat leg islator’s “c annot 67 c on sti tut ion a lly

pr e mis e le g isl atio n o n th e de sir a bil ity of c ontr oll inga

pe rs on ’s pr ivate thoughts” ). 383 U.S. 463, 86 S. C t. 942 (1966). 68 30 spe ec h is the be gin nin g of tho ught
. ” T he Co urt r ei te rate d th at the c onc er

n w ith 65 ch ild por nogr ap hy is “ phy sio log ic al , e m oti ona l, and m en ta l he al th” of c hil dr en , an d thus r eg ulatio n is pe rm iss ibl e onl y w he n targ et ed

a t the e vil s of

the pr oduc tio n pr oc es s it se lf

, and n ot the e ff

ec t of the m at er ia l onit s e ve ntu al vie w er s. T he 66 PR O T E CT A ct

pande ri ng p ro vis ionm iss es that t ar ge t and, ins te ad , w ro ngl y puni she s in div idu al s f

or the non -i nc ite fu l e xpr es sio n of the ir tho ught s and be lie fs
. H ow ev er

r ep ugnant w e m ay

f ind the m , w e m ay

not c onst itu tio na lly 67 supp ress a def

endant’ s beliefs that sim

ulated depiction s of children are real or that inn oc en t de pic tio ns o f ch ildre n are sa la ci ous.

3. The S upre m e C ourt’ s decision in G in zbu rg does not su pport pander ing as an indepe nden t offe nse T he G ove rn m en t’ s c en tr al j ust if ic at ionf or the pande ri ng p ro vis ion , f ound
co nvi nc ing by

the dis tr ic t c ourt, r el ie s onthe S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in Ginzburg v. United States , f

or the pr opos iti on tha t an in div idu al m ay be f ound 68Id. at 470, 476, 86 S. Ct. at 947, 950. 69 5 3 5 U. S
. at2 5 8 , 1 2 2 S
. C t . at1 4 0 6 (qu o t i n g Gi nz bu rg at 474, 86 S. Ct. 942). The 70 Court in Ginzburg applied the test for obscenity

set out in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct . 1 30 4 ( 19 57 ), wh ic h p re c e de d th e c ur re nt Miller

te st, but th e dif

fe re nc e s b e tw e e n th e te sts are immaterial for

the purposes of

our ana ly sis. 31 crim inally

liable for prom oting m aterial a s appealing to prurient interests even tho ugh the m at er ia l a ct

ua lly be ing pr om ote d m igh t no t f al l ou tsi de the F ir st Am en dm en t’s p ro te ct io n. We bel ie ve th atrel ia nc e is il l-g ro un de d. In Gin zb ur

g, er oti c publ ic at ion s th at w er e not “ hard c or e” por

nogr ap hy , and
m ay not have be enobs ce ne pe r se , be cam e the sub j ec ts o f co nvi ct ionbe ca

use the ir pr ur ie nt qua lit ie s w er e explo ite d, or pande re d, by

the de fe ndant f

or c om m er ci al ly
se xua l purp ose s. T he Co urt f ound that e vid en ce of

the m an ne r in whic h th e publ ic at ion s w er e adve rt ise d and m ai le d “ w as r el ev an t i n de te rm ini ng the ult im at e que sti on o f obsc en ity , ” an d th at e vid en ce of

suc h pande ri ng o n th e ba sis of salacious appeal “ m ay

suppo rt the determ ination that the m aterial is obscene even tho ugh in o the r co nte xts the m at er ia l w oul d e sc ap e suc h c onde m na tio n. ” I n Free

69 Spe ec h C oal iti on , the Co urt r ec ogni ze d th e limite d sc ope of the pande ri ng
ratio na le e xpr es se d in G inz burg : that “ in close cases evidence of pandering m ay be probative with respect to the nature of the m aterial in question and th us satisfy the [ obsc en ity ] te st. ” T he Co urt a lso sug ge ste d th at G inz burg ha s no appl ic at ion 70Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). 71 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. C t. 1817 (1976), 72 Sp law n v . Ca lif

or nia , 431 U.S. 595, 603 n.2, 97 S. C t. 1987 (1977) (Steve ns, J ., 73 dissenting)
. 32 w he re , a s inthe c as e of

the CP PA , “ [t ] he statut e doe s no t r equir e that the c ont ex t be pa rt o f an effo rt a t co m m erci al ex pl oi ta ti on .” 71 W e dis ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t G inz burg supp orts a pr ohi bit ionof pande ri ng a s astand- al one c ri m e w ith out r eg ar d to the le ga lity , or

e ve n to the existence, of the pandered m aterial. First, we note that, notwithstandin g its brief
m en tio n by

the Co urt i n F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on , the re is som e que sti on a s to the continu ed vitality

of the G inz burg pandering rationale. Shortly after G inz burg
w as de ci de d, the S upr em e Co urt he ld i n Virginia Sta te B oard of Pharmacy v
. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. that tru thf ul, non -m isl ea din g 72
com m ercia l speech is protected by the First A m endm ent, a lthou gh to a lesser de gr ee than pr ote ct ed

non -c om m er ci al spe ec h. The sort of pandering that caused the pub lic at ion s in G inz burg to be foundobscene, in other w ords, has since gained
som e Fi rs t A m en dm en t pr ote ct ion
. I n on e of tw o po st- G inz burg

c as es in the 1970 s, adis se nt j oin ed

by f our j ust ic es state s th at

“ G inz burg

c an not sur viv e Virginia Pharmacy. ” While the Suprem e Court has not sub stantially addressed 73 the G inz burg

pande ri ng r at ion al e sin ce the 197 0s, Jus tic e St ev en s m or e re ce ntl yPlayboy Entm’ t Group, Inc. , 529 U.S. at 829 120 S. Ct .1878 (Stevens, J., concurring ). 74 535 U.S. at 258, 122 S. Ct . at 1406 (2002). 75 Id. (citation and inter

nal quotation marks omitted). 76 33 reiterated that, since G inz burg w as de ci de d be fo re the Co urt e xte nde d F ir st Am endm ent protection to com m ercia l speech, a

proposal th at otherwise le gal
m at er ia l be de em ed

obs ce ne on the ba sis of

it s ti til la tin g m ar

ke tin g, is

“ an ac hr oni sti c. ” C onse que ntl y , a lth ough G inz burg ha s no t be enove rt

ur ne d, it s 74 pr eced en ti al va lu e is qu es ti on ab le
. Even if the G inz burg pandering rationale rem ains viable, the PRO TE CT Ac t pa nd eri ng pro vi si on , as d is cu ss edab ov e, is no t l im it edto th e co m m erci al co nt ex t. Inc onsi de ri ng the CP PApande ri ng p ro vis iona t i ssu e in F re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on, the Court clear ly

suggest ed that, even if

the G inz burg pande ri ng r at ion al e re m ai ns viable, it w ouldonly

apply in a the com

m ercia l context. T he PRO TE CT Ac t 75 pande ri ng p ro vis ion , li ke the CP PApande ri ng p ro vis ionf ound unc onst itu tio na l i n Free Sp eech Co al it io n, does “ not require that the context be part of an eff ort at ‘co m m er ci al ex p l o i t at i o n .’” 76 Finally , to the extent that the G inz burg pande ri ng r at ion al e re m ai ns v al id, it le nds little c onst itu tio na l su ppor t t o th e pande ri ng p ro vis iona t i ssu e he re . W ith
re spe ct to the “ obsc en e” vir

tua l or sim ulate d m at er ia l de sc ri be d un de r subs ec tio nA congressional re port offe rs the example of the movie “ Carnal Know ledg e,” which 77 the Supreme Court found not to be obsc ene be cause it was not patently offe nsive. See H. Cohen, CRS Report for Congress: Child Pornogra phy : Consti tutional Principles and Fe dera l Statutes Produced Without an Actual Child: Const itutionalit y of 108th Congr ess L eg islation (2003) (c i t i n g J e nk ins v . G e or

gia , 418 U.S. 153, 94 S. C t. 2750 (1974)). Under the PROTECT Act, if a de fe nd ant d istri bute d “ Carn a l K no wl e dg e ” “ in a

mann e r t hat “ re fl e c ts the be lie f, or that is intended to ca

use anothe r to believe ” that it contained a n obscene visual depiction of a c hild, then the def endant would be guilty

of a c rime. Id. But the pa nderingrationale of Gi nz bu rg allows mere ly “that in close c ases e vidence of pande ringmay be probative” of obsc enity
. Id. “Carna l Kn ow le dg e ,” be c a

us e of the Sup re me Court

de c isi on , is no t a

c los e c a se ; th e re fo re , to dis tr ibute it in a pander ing ma

nner w ould not make it obscene
. Id. 34 (ii), if the pandering rationale rem ains valid, then it m ight b e the basis for a c ourt to u phol d ac onvi ct ionund er the P RO T E CT A ct

f or dis tr ibu tin g m at er ia l of que sti ona ble soc ia l va lue that w oul d no t be de em ed obs ce ne but

f or the defendant’ s prom otion of it suggesti ng that it was. But if the rationale holds, then thi s w oul d be the c as e unde r ex ist ing obs ce nity lawand the pande ri ng p ro vis ion ad ds n oth ing in that r es pe ct . T he r at ion al e doe s no t j ust if y apr ose cu tio n un de r the PR O T E CT A ct

that go es f

ar the r than e xis tin g ob sc en ity lawby a tte m pti ng t o co nvi ct ade fe ndant f

or dis tr ibu tin g m at er ia l tha t i s cl ea rlynot obs ce ne , m er el y b e c au s e th e d e f

e n d a n tp a n d e r e di ta s o b s c e n i t y. 77 W ith respect to “ real” child porno graphy as described under subsection (ii), the G inz burg pande ri ng r at ion al e is o f no r el ev an ce . I f the pande ri ng r at ion al e rem ains relevant to determ ination s of obscenity , it does so because such de te rm inatio ns are m ad e by asub j ec tiv e te st tha t w ei ghs a publ ic at ion ’ s de gr ee ofStopping Chi ld Pornography: Protec ting Our Chil dren and the Constituti on: He aring 78 on S. 2520 Before the Se nate Comm. On the J udiciary, 107 Cong. ( 2002) (testimony of Ha rvar d th School of L aw Profe ssor Fr eder ick Schaue r).

See, e .g., A LA . C ODE § 13A-12-195 ( 2005), providingthat “[w]here the c ircumstance s 79 of the dissemination or public display of matter indicates that it is being c ommercia lly exploi ted by the def endant f or its prurient appe al, such e vidence may be conside red in de terminingwhether the matter a

ppeals to the prur ient interest, is patently offe nsive, or lac ks serious literar y , artistic, political or scientific va lue.” 35 social value und er the Miller tes t. G inz burg he ld o nly that pande ri ng m ay

be probative of thos e fa ctors. De term ination s of “ real” child porno graphy as de sc ri be d insub se ct ion( ii) , on the oth er hand, are m ad e by

apur el y obj ec tiv e te st:
w he the r or

not the m at er ia l vi sua lly

de pic ts a n a ct ua l m ino r en ga ge d inse xua lly
expli ci t c ondu ct . T he m an ne r in whic h th e m at er ia l i s pr om ote d ha s no be ar ing on the answ er

to thi s qu es tio n. A s on e co m m en ta tor obs er ve d, “ [n ] o am ount

of pa nd eri ng , eve n m is le ad in g p an de r, can co nv erta vi rtu al ch il d i nt o areal ch il d.” 78 Insum , the G ove rn m en t ur ge s us to re ad the P RO T E CT A ct

a s w ri tin g th e G inz burg pandering rationale into the law
. W e note that at least one state law
co nc er nin g ob sc en e vis ua l de pic tio ns o f ch ildre n ha s su cc inc tly don e j ust that. 79 But the Governm ent asks us to stretch that rationale m uch farther, to supp ort pande ri ng a s an in de pe nde nt c ri m e rathe r than on ly a s e vid en ce of

the c ri m e of obscenityor child pornog raphy
. W e believe such an interpretation of G inz burg butts directly

against the hold ing of F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on and, a cc or din gly , f indBe cause it was an issue much de bated by Congr ess and c ommentators in the wake of 80 Free Spe ech Coalition, we do no t igno re the “ Rom e o a nd Julie t” pr ob le m di sc us se d at le ng th i n that case
. See n.27, supra. T h e C o urt ’s co n ce rn wi tho u t l aw i n g m at er i al ei th er co n t ai n i n g a depiction that “a

ppear [ed] to be” a

minor eng ag ing in se x ually expli cit conduct or

that was prese nted or promoted “ in a manner that convey [ed] the impression” that it containe d such d ep i ct i o n s , wa s th atth e w h o l e a i mo f d ra m at i c p re s en t at i o ni s t o m ak e f i ct i o n al h ap p en i n gs “appe ar” to be re al. Under the over broad de finition of the CPP A, non-obsce ne movies employing youthful actors to simulate minors eng ag ed in appa rent sexually

expli cit conduct could be e nsnare d, even though no child was involved in the produc tion Her e, Willi ams urg es that the PROTECT Act’s “ intended to ca use anothe r to believe ” l an gu age i s n o d i ff

er en tth an th e “ ap p ea rs t o b e” an d “c o n v ey s th e i mp re s s i o nth at ” l an gu age found over

broad by the Court. Whil e the Gove rnment ar gues it is a cure , we do not, for

rea sons discussed in this section, find the insertion of the wor d “obsce ne” into the materia l description par

ticularly meaning ful in avoidanc e of swe epingin meritorious works wher e the statute is punishingactivity that is unrelated to the a ctual conte nts of the mater ial. And if there is otherwise a

constitutionally

rele vant distinction between the swee p of PROTECT and COPP A in this reg ard, it is a fine one. Whether, in a n industry that functions on the suspension of disbelief, le g itimate presente rs and pr omoters of a rtistically meritorious films intend that viewer s truly

“believe ” re al minors are involved in such productions or, r ather , simply invite the viewer imag ine, is debata

ble. B eca use we find the Ac t infirm on a number of other fr onts, we need not split this hair. 36 that G inz burg doe s no t r es cu e the P RO T E CT A ct pande ri ng p ro vis ionf

ro m subs tanti al ove rb re adth. 80 4. The P ROT ECT Ac t pand ering pr ovisi on is not ju stified b y le gi sl at iv e fi ndi ng s. T he pande ri ng p ro vis ionof the P RO T E CT A ct , f

or r ea sons w e ha ve dis cu sse d, is inc onsi ste nt w ith M ill er an d Fe rber , a s r ea ff

irm ed in Free Speech Co al it io n, and is not sustainabl e under G inz burg
. The G overnm ent, howe ver, se ek s t o ju st ify its pro hi bi ti on s i n o th er ways. Fi rs t, not ing the state ’ s c om pe lli ng i nte re st i n pr ote ct ing c hil dr enf ro m tho se
w ho s ex ua lly

e xpl oit the m , Co ngr es s r el ie s on F erbe r an d O

sborne f or theC o n gre s s i o n al Fi n d i n gs (5 0 1 ) a t(2 )- (3 ) ( ci t i n g Osborne v. O hio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 81 (1 9 9 0 ) a n d

qu o t i n g Ne w York

v . F e rb e r 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982) (“ The most expeditious if not the only prac tical method of lawenfor ceme nt may be to dry up the marke t for this material by imposing seve re c riminal penalties on per sons, selling, a dvertising , or otherw ise promoting the product.” )). H. R. R EP . N O . 108-66, Title V, at 62 ( 2003). 82 37 pr opos iti on tha t this int er es t e xte nds to s tam pin g ou t the m ar

ke t f or c hil d pornog raphy
. H owever , C ongress has no t adequately explained why

the m ere 81 pande ri ng o f oth er

w ise le ga l m at er ia l sh oul d be pr ohi bit ed in the pur sui t of

thi s in te res t. In the PRO TE CT Ac t’ s Conference Report, Congress m entions that “ even fr au dul en t of

fe rs to buy

or se ll unpr ote ct ed

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

he lp t o su sta in the ill eg al m ar

ke t f or thi s m at er ia l. ” T his appe ar s to be ar es ur re ct ionof the m ar ke t- 82 de te rr en ce the or

y a dvanc ed

by the G ove rn m en t, and r ej ec te d by the Co urt, in Free Spe ec h C oal iti on . A s th e Co urt r ec ogni ze d, the pr ohi bit ion s of “ re al ” ch ild por nogr ap hy in Fe rber

and O sborne were uph el d o n apro du ct io n- ba se d ra ti on al e. T he Co urt i n F

erbe r allowed m arket deter rence restrictions because they destroy ed the pr of it m oti ve to explo it re al c hil dr en . C ongr es s ha s a ga in f ai le d to art ic ulate specifically

how the pandering and soli citation of legal im ages, e ven if they are prom oted or believed to be oth erw ise, f uels the m arket for

illegal im ages of re al ch il dr en en ga gi ng in sex ua ll y ex pl ic itco nd uc t.See Finding s 501 at (10)- (13). 83 S. R EP . N O . 108-2, Title VI I I , at 23 (2003)( rema rks of Sen. Patrick L eahy ). 84 See Finding s 501 at (13). 85 38 Ne xt, the G overnm ent poin ts to the legis lative finding s of the PRO TE CT A ct that art ic ulate the dif

fi cu lti es in suc ce ssf

ul p ro se cu tio n of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy poss es sio n c as es w he re a dvanc em en ts i n c om put er te ch nol ogy

a llo wim ag es to be
so a lte re d a s to c as t r ea sona ble doubt o n w he the r the y inv olv e re al c hil dr en . 83 Co ngr es s c hara ct er iz es the pande ri ng p ro vis iona s “ anim portant t ool f

or prosecutors to pu nish true childpornographers who for som e technical r eason are be y on d t he reac h o f th e n or m al ch il d p orn d is tri bu ti on or p ro du ct io n s ta tu te s.” 84 T he G ove rn m en t arg ue s th at , gr ound ed on the se f

ind ing s, the pande ri ng p ro vis ion al low s pr ose cu tio ns t o go f or w ar d a ga ins t pe rs ons w ho n ot o nly have the int en t t o part ic ipate in the c hil d po rn ogr ap hy m ar ke t, but w ho a ct ive ly

sol ic it oth er s to part ic ipate in that m ar

ke t, r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r the gov er nm en t c anpr ove whether the underly ing m aterial is r eal child pornog raphy or not. W ithou t such pr ose cu tor ia l t ool s, it

arg ue s, the c hil d po rn ogr ap hy m ar ke t w ill f louri sh, harm ing
re al c hil dr en . 85 This argum ent not on ly

attem pts, once again, to revive the rej ected m arket proliferation rationale but also dis regards the fir m ly established prin ciple thatFree Spe ech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255, 122 S. Ct . at 1404. 86 A number of

courts have held that af

fidavits that defe ndants had joined Interne t e- 87 g ro up s th at me mbe rs us e d to e xch ang e c hil d p or no g ra phy pr ov ide d p ro ba

ble c a us e to s e arc h th e ir home, althoug h there was no e vidence that the def endants ha d ever

downloaded a

ny illega l visual depictions. Se e, e .g., Un ite d S tates v . M ar tin , 426 F.3d 83 ( 2d Cir. 2005) petition for cert. filed, 20 06 WL44 85 14 (U .S. F e b. 16 , 2 00 6) (N o. 05 -1 07 3) (h old ingthat te xtua l e ma il a bo ut c hil d po rn ogra phy e xch ang e d b y

me mbe rs of

the e -gro up wa s n ot p ro te c te d s pe e c h) ; United States v. Coreas , 4 26 F .3 d 6 15 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( same ); United States v. Froman , 355 F.3d 882 ( 5th Cir. 20 04 )( same ); Un ite d S

tates v . H utto , 84 Fe d. Appx. 6 (10th C ir. 2003) (unpublished) (same)
. See H. R. R EP . N O . 108-66 (2003) (statingthat the instant pander ing pr ovision “bans 88 the of fe r t o tr ans a c t in

un pr ote c te d mate ri a l, c ou

ple d w ithpr oo f o f t

he of fe nd e r’ s sp e c if

ic 39 “ [t ] he G ove rn m en t m ay

not sup pr es s law fu l sp ee cha s th e m eans t o su ppr es s unl aw fu l sp ee ch
. . ” A nd whe n th e “ te ch nic al r ea son” is that the m at er ia l be ing 86 described or exchanged does not fall w ithin one of the two proscribable categories — b ut i nst ea d is le ga l c hil d e ro tic a, inn oc en t pi ct ur es of c hil dr enaro usi ng o nly

in the m ind s of

c er ta in v ie w er s, or

non -e xis te nt —

th e G ove rn m en t c an not circum vent the crim inal procedure process. In a non-com m ercia l setting, in which
m ost childpornographyis discuss ed and exchanged, pandering at m ost either
ra ise s a ct ion ab le sus pic ionthat i lle ga l m at er ia ls are pos se sse d or is ev ide nti ar

y of 87 the soc ia l m er it of

que sti ona

ble m at er ia ls. T he G ove rn m en t m ust do i ts j ob t o determ ine whether illegal m aterial is behind the pander. The G overnm ent urges that we c onsid er this sim ply an inchoate crim e,
ar gui ng tha t on ly

tho se w ithspe ci fi c int en t t o tr af fi c in i lle ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
w ill be e nsnare d and n oti ng, f or e xa m ple , that of

fe rs to buy

or se ll ill eg al dr

ugs 88int e nt. ” ); S. R EP . N O . 108-2, at 10 n.6 (2003) (statingthat the provision require s the g overnme nt

to establish that the defe ndant ac ted with the spec ific intent to traff ic in obscene materia l or actua l child pornog raphy

). See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (which e x pressly applies to the pande ringprovision) and 89 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a) ( criminalizing the attempt or conspirac y to produce or distribute obscene or re al child pornography ). Stopping Chi ld Pornography: Protec ting Our Chil dren and the Constituti on: He aring 90 on S. 2520 Before the Se nate Comm. On the J udiciary, 107 Cong. ( 2002) (testimony of th Professor F rede rick Scha uer) . We note that this is also what differe ntiates the instant pandering provision from state law s that criminalize the pander ing of prostitution. W hile a def endant may be convic ted, for e x ample, for soliciting sex from an under cover police off

icer , even though the office r has no intention of a ctually consummatingthe dea l, in a jurisdiction that has outlawed prostitution, t here is no circumstanc e under which sex for money

may be leg al. For

this reason, the Gover nment’s “pha

ntom” druganalogy

is also unpersuasive
. 40 can be punish ed even if no drugs actually exist. H owever , the inchoate off enses — attem pt, solicitation, conspi racy — are covered elsewhere in the code. 89 Furthe r, the int en t e le m en t on ly appl ie s to one portio n of the pr ovi sio n — pr om oti ng m at er ia l i n am an ne r “ that i s in te nde d to c au se anothe r to b el ie ve ” it is ill ic it — and, to be avio la tor , one ne ed not int en d to dis tr ibute il le ga l m at er ia ls, bu t o nl y in te nd th atan ot he r be li ev e th e m at eri al s o ne ha s ar e la sc iv io us . Also , a defendant m ay

be liable for prom oting , distributing , or solicitin g perfec tly legal
m at er ia ls tha t on ly

he or she pe rs ona lly

be lie ve s are la sc ivi ous. A s P ro fe sso r Sc haue r not es , “ w he n th e non- ex ist en ce of il le ga lity is a func tio n no t of

the non ex ist en ce of

an il le ga l pr oduc t bu t r athe r the non -i lle ga lity of an e xis tin g pr oduc t, the F ir st A m en dm en t r et

ur ns t o th e pic tur e. ” F ina lly , w ithany inc hoa te of

fe nse 9041

the gov er nm en t m ust sho wsom e subs tanti al m ove m en t t ow ar d c om ple tin g th e cr im e, m ust pr ove , in oth er

w or ds, som ethin g be y ond m er e ta lk. U nde r the PR O T E CT A ct

pande ri ng p ro vis ion , m er e ta lk i s a ll that i s r equir ed f or li ab ili ty and that does n ot squ are with Suprem e Court First A m endm ent j urisprudence. Insum , w e re co gni ze that C ongr es s ha s ac om pe lli ng i nte re st i n pr ote ct ing ch ildre n and, to that e nd, m ay r eg ulate in int er state c om m er ce se tti ngs the dis tr ibu tio n or

sol ic itatio n of

the m at er ia ls d es cr ibe d in sub se ct ion s ( i) ( obsc en e child po rnography ) and (ii) ( “ real” child porno graphy ) of the P ROT EC T A ct pandering prov ision
. How ever, the pandering provi sion g oes m uch farther than that. T he pr ovi sio n a

br idg es the f

re ed om to en ga ge in a subs tanti al a m ount of law fu l sp ee chin re la tio n to it s le git im at e sw ee p, and the r ea sons the G ove rn m en t
o ff er s i n s up p o rt o f s u ch l i m i t at i o n s h av e n o ju s t i fi ca t i o n i n th e S up re m e C o u rt ’s Fi rs t A m en dm en t pr ec ed en ts. A cc or din gly , w e fi nd i t un co nst itutio na lly
ove rb ro ad
. H. Wi lli am s’ s V agu en es s C ha lle ng e The G overnm ent contends that, since the written plea agree m ent refe rences onl y W ill iam s’ s r igh t t o a

ppe al his pande ri ng c onvi ct ionon g ro unds of overbreadth, he has w aived his vagu eness challenge. W e disagree. W e re cognize th atva gu en es s an d o ve rb read th do ct rin es , alt ho ug h “ lo gi cal ly relat edan d s im il ar,”Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8, 103 S.C t. 1855 (1983). 91 United States v. Rubbo , 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 ( 11th Cir. 2005). 92 Un ite d S

tates v . Nyhu is , 8 F. 3 d

7 3 1 , 7 4 2 (1 1 thC i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. 93 Jefferie s , 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 ( 11th Cir. 1990). Wil liams’s motion t o dismiss was e x pressly raised on grounds that the pande ring 94 provision was both overbr oad and va gue. The rema rks of c ounsel duringthe plea c olloquy ref ere nce the parties’ ag ree ment that Wil liams was pre servingchalleng es under both doctrines and the importanc e of a

rulingon that motion to ensure pre servation, especia lly as to the va gue ne ss c la im, wa s d isc us se d at so me le ng th b y the pa rt ie s a nd the c ourt . 42 ar e dis tin ct . H ow ev er , ple a barg ai ns, a s w e ha ve not ed , are li ke c ontra ct s and

91 shou ld be interpreted in accord w ith the parties’ intent. Further, a w ritten plea 92 ag re em en t sh oul d be vie w ed a ga ins t the ba ck gr ound

of the ne got ia tio ns, a voi din g int er pr et at ionthat di re ct ly

c ontra dic ts an or al und er standi ng; and, be ca use it
co nst itu te s aw ai ve r of

sub stanti al c onst itu tio na l r igh ts, sho uld be r ea d, w he re in doub t, a ga ins t the gov er

nm en t. T he r ec or d inthi s c as e cl earl y r ef le ct s th e 93 part ie s’ int en t t o pr es er

ve W ill iam s’ s c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s un de r both overbreadth and vagueness d octrines. T hat the wr itten m em orialization of that 94 agreem ent om itted the latter of these re lated ground s is insu fficient to suppo rt
wa iver. L aw s th at are ins uf fi ci en tly c le ar are voi d f

or thr ee r ea sons : ( 1) to av oid puni shi ng p eo ple f

or be ha vio r that the y

c oul d no t have kno wn w as il le ga l; (2 ) to avoid su bje ctive enforce m ent of the law s based on arbitrary or discrim inatoryGray ne d v . Ci ty of R oc k for d , 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299 (1972). 95 Withre sp e c t to c hil lin ge ff e c ts, the pr ob le ms o f v a gue ne ss a nd ov e rb re a dth

are , p la inl y , c los e ly intertwined since those pe rsons cove red by the statutes ar e bound to limit t heir be havior to that which is unquestionably

safe
. Kole nd e r, 46 1 U .S. at 35 7, 10 3 S. Ct. at 18 58 (1 98 3) ; Ba ma Tom ato Co. v . U .S . D e pt. 96 of A gr ic ultur e , 112 F.3d 1542 ( 11th Cir. 1997).

Village of Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc
. , 455 U.S. 489, 498, 97 499, 102 S. Ct . 1186 (1982). 43 int er pr et at ion s by

gov er nm en t of fi ce rs ; and ( 3) to av oid

any c hil lin g e ff

ec t onthe exercise of sensitiv e First A m endm ent free dom s. T hus, to pass cons titutio nal 95
m uster, statutes challenged as vague m ust giv e a per son of ordin ary intelligence a
re as ona ble opp ortun ity

to knoww ha t i s pr ohi bit ed and p ro vid e expli ci t st an dard s fo r tho se w ho a

ppl y it to av oid arb itr ar y and d isc ri m inator

y e nf or ce m en t. 96 V ag ue ne ss c onc er

ns are m or e ac ute w he n alawim pli cate s F ir st A m en dm en t r igh ts and a heightened level of clarity and precision is dem anded of crim inal statutes because their consequences are m ore severe . 97 In this case, considering a penal statute that both restricts speech and carr ies hars h c ri m ina l pe na lti es , it is not a t a ll cl ear w ha t i s m eant b y pr om oti ng o r sol ic iti ng m at er ia l “ in a

m an ne r that r ef

le ct s th e be lie f, or

that i s in te nde d to c au se
an oth er to be lie ve ” that t out ed

or de sir ed m at er ia l c ont ai ns i lle ga l c hil d por nogr ap hy
. T his langua ge is so v ag ue and s tandard le ss a s to w ha t m ay not be
sa id tha t the pub lic is le ft w ithno o bj ec tiv e m ea sur e to whic h be ha vio r can beSee City of Chi cago v. M orales , 527 U.S. 41, 119 S. C t. 1849 (1999) (holding 98 un c on sti tut ion a lly

va gue an a

nti -l oit e ri ngor din anc e , whic h d e fi ne d lo ite ri nga s r e ma ini ngin pla c e wi th “ no a

pp are nt p ur

po se ,” fi nd ingthat st and ard “ inh e re ntl y

su bje c tiv e be c a

us e its a pp lic atio n d e pe nd s o n whe the r s ome purp os e is ‘ a pp are nt’ to t

he of fi c e r o n th e sc e ne .” ); City of Ho us ton , Te

x . v . H ill , 482 US 451, 107 S. C t. 2502 (1987) (f inding unc onstitut ionally

vague a city ordinanc e prohibitingspeec h that “in any manner ” interr

upts a police off

icer in the perf ormanc e of his duties, without limi tation to fightingwords or to obsce ne or oppr obrious languag e). 44 co nf orm ed
. Mo re ove r, the pr osc ri pti on r equir es aw hol ly sub j ec tiv e de te rm inatio n by lawe nf or ce m en t pe rs onne l of

w ha t pr om oti ona l or

sol ic ito us s pe ec h “ re fl ec ts the be lie f” or

is “ int en de d to c au se anothe r to b el ie ve ” that m at er ia l i s il le ga lly pornog raphic. Individu al office rs are thus endo we d with incredibly broad d i s cr et i o n t o d ef

i n e w h et h era g i v en u t t er an ce o r w ri t i n g co n t ra v en es th e l aw ’s
m an da te s. 98 Su ppos e, f or e xa m ple , the gov er

nm en t i nte rc ep ts an e m ai l c la im ing that the atta ch ed pho tog ra phs de pic t “ little Janie in the ba th — hub ba , hub ba !” D oe s th is

“ refle ct a belief

” on the sender’ s part that the photo s are la sciviou s? A s discuss ed above, the lawdoes not require the pandered m aterial to contain any particular
co nte nt n or , in fa ct , that any “pur porte d” m at er ia l ne ed

a ct ua lly e xis t. S inc e the

“ re fl ec ts the be lie f” portio n of the statut e ha s no int en t r equir em en t, the gove rn m en t e sta

bli she s avio la tio n w ithpr oof of ac om m uni catio n th at

it de em s, wit h v irt ua ll y

un bo un de d d is cret io n, t o b e ref le ct iv e o f pe rv ers e th ou gh t.45

Regardless of w hat is actually depicted in the pho tos in o ur exam ple — whether the y are inn oc en t ba

by -i n- the -b ubbl es sna

psho ts o r candi d st ill s of

the f am ily Rottweiler

in a N o. 10 wa shtub — regar dless, in fact, of w hether anyphoto s are atta ch ed , thi s c om

m uni catio n c oul d be int er

pr et ed a s c ri m ina l be ha vio r. A nd be ca use the P RO T E CT A ct ’ s a ff irm at ive de fe nse doe s no t a ppl y to the pande ri ng pr ovi sio n, it

is no d ef en se to showthat the und er ly ing m at er ia ls are not , in fa ct , il le ga l ch il d p orno gr ap hy. E ve n m or e co m

ple x is the de te rm inatio n of wha t c onst itu te s pr es en ta tio n in
a “ m an ne r that i s in te nde d to c au se anothe r to b el ie ve ” that m at er ia l c ont ai ns ill eg al c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
. L et us c onsi de r, f

or e xa m ple , an e m ai l e nti tle d si m ply

“ G ood pic s of

kid s inbe d. ” L et

us a lso im ag ine that the “pic s” are a ct ua lly of todd lers in footie paj am as, sound asleep. S ender O ne is a proud and computersavvy grandparent. Sender T wo is a c hronic forwarder of cute photo s with rac y ton gue -i n- ch ee k su

bj ec t l ine s. S en de r T hr ee is a co nvi ct ed c hil d m ole ste r w ho hope s to tr ad e fo r m or e gr ap hic pho tos w ithli ke -m ind ed r ec ipi en ts. I f w ha t the statut e re qui re d w as a

spe ci fi c int en t t o tr af

fi c in i lle ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy , the id en ti ty of th e se nd er an d t he actua l co nt en t o f th e p ho to s wo ul d b e p ro ba ti ve . Se nde rs O ne and T w o w oul d be of f the hoo k w hil e Se nde r T hr ee m ay w ar rant fu rth er i nv es ti ga ti on .See Re no v . A CLU , 5 21 U. S. 8 44 , 8 76 , 1 17 S. Ct . 2 32 9 ( 19 97 ) ( re c ognizi ngthat ov e rl y 99 va gue re str ic tio ns may

c ur ta il a signif ic ant a mou nt o f p ro te c te d s pe e c h in

the re lativ e ly border less arc hitecture of the Interne t).

Se e, e .g., Bo os v . B arry , 485 U.S. 312, 332, 108 S. C t. 1157, 1169-70 (1988); (noting 100 that th e c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he c ha lle ng e d s tatut e a s p ro te c tin gthe “ pe a c e ” wa s su ff ic ie ntl y pr e c ise be c a

us e of the pa rt ic ula r c onte xt of

the pe a c e of

an e mba ssy

); Grayne d, 408 U.S. at 112, 92 S. Ct . at 2304 (findingthat an anti-noise or dinance was not vague whe re it wa s written specific ally

to forbid disturbance of schools bec ause “ prohibited disturbance s are easily measure d by their impact on norma l activities of the school” ). 46 But again, the pandering provisio n requires no inqu iry into th e actual nature
or e ve n e xis te nc e of

the im ag es and p ro vid es no a ff irm at ive de fe nse that the unde rl y ing m at er ia ls are not , in fa ct , il le ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy
. T he of fe nse is
com plete upon com

m unication “ in a m anner that,” in the discretionary view of law enforcem ent, “ is intend ed to cause another to believe” that m aterials ar e illegal child po rnography
. He re, the “ m anner” of pre sentation, as we ll as the plainlylegal unde rl y ing m at er ia l, are ide nti ca l i n a ll thr ee ins tanc es . A nd S en de r T w o c le ar ly intended th at his recipients believe, howe ver brief ly , that the attached photo s wer e se xu al ly exp li ci t d ep ic ti on s o f m in or s. Whil e post ing in a known c hil d po rn ogr ap hy c ha t r oom

w oul d c le ar ly spotl ight th e true c hild abu ser, in open cy berspace, which of these c omm unicators is a crim inal? T he pandering prov ision is devoidof any contextual param eters 99 fo r the r es tr ic tio n onc ondu ct that m igh t i llum inate it s m eanin g and r es cu e it fr om va gue ne ss. Abse nt s uc h ac ont ex tua l ba ck dr op, the langua ge of thi s lawis too 100Un ite d S tates v . M ath e nia , 409 F.3d 1289, 1291 ( 11th Cir. 2005). 101 47 im precise a standard to prov ide sufficient guard against arbitrary deprivation o f a si gn ifi can t l ib ert y

in te res t. W e ag ai n r ec ogni ze that C ongr es s m ay r eg ulate the dis tr ibu tio n or sol ic itatio n of

the il le ga l m at er ia ls d es cr ibe d insub se ct ion s ( i) ( obsc en e ch ild pornog raphy ) and (ii) ( “ real” child porno graphy ) of the pandering provisio n. I f that w er e al l the pr ovi sio n di d, w e w oul d f ind no c onst itu tio na l i nf

irm ity on va gue ne ss g ro unds
. H ow ev er , the statut e is unne ce ssari ly m uddl ed by the
ne bul ous “ pur

porte d m at er ia l” and “ re fl ec ts the be lie f, or is int en de d to c au se
an oth er to be lie ve ” langua ge . B ec au se of thi s langua ge , the pande ri ng p ro vis ion fai ls to co nv ey

th e co nt ou rs of i ts res tri ct io n wi th su ffi ci en t cl ari ty to p erm itlawab idi ng p er sons to co nf

orm to its r equir em en ts. B ec au se of thi s langua ge , the pr ovi sio n is ins usc ep tib le of uni fo rm int er pr et at ionand a

ppl ic at ionby

tho se ch ar ge d w iththe r es pons ibi lity of e nf or ci ng i t. A cc or din gly , w e fi nd i t im pe rm is si bl y

va gu e. III . Wi lli am s’ s Booker C ha lle ng e A. Stan dard of R eview Whe re , a s he re , the re is a tim el y obj ec tio n, w e re vie wade fe ndant' s Booker cl ai m in ord er t o d et erm in e whe th er t he erro r was ha rm le ss . There are t wo 101Id. 102 Id. 103 Id. (citation and inter

nal quotation marks omitted). 104 Id. 105 48 harm le ss e rr or

standard s, one of

w hic h a ppl ie s to Booker

c onst itu tio na l e rr or s, the oth er to Booker

statut or y e rr or s. S ta tut or

y e rr or s are sub

j ec t t o th e le ss 102 de m an din g te st tha t i s a

ppl ic ab le to non- co nst itu tio na l e rr or s. Anon 103
co nst itu tio na l Booker

e rr or is harm le ss i f, vie w ing the pr oc ee din gs i n th ei r en tir ety , ac ourt de te rm ine s th at the e rr or did not a ff ec t the se nte nc e, or

ha d bu t
ve ry sli ght e ff ec t. I f one c ansay

w ithf ai r as sur an ce that the se nte nc e w as not 104 subs tanti al ly

sw ay ed by the e rr or , the se nte nc e is d ue to be a ff

irm ed e ve n th ough there w as err or. Bec ause this is a Booker statutory err or case w e w ill applythat 105 standard
. B. No R eversible Booker Er ro r W illiam s was a ssessed (1) a tw o-level sentence enhancem ent for use of a
co m put er f or tr an sm iss ion , r ec ei pt o r dis tr ibu tio n of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

( 2) atw ole ve l se nte nc e en hanc em en t f or pos se ssi on o f ch ild

por nogr ap hy be ca use the pornog raphic m aterial at issue inv olved m inors un der age tw elve, and (2) a fourle ve l se nte nc e en hanc em en t be ca use the m at er ia l i nvol ve d po rtray ed sa dis tic orSee United States v. She lton , 400 F.3d 1325, 1331 ( 11th Cir. 2005). 106 Id. at 1329-30. 107 49 m as oc his tic c ondu ct

or oth er de pic tio ns o f vio le nc e. B ec au se the se e nhanc em en ts
we re a pplied u nder a m andatory guidelin es schem e, err or occurre d. H owever , 106 be ca use W ill iam s a dm itt ed

to the f ac tua l ba sis f

or his se nte nc e, w hic h in cl ude d th e fa ct s un de rl y ing the se e nhanc em en ts, the re w as no S ixth A m en dm en t Booker
error . 107 W e conclude that, view ing th e proceedings in their entirety , the sentence
wa s not su bstantiallysway ed by the statutory

err or. W illiam s was sentence d ab ove the bottom

of the 57 t o 71 m onth gu ide lin e range f or the pos se ssi on c ount , and the district court, exerc ising its discretion, expressly declined his request for a low er se nte nc e w ith in tha t r an ge . T he c ourt a lso state d th at , e ve n if not bound b y the gui de lin es , it

ha d do ubt s th at

the se nte nc e w oul d be any low er , and i t m ay

have be enhig he r. Whil e the j udge de cl ine d to iss ue an a lte rn at ive se nte nc e in anticipation of B lak

el y ’ s a ppl ic at ionto the gui de lin es giv enthe the n- se ttl ed state of th atis su e in th is cir cu it , he e xp la in edhi s d eci si on th or ou gh ly eno ug h t ha t we
are c on fid en t t ha t h e wou ldno t l owe r th e se nt en ce i n t hi s ca se on rem an d. IV . C on cl us ion50

In the wake of F

re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on, se xua lly

e xpl ic it spe ec h r eg ar din g ch ildre n th at

is ne ith er obs ce ne nor

the pr oduc t of

se xua l a buse of ar ea l m ino r re ta ins pr ote ct ionof

the F ir st A m en dm en t. W e be lie ve the Co urt’ s de ci sio n in F re e Spe ec h C

oal iti on leaves Congress am ple authorityto enact legislation th at al low s th e G ove rn m en t t o a cc om pli sh i ts l eg iti m at e goa l of c ur bin g c hil d a

buse
w ith out pla ci ng an un ac ce pta

bly he av y bur de n onpr ote ct ed

spe ec h. C er

ta inl y Co ngr es s to ok m an y

c ue s f ro m the Co urt i n dr af

tin g th e le gis la tio n a t i ssu e in this
cas e. Given the unique patterns of deviance inherent in tho se who sexually covet ch ildre n and the r ap idl y

a dvanc ing te ch nol ogy

be hin d w hic h th ey

hid e, w e ar e not
unm ind fu l of

the dif fi cu lti es of

str iki ng a

ba lanc e be tw ee n C ongr es s’ s in te re st i n pr ote ct ing c hil dr enf

ro m harm w ithc onst itu tio na l gu ar an te es . H ow ev er , the infirm ities of the PRO TE CT Ac t pandering prov ision ref lect a per sistent d isregard of ti m e- hono re d and c onst itu tio na lly -m an da te d pr inc ipl es r el at ing to the Governm ent’ s regulation of free spee ch and its obl igation to provid e cr im inal de fe ndants due pr oc es s. B ec au se w e fi nd the P RO T E CT A ct pande ri ng p ro vis ion , 18 U
. S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 3) (B ), both su bst an tia lly

ove rb ro ad

and v ag ue , and therefore fac ially

unconst itutio nal, w e re verse W illiam s’ s convictio n und er that section. H owever , bec ause we find no reversible Booker e rr or in his se nte nc ing51

fo r poss es sio n of

il le ga l c hil d po rn ogr ap hy , w e af fi rm his se nte nc e of

60- m onths im pr is on m en t. CONVICTION REVERSED AND SENTENCE ON COUNT O NE VACATED ; SENTENCE ON COUNT TW O AFFIRM ED.