### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 15, 200 4
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. OT IS M IL LE R , III
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-B-1192 M onte Watkins, Ju dge

No. M2004- 00707-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 20, 2005

Th e app e lla nt, Ot is Mil le r, I I I , ple d g uil ty to f ou r ( 4) c ou nts of

a g g ra va te d s e xua l batte ry . A s a re su lt of the g uiltyplea, the tr ial court s en t en ced the appellant to ten ( 10) y ear s on eac h conviction and order ed the f

irst two counts to be serve d concur rently and the last two c ount s to be serve d
concur rently . The trial c ourt order ed that the f ir s t t wo counts be se rved c onsecutively to the
rema ining two c ounts, for an e ffe ctive sente nce of twenty (20) y ear s. On ap p eal, the a ppellant challeng es the trial c ourt’s application of certain enhanc ement fa ctors in violat i o n o f Bl akely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), a nd the trial court’s decision to order consec utive
se nte nc e s. B e c a us e ou r s up re me c ou rt re c e ntl y de te rm ine d th a t B lake ly ha s n o a pp lic a tio n in Tenne ssee, we have revie wed the appellant’ s sentenc e de novo. Despite the trial court’ s improper application of se vera

l e n h an c e ment fac tors, we a ffirm the a ppellant’s sente nce be cause we de termine that the exist ence of enha nceme nt fac tor (16) justifies enha nceme nt of the sentenc e fr om e ight ( 8) to ten (10) y ear s. We also affir m the trial court’ s decision to order consec utive sentenc es.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, i n wh ich J OHN E VE R E TT W I LLI A M S and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Em ma Ra e Te nn e nt, (o n appeal), a ndJona tha n F . Win g , ( a t tria l) , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe nd e rs , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f

o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , O t i s M i l l e r , III

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt er; Brent C . Ch e rry , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, District Attorney Ge n era l; Bernie McEnvoy and Jennifer Ta ckett, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.It is the p o licy o f t h is C o u rt n o t t o id e n tif y the m ino r v ic tim s o f sex u a l ab u se
. 1

-2- OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

I n J une of 2002, the appellant was indicted on eig ht (8) counts of rape of a child in vi olation of Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -5 22 . I n D e c e mbe r o f 20 03 , th e app e lla nt p le d g uil ty to four (4) counts of ag g ravated sexual battery

. At the g uilty plea hearing, the prosec utor made the fo llo wi ng of

fe r o f p ro of

wi th r e g ardto the fa c ts u nd e rl y ing the c ha rg e s:
Your Honor , the victim i n this case is [a] y oung g irl named [B.M.]. She’s the 1 defe ndant’s daug hter. He r date of birth is A pril 17th, 1996. She is now se ven y ear s old. [ B.M.] is the child of the defe ndant, . . . and Ta wana Smit h. The de fenda nt . .

. and Smit h wer e marrie d up until approx imately Aug ust of 2001. At that time, they
se pa rate d a nd[B .M .] w e nt t o li ve wi th h e r m oth e r. Soo n the re a ft e r the de fe nd a nt . . . and Ta wana

Smit h set up a ne w form of visitation whe re [B.M.] spent most of the
wee kends, F riday

night a nd Saturday

night a nd part of Sunday with h er father, the defe ndant.

That arra n gement continued throug h October of 2001, Nove mber of 2001, Dec ember

of 2001, and a

portion of J anuary , 2002. That is when these offe nses occur red.
[B.M.] returned from a visit with t he def endant on January

19th of 2002. Sometime after that her mother w as gi v i n g h er a bath and [B.M.] talked about “hunching ” or “ humping.” He r m other a sked her wher e she g ot that word and she said from he r dad.
[B.M.’s] mot her did the right thing , sh e co n t ac t ed the - the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s and Our Kids Cli nic. [B.M.] was interviewe d by a ca se mana g er from the De partment of Children’s Servic es. She told him that the defenda nt, her fathe r, per formed or al sex on her, licking her va g ina; that he - he made her pe rform or a l se x on h im, lic kin g his pe nis . Sh e sa id, also , th a t - that he ru bb e d h is p e nis ag ainst her v a g in a ; th a t h e p u t h is p e n is in s id e h e r v a g in a
. Sh e s a idth is h ap p ened whene ver she went to her fathe r’s home.-3- Soon after that[ ,] [ B.M.’ s] m other re fused to allow [ B. M

. ] t o see the defe ndant any

more. The defe ndant went to see a license d clinical socia l worker on his ow n ini tia tiv e . H e tol d th e so c ia l w or ke r h e ha d - ha d b e e n e ng a g ing in inappropriate contac t with his daug hter. He said that when his wife was pre g nant he pray ed the c hild would be a boy beca use he w ouldn’t do things to a boy

. Uh- [B.M.] had an e x amination at Our K ids Center and the examination showed no injury

to her g enitals. As the investig ation co ntinued the def endant wa s interviewe d by Detec tive Rob Carrig an of the Metro P olice Department. Uh - in the course of that interview, the def endant made some admissions. He said that wh at [ B. M

. ] say s is true. He denied penetr ating her vag ina with his penis. But he admitted that there was c ontact with his “humping” or “hunc hing” her, r ubbing his pe nis ag ainst her va g ina.

T h e St a te ’ s a tt o r n e y s h a v e me t w ith [B

. M

. ] o n a n u mb e r o f o c c a s io n s
. We believe tha t if we ha d g one to trial she would testify as to the following : That when she visited her da d . . . he would wa ke her at night and he would perf orm oral se x on her. H e would say , “Now, y ou have to do me,” and he would make her perf orm oral sex on hi m.
He would then r

ub his p en i s ag ainst her va g ina. She’s desc ribed it that he
ru bb e d it in the mid dle a ndit f

e lt l ike he wa s tr y ing to sq ue e ze it in. She sa id tha t - that he didthi s w ith he r o n to p o f h im a ndwi th hi m on to p o f h e r. She sa id this happene d more than one time.

Severa l months l ater , the trial court held a sente ncing hearing w here the court hear d testimonyfrom seve ral pe ople, including the victim, the victim’s m o t h er , a d etec tive who took a statement fr om the appellant, a social worke r who interviewe d the victim and a c ounselor who met with the appellant. At the c onclusion of the sente ncing hearing, the trial court de termined that one of the mit ig a tin g fa c tor s su bmi tte d b y the app e lla nt a

pp lie d, that th e “ app e lla nt h a d a sta ble ho me a ndstr on g fa mil y

tie s th a t w ill pr ov ide su pp ort to him in a n a tte mpt to r e ha bil itate him ,” bu t c ho se to g ive that fac tor littl e we ight. The trial court de termined that seve ral e nhance ment fac tors applied: (1) the vic tim was particular ly vulnera ble bec ause of her ag e, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5); (2) the per sonal injuries inflicted upon the victim wer e particularly g rea t , T en n
. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(7); (3) the def

endant ha d no hesitation about committing a c rime whe n the risk to human life
wa s h ig h, Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 1) ; a nd (4 ) the de fe nd a nt abu se d a po sit ion of pr ivate trus t, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(16) . At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court se ntence d the appellant to te n (10) y ear s on eac h count. The trial c ourt then dete rmined that counts one a nd two should be serve d concur

rently and counts five and six should be serve d concur rently , but consec utive to counts one and two f

or a total e ffe ctive sente nce of twenty (20) y ear s.-4-

On appe al, the appe llant sugg ests that the t rial court erre d in “imposing e nhance d sentenc es on the de fe nd a nt’ s a g g ra va te d s e xua l batte ry c on vic tio ns a ndin ord eri ng that tw o o f tho se convictions be ser ved conse cutively to one another .” Sentencing On appe al, the appellant challeng es t he trial court’s application of enhance ment fac tors (5), (7), ( 11) and (16). The S tate concede s that the t rial court erre d in apply ing f actor s (5), (7) and (11) , as they wer e unsupported by

the re cord. H oweve r, the State a rg ues that t he trial court’s applica tion of fa ctor (16) was prope r and that without specific ally listi ng the appe llant’s prior criminal hist ory as an e nhance ment fac tor, the trial court properly considere d it for enha nceme nt.
“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo r eview on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the determinations made by

the court from which the appea l is taken are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “H oweve r, the presumption of corre ctness which a ccompa nies the trial court’s action is conditioned upon t h e af fi rm ative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the sent encing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fenda nt’s potential for reha bilit ati on, the trial and se ntencing hearing e vidence , the pre -sentenc e re port, the sentenc ing principles, sente ncing alternative arg uments, the nature and char acte r of the offe nse, the e nhancing and mitiga ting f

actor s, and the defe ndant’s statements. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bear s “the burde n of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

The a ppellant her ein ar g ues that there was no proof of the e nhan ce ment fac tors, as enumer ated in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114, a nd that there wer e many mitigating fac tors that should ha ve applied. The appellant also arg ues that constitutionallyonly a jury , not the trial court, wa s permitted to make the determination of the prese nce of the enhanc ement fa ctors. The
app e lla nt c ite s B lake ly

v. W ash ing ton , 5 42 U. S. _

__ , 1 24 S. Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ), to s up po rt thi s arg ume nt.
Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt re c e ntl y de te rm ine d th a t B lake ly

didno t a nn ou nc e a

ne w r ule of law a nd that “the Te nnessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t does not aut h o ri ze a sentenc ing proce dure w hich violated the Six th Amendment ri gh t to jury trial.” State v. Gome z, ___ S .W.3d

___ , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

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- R 1 1

- C D , 2 0 0 5 W L 8 5 6 8 4 8 , a t* 1 7 n
. 1 6 ( T e n n
. A p r
. 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 )

. In Gomez, the court de termined that d es p i t e t h e abilit y of trial judg es to set sentenc es above the presumptive sente nce b as ed on the finding of enha nceme nt fac tors neither f ound by a jury or admitted by

a def endant, Te nnessee ’s sentenc i n g s tructure does not violate the Six th Amendment and does n o t co n flict with the holdings of Blakely v. Washington,542 U.S. ___ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), United States v. Booker , ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), or United States v. Fa nFa n, the c a se c on so lid a te d w ith B oo ke r, be c a us e “ [t]he Re fo rm Ac t [ of Ten nes se e ] au tho ri zes a discretionary , non-manda tory sentenc ing pr ocedur e and r equire s t rial judg es to consider the-5-

principles of se ntencing and to eng ag e in a qua litative analy sis of enh an c e me n t a n d mitigating fac tors

. . . a ll of wh ic h se rv e to g uid e tr ia l jud g e s in e xer c isi ng the ir dis c re tio n to se le c t an app ropri a te sentenc e within the ra ng e set by the L eg isl at u re
. ” Gomez, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2005 W L 856848, at *27. Thus, in order

to determine a

defe ndant’s sentence, a

trial court starts at the presumptive sentenc e, enha nces the sentenc e withi n the rang e for exis ting enhance ment fac tors, and then r educe s the sentenc e within the ra ng e for exis ting mitigating f

actor s in acc ordanc e with T ennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210( e). No particular we ight f or ea ch fa ctor is pre scribed by the statute; the we ig ht g ive n to e a c h f a c tor is l e ft to the dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt a s lo ng a s it

c omp orts w ith the sentenc ing principles and purpose s of our Code a nd as long as its finding s are supported by the
rec ord. See State v. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. In t h e c a s e h e r e i n , t h e ap p e l l a n t p l e d g u i l t y t o f o u r ( 4 ) c o u n t s o f

a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y, a Class B f

elony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-504(b)

. The appellant is a Rang e I , standard of fende r, so the rang e of punishment is e ight ( 8) to twelve ( 12) y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(2)

. Unless there are enhanc ement fa ctors p re sent, the pre sumptive sentence to be imposed is the minimum in the rang e for a Class B f

elony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c ).

The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant to ten (10) y ear s for e ach c onviction, th e m i d d le of t h e s en t en ci n g rang e for his c onvictions a nd two (2) y ear s above the presumptive sentenc e for a Class B felony , based on the application of the following enhanc ement fa ctors: (1) the victim of the offe nse wa s particular ly

vulnera ble bec ause of h er age, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(5) ; (2) the persona l injuries inflicted upon the victim we re pa rticularly g reat, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(7) ; (3) the a ppellant had a lack of hesitation about committing a crime wher e the risk to huma n life wa s hig h, Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 1) ; a nd(4 ) the app e lla nt a bu se d a po si ti on of pr ivate trus t, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(16)

. Afte r a r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d , w e a g r e e w ith b o th th e ap p e ll a n t a n d th e St a te th a t th e trial court’s a pplicati o n o f en h ancement fa ctors (5) , (7), a nd (11) wa s improper. While there w as no dispute reg arding the victim’s y oung ag e at the time of the off enses, the T ennesse e Supreme Court h as h el d t h at p ar t i c u l a r v u l n er ab i l i t y ar i s es o n l y

wh en t h e v i ct i mi s “i n ca p ab l e o f r es i s t i n g, summoning help, or te stify ing a g ainst the perpe trator.” State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). Vulner ability

is “a fa ctual issue to be r esolved by the trier of fac t on a case by case basis.” I d. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts tha t, at th e tim e of the of fe ns e s, the vic tim wa s fi ve y e ars old

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt , other than stating that this fa ctor was a pplicable, made no further finding s. I t appea

rs that the trial
c ou rt app lie d th is f

a c tor ba se d s ole ly

on the vic tim ’s a g e
. “A vi cti m’ s y ou th d oe s n ot n e c e ssa ri ly equate with vulne rability .” State v. L ewis, 44 S.W .3d 501, 505 (Tenn. 2001); see a lso St ate v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 98 (Tenn. 1997) (dete rmining that “unless the State produce s evidenc e of phy sical or mental limitations at the time of the offe nse, along with p ro o f o f t he victim’s ag e, it cannot be pr e su me d th a t th e vic tim

wa s pa rti c ula rly vulnera ble based solely on her a g e”) . Wit hout evidence of particular vulner ability in the reco rd , we c onclude that the trial court e rre d in apply ing enhanc ement fa ctor (5)

.-6-

The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (7) ba sed on the victim’s “me ntal injuries.” The
rec ord includes the testimonyof Lisa Dupre e, a soc ial worke r at Our Kids Center who inter viewed t h e v i ct i m o n one occ asion. Dupre e testified that the vic tim suffere d from “some arr ested development” and would proba bly hav e “e m otional difficulties” if he r issues wer e not addr essed. The victim’s mother a lso testified. She claimed that the vi ctim did not appea r t o be suff

ering from

“ a ny so rt of la sti ng defici t from th is a bu se ” a ndthat th e vic tim wa s a g oo d s tud e nt. I n o rd e r t o appropriately

apply enhanc ement fa ctor (7) , the St at e wa s re quired to introduce “spec ific and objective e vidence demonstrating how the victim’s mental injury is more serious or mor e seve re tha n that which norma lly

results from this offe nse.” State v. A rnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 260 (Tenn. 2001). W h i l e t h e r ec o rd ce rt ai n l y i n d i ca t es t h at t h e vi ct i m h as s u ff er ed b o t h p h y s i ca l an d em o t i o n al d am age as a r esult of the off

enses, the State did not introduce evidenc e that the victim’s injuries we re “ more serious” or “more sever e” tha n those which ordina rily result from this serious off ense. Thus, the trial court e rre d in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (7).

The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (11) ba sed on t h e ap p ellant’s prior se x ual prac tices. The trial court stated tha t the appellant ha s a “possi b l e s ex u al disease tha t could have
cause d death” and dete rmined that the appellant wa s “we ll awar e of the fac t that he had ha d sexual rela t i o n s with women outside of his marriag e as w ell as prostitutes.” The re w as testimony in the
re c or d f ro m th e app e lla nt’ s wi fe ind ic a tin g that the app e lla nt o ft e n s le pt w ith pr os titute s d ur ing the ir
marria g e
. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ma y c on sid e r thi s fa c tor wh e n the de fe nd a nt e nd a ng e rs the liv e s o f p e op le other than the victim. St ate v. Dean, 76 S.W.3d 352, 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The rec ord does not indicate that any one other than the victim was endang ere d. The trial c ourt improperly applied this enhance ment fac tor.
The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (16) based on the exis tence of a father/daug hter
re la tio ns hip be tw e e n the vic tim a nd the app e lla nt. Th e fa c ts as g ive n b y the pr os e c uto r at th e g uil ty hearing, a nd admitted by

the def endant, noted tha t the vi ctim was the appellant’ s daug hter. F urther, at the sente ncing hearing, prior to the impositi on of the senten ce , t h e ap p ell ant made a sworn state me nt i n w hic h he state d tha t he re g re tte d the thi ng s h e ha d d on e to h is d a ug hte r a ndwa nte d to
apo log ize to h e r. Th is C ou rt ha s d e te rm ine d th a t th e e xiste nce of a fathe r- daug hte r r e la tio ns hip betwee n a defenda nt and a victim justifies the applica tion of enhanc ement fa ctor (16) . See State v. Hay es, 899 S.W.2d 175, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Thus, the trial court did not err in apply ing enhanc ement fa ctor (16)

. Acc ording ly , we determine that the appellant’ s sentenc e of ten (10) y ear s on each conviction for a g g ravated sexual battery is justi fied ba sed solely on the application of enhanc ement fa ctor (16)

. T h e ap p e ll a n t a ls o c o mp la in s th a t th e tria l c o u r t d id n o t ap p ly th e ma n y mi ti g a ti n g fac tors that the appe llant arg ued shoul d have a pplied to his sentence. Spec ifically , the appe llant complains that the trial court should have applied t he following m itigating fac tors: (1) the a ppellant’s conduc t neither caused nor

threa tened se rious bodily injury , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(1) ; (2) the
app e lla nt show e d r e mor se fo r the c ri me ; a nd(3 ) the app e lla nt h a s b e e n a mod e l in ma te wh ile incar cer ated. The appellant arg ues that the last two proposed mitig ating fac tors should apply under the catch-a ll mit igating f

actor found in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-113(13).-7-

At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing hearing, the trial court de termined that mitigating f actor (1) did not apply beca

use the appellant’ s conduct “did threa ten serious bodily injury beca use of the potential of wha t disease [the victim] may have inc urre d as a result of this sex ual conduc t.” The testimonyat the sente ncing hear ing indicated that the appe llant often slept with prostitut es during the time that he abused his daug hter. The trial court next determined that the fa ct that the appe llant
was a “model inmate” had “nothing to do with the offe nse that he was char g ed with.” The trial court also stated that it “did not believe . . . [the appe llant was] remorsef ul for his conduct” but rather

“ re mor se fu l f

or ha vin g be e n c a ug ht. ” Th e tr ia l cou rt wa s a ble to o bs e rv e the app e lla nt a nde va luate h is d e me a n o r

a n d c r e d ib il it y
. Se e St a te v
. K e ll y , 3 4 S. W. 3 d 4 7 1 , 4 8 1 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 2 0 0 0 )

. We
c on c lud e that the re c or d su pp orts the tr ia l c ou rt ’s re fu sa l to c on sid e r the se mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. Th is issue is without m erit.

Consecutive Sentenc ing

Th e app e lla nt c omp la ins that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in or de ri ng him

to s e rv e the se nte nc e s in counts one a nd two consec utive to the sentenc es in counts five a nd six , for a total effe ctive sente nce of twenty (20) y ear s because the r ec o rd d o es not support the application of Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b). The State a rg ues that conse cutive sente ncing was wa rra nted.

A trial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon a dete rmination that one or more of the c ri te ri a se t fo rth in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 40 -3 5- 11 5( b) e xists

. Th is s e c tio n p e rm its the trial court to impos e conse cutive sente nces if t h e co u rt fi nds, among other c riteria, tha t the “def endant is convic ted of more than one (1) criminal offe nse.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(a ). On e of the p ro vis ion s a llo wi ng c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing pr ov ide s th a t c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is
war rante d if:
[t ]he defenda nt is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abu se of a

minor with considera tion of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or victims, t h e t i m e s pan of defe ndant’s undete cted se x ual ac tivit y , t h e n at ure a nd scope of the sexual acts and the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l, a ndme nta l da ma g e to the vic tim or vic tim s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b) (5).

Further, “consec utive sentenc es ca nnot be imposed unless the terms re asonably rela te to the
severity of the off

enses c ommitt ed and a

re ne cessa ry i n o rd er to protect the public f rom furthe r serious criminal conduct by the defendant.” State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). The de cision to impose concurr ent or consec utive sentenc es, however, is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the tr ial court. State v. Blouvet, 965 S.W .2d 489, 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

I n the ca se her ein, the trial c ourt stated the following as justification for or dering consec utive
se nte nc e s:-8- Now, as to c o n s id e r a ti o n o f c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g
. T h e s ta n d ar d is the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa rd. I n this case, f

actor s to be consider ed: The defe ndant is convicted of two or more statutory offe nses i nvolving se x ual abuse of a minor, with consider ation of ag g ravated circ umstances. I find that to be the c ase. The ti me s pan of the defendant’s undetecte d sexual activity : I believe, or the Court believes, tha t it was a leng thy time period, particularly for a child the ag e of f

ive. The na ture a nd the scope , another fa ct o r of the sexual offe nses, I find that to be a fac tor, bec ause of

the various acts committed by the def endant, a nd the extent of

the residual, phy sical, or menta l damag e to the victim. That ca lls for some spec ulation, but the Court f

inds tha t the re will be some residual eff ect and damag e as a result of this relationship.

Which now leaves me with: How do I run - - so, I

must say that consec utive sentenc es ar e appr opriate. It is a matter of how do I run these pa

rticular c onsecutive sentences

. I am taking into consideration the de fenda nt’s mother and f ather , the de fe nd ant ’s ex-w if

e , a ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s d a ug hte r. B ut, I a m, a lso , ta

kin g int o c on sid e ratio n my

ro le , a s h a vin g to p ro te c t so c ie ty . A ndI thi nk that so c ie ty

ne e ds to be pr ot e c t e d f

r o m i n d i v i d u a l s s u c h a s [th e ap p e l l a n t ]. B u t h e i s b e i n g g i ve n s ome consideration.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court or dere d the appe llant to serve the se ntence s in counts one and two c onsecut i v e t o the sentenc es in counts five a nd six , for a total effe ctive
se nte nc e of

tw e nty (2 0) y e ars . Fro m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s com ments a t th e se nte nc ing he ari ng , it is
app are nt tha t th e tria l c ou rt fo un d a ll f

ou r o f the c on sid e ratio ns in s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ) w e ig he d in favor of conse cutive sente ncing with respe ct t o the convictions involving the defenda nt’s daug hter. On appe al, the appe llant cites to State v. Hay es, 899 S .W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) , fo r the pr op os iti on that c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is ina pp ro pr ia te in this c a se . I n H a y e s, the de fe nd a nt, convicted of

sexual battery

for f renc h kissing his daug hter, c halleng ed the impositi on of conse cutive sentenc ing. T his Court weig hed the f actor s listed in subsecti o n 1 1 5(b)( 5) ag ainst one anothe r; wh e re a s o ne fa c tor

we ig he d in fa vo r o f c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing , re ma ini ng fa c tor s mi lit a te d a g a ins t it:

The state stresses t he fact t hat t he victim was the de fenda nt’s daug hter. How ever , the
c ir c ums ta nc e s in thi s c a se re la tin g to the re ma ini ng fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d mi lit a te ag ainst the use of subse ction 115(b)(5 ). There was no sig nificant time span of undetec ted sexual activity , the nature of the c riminal conduct w a s n o n a g g ravated, and the e xten t of re sid ua l dam a g e to the vic tim c a us e d by the c on du c t is no t su ff ic ie ntl y shown.

I d. at 187. Thus, the Court modified to provide f or conc urre nt sentencing . I d.-9-

I n o ur vie w, the re lianc e on Hay e s is mis pla c e d. As app lie d in this ca se , the fa c tor s li ste d in subsection 115(b)( 5) do not milit ate a g ainst consec utive sentenc ing; they weig h in favor of

it.
First, our r eview of

the re cord r evea ls that the appellant wa s con v i ct ed of “ two or more statutory offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor” as re quired by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-35- 115(b)( 5). The a ppellant pl ed guilty to four (4) counts of the a g g ravated sexual battery of his daug hter.

At the tim e of the abu se , the vic tim ’s mothe r a nd the app e lla nt we re se pa rate d. Th e abu se took place during w eeke nd visitation with the appellant that beg an in a pproxi mately late October or e arl y No ve mbe r o f 2 00 1 a nd c on tin ue d unti l J a nu ary of 20 02

. Th e re la tio ns hip be tw e e n the vic tim
an d t h e ap p el lant of fa ther a nd daug hter c lear ly weig hs in favor of

consec utive sentenc ing. T he appellant wa s entrusted with the c are and we ll-being of his daug hter. See, e.g ., State v. J ernig an, 929 S.W .2d 391, 394-98 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Patrick Kossow, No. M2000- 01871-CCAR3- CD , 2 00 1 WL 95 74 57 , at *8 (T e nn . Crim . A pp ., a t N a sh vil le , A ug . 2 3, 20 01 ); Sta te v. Ha ro ld L y nn Wo o d ru f

f, N o
. 0 1 C0 1

- 9 8 0 9

- CR

- 0 0 3 6 1 , 1 9 9 9 WL 8 2 0 8 7 2 , a t * 4 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A pp., at Nashville, Oc t. 13, 1999).

At the tim e of

the abu se , th e vic tim wa s fiv e (5 ) y e ars old

. Whil e the du ratio n of the abu se wa s sh ort, la sti ng app ro xima te ly thr e e (3 ) mon ths , th is C ou rt ha s p re vio us ly

de te rm ine d th a t a

bu se takin g pla c e ov e r the c ou rs e of a fe w mon ths jus tif ie d c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing , e sp e c ia lly in the c a se of y oung victims. S ee, e .g ., State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tenn. 1999) ; State v. L eonar d Catalano, No. M2001- 0 3 0 3 9 -CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21877933 (Tenn. Crim. App., a t Nashville, J uly 9, 2003), perm. a

pp. denied (Tenn. N ov. 24, 2003); State v. J erry McGaha, No. E2001- 01547- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 499273, at *1-3 (T enn. Crim. App., at Knoxvill e, April 3, 2002); St ate v. J oseph E. Sug g s, No. M1999-02136-CCA-R3- CD, 2000 WL 1521481, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oc t. 4, 2000); State v. Richard L

. Mey er, No. 01C01-9902-CC-00034, 1999 WL 994046, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 3, 1999); Ha rold Ly nn Woodruff, 1999 WL 820872, at *5. This fac tor also weig hs in favor of consec utive sentenc ing.

Further, the “ nature and scope ” of the appellant’s “sexual acts” with the victim was
e xten siv e
. Th e re wa s te sti mon y a t the se nte nc ing he ari ng that th e vic tim wa s n ot o nly

e xpos e d to a video tape of the child’s pare nts e ng ag ed in se x ual activity , but w as forc ed to perform fellatio on her f ather , was for ced to rec eive cunnilingus from her fathe r, and w as for ced to a cquiesc e while he r fathe r w a s “hu nc hin g ” he r, a n ac t dem on str a te d by the vic tim a t the se nte nc ing he ari ng us ing do lls

. I n h is i nte rv ie w w ith a uth or iti e s, the app e lla nt ad mitte d tha t he “ hu nc he d” the vic tim by ru bb ing his penis ag ainst the victim’s vag ina in an ac tion sim ulati n g i n t er course. Obviously , the appe llant’s conduct wa s repr ehensible and repulsive. W e dete rmine that this fac tor weig hs heavily in favor of
consec utive sentenc ing. Finally , the trial court determined that, while “spe culative,” there would be some “ residual [em oti on a l] e ff

e c t a ndda ma g e ” a s a

re su lt o f the vic tim ’s rel ati on sh ip w ith he r f a the r tha t w ou ld justify cons ec u t i v e sentenc ing. T he testimony at the sente ncing hearing r eg arding the emotional-10-

impact of the a

buse to the victim came from Lis a Du p re e, a social worke r at the O ur Kids Clinic, who interview ed the victim prior t o h er me dical-le g al exam. The testimony was a dmitted over objection of the a

ppellant that the long- term eff ects of childhood sexual a

buse “ra ng e from substance abuse, e ating disorders, to more s er i o u s mental hea lth disorders, like mental illness.” Dupr ee testified that the victim in the case h er ei n “r egr essed back to a point in development whe re she
c a nn ot make log ic a l con ne c tio ns ” a ndsu ff e re d f ro m “ so me arr e ste d d e ve lop me nt. ” Du pr e e c a me t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n b a s e d i n p ar to n h e r i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e v i c t i md u r i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w
. A p p ar e n t l y, afte r Dupre e explained to the victim that a doctor would be examining the victim’s g enital ar ea, the vic tim a sk e d w he the r the do c tor wo uld“ hu nc h” he r. Du pr e e op ine d that th e re wo uld“ c ome a tim e when [the victim] will have emotional diffic ulties if this i s not a ddresse d, beca use it is very

clea r that she is no longe r able to ma ke sense of the world around her.” Dupre e stated that it would concern her if the child was doing either e x ceptionally well or e x tremely

poorl y i n s chool. The victim’s mothe r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d not se e n an y c ha ng e s in the vic tim sin c e the abu se a ndthat th e vic tim was doing well in school. The mother also admitted that she had not told the victim that her f ather was in jail or t hat hi s actions constituted a ve ry serious crime. Whil e conc rete evidenc e of “ mental d a m a g e ” w a s s p a

r s e , w e n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n c l u d e t h a tth e t r i a l c o u r tp r o p e r l y f o u n d , b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, that consec utive sentenc es wer e wa rra nted wher e the c onsiderations found in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 5) we igh in f avor of consecu t ive
se nte nc ing . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the appe llant’s sentenc es and a ff i rm the trial court’s decision as to the manne r of se rvice of the sente nces, inc luding c onsecutive se ntencing

.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE