No. 2-- 05--1212 Fil ed: 10-4-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ RIC HARD A. AN DE RSO N and ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court SANDRA P. ANDERSON, ) o f D e K alb Co un t y. ) Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, )

) v. ) No. 00-- CH--16 ) DONALD J. KOHLER, BETT Y J. ) KOHL ER , a nd ARR OWHE AD ) Ho no r ab le DEVELOPMENT GROUP, ) Do uglas R. Eng el and ) Richar d J. Lar so n, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judges, Presidin g.

_ ___________________________________________________________________________ _____ JUSTICE O' MA

LL EY del i vered the opi

ni on of the c ourt : Plai ntif fs, Ri chard A . Anderson a nd Sandra P. A

nderson, appeal

the jud g me nt of the trial courtin fav or o f def endants, Donald J. Kohl er, Bet ty J. Kohl er, and Arrowhead Dev

el opmen t Gro up, followi ng a b ench

t rial o n plaint iff

s' co mplaint. We ag re e wit h plaint iff s t hat t he trial

court violated t heir d ue p ro ces s right s whe n, o ver t heir o bject ion, t he court reli ed on a t ra nscr ipt of t heir ca se- inchi ef from a prior trial

on their com

pla in t rat her than

le t t hem present thei

r case-i n-chi ef anew b ef ore the court . We reverse

and rem and. The background of this m atter is set forth in

our pri ordeci sion, An derson v. Kohl

er , No. 2-- 02--1274 ( 20 03 ) ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme Co ur t Rule 2 3) , a nd we recapi

tulate only

what is necess ary to explai

n our decis ion h

ere. Plai nti f f s s ue d de f en da nts on a n a l l eg ed oral con tract f or t he sale of the Kohl

ers' l and to plai

ntif fs . The compl

ai nt proceeded to a b en ch t r ia l b efore JudgeNo. 2-- 05--1212

-2-

DouglasR. Eng el. At t he cl ose of pl ai ntif fs ' case-i n-chi ef, def endan ts moved un

der section 2--1110 of the C ode of

Ci vi l Procedu re (735 ILCS 5/2--1 110 (W est 200 0)) f

or a f i ndi ng i n thei r f avor. In ru ling on the mot ion, Judge Engel did not weigh the evi dence or assess th e cre di

b i l i ty of the wi tnesses bu t f oun d, a s a matte r of la w, that plai

ntif fs fai le d to present a pr ima fa cie ca se f or th e e xi stenc e of an oral c ontract for the sal e of land. Pla int iffs appealed, and we reve rsed the trial

court 's dec is ion. W

e hel d that plai

ntif fs had presented a pr ima fa cie cas e. A

nd ers on , Sli p op. at 9. We rem

anded for "f

urt her proce edin

gs" withoutspecify

in g how the trial

court should conduct a

new tri al on rem and. A nd ers on , Sli p op. at 11. Whi le the appeal

was pendi

ng, Judg e En

gel reti red. J udge Richard J. L ar so n was assigne d t he case, wh i ch pr oce eded

ag ai n to a ben ch trial . Over pl ai

ntif fs ' obj ection, Judge La

rson barred

them f rom presenti ng thei r case-i n-chi ef aga in and ins tead relied on the transcri pt o f thei r case-i n-chi ef be f ore Ju dg e E ng el. Plai

ntif fs were, however, allowed to present rebut tal foll owing defen

dants' case. At t he clos e o f the evidenc e, Jud ge L ar so n fou nd the wi tnesses f or t he parties

"di am etrical ly opposed, pa r t icu lar ly

as i t related to the alle ged oral contract t o sell real e state." Judge Larson noted that "p laint iff Ri chard A

nderson testif

ie d there was an oral c ontract t o se ll land " w hile " de fen da nt Do na ld Koh ler tes ti fied t her e wa s no or al co nt ra ct t o s ell." Ju dge Lar so n fou nd Richa rd Ander so n and Do na ld Kohler "eq ually cred itable" and D avid Ande rso n, R ichard 's so n who al so testif i ed, " credi bl e." I mplie dly finding Do nald Ko hler mo re cr edible t han Ri chard an d Dav i d A nde rson , the tri

al court en t er ed jud gme nt fo rde fen da nt s. Pla int iffs file d t his t imely a pp ea l. Plaint iff s at t ack bot h t he pr oc edu re of t he t rial and t he su bst ance of it s o ut co me. As t o t he proceduralaspect, plai

ntif fs argue t hat t he t r ial c o ur t co mmit t ed r ev er sible er r o rwh en , o ve rt he ir objec t ion, Judge

La rs on rel i ed on th e tra ns cri pt of the i r ca se -i n- ch i ef f rom t he pr ior t rial in li

eu o f li ve t es t imo ny. Pl

ai n ti f f s a rgue th at, th oug

h cred i b i l i ty was a "cen

tralfocus" of

their cas e at tr ia

l, JudgeNo. 2-- 05--1212

-3-

La rs on h ea rd " onl y a p ortion" of

their wi tnesses' testim ony a nd di d not have a

"f ul l opp ortu n i ty " to observe the demeanor of tho se witnesses. Pla int iffs ci

te In re Ma rri ag e of Sorens on , 127 Ill . App. 3d 967 (1984), from the Fi fth District A pp el l ate Co ur t . I n Sorens on , t he pe t itio ner fil ed p et itio ns f

or diss ol ution of marr i ag e a nd f or tem porary cu st o dy o f t he pa r t ies ' d au gh t er , Sa r ah . Aft er a h ea r ing o n t he pe t it io n f or t em porar y cu st o dy, Ju dg e L o la

Maddox gra nte d te m pora ry cu stod y of Sar ah to the res pon de nt. Judge

Maddox then held a he ar ing o n t he di ss ol ution p eti ti on, taki ng tes ti mony on i ss ue s of perman ent chi ld c ustody and dis tributi on of m

arital assets. Bef

ore Judg e Maddo x issued any findings on t hos e issue s, s he recused her self fro m the c ase . T he ca se wa s rea ss i gn

ed to Jud ge We ndell Dur r, who pr op os ed t o t he partiesthat he decide the i ssuesof perm an en t ch i l d cus tody

an d di str i b uti on of mari tal as sets based on t he transcripts of the h earin gs bef ore Judge Maddox. The parties agreed to the procedure, but o nly the re spon

den t was re pres en ted by coun sel . On

the b asis of

the tran scri pts, Ju dge Durr granted t he res pon de nt p erm

an en t cu stod y of Sar ah . The p eti

ti on er ap peal

ed, arg ui ng th at the tri al court "was wi th out a uth ori ty to en ter j udgm en t bas ed s ole l

y on the record of the pri or hea

ri ngs ." Sorens on , 127 Ill . App. 3d at 968. The appe l l ate

cou rt noted tha t, th ough pri or ca se s " he l d that a

succ es sor

jud ge may p r o pe r ly issu e an order based upo n a predecessor judge's fi ndi ngs of f act, " the present case involv ed "a situ at ion whe re a su cce sso r jud ge issu ed a n or der base d o n origi nal fi ndi ngs of fact dis cerned

f rom t he record of

prior proceed

i ngs ." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Sorens on , 12 7 I ll. App. 3d at 969. The court fou nd no I llino is case "del

in eat[ing] the power of a succ essor judge to make hi s or her own fi

ndi ngs of fact base d so lely upon t ra nscr ibed t est imony and ex h i b i ts" or " de f

i n [i n g] th e p owe

r of l i ti ga n ts to sti pul ate to such a procedu re." Sorens on , 127 Ill. App . 3 d at 969 . T he co ur t t hen su mmed up t he trend i n other j uri sdiction s:No. 2-- 05--1212

-4- "Wh ile t he co ur t s o f ot her jurisd ictio ns are di vi de d on the i ss ueof whether a succ es sor judge ma y m ake f i nd i ng s of f ac t ba se d up on

a transcri pt o f proceedi

ngs over wh

ic h an ot her judge pr es ide d, it is g en er ally he ld t ha t su ch a p r o ce du r e is impr o pe rin th e a bse nce o f a stipul ation by the parties. (See gene

rall y A nnot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 922 (1968 ).) T he r at io na le of t his holding is the longs

tandin g prin ci ple that a li tigant i s enti

tled to a resolution of f

actual que st ions by

a trier of f act who has be en af

forded an oppor tun i ty to as se ss the cre di bi l i ty of t he witne sses b

y obs ervi ng thei r demea n o r . T he se r io us ne ss wit h w hic h t his p r inc iple is re gar ded is evidenc ed bythe f ac t tha t even when pa rti essti pul ateto a re sol

ution of factual que st ions by

a successor judge who r eviews a record o f pri

or pro ceedi

ngs, a n ew trial ma y nevertheless

be warranted

wher e cr itical de t er minatio ns nec essa rily hi nge u po n t he cred

i b i l i ty of one wi tnes s or a s et of wi

tnes ses over a nothe r. ( Moore Golf

, Inc . v . La ke o ver Go lf & Coun try Cl ub, Inc. (1975), 49 App. Div . 2d 583, 370 N.Y. S. 2d 15 6.)" Sorens on , 12 7 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 969. Applying these pri nci ple s, the appella

te court vacated and rem

anded. The court held that t he sti pul ati on of the parti

es w as i ns uf f i cien t to warran

t Judge Durr in deciding t he is sue of custody b ased on transcripts of the proceedin gs bef or e Ju dge Mad do x. T he co ur t re mark ed t hat t he t est imony be f ore Jud ge M addox

was"con tradictory on matt er s cr ucial t o a det er minatio n of t he co mpar at ive parental fi tness" an d, therefore, Judge Du rr"c o uld ha ve r ea ch ed his dec ision o nly by weighing t he t est imony as it ap pe ar ed in t he t r an sc r ipt an d n ec es sa r ily at t r ibu t ing gr ea t er cr ed ib ilit y t o t he t est imony of t he re spo ndent and t he wit nesse s ca lled on r esp ond ent 's behal f." Sorens on , 127 Ill . App. 3d at 970 . O bser vingthat t he "overridi ng concern" in

a child custody case is

the best inter est s o f the chi ld, the court concluded:No. 2-- 05--1212

1 T his i s, a cc ordi ng to Sorens on , w

h at th e l aw re qui re s a t a bare m in im um. Un der Sorens on , even the stipul ated use of transcri

pts in li eu of the de no vo pr ese nt at ion o f evidence may beim proper wh erewi tn es s cre di

b i l i ty i s c en tral to the ca se orwhere ot her im

por tant interest s exi st, such as t hose of the chi ld i n a custody proceedi

ng. -5- "[ W ]edo n

ot b el i ev e th e i n terests of [Sarah] wer e bestserved b y c redibil ity thus attributed on t he basis of

da ta w hi ch wa s i nh ere ntl y i nc om pl ete . If , b y rea son of t heir st ipulat ion, [t he part ies] were not entitled to a det ermi nation of their comparative parental f itnessby a trier of fact who was

affor ded t he o ppo rt unit y to disce rn t ru t hfulness by o bser vingthe de mea nor of contrad i ctory wi tnes ses , [Sarah

], whose lif

e is singu larly affect ed by su ch a d et er minatio n, was so ent it led . O n t his ba sis, we find t he s t ipu lat io n, inso far as it re lat es t o a fi ndi ng of parental fi tness, inconsi stent with t he declared poli cy of [thi s] State." Sorens on , 127 Ill . App. 3d at 970. Defendan ts pro pose t hat, because t he caseat ba r i s n ot "a cri m i na l cas e or a su

pport cas e," Sorens on i s i na ppl i cab l e. In o ur view , t he p rinc iples o f Sorens on areno t so limit ed . T he o nly t en ab le re ading o f Sorens on

is tha t t he co ur t embrac ed t he major ity ru le of o t her jurisd ictio ns: a bsent t he a gr eement o f t he pa rt ies, a suc ces so r jud ge may no t make c re dibili t y det er minatio ns base d o n a transcript of proceedin

gs over whi

ch another judge pres ide d. 1 See An notation, K. Kem

per, Power of Suc ce ss or or

Su bst it ut e J ud ge , in Civ il

Case , t o R ende r D ecisio n or Ent er Jud gment on T est imony Heard by Predecessor, 84 A.L.R. 5t h 399 , 4 18 ( 200 0) (c ollect ing cas es a nd co ncluding that "[ a]s a general ru l e, du e p roc es s c on si

dera ti on s req ui reth at a pa rty i n a c as e tr i ed wi th out a jur y is entitled to a deci si on by

the judge who heard the ev

ide nce"). An

y v ie wth at th i s r ul e is l i m i ted i n Il l i n oi s to casesi n v ol v i n g del i ca te issues like t hos e in Sorens on , or may ha ve di m i ni sh ed appl i ca ti on b as ed

onNo. 2-- 05--1212

-6-

t he substanc e of the underl yi ng controversy, is exti

ngui shed b

y the Ill in ois authorities that Sorens on , oddly, overlooked. The only case Sorens on

cited was Brady

v. Brady, 26 I ll. App. 3d 131 (1975 ), another marriage d

i ssol uti on ca se w

here cus tody i ssues w ere pa

ram ount. Brad

y , h ow ever, ci

ted T r ze bia t o ws ki v . Je r o me , 24 I ll. 2d 24 ( 1962)( Trzeb i atowski II ), whi ch f

oll owed Tr zebiat ow ski v. Je r o me , 19 Il

l . 2d 30 ( 1960)( T r ze bia t o ws ki I ). T r ze bia t o ws ki I and Trzeb i atowski II invo lve d a su it i

n eq ui ty b y th e p l ai n ti f f to in val ida te, as procured by f

raud, a trust agreem

ent between

her and t he de fendant . Aft er a benc h t rial, t he trial courtentered judgm

ent for the plai

ntif f. On direct appeal

t o t he su pr eme co ur t , t he de fendant argued t hat t he trial

court based

its d ecisio n "up on a t heo ry no t adva nced in the p leadings and t o w hich he had no opp ort uni

ty to defend." T r ze bia t o ws ki I , 1 9 I ll. 2d a t 35. The defend ant explaine d th at, thoughthe pla

in tif f' s compl ai nt "sound[ed] i

n actual fraud an d [was] based upon a

fraudul ent wi lf ul
m i sre pres en

tation ," the

tri al cou rt' s dec i si on was"re

pletewi th ref ere nc esto an

d f i nd i ng s of co nst ru ct ivefraud, overreach in g, un con sc i on ab l e f

ee , e n rich men t, and ei ther no servi

ces or no useful serv i ces ." T r ze bia t o ws ki I , 19 Ill. 2d at 35. The sup re me co ur t agr eed t hat "t he theory upon whi ch t he [ t r ial court's ] decr

ee [w as] b ase d took form sub seq uen t to t he pres en tation of e vi den ce." Trzebi atowski I , 19 Il

l . 2d at 36 . T he co ur t re ver sed and r emande d, dire ct ing t hat t he pr oo fs be reopened t o a llow t he de fendant t o pr es en t ad dit io na l ev ide nc e r ele va nt t o t he pla int iff's t he o ry as it evolv ed at trial . On rem an d, th e c ha nc el l orwho had

he ard the evi dence i n the origi

nal proceedin

gs granted
a change of ven

ue, and the case was t ried bef ore "a new j udge who, over p roper and strenuous obj ec ti on b y de f en da n t, p er m i tted pl ai n ti f f to i n trod uc e i n to evi dence the transc

ript of the proceedi

ngs at t he o r igin al h ea r ing ev en t ho ug h t he r e w as no sho win g p laint iff's wit ne ss es we r e n o t av aila ble onNo. 2-- 05--1212

-7-

t he second tr ial ." Trzeb i atowski II , 24 I ll. 2d at 25. After

the defe ndan t presented hi s case, the trial courtfou nd fo r t he pla int iff. The def endan t appealed, an

d the suprem

e court r eversed i

n a b rief op inion, holdi

ng that "[u]nder

the ci rcu m sta nc esref l ec ted i n th e re cord i t wa s error f

ort he se co nd ch an ce l l orto adm

it the transcri

pt of t he first pr oc eed ing into evidenc e and t o co nsid er it as a b as is of decisi on." Trzeb i atowski

II , 24 Ill . 2d at 25. Fo r the court , the i ss ue wa s of constitutional dimension: "The ful l h earin g contempl

ated by due pr oc ess o f law co nt emplat es t hat all of t he evi dence sho uld be sub

mi tt ed bef ore a sin gle judge or master who ma

y s ee the wi

tnesses an

d wei gh their test im

ony and determi

ne their credibil

ity." Trzeb i atowski

II , 24 Ill . 2d at 25-26. The court decl ared that "[i]t was the c l ea rdu t y o f t he ch an ce llo rhe r e t o co nd uc t a t r ial de no vo ." Tr zebi atowski II , 24 I ll. 2 d a t 26 . T he co ur t r ema nd ed "w it h d ire ct io ns t o ha ve a t r ial de n ovo . " Trzeb i atowski

II , 24 Ill . 2d at 26. As authority f

or t he pri nci ple of due pro cess i

t artic ulated, Trzeb i atowski

II cit ed t wo I llino is cases, People ex

rel. Rei ter v. Lupe , 4 05 I ll. 66 ( 195 0) , a nd Mill s v. Ehl er , 407 Il l . 602 (1 951). In Rei ter , the p l ai

ntif f bro ught an a ction f

or an accountin

g agai nst an i nsuran ce compan

y a nd other defendan ts. The trial court referred the cas e to a master in chan cery (the f

irst m aster) to take t est imony and su bm i t prop ose d c onc l

us i ons of law an d fact. At t he conclusi

on of the plain

tiff 's case be f ore the f i rs t mas ter, the

de f en da nts m ove d f ora fin din g in t he ir

f av or. O n th e re com men da ti on of t he first mast er , t he t rial co ur t gr ant ed t he mot ion. The supr em e court re ver sed t he de cision a nd reman ded f or a ne w h eari ng. Re i ter v . Il l i noi s N ati ona l Ca sual ty Co. , 397 Ill . 141 (1947). On reman d, the case was ref

erred to a di ff

erent mas ter (t he second m

as t er ) . T he pla i

n ti f f , s eeki n g to av o id the expense of presenting h is case an ew, moved the second master simpl y to co nside r t he t ra nscr ipt of t he plaint iff

's cas e befo re t he first mast er . T he defend ant s o bject ed, ur ging t he se co ndNo. 2-- 05--1212

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m as te rt o co nd uc t a t r ial de no vo . Th e m oti on wa s ref er re d to th e tr i al j ud ge , w h o de n i ed i t an d directed the second m

aster to conduct a heari

ng de no vo . T he plai

ntif f peti tion ed the su prem e court f ora w rit o f ma

ndam us di recti ng th e tri al cou rt to expun

ge i ts order for a heari

ng de no vo . T he suprem e court denied the peti

tion, reasoni

ng: "[T he second m

aster] has not seen or heard the wi tnessespr o du ce d by p laint iff at the former heari ng. Sin ce a consi deration of the proper

wei ght or suff

ic ie ncy of plai ntif f' s evidence is

a ne ces sary subj ect t o be co nsider ed by him in i nt er pr et ing t he evidence offered by defendan ts, it will be seen t hat t he defend ant s wo uld be d epr ived o f the ir funda menta l right to a d ec i si on by a master w

ho sa w the wi tnes ses on the stan d an d he ard al l thei r testi mony . O n e of

th e du t ies o f a

master i s to dec i deupon

the cre di bi l i ty of the wi tne ss es , a d

uty wh i ch he ca nn ot fully perform i f h e does not see

the wi tnes ses . The f

ull heari ng requi red by due process of law contempl ates th at a

l l of th e ev i den ce

sh oul d b e s ub m i tt ed be f ore a si ngl e j udg e, m

as ter or ot her t r ibu na l wh ich co ul d s ee t he wit ne ss es , we ig h t he irt es t imo ny and d et er mine t he ir cr ed ibilit y. In

the ab senc e of

f i nd i ng s a nd rep ort f rom the mas ter, i n or de r to af f or d th e pa rties a h

ea ri ng wi thi n th e re cogni ze d m ea ni ng of tha t word , i t i s th e d uty of the cou rt t o dir ec t a t r ial de no vo be f

ore an other m aster or b ef

ore i tself . [Ci tation .] * * *
*** No one co uld co nt end in a la w c as e t hat a p laint iff wh o ha d obtai ne d a de ci si on in an App ellate Co ur t , r ever sing t he r ulingof a trial court whi ch h ad taken hi s c as e a wa y f rom t he co ur t or jury, w ou ld have t he r ight t o p re sent hi s evidence from the f irst trial in transcript form at a new trial." Rei

ter , 405 Ill . at 71-73. In Mills , the p l ai

ntif f sue d to hav

e a qu i tcl ai m deed decl ared v oid . The evi den ce was heard by a m aster in chan cery (the f irst m aster), who submi

tt ed pr op os ed c onc lusions of law and fact t o t heNo. 2-- 05--1212

-9-

trial judg e. Lat er , t he plaint iff 's com plai nt wa s dism

i sse d f or fa i l ure to na me a n ece ssa ry par t y. The pla int iff fi led an am ended complai

nt, and, o ver the plai

ntif f' s objection, the case was re fe rre d to a different mast er (t he se co nd mast er ). The sec ond mast er co nduc t ed a hear ing de no vo . O n t he sec ond master's rec ommend ati on, the tri al j udg e di sm

i ss ed the am en de d c om pl ai nt " f or wa nt of equi ty." Mills , 4 07 Ill. at 60 7. Th e p laint iff appealed. When t he ca se r eac hed t he su pr eme co ur t , t he de f en da n ts f i l ed a m oti on to s tri ke f rom th e rec ord

al l matte rsre l ati n g to t he pr oc eed ings befo re t he fi rst master. The plai

ntif f opposed t he motion, sugges

ting that the trial

judge 's deci

si on showed that his concl usi ons were bas ed i

n part on the report from the fi rst master. The c ourt re ject ed t he plaint iff 's i nterpretati on of

the tri al j udge 's deci sion. The court, citing Rei ter , n oted al ter n ati v el y th at, "under the pr eviou s de cisions of t his co ur t , it wo uld have been e rr one ou s eit her for [t he se co nd
master], on a

ref ere nc e to ta keev i de nc e a nd rep ort hi s c onc l

us i ons , or the judg e who made t he referen ce, to have c ons ider ed t he matters pre sen ted to [the f

i rst m aster] on the previ ous ref

eren ce." Mills , 407Ill . at 6 11. Th e c ourt ob serv ed tha t the pl ai nti f f se em ed "a wa re of thi s r ule" "b y he r acti on of causi ng allwi tn esse s who t est ifi

ed be for e [ t he first mast er ], t o a ppe ar aga in befor e [ t he se co nd master]." Mills , 407 Ill . at 612. Several po ints may be d ra wn fro m the ho ldings in Sorens on , Trzebiatowsk iII , Rei ter , a nd Mills . Fi rs t, the la tt er three cases conf

irm that t he due process m

andate--that fi

ndi ngs of fact based on the demeanor of witnesses be m ade by a judge who observed the witnesses--is no t limit ed to marr i ag e di ss ol

ution ca se s. T ho ug h t he y all d ea lt wit h e qu it ab le claims in chancer y cou rt s, no t hing in the ca se s s ugg es ts th

at the e l em

en tary pri nc i ple of due proc es s th

ey es pou se d oe s no t ha ve full sway in pro ceedings at law, as Sorens on would later i

l l ustrate. Indeed, Rei

ter reached

it s ho ldin g in part by dra wing co mpar isons t o p ro cee dings a t law, not ing that "[n ]o one cou ld contend in

a law case that a p l ai n ti f f wh o h ad ob tai n ed a dec i si on i n an A pp el l ate Cou rt, rev ers i ng the rul i ng of a tri al courtNo. 2-- 05--1212

-10-

wh ich ha d t ak en his c as e a wa y fro m t he co ur t o rjur y, w o uld have the righ t t o present hi s evi

dence from the fi

rst t rial in transcript for m at a new trial." Rei ter , 405 Ill . at 72-73. Second, t he requiremen

t o f due process is not met if all the wit nesse s who t est ifi ed be for e t he pre de ce ss orjudge al so give so me t es t imo ny befor e t he su cce sso r jud ge. The sup re me co ur t 's co mmentin Rei

ter that t he second m

aster saw none of the

witne sses wh

o t estif ie d b ef ore th e fi rst master (see Rei

ter , 40 5 I l l . a t 72) must not be taken to im ply that t he m

ere appearance o f those witne ssesbef

ore t he second m

aster would hav e be en s uff icient. Tha t not ion is fo re clos ed by t he co ur t 's descri

ption of wh

at due pro cess requires. According to the cou rt, due pro cess ma ndates that

" all of t he evide nce s hou ld be su bmit t ed be fo r e a sing le ju dg e, mas t er o ro t he rt r ibu na l wh ich co uld see the wi tnesses, wei

gh thei r testi mony and determ

i ne thei r cred i bi l i ty." (Em phasi s ad ded.) Rei ter , 405 I ll. at 71 . Lit ig an t s a r e e nt it led t o "a de cis io n by a ma ster who saw the wi tnesses*** a

nd h eard all their test im

ony." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Rei ter , 40 5 I ll. a t 71 . A t r ial de novo is req uire d whe re t he pr ed ec es so r ju dg e le ft no "fi ndi ngs and report ." Rei

ter , 405 Il l . at 71. Notab l

y , the s uprem e court in Trzeb i atowski

II did no t co nsid er it n ec es sa ry to observe wh

ether all the wi tnesses wh

o t estif ie d at the f i rst he ari ng a l so testif i ed at the se cond

he ari ng. The court found reason enough f or reversal in the si mpl e fac t t hat the j udge who m

ade cr edibility det er minatio ns did no t see all of t he t est imony of the wi tnesses h e j udged. The requi

remen t t hat a j ud ge see the entire test im ony of the wi

tness whose credibi

li ty he assesses i

s i n ke epi ng w i th the di sti nct role s of

tria l and app el

l ate courts. I f cou rtso f r ev iew ar e ill
- eq ui pp ed t o as se ss a w it ne ss 's cr ed ibilit y, t he y ar e no be tter pos i ti on ed to de cid e wh at lev el o f ex po su r e t o a p ar t icu lar wit ne ss is ne ce ss ar y fo ra t r ial c o ur t t o fo r m a substantiated view of hi

s cred ibilit y . Cou

rts of rev i ew are sp are d the n

ee d to m ake th i s ty peof jud gme nt by t he r igid ru le o f Trzeb i atowski II , Rei ter , and Mills .No. 2-- 05--1212

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Thi rd, as the supreme cour t aut horities i mpl y, and as Sorens on

makes ex pli ci t, a succ es sor j udge may render a deci si on based

on a predecessor j udge's f in din gs of f act. See Rei

ter , 405 Ill . at 71-72 (" In the abs ence of

fi ndi ngs an d report from

the master , i

n ord er to affor d t he pa rt ies a hea ring wit hin t he r eco gnized meaning of tha t word , i t i s th e d uty of t he co ur t t o dir ec t a t r ial de no vo be f ore another master or b ef

ore i tself " (em phasi s ad ded)); Sorens on , 12 7 I ll. A pp. 3d a t 969("a succ es sor judge may prop erl y i ss uean orde r b as ed upon a p red ec es sor judge's f in din gs of fact") . W e n

ee d n ot ex plore th e deta

i l s of th i s c av ea t to ren der ou

r d ec i si on , f or here J udge En ge l made n o cred i b i l i ty determi nations in the prior proceedin

g. Fo ur t h, any litigant in the p ro cee ding may assert t he due process right . I n add itio n, a litigant hassta n di n g to obje ct where any

of t he t est imony was no t pr ese nt ed be for e t he judg e who made t he cred i b i l i ty findings. T his includes t est imony from t he li tigant's ownwit nesse s as w ell as t est imony f rom an o t he rlit iga nt 's w it ne ss es . I n t he ca se at ba r , pla int iffs c o mpla in th at th ey wereun ab l e to pr ese nt their own

cas e- in-chief ag ain. I n Trzeb i atowski II and Rei

ter , however, it was the plai ntif fs' dec isions to sta

n d on th e transcri

pts of their cases-in

-chief that t riggered the defendants' objecti ons. Fifth, th e d

ue pr oce ss man da te i s n ot absol ute. A succ es sor

j udg e m ay rel y on tr an scri ptsof a prior trial in li eu of proceedin

g de no vo wher e t he wit nesse s who t est ifi ed a t t he prior tria

l are"n ot av aila ble on the seco nd trial" ( Trzeb i atowski II , 24 Ill . 2dat 25) or wher e t he pa rt ies ag re e t o s t and on t ra nscr ipt s o f the prior proceedin g ( Sorens on , 127 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 969). Sorens on , we note, further su gg ests th at t he ag re ement of t he pa rt ies may be insufficient "w her e cr itical de t er minatio ns ne ce ss ar ily

hi nge upon the credi

bi li ty of one wi

tness or set of witnes ses over an ot her," or where other impor t ant i

n terests ex i st. Sorens on , 127 I ll . App. 3d at 969. We express n o opi n i on on th es e c av ea ts f rom Sorens on , for here the m in im um req ui rem en t of an agreem

ent between the parti es was n ot me tNo. 2-- 05--1212

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and t he r e is no su gg es t io n t ha t an y wit ne ss wh o t es t ified at t he firs t t r ial was unavailable for t he sec ond trial . De f en da n ts contend that Judge Larson's deci si on to proceed as he

di d over p l ai nti f f s' obj ec ti on fi ndsvindicat ion in In re Marri age of Fotsch , 139 Ill. App . 3 d 83 (1 985 ). In Fotsch , th e p red ec es sor judge to ok t estim

ony on the

petitioner' s petiti on for a chan ge of cus t od y of t he pa rt ies' childre n. Wh en the predecessor judge

recus ed h erse l f be f ore the evi dence was concl uded, the petitioner m

oved t he successor j udge to ma ke a de cision ba sed on t he t ra nscr ipt of t he pr oc eed ing befo re t he pr edec es sor

j udge an d on addi ti on al testi mon y pr es en ted b y th e p ar ti es . Th e res pon den t ag re ed to t he procedu

re. The tri al

courtde nied t he p et it io ner 's mo t io n, o n t he b as is o f Sorens on , but certifi ed t he question

f or revi ew. The Fi

rst Di stri ct Ap

pel l ate Court vaca

ted the tria l court's order. The court criticized Sor en son, but on in consi stent grounds. The court dis counted Sorens on as "inco nsist ent wi th th e w el l -e sta b l i sh ed l aw of th isStat e an d m

an y othe rs ," w hi ch i s th at " tran scri ptsof pri or t est imony may b e u se d b y a

successor j udge i f s

uch pro cedure is consented to by all part ies." Fotsch , 139 Ill . App. 3d at 87. Yet the Fotsch co ur t agr eed wit h Sorens on 's re f us al to re l y on th e transcri

pts of the prior proceedin

g de sp i te the parties'

agreem ent to t he procedure. The Fotsch court considered th e re fusal wa rr ant ed be cau se ne ither t he r esp ond ent nor t he pa rt ies' child in So ren son wa s re presented

by cou ns el . In con trast to Sorens on , a ll the p ar t ies in Fotsch wer e r epr ese nt ed by co un se l. The Fotsch

co ur t pr oc eed ed t o d istingu ish Sorens on on one f urther ground: "Finally , in Sorens on , t he successor j udge entered t he judg ment ba sed so lely on t he tra n scri pts of the pri or h ea ri ng an d never h ea rd te sti mony f rom a single w itnes s-- not even t he part ies. In t he ca se be for e us , t he successor j udge will have an o ppo rt unit y to hear t est imonyNo. 2-- 05--1212

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fro m the parents, their ex

perts and vari

ous oth er wi tn es se s, an

d w i l l h av e a n opp ortu n i ty to inter view t he childr en i

n c am era ." Fotsch , 139 Ill . App. 3d at 87. The Fotsch

court off er s thi s r ati on ale as s eemingly independ ent of it s ea rlier o bser vat ion t hat t he partiesvoluntaril

y agreed to the use of transcri pts from the pri

or pro ceedi

ng. If the suggestion i

s that due pr o ce ss is always sa t isfied if all wit nesse s fro m the pri

or proce edi

ng appe ar b ef

ore th e suc ce ss or judge , even i

f n ot all of the evi dence in t he ca se is pr ese nt ed a new t o t hat judg e, t hen Fotsch is out of step wit h sup re me co ur t aut hor ity. I n Trzeb i atowski II , the s up re me c our

t h el d th at " all of th e evi dence sho uld be sub

mi tt ed bef ore a sin gle judge or master who ma

y s ee the wi

tnesses, wei

gh t he ir testi m ony and determ

i ne thei r cred i bi l i ty." (Em phasi s ad ded.) Trzeb i atowski

II , 24 Ill . 2d at 26. In t he pr es en t ca se , Ju dg e E ng el ma de no cr ed ibilit y de t er minat io ns in t he prior proceedin g, and pla int iffs d id n o t ag r ee t ha t t he t r an sc r ipt s fr o m t ha t pr o ce ed ing sho uld st and as thei r case-i n-chi ef be f ore Judge Larson. Judge L arson, therefore, was requ i re d to co nd uc t a t r ial de no vo , w hich he ref us ed to do. The du e p r o ce ss co nc er ns in this cas e are particul arly acute. Plai

ntif fs ' cl ai m of an oral agr eement is

based on a con ve rs ati on between Ri

chard A nderson, hi

s son Dav id, an d Donal d Kohl

er that took pla ce in t he sp r ing o f 19 94 o n R ich ar d' s p r o pe r t y. R ich ar d, Da vid , an d D o na ld a ll testifi ed to t his co nve rsa ti on b

ut, a s J udg e L ars on ob serv ed , Don al d' s v ers i on of the con ve rs ati on "d iame t r ica lly

opposed " Ri

chard' s an d Dav i d's . In plai

ntif fs' cas e- in-chief (be for e Ju dge Eng el) and in thei r reb uttal cas e (b ef

ore Jud ge L ars on) , R icha rd testifi ed that, during the spri ng 1994 co nver sat ion, Donal d "agreed to sell " Richard a parcel of land. David t est ifi

ed, in plaintiffs' case -inch ie f, th at D on al

d s ai d h e w as "m oreth an wi l l i n g" to s el l th e l an d. D av i d di d n ot tes ti f y to th e con ve rs ati on on rebutt al. In the defense case (bef ore Judge Larson), Donal d directl y c ontradictedNo. 2-- 05--1212

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Richa rd and Da

vid, t est ify

ing t hat he o ffered only a su blease o f the land t o R ichard and s aid he "m ay be " woul d agre e to a sal

e later. Judge La r so n ha d o cc as io n t o o bs er ve Ric ha r d a nd Da vid And er so n a s t he y t es t if ied in plai ntif fs' r eb ut t al c as e. T his e xp o su r e w as limit ed in a material respe ct, h owev er . W

h i l e b oth Richard and Dav id h ad testifi ed about the crucia

l s prin g 1994 conversation in

pla in tif fs ' case-i n-chi ef be f ore Judge Engel, only

Ri chard testif

ie d to that conversation i n the rebuttal case bef

ore Judge Lar so n. Da vid 's r eb ut t al t es t imo ny t o uc he d o nly on m atte rs rel evan t to plai nti f f s' ca se f ordamages. Judge Larson, therefore, had n o oppo rtunity

to observe Dav

id a s he testif

ie d to an even t integral to plai ntif fs' case. Wh

ether Judge Larson n

onethel ess saw

enough of David to have an adequate sense of h is credibil ity is im ma terial , for "[t]he ful

l h earin g contempl

ated by due proce ss o f la w contempl ates that all of the evi

dence sh ould be subm itted bef ore a sin gle judge or master who ma

y see the wi

tnesses, wei

gh t he i r testi m ony and determ

i ne thei r cred i bi l i ty." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Trzeb i atowski

II , 24 Ill . 2d at 25-26. Ac co r di ng ly, we r ever se t he trial co urt 's j udgment for defendants on count I of plai ntif fs' com pl ai n t, whi ch sought speci fi

c perform ance of the al le ged oral contract. We als o reverse the trial co ur t 's di sm

i ss al of the remain

in g count , cou nt III , which

sought damages, becausethe dis mi ssal was premised on t he judg ment o n co unt I. If thi s ca se proceed s to a tri al agai n on rem and, the tria l court must co nd uc t a t r ial de no vo because plai ntif fs oppose the

su bs ti tution of tran scri ptsf rom the pri or t r ial f o rlive t es t imo ny. Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e r ever se t he judg ment o f the ci rcu i t cou rt of De Kal b Cou n ty and r emand t his cau se fo r fur t her pr oc eed ings co nsist ent wit h t his op inion. Reversed a

nd rem anded. McL AR EN an d BYR NE, JJ ., conc

ur.