United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-2169

JEAN CLEMENT MASHILINGI,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND,*

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Lynch, Selya, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Nicholas W. Armington, with whom Martha J. Koster, Mintz, 

Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Elena Noureddine, 

and PAIR Project were on brief, for petitioner.

James A. Hurley, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom 

Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Stephen 

J. Flynn, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

were on brief, for respondent.

* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General 

Merrick B. Garland has been substituted for former Attorney General 

William P. Barr as the respondent. 
November 2, 2021
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. It is common ground that "a 

judicial officer who sees and hears a witness has a superior coign 

of vantage in assessing that witness's credibility." ZarumaGuaman v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021). Given that 

superior coign of vantage, courts typically afford considerable 

deference to a trier's credibility determinations. See, e.g., id.

at 3; Rivera-Coca v. Lynch, 844 F.3d 374, 378-79 (1st Cir. 2016); 

Ahmed v. Holder, 765 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2014); Mazariegos-Paiz

v. Holder, 734 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2013); Jianli Chen v. Holder, 

703 F.3d 17, 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2012). This case turns on just such 

a credibility determination — a credibility determination made at 

first hand by an immigration judge (IJ) and affirmed by the Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Given that supportable credibility 

determination, we conclude that the Agency's denial of asylum and 

other relief was supported by substantial evidence on the record 

considered as a whole. Accordingly, we uphold the order of removal 

and deny the petition for judicial review.

I. BACKGROUND

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the 

case. In a visa application dated June 11, 2018, the petitioner, 

Jean Clement Mashilingi, a Rwandan national, requested permission 

to enter the United States and stay for a time in order (he claimed)

to attend the wedding of his son. Once the visitor's visa was 

granted, the petitioner entered the United States in August of
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2018, with permission to stay up until the following February 7. 

On the final day of his authorized stay, the petitioner filed an 

application for protection (in the form of asylum) under the United 

Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). In that asylum

application, he claimed that he was kidnapped, beaten, and tortured

by unknown men (whom he later learned were police officers) over 

several days beginning July 11, 2018. This incident, he said, was 

in retaliation for interviews he filmed for a local television 

station — interviews that concerned allegations that government 

officials were paying high-school girls for sex.

In March of 2019, the petitioner was detained by 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel. He was placed 

in ICE custody, and the Department of Homeland Security instituted

removal proceedings against him on April 8. The petitioner 

conceded removability and cross-applied for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and CAT protection. For the most part, he reiterated his 

previous claims — but this time he alleged that he had immediately 

identified his assailants from the July 2018 incident as police 

officers. 

The IJ held hearings on September 13 and November 4, 

2019. The petitioner testified that he had been a cameraman for 

TV-10, a local television company in Rwanda, and had been assigned 

to collaborate with a journalist who was investigating increased 

pregnancies at local high schools. After some confusion about 
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dates, the petitioner eventually stated that this work had taken 

place in 2018. He went on to testify that he filmed interviews

with two of the pregnant girls, each of whom alleged that 

government officials would visit their school to have sex with 

them and that the school covered up those meretricious activities.

The petitioner further testified that when he arrived 

home after the interview, he saw a police car parked across the 

street. Plainclothes police officers got out of the car and

approached him. He was immediately able to identify the men as 

police officers because they came from the police car and had guns 

and handcuffs. The officers demanded the interview film, queried 

him about his identity, and abused him and his family both verbally 

and physically.

During the petitioner's testimony, there was some 

uncertainty about whether the petitioner had a key to his home and 

how he entered the dwelling. Some of this uncertainty arose 

because the petitioner testified to knocking on his front door, 

not to unlocking it.

The petitioner's testimony continued. He said that —

following the altercation at his home — the men transported him to 

the police station. He was held there for three days while the 

men beat and tortured him and interrogated him regarding the 

whereabouts of the film. He claimed that the officers used 

screwdrivers, removed his thumbnail with pliers, and beat him about 
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the face with their guns. According to the petitioner's account, 

he lost consciousness at some point and awoke in the hospital. He 

was in bad shape: he had swelling about his face, visible 

scarring, and lost and impacted teeth. Although he was not certain 

as to how long he was at the hospital, he was certain that he was 

there "not less than five days." 

In addition to the petitioner's testimony, both sides 

submitted documentary exhibits. These exhibits included the 

petitioner's two applications for relief from removal, his visa 

application, statements from persons with knowledge of various 

events, expert reports, and country conditions reports.1 The 

exhibits did not include the records of the hospital stay that the 

petitioner described as following his alleged beating (which were 

never tendered). 

On December 9, 2019, the IJ denied the petitioner's 

application for relief and ordered him removed to Rwanda. The 

centerpiece of the IJ's written decision was an adverse credibility 

determination: she found the petitioner's testimony not credible 

based on "numerous and significant inconsistencies between [the 

petitioner's] testimony and the documentary evidence, the 

1 Objections were raised by the parties concerning their 

inability to cross-examine the creators of some of these documents 

(including the visa application and the statements of the 

petitioner's children). The IJ did not sustain these objections, 

but advised the parties that she would consider them in determining 

the weight to be given to specific documents.
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implausibility of the timeline of [the petitioner's] account, and 

his responsiveness to the Court's questions." We summarize the 

inconsistencies: 

• The petitioner testified that "the story he used to 

obtain a visa to come to the United States was 

fraudulent" — his son was not getting married. He 

added that his wife's cousin came up with the 

apocryphal tale and filled out the visa application 

for him. Yet, after ICE took him into custody, he 

told ICE officers that he made up the story — but he 

did not mention that his wife's cousin had played any 

role.

• The petitioner testified that he was "kidnapped on 

July 11, 2018, . . . detained for three days, 

and . . . was in the hospital for 'not less than five 

days.'" Yet, his interview for his visa application 

took place at the embassy on July 16, 2018 — a date 

which, "according to [his] timeline, . . . was three 

days before he was released from the hospital." To 

explain this inconsistency, the petitioner suggested 

that his injuries made it difficult for him to 

remember dates. The IJ rejected this suggestion, 

noting that the petitioner steadfastly
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"insisted . . . that he was abducted on July 11, 

2018."

• Even though the petitioner testified that he had 

applied for the visa after his abduction on July 11, 

2018, "it was established . . . that [he] submitted 

his visa application June 14, 2018, almost one month 

prior to his alleged abduction." The IJ found the 

petitioner's explanation for this discrepancy 

unsatisfactory because that explanation did not 

"clarif[y] the timeline of events." Nor did it make 

sense for the petitioner to have sought a visa prior 

to his abduction; according to his testimony — "it 

was his abduction that prompted him to apply for a 

visa." 

• The petitioner testified that the injury to his teeth 

was caused, in part, by his captors "hit[ting] him in 

the mouth with the butt of a gun." In contrast, a 

medical report introduced by the petitioner did not 

ascribe the damage to his teeth to being struck by 

the butt of a gun but, rather, stated that he told 

his doctor that these injuries were inflicted, at 

least in part, when he "was kicked in the face with a 
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heavy boot."2 The IJ found that the petitioner did 

not satisfactorily explain the inconsistency between 

his testimony and the medical report.

• The IJ found that the petitioner's answers were 

inconsistent and evasive with respect to whether 

stitches had been administered: in his testimony,

the petitioner equivocated about whether or not he 

had received stitches, and he did not explain why he 

had equivocated.

• The petitioner testified that he had his visa photo 

taken on July 17, 2018 — six days after he was abducted 

and a few days after he was allegedly beaten and 

tortured. But the photos showed no facial injuries 

or disfiguration. The IJ found it "implausible that 

the photo of [the petitioner] would not display 

significant trauma to [his] face," given that he 

"received such a severe beating that caused his teeth 

to be removed," was an inpatient for "'not less than 

five days' in the hospital immediately preceding his 

2 The medical report was not prepared contemporaneously with 

the petitioner's hospitalization but, rather, was prepared by a 

physician who examined the petitioner during the time — roughly a 

year later — when he was being detained in ICE custody. With 

respect to the etiology of the claimed injuries, the report relies 

exclusively on the petitioner's recitation of events. 
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visa interview," and supposedly "received stitches 

above his left eye."

• The petitioner originally testified that he began 

working on the investigation that allegedly triggered 

his abduction in June 2017. He later testified that 

he had started working on the investigation in June 

of 2018. The IJ did not credit the petitioner's 

explanation that he had confused the starting date of 

the investigation with the starting date of his 

employment at the television station.

• When asked about the men who allegedly abducted him, 

the petitioner testified that "he could tell they were 

police because they had guns, batons, and handcuffs, 

and that he saw them exit the police car." This 

conflicted with his original asylum application, in 

which he stated that he did not know the identity of 

the men who abducted him and did not realize that they 

were police until later.

• The IJ found that the petitioner's answers were 

nonresponsive and evasive with respect to why he did 

not have a key to his own home.

• The petitioner testified that "he learned his wife 

was in the United States in December 2018," but both 

of his asylum applications — submitted after December 
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2018 — stated that "he left his wife in Rwanda and he 

did not know where she was." The IJ considered the 

petitioner's attempted explanations but found them 

unconvincing.

Although these inconsistencies vary in importance and 

degree, the IJ did not simply lump them all together. Instead, 

the IJ noted that, "while each of these inconsistencies taken alone 

may not be concerning," their cumulative effect was great. In her 

view, neither the petitioner's explanations for the 

inconsistencies nor his documentary proffers were sufficient to

repair his damaged credibility. Nor were they sufficient to 

salvage his claims for relief.

The petitioner appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA. 

He contended — as relevant here — that the IJ's adverse credibility 

determination was clearly erroneous. In support, he argued that 

the listed inconsistencies were either "subject . . . to obvious 

explanation, or . . . the result of a misreading or misquotation 

of the record." He further argued that the IJ erred both by not 

giving due weight to corroborating evidence and by requiring him 

to provide additional corroboration that he could not reasonably 

obtain.

Unswayed by these arguments, the BIA upheld the IJ's 

adverse credibility determination, rejected the petitioner's other 

assignments of error, and affirmed the IJ's decision. Of 
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particular pertinence for present purposes, the BIA concluded that 

the adverse credibility determination was supported by "specific, 

cogent reasons based in the record." This timely petition for 

judicial review followed. In it, the petitioner maintains that 

his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection 

were erroneously denied.

II. ANALYSIS

Where, as here, the BIA's decision rests primarily on 

the IJ's decision, we review both decisions as a unit. See ZarumaGuaman, 988 F.3d at 5. For ease in exposition, we attribute the 

adverse credibility determination to the IJ (mindful, however, 

that the BIA unequivocally upheld that determination).

We start with the petitioner's claim for asylum. To 

obtain that relief, he had to show, inter alia, that he was "unable 

or unwilling to return to his homeland on account of either past 

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution." Id. 

On this record, his own testimony is indispensable to that showing: 

without his testimony, there is no sufficient proof either of 

persecution or of a well-founded fear of persecution. In the first 

instance, then, our inquiry focuses on the supportability of the 

IJ's adverse credibility determination. 

An adverse credibility determination is, at bottom, a 

finding of fact. As such, it is subject to review (in immigration 

proceedings) under the substantial evidence standard. See id.
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This standard is deferential: "[a]s long as the agency's 

credibility determination is 'supported by reasonable, 

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a 

whole,' we must accept it." Id. (quoting Rivas-Mira v. Holder, 

556 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2009)). Put another way, "a reviewing 

court should leave such a [credibility] determination intact as 

long as the agency provides specific and cogent reasons for it."

Ahmed, 765 F.3d at 100; see Weng v. Holder, 593 F.3d 66, 71-72 

(1st Cir. 2010). "[A]bsent an error of law" — and we discern none 

here — "we will reverse only if the record is such as to compel a 

reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary determination." ZarumaGuaman, 988 F.3d at 5 (quoting Chhay v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 5 

(1st Cir. 2008)).

In making credibility determinations, an IJ must 

consider "the totality of the circumstances." 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Relevant factors include:

the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 

applicant or witness, the inherent 

plausibility of the applicant's or witness's 

account, the consistency between the 

applicant's or witness's written and oral 

statements (whenever made and whether or not 

under oath, and considering the circumstances 

under which the statements were made), the 

internal consistency of each such statement, 

the consistency of such statements with other 

evidence of record (including the reports of 

the Department of State on country 

conditions), and any inaccuracies or 

falsehoods in such statements, without regard 

to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy or 
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falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's 

claim, or any other relevant factor.

Id. An adverse credibility determination, appropriately reached,

may in itself suffice to defeat an alien's claim for asylum. See

Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 5.

The petitioner argues that the IJ's adverse credibility 

determination was based not on substantial evidence but, rather, 

on "a selective and misconstrued reading of the record." The 

inconsistencies identified by the IJ, he says, were either 

insignificant or nonexistent. Each of them was either "subject to 

obvious explanation, or result[ed] from a misreading or 

misquotation of the record."

We think that the petitioner reads the record through 

rose-colored glasses. The identified inconsistencies are real.3 

And although some of them may be arguable, it was the proper 

province of the IJ to resolve any uncertainty. When the facts 

give rise to competing inferences, each of which is plausible, the 

IJ's choice between those competing inferences cannot be found to 

3 To illustrate, we need look no further than the 

inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the 

petitioner's visa application. This application was dated nearly 

a month before the incident that allegedly prompted him to flee. 

He admitted — both in testimony and in a sworn affidavit — that 

the story he used to gain admittance to the United States was 

concocted. In addition, the time line of the petitioner's alleged 

torture and recovery does not jibe with the time line of the visaapplication process: they overlap in incompatible ways, and the 

visa photo does not show injuries consistent with the alleged 

beating.
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be unsupported by substantial evidence. See Jiang v. Gonzales, 

474 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2007). 

So, too, the bare fact that the petitioner offered 

explanations for the inconsistencies does not carry the day. Part 

of the IJ's function, qua factfinder, is to sift wheat from chaff 

and assess the persuasive force of explanations that are offered 

for apparent inconsistencies. See Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 8. 

Here, the reasons given by the IJ for discounting the petitioner's 

explanations are plausible and, thus, supported by substantial 

evidence. 

The petitioner also argues that some of the identified 

inconsistencies are trivial. That argument, however, suggests 

that we should overlook the forest and focus instead on the 

individual trees. But credibility determinations require a 

reviewing court to consider the record in its entirety. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 

5. The whole is frequently greater than the sum of the parts and 

— whatever may be said about any particular inconsistency if that 

inconsistency is viewed in splendid isolation — the record in this 

case, taken in its totality, strongly supports the IJ's adverse 

credibility determination. Given the number of inconsistencies,

their overall significance, and the weakness of the petitioner's 

explanations, it would stand logic on its head to say that the 
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record as a whole compels a conclusion that the IJ's adverse 

credibility determination was either arbitrary or unfounded.

The short of it is that the inconsistencies in the 

petitioner's testimony were specifically identified, welldocumented, hard as a group to reconcile or explain, and 

cumulatively persuasive of a lack of credibility. Viewing them in 

the aggregate, a factfinder reasonably could conclude — as the IJ 

did — that the petitioner's testimony was unreliable and, thus, 

unworthy of belief. Consequently, the IJ's adverse credibility 

determination passes the substantial evidence test. 

For the sake of completeness, we deal briefly with some 

of the petitioner's other arguments. To begin, he suggests that 

the IJ disregarded substantial corroborating evidence such as his 

children's statements, the medical report, and the report of an 

expert witness. This suggestion does not get him very far.

The petitioner's contention that the IJ erred in not 

attaching greater significance to his children's statements is 

easily dispatched. The IJ considered the children's statements 

but — as she promised she would do when the government objected to 

their admission, see supra note 1 — gave the statements "limited 

weight" because the children were not available for crossexamination. The IJ's assessment of these statements was 

reasonable and does not throw any shade on her adverse credibility 

determination. See Jianli Chen, 703 F.3d at 26 (discussing IJ's 
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prerogative to make determinations about which evidentiary 

documents — and which statements within them — should be given 

weight). 

The petitioner next suggests that the medical report

corroborated his claimed injuries. At best, the medical report 

was a mixed bag, and the IJ did refer explicitly to it in her 

decision. She was not obliged to dissect the report and discuss 

every statement in it. See, e.g., Sihotang v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 

46, 51 (1st Cir. 2018). An IJ may "sift through relevant 

documents, determining which documents are persuasive and which 

statements within a particular document should be given weight." 

Jianli Chen, 703 F.3d at 26. And with respect to such triaging, 

a reviewing court should defer to the IJ's reasonable exercise of 

her judgment. See id.

Nor did the IJ (as the petitioner insists) overlook the 

expert witness's report.4 Rather, she considered it but found it 

unreliable because it was based, in relevant part, on the 

petitioner's own statements. The IJ found the petitioner "not 

credible" and, thus, determined that any conclusions drawn by the 

expert from the petitioner's testimony were also "unreliable." 

4 The expert in question — Dr. Harry Verhoeven — is a political 

scientist. He had no personal knowledge regarding the petitioner's 

travails. Instead, he offered an opinion on the plausibility of 

the petitioner's account, from the vantage point of his (the 

expert's) knowledge of Rwandan country conditions.
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This determination was reasonable: it is a common-sense 

proposition that the quality of an expert's opinions cannot be 

better than the quality of the information supplied to the expert. 

Contrary to the petitioner's importunings, this

determination was not a product of circular reasoning. Unlike in 

Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2007) — the decision 

relied upon by the petitioner — it is plain that the IJ's adverse

credibility determination was the basis of, not the result of, her

findings about the unreliability of the expert's report. There 

was no circularity in the IJ's reasoning.

The petitioner also suggests that the IJ violated his 

due process rights by premising the adverse credibility 

determination partly on unauthenticated evidence (his visa 

application). In support, he alleges that his visa application 

"was not subject to any authenticating testimony concerning the 

information it contained," that it "was not authenticated by an 

official publication," and that it was not "attested by the 

official having legal custody of the record." Thus, the 

petitioner's thesis runs, the admission into evidence of the visa 

application and the IJ's reliance on it were fundamentally unfair. 

The petitioner's thesis rests on a faulty premise. There 

are no hard-and-fast rules for authenticating foreign public 

documents in immigration proceedings. See Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 

27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 7 
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(explaining that "[s]trict rules of evidence do not apply in 

immigration proceedings" (alteration in original) (quoting Jianli 

Chen, 703 F.3d at 23)). In such cases, "a petitioner's own 

testimony is a proper method that may be used to authenticate 

foreign public documents." Vatyan, 508 F.3d at 1185. So it is 

here: the petitioner's testimony authenticated the documents. We 

discern nothing about either the visa application's admission or

the IJ's reliance on it that is antithetic to due process. See, 

e.g., Yongo, 355 F.3d at 30-31 (upholding admission and use of 

unauthenticated immigration documents as against due process 

challenge). 

The petitioner's final plaint is that the IJ overstepped

in requiring corroborating evidence that was not reasonably 

available to him. He submits that "before the failure to produce 

corroborating evidence can be held against an applicant, there 

must be explicit findings that (1) it was reasonable to expect the 

applicant to produce corroboration and (2) the applicant's failure 

to do so was not adequately explained." Seoung v. Holder, 677 

F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 2012). 

This plaint is wide of the mark. In this case, the IJ 

did not require corroborating evidence5 and did not hinge her 

5 Although the IJ noted that a statement from the petitioner's 

wife was "reasonably available and not provided," this comment was 

made in connection with her conclusion that the petitioner's 
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decision on the absence of such evidence. Instead, she quoted our 

statement in Ahmed, 765 F.3d at 101, that "the presence of 

corroboration may save an asylum application notwithstanding the 

alien's apparent lack of credibility." She then concluded that 

the corroborating documentation proffered by the petitioner was 

inadequate to accomplish that objective. In the IJ's words, the 

corroborating evidence proffered by the petitioner was 

"insufficient to support his claim of past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution." 

To recapitulate, we find nothing amiss either with the 

IJ's adverse credibility determination or with the BIA's 

affirmance of that determination. Given the chasmal gap in the 

proof resulting from the lack of sufficient evidence of persecution 

(past or future), the denial of the petitioner's claim for asylum

was supported by substantial evidence. See id.; Mazariegos-Paiz, 

734 F.3d at 65.

Upholding the denial of the petitioner's asylum claim 

effectively ends our inquiry. Because the standard for withholding 

of removal is more stringent than that for asylum, the petitioner's 

counterpart claim for withholding of removal must likewise fail. 

See Rivera-Coca, 844 F.3d at 378 ("Thus, if the petitioner 'fails 

to establish a well-founded fear of persecution sufficient to 

corroborating evidence was lackluster (not as support for the 

adverse credibility determination itself). 
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ground an asylum claim, a counterpart claim for withholding of 

removal . . . necessarily fails.'" (alteration in original)

(quoting Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2009))). 

Finally, the petitioner's CAT claim flounders for much the same 

reason as his asylum claim. To gain protection under the CAT, the

petitioner had to prove that it was more likely than not that he 

would be tortured were he repatriated to Rwanda. Because the 

petitioner's proof in this regard rested mainly on his own

testimony, the adverse credibility determination sinks that claim

as well. See Mazariegos-Paiz, 734 F.3d at 65. 

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the petition for judicial review is denied.

So Ordered.