MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2022 ME	56

Docket: Yor-22-60

Submitted

On	Briefs: September	21,	2022

Decided: November	15,	2022

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	and	LAWRENCE,	JJ.

IVAN	J.	DAVIES

v.

MARY	T.	DAVIES

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1]	 Mary	T.	Davies	appeals	from	an	order	entered	by	the	District	Court	

(Biddeford,	 Mulhern,	 J.)	 striking	 her	 “motion	 to	 reopen	 evidence”	 on	

Ivan J. Davies’s motion	to	modify	child	support because	she	failed	to pay	a	filing	

fee.		Mary	contends	that	the	trial	court	erred	by	interpreting	the	administrative	

order	setting	 forth	 the	court	fees schedule,	Revised	Court	Fees	Schedule	and	

Document	Management	Procedures,	Me.	Admin.	Order	JB-05-26	(as	amended	

by	A. 2-21.2)	(effective	Feb.	11,	2021),1 as	requiring	a	filing	fee	for	a	motion	filed	

1	 	Me.	Admin. Order	 JB-05-26	 has	 recently	 been	 amended	 but	 not	in	 any	way	 that	 affects	 this	

appeal.		See Revised	Court	Fees	Schedule	and	Document	Management	Procedures,	Me.	Admin.	Order	

JB-05-26	(as	amended	by	A.	6-22)	(effective	June	1,	2022).
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pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	59	where the	only	issue	in	the	underlying	matter	is	child	

support.		We	agree	and	vacate	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	Ivan	and	Mary	divorced	in	 2007.	 	At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 divorce,	 the	

parties	 had	 two	 minor	 children,	 and	 Ivan	 was	 ordered	 to	 pay	 Mary	 child	

support	in	the	amount	of	$910	per	month.

[¶3]	 	 In 2018,	 Ivan	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 modify	 child	 support,	 seeking	 a	

reduction	 in	 his	 support	 obligation	 because	 the	 parties’	 oldest	 child	 had	

reached	 nineteen	 years	 of	 age and	 had	 graduated	 from	 high	 school.		

See 19-A M.R.S.	 §	 2006(8)(G)(1)-(2) (2022).	 	On	November	 22,	 2021,	 after	 a	

hearing,	the	trial	court	entered	an	order	granting	Ivan’s	motion,	reducing his	

child	support	obligation	to	$455	per	month,	retroactive	to	when	the	motion	was	

served	on	Mary.

[¶4]		On	November	30,	2021,	Mary	attempted	to	file	a	“motion	to	reopen	

evidence” pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 59(a),	 asserting	 that	 she	 had	 discovered	

evidence	that	was	unavailable	at	the	time	of	the	hearing and	would	show that	

Ivan’s	actual	income	in	2021	was	significantly	higher	than	the	income	imputed	

to	him	by	the	trial	court	in	its	order.		By	a	notice	dated	December	14,	2021,	the	

clerk	 returned	Mary’s	motion for	 failing	 to	include	 the	 filing	 fee required	 by	
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Me. Admin.	Order	JB-05-26.		See M.R.	Civ.	P.	5(f)	(“Filings	that	are	received	but	

which	are	not	. . .	accompanied	at	the	time	of	filing	by	a	legally	required	element,	

including	but	not	limited	 to,	a	filing	 fee,	.	.	.	shall	be	returned	by	 the	clerk	as	

incomplete.”).	 Six	 days	later,	Mary	 refiled her	“motion	 to	 reopen	 evidence,”

again	 without	 the	 fee.	 	 In	 the	 cover	 letter	 accompanying	the	 refiled	 motion,	

Mary	 requested	 that	 her	motion	 be	 restored	 to	 the docket	as	 of	 the	 original	

filing	 date,	arguing	 that	Me.	Admin.	Order	 JB-05-26	“explicitly	exempts	 from	

any	filing	fee	a	Rule	59	Motion	related	to	an	underlying	motion	to	modify	child	

support	order.”		On	February 14, 2022,	the	trial	court	entered	an	order, stating

that

while	 [Ivan]	may	 have	 been	exempted	 from	a	 filing	 fee	when	 he	

filed	the	motion	to	modify,	[Mary’s]	Rule	59(a)	Motion	to	Reopen	

Evidence	is	a	separate	filing	for .	.	.	which	a	filing	fee	is	required.

[Mary’s]	Rule	59(a)	Motion	to	Reopen	Evidence	was	properly	

rejected	 as	 incomplete	 for	 lack	 of	 a	 filing	 fee	 on	 November 30,	

202[1].	 	 It	 similarly	 should	 not	 have	 been	 accepted	 for	 filing	 on	

December	 20,	 2021.	 	 The	 Motion	 to	 Reopen	 Evidence	 filed	 on	

December	20,	2021	is	hereby	STRICKEN.		No	action	will	be	taken	

on	that	motion	as	it	is	not	properly	before	the	Court.

Mary	timely	appealed.		See 14	M.R.S.	§	1901(1)	(2022);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶5]		Mary	contends	that	the	trial	court	erred	by	interpreting	the	court	

fees schedule as	requiring	a	filing	fee	for	her	motion	to	reopen evidence.		“We	
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review	a	trial	court’s	interpretation	of	procedural	rules	de	novo and	look	to	the	

plain	language	of	 the	rules to	determine	 their	meaning.”		U.S Bank Tr., N.A. v.

Keefe, 2020 ME 104, ¶ 6, 237 A.3d 904 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[¶6]		Me.	Admin. Order JB-05-26	sets	forth	the	Judicial	Branch’s	schedule	

of	court	fees.		The	relevant	provision	states	that	a	$60	fee	is	required	when

[f]iling	a	Motion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	55(b)(2),	59,	60(b),	62,	or	

66,	except	there	shall	be	no	fee	for	the	following:

• Motion	to	Modify	or	Enforce	a	Child	Support	Order

• Motion	for	Contempt	alleging	the	failure	to	pay	child	support

• Motion	for	Contempt	filed	by	a	plaintiff	in	a	Protection	from	

Abuse	Action

• Motion	for	Contempt	filed	by	a	plaintiff	in	a	Protection	from	

Harassment	 action	 involving	 domestic	 violence,	 stalking,	

sexual	assault,	sex	trafficking,	or	unauthorized	dissemination	

of	certain	private	images

Me.	 Admin.	Order	 JB-05-26 §	 I(A)(3)(y) (footnotes	 omitted).	 	This	 provision

further	states:

A	motion	or	stipulation	to	modify	or	enforce	a	child	support	order	

may	include	a	request	for	attorney	fees	and	still	be	exempt	from	the	

post-judgment	filing	fee.		A	fee	will	be	charged	for	a	post-judgment	

motion	or	stipulation	that	raises	additional	issues.		For	example,	a	

motion	 or	 stipulation	 seeking	 both	 a	 change	 in	 visitation	 and	

modification	of	child	support	requires	payment	of	the	fee.

Id. §	I(A)(3)(y)	n.16.
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[¶7]	 	 Hence,	 the	 question	 presented	 in	 this	 appeal	 is	 whether	 the	

administrative	 order	 exempts	 the	 fee	 requirement	 for	 post-judgment	

motions—here, a	motion	 filed	pursuant	 to	Rule	59(a)—when	 the	underlying	

matter	is	solely	a	motion	to	modify	or	enforce	a	child	support	order.

[¶8]		We	start	with	the	plain	language	of	the	administrative	order,	taking	

into	 account	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 order,	 and	 our	 analysis	 ends	 there	 if	 the	

meaning	is	clear.		See Higgins	v.	Wood,	2018	ME	88, ¶	58,	189	A.3d	724 (Jabar, J.,	

dissenting)	(stating	that,	as	with	statutes, we	interpret	court	orders	based	on	

their	plain	language);	Dickau	v.	Vt.	Mut.	Ins.,	2014	ME	158,	¶	21,	107	A.3d	621

(“[W]e	 must	interpret	 the	 plain	 language	 by	 taking	into	 account	 the	 subject	

matter	 and	 purposes	 of	 the	 statute,	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	 particular	

interpretation.”);	Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 2011 ME 123, ¶ 16, 32 A.3d

1030	(stating	that	our	analysis	of	a	statute ends	with	its	plain	language when	

the	statute’s	meaning	is	clear	and	 the	result	is	not	illogical	or	absurd).		In	so	

reviewing	 plain	 language,	 we	 must	 reject	 interpretations	 that	 do	 not	 give	

meaning	to	every	word	in	the	text.		State	v.	Dubois	Livestock,	Inc., 2017	ME	223,	

¶	8,	174	A.3d	308;	see	also Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc., 2013 ME

37, ¶ 15, 68 A.3d 1262; Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Pros. Licensure, 2006 ME 48,

¶ 20, 896 A.2d 271.
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[¶9]		Applying these rules of statutory construction, the plain language of

the administrative order imposes a fee except as to “a Motion pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. 55(b)(2), 59, 60(b), 62, or 66” for a series of motions, including a “Motion

to Modify or Enforce a Child Support Order.”	 	 Me.	 Admin.	 Order	 JB-05-26	

§ I(A)(3)(y).		A motion to modify or enforce child support is governed by M.R.

Civ. P. 107(a)(1) if it is a pre-judgment motion and by M.R. Civ. P. 120(a) if it is

a post-judgment motion.		In other words, there is no such thing as a motion to

modify or enforce a child support order “pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), 59,

60(b), 62, or 66.”		But there clearly is an exception to the fee requirement for a

motion under those rules that involves “a Motion to Modify or Enforce a Child

Support Order.”		Me.	Admin.	Order	JB-05-26	§	I(A)(3)(y).		That exception makes

sense if, and only if, we interpret it to apply to a Rule 59 motion seeking a new

trial on a modify or enforce a child support order—exactly what Mary’s motion

was attempting to do.		It follows that the only reading of our administrative

order that gives any meaning at all to the exception is one that exempts the

filing fee when the purpose of “a Motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), 59,

60(b), 62, or 66” is to address the modification or enforcement of child support.

Me. Admin.	 Order	 JB-05-26	 § I(A)(3)(y);	 see Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 20,
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896 A.2d 271 (“[B]ecause no language is to be treated as surplusage if it can be

reasonably construed, we must give meaning to this language.”).

[¶10]	 	 This reading does not result in an illogical or absurd result,

see Dickau,	2014	ME	158,	¶	21,	107	A.3d	621,	but rather is consistent with the

purpose of the fee exemption—to exempt fees in the context of proceedings

solely addressing child support, see	 generally 19-A	M.R.S.	 § 2202(1)	 (2022).		

Therefore, we need go no further than the text of the administrative order.

2		

See Russell, 2011 ME 123, ¶ 16, 32 A.3d 1030.		Because Mary was not required

to pay a filing fee, we vacate the trial court’s order striking Mary’s motion to

reopen evidence and remand to the trial court to restore her motion to the

docket as of the original filing date of November 30, 2021.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 District	

Court	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with	

this	opinion.

2		Because	we	conclude	that	no	fee	is	required	to	file	a	post-judgment	motion	in	matters	dealing	

with	child	support	only,	we	need	not	reach	Mary’s	alternative	argument	that	her	failure	to	pay	a	filing	

fee	should	be	excused	for	good	cause.
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Dori	 F.	 Chadbourne,	 Esq.,	 Chadbourne	 Law	 Offices,	 P.A.,	 Cumberland,	 for	

appellant	Mary	T.	Davies

Craig	 J.	 Rancourt,	 Esq.,	 Law	 Offices	 of	 Craig	 J.	 Rancourt,	 P.A.,	 Biddeford,	 for	

appellee	Ivan	J.	Davies

Biddeford	District	Court	docket	number	FM-2006-496

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY