United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1432 

JUAN C. PEREZ-TOLENTINO, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

ANDREI IANCU, Director of the 

United States Patent and Trademark Office; 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 

Defendants, Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Lipez, and Barron, 

 Circuit Judges. 

Juan A. Vélez-Méndez on brief for appellant. 

W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney; Mariana E. BauzáAlmonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division; and Antonio L. Perez-Alonso, Assistant United States 

Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

December 21, 2020 
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Juan C. Perez-Tolentino 

("Perez") challenges the dismissal of his disability 

discrimination suit against the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office ("USPTO") and its director. The district court held that 

the action could not proceed because Perez waived his 

discrimination claim in a settlement agreement that allowed him to 

resign from his job in lieu of being terminated. Although Perez 

acknowledges the waiver, he argues that it is void because he did 

not knowingly and voluntarily agree to it. He claims that the 

district court erred in finding implausible his allegation of an 

unenforceable waiver. 

Having carefully reviewed the complaint and related 

materials in the record, we agree with the district court's 

analysis of the circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement 

and the court's conclusion that the waiver is binding. See Beddall 

v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) ("When 

. . . a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked 

to -- and admittedly dependent upon -- a document (the authenticity 

of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into 

the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)."). We add only the 

following comments in response to Perez's arguments to this court. 

(1) Perez's primary contention on appeal is that the 

district court erred by failing to consider his psychiatric 
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disability when reviewing the factors relevant to his waiver. 

However, Perez neither alleges in his complaint nor argued in his 

opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss that his ability 

to understand and evaluate the settlement agreement or the waiver 

was compromised by his mental state. Indeed, Perez's complaint 

emphasizes his intellectual capability, alleging that his "medical 

condition" -- described as "major stress" -- would not prevent him 

from performing "the essential job functions of his position" on 

a part-time basis. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 20. 

Perez first reported his "recent" diagnosis of 

depression and anxiety, and his "pharmacologic treatment for his 

mental disorders," in his motion to alter and amend the district 

court's judgment,1 but even then did not explain how those 

conditions impaired his ability to consider the three-page 

settlement agreement (a deficiency that persists on appeal). 

Moreover, Perez was not left to his own devices in deciding whether 

to sign the agreement; significantly, he was assisted throughout 

the settlement process by his union representative, who also was 

a signatory to the agreement. 

Our caselaw clearly rejects the sufficiency of a bald 

assertion of a psychiatric condition to void a waiver where the 

surrounding circumstances otherwise demonstrate voluntariness. 

1 Perez presents no argument on appeal concerning the denial 

of this post-judgment motion. 
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See Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 277 

(1st Cir. 2002) (emphasizing precedent holding that "an incapacity 

to knowingly and voluntarily execute a release will not be inferred 

simply from the showing, standing alone, that the party suffered 

from some psychiatric disorder"); Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. 

Union Emps. Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 714 (1st Cir. 

1999) (stating that "[t]he fact that [the employee] suffered from 

various disorders, including depression, and was on medication is 

insufficient, without more, to invalidate the Agreement"); RiveraFlores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st 

Cir. 1997) (stating that it is not "enough [for an employee] to 

assert that the nature of [his] disability was psychiatric" because 

"not all psychiatric disabilities inherently involve a question 

about capacity to act knowingly and voluntarily" (emphasis 

omitted)). Having failed to explain the relevance of his condition 

to the district court, Perez waived this theory of involuntariness 

as a basis for invalidating his express relinquishment of the 

discrimination claim. See, e.g., Morais, 167 F.3d at 712. 

(2) Perez also contends that, in evaluating the validity 

of his waiver, the district court improperly disregarded guidance 

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on 

waivers of employment discrimination claims. Putting aside the 

question of whether courts must adhere to such guidance, Perez is 

simply wrong about the district court's analysis. As the court 
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correctly explained in its order denying Perez's post-judgment 

motion, its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was fully 

consistent with the EEOC guidelines as well as this court's 

precedent. See EEOC, Understanding Waivers of Discrimination 

Claims in Employee Severance Agreements, EEOC-NVTA-2009-3, 

https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severance-agreements.html 

(last visited Nov. 30, 2020); Melanson, 281 F.3d at 276 & n.4 

(identifying the "non-exclusive set of six factors" used to 

determine the validity of a release). The court noted, inter alia, 

the clarity of the agreement's language, Perez's ability as a 

patent examiner to read documents, the time allowed for his review 

of the agreement,2 and the content "incorporat[ing] exactly what 

[Perez] requested from the USPTO."3 Although it acknowledged that 

Perez was not represented by counsel and "had no input regarding 

[the agreement's] terms," the court pointed out that the agreement 

itself encouraged Perez to consult an attorney and that his union 

representative also signed the agreement. Moreover, the court 

observed, Perez "did not ask for assistance, clarification, or 

2 Perez stated in his opposition to the USPTO's motion to 

dismiss that he was given six days to consider the three-page 

settlement agreement.

3 After he received notice of his termination, Perez asked 

for, and was given, the benefit of resigning with a release of 

claims. 
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different terms," and the record does not indicate that the USPTO 

"denied [him] an opportunity to negotiate."

(3) We deem meritless Perez's assertion that his 

administrative claim of disability discrimination, pursued after 

he signed the settlement agreement, shows that he did not 

understand the waiver. Where all other factors point to Perez's 

knowing and voluntary consent to the waiver, we cannot reasonably 

give weight to his disregard of the agreement. Otherwise, as 

appellees point out, a party could intentionally void an agreement 

simply by breaching it. 

 In sum, the district court properly concluded that 

Perez's allegations "fail[ed] to plausibly show that he did not 

sign the [s]ettlement [a]greement 'knowingly and voluntarily.'" 

Accordingly, the agreement precludes his disability claim, and the 

district court properly dismissed his complaint. 

Affirmed.