Notice: This opinion is subject to form al revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 17-BG-0152

I N RE A BIGAIL A SKEW , R ESPONDENT

. A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 497703) On Report and Recommendation of the

Board on Professional Responsibility (13-BD-238)

(Argued October 29, 2019 Decided February 20, 2020) John O. Iweanoge, Jr. , for respondent.

Julia L. Porter , Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P. Fox , Disciplinary Counsel, and Jennifer P. Lyman , Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary Coun sel. Before B LACKBURNE -R IGSBY , Chief Judge , T HOMPSON , Associate Judge , and W ASHINGTON , Senior Judge.

P ER C URIAM : On July 31, 2009, this court appointed respondent Abigail Askew to represent Purnell Jacks on, an incarcerated indigent de fendant, in the appeal from his conviction of a felony violation of the Bail Re form Act (Appeal No. 09-CF-0850). On June 19, 201 3, we vacated respondent’s app ointment, finding that she had failed to f ile a brief and appendix on beh alf of Mr. Jackson2 despite successive orders by this court extending the time for filing, ignored this court’s orders directing that t he brief and appendix be filed, and failed to respond to a show-cause order as to why she should not be held in conte mpt for failure to file the brief and appendix or otherwise to comply with this co urt’s orders. We referred the matter to the Office of Bar Counsel (now known as the Office of “Disciplinary Counsel,” the ter m we use hereafter), which in Oc tober 2014 charged respondent with seven violations of the District of Columbia Ru les of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1(a) & (b) (failing to provide client with com petent representation), Rule 1.3(a) (fa iling to provide zealous and di ligent representation), Rule 1.4(a) (failing to keep client reasonably informed), Rule 1.4(b) (failing to explain matter to client to enable client to make informed deci sions), Rule 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying obligation under rules of a tribunal), an d Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the adminis tration of justice) in connection with her appointment to represent Mr. Jackson. A fe w months earlier (in July 2014), this court had sanctioned res pondent for simila r misconduct (violating all but one of the fo regoing Rules) relating to anot her, similar matter.

See In re Askew , 96 A.3d 52 (D.C. 2014) (per curiam) (“ Askew I”) (imposing a sixmonth suspension, with all but sixty days stayed, and a one-yea r probationary term, for neglect of imprisoned and i ndigent client Ronald Middleton)

.3 In May 2016, an Ad Hoc Hearing Committee (the “Hearing Committe e”) found in the instant matter that Disciplinary Counsel proved al l seven charged

violations and recommended that respondent be suspended from th e practice of law for six months and required to p rove fitness before reinstateme nt to the bar. The Board on Professional Responsibilit y (“BPR”) adopted the Hearin g Committee’s factual findings (including its credibility determinations) and conclusions of law and, in light of aggravating fa ctors (respondent’s failure to a cknowledge fault in her handling of Mr. Jackson’s case and what the Hearing Committ ee found to be several instances of respondent’s deliberately false testimony before the Hearing Committee), also adopted the Hea ring Committee’s recommended sa nction of a six-month suspension and a requirement to demonstrate fitness b efore

reinstatement.

For the reasons that follow, we accept the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the Rules violations and agree with th e recommended sixmonth suspension. However, we decline to impose a fitness requ irement. Instead, we will require respondent to comp lete a practice management co urse and, after her suspension, to serve a one-y ear probationary period under t he watch of a practice monitor.4

I.

Respondent was the sole witness at her June 30, 2015, hearing b efore the Hearing Committee. Her testimony and the documentary evidence established the following facts, which are undisputed except as identified in t he discussion that follows. Between July 31, 2009, and June 19, 2013, respondent made the following unsuccessful attempts to contact her client. In Augu st 2009, she attempted to visit Mr. Jackson at the District of Columbia Jail , where she was

informed that he had been transferred to a federal institution. Respondent then performed a Bureau of Prisons search, which traced Mr. Jackson to a federal facility in Petersburg, Virginia. Respondent thereafter wrote three letters to Mr. Jackson. She sent the first letter in August 2009, and the let ter was not returned to her, but she received no respon se. Respondent sent a second le tter to Mr. Jackson in either December 2009 or January 2010. She testified that af ter sending the second letter, she “attempted to contact his facility to try to talk to him.” Specifically, she testified, she spoke “at least once” with a P etersburg facility counselor — whose name respondent did not recall — who informed respondent5 that he would speak with Mr. Jackson about respondent’s efforts to contact him. 1 Respondent did not schedule a time to speak with Mr. Jackson, a nd she had no

record of her call to the counselor.

Respondent testified that she did not have copies of the letters she sent to Mr. Jackson because she lost “all of her prior electronic infor mation” because of a computer virus she experienced in May 2011. 2 She further testified that, in early 2011, approximately one year after she wrote the second letter to Mr. Jackson, she received a phone call from a “young lady,” who would not identi fy herself but who stated that Mr. Jackson wanted to know why respondent was “tryi ng to get in touch with him.” Respondent explained to the caller that she had bee n appointed to represent Mr. Jackson. Respondent took the phone call as an in dication that Mr. Jackson “had to have gotten [r espondent’s] letter[,]” because t hat was “the only way [the caller] could have go tten [respondent’s contact] infor mation to call [respondent] on his behalf.” Respondent thought she was “going to be hearing from [Mr. Jackson] based on the phone call.”

1 The Hearing Committee found that respondent’s testimony about her attempt to contact a counselor at Mr. Jackson’s federal institu tion was uncorroborated, implausible , and deliberately false.

2 The Hearing Committee found that respondent’s testimony regar ding her retention of hard-copy documents was inconsistent with her test imony in Askew I.6

On June 28, 2011, respondent wrote a third letter to Mr. Jackso n addressed to the federal correctional institution in Petersburg, but the letter was returned to respondent (and was first opened during the disciplinary hearin g). 3 Upon receiving the returned letter, respondent, thinking that Mr. Jackson migh t have been transferred to another facility, conducted another Bureau of Pr isons search and spoke to someone at the Bureau of Prisons, but did not locate M r. Jackson. At some point in July or August 2011, Ms. Askew made inquiries to this court’s Legal Division about hiring an investigator to assist in locating Mr. Jackson; she was informed that this court would not cover the cost of hiring an investigator in the situation respondent described. Respondent did not move the co urt for permission to hire an investigator and did not inquire of anyone more expe rienced than she (such as the Public Defender Serv ice or the U.S. Attorney’s Off ice) about what to

do when she could not locate her client.

On December 8, 2011, respondent filed a motion to dismiss Mr. J ackson’s appeal without prejudice, on the ground that she was unable to contact the client.

3 The Hearing Committee specifically credited respondent’s test imony that she wrote three letters to Mr. Jackson, because the testimony w as corroborated by her motion filings and by the third letter, which respondent pr oduced at her hearing.7

On December 28, 2011, this court denied the motion without prej udice to renewal of the motion after a more complete search, which this court ad vised should include “contacting [the] U.S. Parole [C]ommission since appell ant is subject to three years of supervised relea se.” Subsequently, between Janu ary and September of 2012, respondent contacted CSOSA (the Court Services and Off ender Supervision Agency), identified Mr. Jackson’s supervisory offic er and left telephone messages for her and her supervisor, and sent a lette r, but never made

contact.

The documentary evidence presente d at the hearing established t hat, over the nearly four years that respondent represented Mr. Jackson, she responded late or not at all to several of this court’s orders. She responded la te to orders issued on June 29, 2011 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed b y July 18; motion for extension of time not filed until July 21); June 22, 2012; July 27, 2012 (directing that the brief and appendix be f iled by September 10; motion fo r extension of time not stamped filed until September 12) 4 ; October 3, 2012 (directing that the brief

4 Respondent contends that she di d not in fact respond late to the court order issued on July 27, 2019. She testified that she filed a motion in response to this order on September 10, 2012, the d ay it was due, and points to the fact that her filing bears stamps indicating both a September 10, 2012, date of receipt and a September 12, 2012, date of receipt. The Hearing Committee fou nd this testimony (continued...)8 and appendix be filed by December 3; motion for extension of ti me not filed until December 6) and March 1, 2013 (directing that the brief and ap pendix be filed within 15 days; motion for extension of time not filed until 17 days later). Respondent failed to respond to c ourt orders issued on July 31, 2009 (requiring respondent to file a statement regarding transcripts); October 21, 2010 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed within 40 days); March 7, 2011 (directing that the brief and appendix be file d by March 30); April 5, 2011 (di recting that the brief and appendix be filed within 2 0 days); August 1, 2011 (directin g that the brief and appendix be filed by September 16); October 5, 2011 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed within 15 days ); November 22, 2011 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed within 10 days ); February 28, 2012 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed within 40 days ); April 17, 2012 (directing th at the brief and appendix be filed within 20 days ); May 18, 2012 (directing that the brief and appendix be filed within 15 days ); July 27, 2012 (directing tha t the brief and appendix be filed by September 10); September 12, 2012 (directi ng that the brief and appendix be filed within 15 days); December 14, 2012 (direc ting that the brief and appendix be filed by Februa ry 4, 2013); and March 26, 2013 (directing that the brief and appendix be f iled by April 1, 2013).

(...continued) to be deliberately false and “a n attempt to capitalize on a [c] ourt date-stamping error.”9

With regard to her failure to respond and late responses to cou rt orders, respondent testified that she “had a lot of trouble with . . . mail” addressed to her at

her virtual office at 1629 K Street. 5 She testified that her mail was sometimes returned without her knowing it, and that by the time she recei ved some of the court’s orders, “they were beyond their deadlines.” She testif ied that she made arrangements to have her mail forwarded from her office to a P. O. Box address near her home in Bowie, Maryland to try to address the problem. 6 She explained that she could not file a brief in response to the court’s orde rs because she needed

first “to talk to Mr. Jackson or have some type of communicatio n with him[.]”

On June 19, 2013, upon Ms. Askew’s failure to respond to this c ourt’s March 26, 2013, order, we issued a n order vacating her appointm ent and appointing replacement counsel for Mr. Jackson. The court furn ished a copy of

5 The Hearing Committee found that respondent’s testimony regar ding mail issues did “not ring true” and was deliberately false.

6 In January 2013, respondent informed this court that she woul d henceforth be using her P.O. Box address. Respondent testified that she d id not receive the court orders filed on August 1, 2011; October 5, 2011; February 28, 2012; and March 26, 2013. Two of the orders that were addressed to her o ffice address — the April 17, 2012, and May 18, 2012, orders — were returned to the court as undeliverable. However, the court orders dated August 1, 2011; October 5, 2011; February 28, 2012; and March 26, 2013 were not returned by the Post Office.10

this order to Mr. Jackson at Fort Dix. Within five months of h is appointment, replacement counsel was able to l ocate Mr. Jackson and communic ate with him. On November 27, 2013, replacement counsel filed a motion to dis miss the appeal accompanied by a statement signe d by Mr. Jackson waiving his ri ght to appeal, and this court granted that motion.

On June 30, 2015, the Hearing Committee issued its Report and Recommendation, rejecting responde nt’s contention that she had done “everything [she] could in this case” and finding that Disciplinary Counsel had proven all seven charged violations. The Hearing Committee also found that the record was “replete” with testimony (the testimony mentioned in notes 1, 2 , 4, 5, and 6 supra , as well as testimony relating to w hen respondent received the o rder terminating both her representation of Mr. Middleton and her membership in the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) panel) “that either rings false or was othe rwise contradicted by the evidence.” The Hearing Committee emphasized that, in Askew I , respondent “violated the same Disciplinary Ru les charged in the instant ma tter.”

The Board issued its Report a nd Recommendation on February 9, 2 017, incorporating by reference the Hearing Committee’s Report and a dopting the Hearing Committee’s recommendations.11

II.

This court reviews de novo the Board’s legal conclusions. In re Szymkowicz , 195 A.3d 785, 788 (D.C. 2018) (per cu riam). We accept “findin gs of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence o f record.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1); In re Johnson , 103 A.3d 194, 197 (D.C. 2014). 7 We also give deference to the Board’s recommended disposition unless doing s o “would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dis positions for comparable conduc t or would

otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1); In re McClure , 144 A.3d 570, 572 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam). “Ultimately, however, . . . the imposition of sanctions[] is the responsibility and duty of this court.” In re Haar , 698 A.2d 412, 423 (D.C. 1997). The final decisi on on sanctions is “committed to this Court’s

discretion.” In re Dickens , 174 A.3d 283, 296 (D.C. 2017).

7 The Board must defer to the f actual findings of the Hearing C ommittee so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re CleaverBascombe , 986 A.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. 2010) (per curiam).12

III.

We have no difficulty sustaining the Board’s conclusion that re spondent

violated each of the Rules cited in the Specification of Charge s.

A. Rules 1.1(a) and (b)

Rule 1.1(a) provides that “a la wyer shall provide competent re presentation to a client.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 1.1(a). “Competent represen tation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughne ss, and preparation reasonabl y necessary for the representation.” Id. Rule 1.1(b) provides that “a lawyer shall serve a client with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to cli ents by other lawyers in similar matters.” D.C . Bar Appx. A, Rule 1.1(b). T hese rules address

failures that constitute a “serious deficiency” in an attorney’ s representation of a

client. In re Yelverton , 105 A.3d 413, 421

– 22 (D.C. 2014). “Mere careless errors do not rise to the level of incompetence.” In re Evans , 902 A.2d 56, 70 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam).13 Respondent argues that her failure to locate her client does no t constitute a

Rule 1.1 violation because there was no prejudice to Mr. Jackso n. She also contends that her inability to lo cate her client was a mere car eless error that did not rise to the threshold of serious deficiency. We do not agree. A serious deficiency “has generally been found in cases where the attorney makes an error that prejudices or could have prejudiced a client and the error was caused by a lack of

competence .” Yelverton , 105 A.3d at 422 (emphasis added). Because actual prejudice is not required, a fortuitous lack of injury to the c lient does not shield a respondent from discipline in response to her neglect of her pr ofessional obligations. In re Speights , 173 A.3d 96, 101 (D.C. 2017) (per curiam). Here, respondent’s failure to successfully make contact with Mr. Jack son over the span of approximately four years could have prejudiced him by puttin g his appellate rights in jeopardy. Further, res pondent’s meager and lackadais ical efforts to find her client over a four-year period cannot fairly be characteriz ed as merely careless. To illustrate, respondent either knew or should have known, fro m the docket sheet in Mr. Jackson’s Bail Reform Act case, that Mr. Jackson, who in September 2008 had been committed pending disposition, had received a sentence of sixteen months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release; and that, by January 2010, there was at least a possib ility that he was on supervise d release and might be found through a CSOSA supervisory office. Respondent’s fail ure to recognize14 this possibility until she received advice from this court when her motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, evinced a failure to familiarize herself with the record, which sounds in incompet ence rather than mere carelessn ess. 8 In addition, respondent’s “dropping of the ba ll in a litigation matter throu gh unexcused failure to make required filings . . . unquestionably violate[d] Rule 1 .1.” In re Sumner , 665 A.2d 986, 989 (D.C. 1995).

B. Rule 1.3(a)

Rule 1.3(a) states that an attorney “shall represent a client z ealously and diligently within the bounds of the law.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rul e 1.3(a); Speights ,

8 Respondent also makes the curious argument that Rule 1.1 viol ations arise only where an attorney makes a single error, rather than an agg regation of errors, and where there was also evidence that the attorney was inexper ienced. But the fact that respondent Askew was an experienced attorney (althoug h she was new to the CJA panel, having joined it in 2008 or 2009, she testified that she worked for over six years as a prosecutor in the Cook County State’s Attor ney’s Office after being admitted to the Illinois bar in 2000) and the fact that s he persisted in her deficient conduct, did not diminish her obligations under Rule 1.1. See, e.g. , In re Mance , 869 A.2d 339, 341 n.8 (D.C. 2005) (per curiam) (“well-respect ed” defense attorney sanctioned for Rule 1.1 violation); In re Drew , 693 A.2d 1127 (D.C. 1997) (per curiam) (suspending attorney for Rule 1.1(a) and (b) violations in the course of representing two defe ndants in separate criminal appe als); In re Douglass , 745 A.2d 307 (D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (publically censuring a n attorney for violating several ru les, including Rule 1.1, in co nnection to various aspects of probate representation).15 173 A.3d at 135. We have interpreted this Rule to prohibit a f ailure to act for a “significant time to further a client’s cause” independently of whether the client is ultimately prejudiced by the delay. In re Starnes , 829 A.2d 488, 503

- 4 (D.C. 2003) (per curiam). “Neglect of client matters is a serious violatio n of the obligation of diligence.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 1.3, Comment 8.

Respondent’s failure to make contact with her client and file a brief on his behalf for a period of approximately four years clearly implica tes Rule 1.3(a). 9 As the Hearing Committee emphasized, respondent “took only sporadi c action to

locate and communicate with” Mr. Jackson, “waiting several mont hs (and at one point approximately a year) betw een action steps.” There also was no evidence that respondent attempted to make an in-person visit to Mr. Jac kson’s supervisory officer when respondent’s effort s at telephone and letter conta ct failed (even though, we take notice, the CSOSA office is located near the co urthouse), and no evidence that respondent asked Mr. Jackson’s trial counsel, the Assistant United States Attorney who had been assigned to this case, or this cou rt’s Clerk’s Office for assistance in locating Mr. Jackson. The Board’s finding th at respondent failed

9 Respondent testified that she reviewed Mr. Jackson’s trial tr anscripts, performed research, and drafted a brief, but acknowledged that she could not produce any hard copy of a draft b rief that she had prepared fo r his appeal.16 to act with diligence and zeal in representing Mr. Jackson is s upported by

substantial evidence.

C. Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) 10

Rule 1.4(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall keep a client reaso nably informed

about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonabl e requests for information.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 1.4(a). Rule 1.4(b) prov ides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessar y to permit the client to make informed decisions reg arding the representation.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 1.4(b). “To meet that expectation, a lawyer not only must resp ond to client inquiries but also must initiate communications to provide info rmation when

needed.” In re Hallmark , 831 A.2d 366, 374 (D.C. 2003). Further, an attorney

must make more than a pro forma attempt to initiate communications. See In re

Geno , 997 A.2d 692, 693 (D.C. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that “a f ew phone calls and one letter sent on the eve of the hearing” were insuf ficient to satisfy Rule 1.4). Here, respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Jackson for approximately

10 Respondent’s brief asserts that she did not violate rule 1.4( h). Given that there is no Rule 1.4(h) and that respondent was not charged wit h violating Rule 1.4(h), we interpret respondent’s statements as assertions that she did not violate Rule 1.4(b).17 four years, never actually having an exchange with him during t he period of her appointment to represent him. Her attempts to contact her clie nt were perfunctory, at best, and fell short of her e thical duties under Rules 1.4(a ) and (b).

D. Rule 3.4(c)

Pursuant to Rule 3.4, a lawyer shall not “[k]nowingly disobey a n obligation

under the rules of a tribunal ex cept for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 3.4(c). We have previously recognized that a failure to meet filing deadlines can violate Rule 3.4. See In re

Murdter , 131 A.3d 355, 356 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that atto rney’s failure to “file appellate briefs for convicted indigent defend ants he was appointed to represent or respond to numerous orders in connection therew ith” constituted a violation of Rule 3.4). Respondent emphasizes that she could n ot file a brief until

she had made contact with Mr. Jack son. Nevertheless, she remai ned under an obligation to respond to, and not simply ignore, court orders. 11 The evidence shows that respondent responded late, or did not respond at all , to court orders at least sixteen times in this case, not counting the two orders t hat were returned to

11 Respondent first informed this court that she was experiencin g difficulties in contacting her client in a mo tion filed February 2011, appro ximately nineteen months after she was appointed.18 the court as undeliverable. We ag ree with the Board that Ms. A skew’s repeated disregard of court orders constitu tes a violation of Rule 3.4(c ).

In taking exception to the finding of a Rule 3.4(c) violation, respondent contends that she reasonably belie ved she was absolved of any r esponsibilities towards Mr. Jackson as of January 2013, which was when she test ified that she became aware of this court’s September 27, 2011, order entered in Middleton that removed her from the CJA panel. The Hearing Committee rejected respondent’s claim, finding that she remained counsel of record in Jackson until this court vacated her appointment on June 19, 2013, and noting that respo ndent turned over

the Middleton file to replacement counsel before January 2013 (supporting an inference that respondent knew of the Middleton order before that time). In addition, despite respondent’s c laim that she believed the Middleton order removed

her from Jackson , she submitted a motion to extend time in Jackson even after the

date she identified as the date when she received the Middleton order. As already noted, the Committee found that r espondent’s testimony regardin g the Middleton order was deliberately false.

E. Rule 8.4(d)19 Rule 8.4 provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a l awyer to . . . engage in conduct that seriously i nterferes with the administra tion of justice.” D.C. Bar Appx. A, Rule 8.4(d). A n attorney violates Rule 8.4(d ) when her improper conduct causes an unnece ssary expenditure of time and resources that taints a judicial proceeding in more than a de minimis way. See In re Cole , 967 A.2d 1264, 1266 (D.C. 2009).

Respondent’s repeated and unexplained failures to comply with c ourt orders delayed a resolution in Mr. Jack son’s case. Furthermore, becau se of respondent’s misconduct, the court had to appoint replacement counsel for Mr . Jackson. Respondent’s conduct is precisely the type of conduct that we h ave often held

violated Rule 8.4. See In re Ukwu , 926 A.2d 1106, 1142

- 43 (D.C. 2007) (holding that an attorney’s failure to file a brief by the due date set by the court, when the attorney had previously stated hi s intention to file a brief, v iolated Rule 8.4(d)); In re Toppelberg , 906 A.2d 881 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam) (suspending attorney wh o failed to comply with a court or der for a Rule 8.4 violation).

IV.20 The purpose of imposing attorney discipline is not to punish th e attorney, but

rather to serve the interests of the public and of the professi on. Cleaver-Bascombe , 986 A.2d at 1199. In determining what sanction to impose, this court reviews a respondent’s violations in light o f all the relevant factors, w hich generally include “(1) the seriousness of the conduc t, (2) prejudice to the clien t, (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) v iolation of other disciplinar y rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has a cknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances.” In re Ekekwe-Kauffman , 210 A.3d 775, 797 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam). In addressing t he fourth of these factors, we simply restate that the Hearing Committee and Board found, and we agree, that respondent’s conduct discussed herein violated seve n of the Rules of

Professional Conduct. We address each of the other factors bel ow (departing

somewhat from the order in which they are listed in Ekekwe-Kauffman ).

As to the first of the foregoing factors, respondent’s neglect of Mr. Jackson’s

case was serious misconduct. Her failure to fulfill her obligat ions as a CJA attorney undermines the Criminal Justice Act’s aim “to provide indigent defendants with not just the mere formal appointment of someone who happens to be a lawyer but more critically legal assistance that is reason ably diligent, conscientious and competent,” and “reflects negatively on both this court and the21 legal profession.” Askew I , 96 A.3d at 60 (internal quot ation marks omitted). And as to prejudice, the second factor, even though Mr. Jackson did ultimately decide to forgo his appeal, it is possible that if he had had the bene fit of the advice of counsel during that four-year period, he might have decided not to waive his appeal rights.

Focusing on her disciplinary history, the fifth factor, respond ent urges us to impose no more than a probationary sanction, asserting that the sanction imposed

in Askew I “was calculated to address the vi olations” in issue in the inst ant case. In other words, she argues that she has already been disciplined f or the conduct involved here. We cannot agree. In our opinion in Askew I , we did allude to the fact that respondent “failed to f ile the brief and respond to c ourt order” in “one other criminal case [ Jackson ],” in order to explain that the conduct involved in

Askew I was not “aberration[al].” Askew I , 96 A.3d at 61. However, contrary to respondent’s claim that the rele vant “facts were known by the C ourt of Appeals when it imposed sanction in Askew I ,” all the relevant facts of Jackson were not

before the court in Askew I . As the Board correctly concluded, the passing

reference to the instant matter in Askew I “does not evidence a full understanding by the [c]ourt of the facts of this case.”22 We do agree with respondent, however, that the time periods inv olved in

Askew I and the instant case overlapped and that the violations involved here “occurred at approximately the sam e period of time” as the viol ations sanctioned in

Askew I . Respondent was appointed to re present Mr. Jackson almost a y ear before she was appointed to represent Mr. Middleton. Her initial effo rts to contact Mr. Jackson by letter in August 2009 a nd December 2009 or January 2 010 predated her appointment to represent Mr. Middleton in June 2010. Responden t sent a third letter to Mr. Jackson in June 2011, months before this court va cated respondent’s appointment to represent Mr. Middleton in September 2011, see Askew I , 96 A.3d at 57, and months before Disciplinary Counsel opened its invest igation into respondent’s conduct in Mr. Middleton’s case in October 2011, id. at 58. Respondent should have known that her attempts to contact Mr. J ackson were inadequate. However, we cannot say that the disciplinary actio n initiated based on respondent’s conduct in representing Mr. Middleton, or this court’s response to respondent’s lack of diligence and neglect of Mr. Middleton, di d anything to caution respondent against Rules violations during the first tw o years of her appointment to represent Mr. Jackson.

Respondent’s actions after the fall of 2011 included a motion t o dismiss Mr. Jackson’s appeal without prejudice and efforts over the next ye ar to obtain23 information from CSOSA. Neither approach was adequate to the s ituation, but both approaches were different from the mere letter-writing to Mr. Jackson at

federal institutions that had followed respondent’s learning th at he was not housed

in the D.C. Jail. On this reco rd, we cannot say that responden t learned nothing from the disciplinary action that was initiated based on her mi sconduct in handling

the Middleton case

. Thus, we do not agree with the Hearing Committee that respondent “did nothing to bring herself into compliance” with her ethical obligations. And even though, as the Hearing Committee correct ly observed, respondent’s “misconduct in the i nstant matter extended over a longer period of time [than the Middleton matter that formed the basis for her discipline in Askew I ] (four years vs. 18 months),” respondent did not repeat the will ful neglect — i.e., respondent’s “actively ignor[ing] both [the client] and the fam ily members who reached out to [respondent] on his behalf,” Askew I , 96 A.3d at 59, 60 — for which

we sanctioned her in Askew I

.

The disciplinary action and te rmination-of-appointment in Middleton should have reminded respondent of the importance of responding timely to court orders. But in sanctioning respondent in Askew I in July 2014 — which came after we had vacated respondent’s appointment to represent Mr. Jackson — we said that the 60- day suspension we imposed would give her time to restructure he r practice to24 ensure adequate mail delivery, so as to correct the problem tha t respondent blamed for missing court orders. 96 A.3d at 62. We do not think it a ppropriate to sanction respondent additionally for her un timely responses to court ord ers during a period that pre-dates the corrective- action period we prescribed.

In light of all the foregoing, we will not treat respondent’s d isciplinary history as an aggravating factor; rather (and on this we agree with the Hearing Committee and the Board), we think it is appropriate to conside r respondent’s violations in this case as if they were before the Board simult aneously with the

violations sanctioned in Askew I . The Hearing Committee read our previous cases to set a “baseline” of a six-month suspension for the neglect o f indigent criminal

defendants. 12 That is a fair assessment, although in a number of cases we h ave imposed only a three-month suspension for neglect of client mat ters and failure to

communicate with the client. 13 The Hearing Committee and the Board, reasoning

12 See In re Murdter , 131 A.3d at 356 (imposing six-month suspension, all but sixty days stayed); Askew I , 96 A.3d at 62 (imposing six-month suspension, all but sixty days stayed); In re Rosen , 470 A.2d 292, 293 (D.C. 1983) (imposing sixmonth suspension for neglect and intentional failure to carry o ut client’s objectives in court-appointed representation); In re Whitlock , 441 A.2d 989, 992 (D.C. 1982) (imposing six-month suspension for neglect of court-appointed c lients).

13 See, e.g. , In re Alexander , 466 A.2d 447 (D.C. 1983) (suspending the respondent for a period of three months for gross and willful n eglect of two client matters); In re Knox , 441 A.2d 265 (D.C. 1982) (three-month suspension for (continued...)25 that a year’s suspension would ha ve been the appropriate sancti on for respondent’s

misconduct in the Middleton and Jackson matters taken together, recommended a six-month suspension in this case on the ground that a six-mont h suspension (with all but 60 days stayed) was already imposed in Askew I. “[C]onsistency with other dispositions [might] call[] for imposition of [only] one six-month suspension for respondent’s conduct involved in both proceedings.” Whitlock , 441 A.2d at 990. But because most of the six-month suspension we imposed in Askew I was stayed, we accept the Board’s recommenda tion of a six-month suspension.

An additional basis for accepting the Board’s recommendation ofa sixmonth suspension rather than imposing a three-month suspension relates to the fourth factor that we consider when determining what sanction t o impose: whether the respondent’s conduct involved dishonesty. As already descr ibed, the Hearing

Committee identified seven instances of what it found to be del iberately false testimony by respondent. While a three-month suspension might otherwise be appropriate for respondent’s neglect of the matter for Mr. Jack son, see supra note

(...continued) respondent’s failure to pursue c lient’s personal injury and wor ker’s compensation claims over a period of years).26 13, we deem a three-month suspension to be inadequate in light of respondent’s deliberately false statements to the Hearing Committee.

The sixth factor we consider is whether the attorney has acknow ledged her wrongful conduct. The Board highlighted respondent’s continued insistence that she did everything she could to contact Mr. Jackson and her fai lure to express remorse and to acknowledge her misconduct. In our view, howeve r, the record shows a lack of competence (e.g ., it appears that the various m eans a competent attorney would have used to lo cate her client never occurred to respondent, even by the date of the hearing) rather than an unwillingness to exp ress remorse or acknowledge misconduct. We highl ight respondent’s statement th at she “d[id not] know any other way to have done it [i.e. to have contacted Mr. Jackson],” as well as her failure to comprehend how to fulfill her obligations whe n her lack of success in reaching the client conflicte d with the filing deadlines set by the court.

Finally, as to the seventh factor, the record does not suggest any mitigating circumstances, such as an emotional or mental condition underly ing the27

misconduct involved here, 14 that should cause us to shorten or stay the suspension we have determined is the appropriate sanction.

The Board recommended that we impose a fitness requirement, exp laining that “a significant factor” in its determination that a fitness requirement is appropriate was the Hearing Co mmittee’s finding that respondent deliberately testified falsely about her conduc t. To be sure, deliberately false testimony is an aggravating factor, and we have treated it as such in adopting the recommendation of a six-month suspension. 15 But, as we have explained, a determination that a substantial sanction is warranted is not necessarily sufficient to justify a fitness requirement. In re Cater , 887 A.2d 1, 22 (D.C. 2005). The reason for imposing a proof-of-fitness require ment is “conceptually different from th e reason for suspending a respondent for a period of time.” Id. In contrast to a suspension, which is “intended to serve as the commensurate response to the attorney’s past ethical misconduct, . . . [an] open-ended fitness requirement i s intended to be an

14 Cf. In re Adams, 191 A.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C. 2018).

15 See , e.g ., Cleaver-Bascombe , 892 A.2d at 413 (recognizing that a respondent’s deliberately false testimony in a disciplinary pro ceeding is “a significant aggravating factor”); In re Corizzi , 803 A.2d 438, 442

- 43 (D.C. 2002) (indicating that dishonest conduct including false statements m ade to Bar Counsel during investigation was an aggravating factor).28 appropriate response to serious concerns about whether the atto rney will act ethically and competently in the future, after the period of su spension has run.” Id. “[T]o justify requiring a suspe nded attorney to prove fitness a s a condition of reinstatement, the record in the disciplinary proceeding must c ontain clear and convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorne y’s continuing fitness to practice law.” In re Ditton , 980 A.2d 1170, 1174 (D.C. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks om itted). “[T]he term ‘doubt’ . . . connote[s] real skepticism, not ‘just a lack of certainty.’” Cater , 887 A.2d at 24. This court’s primary “concern is that [a respondent’s] resumption of the pra ctice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.” Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

We said in Askew I that the record, which suggested respondent’s

“fundamental failure to understa nd her duties as court-appointe d counsel,” 96 A.3d at 61, warranted a period of sus pension and probation, but no f itness requirement. The instant case involves that same, largely contemporaneous, f undamental failure by respondent to understand her duties as court-appointed couns el. But nothing in the current record gives us more “real skepticism” about r espondent’s fitness to29 practice law than we had when we decided Askew I

. 16 Cater , 887 A.2d at 24. It is

true that in Askew I , we did not have a finding by the Hearing Committee that respondent’s testimony was deliber ately dishonest; but we did “ disagree that certain points of Ms. Askew’s questionable testimony [could] be attributed to [mere] ‘confusion.’” Askew I , 96 A.3d at 60. In addition, taking a step beyond the Hearing Committee’s assessment tha t there were “contradictions” between some of respondents’ factual assertions, we observed that some of her a ssertions “lack[ed] the ring of truth even if they had been made in the first insta nce.” Id. Not having imposed a fitness requirement on the record in Askew I (which, like the record here, contained questionable a ssertions about respondent’s “dif ficulties receiving mail,” 96 A.3d at 58; about a telephone call she placed to a fe deral prison, id. at 55 n.2; and about her non-retention of hard copies of documents, id . at 56 n.7, and additionally involved respondent’s affirmative neglect of her c lient’s and his family’s efforts to contact her), we discern no compelling reas on to impose one

16 In Askew I , we did express our “ongoing concern as to Ms. Askew’s ability to adequately fulfill her duties as a lawyer” because s he had not set up a consistent and reliable method of receiving her mail, which we observed is “a fundamental element of legal practice.” In re Askew , 96 A.3d at 59. To the extent that the violations involved in t his case stemmed from mail pro blems, they were from the same time period as was involved in Askew I. There is no evidence that respondent failed to address those problems during her suspensi on, which we said “should give her the time she needs.” 96 A.3d at 62. Accordin gly, we do not have that same worry about respondent’s ability to adequately fulfil l her duties as a lawyer.30

here. 17 We also think a requirement that respondent take a practice m anagement course and work under the eye of a practice monitor during a pr obationary period, rather than a fitness require ment, is appropriate here.

We therefore order tha t Abigail Askew is suspended from the pra ctice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of six months, 18 during which time she shall complete a practice management course approved by Discipl inary Counsel,

17 We note that we have not always imposed a fitness requirement o n the basis of a respondent’s deliberately false statements to the He aring Committee. See, e.g. , In re Chapman , 962 A.2d 922 (D.C. 2009) (imposing a sixty-day suspension, with thirty days stayed in favor of a one-year peri od of probation and certain CLE courses, but no fitness requirement, where responde nt neglected his client’s case, resulting in her case being dismissed, had a min or disciplinary history, showed a lack of remorse for the harm caused to the cl ient, and “was found to be deliberately dishonest in his dealings with Bar Counsel a nd not credible in his testimony before the [Hearing] Committee”); In re Washington , 489 A.2d 452, 461 (D.C. 1985) (three-month suspensi on for respondent’s neglect of a client matter; no fitness requirement despite the f act that the attorney gave “fr ivolous” testimony and proffered explanations that “strain[ed] . . . credulity”); Alexander , 466 A.2d at 451-52 (suspending the respondent for a period of three months for gross and willful neglect of two client m atters; no fitness requirement d espite the Board’s rejection of respondent’s “dissembling excuses” and fact that r espondent had previously been informally admoni shed three times for neglectin g a client’s affairs).

18 Disciplinary Counsel advised us a t oral argument that, in the wake of this court’s August 17, 2017, order suspending her on an interim bas is, respondent has yet to file the affidavit as r equired under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 1 4(g), that would mark the commencement of the period of suspension.31

and after which she shall serve a probationary period of one-ye ar under the watch of a practice monitor. It is

So ordered.