alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No s . 391 41/39142

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff-Respondent ,

v.

JASON WADE GUDGELL ,
Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 468

Filed: May 8, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

TH IS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper , District Judge.

Judgments of conviction and sentences of a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years , for aggravated assault, enhanced by use of a deadly weapon; and a con secutive unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year, for battery on a police officer

, affirmed

. Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM
In docket number 39141, Jason Wade Gudgell pled guilty to aggravated assault, Idaho

Code § § 18

- 901(b), 18

- 905(a), enhanced by use of a deadly weapon during the c ommission of a
crime, I.C. § 19

- 2520

. The district court also found Gudgell to be a persistent violator and sentenced Gudgell to a unified term of twenty years, with five years determinate. 1 In docket

1 Gudgell also pled guilty to operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, I.C. § 49

- 227, and he received a concurrent sentence of 180 days jail. However, Gudgell does not appeal the 180 day sentence.2 number 39142, Gudgell pled guilty to battery on a police officer, I.C. § § 18

- 915(3), 18

- 903(b).

The district court sentenced Gudgell to a unified term of five years, with one year determinate, to

run consecutive to his sentence in docket number 39141. G udgell appeals, contending h is sentences, both individually and in the aggregate, are excessive.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well establish ed and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 1 14, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011,

1014

- 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 ( Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say tha t the district court abused its discretion.
Therefore, Gudgell’s judgments of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
Exhibit 12.2  I, Jérôme Contamine, certify that:  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Sanofi;  2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.The companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have:  (a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  (c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (d)Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and  5.The companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the Audit Committee of the companys Board of Directors:  (a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.  Date: March 6, 2013  By:
/s/ Jérôme ContamineName:
Jérôme ContamineTitle:
Executive Vice President
Chief Financial Officer (1)  
 (1)Principal financial officer.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James ARCHAMBAULT, also known as James Skunk, Appellant.

No. 10-3673.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Aug. 5, 2011.

Filed: Sept. 16, 2011.

*663Jeffrey C. Clapper, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Sioux Falls, SD, for Appellee.

James Archambault, Seattle, WA, pro se.

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

James Archambault was charged with knowingly mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). After having been appointed his third successive attorney, Archambault moved to represent himself. The magistrate judge1 advised Archambault of the hazards and disadvantages of self-representation, found that Archambault knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, permitted him to proceed pro se, and ordered his third attorney to serve as standby counsel. On the day of trial, Archambault decided to plead guilty, and the district court2 accepted his plea after questioning him in compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The court sentenced him to 77 months in prison, at the bottom of the undisputed advisory Guidelines range. Proceeding pro se on appeal, Archambault argues that he should have been allowed to justify his actions to a jury, that he was denied the right to subpoena witnesses, that he had ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his sentence was unjust.

We conclude that Archambault knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, and thus waived his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues, including all issues related to what defenses and witnesses he would have presented had his case gone to trial. *See United States v. Limley,*510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir.2007). We further conclude that the district court did not commit procedural error or abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *United States v. Feemster,*572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc). We decline to review Archambault’s ineffective-assistance claim. *See United States v. Bauer,*626 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2010).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and deny Archambault’s motion to stay this appeal.

1

. The Honorable John E. Simko, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota.

2

. The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation in the District of South Dakota.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6126 

To provide for 100 percent expensing for capital property placed in service 

on or after September 8, 2010, and before 2012. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2010 

Mr. GARAMENDI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To provide for 100 percent expensing for capital property 

placed in service on or after September 8, 2010, and 

before 2012. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 100 PERCENT EXPENSING FOR CAPITAL PROP4 ERTY PLACED IN SERVICE ON OR AFTER SEP5 TEMBER 8, 2010, AND BEFORE 2012. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 179 of the Internal Rev7 enue Code of 1986 (relating to election to expense certain 

8 depreciable business assets) is amended by adding at the 

9 end the following new subsection: 


sroberts on DSK3CLS3C1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6126 IH

1 ‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR 100 PERCENT EXPENSING

2 PERIOD.— 

3 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of property 

4 placed in service on or after September 8, 2010, and 

5 before January 1, 2012, subsection (b) shall not 

6 apply. 

7 ‘‘(2) APPLICATION OF SECTION FOR PERIODS

8 PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 8.—In the case of any taxable 

9 year which includes September 8, 2010, for the por10 tion of such taxable year prior to September 8, each 

11 of the dollar amounts in subsections (b) and (e) 

12 shall be reduced by the amount which bears the 

13 same ratio to such dollar amount as the number of 

14 days in such portion of the taxable year bears to 

15 365.’’. 

16 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

17 subsection (a) shall apply to property placed in service on 

18 or after September 31, 2010. 

Æ 


sroberts on DSK3CLS3C1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 15.3

| |  |                                                              
| |  | -------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | LOGO                                                         
| |  | Incorporating the firms of
Alexander & Spencer
and Rosenbergs

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (file No. 333-659-04) and Forms F-3/A (file
No. 333-114504 and file No. 333-130632) of ViryaNet Ltd. pertaining of our report dated July 15, 2010, with respect to the 2009 financial statements of ViryaNet (Pty) Ltd (a wholly-owned subsidiary of ViryaNet Ltd.), to be included in
the Annual Report (Form 20-F) of ViryaNet Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2009.



|                          
|--------------------------
|Nexia ASR                 
|ABN 16 847 721 257        
|                          
|/s/ George S. Dakis       
|Partner                   
|Audit & Assurance Services
|Melbourne, Australia      
|July 15, 2010             









|                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |      |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---- |  | 
|value beyond numbers
nexia asrabn 16 847 721 257
level 14 / 440 Collins Street Melbourne Australia 3000
telephone +61 3 9608 0100 facsimile +61 3 9670 8325
email theteam@nexiaasr.com.au website www.nexiaasr.com.au |  | LOGO |  | 

Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation other than for the
acts or omissions of financial services licensees
TRACE K. LINDEMAN 

CLER?F "‘IPREME COURT 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

BY • 

- 

DEPUTY CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

BRANDON J. QUINONEZ, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 69530 

FILED 

MAR 04 2016 

This appeal was initiated by the filing of a pro se appeal. 

Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; David A. Hardy, Judge. 

Our review of this appeal reveals a jurisdictional defect. The 

right to appeal is statutory; where no statute or court rule provides for an 

appeal, no right to appeal exists. Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 

P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990). No statute or court rule provides for an appeal 

from a district court order denying a motion for speedy trial. To the extent 

that appellant appeals from the district court order to produce prisoner, no 

statute or court rule provides for an appeal from such an order. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 

Douglas 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

tO) 1947A e 1(, -07 0119 
cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge 

Brandon J. Quinonez 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) 1947A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 00-1284

HERMOGENA IGNACIO, PETITIONER,

 V.

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT.

Before FARLEY, IVERS, and STEINBERG, Judges.

O R D E R

In a single-judge order dated August 4, 2000, this Court denied the pro se petitioner's

petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus (petition). On August 25, 2000, the

petitioner filed a timely motion for a panel decision. 

On September 29, 2000, the Court, sitting en banc, withdrew the August 4, 2000, singlejudge order and reissued it concurrently with an order denying the petitioner's motion for an

initial full Court decision. The Court also ordered that the petitioner's motion for a panel

decision be withdrawn by the Clerk and refiled on the date of the en banc order.

On November 2, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to file out-of-time a motion

for reconsideration of the Court's September 29, 2000, reissued single-judge order denying her

petition. The Court denied that motion in a November 16, 2000 single-judge order. On

November 21, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 16, 2000,

order. Therein, the petitioner asserts, inter alia, that the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000,

Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (VCAA), applies to the claim that is the

subject of her petition and to her November 2, 2000, motion.

The petitioner has an appeal pending before this Court of the denial by the Board of

Veterans' Appeals of the claim that was also the subject of her denied petition, Ignacio v. Principi,

No. 00-1285, and, in that appeal, she is represented by counsel. She is free to raise in the context

of that appeal any concerns that she may have regarding the applicability of the VCAA to the

claim that was the subject of the denied petition and of her appeal. See, e.g., Tellex v. Gober, 14

Vet.App. 196 (2000) (per curiam order). The appellant's arguments regarding the VCAA do not

support a reexamination of the Court's prior determination that the petitioner has not presented

a petition with grounds for the issuance of a writ of mandamus or of its prior determination to

deny her motion for leave to file out-of-time a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of

that petition.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is by the single judge
2

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied. It is by the panel

ORDERED that the motion for a panel decision is denied.

DATED: February 16, 2001 PER CURIAM.
EXHIBIT 23.1




Richardson & Company                                550 Howe Avenue, Suite 210
                                                    Sacramento, California 95825
                                                    Telephone: (916) 564-8727
                                                    FAX: (916) 564-8728



                         CONSENT OF RICHARDSON & COMPANY


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration  Statement
(Form S-8) (SEC File Number 333-62294) pertaining to the Sonoma Valley Bancorp's
1996 Stock Option Plan as amended in April 1999 and the  Registration  Statement
(Form S-8) (SEC File Number 333-88610) pertaining to the Sonoma Valley Bancorp's
2002 Equity  Incentive Plan of our report dated January 24, 2006 with respect to
the  consolidated  financial  statements of Sonoma Valley Bancorp and Subsidiary
included in its Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended  December 31, 2005,
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

                                                       /s/ Richardson & Company
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       Richardson & Company


Sacramento, California
March 24, 2006
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MA RCH 6 , 2013

NO. 03

- 12

- 00799

- CV

Robert Cronin, Appellant

v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. a/k/a Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BE FORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

THIS CAUSE having this day come on to be considered, and the Court being of the opinion that

it is without jurisdiction of the cause and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed for want

of jurisdiction: IT IS ACCORDINGLY considered, adjudged and ordered that the appeal is

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellant pay all costs

relating to this appe al, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified

below for observance.
#### In re WESTERN’S WILL.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.

May 8, 1894.)

Proceeding for the probate of the will of Samuel Western, deceased.

Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
**Exhibit99.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

 

I, Michael A. Maltzman, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer ofStratus Services Group, Inc., (the “Company”), do hereby certify in accordancewith 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that to my knowledge the foregoing Quarterly Report of the Company:

 

1.                                       fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d), and;

 

2.                                       the informationcontained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
| Dated:  May 15, 2003 | By:    | /s/ Michael A. Maltzman                      |
|---------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------|
|                      |   | Michael A. Maltzman                          |
|                      |   | Chief Financial Officer                      |
|                      |   | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----
EXHIBIT 4.3


                                 PROMISSORY NOTE


$625,000
Palm Beach County, Florida                                      January 21, 2002


         FOR VALUE RECEIVED, LAWRENCE LEVINSON (the "Maker") promises to pay to
the order of CYBERADS, INC. (the "Payee"), on or before January 21, 2012, the
principal sum of Six Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand ($625,000) Dollars in lawful
money of the United States, in hand or at the principal office of the Payee as
may from time to time be designated by the Payee. This Note shall bear interest
on the unpaid principal balance at the rate of Four Percent (4%), payable at the
time of the payment of the principal sum of this Note.

         In the event of any default in any payment on this Note, then at the
option of the Payee, this Note shall bear interest computed from the date of
such default at one percent (1%) per month, but in any event not in excess of
the legally prescribed rate for instruments of this kind. The term "event of
default" as used herein, shall mean the failure of Maker to make any payment of
the principal or interest due under the Note, which failure shall continue for
five (5) days after notice of default, such notice to be delivered to Maker by
registered, certified or overnight mail duly recorded at the principal office of
the Maker.

         An provision hereof which may prove unenforceable under any law shall
not affect the validity of any other provisions hereof.

         Maker hereby waives presentment for payment, protest and notice of
protest and all other notices or demands in connection with the delivery,
acceptance, performance, default or endorsement of this Note.

         This Note shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida.


                                                     /s/ Lawrence Levinson
                                                     ---------------------
                                                     Lawrence Levinson
Exhibit 99.8




Consent of Independent Auditors
 
 We hereby consent to the inclusion in this Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31 2013 of Hydrogenics Corporation of our report dated March 6 2014, relating to the consolidated financial statements, which appears in Exhibit 99.1 incorporated by reference in this Annual Report.
  We also consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos.333-77004 and 333-116321) and Form F-3 (No. 333-182974) of Hydrogenics Corporation of our report referred to above.
  
 /s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
 Chartered Professional Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants
  Toronto, Ontario
 March 7, 2014
Exhibit 13.1


SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION




CERTIFICATION




(pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)







In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012 of Hydrogenics Corporation (the “Company”) as filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) on the date hereof (the “Report”) and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Daryl Wilson, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, that:




(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




By:
/s/ Daryl WilsonName:
Daryl WilsonTitle:
President and Chief Executive Officer




Date: March 8, 2013







A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Hydrogenics Corporation and will be retained by Hydrogenics Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.