I N THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 24S-MI-46 

State of Indiana by and through its Department of 

Natural Resources, 

Appellant 

–v–

Kailee M. Leonard and Jeffrey S. McQuary, 

Appellees

Argued: September 21, 2023 | Decided: February 5, 2024

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

No. 49D01-1706-MI-23427

The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Senior Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 

No. 22A-MI-685

Opinion by Chief Justice Rush

Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-MI-46 | February 5, 2024 Page 2 of 11

Rush, Chief Justice.

As captured by Lord Byron’s “Epitaph to a Dog,” the death of man’s 

best friend often prompts a visceral response—perhaps none more so than 

the one here, where a dog’s death triggered over a decade of litigation in 

both state and federal courts. That litigation has culminated in a case

involving the intersection of a successful Section 1983 federal action and 

Indiana’s public-employee indemnification statute. Under the statute, a 

public employee is entitled to indemnification if their actions were 

noncriminal and within the scope of employment. 

Here, a federal jury found a state conservation officer liable for false

arrest based on his actions after a driver hit and killed his dog. The officer 

then assigned his indemnification rights against the State to the driver and 

her attorney. After a bench trial in state court, a judge ordered the State to 

indemnify the officer and pay the federal judgment. The State argues the 

court erred because the officer’s actions constituted a criminal act.

We affirm the trial court. In reaching that conclusion, we clarify both 

the meaning of “noncriminal” and the parties’ relative burdens under the 

public-employee indemnification statute. And we ultimately hold that the

evidence establishes the officer’s actions were noncriminal.

Facts and Procedural History

In December 2012, Kailee Leonard was driving to her boyfriend’s house 

when, while passing the home of Department of Natural Resources 

Conservation Officer Scott Johnson, she hit and killed the family’s pet 

Border Collie, Gypsy. Realizing she had hit the dog, Leonard initially 

stopped but continued driving about a mile to her boyfriend’s house so 

that he could return with her to the accident scene. Leonard’s boyfriend 

then drove the couple in his vehicle to Officer Johnson’s home, where 

Leonard spoke with the officer, apologized for hitting the dog, and 

removed a few pieces of her car from the roadway.

Officer Johnson later questioned whether Leonard’s actions “would be 

classified as a . . . misdemeanor violation.” And so, a few months after the 
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accident, Officer Johnson, while on duty and in uniform, spoke with

Hancock County’s Chief Deputy Prosecutor. Officer Johnson asked 

whether leaving the scene of an accident involving a pet and returning 

“over an hour later” in a different vehicle “would meet the elements of 

leaving the scene of an accident.” On the prosecutor’s advice, Officer 

Johnson relayed “the basics about the incident” to an investigator.

Sometime later, the investigator told Officer Johnson “that he found 

probable cause” to charge Leonard but conveyed he wasn’t going to file 

“charges at that time.” Officer Johnson subsequently spoke on the phone

with the Hancock County Prosecutor about potential charges against 

Leonard.

Then, in June 2013, Leonard received in the mail a criminal summons 

charging her with Class B misdemeanor failure to stop after an accident.

Leonard hired an attorney and answered the summons, but she was never 

arrested. About a year later, after Officer Johnson asked for the charges to 

be dropped, the State dismissed the case.

Leonard then filed a federal lawsuit against Officer Johnson under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), claiming that his “actions in procuring 

[her] prosecution constitute[d] false arrest” in violation of her 

constitutional rights. Leonard alleged Officer Johnson “falsely” told the 

investigator that she “left the scene of the accident and did not return until 

the following day.”

Officer Johnson requested the State represent him in the federal 

lawsuit, but the State eventually declined, believing his alleged “conduct 

was not within the scope of [his] duties.” Officer Johnson proceeded pro 

se, drafting and filing an unsuccessful motion to dismiss. He eventually 

hired an attorney, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Leonard

“was falsely arrested by” Officer Johnson and awarded her $10,000 in 

damages. The federal court then approved Leonard’s request for $52,462 

in attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a $62,462 judgment.

Unable to pay the full amount, Officer Johnson assigned his 

indemnification rights against the State to Leonard and her attorney, 

Jeffrey McQuary (collectively “Leonard” hereafter). Leonard sued the 

State, seeking a declaratory judgment that the State had a duty to 
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indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the judgment under Indiana’s publicemployee indemnification statute.

After the State’s ultimately unsuccessful motion for summary 

judgment, see Smith v. State, 122 N.E.3d 991, 993–94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), 

the case proceeded to a bench trial. There, the parties disputed the 

indemnification statute’s two requirements: whether Officer Johnson’s 

actions were noncriminal and whether they were within the scope of his 

employment. The trial court found in Leonard’s favor and ordered the 

State to pay the $62,462 judgment. The court’s order, however, identified

the only issue as whether Officer Johnson acted within the scope of 

employment—concluding he did. Yet the court made one finding related

to whether his actions were noncriminal: “Johnson falsely maintained that 

Leonard had left the scene and returned the next day – not shortly after 

the accident, as had actually happened.” Pointing to this finding, the State 

moved to correct error, arguing Officer Johnson was not entitled to 

indemnification because the court found his “actions were not 

noncriminal.” That motion was deemed denied after the trial court failed 

to rule on it within 45 days. Ind. Trial Rule 53.3(a). 

The State appealed, challenging only whether Officer Johnson’s actions 

were “noncriminal.” Our Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial 

court effectively found that Officer Johnson committed the crime of false 

informing, and his conduct was therefore not noncriminal as required by 

statute. State ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Smith, 202 N.E.3d 1105, 1112–13

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Leonard petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the 

Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).1

1 We summarily affirm the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion holding that the State did 

not waive its challenge to the noncriminality of Officer Johnson’s actions. See App. R. 58(A)(2).
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-MI-46 | February 5, 2024 Page 5 of 11

Standard of Review

Though the State appeals from the denial of its motion to correct error, 

we apply the standard of review for the underlying judgment. Luxury 

Townhomes, LLC v. McKinley Props., Inc., 992 N.E.2d 810, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied. The trial court here issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law sua sponte. We review issues covered by the findings by

determining whether the evidence supports the findings and, if so, 

whether those findings support the judgment. T.R. 52(A); Steele-Giri v. 

Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). For issues not covered by the

findings, we apply our general judgment standard, meaning we “should

affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Steele-Giri, 

51 N.E.3d at 123–24; see also T.R. 52(D). 

Discussion and Decision

The circumstances surrounding Gypsy’s death bring us to the

intersection of a successful Section 1983 federal action and Indiana’s 

public-employee indemnification statute. Section 1983 provides 

individuals a cause of action for civil rights violations arising from a 

government employee’s reckless or deliberate conduct. See, e.g., Mannoia v. 

Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When a public employee is found 

liable, the indemnification statute requires the State to pay the judgment if 

(1) the violation occurred due to a “a noncriminal act or omission” that 

was (2) “within the scope of the public employee’s employment.” Ind. 

Code § 34-13-4-1. As the State has conceded that Officer Johnson was 

acting within the scope of his employment, the dispute turns only on

whether his conduct was noncriminal. 

The trial court did not explicitly conclude that Officer Johnson’s actions 

were noncriminal, but it implicitly made this determination by ordering

the State to indemnify him. The State argues the trial court erred, pointing

to its finding that Officer Johnson “falsely maintained that Leonard had 

left the scene and returned the next day – not shortly after the accident, as 

had actually happened.” In the State’s view, this falsehood finding reveals 

the court concluded Officer Johnson committed the crime of false 
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informing, which occurs when a person knowingly gives either “a false 

report of the commission of a crime” or “false information to a law 

enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a crime.” I.C. § 35-

44.1-2-3(d)(1). And the State maintains the finding is supported by 

Leonard’s federal false-arrest complaint and the resulting jury verdict,

both of which were admitted into evidence. We disagree.

Leonard’s federal false-arrest complaint and corresponding jury verdict 

do not establish that Officer Johnson committed a criminal act and do not 

support the trial court’s falsehood finding. In reaching that conclusion, we 

clarify that the party seeking indemnification has the initial burden to

show that the loss occurred because of a noncriminal act or omission. The

burden then shifts to the State to rebut that showing by producing

evidence establishing a prima facie case of criminal conduct. Here, 

Leonard demonstrated that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal,

and the State failed to establish a prima facie case that he committed the 

crime of false informing. And though we hold the trial court’s falsehood 

finding is clearly erroneous, the evidence supports the court’s judgment.

We therefore affirm. 

I. The public employee seeking indemnification

must show that the loss occurred because of a 

noncriminal act or omission, but the State can

rebut that showing. 

We first determine the meaning of “noncriminal” in the publicemployee indemnification statute and the parties’ burdens on this 

requirement. Because the statute does not define the term, we consider its

“plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.” I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1). A criminal act 

subjects the actor to criminal prosecution. Crime, Merriam-Webster’s 

Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crime (last 

visited Feb. 5, 2024) (defining “crime” as “an illegal act for which someone 

can be punished by the government”); Act, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019) (defining “criminal act” as an “unlawful act that subjects the 

actor to prosecution under criminal law”). And for a person to be subject 
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to criminal prosecution, the State must have a prima facie case. I.C. § 35-

34-1-2(a), (e). Thus, a noncriminal act or omission is one for which the 

State cannot establish a prima facie showing of criminal conduct. 

As the statute unambiguously mandates indemnification only when a

loss occurs due to a public employee’s noncriminal conduct, the party 

seeking indemnification must first satisfy this requirement. The burden 

then shifts to the State to rebut the showing by producing evidence that 

establishes a prima facie case of criminal conduct. A prima facie case is 

essential because employee misconduct that results in civil liability does 

not necessarily result in criminal liability. As is relevant here, civil liability 

can be imposed in a Section 1983 action for false arrest based on reckless 

conduct, see Mannoia, 476 F.3d at 458, but criminal liability often requires a 

more culpable mens rea, such as knowing or intentional conduct. Thus,

depending on the proffered criminal act, the State may need to produce 

evidence other than an employee’s civil liability to make the requisite 

prima facie showing. Since many civil rights violations can be framed as 

crimes with overlapping elements, solidifying this liability distinction 

preserves the indemnification statute’s functionality. Mindful of these 

principles, we now apply them here.

A. Leonard produced evidence that Officer Johnson’s 

conduct was noncriminal.

Leonard alleged in her complaint that the State was “required to pay 

the judgment, costs, and attorney fees assessed against” Officer Johnson 

under the indemnification statute. And she presented evidence during the 

bench trial demonstrating that Officer Johnson did not knowingly give

either “a false report of the commission of a crime” or “false information 

to a law enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a crime.” I.C. 

§ 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1). 

Indeed, Officer Johnson consistently testified that he truthfully told 

prosecutors and the investigator that Leonard returned on the night of the 

accident. And his statements are supported by the other three witnesses 

who testified. Leonard stated that she “didn’t know” whether it was 

Officer Johnson’s or someone else’s actions that led to her being charged. 
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Officer Johnson’s supervisor also testified, explaining that the DNR 

investigates and potentially disciplines officers for being untruthful with 

law enforcement. But he stated that Officer Johnson was never 

investigated for lying. And the supervisor had no information that Officer 

Johnson “was untruthful regarding the incident.” Finally, an investigator 

with the Hancock County Prosecutor’s Office testified that no records 

reflected the office ever “considered filing charges” against Officer 

Johnson. Thus, all the uncontradicted testimony established that Officer 

Johnson did not commit the crime of false informing.

Accordingly, Leonard met her burden under the indemnification 

statute by producing evidence that Officer Johnson did not commit a 

criminal act. We now consider whether the State rebutted that showing.

B. The State failed to rebut the evidence establishing a 

noncriminal act. 

The State points to Leonard’s federal false-arrest complaint and 

subsequent jury verdict as evidence that Officer Johnson committed the 

crime of false informing. We disagree, as the federal complaint and the 

jury verdict do not establish a prima facie case that Officer Johnson 

knowingly lied to law enforcement. 

We acknowledge Leonard alleged in her federal complaint that Officer 

Johnson “falsely told [an investigator] that [Leonard] left the scene of the 

accident and did not return until the following day.” But the complaint

was admitted only to establish the allegations against Officer Johnson, not 

for the truth of those allegations. Because the complaint was admitted for 

this limited purpose, it cannot “constitute evidence of the facts alleged.” 

State v. Sanders, 596 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. 1992). As for the verdict, the jury 

could have found Officer Johnson liable if he recklessly made false 

statements that led to Leonard being charged. See, e.g., Lawson v. Veruchi, 

637 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2011). But recklessness cannot impose criminal 

liability for false informing—there must be evidence that Officer Johnson 

acted knowingly. I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1). Because the transcript from the 

federal trial was not offered into evidence, we cannot speculate as to

whether the evidence presented to the jury matched the facts alleged in 
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the complaint or the standard on which the jury was instructed to find 

Officer Johnson liable. 

For these reasons, the federal complaint and jury verdict do not 

establish that Officer Johnson knowingly lied to law enforcement—a

requirement to make a prima facie showing for the crime of false 

informing. To conclude otherwise would have broad implications, 

precluding indemnification anytime a civil rights violation is framed as a 

crime that does not impose liability based on recklessness. But because the 

trial court made a factual finding inconsistent with its conclusion, we now

determine whether that finding is clearly erroneous. 

II. Although the trial court’s falsehood finding is 

clearly erroneous, the evidence supports the court’s 

judgment.

In determining the State was required to indemnify Officer Johnson, the 

trial court necessarily concluded that his conduct was noncriminal. But 

the court seemingly determined that Officer Johnson committed false 

informing in finding that he “falsely maintained that Leonard had left the 

scene and returned the next day – not shortly after the accident, as had 

actually happened.” We first note that the trial court made this finding in 

the context of determining only whether Officer Johnson was “acting 

within the scope of his employment.” It is therefore unclear whether the 

court intended for this falsehood finding to address the indemnification 

statute’s noncriminal requirement. But because the finding contradicts the 

court’s judgment, we determine whether the finding is clearly erroneous. 

And our standard of review compels us to hold that it is. 

A finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by reasonable 

inferences from the evidence. See, e.g., Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 

229, 234 (Ind. 2023). Despite this deferential standard, an inference is not 

reasonable if it requires speculation or conjecture. Owens Corning Fiberglass 

Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. 2001). And, in reviewing the 

falsehood finding, we must “look to the record only for inferences 
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favorable to the judgment.” Town of Fortville v. Certain Fortville Annexation 

Territory Landowners, 51 N.E.3d 1195, 1198 (Ind. 2016).

The federal complaint and the jury verdict do not lead to a reasonable 

inference that Officer Johnson lied to law enforcement. As noted above, 

the complaint was admitted for a limited purpose and does not constitute 

evidence of the facts alleged. Thus, the trial court could not consider the 

complaint’s allegations as proof that Officer Johnson lied to law 

enforcement. For similar reasons, the jury verdict does not support the 

court’s finding. The transcript from the federal trial was not offered into 

evidence, and thus the court could not know whether the evidence 

presented to the federal jury matched the facts alleged in the complaint or 

how the jury was instructed. And the jury could have found Officer 

Johnson liable if he recklessly made false statements, which cannot 

support a finding that Officer Johnson knowingly lied. Presumably, that is 

why the State does not argue the federal jury verdict has any collateral 

estoppel effect in this case.

Simply put, speculation and conjecture are required to find that the jury 

relied on the complaint’s allegation that Officer Johnson knowingly lied to 

an investigator in reaching its verdict. Thus, the trial court’s inference that 

Officer Johnson lied is not reasonable—a conclusion bolstered by the fact 

that we must consider only inferences favorable to the judgment. As a 

result, the court’s falsehood finding is clearly erroneous.

Setting that finding aside, the trial court made no findings related to the 

noncriminal requirement, and it did not explicitly conclude that Officer 

Johnson’s actions were noncriminal. But the court implicitly determined 

that his actions were noncriminal because it concluded the State was 

required to pay the federal judgment. In reviewing that conclusion, we 

apply our general judgment standard and will affirm if the judgment is 

supported by the evidence. T.R. 52(D); Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123–24.

For the reasons previously provided, the court’s judgment is supported 

by the evidence. Leonard produced uncontradicted testimony that Officer 

Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal. And the State did not provide 

evidence establishing a prima facie showing that Officer Johnson 

knowingly gave either “a false report of the commission of a crime” or 
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“false information to a law enforcement officer that relates to the 

commission of a crime.” I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1). Because the evidence 

establishes that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal and because 

the State does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Johnson 

acted within the scope of his employment, the judgment is supported by 

the evidence.

Conclusion

Leonard showed that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and 

the State did not rebut that showing. Though the trial court’s falsehood 

finding is clearly erroneous, the evidence ultimately supports the court’s 

judgment. We therefore affirm. 

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Frances H. Barrow

Deputy Attorneys General

Angela Sanchez

Chief Counsel of Appeals

Benjamin M. Jones

Assistant Section Chief of Civil Appeals

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

Jeffrey S. McQuary

Brown Tompkins Lory

Indianapolis, Indiana