IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41148

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

CHAD CALHOUN, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:15-CR-17-1 

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

After a jury trial, Chad Calhoun was convicted of receipt of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1), and 

possession of child pornography, in violation of § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). On 

appeal, Calhoun challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, he argues 

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions 

because the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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knowingly received or possessed the child pornography files found on a laptop 

seized from the residence he shared with his wife, Katie. Second, he argues 

that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the laptop, and 

all evidence derived therefrom, because the laptop was accessed by an 

unknown person two days after it was seized by law enforcement. 

We review a preserved sufficiency challenge such as Calhoun’s de novo. 

See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 910 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995). However, we view all 

evidence and any reasonably inferences that flow therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict. Frye, 489 F.3d at 207.

The main point of dispute at trial was whether it was Calhoun or 

someone else who received and possessed the child pornography files found on 

the laptop. “Possession may be either actual or constructive.” United States v. 

Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2011). “When the government seeks to 

prove constructive possession of contraband found in a jointly occupied 

location, it must present additional evidence of the defendant’s knowing 

dominion or control of the contraband, besides the mere joint occupancy of the 

premises, in order to prove the defendant’s constructive possession.” Id. at 150. 

The Government presented a substantial amount of circumstantial evidence 

meeting this standard. The approximately 380 child pornography files on the 

laptop were associated with the password-protected Windows user account 

named “Chad” and had file creation dates spanning from 2009 to 2014. 

Forensic analysis showed that the “Chad” user account had searched for and 

downloaded numerous child pornography files over a particular peer-to-peer 

file sharing network from both Calhoun’s residence and the church where he 

was employed as the senior pastor. The pattern and logistical requirements 

for downloading those files indicated that the person who downloaded them 

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had lengthy and consistent access to the laptop and, specifically, the “Chad” 

user account. Although several documents apparently authored by Katie were 

saved in the “Chad” user account, there were numerous photographs and 

documents in that account that were directly related to Calhoun, including an 

account of a traffic accident authored by him. The same afternoon someone 

used the laptop to download a child pornography file over the course of three 

hours, the “Chad” user account was used to access the internet and to open a 

document with “Daniel 10” written in the top corner—a possible allusion to a 

bible passage. The church secretary testified that she had observed Calhoun 

carrying his laptop bag to church every morning and using the laptop in his 

office. While she confirmed that Calhoun had an “open-door policy” for his 

office, she never observed anyone else working on the laptop. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 

conclude that the Government provided sufficient circumstantial evidence, 

besides the mere joint occupancy of the premises, establishing at least a 

plausible inference of Calhoun’s knowing dominion or control of the child 

pornography files. See Moreland, 665 F.3d at 150. Although Calhoun argues 

that this case is like Moreland, in which we found that there was insufficient 

evidence supporting a conviction for possession of child pornography, the files 

at issue in Moreland “were not in plain view, but were . . . accessible only to a 

knowledgeable person using special computer software, and there was no 

circumstantial indicium that established that [the defendant] knew of the 

images or had the ability to access them.” Id. at 152. By contrast, child 

pornography files with suggestive titles were saved in a folder on the “Chad” 

user account’s desktop. Given the evidence linking Calhoun to the “Chad” user 

account and the evidence that the “Chad” account was used to search for and 

download child pornography files with suggestive names, there was also 

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sufficient evidence of Calhoun’s knowing receipt of child pornography. Cf.

United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 403–04 (5th Cir. 2003). 

 Calhoun also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion 

to suppress the laptop, and all evidence derived therefrom, because the laptop 

was accessed two days after it was seized by law enforcement. In reviewing 

the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. 

Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2013). This court will uphold the district 

court’s denial “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en 

banc)). Evidentiary decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 217 (5th Cir. 2015). 

The parties stipulated that the law enforcement officer charged with 

logging the laptop into the evidence room was likely the person who accessed 

the laptop while it was in law enforcement custody. Although the parties also 

stipulated that none of the child pornography files on the laptop were accessed 

or altered by that officer, Calhoun sought to suppress the laptop under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 901(a) because the Government did not prove that the laptop 

was in substantially the same condition as when the crime was committed or 

when the laptop was seized. The district court denied that motion after 

determining that the facts established a prima facie showing of authenticity

and questions as to the weight the evidence deserved should be resolved by the 

jury. The record supports that the laptop was not changed in any important 

respect from its original condition. See United States v. Albert, 595 F.2d 283, 

290 (5th Cir. 1979). Thus, the district court properly denied Calhoun’s motion 

to suppress. 

 AFFIRMED. 

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