EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

This is the first report of the United States Commission on International

Religious Freedom (Commission), created by the International Religious Freedom Act

of 1998 (IRFA). IRFA established a multi-faceted program for ensuring that religious 

freedom has a permanent and significant place in the formulation and application of

U.S. foreign policy.

IRFA created the Office of International Religious Freedom at the State

Department, headed by an Ambassador-at-Large, and the U.S. Commission on

International Religious Freedom to give the President, Secretary of State, and the

Congress independent advice. It calls for the State Department to issue an Annual

Report on International Religious Freedom every September 1 and for the Commission

to issue its own report not later than May 1 of each year. Based on the September 1 

report, the President designates “countries of particular concern for religious freedom.”

In preparing its report, the Commission reviewed the State Department reports,

conducted its own hearings and research, met with non-governmental and religious

organizations, and obtained information from other government agencies.

Since its first meeting in June 1999, the Commission has found religious

freedom under serious threat in a number of countries. In setting its first-year agenda, it 

decided to address violations of religious freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, and to 

focus on these three countries in its annual report. The State Department later

designated Sudan and China as “countries of particular concern.” Since its first meeting, 

the Commission has spoken out or made policy recommendations on all three countries 

as well as on Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. It held day-long 

hearings on Sudan on February 15 in Washington, D.C., and on China on March 16 in

Los Angeles. Testimony from those hearings and other relevant documents can be

found on the Commission’s web site at www.uscirf.gov.

In the course of its work, the Commission has, in general, received helpful

cooperation from the White House, State Department, Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC), and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control

(OFAC). The Department of State, however, has withheld certain documents relating to 

the application of economic sanctions on Sudan on grounds of executive privilege and

even more importantly is resisting making embassy cables available to the Commission

on the same grounds, despite the fact that Commissioners and Commission senior staff

hold the requisite security clearances. The Commission believes that this violates the
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spirit of Congress’s intent in IRFA when it provided: “The Commission may secure

directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission

considers necessary . . . subject to applicable law.” The Commission is continuing to

discuss this with the State Department, and will report further to Congress on whether 

Congressional intervention is required to obtain the necessary information.

Sudan

Commissioners chose to look at Sudan because of the 17-year civil war raging

in that African nation – a tragic and genocidal war that has taken some 2 million lives, 

mostly Christians and followers of traditional animist religions. While the conflict has

many contributing causes, religious factors are key: (a) the effort of the Islamist

extremist government in Khartoum to extend Shariah, or Islamic law, to the African

Christians and traditional religionists in the south; and (b) the government’s efforts to

impose its extremist interpretation of Islam on all other Muslims.

The Commission met with, and heard in its hearings from, foreign policy 

experts, humanitarian organizations doing work in Sudan, Sudanese religious leaders,

other leaders from the beleaguered areas, legal experts on war crimes, and a variety of 

experts on the use of sanctions. In this process, the Commission learned that U.S. 

government attempts to enhance religious freedom depended on the effectiveness of our 

policies in addressing the broader conflict in that nation. And it was equally clear that 

efforts to help end the civil war needed a new impetus. 

Toward that end, the Commission has proposed a comprehensive 12-month plan 

to significantly strengthen the United States’ response to this crisis. In addition, the

Commission recommends increasing economic pressure on Khartoum by tightening the

current U.S. sanctions on the Khartoum government and constricting the ability of 

foreign-organized firms doing business with Sudan to raise money in U.S. capital

markets. The Commission met with President Clinton in October 1999 to brief him on

its work and ask him to strengthen U.S. efforts to address the urgent issues of Sudan and 

its violations of human rights and religious freedom.

At that meeting, the Commission raised particular concern about reports that the 

China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) – which owns 40 percent of the Greater 

Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), the developer of Sudan’s oil fields –

planned to obtain capital on the U.S. market through an initial public offering (IPO). In

the estimate of many observers, the new revenue from those fields is helping the

Sudanese government finance and extend the war. 
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Subsequently, CNPC restructured itself, placing its domestic operations in a

wholly-owned subsidiary, PetroChina Company Limited, and retaining its international

operations. On the basis of a registration statement filed by PetroChina with the SEC, 

PetroChina and CNPC each offered and sold PetroChina shares on the U.S. market in

early April 2000. The registration statement said that some of CNPC’s proceeds might 

go into retirement of its debt, but left unclear whether any of that debt was incurred in 

developing the Sudan oil fields. OFAC, which administers the Sudanese Sanctions

Regulations, opined that these shares could be purchased so long as there was no “clear 

statement” that CNPC would use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related debt. As a result, 

millions of those dollars from CNPC’s sale of PetroChina shares may well end up

benefitting GNPOC. Also, this and other interpretations by OFAC have clarified that a 

foreign-organized company may engage in revenue-generating activities in both Sudan

and the United States without violating the sanctions regulations.

 Recommendations on Sudan

 • The United States should continue to increase its aid to Sudan, increase the

percentage of that aid that flows outside the United Nations’ food program, and 

should engage in vigorous multilateral and bilateral efforts to encourage other

governments to follow suit.

 • The United States should begin a 12-month plan of incentives and disincentives 

to pressure Sudan’s government to improve human rights. If there is not

measurable improvement in religious freedom in Sudan at the end of that

period, the United States should be prepared to provide non-lethal and

humanitarian aid to appropriate opposition groups. During the 12 months, the

United States should:

a) launch a vigorous campaign, led by the President, to

inform the world of Sudan’s war crimes, crimes against

humanity, and genocidal activities;

b) engage in vigorous multilateral and bilateral efforts to

increase economic and other pressure on the Sudanese

government;

c) identify specific criteria to measure the Sudanese

government’s actions and create linkages between

Sudan’s actions and the United States’ responses;
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d) include specific criteria for measuring whether

opposition groups have made identifiable efforts to adhere 

to international human rights norms;

e) if after 12 months Sudan has not made measurable

progress to end human rights violations and if opposition

groups have taken steps to improve their human rights

record, provide direct non-lethal aid to appropriate

opposition groups; and 

f) be prepared to provide aid sooner if the situation

deteriorates markedly.

 • The Administration should increase its financial and diplomatic support for the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace negotiations and

persuade Egypt to participate.

 • The U.S. government should earmark additional humanitarian aid for building 

public works (such as roads and bridges) and civil government in southern

Sudan.

 • The U.S. government should work toward a “military no-fly zone” over Sudan

using peaceful means.

 • The United States government should formally request an investigation into

whether Sudanese government forces have used chemical weapons in violation

of international law.

 • The Department of State should give Congress its opinion on whether Sudan’s

government has committed and is committing “genocide” as defined by

international law.

 • The United States government should prohibit any foreign corporation from

seeking to obtain capital in the U.S. market as long as it is participating in

Sudanese oil-field development.

 • The United States government should require any foreign corporation that is

engaged in the development of the oil and gas fields in Sudan to disclose fully, 

before it may proceed with an IPO in the United States, whether it intends to 

use the proceeds from the IPO for the development of those oil and gas fields.
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 • The United States government should require any company that is engaged in

both the development of the oil and gas fields in Sudan and revenue-generating 

activities in the United States to submit public reports from time to time on the 

nature and extent of both of those activities.

 • OFAC should investigate: a) how much of the debt the China National

Petroleum Company intends to retire arose from its Sudanese activities; b) what 

criteria CNPC will use to decide whether to retire Sudan-related debt from the 

proceeds of its recent sale of PetroChina shares in the U.S. capital market; c)

whether prior to the sale CNPC earmarked any of the proceeds for use in

retiring Sudan-related debt; and d) whether U.S. underwriters knew or should 

have known of any such earmarking.

 • OFAC should call on the parties to the sale of PetroChina stock to inform it if

CNPC does retire Sudan-related debt and explain how U.S. sanctions against

Sudan relate to that debt retirement.

 • OFAC should inform the Commission and the Congress of the results of its

investigation, indicate any enforcement action it may take, and adjust its

interpretations of the regulations as appropriate.

 • The SEC should be especially careful to investigate the adequacy and reliability

of representations made in any filings related to the recent sale by CNPC and

PetroChina of PetroChina shares.

The People’s Republic of China

Chinese government violations of religious freedom increased markedly during

the past year. The Communist authorities in Beijing launched a nationwide crackdown

on the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Leaders were sentenced to long prison terms

and thousands of practitioners were detained. A few followers were even beaten to

death or died suddenly while in custody. 

Roman Catholic and Protestant underground “house churches” suffered

increased repression; the crackdown included the arrests of bishops, priests, and pastors, 

one of whom was found dead in the street soon afterward. Several Catholic bishops 

were ordained by the government without the Vatican’s participation or approval. The 

repression of Tibetan Buddhists expanded; government authorities in Tibet, in defiance

of the Dalai Lama, named a new Reting Lama. Another important religious leader, the
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Karmapa Lama, fled to India. Muslim Uighurs, having turned increasingly to Islamic

institutions for leadership in recent years, faced heightened repression of their religious

and other human rights, as they responded to a deliberate government campaign to

move Han Chinese into the region in order to out-populate the Uighurs in their own

land.

The Commission concludes that the Chinese government’s practices with

respect to religious freedom violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Each of these

international instruments prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, and

the right to hold and to manifest beliefs. The government of China, however, imposes 

undue restrictions on the manifestation of beliefs and bans several beliefs altogether.

 Recommendations on China

 • While many Commissioners support free trade, the Commission believes that

the U.S. Congress should grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations

(PNTR) status only after China makes substantial improvement in respect for

religious freedom. Such improvement would be measured by the following

standards:

a) open a high-level and continuing dialogue with the

U.S. government on religious-freedom issues;

b) ratify the International Convention on Civil and

Political Rights, which it has signed;

c) permit the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and

international human rights organizations unhindered access to religious

leaders, including those imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest;

d) respond to inquiries regarding persons who are

imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest for reasons of

religion or belief, or whose whereabouts are not known, 

although they were last seen in the hands of Chinese

authorities; and

e) release from prison all religious prisoners.

Also, before granting PNTR, the U.S. Congress should:
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a) announce that it will hold annual hearings on human rights and

religious freedom in China; and

b) extend an invitation to the Dalai Lama to address a Joint Session of

the Congress.

 • The United States should continue to introduce annually a censure resolution

against China in the UN Commission on Human Rights until China’s record on

religious freedom significantly improves. The President should lead a sustained

effort to persuade other governments to vote for the resolution.

 • The United States should lead a multilateral campaign to seek the release of

Chinese religious leaders imprisoned or under house arrest.

 • The U.S. government should highlight conditions in Xinjiang by raising the

issue with other countries, increasing the number of educational and cultural

exchange opportunities available to Uighurs, and increasing Uighur-language 

U.S. radio broadcasts into the region.

 • The United States should use its diplomatic influence with other governments to 

ensure that China is not selected as a site for the International Olympic Games 

until it makes significant improvement in human rights, including religious

freedom.

The Russian Federation

The Commission selected the Russian Federation as one of the three principal

countries on which it would focus in its first year not because the human rights situation 

is comparable to that of China or Sudan, but because of: (a) its influence in the region, 

(b) the fact that the condition of religious freedom in Russia could deteriorate

significantly in the near future, and (c) the impact of U.S. foreign policy on promoting 

religious freedom in Russia.

The protection of freedom of religion in Russia today is dramatically better than

during the Soviet period, and the Russian government has taken some positive steps to 

promote religious freedom. Unfortunately, Russia took a significant step backward in

1997 by enacting a federal law that replaced legislation adopted in 1990 that broadly

protected religious freedom. The 1997 Religion Law creates a hierarchy of religious

organizations and effectively restricts smaller, newer, and foreign religious

communities. It also establishes an onerous and intrusive registration process and other
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means of state interference with religious organizations’ activities. 

The U.S. Congress responded to this Russian law by passing the “Smith 

Amendment,” to ensure the law would not be implemented in a manner so as to

significantly diminish religious freedom in Russia.

The negative impact of the 1997 Religion Law appears, so far, to have been

somewhat mitigated by the Russian federal authorities and by a 1999 Russian

Constitutional Court decision. Most alarmingly, President-elect Putin issued a decree in

March, which, while extending the registration deadline until December 31, 2000,

would require the liquidation at that time of all non-registered groups. In addition,

regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion Law have denied registration and

sought the liquidation of unpopular religious communities – in some cases using panels 

of “experts” to examine the beliefs and activities of the targeted group.

Also on the regional level, officials have harassed and interfered with the

activities of religious communities. Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim indigenous

believers and foreign missionaries have been harassed by security officials, and even

expelled for propagating their faith. In addition, one-third of Russia’s constituent

regions have enacted legal regulations on religious activities that are more restrictive

and discriminatory than the 1997 Religion Law and that violate the Russian 

Constitution. The federal authorities have been unwilling, or unable, to discipline local

officials or to bring these regional laws into compliance with the Russian Constitution.

While the conflict in Chechnya is based on political and geographic factors, the 

severity of the documented human rights abuses against the majority Muslim population

requires the attention of this Commission and the U.S. government. The Russian

government has used anti-Muslim rhetoric to promote the war and to justify reported 

acts of brutality.

 Recommendations on Russia

 • The United States should continue to monitor religious freedom in Russia,

especially at the regional and local level. While addressing the continuing

problems of non-Russian Orthodox Christian groups (including Catholics and

Protestants) as well as Jews, it should seek more information on groups such as 

Muslims and dissident Orthodox groups such as the Old Believers about whom

there is under-report.

 • The United States should urge the Russian federal government to monitor more
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closely and respond to more effectively the actions of regional and local officials 

who interfere with religious freedom and to ensure conformity of local

government behavior on religion issues with the Russian Constitution and

international human rights standards incorporated in IRFA.

 • The State Department should make the humanitarian and human rights crisis in

Chechnya a high priority issue in United States-Russian relations.

 • Congress should maintain the “Smith Amendment” until President Putin’s 

commitment to religious freedom becomes clearer.

 • The United States government, as an urgent diplomatic priority, should press

President Putin to reverse the edict requiring liquidation of non-registered 

religious groups. 

 • The United States should urge the Russian government to extend the length of

visas for religious workers or at least allow them to renew their residency

permission from within the country.

 • The United States should provide support to willing non-governmental 

organizations, journalists, and academic institutions engaged in programs to

prevent intolerance and support international religious-freedom standards. The

United States should also promote tolerance through exhibits, conferences, the

Internet, and broadcasts in regions where intolerance is a serious problem.

 • The United States should promote contacts between leaders of the Russian

Orthodox Church and other Russian religious communities who may benefit 

from traveling to the United States and meeting with American political and

religious leaders. The U.S. government should encourage American religious

leaders traveling to Russia to discuss tolerance and religious freedom.

 • The United States should promote both the activities of willing Russian publicinterest organizations that defend religious freedom in Russian courts, as well as 

exchanges between Russian and U.S. judges, lawyers and legal rights

organizations.

 • The United States should encourage Russia to agree to a visit by the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.
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State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom

The State Department and the Office of International Religious Freedom deserve 

high praise for the high quality and timely publication of the first Annual Report on

International Religious Freedom, issued September 9, 1999 (Report). Equally

important was the impact of the Report in making religious freedom a higher priority

for the work of every U.S. embassy and consulate. 

The Commission believes that the Report can be strengthened by (a) prioritizing

and evaluating information, (b) placing information in context, (c) referencing relevant

law, (d) eliminating the potential for bias, (e) referencing international law incorporated 

into IRFA, and (f) improving the methodology for information-gathering. The

Commission’s comments in this regard also apply to those sections of the Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices that touch on matters related to freedom of religion 

or belief. 

Specifically, the Reports should clearly identify the most significant religiousfreedom problems in each country. Gaps in information should be identified,

particularly where a foreign government itself is responsible for the inadequacy of

available information. The facts and circumstances in the reports should be

summarized and evaluated in light of the standards set out in IRFA.

The Report should contain enough historical, religious, and political context to

present a more complete picture of religious freedom in each country. State

interference with other human rights that are integral to religious exercise should be

discussed. The Report should identify each country’s relevant constitutional, statutory,

and regulatory provisions affecting freedom of religion; explain the relationship

between the state and religion; and assess whether the government and courts enforce

the laws in a way that promotes religious freedom.

To avoid bias, the Report should distinguish between religious concepts and

how a foreign government may interpret them; politically-loaded terms such as “cult,”

“sect,” “orthodox,” “fundamentalist,” “jihad,” or “Shariah” should be used in defined

and appropriate ways. The consequences of state sponsorship of a favored religion

should be discussed.

Reference should be made to the international human rights laws incorporated

by the Congress into IRFA’s definitions of violations of religious freedom.
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United States embassies should circulate the Religion Reports to other foreign

embassies and urge them to do their own evaluation and to share recommendations and 

information.

The Commission’s Work Program for Its Next Phase

The Commission plans to expand its work program but will need to continue its 

primary focus on Sudan, China, and Russia. On Sudan, it will need to advise the

Congress and the Administration on implementation of its recommendations and

monitor whether they are having the intended effect. On China, the deteriorating 

religious-freedom situation requires it to encourage sustained United States

implementation of these recommendations. On Russia, the Commission will especially

monitor the December 2000 deadline on registration and United States’ efforts to

persuade President Putin to revise his decree. 

In other work, the Commission will make recommendations on the selection of

“countries of particular concern” prior to the State Department’s September 2000 report 

on religious freedom.

The Commission will continue to respond to instances of religious persecution

whenever they occur. It will also begin the process of analyzing and addressing U.S.

policy regarding religious-freedom issues in a larger number of countries. Some

countries may be included in the next May 1 report, while the Commission may report 

on some earlier and others later. Countries that will draw greater attention during the

next phase of the Commission’s work are the seven designated by the State Department 

last October as “countries of particular concern” and the more than 25 countries

discussed in the Executive Summary of the State Department’s Religion Report of

September 9, 1999.

The Commission will also evaluate U.S. policy options that could promote the

right to change one’s faith and the right to seek to persuade others to change theirs (i.e., 

evangelism by both foreign missionaries and indigenous believers). 

Finally, the Commission will make further recommendations on the extent to

which capital-market sanctions and other economic leverage should be included in the

U.S. diplomatic arsenal to promote religious freedom in other nations.
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I. THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

A. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

This first annual report of the United States Commission on International

Religious Freedom (Commission) is a milestone in a process that began with

Congress’s passage of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in October

1998.1

That act established a multi-faceted program for ensuring that religious freedom

has a permanent and significant place in the formulation and application of U.S. foreign

policy. It created the Office of International Religious Freedom at the State

Department, headed by an Ambassador-at-Large, and charged that office with issuing

an annual report on international religious freedom. The office issued its first report on

September 9, 1999. Congress also urged the President to name a special adviser on

international religious freedom to the National Security Council. 

IRFA also established a Commission on International Religious Freedom to

ensure, in the words of one central drafter, “that the President and the Congress receive 

independent recommendations and, where necessary, criticism of American policy that

does not promote international religious freedom.” The Commission is “to hold

policymakers accountable to the purposes of this Act and thus ensure the Act’s

effectiveness.”2

Under IRFA, the President must designate, by September 1 of each year,

“countries of particular concern for religious freedom” and implement actions in

response, taking into account “any findings or recommendations by the Commission

with respect to the foreign country.” In October 1999, the State Department designated 

Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan as “countries of particular concern,” and also listed 

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Milosevic regime in Serbia as “particularly

severe violators of religious freedom.” 

Congress established the Commission as an agency independent of the

Executive Branch. Appointments to the Commission are for a two-year term. The

President appoints three Commissioners; four are appointed by the congressional

leadership of the political party that is not the President’s, and two by the congressional 

leadership of the President’s party. The Ambassador-at-Large for International

Religious Freedom serves as an ex-officio, non-voting member.

Lawmakers charged the Commission with annual, ongoing, and independent

review of the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom abroad. Not
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later than May 1 of each year, the Commission is required to submit an annual report of 

its findings and policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and the 

Congress. In Part III of this report, the Commission evaluates both the State

Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and its September 1 Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom. The Commission is also to consult with

independent human rights groups; non-governmental organizations, including churches

and other religious communities; and with other government agencies. It is also

authorized to hold hearings for the purpose of taking testimony and receiving evidence

of religious-freedom violations, and to travel abroad for in-country meetings and

information gathering.

In addition to issuing the May 1 report, the Commission addresses countries

where persistent violations of religious liberty occur and makes policy

recommendations to the U.S. government. Its members testify before Congress, deliver 

briefings, help train foreign service officers on religious-liberty issues, and meet with

interested institutions and parties within the U.S. government, in the international

community, and among private voluntary and non-governmental organizations.

The Commission is the only governmental agency in the world with the sole

mission of reviewing and reporting the facts and circumstances of violations of religious 

freedom. The Commission’s impact and its success in accomplishing its mission

depend on drawing public attention to and focusing U.S. foreign policy on the

enhancement of religious liberty abroad. By providing information and policy

recommendations as mandated, the Commission provides the U.S. government, and the 

American public, the tools necessary to promote this fundamental freedom throughout

the world.

B. The Commission’s First Year

 1. Overview

With the final appointments of Commissioners in May 1999, the Commission

first met in June 1999 and found religious liberty under serious threat in a number of

countries around the world.3 In setting its first-year agenda, the Commission decided to 

begin by addressing violations of religious freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, and to 

feature these countries in this annual report. The State Department later designated

Sudan and China as “countries of particular concern” under IRFA.

Commissioners chose to look at Sudan because of the 17-year civil war raging

in that African nation – a tragic and genocidal war that has taken some 2 million lives,
15

mostly Christian and traditional religionists. While the conflict has many contributing

causes, religious factors are key: (a) the effort of the Arab Islamist extremist

government in Khartoum to extend Shariah, or Islamic law, to the African Christians

and animists in the south; and (b) the government’s efforts to impose its narrow

interpretation of Islam on all other Muslims.

In China, the Commission noted a sweeping turn for the worse as the Beijing

government cracked down on Roman Catholics loyal to the Vatican; underground,

unregistered Protestant “house churches”; Tibetan Buddhists; Muslim Uighurs; and the

Falun Gong spiritual movement. This crackdown took place simultaneously with

Beijing’s successful negotiations with the United States over China’s potential

membership in the World Trade Organization.

The Commission chose to focus on Russia, not because it is an egregious

violator of religious freedom on the order of Sudan and China (the second Chechen war 

had not yet begun), but because that country is at a crossroads in its approach to

religious freedom, because it is so influential throughout all of the territory of the

former Soviet Union, and because the United States has the ability to promote religious 

liberty there.

In October 1999, the Commission met with the President, National Security

Adviser Samuel Berger, and Chief of Staff John Podesta to discuss violations of

religious freedom in Sudan and China. The President commended the Commission for 

its work to date and strongly encouraged its continuing efforts. Commissioners also met 

with Secretary of State Albright in August 1999.

At the same time, the Commission monitored, reported on, and made

recommendations regarding other countries engaging in or tolerating violations of

religious liberty on a case-by-case basis in addition to the May 1 report4. In doing so, 

the Commission spoke out on problems in Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Turkmenistan, and

Vietnam in addition to its priority countries. Individual Commissioners also traveled to 

Bosnia, France, Italy (including meetings at the Vatican), Indonesia, Jordan, Laos,

Lebanon, Romania, Sudan, Switzerland (to attend a session of the United Nations

Commission on Human Rights), Turkmenistan, Vietnam, and the Netherlands (at the

invitation of the Dutch to discuss cooperation on these issues).

 2. Sudan

The Commission spent a large share of its time and efforts considering the civil

war in Sudan and developing recommendations for U.S. policymakers. As the
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Commission studied the conflict, it became clear that U.S. government attempts to help 

end the civil war needed a new impetus and U.S. sanctions on the Khartoum

government needed tightening. While it is illegal for U.S. companies to do business 

with countries subject to sanctions, it is still possible for most foreign firms doing

business with Sudan to raise money in U.S. capital markets. The Commission met with

President Clinton in October 1999 to brief him on its work and to ask him to strengthen 

U.S. efforts to address the vexing issues of Sudan and its violations of human rights and 

religious freedom. Among its requests: 

First, the Commission asked the President to apply his 1997 Executive Order

imposing economic sanctions on that country to bar the Chinese government’s China

National Petroleum Corporation from using U.S. capital markets to finance Sudan’s

new oil pipeline. Revenues from the pipeline, the Commission judged, insulate Sudan’s 

repressive Islamic extremist regime from the impact of U.S. economic sanctions, and

perpetuate the 17-year-old civil war that has already claimed the lives of 2 million

Sudanese, mostly Christian and traditional religionists.

Second, the Commission also urged the President to meet with prominent

experts on Sudan (the Commission provided recommendations) to design future actions

aimed at ending egregious religious persecution by that country’s government, and to

send Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to a congressionally-sponsored “summit

meeting” on Sudan November 9.

Third, the Commission asked the President to speak out more forcefully and

frequently – in public, before multilateral organizations, and in diplomatic exchanges –

against the violations of religious freedom in Sudan and to strengthen the hand of the 

U.S. special envoy to Sudan. While the President and Secretary of State spoke out

about the situation in Sudan at the National Summit on Africa in February 2000, a few

days following the Commission’s hearing on religious persecution in Sudan, the

Commission believes the President must make better use of the “bully pulpit” if the

situation in Sudan is to be improved.

In December the Commission, noting the Sudanese government’s use of food

aid as a weapon of war, called on the U.S. government to take a series of actions to 

ensure food aid reaches all hungry people in Sudan’s war-torn southern region. It

recommended that the U.S. government:

 • orchestrate international multilateral pressure on the Sudanese government to

immediately stop banning food flights;

 • continue its policy of shipping food into southern Sudan, both through its
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participation in the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and outside

that program, and to increase the percentage of food delivered outside OLS; and

 • undertake an active diplomatic campaign to encourage other nations and

humanitarian organizations to move food aid directly into Sudan outside OLS,

consistent with international law.

The Commission met with nationally recognized experts on the use of sanctions 

and considered the extensive literature on the use of sanctions as policy tools. As a

result, the Commission created a task force to examine the possibility of denying access 

to U.S. capital markets for companies investing or doing business in sanctioned

countries that severely violate religious freedom, focusing in particular on foreign

companies participating in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC),

the Sudanese government’s oil consortium.

During January, Commissioner Elliott Abrams undertook a site visit to southern

Sudan and Nairobi and Lokkichokio, Kenya, to discuss policy options with those on the 

front lines. The Commission hopes to arrange a corresponding visit to Khartoum and

northern Sudan later this year.

The Commission held a day-long public hearing on Capitol Hill on February 15, 

2000, to examine and highlight the degree of religious persecution in Sudan. At the

Commission’s request, Secretary of State Albright met on the day of the hearing with a 

key witness, Roman Catholic Bishop Macram (Max) Gassis of El Obeid, Sudan, along

with the Commission Chair. The following day the U.S. Treasury Department extended 

two-year-old sanctions against Sudan to encompass GNPOC and Sudapet, the

Sudanese-owned portion of GNPOC. 

The Commissioners and their representatives met with State and Treasury

Department officials, including Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and

Agricultural Affairs Alan Larson, to discuss the reasoning behind the President’s waiver 

of the Sudan sanctions to permit the importation of raw Sudanese gum arabic, an

ingredient in candy, soft drinks, and pharmaceuticals. Commissioners also met with

several administration officials and others to discuss the Sudanese civil war and

humanitarian-relief efforts, including Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Susan Rice; Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer; Special

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Gail Smith; and Senior Director 

for African Affairs; Eric Schwartz, Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs and Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; John

Eibner, Director of Advocacy for Christian Solidarity International; and John Garang,
18

leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the main southern rebel group.

On the question of capital-markets access, the Commission staff exchanged

correspondence and met with R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Treasury

Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and David Martin, Director of

the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The

dialogue with OFAC focused on its issuance of a licence to import gun arabic from

Sudan and the applicability of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations to the initial public

offering (IPO) by PetroChina. The dialogue with SEC focused the applicability of SEC 

disclosure requirements to IPOs by foreign corporations and the general sequence and

timing of review by SEC staff of registration statements. SEC declined to make any

comment on the PetroChina IPO.

Following these inquiries, with the situation in Sudan deteriorating rapidly and

PetroChina’s IPO having its debut on the New York Stock Exchange in early April, the 

Commission formulated further recommendations for actions the U.S. government can

take to end the civil war and to promote religious liberty in Sudan. The Commission’s 

report and recommendations on Sudan are found in Part II A.

 3. The People’s Republic of China

In late August and early September 1999, the Commission urged the

Administration to designate China as a “country of particular concern” due to its severe 

and systematic violations of religious freedom, which worsened markedly during the

summer of 1999 and the months following. It welcomed the State Department’s

October decision to do so. 

In 1999, the authorities in Beijing launched a nationwide crackdown on the

Falun Gong spiritual movement. Leaders were sentenced to long prison terms and

thousands of practitioners were detained. A few followers were even beaten to death or 

died suddenly while in custody. Catholic and Protestant underground “house churches”

suffered increased repression; the crackdown included the arrests of bishops, priests and 

pastors, one of whom was found dead in the street soon afterward. Several Catholic 

bishops were ordained by the government without the Vatican’s participation or

approval. The repression of Tibetan Buddhists expanded; authorities in Tibet, in

defiance of the Dalai Lama, named a new Reting Lama. Another important religious

leader, the Karmapa Lama, fled to India. Muslim Uighurs faced heightened repression

as they turned to Islamic institutions against a deliberate government campaign of Han

Chinese in-migration meant to out-populate the Uighurs in their own land.
19

The Commission urged the Administration to raise religious freedom issues as

often and as prominently as possible in meetings with Chinese officials. In a public

statement, it called upon the Chinese government to make peace with Falun Gong and 

other spiritual and religious groups. The Commission later expressed disappointment

with the state ordination of Catholic bishops as a backward step away from improving

Chinese-Vatican relations. It urged the Administration to include a condemnation of

religious persecution in the resolution on Chinese human rights violations the United

States introduced in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in April, and to 

work vigorously for the resolution’s approval. The Administration did so, and lobbied 

hard in Geneva to bring the resolution up for consideration in the face of heavy Chinese 

pressure against it – including the dangling of financial incentives to developing

countries. On April 14, the Commission wrote the President and urged him to

personally intervene in the effort to support the resolution against a Chinese “no action”

motion. Regrettably, in a vote on April 18, 2000, the UNCHR adopted the Chinese

motion to take no action on the U.S. resolution.

The Commission sought to arrange a fact-finding trip to China, but the Chinese 

government did not respond to the Commission’s request. The Commission held a daylong hearing in Los Angeles on March 16 to gather evidence on religious persecution in 

China and explore actions the United States can take to change Beijing’s behavior –

hearing from prominent representatives of the major faith groups and from a wide range 

of policy experts. Commission Vice Chair Michael Young and Chair David Saperstein 

testified on religious freedom in China before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus

March 28.

With the possible accession of China to WTO membership and the question of

Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China before Congress as this report is issued, 

the increased religious persecution in that country is fraught with significance. The

Commission’s report and recommendations for the Administration and Congress in

regard to China are found in Part II B. 

 4. The Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States

The Commission noted a regressive trend toward violations of religious freedom

in Russia, along with the link between extreme nationalism and religious persecution.

Commission staff met separately with Russian Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and

Ukrainian Christian representatives to explore the difficulties they are experiencing in

Russia and the newly independent states. The Commission, in a public statement,

called the Russian government to task for using religious bigotry to fuel the conflict in

Chechnya. In another statement, the Commission welcomed a Russian constitutional
20

court decision in November that benignly reinterpreted portions of the restrictive 1997

law regarding the registration of religious groups. Commission travel to Russia is

tentatively planned for later this year. The Commission’s report and recommendations

on Russia are found in Part II C.

Meanwhile, Commissioner Firuz Kazemzadeh traveled on the Commission’s

behalf to Turkmenistan, where religious repression has reached alarming proportions,

including outright demolition of a Seventh-day Adventist church and the arrest,

imprisonment, and deportation of Baptist pastors. He also testified for the Commission

at a March 21 hearing on Turkmenistan held by the U.S. Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).

 5. Egypt

The six million members of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt experience

serious and pervasive religious discrimination. According to the State Department’s 

most recent Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999 released February 25, 

Christians who proselytize are subject to arrest. Permits to build Christian churches can

only be issued by President Hosni Mubarak. However, in a significant step toward

government nondiscrimination, President Mubarak decreed on December 28, 1999, that 

church repairs no longer require a presidential, governor’s, or federal ministry permit.

On the occasion of President Mubarak’s impending state visit to the United 

States in June 1999, the Commission urged President Clinton to raise reports of

infringements on religious freedom for Christian Copts and others in Egypt. It called

particular attention to the widely reported 1998 arrests and torture of many hundreds of

Coptic Christians in the village of Al-Kosheh and the failure of the Egyptian

government to investigate these reports adequately. The Commission also expressed its 

concern over other actions by the Egyptian government, including a then-pending law

that severely curtails action by human rights and other groups, including those reporting

on violations of freedom of religion. This would affect Muslim groups as well as others 

and would broadly inhibit free exercise of religion. The President raised the issues with 

President Mubarak.

Commissioners and staff met with Coptic Bishop Thomas of Egypt in

November 1999, to discuss religious-freedom issues there.

Unfortunately, religious violence broke out again in Al-Kosheh January 1-3, 

2000, resulting in the deaths of 21 Copts and one Muslim. Local police reportedly

withdrew from the scene immediately prior to the attack by Muslims. While the
21

Egyptian government offered to provide token compensation to the victims, the

Commission fears that local prosecutors will again resort to blaming the victims and

that justice will once again languish. 

The Commission wrote again to President Clinton on the eve of Mr. Mubarak’s 

state visit in March 2000. It urged him to reiterate to the Egyptian President that

concerns about the Copts and promotion of religious freedom are critical to EgyptianAmerican relations. The Commission understands that the matter was raised with

President Mubarak by Egyptian-Americans at a roundtable discussion attended by

President Clinton, at which he raised the issue of human rights. 

 6. Indonesia

During 1998 and 1999, Indonesia suffered several regional outbreaks of

religious and ethnic violence, often related to separatist activity, as the country moved

from authoritarianism to a fragile democracy. The Commission followed closely the

violence by pro-Indonesian militias in mostly Christian East Timor following that

province’s vote for independence in September 1999, and the multinational intervention

to halt the violence. Archbishop Theodore McCarrick, a Commissioner, visited East

Timor and Jakarta, Indonesia in February 2000. 

In January 2000, serious intercommunal violence between Muslims and

Christians broke out again in the Maluku Islands of Indonesia, leading to hundreds of

deaths, the destruction of churches and mosques, and atrocities on both sides. The

Commission called upon the Administration to urge the Indonesian government, as well

as civil and religious leaders, to take all possible steps to restore civil order, foster

interreligious dialogue, and help the communities reintegrate and rebuild. It asked that

any Indonesian troops sent in to quell the violence show respect for human rights. It

further recommended the United States consider offering economic assistance for the 

people of the Maluku Islands.

 7. Iran

The Commission also closely followed developments in Iran, which the State

Department has designated a “country of particular concern”. In June 1999, a

Commission public statement called on the Administration to continue to work at the

highest levels to ensure protection of the rights of 13 Jews arrested in Iran on charges of 

spying for the United States and Israel, charges that appear to be based solely on the 

men’s religion. Indications are the men’s trial will begin this week.
22

In February 2000, the Commission called for nullification of the death sentences 

handed down to three local leaders of the Baha’i faith in Mashdad, Iran. Nearly 200

Baha’is have been put to death since the Islamic Revolution in 1979; the Baha’i religion 

has been declared illegal in the land of its origin. 

The Commission recommended that:

 • The State Department consider introducing a resolution in the United Nations

Security Council condemning the death sentences and the general persecution of 

Baha’is in Iran;

 • State also co-sponsor in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights a

resolution condemning Iran’s repression of religious freedom; and

 • The House and Senate pass a pending sense-of-the-Congress resolution insisting that the men be freed and Baha’is be recognized as full citizens.

The United States is supporting a resolution before the UNCHR on Iranian

human rights violations and resolutions enjoying wide sponsorship are moving through

the House and Senate.

Iran is undergoing significant political changes following this spring’s elections,

but the positive gains thus far are fragile and turmoil there continues.

 8. Vietnam

Religious freedom is severely repressed in Vietnam in the manner common to

Communist countries in general: through arbitrarily enforced registration laws, tightly

controlled official organizations, and strict limitations on religious activity. On March

29-30, some of the two million to four million Hoa Hao Buddhist practitioners in

Vietnam tried to assemble on their “sacred ground” in Hoa Hao village (their founder’s 

birthplace), located in Chau Doc Province in the Mekong Delta. Vietnamese authorities, 

however, forcibly prevented any of the faithful from entering the grounds. According to 

reliable reports reaching the Commission, key leaders were arrested or their houses

were surrounded by police. Other devotees were threatened or detained on their way to 

the site. Eventually only about 1,000 people made it to Hoa Hao village, where a

phalanx of police met them. 

The Commission had previously written to Secretary of State Albright asking

that the State Department monitor the situation, which reportedly it did. In a public
23

statement, the Commission condemned the Vietnamese authorities’ unwarranted

interference with the Hoa Hao Buddhist’s freedom of religion and reminded the Hanoi

government that the international community was watching. 

Commissioner Robert Seiple visited Vietnam in July 1999; Commissioners and

staff met with Hoa Hao representatives in the United States in March 2000.

 9. Other Activities

Section 104 of IRFA provides for improved training of U.S. foreign service

officers in international religious-freedom issues. To assist in this effort, Commission 

staff attended sessions at the Foreign Service Institute to observe and initiate

discussions with the State Department about how the Institute instructs diplomats on

these issues. Commission Executive Director Steven T. McFarland co-taught a

classroom of officers on March 21 regarding the provisions of IRFA and the

Commission hopes to establish regular opportunities for training.

As part of the Commission’s responsibility to “review . . . The facts and

circumstances of violations of religious freedom presented in the Country Reports on

Human Rights Practices,”5 Commission staff met with the authors of those reports in

the State Department to discuss the Commission’s evaluation of and recommendations

for improvement of the Department’s coverage of religious freedom. That evaluation

and those recommendations appear in Part III, below. 

On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Nina Shea testified before the House

International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on International Operations and

Human Rights on the Department’s first Annual Report: International Religious

Freedom 1999, particularly regarding China and Sudan. In addition, Commissioner

Nina Shea in March 2000 testified on the Commission’s behalf before the House

Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights regarding the State

Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999.

 10. Web Site

Commissioners’ testimony before Congress, this report, and other relevant

documents can be found on the Commission’s Web site at www.uscirf.gov. Posted there 

is information about the Commission and the Commissioners, the State Department’s

reports on human rights and international religious freedom, transcripts of both

Commission hearings, press releases, and links to related government and nongovernmental information sites.
24

 11. Cooperation From Other Agencies

When Congress adopted amendments to strengthen the Commission, it

concluded that the Commission would need access to information in the possession of

other government agencies. It believed this was necessary in order for the Commission

to give sound advice on conditions of religious freedom abroad and on effective foreign

policy for enhancing that freedom. Consequently, IRFA conferred on the Commission

the power to 

secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information

as the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this 

section. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Commission, the head of 

such department or agency shall furnish such information to the

Commission, subject to applicable law.6

The level of cooperation by other government agencies with the Commission’s

information requests has varied. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the

Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control were helpful and responsive in

providing information and documentation relevant to this Commission’s investigation

of the PetroChina IPO referred to in Section B above and in Part II A below.

The Office of International Religious Freedom in the Department of State has

been most cooperative with the Commission. However, other offices in State have

withheld documents requested by the Commission relating to the partial lifting in

December 1999, of the U.S. ban on importation of gum arabic from Sudan. More

recently, the Department is resisting the Commission’s request for full access to cables

to and from embassies and consulates in countries of interest to the Commission.7 Other 

records requested have also not been provided. The Department, in response to all these 

requests, has asserted a legal position (executive privilege as to deliberative process

within the Administration) with which the Commission does not agree.

The Commission will continue its discussions with the State Department, but

believes the deadlock must be resolved soon. The Commission will report to Congress 

on the degree to which the Department’s level of cooperation improves and whether the 

Commission might need Congress’s assistance in obtaining from the Department 

information the Commission deems vital to an informed evaluation of religious liberty

abroad. In the meantime, the Commission strongly urges the Secretary of State to

intervene to ensure that the Commission is provided with the requested State

Department documents on a regular and timely basis.
25

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: SUDAN, CHINA, AND RUSSIA

A. SUDAN

 1. Background on Sudan

a. A Religious and Humanitarian Tragedy

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom finds that the

government of Sudan is the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of

religion and belief. Sudan has been engulfed in a brutal civil war for all but 10 years 

since gaining independence in 1956; two million Sudanese have been killed since 1983. 

More than 4.5 million have been, at some point, internally or externally displaced as a 

consequence of the war – a figure higher than that of any other country. An estimated 

1.5 million displaced persons now live in squalid conditions in government-controlled 

“peace camps.” The scope of the humanitarian tragedy of Sudan dwarfs the figures of

other recent conflicts, and yet Sudan receives far less international attention or scrutiny

than many other conflicts.

The Commission finds that religion is a major factor in the conflict in Sudan,

and therefore it serves as an essential starting point for understanding a civil war that

also includes racial, cultural, geopolitical, economic, and linguistic factors. Because

religion is intertwined with broader human rights abuses, the civil war, the ethnic strife, 

and the attacks on civilian population centers and institutions, the Commission’s policy

recommendations must address these broader issues. 

The Sudanese government has committed and continues to commit genocidal

atrocities against civilian populations in the south and in the Nuba Mountains. Its

military repeatedly bombs and strafes schools, hospitals, and large gatherings of

civilians awaiting distribution of food or engaged in worship. The government uses

food as a weapon by a combination of attacking villages (thereby disrupting food

production and distribution) and by preventing humanitarian food relief from reaching

many areas of the country. Toward that end, it has threatened to shoot down any United 

Nations plane seeking to deliver food to designated rebel-controlled areas. The regime 

arms Arab tribes who are traditional rivals of indigenous African southern villagers,

commissioning them as militia and allowing them to attack, burn, and loot villages, and 

to kill, rape and enslave the villagers. The Sudanese army is using “scorched earth”

campaigns to massively relocate populations off their land in the areas where petroleum

companies pump oil. Some sources report the government is using cluster bombs and 

chemical weapons against civilian and rebel groups.
26

The Sudanese government identifies itself as Islamic and declares that its

mission is to impose its interpretation of Islamic law (Shariah) on the country. It has 

declared the civil war to be a jihad (against both non-Muslims and Muslims) and uses 

religion to recruit (or conscript) soldiers for the civil war. There are reports of forced 

conversions to Islam and aggressive indoctrination in the refugee camps. Muslims who 

do not subscribe to the government’s extremist interpretation of Islam are persecuted.

Christian schools were nationalized in 1992. Christian churches and prayer centers

continue to be demolished, and the government has not granted permission to build or

repair a church in over 30 years. The regime also promotes Islamization in an effort to 

suppress Christian and traditional religions. 

Neither the international community nor the United States has any plan to

address the mounting tragedy in Sudan. Although the United States has taken important 

steps to isolate Sudan economically and to provide massive amounts of humanitarian

relief, these steps – by themselves – do not respond to the underlying catastrophe in

Sudan.

The U.S. government has not determined whether such acts constitute

“genocide” under international law, but has decided that they do constitute war crimes

and crimes against humanity. The Commission concludes that the Sudanese

government’s actions constitute not only war crimes and crimes against humanity but

genocidal activities as well.

b. PetroChina and U.S. Capital Markets

The terrible situation in Sudan is likely to become worse. The Sudanese

government, which has been waging a campaign of death and destruction against its

own people, is now receiving windfall profits from oil fields in south central Sudan. 

During 1999, Sudan became a net exporter of oil, and its oil income is expected to rise 

to $ 400 million this year – with additional increases over the next few years. These oil 

profits will provide the government with funds to increase its purchases of military

equipment, which will in turn be used to further its campaigns against religious, racial,

and ethnic minorities.

There is a critical linkage between oil and gas production and human rights

violations in Sudan. The government of Sudan destroyed a number of villages

surrounding the Bentiu oil fields in order to rid them of human habitation. The

proceeds from the oil revenues will, in turn, be used to support the Sudanese military's 

actions against other regions of the country. 
27

In this context, the Commission was alarmed by reports in late 1999, that the

China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a 40 percent stakeholder in a joint

venture to develop the Sudanese oil and gas fields, was poised to obtain additional

funds from the U.S. capital markets on a huge scale. According to those reports, CNPC 

was planning to make an initial public offering (IPO) of equity shares in the amount of

$10-12 billion. At that level, the IPO would have been one of the largest ones ever 

made on the New York Stock Exchange.

In response, the Commission studied the applicability of the President’s

economic sanctions and the disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) to such an IPO, in consultation with the Department of the

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the SEC. In October 1999, 

the Commission urged President Clinton and top White House officials at a meeting

with them to prevent the IPO. The Commission also focused a substantial part of its 

February 14, 2000 hearing on Sudan on this sort of use of our capital markets.

In the face of the issues raised by the Commission and others, CNPC

substantially changed the structure of its operations and its plans for obtaining financing

in the United States and elsewhere. CNPC created a new, wholly-owned subsidiary, 

PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina), and placed most of its domestic business

into PetroChina, retaining its foreign business, including its business in Sudan. Then, in

March 2000, PetroChina filed a registration statement with the SEC disclosing that

CNPC and PetroChina each planned simultaneously to make an offering of shares in

PetroChina. Thus, while PetroChina would be offering shares in its own business, its 

parent CNPC would also be offering PetroChina shares. The registration statement

became effective on March 30, 2000, and the offerings took place in early April. 

Globally, according to press accounts, the proceeds totaled $ 2.5-3 billion.

The Commission has addressed many of the disturbing aspects of this corporate 

restructuring and sale in Recommendations 1.8 to 1.13 below. But it wishes to

emphasize here the artificial nature of CNPC’s “carve-out” of PetroChina. The

economic reality is that the infusion of capital into PetroChina that has now occurred

may free up resources within CNPC, so that it can better pursue its international

activities, including development of the oil and gas fields in Sudan. Also, PetroChina is

explicit in its registration statement that major portions of its dividends will go directly

to CNPC. Thus, capital obtained on the U.S. market quite likely will end up facilitating 

the development of those fields and hence the predatory activities of the government of 

Sudan.
28

 2. Commission Recommendations on Sudan

Based on the above-described violations of human rights, including religious

freedom, in Sudan, the Commission recommends the following policies to the President 

and the Congress:

Recommendation 1.1: Increasing Non-OLS support

The government of Sudan has restricted, on a continuing basis, the UN’s

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) from making deliveries of food and other humanitarian

aid to the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, the Beja, the Furs of western Sudan, and 

broad areas of southern Sudan. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians 

have died of starvation and related illnesses, even though international relief was

available. Reliable sources report that over 100,000 civilians died in Bahr al Ghazal

alone when the government imposed a “no-fly zone” over that area in 1998. Several

international humanitarian organizations have chosen to ignore the government’s flight

ban and have delivered food and other supplies to areas that fall under the ban. These 

non-OLS operations often fly into dangerous situations to deliver food and other

supplies to areas that fall under the ban. The Commission believes the U.S. government 

should intensify this shift to non-OLS efforts and encourage other governments to do so 

as well, so as to guarantee that the government of Sudan cannot block aid from reaching 

Sudanese who desperately need it. 

Some aid groups have chosen to terminate their aid to southern Sudan because 

they were unwilling to sign a Memorandum Of Understanding with the SPLA’s relief

arm that would have granted the SPLA power to regulate their relief activities.

1.1 The U.S. government should continue to increase its aid 

to non-OLS providers of aid to Sudan and should engage in 

vigorous multilateral and bilateral efforts to encourage other 

governments to join. 

The U.S. government contributes over $ 110 million annually in food aid to

Sudan, most of which flows through OLS. During the past three years the U.S.

government has increased significantly its support for non-OLS aid. The Commission

believes that the U.S. government should increase significantly its support for such nonOLS efforts and encourage other governments to do so as well.

 The Commission also believes that the U.S. government should seek to

persuade the SPLA and the humanitarian groups that withdrew from Sudan to settle
29

their differences so that the latter may return.

Recommendation 1.2: A Comprehensive Plan for a Solution to the 

Tragedy in Sudan

Sudan is engulfed in a religious and humanitarian tragedy that worsens daily. 

The response by the U.S. government, the countries involved in the Intergovernmental

Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners Forum, and the broader international

community is woefully inadequate. While the U.S. government should be commended

for doing more than any other country, the Commission is unaware of any plan by the 

U.S. government or any other government to respond in a timely way to this crisis. The 

Commission believes that unless immediate, concrete, and far-reaching actions are

taken by the U.S. government, the conditions of civilian life indispensable for religious

freedom cannot be achieved and there will be great additional loss of life in Sudan

through both violence and starvation. We therefore call upon our government to act –

now.

1.2. The U.S. government should launch a comprehensive 12-

month plan to reverse the tragic human rights situation in

Sudan. The plan should establish a direct linkage between 

the Sudanese government’s actions measurably improving

religious freedom and the U.S. government’s proportionate

responses. To the extent that the Sudanese government

improves its record on human rights and religious freedom, 

the U.S. government should respond by improving diplomatic 

relations as well as providing humanitarian and other

assistance. To the extent the Sudanese government’s

behavior does not improve in measurable ways, the U.S.

government should, following a 12-month preparation period, 

provide non-lethal and humanitarian aid to Sudanese

opposition groups that have developed procedures to comply 

with verifiable international human rights standards.

There are many components that could be included within such a comprehensive 

plan – most of which can and should be pursued vigorously by the U.S. government, 

regardless of whether a comprehensive plan as such is adopted. With the exception of 

providing aid to opposition groups (Recommendation 1.2.e below), each of these

elements should be launched immediately so that the U.S. government will be able to

provide assistance to legitimate opposition groups by the end of the 12-month period. 
30

Comprehensive plan: Informational Campaign

1.2.a. The President should launch a vigorous

campaign to inform both the American public and the 

international community of the human rights abuses,

the pervasive infringement of religious freedom, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal

activities perpetrated by the government of Sudan.

The United States should launch immediately a vigorous domestic and

international campaign to inform the world community of the situation in Sudan. The

President should play an active role in launching the plan by identifying the war crimes, 

crimes against humanity, and the genocidal activities of the Sudanese government. The 

United States should publicize such actions as: (a) the intentional bombings of civilian

populations in the Nuba mountains, southern Sudan, and northeastern Sudan (among the 

Beja people); (b) the intentional destruction of entire villages in the Bentiu region; (c)

the intentional restrictions of international deliveries of food to starving people; (d)

complicity in militia raids to abduct civilians (particularly women and children) and

place them in conditions of slavery and forced labor; and (e) the systematic abridgement 

of religious freedom and the pervasiveness of religious persecution.

Comprehensive plan: Economic Pressures 

1.2.b. The U.S. government should engage in vigorous 

multilateral and bilateral efforts to increase economic 

and other pressures on the Sudanese government. 

The United States should use its diplomatic influence to urge governments,

international organizations, and businesses to: (a) refrain from engaging in trade 

relations with the government of Sudan (with the exception of humanitarian goods and

services); (b) boycott the importing of oil from Sudan; (c) cease production,

transporting, or refining of oil in Sudan; and (d) cease selling military equipment to the 

government of Sudan.

In addition to the diplomatic efforts involving other countries, the Commission

has recommendations pertaining to access to U.S. capital markets by foreign

corporations. Those recommendations are found at Recommendations 1.8 to 1.13 

below.
31

Comprehensive plan: criteria for measuring Sudanese 

government actions 

1.2.c. The comprehensive plan should identify specific 

criteria to measure the Sudanese government’s actions 

and create specific linkages between those actions and 

U.S. government responses. 

The types of criteria that should be used to measure the government’s actions

and improvement in conditions include: (a) stopping the bombing of civilian

populations; (b) discontinuing all flight bans and travel restrictions for humanitarian

relief operations; (c) permitting international human rights observers complete access to

places such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Red Sea province, “peace camps,” western 

upper Nile (areas surrounding oil fields), and villages along the Wau-Babanusa train

track, and (d) complying with the Geneva Conventions.

If the Sudanese government’s actions and human rights conditions improve in

the areas of the criteria, the United States should respond proportionately by such steps 

as improvement of diplomatic relations, the provision of additional humanitarian relief 

to areas within government control, and, if there is significant and systemic

improvement, the easing of United States-imposed sanctions. The United States should 

respond to the failure to make improvements by increasing pressures on Sudan.

Comprehensive plan: Criteria for Measuring Opposition 

Groups’ Actions 

1.2.d. The comprehensive plan should include specific 

criteria for measuring whether opposition groups that 

are potential recipients of United States aid have made 

verifiable efforts to adhere to international human

rights norms.

It is important that Sudanese opposition groups (such as the Sudanese People’s 

Liberation Army and the National Democratic Alliance) that may receive humanitarian

and other non-lethal aid from the United States make serious and verifiable efforts to

comply with international human rights norms. It must be recognized that serious

human rights abuses have been committed by opposition forces. The Commission

concludes that there is no parity between the scale of human rights abuses of the SPLA 

and those by the government of Sudan. Before providing aid to such groups, the United
32

States should ensure that verifiable steps are being taken by opposition forces to comply 

with international human rights norms. Such norms should include, for example,

observing the Geneva Conventions, establishing fair and transparent judicial procedures

for the trial of persons accused of committing crimes, and providing access to

international human rights observers.

Comprehensive plan: Aid to Sudanese Opposition

Groups

1.2.e. If, after 12 months, the President concludes

that: (a) the Sudanese government has not taken

actions to measurably improve human rights and 

religious freedom, and (b) Sudanese opposition

groups have established procedures to comply with

verifiable international human rights standards, the

Commission believes that the U.S. government should 

provide non-lethal and humanitarian aid directly to 

appropriate opposition groups. Any such aid provided 

to opposition groups should be separate and distinct

from ongoing U.S. assistance to humanitarian

organizations through OLS or non-OLS channels.*

If the Sudanese government does not alter its behavior, the Sudanese people 

will continue to suffer. The only organized groups capable of defending the people 

against the government’s onslaught (thereby offering the possibility of the

resumption of normal civilian life, including religious life) are opposition groups, 

particularly the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and possibly the

National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Although the Commission is not prepared to 

recommend lethal aid to these groups, it does believe that – as a last recourse –

nonlethal and humanitarian aid to such groups may be a necessity for preventing 

an exacerbation of this humanitarian and human rights tragedy. 

Comprehensive plan: Acceleration of Response

1.2.f. The United States should be prepared to

provide aid to opposition groups on an accelerated

basis if the situation in Sudan deteriorates markedly

 

1

 For the dissent of Commissioner Al-Marayati to Recommendations 1.2.e-f, see pp. 

57-58 below.
33

or if the Sudanese government shows no signs of

engaging in serious efforts to remedy its human rights 

abuses.

If the President determines that the Sudanese government is increasing its

attacks on civilians or exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, the U.S. government should

accelerate its decision to provide humanitarian and other non-lethal aid to opposition

groups.

Recommendation 1.3: IGAD and Egypt 

1.3 The U.S. government should increase its financial and

diplomatic involvement and support for the IGAD peace

negotiations, and use diplomatic influence to urge Egypt to

join that process. The United States should promote

implementation of the IGAD Declaration of Principles. 

Virtually all of the witnesses at the Commission’s February 15, 2000 Sudan

hearings and in its private interviews espoused support for the ongoing peace talks

occurring under the auspices of IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum. The government 

of Sudan and the SPLA have agreed to conduct these negotiations using the Declaration 

of Principles (DOP) as the framework for resolution of the conflict (although the

Sudanese government no longer consents to the DOP as a blueprint for resolution of the 

conflict). The IGAD talks have been sluggish at best. Nevertheless, IGAD appears to 

be the best hope for a negotiated settlement, due in part to its inclusion of most of the 

neighboring countries as partners in the process. 

Egypt and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) are not participants in the

IGAD-sponsored discussions on Sudan. Some speculate that Egypt would not endorse 

the DOP because it conditionally provides for self-determination for the south, while

Egypt would prefer a unified, Arab, and Islamic neighbor at the headwaters of the Nile. 

(Egypt and Libya recently proposed their own peace initiative, one that omits selfdetermination as an option for the southern Sudanese.) Nevertheless, the United States 

should make every effort to use the leverage of its close relationship with Egypt to

convince Egypt to become an active and constructive partner in the IGAD process.
34

Recommendation 1.4: Aid to Build Infrastructure in Southern Sudan

1.4. The U.S. government should earmark more of its

humanitarian aid for the building of infrastructure and civil

government in southern Sudan.

While humanitarian relief is essential and is the top priority. In the long run the 

peoples of southern Sudan must build a decent and just political order. U.S. assistance 

to them in this endeavor will be critical and has begun. Increased efforts are worthwhile 

if southern Sudan is ever to emerge into a stable democratic order.

Recommendation 1.5: Creation of a “Military No-Fly Zone”

As discussed above, the Sudanese military is increasing its bombing of civilian

areas, including hospitals and primary schools. It has demonstrated that it recognizes

no distinction between military and civilian facilities when selecting bombing targets. 

1.5. The U.S. government should advocate within the

international community for a “military no-fly zone” over

Sudan and for taking steps to prevent civilians from being

hurt by Sudanese bombing attacks.

The Commission recommends three steps aimed at reducing Sudanese bombings 

of civilian targets. First, the United States should provide civilian leaders in targeted

areas with communication and tracking equipment that can help provide early warning

of military flights. Second, the United States should urge IGAD to call for a

moratorium on military flights over Sudan. The third step, if necessary, would be to

call upon the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations Security Council

for a moratorium and an internationally enforced ban.

Recommendation 1.6: Request Investigation Regarding Chemical Weapons

1.6. The U.S. government should formally request that the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

investigate and determine whether the government of Sudan

violated the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In February 2000, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Médecins Sans Frontières, 

reported evidence that the Sudanese government is using chemical weapons against

civilian populations. Both Sudan and the United States are parties to the Chemical
35

Weapons Convention. The United States should request the Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to investigate the allegations thoroughly.

Recommendation 1.7: Request for Opinion on “Genocide”

In the half-century since the ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and 

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the world community has rarely invoked 

it or applied its definitions. And typically, when the United Nations or the United

States has done so, it has either been years after the fact – after the killing has stopped 

and the mass graves have been exhumed (e.g., Cambodia) or when it has helped to

justify a decision to intervene militarily (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo). 

Millions of Sudanese have already died as a direct result of the actions of their 

government, and the killing continues to this day. The Commission concludes that by

the nature of these actions, the government of Sudan has engaged in genocidal activity, 

whether or not that activity meets the technical definition of “genocide” in the 1948

Convention. A determination that the Sudanese government is guilty of “genocide”

under the Convention would have significant international legal and political

ramifications.

1.7. The Department of State should give the Congress its 

opinion on whether the government of Sudan has committed, 

and/or continues to commit, acts against any segment of the 

Sudanese people that meet the definition of “genocide” under 

the 1948 Genocide Convention.

The State Department has informed this Commission that it has never prepared 

an opinion on this subject. The Commission believes it is time to do so. If the

Department concludes that genocide has been or is being committed by the government 

of Sudan, then its opinion also should explain what legal powers and obligations upon 

signatories to the Convention flow therefrom.

Recommendations 1.8-1.9: Strengthening the Sudanese Sanctions

Regulations 

For an earlier discussion of the relationships between violations of human rights

by the government of Sudan, development of the oil and gas fields in Sudan, and the 

recent sale of PetroChina stock, see “PetroChina and the U.S. Capital Markets” in

section II.A.1.b. above.
36

The President’s program of economic sanctions for Sudan takes the form of the 

Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 538. Those regulations, which are

administered and enforced by OFAC, prohibit, among other things, any U.S. person

from performing any financing contract in support of a government project in Sudan,

including any project of a “Specially Designated National” (SDN). On the day after the 

Commission’s hearing on Sudan in February, OFAC named the Greater Nile Petroleum

Operating Company (GNPOC) as an SDN. The Regulations also prohibit any “U.S.

person” from dealing in any “property” of the government of Sudan, including any

property of an SDN. The term “U.S. person” includes any corporation “in the United 

States.” The term “property” includes “contracts of any nature whatsoever,” including

presumably CNPC’s performance obligations to GNPOC. The Regulations impose

civil liability for violating its prohibitions and criminal liability for violating them

willfully. They also point to a federal statute that imposes criminal liability for willfully

misrepresenting material facts.

In consulting with OFAC about the applicability of the Sudanese Sanctions

Regulations to the offering by PetroChina and CNPC of PetroChina shares, the

Commission obtained various letter interpretations by OFAC of those regulations, one

of which was in response to a specific Commission inquiry. Those interpretations

clarified that the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations present no significant barrier against a

foreign-organized company both (1) collaborating with the GNPOC or otherwise

participating in the development of the oil fields in Sudan and (2) engaging in revenuegenerating activities in the United States, including selling securities, assuming (in the

case of selling securities) that its Sudan work is not a predominant part of its overall

business.8 For example, Talisman Energy Corporation, a Canadian company, which is

another partner in GNPOC, apparently would be free to sell shares in the company on

the U.S. capital markets, even though its work with GNPOC generates financial support 

for the Sudanese government, which as described above is engaging in genocidal

activity. It is wrong that a company that is benefitting the government of Sudan might 

be able to gain the benefits of our marketplace, particularly our capital markets.

Furthermore, a foreign-organized company may now conduct revenuegenerating activities in both Sudan and the United States outside the realm of public

scrutiny, because there is at present no obligation to report to the federal government on 

those activities. This means that neither policymakers nor the public have a full

understanding of the scope and significance of those dual activities. As a result,

policymakers do not have a strong factual foundation for building sound policy, nor

does the public for guiding its choices in the marketplace.

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:
37

1.8. The United States should prohibit any foreign-organized 

corporation from obtaining capital in the U.S. markets as

long as it is engaged in the development of the oil and gas 

fields in Sudan, including exploration, extraction, piping or

refining.

1.9. In view of the linkage between oil and gas revenues and 

the human rights violations of the government of Sudan, the 

United States should mandate that any foreign-organized 

corporation engaged in the development of the oil and gas 

fields in Sudan must:

(a) in the event it intends to make an IPO in the United 

States, disclose fully whether or not it intends to use 

the proceeds of the IPO for development of those oil 

and gas fields before it may proceed with the IPO; and

(b) in the event it is engaged in revenue -generating 

activities in the United States, submit periodically for

public review reports on the nature, extent and

duration of its involvement in developing those oil and 

gas fields and its revenue -generating activities in the 

United States.

In making the above recommendation for public disclosure (Recommendation

1.9), the Commission recognizes that there are various ways to implement it – for

example, various amendments by the President of his Sudan sanctions executive order

or even special legislation – and that the recommended changes may have generic

implications that should be taken into account in fashioning a solution. For example,

should the recommended changes be extended to sanctions programs for countries other 

than Sudan? These matters call for further careful consideration by the Commission of

the transferability of these policies elsewhere in the event that the President or the

Congress wish to pursue this recommendation.

Recommendations 1.10-1.13: Investigations by the Office of Foreign Assets 

Control and the Securities and Exchange Commission

In early April 2000, CNPC and PetroChina, with the help of U.S. underwriters, 

offered and sold shares in PetroChina on the U.S. market on the basis of a registration
38

statement filed by PetroChina with the SEC. The registration statement said that CNPC 

planned to use some of its proceeds to retire its borrowings except to the extent that

such use would result in a violation of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations or the

sanctions regulations of any other country. Further, the registration statement noted that 

CNPC would establish a special account for the proceeds of the sale and guidelines for 

administering it, thereby implying that CNPC had no clear intention at the time of the

sale to use the proceeds to retire any debt that it might have incurred in working with

GNPOC. The registration statement, however, did not disclose (1) how much of the

borrowings arose from CNPC’s work with GNPOC, nor (2) what criteria CNPC would 

use to decide whether to retire such debt. In effect, it left unclear whether and to what 

extent the proceeds of the sale would go into development of the Sudan oil and gas

fields. To the best of the Commission’s knowledge, CNPC has not disclosed that

information publicly through any other means. Thus, it remains conceivable that (1)

CNPC will retire Sudan-related debt in sufficient volume so as to benefit its work with

GNPOC, (2) it has planned to do so all along, and (3) the U.S. underwriters knew or 

should have known, in the event CNPC had earmarked some of the proceeds for retiring 

Sudan-related debt, that it had done so.

In this context, OFAC has taken the position that “a clear statement” of intent on 

the part of CNPC to use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related debt would be necessary 

prior to the sale in order to impose liability on purchasers of the PetroChina shares.9 In 

other words, according to OFAC, there would have to be a pre-sale visible

“earmarking” of the proceeds for such use. Moreover, OFAC apparently does not

believe that U.S. purchasers, including U.S. underwriters, have a duty of inquiry in the

circumstances of the CNPC offering.

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

1.10. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of

Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) promptly should use its

investigatory powers, to the extent it has not already done so, 

to learn from the parties to the PetroChina offering (e.g.,

PetroChina, and the U.S. underwriters):

the extent to which the borrowings that CNPC has

targeted or may target for retirement arose out of its 

activities in Sudan;
39

what criteria CNPC plans to use to decide whether to 

retire Sudan-related debt out of the proceeds of the 

sale;

whether CNPC prior to the sale had earmarked any of 

the proceeds for use in retiring Sudan-related debt;

and

whether the U.S. underwriters were aware of any such 

earmarking or had reason to inquire.

1.11. OFAC should call on such parties, especially

PetroChina and the U.S. underwriters, to inform it if ever

CNPC does retire Sudan-related debt out of the proceeds and 

to explain the rationale for such retirement in relation to the 

Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. 

1.12. OFAC should inform this Commission and appropriate 

congressional committees of the results of this investigation, 

initiate any enforcement action that may be appropriate in

the circumstances, and adjust its current interpretations of

the Regulations as may be appropriate. For example, OFAC 

should clarify that U.S. underwriters in the circumstances

presented here have a duty of inquiry as to whether the seller 

has earmarked any significant portion of the proceeds for its 

activities in Sudan.

While the Commission recognizes that the law and the facts in these

circumstances are complex, it believes (in connection with recommendation 1.12) that

the U.S. underwriters, who participated with CNPC in the structuring of CNPC’s efforts 

to gain capital on the U.S. market, should have a duty to inquire, particularly when the 

surface indications point to the possibility that CNPC might use the proceeds in part to 

benefit its operations in Sudan.

1.13. Because disclosure requirements for corporations are 

inadequate under Chinese law, and given the fungibility of 

money, the Securities and Exchange Commission should be 

especially careful to investigate the adequacy and reliability 

of representations made in any PetroChina filings.
40

B. The People’s Republic of China

 1. Background on China

The government of China and the Communist Party of China (CPC)

discriminate, harass, incarcerate, and torture people on the basis of their religion and

beliefs. Chinese law criminalizes collective religious activity by members of religious

groups that are not registered with the state. It registers only those groups that submit to 

membership in one of the government-controlled associations affiliated with the five

officially recognized religions. Members of registered religious groups can only engage 

in a limited range of what the state deems “normal” religious activities. 

The religious and belief communities that resist registration or that have been

denied permission to register, including Catholics loyal to the Pope and Protestants who 

worship in “house churches,” have no legal standing in China. Adherents are often

harassed, detained, and fined. Meetings are broken up, unauthorized buildings are

destroyed, and leaders are arrested and frequently imprisoned. 

Over the past several years, Chinese officials have been employing increasingly

strict laws and regulations as instruments to harass religious groups and maintain

control over religious activities. Officials responsible for enforcing the strict laws

continue to be guided by CPC policy directives on religion. Furthermore, the Chinese 

legal system does not protect human rights from state interference, nor does it provide 

effective remedies for those who claim that their rights have been violated. Thus, this

Commission finds that even though the Chinese government modified its means of state 

control by moving to a system of regulation of religion according to law, it has not

improved the conditions of religious freedom in China. 

The right to freedom of religious belief is explicitly denied to the 60 million

members of the CPC, and the 3 million members of the Chinese military, and to

hundreds of millions of minors under the age of 18, whose education the government

monopolizes.

The new “anti-cult” provision of the Criminal Code is being used to impose long 

prison sentences on leaders of the Falun Gong and Zhong Gong spiritual movements as 

well as Protestant house church leaders. 

Chinese authorities exercise tight control over Tibetan Buddhist monasteries,

select and train important religious figures, and wage an invasive ideological campaign

both in religious institutions and now among the Tibetan people generally.
41

Chinese authorities similarly exercise tight control over the Uighur Muslims in

Xinjiang in northwest China. There are credible reports of thousands of arbitrary

arrests, the widespread use of torture, and extra-judicial executions.

This Commission concludes that the practices of the Chinese government and

the CPC with respect to freedom of religion and belief violate the standards of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR). Each of these international instruments prohibits

discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, and the Universal Declaration and the 

ICCPR protect the right to hold and to manifest beliefs. The government of China,

however, imposes undue restrictions on the manifestation of beliefs and bans several

beliefs altogether.

 2. Commission Recommendations on China

In light of the preceding description of the situation in China, the Commission

makes the following recommendations: 

Recommendation 2.1: Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with

China

As of May 1, 2000, the date on which the Commission is releasing this report, 

China has applied for entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), a multilateral

organization including the United States and other industrialized countries. As a part of

the admission process, the WTO established a “Working Party on the Accession of

China,” a task force that oversees the consideration of China’s application to join the

WTO. The Working Party is responsible for drafting a Protocol for the accession of

China and for monitoring a series of bilateral market-access agreement negotiations

between China and 37 members of the WTO (including the United States and the

European Union). Although conclusion of these bilateral agreements is not strictly

necessary for obtaining WTO membership, such agreements establish the terms of the

trade relations, on a bilateral basis, between China and the WTO members with whom it 

enters into the bilateral agreements. China and the United States signed a bilateral

accession agreement in 1999, although China is not bound by the agreement unless the 

United States grants China PNTR status. As of April 28, the European Union and

several other members, unlike the United States, have not concluded their bilateral

discussions with China. After China agrees to an accession Protocol with the Working 

Party, China will likely receive a sufficient number of votes from WTO members to

permit it to join. The U.S. Congress currently is scheduled to vote on the question of
42

whether to grant PNTR status to China within the next few weeks (currently scheduled 

for the week of May 22). 

The Commission believes that in many countries, including some of China's

neighbors, free trade has been the basis for rapid economic growth, which in turn has

been central to the development of a more open society and political system. This

belief is the basis for the annual decision, by presidents and congressional majorities of

both parties, to grant "most favored nation" (MFN) trade relations with China each year 

over the past two decades. Moreover, a grant of PNTR and Chinese membership in the 

World Trade Organization may, by locking China into a network of international

obligations, help advance the rule of law there in the economic sector at first, but then

more broadly over time.

Nevertheless, given the sharp deterioration in freedom of religion in China

during the last year, the Commission believes that an unconditional grant of PNTR at

this moment may be taken as a signal of American indifference to religious freedom. 

The government of China attaches great symbolic importance to steps such as the grant 

of PNTR, and presents them to the Chinese people as proof of international acceptance 

and approval. A grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by Chinese people

struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their cause at a moment of great 

difficulty. The Commission therefore believes that Congress should not approve

PNTR for China until China makes substantial improvements in respect for religious

freedom, as measured by the following standards:

2.1. The U.S. Congress should grant Permanent Normal

Trade Relations status to China only after China makes

substantial improvements in respect for freedom of religion, 

as measured by the following standards;

2.1.a. China agrees to establish a high-level and

ongoing dialogue with the U.S. government on

religious-freedom issues.

China’s policy on treatment of religious exercise and religious groups is dictated 

by the Chinese Communist Party through its United Front Work Department (UFWD). 

This policy is implemented by the national and local offices of the Religious Affairs

Bureau (RAB).

Since May of 1999, no dialogue on religious freedom or other human rights has 

taken place between the United States and any level of the Chinese government. The
43

RAB has refused to meet with U.S. embassy personnel or even to receive official

communications. Obviously, this closed door policy in Beijing is not conducive to

bilateral communication or improvement in religious freedom for the Chinese people.

The Commission recommends that the first condition for granting PNTR be the

reestablishment of direct, ongoing, and constructive dialogue between high-level United

States and Chinese officials on freedom of religion and belief. The dialogue should

include officials within the UFWD.

In addition to official dialogue between governments on religious-liberty issues,

the U.S. government should press Beijing to allow contacts, official and unofficial,

between and among various religious groups in China and their counterparts in the

United States. This communication can only increase understanding in both countries

of the similarities and differences in conditions for religious liberty in each country.

2.1.b. China must agree to ratify the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

China is the only member of the UN Security Council that has not ratified the 

ICCPR. In anticipation of President Clinton’s trip to China in 1997, China signed the 

ICCPR in 1998. Ratification of the ICCPR would demonstrate to the world and the 

people of China that the government takes seriously its role as a member of the

international community.10

2.1.c. China must agree to permit unhindered access to 

religious leaders, including those imprisoned, detained 

or under house arrest, by the U.S. Commission on

International Religious Freedom and respected

international human rights organizations.

2.1.d. China must provide a detailed response to

inquiries regarding a number of persons who are

imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest for

reasons of religion or belief, or whose whereabouts are 

not known but who were last seen in the custody of 

Chinese authorities. The Department of State, after

consultation with human rights and religious groups,

should compile a detailed list of such prisoners of

conscience and make specific inquiries to the Chinese 

government.
44

China has detained thousands of religious practitioners, many in the

“reeducation through labor” (laojiao) system. Using its laws against “cults,” the

government recently prosecuted scores of religious leaders and gave them prison

sentences as long as 18 years. At least seven Roman Catholic bishops who have refused 

to join the relevant governmental association have been arrested and remain imprisoned 

or have not been seen in public since. In 1997, a delegation to China of three American 

clerics (including now-Commissioner Archbishop Theodore McCarrick), asked to meet

with several leaders (such as James Su Zhimin, Bishop of Hebei), but Chinese

authorities refused to permit it.

Shen Yiping and Zheng Suqian were imprisoned for their leadership of large

Protestant “house churches” in 1999. Thousands of practitioners of Falun Gong have

been detained and more than 300 have been sentenced, including one leader to 18 years. 

Within the Tibetan Buddhist community, the Dalai Lama’s choice for the Panchen

Lama – a child named Gendun Choekyi Nyima – has not been seen since 1995, and 

numerous monks and nuns remain in prison in Lhasa.

2.1.e. China must release from prison all persons

incarcerated for religious reasons. 

Needless to say, the Commission believes that all prisoners incarcerated for

reasons of religion or belief should be released immediately. The very least the

government of China should be required to do before PNTR is granted is to free those 

who are minors and those whose health is poor.

Recommendation 2.2: Steps the U.S. Congress Should Take Before Granting 

PNTR

Before granting PNTR to China:

2.2.a. The U.S. Congress should announce that it will 

hold annual hearings on human rights in China. 

The Commission believes that congressional monitoring of human rights

conditions in China should be intensive and continuous. If normal trade relations are to 

be permanent, so should congressional monitoring of human rights conditions in China

be permanent. Toward this end, the Commission urges Congress to hold annual

hearings for monitoring Chinese human rights performance. Congress should announce

this initiative before PNTR is granted, while the issue is still visible and while both

proponents and opponents of PNTR are espousing the importance of monitoring and
45

leveraging improvements in human rights in China. The full Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations and House Committee on International Relations should plan regular, 

in-depth hearings (to be held at least annually). 

2.2.b. Congress should invite the Dalai Lama to

address a Joint Session of Congress.

The Dalai Lama is an international symbol of religious freedom and nonviolence. A congressional invitation to address a joint session would honor him and the 

cause of religious freedom at a moment when that cause is under attack in China. Such 

an invitation would demonstrate continuing Congressional concern and a firm resolve

never to abandon freedom of religion as a central human right. The Commission

therefore urges that Congress issue the invitation as soon as possible. 

Recommendation 2.3: UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on China

The Commission believes that China should be censured annually by the UN

Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) as long as the government’s treatment of

religious communities falls dramatically short of the standards of the UN Declaration on

Human Rights and the ICCPR.

Since 1990, the United States has sponsored a resolution on China in the

UNCHR every year except 1998. The UNCHR has voted to take no action on those 

resolutions every year except in 1995. On only two occasions, in 1995 and 2000 (the 

only two years that the UNCHR came close to debating the United States’ resolution on 

China) did the Administration make an early and concerted effort to push for the

resolution. China, on the other hand, lobbies UNCHR member countries year-round, 

dispensing aid and favors in return for commitments that the members will support a

“no action” motion each year at the UNCHR. 

2.3. Until religious freedom significantly improves in China, 

the U.S. government, led by the personal efforts of the

President of the United States, should initiate a resolution to 

censure China at the annual meeting of the UN Commission 

on Human Rights and should support a sustained campaign

to convince other governments at the highest levels to support 

it.

The U.S. government should decide by October of each year – six months

before the UNCHR vote in April – whether a resolution condemning China’s human
46

rights performance is warranted. If so, the Administration should coordinate all

appropriate agencies in a sustained campaign to enlist the support of UNCHR member 

countries. 

Even with a six-month lead time, a U.S. resolution will likely continue to fail in

Geneva unless the President makes its adoption a high priority of the Administration. At 

the 2000 meeting of the UNCHR, the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary for

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor pressed hard for passage of the resolution, but the 

unsuccessful result shows that presidential involvement is clearly needed. The

Commission urges the President personally to solicit support for the resolution from the 

governmental leaders of UNCHR member countries. Indeed, this year the Commission

urged the President to increase his involvement in the final days leading up to the vote. 

The importance that the United States places on passage of the resolution would not be 

lost if the President were to address the UNCHR in Geneva. The success or failure of 

this referendum on China’s standing in the international community is likely to depend

on whether the President makes liberal use of the “bully pulpit” and effective diplomacy 

at every opportunity. 

 Recommendation 2.4: International Campaign for Prisoner Release

As discussed above, the PRC government routinely arrests and incarcerates

religious practitioners of unofficial churches or illegal “sects” in “reeducation through

labor” camps for up to three years, and imprisons religious leaders for long sentences. 

The current victims include Roman Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, and a number of other

bishops and priests, Falun Gong leaders, House Church leaders, Gendun Choekyi 

Nyima (the Panchen Lama designated by the Dalai Lama), and members of the Muslim

Uighur community who have been imprisoned for their religious belief, association or

practice. 

Multilateral overtures to the Chinese government comprise the most promising 

means of liberating some of these individuals. 

2.4. The United States should lead a multilateral campaign to 

seek the release of Chinese religious leaders imprisoned or

under house arrest.

All diplomatic means should be used to effect the release of those Chinese

religious leaders who are imprisoned, who have not been seen in public since their

detention, or who are under house arrest.

 

The means employed should be the full range of diplomatic tools – from private 

demarches to UN Security Council resolutions to presidential statements. Every
47

meeting of U.S. embassy personnel with the Chinese government should include

prominent mention of our government’s profound concern for the welfare of these

religious leaders and a request that they be released.

 Recommendation 2.5: Measures to Enhance Freedom of Uighur Muslims

The residents of Xinjiang province are the only Chinese who are subject to

capital punishment for political crimes. That apparently is intended to suppress the

separatist movement of the Uighur people in that province, a movement that sometimes 

apparently involves violence. But one reported result of the government’s heavyhanded policy toward Xinjiang is the limitation of religious exercise by nonviolent

Uighur Muslims. 

Because the Chinese government vigorously suppresses the flow of information

from Xinjiang, and because the Uighur people are not well-known and lack a large

international constituency (in contrast to the Tibetan Buddhists), the Commission

recommends that the U.S. government enhance their visibility, in the hope of relieving

their religious exercise of current strictures.

2.5. The U.S. government should raise the profile of

conditions in Xinjiang by addressing religious-freedom and

human rights concerns in bilateral talks, by increasing the 

number of educational exchange opportunities available to

Uighurs, and by increasing radio broadcasts in the Uighur

language into Xinjiang.

The Commission recommends that the State Department raise the status of

Xinjiang toward the same level presently enjoyed by Tibet. The religious freedom of

Uighur Muslims in that province should be made a priority agenda item in discussions

with the Chinese government. American diplomats should also raise the plight of the

Uighurs on a bilateral basis with other countries, particularly Islamic governments, and

urge them to pursue the issue in their own discussions with Beijing.

In addition, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government increase the 

number of educational and cultural exchange opportunities available to Uighurs. 

The Commission further recommends that the U.S. government devote more

attention and resources to documentation of the situation in Xinjiang.

Finally, the Commission believes that religious freedom would be promoted in
48

Xinjiang by increasing the flow of information via radio in the Uighur language, 

through, for example, Radio Free Asia. 

 Recommendation 2.6: China’s Hosting of Olympic Events

2.6. The U.S. government should use its diplomatic influence 

with other governments to ensure that China is not selected

as a site for the International Olympic Games until it has 

made significant and sustained improvement in religious

freedom and human rights. 

C. The Russian Federation

 1. Background on Russia

When the Commission selected Russia as one of the principal countries on

which it would focus, it was not because the religious freedom situation was then

comparable to that of China or Sudan, but because of: (a) Russia’s influence in the 

region, (b) the possibility that the conditions of religious freedom in Russia could

deteriorate significantly in the near future, and (c) the opportunity the United States has 

to promote religious freedom in Russia. 

The protection of freedom of religion in Russia today is dramatically better than

during the Soviet period, and the Russian government has taken some positive steps to 

promote religious freedom. Unfortunately, Russia took a significant step backward in

1997 by enacting a federal law (1997 Religion Law) that replaced legislation adopted in 

1990 that provided broad protections for the exercise of the right to freedom of religion 

and for the equality of religious communities. The 1997 Religion Law creates a

hierarchy of religious organizations and effectively restricts the rights, powers, and

privileges of smaller, newer, and foreign religious communities. It also establishes an

onerous and intrusive registration process and other mechanisms of state interference

with the activities of religious organizations. The negative impact of the 1997 Religion

Law on religious freedom appears, thus far, to have been mitigated to some extent by

the Russian federal authorities and by a 1999, decision of the Russian Constitutional

Court. 

On March 26, 2000, President Putin quietly signed an amendment to the 1997 

Religion Law that contained one positive and one very negative provision. On the

positive side, it extended the registration deadline for religious organizations by one

year until December 31, 2000. On the other hand, the law now requires that non-
49

registered groups be “liquidated” after that date. (The original law provided only that

unregistered groups could be liquidated.) It bears close watching whether Russian

officials, at all levels, will make good faith efforts to register religious groups and

whether unjustifiable liquidations will take place in 2001. In addition, in January 2000, 

President Putin signed an important directive specifying that one of the measures

necessary to protect Russian national security is a “state policy to maintain the

population’s spiritual and moral welfare and counter the adverse impact of foreign

religious organizations and missionaries.”

Regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion Law have denied registration

and sought the liquidation of unpopular religious communities – including Baptists,

Pentecostals, Charismatic churches, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Mormons,

Seventh-day Adventists, and Orthodox groups not associated with the Moscow 

Patriarchate – in some cases using panels of “experts” to examine the beliefs and

activities of the targeted group.

Also on the regional level, some officials have harassed and interfered with the

activities of religious communities, preventing them from renting suitable places for

worship, distributing religious publications, and conducting religious education. 

Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim indigenous believers and foreign missionaries have

been harassed by security officials, and even expelled, for propagating their faith. In

addition, one-third of Russia’s constituent regions have enacted legal regulations on

religious activities that are more restrictive and discriminatory than the 1997 Religion

Law and that violate the Russian Constitution. The federal authorities have been

unwilling, or unable, to discipline local officials or to bring these regional laws into

compliance with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards and

international human rights standards. They have themselves harassed foreign priests

and pastors, particularly Roman Catholics, by issuing them visas for a three-month stay 

only and then requiring them to return to their home countries for visa renewal.

While the conflict in Chechnya is primarily political and ethnic in nature,

religion appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict. Chechens are Muslims and 

Islam is a part of their nationalistic identity. Russian authorities, meanwhile, have

played upon deep-seated and historic prejudices against Muslims to rally domestic

support for the war, portraying Islam and Muslims as synonymous with terrorism and

extremism.

Three widely shared attitudes in Russia exacerbate the impact of the defects in

the legal system (and ultimately may be more significant to the protection of religious

freedom). First, many hold prejudices against ethnic and religious minorities, including,
50

most importantly, Muslims, Jews, and various Christian groups other than the Russian

Orthodox Church. Second, among many Russians, longstanding nationalistic

resentment against “foreign influences” affects the treatment of religious groups that are

perceived to have strong foreign ties (such as Roman Catholics, Protestants and some

Muslim groups). Third is the related belief among some that the Russian Orthodox

Church, or the “traditional” religions of Russia, should be accorded special privileges

and protection in contrast to smaller, newer, and “foreign” religious groups. 

 2. Commission Recommendations on Russia

Based on these threats to religious freedom in Russia, the Commission

recommends the following policies to the U.S. government. 

Recommendation 3.1: Ongoing U.S. Government Monitoring

The Commission believes that the State Department has made commendable 

efforts to keep religious freedom a priority in its bilateral agenda with the Russian

government. The Commission also believes that the U.S. embassy in Moscow has done 

an effective job of monitoring the religious-freedom situation. Nevertheless, many

interferences with the activities of religious groups occur in regions outside major

population centers and involve groups that have not had regular contacts with American

officials. It is important that monitoring efforts continue and be expanded to cover 

effectively the most significant religious-freedom problems in Russia. 

3.1. The U.S. government should actively continue to monitor 

conditions of religious freedom in Russia – in particular,

interference with the activities of religious groups at the 

regional and local level as well as the implementation of the 

1997 Religion Law. It should make additional efforts to

document interferences with the right to freedom of religion

or belief and discrimination against groups on which there is 

under-reporting, including, for example, Muslims and other

Orthodox groups (such as Old Believers).

Interference with religious activities by regional and local officials in those areas

known to be problems in the past should be given particularly close attention. Since 

religious denominations and organizations in other countries often have more ongoing

communications with Russian religious communities, the U.S. government should

expand its consultation with such groups (both inside and outside Russia), to obtain a

more comprehensive picture of existing problems.
51

Recommendation 3.2: Ongoing Russian Monitoring of Local Regulations

The State Department reports that 30 of the 89 constituent regions of the

Russian Federation have adopted, in violation of the Russian Constitution, legal

regulations that restrict the activities of religious institutions. Many of these regulations

specifically target members of foreign religious groups for restrictions on their

activities. Difficulties encountered by religious groups in Russia are related to the

enforcement of these restrictive regional and local laws as they provide the mechanism, 

or in some cases the pretext, for local officials to harass or interfere with religious

activities. Apparently, significant action has not been taken by the federal authorities to 

discipline local officials or to bring regional and local laws into compliance with the

Russian Constitution. 

3.2. The U.S. government should urge the Russian

government to monitor the actions of regional and local 

officials that interfere with the right to freedom of religion or 

belief, and to take steps to bring local laws and regulations on 

religious activities into conformity with the Russian

Constitution and international human rights standards.

The U.S. government should urge the Russian federal authorities to monitor

local officials effectively and, if appropriate, to investigate and punish officials whose

actions are in violation of the Russian Constitution and international human rights

standards. In addition, Russian officials reportedly have stated that many regional and 

local laws and decrees concerning religious activities violate the Russian Constitution.

The U.S. government should urge the government of Russia to act – consistent with

their constitutional system – to bring such laws into conformity with the Russian

Constitution and international human rights standards.

Recommendation 3.3: Chechnya as a High Priority Bilateral Issue

The Russian government has inadequately responded to the concerns expressed 

by the international community over the humanitarian situation in Chechnya and the

allegations of serious human rights abuses by Russian forces. These responses fall short 

of allowing full access to affected regions by human rights monitors and humanitarian

organizations ready to provide aid to civilians affected by the fighting.

While the conflict in the Caucasus is primarily political and ethnic in nature,

religion appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict. Islam forms the basis of 

Caucasian Muslim identity, and it is a significant element of resistance to domination
52

by Moscow. Russian authorities, meanwhile, have played upon deep-seated and

historic prejudices against Muslims to rally domestic support for the war, which in turn

has fueled anti-Muslim attitudes in Russia by making Islam and Muslims synonymous

with terrorism and extremism. These actions apparently have had a direct impact on the 

religious freedom of Muslims who are independent of the officially-sanctioned Muslim

organizations.

3.3. The U.S. State Department should make the

humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high

priority issue in its bilateral relations with Russia. 

The U.S. government should make it clear to the Russian government that its

handling of the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya is an important consideration in U.S.

government policy toward Russia. The U.S. government should also deplore any

efforts on the part of the Russian government to use intolerance against Muslims as a

mechanism to fuel public support for its offensive in Chechnya, or the offensive in

Chechnya as a justification to violate the religious freedom of Muslims in Russia.

Recommendation 3.4: Re-enactment of the “Smith Amendment”

3.4. The Congress should continue to include the “Smith

Amendment” in its appropriations bills, at least until it

becomes clear whether the Putin administration will work to 

ensure that Russian laws do not discriminate against groups 

on the basis of religion. 

Following the adoption of the 1997 Religion Law in Russia, the U.S. Congress 

enacted an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations act that would prohibit

foreign assistance to the government of Russia unless the President determines that “the 

Government of the Russian Federation has implemented no statute, executive order,

regulation or similar government action that would discriminate, or would have as its

principal effect discrimination, against religious groups or religious communities in the

Russian Federation in violation of accepted international agreements on human rights

and religious freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party.” This provision –

commonly known as the “Smith Amendment” (after its sponsor, Senator Gordon Smith) 

– has been included in the foreign assistance appropriations bills for fiscal years 1999

and 2000.
53

The Commission believes that the “Smith Amendment” has been an effective

tool for promoting religious freedom in Russia and urges Congress to reenact it until it 

becomes clearer the direction that Russia will proceed under its new president.

Recommendation 3.5: Liquidation of Religious Organizations

3.5. The U.S. government should continue, as a major

diplomatic priority, efforts to ensure that legitimate religious 

groups that have not registered by 2001 are not liquidated. 

The President of the United States should communicate

directly with President Putin on this issue.

As explained in the opening section on Russia above, President Putin signed an

amendment to the 1997 Religion Law in March 2000. The amendment requires the

liquidation of religious organizations that are not registered by December 31, 2000. 

The U.S. State Department and the President should engage in serious diplomacy with

the Russian government to ensure that no legitimate religious organizations are

liquidated.

Recommendation 3.6: Promoting Religious Tolerance

As described above, there are significant societal attitudes in Russia that

undermine the promotion of religious freedom and encourage intolerance and

discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. These include negative attitudes toward

Muslims, Jews and non-Orthodox Christians and the view that the Russian Orthodox

Church and the so-called “traditional” religions of Russia should have privileges and

protections not afforded to other religious communities. The United States cannot

impose religious freedom in Russia, and religious freedom will be vigorously protected

only when the people and the government of Russia themselves seek to promote and 

protect it. Therefore, the U.S. government should take positive steps to support Russian 

efforts at promoting religious freedom and opposing intolerance. 

3.6. The U.S. government should actively promote religious 

tolerance in Russia by providing support to willing nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and academic

institutions engaged in programs aimed at preventing

intolerance and discrimination and supporting international

standards on freedom of religion or belief. The U.S.

government should also promote religious tolerance through

appropriate activities such as exhibits, conferences, and

media and Internet broadcasting, particularly in regions
54

where numerous manifestations of intolerance have occurred. 

One of the means by which religious freedom can be promoted in Russia is for 

the United States to identify Russians who themselves seek to promote international

standards of religious freedom and tolerance. The United States can provide support to 

these individuals by such measures as providing support for NGOs and providing for 

educational, journalistic, and academic exchanges in Russia and the United States. The 

U.S. government can also promote religious tolerance by conducting and supporting

activities in Russia such as exhibits, media broadcasting, and Internet postings directed

toward that end. 

Recommendation 3.7: Hosting Russian Religious Leaders

One of the impediments to promoting religious freedom in Russia is the distrust 

of Western (particularly American) ideas and the identification of international human

rights standards related to religious freedom with those ideas. A number of leaders of

Russia’s major religious communities have criticized the activities of unfamiliar and

foreign religious groups and have supported efforts to restrict the activities of such

groups, including the 1997 Religion Law and discriminatory regional laws. 

3.7. The U.S. government should promote contacts with

leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and members of

other religious communities in Russia who may benefit from 

traveling to the United States and meeting with American

political and religious leaders. The U.S. government also

should encourage appropriate American religious leaders and 

seminarians in traveling to Russia to discuss issues of

tolerance and religious freedom. 

Russian religious leaders may benefit significantly from travel in the United

States and exposure to American political and religious leaders who concern themselves 

with the process of the protection and promotion of religious freedom and with

interreligious dialogue and action in the United States.

Recommendation 3.8: Supporting Legal Defenders

Effective legal advocacy is important for the protection of religious freedom in

Russia. Russians have only begun to use the judicial process to seek effective remedies 

for violations of the right to freedom of religion and to reform federal and local law in
55

accordance with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards. 

Legal representation is necessary for religious groups to effectuate their rights under

federal and local law and to protect their activities from undue interference by the

authorities.

3.8. The U.S. government should promote the legal

protection of freedom of religion or belief in Russia by

supporting the activities of Russian public interest

organizations that defend the right to freedom of religion or

belief in Russian courts. The U.S. government should

promote exchanges between Russian judges, lawyers, and

legal rights organizations with their counterparts in the

United States. 

Many religious groups, in particular small and indigenous Russian communities,

do not have the resources to secure adequate legal representation to challenge state

action and defend their rights in court. Public interest organizations exist in Russia for 

these purposes, but their effectiveness is limited due to a lack of resources. The U.S. 

government should support such organizations in ways that do not compromise their

independence or integrity.

Recommendation 3.9: Visit By UN Special Rapporteur

3.9. The U.S. government should, on a bilateral basis,

encourage the government of Russia to agree to the request of 

the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit 

Russia.

In his 2000 report to the UNCHR, the Special Rapporteur for Religious

Intolerance noted that the Russian government has not responded to his request for a

site visit. The U.S. government, which previously agreed to such a site visit by the

Special Rapporteur, should urge the Russian government to do so as well.

Recommendation 3.10: Visas

3.10. The U.S. government should, to the extent possible,

encourage the Russian government to extend the length of

visas for religious workers, or at least allow them to renew 

their residence permission from within Russia.
56

The obtaining of visas is an ongoing problem for foreign clergy and missionaries 

who wish to work in Russia. The U.S. government should raise this issue with

appropriate Russian officials and urge that the length of visas be extended or permit

visa renewals to be obtained from inside Russia.
57

Dissent to Commission Recommendation 1.2.e-f by Dr. Laila Al-Marayati 

This dissent is written in response to the recommendation by the Commission to 

provide non-lethal aid to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) if the

government of Sudan has not taken action to measurably and substantially improve

religious freedom in Sudan, particularly in the south. My opposition to this

recommendation is based on four points:

First, the SPLA has a history of human rights abuses that have not significantly

abated in recent years. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Sudan and other human

rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have documented the ongoing abuses 

such as abductions, extrajudicial killings, and the diversion of relief supplies and food

from the civilian population. Although the Commission recommends that aid to the

SPLA be conditional upon documentation of compliance with international human

rights standards, it is improbable that substantial, verifiable improvement will occur in

the short time span of 6-12 months. Therefore, to provide aid of any kind to an

organization known to commit abuses against populations that need protection is

irresponsible and dangerous. Until the SPLA demonstrates that it is capable of

respecting the rights of civilians and dissident SPLA factions, the United States should

not even consider providing such aid to the SPLA.

Second, the human rights violations perpetrated by the government of Sudan and 

its military upon civilian populations of southern Sudan emanate to a large extent from

its involvement in the 17- year civil war. Substantial progress in advancing human

rights and religious freedom in Sudan is unlikely to occur until the civil war ends. The 

argument that strengthening the SPLA will bring the Sudanese leadership to the

negotiating table and pressure them into concessions is not only highly speculative but

is extremely unlikely, according to most informed observers. By promoting and aiding

one side over the other in this tragic conflict, the United States will only contribute to

prolonging the war and perpetuating the suffering of millions of Sudanese, particularly

in the south where the war is being fought.

Third, the U.S. government has not demonstrated sufficient political will to

bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Sudan. The current policy that

emphasizes isolation of Sudan as a “rogue state” has further hindered the United States 

from playing a constructive role in bringing the parties to a negotiated settlement. 

Without a concerted good faith effort, in conjunction with allies in the region, to

invigorate and empower the peace process (see Recommendation 1.3), it is premature to 

offer aid to the SPLA, as this will compromise any ability of the U.S. government to

negotiate fairly. It is not enough for the Commission to recommend diplomatic efforts
58

that could occur simultaneously with aid to the SPLA. Until the diplomatic channels 

have been completely exhausted, aid to the rebel forces should not be an option, as this 

will thwart any opportunity for peace. To the extent that the United States aids rebel

groups, it will become a party to the conflict, thereby undermining its credibility in the 

region and undercutting its own peace efforts.

Fourth, ancillary equipment and supplies (i.e., the type of non-lethal aid that is 

recommended by the Commission) can strengthen the forces in a way that will enable

them to function more effectively on the battlefield. In addition, non-lethal supplies can 

be sold or exchanged for weapons and ammunition such that the distinction between

lethal versus non-lethal aid is blurred. It is possible that the government of Sudan and 

perhaps other states and individuals in the region will consider aid to the rebels as a

declaration of war by the United States against Sudan. Such a perception would have 

severe ramifications not only for American relief workers in Sudan but for American

interests in the region, and violent backlash against American targets (human or

otherwise) could readily occur. If American citizens were to become victims of

aggression in Sudan, the U.S. government may be called upon to defend them, which

could lead to actual military involvement that could threaten to destabilize the entire

region.

Thus, because of its ongoing human rights abuses, its internal divisiveness and

its general inability to govern, aid to the SPLA is unwise at this time. Moreover, such a 

move can only undermine U.S. credibility in the region and much of the international

community.
59

III. STATE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORTS 

A. Background of the State Department Reports

The U.S. Department of State now issues reports twice each year that describe 

the status of religious freedom in countries of the world. The Country Reports on

Human Rights Practices (Country Reports) have been issued annually since 1979, and 

report on a wide range of human rights issues, including freedom of religion or belief.11 

Following the statutory requirements of the International Religious Freedom Act of

1998 (IRFA), the Department of State issued its first Annual Report on International 

Religious Freedom (Religion Reports) on September 9, 1999.12

The Department of State, and in particular its Office of International Religious

Freedom (IRF), deserves high praise for issuing a report of such high quality as the

Religion Reports and in such a timely manner. Perhaps as important as the report itself 

was the impact its preparation had on the Department of State and our embassies. By 

requiring this report, investigation and reporting on religious freedom became a higher

priority to the work of every U.S. embassy and consulate. Foreign service officers and 

posts researched religious-freedom conditions and, in many cases, made new contacts

with religious communities whom they had rarely, if ever, met. Country desks and

regional bureaus at the State Department needed to review all this material. Higher

ranking officials needed to consider more controversial decisions. When

Commissioners traveled to countries for site visits, they generally found that embassy

staff had been nurturing those new connections with religious, human rights, and

government officials involved in these issues whom they had first encountered in

preparing these drafts. Relatedly, the religious-freedom components of this year’s

Country Reports have been strengthened by information gathered for the Religion 

Reports. As a result, the latter report marked a sea change in bringing attention to an 

otherwise neglected issue; religious freedom was elevated to a more important element

of U.S. foreign policy. If nothing else ever came of IRFA, this in itself would prove the 

law’s worth.

The Commission also wants to commend Ambassador Robert Seiple,

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. The Commission recognizes

the enormous effort and dedication that went into preparing the Religion Reports within 

the constraints of the State Department’s personnel, budget, and other operational

priorities. With limited time, they forged from the drafts of the foreign service officers 

a very strong report. Ambassador Seiple has since traveled widely, visiting countries

that the report identified as having problems, to discuss ways to improve religious

freedom there. He, as well as the Commission staff, has been approached by other
60

countries interested in enhancing religious freedom issues within their own foreign

policy, as well as exploring ways to work more closely with the Ambassador’s staff and 

with the Commission.

A number of lessons can be learned from an assessment of this praiseworthy

first effort. The goals of the Religion Reports require that the facts and circumstances 

reported must be accurate, comprehensive, free from bias, and undistorted by foreign

policy considerations other than the promotion of religious freedom. Trends and events 

must be placed in their political, social, and historical context. The information must be 

organized, effectively summarized, and prioritized to present clearly the most urgent

problems. These trends and events must be evaluated in light of the standards set out in 

IRFA. 

As these goals are met, the Religion Reports can more effectively meet the

statutory requirements under IRFA, focus Congress and the Executive branch on the

most egregious violators, provide a factual basis for sound policy for the State

Department and sound recommendations by the Commission, and serve as reliable tools 

for human rights defenders at home and abroad to promote international religious

freedom.13 Notwithstanding the professionalism and commitment of the State

Department personnel, the Commission recognizes that improvements can and should

be made. It recognizes that these goals may be difficult to achieve and moving to

implement them fully will be a process taking several years. These recommendations

are offered with the hope that next year’s report will begin this process. 

B. Commission Commentary

The Commission has identified six areas that could be improved in the Religion 

Reports: (a) prioritizing and evaluating information, (b) placing information in context,

(c) referencing relevant law, (d) eliminating the potential for bias, (e) referencing

international authorities, and (f) improving the methodology for information-gathering. 

The Commission’s comments in this regard also apply to those sections of the Country 

Reports that touch on matters related to freedom of religion or belief.

 1. Prioritizing and Evaluating Information

The Religion Reports are an important basis for presidential action taken

pursuant to IRFA to promote and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief.14 

The statutory requirement of presidential action is triggered by a finding that a

country’s government engages in or tolerates violations of religious freedom.15 The

choice of presidential actions – including the designation of a “country of particular
61

concern” – is dependent on the severity of the violations. Thus, IRFA requires that the 

Religion Reports contain an "assessment and description of the nature and extent of

violations of religious freedom in each foreign country.”16 

Prioritizing information. The information presented in the Religion Reports

should be prioritized in order to identify the most significant religious-freedom 

problems in each country. Commissioner Nina Shea testified in October 1999, with

respect to the 1999 Religion Reports:

The report itself contains an overwhelming and unselective compilation

of facts and information without reaching definitive conclusions, or

conveying a sense of priority. In a report of this magnitude and type,

prioritizing American concerns becomes essential. Not to do so is to

lose sight of severe persecutors in a welter of detail.17 

Information in the Religion Reports is often presented as a string of unconnected 

incidents. Information about a given topic or problem in a particular country is also

scattered throughout the report. In a number of cases, the exact same information is 

presented in the sections on "Freedom of Religion” and on "Societal Attitudes,” thereby

blurring the distinction between the two.18 A wealth of information may be reported on 

a particular group or issue and only sketchy information on others.

As stated in Commissioner Shea’s testimony, the primary problem with this

form of presentation is that it is difficult to draw an overall picture of the status of

religious freedom or to assess the comparative significance or seriousness of the

multitude of events or trends reported. In other words, the most important problems

relating to religious freedom can be buried in a wealth of seemingly unconnected

events. This problem can be avoided by organizing each county’s report to identify

clearly the types of religious freedom problems that exist as well as the facts, events,

and trends connected with each particular problem. Finally, those problems should be

prioritized according to their relative seriousness. 

Identifying Gaps in Information. The unavailability of information can lead to 

an erroneous assessment of the status of religious freedom. Identifying gaps in

information is particularly important before conclusions can be drawn or comparisons

made between the status of religious freedom in relation to different groups or regions. 

Reference to inadequate information also alerts religious communities, human rights

NGOs, and other interested parties to the need to develop such information. For

example, the religious-freedom conditions of indigenous peoples are generally not

reported in the Religion Reports.

 
62

States that have interfered with the development of reliable information (for

example, North Korea) should not be “rewarded” by leaving this problem

unacknowledged. The Religion Reports should specify whether a state itself is

responsible in any way for the absence or inadequacy of available information because

it has (a) failed to adequately investigate alleged abuses, (b) improperly withheld

information that it has developed, (c) interfered with the investigations of external

human rights monitors, or (d) interfered with the ability of domestic human rights

groups to conduct their own investigations or to communicate their findings to the

outside world.19

Evaluating Information. In addition to prioritizing the data and identifying

relevant gaps in information, the information in the Religion Reports should be

evaluated in light of the standards set out in IRFA, including the international norms to 

which it refers. Utilizing such measures will strengthen our efforts to bring into this

work other nations committed to those international norms. The atomized listing of

seemingly unconnected facts discussed above intensifies the difficulty of drawing

conclusions based on the requirements of IRFA.

 2. Presenting Information in Context 

To assess the severity of religious-freedom problems and the direction in which

the country is headed, the reported current events may need to be placed in historical, 

political, or social context as well as in the context of other human rights violations.20 

This type of information is also important to developing policies that will work. 

While the Religion Reports should not provide an academic thesis on each

country, where an accurate depiction of the severity and direction of religious-freedom 

problems requires it, context should be provided. Among the important contextual

factors that may deepen the understanding of religious-freedom problems and the

impact that U.S. policy might have on them are: the history of religious communities in

that nation; political and legal developments; historical patterns of human rights and

religious-freedom abuses; the development of religion and state relationships; inter- and 

intra-religious relations; those political, ideological, and philosophical movements that

exert a strong influence on a particular nation; and relationships between national and

ethnic communities. 

The report on Tibet is a case in point.21 Reflecting the severity of religious

freedom violations in Tibet requires at least reference to the vast network of

monasteries and the tremendous number of monks and nuns that were present in Tibet
63

prior to the consolidation of Chinese control over Tibet in 1959. Most of these

monasteries and other places of religious significance were destroyed between 1959 and 

the end of the Cultural Revolution, and there are credible estimates that the Chinese

authorities either directly or indirectly imprisoned, tortured, and killed tens of thousands

of lamas, monks, and nuns. It is only against background information such as this that 

the current information presented in the report (such as the numbers of Buddhist

monasteries, monks, and nuns, as well as the significance for religious freedom of the

state-ordered “education” programs for monks) can be assessed and the status of

religious freedom in Tibet measured.22

In addition to historical, political, and social conditions, it is also important for

potential religious-freedom violations to be placed in the context of state interference

with other rights and freedoms, the exercise of which are integral to religious freedom.

For instance, it is important to consistently identify where state surveillance of religious

organizations or interference with religious expression takes place in a broader context

of state interference with other political, social, or cultural groups’ privacy, expression,

assembly, and manner of association.23 While the Religion Reports do this for a number 

of countries, this type of information is notably lacking in the report on China. The

problems faced there by adherents of unregistered religious groups are related to those 

faced by many other individuals or independent groups that the state has identified as

potential centers of opposition or foreign influence. In many such cases, the instruments 

and methods of state control and repression are the same, as is the detrimental impact on 

freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. Such information is therefore

especially significant in fashioning responses or policies that are directed at the root

causes of religious-freedom violations and can achieve the desired results.

 3. Referencing Relevant Law 

In countries where there are religious-freedom problems, the Religion Reports

should identify the relevant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions

regarding freedom of religion, the prevention of discrimination, the legal treatment of

religious minorities, and the relationship between the state and religion and religious

institutions. There should be a candid assessment of whether the government and courts 

enforce, interpret, and apply the laws in a way that promotes religious freedom.24 In

reports on some countries, the operations of the legal systems are described with a

reasonable degree of sophistication.25 But in others, there is little or no meaningful

discussion of the protection (or lack thereof) provided by the constitution, laws,

regulations, and courts (whether judicial or administrative).26
64

 4. Eliminating the Potential for Bias

The Religion Reports identifies an important goal of the report, stating that the 

“guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant information was assessed as

objectively, thoroughly, and fairly as possible.”27 Imbalanced reporting and

inconsistent treatment of states or religious communities can appear as favoring or

disfavoring certain states or religious traditions compared with others. This type of

problem, however inadvertent, can compromise the usefulness of the Religion Reports

as a tool to promote religious freedom.

When reporting on state policies or political movements that purport to be based 

on religious law, practices, or beliefs, it is very important to distinguish between

religious concepts in the abstract and governments’ and political movements’

interpretations of those concepts and practices. Except where religious leaders or

groups make assertions of a religious justification to engage in human rights abuses, the 

State Department should, of course, be neutral regarding religious concepts in general. 

The governments’ interpretation of such concepts, however, may have a significant

impact on the status of religious freedom, but these interpretations should not be

imputed to the religion itself. It is also important to recognize that varying views exist 

within any religious tradition or community, and believers of a particular religion

should not be treated as if they represented a single, undifferentiated whole. In

addition, politically-loaded terms such as "nationalist," “cult,” "sect,” "orthodox,”

"fundamentalist,” "jihad,” or "Shariah” should be used in defined and appropriate

ways.28

Overlooking the problems encountered by state-controlled religious

organizations, which happened occasionally in the Religion Reports, can result in

another type of bias. In the report on China, for example, little information is presented 

on the limits on religious practice placed on the adherents of officially-recognized and 

registered religious organizations, such as state control over the size of congregations. 

In countries where Islam, or a particular school of Islam, is the state religion,

comparatively little information is presented on state control over and interference with

the religious activities of some Muslims. As is briefly noted in some countries, such

interference can be significant and include state control over the selection and training

of clergy and even the content of sermons. These controls clearly affect religious

freedom and in many cases affect the overwhelming majority of the population in a

country. The lack of this type of reporting can lead to the mistaken impression that in

countries where a state religion exists, only minorities suffer interferences with religious

freedom.29
65

 5. Referencing International Authorities

Critics of the U.S. government’s efforts to promote international religious

freedom frequently assert that Americans are attempting to promote their peculiar

beliefs about the separation of religion and government on the remainder of the world. 

While America’s distinctive concern for religious freedom permeates IRFA, the

legislation’s use of international norms to measure abuses can help prevent such critics

from isolating Americans from the international community on this issue. Further,

since religious freedom ultimately will be achieved only when people within a country

accept and implement the ethic of freedom of religion themselves, the Country Reports

and Religion Reports should explain violations of religious freedom in terms that are

widely accepted in the international community.30

Toward that end, Congress wrote into IRFA definitions of violations of religious 

freedom that explicitly incorporate standards set out in international human rights 

instruments.31 Findings by appropriate international bodies of violations of the right to

freedom of religion, discrimination on the basis of religion, and related human rights are 

also relevant to the State Department’s reporting task and should be highlighted in cases 

where doing so would advance the protection of religious freedom.32

 6. Improving Information Gathering

The State Department should articulate more fully the methodology used to

prepare the Religion Reports, including at least the gist of instructions or guidelines sent 

to embassies or State Department staff related to the gathering of information. 

Obviously, the gathering and confirmation of information must take place in light of the 

particular circumstances in each country. The Commission has several

recommendations in this regard (recognizing that some of these may, in fact, have been

utilized, but because the methodology was not fully specified, this is unclear):

1. Embassy staffs should proactively develop and encourage sources of

information, rather than rely solely on information presented to them by outside

sources. In the words of IRFA, they should: “seek out and maintain contacts with

religious and human rights nongovernmental organizations.”33 

2. State Department staff in Washington should do the same, perhaps using the 

Department and Commission Web sites as suitable vehicles for outreach. 

3. State Department personnel should proactively investigate problems related to 

religious freedom. IRFA requires that U.S. missions abroad “maintain a consistent
66

reporting standard and thoroughly investigate reports of violations of the internationally

recognized right to freedom of religion.”34 

4. The IRFA reporting process should be publicized within countries so that the 

relevant human rights organizations, religious communities, and public officials will be

aware that embassy staff are gathering information for the Religion Reports.

5. Training of foreign service officers needs to be adapted to strengthen these 

skills.

 7. Sharing Information with Foreign Embassies

In order to foster greater cooperation and multinational attention to the status of

religious freedom, U.S. embassies in foreign capitals should circulate the Religion 

Reports and the Commission Report to other embassies, particularly those who have

shown concern with human rights and religious freedom. They should urge those

embassies to share the Religion Reports and the Commission Report with officials of

other embassies in foreign capitals in the various countries, to do their own evaluations, 

and, where appropriate, to share recommendations and information.
67

IV. THE COMMISSION’S WORK PROGRAM FOR NEXT YEAR

Ongoing Focus: Sudan, China, and Russia

With the experience of its first year behind it, during which the Commission

organized itself, hired staff, and occupied its offices, the Commission looks ahead to an

expanded work program in its next phase. Yet the three primary countries that it

focused on this year will need the Commission’s continued attention.

If the U.S. government does not implement this report’s recommendations

regarding Sudan, the Commission will need to continue to urge their implementation. If

the United States does implement the recommendations, continued attention will be

needed to determine whether Khartoum is meeting the requirements for improved

relations and whether the implementation is having the intended effect or whether

further steps are required. In either event, the magnitude of the Sudanese conflict will

require the Commission’s attention over the next 12 months. If its recommendations

are implemented but do not succeed in reining in the conflict, new approaches must be 

developed.

China will likewise demand continued attention during the next year. Beijing’s

pattern has been to grant the West’s wishes in a few high-visibility human rights cases 

while doing little or nothing about the underlying system that violates human rights in

the first place. It is widely perceived that the status of religious freedom in China

continues to deteriorate: the government’s egregious rights violations show no sign of

abating any time soon and will need additional Commission action. Indeed, as the

Chinese Communist Party struggles with the economic dislocations caused by

modernization and its entrance into the global economy, its desperation to hold onto

power could worsen the human rights situation in the short term.

Russia, while not comparable to Sudan and China in terms of religious

persecution, nevertheless requires continued Commission attention for the same reasons

the Commission chose to focus on it in the first place: the potential for religious

freedom to make significant gains or suffer significant losses over the next few years

and the effect Russia’s choice will have on neighboring countries. Authorities have now

set December 31 as the deadline for religious groups to re-register under the 1997

Religion Law, which requires authorities to dissolve religious groups not registered by

then. This and the election of a new president, whose policies on religious freedom

have yet to fully emerge, raise the importance of continued Commission scrutiny of

Russia at this watershed period.
68

The Commission will work diligently with the Administration and the Congress 

over the next year to implement its recommendations regarding these three countries

and to make them an integral part of United States foreign policy.

Countries of Particular Concern

The State Department designated seven countries of particular concern

following the issuance of the 1999 Religion Reports last fall. The Commission will

make recommendations on the selection of “countries of particular concern” this

summer before the Department issues its designation of “CPCs” in September.

Freedom to Change One’s Belief and Engage in Religious Persuasion

In its meetings with religious communities and non-governmental organizations,

the Commission has noted a common problem that runs through many violations of

religious freedom worldwide: a refusal to permit the freedom to change one’s faith. To 

this are related the freedom not only to choose a disfavored faith (or no faith at all), but 

also the freedom to preach and propagate one’s religion. Indeed, indigenous religious

leaders and foreign missionaries often suffer equally severe prohibitions and

punishment. 

This issue transcends any one region or even continent. During the next year,

the Commission will examine this trend, report on how it affects a number of countries, 

and formulate policy recommendations.

Economic Leverage

The Commission during this past year has conducted an in-depth inquiry into

U.S. policies that permit companies that are engaged in revenue-generating activities in

Sudan – especially those developing oil fields – to raise money in U.S. capital markets 

despite U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan. In doing so, the Commission developed the 

recommendations found in Part II A of this report for tightening the U.S. sanctions

regime. The Commission will study and make recommendations on whether, and under 

what circumstances, such capital-market sanctions and other forms of economic

leverage would be useful and should be included as a new tool in the U.S. diplomatic 

arsenal to deal with religious persecution.
69

Countries Meriting Scrutiny

While maintaining its policy focus on Sudan, China, and Russia, and while

responding to instances of religious persecution wherever they arise, the Commission

intends to address religious freedom issues in a larger number of countries. They may 

include some or all of the “countries of particular concern” designated by the State

Department in October, 1999, as well as the 30 countries discussed in the Executive

Summary of the Religion Reports of September 9, 1999. Many of these countries are 

egregious violators of religious freedom, while others are not, but suffer significant

problems that U.S. policy may be able to address. Inclusion on the Commission’s

agenda does not mean a country is necessarily a candidate for designation as a “country 

of particular concern” (although it may); exclusion does not necessarily imply that a

country has an exemplary record on religious freedom.

In selecting countries for scrutiny, the Commission will use four general criteria.

Not all may apply in every case, and some may overlap: 

 • The violations of religious freedom in a given country are serious and

systematic.

 • Conditions for religious freedom are deteriorating or are in danger of

deterioration.

 • U.S. policy in a given country needs to be reconsidered, given the severity of

religious-freedom violations there. 

 • U.S. policy could have a significant impact on religious freedom in that country.

As resources permit, the Commission will address some or all of these countries 

during the next year and may include some or all of them in its May 1, 2001 report. 

The urgency of some problems may require Commission action sooner than the next

report, while the complexity of others may require more time to develop effective

policy recommendations. 

As has been its practice since its inception, the Commission will not limit itself

to these countries, should events dictate that it open an inquiry or make policy

recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, or Congress regarding violations 

of religious freedom in other countries.
70

Expedited Removal Procedure in Asylum Claims

The Commission is undertaking preparations for an independent expert study of

the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s expedited-removal program and how it

affects potential refugees applying for asylum based on a fear of religious persecution,

as authorized in IFRA. It will solicit bids for the study in the near future.
71

APPENDIX

Biographies of Members

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Rabbi David Saperstein, the Commission’s first Chair, is the Director of the

Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, which represents the Reform Jewish

Movement to Congress and the Administration. He has headed several religious

coalitions and served on the boards of numerous national organizations, including

Common Cause, the NAACP, and People for the American Way. He currently cochairs the Coalition to Preserve Religious Liberty, comprised of more than 60 national

Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and educational groups opposing school-prayer 

amendments and legislation. Also an attorney, Rabbi Saperstein teaches seminars in

both First Amendment church-state law and Jewish law at Georgetown University Law

School.

Dean Michael K. Young is the Commission’s Vice-Chair. He joined the

George Washington University Law School as Dean in 1998, after serving as the Fuyo 

Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions at the School of Law of Columbia

University. He also served as Director of the Center for Japanese Legal Studies, the

Center for Korean Legal Studies, and the Project on Religion, Rights, and Religious

Freedom. During the Bush Administration, he served as Ambassador for Trade and

Environmental Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs,

and Deputy Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State.

Elliott Abrams is President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in

Washington, D.C. After serving on the staff of Sens. Henry M. Jackson and Daniel

Patrick Moynihan in the 1970s, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for

International Organization Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and

Humanitarian Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

during the Reagan Administration. He was a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute from

1990 to 1996, when he moved to the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He is a member 

of the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Advisory Council of the American

Jewish Committee.

Laila Al-Marayati, M.D., is a founding member and Past President of the

Muslim Women’s League, a Los Angeles-based nonprofit organization focusing on the

dissemination of accurate information about Islam and Muslims, particularly regarding

women. Along with 20 religious leaders, scholars, and activists, Dr. Al-Marayati was a 

member of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad. 

In September 1995 she served on the U.S. Delegation, chaired by first lady Hillary
72

Rodham Clinton, to the United Nations-sponsored Fourth World Conference on Women 

in Beijing, China. In 1993, Al-Marayati led a private delegation to Zagreb, Croatia, to 

determine how Americans could assist rape survivors and other refugees fleeing Bosnia.

John R. Bolton has been Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research since January 1997. In the Bush Administration,

Mr. Bolton was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He

served in the Reagan Administration as Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division

from 1988 to 1989. Before that, he was Assistant Attorney General for the Office of

Legislative Affairs (1985-88), where he was responsible for obtaining Senate

confirmation of the President’s nominees to the Supreme Court and lower Federal

benches. He also served as General Counsel (1981-82) and Assistant Administrator for 

Program and Policy Coordination (1982-83) of the Agency for International

Development.

Firuz Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., of Alta Loma, California, is Secretary for External

Affairs of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States. He is

Professor Emeritus of History at Yale University, having taught Russian history there

from 1956 until his retirement in 1992. During his tenure at Yale, Dr. Kazemzadeh also 

served variously as Director of Graduate Studies in Russian and Eastern European

Studies; Chair of the Committee on Middle Eastern Studies; Director of Graduate

Studies in History; and Master of Davenport College. He is the author of several books 

relating to Russia and Central Asia.

Most Reverend Theodore Edgar McCarrick was named the Fourth

Archbishop of Newark, New Jersey, in 1986. The National Conference of Catholic

Bishops elected Archbishop McCarrick to head its Committee on Migration in 1986 and 

in 1992. In 1992, he was also named to head the Committee for Aid to the Church in 

Central and Eastern Europe, and was elected in 1996 as Chair of the Committee on

International Policy. He was elected one of l5 U.S. bishops to serve as a member of the 

Synod for America held in 1997. At the conclusion of that Synod, the bishops elected 

him to serve on the Post Synodal Council. In November 1996, Archbishop McCarrick 

was invited to serve on the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Religious

Freedom.

Robert A. Seiple (ex officio) joined the State Department in August 1998 as 

Principal Advisor to the President and Special Representative to the Secretary of State 

for International Religious Freedom. In May 1999, he was named the first U.S.

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. Before that, he spent 11

years as President of World Vision, Inc., the largest privately funded relief and
73

development agency in the world. He founded within World Vision the Institute for

Global Engagement, a strategic think tank for global advocacy. Seiple, who was

President of Eastern College and Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary from 1983 to

1987, was named “Churchman of the Year” in 1994 by Religious Heritage America. 

Nina Shea is the Director of the Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom

House in Washington, D.C. She has been an international human rights lawyer for 20 

years and has for 13 years focused specifically on the issue of religious persecution. 

Before her appointment to the Commission, Ms. Shea served on the Advisory

Committee on Religious Freedom to the U.S. Secretary of State. Ms. Shea has

organized and sponsored numerous fact-finding missions to Sudan, China, Egypt, and

elsewhere and has testified regularly before Congress on the governments of these and 

other countries. She is the author of In the Lion’s Den, a book on anti-Christian 

persecution around the world.

The Honorable Charles Z. Smith, of Seattle, Washington, is a Justice of the 

Washington State Supreme Court. He was originally appointed in July 1988, to fill an

unexpired term, and was elected, unopposed, in 1988 and 1990, and most recently in

1996 to another term of six years. Justice Smith served from 1965 to 1995 on the

General Board of the American Baptist Churches, USA, and was President of the

American Baptist Churches from 1975 to 1977, and Immediate Past President from

1977 to 1979. He has served in several local, national, and international organizations 

concerned with religious freedom and human rights, including active participation with

the national Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, monitoring compliance with the 

Helsinki Accords during the period from 1977 to 1985.
74
Endnotes

 

1 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq.

2 Remarks of Sen. Don Nickles of Oklahoma, Congressional Record, S12999,

November 12, 1998.

3 Two factors delayed the Commission’s start up: a) the delay in appointing

Commissioners; and b) a delay in making the Commission’s appropriation available,

which was resolved only with the passage of an amendment (P.L. 106-55) to IRFA in 

August 1999.

4 See Part IV below for a discussion of the Commission’s work program for the next 

report year.

5 IRFA § 202(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6432(a)(1).

6 Ibid. § 203(b), 22 U.S.C. § 6432a(b).

7 This is particularly puzzling and troubling insofar as the State Department has

provided the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki

Commission) with access to cable traffic for years, even though the Helsinki

Commission does not have the explicit statutory authorization to request information.

8 See, e.g., Letter dated March 14, 2000, from Peter Wyckoff, Deputy Director/General 

Counsel, USCIRF, to R. Richard Newcomb, Director, OFAC; Letter dated March 27, 

2000, Newcomb to Wyckoff (FAC No. SU-180427).

9 Letter dated March 27, 2000, from Newcomb to Wyckoff (FAC No. SU-180427). 

See also, Letter dated December 27, 1999, from Linda Robertson, Assistant Secretary, 

Department of the Treasury, to Congressman Frank Wolf; Letter dated December 13,

1999, Robertson to Wolf. 

10 The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 

1966, became effective March 23, 1976, and was ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 8, 

1992. Among the rights guaranteed by signatory countries that help protect religious

freedom are:

• equal rights regardless of religion (Art. 2, cl. 1);

• “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” including “freedom, either
 

individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest

his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching” (Art. 18, cl. 

1);

• freedom to have or adopt a religion and to inculcate religion in one’s children

(Art. 18, cls. 2,4);

• the right of religious minorities “to profess and practice their own religion”

(Art. 27);

• freedom of expression (Art. 19, cl. 2);

• the right to peaceful assembly (Art. 21);

• freedom of association (Art. 22); and

• freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention (Art. 9, cl. 1).

11. The statutory requirement to issue the Country Reports derives from Sections

116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 

2151n(d), 2304(b), and Section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 2465(c). The Country Reports provide the information necessary to prevent countries 

that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized

human rights from receiving security assistance and other forms of U.S. aid. 

12. The statutory requirement to prepare the Religion Reports derives from Section 102 

of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 et seq., (P. L. 

105-292, 112 Stat. 2815, as amended by P. L. 106-55, 113 Stat. 401) (“IFRA”). IRFA 

requires the Secretary of State to prepare and transmit to Congress the Religion Reports, 

which are to provide "detailed information with respect to matters involving

international religious freedom.” IRFA § 102(b). These reports must include: (1) a

“description of the status of religious freedom in each foreign country” along with

trends toward either improvement or deterioration in the respect and protection of

religious freedom, (2) an “assessment and description of the nature and extent of

violations of religious freedom in each foreign country,” and (3) a “description of

United States actions and policies in support of religious freedom in each foreign

country engaging in or tolerating violations of religious freedom.” Ibid. Violations of

religious freedom are not limited to state actions or policies, but can include actions

taken by non-governmental entities and by one religious group against another. IRFA § 

102(b)(1)(B). The Religion Reports must also identify foreign countries in which the

United States is actively promoting religious freedom and foreign countries of
 

significant improvement in religious freedom. IRFA § 102(b)(1)(F).

13. Other U.S. government actions – particularly asylum adjudications – will also

benefit from more accurate information on the status of international religious freedom.

14. See IRFA §§ 401(a)(2), 402(b)(1)(B).

15. See IRFA §§ 401(a)(1)(B) (violations of religious freedom), 402(a)(2) (particularly

severe violations of religious freedom), 402(c)(1) (same). The term “violations of

religious freedom” is defined at IRFA § 3(13). The term “particularly severe violations 

of religious freedom” is defined at IRFA § 3(11).

16. IRFA § 102, 22 U.S.C. § 6412.

17. Testimony by Commissioner Nina Shea on “The First Annual State Department

Report on International Religious Freedom” before the House International Relations

Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, October 6, 1999

(http://www.house.gov/international-relations/hr/irfshea.htm).

18. This is particularly evident in the reporting on incidents of anti-Semitism in Russia. 

House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, Annual Report: International Religious Freedom 1999, report prepared by 

U.S. Department of State, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, Joint Committee Print, 301-04.

19. Each of the Country Reports includes a section devoted to this topic in general

entitled “Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and Nongovernmental

Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.” See Section 116(c)(1) of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(c)(1). For example, as 

of September 1999, requests by the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance of the 

UN Commission on Human Rights to visit Indonesia, Israel, Mauritius, and Russia had 

not yet been responded to by those countries. UN Special Rapporteur on Religious

Intolerance, Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, A/54/386, September 23, 

1999, ¶ 123. This fact is not mentioned in the reports on these countries.

20. As the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has stated with respect to the

Country Reports:

Understanding the full character of a human rights situation is a matter of

much more than chronological fact. History has an enormous bearing on

the present reality of human rights, as well as on the future prospects
 

for their observance. . . . Likewise, larger political factors, which do not 

appear at first blush to be related to the mandate of the Country Reports, 

may have an enormous influence on human rights.

Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of 

State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (1997). 

21 See 1999 Religion Reports, “China,” 110-14.

22. Other important factors not reported in the 1999 Religion Reports on Tibet include 

the state policy directing migration of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet and the admission

in 1980 by Hu Yaobang, then Communist Party Secretary, that the repression of

religion in Tibet may have been a misguided policy. See Ronald D. Schwartz, Circle of 

Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising, 15-17 (1994).

23. See, e.g., 1999 Religion Reports, “Tunisia,” 391-92.

24. The following are some of the issues that should be considered in setting forth and 

characterizing the legal context for the protection of religious freedom in a particular

country:

 a. Are there constitutional norms and other laws in place that protect the right to

freedom of religion and belief and the right to protection against discrimination 

on the basis of religion or belief, and provide effective remedies for violations of

those rights? 

 b. Are these laws applied and enforced in a rigorous and non-discriminatory 

manner?

 c. Do any protections against discrimination reach actions by private parties?

 d. Are whatever administrative enforcement mechanisms that have been put into

place accessible and effective?

 e. Is there a state body (or bodies) charged with supervising or regulating religious 

institutions or the religious affairs of religious communities and are any

standards in place to insure that the personnel of such bodies act in an impartial

fashion?

 f. Do laws or regulations governing the recognition or registration of religious

communities, establishing their privileges and regulating their affairs
 

unjustifiably restrict freedom of religion or create unwarranted distinctions

between religions, or are they applied in a way that does?

 g. Are definitions of “religion,” “religious worship,” “religious activities,” and

similar terms interpreted and applied in such a way so as to pass judgment on

the truth, correctness (orthodoxy) or merits of religious beliefs?

 h. Are otherwise neutral and generally-applicable laws that regulate individuals or

groups or cover expressive or associational activities applied in such a way as to 

target manifestations of religion or belief as such or to discriminate between

persons or institutions of different religions?

The Commission notes that the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance 

is undertaking a project to compile constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions

regarding freedom of religion or belief. See UN Special Rapporteur on Religious

Intolerance, Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, A/54/386, 23 September 

1999, ¶¶ 98-99. IRF may be able to cooperate or coordinate with the Special

Rapporteur in this regard.

25. See, e.g., 1999 Religion Reports “Austria,” 206-07.

26 See, e.g., 1999 Religion Reports, “Sudan,” 75-79; “Vietnam,” 152-158. 

27. 1999 Religion Reports “preface”, xi.

28. For example, in the report on Turkey, the terms “Islamic fundamentalism,”

“Islamist,” “Islamic extremism,” and “moderate Islam” are all used without any

attempt at definition. See 1999 Religion Reports, “Turkey,” 323 -26. See also 1999 

Religion Reports, “Algeria,” 344.

Particular attention should also be paid to states that have taken steps to suppress 

political movements (violent or otherwise) espousing religious motivations to determine

whether such actions have resulted in interferences with religious freedom. For

example, the report on Turkey notes that the state’s campaign against “Islamic

fundamentalism” has included tighter state controls on the administration of all existing

mosques and the construction of new mosques. The report also notes recent state

initiatives such as increased enforcement of a 50-year-old ban on wearing religious

headgear in government offices and a 1997 moratorium on new enrollments in Islamic

primary schools. See 1999 Religion Reports, “Turkey,” 324-25. Thus, measures taken 

against “Islamists” and “fundamentalists” have resulted in interferences with the

religious freedom of all Muslims. No information is presented on comparable situations
 

in Algeria, Egypt, or Tunisia.

29 See, e.g., 1999 Religion Reports, “Bahrain,” 345, “Egypt,” 346, and “Morocco,”

380. 

30 See Michael K. Young, “Religious Liberties and Religious Tolerance: An Agenda

for the Future,” Brigham Young University Law Review (1996): 973-87, 984.

31. IRFA defines “violations of religious freedom” as “violations of the internationally

recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice” as set forth in

international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Helsinki Final Act

(1975), the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and

Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), the United Nations Charter (1945)

and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (1950). 22 U.S.C. § 6402.

32. Such international bodies include the European Court of Human Rights

(adjudicating violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (considering the Helsinki Accords); the Human Rights Committee (in

consideration of state party reports under the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance (applying the

standards of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and

Discrimination on the Basis of Religion and Belief).

33. 22 U.S.C. § 6412.

34. See 22 U.S.C. § 6412. A laudable example of monitoring by embassy personnel is 

the observer sent to the Russian court proceedings concerning the liquidation of a local

organization of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow. See 1999 Religion Reports,

“Russia,” 305.