alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PEOPLE v. LUHRS.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

June 18, 1894.)

Criminal Law—Former Jeopardy.

A justice of special session did not lose jurisdiction by reason of the fact that a trial before him, commenced on Saturday, was continued into Sunday morning, but proceeding on Sunday was merely an error for which the judgment will be reversed, and a new trial granted.

Appeal from court of sessions, Orange county.

Henry J. Luhrs was convicted of selling liquor without a license, and appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and CULLEN, JJ.

M. H. Hirschberg, for appellant.

S. E. Dimmick, for the People.

CULLEN, J.

The defendant was tried in a court of special sessions, charged with selling liquor without a license. The trial commenced on Saturday, and was continued into Sunday morning, when the jury was charged, the defendant convicted, and sentenced. For this error of holding the trial on Sunday the court of sessions reversed the conviction' and judgment, and ordered a new trial in that court. From so much of the judgment as directs a new trial in the court of sessions, this appeal is taken.

We think there can be no doubt that,, when a new trial is ordered on appeal from a court of special sessions, trial, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to be had in the court of sessions of the county. Section 768 of the Code, referring to appeals from courts of special sessions, provides: “If a new trial be ordered, it must be had in the court of sessions, in the same manner as upon an issue *790of fact upon an indictment.” As indictments are not triable in courts of special sessions, it is manifest that the court mentioned in the section is the court of sessions of the county.

The plaintiff contends “that, the judgment being void, the justice lost jurisdiction of the action, and no appellate court can restore it to life.” It may be that the judgment was so void that it could be attacked collaterally, but it was none the less an- erroneous judgment. “A judgment may be erroneous, and not void, and it may be erroneous because it is void.” Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163. Conceding, for the argument, that the defendant might have been discharged on habeas corpus, he was not precluded from seeking relief by appeal. This mode he adopted, and, having taken it, he must abide the practice prescribed by the Code on appeal.

The point that by the trial on Sunday the justice lost jurisdiction of the charge, and the defendant obtained immunity for his offense, is without any foundation. In People v. Connor, 142 N. Y. 130, 36 N. E. 807, the defendant was tried on an indictment in the court of sessions, and convicted. It appeared that one of the justices of that court was related tó the defendant within the statutory degree. Thereupon, the prior conviction was set aside, and upon the new trial the defendant was again convicted. On appeal it was held that, the first trial being a nullity, the defendant was properly again placed on trial. The judgment of the court of sessions, appealed from, should be affirmed.
Exhibit 12.2  I, Jérôme Contamine, certify that:  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Sanofi;  2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.The companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have:  (a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  (c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (d)Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and  5.The companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the Audit Committee of the companys Board of Directors:  (a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.  Date: March 6, 2014  By:
/s/   Jérôme ContamineName:
Jérôme   ContamineTitle:
Executive   Vice President   Chief Financial Officer (1)  
 (1)Principal financial officer.
Opinion issued June 6, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-24-00283-CV

———————————

REGINA MEEKS, Appellant

V.

GILLMAN OF FORT BEND, INC. D/B/A GILLMAN HONDA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 295th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2022-68814

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Regina Meeks attempts to appeal from the trial court’s judgment 

signed on February 2, 2024. Instead of filing a notice of appeal, appellant filed an 

appellant’s brief. Although the filing of appellant’s brief demonstrates a bona fide 

attempt to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, appellant needed to file an 
2

amended notice of appeal. See Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners ex rel. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Park Warwick, L.P., 244 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Tex. 

2008) (explaining court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeal if party files 

instrument “in a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction”); Grand 

Prairie I.S.D. v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991)

(providing that party should be given opportunity to amend defective perfecting 

instrument before court of appeals dismisses appeal). On May 9, 2024, we notified 

appellant to file an amended notice of appeal within 10 days. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.1(g), 37.1. Although she filed another appellant’s brief, appellant has not filed 

an amended notice of appeal or otherwise responded to our notice. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.3(a). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.
---

Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, John Hromyk, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of
Coventure International Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

> a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
>     controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
>     material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
>     subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
>     during the period in which this report is being prepared;
>   b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
>     and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness
>     of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
>     by this report based on such evaluation; and
>   c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
>     control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
>     most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
>     the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
>     likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
>     reporting; and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

> a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
>     the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
>     are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
>     record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
>   b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
>     or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
>     control over financial reporting.

|Date: October 26, 2005                          | 
|----------------------------------------------- | 
|                                                | 
|/s/ John
      Hromyk                           | 
|John Hromyk                                     | 
|Chief Executive Officer/Chief Financial Officer | 

---
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This version includes the errata dated 18Nov02 -e

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 98-354

RICHARD D. SIMMONS, APPELLANT,

 V.

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

Before HOLDAWAY, STEINBERG, and GREENE, Judges.

O R D E R

On June 7, 2002, the Court issued a per curiam order withdrawing the August 30, 2002, panel

decision and ordering the parties to file supplemental memoranda regarding the Secretary's

supplemental response and the effect, if any, on the instant appeal of Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001), Disabled American Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001), Hayre

v. West, 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 165 (2001) (en banc).

On September 23, 2002, the Secretary filed hisresponse to the Court's June 2002 order; he requests

that the Court's decision be stayed pending the outcome in the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) of Cook v. Principi, No. 00-7171. Response (Resp.) at 1-2.

In Cook, on January 4, 2002, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 275 F.3d 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir.

2002), ordered the parties to brief the efficacy of Hayre, supra, and heard oral argument on July 9,

2002. The Secretary argues here that "the outcome of Cook, although perhaps not controlling, will

be of great assistance to the Court". Resp. at 2. In his October 3, 2002, reply, the appellant indicates

that he does not object to such a stay. Reply at 1-2.

 The issues in the two cases regarding the application of the Secretary's duty to assist in

connection with claims of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) are substantially similar, and the

disposition of Cook could materially affect the instant proceedings. Therefore, in the interest of

judicial economy, the Court will stay further proceedings in the instant case pending the disposition

of Cook. 

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Secretary's unopposed request to stay proceedings pending the

disposition of Cook, supra, is granted pending further order of the Court. 
DATED: November 13, 2002 PER CURIAM.
#### Karen M. Schrader, Respondent, v Robert K. Schrader, Jr., Appellant.

Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Oneida County, for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: The court erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment of divorce. Our courts have embraced a liberal policy with *988respect to vacating default judgments in matrimonial actions *(see, Black v Black,*141 AD2d 689; *Sasson v Sasson,*134 AD2d 491; *Antonovich v Antonovich,*84 AD2d 799), although it is still incumbent upon the moving defendant to show a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense *(see, Mason v Mason,*69 AD2d 942, *Iv dismissed*47 NY2d 992). In our view, defendant met his dual burden and is entitled to his day in court. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, O’Donnell, J. — vacate default judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Davis, JJ.
#### LATIN AMERICAN UNION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF MILWAUKEE et al., Defendants.

No. 72-C-545.

United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin.

Oct. 16, 1972.

*988Richard M. Klein, Patricia D. McMahon, Steven H. Steinglass, Freedom Through Equality, Inc., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs.

James B. Brennan, City Atty. by Roeh Carter, Asst. City Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION and ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in this action seek a preliminary injunction to compel the board of election commissioners of the city of Milwaukee to appoint registered electors of the city of Milwaukee as special registration deputies pursuant to Wis.Stats. § 6.28(2) and to permit such deputies to register qualified persons through door to door canvassing. It is urged that the present system of permitting the registration of qualified electors to take place only at specific locations and at certain times designated by the board denies low income persons and other residents of the city of Milwaukee their fundamental right to vote.

The defendant Stawicki, executive secretary of the board of election commissioners, has submitted an affidavit which asserts that the board has authorized 131 voter registration sites within the city of Milwaukee where prospective voters may register for the general election to be held on November 7, 1972. These sites include 13 public libraries, four bookmobiles, 31 firehouses, six police stations, six “model cities” library centers, six department stores, 23 grocery stores, all public and private high schools, all colleges and universities, a YWCA center, the Spanish Center, Northcott Neighborhood House, the courthouse and city hall.

As pertinent here, Wis.Stats. § 6.-28(1) provides:

> “In 1st class cities, all applications for registry corrections and additions may be made during office hours throughout the year at the office of the city board of election commissioners or *other locations provided by the board with common council approval.”*(emphasis added).

It is not apparent to me, after considering the briefs submitted and especially such cases as Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case. Therefore, the application for a preliminary injunction should not be granted.

Therefore, it is ordered that the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction be and hereby is denied.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**Certification of the President and**

**the Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the**

**Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Wo Hing Li, President ofChina Precision Steel, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

a)          The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterlyperiod ended September 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

b)         The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Date: November 19,  2007 | By:    | /s/ Wo Hing Li |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------|
|                          |   | Wo Hing Li     |
|                          |   | President      |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

I, Leada Tak Tai Li, ChiefFinancial Officer of China Precision Steel, Inc. (the “Company”), certify,pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

a)          The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterlyperiod ended September 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

b)         The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Date: November 19,  2007 | By:    | /s/ Leada Tak Tai Li    |
|-------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                          |   | Leada Tak Tai Li        |
|                          |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
#### PARKER et al., Respondents, v. BOWMAN, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Filth D partment.

June 20, 1894.)

Action by Edward F. Parker and another against Mary J. Bowman.

No opinion. Judgment appealed from affirmed.
(October 13, 1987)

#### Isaac E. Amoo et al., Respondents, v Eastlake Realty Company, Appellant.

— In an action to declare a lease valid and enforceable, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.), dated August 5, 1986, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion to stay a pending *658holdover proceeding in the Civil Court, Kings County, between the parties, and denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and the facts, by deleting the provision thereof which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a stay of the Civil Court holdover proceeding pending between the parties, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the defendant.

In view of the triable issues of fact concerning the plaintiffs’ entitlement to remain in possession of the demised premises under an allegedly valid lease, the court acted properly in denying the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

However, we find that the court erred in staying the holdover proceeding instituted by the defendant against the plaintiffs in the Civil Court, Kings County, pending a resolution of the instant declaratory judgment action. It is well settled that a court of equity will not stay a summary proceeding between the parties pending the outcome of a suit in equity unless the tenant has some equity or defense which is not available in the summary proceeding *(see, Parksouth Dental Group v East Riv. Realty,*122 AD2d 708; *Kanter v East 62nd St. Assocs.,*111 AD2d 26; *Cohen v Goldfein,*100 AD2d 795; *Lun Far Co. v Aylesbury Assocs.,*40 AD2d 794; *see also,*3 Rasch, New York Landlord & Tenant — Summary Proceedings § 1412, at 238 [2d ed]). In the case at bar, it is clear that the plaintiffs may obtain full redress of their rights under the alleged lease agreement in the summary proceeding pending in the Civil Court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion for a stay thereof should have been denied. Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Rubin, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.