NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROGER WILLIAM HULL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KATHRYN REYNOLDS; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15055 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-00348-RCJ-VPC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 9, 2017**

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

Nevada state prisoner Roger William Hull appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional 

claims related to constant illumination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo. Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15055 

Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hull failed to 

raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately 

indifferent by using excessive light in his prison dormitory, resulting in migraines. 

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be 

found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 

conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hull’s Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(d) motions for a stay and request for discovery because Hull failed to 

demonstrate that the discovery he requested would have precluded summary 

judgment. See Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting 

forth standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff must show that the 

discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in not considering Dr. 

Lockley’s affidavit because such evidence would not defeat summary judgment. 

See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of 

review for district court’s rulings concerning admissibility of evidence on 

summary judgment).

We reject as without merit Hull’s contentions that the district court erred in 
3 17-15055 

considering appellees’ light test evidence, denying Hull’s motion for sanctions, 

finding that its screening order allowed only one condition of confinement claim to 

proceed, and allowing defendants to change their defense. 

We do not consider Hull’s allegations that were not raised in the operative 

complaint, including his allegations that prison officials recently installed new 

lights, that additional lights are now lit all day, and that he now suffers from sleep 

deprivation. These new allegations must be raised in a separate action.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.