*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 6, 2006*

Decided April 7, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1753

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES JEFFRIES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 1:03-cv-01132

Amy J. St. Eve,

Judge.

O R D E R 

Charles Jeffries appeals from the district court’s order confirming the sale of

his property pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure. In 1996 Jeffries had executed a

mortgage on his residence in Hoffman Estates, Illinois with Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc. When he struggled to meet his mortgage payments in 2002, he

contracted to sell the property to Thaddeus Zurawski. However, neither Zurawski

nor Jeffries made payments on the property after July 2002, prompting

Countrywide to file the underlying complaint seeking to foreclose on Jeffries’s

mortgage. The district court eventually entered a foreclosure judgment and then

appointed a special commissioner to conduct a judicial sale of the property on June

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1753 Page 2

24, 2004. One day before the sale, Jeffries filed for bankruptcy. The sale was

rescheduled for August 6, 2004, when the property was sold to Zurawski, the high

bidder. 

Countrywide asked the district court to confirm the sale under the Illinois

Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq., but Jeffries opposed the

motion on grounds that (1) he did not receive notice of the rescheduled August 6

sale; (2) the property was sold at a price too low to be conscionable; and (3)

confirmation of the sale would be unjust because Zurawski fraudulently induced

Jeffries into the real estate contract and then breached it by not paying the

mortgage. The district court held a hearing pursuant to section 15-1508(b) of the

Mortgage Foreclosure Law but ultimately confirmed the sale, finding that Jeffries

had not established “good cause” to invalidate the sale as required by section 15-

1508(d) because he provided no evidence that he or anyone on his behalf had

enough money to bid on the property at the sale, even if he had been notified of the

correct date. The court also held that the sale price of $163,056 was not

unconscionable as a matter of law because it was equal to about 61% of the fair

market value of the property, and that there was insufficient evidence to conclude

that justice was not otherwise done. 

Jeffries’s brief on appeal is almost devoid of legal argument and supporting

authority and nearly fails the requirements for appellants’ briefs found in Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9). See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545

(7th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, generously construing his pro se brief, id. at 545, we

can discern one issue for review–that the district court improperly concluded that

he did not receive adequate notice of the August 6 sale. But Jeffries

misunderstands the district court’s basis for dismissal. The court made no finding

about notice. The court stated only that “even if [Jeffries] had received the notice of

that correct date,” he failed to prove “good cause” to invalidate the sale under 735

ILCS 5/15-1508(d). Under the Mortgage Foreclosure Law, no public sale is invalid

“because of any defect in the notice thereof . . . except upon good cause shown in a

hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of section 1508.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(d); Craigin

Fed. Bank for Sav. v. Am. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chi., 633 N.E.2d 1011, 1014

(Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The district court found that good cause was lacking because

Jeffries did not have sufficient means to bid on the property at the sale. Jeffries has

not challenged this finding, which we consequently will not disturb. 

To the extent he argues that the alleged lack of notice violates constitutional

guarantees, those arguments are waived because he raises them for the first time

on appeal. See King v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 410 F.3d 404, 424 (7th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.