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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.

GREGORY L. WEATHERS

(AC 41291)

Keller, Prescott and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted by a three judge panel of the crimes of murder, criminal possession

of a pistol or revolver, and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed. The defendant’s conviction stemmed from his conduct

in approaching the victim in a construction site and shooting the victim,

who died from the gunshot wounds. Following the shooting, the defendant told police he shot the victim to settle a labor dispute. During his

police interview, the defendant stated he was looking for a job and

felt that the victim had brushed him aside. The defendant asserted an

affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect

and presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, L and A. L testified

that at the time of the offense the defendant was suffering from a

psychotic disturbance that influenced his thinking and behavior, and

that the defendant had reported that on the morning of the offense he

experienced auditory hallucinations, delusions and suicidal thinking,

including a hallucination of flashing lights conveying to him that the

victim was dangerous and that the defendant should shoot him. L also

surmised that a psychiatrist at the Department of Correction who had

suspected that the defendant may have been exaggerating or fabricating

his symptoms likely had not reviewed the defendant’s hospital records

wherein he was diagnosed with a psychosis, or conducted any collateral

interviews. A testified that the sum of the evidence provided a sufficient

basis to conclude that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to

control his conduct at the time of the offense. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail in his claim that the trial court’s rejection

of his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was not reasonably

supported by the evidence:

a. The defendant’s claim that the court arbitrarily rejected the opinions

of his experts that he lacked substantial capacity to control his conduct

within the requirements of the law was unavailing: that court’s decision

was based on its reasonable assessment of the evidence presented, as

the court did not merely find that the defendant had failed to prove that

he lacked substantial capacity to control his conduct as a result of his

psychosis but, rather, found that the defendant was acting under the

influence of a multitude of stressful and emotional hurdles in his life

not of a psychiatric nature, and, therefore, the court, as the finder

of fact, was entitled to adopt that nonpsychiatric explanation for the

defendant’s conduct and reject the expert opinions; moreover, given

the experts’ reliance on the defendant’s own account of his symptoms

and the events surrounding the shooting, it was reasonable for the court

to conclude that their opinions were undermined by its finding that the

defendant intentionally had either embellished or fabricated psychiatric

symptoms over time, and although L credited the defendant’s explanation that the victim was dangerous and should be shot, the court found

that the defendant shot the victim because he felt brushed aside after

inquiring about employmnet opportunities, not because he was laboring

under any delusional beliefs, and it reasonably could have found that

evidence pertaining to L’s understanding of the statutory insanity test

undermined the value of his opinions; furthermore, the court reasonably

could have found that A failed to account adequately for the defendant’s

statements to police after the shooting that he shot the victim to settle

a perceived labor dispute, and in light of the weight that A placed on

the seemingly enigmatic nature of the shooting, the court reasonably

could have found A’s conclusion to be attenuated.

b. The trial court findings that the defendant shot the victim out of

frustration and anger, that there was nothing unremarkable, untoward,

or aberrant about the defendant’s conduct during his police interview

and that the defendant either fabricated or embellished his symptoms

were not clearly erroneous and were supported by evidence in the
record: given the defendant’s preexisting anxiety and depression regarding his unemployment, his perception of the victim’s response as a slight,

his characterization of their interaction as a dispute, and his admission

that he shot the victim to settle this dispute, the court could have found

that it was that perceived slight, as opposed to a psychotic delusion or

hallucination, that prompted the defendant to shoot the victim, and the

fact that there was no direct evidence that the defendant was visibly

angry did not render the finding that he shot the victim out of frustration

clearly erroneous; moreover, although, during the police interview, there

were numerous instances in which the defendant failed to answer the

questions asked or gave an unresponsive answer, and some of his statements could be characterized as disorganized, it is not uncommon for

defendants to not be entirely responsive during a police interview and

to be reticent to respond to police questioning, and inattention and

confusion are not necessarily indicative of a mental disease or defect;

furthermore, the defendant conceded that there was evidence of malingering in the record, namely, a psychiatrist’s notations in his medical

records and A’s conclusion in his written evaluation, and his claim that

a fact finder could not reasonably infer his mental condition at the time

of the offense from evidence of his mental condition at a subsequent

time was unavailing, as a defendant’s state of mind may be proven by

his conduct before, during, and after the offense.

2. The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

rendering an opinion on a matter that required expert testimony was

unavailing; although expert testimony is of assistance, the ultimate issue

of sanity, including intent, is decided by the trier of fact, and if expert

testimony was required, there was expert testimony to support the

court’s conclusion that although the defendant was suffering from a

psychosis at the time of the shooting, such psychosis did not impair his

capacity to control his conduct within the requirements of the law, as

both expert witnesses testified that a psychosis does not necessarily

impair an individual’s capacity to substantially control his conduct within

the requirements of the law, and, therefore, the court reasonably could

have concluded as it did.

Argued September 20, 2018—officially released March 19, 2019

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crimes

of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver,

stealing a firearm, and carrying a pistol without a permit, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield and tried to a three judge court, Kavanewsky, Pavia and E. Richards, Js.; thereafter, the state

entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of stealing a

firearm; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant

appealed. Affirmed.

Dina S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s attorney, and Emily D. Trudeau, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The defendant, Gregory L. Weathers,

appeals1

from the judgment of conviction, rendered

after a trial by a three judge court,2 of murder in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), criminal possession

of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-217c (a) (1), and carrying a pistol without a permit

in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). On appeal,

the defendant claims that (1) the trial court’s rejection

of his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect

was not reasonably supported by the evidence and (2)

the court erred as a matter of law in deciding an issue

without the aid of expert testimony. We disagree and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court reasonably could have found the following

facts from the evidence presented at trial.3 On the morning of March 26, 2015, the victim, Jose Araujo, and

several other individuals employed by Burns Construction were installing an underground gas main on Pond

Street in Bridgeport. Fernando Oquendo, a patrolman

with the Bridgeport Police Department, was working

overtime duty at the construction site and had blocked

off Pond Street near Chopsey Hill Road.4 Around the

time in question, Officer Oquendo had gone to retrieve

coffee for the construction crew, who were in the process of backfilling a trench that had been dug along the

side of the road. Matthew Girdzis, one of the crew

members, was seated in a dump truck positioned near

the trench. The victim was standing on the driver’s side

of the truck speaking with Girdzis about where they

should dump the fill material.

While the victim and Girdzis were talking, the defendant walked into the work zone and approached the

victim. Girdzis had never seen the defendant there

before; he was not an employee of Burns Construction.

The defendant greeted the victim with a seemingly amicable ‘‘fist bump’’ and asked the victim whether the

construction company was hiring. The victim, in turn,

relayed the question to Girdzis. Speaking to the defendant directly, Girdzis suggested that he go to the construction company’s office downtown to fill out an

application and ‘‘see what happens.’’ By all accounts,

there was nothing unusual or remarkable about the

defendant’s demeanor during his initial interaction with

the victim and Girdzis.5 There was nothing to suggest

that any sort of argument or altercation ensued or that

the defendant harbored any animosity toward the victim

or Girdzis. The defendant did not appear to be acting

strangely; he appeared to be rational and to understand

what was being said.

Following this encounter, the defendant walked

away, seemingly leaving the work zone, but, in fact, he

merely walked around to the other side of the truck

and stood near the passenger side door. Meanwhile,
Girdzis and the victim had begun walking toward the

trench. After a few seconds, the defendant looked up

and down the street and, seeing the street empty, proceeded to walk back around the truck and reapproach

the victim. In a matter of seconds, the defendant, without saying a word, removed a revolver from his pocket

and shot the victim several times. The victim ultimately

died from gunshot wounds.

Immediately after the shooting, the defendant began

running up the street, zig-zagging across it several times.

Several of the victim’s coworkers chased the defendant

on foot. The defendant, seeing that he was being pursued, stopped momentarily at a parked pickup truck

and opened its door but then quickly shut it again and

resumed running up the street. The coworkers continued chasing the defendant until he ran in between

two houses.

Members of the Bridgeport Police Department soon

arrived on the scene and began canvassing the area.

The defendant eventually was located by Officer Darryl

Wilson, who found the defendant hiding in some tall

bushes in a backyard. Wilson ordered the defendant to

show his hands, at which point the defendant began to

run. Wilson ordered the defendant to stop and again

demanded that he show his hands. The defendant complied. Upon observing the revolver in the defendant’s

hand, Wilson ordered the defendant several times to

drop the weapon and warned the defendant that he was

prepared to shoot if the defendant did not comply. After

repeating this order, the defendant dropped his weapon.

Additional police units arrived a few seconds later, and

the defendant was arrested. As he was being arrested,

the defendant mumbled something to the effect of, ‘‘it’s

all messed up’’ or ‘‘I messed up.’’

Following his arrest, the defendant was led out from

behind the house and into the street, at which point

Lieutenant Christopher LaMaine heard the defendant

state spontaneously that he had been involved in a

‘‘labor dispute.’’ When approached by LaMaine, the

defendant again claimed that there had been a ‘‘labor

dispute.’’ After advising the defendant of his constitutional rights, which the defendant waived, LaMaine

questioned him. The defendant seemed to have difficulty focusing, putting his thoughts together, and

answering LaMaine’s questions fully, and, at times, he

rambled on incoherently, causing LaMaine to suspect

that the defendant either had a mental illness or was

under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP). Upon further questioning, the defendant stated that the victim

was a foreman and was not ‘‘letting anyone out here

work’’ and that he had shot the victim to settle this

dispute.

The defendant subsequently was transported to the

police station, where he was interviewed by Detective

Paul Ortiz and another detective.6 As Ortiz observed,
there were numerous instances throughout the interview where the defendant either entirely failed to

respond to questions or gave less than responsive

answers, and some of his statements seemed disorganized. Given his interactions with the defendant, Ortiz

thought it was appropriate to have him evaluated at a

hospital for possible mental health or drug problems.

Nevertheless, the defendant appeared to understand

the detectives’ questions. He admitted to shooting the

victim and expressed remorse for it. He stated that he

had been looking for a job and felt that the victim

had ‘‘brushed [him] off.’’ Following the interview, the

defendant was transported to Bridgeport Hospital for

evaluation and, the next day, was remanded to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction. Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary.

The defendant subsequently was charged with, inter

alia,7 murder, criminal possession of a firearm, and carrying a pistol without a permit. The defendant elected to

be tried by a three judge court and raised the affirmative

defense of mental disease or defect pursuant to General

Statutes § 53a-13 (a), otherwise known as the insanity

defense. ‘‘This defense has both a cognitive and a volitional prong. . . . Under the cognitive prong [of the

insanity defense], a person is considered legally insane

if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks

substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the . . .

[wrongfulness] of his conduct. . . . Under the volitional prong, a person also would be considered legally

insane if he lacks substantial capacity . . . to [control]

his conduct to the requirements of law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Porter v. Commissioner of Correction, 120 Conn. App. 437, 449–50

n.17, 991 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d

71 (2010). The matter subsequently was tried to the

court over the course of two days.

In its oral decision, the court rejected the defendant’s

insanity defense and found him guilty of the charged

offenses. With respect to the insanity defense, the court

found that there was credible evidence that the defendant did suffer from a mental disease or defect, specifically, psychosis of an unspecific nature. Nevertheless,

the court determined that the defendant had failed to

establish that, as a result of his psychosis, he lacked

substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of

his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.

With regard to the volitional prong in particular—the

only prong at issue in this appeal—the court found that

‘‘the defendant’s mental disease did not diminish his

ability to conform his behavior. The defendant’s actions

in shooting [the victim] were not borne out of his psychosis. Simply put, he was acting out of frustration and

anger. The defendant was faced with a multitude of

stressful and emotional hurdles in his life not of a psy-
chiatric nature which motivated his actions that day.

. . . The evidence suggests that he made overtures for

a job, and when he was directed to make an application

elsewhere, he felt rebuffed and in his own words, felt

that he had been brushed off.’’ The court further found

that the defendant had obeyed police commands and

that ‘‘there was nothing remarkable, untoward or aberrant about the defendant’s conduct’’ during the police

interview.8 On the basis of these findings, the court

determined that ‘‘the credible evidence [did] not support a finding that as a result of his mental disease, the

defendant lacked the substantial capacity to control his

conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ The court

rendered judgment accordingly and sentenced the

defendant to a total effective term of imprisonment of

forty-five years. This appeal followed.

I

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the court’s

rejection of his affirmative defense of mental disease

or defect was not reasonably supported by the evidence.

He argues that the court improperly rejected his expert

witnesses’ conclusions that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct within the law. He further

argues that the court made certain clearly erroneous

findings of fact.9 We disagree.

As an initial matter, we set forth our standard of

review. ‘‘The evaluation of . . . evidence on the issue

of legal insanity is [within] the province of the finder

of fact . . . . We have repeatedly stated that our

review of the conclusions of the trier of fact . . . is

limited. . . . This court will construe the evidence in

the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s

[judgment] and will affirm the conclusion of the trier

of fact if it is reasonably supported by the evidence

and the logical inferences drawn therefrom. . . . The

probative force of direct and circumstantial evidence

is the same. . . . The credibility of expert witnesses

and the weight to be given to their testimony and to

that of lay witnesses on the issue of sanity is determined

by the trier of fact. . . .

‘‘The affirmative defense of mental disease or defect

is codified in . . . § 53a-13 (a) and provides that [i]n

any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative

defense that the defendant, at the time he committed

the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity,

as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his

conduct within the requirements of the law. Whereas

an affirmative defense requires the defendant to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, a

properly raised defense places the burden on the state

to disprove the defendant’s claim beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Campbell, 169 Conn. App. 156, 161–62, 149 A.3d 1007,
cert. denied, 324 Conn. 902, 151 A.3d 1288 (2016).10

To the extent that the defendant challenges the

court’s factual determinations, ‘‘[o]ur review . . . is

limited to whether those findings are clearly erroneous.

. . . A court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous and

its conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient

evidence when there is no evidence in the record to

support it or when although there is evidence to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Altayeb, 126

Conn. App. 383, 387–88, 11 A.3d 1122, cert. denied, 300

Conn. 927, 15 A.3d 628 (2011).

The following additional facts are relevant to this

issue. In support of his affirmative defense, the defendant presented the testimony of two expert witnesses,

David Lovejoy and Paul Amble, both of whom produced

written evaluations that were admitted into evidence.11

Lovejoy, a board certified neuropsychologist hired by

the defense, examined the defendant on three separate

occasions in July, September, and November, 2015.

Lovejoy also reviewed a variety of records, conducted

interviews with the defendant’s wife and two of his

friends, and watched the video recording of the

police interview.

According to Lovejoy, the defendant and his wife

reported that in the two years leading up to the offense,

the defendant had been experiencing multiple ongoing

stressors. Lovejoy’s evaluation revealed that the defendant had lost his job as a truck driver in 2013 and

that he had remained unemployed thereafter, despite

continuing efforts to secure employment. Following the

loss of his job, the defendant began drinking heavily,

which resulted in criminal charges for operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

or drugs. In January, 2015, the defendant, aware that

there was a warrant out for his arrest in connection

with these charges, turned himself in to authorities. The

defendant remained in prison until his wife was able

to secure a bail bond in March, 2015—shortly before

the offense in question took place. According to the

defendant’s representations to Lovejoy, after his release

from prison, he began to worry about his family’s

finances and, over time, started to ‘‘feel crazy’’ and

experience thoughts of suicide. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

According to Lovejoy, ‘‘[i]nformation collected during the clinical interviews with [the defendant] and the

collateral interviews with his wife and friends indicated

that [the defendant] began to decompensate psychiatrically, beginning on [March 22 or 23, 2015]. Strange

behaviors, disrupted sleep, ruminative pacing, tangential and confused thinking, and moments of appearing

‘spaced out’ were observed by those who were with
him.’’ The defendant’s wife also indicated to Lovejoy

that she had observed the defendant begin to espouse

paranoid thoughts related to a belief that she wanted

to hurt or kill him.

Regarding the defendant’s conduct and state of mind

later that week, Lovejoy’s interviews with the defendant

revealed that ‘‘[b]y the evening [before and/or morning

of the offense, the defendant] appeared to be under the

influence of strong beliefs that were not based in reality

(delusions).’’ More specifically, the defendant reported

to Lovejoy that he had begun to believe that he was

receiving messages via flashing lights emanating out of

his computer screen. In Lovejoy’s view, ‘‘[t]hese beliefs

had become a prominent part of [the defendant’s] clinical presentation, at that time.’’ The defendant also

reported to Lovejoy that he had begun to hear voices

that made critical comments about him. He described

these voices as sounding like ‘‘me talking to myself

from the inside.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendant further represented to Lovejoy that, by

the night before the offense, he had resolved to kill

himself because he ‘‘was tired of trying to get [his]

thoughts together and . . . wanted the voices to go

away,’’ but he decided against doing it at that time

because he did not want his wife and daughter to have

to find his body in the house. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

Lovejoy’s interviews with the defendant further

revealed that, by the morning of the offense, ‘‘auditory

hallucinations, delusions and suicidal thinking were

present and appeared to be overarching influences on

[the defendant’s] thinking and behavior.’’ More specifically, the defendant reported to Lovejoy that, on the

morning of the offense, he had believed that the flashing

lights from his computer screen were sending him a

message indicating, ‘‘[g]et your gun. You are worthless

and others are evil.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendant reported that the message also had indicated that he would receive additional messages from

lights outside of his home. The defendant reported that,

by this point, he had decided to kill himself at a local

cemetery. He further reported, however, that he came

upon a construction site displaying a range of colored

lights that were flashing at him and that these lights

and the voices inside of him told him to stop. According

to the defendant, a person at the construction site fixed

his eyes on him and then looked to another man with

‘‘an evil intent,’’ at which time the lights conveyed to

the defendant that this person was dangerous and that

he should shoot him.

In addition to interviewing the defendant and collateral sources, Lovejoy also reviewed the defendant’s

medical records from after the offense. Regarding the

defendant’s Bridgeport Hospital records, which were

admitted into evidence at trial, Lovejoy noted that men-
tal health experts there had diagnosed him with ‘‘psychosis not otherwise specified’’ and that his Global

Assessment of Functioning score indicated ‘‘the presence of very severe psychiatric symptoms and associated functional impairments.’’ Lovejoy further noted

that the hospital records described a number of symptoms consistent with a thought disorder, including tangential thinking, thought blocking, confused and

disorganized thinking, the inaccurate interpretation of

reality, suspicious and paranoid thinking, difficulty following conversations and responding to questions, a

poverty of speech, and impaired impulse control. The

defendant also was observed to be internally preoccupied and staring suspiciously. Regarding the defendant’s medical records from the Department of

Correction (department), Lovejoy testified that they

were largely, but not entirely, consistent with the hospital records.12 Lovejoy testified that, early on in the defendant’s treatment at the department, a psychiatrist,

Allison Downer, had suspected that the defendant may

have been exaggerating or fabricating his mental health

symptoms.13 Lovejoy surmised, however, that Downer

likely had not reviewed the defendant’s hospital records

nor conducted any collateral interviews.

Finally, as part of his evaluation, Lovejoy also conducted psychological and neuropsychological testing

on the defendant. Lovejoy testified that this testing gave

no indication that the defendant had been exaggerating

his cognitive complaints or had been attempting to fabricate or exaggerate his psychiatric symptoms.

According to Lovejoy, the testing revealed the presence

of likely delusions, auditory hallucinations, and a tendency to experience confused thinking, which was consistent with the defendant’s self-report of his

psychological and psychiatric symptoms.

On the basis of the foregoing information, Lovejoy

testified that his overall opinion was that, at the time

of the offense, the defendant had been suffering from

a psychotic disturbance that significantly influenced his

thinking and behavior, although he was not able to

arrive at any specific diagnosis for the defendant.

Although he did not opine in his written evaluation as

to whether this psychotic disturbance had impacted the

defendant’s ability to conform his conduct to the law,

upon questioning by defense counsel, Lovejoy testified

that the defendant’s ‘‘psychotic disorder did impact him

in that way.’’

Amble, a board certified forensic psychiatrist hired

by the state, also testified for the defense. Amble evaluated the defendant for three and one-half hours in April,

2016. Amble reviewed the same reports, records, and

video recording reviewed by Lovejoy and interviewed

the same collateral sources. He also reviewed Lovejoy’s

written evaluation.

Amble testified that the information he obtained dur-
ing his interviews with the collateral sources was consistent with that reported by Lovejoy. The defendant’s

account of his symptoms and the circumstances surrounding the offense, as reported in Amble’s written

evaluation, were also generally consistent with that provided to Lovejoy, but it also included some additional

information. Regarding his auditory hallucinations, the

defendant reported to Amble that he had first begun to

hear voices while still incarcerated on the operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence charges. He

also reported that these voices had indicated to him on

multiple occasions that he should kill himself, and on

the morning of the offense he heard his own voice

confirming the plan. The defendant further reported

that, in addition to the auditory hallucinations, he also

had experienced visual hallucinations in the form of

his deceased father. Most notably, upon questioning by

Amble as to what exactly had prompted him to shoot

the victim,14 the defendant reported that, at the time of

the offense, he had perceived himself to be possessed

by a demon and that, afterward, he had continued to

be possessed until ‘‘people in jail prayed over [him] and

release[d] the demon.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)

On the basis of his review of the records, Amble

concluded that the department’s diagnosis of psychosis

not otherwise specified was reasonable, although he

was likewise unable to make his own diagnosis. As to

the defendant’s insanity defense, Amble testified that

his overall opinion was that, at the time of the offense,

the defendant ‘‘had some impairments in his ability to

conform his conduct to the law.’’ As Amble explained

in more detail in his written evaluation, however, there

were several pieces of countervailing information that

militated against the veracity of the defendant’s claim

of insanity.

First, Amble noted that the defendant had failed to

share with anyone, including Lovejoy, that he was having severe visual hallucinations and auditory hallucinations while incarcerated prior to the offense. Second,

the defendant had never before claimed to have been

possessed by a demon until after repeated questioning

by Amble. Amble opined that these two pieces of information, taken together, strongly suggested the possibility that the defendant was embellishing his psychiatric

symptoms and was providing a malingered explanation

for why he shot the victim. Third, the mental health

evaluations by Downer at the department drew clear

conclusions that the defendant was fabricating symptoms of a mental illness. Fourth, the defendant’s

account of his symptoms was not typical for individuals

with a psychotic illness. Specifically, Amble stated that

it was atypical for an individual to experience auditory

hallucinations in one’s own voice and to experience

visual hallucinations as distinctive as those described

by the defendant. Finally, Amble raised doubts about
the claimed impulsivity of the shooting. He found it

curious that, although the defendant purportedly had

experienced auditory hallucinations telling him to kill

himself on numerous occasions and had intended to

do so on the day of the offense, the single hallucination

at the construction site was enough to cause him to

change his plans and kill somebody else.

Ultimately, Amble concluded that, despite these

countervailing considerations, ‘‘the sum of the evidence, including reports of the defendant’s spouse and

friends, the illogical nature of the act, the lack of primary gain, and mental health assessments immediately

after the crime concluding that he was suffering from

a psychiatric illness, provide[s] a sufficient basis to

conclude that the defendant lacked substantial capacity

to control his conduct at the time of his crime.’’ In

response to questioning by the court, Amble clarified

that his conclusion was ‘‘[t]o some extent based on

[the defendant’s own] report’’ but also noted that the

collateral information was ‘‘very important.’’ He also

attributed moderate weight to what he described as the

seemingly illogical, senseless nature of the shooting.

In rebuttal to the defendant’s insanity defense, the

state relied on its cross-examination of the defendant’s

two experts and the evidence adduced in its case-inchief. A significant portion of the state’s cross-examinations was focused on the possibility that the defendant’s

mental state had been caused by the use of PCP or

‘‘bath salts.’’15 See General Statutes § 53a-13 (b) (‘‘[i]t

shall not be a defense under this section if such mental

disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating

liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination

thereof’’). Nevertheless, the state also challenged the

experts’ conclusions regarding the defendant’s ability

to control his conduct. On cross-examination, Lovejoy

conceded that not all people who suffer from psychotic

symptoms lose the ability to control their conduct

within the requirements of the law and that the majority

of people who suffer from some sort of psychosis do

not come into contact with the law. Regarding his familiarity with the meaning of the statutory insanity defense,

Lovejoy acknowledged that it was ‘‘difficult for [him]

to separate conceptually in [his] head’’ the cognitive

and volitional prongs because ‘‘[f]or [him] the notion

of understanding the wrongfulness of your action and

the notion of being in control of your actions when you

are separated from reality are somewhat intertwined

. . . .’’ Lovejoy agreed that this was ‘‘sort of a philosophical difference from the way the law is written.’’

Amble likewise conceded on cross-examination that

a psychosis does not necessarily impair a person’s ability to control his or her conduct within the requirements

of the law and that the majority of people experiencing

their first episode of psychosis do not commit violent
acts. Amble further conceded that the fact that a crime

is poorly thought out does not necessarily indicate that

it is a product of psychosis. Similarly, Amble agreed

that the fact that someone may have reacted violently to

an apparently minor slight does not necessarily indicate

that he was operating under the influence of a psychosis. Moreover, in response to questioning by the court,

Amble agreed that people who act illogically and commit illogical acts are not necessarily unable to conform

their behavior to the requirements of the law. He also

acknowledged that there was some evidence that the

defendant had ‘‘mention[ed] something about a labor

dispute at the time of his arrest’’ but stated that, from

the information that Amble had, this ‘‘didn’t seem to

make sense.’’16

A

The defendant first argues that the court arbitrarily

rejected Lovejoy and Amble’s expert opinions that the

defendant lacked substantial capacity to control his

conduct within the requirements of the law. According

to the defendant, there was no conflicting evidence

adduced at trial to undermine the experts’ opinions,

and, thus, the court had an insufficient basis to reject

them. We disagree.

Preliminarily, we set forth the standard for reviewing

a fact finder’s rejection of expert testimony. ‘‘It is well

established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the

[panel of judges] is the sole arbiter of the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific

testimony. . . . The credibility and the weight of

expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and

the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony

[it] reasonably believes to be credible. . . . On appeal,

we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of

witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Campbell, supra, 169 Conn. App. 165. ‘‘The trier may

not, however, arbitrarily disregard, disbelieve or reject

an expert’s testimony in the first instance. . . . There

are times . . . that the [fact finder], despite his superior vantage point, has erred in his assessment of the

testimony. . . . Where the [panel] rejects the testimony of a plaintiff’s expert, there must be some basis

in the record to support the conclusion that the evidence of the [expert witness] is unworthy of belief.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wyszomierski v.

Siracusa, 290 Conn. 225, 244, 963 A.2d 943 (2009).

‘‘[I]n its consideration of the testimony of an expert

witness, the [fact finder] might weigh, as it sees fit,

the expert’s expertise, his opportunity to observe the

defendant and to form an opinion, and his thoroughness. It might consider also the reasonableness of his

judgments about the underlying facts and of the conclusions which he drew from them. . . . [T]he [fact finder]

can disbelieve any or all of the evidence on insanity

and can construe that evidence in a manner different
from the parties’ assertions. . . . It is the trier of fact’s

function to consider, sift and weigh all the evidence

including a determination as to whether any opinions

given concerning the defendant’s sanity were undercut

or attenuated under all the circumstances.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Campbell, supra, 169 Conn. App. 165; see also State v.

Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 490, 743 A.2d 1 (1999) (‘‘the state

can weaken the force of the defendant’s presentation

by cross-examination and by pointing to inconsistencies

in the evidence’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64

(2000). ‘‘The fact, therefore, that both of the defendant’s

expert witnesses supported his claim of insanity while

the state chose to call no expert witnesses, but rather

principally relied on cross-examination of the defendant’s expert witnesses, does not require a determination that the trier of fact reasonably could not have

concluded that the defendant had failed to prove insanity by the required standard.’’ State v. DeJesus, 236

Conn. 189, 201, 672 A.2d 488 (1996).

In its oral decision, the court explicated that it was

unpersuaded by the experts’ testimony because it found

that the defendant had (1) ‘‘had a perceived motivation,

a reason, to commit these crimes,’’ i.e., to seek retribution for having been ‘‘brushed off’’; (2) obeyed police

commands immediately after the shooting and behaved

appropriately in the subsequent police interview; and

(3) ‘‘willingly either fabricated or embellished his symptoms selectively over time.’’17 As discussed, in a trial to

the court, the court acts as the fact finder to ‘‘consider,

sift and weigh all the evidence including a determination

as to whether any opinions given concerning the defendant’s sanity were undercut or attenuated under all

the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Campbell, supra, 169 Conn. App. 167. We conclude that the court properly considered, sifted, and

weighed the evidence.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that

the court’s decision was based on its reasonable assessment of the evidence presented. Preliminarily, we note

that the court did not merely find that the defendant

had failed to prove that he lacked substantial capacity

to control his conduct as a result of his psychosis. The

court also found that the defendant had been acting

under the influence of ‘‘a multitude of stressful and

emotional hurdles in his life not of a psychiatric

nature,’’ and, thus, it affirmatively found that ‘‘the

defendant’s mental disease did not diminish his ability

to conform his behavior.’’ (Emphasis added.).18 This

conclusion directly conflicts with Lovejoy and Amble’s

opinions. Therefore, the court, as the finder of fact, was

entitled to adopt this nonpsychiatric explanation for

the defendant’s conduct and, accordingly, to reject the

expert opinions. Moreover, given the experts’ reliance

on the defendant’s own account of his symptoms and
the events surrounding the shooting, it was reasonable

for the court to conclude that the experts’ opinions were

undermined by the court’s finding that the defendant

intentionally had either embellished or fabricated psychiatric symptoms over time. See State v. Patterson,

229 Conn. 328, 338, 641 A.2d 123 (1994) (trial court

reasonably rejected expert opinion because opinion

was based on ‘‘generally self-serving interview statements of the defendant and his family members’’); State

v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 310, 636 A.2d 351 (1994)

(because state elicited on cross-examination of defendant’s experts that state medical personnel had concluded that defendant was malingerer who did not

suffer from serious mental illness, jury was free to credit

such conclusion and reject expert testimony).

With respect to Lovejoy in particular, the court reasonably could have found his opinion to be unworthy

of belief due to inconsistencies in the defendant’s version of events.19 It is clear from his testimony and written evaluation that Lovejoy credited and viewed as

significant the defendant’s explanation that he had shot

the victim because of a delusional belief that the victim

was dangerous and should be shot. The court, however,

found that the defendant had shot the victim because

he felt brushed aside after inquiring about employment

opportunities—not because he was laboring under any

delusional beliefs. If an expert’s opinion of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is based

in part on information obtained from the defendant

himself during the expert’s interview with him, the fact

finder may reasonably discredit this opinion if it finds

the defendant’s account to the expert to be inconsistent

with other evidence adduced at trial. See State v. Cannon, 165 Conn. App. 324, 337, 138 A.3d 1139 (‘‘the inconsistencies in the defendant’s [trial] testimony further

weakened [the expert’s] . . . assessment of the defendant’s state of mind because [the expert’s] opinion,

developed by interviewing the defendant, relied on the

assumption that the defendant’s version of events was

accurate’’), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924, 138 A.3d 285

(2016); see also State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 680–81,

718 A.2d 925 (1998) (because expert opined that defendant had been suffering from disorder characterized by

tendency to be unable to remember events and that

this disorder rendered him unable to control his anger in

highly stressful situations, trial court reasonably could

have discredited expert opinion because court was entitled to disbelieve defendant when he told expert that

he could not remember killing victim), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct. 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999); State

v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 381–83, 590 A.2d 408 (1991)

(court’s rejection of defendant’s insanity defense was

supported in part by evidence from which trial court

reasonably could have determined that at time of

offense defendant was not, as he had claimed during

interview with expert, in delusional state in which he
thought victims were terrorists).

The court also reasonably could have found that the

evidence pertaining to Lovejoy’s understanding of the

statutory insanity test undermined the value of his opinion. As Lovejoy himself acknowledged, he found it difficult to distinguish between the cognitive and volitional

prongs of the test. This difficulty appears to be borne

out in his written evaluation, in which he opined that

the defendant’s psychosis had impaired the defendant’s

capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct

but made absolutely no mention of the defendant’s

capacity to control his conduct. It was not until Lovejoy

explicitly was asked at trial to opine on the volitional

aspect of the affirmative defense that he offered an

opinion. Given the conclusory nature of this opinion,

his failure to offer such opinion in his written evaluation, and his apparent misapprehension of the distinction between the two prongs of the affirmative defense,

the court reasonably could have found Lovejoy’s opinion to be unpersuasive.

With respect to Amble, the court reasonably could

have found that he had failed to account adequately for

the defendant’s statements to police immediately after

the shooting. As indicated in his written evaluation,

Amble found the defendant’s reason for shooting the

victim to be ‘‘a mystery’’ and relied on the apparent

‘‘randomness’’ and ‘‘illogical’’ nature of the shooting to

conclude that the defendant lacked substantial capacity

to control his conduct at the time of the offense. As

Amble clarified at trial, he gave ‘‘moderate’’ weight to

the seemingly senseless, illogical nature of the act. As

previously noted, however, the defendant himself told

police immediately after the shooting that the victim

had not been ‘‘letting anyone out [there] work’’ and

that he had shot the victim to settle a perceived ‘‘labor

dispute.’’ When confronted with this contradictory evidence at trial, Amble’s only response was that the defendant’s statements to police ‘‘didn’t seem to make sense.’’

In light of the weight that Amble placed on the seemingly enigmatic nature of the shooting, the court reasonably could have found Amble’s conclusion to be

attenuated. See State v. Patterson, supra, 229 Conn. 338

(trial court’s finding that experts had failed adequately

to account for defendant’s apparently premeditated

attack on victim, his efforts thereafter to avoid detection and apprehension, and his calculated attempts to

manipulate hospital staff supported court’s conclusion

that defendant had failed to meet burden of establishing

insanity defense).

Because the court’s rejection of Lovejoy’s and

Amble’s expert opinions is reasonably supported by the

court’s findings of fact and the evidence adduced at

trial, the defendant’s first argument fails.20

B
The defendant also argues that some of the court’s

express subordinate findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Specifically, the defendant assigns as clearly erroneous the court’s findings that (1) the defendant shot

the victim out of ‘‘frustration and anger’’; (2) ‘‘there was

nothing unremarkable, untoward or aberrant about the

defendant’s conduct [in the police interview]’’; and (3)

the defendant either fabricated or embellished his

symptoms over time. Because there is evidence in the

record to support the court’s factual findings and we

are not left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been made, we conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous.

The defendant first contends that the court’s finding

that he shot the victim out of frustration and anger ‘‘is

not supported by the testimony of any witness.’’ In

support of this argument, the defendant points out that,

not only did none of the victim’s coworkers testify that

the defendant had appeared angry, their testimony suggested the opposite—that there was ‘‘nothing unusual’’

about the defendant’s demeanor during his initial interaction with the victim and Girdzis and there did not

appear to be any argument or altercation between the

defendant and any of the victim’s coworkers. The defendant also notes that it was Girdzis and not the victim

who had directed the defendant to fill out an application

at the construction company’s office.

As to the defendant’s state of mind in the period

leading up to the offense, the defendant’s wife reported

to Lovejoy that, after losing his job in 2013, the defendant began on a downward emotional spiral characterized by significant depression and feelings of

hopelessness about his future. She further reported that

the defendant had become increasingly desperate for

work in 2014 and that, upon his release from prison

in March, 2015, he quickly became overwhelmed by

financial pressures. The defendant’s wife provided

Amble with a similar account of the defendant’s financial and emotional circumstances. Moreover, the defendant himself reported to Lovejoy that he had begun to

worry about his family’s finances and his failures in life

upon leaving prison and that he had felt as though he

had failed his family and was responsible for the stress

in their lives. Similarly, Lovejoy testified that the defendant had reported experiencing significant financial distress related to his lack of employment, the potential

foreclosure of his home, and his bail bond obligation.

Given this evidence, it was reasonable for the court to

find that the defendant had been facing a ‘‘multitude

of stressful and emotional hurdles in his life not of a

psychiatric nature . . . .’’

After the offense, the defendant stated in his interview with Detective Ortiz that he had been out of work

for more than a year and that, after approaching the

victim and his coworkers looking for a job, ‘‘they sent
[him] to the office.’’ When asked by Ortiz whether the

victim had said anything that upset him, the defendant

responded, ‘‘he did, he brushed me off.’’ Similarly,

Detective LaMaine testified that, immediately after

being apprehended, the defendant had stated that the

victim was not ‘‘letting anyone out here work’’ and that

he had shot the victim to settle a ‘‘labor dispute.’’21

Given the defendant’s preexisting anxiety and depression regarding his prolonged unemployment, his perception of the victim’s response as a slight, his

characterization of their interaction as a dispute, and

his admission that he shot the victim to settle this dispute, the court could have properly found that it was

this perceived slight—as opposed to a psychotic delusion or hallucination—that prompted the defendant to

shoot the victim. Consequently, it was reasonable for

the court to find that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s actions in shooting [the victim] were not borne out of his psychosis’’

and that he was simply ‘‘acting out of frustration and

anger.’’ The fact that there was no direct evidence that

the defendant had been visibly angry does not render

this finding clearly erroneous. See Keeley v. Ayala, 328

Conn. 393, 419–20, 179 A.3d 1249 (2018) (‘‘[A] finding

is not clearly erroneous merely because it relies on

circumstantial evidence. . . . [T]riers of fact must

often rely on circumstantial evidence and draw inferences from it. . . . Proof of a material fact by inference

need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other

hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in

the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact. . . . In short,

the court, as fact finder, may draw whatever inferences

from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it

deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ [Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.]). Nor does the possibility that the court might have reached a different

conclusion, given that it was Girdzis who ultimately

responded to the defendant’s inquiry, render clearly

erroneous the conclusion that the court did reach. See

Skakel v. State, 295 Conn. 447, 543 n.11, 991 A.2d 414

(2010) (‘‘[A]ppellate courts do not examine the record to

determine whether the trier of fact could have reached

a different conclusion. Instead, [they] examine the trial

court’s conclusion in order to determine whether it

was legally correct and factually supported. . . . This

distinction accords with [an appellate tribunal’s] duty

. . . to review, and not to retry, the proceedings of the

trial court.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); State

v. Barnes, 27 Conn. App. 713, 723, 610 A.2d 689 (under

clearly erroneous standard of review, ‘‘[t]he issue is not

whether the trial court could have reached a different

conclusion but whether the conclusion which it did

reach is clearly erroneous’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 914, 614 A.2d 826

(1992).

The defendant next challenges the court’s finding that
‘‘there was nothing remarkable, untoward or aberrant

about the defendant’s conduct [in the police interview].’’ In support of this contention, the defendant

notes the extended periods of time during which he

was unresponsive and asserts that he appeared distracted and confused during the interview. Because trial

testimony and the video recording of the interview support the court’s finding, we conclude that it is not

clearly erroneous.22

As revealed by the video recording and conceded by

Detective Ortiz, there were numerous instances during

the course of the interview that the defendant either

failed to answer the questions asked or gave an unresponsive answer, and some of his statements could

rightly be characterized as disorganized. Ortiz also testified, however, that it is not uncommon for defendants to

not be entirely responsive during an interview. Indeed,

it is a matter of common knowledge that an individual

involved in the commission of a serious offense might

understandably be reticent to respond to police questioning; ‘‘[triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they

expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge

or their own observations and experience of the affairs

of life . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. $7379.54 United States Currency, 80 Conn. App.

471, 476, 844 A.2d 220 (2003). Common sense similarly

dictates that inattention and confusion are not necessarily indicative of a mental disease or defect. Moreover,

Amble testified that the defendant’s unresponsiveness

and blank gaze are ‘‘such . . . non-specific observation[s] that . . . [these] certainly could be [indicative

of psychosis], and then it might not be; it all depends.’’

(Emphasis added.) Given this evidence and the great

deference we afford the trier of fact’s findings in view

of its function ‘‘to weigh and interpret the evidence

before it’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.

Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 487, 180 A.3d 882 (2018); we

cannot agree with the defendant’s contention that ‘‘[n]o

reasonable fact finder could view this interview and

conclude that the defendant was not experiencing a

mental breakdown of some sort at the time.’’

Finally, the defendant argues that the court’s finding

that he either fabricated or embellished his symptoms

is clearly erroneous because the evidence on which the

court based this finding ‘‘cannot reasonably be called

substantial evidence.’’ This argument clearly lacks

merit. ‘‘Under the clearly erroneous standard of review,

an appellate tribunal does not weigh the quantum of

evidence submitted; it simply inquires as to whether

there is any evidence in the record to support a given

finding, or whether the tribunal otherwise is definitely

and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.’’

(Emphasis added.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App.

124, 138, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104

A.3d 107 (2014). Moreover, ‘‘[p]roof of a material fact
by inference need not be so conclusive as to exclude

every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence

produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that

the material fact is more probable than not.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Patrick v. Burns, 5 Conn.

App. 663, 669–70, 502 A.2d 432 (1985), cert. denied, 198

Conn. 805, 504 A.2d 1059 (1986). Because the defendant

concedes that there is some evidence of malingering

in the record—namely, Downer’s notations in the defendant’s medical records with the department and

Amble’s conclusion in his written evaluation—we cannot conclude that the court’s finding is clearly

erroneous.

The defendant further argues that, even if this finding

is not clearly erroneous, it does not logically support

the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s psychosis

did not diminish his ability to control his behavior. More

specifically, the defendant contends that the fact that

he was fabricating or exaggerating his symptoms after

the offense ‘‘does not prove anything about [his] mental

state at the time of the shooting.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In other words, the defendant appears to be

arguing that a fact finder cannot reasonably infer a

defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense

from evidence of his mental condition at a subsequent

time. This argument plainly lacks merit and requires

little discussion, as it is well established that a ‘‘defendant’s state of mind may be proven by his conduct

before, during and after the [offense].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Douglas, 126 Conn. App.

192, 204, 11 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 926, 15

A.3d 628 (2011).

We conclude that the court’s express subordinate

findings of fact are reasonably supported by the evidence. Moreover, the defendant has failed to meet his

burden to establish that the court’s rejection of his

affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was not

reasonably supported by the evidence.

II

The defendant additionally claims that the court

‘‘erred as a matter of law in rendering an opinion on a

matter that required expert testimony.’’ The defendant

asserts that, once a fact finder determines that a defendant had been suffering from a mental illness, the fact

finder cannot make a finding as to whether that illness

impaired the defendant’s capacity to control his conduct unless there is expert evidence in the record

regarding the effects of that illness on the defendant’s

behavioral controls. The defendant thus appears to

argue that, because the court rejected the opinions of

Lovejoy and Amble, and the state did not offer any

rebuttal expert testimony, the court had no proper basis

on which to conclude that ‘‘the defendant’s mental disease did not diminish his ability to control his behavior.’’

This claim clearly lacks merit.
It is well established that, although ‘‘expert testimony

is of great assistance, the ultimate issue of sanity,

including intent, is decided by the trier of fact.’’ State

v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 242, 523 A.2d 1306 (1987).

Thus, this court has stated—albeit in the context of a

petition by the state for an order of continued commitment of an insanity acquittee pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (c)23—that ‘‘[t]he ultimate determination

of mental illness . . . is a legal decision. . . .

Although psychiatric testimony as to the defendant’s

condition may form an important part of the trial court’s

ultimate determination, the court is not bound by this

evidence. . . . It may, in its discretion, accept all, part,

or none of the experts’ testimony.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Damone,

148 Conn. App. 137, 167 n.13, 83 A.3d 1227, cert. denied,

311 Conn. 936, 88 A.3d 550 (2014); see also Ciarlelli v.

Romeo, 46 Conn. App. 277, 283, 699 A.2d 217 (‘‘[o]ur

courts have held that expert testimony is not required

to prove . . . that a criminal defendant is sane after

he raises an insanity defense’’), cert. denied, 243 Conn.

929, 701 A.2d 657 (1997).

Moreover, even if we assume, arguendo, that expert

testimony is generally required in such instances, the

defendant’s argument would still fail. Contrary to the

defendant’s assertion, there was expert testimony to

support the court’s ultimate conclusion. As both expert

witnesses testified, a psychosis does not necessarily

impair an individual’s capacity to substantially control

his conduct within the requirements of the law. Consequently, the court reasonably could have concluded

that, although the defendant had been suffering from

a psychosis at the time of the shooting, such psychosis

did not impair his capacity to control his conduct within

the requirements of the law.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant originally appealed to our Supreme Court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). The appeal subsequently was transferred

to this court pursuant to § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2 The three judges were impaneled pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82.

3 Although the court explicitly discussed only a fraction of the evidence

adduced at trial in making its findings of fact, it did not indicate that its

decision was based exclusively on this evidence. As our Supreme Court has

stated, where the trial court, in explicating the evidence on which it relied

in rejecting a defendant’s insanity defense, does not indicate that it relied

exclusively on such evidence, ‘‘[appellate courts] are free to examine the

entire record to determine whether a fact finder reasonably could have

concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that he lacked substantial capacity to control his desire to commit [the charged offense].’’ State

v. Quinet, 253 Conn. 392, 410–11, 752 A.2d 490 (2000). Consequently, we

properly may consider all of the evidence presented at trial in determining

whether the court’s rejection of the defendant’s affirmative defense is reasonably supported by the record.

4 Another police officer was blocking off the street from the other

direction.

5 As one of the construction workers testified, however, the defendant

kept his right hand in his pocket throughout the encounter.

6 A video recording of the police interview was admitted into evidence
at trial.

7 The defendant also was charged with stealing a firearm in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-212 (a). The state entered a nolle prosequi with

respect to this count.

8 The original language from the transcript of the court’s oral decision

provides, ‘‘there was nothing remarkable, untoward or admirant about the

defendant’s conduct.’’ (Emphasis added.) In response to the defendant’s

motion for rectification, the court, Kavanewsky, J., corrected the word

‘‘admirant’’ to ‘‘aberrant.’’

9 The defendant also argues that the court ‘‘unreasonably ignored the

totality of the record.’’ This argument lacks merit. ‘‘[T]he trier [of fact] is

bound to consider all the evidence which has been admitted, as far as

admissible, for all the purposes for which it was offered and claimed. . . .

[W]e are not justified in finding error upon pure assumptions as to what

the court may have done. . . . We cannot assume that the court’s conclusions were reached without due weight having been given to the evidence

presented and the facts found. . . . Unless the contrary appears, this court

will assume that the court acted properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 207, 229, 145

A.3d 362 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 905, 153 A.3d 653 (2017).

In the present case, the defendant does not point to any specific evidence

that the court purportedly failed to consider. The defendant merely speculates that the court considered only a fraction of the evidence presented at

trial and asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that the court therefore ‘‘ignore[d]

a vast array of undisputed facts.’’ The court expressly stated in its oral

decision, however, that it had ‘‘reviewed and considered all applicable statutes, testimony, exhibits, and arguments of counsel in deliberations upon

this matter.’’ ‘‘Ultimately, the court was not required to mention [any specific

piece of evidence] because [t]he [trier of fact] can disbelieve any or all of

the evidence on insanity . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Campbell, 169 Conn. App. 156, 166, 149 A.3d 1007, cert. denied, 324

Conn. 902, 151 A.3d 1288 (2016). Because the defendant has failed to show

otherwise, this court will assume that the trial court acted properly.

10 The state argues that our standard of review of the rejection of a defendant’s affirmative defense is limited. According to the state, where the

evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant committed the charged

offenses, ‘‘analysis of the evidence presented in support of his defense is

unnecessary and inappropriate.’’ This argument is inconsistent with controlling case law. Numerous decisions of both our Supreme Court and this

court confirm that, in reviewing the fact finder’s rejection of a defendant’s

affirmative defense, we consider the evidence presented at trial concerning

the defendant’s affirmative defense and determine whether, on the basis of

that evidence, the fact finder’s rejection of the defense was reasonable.

See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 229 Conn. 328, 334–42, 641 A.2d 123 (1994)

(summarizing evidence on defendant’s affirmative defenses and concluding

that, ‘‘because the court’s rejection of the defendant’s affirmative defenses

is reasonably supported by the evidence, his claim must fail’’); State v.

Campbell, supra, 169 Conn. App. 161–68 (summarizing evidence regarding

defendant’s mental state and concluding that defendant ‘‘failed to meet his

burden of establishing that the court’s rejection of the affirmative defense

of mental disease or defect was not reasonably supported by the evidence’’);

see also State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 376, 590 A.2d 408 (1991) (in appeal

challenging trial court’s rejection of defendant’s affirmative defenses of

insanity and extreme emotional disturbance, Supreme Court, ‘‘[t]o consider

these claims properly . . . must necessarily summarize the voluminous evidence presented by the defendant and the state concerning the defendant’s

mental state’’).

11 The defendant also produced a photograph of himself taken on the day

of the offense, as well as his Bridgeport Hospital medical records, both of

which were admitted into evidence without objection.

12 The defendant’s medical records from the department were not in evidence, although they were reviewed by both experts.

13 In his written evaluation, Amble provided excerpts of the relevant portions of the defendant’s medical records from the department. According

to Amble, Downer completed an initial psychiatric evaluation of the defendant on March 31, 2015, and noted: ‘‘While he presented as odd, the undersigned believes his behavior was intentional as he is trying to feign mental

illness to avoid penalty for alleged charges. He was avoidant of eye contact

and while seated, [seemed] to be, ‘coming in and out,’ of different states of

orientation and confusion. The mood is euthymic and with odd, bizarre
affect. Denies auditory or visual hallucinations, denies suicidal or homicidal

ideation.’’ According to Amble, on April 6, 2015, Downer further noted: ‘‘In

light of collateral information, past custody records and presentation over

his time in the infirmary, it can be stated with confidence [that the defendant]

does not suffer with a mental illness and is not in acute risk of hurting

himself or others. With the exception of the initial encounter, [the defendant]

has been clear, logical and coherent, manifesting no symptoms of mood or

psychotic disturbance. Informed him he would be discharged and he will

continue to be seen by mental health for supportive intervention with psychotropic intervention to be employed if deemed necessary.’’

14 Specifically, Amble asked the defendant, ‘‘[d]id you feel your body was

overtaken by an evil spirit who took control of you and shot the man?’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant responded affirmatively.

When asked to explain, the defendant initially stated that ‘‘something from

the devil’’ had taken control of his body and fired the gun. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Upon further probing, the defendant clarified that he perceived himself to be possessed by a demon.

15 Evidence pertaining to the possible use of PCP or bath salts is as

follows. The defendant reported to Lovejoy that he had ‘‘experimented with

substances such as cocaine, hallucinogens and PCP’’ but that ‘‘he did not

like the way that he felt after taking the substances and did not continue

[using them].’’ According to Amble, one of the defendant’s friends whom

he interviewed—identified only by the nickname ‘‘Dread’’—claimed that the

defendant’s wife had mentioned to Dread that she had smelled PCP on

the defendant’s breath two weeks before the incident. At this point in the

telephonic interview, the call was disconnected, and Amble’s subsequent

attempts to contact Dread were unsuccessful. As Amble noted, the defendant’s wife denied any awareness of the defendant having used PCP. In

summarizing the defendant’s medical records, Amble also noted that there

was a notation in the department’s records indicating that a urine toxicology

screen performed at Bridgeport Hospital had tested positive for PCP, which,

as Amble recognized, directly contradicted the Bridgeport Hospital records.

In an attempt to resolve this discrepancy, Amble contacted the individual

at the department who had made the notation. According to Amble, she

could not recall why she had made that notation.

At trial, Amble conceded that the defendant’s behavior around the time

of the shooting could also be consistent with PCP use or with the use of

‘‘bath salts,’’ also known as ‘‘synthetic marijuana.’’ According to Amble,

synthetic marijuana ‘‘has a much more potent . . . psychogenic effect on

individuals [than marijuana],’’ and it is commonly used by people who know

that they are going to be subjected to drug testing because there is not a

readily available, reliable test for it. Ultimately, however, the trial court

found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant’s

mental state had been the product of PCP use.

16 Regarding the ‘‘labor dispute’’ explanation he had given to LaMaine, the

defendant told Amble, ‘‘[i]t was like I was a mechanic and this was a labor

dispute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) When asked what was specifically in his mind at the time of the offense, he responded, ‘‘I don’t know where

[this explanation] came from and why.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

17 In discussing its rejection of the experts’ opinions, the court observed

that ‘‘their testimony and . . . reports show at least as much divergence

as they do uniformity in the basis for their opinions.’’ The defendant argues

that ‘‘this observation does not justify rejecting both experts’ conclusions.’’

We conclude that this claim is inadequately briefed. ‘‘We are not required

to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through

an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue

properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fowler, 178 Conn.

App. 332, 345, 175 A.3d 76 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 999, 176 A.3d 556

(2018). The defendant devotes less than one page of his brief to his claim,

provides no legal authority to support it, and fails to adequately explicate

the basis for it. See id., 344–45, and cases cited therein. Accordingly, we

decline to address this claim.

18 The defendant argues that the court’s ultimate conclusion that his mental

illness did not diminish his ability to control his behavior is not reasonably

supported by the evidence. More specifically, the defendant contends that

this conclusion is not logically supported by the court’s subsidiary findings

of fact—namely, that he greeted and exchanged pleasantries with the construction workers, made overtures for a job, and behaved appropriately

during the police interview—because these findings are not necessarily
inconsistent with a conclusion that the defendant was legally insane. In

other words, the defendant’s position appears to be that, in order to reasonably infer that he was legally sane from circumstantial evidence of his state

of mind, such evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other possible

inference. This argument plainly lacks merit, as it contravenes the wellestablished principle that ‘‘[p]roof of a material fact by inference from

circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other

hypothesis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berthiaume, 171

Conn. App. 436, 444, 157 A.3d 681, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 926, 169 A.3d

231, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 403, 199 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2017).

19 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

20 Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Lapointe v. Commissioner

of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 112 A.3d 1 (2015), the defendant argues in

the alternative that a ‘‘reviewing court may assess the reasonableness of a

trial court’s decision regarding an expert’s opinion when it is based not on

demeanor but on the foundation of the opinions and the factual record’’

and that, therefore, ‘‘this court is not bound to defer to the [trial court’s]

rejection of the [opinions of the] experts . . . .’’ As explained in footnote

22 of this opinion, the de novo review sanctioned in Lapointe is limited to

factually similar cases involving a trial court’s predictive assessment of the

credibility of expert testimony. This is not such a case.

21 LaMaine also testified that the defendant had stated that he was

employed as a mechanic by a company called ‘‘AA.’’ There was no evidence

presented at trial to indicate that the defendant had ever worked as a

mechanic or for a company called ‘‘AA,’’ which fact the defendant cites on

appeal as an indication of his delusional thinking at the time of the shooting.

The only mention of ‘‘AA’’ in the record is in Lovejoy’s written evaluation.

The defendant reported to Lovejoy that, on the night before the shooting,

he had been placing pages from a phone book into neighbors’ mailboxes

in the belief that the pages represented messages. According to Lovejoy,

the defendant believed that one of these messages related to ‘‘AA Automotive.’’ As the defendant appears to suggest, this evidence reasonably might

be construed to support the defendant’s contention that he was delusional

at the time of the shooting. The trial court, however, evidently did not find

this evidence to be so strong as to preclude its finding that the defendant’s

actions were motivated by nonpsychiatric factors. Accordingly, to the extent

the defendant is arguing that this evidence renders the court’s finding clearly

erroneous, we disagree.

22 The defendant appears to argue that we may review this finding de

novo because ‘‘[t]here was no live witness whose credibility could only be

assessed by the fact finder,’’ and that, therefore, this court is in as good a

position as the trial court to assess the defendant’s demeanor during the

interview. For this proposition, the defendant relies on our Supreme Court’s

decision in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 225.

We are not persuaded.

In Lapointe, the habeas court was tasked with evaluating the materiality

of a petitioner’s claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.

1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Lapointe v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 266–67. Our Supreme Court applied de novo

review when assessing the habeas court’s determination ‘‘that the testimony

of the petitioner’s experts, when viewed in light of [the respondent’s expert’s]

testimony, was not sufficiently credible to give rise to a reasonable probability of a different result at the original trial . . . .’’ Id., 267. Our Supreme

Court concluded that the ‘‘habeas court’s assessment of the testimony of

[the petitioner’s experts] was not predicated on their demeanor or conduct

on the witness stand, nor was it related to anything else that would reflect

adversely on their credibility, such as untruthfulness, bias, poor memory or

substandard powers of observation. That assessment also was not dependent

on any underlying factual findings requiring the trial court’s firsthand observation and determination of the credibility or reliability of other witnesses.

Rather, the . . . habeas court rejected the opinions of [the petitioner’s

experts] solely because, in its view, those opinions lacked an adequate

foundation, first, because they were premised on facts that were contrary

to the record in the case, as reported by [the respondent’s expert], and,

second, because the court did not credit the scientific underpinnings of

those opinions. In such circumstances, when the habeas court’s assessment

of the expert testimony has nothing to do with the personal credibility of

the expert witness but instead is based entirely on the court’s evaluation

of the foundational soundness of the witness’ professional opinion, this
court is as well situated as the habeas court to assess that testimony for

Brady purposes.’’ Id., 268–69. Accordingly, the court saw no reason to defer

to the habeas court’s assessment of the materiality of the expert testimony.

Id., 272.

Importantly, however, our Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that

‘‘[its] conclusion . . . [was] limited to the kind of fact-finding that is implicated in the Brady context.’’ Id., 272 n.42. That is to say, its conclusion

was limited to a habeas court’s ‘‘predictive or probabilistic judgment as to

whether the original jury reasonably might have credited the testimony of

the petitioner’s experts’’; id., 272; as opposed to a ‘‘trial court’s findings with

respect to the underlying historical facts . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 273 n.43. As the court explained, ‘‘a habeas court’s credibility

determination [in the context of a Brady claim] is not an ‘absolute’ finding,

as the factual findings of the ultimate finder of fact are, but merely is a

threshold evidentiary assessment required for the purpose of determining

whether the ultimate finder of fact reasonably could credit the evidence

. . . .’’ Id., 272 n.42.

The present case clearly is not one of the rare cases for which Lapointe

requires de novo review. See id., 307 (‘‘only in the rare case that a litigant

can establish that his case is materially similar to [that in Lapointe] will he

be entitled to de novo review of the lower court’s materiality determination’’).

In the present case, the court heard testimony from Detective Ortiz regarding

his interview of the defendant, reviewed the video recording made of that

interview, and, on the basis of this evidence, made an ‘‘absolute finding’’

regarding the defendant’s conduct and demeanor during the interview. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See id., 272 n.42. Thus, the court’s factual

finding does not constitute the sort of predictive or probabilistic judgment

at issue in Lapointe, and, consequently, the defendant’s reliance on Lapointe

in unavailing. We therefore limit our review to whether that finding is clearly

erroneous. See State v. Smith, 107 Conn. App. 666, 675, 946 A.2d 319

(reviewing for clear error trial court’s finding that photographs included

in array all matched description of victim’s attacker and that defendant’s

photograph did not stand out from all other photographs in such manner

as to influence victim’s identification), cert. denied, 288 Conn. 902, 952 A.2d

811 (2008).

23 General Statutes § 17a-593 (c) provides: ‘‘If reasonable cause exists to

believe that the acquittee remains a person with psychiatric disabilities or

a person with intellectual disability to the extent that his discharge at the

expiration of his maximum term of commitment would constitute a danger

to himself or others, the state’s attorney, at least one hundred thirty-five

days prior to such expiration, may petition the court for an order of continued

commitment of the acquittee.’’