Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 80 / Wednesday, April 25, 2001 / Proposed Rules 20781

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01–9887 Filed 4–24–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 538

[Docket No. NHTSA–98–3429]

[RIN 2127–AF37]

Minimum Driving Range for Dual

Fueled Electric Passenger

Automobiles

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Denial of petition for

reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This notice announces the

denial of a petition for reconsideration

of the agency’s decision to set the

minimum driving range for dual fueled

electric passenger vehicles at 7.5 miles

when operating in the EPA urban cycle

and 10.2 miles on the EPA highway

cycle.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

non-legal issues: Mr. P.L. Moore, Motor

Vehicle Requirements Division, Office

of Market Incentives, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC

20590, (202) 366–5222.

For legal issues: Otto Matheke, Office

of the Chief Counsel, NCC–20,

telephone (202) 366–5253, facsimile

(202) 366–3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Establishment of a Minimum Driving

Range for Dual Fueled Electric

Passenger Vehicles

On December 1, 1998, NHTSA

published a final rule in the Federal

Register (63 FR 66064), which

established a minimum driving range

for dual fueled electric passenger

vehicles.

The agency promulgated this rule in

response to amendments in the Energy

Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) (Pub. L.

102–486) which expanded the scope of

the alternative fuels promoted by

section 513 of the Motor Vehicle

Information and Cost Savings Act (Cost

Savings Act), now codified as 49 U.S.C.

32905. Section 32901(c), the

replacement section for section

513(h)(2), requires dual fueled

passenger automobiles to meet specified

criteria, including meeting a minimum

driving range, in order to qualify for

special treatment in the calculation of

their fuel economy for purposes of the

corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)

standards promulgated under Chapter

329 of Title 49 of the United States Code

(49 U.S.C. 32901 et seq.).

The EPACT amendments, which

expanded the scope of alternative fuel

vehicles eligible for special CAFE

treatment, established and modified

minimum driving range requirements

for these vehicles. These new or

modified minimum driving range

requirements necessitated amendments

to the driving range requirements found

in 49 CFR part 538, Manufacturing

Incentives for Alternative Fuel Vehicles.

NHTSA established a minimum driving

range for all dual fueled vehicles except

electric vehicles in a final rule issued on

March 21, 1996 (61 FR 14507). As noted

above, a final rule establishing a

minimum driving range for dual fueled

electric passenger vehicles was

published on December 1, 1998. This

final rule set the minimum driving

range for dual fueled electric passenger

vehicles at 7.5 miles on the EPA urban

cycle and 10.2 miles on the EPA

highway cycle when operating on

electricity alone. The rule further

specified that a dual fueled electric

passenger vehicle must attain these

minimum driving ranges while

operating on its nominal electric storage

capacity.

The final rule represents the agency’s

best effort to reconcile the

characteristics of contemporary vehicles

with Chapter 329’s alternative fuel

incentive program. The statutory

framework of this incentive program,

which was drafted well before the

advent of the technologies now used in

some Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs),

does not accommodate the most

common HEV designs now in use or

under development. Contemporary

HEV’s have both a conventional internal

combustion petroleum fueled engine

and an electric motor/generator in their

drivetrain. The vehicle uses the

petroleum fueled engine either to assist

the electric motor or to recharge the

batteries used to power the electric

motor. Depending on the conditions

encountered by the vehicle, it may be

powered solely by the electric motor or

may be propelled by both the petroleum

fueled engine and the electric motor at

the same time. In certain modes of

operation, the vehicle may be propelled

by the electric motor but the gasoline

engine may be operating to recharge the

batteries. In these HEV’s, the modes of

operation must switch rapidly and

seamlessly—the vehicle may be

powered exclusively by the electrical

energy stored in the batteries at one

moment and may be deriving a

substantial amount of its propulsion

from the internal combustion engine the

next.

As the agency noted in both the

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)

(62 FR 375, January 3, 1997) and the

preamble accompanying the final rule

establishing the minimum driving

range, Congress established specific

definitions for what vehicles may be

considered to be dual fueled vehicles for

CAFE purposes. Section 32901(a)(2)

defines an alternative fuel vehicle as

either a dedicated vehicle or a dual

fueled vehicle. Dedicated vehicles are

defined in section 32901(a)(7) as

automobiles that operate only on an

alternative fuel. Dual fueled vehicles are

defined in section 32901(a)(8) as

follows:

(8) ‘‘dual fueled automobile’’ means an

automobile that—

(A) is capable of operating on alternative

fuel and on gasoline or diesel fuel;

(B) provides equal or superior energy

efficiency, as calculated for the applicable

model year during fuel economy testing for

the United States Government, when

operating on alternative fuel as when

operating on gasoline or diesel fuel;

(C) for model years 1993–1995 for an

automobile capable of operating on a mixture

of an alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel

fuel and if the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency decides to

extend the application of this subclause, for

an additional period ending not later than the

end of the last model year to which section

32905(b) and (d) of this title applies, provides

equal or superior energy efficiency, as

calculated for the applicable model year

during fuel economy testing for the

Government, when operating on a mixture of

alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel fuel

containing exactly 50 percent gasoline or

diesel fuel as when operating on gasoline or

diesel fuel; and

(D) for a passenger automobile, meets or

exceeds the minimum driving range

prescribed under subsection (c) of this

section.

Examination of this section compels

the conclusion that Congress intended

that for the purposes of Chapter 329’s

incentive program that dual fueled

vehicles are, with one limited

exception, vehicles operating either on

an alternative fuel or a petroleum fuel

but not on a mixture of the two.

Subsection (A) describes a vehicle that

operates on a petroleum or alternative

fuel but not a mixture of both.

Subsection (B) limits dual fuel vehicles

to those vehicles that offer equal or

superior energy efficiency when

operating on an alternative fuel, thereby

indicating that the two modes of

20782 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 80 / Wednesday, April 25, 2001 / Proposed Rules

1Section 32905(b) sets forth the method for

calculating the fuel economy of qualified dual fuel

vehicles. The section provides, in pertinent part,

that:

The Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency shall measure the fuel economy

for that model by dividing 1.0 by the sum of—

(1) .5 divided by the fuel economy measured

under section 32904(c) of this title when operating

the model on gasoline or diesel fuel; and

(2) .5 divided by the fuel economy measured

under subsection (a) of this section when operating

the model on alternative fuel.

2The Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 created

the incentive system for alternative fueled vehicles

now found in Chapter 329. The EPACT

amendments leading to the establishment of the

final rule at issue here, modified the provisions

created by AMFA.

operation are exclusive. Subsection (C)

indicates that vehicles operating on a

mixture of alternative fuel and gasoline

or diesel fuel may only be considered as

dual fueled automobiles for the 1993–

1995 model years (unless extended by

the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency to the 2004 model

year) when such vehicles offer equal or

superior energy efficiency when

operating on a 50/50 mix of alternative

fuel and diesel fuel or gasoline.

Therefore, the statutory text of section

32901(a)(8) indicates that Congress did

not intend to make incentives available

for dual fueled vehicles operating on a

mix of fuels except under the limited

circumstances enunciated in

32901(a)(8)(C). As the period set by

Congress in which such vehicles could

be considered as dual fueled vehicles

has expired and the EPA has not

extended this period by regulation, a

dual fueled vehicle is one that is

capable of operating on either an

alternative fuel or gasoline or diesel fuel

but not a mixture of both

simultaneously.

In order to qualify for the incentives

offered for dual fueled alternative fuel

vehicles, a vehicle must meet the

criteria of section 32901(a)(8) and be

capable of attaining a minimum driving

range while operating on alternative

fuel. In setting the minimum driving

range for dual fueled vehicles, NHTSA

considered several principal factors: (1)

In requiring a minimum driving range

when operating on alternative fuel,

Congress did not intend that range to be

so low so that vehicles would have little

or no utility when operating on

conventional fuel, (2) Alternative fuel

vehicle technology, particularly in the

case of dual fueled electric vehicles and

hybrids, is far from mature and, (3) In

order to evaluate the fuel efficiency of

the vehicle when operating on an

alternative fuel, the vehicle must have

sufficient range while operating on that

fuel to allow the fuel economy to be

measured using existing or accepted test

methods. Considering these factors, and

others, NHTSA initially proposed to set

the minimum driving range for dual

fueled electric vehicles at 17.7 miles—

the range required to complete one EPA

urban/highway cycle under the current

Federal Test Procedure (FTP)—while

operating on electricity alone (62 FR

375, January 3, 1997). Following

consideration of the comments

submitted in response to that proposal,

NHTSA modified the proposal to set the

minimum driving range at the same

level as the EPA urban/highway cycle

when that cycle is split into two

components—7.5 miles when operating

on the urban cycle and 10.2 miles on the

highway cycle. As the agency explained

in the preamble to the final rule, this

driving range was sufficient to establish

that dual fueled vehicles had enough

range to have some utility to consumers

when operating on electricity, allowed

the fuel economy of the vehicles to be

measured when operating in this mode,

and was not so high as to preclude

further development of dual fueled

electric vehicles.

As the agency recognized that most

contemporary HEV designs derive all of

their power, whether operating on

electricity alone, gasoline alone, or both

gasoline and electricity together, from

the combustion of petroleum fuel by a

conventional engine, care was taken to

determine if these HEVs were, for the

purposes of Chapter 329, dual fueled

electric vehicles. As the agency

explained when issuing the final rule,

Chapter 329 indicates that a dual fueled

alternative fuel vehicle is one that can

operate on an alternative fuel and a

conventional fuel but not both

simultaneously. However, when the fuel

economy of the vehicle is measured

under section 32905(b) and when the

vehicle attains the minimum driving

range required under section 32901(c), it

must be operated on the alternative

fuel .1 Therefore, the definition of an

alternative fuel dual fueled vehicle, the

command that there be some minimum

driving range for that vehicle, the

procedures specified for measuring its

fuel economy, and the method

calculating the incentive all indicate

that the vehicle must be capable of

operating some distance while powered

only by the alternative fuel.

As outlined above, the definition of a

dual fueled alternative vehicle

contemplates that the vehicle will

derive its motive power either from a

petroleum based fuel or from an

alternative fuel. In the case of dual

fueled electric vehicles, the alternative

fuel is electricity. This electricity can be

derived from a number of sources—from

batteries charged from an external

source, from solar cells, or by using the

vehicle’s own petroleum fueled engine

to produce electricity to be stored or

used according to the demand. In the

agency’s view, electricity that is

generated solely from burning

petroleum in a vehicle’s internal

combustion engine is not an alternative

fuel for the purposes of Chapter 329.

II. Petition for Reconsideration of the

Minimum Driving Range

On January 13, 1999, the agency

received a petition from Toyota Motor

Corporation (Toyota) requesting

reconsideration of NHTSA’s decision to

set a minimum driving range of 7.5

miles when operating in EPA urban

cycle and 10.2 miles on the EPA

highway cycle for all dual fueled

electric passenger automobiles.

Toyota’s petition argues that the

requirement that dual fueled electric

vehicles must meet the minimum

driving range requirements while

operating on electricity alone is

inconsistent with the Alternative Motor

Fuels Act of 1988 (AMFA) (Pub. L. 100–

494). In the company’s view, requiring

HEV’s to meet a minimum driving range

while operating on electricity alone is

contrary to the EPACT amendments goal

of encouraging the development of new

alternative fuel technologies. Toyota

disagrees with the agency’s view that

vehicles that are not capable of

operating on electricity alone are not

dual fuel vehicles and its view that

HEVs that charge their batteries using

only energy derived from the

combustion of petroleum fuel in a

conventional engine are not, for CAFE

purposes, dual fueled vehicles. The

company contends that the agency’s

conclusion that qualifying dual fuel

vehicles must be capable of operating

alternately on an alternative fuel and a

conventional petroleum fuel is contrary

to the express language and the

legislative history of AMFA.2

Toyota first relies on the definition of

dual fueled vehicle found in section

32901(a)(8)(A). The company

emphasizes that the section states that a

dual fueled automobile is on that ‘‘is

capable of operating on alternative fuel

and on gasoline or diesel fuel.’’

(emphasis added). Toyota contends that

Congress could have drafted the section

to indicate that a dual fueled vehicle is

one that is capable of operating on

alternative fuel or on gasoline and diesel

fuel and chose not to. The company

submits that the agency’s interpretation,

which requires a vehicle to operate

solely on an alternative fuel, is more

consistent with the latter definition

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 80 / Wednesday, April 25, 2001 / Proposed Rules 20783

3Section 32901(a)(8)(C) provides that after the

1995 model year, vehicles using a mix of alternative

fuel and petroleum fuel may be qualified dual fuel

vehicles if the EPA issues a regulation extending

their eligibility. EPA has not done so.

rather than the one actually adopted by

Congress. The petitioner also argued

that the legislative history of the EPACT

amendments was consistent with its

view. This legislative history indicated

that EPACT would provide an incentive

for dual fueled vehicles even though the

vehicles might not be operated on an

alternative fuel. Due to concerns that

manufacturers might take advantage of

the special calculations for dual fueled

vehicles even though the vehicles might

actually operate on petroleum fuels

regardless of their capability to do

otherwise, the compromise version of

the amendments contained a cap, or

limit, on the benefits that manufacturers

could gain by producing dual fuel

vehicles. The existence of this cap,

according to Toyota, indicates that

Congress did not intend to exclude

manufacturers of vehicles operating on

a combination of fuels from qualifying

for an incentive—it simply sought to

limit the amount of that incentive.

Toyota contended that the agency’s

interpretation, which it construed as a

‘‘flat exclusion’’ of an entire class of

HEV technology, is contrary to overall

intent of the EPACT amendments, the

definition of dual fueled vehicles as set

forth in section 32901(a)(8)(A), and the

choice to limit the extent of the

incentive available rather than exclude

a promising technology.

Toyota also contends that in setting

the minimum driving range at the level

selected and requiring that vehicles

attain this range while operating on

electricity alone, NHTSA has interfered

with the HEV market and provided a

disincentive to the development of

HEV’s. The company urges the agency

to reconsider its decision to set the

minimum driving range for electric

vehicles at 7.5 miles when operating in

the EPA urban cycle and 10.2 miles on

the EPA highway cycle and suggested

that this range be set at zero. Finally,

Toyota requests that in the event the

agency does not reconsider its position

that mixed fuel vehicles are not, for

CAFE purposes, dual fueled vehicles,

that NHTSA should consider a vehicle

that operates on electricity and gasoline

simultaneously as a dual fueled vehicle

under section 32901(a)(8)(c)—which

allows, under certain circumstances,

qualifying dual fueled vehicles to

operate on an alternative fuel and

petroleum fuel simultaneously.

III. Response To Petition for

Reconsideration

In response to the petition, the agency

has reviewed its decision to set the

minimum driving range for dual fueled

electric vehicles at 7.5 miles when

operating in the EPA urban cycle and

10.2 miles on the EPA highway cycle.

As explained below, the agency is

reaffirming that decision.

A. Statutory Interpretation

In regard to the meaning and intent of

Chapter 329’s treatment of dual fueled

vehicles, Toyota argues, first, that

NHTSA erred in adopting the position

that Congress did not intend to make

alternative fuel incentives available to

vehicles capable of operating on

gasoline alone. Second, Toyota argues

that by denying CAFE incentives for

technologies that use a combination of

alternative and conventional fuels,

NHTSA ‘‘disincentivizes’’ the

development of an entire class of

potential HEV designs. Toyota contends

that the agency’s interpretation of

AMFA places a regulatory limitation on

the future development of HEV’s. The

company stresses that Congress

expressly rejected such an approach and

strongly favored letting the marketplace,

rather than the government, determine

the future course of alternative fuel

vehicle development.

Despite Toyota’s characterization of

NHTSA’s views, the agency agrees with

Toyota that the alternative fuel

incentives contained in Chapter 329 are

available for vehicles that operate on

gasoline alone—provided they can also

operate on an alternative fuel alone. The

agency also agrees that Congress did not

intend to strictly direct and control the

development of alternative fuel

vehicles. We disagree, however, with

the notion, implicit in the petitioner’s

argument that these principles lead to

the conclusion that vehicles that are

incapable of operation unless they burn

petroleum fuel, and only petroleum

fuel, are alternative fueled vehicles

eligible for special treatment under

CAFE.

Chapter 329 allows vehicles that

operate on gasoline alone to qualify as

alternative fuel vehicles. As Toyota

asserts, section 32901(a)(8)(A) defines

‘‘dual fueled automobile’’ as an

automobile that ‘‘is capable of operating

on alternative fuel and on gasoline or

diesel fuel * * *’’ In Toyota’s view,

NHTSA’s position that a qualifying dual

fueled vehicle must be capable of

operating while powered solely by an

alternative fuel and not just by a

conventional fuel alone, would require

that section 32901(a)(8)(A) be read as

requiring a dual fueled vehicle to be

‘‘capable of operating on alternative fuel

or on gasoline or diesel fuel * * *’’.

Examination of the remainder of

Section 32901(a)(8) as a whole leads us

to conclude that for a dual fueled

vehicle to be accorded special CAFE

treatment, it must have the capability to

be propelled solely by an alternative

fuel. Section 32901(8) defines a ‘‘dual

fueled automobile’’ as follows:

(8) ‘‘dual fueled automobile’’ means an

automobile that—

(A) is capable of operating on alternative

fuel and on gasoline or diesel fuel;

(B) provides equal or superior energy

efficiency, as calculated for the applicable

model year during fuel economy testing for

the United States Government, when

operating on alternative fuel as when

operating on gasoline or diesel fuel;

(C) for model years 1993–1995 for an

automobile capable of operating on a mixture

of an alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel

fuel and if the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency decides to

extend the application of this subclause, for

an additional period ending not later than the

end of the last model year to which section

32905(b) and (d) of this title applies, provides

equal or superior energy efficiency, as

calculated for the applicable model year

during fuel economy testing for the

Government, when operating on a mixture of

alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel fuel

containing exactly 50 percent gasoline or

diesel fuel as when operating on gasoline or

diesel fuel; and

(D) for a passenger automobile, meets or

exceeds the minimum driving range

prescribed under subsection (c) of this

section.

To qualify as a dual fueled

automobile, a vehicle must meet each

criteria of the definition—it must

operate on an alternative fuel and

gasoline or diesel fuel, provide equal or

superior energy efficiency when using

the alternative fuel, meet a minimum

driving range while using the alternative

fuel, and, if the vehicle operates on a

mixture of alternative fuel and gasoline

or diesel fuel, be a 1993 through 1995

model year vehicle.3 In addition, section

32905(b), which sets forth the method

for calculating the fuel economy of

qualified dual fuel vehicles, explicitly

requires that the fuel economy of a dual

fueled vehicle be measured while it is

operating only on an alternative fuel.

These provisions indicate that

qualifying dual fueled passenger

automobiles must, with the exception of

model year 1993–1995 vehicles using a

mixture of alternative fuel and

conventional fuel, be able to operate for

some minimum distance while being

powered by an alternative fuel

providing equal or superior energy

efficiency to gasoline or diesel fuel. It is

also evident that, but for the provision

in section 32901(a)(8)(C) allowing

certain dual fueled automobiles to

operate on a mixture of alternative fuel

20784 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 80 / Wednesday, April 25, 2001 / Proposed Rules

and gasoline or diesel fuel, Congress

may very well have chosen to define a

dual fueled automobile as one that

operates on alternative fuel or gasoline

and diesel fuel rather than one that

operates on alternative fuel and gasoline

or diesel fuel.

The petitioner stresses that the

legislative history and references within

that history to sections 32905 and 32906

indicate that Congress was aware that

dual fueled vehicles might operate on

gasoline alone and intended that such

operation be permitted. While

examination of the legislative history is

not warranted here due to the clarity of

the statute itself, we recognize that

Chapter 329 envisions that dual fueled

vehicles would and could operate on

gasoline or diesel fuel alone. Sections

32905(b) and (d) set forth fuel economy

measurement procedures for dual fueled

vehicles when operating on gasoline or

diesel fuel and when operating on

alternative fuel. Sections 32906(a)(1)(A)

and (a)(1)(B) place restrictions on the

maximum fuel economy increases

available to manufacturers producing

dual fueled automobiles to prevent

those manufacturers from obtaining a

large fuel economy gain from the

production of vehicles that may very

well be operated on gasoline alone.

The fact remains, however, that the

recognition that dual fueled vehicles

would be capable of operating on

gasoline alone, or might well be

operated on gasoline alone, does not in

any way conflict with the requirement

that a dual fueled vehicle also be

capable of operation while being

powered by an alternative fuel alone.

Toyota’s second argument is that in

indicating that dual fueled electric

vehicles must be capable of operating on

electricity alone and that this electricity

may not be generated by the vehicle’s

own gasoline or diesel powered motor,

NHTSA has, in defiance of Congress,

erected an unreasonable bar to

marketplace-driven development of

alternative fuel technologies. The

petitioner contends that this

requirement interferes with the free

development of alternative fuel

technologies by forcing dual fueled

electric vehicles to have large storage

batteries and high-powered electric

motors. In support of its position,

Toyota has submitted segments of the

legislative history of AMFA indicating

that Congress did not intend to favor

one technology over another and the

market should determine which

technologies will prevail.

The agency does not take issue with

the petitioner’s claim that AMFA’s

legislative history demonstrates an

intent to treat all qualifying technologies

equally. However, the matter at issue is

not, as Toyota argues, favoring one

technology over another. Instead the

question is whether a technology that

depends entirely on the consumption of

petroleum is eligible for treatment as an

alternative fuel technology. Section 3 of

the EPACT amendments to AMFA

contained this declaration of purpose:

(1) To encourage the development and

widespread use of methanol, ethanol, natural

gas, other gaseous fuels, and electricity as

transportation fuels by consumers; and

(2) To promote the production of

alternatively fueled motor vehicles.

While Congress certainly intended to

encourage innovation, increased

efficiency, and the use of new

technologies for all vehicles, the AMFA

and EPACT amendments were

specifically dedicated to encourage the

production of vehicles that did not use

gasoline and the development of

technologies and infrastructure

supporting the increased use of

alternative fuels. As we observed when

establishing the minimum driving range

for dual fueled electric vehicles, a dual

fueled electric passenger automobile

that is incapable of obtaining electrical

energy from any source other than the

onboard combustion of gasoline or

diesel fuel, is not a dual fueled or an

alternative fueled vehicle. Such a

vehicle, regardless of the technology

employed or the form of energy used in

converting fuel to work, is powered only

by the fuel it consumes. It is our

position that this interpretation is

consistent with the Chapter 329 and the

alternative fuel incentive program.

B. Minimum Driving Range

The petitioner also urges NHTSA to

reconsider its decision to set the

minimum driving ranges for dual fueled

electric vehicles at 7.5 miles when

operating on the EPA urban cycle and

at 10.2 miles on the EPA highway cycle.

In the petitioner’s view, these minimum

driving ranges are so high that they

eliminate CAFE incentives for certain

promising hybrid electric vehicle

technologies and interfere with the

natural market forces that Congress

intended should shape the development

of dual fueled vehicles. Instead of the

ranges selected by the agency, Toyota

argues that NHTSA should set the

minimum driving range for dual fueled

electric vehicles at zero miles. Doing so,

in Toyota’s view, would encourage the

development of vehicles that run on a

combination of fuels.

The petitioner’s arguments are similar

to those in comments to the agency’s

original minimum driving range

proposal. One commenter in particular,

Mercedes Benz of North America,

contended that the minimum driving

range for dual fueled electric vehicles

should be set at zero. As we explained

in the notice issuing the final rule, the

agency gave extensive consideration to

this matter. It was, and is, the agency’s

view that a minimum driving range of

zero miles would be inconsistent with

the Congressional command that a

minimum driving range be established.

Setting a minimum driving range of zero

miles would result in a range

requirement of no range at all.

Furthermore, section 32901(c)(3) directs

that in setting a minimum driving range

the agency must specifically consider

consumer acceptability, economic

practicability, technology,

environmental impact, safety,

drivability, performance, and other

factors the Secretary considers relevant.

An alternative fuel vehicle that has no

range while operating on that alternative

fuel would not appear to be acceptable

to consumers or particularly practicable.

Most significantly, a dual fueled electric

vehicle must be capable of some

meaningful operation in the electriconly mode to allow measurement of its

fuel economy when operating on that

alternative fuel. In setting the minimum

driving range as it did, NHTSA

established minimum ranges that were

the shortest ranges that could be used to

measure the fuel economy of dual

fueled electric vehicles under the EPA

test procedure. While a test procedure

comparable to the existing EPA urban/

highway test might be used, the lack of

an alternative test procedure mandated

the use of the existing EPA test.

Other than urging the agency to adopt

a zero mile driving range, the petitioner

did not submit a suggested test

procedure or offer any other information

indicating that a zero mile driving range

would be useful either to consumers or

that it would facilitate testing of

vehicles in the electric only mode.

NHTSA does not believe that Congress,

in specifying a minimum driving range,

intended that this range be set at zero.

Furthermore, in order to actually test

the fuel efficiency of a dual fuel electric

vehicle when operating on an

alternative fuel, the vehicle must be

capable of some operation in that mode.

A minimum driving range of zero miles

would not serve either the intent of

Congress or the need to actually

measure energy efficiency.

C. Mixed Fuel Vehicles

The petitioner’s alternative request is

that NHTSA clarify that vehicles using

a combination of electricity and

conventional fuels are dual fueled

vehicles under the conditions set forth

in section 32901(a)(8)(C). Section

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 80 / Wednesday, April 25, 2001 / Proposed Rules 20785

32901(a)(8)(C) provides that for the

1993–1995 model years (and subsequent

model years if extended by the

Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency), vehicles operating

on a 50/50 mixture of alternative fuel

and gasoline or diesel fuel may be

considered to be dual fueled vehicles if

they provide superior energy efficiency

in comparison to operating on pure

gasoline or diesel and meet the

remaining conditions of the section.

Therefore, for the 1993, 1994, and 1995

model years, vehicles operating on such

a mix of alternative fuel and

conventional fuel could be considered

dual fuel alternative fuel vehicles. For

model years after 1995, vehicles

operating on a 50/50 mixture of

alternative and conventional fuel

vehicles may not be dual fueled

alternative fuel vehicles, as the

Administrator of the EPA has declined

to extend that provision of section

32901(a)(8)(c).

Toyota observes that when issuing the

final rule, NHTSA cited section

32901(a)(8)(c) as the one instance where

a vehicle operating on a mixture of an

alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel

fuel might have been considered to be

a dual fueled vehicle. The petitioner

submits that it is not clear from the final

rule whether the agency would consider

vehicles operating on electricity and

gasoline to fall within section

32901(a)(8)(c) and further argues that it

would be contrary to the meaning and

intent of Chapter 329 if NHTSA were to

determine that such vehicles did not.

In support of the latter contention,

Toyota contends that as Section

32901(a)(1)(J) includes electricity as an

alternative fuel and Section

32901(a)(8)(C) expressly states that if

certain other conditions are met, a

vehicle operating on a mixture of

electricity and gasoline or diesel fuel is

a dual fueled vehicle, a vehicle

operating on a mixture of electricity and

petroleum fuel must be a dual fueled

vehicle.

NHTSA agrees that a vehicle

operating on a mixture of electricity and

gasoline or diesel fuel would meet the

definition of a dual fueled vehicle

provided that all the conditions of

Sections 32901(a)(8) and (a)(8)(C) are

met, including the minimum driving

range requirement. The agency notes,

however, that as the EPA has declined

to extend the availability of dual fuel

status to vehicles operating on a 50/50

mix of petroleum and alternative fuel,

this classification is no longer available.

Accordingly, NHTSA is not in a

position to grant the relief Toyota seeks

even if it were inclined to do so.

Toyota’s request also implies that a

vehicle that derives all of its energy

from the combustion of petroleum fuel,

would qualify as such an alternative

fuel vehicle. We note that under Section

32901(a)(8)(C), a qualifying vehicle must

operate on a mixture of alternative and

conventional fuel. We decline, however,

to embrace the notion that a mixture of

conventional and alternative fuel is

created when a petroleum fuel is burned

by the vehicle to produce both kinetic

and electrical energy that may be used

or stored depending on the work to be

done. NHTSA believes that any

interpretation under which electricity

that is generated due to the operation of

a vehicle on conventional fuel, could be

classified as an alternative fuel would

be overly broad and inconsistent with

the meaning and intent of Chapter 329.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the

agency is denying the petition.

Issued on: April 18, 2001.

Stephen R. Kratzke,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 01–10237 Filed 4–24–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P