Statement Before the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Hearing on 

Techno-authoritarianism and transnational repression and influences 

Influences religious freedom in Southeast Asia

January 25, 2024

Dr. Rana Siu Inboden

Distinguished Scholar, Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law

University of Texas at Austin
Distinguished Commissioners and fellow witnesses, it is an honor to be a part of today’s 

hearing. My statement focuses on ways the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is coopting and 

weakening the UN human rights system to make it easier for countries to evade accountability 

for human rights and religious freedom abuses. Because of these actions China’s human rights 

violations and resistance to universal human rights norms now no longer pose a threat merely 

within its borders. 

Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-government’s religious 

persecution and efforts to control religious groups, has mushroomed. The case of Pastor Wang 

Yi, who is serving a 9-year sentence for peaceful religious activity, and the Chinese 

government’s persecution, monitoring and detention of ethnic Uyghurs, are emblematic of 

these abuses. The Chinese Communist Party government presents a threat to religious 

freedom in other countries through its global rhetoric and propaganda that resists international 

human rights standards and its efforts to undermine and weaken the UN as a venue for 

international accountability. 

Compared to the 1990s, when Chinese leaders occasionally voiced a degree of 

acceptance regarding the universality of human rights or indicated that over time its goal was 

to engage in political reform and improve its human rights practices, the PRC now trumpets 

views that challenge the universality of human rights; asserts that the unique historical, 

national, political and religious conditions of each country must be taken into account; and 

claims that any expression of concern over human rights violations from the international 

community is tantamount to interference in internal affairs. It would be misguided to discount 

this as mere rhetoric. The PRC is using the UN as a key venue to make these statements and is 

collaborating with other countries that share its views to advance these positions. 

Among the PRC’s key means of undermining the UN human rights system is resisting UN 

human rights instruments that are country-specific, including resolutions, special procedures, 

and special sessions.1

 This is part of a long-standing effort by China. Nearly two decades ago,

when the UN Commission on Human Rights was disbanded and the UN Human Rights Council 

(HRC) was being established in its place, Beijing attempted to introduce rules that would make 

it so difficult to introduce a country-specific resolution that this tool would be rendered nearly 

impossible to use.2 Yet, because resolutions carry moral weight and draw the international 

community’s attention, they are a potent tool in protecting human rights. China also sought to 

dilute the UN’s system of Special Procedures, which is comprised of independent experts who 

focus on a specific human rights issue or country.3

 During discussions about the rules that 

1 Rana Siu Inboden, China and the International Human Rights Regime: 1982-2017 (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2021): 122-126. 2 Ibid. 154-157. 3 There are currently Special Procedures focused on Afghanistan, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 

Republic, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, the Palestinian Occupied 

Territories, Russia, Somalia, and Syria. “Country mandates,” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?lang=en, accessed January 24, 2024. 
would govern the HRC, Chinese diplomats insisted that country-focused Special Procedures 

must only be created if the government in question consented.4 This requirement would have 

undermined this tool since countries with severe human rights violations generally face these 

problems either because the government is the main perpetrator or willingly enables or allows 

such abuses. 

Even though the PRC was unsuccessful in these rule-shaping attempts, it continues to 

resist country-specific scrutiny both for itself and its allies in the Human Rights Council. For 

example, in 2017, when the HRC was considering a resolution on Myanmar’s persecution of the

Rohingya, China called for a vote rather than allowing the Council to adopt the resolution by 

the preferred means of consensus, and voted against the resolution. The PRC delegation

framed the situation as one that could be solved through cooperation between Bangladesh and 

Myanmar, and stated that 

The signing of the repatriation agreement between the two countries was an important 

step forward. What was now important was to create favourable conditions and a 

favourable atmosphere in order to implement the agreement. The draft resolution did 

not help ease the situation. On the contrary, it could complicate the implementation of 

the repatriation agreement.5

 

The PRC’s language was clearly aimed at attempting to whitewash the Myanmar government’s 

willful violence against the Rohingya and disparage the international community’s legitimate 

use of a resolution to draw attention to human rights atrocities. 

The PRC also continues its efforts to undermine and discredit the Special Procedures, 

especially because the Special Procedures have expressed alarm about China’s human rights 

violations. Since 2016, the Special Procedures have issued at least 22 joint public statements 

expressing deep concern about China’s egregious human rights violations, including several 

statements signed by dozens of Special Procedure Mandate holders.6 In response to justified 

concerns expressed by the Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom, the Chinese government 

responded by criticizing and aiming to discredit the mandate holder. PRC diplomats 

complained that Ahmed Shaheed, who held the position of special rapporteur on freedom of 

religion or belief from November 2016 through July 2022, was “wantonly spread[ing] false 

4 Ibid., 149. Malaysia joined the PRC in insisting on this position. 

5

 “Council condemns alleged systematic and gross violations of human rights against Rohingya Muslims and other 

minorities in Myanmar,” Press releases, Human Rights Council, https://www.ohchr.org/en/pressreleases/2017/12/council-condemns-alleged-systematic-and-gross-violations-human-rights, accessed January 23, 

2024.

6 Rana Siu Inboden, “China, Power, and the UN Special Procedures: Emerging threats to the ‘crown jewels’ of the 

International Human Rights System,” Global Policy (forthcoming). There are currently 60 Special Procedures. 
information, lack[ing] minimum professional ethics, and serv[ing] as a political tool for some 

Western countries and anti-China forces.”7

 

The PRC also actively works with other countries, including Southeast Asian nations, in 

advancing positions to thwart the Human Rights Council’s ability to hold nations accountable. 

For example, China as well as Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, the 

Philippines, and Thailand belong to the Like-Minded Group (LMG), a coalition of countries, that 

hold illiberal human rights views and seek to protect each other from scrutiny.

8 The PRC’s 

collaboration with these countries is also part of Beijing’s endeavor to sow divisions in the HRC 

between the Global South and Global North and use the HRC to claim that the west is unfairly 

critical and holds imperialist attitudes towards the developing world. In the UN Human Rights 

Council, the LMG numbers over 50 countries and takes positions that denigrates the 

universality of human rights and resists civil and political rights in favor of a right to 

development. The group also insists that technical assistance and capacity building should be

the key means to encourage respect for human rights and that UN resolutions, monitoring via 

public reports, or expressing concern are less effective. While in some instances external 

assistance can be useful, China and these states appear to want to turn the UN into a mere 

service provider rather than a forum for accountability and scrutiny. These nations appear to 

be advancing these positions on capacity building and assistance to try to escape scrutiny and 

the Like-Minded Group works to shield each other from human rights scrutiny.

9

 

Finally, the PRC is one of the leading countries blunting the Universal Period Review 

(UPR), including its own recently concluded review. The UPR was first envisioned as a way to 

ensure that every country undergoes rigorous periodic scrutiny. Yet, China along with other 

countries, including the Like-Minded Group, has instead turned the UPR into a talk fest where 

instead of scrutiny nations receive softball comments on blandishments from each other. For 

example, despite Vietnam’s troubled record on religious freedom, during Vietnam’s last UPR 

Beijing’s comments included encouraging the government to “Continue efforts to eliminate 

inequalities in access to public services” and to “Continue to invest in health-care services for 

women.”10 While these goals are not without merit, they fail to get at the heart of the most 

severe rights abuses in Vietnam, a country that is on the State Department’s Watch List for 

7 “China Slanders and Smears at UN Human Rights Council,” Human Rights Watch, 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/11/chinas-slanders-and-smears-un-human-rights-council, accessed January 

23, 2024. 

8 Rana Siu Inboden, Authoritarian States: Blocking Civil Society Participation in the United Nations (Austin: Robert S. 

Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2019), https://www.strausscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/strauss/18-19/RSInboden_AuthoritarianStates.pdf 9 Rana Siu Inboden, Defending the Global Human Rights System From Authoritarian Assault, (Washington DC, 

National Endowment for Democracy, 2023), https://www.ned.org/new-report-defending-the-global-human-rightssystem/

10 “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 

Review, Viet Nam,” UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/41/7, March 28, 2019. 
religious freedom violations.11 Other diplomats have described the LMG’s UPR behavior as 

horse-trading where they exchange positive or soft comments in order to blunt scrutiny.12

Despite the PRC’s efforts to dilute the international human rights system, there are 

steps that the U.S. government can take to strengthen the UN’s human rights bodies and 

procedures to better protect religious freedom and other human rights abuses. First, the U.S. 

government should invest in ensuring American diplomats have the resources they need in 

Geneva. The PRC mission is nearly double the size of the U.S. mission in terms of diplomats. 

Moreover, the U.S. State Department should also enable American diplomats to get the training 

and time in Geneva needed to master UN procedures and develop relationships with other 

similarly-minded countries.

13 Second, the United States, needs to focus on cross-regional 

collaboration in the HRC to advance robust rights initiatives. This could start with a concerted 

effort to meet with and develop relationships with countries outside the Western European 

and Others Group (comprised of North American and Western European countries), especially 

ones might be open to cooperation. Third, despite the HRC’s shortcomings, the U.S. should be 

committed to participating in the UN human rights system. Aside from being a member of the 

HRC, the U.S. should also encourage other states with a commitment to religious freedom and 

human rights to stand for election. The U.S. government should also support the candidacy of

individuals with strong track records and integrity to serve as experts in the UN human rights 

treaty body system and the Special Procedures system. Finally, the U.S. should persist in 

utilizing the tools at its disposal in the UN. Even though the resolution on Xinjiang that was 

introduced in 2022 did not pass, the U.S. should be commended for introducing it along with 

other nations. Similarly, the U.S. used its opportunity to submit questions in advance of China’s 

recently concluded Universal Periodic Review and put forward fifteen strong questions, 

including one that asked about the cases of over 20 prisoners of conscience.

Thank you again for your time and attention on this important subject.

11 “Countries of Particular Concern, Special Watch List Countries, Entities of Particular Concern,” U.S. State 

Department, https://www.state.gov/countries-of-particular-concern-special-watch-list-countries-entities-ofparticularconcern/#:~:text=The%20most%20recent%20Special%20Watch,Republic%2C%20Comoros%2C%20and%20Vietna

m.

12 Human Rights Watch, The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights 

Mechanisms (Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 2017). 13 Some of core LMG countries enable their diplomats to do multiple tours in Geneva, allowing them to gain 

expertise and build relationships.