alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JUN FU LI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71126.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2011.*

Filed April 21, 2011.

Michael Brown, Law Offices of Michael Brown, LLC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Richard M. Evans, Esquire, Assistant Director, Sada Manickam, Esquire, Trial, OIL, Christina Bechak Parascandola, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, District Counsel Phoenix, Esquire, Office of the District Director U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: B. FLETCHER, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jun Fu Li, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings, *Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003), and for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand, *de Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales,*503 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.2007). We deny the petition for review.

The forensic expert’s testimony and report provide substantial evidence to support the agency’s finding that Li submitted a possibly fraudulent sterilization certificate and fine receipt. *See Desta v. Ashcroft,*365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir.2004). Accordingly, Li’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See id.*

Li did not advance an argument in support of his CAT claim in his opening brief. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996) (issues not supported by argument are deemed waived).

Li contends the record does not support the BIA’s refusal to consider new evidence he submitted on appeal to the BIA, and its implicit denial of his request for remand. To the extent the BIA construed Li’s submission of new evidence as a motion to remand, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the new evidence did not show that Li’s wife was forcibly sterilized. *See Rodriguez v. INS,*841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir.1988) (re*739quirements for a motion to remand are the same as for a motion to reopen); *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir.2010) (BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### SHERMAN, CLAY & CO. v. SEARCHLIGHT HORN CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 21, 1916.)

No. 2677.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California.

N. A. Acker, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

John H. Miller, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

On motion of counsel for appellant to withdraw and dismiss appeal, without prejudice, etc.- — ordered appeal dismissed, with costs in favor of the appellee and against the appellant. See, also, 225 Fed. 497,140 C. C. A. 539.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Six Brothers Concrete Pumping, LLC and Joseph Lowry v. Martin

Tomczak

Appellate case number: 01

- 21

- 00161

- CV

Trial court case number: 2021

- 07817

Trial court: 333 rd District Court of Harris County

Appellants Six Brothers Concrete Pumpin g, LLC and Joseph Lowry filed a motion for

rehearing from our August 2, 2022 opinion . The Court requests a response to the motion.

Appellee, Martin Tomczak, is orde red to file a res ponse to the motion for rehearing , which is

due on November 1, 2022

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

______ /s/ Peter Kelly

______  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __ October 18, 2022

____
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6108 

To strike certain provisions of Public Law 111–226 relating to Texas and 

the Education Jobs Fund. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2010 

Mr. BURGESS (for himself, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. 

GOHMERT, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. OLSON, Mr. POE of Texas, Mr. SMITH

of Texas, Mr. HENSARLING, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. THORNBERRY, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. PAUL, Mr. CARTER, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. 

NEUGEBAUER, and Mr. HALL of Texas) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To strike certain provisions of Public Law 111–226 relating 

to Texas and the Education Jobs Fund. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO 

4 TEXAS. 

5 Section 101 of Public Law 111–226 is amended by 

6 striking paragraph (11). 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37324

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRANDON MORRIS FEDER,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 315

Filed: January 11, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Latah County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and suspended unified sentence of seven years, with a 

minimum period of confinement of two years, for attempted rape, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Chief, 

Appellate Unit, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

______________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Brandon Morris Feder was found guilty of attempted rape. I.C. § 18-306, 18-6101. The 

district court sentenced Feder to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of two years. The district court retained jurisdiction, thereafter suspended Feder’s 

sentence and placed him on probation. Feder appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 
2

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Feder’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Lewis CARPENTER, Claimant-Appellant, v. Eric K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2010-7134.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 25, 2011.

George E. Quillin, Foley & Lardner LLP, Washington, DC, for Claimant-Appellant.

Tara K. Hogan, Department of Justice, David J. Barrans, Y. Ken Lee, Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

ON MOTION

RADER, Chief Judge.

The appellant moves without opposition to vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and to remand for further proceedings.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Veterans Claims more than 120 days after the Board of Veterans’ Appeals mailed its decision in his case. That court dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the 120-day appeal period established by 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) for seeking review of Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The appellant sought this court’s review.

This court stayed the briefing schedule in this appeal pending the United States Supreme Court’s review of our decision in *Henderson v. Shinseki,*589 F.3d 1201 (Fed.Cir.2009) (en banc) (affirming Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determination that period to appeal to that court is not subject to equitable tolling). In *Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,*-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision and concluded that the 120-day deadline for filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims does not have jurisdictional consequences. Because the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims erred in concluding that the appeal deadline established by § 7266(a) is jurisdictional, we vacate the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

*952(1) The motion is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

(2) Ail sides shall bear their own costs.
REGINALD BRYANT

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 4157

________ _____________________/

Opinion filed June 1, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. William E. Davis , Judge

.

Reginald Bryant, pro se , Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AF FIRMED.

WETHERELL, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
Specimen Unit Certificate



 Exhibit 4.17 

 

 

  
 SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR RESTRICTIONS 
 Lighting Science® 

NUMBER 

U– 

UNITS 

CUSIP 53224G 50 9 

LIGHTING SCIENCE GROUP CORPORATION 

INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Each Unit Consisting of One Share of Series D Non-Convertible Preferred Stock and One Warrant to Purchase One Share of
Common Stock 
 This Certifies that 

is the owner of 

Units. 

Each Unit (“Unit”) consists of one (1) share of Series D Non-Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.001
per share (“Series D Preferred Stock”), of LIGHTING SCIENCE GROUP CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and one warrant (the “Warrant”). Each Warrant entitles the holder to purchase one (1) share of
the Company’s common stock, $0.001 par value per share (“Common Stock”) for $6.00 per share (subject to adjustment). Each Warrant is immediately exercisable and will expire unless exercised before 5:00 p.m. New York City Time, on
March 3, 2022 (the “Expiration Date”). Until the redemption date of the shares of Series D Preferred Stock represented by this certificate, the share(s) of Series D Preferred Stock and Warrant(s) comprising the Units represented by
this certificate are not transferable separately, and any sale, transfer or assignment of Units must consist of at least 25,000 Units. The terms of the Series D Preferred Stock are governed by the Certificate of Designation of the Series D Preferred
Stock (the “Certificate of Designation”), filed by the Company with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on September 2, 2009, and are subject to the terms and provisions contained therein, all of which terms and provisions
the holder of this certificate consents to by acceptance hereof. The terms of the Warrants are governed by a Warrant Agreement, between the Company and American Stock Transfer & Trust Company, as Warrant Agent, and are subject to the terms
and provisions contained therein, all of which terms and provisions the holder of this certificate consents to by acceptance hereof. Copies of the Certificate of Designation and Warrant Agreement are on file at the office of the Company at 1227
South Patrick Drive, Building 2A, Satellite Beach, Florida 32937, and are available to any Unit holder on written request and without cost. 

This certificate is not valid unless countersigned by the Transfer Agent and Registrar of the Company. Witness the
facsimile seal of the Company and the facsimile signatures of its duly authorized officers. 
 COUNTERSIGNED AND
REGISTERED: 
 AMERICAN STOCK TRANSFER TRUST& COMPANY, LLC 

(New York, NY) 

BY: 

Transfer Agent and Registrar 

Authorized Signature 

President 

LIGHTING SCIENCE GROUP CORPORATION 

CORPORATE 

SEAL 

1988 

Secretary
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Pinnacle Resources, Inc. (the "Company"),
hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the amendment to
the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the nine months ended
March 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                 /s/ Glen R. Gamble
                                     Glen R. Gamble
                     President & Chief Executive Officer

May 25, 2004




                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Pinnacle Resources, Inc. (the "Company"),
hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the amendment to
the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-QSB for the nine months ended
March 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                     /s/ Robert A. Hildebrand
                         Robert A. Hildebrand
                         Chief Financial Officer



May 25, 2004
Exhibit 10.9

                      ADDENDUM TO CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE AND
                        WARRANT TO PURCHASE COMMON STOCK

This Addendum to Convertible Debenture and Warrant to Purchase Common Stock
("Addendum") is entered into as of the ____ day of February 2004 by and between
Direct Response Financial Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation ("Direct"), and
La Jolla Cove Investors, Inc., a California corporation ("LJCI").

WHEREAS, Direct and LJCI are parties to that certain 8% Convertible Debenture
dated as of January 9, 2003 ("Debenture"); and

WHEREAS, Direct and LJCI are parties to that certain Warrant to Purchase Common
Stock dated as of January 9, 2003 ("Warrant"); and

WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Debenture in certain respects.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained
herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Direct and LJCI agree as follows:

1.       All terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the
         definitions set forth in the Debenture.

2.       Once the Registration Statement is declared effective by the SEC and
         DRFL is able to issue registered Common Stock to LJCI, LJCI will
         immediately submit a $2,500 Debenture conversion and related $25,000
         Warrant exercise. Within 2 business days of LJCI's receipt of the
         registered Common Stock from such Debenture conversion and Warrant
         exercise, LJCI shall wire the sum of $150,000 to Direct; such funds
         shall represent a prepayment towards the exercise of Warrant Shares
         under the Warrant, the timing of which shall be at LJCI's sole
         discretion.

3.       When the Debenture Principal Amount declines below $50,000, LJCI shall
         be permitted, for a period of 30 days, to add up to $150,000 of
         additional principal to the Debenture, on the same terms and conditions
         as the Debenture.

4.       Except as specifically amended herein, all other terms and conditions
         of the Debenture and Warrant shall remain in full force and effect.

IN WINESS WHEREOF, Direct and LJCI have caused this Addendum to be signed by its
duly authorized officers on the date first set forth above.

Direct Response Financial Services, Inc.       La Jolla Cove Investors, Inc.

By: _________________________                  By: __________________________

Name: _______________________                  Name: ________________________

Title: ______________________                  Title: _______________________
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION**


**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**(SUBSECTIONS
      (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350,**


**CHAPTER
      63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE)**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Intermec, Inc. (the
“Company”) for the period ended July 1, 2007, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lanny H. Michael,
      Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350,
      that:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/
                Lanny H. MichaelLanny
                H. Michael*Chief
                Financial Officer*August 3,
                2007
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30811

Summary Calendar

DERRICK SCOTT

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

RAY HANSON

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:04-CV-460

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Derrick Scott, Louisiana prisoner # 126372, appeals the district court’s

judgment, following a jury trial, dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint

against a prison officer, Ray Hanson, for use of excessive force. Scott argues on

appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.

A district court’s decision not to grant a new trial generally is not

appealable. See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 1986). Instead,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 28, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-30811

2

it is regarded as an attack on the final judgment. See id. Scott failed to move

for judgment as a matter of law in the district court at the close of the evidence

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Accordingly, our review is

limited to determining “whether there was any evidence to support the jury

verdict.” Flowers v. Southern Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 238 (5th

Cir. 2001).

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of use of excessive force, a

plaintiff must establish that the force was not applied in a good faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). At trial, Hanson denied using mace

on Scott outside of a disciplinary courtroom and then dragging him to his cell.

Hanson acknowledged that Scott was still restrained and inside of his cell when

mace was briefly used; however, Hanson testified that the use of mace was

justified by Scott’s continued refusal to comply with orders to cease his

disruptive behavior, which Hanson said interfered with audio equipment used

to monitor the inmates and guards.

Therefore, there was support in the record for the jury’s conclusion that

Hanson’s actions did not constitute an excessive use of force. See Baldwin v.

Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838-39, 841; Flowers, 247 F.3d at 238.

AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 11-2953

ISABEL D. MENDOZA, PETITIONER,

V.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT.

Before HAGEL, MOORMAN, and SCHOELEN, Judges.

O R D E R

On September 29, 2011, Isabel D. Mendoza, who is self-represented, filed a petition for

extraordinaryreliefin the nature of a writ of mandamus, seeking an orderfrom this Court compelling

the VA regional office in Manila, Phillippines, to either issue an adverse rating decision from which

she can appeal or award her dependency and indemnity compensation benefits. A panel was formed

on December 14, 2011, to consider Mrs. Mendoza's petition and, on January 10, 2012, the panel

issued an order holding Mrs. Mendoza's petition in abeyance for 45 days and directing the Secretary

to apprise the Court of the status of Mrs. Mendoza's claim every 15 days. On January 30, 2012, the

Secretaryfiled a responsewith supporting documentation indicating that Mrs. Mendoza was awarded

dependencyand indemnity compensation benefits bythe regional office in a January 20, 2012, rating

decision. 

This Court adheres to the case-or-controversy jurisdictional restraints provided for in Article

III of the U.S. Constitution. See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 13-15 (1990). When the relief

requested in a petition has been obtained, the appropriate course of action is for the Court to dismiss

the petition as moot. See Thomas v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 269, 270-71 (1996) (per curiam order). 

Accordingly, because the response filed by the Secretary indicates that Mrs. Mendoza has now

received the requested relief, the Court will dismiss the instant motion as moot. Id.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is 

ORDERED that the September 29, 2011, petition is DISMISSED. 

DATED: February 9, 2012 PER CURIAM.

Copies to:

Isabel D. Mendoza

VA General Counsel (027)
#### VAN CLEEF v. BROWN.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

May 14, 1894.)

Action by William S. Van Cleef against James J. Brown.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and CULLEN, JJ.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Mercantile Bank *v.*Tennessee and Shelby County,

No. 677,

by stipulation, abides the event of the foregoing case.