*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
KRISTIN WILKINS ET AL. v. CONNECTICUT

CHILDBIRTH AND WOMEN’S

CENTER ET AL.

(AC 38224)

Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought, in two actions that were consolidated for trial, to

recover damages from the defendant W Co. for medical malpractice,

claiming that W Co. and its agents were negligent in their care and

treatment of the plaintiff immediately after the delivery of her daughter

and in her postdelivery care with regard to her pregnancy. Specifically,

the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that W Co. had failed to diagnose and to

treat a fourth degree obstetrical laceration at the time of the delivery.

The matter was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of W

Co. From the judgments rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this

court. She claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion

in submitting a threshold interrogatory to the jury and in framing its

answer to a question from the jury. Specifically, the first jury interrogatory asked the jury to determine whether the plaintiff had in fact sustained a fourth degree laceration and/or a severe tear of her vaginal

tissue, her perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter muscle during

labor and delivery, and it stated that if the answer was no, the jury was

to return a verdict for W Co. During deliberations, the jury asked the

court whether it was sufficient if it found that there was an injury to

just one of those areas or whether it had to find an injury to all three

of those areas. The court answered that in light of the use of the word

‘‘and’’ in the interrogatory, the injury should be evaluated as a whole

and not as separate injuries. Held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in giving the jury the first interrogatory or in framing its

answer to the jury’s question: that court’s use of the first interrogatory

and its answer to the jury that the injury should be evaluated as a

whole were consistent with the language of the plaintiff’s complaint,

the evidence adduced at trial and the plaintiff’s arguments, and were

permissible in order to elicit a determination of the material threshold

fact, namely, whether the plaintiff had sustained a fourth degree laceration and/or severe tear to her vaginal tissue, perineal skin and muscle,

and anal sphincter muscle at the time of giving birth, as alleged in the

complaint, as the existence of such an injury was central to all of the

claims alleged in the complaint, and the expert testimony presented

focused on the existence of such an injury and did not relate that the

plaintiff sustained anything less than a fourth degree laceration during

labor; moreover, because the crux of the plaintiff’s claim at trial was

that she sustained such an injury and the success of her presentation

at trial depended on the factual determination of whether she did indeed

suffer the claimed injury, it was within the court’s discretion to submit

the interrogatory to the jury asking it to determine first whether it found

that the plaintiff sustained such an injury, and the plaintiff could not

claim that the court erred in framing the language utilized by the plaintiff

herself as the core of her complaint.

Argued April 19—officially released September 19, 2017

Procedural History

Action, in two cases, to recover damages for personal

injuries sustained by the named plaintiff as a result of

the defendants’ alleged medical malpractice, and for

other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Danbury, where the plaintiff Billy Wilkins

withdrew his claim for loss of consortium; thereafter,

the actions were withdrawn as to the named defendant,

and the cases were consolidated and tried to a jury
before Truglia, J.; verdict for the defendant Women’s

Health Associates, P.C., in both cases; subsequently,

the court denied the named plaintiff’s corrected motion

to set aside the verdict and rendered judgments in

accordance with the verdict, from which the named

plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Alinor C. Sterling, with whom were Sarah Steinfeld

and, on the brief, Carey B. Reilly, for the appellant

(named plaintiff).

David J. Robertson, with whom were Christopher

H. Blau and, on the brief, Madonna A. Sacco and Matthew M. Sconziano, for the appellee (defendant Women’s Health Associates, P.C.).
Opinion

BISHOP, J. In this medical negligence action, the

plaintiff Kristin Wilkins1 appeals from judgments in two

cases, which were consolidated for trial, in favor of the

defendant Women’s Health Associates, P.C.2 On appeal,

she argues that the court abused its discretion in submitting a threshold jury interrogatory and in framing its

answer to a question from the jury regarding that interrogatory, and, therefore, the jury verdict, returned in

the defendant’s favor, should be set aside and a new

trial should be ordered. We disagree and, accordingly,

we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. The defendant is a birthing center located in Danbury, which employs physicians and certified nursemidwives, in addition to other medical professionals

and support staff. The plaintiff gave birth to her second

child on April 17, 2007, at the defendant birthing center,

where she was attended to by staff, including Katy

Maker, a certified nurse-midwife. Immediately following the birth, Maker visually and physically examined

the plaintiff’s vaginal and perineal areas3

to determine

whether there had been any obstetrical lacerations during birth.4 Maker documented in the plaintiff’s medical

chart that the plaintiff had not sustained any obstetrical

lacerations and that her perineum was intact.5 The following day, April 18, 2007, at the plaintiff’s home, Maker

again visually and physically examined the plaintiff’s

vaginal and perineal areas to ensure that she was healing properly from birth. Maker did not document that

the plaintiff had a laceration or any abnormalities. The

plaintiff also returned to the defendant center on April

25, 2007 for a one week postpartum visit, performed

by another certified nurse-midwife, Catherine Parisi.

Parisi noted on the medical form during that visit that

there were no problems with the plaintiff’s perineum.

The plaintiff next returned to the defendant center on

May 31, 2007, for a six week follow-up examination,

performed by Maker. Maker visually and physically

examined the plaintiff’s vaginal and perineal areas, and

documented in the plaintiff’s medical chart that she had

‘‘healed well’’ from the birth, and recorded no lacerations or abnormalities.

On August 1 or 2, 2007, the plaintiff returned to the

defendant center again for an annual examination, at

which time no lacerations or abnormalities were

recorded. On September 4, 2007, the plaintiff was examined by a dermatologist, unaffiliated with the defendant,

who documented that the plaintiff’s genitalia were

normal.

On March 6, 2008, the plaintiff returned to the defendant center for an annual gynecological examination,

performed by Parisi. Parisi noted on the medical chart

under ‘‘Reason for Visit’’ that it was an annual examina-
tion, and also, on the basis of how the plaintiff described

her condition, that the plaintiff was ‘‘concerned about

healing of laceration from birth last year, some rectal

incontinence, [and] ‘loose’ tissue in vagina.’’ Parisi

examined the plaintiff’s perineal area and noted on the

medical form that her external genitalia ‘‘showed abnormalities [and a] poorly healed laceration,’’ though Parisi

testified that she did not know whether a laceration

had occurred at birth. Parisi referred the plaintiff to

Kenneth Blau, a gynecologist specializing in pelvic

reconstructive surgery and urogynecology,6 who was

the founder, managing partner, and president of the

defendant. Blau examined the plaintiff on April 26, 2008,

and recorded that the plaintiff’s perineum was ‘‘totally

absent,’’ that she had ‘‘no sphincter, thin membrane

between anus and vagina,’’ and that she required ‘‘complete perineal/anal reconstruction . . . .’’ He opined

that the cause of such an injury was a ‘‘failed episiotomy

restitution,’’ though he testified that he was not sure

whether the plaintiff had an episiotomy when she gave

birth, and was relying on the plaintiff’s own recollection.7

The plaintiff later began treatment with another urogynecologist, Richard Bercik, who is unaffiliated with

the defendant. On July 31, 2008, Bercik performed an

abdominal examination, a pelvic examination, and a

rectal examination of the plaintiff. He determined that

the plaintiff’s ‘‘external genitalia were gaping or essentially . . . wide open,’’ that her ‘‘sphincter muscles,

both the internal and external sphincters, were torn,’’

that ‘‘she had a complete separation of [the] wall

between the vagina and the rectum,’’ that ‘‘[t]he muscles

that would make up the perineal body . . . were no

longer there . . . and there was, actually, an absent

perineum, so there was no separation between the

vagina and the rectum,’’ and ‘‘[e]ssentially the lining of

the rectum, the mucosa of the rectum and the mucosa

of the vagina were . . . basically next to each other

with no tissue in between . . . .’’ Bercik testified that

the plaintiff was suffering from a ‘‘cloaca, which is a

term for a combined vagina and anus.’’ He diagnosed

the plaintiff with a fourth degree obstetrical laceration,

which he opined dated back to the time of delivery,

and was either unrepaired, or was repaired, but the

repair had subsequently broken down.

A fourth degree laceration extends ‘‘from the vagina

all the way through into the rectal mucosa,’’ which is

‘‘the most internal part of the . . . anal sphincter.’’8

Bercik surgically repaired the fourth degree laceration

on September 8, 2008.

The plaintiff filed a complaint in this medical negligence action on February 19, 2010, alleging that the

defendant and its agents were negligent in their care

and treatment of the plaintiff immediately after the

delivery of her daughter, on April 17, 2007, and in her
postpartum examination on April 18, 2007. In her operative one count amended complaint, dated January 16,

2015, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was negligent in the following ways: (1) ‘‘failed to adequately

and properly care for, treat, diagnose, monitor and

supervise the plaintiff . . . for delivery and postdelivery care with regard to her pregnancy’’; (2) ‘‘failed to

inspect properly the vaginal, perineal and anal areas of

the plaintiff . . . immediately following the vaginal

delivery on April 17, 2007 and/or on April 18, 2007’’; (3)

‘‘failed to diagnose a [fourth] degree and/or severe tear

of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle and anal

sphincter immediately following the vaginal delivery’’;

(4) ‘‘failed to inform the plaintiff that she had a [fourth]

degree and/or severe tear of her vaginal tissue, perineal

skin/muscle and anal sphincter immediately following

the vaginal delivery’’; (5) ‘‘failed to treat properly and

in a timely manner the plaintiff’s [fourth] degree and/

or severe tear of her vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle

and anal sphincter immediately following the vaginal

delivery’’; and (6) ‘‘failed to refer properly and in a

timely manner the plaintiff for treatment of the [fourth]

degree tear and/or severe tear of her vaginal tissue,

perineal skin/muscle and anal sphincter immediately

following the vaginal delivery . . . .’’ The plaintiff

alleged many physical injuries, including an unrepaired

fourth degree obstetrical laceration, fecal incontinence,

surgery, ‘‘tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin, perineal muscle, anal sphincter and/or rectal tissue,’’ and

absent perineum.9

The jury trial took place over the course of nineteen

days, at which the plaintiff called to testify, inter alia,

the plaintiff, Bercik, and Blau, and entered into evidence

the video depositions of many of the defendant’s nursemidwives, including Maker and Parisi. The plaintiff’s

theory of the case, that the defendant failed to diagnose

and treat a fourth degree laceration at the time of the

delivery, vastly differed from the defendant’s theory,

that the plaintiff did not suffer a fourth degree obstetrical laceration during delivery.10 The defendant moved

for a directed verdict on January 20, 2015, alleging,

inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to establish that the

defendant was negligent in its care of the plaintiff. The

court, Truglia, J., denied the defendant’s motion.

At the end of the evidence portion of the trial, on

February 24, 2015, the court held a charge conference

to discuss a draft of the proposed jury charge and jury

interrogatories. The first jury interrogatory suggested

by the court purported to ask the jury to determine

whether the plaintiff had in fact sustained a fourth

degree laceration during labor and delivery on April

17, 2007. The plaintiff objected to the interrogatory as

creating a prejudicial threshold issue. The plaintiff also

argued that not all of the allegations in the complaint

specified that there was a fourth degree laceration, and,

therefore, the jury did not necessarily have to find that
there was such an injury in order to return a verdict in

the plaintiff’s favor. In the event that the interrogatory

was given to the jury, however, the plaintiff requested

that the court add the clause ‘‘and/or severe tear of her

vaginal tissue, her perineal skin and muscle and anal

sphincter muscle’’ after ‘‘fourth degree laceration’’ in

order to conform to the language used in the complaint.

The defendant, however, agreed with the court’s use

of this first interrogatory stating: ‘‘[I]t is the definitive

question that was asked of all the experts. If there was

no fourth degree laceration . . . or no perineal skin

muscle and anal sphincter [tear] during labor and delivery on April [17, 2007] . . . [then] the whole case is

gone.’’ The defendant further stated that there was no

claim in the case that the plaintiff had anything other

than a fourth degree laceration, and there was ‘‘no testimony about [a first] or a second or a third’’ degree

laceration, and that ‘‘everything . . . fails if there was

no fourth degree laceration,’’ to which the court

responded, ‘‘[t]hat’s how I see it.’’

On February 25, 2015, after instructing the jury, the

court submitted its proposed first interrogatory with

the additional language requested by the plaintiff. The

interrogatory stated as follows: ‘‘1. Do you find that the

plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence

that she sustained a fourth degree laceration and/or a

severe tear of her vaginal tissue, her perineal skin and

muscle and anal sphincter muscle during her labor and

delivery on April 17, 2007?’’ The interrogatory further

instructed: ‘‘If your answer to this question is yes,

please proceed to the next questions. If your answer

is no, please proceed directly to the verdict form for

defendant Women’s Health Associates, P.C., and enter

a verdict for the defendant.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

On the following day, during deliberations, the jury

asked the court the following question: ‘‘Is the injury

stated after and/or evaluated as a whole or should they

be evaluated separately?’’ After some discussion as to

how to interpret the question, the court, the plaintiff’s

counsel, and the defendant’s counsel agreed on an

understanding—that ‘‘the jury wants to know if they

find that there was an injury to just the vaginal tissue,

just the perineal skin or just the . . . anal sphincter

muscle, [whether] that’s sufficient or whether they have

to find an injury to all three of those areas . . . .’’ The

defendant argued that the clause, ‘‘a severe tear of her

vaginal tissue, her perineal skin and muscle and anal

sphincter muscle,’’ should be evaluated as a whole

because of the use of word ‘‘and,’’ whereas the plaintiff

argued that the jury could evaluate it as a whole, or

as separate injuries. In determining the answer to the

question, the court stated to the plaintiff: ‘‘[Y]our complaint speaks of [the] failure to diagnose a fourth degree

and/or severe tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin/

muscle and anal sphincter. Those things are the same
in the court’s view. Fourth degree and/or severe tear

mean the same thing.’’

Accordingly, the court instructed the jury as follows:

‘‘The answer to your question is: the injury stated after

and/or, in interrogatory number one, should be evaluated as a whole, that’s the answer to this question and

that’s all I can say, at this time.’’ Thereafter, the jury

answered ‘‘no’’ to the first interrogatory and, accordingly, returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on

February 26, 2015.

The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict

on March 4, 2015, alleging, inter alia, that the court

improperly submitted the first jury interrogatory. The

court denied the motion on July 28, 2015, stating that the

interrogatory and subsequent instruction were ‘‘entirely

consistent with the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence

and offer of proof at trial.’’ Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on July 28,

2015. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused

its discretion in giving the jury an unnecessary threshold

interrogatory, and, therefore, the jury verdict should be

set aside and a new trial should be ordered. Specifically,

the plaintiff argues that the interrogatory was unnecessary and confusing, that the complaint made claims

other than those allowed by the interrogatory, that the

evidence supported claims based on injuries other than

those posed in the interrogatory, and that the court’s

instruction following the jury’s question ‘‘cemented the

error.’’ In each of her arguments, the plaintiff is essentially making the same claim: that the jury could have

returned a verdict for the plaintiff even if it did not

find that the plaintiff had sustained a fourth degree

laceration and/or severe tear of her vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle, and anal sphincter muscle during

labor. In response, the defendant argues that the court

acted well within its discretion in giving the jury the

first interrogatory because it ‘‘accurately captured and

reflected’’ the plaintiff’s claims at trial. We agree with

the defendant.

We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘The power

of the trial court to submit proper interrogatories to

the jury, to be answered when returning [its] verdict,

does not depend upon the consent of the parties or the

authority of statute law. In the absence of any mandatory enactment, it is within the reasonable discretion

of the presiding judge to require or to refuse to require

the jury to answer pertinent interrogatories, as the

proper administration of justice may require. . . . The

trial court has broad discretion to regulate the manner

in which interrogatories are presented to the jury, as

well as their form and content. . . . Moreover, [i]n

order to establish reversible error, the defendant must

prove both an abuse of discretion and a harm that

resulted from such abuse.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Champeau v. Blitzer, 157 Conn. App. 201,

210, 115 A.3d 1126, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 909, 115

A.3d 1105 (2015).11

We further note that jury interrogatories must be

consistent with the pleadings and the evidence adduced

at trial, so as not to mislead the jury. Chapman v.

Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 39 Conn. App.

306, 316, 665 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 925, 666

A.2d 1185 (1995). ‘‘The function of jury interrogatories

is to provide a guide for the jury’s reasoning, and a

written chronicle of that reasoning.’’ Hammer v. Mount

Sinai Hospital, 25 Conn. App. 702, 710, 596 A.2d 1318,

cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933, 599 A.2d 384 (1991). The

purpose of jury interrogatories is to elicit a determination of material facts, to furnish the means of testing

the correctness of the verdict rendered, and of ascertaining its extent. Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 451,

927 A.2d 843 (2007). In the present case, the court’s

use of the first interrogatory was consistent with the

pleadings and the evidence, and was permissible in

order to elicit a determination of the material, threshold

fact: whether the plaintiff sustained a fourth degree

laceration and/or severe tear to her vaginal tissue, perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter at the time of

giving birth.

The plaintiff’s argument that the interrogatory was

improper because the complaint made claims other

than those allowed by the interrogatory must fail

because the tenor of the complaint, as highlighted by

the testimony elicited at trial, relied on the plaintiff

suffering from a fourth degree laceration and/or severe

tear at the time of birth. Additionally, the plaintiff’s

argument that the interrogatory was improper because

the jury could have found something less than a fourth

degree laceration is inconsistent with the testimony

elicited at trial. So, too, is her argument that the interrogatory was improper because the complaint and evidence supported a jury’s finding for the plaintiff even

if there was no fourth degree laceration and/or severe

tear. Finally, the plaintiff’s argument that the court’s

supplemental instruction to the interrogatory

‘‘cemented the [court’s] error’’ must also fail for the

same reasons.

In her one count negligence complaint, the plaintiff

alleged six subclaims, four of which specifically linked

the defendant’s negligence to the existence of a fourth

degree laceration and/or ‘‘severe tear of the vaginal

tissue, perineal skin/muscle, and anal sphincter’’ on

April 17 or 18, 2007. The two allegations that did not

specifically mention the claimed injury were that the

defendant ‘‘failed to adequately and properly care for,

treat, diagnose, monitor and supervise the plaintiff . . .

for delivery and postdelivery care with regard to her

pregnancy, ‘‘ and ‘‘failed to inspect properly the vaginal,

perineal and anal areas of the plaintiff . . . immedi-
ately following the vaginal delivery on April 17, 2007

and/or on April 18, 2007.’’ It is clear from the evidence

the plaintiff elicited at trial that, although the complaint

itself did not reiterate the claim of a fourth degree

laceration in these two subclaims, the existence of such

an injury was central to all of her claims.

The plaintiff presented expert testimony from Elizabeth Howard, a nurse-midwife with a doctorate in nursing, who testified regarding the standard of care, that

the plaintiff sustained a fourth degree laceration during

birth. She further testified that without a proper examination, a fourth degree laceration could have been

missed, and that, in fact, Maker did fail to accurately

diagnose a ‘‘significant obstetrical laceration’’ because

of an improper examination. In addition to Howard, the

plaintiff presented testimony from one other expert

witness, Bercik, regarding causation. Both Bercik and

Howard testified that they believed the plaintiff sustained a fourth degree laceration during childbirth. The

plaintiff, contrary to her assertions in her brief, elicited

no expert testimony that the plaintiff sustained anything

less than a fourth degree laceration during labor. Further, Bercik testified on direct examination that a fourth

degree laceration does not ‘‘generally progress from a

first to a second, or [from] a second to a third,’’ and

further testified on cross-examination that ‘‘[w]ithin a

degree of medical probability,’’ a small tear would not

turn into a fourth degree laceration. Blau also testified

on direct examination in the plaintiff’s case-in-chief as

well as on cross-examination that a first degree laceration, sustained during childbirth, would not evolve into

a fourth degree laceration.12 Additionally, the plaintiff’s

counsel, herself, relied on the expert testimony that the

plaintiff sustained a fourth degree laceration in opposing the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Counsel argued that the testimony of both Bercik and

Howard supported the claim that the plaintiff sustained

a fourth degree laceration at the time of birth, and,

therefore, a directed verdict was improper.13

The crux of the plaintiff’s claim at trial was that she

had sustained a fourth degree laceration and/or severe

tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle and anal

sphincter during childbirth on April 17, 2007, and the

success of her presentation at trial rose and fell on

the factual determination as to whether she did indeed

suffer such an injury. For the plaintiff to now claim, on

appeal, that the dispute at trial implicated a question

regarding the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, and not

whether the plaintiff had, in fact, sustained the claimed

injuries at childbirth is at odds with the factual record.

It was clear throughout the plaintiff’s case-in-chief that

she was alleging that she sustained a fourth degree

obstetrical laceration during childbirth. Indeed, during

opening arguments, the plaintiff’s counsel stated: ‘‘[T]he

evidence in this case and the primary dispute in this case

is that [the plaintiff] suffered a fourth degree obstetrical
laceration.’’ It is clear further from the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict

that the plaintiff realized that the factual dispute in

question was at the heart of this case. Counsel stated:

‘‘[T]here’s a fact in dispute here. . . . [T]hat’s what the

jury’s here for, to . . . resolve the facts in dispute. . . .

I mean, this case is about a factual dispute, it’s less

about standard of care and deviation from the standard of care, than it is about the facts. . . . [I]t is

ultimately going to be for the jury to decide, based on

the state of the evidence, what they believe the facts

to have been.’’ (Emphasis added.) Further, the following

colloquy occurred during argument on the defendant’s

motion for a directed verdict:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: [I]t is for the jury to decide

whether or not the totality of that evidence supports the

fact that there was a laceration existing at the time, so—

‘‘The Court: A fourth degree laceration, existing at

the time. . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: A fourth degree laceration,

although it—it’s also the complaint had—as stated

says—right, not a first degree, right, a severe . . .

injury to the perineal skin, yes.

‘‘The Court: No, your allegation is that it was a

fourth degree.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And/or, it says; and/or

severe—

‘‘The Court: And/or a severe tear of the vaginal tissue.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Right. Exactly. So, and

that’s been the allegation all along.’’ Indeed, at the plaintiff’s request, the court amended the language of the

interrogatory and jury instructions to specifically

include a ‘‘severe tear’’ as an alternative injury for the

jury to determine, as described by the plaintiff herself

in her complaint. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged in

her complaint that she sustained an ‘‘unrepaired fourth

degree obstetrical laceration.’’

Finally, the plaintiff’s argument that the court’s supplemental instruction to the jury on the interrogatory

‘‘cemented the [court’s] error’’ must also fail for all of

the reasons stated above. The plaintiff continues to

argue in this claim that the interrogatory was unnecessary and precluded the jury from finding in her favor,

even though it found that the plaintiff had not sustained

a fourth degree laceration and/or severe tear during

labor. Again, this argument is inconsistent with the

plaintiff’s contentions throughout trial, as well as the

testimony and evidence elicited by the plaintiff. In its

question to the court regarding the first interrogatory,

the jury asked whether ‘‘the injury stated after and/or

[should be] evaluated as a whole or should they be

evaluated separately,’’ to which the court responded:

‘‘The injury stated after and/or . . . should be evalu-
ated as a whole . . . .’’14 The plaintiff’s counsel even

argued to the court that the plaintiff’s ‘‘allegation all

along’’ has been that the plaintiff suffered a fourth

degree laceration and/or severe tear of her vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle and anal sphincter. Also, the

language of the interrogatory was taken from the plaintiff’s complaint, specifically at the plaintiff’s request.

The plaintiff may not now claim that the court erred

in framing the language that the plaintiff herself utilized

as the core of her complaint against the defendant.

Because it is clear from the plaintiff’s complaint, the

evidence elicited at trial, and the plaintiff’s arguments

that the case revolved around the existence of a fourth

degree laceration and/or a severe tear of the vaginal

tissue, perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter, it

was within the court’s discretion to submit this interrogatory to the jury, asking it to determine first whether

it found that the plaintiff sustained such an injury.

Accordingly, in propounding this threshold interrogatory and the following instruction, the court did not

abuse its discretion.15

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Kristin Wilkins’ husband, Billy Wilkins, also was a plaintiff, but he withdrew his claims for loss of consortium prior to the verdict. Therefore, we

refer in this opinion to Kristin Wilkins as the plaintiff.

2 The plaintiff’s claims against the named defendant, Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, were withdrawn prior to the verdict. All subsequent

references to the defendant are to Women’s Health Associates, P.C.

3 The perineum is the ‘‘area between the vagina and . . . [the] rectum or

anus and [is] really made up of mostly muscles.’’

4 An obstetrical laceration is one in which the vaginal, perineal, and/or

anal structures ‘‘tear during the course of delivery.’’

5 The plaintiff testified at trial that Maker told her that there was ‘‘a small

first degree tear’’ that looked like it would ‘‘heal on its own,’’ so she would

not stitch it. Maker testified, however, that she never told the plaintiff that

there was any laceration that occurred at birth.

6 Urogynecology is a subspecialty of gynecology ‘‘that deals with vaginal

fl[ow] dysfunction and abnormalities.’’

7 An episiotomy is the intentional cutting of the vaginal tissue during birth

to prevent an obstetrical laceration from occurring. The testimony and

evidence reflects that the plaintiff did not require an episiotomy during labor.

8 At trial, Bercik testified to the other degrees of lacerations as follows:

‘‘[A] first degree laceration is when that tear only includes the lining of the

vagina or the . . . vaginal epithelia. . . .

‘‘The second degree laceration is one in which that laceration or tear . . .

extends into the perineum, but not to the muscles of the anal sphincter. . . .

‘‘Then there’s something we call a third degree laceration, which is actually

broken down into A, B, and C. So, a third degree laceration, in general,

refers to that—that tear now extends into the anal sphincter, but not to the

rectal epithelium or mucosa.

‘‘So, [a third degree] A) laceration . . . extends into the external anal

sphincter, but not through the entire thickness . . . [and it is] what we call

a partial tear of this external anal sphincter.

‘‘Three B) is a complete tear of the [external] anal sphincter, but not the

internal sphincter.

‘‘And, then three C) is one which encompasses both [the] internal and

external anal sphincter, but not yet to the rectal mucosa.’’

Blau testified that ‘‘[a] fourth degree . . . laceration is really a fairly

catastrophic event at a delivery. . . . [T]his is a large gaping defect in the

perineum and it extends all the way from the vagina down to the . . . rectal

canal . . . the symptoms are incontinence and pain and bleeding, difficulty

with intercourse, defecatory abnormalities or problems with incontinence,
fecal incontinence, anal incontinence.’’

9 Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered from dyspareunia,

‘‘disrupted external and internal anal sphincters,’’ ‘‘completely disrupted

perineal body,’’ ‘‘attenuated rectovaginal space,’’ ‘‘rectovaginal fistula,’’ ‘‘very

thin rectovaginal septum,’’ ‘‘perineal discomfort,’’ ‘‘weakened anal sphincter,’’ ‘‘pocket between vagina and rectum in which feces gets trapped,’’

‘‘increased risk of tissue breakdown and loss of elasticity/strength of anal

sphincter with menopause,’’ and ‘‘psychological, physiological and neurological sequelae.’’

10 The defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff did in fact have a fourth

degree laceration at some point in time, but did dispute that it occurred

during the birth of the plaintiff’s second child, on April 17, 2007, or shortly

thereafter, on April 18, 2007. The plaintiff claims only that the defendant

was negligent in its care of the plaintiff on April 17, 2007 and/or April 18,

2007, and does not make any claim against the defendant in its follow-up

care of the plaintiff.

11 The plaintiff argues that the court essentially directed a verdict in favor

of the defendant and, therefore, the standard of review applicable to directed

verdicts applies in this case, which is that ‘‘[w]e review a court’s decision

to direct a verdict for the defendant by considering all of the evidence,

including reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Stamford, 115 Conn. App. 47,

67, 971 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 912, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009). We do

not agree with the plaintiff’s characterization of the court’s action and,

therefore, decline to apply this standard of review.

12 The plaintiff also argues that the court mistakenly believed that a fourth

degree laceration was the same thing as a severe tear of the vaginal tissue,

perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter. In her brief, the plaintiff

argues that the latter injury could be considered a third degree laceration as

opposed to a fourth degree laceration. It appears clear from the undisputed

evidence, however, that a ‘‘severe tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin

and muscle, and anal sphincter,’’ as listed in the complaint, is the natural

sequelae of a fourth degree laceration. Also, even if we agreed with the

plaintiff that the court was mistaken in its analysis that they are the same

injury, the argument fails because of the framing of the interrogatory. Specifically, the use of the term ‘‘and/or’’ in the interrogatory allowed the jury to

determine the two stated injuries, a ‘‘fourth degree laceration’’ and a ‘‘severe

tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin/muscle, and anal sphincter,’’ separately. In sum, if the jury had believed that a forth degree laceration was a

different injury from a severe tear, it could have answered ‘‘yes’’ to the

interrogatory if indeed it determined that the plaintiff had sustained such

an injury during labor. Moreover, the evidence could not have supported

reasonably a jury’s conclusion that the plaintiff sustained a lesser laceration,

such as a third degree laceration, during labor, as the record contains no

evidence in support of such a finding. See Carrano v. Yale-New Haven

Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 656, 904 A.2d 149 (2006) (‘‘[g]enerally, the plaintiff

must present expert testimony in support of a medical malpractice claim

because the requirements for proper medical diagnosis and treatment are

not within the common knowledge of laypersons’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]).

13 We realize that counsel’s statements are not evidence, though it is

illustrative and provides useful insight into the plaintiff’s theory of the case

at trial, as opposed to what she now argues on appeal.

14 The defendant argues that the court ‘‘correctly instructed the jury to

consider both parts of the first interrogatory together.’’ It appears, however,

that the defendant misunderstands the court’s answer to the jury’s question.

The interrogatory asked the jury to determine whether the plaintiff had

sustained a ‘‘fourth degree laceration and/or a severe tear of [the] vaginal

tissue . . . perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The jury asked the court whether ‘‘the injury stated after and/

or [should be] evaluated as a whole or should they be evaluated separately?’’

(Emphasis added.) The court answered: ‘‘The injury stated after and/or . . .

should be evaluated as a whole . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In sum, the court

was not instructing the jury that a fourth degree laceration and a severe

tear should be read as one injury, but instead that a ‘‘severe tear of the

vaginal tissue, perineal skin and muscle, and anal sphincter’’ should be read

as one injury. Though the court opined, outside of the presence of the jury,

that a fourth degree laceration and severe tear, as listed in the interrogatory,

were the same injury, it did not instruct the jury to read the interrogatory

as such. The jury was free to determine separately, by virtue of the use of
‘‘and/or,’’ whether the plaintiff sustained a fourth degree laceration, or

whether she sustained a severe tear of the vaginal tissue, perineal skin and

muscle, and anal sphincter. See also footnote 11 of this opinion.

15 A court’s decision, sua sponte, to submit a narrowing interrogatory to

the jury carries some risks. It is not our role, on review, however, to substitute

our judgment for the court’s reasonable exercise of discretion.