IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 34

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Cori Jean Willard, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20210203

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable David E. Reich, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Dennis H. Ingold, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and 

appellee.

Richard E. Edinger, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 18, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Willard

No. 20210203

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Cori Jean Willard appeals from a criminal judgment entered after she 

conditionally pleaded guilty to five drug-related offenses. She argues the 

district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the arresting 

officer had no legal basis to stop her and the officer’s mistake of law was not 

objectively reasonable. We affirm. 

I

[¶2] In July 2020, a Bismarck Police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by 

Willard for failing to stop prior to entering the sidewalk and onto the roadway. 

At the time, Willard was exiting the parking lot of a gas station. 

[¶3] The officer smelled the odor of marijuana after he approached the vehicle 

and began speaking to Willard and her passenger. A search of the vehicle 

revealed methamphetamine, oxycodone pills, a scale, multiple cell phones, and 

thousands of dollars. Willard was charged with five drug-related offenses.

[¶4] Willard moved to suppress the evidence seized during the stop, arguing 

the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop. At the 

suppression hearing, the officer testified his sole basis for stopping Willard was 

a belief she violated N.D.C.C. § 39-10-45. That statute requires a driver 

emerging from an “alley, driveway, private road, or building within a business 

or residence district” to stop prior to driving onto a sidewalk. N.D.C.C. § 39-10-

45. The district court denied Willard’s motion, finding Willard’s exit from the 

gas station parking lot onto the roadway was an exit from a “driveway” under 

the statute. The court also found the officer’s actions were objectively 

reasonable, even if he relied on a misinterpretation of the statute.

[¶5] Willard conditionally pleaded guilty to the charges and preserved her 

right to appeal. The district court approved the conditional plea and entered 

judgment accordingly. 
2

II

[¶6] Willard argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress 

for an alleged violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. 

[¶7] The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Because automobile stops constitute seizures, “officers 

must have at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the 

law[.]” State v. Hirschkorn, 2016 ND 117, ¶ 13, 881 N.W.2d 244. “Reasonable 

suspicion exists when a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be 

justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity.” 

Id. Traffic violations, even if common or minor, provide officers with the 

suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop. Id. Additionally, an officer’s 

objectively reasonable mistake of law or fact may be the officer’s basis of 

reasonable suspicion. Id. at ¶ 14.

[¶8] This Court will affirm a district court’s decision regarding a motion to 

suppress if there is “sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting 

the district court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest 

weight of the evidence.” City of Lincoln v. Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶ 6, 962 

N.W.2d 413.

III

[¶9] Willard argues the word “driveway” in N.D.C.C. § 39-10-45 does not 

encompass a “parking lot.”

[¶10] Statutory interpretation is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal. 

Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶ 7. 

“Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the 

intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of 

the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning. 

When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, 

the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 

pursuing its spirit. . . . We presume the legislature did not intend 

an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we 
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construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the 

context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were 

enacted.”

Id. 

[¶11] Section 39-10-45, N.D.C.C., provides:

“The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, 

private road, or building within a business or residence district 

shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a 

sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across such alley, 

building entrance, road, or driveway, or in the event there is no 

sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be 

entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic 

thereon.”

[¶12] Willard argues her exit from a gas station parking lot did not constitute 

an exit from a “driveway” under the statute. Her argument focuses broadly on 

whether an entire parking lot is a “driveway.” However, the question is 

narrower—whether the portion of the parking lot from which Willard emerged 

constitutes a “driveway.”

[¶13] Chapter 39-10, N.D.C.C., does not define the term “driveway.” Therefore, 

we look to the ordinary meaning of the term. Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶ 7. 

Willard points to the dictionary’s definition of “driveway” which is “a private 

road giving access from a public way to a building on abutting grounds.” 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 382 (11th ed. 2005). The ordinary 

meaning of “driveway” has remained consistent since the term first appeared 

in section 39-10-45 in 1955. See Webster’s New International Dictionary 788 

(2d ed. 1954) (“A passageway for vehicles to the front or rear of a building.”) 

Another definition for “driveway” is “a road, especially a private one, leading 

from a street or other thoroughfare to a building, house, garage, etc.” Driveway, 

Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/driveway (last visited Jan. 

20, 2022). The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a case decided under similar law, 

provided a series of definitions for “driveway.” State v. Jones, 401 P.3d 271, 274 

(Or. Ct. App. 2017). The court concluded all the definitions shared the common 
4

idea that a “driveway” is “a private way of access that allows drivers to reach 

a private place from a public road.” Id. We agree.

[¶14] Here, the officer observed Willard’s vehicle failed to stop in the portion 

of the parking lot that allows motorists to enter and exit the gas station 

parking lot from the main road. Thus, that portion of the parking lot is a 

“driveway” and Willard’s failure to stop constituted a violation of N.D.C.C. § 

39-10-45. 

[¶15] Willard’s traffic violation provided the officer with reasonable suspicion 

necessary to justify the stop. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 

Willard’s motion to suppress. 

IV

[¶16] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the 

parties and find them to be either unnecessary to our decision or without merit. 

The district court’s criminal judgment is affirmed.

[¶17] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Gerald W. VandeWalle 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers 

Jerod E. Tufte