1

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY

OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

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C.C.D. No. 17-01

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IN RE: COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

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PROCEEDING IN REVIEW OF THE ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

J.C. No. 06-13-90009

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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

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(Filed August 14, 2017) 

Present: Judges Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Sarah Evans Barker, Edith Brown Clement, Joel 

F. Dubina, Joel M. Flaum, Thomas F. Hogan, and Kathryn H. Vratil.1

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This matter is before the Judicial Conduct and Disability Committee on a Petition for 

Review filed by Judge John R. Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Ohio.2 Judge Adams seeks review of an Order of the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit, 

attached herewith, finding Judge Adams committed misconduct under the Judicial Conduct and 

Disability Act of 1980 (“Act”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64, and the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and 

Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Rules”) (amended Sept. 17, 2015). Specifically, the Sixth 

Circuit Judicial Council found Judge Adams committed misconduct when he issued a Show 

 1 See R. 21(c) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Those 

members hearing the petition for review should serve in that capacity until final disposition of 

the petition, whether or not their term of committee membership has ended.”).

2 Judge Adams is represented by Paul J. Orfanedes and Robert Popper, of Judicial Watch, Inc.,

and Steven McCool, of Mallon & McCool.
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Cause Order to a magistrate judge on February 1, 2013, and when he refused to cooperate with 

the Special Committee investigating the Complaint against him by failing to undergo a mental 

health examination conducted by a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee. The Judicial 

Council found Judge Adams’s refusal to undergo the examination prevented the Judicial Council 

from being able to determine whether Judge Adams has a “temporary or permanent 

impairment . . . rendering [him] unable to discharge the duties of the particular judicial office.” 

R. 3(e).

Judge Adams’s Petition for Review challenges the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

conclusion that his issuance of the Show Cause Order and his refusal to undergo a mental health 

examination conducted by a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee constitute cognizable 

misconduct. In addition, Judge Adams’s Petition for Review challenges the sanctions imposed by 

the Judicial Council. For the reasons we explain, we deny in part and grant in part Judge 

Adams’s Petition for Review.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts3

1. Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order and Related Show Cause Order

Magistrate judges play an essential role in facilitating the expeditious administration of 

justice in federal courts throughout the country. In the Northern District of Ohio, seven 

magistrate judges support eleven district judges, and each magistrate judge works with multiple 

district judges. The magistrate judges hear some matters by consent of the parties, address 

discovery disputes, conduct preliminary proceedings in criminal cases and jury voir dire, and 

 3 This section includes findings from the Special Committee’s Report relied upon by the Sixth 

Circuit Judicial Council.
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hold settlement and mediation conferences, among other matters. Magistrate judges are also 

responsible for certain matters automatically referred to them under the Local Rules for the 

Northern District of Ohio. These matters—pro se petitions for habeas corpus, administrative 

cases, and petitions for review of administrative decisions—are randomly assigned to a district 

judge and then automatically referred to a random magistrate judge for completion of a Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) for submission to the assigned district judge. Among these 

automatically referred cases, which comprise a substantial portion of each magistrate judge’s 

docket, are petitions for review of social security disability determinations.

The triggering incident for the underlying Complaint and subsequent investigation in this 

matter was Judge Adams’s decision to issue a Show Cause Order to a magistrate judge within his 

district for the magistrate judge’s failure to comply with Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order in 

social security cases.

a. Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order in Social Security Cases

Judge Adams began issuing a standard scheduling order in all social security cases in 

2011. The Scheduling Order required the assigned magistrate judge to file an R&R within 270 

days of the filing of the underlying complaint. If the assigned magistrate judge could not meet 

the deadline, Judge Adams required the magistrate judge to file an interim R&R before the 

expiration of this period. Briefing by the parties in social security cases typically is not 

completed until 240 days after the filing of the underlying complaint, which left magistrate 

judges limited time to complete an R&R within Judge Adams’s 270-day deadline.

In 2012, two magistrate judges sent Judge Adams timely letters about particular cases 

explaining that they would not be able to complete the R&Rs before the 270-day deadline due to 

“other matters and responsibilities, including [their] consent docket[s] and referrals from other 
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judges.” Jud. Council Order 14 (alterations in original). Judge Adams responded, noting the 

magistrate judges had failed to provide “specific reasons” explaining their inability to meet the 

deadline and directed them to respond within seven days. Id. He added, “If you continue to assert 

that other cases have become ripe for decision at an earlier date, please provide the specifics of 

those cases, including case numbers and the dates those matters became ripe for decision.” Id.

The magistrate judges responded by letter, noting that “the timeliness of social security 

cases is dependent on the management of an entire docket.” Jud. Council Order 14. They 

explained that magistrate judges must “balance workloads in a manner that is fair to all of the 

litigants and district court judges who refer cases.” Id. at 15.

Judge Adams wrote back, arguing that the magistrate judges’ explanations contained 

“several misstatements and omissions.” Jud. Council Order 15. He wrote, “First, you begin by 

indicating that you are an ‘independent judicial officer.’ You are not. Magistrate Judges are 

subordinate judicial officers.” Id. He continued:

You take great pains to note that you work for the Court as a whole and not 

simply one Article III Judge. In so doing, you effectively establish a system in 

which you answer to no one. Your assertion that you cannot satisfy my deadline 

because of responsibilities to other Article III Judges is a response that you can 

provide to any inquiry from any Article III Judge. Instead, in matters on my 

docket, you are answerable solely to me, not the Court as a whole. The same 

would [be] true for any of my Article III colleagues.

Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original). Judge Adams’s letter disputed the magistrate 

judges’ claim that they had an obligation to manage their workloads in a manner that is fair to all 

litigants and district judges, calling it a “half-truth.” He added, “you misplace your role by 

effectively elevating yourself to equal footing with Article III Judges.” Id.

According to Judge Adams, the magistrate judges had identified no authority “for simply 

deciding the rest of [their] docket [was] sufficient reason to ignore [his] order.” Jud. Council 
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Order 15 (alterations in original). He stated that their caseloads were “far from overwhelming” 

and that social security cases “rarely raise novel legal theories.” Id. In response to the magistrate 

judges’ contention that social security cases should not take priority over other cases on their 

dockets, Judge Adams wrote, “this is not your decision” and added, “I am vested with the 

authority to put in place my own scheduling orders, and while you may disagree with them, you 

are bound by them.” He concluded that if a magistrate judge needed an extension in the future, 

he would require “case specific reasons to justify the extension, rather than vague references to 

other matters on [the magistrate judge’s] docket and [the magistrate judge’s] general 

disagreement with [Judge Adams’s] binding order.”

In response to Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order and in an effort to create uniformity, as 

urged by the court’s magistrate judges, the Northern District of Ohio adopted Local Rule 16.3.1, 

effective January 1, 2013, which directs that a magistrate judge “should issue a[n R&R] within 

two hundred and eighty-five (285) days of the filing of the answer and transcript” in a social 

security case. In response, Judge Adams modified his Scheduling Order to reflect the 285-day 

deadline, but he made the deadline mandatory, even though the text of the Rule is precatory. All 

other district judges treated the new deadline as advisory.

b. Judge Adams’s Show Cause Order for Failure to Comply with His 

Scheduling Order

On May 3, 2012, a social security case was assigned to Judge Adams and automatically 

referred under the local rules to a magistrate judge for an R&R. As this case arose prior to the 

adoption of Local Rule 16.3.1, Judge Adams issued his standard Scheduling Order, requiring the 

magistrate judge to file an R&R within 270 days of the filing of the complaint (by January 28, 

2013). Due to a clerical error, the magistrate judge’s chambers incorrectly calculated the due date 
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and therefore missed the 270-day deadline. The magistrate judge had never before missed one of 

Judge Adams’s deadlines.

On Friday, February 1, 2013, Judge Adams learned the magistrate judge had not filed the 

R&R or an interim R&R explaining the delay. Instead of exploring informal resolution, Judge 

Adams issued a Show Cause Order requiring the magistrate judge to show cause by 4:00 p.m. on 

Monday, February 4, 2013, why the magistrate judge should not be held in contempt or 

otherwise sanctioned for failing to comply with Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order. Neither Judge 

Adams nor his staff reached out to the magistrate judge to determine the cause for the delay. Nor 

did Judge Adams attempt to give notice to the magistrate judge of the Show Cause Order—and 

the imminent response deadline it imposed—other than by filing the Order on the docket.

The magistrate judge learned about the Show Cause Order on Saturday, February 2, 

2013. That same evening, the magistrate judge emailed Judge Adams to take responsibility for 

the clerical mistake. Concerned about the threat of being held in contempt, the magistrate judge 

began arranging legal representation for a potential hearing and spent the weekend completing

the R&R. Judge Adams’s law clerk called the magistrate judge on Monday, February 4, 2013, to 

tell the magistrate judge that Judge Adams accepted the magistrate judge’s explanation for 

missing the deadline. Later that day, Judge Adams issued another Order noting the clerical error 

and finding the Show Cause Order to be “satisfied.” Jud. Council Order 17.

c. Reaction of District and Magistrate Judges

The court’s district judges expressed immediate concern with regard to the effects of the 

Show Cause Order on the magistrate judge and its impact on the administration of justice within 

the court. Following a unanimous vote, the Chief Judge of the Northern District of Ohio sent a 

letter to Judge Adams stating that Judge Adams’s issuance of the Show Cause Order was 
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unwarranted and improper, and requesting that Judge Adams vacate the Show Cause Order and 

strike it from the docket. Judge Adams refused. 

Judge Adams suggested that his Show Cause Order was “precisely the message that 

needed to be sent” and lamented the “history of defiance from the Magistrate Judges” that 

required him to resort to the threat of contempt. Jud. Council Order 17. Judge Adams criticized 

the Chief Judge for failing to “discipline” the two magistrate judges, whom Judge Adams 

believed had “disrespectful[ly] and “defiant[ly]” suggested that their need to manage other cases 

was a valid reason not to comply with Judge Adams’s Scheduling Order. Id.

During the Special Committee’s investigation, testimony revealed that Judge Adams’s 

Show Cause Order placed unwarranted and undue pressure on the court’s magistrate judges. Six

judges testified that the magistrate judges give higher priority to Judge Adams’s matters as a 

result of his Show Cause Order. One magistrate judge specifically described concerns over being 

held in contempt—and, accordingly, reluctance to grant briefing extensions to parties in Judge 

Adams’s cases.

In addition to influencing the manner in which magistrate judges handle their dockets, the 

Show Cause Order has strained relationships between magistrate and district judges. One district 

judge said it “dampen[ed] the spirit of the magistrate judges” and worried that the Order “put 

them under the gun in an inappropriate way.” Another district judge expressed concern that 

magistrate judges may not trust district judges to treat them fairly in the wake of the Show Cause 

Order. Ultimately, every witness—including Judge Adams—agreed that it was inappropriate for 

Judge Adams to have issued the Show Cause Order. Pet. for Review 3 (“[Judge Adams] has 

acknowledged that he should not have issued the Show Cause Order.”).
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2. Judge Adams’s Further Obstruction of Court Administration 

Judge Adams’s issuance of the Show Cause Order was the culmination of an increasingly 

strained relationship between Judge Adams and his colleagues that began in 2008, when the 

court did not select Judge Adams’s preferred candidate for a vacant magistrate judge position in 

the Akron courthouse. Judge Adams believed his colleagues would defer to his choice of 

appointee, but the district judges ultimately selected another candidate by majority vote, in 

accordance with the procedure established in the Federal Magistrates Act. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 631(a). Since that time, Judge Adams has repeatedly expressed hostility and contempt toward 

the court’s magistrate judges, attempted to undermine his colleagues’ administration of the 

court’s business, and withdrawn from relations with his colleagues.

After the appointment of the magistrate judge in 2008, Judge Adams refused to interact 

with that judge or assign that judge any work from his docket. Despite numerous attempts by the 

magistrate judge to initiate contact with Judge Adams, Judge Adams repeatedly refused to meet 

with that judge. In addition, Judge Adams denied use of Akron’s ceremonial courtroom for that

magistrate judge’s investiture ceremony, and Judge Adams declined to attend the investiture. 

Judge Adams’s hostility has not been limited to this specific magistrate judge: he refused to meet 

with another magistrate judge appointed in 2011, instead sending a lone email explaining he 

expected “prompt decisions” in social security cases and criticizing the “work ethic” of the other 

magistrate judges. In fact, Judge Adams has rejected communications with any of the court’s 

magistrate judges since 2008, requiring that all communications go through his staff. 

In addition to his hostile treatment of the court’s magistrate judges, Judge Adams has also 

“routinely attempted to undermine his colleagues as they administer the court’s business,” 

causing the court to “devote unnecessary additional time and resources to justifying simple 
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matters that could have more easily been handled internally.” Jud. Council Order 11, 13. For 

example, in 2010, Judge Adams refused to participate in an internal meeting to request 

authorization to fill a soon-to-be vacant magistrate judge position, instead unilaterally writing a 

letter to the Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate 

Judges System, complaining that filling the position was “neither necessary, nor fiscally 

responsible.” Id. at 12. When the district court’s Chief Judge wrote to defend the court’s request, 

Judge Adams accused the Chief Judge of making demeaning personal attacks against him. In 

2011, when the court decided to purchase iPads for its judges, rather than raising his concerns 

internally, Judge Adams wrote separately to the Judicial Conference Committee on Audits and 

Administrative Office Accountability, complaining that the purchase constituted “waste and/or 

mismanagement of funds.” Id. And in 2012, Judge Adams unilaterally complained to the same 

Committee about reimbursement given to judges who traveled to attend the unveiling of a senior 

district judge’s portrait. In each of these instances, Judge Adams did not attempt to communicate

directly with his colleagues about his concerns, hindering the expeditious resolution of such 

disputes.

Overall, after the court did not select Judge Adams’s preferred candidate for the 

magistrate judge position in 2008, Judge Adams withdrew from any collegial or collaborative 

relations with his colleagues. In addition to refusing to meet with magistrate judges, Judge 

Adams stopped attending court events, including declining to attend court retreats and 

administrative meetings, and only occasionally participating by telephone. Judge Adams has also 

withdrawn from the three district court committees on which he previously served, and his 

overall participation in court governance has been limited to occasional conversations with a few 

colleagues regarding specific matters of particular interest to him. In addition, Judge Adams has 
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rebuffed his colleagues’ efforts to engage him, directing all communications through his staff 

and even refusing in one instance in 2010 to allow another district judge and his staff to enter 

Judge Adams’s chambers to introduce themselves. Judge Adams has not been receptive to his 

colleagues’ expressions of concern for him, instead suggesting they seek only to “impugn [his] 

character” as part of a “smear campaign” against him.4

B. Procedural History

On February 15, 2013, four district judges filed a Complaint of judicial misconduct 

against Judge Adams. The Complaint alleged that Judge Adams’s issuance of the Show Cause 

Order, in combination with other ongoing disruptive behavior directed at other judges in the

Northern District of Ohio, was “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); R. 3(h). Judge Adams 

responded to the Complaint with two letters to the then-Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Sixth Circuit, disputing the allegations. The then-Chief Judge disqualified herself from 

acting as chief judge in the matter, and another Circuit judge was designated in her place. See R. 

25(f).

The acting Chief Judge appointed a Special Committee on April 8, 2013. See 28 U.S.C. § 

353(a)(1); R. 11(f). The acting Chief Judge notified Judge Adams that he had appointed a 

Special Committee and provided Judge Adams with information regarding his rights during the 

investigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 353(a)(3); R. 11(f), (g)(1), 15(a)(1)(A). 

 4 The Judicial Council also determined that two incidents involving Judge Adams were 

“troubling.” Jud. Council Order 20. In one incident, there were disputed accounts regarding 

whether Judge Adams bumped a magistrate judge on a running path near the courthouse. In the 

other incident, Judge Adams reportedly blocked an intern’s car with his own when the intern 

inadvertently parked in Judge Adams’s parking space.
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Between May and August 2013, the Special Committee interviewed fourteen witnesses, 

including the four complainants, Judge Adams, and two witnesses suggested by Judge Adams. 

The Special Committee also reviewed documents obtained from the complainants, Judge Adams, 

various witnesses, and publicly available sources.

The acting Chief Judge expanded the scope of the investigation on May 27, 2014, to 

consider whether Judge Adams may be suffering from an emotional or mental disability and 

notified Judge Adams of the expansion. See R. 15(a)(1)(B). Following expansion of the 

investigation, the Special Committee retained the services of a forensic psychiatrist to provide an 

opinion regarding whether Judge Adams might have a mental or emotional disability rendering 

him unable to discharge the duties of his judicial office. The Special Committee requested that 

the forensic psychiatrist “perform the necessary evaluations of Judge Adams that would allow 

[him] to reach an opinion as to [Judge Adams’s] emotional and mental state” and to “provide a 

report of [his] findings to the [Special Committee].” Jud. Council Order 20 (alterations in 

original). To support the psychiatrist’s efforts, the Special Committee asked Judge Adams to 

provide any records available to him pertaining to any mental or emotional health treatment or 

testing he had undergone. The Special Committee also asked Judge Adams to submit to 

psychological testing by an expert in neuropsychology and neuroforensics, the results of which 

would be used by the forensic psychiatrist in conducting Judge Adams’s mental health 

examination.

Judge Adams refused to undergo the requested psychological testing or to provide the 

requested documents. The Special Committee responded to Judge Adams, explaining that his 

refusal to cooperate by submitting to the requested psychological testing might constitute 

misconduct. In light of Judge Adams’s refusal, the Special Committee’s forensic psychiatrist 
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could not render an expert opinion or diagnosis regarding Judge Adams’s mental or emotional 

state. Based on materials provided by the Special Committee, however, the Special Committee’s 

forensic psychiatrist concluded that there is “a reasonable basis for concern as to Judge 

Adams’[s] mental or emotional state. The data available so far do not suggest a mental state of 

psychotic proportions, but do suggest significant personality traits that may have contributed to 

the current concerns.” Id. at 21 (alteration in original).

The acting Chief Judge again expanded the scope of the investigation on December 9, 

2014, to include an inquiry into whether Judge Adam’s non-cooperation—by refusing to submit 

to an evaluation by the doctor selected by the Special Committee and by refusing to submit 

documents requested by the Committee—constituted misconduct. The acting Chief Judge

notified Judge Adams of the expansion of the investigation. See R. 15(a)(1)(B). Throughout the 

Special Committee’s investigation, Judge Adams continued to refuse to undergo testing by the 

Special Committee’s expert and refused to provide the records requested by the Special 

Committee.

The Special Committee held a factfinding hearing from April 20 to April 22, 2015.5

Eleven witnesses testified at the hearing. Judge Adams elected not to call any of his subpoenaed 

witnesses, but two other witnesses testified at Judge Adams’s request. In addition, the Special 

Committee received hundreds of documents into evidence, including interview transcripts and 

 5 In anticipation of a factfinding hearing, Judge Adams’s counsel worked with the Special 

Committee to draft rules for the hearing. The Special Committee provided Judge Adams with 

formal notice of the hearing and a copy of the final rules, as well as disclosed to Judge Adams all 

potential exhibits, prior recorded statements of all scheduled witnesses, and summaries of 

additional expected testimony. See R. 15(a)(1)(C). The Special Committee also granted Judge 

Adams’s request for certain witness subpoenas, although it rejected some others as unnecessary 

and overly broad. See 28 U.S.C. § 356(a); R. 15(c).
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witness statements submitted by Judge Adams. Both Judge Adams’s counsel and the Special 

Committee’s counsel offered oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing. See R. 15(d). And

both submitted post-hearing briefs and recommended actions after the hearing. Id. Judge Adams 

also submitted proposed findings of fact.

At the Special Committee’s hearing, Judge Adams sought to introduce the testimony of a 

psychiatrist who had previously conducted a mental health evaluation of Judge Adams at his 

request, but the Special Committee excluded the psychiatrist from testifying because Judge 

Adams refused to produce any of the records underlying his psychiatrist’s evaluation. The 

Special Committee’s forensic psychiatrist also did not testify at the hearing, but rather provided 

an affidavit stipulating the content of his testimony. Judge Adams filed written objections to the 

affidavit of the Special Committee’s forensic psychiatrist. Significantly, none of the evidence 

submitted at the hearing regarding Judge Adams’s mental health specifically addressed Judge 

Adams’s behavior with respect to litigants or in adjudicating cases.

The Special Committee issued its unanimous Report to the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council 

on July 10, 2015, which provided the Committee’s factual findings and conclusions on legal 

issues raised by its investigation. The Special Committee found the evidence regarding Judge 

Adams’s hostility and defensiveness toward the court’s magistrate judges, his withdrawal from 

court administration, and his colleagues’ serious concerns about his ongoing behavior suggested 

that Judge Adams may have a disability that “(1) prevents him from maintaining a professional 

relationship with his colleagues, (2) prevents him from shouldering his responsibilities as a 

member of the District Court, and (3) causes him to make unfounded and destructive attacks 

against his colleagues.” Based on its review of the evidence, the Special Committee expressed 

concern that “a reasonable person [would have] cause to question whether Judge Adams has a 
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[mental or emotional] disability” and concluded the evidence provided a “reasonable basis” to 

expand the Special Committee’s investigation.

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The Judicial Council met on September 10, 2015, and Judge Adams’s counsel presented 

oral argument contesting the findings and recommendations set forth in the Special Committee’s 

Report. See R. 20(a). The Judicial Council unanimously determined the Special Committee’s 

Report and underlying record provided an adequate basis for deciding the merits of the 

Complaint.

On February 22, 2016, the Judicial Council issued its Order, finding (1) Judge Adams’s 

issuance of the Show Cause Order constituted misconduct, R. 3(h)(1); (2) Judge Adams’s refusal 

to cooperate with the Special Committee’s request that he undergo a mental health examination 

with a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee constituted misconduct, id.; and (3) it 

could not determine whether Judge Adams has a disability based on his refusal to undergo the 

requested mental health examination, R. 3(e). The Judicial Council ordered that (1) Judge Adams 

be publicly reprimanded for his actions related to and including his February 1, 2013, issuance of 

the Show Cause Order, 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(iii); R. 20(b)(1)(D)(i); (2) Judge Adams 

undergo a mental health examination by a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee and 

submit to any treatment or counseling deemed necessary by the psychiatrist, 28 U.S.C. § 353(c); 

R. 1, 13(a), 20(c); Sixth Circuit R. 14(b); (3) no new cases be assigned to Judge Adams for two 

years and his current cases be transferred to other judges (subject to suspension by the Judicial 

Council of the Order that no new cases be assigned to Judge Adams for two years should Judge 

Adams submit to a mental health examination demonstrating he does not suffer from a disability 

rendering him unable to discharge the duties of office or if Judge Adams receives treatment after 

 6 Judge Adams submitted a written response to the Special Committee’s Report.
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the examination that remedies any disability), 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i); R. 20(b)(1)(D)(ii); (4) 

the Special Committee maintain jurisdiction for two years to ensure Judge Adams does not 

engage in additional inappropriate behavior involving magistrate judges and to order further 

remedies depending on the results of the mental health examination, 28 U.S.C. § 353(c); R. 1, 

13(a); and (5) Judge Adams voluntarily retire, waiving the ordinary length-of-service 

requirements, if he continues to refuse to undergo a mental health examination by a psychiatrist 

chosen by the Special Committee, 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(B)(ii); R. 20(b)(1)(D)(v).

DISCUSSION

We review circuit judicial council orders for errors of law, clear errors of fact, or abuse of 

discretion. R. 21(a); see also In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 747 F.3d 869, 872 (U.S. 

Jud. Conf. 2014) (finding that circuit judicial council did not abuse its discretion); In re 

Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 664 F.3d 332, 334–35 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2011) (deferring to 

findings of circuit judicial council and overturning them only if clearly erroneous). Our review 

necessarily depends on the record before us and gives deference to the circuit judicial council’s 

consideration of the special committee’s review of the evidence. See In re Memorandum of 

Decision of Judicial Conference Comm. on Judicial Conduct & Disability, 517 F.3d 563, 569 

(U.S. Jud. Conf. 2008) (“[W]e will defer to the findings of the Judicial Council and the special 

committee, and will overturn those findings only if, upon examination of the record, they are 

clearly erroneous.”).

Judge Adams challenges the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council’s findings and sanctions 

related to his issuance of and actions related to the Show Cause Order and his refusal to submit 

to a mental health examination. Judge Adams argues that his issuance of the Show Cause Order 

was not cognizable misconduct because it related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling. 
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He also argues that his refusal to undergo the mental health examination was not cognizable 

misconduct because the Special Committee did not have the authority to request that he submit 

to such an examination. Pet. for Review 1.

We conclude both misconduct findings were reasonable based on the evidence and well

within the Judicial Council’s sound discretion. Judge Adams’s issuance of and actions related to 

the Show Cause Order constituted “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a), because they disrupted the 

orderly adjudication of social security cases in the Northern District of Ohio, negatively 

impacted the magistrate judges’ ability to perform their judicial duties, and impeded

management of the court’s internal affairs. Furthermore, the Special Committee’s request that 

Judge Adams undergo a mental health examination was warranted and permissible to facilitate

the Special Committee’s investigation of the Complaint against Judge Adams because there was 

a reasonable basis to believe that such an examination was necessary. Judge Adams’s refusal to 

undergo the requested examination was a failure to cooperate with the Special Committee’s 

investigation that constituted misconduct. See R. 3(h)(1)(H) (defining misconduct to include 

“refusing, without good cause shown, to cooperate in the investigation of a complaint under 

these Rules”). 

Based on the Judicial Council’s findings of misconduct, we affirm that the Judicial 

Council’s public reprimand of Judge Adams for his issuance of and actions related to the Show 

Cause Order was a warranted and permissible remedial action to ensure the “effective and 

expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); see R.

20(b)(1)(D)(i). In addition, we affirm the Judicial Council’s Order directing Judge Adams to 

undergo a mental health examination as falling within the Judicial Council’s and the Special 
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Committee’s broad investigatory powers and discretion under the Judicial Conduct and 

Disability Act and the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, as well as 

the Judiciary’s inherent authority to regulate its affairs. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(1), 353(c), 

354(a)(1)(A); R. 13(a). The Judicial Council and the Special Committee had a reasonable basis 

to believe that such examination was warranted based on their factual findings.

Judge Adams’s refusal to submit to the requested mental health examination impeded the 

Judicial Council’s and the Special Committee’s ability to determine whether Judge Adams has a 

temporary or permanent condition that renders him unable to discharge all the duties of office, 

which necessarily includes his adjudicative duties. Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined below, 

we are unable at this time to uphold the Judicial Council’s Order that no new cases be assigned 

to Judge Adams for two years and transferring his present docket to other judges. The Judicial 

Council’s findings provide a reasonable basis for requiring a mental health examination as an 

investigatory tool to determine whether an impairment exists, but the record before us fails to

support an order removing cases from Judge Adams’s docket because the Judicial Council made 

no findings on Judge Adams’s inability to discharge his adjudicative duties. We affirm the 

Judicial Council’s Order that the Special Committee retain jurisdiction over this matter for a 

reasonable period of time, not to exceed two years, to ensure Judge Adams’s ability to discharge 

the duties of office as a federal district court judge.

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A. Judge Adams’s Actions Related to and Involving the Show Cause Order Constituted 

Cognizable Misconduct.

Judge Adams argues that “[s]anctioning [him] for issuing the February 1, 2013 Show 

Cause Order violates the merits-related bar on reviewing judicial decisions.” Pet. for Review 6 

 7 In view of the pendency of this matter before this Committee, the two-year period will be 

deemed to run from the date of this Decision and Order.
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(citing R. 3(h)(3)(A)). In addition, Judge Adams asserts that the Judicial Council’s “findings of 

fact underlying its finding of prejudice [were] clearly erroneous.” Id. at 8. We reject these 

contentions and affirm the Judicial Council’s finding of misconduct related to Judge Adams’s 

actions related to and involving the Show Cause Order.

1. Judge Adams’s Misconduct Is Not Related to the Merits of a Judicial Ruling.

A complaint “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” cannot be 

the basis for misconduct under the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii). Rule 3(h)(3)(A) similarly 

provides that “an allegation that is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural 

ruling” does not constitute cognizable misconduct. An “allegation that calls into question the 

correctness of a judge’s ruling, . . . without more, is merits-related.” Id.

The Commentary on Rule 3 explains the important rationale behind the exclusion of 

complaints related to the merits of a substantive or procedural ruling: “This exclusion preserves 

the independence of judges in the exercise of judicial power by ensuring that the complaint 

procedure is not used to collaterally attack the substance of a judge’s ruling.” This Committee 

has similarly recognized that “allowing judicial decisions to be questioned in misconduct 

proceedings would inevitably begin to affect the nature of those decisions and would raise 

serious constitutional issues regarding judicial independence under Article III of the 

Constitution.” In re Memorandum of Decision of Judicial Conference Comm. on Judicial 

Conduct & Disability, 517 F.3d 558, 561 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2008) (“Judges should render 

decisions according to their conscientiously held views of prevailing law without fear of 

provoking a misconduct investigation.”).8 For this reason, “[t]he judicial misconduct system is 

 8 See also In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir. 1982) (“To 

determine whether a judge’s rulings were so legally indefensible as to mandate intervention 
19

emphatically not a forum for disappointed litigants to continue litigation already decided on the 

merits.” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 579 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009).9

But the merits-related bar does not prevent the Judiciary from regulating conduct that is

“prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts,” 28 

U.S.C. § 351(a), when that conduct is not directly related to the merits of a decision or 

procedural ruling. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 37 F.3d 1511, 1515 (U.S. Jud. 

Conf. 1994) (“[T]he central thrust of the Act is to make judges accountable for precisely this sort 

of conduct: conduct not related to the merits of rulings that arises in the course of the 

performance of judicial duties.”). This includes actions that affect the Judiciary’s ability to 

manage and regulate itself, including conduct that impairs the ability of other judicial officers to 

perform their functions. 

Misconduct that takes place while a judge is performing judicial duties is not inherently

merits-related. For example, as noted in the Commentary on Rule 3, a misconduct complaint 

may properly challenge a judge’s motives in reaching a particular decision:

[A]n allegation — however unsupported — that a judge conspired with a 

prosecutor to make a particular ruling is not merits-related, even though it 

“relates” to a ruling in a colloquial sense. Such an allegation attacks the propriety 

of conspiring with the prosecutor and goes beyond a challenge to the correctness 

— “the merits” — of the ruling itself. An allegation that a judge ruled against the 

complainant because the complainant is a member of a particular racial or ethnic 

group, or because the judge dislikes the complainant personally, is also not 

merits-related. Such an allegation attacks the propriety of arriving at rulings with 

an illicit or improper motive. Similarly, an allegation that a judge used an 

 

would require the same type of legal analysis as is afforded on appeal. More important, in such 

cases the gravamen of the complaint is not the fitness of the judge, but the merit of his decision. 

Disciplinary procedures must not be used to correct judicial mistakes.”).

9 See also S. Rep. No. 96-362, at 8 (1979) (“It is important to point out what [the Judicial 

Conduct and Disability Act] does not mean; it is not designed to assist the disgruntled litigant 

who is unhappy with the result of a particular case.”).
20

inappropriate term to refer to a class of people is not merits-related even if the 

judge used it on the bench or in an opinion; the correctness of the judge’s rulings 

is not at stake. An allegation that a judge treated litigants or attorneys in a 

demonstrably egregious and hostile manner while on the bench is also not 

merits-related. 

Thus, judicial councils have addressed complaints alleging judicial misconduct related to a 

judicial decision where the complainant alleges the judge acted as a result of bias, prejudice, or 

dislike of a litigant or other individual. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 761 

F.3d 1097, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] merits ruling may constitute misconduct if it is influenced 

by an invidious factor or an impermissible motive.”); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct,

605 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Allegations of prejudice are the bread-and-butter of 

misconduct complaints and aren’t normally dismissed as merits related.”).

In this case, the Judicial Council found that Judge Adams’s actions related to his issuance 

of the Show Cause Order constituted “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the courts” because those actions had prejudicial effects on (1) 

the specific magistrate judge targeted; (2) the ways in which the district’s magistrate judges 

performed their work generally; and (3) the district as a whole. Jud. Council Order 28–29. In 

addition, the Judicial Council found that the Show Cause Order was motivated by 

non-merits-based considerations, taking “no position on the legality of the Show Cause Order.” 

Id. at 18 n.5. Rather, the Judicial Council based its misconduct finding on “[t]he prejudicial 

impact of the Show Cause Order on the administration of the business of the court and Judge 

Adams’s inability or refusal to recognize that harm.” Id. at 23.10

 10 Similarly, the allegations in the underlying Complaint were not related to the merits of the 

Show Cause Order: “[T]he Complaint focuses on Judge Adams’s hostile treatment of his fellow 

judicial officers and the severe damage brought about by that treatment rather than the legal 
21

The Judicial Council and the Special Committee made numerous findings regarding the 

negative impact of the Show Cause Order on the administration of the business of the Northern 

District of Ohio. Specifically, the Show Cause Order caused magistrate judges to prioritize Judge 

Adams’s cases over cases referred by other district judges. In addition, the threat of contempt 

sanctions impaired the magistrate judges’ ability to manage their dockets as independent judicial 

officers. Further, the Judicial Council concluded—based on its consideration of extensive 

evidence—that Judge Adams’s Show Cause Order was based, at least in part, on Judge Adams’s 

hostility and animus toward the magistrate judges, beginning in 2008 when the court did not 

select his preferred candidate for an open magistrate judge position. Judge Adams’s refusal to 

withdraw the Show Cause Order at the request of the Chief Judge and Judge Adams’s fellow 

district court judges further supported the Judicial Council’s conclusion. 

For these reasons, the Judicial Council’s misconduct finding regarding Judge Adams’s 

actions related to the issuance of the Show Cause Order was not based on the merits of the 

Order, but rather on the Order’s interference with the effective and expeditious administration of 

the business of the courts and Judge Adams’s motives in issuing the Order (including his 

longstanding history of hostility toward the court’s magistrate judges). The merits-related bar 

does not apply. Accordingly, Judge Adams’s conduct in issuing the Show Cause Order is within 

the proper scope of the Judicial Council’s misconduct finding. 

2. The Judicial Council’s Findings of Fact Related to the Prejudicial Effect of 

Judge Adams’s Show Cause Order Are Not Clearly Erroneous.

Judge Adams challenges as clearly erroneous the Judicial Council’s findings of fact 

regarding the prejudicial effect of his Show Cause Order. Specifically, he challenges the Judicial 

 

correctness of his [S]how [C]ause [O]rder. Whether the [S]how [C]ause [O]rder was legally 

correct or not does not affect the analysis at all.” Jud. Council Order 23 (alterations in original).
22

Council’s findings that the Show Cause Order (1) “caused the court’s magistrate judges to 

prioritize Judge Adams’[s] cases over other cases and harmed the ability of district judges to 

have their cases prioritized fairly”; (2) “eroded trust and harmed the relationships between the 

district court’s judges and the magistrate judges”; and (3) “caused prejudice because it was 

placed on the docket.” Pet. for Review 8–9. We disagree. 

Judge Adams first challenges the Judicial Council’s conclusion that the Show Cause 

Order caused the court’s magistrate judges to prioritize his cases over other cases. In support of 

this argument, Judge Adams refers to an evaluation by an internal court committee that could not 

confirm any such prioritization. But the Special Committee credited testimony from six judges—

three district judges and three magistrate judges—that the court’s magistrate judges have placed 

Judge Adams’s cases ahead of other matters on their dockets as a result of Judge Adams’s Show 

Cause Order, and that they continue to do so. One magistrate judge testified that Judge Adams’s 

Show Cause Order increased the magistrate judge’s fears about missing one of Judge Adams’s 

deadlines, explaining, “[F]rankly, to this day I place his social security R&R’s ahead of stuff that 

I don’t think they—if I were free to run my docket as I saw fit as a judicial officer, sometimes 

other things would come ahead of those.” Another magistrate judge likewise testified that the 

magistrate judge fears contempt and fears granting briefing extensions to parties in Judge 

Adams’s cases. Yet another magistrate judge testified that the magistrate judge would prioritize 

Judge Adams’s social security cases over others if necessary to meet Judge Adams’s deadline.

Judge Adams next challenges the Judicial Council’s finding that the Show Cause Order 

eroded trust and harmed relationships between the court’s magistrate and district judges, and 

cites one judge’s testimony in support of this argument. Aside from Judge Adams, all other 

witnesses unanimously testified that it was inappropriate for Judge Adams to threaten to sanction 
23

another judicial officer. One district judge expressed concern that magistrate judges may not trust 

district judges to treat them fairly in the wake of the Show Cause Order. Another district judge 

testified that the Show Cause Order “dampen[ed] the spirit of the magistrate judges” and “put 

them under the gun in an inappropriate way.” 

Finally, Judge Adams contends that the Show Cause Order could not have caused 

prejudice because social security appeals filings generally are not made public, Judge Adams 

discharged the Show Cause Order, and Judge Adams eventually placed the Show Cause Order 

under seal. Judge Adams’s objection misses the point of the Judicial Council’s finding. The 

Judicial Council’s finding of prejudice was not based on whether the Show Cause Order was 

made public. Rather, it was based on Judge Adams’s refusal to withdraw the Show Cause Order, 

despite the request of the Chief Judge and the other district court judges. The Judicial Council 

concluded this refusal demonstrated hostility and animus towards the magistrate judge involved, 

and by implication toward the other magistrate judges in the Northern District of Ohio.

11

The Judicial Council’s findings were based on its consideration of the Special 

Committee’s lengthy investigation, which included testimony from numerous witnesses, and the 

Special Committee’s assessment of the credibility of those witnesses. The Judicial Council’s 

findings with respect to the Show Cause Order are not clearly erroneous.

B. Judge Adams’s Failure to Cooperate Constituted Misconduct.

Judge Adams next argues that his refusal to undergo the mental health examination 

requested by the Special Committee does not constitute misconduct. Judge Adams contends the 

 11 Judge Adams’s statement that “perhaps my show cause [order] was precisely the message that 

needed to be sent,” Jud. Council Order 17 (alteration in original), when he was asked to strike the 

Show Cause Order from the docket lends further support to this conclusion.
24

Act and the Rules do not authorize a special committee to request a mental health examination. 

Judge Adams argues that requiring that he submit to and disclose the results of the examination 

to the Judicial Council also violates his privacy rights. We conclude, based on the Judicial 

Council’s evidentiary findings concerning Judge Adams’s actions related to his Show Cause 

Order, as well as his obstruction of the court’s internal administrative affairs, that the Special 

Committee was justified in requiring Judge Adams to undergo a mental health examination 

under the Act and the Rules, and that Judge Adams’s refusal to cooperate with the Special 

Committee’s request in this regard constituted misconduct.12

1. The Act and the Rules Authorize the Special Committee’s Request that Judge 

Adams Undergo a Mental Health Examination.

Judge Adams contends the Act and Rules do not authorize a special committee to request 

and a judicial council to order a judge who is the subject of a conduct and disability complaint to 

undergo a mental health examination. The Rules, as amended in September 2015, expressly 

authorize a special committee to “request [a subject] judge to undergo a medical or psychological 

examination.”13 R. 13(a) cmt. Judge Adams nonetheless argues that when the Special Committee 

 12 Amended Rule 3(h)(1)(H) provides that “refusing, without good cause shown, to cooperate in 

the investigation of a complaint under these Rules” constitutes cognizable misconduct.

13 The complete text of the amendment to the Commentary to Rule 13 is as follows:

Rule 13(a) includes a provision making clear that the special committee may 

choose to consult appropriate experts or other professionals if it determines that 

such a consultation is warranted. If, for example, the special committee has cause 

to believe that the subject judge may be unable to discharge all of the duties of 

office by reason of mental or physical disability, the committee could ask the 

subject judge to respond to inquiries and, if necessary, request the judge to 

undergo a medical or psychological examination. In advance of any such 

examination, the special committee may enter into an agreement with the subject 

judge as to the scope and use that may be made of the examination results. In 
25

requested that he undergo a mental health examination in 2013 and 2014, prior to this 

amendment to the Rules, the Special Committee’s authority was “not express” or was “at least 

uncertain.” Pet. for Review 12 n.6. We disagree. 

The Act and the pre-amendment Rules provided the Judicial Council with express 

authorization to conduct “any additional investigation which it consider[ed] to be necessary,” 28 

U.S.C. § 354(a)(1)(A); see also R. 20(c), and provided the Special Committee with express 

authorization to “conduct an investigation as extensive as it consider[ed] necessary,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 353(c); see also R. 13(a). In addition, the Judicial Council and the Special Committee possess 

the inherent authority to regulate the administration of the courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1).

Such authority clearly includes a request for a subject judge to undergo a mental health 

examination. 

 

addition or in the alternative, the special committee may ask to review existing 

records, including medical records.

The extent of the subject judge’s cooperation in the investigation may be taken 

into account in the consideration of the underlying complaint. If, for example, the 

subject judge impedes reasonable efforts to confirm or disconfirm the presence of 

a disability, the special committee may still consider whether the conduct alleged 

in the complaint and confirmed in the investigation constitutes disability. The 

same would be true of a complaint alleging misconduct. 

The special committee may also consider whether such a judge might be in 

violation of his or her duty to cooperate in an investigation under these Rules, a 

duty rooted not only in the Act’s definition of misconduct but also in the Code of 

Conduct for United States Judges, which emphasizes the need to maintain public 

confidence in the judiciary, see Canon 2(A) and Canon 1 cmt., and requires 

judges to “facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other 

judges and court personnel,” Canon 3(B)(1). If the special committee finds a 

breach of the duty to cooperate and believes that the breach may amount to 

misconduct under Rule 3(h)(1)(H), it should determine, under the final sentence 

of Rule 13(a), whether that possibility should be referred to the chief judge for 

consideration of action under Rule 5 or Rule 11. See also Commentary on Rule 3. 
26

The Judiciary has long been vested with the power to self-regulate the conduct and 

behavior of its judges to ensure “the effective and expeditious administration of the business of 

the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). Congress enacted legislation in 1939 creating judicial councils to 

oversee the administration of courts within each circuit, Administrative Office Act, Pub. L. No. 

76–299, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331–335), and required the

councils to “make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious 

administration of justice within [their] circuit[s].” 28 U.S.C. § 332; see also Chandler v. Judicial 

Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S 74, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that 

Congress “empower[ed] [the judicial councils] to supervise the work of the district courts, in 

order to ensure the effective and expeditious handling of their business.”). “The Councils were 

deliberately given broad responsibilities to meet . . . problems as they arose,” Chandler, 398 U.S. 

at 123 including “dealing with the business of the judiciary in its broader or institutional sense, 

such as the preventing of any stigma, disrepute, or other element of loss of public confidence 

occurring as to the Federal courts or to the administration of justice by them, from any nature of 

action by an individual judge or a person attached to the courts.” Id. at 124–25 (citing H.R. Doc. 

No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1961)). Accordingly, in creating the judicial councils, 

Congress vested in them “considerable discretion . . . to choose how to regulate court business, 

whether by formal rules, standing orders, or other means.” Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 

760 (4th Cir. 1998).

When Congress enacted the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, it upheld this 

longstanding practice of self-regulation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364; see also H.R. Rep. No. 

96-1313, at 4 (1980) (recognizing that “[i]n the context of judicial discipline and disability, it did 

not appear that there had been a showing of a serious, pervasive and recurrent problem that could 
27

not be handled by administrative proceedings within the judiciary itself.”). “[R]ather than 

creat[ing] luxurious mechanisms such as special courts and commissions—with all the trappings 

of the adversary process, including legal counsel, written transcripts, discovery and cross 

examination,” Congress “plac[ed] primary administrative responsibility within the judicial 

branch of government.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1313, at 4. And Congress vested judicial councils with 

substantial power and discretion in conducting judicial conduct and disability proceedings under 

the Act: “[T]he judicial council is not to be thought of as a passive and impartial referee; rather, 

the council can become the active gatherer of evidence and can control the objectives and nature 

of the inquiry.” Id. at 14.14

The Act therefore provides express authority to a special committee to “conduct an 

investigation as extensive as it considers necessary,” 28 U.S.C. § 353(c), and to a judicial council 

to “conduct any additional investigation which it considers to be necessary,” id. § 354(a)(1)(A). 

The Rules similarly authorize a special committee to “determine the appropriate extent and 

methods of its investigation in light of the allegations of the complaint and its preliminary 

inquiry,” R. 13(a), and a judicial council to “conduct further investigation,” R. 20(c). As one 

court aptly stated:

 14 In 2004, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study 

Committee (“Breyer Committee”) to evaluate implementation of the Act. The Breyer Committee 

established interpretive standards and issued its findings in a 2006 report. Breyer Committee 

Report, 239 F.R.D. 116 (Sept. 2006). Based on the Breyer Committee’s findings, the Committee 

on Judicial Conduct and Disability recommended to the Judicial Conference that it exercise its 

power under Section 358 of the Act to fashion standards guiding the various officers and bodies 

that exercise responsibility under the Act. Relying on this recommendation, the Judicial 

Conference promulgated national mandatory rules in 2008 governing the processing of 

complaints and strengthening of the role of the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. 

The Judiciary’s enactment of the Rules instituted significant improvements to the process and 

reflects ongoing efforts by the Judiciary to address and formulate policy enhancements regarding 

judicial conduct and discipline.
28

[T]he scant legislative history . . . suggests that Congress did not intend to restrict 

the investigatory methods a Special Committee might pursue. . . . [T]he Act 

imposes a duty upon the Committee to “conduct an investigation as extensive as it 

considers necessary.” Congress assigned and entrusted the duty and responsibility 

to committees of Federal Judges and intentionally gave them the wide latitude to 

investigate without limitation as they “consider [ ] necessary.” Consistent with the 

desire to avoid an adversarial-disciplinary procedure, an 

“inquisitorial-administrative” approach was suggested and adopted for the 

conduct of such investigation, rather than an adversarial-trial concept. [The Act] 

was therefore seen to “provide[] the special committee with broad flexibility and 

general authority to investigate the facts and allegations contained in the 

complaint.” Thus, it is for the Committee to “control the objectives and nature of 

the inquiry.” 

In re Petition to Inspect & Copy Grand Jury Materials, 576 F. Supp. 1275, 1278–79 (S.D. Fla. 

1983) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

The Judiciary’s broad investigative powers in conduct and disability proceedings are 

necessary to uphold the integrity of the judicial process. As this Committee previously 

recognized, “there are serious constitutional doubts . . . whether Congress itself or some 

non-judicial branch agency could properly administer a disciplinary system short of 

impeachment.” In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 9 F.3d 1562, 1566–67 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 

1993). “[T]hese doubts exist not because the task is inherently purely ‘judicial’—it’s not—but 

because of the potential for interference with the independence of a coordinate branch that such 

an arrangement would create.” Id. at 1567. For similar reasons, Congress rejected the creation of 

a special court, noting that “a system in which complaints against federal judges could be so 

easily pressed to a formal adversary accusatorial proceeding raised the dangers of a substantial 

chilling effect on judicial independence, as well as the danger of infliction of harm and 

disruption of the administration of justice.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1313, at 18. “The inquisitorial 

nature of a misconduct proceeding is the direct result of the Act’s adoption of a self-regulatory 

system in recognition of the need to maintain judicial independence, as opposed to a system in 
29

which misconduct complaints are adjudicated by an external tribunal.” In re Memorandum of 

Decision, 517 F.3d at 568.

It is axiomatic that the work of a lifetime appointed federal judge is demanding and 

requires the highest degree of functionality. If a judicial council or its special committee has a 

reasonable basis for concluding that a judicial colleague might suffer from a disability rendering 

him or her unable to perform the duties and responsibilities of the judicial office, the judicial 

council and its special committee necessarily possess the authority to request the subject judge 

undergo a mental health examination. In the case before us, over the course of a lengthy 

investigation, as well as direct observations of Judge Adams’s behavior in the context of his 

performance of administrative duties, the Special Committee determined that “a reasonable 

person [would have] cause to question whether Judge Adams has a [mental or emotional] 

disability.” Jud. Council Order 19 (alterations in original). On that basis, the Special Committee 

requested that Judge Adams undergo a mental health evaluation by a forensic psychiatrist 

retained by the Special Committee to allow the Committee to determine whether Judge Adams 

does, in fact, suffer from a mental or emotional disability and, if so, its nature and extent. 

The authority underlying this request by the Judicial Council and the Special Committee 

that Judge Adams undergo a mental health examination stems from the Judiciary’s inherent 

authority to regulate its affairs, 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1), including the conduct and fitness for duty 

of federal judges, and from its broad investigatory powers and decisional discretion under the 

Act and the Rules, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 353(c), 354(a)(1)(A); R. 13(a); R. 20(c). Judge Adams’s 

failure to cooperate through his repeated refusals to undergo the mental health examination 

impeded the Judicial Council’s ability to conduct a thorough and conclusive investigation. As 
30

such, it was conduct “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business 

of the courts.”15 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).

2. The Requested Mental Health Examination Does Not Violate Judge Adams’s 

Privacy Rights.

Judge Adams contends he had a good-faith basis for objecting to the mental health 

examination requested by the Special Committee on the ground that it violated his right to 

privacy. We disagree that his right to privacy was improperly infringed. The Judicial Council’s 

Order requiring Judge Adams to undergo a mental health examination and disclose the results to 

the Special Committee and the Judicial Council was reasonable under the facts of this case and 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment or any protectable right to privacy Judge Adams might 

otherwise have had.

All parties agree that Judge Adams has a valid privacy interest in his mental health. 

Indeed, the Judicial Council acknowledged that “[a] mental-health evaluation would intrude on 

this interest to a nontrivial degree.” Jud. Council Order 24. But this is not where a correct

analysis should end. “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the 

 15 The amendments to the Rules in September 2015 expressly authorizing a special committee to 

“request [a subject] judge to undergo a medical or psychological examination,” defining 

“misconduct” to include “refusing, without good cause shown, to cooperate in the investigation 

of a complaint,” and allowing a special committee to “consider whether . . . a judge [who 

impedes reasonable efforts to confirm or disconfirm the presence of a disability] might be in 

violation of his or her duty to cooperate in an investigation under these Rules” are immaterial to 

the outcome of this case. R. 3(h)(1)(H); R. 13 cmt. As previously noted, a judicial council and its 

special committee possessed the authority under the pre-amendment Rules to request such an 

examination and consider whether a refusal to comply with the request constitutes misconduct 

for failure to cooperate. The amendments to the Rules made explicit the procedures previously 

available to a judicial council and its special committee. See, e.g., R. 13 cmt. (noting a judge’s 

duty to cooperate is “rooted not only in the Act’s definition of misconduct but also in the Code of 

Conduct for United States Judges, which emphasizes the need to maintain public confidence in 

the judiciary and requires judges to ‘facilitate the performance of the administrative 

responsibilities of other judges and court personnel’”) (citations omitted).
31

constitutionality of a government search is ‘reasonableness.’” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 

515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). Determining whether a search is reasonable requires “balancing its 

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests.” Skinner v. Labor Ry. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citations

omitted). Here, balancing Judge Adams’s privacy interest against the Judiciary’s responsibility to 

litigants and the public leads us to conclude that the Judicial Council’s Order was reasonable 

based on the evidence before the Judicial Council and the Special Committee.

Despite Judge Adams’s indisputable privacy interest relating to his mental health, we 

evaluate that interest in the context of his role and responsibilities as a federal judge. Federal 

judges are subject to requirements and restrictions to which private citizens are not. For example, 

federal judges must file financial disclosure reports, see 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101–11, and must 

comply with a wide range of other ethical restrictions, see Code of Conduct for United States 

Judges. We offer these examples not to minimize the privacy interests of federal judges who are, 

of course, constitutional officers with decisional independence, but rather to illustrate that those 

privacy interests must be evaluated in light of the Judiciary’s broader obligations.

This is particularly important because a federal judge’s sound mental health is essential to 

his or her fulfillment of all judicial duties. Judges must fairly, justly, and expeditiously resolve 

the cases before them. Litigants depend on individual judges, like Judge Adams, to protect their 

interests. Public confidence in the Judiciary turns in major ways on the judges’ ability to address 

and vindicate the parties’ rights with fairness, efficiency, and sound decisionmaking. 

Here, any intrusion on Judge Adams’s privacy interests must be assessed in light of the 

medical nature, as well as the confidentiality, of the mental health examination. The requested 

examination is for the limited purpose of determining whether Judge Adams suffers from a 
32

disability that renders him unable to discharge the duties of his judicial office. Such an 

examination would not likely entail extensive, protracted psychological testing or excessively 

invasive procedures. The examination and its results would be confidential in accordance with 

the applicable provisions of the Act and Rules, see 28 U.S.C. § 360(a); R. 23(a), which prohibit 

disclosure of information related to judicial conduct and disability proceedings.16 And the 

psychiatrist selected to conduct the examination is bound by professional obligations to keep test 

results private. While Judge Adams has expressed a preference for being evaluated by an expert 

of his choosing and an opportunity to direct to some extent the nature of the examination, we 

conclude that the Special Committee and the Judicial Council appropriately exercised their 

discretion in determining that an examination by an independent expert is necessary to ensure the

accuracy and reliability of the procedures and examination results.

Judge Adams argues that the evidence before the Special Committee and the Judicial 

Council is, in any event, not sufficient to warrant so limited an intrusion as this on his privacy 

interests. Again, we disagree. The record contains evidence of Judge Adams’s demonstrated

hostility and animus toward the court’s magistrate judges, which has been ongoing for years. The 

evidence also reveals Judge Adams’s unfounded suspicion of his colleagues and obstruction of 

effective court administration with respect to magistrate judges in the Northern District of Ohio. 

 16 Although the Rules provide certain exhibits may be made public, we anticipate that such 

publication would not occur here absent extenuating circumstances. See R. 23(c) (providing 

“written decisions of a chief judge, a judicial council, or the Committee on Judicial Conduct and 

Disability, and dissenting opinions or separate statements of members of a council or the 

Committee may contain information and exhibits that the authors consider appropriate for 

inclusion, and the information and exhibits may be made public.”); R. 24 (requiring “all orders 

entered by the chief judge and judicial council, including memoranda incorporated by reference 

in those orders and any dissenting opinions or separate statements by members of the judicial 

council” to be made public “[w]hen final action has been taken on a complaint and it is no longer 

subject to review,” subject to specific exceptions).
33

The record further documents the unanimous concern evinced by the members of both the 

Special Committee and the Judicial Council that Judge Adams’s behaviors indicate that he may

be suffering from an impairment that renders him unable to discharge the duties of his judicial 

office. This evidence supports the reasonableness of their requiring him to undergo a mental 

health examination.

Judge Adams’s insufficiency arguments are unpersuasive. Though the evidence

developed in the record before us focuses on Judge Adams’s behavior in the context of his 

handling of internal administrative matters as opposed to his adjudication of cases, that evidence 

is sufficient to justify the Judicial Council’s request that Judge Adams undergo a mental health 

examination to determine if he suffers from a disability affecting his ability to fulfill his judicial 

function. The Special Committee and the Judicial Council need not specifically identify a

particular mental disability afflicting Judge Adams before directing an appropriate examination. 

The Special Committee and the Judicial Council sufficiently documented their observations and 

findings on Judge Adams’s behavior and the concerns justifying the required mental health 

examination.

Without minimizing the importance of Judge Adams’s privacy interests, this

Committee’s endorsement of the Judicial Council’s Order does not exceed the boundaries of our 

legitimate interest in ensuring Judge Adams’s ability to appropriately discharge his duties. Based 

on the facts before us, we conclude that the evidence of Judge Adams’s improper issuance of the 

Show Cause Order, as well as his behavior affecting “the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the courts,” is sufficient to justify the reasonable requirement 

that he undergo a mental health examination. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); R. 3(h)(1). Judge Adams’s 
34

objections to this procedure do not overcome its reasonableness or justify his failure to cooperate 

with the investigation.

C. The Judicial Council’s Sanctions

Judge Adams challenges the sanctions imposed by the Judicial Council. We address each 

sanction in turn.

1. Public Reprimand

Judge Adams first argues that the Judicial Council’s public reprimand of him based on

his issuance of the Show Cause Order is “excessive, potentially harmful, and an abuse of 

discretion.” Pet. for Review 23. We disagree, and affirm the public reprimand as to Judge 

Adams’s actions related to and involving the Show Cause Order.

The Act and the Rules vest significant discretion in a judicial council investigating and 

resolving a conduct and disability complaint, including through public censure or reprimand. See 

28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Rules similarly provide that a judicial council may publicly 

censure or reprimand a subject judge “to ensure the effective and expeditious administration of 

the business of the courts.” R. 20(b)(1)(D)(i).17

Our Committee “generally defer[s] to a judicial council’s judgment with respect to an 

appropriate sanction so long as the council has fully considered all the relevant options.”18 In re 

 17 The list of sanctions provided in the Rules is not exhaustive. See R. 20(b)(1)(D); see also R. 20 

cmt. (“Rule 20(b)(1)(D) recites the remedial actions enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2) while 

making clear that this list is not exhaustive.”).

18 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 618–19 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 

2014) (upholding public reprimand for subject judge’s use of court email account to forward 

race-related joke concerning the President and his mother and hundreds of other inappropriate 

electronic messages); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 664 F.3d at 339–40 (upholding 

public reprimand for subject judge’s membership in organization that practiced invidious 

race- and sex-based discrimination where subject judge announced his forthcoming retirement 
35

Memorandum of Decision, 517 F.3d at 569. Here, the Judicial Council concluded that the Show 

Cause Order prejudiced the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts 

by interfering with the orderly adjudication of social security cases. The Show Cause Order 

caused magistrate judges to prioritize Judge Adams’s cases notwithstanding the merits of the 

case or the workloads of the magistrate judges. Moreover, the Show Cause Order was part of an 

ongoing, longstanding pattern of hostility and antagonism by Judge Adams towards magistrate 

judges. A public reprimand was an appropriate sanction. 

2. Mental Health Examination

Judge Adams also argues that the Judicial Council’s request that he undergo a mental 

health examination was “unlawful” because the Judicial Council lacked the authority to make 

such a request and was “unwarranted” in his particular case. Pet. for Review 24. Judge Adams

further contends that the Judicial Council’s directive violates his privacy rights under the Fourth 

Amendment. Again, we disagree, and affirm the Judicial Council’s and the Special Committee’s 

authority to request such an examination under these circumstances.

Based on the findings regarding Judge Adams’s conduct in the context of the court’s

internal administrative matters, the Judicial Council determined that “[s]ufficient evidence exists 

to merit further investigation into whether Judge Adams suffers from a mental or emotional 

disability that renders him unable to discharge the duties of his office.” Jud. Council Order 29. 

These findings were based on evidence that Judge Adams treated his magistrate judge colleagues 

with hostility and suspicion, withdrew from court governance, and undermined internal court 

 

and where the decision represented the first enforcement of Canon 2C of the Code of Conduct 

for U.S. Judges); In re Memorandum of Decision, 517 F.3d at 569 (upholding public reprimand 

for subject judge’s inaccurate and misleading responses to Judicial Council and Special 

Committee, and for taking action in litigation based on personal knowledge and information 

received ex parte).
36

operations. We note in particular that the forensic psychiatrist consulted by the Special 

Committee was able to determine, even on the basis of the limited information made available to

him, that there was “a reasonable basis for concern as to Judge Adams’[s] mental or emotional 

state.” Id. at 21 (alteration in original). The Judicial Council’s request for the mental examination 

was both reasonable and warranted. We share the Judicial Council’s view that input from an 

independent medical expert is necessary to fully and fairly assess Judge Adams’s mental 

condition and fitness to continue to serve as a judge.

Judge Adams’s objections are unpersuasive. As previously discussed, the Act and the 

Rules authorize a special committee to request a mental health examination in appropriate 

circumstances. The Judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that judges are fully capable of 

discharging the important duties entrusted to them. The evidence on which the Judicial Council 

and the Special Committee relied in reaching their unanimous decisions warrants our affirmance. 

We find no error in their determination that Judge Adams should be required to undergo a mental 

health examination.

3. Two-Year Ban on New Cases and Reassignment of Current Cases

Judge Adams challenges the Judicial Council’s Order suspending the assignment of new 

cases to him for two years and transferring his current cases as “unwarranted, extraordinarily 

harsh, and grossly disproportionate” and “an abuse of discretion.” Pet. for Review 28. We noted 

previously the lack of evidence in the record before us of Judge Adams’s inability to adjudicate 

cases or his inability to perform the adjudicative duties of his office. Without such evidence, we 

cannot affirm these sanctions at this time.

The Complaint against Judge Adams relates to the Show Cause Order and to his 

interference with the internal functioning of the court. As discussed, Judge Adams’s actions 
37

related to and involving the Show Cause Order and his pattern of antagonism toward the court’s 

magistrate judges prejudiced the effective and expeditious administration of the courts and thus

constituted misconduct. The evidence on which the Judicial Council’s findings were based was 

sufficient to warrant further investigation into his mental condition. Judge Adams’s failure to 

cooperate with the Judicial Council and the Special Committee’s investigation to determine 

whether he suffers from such a disability by refusing to voluntarily undergo a mental health 

examination impeded the ability of the Northern District of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Judicial 

Council, and the Judiciary generally to meet their responsibilities in monitoring judicial conduct.

The Judicial Council’s findings were limited to Judge Adams’s conduct in the context of 

the court’s internal administrative responsibilities, including his demonstrated hostility toward 

the court’s magistrate judges and his obstruction of internal court governance procedures. The 

Judicial Council did not address or make specific findings with regard to Judge Adams’s 

capability of discharging his adjudicative responsibilities. The Judicial Council’s ability to make 

such a determination was impeded by Judge Adams’s refusal to submit to a mental health 

examination. But curtailment of Judge Adams’s docket is not supported by the record as it exists 

at this time given the lack of evidence related to Judge Adams’s ability to discharge his 

adjudicative duties. We cannot rule out the appropriateness of such a sanction should sufficient 

evidence establish Judge Adams’s incapacity, but we cannot base a sanction on the assumption 

his behavior in connection with court administrative matters would likewise adversely affect his 

adjudicative responsibilities.

4. Retention of Jurisdiction

Finally, Judge Adams challenges the Judicial Council’s Order that “[t]he Special 

Investigating Committee shall maintain jurisdiction for two years to ensure that Judge Adams 
38

does not engage in additional inappropriate behavior involving magistrate judges, whether in his 

official functions or otherwise.” Jud. Council Order 29. We affirm the Judicial Council’s Order 

retaining jurisdiction over this matter for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed two years, to 

ensure Judge Adams is fully capable of discharging the duties of the judicial office.

Following a finding of misconduct or disability, a judicial council is empowered to take

any necessary “remedial action to ensure the effective and expeditious administration of the 

business of the courts.” R. 20(b)(1)(D). Here, having affirmed the Judicial Council’s finding of 

misconduct based on Judge Adams’s refusal to cooperate with the Special Committee’s request 

that he undergo a mental health examination with a psychiatrist selected by the Special 

Committee, and concurring in the reasonableness and necessity of the Judicial Council’s Order 

that Judge Adams submit to such an examination, we also support the retention of jurisdiction by 

the Special Committee for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed two years, to ensure Judge 

Adams’s ability to discharge the duties of office as a federal district court judge. This will allow 

the Special Committee to conduct whatever further investigation is deemed necessary and 

appropriate to determine Judge Adams’s ability to discharge his judicial duties.

19

D. Future Actions

In this matter of first impression under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and the 

Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, we reject Judge Adams’s 

constitutional and statutory challenges to the Judicial Council’s finding that he committed 

 19 The Judicial Council’s implementation of our Decision, including the requirement that Judge 

Adams undergo a mental health examination and any other investigation deemed necessary and 

appropriate to determine Judge Adams’s ability to discharge his judicial duties, does not 

constitute an expansion of the Special Committee’s investigation under Rule 13(a) and Rule 

15(a)(1)(B) absent the discovery of evidence demonstrating that Judge Adams “may have 

engaged in misconduct or has a disability that is beyond the scope of the complaint,” as 

expanded on May 27 and December 9, 2014.
39

misconduct and directing him to undergo a mental health examination. For the reasons discussed, 

the Act and the Rules authorized the Special Committee’s request that Judge Adams submit to 

such an examination, the Special Committee was justified in making the request based on its

findings concerning Judge Adams’s behavior, and Judge Adams’s objections to the examination 

do not justify his failure to cooperate in the investigation.

Having rejected Judge Adams’s objections, we anticipate that Judge Adams will 

expeditiously comply with the Judicial Council’s Order, as affirmed by this Committee, that he 

submit to a mental health examination by a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee. This 

examination should seek evidence as to whether Judge Adams is able to discharge the duties of a 

federal district court judge, which necessarily includes his adjudicative duties. Once the 

examination is completed, the Judicial Council should consider the results, along with any 

records or other examination results submitted by Judge Adams, to determine whether additional 

action by the Judicial Council is appropriate. In addition to its consideration of any examination 

results, the Special Committee may conduct further investigation into Judge Adams’s conduct on 

the bench, including interviews with litigants, lawyers, and court staff, as part of its investigation 

into Judge Adams’s ability to discharge his adjudicative duties as a federal district court judge. 

As we have noted, failure to cooperate with an investigation under the Act and the Rules 

is cognizable misconduct. His objections having now been ruled on and having been rejected by 

this Committee, should Judge Adams refuse to submit to the mental health examination ordered 

by the Judicial Council and affirmed by this Committee, sanctions for Judge Adams’s continued 

failure to cooperate—including the prohibition of the assignment of new cases on a temporary 

basis for a time certain—may be warranted subject to the Judicial Council’s sound discretion. 28 

U.S.C. § 354(a)(2); R. 20(b)(1)(D).
40

CONCLUSION

For the above explicated reasons, we deny in part and grant in part Judge Adams’s 

Petition for Review. We affirm the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council’s finding that Judge Adams’s 

actions related to and involving the Show Cause Order, as well as his actions to impede the 

court’s oversight of other internal administrative matters, constituted misconduct and the Judicial 

Council’s public reprimand of Judge Adams for this conduct. We also affirm the Judicial 

Council’s finding that Judge Adams’s refusal to cooperate with the Special Committee’s request 

that he undergo a mental health examination by a psychiatrist selected by the Special Committee 

constituted misconduct.

We conclude that the Judicial Council and the Special Committee had a reasonable basis 

for requesting that Judge Adams undergo a mental health examination, and in so deciding, acted 

within their lawful discretion. Thus, we affirm the Judicial Council’s Order directing that Judge 

Adams undergo such an examination and any necessary treatment that may be prescribed. 

Because the Judicial Council did not include in its Order any specific findings regarding whether 

Judge Adams’s conduct has adversely affected his ability to discharge the adjudicative duties of

his office, we vacate the portion of the Judicial Council’s Order that prohibits the assignment of

new cases to Judge Adams for two years and transfers Judge Adams’s current cases to other 

judges. We affirm the Judicial Council’s Order that the Special Committee retain jurisdiction for 

a reasonable period of time, not to exceed two years, to ensure Judge Adams’s ability to 

discharge the duties of office as a federal district court judge. 

For these reasons, we deny in part and grant in part Judge Adams’s Petition for Review.
RECEIVED 

FEB 2 2 2016 

OFFICE OF THE 

CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE No. 06-13-90009 

JUDICIAL COUNCIL 

OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM 

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Circuit Judge; BOGGS, BATCHELDER, GIBBONS, ROGERS, 

GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges; 

ROSEN, MCKINLEY, CALDWELL, VARLAN, BREEN, JONKER, and 

SHARP, Chief District Judges. 1 

Four complainants filed a Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against Judge John R. 

Adams of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The Complaint 

alleges that Judge Adams committed misconduct by issuing a Show Cause Order to a magistrate 

judge on February 1, 2013. A Special Investigating Committee ("SIC") was formed to review 

the Complaint. During the course of this review, other facts came to light that led to an 

expansion of the investigation. The investigation was first expanded to determine whether Judge 

Adams suffers from a mental or emotional disability that renders him unable to discharge the 

duties of his office. The investigation was later expanded to determine whether Judge Adams 

1 Julia S. Gibbons and Bernice B. Donald, Circuit Judges, and Karen K. Caldwell, Chief District 

Judge, were excused from participating in the Council's September 10, 2015, meeting to 

consider this matter. They have, however, reviewed the written record and concur in this Order 

and Memorandum. Edmund A. Sargus, Chief District Judge, recused himself from this matter. 

Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief District Judge, participated in deliberations but did not vote on the 

disposition. 
No. 06-13-90009 

In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 

committed misconduct by refusing to cooperate with the SIC's investigation into his mental and 

emotional health. 

The SIC prepared a detailed and thorough Report of its investigation. After reviewing 

the Report and Judge Adams's response, the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit concludes that 

Judge Adams committed misconduct through both his issuance of the Show Cause Order and his 

refusal to cooperate with the investigation. The Council is unable to determine whether Judge 

Adams suffers from a mental or emotional disability. 

This Order and Memorandum first describes the initiation of these proceedings and the 

steps taken by the SIC in its investigation. Next, it summarizes the factual findings and legal 

conclusions contained in the SIC's Report. Finally, it provides the Council's findings and 

remedial actions. 

I. The Investigation 

On Friday, February 1, 2013, Judge Adams issued a Show Cause Order requiring one of 

the district's magistrate judges to show cause by 4:00 p.m. on February 4, 2013, the following 

Monday, why he should not be held in contempt or otherwise sanctioned for failing to comply 

with Judge Adams's scheduling order in a Social Security case. Although Judge Adams 

ultimately did not hold the magistrate judge in contempt, Judge Adams also refused to vacate the 

Show Cause Order or strike it from the docket despite a unanimous request from the other judges 

of the district who were concerned with its effects on the magistrate judge and the administration 

of justice in the district. 

On February 15, 2013, four complainants-all district judges-filed a Complaint of 

Judicial Misconduct. The Complaint alleges that Judge Adams's issuance of the Show Cause 

Order, in combination with other ongoing disruptive behavior directed at the judges of the 

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district, constituted "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the 

business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 351; Rule 3(h). 2 Judge Adams responded to the Complaint 

with two letters to then-Chief Circuit Judge Batchelder in which he denied the allegations, 

argued that his actions were lawful, and accused the complainants of conducting a "smear 

campaign." Judge Batchelder recused herself from acting as chief judge in the matter, and Judge 

Boggs was designated to act in her stead. See Rule 25(f). 

On April 8, 2013, after reviewing the Complaint, Judge Boggs activated the Council's 

SIC to investigate the matter. 3 28 U.S.C. § 353(a); Rule ll(f). Judge Boggs notified Judge 

Adams of the activation of the SIC and provided him with information regarding his rights in the 

investigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 353(a)(3); Rules 1 l(g)(l), 15(a)(l)(A). 

Judge Boggs twice expanded the scope of the investigation in response to requests from 

the SIC. See Rule 13(a). On May 27, 2014, Judge Boggs directed the SIC to investigate 

potential mental and emotional disabilities from which Judge Adams might be suffering. See 

Rule 3(e). On December 9, 2014, Judge Boggs directed the SIC to investigate whether Judge 

Adams's non-cooperation with the SIC's investigation into his potential disability itself 

constituted misconduct. See Rule 3(h). Judge Adams was notified of each of these expansions. 

Rule 15(a)(l)(B). 

2 Throughout this Order and Memorandum, the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and JudicialDisability Proceedings will be cited simply as "Rule." The Sixth Circuit has promulgated 

additional Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, which will be cited 

as "Sixth Circuit Rule." 

3 Members of the SIC are District Judge Curtis L. Collier, Chair; Circuit Judges Danny J. Boggs, 

Eric L. Clay, and John M. Rogers; and District Judges Paul L. Maloney and Thomas B. Russell. 

See Rule 12; Sixth Circuit Rule 9. The SIC retained the law firm of Robbins, Russell, Englert, 

Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP to assist in the investigation and resolution of this matter. See 

Rule 13(c). 

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Accordingly, the SIC investigated three ultimate issues ansmg from the complaint: 

misconduct from issuing the Show Cause Order, potential disability, and misconduct from noncooperation. In carrying out its investigation, the SIC interviewed fourteen witnesses from May 

2013 to August 2013. Among those interviewed were the four complainants and Judge Adams. 

Two of the witnesses were interviewed specifically at Judge Adams's request. See Rule 

15(a)(2). The SIC also reviewed documents obtained from the complainants, Judge Adams, the 

various witnesses, and publicly available sources. After the investigation was expanded in May 

2014 to consider Judge Adams's mental and emotional health, the SIC retained the services of a 

forensic psychiatrist for the purpose of providing an opinion as to whether Judge Adams might 

be suffering from a mental or emotional disability. 

Judge Adams twice requested the transfer of this matter to the judicial council of another 

circuit, first in March 2015, and again in April 2015. Rule 26. Chief Judge Cole denied both 

requests, finding that this matter presented no "exceptional circumstances" that warranted 

transferring the proceeding. 

Following the initial evidence-gathering period, the SIC held a fact-finding hearing from 

April 20 to 22, 2015. See Rule 14. Judge Adams's counsel worked with the SIC to draft special 

rules for the hearing. Judge Adams was provided formal notice of the hearing and a copy of the 

final rules in February 2015. In the weeks before the hearing, the SIC disclosed to Judge Adams 

all potential exhibits and the prior recorded statements of all witnesses to be called at the hearing, 

as well as summaries of additional expected testimony for all witnesses expected to testify. Rule 

15(a)(l)(C). Judge Adams made similar disclosures. The SIC also granted Judge Adams's 

request for certain witness subpoenas, although it rejected some others as unnecessary and overly 

broad. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(l), 356; Rule 15(c). 

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In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 

Eleven witnesses testified at the hearing. Judge Adams ultimately elected not to call any 

of his subpoenaed witnesses at the hearing, but two of the witnesses who testified were called by 

the SIC at Judge Adams's request. All witnesses were subject to examination by the SIC's 

counsel, Judge Adams's counsel, and members of the SIC. Rules 14, 15(c), 15(f). The SIC also 

received hundreds of documents into evidence, including interview transcripts and witness 

statements submitted by Judge Adams. Judge Adams sought to introduce the testimony of a 

psychiatrist who apparently had recently conducted a mental-health evaluation of him. But 

because Judge Adams refused to produce any of the records underlying his psychiatrist's 

evaluation, the SIC excluded Judge Adams's psychiatrist from testifying. The SIC's forensic 

psychiatrist also did not testify at the hearing; instead, the parties agreed to have the SIC's 

forensic psychiatrist provide an affidavit stipulating as to the content of his testimony, and for 

Judge Adams to make written objections to that stipulated testimony. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the SIC's counsel and Judge Adams's counsel offered oral argument. Rule 15(d). Both 

the SIC and Judge Adams submitted post-hearing briefs and recommended actions. Id. Judge 

Adams also submitted proposed findings of fact. 

Throughout the investigation, the SIC also negotiated with Judge Adams and his counsel 

in an attempt to reach a mutually agreeable conciliation plan that would resolve the Complaint 

without requiring action by the Judicial Council. The discussions began in the fall of 2013 and 

continued through the winter of 2015. While some progress was made early on, the negotiations 

were ultimately unsuccessful. 

On July 10, 2015, the SIC issued its unanimous Report to the Council. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 353( c ); Rule 17. Judge Adams was provided with a copy of the Report. Rule 15(b ). The 

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Report related the factual findings of the SIC's investigation and its conclusions on legal issues 

raised by the investigation. 

Based on this evidence and analysis, the Report made findings on the three ultimate 

issues raised by the Complaint, as expanded in scope. The Report recommended that the 

Council take certain "necessary and appropriate action" to resolve this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 

353( c ); Rule 20(b )(1 )(D). 

On September 10, 2015, the Council conducted a meeting to consider the Complaint. 

Prior to the meeting, Judge Adams submitted a written response to the Report to the Council. 

Rule 20(a). At the meeting, Judge Adams's counsel presented oral argument contesting the 

findings and recommendations set forth in the Report. Id. 

II. Factual Findings of the Special Investigating Committee 

The SIC's Report contains detailed factual findings drawn from its fact-gathering 

process. Those factual findings are summarized below and are reorganized for the sake of 

brevity. First, this Order and Memorandum describes the Report's findings regarding Judge 

Adams' s withdrawal from the court starting in 2008, his mistreatment of other judges on the 

court, and his attempts to undermine the administration of court business. Second, this Order 

and Memorandum summarizes the Report's findings regarding the circumstances surrounding 

the Show Cause Order. Finally, this Order and Memorandum summarizes the SIC's findings 

with respect to Judge Adams's refusal to cooperate in the SIC's investigation into his mental and 

emotional health. 

To reach these factual findings, the SIC had to resolve issues of credibility when 

conflicting testimony or evidence appeared in the record. Those credibility determinations are 

addressed below where relevant to explaining the Report's factual findings. 

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A. Withdrawal from the Court, Mistreatment of Colleagues, and Undermining the 

Administration of Court Business 

Judge Adams was confirmed to the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Ohio in 2003. His chambers are located in Akron, Ohio. By all accounts, from 2003 to 2008 

he was a collegial and involved member of the court, participating in court governance and 

socializing with his colleagues. 

In 2008, however, Judge Adams's behavior changed sharply. The catalyst for this change 

seems to have been the selection of a new magistrate judge who would reside in the Akron 

courthouse. Judge Adams preferred one candidate for the position and believed that the other 

district judges would defer to his choice because he was the most-senior active judge in Akron. 

The district judges ultimately preferred another candidate, though, and selected that candidate by 

majority vote. From then on, Judge Adams ceased interacting collegially with other members of 

the court and ceased virtually all involvement in court administrative matters. 

1. Refusal to Interact with Other District Judges 

Judge Adams has ceased all social interactions with members of the court aside from one 

judge with whom he apparently maintains friendly relations. Further amplifying his 

reclusiveness, Judge Adams has generally forbidden his staff from interacting with others in the 

courthouse. 

Judge Adams has rebuffed his colleagues' efforts to engage him. For example, when one 

district judge greeted Judge Adams at an event for federal judges in Washington, D.C., in 2010, 

Judge Adams ignored his colleague and walked away. Although Judge Adams claims he merely 

did not see the judge, the SIC found this explanation not credible. 

Also in 2010, Judge Adams refused to allow another district judge and his staff-who 

were visiting from out of town-to even enter his chambers to introduce themselves. The 

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In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 

visiting judge had sent Judge Adams an email advising him of the visit and asking if he might 

stop by so that his staff could meet Judge Adams's staff. Instead of accepting this social nicety, 

Judge Adams sent a harsh email to the visiting judge, telling him, "Bluntly-----your [sic] not 

welcome in my chambers. Please do not knock on my door to avoid the embarrassment of being 

turned away. Lastly please spare me the condescending lecture on collegiality etc." 

2. Mistreatment of Magistrate Judges 

Judge Adams has repeatedly expressed a general hostility towards and contempt for the 

court's magistrate judges. The Show Cause Order, which is discussed in detail in Section II.B.2 

below, is only the most glaring example of Judge Adams's hostility toward all magistrate judges. 

After the appointment of Akron's new magistrate judge in 2008, Judge Adams refused to 

interact with that judge or assign that judge any work from his docket. Despite numerous 

attempts by the magistrate judge to initiate contact, Judge Adams refused to meet. Judge Adams 

also refused to allow the magistrate judge to use Akron's ceremonial courtroom for the judge's 

investiture ceremony, instead relegating the judge to a smaller courtroom. Judge Adams was the 

only member of the court who did not attend the magistrate judge's investiture ceremony. 

Judge Adams has been generally unwilling to communicate with any of the court's 

magistrate judges since 2008. Instead, he requires that all communications go through his staff. 

Several magistrate judges noted that this inability to contact Judge Adams directly, and Judge 

Adams's hostility to those magistrate judges who do try to contact him, have negatively 

impacted their ability to work on his cases. 

When another magistrate judge was selected to serve in Akron in 2011, Judge Adams 

flatly refused the magistrate judge's invitation to meet. Instead, he sent the judge a terse email 

explaining that he typically does not refer work from his cases to magistrate judges. With 

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respect to Social Security cases-which by local rule are automatically referred to magistrate 

judges-he stated that, "[g]iven the magistrates extremely limited caseloads," he "expect[ ed] 

prompt decisions." Judge Adams concluded with a parting shot at the magistrate judges: 

"[H]opefully your work ethic will exceed that of your predecessors here in Akron as well as that 

of the remaining magistrates in the District." To date, this has been Judge Adams's only direct 

communication with this magistrate judge, despite sharing a courthouse. 

Judge Adams has described the Northern District of Ohio's magistrate judges as having 

"meager" caseloads and has criticized other district judges for allowing Social Security cases to 

"languish[]" on magistrate judges' dockets. In correspondence to another district judge, he 

asked, "[t]o whom do these Magistrates answer for their performance? Do you or any of your 

colleagues provide any oversight?" 

As described in more detail in Section 11.B.1 below, Judge Adams's hostility toward the 

magistrate judges boiled over in 2012 during a dispute regarding his scheduling order for Social 

Security cases. In that instance, two magistrate judges wrote Judge Adams letters explaining 

why their need to balance work on all the cases on their dockets meant that they would require 

extensions on Judge Adams' s deadline in particular cases. In response, Judge Adams voiced his 

opinion that magistrate judges, as Article I judges, do not deserve the same autonomy to manage 

their workloads as Article III judges. Judge Adams later criticized the district's chief judge for 

failing to "discipline" these two magistrate judges for what he viewed as the "disrespectful" and 

"defiant" attitudes expressed in their letters. 

3. Withdrawal from Court Governance 

Since the 2008 magistrate judge selection, Judge Adams has also refused to participate in 

any court administration or governance. Judge Adams withdrew from the three court committees 

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on which he served. Judge Adams has not attended a regular judges' meeting or committee 

meeting since then. 

Only a few times since 2008 has Judge Adams participated in court governance matters. 

During a 2011 judges' meeting to select a candidate to fill the open magistrate position in Akron, 

Judge Adams appeared by telephone. But when Judge Adams's tum to speak came he declined 

the invitation, stated that he did not think his views would make much difference, and then hung 

up. In 2012, when the court was considering adopting a new rule regarding the processing of 

Social Security cases ( explained in more detail in Section 11.B. l below), Judge Adams 

communicated his views on the issue via a written letter rather than attend the meeting. 4 

Despite this general withdrawal, in 2009 Judge Adams voiced his objection to the chief 

judge's selection of another judge to chair the Akron courthouse security committee, even 

though Judge Adams was more senior. When the chief judge responded to Judge Adams's 

concerns by asking the rest of the court to notify him of any opposition to the appointment, 

nobody responded. 

Over the years, other judges have suggested to Judge Adams that he should participate in 

court governance and join one of the court's administrative committees. Judge Adams has 

refused or ignored these suggestions. During this investigation, Judge Adams denied that any 

judges had reached out to him, but testimony from other judges, verified by written documents, 

refutes his claims. Put simply, Judge Adams has rebuffed his colleagues' efforts to engage him 

at every tum. Judge Adams claims that his withdrawal from court governance is due to the other 

4 Judge Adams also spoke on the phone with another district judge about this issue when it was 

first raised in 2011, but refused that judge's invitation to attend a court meeting where he could 

present his views to the entire court. 

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judges "routinely ignor[ing]" or "disregard[ing]" his views, but the evidence simply shows 

normal give-and-take among judges regarding the administration of the court. 

At best, Judge Adams has occasionally interacted with a few colleagues regarding 

matters that personally interest him (particularly with respect to the scheduling of Social Security 

cases), and has served his turns in the court's "miscellaneous judge" rotation. Judge Adams has 

also argued that various other activities-such as teaching at a local law school, speaking at 

United States Sentencing Commission conferences, and sitting by designation on the Sixth 

Circuit-show that he has participated in court governance, even though all of these activities are 

external to the court. Judge Adams conceded in his testimony that it would be difficult for the 

court to function if every judge were to conduct himself as he has. 

4. Undermining the Administration of Court Business 

Instead of actively participating in court governance, Judge Adams has routinely 

attempted to undermine his colleagues as they administer the court's business. 

These attempts started immediately after the 2008 magistrate judge selection process. 

Judge Adams preferred another candidate with whom he had practiced law before becoming a 

judge. After the selection process was completed, Judge Adams's preferred candidate wrote an 

inflammatory letter to several judges, senators, and members of the House of Representatives, 

complaining about the internal workings of the court's selection process. He sent a copy of this 

letter to a reporter from the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Although Judge Adams denies it, the SIC 

concluded that Judge Adams was most likely the source of the candidate's information about the 

confidential internal workings of the magistrate judge selection process. 

In 20 I 0, the district judges met and voted to request authorization to fill a soon-to-be 

vacant magistrate judge position. Rather than participating in that meeting, Judge Adams wrote 

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directly to the Chair of the Judicial Conference's Committee on the Administration of the 

Magistrate Judges' System, complaining that filling the position was "neither necessary, nor 

fiscally responsible." When the district's chief judge wrote to defend the court's request, Judge 

Adams accused the chief judge of making demeaning personal attacks against him, distorting the 

facts, and generally depriving Judge Adams of "the rights and privileges due to a District Court 

Judge." Judge Adams further argued that this was "a reflection of how [the chief judge] has 

conducted himself during his tenure as Chief Judge of this District." 

The documents and witnesses, however, do not support Judge Adams's description of the 

chief judge's actions. In his interview with the SIC, Judge Adams was unable either to identify 

any falsehoods in the chief judge's letter or to explain coherently why he felt the chief judge had 

been hostile towards him. The only concrete incident Judge Adams could identify was his not 

being appointed to the security committee for the Akron courthouse in 2009. Judge Adams 

suggested in his testimony that his reference to "rights and privileges due to a District Court 

Judge" was meant to refer generally to the other district judges not agreeing with him on court 

governance matters. But the evidence in the record merely shows that Judge Adams was on the 

losing end of several internal discussions among the district judges, not that he was intentionally 

marginalized. 

Judge Adams's practice of appealing to outside authorities to challenge court business 

decisions continued for years. When the court decided to purchase several iPads for its judges in 

2011, Judge Adams wrote the Committee on Audits and Administrative Office Accountability of 

the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, complaining that this purchase constituted 

"waste and/or mismanagement of funds." And in 2012, Judge Adams again complained to the 

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same Committee, this time about reimbursement given to judges who traveled to Toledo to 

attend the unveiling of a senior district judge's portrait. 

Judge Adams's opposition to these routine business decisions has required the court to 

devote unnecessary additional time and resources to justifying simple matters that could have 

more easily been handled internally. Judge Adams did not even give notice of the foregoing 

objections to his colleagues. In his correspondence with the Committee, Judge Adams 

questioned the motives of his colleagues in seeking approval for these business decisions. 

Various members of the court have encouraged Judge Adams to take a more active role 

in court governance in order to avoid these problems. For example, after the iPad incident, 

Judge Adams was offered a seat on the court's IT Committee, where he could address his 

concerns. Judge Adams, however, never responded to the offer, instead preferring to continue 

taking his concerns to outside authorities rather than to his colleagues on the court. 

This behavior renders the administration of business in the Northern District of Ohio less 

efficient and leaves Judge Adams's colleagues constantly apprehensive that he will challenge 

their decisions and actions. 

B. Show Cause Order 

The triggering incident for the instant investigation was Judge Adams's decision to issue 

a Show Cause Order to a magistrate judge in February 2013. Although Judge Adams's other 

behavior is useful to contextualize the Show Cause Order, the focus of the investigation has 

always been the Show Cause Order and its effects on the administration of business in the 

Northern District of Ohio. 

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1. Judge Adams's Scheduling Order 

In the Northern District of Ohio, cases seeking review of Social Security determinations 

are assigned to district judges but are then automatically referred to magistrate judges. In 2011, 

Judge Adams began issuing a standard scheduling order in all Social Security cases that required 

the magistrate judge assigned to the case to file a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") within 

270 days of the filing of the complaint. If the deadline could not be met, Judge Adams required 

an interim R&R to be filed 30 days before the expiration of this period. Other judges in the 

district found this deadline to be unreasonable, given that briefing in these cases typically is not 

completed until 240 days after the filing of the complaint. 

Judge Adams argues that the deadline is reasonable. He blames the magistrate judges for 

not being able to meet his schedule because, in many cases, they grant what he considers to be 

unwarranted extensions to the parties. 

In 2012, two magistrate judges sent Judge Adams timely letters, each about a particular 

case, explaining that "other matters and responsibilities, including [their] consent docket[s] and 

referrals from other district judges" would prevent them from completing R&Rs before the 270-

day deadline, and accordingly requested extensions. Judge Adams responded by criticizing the 

magistrate judges for failing to provide "specific reasons" why they could not meet the 270-day 

deadline. He added: "If you continue to assert that other cases have become ripe for decision at 

an earlier date, please provide the specifics of those cases, including case numbers and the dates 

those matters became ripe for decision." He directed them to respond within seven days. 

The magistrate judges responded, noting that "the timeliness of social security cases is 

dependent on the management of an entire docket." They explained that magistrate judges must 

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"balance workloads in a manner that is fair to all of the litigants and district court judges who 

refer cases." 

Judge Adams wrote back, argumg that their explanations contained "several 

misstatements and omissions." He wrote, "First, you begin by indicating that you are an 

'independent judicial officer.' You are not. Magistrate Judges are subordinate judicial officers." 

He continued: 

You take great pains to note that you work for the Court as a whole and not 

simply one Article III Judge. In so doing, you effectively establish a system in 

which you answer to no one. Your assertion that you cannot satisfy my deadline 

because of responsibilities to other Article III Judges is a response that you can 

provide to any inquiry from any Article III Judge. Instead, in matters on my 

docket, you are answerable solely to me, not the Court as a whole. The same 

would [be] true for any of my Article III colleagues. 

Judge Adams's letter further disputed the magistrate judges' claim that they had an 

obligation to manage their workloads in a manner that was fair to all litigants and district judges. 

"Again," he wrote, "you misplace your role by effectively elevating yourself to equal footing 

with Article III Judges." The magistrate judges, he wrote, had identified no authority "for simply 

deciding the rest of [their] docket [was] sufficient reason to ignore [his] order." He stated that 

their caseloads were "far from overwhelming" and that Social Security cases "rarely raise novel 

legal theories." He concluded that it is not the decision of the magistrate judges as to what cases 

should take priority on their dockets; rather, they are bound to obey his scheduling orders. 

Later in 2012, the court adopted Local Rule 16.3 .1 to respond to Judge Adams' s 

scheduling order. Local Rule 16.3.1, which became effective January 1, 2013, directs that a 

magistrate judge "should issue a[n R&R] within [285] days of the filing of the answer and 

transcript" in a Social Security case. In response, Judge Adams modified his scheduling order to 

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reflect this new deadline, but made the deadline for the R&R mandatory even though the text of 

the rule is permissive. 

2. The Show Cause Order 

On May 3, 2012, a Social Security case was assigned to Judge Adams and automatically 

referred to a magistrate judge for a R&R. Judge Adams issued his standard scheduling order. 

As this case arose prior to the adoption of Local Rule 16.3 .1, the scheduling order required the 

magistrate judge to file his R&R within 270 days of the filing of the complaint. This would have 

made the R&R due on January 28, 2013. The magistrate judge's chambers, however, incorrectly 

calculated the due date to be February 24, 2013. Thus, the R&R was not issued on January 28, 

2013. Until this incident, this magistrate judge had never before missed one of Judge Adams's 

deadlines. 

On Friday, February 1, 2013, Judge Adams learned that the magistrate judge had filed 

neither the R&R nor an interim R&R explaining the delay. Consistent with his pattern of 

refusing to communicate with magistrate judges, Judge Adams took no steps, either personally or 

through his staff, to ask the magistrate judge why the R&R was late. Instead, that same day, 

Judge Adams issued an order to the magistrate judge to show cause by 4:00 p.m. on Monday, 

February 4, 2013, why he should not be held in contempt for missing the deadline. Judge Adams 

did not attempt to give any notice of the Show Cause Order to the magistrate judge other than by 

filing it on the docket. 

The magistrate judge learned about the Show Cause Order on Saturday, February 2, 

2013. The magistrate judge immediately began working to complete the R&R, a task that would 

typically take several days. The magistrate judge emailed Judge Adams that evening to take 

responsibility for the clerical mistake that had occurred in his chambers. 

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On Monday, February 4, 2013, Judge Adams's law clerk called the magistrate judge to 

tell him that Judge Adams accepted his explanation for missing the deadline. Later that day, 

Judge Adams issued another order noting the clerical error, and for this reason found the Show 

Cause Order to be "satisfied." 

On February 5, 2013, the district's chief judge sent Judge Adams a letter on behalf of the 

other district judges requesting that Judge Adams declare the Show Cause Order null and void 

and that he strike both orders from the docket. 

Judge Adams refused the request to strike the orders from the docket. In a response 

letter, Judge Adams complained that the magistrate judges had treated his scheduling orders with 

"disdain and noncompliance." He criticized the chief judge for failing to "discipline" the two 

magistrate judges who, in 2012, had "disrespectful[ly]" and "defiant[ly]" suggested that their 

need to manage other cases on their dockets was a valid reason not to comply with the 

scheduling orders in Judge Adams's Social Security cases. Apparently not recognizing the harm 

the Show Cause Order could cause, Judge Adams stated that he was "somewhat unclear on what 

damage was done to [the magistrate judge's] reputation," since "[a] simple review of the docket 

by anyone would reveal that he had not complied with my scheduling order." Judge Adams 

argued that keeping the Show Cause Order public was necessary to prevent a "misimpression" 

that Judge Adams had failed to enforce his own scheduling order. Judge Adams concluded by 

criticizing how long some of the magistrate judge's Social Security cases had been pending. He 

continued: "As such, perhaps my show cause [order] was precisely the message that needed to be 

sent. Further, given the history of defiance of the Magistrate Judges, I can think of nothing other 

than the threat of contempt that would be sufficient to compel compliance with my scheduling 

order." 

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Regardless of whether Judge Adams had the legal authority to issue the Show Cause 

Order, 5 the Show Cause Order has caused substantial internal strife within the court. It has 

harmed the morale of the magistrate judges, and diminished the trust between magistrate judges 

and district judges. As a result of this incident, magistrate judges in the Northern District of 

Ohio have had to prioritize Judge Adams's Social Security cases above all other cases on their 

dockets for fear of provoking Judge Adams's ire. This has harmed other district judges' ability 

to supervise and generally work with the magistrate judges, and has hindered the overall 

administration of the court. 

The SIC also found that it cannot take seriously Judge Adams's assurances, given during 

his interview with the SIC, that he will not issue similar show cause orders in the future. Judge 

Adams claimed in August 2012 correspondence to another judge that concerns about the 

prospect of contempt proceedings for failing to meet his Social Security deadlines were 

"unfounded," but he nonetheless issued the Show Cause Order only five months later. In his 

defense to this Complaint, Judge Adams has largely relied on the argument that he had "ample 

authority" to issue the Show Cause Order and that the Show Cause Order was necessary to make 

the magistrate judges comply with his scheduling orders. Judge Adams continues to issue 

scheduling orders in Social Security cases that include mandatory deadlines, despite the 

permissive language of Local Rule 16.3.l. 

Judge Adams does not appear to appreciate the harm the Show Cause Order caused. 

Judge Adams acknowledged that he owes an apology to the magistrate judge for this incident, 

5 The Council takes no position on the legality of the Show Cause Order. The SIC's Report goes 

to great lengths to explain that the problems generated by the Show Cause Order do not depend 

on its merits. Rather, the fact that the Show Cause Order was issued at all shows extremely poor 

judgment on Judge Adams' s part. This conclusion is discussed in more detail below in Section 

III.A. 

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but he had not yet actually apologized at the time of the Council's September 10, 2015, meeting. 

Although Judge Adams now recognizes issuing the Show Cause Order was unwarranted, he 

continues to assert that issuing a show cause order to a magistrate judge is a proper means by 

which to affirm his authority and maintain control over his docket. Even though the Show Cause 

Order has demonstrably harmed working relationships among judges in the district, Judge 

Adams argued in his post-hearing brief that the Show Cause Order was "intended to promote the 

effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, not prejudice it." Judge 

Adams has further argued that there is no evidence that the Show Cause Order interfered with the 

court's business, and that the Show Cause Order has actually made the court more efficient by 

speeding up the completion of his Social Security cases. 

While the Show Cause Order is the most concrete example of Judge Adams's 

mistreatment of the district's magistrate judges, it is far from an isolated incident. As discussed 

above in Section II.A.2, Judge Adams has persistently treated magistrate judges with disdain and 

disrespect. The Show Cause Order seems to have been motivated at least in part by Judge 

Adams's general animus toward the magistrate judges of the district, and his desire to punish 

them for what he viewed as their "defiant" attitudes towards him. 

C. Non-Cooperation with the Investigation 

The evidence gathered by the SIC during its investigation into the Show Cause Order led 

the SIC to be concerned that "a reasonable person [ would have] cause to question whether Judge 

Adams has a [mental or emotional] disability." Specifically, the evidence suggested that Judge 

Adams may have a disability that "(1) prevents him from maintaining a professional relationship 

with his colleagues, (2) prevents him from shouldering his responsibilities as a member of the 

District Court, and (3) causes him to make unfounded and destructive attacks against his 

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colleagues." The SIC concluded that this evidence gave it a "reasonable basis" to expand its 

investigation to include these issues. 

The Report also highlights two "troubling" incidents that, while not directly related to 

Judge Adams's duties as a federal judge, "deepen[ed] the [SIC]'s concern about how Judge 

Adams's mental and emotional state might affect the administration of judicial business." In the 

first incident, the SIC found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Adams had "bumped" a 

magistrate judge hard on a running path near the Akron courthouse and then sprinted away 

without apologizing or seeing if the judge needed assistance. Judge Adams denies he was the 

person who bumped the magistrate judge, but the SIC found his denial not to be credible. In the 

second incident, Judge Adams reacted to an intern accidentally parking in his space by blocking 

the intern's car with his own and ordering court security personnel to ticket or tow the intern's 

car, even though security officers believed such punitive measures were not warranted for an 

innocent and easily corrected mistake. 

On May 27, 2014, in response to a request from the SIC, Judge Boggs directed the SIC to 

investigate whether Judge Adams might have an emotional or mental issue that amounts to a 

disability. The SIC notified Judge Adams before seeking permission for this expansion, and then 

gave a copy of Judge Boggs's decision to Judge Adams. See Rule 15(a)(l). 

In order to conduct its investigation into these issues, the SIC retained the services of a 

forensic psychiatrist. The SIC requested that the forensic psychiatrist "perform the necessary 

evaluations of Judge Adams that would allow [him] to reach an opinion as to [Judge Adams's] 

emotional and mental state," and to "provide a report of[his] findings to the [SIC]." To aid this 

evaluation, in August 2014 the SIC asked Judge Adams to provide any records available to him 

pertaining to any mental or emotional health treatment or testing he had previously undergone. 

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The SIC also asked Judge Adams to submit to psychological testing by another doctor, the 

results of which would be used by the forensic psychiatrist in his mental-health evaluation. 

Judge Adams refused to provide the requested documents or undergo the requested 

psychological testing. In a September 24, 2014, letter, Judge Adams's counsel argued that the 

SIC had not adequately specified the reasons it believed Judge Adams might have a disability, 

and thus complained that the notice to Judge Adams was inadequate. Judge Adams's counsel 

also accused the SIC of improperly "tak[ing] on a prosecutorial role." The letter concluded by 

asserting "that a compelled mental health examination is a very intrusive investigative technique 

and should only be utilized with the support of a full and complete record." 

The SIC responded by outlining the steps it had taken to notify Judge Adams of this 

issue, and explained that it viewed his refusal to cooperate as itself potential misconduct. 

Nevertheless, Judge Adams still refused the SIC's requests. 

In light of Judge Adams's refusal to submit to a mental-health examination, the SIC's 

forensic psychiatrist could not render an expert opinion or diagnosis regarding Judge Adams' s 

mental or emotional state. But based on the materials the SIC provided to him, the forensic 

psychiatrist concluded that there is "a reasonable basis for concern as to Judge Adams' [ s] mental 

or emotional state. The data available so far do not suggest a mental state of psychotic 

proportions, but do suggest significant personality traits that may have contributed to the current 

concerns." Judge Adams has objected to this conclusion. 

On December 9, 2014, in response to another request from the SIC, Judge Boggs directed 

the SIC to investigate whether Judge Adams's refusal to participate in the mental-health 

evaluation itself constituted misconduct. After receiving notice of this expansion of the 

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investigation, Judge Adams continued to refuse to undergo testing by a SIC-retained expert, and 

refused to provide the SIC with records it requested. 

At the SIC's April 20-22, 2015, hearing, however, Judge Adams sought to introduce 

testimony from his own psychiatrist who had purportedly conducted an evaluation of Judge 

Adams's mental health. The SIC excluded the psychiatrist's testimony from the hearing, as 

Judge Adams refused to disclose any of the underlying reports, testing materials, or other 

documents relating to the evaluation. 

III. Legal Conclusions of the Special Investigating Committee 

In addition to its factual findings, the SIC's Report also makes three conclusions on legal 

issues. First, that the merits-related exception to the misconduct definition does not apply in this 

case. Second, that the SIC's request for Judge Adams to undergo a mental-health evaluation did 

not violate Judge Adams's Fourth Amendment rights. Third, that Judge Adams received 

adequate notice during these proceedings to satisfy due process. 

A. The Merits-Related Exception 

Judge Adams argues that the Complaint in this case attacks the merits of the Show Cause 

Order. Cognizable judicial misconduct includes "conduct prejudicial to the effective and 

expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 351; Rule 3(h). However, 

cognizable misconduct does not include "an allegation that is directly related to the merits of a 

decision or procedural ruling." Rule 3(h)(3)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(l). A review of the 

relevant rules, statutes, and precedent authorities-including the "Breyer Committee Report," 

239 F.R.D. 116 (2006), and publicly available decisions from other disciplinary proceedingsconvinced the SIC that the Complaint in this case is not subject to the merits-related exception. 

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First, before referring this matter to the SIC, Judge Boggs reviewed the Complaint. That 

he did not dismiss it reflects his decision that it did not fall within the merits-related exception. 

See Rule 1 l(c)(l)(B). Second, the SIC concluded that the magistrate judge's potential to appeal 

the Show Cause Order was neither an effective nor realistic avenue for relief, and did not excuse 

Judge Adams' s misconduct in this case. See Commentary to Rule 3(h). Third, the harms 

flowing from the Show Cause Order were prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 

administration of the business of the court. 

Finally, the SIC concluded that the allegations of the Complaint do not "directly" relate 

to the merits of the Show Cause Order, or attempt to collaterally attack its substance or 

correctness. Instead, "the Complaint focuses on Judge Adams's hostile treatment of his fellow 

judicial officers and the severe damage brought about by that treatment rather than the legal 

correctness of his [S]how [C]ause [O]rder. Whether the [S]how [C]ause [O]rder was legally 

correct or not does not affect the analysis at all." The prejudicial impact of the Show Cause 

Order on the administration of the business of the court and Judge Adams's inability or refusal to 

recognize that harm are the issues here, not his legal authority to issue the Show Cause Order. 

"Any allegation that calls into question the correctness of an official action of a judgewithout more-is merits-related." Commentary to Rule 3 (emphasis added). The SIC concluded 

that, "[h ]ere, there is 'more."' As such, the SIC concluded that the merits-related exception does 

not apply in this case. 

B. Fourth Amendment Challenge to Mental-Health Examination 

Judge Adams argues that he was justified in refusing to submit to the SIC's requested 

mental-health evaluation because such an examination would violate his rights under the Fourth 

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Amendment. The SIC's Report concludes that even if a compelled mental-health evaluation is a 

search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the SIC's request was reasonable. 

There is an exception to the normal warrant and probable cause requirements where "a 

Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law 

enforcement." Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). One such 

special governmental need is for psychiatric or medical testing of government employees. In 

such cases, the individual's privacy interests are balanced against the nature of the intrusion and 

the Government's interests. Int'! Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1009-13 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the SIC found this balance clearly tipped in favor of requiring Judge Adams to 

undergo a mental-health evaluation. Judge Adams undoubtedly has a valid privacy interest in his 

mental health. A mental-health evaluation would intrude on this interest to a nontrivial degree. 6 

However, the SIC concluded that "the judiciary unquestionably ha[s] an interest in ensuring that 

judges are of sound mental health" in order to ensure that federal judges are able to carry out 

their constitutional functions. 

Balancing these interests, the SIC concluded that the request that Judge Adams undergo a 

mental-health evaluation was reasonable. Its initial investigation raised certain "red flags." 

Because the SIC did not have the expertise to evaluate Judge Adams's mental condition, the SIC 

concluded it needed an independent expert to help it perform its investigation. See Rule 13(a). 

The SIC's request was specifically tailored to address issues that arose during the investigation, 

and the results were to be kept confidential. Under these circumstances, the SIC concluded that 

6 Notably, Judge Adams was willing to undergo psychological testing, just not by a doctor 

retained by the SIC. Judge Adams retained his own doctors to evaluate his health and attempted 

to introduce the conclusion of one psychiatrist-though not the underlying results of the testsat the SIC's fact-finding hearing. This undercut any argument Judge Adams made about the 

unwarranted intrusion on his privacy from undergoing such an evaluation. 

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its request "was reasonable and comported with the Fourth Amendment. Judge Adams's refusal 

to submit to the evaluation was not justified on that basis." 

C. Due Process Challenge to the Investigation 

Judge Adams argues that he did not receive proper notice of the Complaint because it 

was ambiguous with respect to the "charges against him." Judge Adams also argues that he did 

not receive adequate notice of the expansion of the investigation because certain internal 

communications between the SIC and Judge Boggs regarding the request for expansion were not 

provided to Judge Adams at the time of the communication. 

Rule 15 entitles Judge Adams to notice of three things: ( 1) "the appointment of a special 

committee under Rule 1 l(f);" (2) "the expansion of the scope of an investigation under Rule 

13(a);" and (3) "any hearing under Rule 14, including its purposes, the names of any witnesses 

the committee intends to call, and the text of any statements that have been taken from those 

witnesses." The SIC concluded that Judge Adams received all the notice he was due under Rule 

15. The Circuit Executive sent Judge Adams a copy of the Complaint and all its attachments; 

that Judge Adams sent two letters to Judge Batchelder in response demonstrates that he 

understood the nature of the allegations. Judge Boggs sent a letter to Judge Adams on April 8, 

2013, notifying him that the SIC was being activated. Judge Boggs also sent Judge Adams 

copies of his two decisions expanding the scope of the investigation-first on May 27, 2014, and 

again on December 9, 2014. Finally, Judge Adams was given notice of the SIC's April 2015 

hearing, copies of all witness statements, exhibits the SIC sought to introduce, and summaries of 

the testimony that the SIC intended to elicit, all according to a schedule agreed upon by Judge 

Adams' s counsel. 

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Judge Adams also argues that the notice he received was constitutionally insufficient 

because the allegations in the Complaint were unduly vague. Due process requires the 

government to give "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 

interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). 

The SIC explained in numerous communications with Judge Adams and his counsel that 

the initial focus of the investigation was the Show Cause Order, even if the SIC also sought other 

information to help it reach its ultimate determination. As the SIC succinctly explained at the 

beginning of its August 23, 2013, interview with Judge Adams, "[t]he focus of [the] 

investigation is the show cause order you issued ... on February 1st, 2013[,] and the events that 

lead [sic] up to that order .... There's a lot of other material in the complaint that might 

constitute allegations of your pattern of conduct, background information to the show cause 

order, or extraneous material, but the immediate reason for the complaint was the show cause 

order." The SIC investigated the context and history in which the Show Cause Order was issued 

and its effect on the court, but concluded in its Report that its focus was made clear to Judge 

Adams throughout the investigation. 

Judge Adams also argues that he did not receive notice of internal communications 

between the SIC and Judge Boggs and thus was confused as to the nature of the mental or 

emotional issue that concerned the SIC. But before bringing its concerns to Judge Boggs, the 

SIC had numerous discussions with Judge Adams and his counsel about these issues. The SIC 

concluded that the Rules do not entitle Judge Adams to receive internal communications between 

the SIC and Judge Boggs. 

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IV. Disposition 

At the September 10, 2015, Sixth Circuit Judicial Council meeting, the members 

unanimously determined the Special Investigating Committee's Report and the underlying record 

provided an adequate basis for deciding the merits of the Complaint. See Rule 20( c ), ( d). 

After due consideration of these materials, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council FINDS the 

following: 

1. Judge Adams's February 1, 2013, issuance of the Show Cause Order under the 

circumstances presented here was "conduct prejudicial to the effective and 

expeditious administration of the business of the courts," because it had prejudicial 

effects on the District Court as a whole; had prejudicial effects on the ways in which 

the magistrate judges of the Northern District of Ohio performed their work 

generally; and had prejudicial effects on the magistrate judge it targeted. See Rule 

3(h)(l ). 

2. The Judicial Council cannot determine whether Judge Adams has a "temporary or 

permanent condition" that renders him "unable to discharge the duties" of his office, 

because Judge Adams refused to undergo an evaluation by the forensic psychiatrist 

the Special Investigating Committee retained. See Rule 3(e). 

3. Judge Adams committed misconduct by refusing to cooperate with the Special 

Investigating Committee's request that he undergo a mental-health evaluation with a 

psychiatrist selected by the Special Investigating Committee, as it prejudiced the 

effective and expeditious investigation of this matter, which is an integral part of the 

business of the courts. See Rule 3(h)(l). 

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Given these findings, and having considered the Special Investigating Committee's 

recommendations, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council ORDERS the following: 

1. The Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit hereby PUBLICLY REPRIMANDS Judge 

Adams for his February 1, 2013, issuance of the Show Cause Order to a magistrate 

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(iii); Rule 20(b)(l)(D)(i). This conduct was 

prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. This behavior was 

outside the scope of normal, acceptable behavior expected within the judiciary. 

Specifically: 

a. The Show Cause Order was personally demeaning to the magistrate judge it 

targeted and was an unwarranted use of the court's contempt power. The 

Show Cause Order has caused the court's magistrate judges to prioritize Judge 

Adams's cases over other matters on their dockets. As a result, magistrate 

judges decline to grant reasonable briefing extensions rather than exercise 

their own judgment as to the management of their dockets, based on a fear 

that Judge Adams will threaten them with contempt. 

b. The Show Cause Order was demeaning and embarrassing to the court's 

magistrate judges and affected their morale. Its broader effect was to interfere 

with the effective and efficient administration of the business of the court by 

harming the relationships between district judges and magistrate judges, 

eroding the trust that is important to the functioning of any court. 

c. Moreover, Judge Adams's decision to place the Show Cause Order on the 

docket was prejudicial to the conduct of the court's business, given the Show 

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Cause Order's tendency to lend discredit to the magistrate judge it targeted 

and to the court as a whole. It was also prejudicial to the ability of the district 

judges to have their matters fairly prioritized by the magistrate judges, and to 

the ability of the district judges to oversee the work of the magistrate judges. 

d. The Judicial Council directs that no such order be issued by Judge Adams 

with respect to the work of any of the court's judges. 

2. Sufficient evidence exists to merit further investigation into whether Judge Adams 

suffers from a mental or emotional disability that renders him unable to discharge the 

duties of his office. Accordingly, no new cases shall be assigned to Judge Adams for 

a period of two years, and his present docket shall be transferred to other judges. 28 

U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i); Rule 20(b)(l)(D)(ii). This action is necessary to protect the 

public and the judiciary from the possibility of Judge Adams engaging m 

inappropriate or embarrassing behavior while the investigation continues. 

3. The Special Investigating Committee shall maintain jurisdiction for two years to 

ensure that Judge Adams does not engage in additional inappropriate behavior 

involving magistrate judges, whether in his official functions or otherwise. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 353(c); Rules 1, 13(a). 

4. Judge Adams shall undergo a mental-health evaluation by a psychiatrist selected by 

the Special Investigating Committee. The psychiatrist shall be provided with any 

material from the Special Investigating Committee and Judge Adams that the 

psychiatrist deems appropriate within six months of the date of this Order. Any 

report(s) prepared by the psychiatrist shall be made available for the Judicial 

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Council's confidential review. 28 U.S.C. § 353(c); Rules 1, 13(a), 20(c); Sixth 

Circuit Rule 14(b ). 

5. Judge Adams shall submit to any treatment or counseling deemed necessary by the 

psychiatrist. 

6. Should Judge Adams submit to a mental-health evaluation and it demonstrates that he 

does not suffer from a disability that renders him unable to discharge the duties of his 

office, or if he receives treatment after the evaluation that remedies any disability, the 

Judicial Council may suspend the Order that no new cases be assigned to him for two 

years. Judge Adams would nevertheless remain subject to the Special Investigating 

Committee's continued jurisdiction for the remainder of the two years, as set forth in 

Order No. 3. The Judicial Council shall retain jurisdiction to order further remedies 

depending on the results of the evaluation. 

7. Should Judge Adams refuse to undergo a mental-health evaluation by a psychiatrist 

chosen by the Special Investigating Committee, the Judicial Council intends to 

request that Judge Adams voluntarily retire, waiving the ordinary length-of-service 

requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(B)(ii); Rule 20(b)(l)(D)(v). 

Judge Adams has a right to petition the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of 

the Judicial Conference of the United States for a review of this Order and Memorandum. Rules 

20(/), 21 (b). This Order and Memorandum shall be made public 64 days after its filing, 

provided that no petition for review is filed before then. Rules 22(c), 24. 

Dated: February 22, 2016 

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