O r al ar gu ment was he ar d O ct ob er 2, 200 8, i n N as hv i l l e, D avi dson C ount y , T enn es s ee, as a par t of t he S u pr e me 1 C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n f o r S tud e n ts (S .C .A .L .E .S .) p ro je c t. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 2, 200 8 S es sio n H eard at N as hvi lle 1 

### JA M ES G. TH OM A S, JR . , Br ot he r an d N ex t of Ki n of Ka re n G. Th om as, Decea se d v . ELI ZABETH OLDFI ELD, M.D. ET AL 

### . App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Courtfor Davidson County No. 05C-3207 Walte r C. Kurtz, Judge
No. M2006- 02767-SC-R11- CF - F iled Fe bruary 2, 2009 The plaintiff f

iled interrog atories a

nd reque sts for produc tion seekinginformati on conce rningthe de fe nd ants ’ l ia

bil ity ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e . Whe n th e de fe nd ants ob je c te d to pr ov idi ngthi s inf or matio n, the pla int if

f f ile d a mot ion to c omp e l di sc ov ery

purs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 37 .0 1. Th e tr ia l c ourt ru le d th at th e inf

or matio n w a s su

bje c t to disc ov e ry

purs ua nt t o Tenne ssee Ru l e o f C i vil Procedure 26.02 and grante d the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defe ndants’ re quest for an interlocutory appea l. The Court of Appe als reve rsed the trial court’s order , holding that infor

mati o nconce rningthe def endants’ liability

insurance cover ag e wa s not dis c ov e ra ble un de r R

ule 26 .0 2. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls. Tenn. R. App . P . 11 Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals Aff irm ed J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , G A RY R. W ADE , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., and E. R I L EY ANDE R S ON , S P . J ., joined. Wil liam D. L eade r, Jr., an d Erin P. McDanie l, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J ames G. Thomas, J r. Dar rell G. Townse nd, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, Charles V. L ove, M.D., a nd Emerg ency

Coverag e Corporation. Br adfor d D. B ox and Spencer R. Bar nes, Jackson, Tennesse e, for the amicus c uriae , Tenne ssee Def ense L awyers Assoc iation. H. Anthony Dunca

n, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the amicus curia e, Tenne ssee Association for Justice.D r. Lo ve and E C C are t he o nl y de f end ant s who f

i l ed an i nt erl o cut o ry ap p eal
. Fo r p urpo ses o f t hi s o p i ni o n, 2 w e re fer to D r. L o v e a n d E C C a s “th e d e fen d a n ts.” 2 OP IN ION Fa cts and Proce dural History On Dec ember

8, 2004, Kar en Thomas underw ent abdominal surg ery at Centennial Medic al Center in Na shville, Tenne ssee. She was discharg ed on Dec ember 11, 2004, and we nt to her father’s ho me in L awr e nc e burg , T e nn e sse e , to re c ov e r f ro m he r s ur g e ry . O n Decemb er 13, 20 04 , M s. Thomas was a dmitted t o the emerg ency depar tment of Crocke tt Hospital in L awr enceburg complainingof abdominal pa in. Dr. Charle s L ove and Dr. J une McMill in diagnosed Ms. Thomas with a urinar

y trac t infection and se nt her home. The fo l l owingday , Ms. Thomas returne d to the Crockett Hospital eme rg ency depar tment complaining of incre ased abdominal pain, slurred spe ech, and shortness of

breath. Dr. McMillin made a pr elimina ry diagnosis of sepsis. Ms. Thomas was tr ans fe rr e d b y

he lic op te r t o B a

pti st H os pit a l in

Na shvil le , whe re sh e late r d ie d o f s e ps is. On Octobe r 18, 2005, James Thom as , M s . Thomas’ brothe r, filed a complaint for the wrongfu l death of

Ms. Thomas ag ainst sever al doctors a nd hospitals, including Dr . L ove and Emerg ency

Coverag e Corporation (“ECC”) , which provides the emerg ency depar tment phy sicians to Crockett Hospital. Mr. Thomas thereaf ter propounde d interrog atories to and r equests for production fr om both Dr. L ove and E CC seeking“information concer ning the extent and amount of lia bil ity ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e fo r t

he c la ims fo rm ingthe ba sis of thi s la ws uit .” Whe n th e de fe nd ants o b j e c t e d t o p r o v i d i n g th e r e qu e s t e d i n f o r m at i o n , M r . T h o m a s f

i l e d a m o t i o nt o c o mp e l d i s c o v e r y. Dr. L ove and ECC a

rgued that the information was not subje ct to disc overy under Rul e 2 6.02 beca use the e x tent and amount of liability insurance cover ag e is not releva nt to the subject matter of the laws uit
. On No ve mbe r 2 9, 20 06 , th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d a n o rd e r c omp e lli ngDr . L ov e and EC C to re sp on d to the pla int if

f’ s inte rr og atorie s and

re qu e sts fo r p ro du c tio n r e g ard ingthe ir lia bil ity insurance cover ag e. On De cembe r 18, 2006, the trial c ourt grante d Dr. L ove and ECC permission to s e e k a n inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l of the c ourt ’s ru lin gon

Mr . T ho ma s’ mot ion

to c omp e l. 2 The Court of Appea ls grante d the defe ndants’ application for an interlocutory appeal and reve rse d t h e trial court, holding that infor mation conce rningthe def endants’ liability

insurance cover ag e is not releva

nt to the merits of the suit and is not reasona bly ca l cu l at ed t o l ead to the dis c ov e ry of a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e . We gra nte d th e pla int if

f' s a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. An a ly sis This case prese nts an issue of first impression for this Court: whether

information c on c e rn inga

de fe nd ant’ s li a

bil ity ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e is dis c ov e ra ble un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Procedur e 26.02(1)
.W e may l oo k t o t he i nt er pret at i on o f co mp ar abl e f

eder al rul es f

or gui dance
. W i l l i amson C ount y v. T wi n La wn 3 D e v . C o ., 4 9 8 S .W .2 d 3 1 7 , 3 2 0 ( T e n n . 1 9 7 3 ) (“ [O ]u r R u le s h a v ing b e e n tak e n fro m the F e d e ra l R u le s o f C ivil P r ocedur e, an d t he ob j ect of our vi r t ual adop t i on of

t he f eder al r ul es bei ng t o hav e s i mi l ar r ul es of procedur e i n s t at e t r i al co urt s and f

ed eral d i st ri ct c o urt s, it is p rop er t hat w e l o o k to t he i nt erpret at i o n o f the co m p arab l e Fe d eral R ul e . . . . ”); s ee a l s o 1 T en n . J u r i s . , Rul es of Cour t § 2. 3 Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 26 .0 2( 1) state s, in p e rt ine nt p art : Parties may obtain discovery reg arding any matter, not privilege d, which is rele vant to t he su bje c t matte r i nv olv e d in

the pe nd inga c tio n, wh e the r i t r e late s to the c la im or def ense of the par ty seekingdiscovery or to the cla im or defe nse of a ny other party , including the exis tence , description, nature, custody , condition and location of any books, d o cu m en t s , or other ta ng ible things a

nd the identity

and location of persons having know ledg e of any discovera ble matter. It is not ground f or objec tion that the information sought w ill be ina dmissibl e at the trial if the information sought appea rs re asonably

calc ulated to lead to the disc overy of admissible evidenc e. Te nn . R. Civ . P. § 2 6. 02 (1 ) ( 20 08 ). Inte rp retati on of th e Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure is a question of law, whic h we revie w de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. L acy v. Cox , 152 S.W .3d 480, 483 (Tenn. 2004) . Although the rules of c ivil procedure are not statutes, the same rule s of st atutory construction apply in the interpre tation of rules. See Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S .W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn. 1980) ; see also 1 Tenn. Juris., Rules of Court § 2 (2004). O ur g oal “‘ is to ascer tain and gi v e e ff ec tt o th e l egi s l at i v e i nt en twi th o utu n du l y re s tri ct i n g o r e x p an d i n g a s t atut e’ s co v er age beyond its int ended sc ope.’” Over street v. TRW Commercial S teering Div., 256 S.W .3d 626, 630 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Houghton v. Aramark Educ . Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002)). We determine le g islative intent by g iving wor ds their natura l and ordinar y meaning . Gre en v. J ohnson, 249 S.W .3d 313, 319 (Tenn. 2008) . In construingthe rules of this Court, howeve r, our goa l is to ascer tain and g ive ef

fec t to this Court’s intent in adoptin g i t s ru l es . See State v. Mallar d, 40 S.W. 3d 47 3, 48 0- 81 (T e nn . 2 00 1) (“ [T]he [Te nn e sse e ] Sup re me Court ha s th e inh e re nt p ow e r t o promulg ate r

ules g overning the pra ctice a nd proce dure of

the cour ts of this state.”); seealso Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-3- 401 & 402 ( 1994). In construingthe meaningof Tenne ssee Ruleo f Ci v ilPro c e dure 26.02( 1), we must determine whether information concerningthe def endants’ liability

insurance cover ag e is “re levant to the subject matter involved in the pe nding a ction.” The United States Supreme Court has inter prete d the identical phr ase in F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 26(b) to “e ncompass any matter that be ars on, or that re asonably

could lead to othe r matter that could bea r on, any issue that is or may

be in the case .” Oppenhe imer Fund, Inc. v. S ander s, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Thus, the subject matter of 3 a c a se is n ot l imi te d to the me ri ts o f t he c a se be c a

us e “ a va ri e ty of fact -or ien ted i ssu e s ma

y ari se duringlitigation that ar e not related to the merits.” I d. Under this broad interpre tation, information conce rningthe exist ence and extent of liability insurance cover ag e ma y b e relevant to settlement ne g oti atio ns or tr ia l pr e pa ratio n. Se e Johane k v . Abe rl e , 2 7 F .R. D. 27 2, 27 8 ( D. Mo nt. 19 61 ); Hi ll v. Gre er, 30 F .R.D. 64, 66 (D.N.J. 1961); Terry v. Fisher , 145 N.E.2d 588, 593 (I ll. 1957).T enness ee R ul e o f E vi d ence 4 0 1 de f

i nes “r el evant evi d ence” as “evi d ence havi ng any t end ency t o m ake t he 4 e x isten c e o f an y fac t t h a t i s o f c o n s e q u e n c e to the d e te rm ina tio n o f t h e a c tio n m o re p ro b a b le o r le ss p ro b a b le tha n it w o u ld b e w itho u t t h e e v id e n c e .”

T e n n e sse e R u le o f E v id e n c e 4 1 1 sta te s: 5 Evi den ce t h at a pe r s on w as or w as n ot i n s u r ed ag ai n s t l i abi l i t y i s n ot a dmi s s i bl e u pon i s s u es of n eg l i g en ce or ot h er w r on g f u l c on du ct
. T h i s r u l e does n ot r equ i r e t h e ex cl usi o n o f e vi d en ce of i n s u r an ce a g ai n s t l i abi l i t y w h en of f er ed f or a n ot h er pu r pos e, s u ch as proof of ag en cy , ow n er s h i p, or co ntro l , o r b i as o r p rej ud i ce o f a w i t ne ss. 4 We construe Te nnessee Rule of Civil P rocedure 26.02( 1) consistently with its federa l counter part a nd conclude that information concerning liability insurance cover ag e is “re levant to the s u b j e c tm att e r ” i nv o l v e d

i nth e p e n d i n gl aw s u i t
. T h atc o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o te n d o ur i n qu i r y. Rul e 26 .0 2( 1) fu

rt he r pr ov ide s that an “ ob

je c tio n that the inf

or matio n so ught w ill be ina dmi ssi ble at the trial” is not sufficient to defeat a d iscovery reque st if the “information sought appe ars re a so na bly c a lc ulate d to le a d to the di sco very of a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e .” In o the r w or ds , inadmissibil ity

under othe r rules of

rele vancy , such as Te nnesse e Ru l e o f Evidence 401, will not 4 nece ssarily

bar the production of this information if the rule of rele vancy contained in the se cond par t of Rul e 26 .0 2( 1) is m e t. In th is c a se , th e pa

rt ie s c on c e de that i nfo rm ation c on c e rn ingthe de fe nd ants ’ l ia bil ity insurance cover ag e would be ina dmissibl e at tria l pursu ant t o Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 411. 5 Howeve r, the plaintiff doe s not argue that discove ry of this inadmissibl e evide nce “ appea rs rea sonably

calc ulated to lead to the disc overy of admissible evidenc e.” A fter a considere d revie w, we a re una ble to conclude that discovery of this infor mation a ppear s rea sonably calc ulated to lead t o th e d i s c o v e r

y o f a dm i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e . T h e r e f o r e , th e e xi s t e n c e an d

e xt e nto f th e d e f e nd ants ’ liability insurance is not subject to discovery in this case. The history

of Rule 26.02 supports our conclusion. The Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure wer e adopted in 1970 and wer e modeled on the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e prior to the ir 1970 amendments. Fe dera l courts construing the pre- 1970 version of the federa l rules were divided on the question of whe ther information conce rninginsurance cover ag e wa s subject to discovery under Fe d er al R u l e 2 6 (b ). J o h an ek , 2 7 F. R
. D. at2 7 4 & n . 2
. S ev er al d ec i s i o n s re as o n edth atth e l an gu age in Rule 26(b) per

mitted discove ry only of matters admissible a t trial or rea sonably

calc ulated to lead to admissible evidenc e. See, e.g., Be al v. Z ambelli Fire works Mfg. Co., 46 F.R.D. 449, 450 (W.D. P a. 1 96 9); Cl aus s v . Dank er, 264 F. Sup p. 24 6, 24 9 (S. D.N .Y. 19 67 ); Bis ser ier v. Man ni ng, 2 07 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D.N.J. 1962). Other cour ts concluded that a def

endant’ s financia l information was beyond the scope of Rule 26(b). See , e.g ., L ang lois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67, 68-69 (D. Conn. 1962); McClure v. B oeg er, 105 F . Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Stil l other cour ts found that information conce rningliability

insurance cover ag e wa s discovera ble bec au s e i twas re levant to settlement or tr ia l pr e pa ratio n. Se e , e. g ., Johane k, 27 F .R. D. at 28 0; H ill , 3 0 F .R. D. at 65 -6 6; B ra c ke tt v . Wo od a ll Food Prod., Inc., 12 F .R.D. 4, 5-6 (E.D. T enn. 1951).A l a. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); A l aska R
. C i v. P
. 21 6 (a)( 1 )( F); A ri z. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); A rk. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); 6 C al
. C o d e C i v. P
. § 2 0 1 7
. 2 1 0 (20 0 8 ); C
. R
. C
. P
. 26 (a)( 1 )( D ) ( C o l o rado ); C o nn. G en. Stat
. § 5 2
- 2 0 0 a (20 0 8 ); D el
. Sup er. Ct
. R. 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; Ga
. Co d e A n n . § 9
- 1 1
- 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; Ha w . R. Ci v . P. 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; I d a h o R. Ci v . P. 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; I n d
. R. Tr i a l P. 26( B ) ( 2) ; I owa R. Ci v . P. 26( b) ( 2) ; K an . R. Ci v . P. 60
- 226( b) ( 3) ; K y . R. Ci v . P. 26. 02( 2) ; L. S. A.
- C. C. P. Ar t
. 1423 ( L o u i s i a n a ) ; Me
. R
. C i v . P
. 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; Md
. R
. C
. P
. C i r . C t
. R
. 2
- 4 0 2 ( b ) ; Ma s s . R
. C i v . P
. 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; Mi c h
. R. Ci v . P. 2
. 3 0 2 (b)(2); M i nn. R
. C i v. P
. 26
. 0 2 (b); M i ss . R
. C i v. P
. 2 6 (b)(2); M o . S up . C t
. R
. 5 6
. 0 1 (b)(2); M o nt
. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); N eb
. R
. D i scovery 2 6 (b)(2); N ev. R
. C i v. P
. 16
. 1 (a)( 1 )( D ); N
. J. C
. R
. 4:10
- 2 (b ); N .M . R . C i v. P
. 1-02 6 (B )( 3 ); N
. Y
. C
. P
. L.R
. § 3 1 0 1 (f ); N
. C
. R
. C i v. P
. , G
. S. § 1 A
- 1 , R ul e 2 6 (b)(2); N
. D
. R
. C i v. P
. 2 6 (b)(3); O hi o R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); O r e. R. Ci v. P
. 36B ( 2); P a. R. Ci v. P
. N o. 400 3. 2; R. I
. Super
. R
. C i v. P
. 26(b)( 2); S. C
. R. Ci v. P
. 26(b)( 2); S. D
. Co di f i ed La ws § 1 5
- 6
- 2 6 (b)(2); T ex. R
. C i v. P
. 1 9 2 (f ); V t
. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); V a. S. C t
. R
. 4:1(b )( 2 ); W ash. R
. Sup er. C t
. C i v. C
. R
. 26 (b)(2); W
. V a. R
. C i v. P
. 26 (b)(2); W i sc. Stat
. A nn. 58 0 4
. 0 1 (2)(b); W y o . R
. C i v. P
. 26 (a)( 1 )( D ).

Se e V i l or d v
. J en k i n s , 240 So. 2d 68, 68 ( Fl a. D i s t
. Ct
. App. 1970); T er r y , 145 N
. E. 2d at 593; T u l l er , 886 P. 2d 7 at 484. N
. H
. R ev. Stat
. A nn. § 4 9 8 : 2
- a (20 0 8 ).

8 5 State co u rt s were likewise divided. Seve ral states pe rmitted discovery of information conce rningliability

insurance cover ag e because it fac ilitated settlement or apprised the par ties of the insurance co mp an y ’s role in the a ction. See Superior I ns. Co. v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 833, 835-36 (Cal. 1951); Lucas v. District Court of County of Pueblo, 345 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo. 1959); Terr y , 145 N.E.2d at 593; Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Ky
. Ct. App. 1954). Other state s h e ld that this inf

or matio n wa s not sub

je c t to dis c ov e ry be c a

us e it wa s not re le va

nt t o th e me ri ts of the c ase or

infring ed on the de fenda

nt’s privac y . See Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746, 750-51 (Ariz. 1958); Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514, 515 (Del. Super . Ct
. 1 9 59); Br ooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 6 9 3 , 6 9 9 (Fla. 1957); Sander s v. Ay rhar t, 404 P.2d 589, 592 (I daho 1965); J eppese n v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649, 658 (Minn. 1955); Bush v. Elliot, 363 S.W .2d 631, 636-37 (M o. 19 63 ); Carm an v . F ish e l, 4 18 P.2 d 96 3, 97 5 (O kla
. 19 66 ), ov e rr ule d by Tu lle r v. Sha llc ro ss, 886 P.2d 481 (Okla. 1994); Gr eat Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray , 437 S.W .2d 264, 267-68 (Te x . 1969). In 1970, Fe dera l Rule 26(b) wa s amende d expressly to allow for the disc overy of information reg ardinginsurance cover ag e. F ed. R. Civ. P . 26(b), 1970 Ame ndment Note to Subdivisi on (b)( 2). The United States Supre me Court observe d that “an amendment to Rule 26(b) wa s require d to bring within the scope of disc overy the exist ence and c o n t ents of insuranc e agree ments . . . for that information ordinarily

cannot be considere d, and would not lead to infor mation th at co u l dbe considere d, by

a cour t or jury in decidingany

issues.” Oppe nheimer, 437 U .S. at 352. F oll ow ingthe 19 70 ame ndme nt t o F e de ra l Ru le 26(b ), a ma jority of state s ame nd e d th e ir rules to allow discove ry

of information concer

ning liability

insura n c ec o v e r a g e . Currently , forty-five states allow discove ry

of such infor

mation by

rule or statute. Court s i n t h re e other states have 6 construed their rules to a llow disc overy of information conce rning liability insurance cover ag e, and 7 New H ampshire permits discovery of this information for settlement purposes in cases in which the insurer is joi ned as a party
. Moreove r, i n 1993, the Feder al Rules of Civil P roce dure w ere further 8 amende d to make insuranc e agree ments subject to mandatory initial dis closure. F ed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) (1)( A)(iv) (2008).T he of f i ci al C om mi t t ee C om ment t o t he 19 79 amendment s provi des , i n par t : “ R ul es 26 t hr ough 37, i ncl us i ve, 9 rel at i ng t o de p o si t i o ns and dis co very , have b een am end ed to co nf o rm subst ant i al l y b ut no t identi cal l y t o R ul es 26 t hrough 37 , i ncl us i ve, of

t he Federa l R ul es o f

C i vi l P r ocedur e. ” V y t houl kas , 6 93 S
. W
. 2d at 3 55 n. 7. T he amendment s i ncl uded n ew s u bs ec t i on s ( 3) a n d ( 4) c on ce r n i n g di s cov er y of w or k pr odu ct a n d e x per t t es t i mon y . I d. C le a rly the re w ill b e situa tio n s w h e re info rm a tio n c o n c e rn ing a d e fe n d a n t’s i n su ra n c e c o v e ra g e is 10 di s cov er abl e. Ru l e 411 of t h e T en n es s ee Rul es of Evi den ce a l l ows s u ch i n f or mat i on t o be admi s s i bl e t o s h ow “ pr oof o f ag e n c y, o w n e rs h ip , o r c o n tro l, o r b ia s o r p reju d ic e o f a w itne ss.” In a d d iti o n , ev e n w h e n the info rm a tio n so u g h t will be i nadmi s s i bl e a t t r i al , i t i s d i s cover abl e when i t i s reas onabl y cal cul at ed t o l ead t o t he di s cover y of admi s s i bl e e vi dence
. 6 In 1979, the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Proc edure wer e amende d, and Rule 26.02 wa s revised to conform substantially

to the amende d Fe dera l Rule 26(b). Vy thoulkas v. Vande rbilt Univ. Hosp., 9 6 9 3 S .W.2d 350, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), superse ded by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(B ); see Advisory Commi ssion cmt. to 1987 amend. The 1979 revisions to Tennesse e Rule 26.02 diffe red from the 1970 ve rsion of Feder al R ule 26(b) in one important respect: Rule 26.02 did not include the provision expressly

allowingdiscovery

of i n fo rm ation reg ardinginsurance cover ag e. The a bs e nc e of thi s la ngua g e fr om t

he 19 79 re vis ion s is c on sp ic uo us . Whil e we are constraine d by both the languag e and the history of cur rent Rule 26.02 fr om ho ldi ng th at in fo rm atio n c on c e rn ingthe de fe nd ants ’ l ia bil ity ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e is s ub je c t to discovery , we a

re c onvinced that the time has come to align Tenne ssee with the r ules in forty-eight states and the f

eder al rule in a llowing discove ry of this information. Our de cision today

leave s Tennesse e in the extreme minority of jurisdictions that have not ame nd e d or con str

ue d th e ir ru le s to e xpre ssl y

pr ov ide fo r t

he dis c ov e ry

of a de fe nd ant’ s li a

bil ity insur an c e c o v e r a g e . We ar e p e r s u a d e d th at a ll o w in g d is c o v e r y o f s u c h in f

o r mati o n r e f

le cts the 10 curr ent re alities of litigation and se ttlement of ca ses in Tenne ssee. F irst, discovery of insuranc e c ov e ra g e wi ll e nc oura g e me diatio n an d settle me nt of c a se s by “ e na bl[i ng ] c ouns e l f

or bo th s ide s to make the sa

me re alistic appra isal of the ca se, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledg e and not spe culatio n.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 1970 Amendment Note to Subdivision (b )( 2) ; se e a lso Hi ll, 30 F .R. D. at 66 (“ Th e pla int if f’ s kn ow le dg e of de fe nd ant’ s ins ur anc e pe rm its am o r e r e a l i s t i c a

p p r a i s a l o f a c a s e an d un d o u b t e d l y l e a d s t o s e tt l e m e nt o f c a s e s wh i c h o the rw ise would g o to trial.”). The majority rule is there fore in acc ord with the policy of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, “ to provide for the just, spee dy , and inexpensive deter mination of ever

y action,” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 1 ( 20 08 ), and wi th t his Court ’s c omm itm e nt t o ma kethe pr oc ess of

dis pute resolution in Tennesse e “more efficient, more economica l, and equa lly fair.” See Or der Esta

blishing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 31 R eg ardingAlternative Dispute Resolution pmbl . (De c. 18, 1995). Finally , the insuranc e compa ny is often the “rea l party

in interest to the suit to the ex tent of its poli cy limit s.” Tuller, 886 P.2d at 484. Thus, knowledg e of the insurance agree ment is helpful to the plaintiff’s attorney “to prepa re for the case he has to me et and be apprised o f h i s re al adver sary .” J ohanek, 27 F .R.D. at 278. In these c ases, it is the insuranc e compa ny , rathe r than the defe ndant, that objects to the di sclosure of the pol icy and it s limit s. Tuller, 886 P.2d at 484. When it is i n the defe ndant’s interest to settle the c ase w ithin the policy limit s, the insuranc e compa ny may7

pref er to g amble on a jur

y verdic t of non-liability “whe re the only one who stands to lose from that g ambl e is t

he po lic y ho lde r. ” Szarm a c k v . We lc h, 31 8 A.2 d 707 , 7 10 (P a . 1 97 4) . T hu s, it i s benef icial to both the plaintiff and the def endant to eng ag e in “pur

poseful discussions of settlement,” J ohanek, 27 F.R.D. at 278, and “[ a]llowing di scover y in such circumstance s apprises the pa rties of information nec essar

y to produce results fair

to both sides,” Tuller, 886 P.2d at 484. Conclusion We hold that information conce rningthe def endants’ liability

in s u ranc e cove rag e is not su bje c t to dis c ov e ry

un de r Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 26 .0 2 b e c a us e it i s n e ith e r a dmi ssi ble nor do es i t ap p ea r t o be re asonably calc ulated to lead to the disc overy of admissible evidenc e. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the appe llant, J ames G. Thoma s, and his surety , for whic h execution m ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, C HIEF JUSTI CE