[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 13

- 14216 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 4:13

- cr - 00025

- RH

- CAS

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus JAMIE LEE WAMBLES, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida

________________________ (May 7, 2014) Before CARNES , Chief Judge, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 13-14216 Date Filed: 05/07/2014 Page: 1 of 42 Jamie Wambles appe als his convictions for making false threats to use a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1)(A). He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, contending that more than 70 non

excludable days elapsed from the time of his arraignm ent on March 26, 2013, to the start of his trial on June 10, 2013

. “We review a claim under the Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district court’s factual determinations on excludable time for clear error .” United States v. Mathurin , 690 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012). The Act specifies that a defendant’s trial must commence with in 70 days of the filing of the indic tment or his arraignment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Certain events, however, are excluded from the 70

- day time limit, including any “delay resulting from [a] pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the h earing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D). “In calculating includable time, both the date on which an event occurs or a motion is filed and the date on which the court disposes of a motion are excluded.” United
States v. Yunis , 723 F.2d 795, 797 (11th Cir. 1984). If the defendant is not brought to trial within 70 non

- excludable days of the relevant triggering date, the district court must dismiss the indictment upon the defendant’s motion. Id. § 3162(a)(2). Case: 13-14216 Date Filed: 05/07/2014 Page: 2 of 43 In this case, there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The 70

- day time limit began to run on March 27, 2013, the day after Wambles was arraigned on his indictment. See Yunis , 723 F.2d at 797 ( holding that “the date of the indictment and the date of arraignment are excluded” from the speedy trial calculation). Thirty

- seven days of non

- excludable time passed before Wambles , on May 3, 2013, filed a pretrial motion for an in camera inquiry regarding the appointment of substitute counsel, which was denied four days later foll owing a hearing on that motion. The date on which Wambles’ motion was filed, the days leading up to the motion hearing, and the date of the hearing itself

— five days in total

— were all
excluda ble under the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); Yunis , 723 F.2d at 797. Even without any o ther excludable events , the 70

- day time limit would have expired on Sunday, June 9, 2013, the day before Wambles’ trial bega n. But because the last day of the p eriod fell on a Sunday, the speedy trial clock did not actually expire until Monday, June 10, 2013, t he very day the trial commenced

. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(C) (providing that if the la st day of a time period falls on a weekend or legal holiday, “t he period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday”); see also United States v. Skanes , 17 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, t he district court properly denied Wamble’s motion to dismiss the indictment, and his convictions are due to be affirmed.

Case: 13-14216 Date Filed: 05/07/2014 Page: 3 of 44 AFFIRMED. Case: 13-14216 Date Filed: 05/07/2014 Page: 4 of 4