United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Annual Report 2007

russia

Annual Report

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

May 2007
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Commissioners

Chair

 Felice D. Gaer

Vice Chairs 

Michael Cromartie

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Nina Shea

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl

Preeta D. Bansal

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput

Dr. Richard D. Land

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez

John V. Hanford, III, ex officio, non-voting member

Executive Director 

Joseph R. Crapa
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Staff

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Judith Ingram, Director of Communications

Holly Smithson, Director of Government Affairs

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration

Patricia Carley, Associate Director for Policy

Angela Stephens, Assistant Communications Director

Dwight Bashir, Senior Policy Analyst

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Senior Policy Analyst

Julia Kirby, Middle East Researcher

Mindy Larmore, East Asia Researcher

Tiffany Lynch, Research Assistant

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

Allison Salyer, Legislative Assistant

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

Christopher Swift, Researcher
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2007

The PRESIDENT

The White House

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, 

as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Felice D. Gaer

Chair 

Enclosure
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2007

Hon. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Secretary of State

Department of State

DEAR MADAME SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 

Sincerely, 

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Enclosure
russia

Hon. NANCY PELOSI

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representative

DEAR MS. PELOSI: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 

105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

 

Enclosure

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2007
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2007

Hon. ROBERT BYRD

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

DEAR MR. BYRD: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 

105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Felice D. Gaer

Chair 

 

Enclosure
ABOUT THE COMMISSION

The Commission is the first government commission 

in the world with the sole mission of reviewing and making 

policy recommendations on the facts and circumstances 

of violations of religious freedom globally. The Commission’s impact and success in accomplishing its mission is 

achieved through its efforts to bring advice and accountability to U.S. foreign policy in the promotion of religious 

freedom abroad. By providing reliable information and 

analysis, and careful and specific policy recommendations, 

the Commission provides the U.S. government and the 

American public with the tools necessary to promote this 

fundamental freedom throughout the world.

In the words of a key drafter of IRFA, the Commission 

was established for the purpose of ensuring “that the President and the Congress receive independent recommendations and, where necessary, criticism of American policy 

that does not promote international religious freedom.”1

The Commission, which began its work in May 1999, is 

not a part of the State Department and is independent from 

the Executive Branch.

The Commission is composed of 10 members. Three 

are appointed by the President. Three are appointed by 

the President pro tempore of the Senate, of which two are 

appointed upon the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader. Three are appointed by the Speaker of the House 

of Representatives, of which two are appointed upon the 

recommendation of the House Minority Leader. The 

system of appointments thus provides that leaders of 

the party in the White House appoint five voting 

members, and leaders of the other party appoint four. 

The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom serves ex officio as a non-voting member. 

Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise and experience in foreign affairs, human rights, religious freedom, 

and international law; the membership also reflects the 

religious diversity of the United States.

In June of 2006, Michael Cromartie completed his 

term as the Chair of the Commission, during which Felice 

D. Gaer and Nina Shea served as Vice Chairs. In July 2006, 

Felice D. Gaer became Chair, and Michael Cromartie, 

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, and Nina Shea became Vice 

Chairs. Commissioners serve a two-year term and can 

be reappointed. 

In carrying out its mandate, the Commission reviews 

information on violations of religious freedom as presented 

in the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices and its Annual Report on International 

Religious Freedom. The Commission also consults regularly with State Department and National Security Council 

officials, U.S. Ambassadors, and officials of foreign governments, as well as with representatives of religious communities and institutions, human rights groups, other nongovernmental organizations, academics, and other policy 

experts. It visits foreign countries to examine religious 

freedom conditions firsthand. The Commission also holds 

public hearings, briefings and roundtables.

The Commission has met with President George W. 

Bush and senior members of his Administration, including 

the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, 

to discuss its findings and recommendations. The Commission also briefs Members of Congress, U.S. Ambassadors, 

and officials from international organizations. In addition, 

the Commission testifies before Congress, participates 

with U.S. delegations to international meetings and 

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created 

by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor violations 

of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, 

as defined in IRFA and set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and related international instruments, and to give independent policy 

recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress.

1

 Congressional Record, S12999, November 12, 1998.
conferences, helps provide training to Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials, and advises the Administration and Members of Congress and their staff on executive 

and legislative initiatives. 

The Commission raises issues and brings its findings 

and recommendations to the American public through its 

public speaking activities, press conferences, other public 

events such as roundtables and briefings, its publications, 

Web site, and media outreach. During this reporting period 

the Commission’s activities were covered by the Christian 

Science Monitor, International Herald Tribune, Miami 

Herald, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, The Washington 

Post, The Washington Times, the wires, National Public 

Radio, and PBS, to name a few.

Commissioners reside throughout the United States, 

and the Commission has traveled around the country to 

hold public hearings, public meetings, and other activities 

to inform the American people of its work. 

While the work of the Commission is conducted year 

round, the Commission delivers an annual report of its 

policy recommendations in May to the President, the 

Secretary of State, and Congress. This report covers the 

period May 2006 – April 2007.
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

May 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: The Commission’s Role in Advancing Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Country Reports: AFRICA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Country Reports: EAST ASIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Country Reports: EUROPE AND EURASIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Belarus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Country Reports: THE MIDDLE EAST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181

Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Country Reports: SOUTH ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Bangladesh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Country Reports: WESTERN HEMISPHERE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Appendix 1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Appendix 3: International Human Rights Standards: Summary of Provisions on Freedom of Thought, Conscience, 

 and Religion or Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
The protection of freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief is deeply intertwined with 

other human rights and is a foundation of peaceful, stable, and vibrant societies. Increasingly, advancing religious freedom means promoting fair and non-discriminatory 

policies across the board, in political events such as elections, 

refugee policies, and government treatment of the non-governmental sector.

“(T)he issue of religious freedom is now understood to 

have a profound impact on our own political and national 

security interests as well as on political stability throughout 

the world,” Felice D. Gaer, the Commission chair, said in her 

testimony on the Department of State’s 2006 Annual Report 

on International Religious Freedom. “Religious freedom can 

neither flourish nor be protected in a vacuum, without being affected by the wider conditions for human rights in any 

given society,” Gaer said.

The wide range of activities of the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom in 2006 – 2007 reflects this 

understanding. Whether advocating vigorous implementation of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, pressing for free and fair elections in Bangladesh, demanding 

respect for the rights of those defending religious freedom 

in China and Vietnam, or analyzing Russia’s new legislation 

governing non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 

Commission is working to advance freedom of religion and 

the conditions necessary to protect it.

Policymakers have come to recognize the central place 

that religious freedom has not only in the area of advancing human rights but also in promoting accountability, 

conflict resolution, and reconciliation within societies. In 

approving the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), Congress determined that it would be the policy of 

the United States to use all appropriate tools in U.S. foreign 

policy to promote respect for this right.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom is an independent, bipartisan federal agency 

mandated by Congress through IRFA to advance freedom 

of religion or belief. It monitors international respect for 

religious freedom and makes recommendations to the 

President, State Department, and Congress on how best 

to ensure that people the world over are free to believe 

and manifest their belief, in accordance with international 

human rights norms.

This annual report reviews the Commission’s activities 

during the past year:

• describing conditions for religious freedom and related 

human rights in the countries of central concern to the 

Commission and highlighting key findings;

• presenting the Commission’s policy recommendations 

to ensure that the promotion of freedom of religion or 

belief becomes a more integral part of U.S. foreign policy, 

furthering our nation’s humanitarian as well as national 

security interests; and

• reporting on the actions the Commission has taken to 

raise public awareness of religious freedom violations, 

and summarizing the Commission’s efforts to keep Congress informed of religious freedom conditions throughout the world. 

Assessing the Status of Religious 

Freedom Firsthand

Every year, Commissioners visit foreign countries to examine 

threats to religious freedom and to learn about strategies to 

protect that freedom. During the current reporting period, 

delegations traveled to Russia and Turkey to examine the 

state management of religion. The trip to Russia was prompted in part by the introduction of a restrictive new law govern1

Introduction

Religious freedom can neither 

flourish nor be protected in a 

vacuum, without being affected 

by the wider conditions for human 

rights in any given society.

Felice D. Gaer, USCIRF Chair
2

ing NGOs, including religious groups, as well as the nation’s 

retreat from democracy. In the case of Turkey, the Commission wanted to examine more closely the relationship 

between religion and state and to learn more about religious 

freedom and related human right challenges encountered 

by the only overwhelmingly majority Muslim country on the 

European continent. 

Russia

The Commission delegation traveled to Russia in June 2006, 

visiting Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan, the capital 

of the Republic of Tatarstan, a region inhabited by nearly 

equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. It identified five 

major areas of concern:

• the rise in xenophobia and ethnic and religious intolerance, resulting in an increased number of violent attacks 

and other hate crimes, and the government’s failure to 

address the problem adequately;

• the Russian government’s challenge to international 

human rights institutions and its persistent claims that 

foreign funding of Russian human rights organizations 

constitutes illegitimate interference in Russia’s internal 

affairs;

• official actions related to countering terrorism that 

result in harassment of individual Muslims and Muslim 

communities;

• new amendments to the law on non-commercial organizations, including religious groups, which may be used 

to restrict severely their ability to function; and

• continued restrictions by Russian authorities on the 

exercise of freedom of religion or belief, particularly 

at the regional and local levels.

Upon the delegation’s return from Russia, the Commission issued a series of recommendations to the leaders 

of the Group of Eight, which Russia chaired in 2006 and 

which was convening a July summit in St. Petersburg. In 

December, the Commission published Policy Focus: Russia, 

which examined its religious freedom and other human 

rights concerns in-depth and offered a series of U.S. policy 

recommendations. In February 2007, it published the first 

independent legal analysis of Russia’s newly amended law 

on non-commercial organizations and urged the Russian 

government to rescind or significantly rework the legislation in order to minimize the adverse impact on NGOs, 

including religious groups. More information about the 

Commission’s findings from the trip and concerns surrounding the NGO law can be found in the chapter on the 

Russian Federation in this report.

Turkey

A Commission delegation visited Turkey in November. 

During its meetings in Istanbul and Ankara, the delegation 

looked into broader issues of democracy, human rights, 

rule of law, and civil liberties within Turkey, as well as associated questions of Turkey’s model of secularism and the 

relevance of the country’s accession negotiations with the 

European Union to all of these matters.

The delegation examined a number of problems that 

have been reported both for the majority Muslim community and for all of Turkey’s religious minorities. The delegation 

heard about the capacity of religious groups to gather and 

worship, but also about:

• restraints on Muslims’ ability to manifest their religious 

beliefs in public spaces; 

• state actions that effectively prevent religious minority 

communities from maintaining themselves, denying 

them full property rights, including the right to own and 

maintain property, and to train religious clergy; and

• incidents of anti-minority violence, especially against 

Greek Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants, as well as 

growing anti-Semitism in some sectors 

of the country.

The Commission’s report on Turkey can be found 

in the chapter that immediately follows this Introduction.

Keeping Congress Apprised of Religious 

Freedom Issues

Commissioners presented expert testimony at numerous 

congressional hearings during the reporting period, including an assessment of the religious freedom climate in 

Vietnam, Egypt, and Russia and an analysis of the impact 

of anti-conversion and blasphemy laws in the Middle East 

and South Asia.

Commission Chair Gaer testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on the broader problems of 

human rights protection in the Middle East and South Asia, 

as well as the state of religious freedom in Afghanistan. “Because the United States has been directly involved in the 

country’s political reconstruction, it has a special obligation 

to act vigorously, together with the Karzai government, to 

identify and remedy the systemic flaws which continue to 
3

undermine the progress of democracy and protection of 

internationally recognized human rights in Afghanistan,” 

Gaer told the Caucus. 

Gaer also testified before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe about the Commission 

delegation’s trip to Russia and its findings ahead of the July 

summit of the Group of Eight. 

Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea presented testimony on religious freedom conditions in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and specifically on the extent 

to which their governments perpetuate hatred against religious minorities and foster religious extremism through 

the education system, the official media, and other government policies. 

Commission Vice Chair Michael Cromartie testified 

on religious freedom and U.S. refugee policy. “Unlike other 

refugee applicants who face persecution due to a more 

external characteristic such as race, nationality, group 

membership or political opinion, religion-based refugees 

fled persecution for carrying a much less visible characteristic: faith, belief, and/or a way of life,” Cromartie told the 

House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 

International Operations. “The intangibles of religious faith 

make religion-based refugee claims the most difficult to 

prove for bona fide asylum seekers.” 

The Commission sponsored briefings for congressional staff on the situations in Russia, North Korea, and 

China, as well as on the plight of Iraqi refugees. One such 

briefing, held in May 2006, explored U.S. policy options on 

North Korean refugees in China. 

Over 30 separate pieces of legislation in the last0. Congress included Commission findings and recommendations 

on countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, 

Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. For example, the House 

of Representatives passed a resolution urging President 

George W. Bush to appoint a special envoy for Sudan. That 

official, Andrew Natsios, was appointed in September 2006.

Countries of Particular Concern and the 

Watch List

Among the Commission’s most important tasks is the 

annual recommendation to the Department of State of 

countries of particular concern or CPCs: countries whose 

governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and 

egregious violations of the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief. Once a country is so designated, the U.S. 

president is required by law to oppose the violations by 

taking actions specified in IRFA. The Commission emphasizes that under IRFA, CPC designation is just the beginning of diplomatic activity intended to promote freedom 

of religion or belief.

In this reporting period, the Commission recommends 

that the Secretary of State designate the following countries 

as CPCs: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi 

Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 

This report contains chapters detailing the status of religious freedom in each of those countries. 

The Commission also compiles a Watch List of countries that do not merit CPC designation but require close 

monitoring in an effort to improve conditions for the freedom of religion or belief. The Commission’s Watch List in this 

reporting period includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 

Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria. The Commission 

is concerned about the serious abuses in these countries and 

that the governments have either not halted repression and/

or violence against persons amounting to severe violations of 

freedom of religion, or failed to punish those responsible for 

perpetrating those acts. More information about the Commission’s recommendations can be found in this report. 

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Unlike other refugee applicants who face persecution due to a 

more external characteristic such as race, nationality, group membership 

or political opinion, religion-based refugees fled persecution for carrying 

a much less visible characteristic: faith, belief, and/or a way of life.

Michael Cromartie, USCIRF Vice Chair
4

Assessing U.S. Government Performance

In February 2007, the Commission issued a report card 

as follow-up to its congressionally-authorized 2005 study 

establishing that implementation of the Expedited Removal 

procedure, which allows U.S. border officials to quickly remove illegal aliens from the country, was seriously flawed. 

Some legitimate asylum seekers are being put at risk of being returned to countries where they faced repression and 

are being held in inappropriate, jail-like detention facilities 

pending review of their cases.

The report card, introduced by Commission Chair 

Gaer, noted that the relevant agencies, particularly the 

Department of Homeland Security, had not taken steps to 

address the serious problems identified in the study, which 

included recommendations on improving implementation 

of Expedited Removal. The overarching recommendation 

was to not expand Expedited Removal until the serious 

problems identified by the Commission study were 

resolved; yet the lead agency involved in the process, the 

Department of Homeland Security, expanded it from a portof-entry program to one that extends to all U.S. borders.

“Instead of refuge, asylum seekers all too often are 

coming up against bureaucratic walls and getting stuck in 

bureaucratic mazes,” Commissioner Preeta Bansal told a 

conference where the report card was presented in February. “Aliens without proper documents can be ordered deported without the benefit of consultation with an attorney 

or a hearing before an immigration judge.”

The Commission has played a leading role in efforts 

to encourage the U.S. government to increase resettlement options for members of vulnerable groups fleeing 

religious repression. In November 2006, the Commission 

urged the State Department to allow members of Iraqi 

religious minority groups who have fled Iraq to be given 

access to the U.S. Refugee Program. 

“Thousands of Iraqis are suffering and fleeing their 

country, and refugee protections should be available to all 

of them,” Commissioners Gaer and Archbishop Charles 

Chaput wrote in a December op-ed in The Washington 

Times. “Surely countries can make ‘room at the inn’ for 

these vulnerable people so badly in need of help.”

In February 2007, the State Department announced 

the formation of an Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced 

Persons Task Force to coordinate the work of U.S. agencies and international organizations involved in assisting 

and resettling refugees and internally displaced persons.

In a letter to Secretary of State Rice that same month, the 

Commission put forward a number of additional recommendations, including:

• developing strategies for protecting vulnerable religious 

minorities inside Iraq;

• urgently considering opening a priority category that 

would accelerate the processing of asylum applications 

from Iraqi minority members and would not require 

referral from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), which can be time-consuming;

• assuring UNHCR that it can count on the United States 

to play a leading role in contributing the resources 

necessary to preserve first asylum for Iraqis and provide 

resettlement places; and 

• urging that UNHCR take more active measures to ensure 

that the most vulnerable Iraqis in need of resettlement 

are identified and referred without undue delay.

The Commission has repeatedly expressed concern 

over inadequate training of consular and other Foreign Service Officers in refugee and resettlement issues. Commission staff have conducted training sessions on international 

religious freedom issues for immigration judges, the Board 

of Immigration Appeals, asylum officers, and other U.S. 

government officials involved in the asylum and refugee 

adjudication processes.

Raising Public Awareness

Over the past year, the Commission sponsored public 

discussions highlighting critical religious freedom concerns. In July 2006, together with Rep. Gary Ackerman, 

the Commission convened a town hall meeting in Flushing, New York, on human rights in North Korea. It used 

Instead of refuge, asylum seekers 

all too often are coming up against 

bureaucratic walls and getting 

stuck in bureaucratic mazes.

Preeta D. Bansal, USCIRF Commissioner
5

the occasion to issue the Korean-language version of its 

report, Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts 

of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 

Religion in North Korea.

In October, the Commission held a public forum on the 

scheduled 2007 elections in Bangladesh and on promoting 

democracy and protecting rights in a Muslim-majority country. During its February-March 2006 visit to Bangladesh, the 

Commission had heard concerns that members of religious 

minority communities might be excluded from the voter 

rolls, intimidated from voting, or targeted by anti-minority 

violence such as had followed the last national election in 

October 2001. Also in October, the Commission held a staff 

discussion with Ibrahim al-Mugaiteeb, president of Human 

Rights First Society, the only independent human rights 

group in Saudi Arabia.

Commissioner Gaer delivered an address as a member 

of the U.S. delegation to the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe in Warsaw, Poland, in October 2006. 

She highlighted religious freedom problems in formerly 

Soviet Central Asia, Turkey, Russia, and Belarus, and voiced 

the U.S. government’s concern over recently drafted and 

adopted religious laws in a number of countries. She also 

noted problems with official registration of religious communities, emphasizing that such registration “should not be 

used to discriminate or to unduly burden or repress peaceful religious practice.”

In December 2006, together with the National Endowment on Democracy, the Commission held a public panel 

discussion on the threat to civic and religious freedom in 

Russia. The discussion featured veteran Russian rights campaigner Ludmilla Alexeyeva, as well as the president of NED, 

Carl Gershman, and Commissioners Gaer and Cromartie.

The Commission brought together representatives of 

five religious communities in China and two NGO experts 

at a January 2007 hearing to review policy recommendations intended to reverse the increasing religious repression 

in China. “In the year before the Beijing Olympics, Chinese 

authorities have raised the stakes, drawing a line between 

‘normal’ religious activity and ‘illegal’ religious activity,” 

Gaer said at that hearing. “Those not deemed ‘normal’...face 

continued pressure, harassment, and arrest.” 

The Commission and the Woodrow Wilson Center for 

Scholars co-sponsored a discussion in February 2007 of 

a new survey of public opinion in Turkey on politics and 

religion. The discussion, in which Commissioners Gaer and 

Elizabeth H. Prodromou took part, focused on the findings 

of a recent country-wide poll by the Turkish Economic and 

Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).

Commissioner Bishop Ricardo Ramirez addressed a 

conference in Cape Town, South Africa, in March 2007 on 

“Combating Religious Hatred through the Freedom to Believe.” Ramirez told the conference, which was sponsored 

by the International Religious Liberty Association, about 

U.S. efforts to advance the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief around the world. “We don’t base 

our work solely on U.S. legislation but on the international 

human rights covenants that the vast majority of the international community has ascribed to,” Ramirez said. “So we 

push our own government to press other governments to 

live up to their commitments.”

Throughout the reporting period, the Commission 

held numerous public and private briefings and published 

Policy Focus studies on Russia, Sudan, and Bangladesh. It 

issued a series of press statements and op-eds on religious 

freedom and related human rights issues. In addition to 

Iraq, the op-eds published in 2006 addressed problems in 

Iran, China, and Pakistan. 

“The ability of Pakistan to build a sustainable democracy that is not a haven for terrorism depends on President Musharraf’s willingness to change his own country’s 

behavior when it comes to human rights and religious 

freedoms. It means limiting abusive actions and overbroad punishments by extremists, not encouraging them,” 

Commissioners Chaput and Prodromou wrote in 

a September op-ed in The Denver Post.

In an op-ed published in the New York Sun in April, 

Commissioners Gaer and Cromartie stressed that the U.S.-

China relationship is about more than trade and security, 

and that the Chinese government must understand that 

the state cannot regulate thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

I N T R O D U C T I O N
Ortakoy Mosque, Istanbul
T 7

urkey is located at a geographic, cultural, and 

religious crossroads. The country bridges the 

West and the East, Europe and Asia, and the 

Christian and Muslim worlds. By many standards modern, 

Western, and democratic, Turkey is also the only overwhelmingly majority Muslim country on the European continent. 

Since its founding as a republic in 1923, Turkey has struggled, with mixed results, to build a democratic polity where 

human rights, including religious freedom, are protected. 

Turkey’s political leaders have intensified efforts to deepen 

and substantively expand the country’s democratic reforms 

and human rights, driven by the pursuit of membership in 

the European Union (EU); however, it has encountered a 

number of difficulties, particularly with regard to religious 

freedom, that reflect the tensions and constraints that were 

built into the fabric of the country’s founding. As Turkey 

confronts these tensions, questions have been raised, both in 

and outside Turkey, about whether Turkey should continue 

on its current reform path. Many experts argue that Turkey is 

at a critical juncture in its history. 

The Commission traveled to Turkey in November 

2006 to learn more about the country’s experiences with 

religious freedom and other human rights, and to examine 

more closely the relationship between religion and the 

state. The Commission visit also addressed broader issues 

of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and civil liberties 

within Turkey, as well as associated questions of Turkey’s 

model of secularism and the relevance of the country’s EU 

accession negotiations to all of these matters. While in Turkey, the Commission met with Turkish government officials 

from the Foreign Ministry, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar), 

and the Ministry of Education, as well as several members 

of Turkey’s parliament and representatives of a variety of 

political parties not seated in the parliament. Additionally, 

the Commission met with representatives of the country’s 

Muslim majority and minority communities, as well as 

non-Muslim minority communities. The delegation also 

met with academics, journalists, legal advocates, members 

of the business community, and representatives of human 

rights organizations.

According to the EU’s November 10, 2006 Progress 

Report on Turkey, “freedom of worship continues to be 

generally respected” in Turkey.1

 Throughout the visit, the 

Commission noted the extent to which people of almost 

every tradition in Turkey confirmed that they were free 

to gather and worship as provided for in the country’s 

constitution. However, the Commission also encountered 

restrictions on religious freedom in Turkey, including for 

the majority Sunni Muslim community and minority Muslim Alevis; for the “Lausanne minorities,” that is, the Greek 

and Armenian Orthodox and Jews; and for other Christian 

minorities, including Assyrian Orthodox, Roman Catholics, 

and Protestants. For Muslims, there are restraints on the 

ability to manifest their religious beliefs in state institutions; 

for religious minority communities, there are state policies 

and actions that effectively prevent them from sustaining 

themselves, denying them the right to own property as a 

community, to maintain that property, to train religious 

clergy, and to offer religious education above high school. 

This has led to the decline—and some cases, virtual disappearance—of some of these religious minorities on lands 

they have inhabited for millennia.

Turkey’s constitution establishes the country as a 

“secular state,” according to the policy of “secularism” 

as defined by the country’s founder and first president, 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who defined secularism in terms 

of the French policy of laïcité. During the visit, the Commission noted the way in which many Turks are reclaiming 

their identity as Muslims as well as Turks. It became clear 

that these two currents in Turkey—the country’s policy of 

secularism and the growing sense of Muslim identity—are 

among the premier political issues in Turkey today. It was 

also clear that the struggle between these two currents is 

TURKEY

Many experts argue that Turkey 

is at a critical juncture in its history.
8

indicative of Turkey’s position at the juncture of the Eastern 

and Western worlds—and is a crucial factor in the future of 

human rights protections in Turkey.

In March 2001, the EU officially adopted the Accession 

Partnership as a roadmap for the process of Turkey’s bid to 

join that body. As a part of that endeavor, the Turkish government has been required to implement numerous reforms to 

ensure that its laws are consistent with EU standards. In the 

past several years, Turkey has taken significant positive steps 

toward passing new legislation to bring its laws into conformity with EU legislation. However, more remains to be done 

and clearly, certain religious freedom problems, some of 

them very serious, persist in Turkey. 

Demographic Information

Turkey has a population of approximately 70 million people. 

According to government statistics, the population is 98-99 

percent Muslim, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. 

There are an estimated 7-10 million Alevis in Turkey (estimates vary from 4.5 to 18 million), considered by some to be 

a sect of Shi’a Islam but who also incorporate Zoroastrian or 

other pre-Islamic elements. The Turkish state identifies the 

Alevis as heterodox Muslims, although some elements of 

the Sunni community consider the Alevis to be a heretical 

offshoot of Islam. Three religious groups, Greek Orthodox 

Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews, are 

specifically recognized by the state as religious minority 

communities pursuant to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (see 

below). Today, there are thought to be approximately 65,000 

Armenian Orthodox, 23,000 Jews, and 2,500 Greek Orthodox 

in Turkey. In addition, there are approximately 15,000 Syriac 

Christians, 10,000 Baha’is, 5,000 Yezidis, 3,300 Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 3,000 Protestant Christians, with smaller numbers 

of Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, 

and Maronite Christians. A number of the Christian communities, including the Greek, Armenian, and Syrian Orthodox, 

lived on the land that is now Turkey for centuries before the 

arrival of the Turkic peoples to the region from Central Asia.

Constitutional Provisions on Religious 

Practice and the Policy of Secularism

Article 24 of Turkey’s Constitution clearly lays out the protections for religious freedom. This Article states that “(1) 

Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious 

belief and conviction; (2) Acts of worship, religious services, 

and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that 

they do not violate the provisions of Article 14;2

 and (3) No 

one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and 

convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions. This Article also governs religious education by stating that (4) Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State 

supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture 

and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula 

of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own 

desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their 

legal representatives.

In July 1923, Turkey, together with France, Great 

Britain, Greece, and Italy, signed the Treaty of Lausanne 

to delineate Turkey’s borders with Greece and Bulgaria.3

 

Articles 38-44 of the Treaty contain guarantees for religious 

freedom and equal protection of the law, as well as prohibitions on discrimination. These articles also provide specific 

protections for non-Muslim religious communities in Turkey and for the freedom of those communities to establish 

charitable and religious institutions and schools. According 

to Article 37, the signatories to the Treaty accept that these 

protections are to be recognized as fundamental laws and 

the Turkish state, as with other Treaty signatories, “undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 

shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, 

no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere 

with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor 

official action prevail over them.” 

Secularism as practiced in 

Turkey does not reflect a separation 

but is instead based on state 

control over religious activity 

expressed in the public sphere in 

order to guard against that which 

Ataturk was distrustful of—

the unchecked influence of religion 

on state policies and institutions.
The Policy of Secularism 9

A hallmark of the Constitution was its establishment of Turkey as a secular state, and every constitution since then has 

reiterated secularism as a defining feature of the Turkish 

state. The Preamble states that “[...] as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever 

of the sacred religious feelings in State affairs and politics...” 

Article 2 (states) that “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity 

and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism 

of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in 

the Preamble.” Secularism is underlined once more in Article 24, the provision that outlines religious freedom rights 

by noting that (5) No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse 

religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal 

or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the 

State on religious tenets.”

Turkey’s concept of secularism was built on Ataturk’s 

conviction that religion was the primary reason for the Ottoman Empire’s lag in modernization relative to Europe. 

Consequently, Ataturk and Turkey’s subsequent political 

leaders were determined to remove the influence of religion, including even indications of personal belief, from 

public life in Turkey and to subject religion to state control. 

To accomplish this aim, Ataturk instituted a series of domestic reforms, first and foremost separating the political 

process and workings of the government from the Islamic 

religion—the religion of the majority of Turkey’s citizens—all the while retaining state control of religious institutions. He abolished religious courts and replaced them 

with secular ones, changed the alphabet for the Turkish 

language from a modified Arabic to the Latin script, purged 

the Turkish language of many Arabic and Persian words, 

insisted that the Koran be translated into and read in Turkish, and decreed that the call to prayer be in Turkish rather 

than Arabic.4

 In addition, in March 1924, Ataturk abolished 

the office of the Caliphate, or titular leader of the Muslim 

world, a position that had been held by the Ottoman sultan 

since the 16th century.

Separation or State Control of Religion? The Role 

of the Diyanet and Ministry of Education

During the Commission’s visit to Turkey, it soon became 

clear that the Turkish government’s concept of secularism 

is something altogether different from the American version of separation of religion and state. Secularism as practiced in Turkey does not reflect a separation but is instead 

based on state control over religious activity expressed 

in the public sphere in order to guard against that which 

Ataturk was distrustful of—the unchecked influence of religion on state policies and institutions. The state carries out 

this management role with regard to the majority Muslim 

community through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or 

the Diyanet. The state, through the Diyanet, controls and 

supervises the religious institutions of the Sunni Muslim 

population, managing all 80,000 mosques in Turkey and 

employing all imams as state functionaries. In official 

terms, the Diyanet “is a public institution in the general 

administration, and is responsible for the execution of the 

duties specified in the special law in order to provide national unity and solidarity, and remain separate from all political views and thoughts in accordance with the principle 

of secularism. These duties in the related law are as follows: 

to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and 

ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, 

and administer the sacred worshipping places.”5

 Ali Bardakoglu, the current Director General of the 

Diyanet, explained to the Commission that secularism is an 

important safeguard for freedom of religion in Turkey. The 

existence of the Diyanet, he noted, which operates independently of the government, does not mean government 

intervention in religious affairs; in fact, there are times when 

the positions of the Diyanet conflict with those of the government. Although salaries of religious officials are paid from 

the state budget and mosques are constructed and mainT UR KEY

Interior of Istanbul’s Blue Mosque
10

tained with state monies, mosques may also be built, with 

state permission, as a result of local initiative. 

According to Hasan Huseyin Baysal, Deputy General for 

Religious Education in the Ministry of Education, during the 

Ottoman period, there were religious schools, or madrassas, in which theology was the only subject taught. Other 

subjects (such as science) were offered in separate schools. 

In 1924, the Law for the Unification of Schools brought 

all schools, including religious schools, together under 

the Ministry of National Education. There were two kinds 

of religious education: one to train religious officials, for 

which 24 schools, known as imam hatip high schools, were 

established; and another to teach all students religious 

knowledge and ethics within the principle of secularism. 

Until 1982, the latter was an elective. In that year, the constitution was changed so that religious education (the cultural and ethical dimensions of Islam) became compulsory 

in primary and secondary schools for Muslims, both Sunnis 

and non-Sunnis. According to the Deputy Minister, nonMuslims may opt out of this religious education.

Secularism and Political Parties

According to Article 68 of the Constitution, political parties 

based on religion are banned. This Article states that “the 

statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be in conflict with the independence 

of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and 

nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule 

of law, sovereignty of the nation, or the principles of the 

democratic and secular republic.” Over the decades, political parties that aimed to confront the state’s definition of 

secularism were regularly suppressed or banned. Nevertheless, the absence of religion from public life remained controversial for some Turks and in 1950, the Democrat Party, 

which was less rigid on government policies of religious 

expression for Muslims, won the country’s first free parliamentary elections. The Turkish military, which is constitutionally identified as the guardian of Ataturk’s expression 

of secularism, became alarmed about this and other policies of the Democrat Party government and staged a coup 

against it in 1960. The military staged coups two more times 

in Turkey’s politics to oust governments: in 1971 and 1980, 

the latter time primarily because of the left vs. right factional battles that were leaving dozens dead daily also because 

the military determined that the policy of secularism was 

under threat. In the 1990s, the Refah (Welfare) Party, which 

also aimed to confront the state’s definition of secularism, 

gained a plurality in the polls, but was “maneuvered” out 

of power by the military in 1997 in what was termed a “soft 

coup” and forced to disband.

Turkey’s current governing party, the Justice and Development Party (known by its initials in Turkish, the AKP, 

or the AK Party), has roots in the Refah Party and Turkey’s 

current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, served two 

terms as Mayor of Istanbul under Refah. The AK Party won 

a majority 34 percent of the vote in national elections in 

November 2002, campaigning on a platform of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the reintegration of Islam into public 

life in a manner consistent with modernity and democracy. 

Although the military had previously jailed Erdogan and 

banned him from politics because of his public recitation of 

a poem that included references to Islam, the national election results and the discredited leadership of the country’s 

center-right parties led the military to permit Erdogan to 

assume the position of Prime Minister in early 2003. At that 

time, Erdogan stated that he wanted to promote democracy 

in Turkey and within that context, to institute a more liberal 

understanding of secularism. In particular, he suggested 

canceling the ban on wearing headscarves in state institutions (see below), though he also stated his opposition to 

state enforcement of Islamic dress codes. He later proposed 

a bill to ease the entry of imam hatip school graduates into 

Muslims are prohibited from wearing certain kinds of religious garb 

in state institutions, including government offices, the parliament,

 judicial buildings, and both public and private universities.
11

universities in Turkey, with the alleged aim of enabling 

more religious school attendees to take jobs in the state bureaucracy. This legislation was opposed by the military and 

shelved. At the same time, the AK Party platform contained 

strong support for Turkey’s integration into the global 

economy and alignment with the West. Prime Minister 

Erdogan also declared it the policy of his government actively to seek membership in the EU and in pursuit of this 

aim, he has instituted a number of democratic reforms, 

many of which have dealt with some of Turkey’s most 

notoriously undemocratic practices. 

Observers both in and outside Turkey have conflicting 

views about the true aims of the AK Party government. Some 

judge the party to be a genuinely moderate, religiously-oriented party that espouses Islamic religious values but that 

would also like to see Turkey take its place as a democratic 

society within Europe. Others, however, contend that the AK 

Party is skillfully masking its more radical intentions, including the eventual introduction of Islamic law in Turkey. There 

were similarly mixed views about the AK Party among those 

with whom the Commission met during its visit to Turkey.

One noted academic suggested that the AK Party represented the growing political influence of people in Turkey who 

had for decades not been adequately represented by Turkey’s 

other political parties. Another told the Commission that 

Muslims in the AK Party have changed their rhetoric so that 

they are now more outwardly concerned about human rights 

and universal values, but that it is difficult to know whether 

their intentions are tactical or sincere. One journalist and 

academic suggested that the AK Party reflects the fact that 

there is a greater plurality within Islam, within Muslims’ 

expression of Islam, in Turkey today compared to the past.

Those who saw the AK Party as genuine in its stated 

aims pointed to the AK government’s efforts to implement 

far-reaching democratic reforms in the EU bid. Those expressing suspicion of AK pointed to the AK government’s 

initiatives, for example, to criminalize adultery and assist 

graduates of religious or imam hatip schools in entering 

universities. General concerns about religious extremism were also reinforced by the May 2006 shooting by an 

Islamist activist of a number of judges from the Council 

of State, the country’s chief administrative court, an attack that killed one and wounded four others. One of 

the wounded judges had reportedly been criticized for 

ruling against teachers wearing headscarves and had received death threats in the past. Erdogan immediately 

condemned the attack. Concerns have also been raised 

about the AK Party’s reported attempt to interfere with the 

process of appointing judges to the country’s highest court 

of appeals and the high administrative court. In March 

2007, it was reported that the Supreme Board of Judges and 

Prosecutors in Turkey held a press conference at which 

members of the judiciary protested what they argued was 

the Erdogan government’s obstruction of judicial appointments in order eventually to fill these positions with judges 

with an Islamist legal perspective.

T UR KEY

Ali Bardakoglu, President of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet), with USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer (center), Commissioner 

Preeta D. Bansal (far right) and a translator.
12

 During the visit to Turkey, Commissioners persistently raised the issue of whether the state imposition of 

religious law represents a threat in contemporary Turkey.

Regardless of their views on the true aims of the AK Party, 

few with whom the Commission met expressed the concern that the full imposition of sharia was a serious threat, 

because they believed that secularism, in some form, 

was too ingrained in and accepted by the vast majority 

of Turks. However, the issue of whether aspects of sharia 

might, over time, become state policy was not explicitly 

discussed. Several persons in Turkey noted that the military nonetheless remains suspicious of the AK Party government and its intentions; however, virtually all of those 

with whom the delegation met expressed the conviction 

that any attempt on the part of the military to interfere 

with normal democratic practices would substantially 

set back Turkey’s democratic reform process and be 

disastrous for the country’s EU membership bid. The 

matter was to have come to a head during the 2007 presidential election, when Erdogan was expected be elected 

to that post by his party in Parliament. This move was 

reportedly firmly opposed by those who protect the policy 

of secularism as it currently exists in Turkey, as they 

feared that an Erdogan presidency would lead to the state 

enforcement of the AK Party’s religious views. In the end, 

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was nominated as 

the AK Party’s candidate for president.

Religious Freedom in Practice: The Negative 

Impact of Turkey’s Brand of Secularism and 

Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities 

The Commission met with representatives of eight religious 

communities in Turkey, including seven minority religious 

communities. Although there were reports of serious problems regarding the opening, maintaining, and operation 

of houses of worship, as well as state expropriation of such 

properties without compensation, few reported problems 

regarding freedom to gather and worship. According to the 

U.S. State Department, there are no religious prisoners in 

Turkey and no group reported serious problems involving 

religious literature or the right to assemble and express their 

beliefs.6

 Moreover, virtually all groups also mentioned that 

conditions for religious freedom had improved in the past 

decade and particularly in the past several years as a result 

of the reforms undertaken by the current government during 

the EU accession process. For example, representatives of the 

Alevi and Protestant communities noted that they had been 

able to open foundations in recent years that provide them 

with a number of legal opportunities that had been unavailable in the past. In addition to worship services, a number of 

religious minorities operate schools, hospitals, and a variety 

of charitable organizations. Several persons the delegation 

met with claimed that Turkey’s Ottoman past was a source 

for the relative tolerance, compared to neighboring Muslim 

countries, of freedom of worship in Turkey.

Despite these positive conditions for the freedom to 

practice, there are other significant problems in Turkey that 

seriously affect religious freedom for members of both the 

majority and minority groups. Muslims are prohibited from 

wearing certain kinds of religious garb in state institutions, 

including government offices, the parliament, judicial buildings, and both public and private universities. Religious 

minority communities, despite the rights their members do 

enjoy, are not recognized as legal entities in Turkey, resulting in serious difficulties for these groups and endless legal 

wrangling over property rights and the ability to train clergy 

and select leaders for future generations. Although some of 

these concerns have been addressed through the EU accession reform packages, many are still to be resolved. 

The Commission understood from 

its visit to Turkey that due to 

this persistent tug of war between those

 promoting Ataturk’s secularist legacy 

and those pressing for greater expression 

of popular religious symbols and clothing, 

the “headscarf issue” is, without doubt, 

the most politically and popularly 

charged issue in Turkey today, one

 that each side now views as a 

“zero-sum” matter, leaving little room 

for a reasonable compromise.
13

The Sunni Muslim Community

Many of the Commission’s interlocutors contended that 

secularism in Turkey as defined and instituted by Ataturk 

has resulted in a marked suspicion on the part of the Turkish state of religious piety and certain outward, public 

displays of religious adherence. Most of those with such 

views pointed to the government’s control of Sunni religious practice in Turkey, symbolized most pointedly 

by the state’s ban on the wearing of headscarves, which 

some—though clearly not all—observant Muslims believe 

is a religious obligation, in state buildings, including both 

public and private universities.7

 Some in Turkey claimed 

that secularism as applied there amounted in certain instances almost to a repression of religion, clearly resulting 

in religious freedom violations. One academic pointed out 

that most people in Turkey do not disagree with secularism—understood as the separation of religion from the 

workings of the state. However, he continued, some people 

do take issue with the form of secularism that is enforced in 

their country, a form that involves considerable state control over, and limitations on, religious expression. 

Women who wear headscarves or those who advocate 

for the right to wear them have lost their jobs in the public 

sector, including as doctors, lawyers, nurses, and teachers, 

and students who wear headscarves are not officially permitted to register for university classes. Women in headscarves 

are also not permitted to get a university education at any 

private institutions. In practical terms, the prohibition on 

public displays of religion in state institutions means that 

a Muslim woman who believes that religious observance 

requires a head covering must choose between obtaining 

a university education in Turkey or following her religious 

principles and practices. In addition, members of the military have been charged with “lack of discipline” for performing Muslim prayers or being married to women who wear 

headscarves. Some individuals also reported that members 

of the government whose wives wear headscarves—including the current prime minister—are not allowed to bring 

their wives to official receptions.

Many persons with whom the delegation met in Turkey noted that Ataturk’s secularist reforms, while dramatic 

and far-reaching, were a top-down phenomenon, rather 

than a natural progression arising from popular sentiments. Several persons suggested that those who back 

secularism in Turkey in its current form have an inaccurate understanding of what the policy is, since they see 

any kind of religious observance as a threat or a cause for 

suspicion, including such central practices as praying on 

Fridays or observing Ramadan. One person noted that 

because those that enforce this strict interpretation of secularism appear to have scorn for observant Muslims, the 

result is that observant Muslims are led to distrust and, in 

the worst-case scenario, even spurn secularism. 

However, state and societal groups committed to secularism expressed repeatedly to the Commission that state 

control over religion is the only feasible policy for guarding 

against Islamist extremism in state institutions and society 

as a whole. Some who support the headscarf ban do so on 

the principle that they are protecting the rights of women, 

protecting them from societal and, in the worst instance, 

state pressure and coercion to conform to someone else’s 

religious standards, rather than freely to choose what to 

wear in fulfillment of one’s religious beliefs. Still others do so 

because they view the headscarf as a political symbol linked 

to what they see as an Islamist political platform which 

seeks to interlink the dominant religion in Turkey with all 

aspects of public life and governance. Supporters of the ban 

contend that those who oppose the headscarf ban have not 

satisfactorily addressed the fear of many women that wearing a scarf could become mandatory, and indeed, that all 

persons in Turkey will be subject to religion-based laws that 

will be determined by clerics, rather than laws determined 

through the democratic process. 

The headscarf controversy in Turkey was brought to the 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by Turkish citizen 

Leyla Sahin, a medical student who in 1998 was 

expelled from her state university for wearing a headscarf. In 2004 and again in a 2005 Grand Chamber decision 

(16-1), the ECtHR held that the university’s prohibition of 

the headscarf did not violate the European Convention on 

Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR ruling cited the Turkish 

Constitutional Court’s finding that secularism’s constitutional status in Turkey functions as a guarantor of freedom of 

religion and equality before the law, and in view of Turkey’s 

history, the wearing of headscarves at universities could be 

viewed as an assault on the country’s secular and democratic 

underpinnings. Under Article 9 of the Convention, freedom 

to manifest one’s religion can be restricted if necessary to 

preserve the country’s secular and democratic foundations.

It was also decided that the headscarf in the Turkish context 

is often presented by some as a compulsory religious duty 

and form of expression, and as such, it may have a coercive 

T UR KEY
14

impact on students who choose not to wear it. Others present it as “a symbol of political Islam” in a “debate that has 

taken on political overtones.” Imposing limitations in this 

sphere may, therefore, be permissible in order to preserve 

the secular nature of the universities, thus protecting the 

rights and freedoms of others, as well as public order, both 

being “legitimate aims.” The court noted that “Article 9 does 

not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion 

...” and concluded that “it is established that institutions of 

higher education may regulate the manifestation of the rites 

and symbols of a religion by imposing restrictions as to the 

place and manner of such manifestation with the aim of 

ensuring peaceful co-existence between students of various 

faiths and thus protecting public order and the beliefs of 

others.” The policy was also in compliance with Article 2 of 

the First Protocol, because the restriction did not impair “the 

essence of the applicant’s right to education.”

The Commission understood from its visit to Turkey 

that due to this persistent tug of war between those promoting Ataturk’s secularist legacy and those pressing for greater 

expression of popular religious symbols and clothing, the 

“headscarf issue” is, without doubt, the most politically and 

popularly charged issue in Turkey today, one that each side 

now views as a “zero-sum” matter, leaving little room for a 

reasonable compromise. One interlocutor suggested that 

one form of compromise could be to allow headscarves at 

universities, but maintain the ban in state buildings. He 

contended that this would alleviate the need for a woman 

to be denied an education because of her professed religious obligation and would maintain the absence of religious garb in public buildings.

The “Dönme”

The Dönme are Muslims who are also descendants of the 

Jewish followers of a self-proclaimed messiah, Sabbatai 

Sebi (or Zevi, 1626-76), who was forced by the Ottoman 

sultan to convert to Islam in 1666. Their doctrine includes 

Jewish and Islamic elements, although they consider 

themselves Muslims and are officially recognized as such. 

Their name is the Turkish word for convert (it comes from 

the Turkish verb “dönmek,” which means to turn or return) but it carries negative overtones of turncoat as well. 

Many among the Dönme kept up their original Jewish 

traditions through the centuries and are still known as 

having Judaism somewhere in their history. Though this 

community had experienced discrimination in the past in 

Turkey, in the 1980s and 1990s, overt discrimination had 

lessened, and intermarriage between Dönme and other 

Muslims grew more common.

 In the past few years, however, several observers have 

noted the emergence of a campaign against the Dönme that 

has involved criticism of their not being “real” or “good” 

Muslims—and, it is implied, not good Turks (insinuating that 

this is because there is Judaism in their backgrounds). This 

campaign of intimidation, which was confirmed by several 

of the delegation’s interlocutors during the visit to Turkey, 

is reportedly coming from political actors who, for political 

gain, wish to call into question the patriotism of their opponents. Several in Turkey confirmed that the Dönme in Turkey 

are subject to a wide variety of conspiracy theories and other 

attempts to malign them, and that the intimidation has been 

carried out within a wider pattern of rising anti-Semitism in 

Turkey in the last decade. To date, the government has done 

little or nothing to stem this pattern.

Problems for Religious Minorities

The consequences of some of Turkey’s state policies toward 

religion have been particularly detrimental for religious 

minorities. These include the Greek, Armenian, and Syrian Orthodox communities, the Roman and Syriac Catholics, and the Jewish community, who together making 

up around 1 percent of the population, and the Alevis, a 

syncretic sect of Islam representing Turkey’s largest religious minority. Several persons in Turkey pointed out that 

The late Hrant Dink (center), who edited Agos, an Armenian-Turkish 

weekly, with Commissioners Elizabeth H. Prodromou and Michael 

Cromartie in November 2006. Dink was assassinated Jan. 19, 2007, 

allegedly by a 17-year-old Turkish ultranationalist.
15

in addition to the inauguration of Ataturk’s conception of 

secularism, the establishment of the Turkish state in the 

aftermath of occupation by Allied powers with co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire had left an historical memory 

of fear—several of those the delegation spoke to used the 

word “paranoia”—of the possibility for contemporary dismemberment of Turkey. Thus, built into the founding of 

Turkish identity was the implicit understanding that citizens other than ethnic Turks residing in Turkey are potentially suspect, since they allegedly harbor a secret desire to 

secede from and hence, dismember the country. This fear 

of dismemberment, which has fueled a strain of virulent 

nationalism in Turkey, continues to hold sway in some sectors of society, resulting in state policies that actively undermine ethnic and minority religious communities, and, in 

some cases, threaten their very existence. The Commission 

learned in meetings that the Greek Orthodox and Armenian 

Orthodox communities are focal points for this perception 

and its resultant policies.

The January 2007 murder of Hrant Dink, a Turkish citizen and respected journalist of Armenian ethnicity, is just 

one example of the persistence of this extreme nationalism. 

Mr. Dink, with whom the Commission met on its visit to 

Turkey, had been convicted under Article 301 of the Turkish 

Penal Code for “insulting” the Turkish state because of his 

use of the term “Armenian genocide” in his public remarks 

and written publications. His conviction was converted to a 

suspended sentence following EU and other international 

pressure. Dink told members of the Commission that he 

continued to receive numerous death threats in the face of 

his discussion of issues of religious and political freedom 

considered by the Turkish government to be controversial. 

Prime Minister Erdogan quickly condemned the murder 

and the alleged perpetrator was promptly arrested. In addition, at a public meeting in New York in February 2007, 

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul stated that the government 

had plans to amend Article 301. During the Commission’s 

visit, the issue of the Armenian genocide was not raised by 

any interlocutors, but the continued refusal of the Turkish 

government to recognize the event continues to be a source 

of controversy in Turkey’s relations with other Western 

countries, including the United States.

Alevis

Alevis are a minority Muslim community in Turkey that 

make up anywhere from 15 to 25 percent of the population, though they are not recognized as an official minority by the state. The beliefs and practices of the Alevis are 

described in many, often contradictory, ways and even 

today, remain somewhat obscure. Though they are sometimes erroneously referred to as “Turkey’s Shi’as,” in fact, 

the Alevis are an offshoot of Shiism that many Sunnis—and 

Shi’as—view as heretical. The beliefs of the Alevis incorporate aspects of both Shi’a and Sunni Islam, as well as other, 

more ancient traditions found in Anatolia, and also include 

some mystical aspects of Sufism. Some more militant 

Sunnis do not regard the Alevis as Muslims. 

The Alevis have generally been supporters of the policy 

of secularism in Turkey, as they have sometimes been fearful, in view of their perceived heterodoxy, that they will 

be discriminated against by any Sunni-oriented political 

authority. In fact, according to a representative of the Alevi 

community with whom the Commission met, as part of the 

general suspicion of “the other,” until 1990, the word “Alevi” 

was not spoken in Turkey by state officials; the existence of 

the Alevis was not acknowledged until then. Since 1990, he 

noted, there has been progress for Alevis in Turkey.

Alevis do not worship in mosques but in what are 

called “gathering places” (or “cem evleri,” in Turkish). Technically, however, cem houses are not officially recognized 

as houses of worship, and are usually officially referred to 

as “cultural centers.” Alevis are reportedly able to practice 

their beliefs relatively freely and build cem evleri, though 

there are cases in which Alevis have been denied permission to build a house for gathering purposes. According to 

an Alevi leader, obstacles to building new cem evleri include 

long delays—often lasting years—on building requests. 

Nevertheless, he noted, building cem evleri has become 

easier today than in the past. Another form of discrimination involves the fact that none of the budget of the Diyanet

goes to the Alevis, as it is all reserved for the Sunni community. Alevis also reported experiencing harassment and 

discrimination in other aspects of life. 

Alevi children are subject to the same compulsory 

religious education as all Muslims, which, Alevis contend—

and Ministry of Education officials confirmed—involves 

instruction only about Sunni Islam. (Since Alevis are considered by the state to be Muslims, they are not able to opt 

out of this compulsory education.) According to the Alevi 

representative, Alevis are trying to use the judicial system 

to address this problem and currently have more than 4,000 

court cases before the Ministry of Education. Several years 

ago, a member of the Alevi community in Turkey took this 

issue before the ECtHR, which has not yet issued a ruling 

T UR KEY
16

on the matter. The Turkish government had pledged—as 

early as 2004—to introduce instruction about Alevism into 

the school curriculum, but the Commission did not receive 

a definitive response to questions about whether or not this 

reform has been implemented. 

It should be noted, however, that conversations with 

others in the Alevi community revealed a certain ambivalence about the effort to seek Diyanet funding or to include 

instruction about Alevism into the state’s religion classes. 

Some are clearly in favor; others, however, fear that such 

state involvement and/or inclusion in the education system 

would lead to greater assimilation of Alevis into, or co-optation by, orthodox Sunni Islam.

Christian Minorities

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty signed between 

Turkish forces and several European powers that formally 

established the Republic of Turkey, contained specific guarantees and protections for non-Muslim religious minorities 

in Turkey, since interpreted by the Turkish government to 

refer only to the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, 

and the Jewish communities. Nevertheless, legal recognition 

of these and other religious minority communities has not 

been implemented in Turkish law and practice. The reason 

for this, according to a Foreign Affairs Ministry official, is 

that Turkey cannot tolerate the notion of legal personality 

based solely on religious identity, as it would undermine 

the country’s secular system. Compounding this is the fact 

that, according to a representative of one minority community, there is no clear legal process through which these 

communities can even apply for legal status. The absence 

of legal personality has over the decades resulted in serious 

problems with regard to their right to own, maintain, and 

transfer property as a community and as individuals and to 

train religious clergy, leading in some cases to a critical decline in these communities on their historic lands. 

The problems for the Christian minorities stem in part 

from the fact that most of them are, in addition to religious 

minorities, members of ethnic minorities also, and have thus 

faced some suspicion from the majority community with 

regard to their loyalty as Turkish citizens; indeed, in many 

instances, they are not fully accepted as Turkish citizens. 

At meetings with political party leaders and some Turkish 

think-tank representatives, the term “foreigner” was used 

to describe Christian minorities, particularly members of 

the Greek and Armenian Orthodox communities. Since the 

Turkish state has not officially recognized the existence of 

ethnic minorities inside the country, these groups are referred to and dealt with only as religious minorities, though 

not as legal entities. When the Commission met with members of these groups, all of them stressed their loyalty to the 

Turkish republic, the fact that they had proudly served in the 

Turkish military, and their chagrin at still not being treated as 

equal citizens of Turkey. It is this de facto status as “foreigners”—because they are Muslims and/or not ethnic Turks—

that is behind so many of the problems that members of 

these communities face with regard to property rights, education, and, in some instances, physical security.

At the time Turkey was founded in 1923, there were 

approximately 200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in the 

country. In 1955, by which time the number had fallen to 

100,000, violent riots broke out targeting the Greek Orthodox community, resulting in destruction of private and 

commercial properties, desecration of religious sites, and 

killings. Due to the fallout from those riots and other difficulties for the Greek Orthodox minority, the number of 

Orthodox Christians has fallen to its current level of about 

2,500. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek 

Orthodox community in Turkey came under Ottoman 

Turkish rule in 1453, the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate is 

His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Ecumenical Patriarch, with Commissioners 

Elizabeth H. Prodromou (left), Michael Cromartie, Preeta D. Bansal and 

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput.
17

not recognized as a legal entity by the Turkish government. 

Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s constituencies include, in addition to Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey, 

the Archdiocese of America, the international monastic 

community of Mt. Athos on the Chalcidice Peninsula, several small Orthodox Churches in EU member states, and 

the Orthodox Church of Australia, the Turkish authorities 

do not allow the Patriarch to use the term “ecumenical” in 

his title, recognizing him only as the head of Turkey’s small 

(and decreasing) Greek Orthodox community. As a result, 

the government maintains that only Turkish citizens can 

be candidates for the position of Ecumenical Patriarch and 

for membership as hierarchs in the Church’s Holy Synod. 

Yet, since the Turkish state does not protect the right of the 

Greek Orthodox minority to train its clergy, having closed 

down the Halki School of Theology in 1971 (see below), and 

because of the continuing expropriation of income-generating properties from Greek Orthodox private citizens, the 

very survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek 

Orthodox community in Turkey are at risk. 

Some state officials reported that opposition to the 

Ecumenical title of the Patriarch reflects, at least in part, 

the belief by Ankara that the Patriarchate will seek to build 

an Orthodox Christian status similar to that of the Vatican. 

In speaking with the Commission, His All Holiness Bartholomew I, the current Ecumenical Patriarch, confirmed 

that he is regularly accused of wanting to create a “second 

Vatican,” a state within a state in Turkey. He rejected this 

notion outright, and explained that Orthodox theology 

does not allow the joining of church and state that characterizes the Vatican. He underscored that the accusation is 

wholly without merit. 

The Armenian Patriarch similarly has no legal personality and there is no seminary in Turkey to educate clerics. 

There are 38 Armenian churches, the Commission was told, 

and only 20 clergy. A representative of the Armenian Orthodox community pointed out that it is costly to send people 

to Lebanon, Jerusalem, or Armenia to study, but the only 

religious education available to their community is high 

school. As with the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian 

Patriarchate experiences direct interference in the selection of its religious leadership to the position of patriarch 

and to hierarchical positions in the synod, and the Turkish 

state also prevents Armenian Christians from operating an 

independent seminary to train new clergy members. The 

Armenian Patriarch recently submitted a proposal to the 

Minister of Education to enable the community to establish 

a faculty in Armenian at a state university with instruction 

by the Patriarch. Under current restrictions, only the Sunni 

Muslim community can legally operate institutions to train 

new clergy in Turkey for future leadership. 

Metropolitan Yusuf Çetin of the Syrian Orthodox 

Church told the Commission that his community also does 

not have a seminary to train clergy. The Syrian churches 

face a particular problem in that their mother tongue is Aramaic, an ancient Semitic language dating back over 2,000 

years, whose use is dying out in Turkey. The Metropolitan 

also described the way in which the decades-long conflict 

between the Turkish government and Kurdish rebels in the 

southeast had created serious difficulties for his community. 

He reported that violence between the Turkish military and 

the Kurds had led to the death of 60 members of the Syrian 

Orthodox community, as well as the evacuation of Syrian 

Christian villages. He reported that conditions have begun to 

improve, noting that the Turkish government has provided 

some assistance in restoring churches and monasteries.

The “Lausanne minorities,” the Greek Orthodox, the 

Armenian Orthodox, and the Jewish community, may operate primary and secondary schools for children under the 

supervision of the Ministry of Education. However, such 

T UR KEY

The problems for the Christian minorities stem in part from the fact that most of them are, 

in addition to religious minorities, members of ethnic minorities also, and have thus faced 

some suspicion from the majority community with regard to their loyalty as Turkish 

citizens; indeed, in many instances, they are not fully accepted as Turkish citizens.
18

schools are required to appoint a Muslim as deputy principal; reportedly, these deputies often have more authority 

than their nominal supervisors. In addition, regulations on 

the non-Muslim schools changed in the 1980s, making it 

more difficult for non-Muslim children to register and attend 

these schools. School registration now must be carried out 

in the presence of inspectors from the Ministry of National 

Education, who reportedly check to ensure that the child’s 

father is in fact from the relevant minority community. 

In addition to these difficulties, the members of some 

minority groups, particularly members of the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant communities, are 

sometimes subject to societal attacks, usually by nationalists or religious extremists. In February 2006, an Italian 

Catholic priest was shot to death in his church in Trabzon, 

reportedly by a youth angered over the caricatures of the 

Muslim prophet in Danish newspapers. Prime Minister 

Erdogan and other government officials strongly condemned the killing. A 16-year-old boy was subsequently 

charged with the murder and sentenced to 19 years in 

prison the following October. Also in February 2006, a 

Slovenian Catholic monk was attacked in Izmir. In October 2004, a month after a group of nationalists and others 

marched on the Patriarchate in opposition to granting “foreigners” any rights, a bomb was thrown into the Patriarchal 

compound. During the visit to Turkey of Pope Benedict 

XVI in November 2006, the press office of the Ecumenical 

Patriarch was reportedly harassed in an effort to stifle press 

operations, and Orthodox believers in Turkey were reportedly improperly prevented from attending a special service 

that was celebrated by the Ecumenical Patriarch on the occasion of the Pope’s visit to Turkey, for which they claimed 

to have had valid official authorization. In addition, Orthodox Christian pilgrims from outside Turkey also planning 

to attend the service were subjected to what were reported 

by some to be deliberate delays, intimidation, and other 

harassment on the part of Turkish officials. 

Protestants in Turkey, who number approximately 

3,000, are primarily converts from other religions and are 

predominantly Turks by ethnicity, and thus not members 

of an ethnic minority as are most other Christian groups. 

As the Turkish state largely rejects their legal personality, 

Protestant Christians often meet in the buildings of other 

churches, homes, and in other property that is either 

rented or owned. The head of the Protestant Church in 

Istanbul was able to register a foundation for his community in 2000 and was then able to register his church 

building under this foundation in 2006. According to a 

representative of the church, this move became possible 

as a result of changes in the wording of the zoning laws 

from “mosques” to “places of worship,” a change that occurred in 2003 as part of the legislative reforms for the EU 

accession process.

Meeting in homes is often viewed with suspicion, as 

some in Turkey believe that such meetings indicate subversive intentions. Police sometimes bar Protestant groups 

from holding services in private homes and have detained 

and prosecuted individual Protestants for holding unauthorized gatherings. As an example of the difficulties they 

face in this regard, a Protestant leader described to the 

Commission the situation of the church’s only building 

in the town of Eskisehir. The building was cited by the local authorities for demolition on the basis that it was not 

earthquake proof. In this case, the group sought publicity 

on the matter from foreign journalists and also contacted 

the Prime Minister’s office; in the end, the Eskisehir municipality did not go forward with its demolition plans and 

pledged not to touch the building in the future. 

Although engaging in public religious expression and 

persuasion is not illegal in Turkey, persons involved in such 

activities are sometimes harassed and arrested. In November 2006, two Christian men stood trial under Article 301 on 

charges of “insulting Turkish identity” for carrying out missionary activities. They attended their second court hearing 

in January 2007. The State Department reported that last 

year, the government “waged a public campaign” against 

Christian and Christian missionary activity, including by 

composing a sermon that was distributed to imams and delivered in the mosques suggesting that the presence of missionaries was part of a plot by foreigners to “steal the beliefs” 

of Turkish children. This campaign was reportedly accompanied by a significant increase in anti-Christian articles in the 

Turkish media.8

 Protestant individuals and/or property are 

also subject to societal attacks. In January 2007, a Protestant 

church in the Black Sea town of Samsun was vandalized; the 

church had also experienced similar stoning attacks in the 

past two years. In April, three employees of an Evangelical 

Protestant publishing house in the city of Malatya were murdered in a shockingly brutal manner, reportedly by youths 

associated with a nationalist group. Five persons suspected 

of committing the murders were arrested soon after the attack, and five others were detained days later.
19 Property Issues and the Law on Foundations

Many of the most serious problems faced by religious 

minorities in Turkey, particularly the Christian groups, 

involve property rights and ownership. While the Diyanet

runs Sunni Muslim affairs, another government agency, 

the General Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar) regulates all activities of non-Muslim religious groups and 

their affiliated houses of worship and other property. The 

establishment of a foundation is the mechanism through 

which a minority religious community can own property, 

including buildings of worship, schools, and other institutions. As noted above, the communities themselves have 

no legal status in Turkey. Therefore, there is no way other 

than through a foundation for a religious community to 

become a collective legal entity. The rules governing the 

foundations of minority religious communities in Turkey 

have been found to be intrusive and in many cases, 

onerous. During the visit, representatives of a number of 

minority religious groups reported extensive problems in 

the way their foundations are regulated by the state.

Over the previous five decades, the state has, using 

convoluted regulations and undemocratic laws, confiscated 

hundreds of religious minority properties, primarily those 

belonging to the Greek Orthodox community, although 

Armenian Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews also reported such 

expropriations. The state has also closed their seminaries, 

denying these communities the right to train clergy. In 1936, 

the government required all foundations (including those 

that supported religious activities) to declare their sources 

of income; in 1974, at the time of the Cyprus invasion, the 

Turkish High Court of Appeals ruled that minority foundations had no right to acquire properties other than those 

listed in those 1936 declarations. Particularly since that time, 

the government has seized control of hundreds of properties 

acquired after 1936; religious minority foundations that are 

recognized by the state can acquire property, but previously 

appropriated property cannot be reclaimed. In many cases, 

the government has prevented the Orthodox from using a 

particular property and then expropriated it—with the justification that it is not being utilized. There is also no right to 

appeal these government actions.

Renovation works undertaken by community foundations that exceed a certain cost amount require a permit 

from the Vakiflar. Moreover, a recently adopted procedure 

requires that a permit also be obtained from the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs, confirming that religious minorities are 

still viewed as “foreign” in Turkey. Greek and Armenian 

Christians have been especially subjected to limitations on 

maintaining religious and cultural sites, due in part to bureaucratic obstacles in gaining the necessary authorization. 

Groups are prohibited from using funds from their properties in one part of Turkey to support their existing population elsewhere in the country. Roman Catholics have also 

had much of their property confiscated by the government. 

In 1993 – 1996, the state conducted political consultations 

at the Vatican, which concluded in a cooperation agreement between the University of Ankara and the Jesuit 

Consortium Gregorianum and the reopening of the chapel 

at Tarsus; however, in most cases the state has taken possession of Catholic property or prohibited its use for other 

purposes. The authorities have also imposed restrictions on 

the renovation of Catholic churches and monasteries. 

Under pressure from the EU, the current AK Party 

government passed legislation three years ago giving the 

Greek Orthodox and other minorities the right to acquire 

property and regain property expropriated by the Turkish 

state. Nevertheless, even after this legislation was passed, 

it was reported that minority Greek and Greek Orthodox 

properties continued to be confiscated at a high rate, based 

on such criteria as disuse or absence of a sustaining population; between 1999 and 2005, it was reported that approximately 75 percent of Patriarchal and Patriarchal-affiliated 

properties owned at that time were confiscated. 

In November 2006, the Turkish government, as part of 

the ninth reform package on EU accession, passed a new law 

governing foundations. However, though this legislation does 

Turkish tiles in Topkapi Palace, Istanbul
20

address some key concerns, it is thought by most observers not to go far enough to remove the shortcomings of the 

system as it has functioned in Turkey for so many decades. 

The law does make it easier to form a foundation by simplifying the process and allowing non-Turkish citizens resident in 

Turkey to open foundations. In addition, the new legislation 

allows groups to recover property that was registered after 

the 1936 decree but still confiscated by the state. However, 

the new law does not enable foundations to regain confiscated property that the state sold to third parties, a category 

that reportedly involves a considerable amount of property, 

nor does it end the Vakiflar’s authority to continue expropriating foundation properties if the foundation is determined 

not to be carrying out its stated purpose or the population in 

question has declined (although no properties were in fact 

confiscated in 2006). Much of this was made moot, however, 

as the following December, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet 

Sezer vetoed the new legislation, stating that several of its 

provisions were incompatible with the Turkish Constitution. This was not the first time that President Sezer vetoed 

legislation passed to bring Turkey’s legislation in line with 

EU standards, frequently with the claim that the legislation 

threatened the state’s secular structure.

In one other important development whose impact 

is as yet unknown, in January 2007, the European Court of 

Human Rights (ECHR) ordered the government of Turkey 

to return the property of a charitable foundation (an 

orphanage) that had been seized in 1974 or pay compensation. This was the first ruling by the ECHR censuring 

Turkey on issues involving charitable foundations set 

up by religious minorities. As of this writing, the Turkish 

government has not complied with this ruling.

The Case of the Halki Seminary

After the military coup in 1971, the Turkish state nationalized all private institutions of higher learning, including 

those devoted to religious training. As a result, the Halki 

School of Theology, which is the theological seminary on 

the island of Heybeli that, since the nineteenth century, 

has trained religious leaders of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian communities worldwide, was 

closed. Despite repeated government promises that it 

would be reopened, it remains closed as of this writing. 

Since the Turkish state imposes a citizenship requirement 

on candidates to the religious leadership positions of the 

Ecumenical Patriarch but prevents training of such clergy 

by keeping Halki closed, the Ecumenical Patriarch has said 

that this policy is deliberately designed to eliminate the 

Greek Orthodox community from Turkey. 

Several Turkish officials explained to the Commission that the Turkish government cannot agree to re-open 

the Halki Seminary because it will upset the balance of 

the state’s position with regard to Muslim seminaries, or 

madrassas, which remain administered by the state. According to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, however, 

there are currently 24 divinity schools in operation in 

Turkey for teaching Muslim theology. What is more, the 

Halki Seminary was open and functioning from 1923-1971 

without threatening the relationship between the state and 

Muslim institutions of higher learning. The Halki school 

would not operate independently from the state as some 

have claimed, the Patriarch said, but would operate under 

the Ministry of Education. With regard to the proposal by 

the Armenian Orthodox Church and others to establish 

a department of theology at a university, the Ecumenical 

Patriarch explained that the Greek Orthodox community 

does not want a university department of religion, but 

instead desires the reopening of the Halki school in order to 

train clergy. Bartholomew also reported that his numerous, 

formal written communications to Prime Minister Erdogan 

and other Turkish officials to request a discussion about 

Halki have received no response. In meetings with Turkish 

state officials in the Vakiflar and Diyanet, as well as with 

members of Turkish political parties, the Commission was 

told that the decision was a “political decision” that rested 

with the President’s office. 

Jews

According to several Jewish community leaders with 

whom the Commission met, there are 23,000 Jews in 

Turkey today. Jews operate their own schools, hospitals, 

two old-age homes, and welfare institutions, as well as a 

Jewish newspaper, which is in Turkish with one page in 

Ladino.9

 The majority of Jews in Turkey (96 percent) have 

ancestors who fled from Spain or Portugal. The situation 

for Jews in Turkey is better than the situation in other majority Muslim countries and Jews report being able to worship freely and their places of worship generally receive 

government protection when it is required. Nevertheless, 

concerns have arisen about attacks on synagogues in 

recent years and increasingly vocal anti-Semitism in some 

sectors of the media.
21

In 2001, a new Jewish Museum of Turkey was opened 

in Istanbul, the only museum of its kind in the Muslim 

world, illustrating 700 years of Jewish life in Turkey. Like the 

other religious minorities, Jews have experienced problems 

in operating their synagogues because of the laws governing foundations. For example, there was a law imposing 

a low limit on the amount of money that could be spent 

repairing a building, which is preventing the community 

from developing its property. Generally speaking, however, 

the Jewish community did not report the kind of difficulties with property and property rights that other religious 

minority communities have experienced. In fact, since 

the changes that have been made to the law during the EU 

accession process, Jewish representatives report that their 

foundations have bought and sold some property. Like the 

Alevis, Jews in Turkey tend to be wary of any attempt to inject religion—i.e., the majority religion—into state policies, 

which leads them, generally speaking, to be strong supporters of Ataturkist secularism. They expressed fears that 

changes in secularism could lead to further expressions of 

anti-Semitism and limits on religious freedom for Jews.

In November 2003 and August 2004, synagogues were 

bombed by terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, the first 

attack killing 25 persons and the second two persons. The attackers also bombed the British Consulate and a British bank 

in Istanbul.The Turkish state took prompt action to bring to 

justice the perpetrators of the attack, which was reportedly 

carried out by a Turkish al-Qaeda cell. As of the end of last 

year, more than 70 suspected al-Qaeda militants were on 

trial for their alleged roles in the bombings, though some of 

those suspected of involvement have fled the country. The 

authorities, as well as the public, reacted with outrage and 

sympathy for the victims.The day after the terrorist bombing 

in November 2002, in an apparently unprecedented move, 

Prime Minister Erdogan visited Turkey’s Chief Rabbi to 

express condolences. 

In meetings with representatives of the Jewish community of Istanbul, concern was expressed about increasing 

anti-Semitism in some sectors of the media that is generally 

coupled with anti-Americanism, particularly in media outlets that are viewed as either nationalist or religious extremist. In 2005, a new Turkish edition of Adolf Hitler’s Mein 

Kampf, along with the notorious anti-Semitic Protocols of 

the Elders of Zion, were bestsellers on popular reading lists 

published in Turkey. The growing anti-Semitism is thought 

in part to be a reflection of increasingly politicized Islamist 

sentiments due to some degree to wide opposition in Turkey to the U.S. invasion of Iraq; there are a growing number 

of specious stories about Israeli and U.S. misdeeds in Iraq, 

as well as pieces containing more conventional anti-Semitic stereotyping. According to Turkey’s Jewish leaders, 

anti-Semitism in the Turkish media is directly related to 

what is happening in the Middle East; Jews in Turkey report 

that they are held responsible for events in the Middle East, 

though they regularly try to emphasize that they are Turkish 

citizens and not involved in any way. All of these factors, 

together with the 2003 and 2004 bombings, have resulted in 

an increasing sense of fear and insecurity among members 

of the Jewish community that has generally not been present before in Turkey. 

The Way Forward for Turkey

Without exception, everyone the delegation met with in 

Turkey, including those from among all of Turkey’s religious 

communities, stressed EU membership as the most promising means to advance religious freedom and other human 

rights protections and to drive democracy forward in Turkey. In the past few years, in response to EU Commission 

reports regarding a start-date for Turkey’s accession negotiations, Ankara undertook important legal changes that 

have included a series of domestic reforms in human rights 

matters. Notably, since accession negotiations began in late 

2002, Turkey has ratified three major international human 

rights treaties, specifically the International Covenants and 

the Racial Discrimination Convention. Key among them 

is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(ICCPR), which in article 18 sets forth the clear-cut obligations of states parties with regard to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion, and in article 19 specifies the 

wide-ranging elements of freedom of expression. Turkey 

also ratified its optional protocol, permitting individual 

complaints to be submitted to the UN treaty monitoring 

body. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, 

and Cultural Rights has also been ratified. The Convention 

on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ratified in 

2002, prohibits discrimination in regard to a wide range of 

public actions by the state, including the right to freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion, and such rights as to 

own property and to education.10

Various laws, including the Penal Code, Anti-Terror 

Law, and the Press Law, have been amended, lifting several 

T UR K E Y 
22

legal restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression. 

The new Penal Code narrows the scope of some articles 

that have been used to convict those expressing non-violent 

opinion, such as new Article 216, which limits convictions 

on incitement charges, and Article 125, which narrows the 

scope of defamation. The new Penal Code also strengthened the principle of equality between men and women. 

In addition, since 2002, Turkey has also boosted efforts to comply with the decisions of the ECtHR. Some 

of the other reforms reported in European Commission 

Progress Reports on Turkey include a reduction in military 

prerogatives in civilian politics through the institution of 

the National Security Council; enshrining the principle of 

the primacy of international and European human rights 

conventions over domestic law in the Constitution (Article 

90 of the Constitution was revised in May 2004 for this 

purpose); abolishing State Security Courts and transferring 

some of their responsibilities to newly created Regional 

Serious Felony Courts; the adoption by Parliament of a new 

Civil Code and a new Penal Code, both of which entered 

into force in April 2005; the creation of Intermediate Courts 

of Appeal and a family courts system (the law on family 

courts was amended in April 2004 in order to exclude their 

jurisdiction over all non-family law matters); the ratification of various international treaties; and the abolishment 

of the death penalty in January 2004. It was in 1987 that 

Turkey declared its recognition of the individual application procedure to the ECtHR. According to the November 

2006 EU progress report, from September 2006 until August 

2006, over 2,100 new applications with regard to Turkey 

were made to the ECtHR. The report goes on to note that 

Turkey has “made progress...in the execution of ECtHR 

judgments.” However, the report also notes that more efforts at compliance are needed.

In the same way, more needs to be done to ensure that 

religious freedom and other human rights will be protected 

in Turkey. State control of religious life persists in Turkey, 

involving management through the Diyanet of the majority 

Sunni Muslim community—exemplified by the continued legal restrictions on religious dress in state buildings, 

including in both public and private institutions of higher 

education. According to international standards, each 

individual is guaranteed the freedom to manifest his or her 

religion or belief in public, or not to do so. At the same time, 

concerns must be addressed that a lifting of the ban on 

headscarves might jeopardize the rights of women, subjecting them to societal and possibly even state coercion on 

matters of religious observance. 

Despite the constitutional protection for religious freedom, other of the problems described in this report remain. 

These problems include:

• the absence of full legal recognition for religious minorities, including Alevis; Greek, Armenian, and Syrian Orthodox; Roman and Syriac Catholics; Protestants; and Jews; 

• the lack of full property rights for religious minorities, 

including the right to own and maintain property as a 

community, leading in some cases to a critical decline in 

these communities on their historic lands;

• the continued incidents of anti-minority violence, 

especially against members and property of the Greek 

Orthodox community, the growth in violence against 

members of the Catholic and Protestant communities, 

and the growing anti-Semitism in some sectors of the 

Turkish media; 

• the continued existence of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which restricts freedom of expression through 

prohibitions on insulting “Turkishness” and the TurkWithout exception, everyone the delegation met with in Turkey, 

including those from among all of Turkey’s religious communities, stressed 

EU membership as the most promising means to advance religious freedom and other 

human rights protections and to drive democracy forward in Turkey.
23

ish state, with associated negative effects on religious 

freedom also, as evidenced by the charges against the two 

Protestants noted above;

• a decades-long government practice, through convoluted 

regulations, of expropriating the property of religious 

minorities, particularly the Greek and Armenian Orthodox, without a court administrative process or adequate 

compensation; 

• the closure of and refusal to permit institutions for religious 

minorities to train religious clergy, depriving them of the 

ability to train future clerics, and the associated state demand that religious leaders must be Turkish citizens;

• the failure of the Diyanet to include the Alevi community, 

the country’s largest religious minority, in its activities 

involving the administration of Muslims in Turkey, and 

the general societal discrimination against Alevis in other 

areas of life in Turkey;

• restrictions on the ability of leaders of majority and 

minority religious communities to wear clerical garb in 

public areas and state institutions and public and private 

universities and restrictions on the Christian and Jewish 

communities from wearing clerical garb in the public 

space writ large; and

• state policies that impede the opening or repair of 

churches and other worship buildings.

The Commission strongly urges the U.S. government 

to persist in raising these religious freedom concerns regularly with the government of Turkey. Clearly, the remaining 

problems are troubling enough to warrant their continued 

inclusion on the U.S.-Turkish bilateral agenda. It became 

apparent to the Commission after the visit that in order for 

Turkey to address the remaining problems faced by both 

the majority Muslim and minority religious communities, 

continuing the democratic reform process, which was intensified as a result of the EU accession project, is critical. 

In February 2007, Foreign Minister Gul announced at a 

meeting in New York that despite the December suspension by the EU, Turkey would open the chapters itself 

and continue with its reform program, since the reforms 

benefit the people of Turkey. Whether or not Turkey ever 

becomes an EU member, he continued, it is important that 

the country adopt the EU’s democratic standards. In March 

2007, Turkey resumed accession talks with the EU and also 

announced that it would set into motion a 13-step reform 

program in the following months. The Commission encourages the U.S. government to continue to support the Turkish government in its efforts to implement the remaining 

reforms needed to further the EU accession process and 

move Turkey forward on the democratic path.

T UR KEY

Ayse Sucu, head of the Women’s Branch, Religious Affairs Directorate 

(Diyanet), with Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal (left) and USCIRF Chair 

Felice D. Gaer.
CComm ommission ission R Rececommendations ommendations 

 

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government urge 

the government of Turkey to: 

• report fully and promptly to international supervisory mechanisms 

regarding the international human 

rights treaty obligations Turkey has 

accepted since 2002. Turkey should 

immediately submit its report on 

compliance with the ICCPR (due 

in 2004) to the UN Human Rights 

Committee for review, including a 

detailed report on its obligations 

under Article 18. Reports on compliance with the other newly ratified 

instruments should also be prepared 

and submitted; 

• implement the judgments on 

religious freedom and related rights 

of the European Court of Human 

Rights, including the recent ECtHR 

decision ordering the government 

of Turkey to return the property of a 

Greek charity that had been seized 

in 1974 or pay compensation;

• continue with the legal reforms 

that will ensure conditions for the 

full exercise of all human rights, 

including religious freedom, for all 

individuals and religious communities in Turkey and implement 

fully and promptly the reform legislation already in force. The obligations under the Lausanne Treaty 

of 1923 for the Greek Orthodox, 

Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish 

communities should be implemented and treated as minimum 

obligations for the Turkish government for all Turkish citizens;

• take measures, in accordance with 

international standards, to establish 

a legal personality or status for religious communities and to address 

the restrictions on the right to own 

property and train clergy, including 

by re-opening the Halki School of 

Theology, to bring those restrictions 

into line with the requirements of 

the ICCPR and the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance, and 

other relevant international norms; 

• undertake significant steps to establish and enhance trust between 

the majority and minority religious 

communities in Turkey. Specifically, every effort should be made to 

acknowledge, as the EU states, that 

“the existence of minority religious 

groups is an aspect of pluralism 

that needs to be recognized and 

preserved as an asset to Turkish 

society, rather than perceived as a 

threat.”11 The government should 

consider measures such as 1) 

convening a public roundtable to 

air grievances, consider diverse 

opinions, and express commitments to a democratic, more 

inclusive Turkish society, and 2) developing civic education and public 

awareness programs that reflect the 

religiously plural nature of Turkish 

society and the diversity of Turkey’s 

religious past; and

• In view of Turkey’s standing invitation to receive visits from UN special 

rapporteurs on human rights, 

encourage a return of the relevant 

rapporteurs, including the Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief, in the near future. 

24
25

ENDNOTES

1

 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, 

Commission Staff Working Document, 8 November 2006, SEC (2006) 1390, p. 16.

2

 Article 14 of the Constitution states that “None of the rights and freedoms embodied 

in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity 

of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish 

State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the 

government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or 

establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination 

on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a 

system of government based on these concepts and ideas...”

3

 The United States participated as a non-signatory conference observer. 

4

 Some of these changes have since been reversed, most notably the call to prayer, 

which, as for all other Muslims, is rendered in Arabic. 

5

 This and much other information about the Diyanet can be found on its Web site, 

http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp. 

6

 U.S. Department of State, 2006 International Religious Freedom Report, “Turkey” 

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71413.htm).

7

 It was after the 1980 military intervention that the wearing of headscarves in public 

institutions was banned. 

8 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2006, 

“Turkey,” September 2006.

9 Ladino is a Romance language, derived mainly from Old Castilian (Spanish) and 

Hebrew. Speakers are currently almost exclusively Sephardic Jews, found in (or from) 

Thessaloniki and Istanbul.

10 Turkey was already a state party to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 

(CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 

11 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Turkey, 

Adopted 25 June 2004, p. 25.

T UR KEY

F 27 ollowing the fall of the Ba’athist regime

and brief period of rule by the U.S.-led 

 Coalition Provisional Authority, the United States 

returned full sovereignty to the Iraqi people in June 2004 

under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546. 

That resolution endorsed the formation of an interim Iraqi 

government, which was then followed by parliamentary 

elections in January 2005. Boycotted by many Sunni groups, 

those elections brought a Shi’a majority government to 

power in coalition with Kurdish parties. United States and 

foreign military forces subsequently remained in Iraq at the 

Iraqi government’s invitation to support the new regime 

and help fight international terrorism.1

 

Despite ongoing efforts to stabilize the country, 

however, successive Iraqi governments have not curbed 

the growing scope and severity of human rights abuses.

Instead, in the past year, there has been a dramatic increase 

in sectarian violence between Arab Sunni and Shi’a factions, combined with religiously-motivated human rights 

abuses targeting non-Muslims, secular Arabs, women, 

homosexuals, and other vulnerable groups, on which 

the Commission has previously reported. Although the 

Sunni-dominated insurgency and foreign jihadi groups are 

responsible for a substantial proportion of the sectarian 

violence and associated human rights abuses, Iraq’s Shi’adominated government bears responsibility for the actions 

it engages in, as well as for tolerating abuses committed by 

Shi’a militias with ties to political factions in the governing 

coalition. What is more, the Iraqi government is a party to 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

which permits no government derogation from international protections for religious freedom, even during declared 

periods of national emergency.2

The Commission has identified two major areas of 

concern. The first is human rights violations committed 

by the Iraqi government through its state security forces, 

including arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without 

due process, extrajudicial executions, and torture. Many 

such actions of the security forces are directed 

against suspected terrorists and insurgents. Some of 

these actions, however, fail to discriminate between those 

groups and ordinary Sunnis targeted on the basis of their 

religious identity. The second is the Iraqi government’s 

apparent tolerance of religiously-motivated attacks and 

other religious freedom abuses carried out by armed Shi’a 

factions, including the Jaysh al-Madhi (Mahdi Army) 

and the Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Brigades).

Abuses committed by these militias target Sunnis on the 

basis of religious identity and include abductions, beatings, 

extrajudicial executions, intimidation, forced resettlement, 

murder, rape, and torture. 

Many of these militia-related abuses occur contrary to 

the stated policy of Iraq’s senior national leadership, and 

despite considerable security assistance from the U.S.-led 

coalition forces. Nonetheless, relationships between these 

militias and leading Shi’a factions within Iraq’s ministries 

and governing coalition indicate that the Madhi Army and 

IRAQ

Although the Sunni-dominated 

insurgency and foreign jihadi 

groups are responsible for a 

substantial proportion of the sectarian 

violence and associated human 

rights abuses, Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated 

government bears responsibility 

for the actions it engages in, 

as well as for tolerating abuses 

committed by Shi’a militias 

with ties to political factions in 

the governing coalition.
28

Badr Organization are para-state actors, and operate with 

impunity or even governmental complicity. Given these 

ties, the Iraqi government’s failure to control such actors 

could ultimately constitute tolerance of egregious, ongoing 

and systematic violations of religious freedom as defined in 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). 

The Commission is also concerned about the grave conditions affecting non-Muslims in Iraq, including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Yazidis, Sabean Mandaeans, and 

other minority religious communities. These groups face 

widespread violence from Sunni insurgents and foreign 

jihadis, and they also suffer pervasive discrimination and 

marginalization at the hands of the national government, 

regional governments, and para-state militias, including 

those in Kurdish areas. As a result, non-Muslims are fleeing 

the country in large numbers. The Commission continues 

to monitor conditions for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those minority groups 

experiencing a degree of religious intolerance and persecution vastly disproportionate to their numbers. Together 

with the rising tide of sectarian violence, conditions for 

religious minorities and the associated Iraqi refugee crisis 

require heightened attention and more effective action by 

the U.S. government. 

The Secretary of State designated Saddam Hussein’s 

Iraq a “country of particular concern” (CPC) under IRFA 

from 1999 until 2002, following Commission recommendations citing extensive, systematic government violations of religious freedom. The Secretary later dropped 

that designation in 2003, following the U.S. intervention 

and the subsequent collapse of Hussein’s government. In 

the intervening years, the Commission has reported on 

religious freedom conditions in Iraq, noting improvements 

in some areas but new and continuing problems in others. 

Now, due to the alarming and deteriorating situation for 

freedom of religion and belief, and because the new Iraqi 

government has either engaged in or otherwise tolerated 

violations of freedom of religion as defined under IRFA, 

the Commission has placed Iraq on its Watch List with the 

understanding that it may designate Iraq as a CPC next year 

if improvements are not made by the Iraqi government.*

Together with the rising tide of sectarian violence, conditions for religious 

minorities and the associated Iraqi refugee crisis require heightened attention 

and more effective action by the U.S. government. 

Children’s Hospital, Basra, Iraq (Courtesy of Frederick Gerber/

Project Hope)

* Commissioners Bansal, Gaer, and Prodromou conclude that based on the severe human rights and religious freedom conditions now extant in that country, and the sovereign 

government’s complicity with, or toleration of, abuses as outlined in this chapter, Iraq should be recommended for designation as a country of particular concern (CPC) at this time.
29

Abuses by the Sunni-Dominated Insurgency

IRFA addresses religious freedom violations that are either 

committed or tolerated by governments. It does not contemplate abuses committed by non-state actors, including groups engaged in military confrontations with state 

authorities. Accordingly, the Commission’s Watch List designation does not reflect the actions of indigenous Sunni 

insurgents or foreign jihadis, whom the Iraqi government is 

fighting alongside U.S. and other coalition forces. Nonetheless, it is essential to note that these non-state militants 

continue to perpetrate severe abuses of religious freedom 

and other human rights.7

 

The Sunni-dominated insurgency is comprised of 

former Ba’athists, indigenous Salafi militants, tribal groups, 

and various organized criminal groups. This insurgency is 

hydra-headed, with each faction possessing varied objectives and modus operandi. Former Ba’athists systematically 

target Iraqi government officials and suspected coalition 

collaborators, including but not limited to fellow Sunni 

Arabs. Tribal factions and other Sunni nationalists, by 

comparison, appear to be locked in a cycle of violence and 

reprisal with government-linked Shi’a militias. These indigenous insurgents operate alongside a growing spectrum of 

foreign jihadi groups that cooperate in some instances and 

compete in others.8

The insurgency’s effect on security and protections 

for universal human rights in Iraq is pernicious. As the U.S. 

Department of State observed, Sunni militants routinely 

“kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the 

electoral process, civil society activists, members of security 

forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.”9

 Other abuses include religiously-motivated attacks on 

Shi’as and Shi’a holy sites, such as the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra and the March 2007 

suicide attacks that killed an estimated 120 Shi’a pilgrims 

traveling to Karbala to mark the end of Ashura.10 Finally, 

Sunni insurgents and foreign jihadis are a principal source 

of violence between Arabs and Kurds in ethnically-mixed 

regions such as Mosul and Kirkuk, as well as violence targeting non-Muslim religious minorities living in northern 

and western Iraq. 

Also significant are foreign Sunni fighters with links 

to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and similar transnational jihadi 

groups. Though small in number when compared with 

Iraq’s indigenous insurgents, military observers widely 

acknowledge that these factions are responsible for many 

This Watch List designation follows four years of 

Commission activity concerning U.S. efforts to 

advance protections for universal human rights, 

including religious freedom, for all in post-Saddam 

Hussein Iraq. As early as April 2003, the Commission urged President Bush to work with Iraqis to 

ensure that all Iraqis could exercise their religious 

freedom in full accordance with international human 

rights standards. In February 2004, the Commission notified the leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that the initial drafts of Iraq’s 

Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) did not guarantee the freedom of thought, conscience, religion 

or belief for all Iraqis. In a letter to then-CPA Chief 

Ambassador Paul Bremer, the Commission also 

expressed concern about provisions establishing 

Islam as a source of legislation and the potential impact of these provisions on protections for human 

rights. These warnings encouraged a substantial expansion of the TAL’s guarantees for individual rights, 

including protections for religious freedom.

Later that same year, the Commission issued 

recommendations advocating extensive human 

rights protections in Iraq’s permanent constitution, including the individual freedoms enumerated 

in the revised TAL. The Commission continued to 

press for these guarantees following the election 

of Iraq’s National Assembly in 2005, urging both 

Iraqi civil society leaders and U.S. Ambassador 

to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to promote constitutional 

guarantees for freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief for all Iraqis, as well as provisions for the legal equality of religious minorities 

and women. These themes were featured prominently in an August 2005 op-ed by Commissioners Preeta Bansal and Nina Shea published in The 

Washington Post.

3

 

The Commission also produced a detailed 

analysis of Iraq’s draft constitution and a comparative study of constitutions in 44 Muslim-majority 

countries, which was published in the Georgetown 

University Journal of International Law. The Commission extended that analysis in March 2006, raising concerns regarding the newly adopted constitution’s “repugnancy” clause, which mandated that 

no law be contrary to “the established provisions 

PRIOR COMMISSION ACTION

 (Continued on page 31)
30

of the most provocative and egregious attacks upon Shi’a 

civilians, mosques and religious festivals. More than any 

other element in the Sunni-dominated insurgency, foreign 

fighters focus attacks on Shi’a religious leaders and sites with 

the stated object of fomenting and fueling sectarian discord. 

The hatred with which foreign jihadis view Iraq’s Shi’a 

majority is particularly evident in slain AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s February 2004 letter to Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri. The letter accuses Shi’a of atheism, polytheism, treachery against Islam, and collusion with the West. 

Al-Zarqawi’s indictments sketched a political and theological 

rationale for fomenting sectarian civil war, thus underscoring the importance of religion and religious identity as a 

motivating and exacerbating factor in the violence in Iraq.11 

Combined with abuses perpetrated by the Iraqi government, 

para-state militias and other non-state actors, AQI’s presence 

amplifies the radicalization of Iraqi society along sectarian 

lines while fostering growing religious intolerance. 

Violations by the Iraqi Government

Although the Sunni insurgency accounts for a significant 

proportion of religiously-motivated human rights abuses in 

Iraq, the Iraqi government remains responsible for those violations perpetrated by its own security forces and officials of 

national ministries, as well as by regional and local government authorities. These violations include arbitrary arrest, 

prolonged detention without due process, extrajudicial 

executions, and torture. Pervasive threats and abuses against 

women, members of religious minorities and other vulnerable groups are also common, as is the continued de facto

marginalization of these vulnerable groups. These actions, 

including those evident in Kurdish regions, are discussed in 

greater detail later in this chapter. 

Many of the documented human rights violations by 

Iraqi national security officials have been committed against 

suspected Sunni insurgents and criminals. Nonetheless, ordinary Sunnis have also been swept up in government dragnets and abused while in official custody. These individuals’ 

religious affiliation appears to be a dominant factor in their 

arbitrary detention and subsequent maltreatment. Moreover, 

the Iraqi government has done little to date to hold government personnel who perpetrate these violations accountable. As a result, many Sunnis have come to believe that attacks on their community by Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated security 

forces can be carried out with impunity.12 This impression is 

further exacerbated by the fact that the Iraqi government has 

excluded Sunnis and non-Muslims from various state-sponsored benefits and programs.

Both the U.S. government and international human 

rights defenders locate the primary source of governmentperpetrated human rights violations in the Iraqi Ministry of 

the Interior (MOI).13 In January 2005, for example, human 

rights monitors published an extensive report documenting 

the routine torture of detainees by Interior Ministry officials, including beatings and electrocution, as well as their 

deprivation of food and water.14 As noted above, detainees 

abused by this treatment included suspected insurgents and 

criminals, as well as other Sunnis who appear to have been 

targeted based on their religious identity. Most troubling, 

there “was little indication that MOI or other government 

officials took disciplinary action in cases alleging abuses, 

apart from some transfers within the ministry.”15

Both the U.S. government and 

international human rights defenders 

locate the primary source of governmentperpetrated human rights violations 

in the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. 

Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal and Sheikh Fatih Kashif Al-Ghitta at a 

2005 meeting of Iraqi civil society in Amman, Jordan, to discuss issues 

related to drafting Iraq’s permanent constitution.
31

Human rights violations by MOI forces are also committed outside custodial settings. In May 2006, for example, 

the Iraqi government admitted the presence of a Shi’a terror 

group within the MOI’s 16th Brigade, before arresting a Major 

General and 17 other MOI employees implicated in kidnapping and “death squad activities.”16 In October 2006, the U.S. 

military charged that Iraq’s 8th Brigade, 2nd National Police 

had been responsible for the kidnapping of 26 Sunni factory 

workers in southwest Baghdad, 10 of whom were later executed. During the same period, print and broadcast media 

reported that the 8th Brigade wore government uniforms and 

used government vehicles during armed raids on civilians in 

Sunni neighborhoods.17 The MOI subsequently disbanded 

the brigade, sending hundreds of officers to alternative units. 

To date, the Commission has not received reports indicating 

that 8th Brigade personnel were held accountable for these 

violations beyond receiving administrative transfers. In 

numerous other cases of MOI violations, there have been no 

reported actions to hold violators to account.

The Commission’s concern over these violations is 

further amplified by new emergency regulations announced 

on February 13, 2007 in conjunction with the joint Iraqi-Coalition Baghdad Security Plan. Those regulations authorize 

arrests without warrants, as well as the interrogation of 

suspects without clear limitations on the amount of time 

they can be held in pre-trial detention. Despite government 

assurances that MOI and other officials would observe 

international human rights standards and conduct investigations in accordance with Iraq’s Criminal Procedure Code, 

such commitments have seldom been respected in the past. 

Moreover, as the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) 

noted, “the absence of effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms governing the conduct of law enforcement 

personnel only serves to exacerbate the problem.”18 

The violations described above accompany other government violations of religious freedom in Iraq, including 

the seizure of religious property by the Iraqi government 

and its security apparatus. In May 2006, for example, the 

MOI raided Baghdad’s Abu Hanifa Mosque with the stated 

object of capturing alleged Sunni insurgents. National 

government officials subsequently converted this historic 

Sunni structure to Shi’a use, against the objection of Sunni 

leaders and clerics. This conversion of religious property 

followed the MOI’s June 2005 seizure Amarra’s Hetten 

Mosque in a similar operation. As with the Abu Hanifa 

Mosque, this incident also led to the transfer of historic 

of Islam.4

 The Commission also expressed concern 

over constitutional provisions requiring that Islam 

serve as a “foundational source” for legislation 

while providing “no additional constitutional guidance to address the question of what governmental 

body, person or mechanism, if any, is charged with 

assessing legislation’s conformity with Islamic principles or law.5

 

Later in 2006, the Commission concluded that

the United States’ direct involvement in Iraq’s political reconstruction created a special obligation 

to remedy the systemic flaws that continue to undermine the protection of universal human rights.6

The Commission also affirmed that international human rights standards must be understood to protect each Iraqi as an individual, and not just as a 

member of a particular ethnic, political, or religious 

group. With these concerns in mind, the Commission has met with senior U.S. and Iraqi officials, as 

well as Iraqi human rights activists, legal experts, 

and representatives of Iraq’s diverse religious communities. The Commission has encouraged both 

U.S. and Iraqi officials to ensure that every Iraqi 

citizen has the freedom not only to worship and to 

practice his or her faith openly, but also the right to 

dissent from state-imposed orthodoxies on issues 

related to religion. The Commission further reiterated these concerns when briefing experts of the 

Iraq Study Group. 

Finally, the Commission has consistently urged 

the U.S. government to expand opportunities for 

Iraqis fleeing religious persecution to access the 

U.S. Refugee Program. Chief among them are 

ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Sabean Mandeaens, 

Yazidis, and other religious minorities who now represent a vastly disproportionate share of Iraqis who 

are internally displaced or seeking refuge outside 

their country. As the Commission noted in its 2006 

annual report and in subsequent letters to U.S. 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the future of 

communities inside Iraq now hangs in the balance. 

PRIOR COMMISSION ACTION (Cont.)
32

Sunni property to Shi’a control. These and other actions 

prompted protests from Sunni political and religious leaders, who viewed government counterinsurgency operations 

as a pretext for state-sanctioned expropriation of prominent 

Sunni religious sanctuaries by the Shi’a majority. 

Religious freedom violations by Iraqi authorities at the 

regional and local level include growing official pressure 

to adopt strict Islamic religious practices. This pressure has 

manifested in Sunni-dominated central and western Iraq, 

where the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime removed a 

significant impediment to the activities of Salafist imams. 

Buoyed by anti-American sentiment among Sunnis and 

burgeoning sectarian conflict with Iraq’s Shi’a majority, 

some of these imams have pressed for more stringent application of sharia by local government officials, particularly 

in Sunni insurgent strongholds such as Ramadi and Fallujah.19 Similar pressures have also been evident in mixed 

ethnic and sectarian regions, as well as in the Shi’a-dominated south. In March 2005, for example, officials in the 

northern city of Mosul promulgated an ordinance requiring 

all female university students to wear the hijab regardless of 

their religious affiliation.20 That same year, Basra’s education director instituted a policy requiring all female schoolchildren to cover their heads, regardless of their religion. 

Government complicity in religiously-motivated 

discrimination is also reported in the pro-Western Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). According to the State 

Department, Christians and other minorities “living in 

areas north of Mosul asserted that the KRG confiscated 

their property ... without compensation and ... Assyrian 

Christians also alleged that the Kurdish Democratic Partydominated judiciary routinely discriminates against nonMuslims.”21 ChaldoAssyrian Christians have also alleged 

that KRG officials affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic 

Party deny Christians key social benefits, including employment and housing. 

Additional reports also alleged that foreign reconstruction assistance for ChaldoAssyrian communities was being 

controlled by the KRG without input from that community’s 

legitimate leaders. KRG officials were also reported to have 

used public works projects to divert water and other vital 

resources from ChaldoAssyrian to Kurdish communities. 

These deprivations reportedly threatened the safety of 

ChaldoAssyrians leading to mass exodus, which was later 

followed by the seizure and conversion of abandoned ChaldoAssyrian property by the local Kurdish population. Turkmen groups in the region surrounding Tel Afer also report 

similar abuses by Kurdish officials, suggesting a pattern of 

pervasive discrimination, harassment, and marginalization. 

Combined with non-state sources of instability, including 

violence from foreign jihadis and Sunni insurgents, the 

KRG’s practices add to the continuing flight of Iraq Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities to sanctuaries outside the country. 

Abuses by Actors with Government Ties

In addition to human rights violations committed by Iraq’s 

national, regional, and local governments, particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom are committed by 

armed groups with ties to the Iraqi government. Several 

armed Shi’a factions orchestrate and participate in sectarian violence and associated religious freedom abuses. 

Chief among those factions are the Mahdi Army and the 

Badr Organization. Conflict between these militias and the 

Sunni-dominated insurgency escalated following the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra—a 

bombing some analysts attributed to foreign jihadis. In the 

month that followed, Sunnis launched hundreds of suicide 

and other bombing attacks against Shi’a civilian and religious targets, precipitating an equally dramatic escalation 

in the number of Shi’a militia raids on predominantly Sunni 

neighborhoods in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Those raids produced serious human rights abuses. 

Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization routinely 

abduct, ransom, torture, and execute Sunnis based on their 

religious identity, as well as employ violence and the threat 

of violence to seize private property from Sunnis in an effort to drive Sunnis from Shi’a-majority neighborhoods. As 

the State Department has reported, “MOI-affiliated death 

squads targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids and 

killings in Baghdad and its environs, largely with impunity.”22 

In turn, Sunni leaders and human rights monitors allege that 

Shi’a militias with ties to government ministries systematically target Sunni clerics and sheikhs for assassination. 

These patterns of indiscriminate violence against 

Sunni civilians and community leaders add to mounting allegations that Shi’a militia counterparts are now 

pursuing “sectarian cleansing” strategies, with the object 

of further balkanizing the already divided country. The 

effects of that violence are clear. According to the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the total estimate 
33

of Iraqis displaced by sectarian conflict since February 

2006 is 707,000, or some 117,901 families. These numbers 

are in addition to the 1.6 million persons displaced prior 

to the al-Askari mosque bombing.23

Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization have 

close ties to the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the dominant 

political faction within Iraq’s ruling coalition.24 The Badr 

Organization, for example, is the armed wing of the Supreme 

Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), whose 

members now constitute the largest single party within 

the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s lower parliamentary 

chamber. Like their former and allegedly current Iranian 

patrons, SCIRI and the Badr Organization favor the direct intervention of Shi’a clerics in Iraqi politics. Before quitting the 

government in April 2007, the political allies of Mahdi Army 

leader Moqtadeh al-Sadr also shared power in the national 

government with SCIRI under the UIA’s auspices. 

The Iraqi government’s tolerance of severe and systematic human rights abuses committed by Shi’a militias is 

evident in connections between these militias and major 

government ministries. With power apportioned among 

governing coalition members, factions within these militialinked Shi’a political parties effectively control most if not 

all of Iraq’s key government ministries. Until recently, for 

example, allies of Moqtadeh al-Sadr controlled the Agriculture, Health, and Transportation ministries. Moreover, both 

the Mahdi Army and Badr Organization still maintain close 

ties with various MOI police units.25 As one international 

human rights organization observed, these “militias have 

operated as quasi-independent security forces under the 

protection of the Ministry of Interior, abducting, torturing 

and killing hundreds of people every month and dumping 

mutilated corpses in public areas.”26 

Evidence for official Iraqi tolerance of such human 

rights abuses is further supported by the close relationship between Shi’a militias and the approximately 145,000 

Iraqis currently employed by Iraq’s Facilities Protection 

Services (FPS). Each government ministry maintains its 

own FPS to secure its buildings, assets, and other critical 

infrastructure. Many of “these units have questionable loyalties and capabilities.”27 FPS from the Agriculture, Health, 

and Transportation ministries, for example, fell under the 

control of Mahdi Army leader Moqtadeh al-Sadr. Under 

his direction, these forces became a de facto “source of 

funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army,” with the result that 

there is now significant overlap between FPS employees 

and militia members.28 As the State Department has noted, 

this “sectarian misappropriation of official authority within 

the security apparatus” consistently impedes “the right of 

citizens to worship freely.”29 

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government has 

failed to exercise effective control over the various political 

factions in his coalition government, as well as affiliated 

Shi’a militias. This is due in part to al-Maliki’s political alliance with SCIRI and, until recently, al-Sadr’s movement. 

The result is minimal formal oversight of Iraq’s security services by the elected political leadership. In some instances, 

human rights defenders report that the Iraqi government 

has failed to publish findings from internal government 

investigations of sectarian violence and other religiouslymotivated abuses by these militias against Sunni civilians. 

In others, Shi’a government officials reportedly obstructed 

the criminal prosecution of human rights abuses against 

Sunnis by those same militias.30 

Finally, as previously noted, the Iraqi government 

has, in the vast majority of cases, not held perpetrators 

to account for these actions, particularly in cases involving Sunnis. Even more troubling are credible allegations 

that Iraqi officials at the highest levels are protecting those 

who engage in such abuses. As recently as April 2007, for 

example, U.S. military sources reported that Iraqi Prime 

Minister al-Maliki’s office was playing a leading role in the 

arrest of senior Iraqi army and police officials who had 

worked aggressively to combat violent Shi’a militias.31

There is also evidence indicating that Iraq’s local and 

regional officials failed either to prevent or prosecute human 

rights abuses by government-linked militias. In 2005, for 

example, Mahdi Army militiamen attacked students at Basra 

University on the grounds that their dancing, singing and 

IRA Q

In addition to human rights 

violations committed by Iraq’s national, 

regional, and local governments, 

particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom are committed by armed 

groups with ties to the Iraqi government. 
34

Western-style dress violated Islamic principles. Local Interior 

Ministry police present at the incident failed to intervene, 

even when militants fired guns at students and beat them 

with sticks.32 Such incidents underscore the Iraqi government’s unwillingness to take action against Shi’a militias 

despite having the capability and opportunity to do so. 

Abuses Against Non-Muslims and Other 

Vulnerable Groups

Against the backdrop of sectarian violence and other 

particularly severe violations of religious freedom, human 

rights conditions in Iraq are deteriorating dramatically for 

non-Muslims, women, and other vulnerable groups. As 

previously stated, members of non-Muslim groups, including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Yazidis, and Sabean Mandaeans, appear to suffer a degree of attacks and other human 

rights abuses disproportionate to their numbers. As a result, 

thousands of members of Iraqi religious minorities have fled 

the country, seeking refuge in neighboring states and among 

growing diaspora communities in the West. 

Some of these conditions approach the level of systematic, ongoing and egregious violations of religious freedom. 

Others flow from deficiencies in Iraqi law or discriminatory government action. Still others are the result of the 

Sunni-dominated insurgency and the concurrent sectarian 

violence. These abuses against minority groups further 

illustrate the diverse, pervasive and increasingly pernicious 

abuses and violations of freedom of religion or belief now 

evident in contemporary Iraq. As such, they merit heightened scrutiny and swift government action. 

Violence against members of Iraq’s Christian community remains a significant concern, particularly in Baghdad 

and the northern Kurdish regions. Reported abuses include 

the assassination of Christian religious leaders, the bombing 

and destruction of churches, and violent threats intended to 

force Christians from their homes. Reports also document 

targeted violence against liquor stores, hair salons, and other 

Christian businesses by extremists claiming that such trades 

violate Islamic principles. In some areas, ordinary Christians 

have reportedly ceased their participation in public religious 

services for fear of inviting further violence. 

Attacks on Christian religious sites continue unabated. 

Between 2004 and 2006, some 27 ChaldoAssyrian churches 

were attacked or bombed in Baghdad and the Kurdish areas, 

often in simultaneous operations. In some areas, conditions 

are so grave that priests from the Catholic Assyrian Church 

of the East no longer wear clerical robes, lest they be targets 

and attacked by Islamic militants.33 Official discrimination, harassment, and marginalization by KRG officials and 

other local and regional governments, as described above, 

exacerbate these conditions. Between the Sunni-dominated 

insurgency and the KRG’s reported diversion of critical services and reconstruction assistance, the current confluence 

of events has forced tens of thousands of Iraqi Christians to 

flee during the last three years.34 According to some reports, 

nearly 50 percent of Iraq’s indigenous Christian population is 

now living outside the country.

Though smaller in number, Sabean Mandaeans and 

Yazidis have suffered abuses similar to Christians. Foreign 

jihadis, Sunni insurgents, and Shi’a militias view members of these groups as infidels or outsiders. In addition, 

religious minority communities often lack the tribal base 

or militia structures that might otherwise provide security. 

As such, these groups are often targeted by both Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militias. The risks are particularly severe 

for isolated minority communities in areas where foreign 

jihadis and Sunni insurgents remain active. In April 2007, 

for example, unidentified gunmen killed 23 Yazidis in the 

Kurdish town of Bashika.35 This incident represented one 

of the largest single attacks against the Yazidi community 

since the current Iraqi government came to power.

Some of this violence stems from the reported tendency of foreign jihadis and Sunni insurgents to associate 

Iraqi Christians and other non-Muslims with the United 

States and the U.S.-led military intervention. In other 

instances, however, religious minorities appear to be the 

victims of escalating intra-Muslim violence. In a meeting 

Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea testifying on religious minorities in Iraq 

and other countries before the House International Relations Subcommittee 

on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, June 2006.
35 with Commission staff, for example, a Mandaean delegation described how non-Muslims are often executed 

alongside Sunnis during attacks by Shi’a militants and 

alongside Shi’a during strikes by Sunni insurgents. This 

pervasive violence has had a devastating effect on this 

small community. According to the Mandaean Society of 

America, approximately 85 percent of Iraqi Mandaeans 

have fled their country since 2003.

The treatment of Iraq’s dwindling Baha’i community 

is also at issue, as are Saddam-era laws that continue to 

mandate official discrimination against them. Law No. 105 

of 1970, for example, expressly prohibits the practice of the 

Baha’i faith. Regulation 359 of 1975 prohibits the Iraqi government from issuing national identity cards to members 

of the Baha’i community.36 Finally, adherence to the Baha’i 

faith is a capital offense under a decree passed in 1979 by 

Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council—a decree that 

was rescinded by the CPA, although the current legal status 

of Baha’is remains unclear. These laws are reportedly still 

enforced by some government ministries.37

Also significant is the apparent failure of Iraq’s local 

and regional governments to protect those Muslims who 

reject clerical rule or challenge narrow, orthodox interpretations of sharia. The effects of that failure are particularly 

evident with respect to university professors, including 

legal and religious scholars. In one January 2007 incident 

documented by UNAMI, a group calling itself the Doctrine 

Battalion (Saraya Nusrat al-Mathhab) targeted a Basra University professor for intimidation and death threats based 

on his secular views and teachings. According to the Iraqi 

Ministry of Higher Education, there were 200 documented 

incidents of targeted assassinations and abductions of academic professionals between 2003 and March 2007. These 

incidents appear to have occurred along sectarian lines, or 

because of their allegedly secular views and teachings.38 

Finally, religiously-motivated discrimination and targeted violence has undermined women’s safety and their 

participation in political life, as well as their status within 

Iraqi society. As the Commission has previously reported, 

some attackers spray or throw acid onto women, including 

their face and eyes, for being “immodestly” dressed. There 

is growing social and religious pressure to wear the hijab. 

The implementation of stricter customary and Islamic practices in some areas has made both Muslim and non-Muslim women fearful and feel compelled to wear headscarves 

or veils in order to protect themselves from violence.39 

Human rights abuses against women are also evident 

in the high incidence of so-called “honor killings” and 

the growing number of female injuries and deaths due to 

immolation documented in some Kurdish regions.40 There 

are also regular reports of inter-sectarian abductions, rape, 

forced conversions, and forced marriages, as well as mut’a, 

or temporary marriage contracts permitted in some Shi’a 

communities. In predominantly Arab areas, human rights 

monitors have observed an increase in de jure and de facto

government discrimination against women in the areas of 

divorce, inheritance, and marriage.41 Against this backdrop, 

the continuing failure of Iraqi government officials to enforce existing laws prohibiting violence, holding perpetrators to account, and mandating non-discrimination, as 

well as to amend other overtly discriminatory legislation, 

exacerbates deteriorating human rights conditions for 

many Iraqi women. 

IRA Q

The implementation of stricter customary and Islamic practices in some areas 

has made both Muslim and non-Muslim women fearful and feel compelled 

to wear headscarves or veils in order to protect themselves from violence. 

A mosque in northern Iraq where many displaced Arab families have fled. 

(UNHCR/K. Brooks)
Sharply deteriorating conditions 

for freedom of religion or belief 

and other human rights in Iraq during 

the past year are evident in the growing scope and intensity of sectarian 

violence, a burgeoning refugee crisis 

and the possible imminent demise of 

religious communities that have lived 

in what is now Iraq for millennia. Many 

of these developments stem from the 

Sunni insurgency and the Sunni-Shi’a 

sectarian conflict, as well as from Iraqi 

government action or inaction. Although pervasive conditions of armed 

conflict provide a context for these violations and abuses, they do not absolve 

Iraqi government from the responsibility to take immediate, remedial action 

with respect to its own conduct and 

that of its constituent factions.

Nor does it absolve the U.S. government from pursuing a more active 

role. As the Commission has previously noted, the United States’ direct 

and continuous involvement in Iraq’s 

political reconstruction creates a 

special obligation to help remedy the 

circumstances that threaten religious 

freedom and other universal human 

rights.42 In order to advance human rights protections for all Iraqis, 

including the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, the 

Commission urges the U.S. government to take the following steps:

 

 U.S. Diplomacy

The U.S. government should:

• urge the Iraqi government at the 

highest levels to:

• undertake transparent and effective investigations of human rights 

abuses, including those stemming 

from sectarian, religiously motivated, or other violence by Iraqi 

security forces, political factions, 

militias or any other para-state 

actors affiliated with or otherwise 

linked to the Iraqi government;

• bring the perpetrators of such 

abuses to justice;

 • suspend immediately any MOI 

or FPS personnel charged with or 

known to have been engaged in 

sectarian violence and other human rights abuses;

• ensure that Iraqi government 

revenues are neither directed to nor 

indirectly support the Mahdi Army, 

Badr Organization or any other 

organization complicit in severe 

human rights abuses;

• halt immediately the practice of 

seizing and converting places of 

worship and other religious properties, and restore previously seized 

and converted properties to their 

rightful owners; and

• establish, with U.S. support, effective Iraqi institutions to protect 

human rights in accordance with 

international standards, including 

the establishments of an independent and adequately financed 

national human rights commission;

• continue to speak out at the highest 

levels to condemn religiously-motivated violence, including violence 

targeting women and members of 

religious minorities, as well as efforts by local officials and extremist 

groups to enforce religious law in 

violation of the Iraqi constitution 

and international human rights 

standards;

• take steps, in cooperation with Iraqi 

law enforcement officials, (a) to enhance security at places of worship, 

particularly in areas where religious 

minorities are known to be at risk, 

and (b) to locate and close illegal 

courts unlawfully imposing extremist interpretations of Islamic law;

• appoint and immediately dispatch 

a senior Foreign Service Officer to 

Embassy Baghdad to report directly 

to the Ambassador and to serve 

as the United States’ lead human 

rights official in Iraq, as repeatedly 

endorsed by the U.S. Congress;

• urge the Shi’a dominated Iraqi 

government and its Kurdish allies to 

accommodate the pressing need for 

more Sunni government officials, 

and for greater independence of 

government officials and ministries 

from their political patrons;

• appoint immediately one or more 

U.S. advisors under the Department 

of State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office to serve as liaisons to 

the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights;

1 36

CComm ommission ission R Rececommendations ommendations 
37

• advocate constitutional amendments to strengthen human rights 

guarantees, including the specific 

recommendations formulated by 

the Commission in its analysis of the 

constitution; and43

• urge the Iraqi government to reconsider and revise a proposed new 

law regulating NGOs, drafted by the 

Ministry of Civil Society, which reportedly imposes harsh restrictions 

on both national and international 

NGOs; any such regulations should 

comport with international human 

rights standards.

 U.S. Foreign Assistance

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. foreign assistance 

and security assistance programs do 

not directly or indirectly provide financial, material or other benefits to 

(1) government security units and/or 

para-governmental militias responsible for severe human rights abuses 

or otherwise engaged in sectarian 

violence; or (2) Iraqi political parties 

or other organizations that advocate 

or condone policies at odds with 

Iraq’s international human rights 

obligations, or whose aims include 

the destruction of such international 

human rights guarantees;

• give clear directives to U.S. officials 

and recipients of U.S. democracy 

building grants to assign priority 

to projects that promote multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to 

address religious tolerance and understanding, that foster knowledge 

among Iraqis about universal human rights standards, and encourage the inclusion of effective human 

rights guarantees for every Iraqi in 

the permanent constitution and its 

implementing legislation; and

• re-allocate Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund44 resources to support human rights by:

• directing unobligated Iraq 

reconstruction funds to deploy 

a group of human rights experts 

for consultations with the Iraqi 

Council of Representatives and 

the constitutional amendment 

committee, and to assist with 

legal drafting and implementation matters related to strengthening human rights provisions, 

including freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief;

• funding workshops and training 

sessions on religion/state issues 

for Iraqi officials, policymakers, 

legal professionals, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious leaders, and other members of key 

sectors of society who will have 

input on constitutional amendments and implementation; and

• establishing an Iraqi visitors program through the State Department to focus on exchange and 

education opportunities in the 

United States related to freedom 

of religion and religious tolerance 

for Iraqi officials, policymakers, 

legal professionals, representatives of NGOs, religious leaders, 

and other members of key sectors 

of society.

 Regional and Minority 

Issues

The U.S. government should:

• declare and establish a proportional allocation of foreign assistance funding for ChaldoAssyrian, 

Yazidi, Sabaen Mandean, and other 

religious minority communities, 

ensure that the use of these funds 

is determined by independent 

ChaldoAssyrian or other minority 

national and town representatives, 

and establish direct lines of communication by such independent 

structures into the allocation process of the Iraqi national government in Baghdad, separate from 

the KRG, in order to ensure that 

U.S. assistance benefits all religious 

and ethnic minority groups and 

is not being withheld by Kurdish 

officials or other local and regional 

governments;

• address with regional Kurdish 

authorities the reports of attacks on 

religious and other minorities and 

the expropriation of ChaldoAssyrian property, and seek the return 

of property or restitution, as well as 

assurances that there will be no official discrimination practiced against 

minority communities; and

• collaborate with Iraqi and KRG officials to establish an independent 

commission to examine and resolve 

outstanding land claims involving 

ChaldoAssyrian and other religious 

minorities in the Kurdish regions.

2 

3

IRA Q
The confluence of sectarian violence, religious discrimination, and other serious human rights violations has driven millions of Iraqis from their homes 

to seek refuge in the Nineveh plains in northern Iraq, and 

in predominantly Kurdish regions, as well as in countries 

outside of Iraq. For the past few years, the Commission has 

drawn attention to the growing refugee crisis and continues 

to emphasize the plight of those fleeing religious persecution 

in Iraq. 

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), more than 2 million Iraqis have been forced 

to take refuge in neighboring countries. Of the 2 million 

refugees, 750,000 are in Jordan, 1.2 million are in Syria, 

100,000 in Egypt, 54,000 in Iran, 40,000 in Lebanon, 10,000 in 

Turkey, and 200,000 in various Persian Gulf states. In March, 

UNHCR announced that Iraqis top the list of asylum seekers 

in Western industrialized countries and that the number of 

Iraqi asylum claims increased by 77 percent in 2006. There 

are also almost 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) 

within Iraq, including 480,000 in 2006, and UNHCR estimates that the number could climb to 2.3 million by the end 

of 2007. 

In the sectarian strife that has engulfed Iraq, members of 

many religious communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, have 

suffered violent attacks. Among the most vulnerable are ChaldoAssyrians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis, who make up 

a disproportionately large number of refugees from Iraq and 

who do not have militia or tribal structures to provide some 

measure of protection. These non-Muslim religious minorities report that they are targeted because they do not conform 

to orthodox Muslim religious practices or are perceived as 

working for the U.S.-led coalition forces. As discussed elsewhere in this report, members of these communities have 

been targeted in violent attacks, including murder, torture, 

abductions for ransom, and reportedly for forced conversion, 

rape and destruction or seizure of community property. 

According to the Iraqi Ministry for Migration and Displacement, nearly half the members of Iraq’s non-Muslim 

minorities have fled abroad. UNHCR estimates that these 

minorities, who account for 3 percent of the population, 

comprise more than a third of the Iraqis who have sought 

sanctuary outside their country. According to a study by 

the International Organization for Migration, members of 

these minorities also make up almost 10 percent of IDPs in 

Iraq. This exodus has not only caused tragic hardships and 

uncertainty, but could mean the end of the presence in Iraq 

of ancient Christian and other religious minority communities that have lived on that land for millennia.

Humanitarian and protection assistance remain of 

primary importance for the United States and international 

community for helping Iraqi refugees and IDPs. In neighboring countries, the initial welcome has been wearing increasingly thin, and refugees are currently faced with stricter 

border control policies and decreasing resources to support 

themselves and their families. 

Neither Jordan, Lebanon, nor Syria is a signatory to 

the 1951 Refugee Convention, but all three countries work 

with UNHCR under a Memorandum of Understanding that 

requires UNHCR to resettle those it recognizes as refugees. 

Those who are not resettled within a year may be detained or 

deported to their country of origin. As the influx of refugees 

into neighboring countries increased in 2006, public service 

resources were strained and host countries implemented 

stricter border control policies that have led to the denial 

of entry of many of those seeking to flee. For example, in a 

report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, a Jordanian authority said that the new border 

control policies have led to denials for more than half who 

wished to enter the country. Those refugees already within 

Jordan who do not meet the entry requirements are subject 

to potential deportation and no longer receive renewed residency permits, forcing many to return to Iraq only to attempt 

re-entry into Jordan. The implementation of similar rigorous 

immigration policies in Syria has been relaxed following UNHCR appeals. Lebanon has stopped admitting Iraqi refugees 

altogether and some already within the country have been 

imprisoned or deported. 

In addition to the fear of deportation from or imprisonment in their current country of residence, refugees are 

having difficulties supporting themselves and accessing 

basic social services. Refugees are not permitted to work in 

any of the countries in the region to which they have fled 

and are quickly running out of the money they brought with 

them from Iraq. For many, access to shelter and medical care 

remain serious problems. Finally, many children do not have 

access to education either due to state policies preventing 

Iraqis from attending public schools, or the inability of refugees to pay for supplies or private schools. Host countries 

are also facing resource shortages and are finding their basic 

service sectors overburdened and in need of assistance. 

In the Commission’s view, resettlement of the most 

vulnerable refugees needs to be a high priority for the U.S. 

government and the UNHCR. UNHCR has stated it is looking 

THE PLIGHT OF IRAQI REFUGEES

38
39

IRA Q

to refer 20,000 refugees in 2007. In February, the State Department agreed to accept 7,000 referrals from UNHCR for U.S. 

resettlement. Since 2003, the United States has admitted only 

692 Iraqi refugees, including 202 in 2006. The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) 

is working with UNHCR to prioritize vulnerable groups, 

including religious minorities, for resettlement as a potential 

durable solution and is also continuing to request UNHCR 

referrals. Assistant Secretary of State for PRM Ellen Sauerbrey 

stated that if the Bureau receives its full budget request of 

$20 million for Iraq in 2007, it can resettle more individuals. Nevertheless, the Commission has concluded that more 

needs to be done by the United States to provide direct access 

to the U.S. Refugee Program for vulnerable Iraqis, in addition 

to pressing UNHCR to make appropriate referrals. 

In February, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that Under Secretary of State for Democracy and 

Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky will lead an Iraq Refugee 

and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force to coordinate 

assistance for refugees and IDPs as well as U.S. resettlement efforts. The Bureau’s priority is to provide assistance 

(humanitarian relief) for the most vulnerable refugees and 

encourage open borders. In March, the United States announced it will contribute $18 million to UNHCR’s appeal for 

$60 million to provide protection and assistance to Iraqi IDPs 

and refugees in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey. 

In 2004, the Commission first raised with President 

George W. Bush the drastic effect of escalating religious 

violence on Iraq’s ancient Christian and other minorities. A 

Commission delegation met in Turkey last fall with representatives of Iraqi ChaldoAssyrian refugees in that country.

The Commission has since written to Secretary Rice and 

Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky about the urgent 

need to provide members of religious minorities who have 

fled Iraq with access to the U.S. Refugee Program. In December, the Commission published an op-ed on the subject in 

The Washington Times, which helped spur congressional 

hearings and led to the decision to establish the task force on 

Iraqi refugees. 

ENDNOTES 

1 President’s Statement on Failure of the Senate Procedural Motion (Washington, DC: The 

WhiteHouse, February 17, 2007).

2

 Iraq ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1971. Successive 

governments are bound by this treaty obligation. 

3

 Preeta D. Bansal and Nina Shea, “Iraq Must Avoid a Rollback of Rights,” The Washington Post, 

August 4, 2005.

4

 Iraq Const. Art. 2(1).

5

 Tad Stahnke and Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of 

Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim 

Countries, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 947, 959 (2005).

6 USCIRF 2006 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, 2006), 8.

7

 “Iraq,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, March 8, 2006).

8

 See Hashim, Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst, 

2006).

9

 Id.

10 UNAMI Human Rights Report, January-March 2007, 6.

11 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of 

terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by United States Government in Iraq (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of State, February 2004).

12 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.

13 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.

14 The New Iraq? Torture and Ill-Treatment of Detainees in Iraqi Custody (New York, NY: Human 

Rights Watch, January 2005).

15 Ibid.

16 “Iraq,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, March 6, 2007).

17 “Iraq police brigade suspected of aiding abductions pulled,” CNN (October 4, 2006).

18 UNAMI Human Rights Report, January-March 2007, 23.

19 Salafism is a purist strain within Sunni Islam that seeks to reestablish the idealized Muslim 

community created by the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions through strict interpretation 

of Islamic practices. Commonly confused with Wahhabism, this tradition does not subscribe to 

any particular school of Islamic jurisprudence and is not connected to a particular state or national 

ideology. See Hashim, Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: 

Hurst, 2006), 116.

20 International Religious Freedom Report, 2006.

21 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.

22 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2006.

23 UNAMI Human Rights Report, January-March 2007, 19.

24 The Mahdi Army is a Shi’a Islamist movement with a nationalist orientation. Led by radical Shi’a 

Cleric Moqtadeh al-Sadr, the organization and its affiliates control Baghdad’s sprawling Sadr City 

district while dominating districts in the southern regions of Basra, Kufa, Najaf, and Samarra. 

The Badr Organization, in turn, is a longstanding Shi’a militia whose members fought against the 

Saddam Hussein regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Based in Iran for two decades, the 

organization maintains a base of operations in and around Karbala, as well as in other central and 

southern Shi’a districts. 

25 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.

26 Iraq: U.S. Plan Must Reign In Death Squads (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, January 8, 

2007). See also Edward Wong and Paul von Zielbauer, “Iraq stumbling in bid to purge its rogue 

police,” International Herald Tribune, September 16, 2006; Christopher Allbritton, “Why Iraq’s 

Police are a Menace,” Time, March 20, 2006; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005, etc.

27 The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: December 2006), 14.

28 Ibid.

29 International Religious Freedom Report, 2006.

30 Iraq: End Interior Ministry Death Squads (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, October 29, 

2006).

31 Joshua Partlow, “Maliki’s Office is Seen Behind Purge in Forces,” The Washington Post, April 29, 

2007.

32 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005.

33 Testimony of Rosie Malek-Yonan before the House Committee on International Relations

(Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, June 30, 2006).

34 International Religious Freedom Report, 2006.

35 “Iraq: Yazidi Community demands protection after killings,” IRIN News, April 23, 2007.

36 International Religious Freedom Report, 2006.

37 UNAMI Human Rights Report, January-March 2007, 15.

38 Ibid, 9, 10.

39 USCIRF 2006 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, 2006), 11.

40 UNAMI Human Rights Report, January-March 2007, 17.

41 The Status of Women in Iraq Update to the Assessment of Iraq’s De Jure and De Facto Compliance 

with International Legal Standards (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 2007). 178-79.

42 USCIRF 2006 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, 2006), 8.

43 The analysis of the Iraq constitution and related recommendations, in English and Arabic, is 

available on the Commission’s website, www.uscirf.gov.

44 Pub. Law 108-106, 117 Stat. 1209 (November 6, 2003).
St. Basil’s Cathedral, Moscow
P 41

resident Vladimir Putin’s Russia has 

 steadily retreated from democratic reform, endangering significant gains in human rights made since the end of 

the Soviet era, including in the areas of freedom of religion 

or belief. Evidence of the backsliding includes increasing 

limitation of media freedom and of political parties’ independence; tighter restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious communities, and other civil 

society groups; harassment of human rights organizations; 

legal restrictions on freedom of assembly; and constraints 

on the use of popular referenda. The deterioration in the 

human rights climate over the past few years appears to 

be a direct consequence of the increasingly authoritarian 

stance of the Russian government, as well as the growing 

influence of chauvinistic groups in Russian society, which 

seem to be tolerated by the government.

The past year saw a further retreat from democracy. In 

January 2006, Putin signed into law restrictive new legislation 

on NGOs that also affects the rights of religious communities. 

The law enables the Ministry of Justice’s Federal Registration Service (FRS) to interfere with the activities of NGOs 

and deny the registration of groups that do not meet certain 

requirements, including minor or trivial ones. In addition, 

despite considerable domestic and international opposition, 

in July 2006 Putin signed an amended version of the 2002 law 

on counter-extremism. Citizens can now be charged with extremism if they are alleged, within the context of extremism, 

to have committed public slander of government officials, 

although these charges must be proven in court. Moreover, 

those who are alleged to have defended, or even expressed 

sympathy with, individuals charged with extremism are 

themselves liable to the same charges.

Since its inception in 1999, the Commission has reported on the situation in Russia, including on freedom of 

religion or belief, xenophobia, and the often violent acts of 

ethnic and religious intolerance. While the Commission 

has not recommended that Russia be named a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC, nor placed it on its 

Watch List, the Commission is nevertheless convinced that 

the fragile human rights situation in the country, which 

directly affects the status of religious freedom, merits 

particularly close scrutiny. Equally important, Russia is a 

model and bellwether for a wide swath of countries in transition, particularly in the former Soviet Union; negative human rights developments in Russia, such as newly restrictive laws or criticism of human rights standards and monitoring by international organizations, soon emerge in some 

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On the surface, Russian citizens 

have considerable personal freedom and 

some opportunities for public political 

debate, although these opportunities 

are increasingly limited by the threat 

or use of coercion. In many areas of 

civil life, however, including freedom for 

religious worship and practice, it is 

increasingly a particular group’s or 

community’s relationship to the state—

rather than the rule of law—that 

defines the parameters on freedom to 

engage in public activities. The Commission 

finds that political authoritarianism—

combined with rising nationalism 

and a sometimes arbitrary official 

response to domestic security concerns—

is jeopardizing the human rights of 

Russia’s citizens, including members of the 

country’s religious and ethnic minorities. 
42

of its neighbors. Moreover, Moscow has increasingly rallied 

a group of countries that violate human rights against what 

it terms “meddling” by the international community.

A Commission delegation traveled to Russia in June 

2006, visiting Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan, the capital 

of the Republic of Tatarstan. The visit, the Commission’s second to Russia in three years, was prompted by the passage 

of the new law governing the work of NGOs. The legislation 

could have deep repercussions for civil society in Russia and 

a harmful impact on the protection of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief in Russia. Such restrictions on NGOs negatively affect the work of non-profit, civil 

society groups, including foreign groups, operating in Russia, and could pave the way for amendments to the religious 

association law. Some of the NGO law’s provisions directly 

limit the human rights of members of religious communities, including legitimate charitable activities, and have had 

a chilling—if not freezing—effect on the overall climate for 

human rights monitoring. 

On the surface, Russian citizens have considerable personal freedom and some opportunities for public political 

debate, although these opportunities are increasingly limited 

by the threat or use of coercion. In many areas of civil life, 

however, including freedom for religious worship and practice, it is increasingly a particular group’s or community’s 

relationship to the state—rather than the rule of law—that 

defines the parameters on freedom to engage in public 

activities. The Commission finds that political authoritarianism—combined with rising nationalism and a sometimes 

arbitrary official response to domestic security concerns—is 

jeopardizing the human rights of Russia’s citizens, including 

members of the country’s religious and ethnic minorities. 

The Inadequate Response to Increasing 

Xenophobia, Intolerance, and Hate Crimes

Russian law has several provisions that address crimes 

motivated by ethnic or religious hatred.1

 Unfortunately, 

Russia’s law enforcement agencies and judicial system have 

a history of infrequent, inconsistent, and even arbitrary and 

inappropriate application of these provisions. 

While no official statistics are available, groups in 

Russia that monitor hate crimes contend that xenophobic 

attacks have become more violent. The SOVA Center, a 

leading Russian NGO monitor of hate crimes, documented 

54 racist killings and hate-based attacks on 539 individuals 

in 2006. In the first three months of 2007, the SOVA Center 

recorded 17 people killed and 92 wounded in racist attacks, 

and it said more serious weapons, notably guns and explosives, were being used increasingly in such attacks. It also 

reported at least 70 incidents of vandalism against religious 

targets, 36 of them against Jews, 12 against Russian Orthodox, and 11 against Muslims. 

Persons who have investigated or been publicly critical of hate crimes in Russia have themselves been subject 

to violent attacks. Nikolai Girenko, a St. Petersburg expert 

on xenophobia who often testified in trials concerning 

hate crimes, was gunned down in June 2004. Local police 

claimed in May—two years after the murder and shortly before the meeting of the G-8 countries in July 2006—to have 

found the five men perpetrators and killed the ultranationalist gang’s ringleader as he was violently resisting arrest. However, some who are familiar with the case have questioned 

whether these are the real perpetrators. In addition, several 

judges who have ruled against skinheads have also received 

death threats. In October, prominent Russian journalist Anna 

Politkovskaya, who reported extensively on the situation in 

Chechnya, was murdered in Moscow in a crime that prosecutors have reportedly linked to her work. Her name was 

among those on “hit lists” of liberals that had appeared on 

ultranationalist Internet sites in Russia.

During 2006, the incidents of violent hate crimes increased not only in number, but also in scope. Frequently, 

migrants are the victims, as are dark-skinned foreign students and other visitors. According to a May 2006 report to 

the UN Secretary General, Russia today has a population 

of 12 million migrants—the majority are Muslims from 

Central Asia and Azerbaijan—of whom only 10 percent are 

thought to have legal status. That roughly corresponds to 

the Russian Security Council’s estimate of some 10 million 

illegal migrants in Russia.

In August 2006, four young skinheads were arrested 

after they bombed a Moscow market, killing 11 and injuring 45. They told the police that they had bombed the 

market because “too many people from Asia” worked 

During 2006, the incidents of violent 

hate crimes increased not only in 

number, but also in scope. 
43

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there.2 According to the city police chief, the four are also 

responsible for eight additional bombings in Moscow and 

the Moscow region. 

Most officials and NGOs agree that these attacks were 

motivated largely by ethnic intolerance, although religious 

and ethnic identities often overlap. Nevertheless, attacks 

have occurred against members of Muslim, Jewish, Protestant, and other religious communities that are explicitly 

motivated by religious factors. Leaders of these three 

communities have expressed concern to the Commission 

about the growth of chauvinism in Russia. They are also 

apprehensive that Russian government officials provided 

tacit or active support to a view held by many ethnic Russians that their country should be reserved for them and 

that Russian Orthodoxy is the country’s so-called “true 

religion.” Officials link this view to a perception that Russian identity is currently threatened due to a demographic 

crisis stemming from a declining birthrate and high mortality rate among ethnic Russians. 

In a legal reflection of this perception as well as the 

palpably growing nationalist atmosphere, a new government decree went into effect prohibiting foreigners from 

retail jobs in Russia as of April 1. Since the indoor and 

outdoor markets that are prevalent in Russia have been 

dominated by vendors from former Soviet republics, 

foreign workers are being hit hard and many are leaving 

Russia. The new measures came on the heels of a highly 

public campaign of deportations of illegal migrants in fall 

2006, which many alleged were used to target the citizens 

of Georgia and other countries with which Russia has tense 

relations. Putin lent his voice to the nationalist campaign, 

saying it was necessary to protect the rights of Russia’s 

“indigenous” population on the labor market. At the same 

time, authorities announced a simpler process to file for 

foreign labor permits—which should result in less extortion 

by officials—as well as a quota of 6 million laborers from 

former Soviet republics for 2007, far more than before, 

according to press reports.

Many government officials whom the delegation 

met either tried to downplay the growing problem of hate 

crimes or explain it away. Officials from the Leningrad 

Oblast, or region, declined even to meet with the Commission because, in their words, there was no government 

official responsible for monitoring or prosecuting xenophobia and hate crimes since their “region did not have these 

problems.” Like many other Russian officials including law 

enforcement authorities, local officials in Tatarstan and 

St. Petersburg labeled crimes targeting ethnic or religious 

communities simply “hooliganism,” claiming that such 

crimes are motivated solely by economic hardships. In a 

similar vein, Nikolai Spasskiy, the deputy secretary of the 

Security Council, told the Commission that hate crimes 

were “rooted in socio-economic misery that is shared by 

the attackers and victims.” Officials often noted that ethnic 

and migrant communities themselves were linked to criminal activities, or stated that they were “outsiders,” by which 

officials meant migrants from Central Asia or the Caucasus. 

Unlike in the Soviet period, the state does not act as 

the official sponsor of anti-Semitism. Yet anti-Semitic literature that includes accusations that Jews engage in the ritual 

murder of Christian children is sold in the Russian State 

Duma building. The Russian Procuracy has not responded 

to complaints that such literature violates Russian laws 

against incitement of ethnic and religious hostility.

Many government officials whom the 

delegation met either tried to 

downplay the growing problem of hate 

crimes or explain it away. 

Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shayevich (center), with 

Commissioners Felice D. Gaer, Michael Cromartie, Richard D. 

Land, and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, at Moscow Choral Synagogue.
44

Russian officials have an inconsistent—and often inadequate—record in responding to anti-Semitic incidents. 

Nevertheless, there are some reported cases when hate 

crimes legislation has been used. In 2006, a group of extremists who tried to kill Jews in the Siberian city of Tomsk 

were convicted of attempted murder and terrorism (they 

had injured a policeman by booby-trapping an anti-Semitic 

sign with an explosive). In June 2006, the Russian Supreme 

Court ordered a review of the 13-year sentence handed 

down in March against a young man who wounded nine 

worshippers during a January 2006 knife attack in a Moscow synagogue. Investigators had found anti-Semitic literature and ammunition in the attacker’s apartment, but the 

lower court had not found the defendant guilty of incitement of ethnic or religious hatred under Article 282 of the 

Russian Criminal Code. In September, a Moscow court sentenced the young man to 16 years in prison for attempted 

murder and inciting racial hatred under Article 282. 

Russian human rights advocates say that Putin and 

senior members of his administration have not spoken out 

strongly enough in support of the multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature of the Russian state and society.3

Some Western and other observers have suggested that 

Russian authorities have manipulated xenophobia for 

political purposes. The Kremlin is believed, for example, 

to have supported the formation of the ultra-nationalist 

“Rodina” political party—and then to have been unprepared for its popularity—as well as the politically active 

nationalist youth movement “Nashi.” Putin has on occasion affirmed the value of pluralism in Russia, for instance 

at the meeting of the G-8 countries in July 2006, and has 

also decried anti-Semitism and hate crimes. Nevertheless, 

in the Commission’s view, more can and should be done 

to ensure that Russian law enforcement agencies recognize hate crimes for what they are—human rights abuses—and to prevent and punish such crimes, including 

those involving ethnicity and religion.

Metropolitan Kirill, Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad and External Affairs spokesman of the Moscow Patriarchate of the 

Russian Orthodox Church, meeting with the Commission delegation.
45

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Attempts to Challenge International Human 

Rights Institutions and Undermine Domestic 

Human Rights Advocacy

Growing suspicion of foreign influence in Russia has been 

exacerbated by the repeated assertions by Putin and other 

Russian government officials that foreign funding of NGOs 

constitutes “meddling” in Russia’s internal affairs. The official branding of Russian human rights organizations as 

“foreign” has increased the vulnerability of Russia’s human 

rights advocates and those they defend. Moreover, although 

Russia has ratified international human rights treaties and 

agreements including the Helsinki Accords, government officials and other influential Russian figures have challenged 

international human rights institutions, as well as the validity of human rights advocacy in Russia, charging that both 

are being used for political purposes and, worse, that they 

represent “foreign” values. Furthermore, they have complained of “double standards,” “selectivity,” and “politicization” when there is an inquiry into Russia’s human rights 

practices, particularly with reference to Chechnya. 

These and similar views about human rights and the 

foreign funding of Russian NGOs have been expressed 

not only by Russian government officials, but also by Metropolitan Kirill, the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad and External Affairs spokesman of the Moscow 

Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. This gives 

particular cause for concern, in light of the increasingly 

prominent role provided to the Russian Orthodox Church 

in Russian state and public affairs.

In a meeting with the Commission delegation, Metropolitan Kirill affirmed the norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the same time, however, he 

expressed three main concerns about international human 

rights standards and their application in Russia: human 

rights may be used “to offend or desecrate holy things;”

human rights may “defame people” or be used as “an excuse for certain unacceptable acts;” and laws created under 

the guise of promoting human rights may be used “to destroy morality” and related values. In Kirill’s view, human 

rights must be connected to ethical and moral “values” 

rather than what he claims are simply “political agendas.”

Increasing Official Harassment of Muslims

As is the case in many other countries, the Russian government faces major challenges as it addresses religious extremism and acts of terrorism that claim a religious linkage, 

while also protecting freedom of religion or belief and other 

human rights. The rapid post-Soviet revival of Islamic worship and religious education, along with the ongoing war in 

Chechnya and growing instability in the North Caucasus, 

compound difficulties for the Russian government in dealing 

with its 20 million strong Muslim population, the country’s 

second largest religious community. 

Security threats from domestic terrorism, particularly 

those related to the conflict in Chechnya, are genuine. 

According to Spasskiy, the deputy secretary of the Security 

Council, the security threat emanating from the North Caucasus is driven by a religion hijacked by political extremism. 

The region faces chronic instability due to a variety of factors: 

severe economic dislocation, especially among young men; 

Kul Sharif Mosque, Kazan, Tatarstan

The rapid post-Soviet revival of 

Islamic worship and religious education, 

along with the ongoing war in 

Chechnya and growing instability in 

the North Caucasus, compound 

difficulties for the Russian government 

in dealing with its 20 million strong 

Muslim population, the country’s 

second largest religious community. 
46

the conflict in Chechnya; some radical foreign influences on 

indigenous Muslims; and other local grievances. All these 

factors have combined to fuel volatile, and increasingly violent, expressions among Muslims of popular dissatisfaction 

with the Russian government. 

Yet human rights groups are concerned that the methods used by the Russian government to address security 

threats could increase instability and exacerbate radicalism 

among Russia’s Muslim community. NGOs and human 

rights activists have provided evidence of numerous cases 

of Muslims being prosecuted for extremism or terrorism 

despite no apparent relation to such activities. These included dozens of cases of individuals detained for possessing religious literature, such as the Koran, or on the basis 

of evidence—including banned literature, drugs, or explosives—allegedly planted by the police. The Commission has 

been informed of at least 200 cases of Muslims imprisoned 

on what reportedly are fabricated criminal charges of possession of weapons and drugs. The Memorial human rights 

group reports that men with long beards, women wearing 

head scarves, and Muslims perceived as “overly devout” 

are viewed with suspicion by some Russian officials. Such 

individuals may be arrested on vague official accusations of 

alleged Islamic extremism or for displaying Islamist sympathies. Persons suspected by local police of involvement in 

alleged Islamic extremism have reportedly been subjected 

to torture and ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, prisons, 

and labor camps. 

During the Commission delegation’s trip to Kazan, 

officials spoke of local government support for preserving 

Tatarstan’s traditionally moderate form of Islam in the republic, which has a Muslim majority and a sizeable Russian 

Orthodox minority. A potential complication arises, however, from the fact that nearly one-third of the imams in the 

republic’s 1,100 mosques reportedly were trained in Saudi 

Arabia and other countries in the Middle East. The promotion of moderate Islam may also prove difficult due to the 

Tatarstan government’s own actions. According to Memorial, Tatarstan officials sometimes threaten or imprison 

those Muslims who refuse to testify in court against their 

co-religionists or who provide humanitarian assistance to 

Muslim prisoners or their families. 

Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev and other regional officials supported the training of imams through 

the government-funded Russian Islamic University in Kazan. However, according to Rafik Mukhametshin, deputy 

head of the Islamic Studies Department at the Tatarstan 

Academy of Sciences, the University’s approach to religious 

education is so secular that local Muslim leaders view it as 

insufficient to train imams. 

Although local officials in Tatarstan report no danger 

from extremism, they did confirm that there had been 

several investigations into extremist activity. Furthermore, 

Tatarstan officials did acknowledge that in at least one case, 

individuals had been arrested when police erroneously 

identified the Koran as extremist material. In another case, 

charges were brought against an individual for distributing 

allegedly extremist material in Tatarstan: a textbook on the 

Arabic language printed in Moscow

Muslim leaders, too, have also been targeted by Russian officials. For example, Mansur Shangareev, a leading 

Muslim activist in the southern region of Astrakhan has 

been charged with incitement to religious hatred by the regional authorities, although his lawyer from the Slavic Legal 

Center insisted that the charges are “very crudely falsified.”4

In another incident, after a court in the North Caucasus 

From right, Commission Deputy Director for Policy Tad Stahnke, 

Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa and Vice Chair Michael Cromartie 

outside the Russian Islamic University in Kazan, Tatarstan.
47

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republic of Adygea rejected a case brought against a local 

imam for “incitement of hatred or hostility by insulting human dignity” under Article 282.1 of the Russian Criminal 

Code in March 2006, officials filed an administrative suit 

against the imam in September—for the “illegal sale of 

spoiled butter.” 

There are also concerns that certain government 

actions to counter extremism will have a chilling effect 

on freedom of expression in Russia. For example, Sheikh 

Nafigulla Ashirov, the Chairman of the Spiritual Directorate 

for Muslims of the Asian part of Russia, said that Russian 

officials had warned him that he could be charged with extremism for publishing a court-requested expert analysis of 

texts from the banned radical Muslim group Hizb ut-Tahrir. 

As a result of Ashirov’s conclusion that the documents of 

the organization’s Russian branch did not advocate violence, he claims that several defendants received lighter 

sentences from the courts. Memorial, which requested and 

then posted Ashirov’s analysis on its Web site, was also informed that it could be charged with extremism. 

The SOVA Center reported that courts had delivered 

much harsher sentences against alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir

members in 2006 in comparison with the previous year, 

and it cited estimates by human rights groups that some 40 

percent of Hizb ut-Tahrir defendants had been subjected to 

torture during investigations. The last two years have also 

seen a series of criminal cases filed against members of 

other alleged radical Muslim groups, the SOVA Center said.

According to human rights groups, a 2003 Russian 

Supreme Court decision to ban 15 Muslim groups for their 

alleged ties to international terrorism has made it much 

easier for officials to detain arbitrarily individuals on extremism charges for alleged connections to these groups. 

The Court decision to ban the 15 organizations was not 

made public for more than three years, yet police, prosecutors, and courts reportedly used the decision to arrest and 

imprison hundreds of Muslims. Indeed, it was not until July 

2006 that the official government newspaper Rossiiskaya 

gazeta published a list with the names of the banned, terrorist-designated organizations drawn up by the Federal 

Security Service (FSB)—a necessary step to give the ruling 

legal force—and the list then contained the names of two 

additional groups, without any supporting explanation for 

their inclusion.5

 

The Commission has also received reports that Russian 

government officials have closed a number of mosques. 

While some mosque closures may have been necessitated 

by security concerns, in other cases officials seem to have 

acted in an arbitrary fashion. For example, the late, former 

president of the Kabardino-Balkaria republic in the North 

Caucasus ordered the closure of six of the seven mosques 

in Nalchik, the regional capital. This decision, along with 

allegations by Russian analysts that local police had tortured young men suspected of Islamist sympathies, are 

seen as major contributing factors to the October 2005 violence in Nalchik, when Muslim radicals attacked police and 

other security offices and more than 100 people were killed 

in the fighting.6

 The new president of Kabardino-Balkaria 

said in September 2006 that he plans to reopen two of the 

Nalchik mosques. In August 2006, the Russian Supreme 

Court upheld a lower court decision ordering that the local Muslim community pay for the demolition of its new 

mosque in the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. Allegedly, the city’s Muslim community had not received all the 

required building permits, although the construction of this 

mosque had been partly funded by the previous regional 

and city governments.

In September, a Moscow court took up a case on 

whether the writings of Said Nursi, a Turkish pacifist 

Islamic theologian with 6 million adherents in Turkey, 

should be declared extremist. The Tatarstan prosecutor 

had initiated a case against the private Tatarstan-based 

Commissioners Richard D. Land (left) and Michael Cromartie 

(right) with Sergei Movchan, Director of Russia’s Federal 

Registration Service (center). 
48

Nuri-Badi Foundation, which has published Nursi’s works. 

The Russian Council of Muftis, asked by the court to conduct an expert analysis of Nursi’s writings, concluded that 

his writings were not extremist. Indeed, the extensive analysis, published by the Web site “portal-credo.ru” and signed 

by Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, concluded that in this case the 

analytical methods of the Tatarstan prosecutor’s office had 

been “anti-religious,” as well as prejudicial toward Islam. 

A group of more than 3,000 Muslims, including four 

prominent imams, published an unprecedented open letter 

to Putin in March 2007 asking him to intervene and stop the 

repression of Muslims in the name of the struggle against 

terrorism. The letter, published in the Izvestia daily, complained of the phenomenon of alleged Muslim prisoners 

of conscience, including an arrested imam in the southern 

city of Pyatigorsk who they alleged was guilty only of having 

converted non-Muslims to his religion. The imam, Anton 

Stepanenko, received a suspended one-year sentence in 

March for inciting inter-ethnic and inter-religious hatred and 

for “arbitrariness.” The letter also protested the criminal case 

against Nursi’s writings, saying it could become “a precedent 

for practically all literature that cites the Koran to be outlawed in Russia.” Russian officials have consistently denied 

discriminating against Muslims.

A Restrictive New NGO Law That Also Applies 

to Religious Organizations

The law passed in 2006 that restricts the activities of NGOs 

could have a significantly negative effect on religious 

groups. Although Aleksandr Kudryavtsev, Director of the 

Presidential Administration Liaison with Religious Organizations, told the Commission delegation that the new law 

would have little such impact, Sergei Movchan, until recently the director of the Federal Registration Service (FRS), 

confirmed that some of the law’s most intrusive provisions 

do apply to religious organizations, charitable and educational entities set up by religious organizations, and groups 

defending human rights. 

The FRS, established as a department in the Ministry 

of Justice in late 2004, is charged with enforcement of the 

NGO law, as well as the registration of all political parties and real property in Russia. Among its staff of 30,000, 

the FRS currently has 2,000 employees nationwide who 

are tasked with the oversight of NGOs, including religious 

organizations. During the next two years, the FRS plans to 

hire an additional total of 12,000 employees. Since the new 

NGO law took effect in April 2006, the FRS reports that it 

has received 6,000 requests for registration, of which 600 

applications were refused, mainly, the agency claims, on 

technical grounds.

Under the new law, FRS officials can order an examination of an organization’s documents, including financial 

information, as well as attend its events, without the group’s 

consent or a court order. If violations are found, the FRS 

can call for court proceedings against the group, possibly 

resulting in the group’s eventual liquidation. FRS officials 

told the Commission that the FRS regulations on the use of 

these powers had not yet been finalized, but that officials 

would be able to use this new authority if they believed that 

an organization was acting contrary to its charter. 

In one such example, the FRS branch in Novosibirsk 

found in June 2006 that a registered local Pentecostal 

church, the Word of Life, had violated its charter when it 

organized a show in a Siberian military unit its representatives had been visiting for three years, the SOVA Center 

reported. If the church does not change its charter accordingly, it could face court proceedings leading to its liquidation. The SOVA Center also reported that FRS officials in 

the Novgorod region moved in June to shut down the local 

branch of the Salvation Army for violating its charter.

Moreover, the FRS has almost complete discretion to 

cancel programs and ban financial transactions by Russian 

branches of foreign organizations. Although the law provides 

only the vaguest guidance regarding the circumstances 

under which officials could take these actions, FRS officials 

confirmed to the delegation that no further regulations 

Fr. Gleb Yakunin of the All-Russian Movement for Human Rights (center) 

with Commissioners Felice D. Gaer, Michael Cromartie, and Richard Land
49

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were being considered. Instead, they plan to wait until FRS 

actions are challenged in court to undertake any refinements in guidelines regarding the scope of these powers. 

The new law also establishes extensive and onerous reporting requirements. NGOs are required to submit detailed 

annual reports regarding all of their activities, the composition of their governing bodies, as well as documentation of 

spending and the use of other property, including assets 

acquired from foreign sources. NGOs have expressed concern about the administrative and financial burdens of these 

requirements. Russian authorities simplified registration requirements for religious organizations in April 2007, after a 

wave of protest including from the majority, Kremlin-allied 

Moscow Patriarchate Russian Orthodox Church, suggesting 

an official admission that the rules were too stringent. They 

have not eliminated the requirements altogether, however, 

leaving in place excessively strict regulatory measures.

Given the unfettered discretion granted to FRS officials 

under the new law, its actual impact will be measured by its 

practical implementation. Security Council Deputy Secretary Spasskiy said that implementation of the law would be 

monitored by the Public Chamber, a new body consisting 

of civil society figures appointed by the Russian government with no formal oversight authority or accountability 

to the courts or the Duma. The Russian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs insists that the new law is in line with those found 

in European and other Western countries. This assertion, 

however, is questioned by legal experts in the United States. 

the Council of Europe, and by the Commission. 

FRS officials told the Commission that one of the 

problems the law was designed to address was that foreign 

funding had reached Russian political parties via NGOs or 

had otherwise influenced the political process. In Kazan, 

the Tatarstan Human Rights Ombudsman told the Commission delegation that one of the key purposes of the 

new legislation was to prevent NGOs and other non-commercial organizations from engaging in political activities, 

especially those entities that receive funding from foreign 

sources. Yet this purpose is not directly stated in the NGO 

law. Russia’s human rights organizations are particularly 

vulnerable to this implicit prohibition, which is subject to 

arbitrary interpretation. These provisions of the NGO law 

on foreign funding are part of the broader effort by Russian 

officials, described above, to link human rights groups to 

“foreign interference,” and thus to discredit—and perhaps 

ultimately halt—their activities.

Continuing Restrictions on Religious 

Freedom at the Regional and Local Levels

Unlike under the Soviet regime, most people in Russia today 

are generally able to gather for worship and profess and 

practice the religion of their choice. Nevertheless, minority religious groups continue to face some restrictions on 

religious activities, especially at the regional and local levels. 

These restrictions stem from a variety of factors, including 

Russia’s weak judicial system, inconsistent adherence to the 

rule of law, and local officials’ sometimes arbitrary interpretations regarding the status of the so-called “traditional” 

religions, deemed to be Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, 

and Buddhism. These problems include denials of registration (status of legal person) requests; refusals to allot land 

to build places of worship; restrictions on rental space for 

religious activities and lengthy delays in the return of religious property; and attacks in the state-controlled media that 

incite intolerance. 

The Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman’s 

office (RFHRO) receives 200 – 250 religious freedom 

complaints every year, representing thousands of alleged 

individual violations; its investigations reveal that about 

three-quarters of these cases represent genuine violations 

of religious freedom guarantees under Russian law. The 

RFHRO reports that the restrictions and limitations that 

produce these problems are due to subjective factors, 

including the notion that Russian officials should accord 

These provisions of the NGO law on foreign funding are part of the 

broader effort by Russian officials . . . to link human rights groups to “foreign interference,” 

and thus to discredit—and perhaps ultimately halt—their activities. 
50

different treatment to the four so-called “traditional” religions than to the many alleged “non-traditional” religious 

communities in Russia. Another factor is the alleged preferential treatment given to the Russian Orthodox Church, and 

the documented influence of Russian Orthodox priests who 

object to the activities of other religious groups on local and 

regional government officials. 

Official Barriers to Legal Status and Practice 

and Societal Intolerance

Since the passage of the 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Communities,” the number of registered religious communities has increased, but there has 

also been a steady rise in groups experiencing chronic difficulties in obtaining legal status. According to the RFHRO’s 

2006 annual report, religious groups experiencing such 

difficulties include various Orthodox churches that do not 

recognize the Moscow Patriarchate, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

the Hare Krishna Society, Pentecostal churches, and the 

Church of the Latter-day Saints.

Religious groups that have taken their cases to court to 

overturn denials of registration have often been successful, 

but some administrative authorities have been unwilling to 

implement court decisions. For example, the Salvation Army 

has not been re-registered in the city of Moscow, despite a 

2002 Russian Constitutional Court ruling in its favor and an 

October 2006 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights 

that the Russian government should pay damages to the 

group. Russian authorities have also denied registration to 

certain religious communities because they allegedly have 

not been in existence for a sufficiently long period, despite 

a 2002 Russian Constitutional Court decision that an active 

religious organization registered before the 1997 law could 

not be deprived of legal status for failure to re-register. The 

problem is particularly acute at the local level, since local officials sometimes either refuse outright to register groups or 

create prohibitive obstacles to registration.

The 1997 religion law gives a minimum of 10 citizens the 

right to form a religious association, which, in turn, provides 

them the legal right for a house of worship. Yet, despite this 

legal guarantee, building or renting worship space remains a 

problem for a number of religious groups. For example, local authorities in Kaliningrad, Sochi, and St. Petersburg have 

not responded to longstanding requests from Muslim communities for permission to build mosques. Roman Catholics, 

Protestants, Old Believers, Molokans, and other alternative 

Orthodox communities have also reported difficulties in 

obtaining permission to build houses of worship.

There are also concerns about property. The March 2007 

RFHRO report noted many complaints concerning the inability of religious organizations to regain property that had 

been confiscated in the Soviet era or to acquire new property.That concern was echoed by the SOVA Center, which said 

that the property problem was most acute among Muslims, 

Protestants (especially Pentecostalists), and new religious 

movements. Throughout 2006, the SOVA Center reported, 

authorities had tried to take away facilities already in use by 

various religious groups. The Itar-Tass news agency reported 

in March 2007 that the government had made a preliminary 

decision to return to religious organizations land and real 

estate that they had controlled only by lease since the 1917 

Bolshevik Revolution—with the exception of monuments 

on the UNESCO world culture and heritage lists—but implementation of the decision remains to be seen.

Muslim and Protestant leaders and non-governmental 

sources describe articles in the Russian media that frequently are hostile to Muslims or that spread falsehoods 

about Protestants. For example, according to the SOVA 

Center, in April 2006, in the Buddhist-majority republic of 

Kalmykia, a local parliamentarian branded Protestants as 

“Satanists” in a statement broadcast on TV. A Pentecostal 

church service in the Siberian city of Perm was disrupted 

by a gas attack in August 2006; the church’s pastor believes 

the attack may be connected to negative articles in the local 

media, the SOVA Center reported.

Evangelical Protestants and members of other minority Christian communities have been targeted in violent 

attacks, to which local authorities reportedly do not 

Many of the problems faced by 

minority religious communities in 

Russia stem from the notion set 

forth in the preface to the 1997 law 

that only four religions—Russian 

Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 

Buddhism—have “traditional” 

status in that country. 
51

russia

adequately respond. For example, the Forum 18 News 

Service reported that Russian police failed to respond after 

drunken youths attacked a Pentecostal service in the Siberian city of Spassk in April 2006, or when a Catholic service 

in St. Petersburg was disrupted by intruders in late May. In 

both incidents, only after church leaders complained did 

the authorities take action. Security police have also reportedly restricted the religious activities of certain religious 

minorities. In May 2006, Forum 18 reported that in Ivanovo 

near Moscow, the FSB raided a Baptist event at a rented 

cinema and detained two Baptists who were distributing 

religious literature.

“Traditional” vs. “Non-Traditional” Religions

Many of the problems faced by minority religious communities in Russia stem from the notion set forth in the preface to 

the 1997 law that only four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, 

Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—have “traditional” status 

in that country. Others are held to be “non-traditional,” and 

their activities and leaders are subject to official oversight. 

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which has played a 

special role in Russian history and culture, receives the bulk 

of state support, including subsidies for the construction of 

churches, although other so-called “traditional” religious 

communities also sometimes benefit from such subsidies. 

The ROC also has agreements with a number of government 

ministries on guidelines for public education, religious training for military personnel, and law enforcement decisions. 

Metropolitan Kirill has said that religious organizations 

will be empowered to operate based on “their weight in 

society,” with proselytism “totally [prohibited]...to avoid 

conflict between faiths.” ROC officials also sometimes 

use their influence with regional authorities to restrict the 

activities of other religious groups. There are frequent reports, particularly on the local level, that minority religious 

communities must secure permission from the ROC before 

being allowed to build, buy, or rent a house of worship and 

that local authorities sometimes deny registration to minority groups at the behest of local ROC officials. 

The proposal of the ROC to add a voluntary course on 

Russian Orthodox culture as part of the national education curriculum can also be viewed as an example of the 

ROC’s assertion of preferential status. As of September 

2006, four regions of the Russian Federation—Kaluga, 

Belgorod, Bryansk, and Smolensk—had introduced 

compulsory classes focusing on Russian Orthodoxy. The 

course will be offered as an elective subject in at least six 

more regions and a variety of smaller districts, according 

to the SOVA Center. Representatives of the four “traditional” religions told the Commission that they favored religious instruction as part of the state curriculum, but only 

on a voluntary basis and available to members of all religious communities based on the number of participating 

students. However, several Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant 

leaders informed the Commission delegation that they objected to the proposal to introduce even voluntary courses 

on the “Russian Orthodox Culture,” because it asserted one 

religious tradition to be the foundation of Russian culture.

Because of the threat to the constitutionally mandated 

secular status of the state and the separation of the state 

from religion set forth in Russian law, an RFHFO representative told the Commission delegation that teaching about 

religion in state schools must be conducted by academics 

and other experts on world religions rather than clerics. 

Moreover, in May 2006, Interfax reported that the Ombudsman had declared that the mandatory teaching of religious 

subjects in public schools would be unconstitutional. Andrei Fursenko, the Russian Federation Education Minister, 

told Itar-Tass in September 2006 that he disapproves of the 

introduction of the courses on Russian Orthodoxy, that he 

favors teaching children “the history of all religions,” and 

that he would ask the Public Chamber to resolve the issue. 

In November, the Chamber largely ruled in favor of the 

supporters of the Russian Orthodox Culture curriculum, 

but stressed that students should be taught only with the 

permission of their parents or, if they are over 14 years of 

age, with their own consent, the SOVA Center reported. 
 

C ommission R ecommendations

 

 

 Combating Xenophobia, 

Intolerance, and Hate Crimes 

The U.S. government should urge the 

Russian government to: 

• condemn specific acts of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance, as well as incidents of hate 

crimes, and to make clear that such 

crimes are to be treated by officials as human rights abuses, not 

“hooliganism,” and that they will be 

fully and promptly investigated and 

prosecuted;

• while vigorously promoting freedom of expression, take steps to 

discourage rhetoric that promotes 

xenophobia or intolerance, including religious intolerance;

• provide special training and other 

programs for law enforcement 

officers and other officials to address ethnic hatred and promote 

tolerance; 

 • establish a special nationwide antidiscrimination body, as recommended by the Council of Europe’s 

European Commission against 

Racism and Intolerance; 

• implement the numerous specific 

recommendations made by Russia’s 

Presidential Council on Human 

Rights, the official Human Rights 

Ombudsman, and the Council 

of Europe’s Commission against 

Racism and Intolerance to address 

anti-Semitism and xenophobia and 

prevent and punish hate crimes, 

including full implementation by 

regional and local law enforcement personnel of criminal code 

provisions prohibiting incitement 

and violence motivated by ethnic 

or religious hatred, in accordance 

with standards established by the 

European Court of Human Rights 

(ECtHR); and

• report, as required, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE) on the specific 

measures that have been undertaken on a national level to address 

hate crimes, including maintaining statistics on these crimes, and 

strengthening legislative initiatives 

to combat them, and to take advantage of relevant OSCE training programs for Russian law enforcement 

and judicial officials. 

 Reforming or Withdrawing 

the 2006 Russian Law on 

Non-Commercial 

Organizations 

The U.S. government should:

• establish a program to monitor 

implementation of Russia’s law on 

non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), including its impact on 

religious organizations;

• encourage the Russian government to withdraw or substantially 

amend the NGO law; failing that, 

the government should be urged to 

develop regulations that clarify and 

sharply limit the state’s discretion 

to interfere with the activities of 

NGOs, including religious organizations. These regulations should 

be developed in accordance with 

international standards and in conformance with international best 

practices; 

• encourage the Russian government 

to publish precise and transparent 

statistical data on a regular basis 

regarding the Ministry of Justice’s 

Federal Registration Service (FRS) 

activities related to implementation 

and enforcement of the NGO law; 

and

• devote added resources to legal 

training for Russian NGOs, giving 

them the tools to defend the civil 

society they have built, and speak 

out in support of defense attorneys 

who are harassed and threatened 

for defending their clients, including human rights defenders and 

religious groups.

 Ensuring the Equal Legal 

Status and Treatment of the 

Members of Russia’s Religious 

Communities

The U.S. government should encourage the Russian government to: 

• ensure that law enforcement officials vigorously investigate and 

prosecute acts of violence, arson, 

and desecration perpetrated against 

members of any religious com1 

2 

3 

Commission Recommendations 

52
munity, their property, or houses of 

worship; set up a review mechanism 

outside the procuracy to ensure that 

government authorities and law enforcement personnel are investigated and sanctioned, as appropriate, if 

they are found to have encouraged 

or condoned such incidents;

• affirm the multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature of Russian 

society;

• affirm publicly that all religious 

communities in Russia are equal 

under the law and entitled to equal 

treatment, whether registered or 

unregistered; publicly express opposition to any legislation that would 

grant preferences to the purported 

“traditional” religions over other 

groups; and direct national government agencies to address and resolve 

continuing violations of religious 

freedom at the regional and local 

levels, including by:

• issuing instructions to local law 

enforcement, prosecutors, and 

registration officials as well as 

publicly affirming that members 

of all religious communities are to 

be treated equally under the law; 

• enforcing non-discriminatory, 

generally applicable zoning and 

building codes, and ordering an 

end to the practice of using local 

public opinion surveys that serve 

as a basis to deny land and building permits to minority religious 

communities; and 

• deleting from the preface to the 

1997 Law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” the reference to the four 

“traditional” religions—Russian 

Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 

Buddhism, as that reference 

contradicts the Russian constitutional provision that “religious 

associations are separate from 

the state and are equal before 

the law” and has led Russian officials to establish inappropriate 

limits or demands against members of Russia’s other religions 

communities;

• denounce media attacks on any 

religious community and adopt 

administrative measures against 

government officials who fuel them;

• cease all forms of interference in 

the internal affairs of religious 

communities; 

• avoid taking steps that could exacerbate religious extremism by (1) 

developing policies and strategies 

to protect the religious freedom and 

other human rights of the members 

of Russia’s Muslim community and 

(2) reviewing past cases of alleged 

arbitrary detention or arrest of 

members of this community;

• distribute on a regular basis updated 

information on freedom of religion 

or belief, as well as on Russian constitutional provisions and jurisprudence on separation of church and 

state and the equal status of religious 

denominations, to the Russian judiciary, religious affairs officials at 

all levels of government, the FRS, 

the procuracy, and all law enforcement bodies;

• extend the current annual training program for regional and local 

religious affairs officials to include 

their counterparts in the judiciary, 

procuracy, law enforcement agencies, and to the FRS; 

• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up 

a nationwide monitoring system on 

the status of freedom of religion or 

belief in the 89 regions of Russia; and

• accept a site visit to Russia from the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief and grant her 

unrestricted access to religious communities and to regions where religious freedom abuses are reported.

 Strengthening Attention 

to the Issue of Freedom of 

Religion or Belief in U.S. 

Diplomacy

The U.S. government should: 

• ensure that the U.S. Congress 

maintain a mechanism to monitor 

publicly the status of human rights 

in Russia, including freedom of 

religion or belief, particularly in the 

case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik 

amendment with respect to Russia, 

and maintain the Smith Amendment as U.S. law; 

• urge the government of the Russian 

Federation to invite each of the 

three OSCE Personal Representatives on combating intolerance as 

well as the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief to 

visit the Russian Federation during 

2007-2008;

• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials 

and programs (a) engage with regional and local officials throughout 

the Russian Federation, especially 

when violations of freedom of religion occur, and (b) disseminate 

information to local officials concerning international legal norms 

on freedom of religion or belief, 

including the rights of unregistered 

religious communities; 

• ensure that the issue of human 

rights, including freedom of religion 

4 

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53
or belief, be raised within the context 

of negotiations on Russian accession 

to the World Trade Organization; and 

• work with the other members of 

the G-8 to ensure that the issue of 

human rights, including the human 

rights aspects of migration and protecting human rights in the context 

of counter-terrorism, are raised at all 

bilateral and multilateral meetings.

 Strengthening U.S. 

Programs on Promoting 

Religious Freedom and 

Combating Religious 

Intolerance 

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. government-funded 

grants to NGOs and other sectors in 

Russian society include the promotion of legal protections and respect 

for freedom of religion or belief as 

well as methods to combat xenophobia, including intolerance based on 

religion; solicitations and requests 

for proposals should include these 

objectives;

• support programs developed by 

Russian institutions, including 

universities, libraries, NGOs, and 

associations of journalists, particularly those who have engaged in the 

activities described in the above 

recommendation, to organize conferences and training programs on 

issues relating to freedom of religion 

or belief, as well as on promoting 

inter-religious cooperation, encouraging pluralism, and combating hate 

crimes and xenophobia;

• support programs to train lawyers 

to contest violations of the rights 

to freedom of religion or belief as 

guaranteed in Russian law and 

under its international obligations 

both in Russian courts and before 

the ECtHR; 

• translate, where necessary, into 

Russian and print or otherwise make 

available to Russian citizens relevant 

documents and materials, including: 

• hate crimes guidelines developed by 

the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as U.S. Department of 

Justice expertise on combating hate 

crimes and religiously-motivated 

attacks; and

• international documents and materials generated by Russian institutions relating to freedom of religion 

or belief, xenophobia, and hate 

crimes, as well as relevant U.S. Department of State and Commission 

reports, posting such documents on 

the U.S. Embassy Web site; 

• ensure that Russia’s citizens continue to have access to alternative 

sources of information through 

U.S.-government-funded radio and 

TV broadcasts, as well as Internet 

communications, and that these 

broadcasts include information 

about freedom of religion or belief 

and the need to combat xenophobia 

and hate crimes; in particular by:

• restoring the funding of Russianlanguage radio broadcasts of Voice 

of America and Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to the levels 

of fiscal year 2007, restoring the 

broadcast hours that have been cut 

and planned staff reductions, and 

considering new vehicles for delivery 

of broadcasts and; 

• increasing funding for radio broadcast programs in minority languages 

spoken in Russia, including the 

RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus 

services, which are often the primary 

source of independent broadcast 

media in regions of Russia with majority Muslim populations;

• include in U.S.-funded exchange 

programs a wider ethnic and religious cross section of the Russian 

population, with particular focus on 

educational and leadership development programs for students from 

the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and 

other regions of Russia with sizeable 

Muslim and other religious and 

ethnic minority populations; and 

• initiate International Visitor’s 

Programs relating to the prevention 

and prosecution of hate crimes 

for Russian officials and other 

relevant figures.

 Addressing the Crisis 

in Chechnya and the North 

Caucasus 

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that the continued humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and 

allegations of human rights abuses 

perpetrated by the Russian military 

there and in other North Caucasus 

republics remain a key issue in U.S. 

bilateral relations with Russia;

• urge the Russian government to end 

and vigorously prosecute all alleged 

acts of involuntary detention, torture, rape, and other human rights 

abuses perpetrated by members 

of the Russian security services in 

Chechnya, including those by proKremlin Chechen forces;

• urge the Russian government to 

abide by all resolutions passed by 

the Parliamentary Assembly of the 

Council of Europe relating to the 

human rights and humanitarian 

6

54

5 
55

situation in the North Caucasus, and 

reinstate regular on-site visits by the 

Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for Chechnya; 

• urge the Russian government to accept a site visit to Chechnya from the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions and to reconsider 

the October 2006 decision to deny 

access to the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Torture;

• work with other OSCE Member 

States to ensure that issues related 

to human rights abuses in the North 

Caucasus play a more prominent role in OSCE deliberations, 

and encourage the OSCE to raise 

humanitarian and other forms of 

assistance to the civilian populations 

affected by the decade-long conflict 

in Chechnya; and

• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict 

resolution and post-conflict reconstruction programs for the North 

Caucasus also fund credible local 

partners in Chechnya, Ingushetia, 

and Daghestan. 

ENDNOTES 

1

 For example, Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code forbids the incitement of ethnic and religious 

hatred. Article 63 contains a provision for enhanced penalties in violent crimes with evidence of bias 

motivation. The Russian Criminal Code also contains five articles (105, 111, 112, 117, 244) with explicit 

provisions for the punishment of violent hate crimes. 

2

 The three men have been charged with multiple counts of racially motivated murders and investigators 

reportedly will order psychiatric examination. As of this writing, they are being held in jail awaiting trial. 

3

 For example, President Putin has not condemned the August 2006 incident of communal violence in 

Kondopoga, in the northern republic of Karelia. In a televised question-and-answer session last year, 

Putin used a question about Kondopoga to advance his government’s policy of restricting foreign labor. 

“We need neither provocateurs, on the one hand, nor corrupt (government officials), on the other,” Putin 

said in remarks translated by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “We should bring order to the (retail and 

wholesale) trade system, to food markets, we should bring order on issues of migration and labor.” 

4

 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Muslim rivalry behind criminal charges?” Forum 18 News Service, February 

8, 2006. 

5

 According to the head of the FSB Department for Combating International Terrorism, there are three 

criteria for inclusion on this list: violent activities aimed at changing Russia’s constitutional system; 

links to illegal armed groups and other extremist organizations operating in the North Caucasus; and 

connections to groups regarded as terrorist by the international community.

6 In October 2005 in Nalchik, violence erupted in which some 300 persons attacked military garrisons 

and police stations, leaving 34 police and armed forces members dead.

57 Overview of the Commission’s Work with 

Refugee, Asylum and Immigration Issues

As stated in the preamble of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA): 

 The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very 

origin and existence of the United States. Many of 

our nation’s founders fled religious persecution 

abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds the 

ideal of religious freedom... From its birth to this 

day, the United States has prized this legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by standing 

for religious freedom and offering refuge to those 

suffering religious persecution.

Consistent with the language in these principles, Title 

VI of IRFA included several provisions related to asylum 

seekers, refugees, and immigrants, with particular attention 

to those individuals who have fled—or committed—severe 

violations of religious freedom. Title VI also authorized the 

Commission to conduct a major study of the impact of a 

new U.S. immigration procedure established in 1996, called 

“Expedited Removal,” on asylum seekers.

As part of its monitoring of the implementation of Title 

VI of IRFA, the Commission has concluded that implementation of some of the training and reporting provisions of 

Title VI has resulted in a heightened awareness of religious 

persecution issues among relevant decision-makers and 

adjudicators. Other training and operational provisions, 

however, remain under or even unimplemented—nearly 

eight years after IRFA’s enactment. The Commission continues to urge the State Department and other relevant agencies to implement completely IRFA’s Title VI provisions. 

Working with the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and 

Homeland Security, as well as the U.S. Congress, the Commission had several notable achievements in the refugee, 

asylum, and immigration fields in the past year.

• The Commission released a report card assessing the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice on their implementation of Commission 

recommendations made in the Commission’s Report on 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal two years following 

the release of the report.1

• The Justice Department announced new reforms regarding immigration judges that were based on the Commission’s recommendations to protect asylum seekers in the 

Expedited Removal process.

• Congress renewed the Lautenberg (formerly Specter) 

Amendment, adopting a Commission recommendation 

to promote consistent adjudications by the U.S. Refugee 

Program for members of religious minorities from Iran 

(P.L. 110-5, Section 20412).

• Legislation was drafted by Senators Joseph Lieberman 

and Sam Brownback in the Safe and Secure Detention 

and Asylum Act of 2006 as part of comprehensive immigration reform to implement many of the recommendations of the Commission’s study on Expedited Removal.

• The Commission conducted trainings on international 

religious freedom issues for U.S. government officials 

with roles in the asylum and refugee adjudication 

processes, including the immigration judges and the 

Board of Immigration Appeals at the Executive Office 

for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice as 

well as the Refugee Corps and asylum officers of the U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department 

of Homeland Security.

Expedited Removal Study Report Card: 

Two Years Later

The Commission released a report card assessing the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) on their implementation of 

recommendations put forth in its Report on Asylum Seekers 

in Expedited Removal (hereafter referred to as the Study). 

Congress authorized the Commission to do the Study to 

see how adequately the responsible agencies implemented 

Congressionally-mandated protections for asylum seekers 

IRFA & The u.s. refugee & asylum programs
58

facing Expedited Removal (see below). Senators Joseph I. 

Lieberman (ID-Ct) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) asked the 

Commission to prepare the report card.

Two years later, the Commission concluded that 

most of the serious implementation flaws identified in the 

Study have not been addressed, and most of the Study’s 

recommendations have yet to be implemented. The 

Commission’s overarching recommendation was that Expedited Removal not be expanded until the serious problems identified by the Study were resolved. Despite this 

recommendation, and the failure to resolve the problems 

cited in the study, DHS has in fact expanded Expedited 

Removal from a port-of-entry program to one that covers 

the entire land and sea border of the United States, to a 

distance of 100 miles inland. 

Expedited Removal—included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

1996—provides for the prompt removal of aliens without 

proper documentation to their country of origin. However, 

the process includes the risk that refugees, who often travel 

without proper documents, might be mistakenly returned 

to their persecutors. To address this risk, Congress implemented several special procedural protections, including 

detention of asylum seekers while a determination is made 

if the alien has a “credible fear” of persecution (credible 

fear determination) and, if the asylum seeker goes before 

an immigration judge (IJ), allowing some to be paroled 

while their asylum case is pending. If it is determined that 

the asylum seeker does not have a credible fear of persecution, he or she is put back in the Expedited Removal 

process and removed promptly.

At least five separate entities are involved in Expedited 

Removal. Within DHS, it is Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) that first encounters aliens and identifies those subject 

to Expedited Removal and those seeking asylum. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for 

detaining asylum seekers until Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) makes the credible fear determination. For 

those asylum seekers found to have a credible fear, the DOJ’s 

Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) takes over; 

immigration judges hear the cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) reviews any appeals. With 

so many immigration officers involved in so many locations, 

coordination has been and remains a major challenge within 

DHS, and between DHS and DOJ.

Although Expedited Removal was intended to protect 

the integrity of U.S. borders while also protecting bona fide

asylum seekers, the Study discovered that serious implementing flaws place asylum seekers at risk of being returned 

to countries where they may face persecution. The Study 

also found that asylum seekers were detained inappropriately, under prison-like conditions and in actual jails.

DHS has not made any public response to the Study, 

despite a 2005 request from the Senate Appropriations 

Committee in Report 109-083 to consult with EOIR and report to the Committee by February 2006 on various aspects 

of the agency’s implementation of the Study’s recommendations. The House of Representatives Appropriations 

Committee in Report 109-79 also urged DHS to consider 

implementation of specific Study recommendations. It 

should be emphasized that none of the Study’s recommendations require congressional action. However, because of 

concern over the agencies’ failures to address the Study, 

Senators Lieberman and Brownback prepared legislation in 

2006 that would mandate implementation of a number of 

the Commission’s recommendations. Senator Lieberman 

The Commission’s overarching recommendation was that Expedited 

Removal not be expanded until the serious problems identified by the Study 

were resolved. Despite this recommendation, and the failure to resolve the problems 

cited in the study, DHS has in fact expanded Expedited Removal from a 

port-of-entry program to one that covers the entire land and sea border 

of the United States, to a distance of 100 miles inland. 
59

and Rep. Chris Smith have announced their intention to 

renew this legislation in 2007.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The Commission found that in more than half of the Expedited Removal interviews observed during the Study, 

immigration officers failed to read a script advising aliens 

in the Expedited Removal process that they should ask 

for protection without delay if they have any reason to 

fear being returned home. The Study further found that in 

72 percent of the cases, asylum seekers are not provided 

an opportunity to review sworn statements taken by 

immigration officers to make any necessary corrections 

for errors in interpretations before signing. These sworn 

statements are not verbatim, are not verifiable, often 

suggest that information was conveyed to the asylum 

seeker which was in fact never conveyed, and sometimes 

contain questions that were never asked. Although they 

look like verbatim transcripts they are not. The Study 

found that these unreliable documents are often used 

against asylum seekers when their cases go before an 

immigration judge. 

DHS regulations also require that, when an asylum 

seeker expresses a fear of return, he or she must be referred 

to an Asylum Officer to determine whether the fear is 

“credible.” Yet, in nearly 15 percent of the cases that Study 

experts observed directly and in person, asylum seekers 

who expressed a fear of return were nevertheless removed 

without a referral to an asylum officer. Of those cases, 

nearly half of the files indicated that the asylum seeker had 

not expressed any fear.

The Study put forth five recommendations to CBP to 

enhance and expand quality assurance procedures to ensure that Expedited Removal procedures are being properly 

followed, including: 1) expand existing videotape systems 

to all ports of entry and border patrol stations and have 

“testers” verify that procedures are correctly followed; 2) 

reconcile conflicting field guidance to clarify the requirement that any alien who expressed fear be referred for a 

credible fear interview; 3) inform immigration judges that 

forms used at ports of entry and the border are not verbatim transcripts of the alien’s entire asylum case, despite 

their appearance, so that they can be given proper weight; 

4) save scarce detention resources by not placing asylum 

seekers with valid travel documents in Expedited Removal; 

and 5) improve monitoring so that existing border procedures are correctly followed. 

CBP received an F grade on the implementation of all five 

recommendations. DHS failed to provide information on 

steps taken to address these issues and there was no public 

information available to indicate that any of the recommendations had been implemented. On the contrary, information provided by DHS during the course of the Orantes

litigation revealed that supervisors continue to rely almost 

exclusively on file reviews of Expedited Removal orders, 

and that the DHS officials involved had no knowledge of 

DHS adopting the Commission’s recommendations.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

The Study found that despite established national criteria 

to determine when asylum seekers in Expedited Removal 

should be released from detention pending their asylum 

hearing, there was no evidence that the criteria are actually being implemented. The Study found wide variations 

in release rates across the country, from 0.5 percent in 

New Orleans and 4 percent in New Jersey, to 94 percent 

in San Antonio and 81 percent in Chicago. Additionally, 

the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers referred 

for credible fear are detained—for weeks or months and 

occasionally years—in penal or penitentiary-like facilities. 

On average, asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution are detained for 60 days; one third of them are held 

for 90 days or more. Many facilities are, in fact, jails and 

prisons, and in some of these facilities, asylum seekers 

IR F A

USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer (center) speaks at the February 

2007 release of a report card on the Justice and Homeland Security 

Departments’ implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations in its 

2005 congressionally authorized Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited 

Removal. Left to right: Commissioners Richard D. Land and Preeta 

D. Bansal, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Commissioner Bishop Ricardo 
60

live alongside U.S. citizens serving criminal sentences or 

criminal aliens—even though ICE detention standards 

do not permit non-criminal detainees to be co-mingled 

with criminals. ICE has experimented with alternatives to 

detention, and has opened one secure facility—in Broward 

County, Florida—that is more in line with a refugee center 

than a penal institution. Broward, unfortunately, remains 

the exception. 

The Study put forth five recommendations to ICE 

to ensure that detention standards and conditions are 

appropriate for asylum seekers and to implement more 

consistent parole criteria, including: 1) train detention 

center personnel to work with non-criminal, psychologically vulnerable asylum-seekers; 2) work with the 

immigration courts to ensure that detained aliens in 

Expedited Removal, including those who have not been 

referred for a credible fear determination, have access to 

legal service providers; 3) change detention standards so 

that non-criminal asylum seekers are not detained under 

penal conditions; 4) codify existing parole criteria into 

regulations; and 5) ensure consistent and correct parole 

decisions by developing standardized forms and national 

review procedures to ensure their proper application. 

ICE received an overall D grade on implementation 

of the recommendations. The Commission was informed 

that ICE had jointly developed a new training module for 

its personnel on cultural awareness and asylum issues, 

although there was no time frame for its release. However, 

DHS failed to provide to the Commission information on 

steps taken to address the other four recommendations, 

nor was any public information available to indicate that 

any recommendations had been implemented. Rather, 

a December 2006 Audit Report by the DHS Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) found instances of non-compliance with existing ICE Detention Standards at all five of 

the facilities surveyed, three of which were included in the 

Commission’s Study. Furthermore, an April 2006 DHS OIG 

Audit Report recommended that ICE expedite the development of alternatives to detention and improve the capacity 

of data management systems to track information on the 

rationale underlying parole decisions. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

The Study found that, despite their expertise and authority to grant asylum outside the Expedited Removal context, 

asylum officers have a limited role in the Expedited Removal 

process. The Study found a high rate of positive credible 

fear determinations, reflecting the deliberately generous 

preliminary screening standard used in order to assure 

that a refugee is not mistakenly returned. However, review 

procedures for negative credible fear determinations were 

found to be more onerous, and might have the unintended 

consequence of encouraging positive determinations. The 

Study also found that the partnership between the Arlington, 

Virginia Asylum Office and the Capital Area Immigrants 

Rights Coalition to ensure legal advice for credible fear determinations was a success worth replicating. The partnership 

not only provides detained asylum seekers with legal advice, 

but has also improved efficiency by increasing the number of 

asylum seekers who, after consulting with counsel, chose not 

to pursue their claims. 

The Study put forth three recommendations to ensure 

asylum seekers are not turned away in error, including: 1) 

subject both positive and negative credible fear findings to 

similar review procedures; 2) expand the existing pro bono

program for the credible fear process to all eight asylum 

offices; and 3) allow asylum officers to grant asylum at the 

credible fear stage. 

USCIS received an overall B grade on implementation 

of the recommendations. The Commission applauds USCIS for its April 2006 memorandum on increasing quality 

assurance review for positive credible fear determinations, 

the release of an updated asylum officer Basic Training 

Course Lesson Plan, and the announcement in December 

2006 that it welcomes approaches by non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) to expand the existing pro bono

program to the other seven asylum office cities. However, 

Many facilities are, in fact, jails 

and prisons, and in some of these facilities, 

asylum seekers live alongside U.S. citizens 

serving criminal sentences or criminal 

aliens—even though ICE detention 

standards do not permit non-criminal 

detainees to be co-mingled with criminals. 
61

the Commission continues to urge USCIS to allow asylum 

officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Agency-wide

The Study found extensive problems with the overall 

management and coordination of the Expedited Removal 

process, including insufficient quality assurance practices, 

inadequate data management systems, poor communication between responsible DHS bureaus, and no mechanism to address system-wide issues. The Commission put 

forth four recommendations to address these coordination and management flaws: 1) create a high-level Refugee Coordinator position; 2) address implementation and 

coordination issues before expanding Expedited Removal; 

3) create a reliable data management system that allows 

for real-time information on asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal; and 4) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at 

the credible fear stage.

As an agency, DHS received an overall D grade on 

the implementation of the recommendations. While 

DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff did appoint a Refugee 

Coordinator, no other recommendations were acted 

upon. In February 2006, a Senior Advisor for Refugee and 

Asylum Policy was appointed. The Commission remains 

concerned, however, that unless supported by a fully 

staffed office and with the necessary authority within the 

Department to make the needed changes, the position 

cannot implement the Study’s recommendations, ensure 

consistent asylum policy and legal interpretations Department-wide, and monitor the system on an agency-wide 

basis so that changes remain in place and problems are 

addressed as they arise. 

Furthermore, the Commission is concerned that 

Expedited Removal has been extended, despite the specific 

recommendation that flaws in the process must be addressed before such an extension. The Commission also 

discovered in the DHS OIG Audit Report in April 2006 that 

ICE lacks data analysis capabilities to manage the detention 

and removal program in an efficient and effective manner.

The Commission continues to urge DHS to allow 

Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

Department of Justice, Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR)

The Study found that sworn statements taken at ports of 

entry and the border are inaccurate and incomplete, and that 

credible fear determinations are not intended to document 

the asylum seeker’s entire claim. Nevertheless, the Study 

found that in 57 percent of all cases, sworn statements and/

or credible fear determination records were used to impeach 

the asylum seeker. In 39 percent of all cases, the immigration 

judge cited these documents in denying the claim. The Study 

also found that one in four asylum seekers who are represented by pro bono attorneys are granted asylum, whereas 

only one in 40 unrepresented asylum seekers succeed. 

The outcome of the asylum seeker’s case also seems to 

depend largely on chance; namely, the IJ who is assigned to 

hear the case. Among IJs sitting in the same city who hear 

a significant number of asylum cases, some grant close to 

zero percent of applications, while others grant 80 percent. 

Of the asylum cases appealed to the BIA, only 2 to 4 percent 

are reversed. A particular concern is the use of “summary affirmances without opinion,” whereby a single Board member 

can endorse the result reached by an IJ without providing a 

reasoned written opinion discussing the issues raised on 

The Commission applauds USCIS for its April 2006 memorandum on increasing 

quality assurance review for positive credible fear determinations, the release of an 

updated Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Lesson Plan, and the announcement in 

December 2006 that it welcomes approaches by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

to expand the existing pro bono program to the other seven asylum office cities. 

IR F A
62

appeal. This practice, while allowing the Board to work 

through some of its backlog, can reduce confidence in the 

rigor of the Board’s review and has led to an increase in appeals of BIA decisions to federal circuit courts. Another drawback of summary affirmances is that they do not provide any 

guidance to IJs, since any errors short of requiring reversal of 

the decision are not caught or corrected by the Board. 

The Commission put forth six recommendations to 

improve consistency in asylum determinations by IJs. These 

are: 1) reinstate funding for immigration judge training; 2) 

expand the Legal Orientation Program (LOP), conducted 

by NGOs under EOIR’s direction in order to provide legal 

information to detained aliens, improve their access to 

pro bono counsel, reduce detention costs, and increase 

immigration cost efficiency; 3) improve the quality of immigration court decisions; 4) work with ICE to ensure that 

detained aliens in Expedited Removal, including those who 

have not been referred for a credible fear determination, 

have access to legal service providers; 5) improve administrative review of asylum appeals; and 6) allow Asylum 

Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

EOIR received an overall C+ grade on implementing 

the recommendations. In August 2006, the Commission 

welcomed new DOJ reforms based on the Commission’s 

recommendations. The reforms include: implementation of 

performance and supervision measures to promote better 

consistence and quality of IJ decisions; improvement and 

increased explanation of BIA decisions; increased training 

of IJs, BIA members, and EOIR staff; and expansion and 

improvement of EOIR’s pro bono programs.

The Commission was impressed by the increased 

training EOIR is providing to immigration judges. In January 2007, EOIR informed the Commission that it is expanding and improving training for all IJs. In August 2006, all 

IJs participated in a five-day training conference, which 

included presentations on religious freedom by the Commission and the State Department’s Office of International 

Religious Freedom, and mandatory workshops concerning 

asylum law and procedures and improving oral decisions. 

The conference also included circuit-specific reference 

materials. A similar mandatory conference is planned for 

August 2007. In November 2006, all IJs received an in-depth 

outline on asylum credibility and corroborating evidence 

in the federal Courts of Appeals. Additionally, a one-week 

training course for new IJs was held in March 2007 that 

included lectures on asylum, withholding of removal and 

protection under the Convention against Torture, a discussion of credibility developments under the REAL-ID Act, 

and a mock asylum hearing. 

The Commission was also pleased to learn in January 

2007 that EOIR doubled the number of LOP sites from six 

to 12, with an additional four pilot sites for unaccompanied 

minors in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. 

This also corresponded with a funding increase in FY06 that 

is expected to remain at the $2 million level in FY07 and 

FY08. Finally, EOIR formed a Pro Bono Committee to oversee expansion and improvement of its pro bono programs. 

The Commission noted efforts by EOIR to improve 

immigration adjudication through additional training and 

resource materials and the consideration of “quality assurance procedures (i.e., peer review) to address the significant variations in approval and denial rates among immigration judges.” The Commission further notes that the BIA 

has decreased the number of summary affirmances from 36 

percent in FY03 to 15 percent in FY06, and 10 percent in the 

first quarter of FY07, and has also added four new Board 

members. It continues to urge the BIA to increase 

the number of written opinions in asylum cases. 

Following the release of the report card, the Commission received invitations to meet with staff from ICE 

and EOIR. During the meeting with ICE, members of the 

Commission staff were informed that the bureau will soon 

be releasing its training CD on cultural awareness and 

asylum issues and is conducting private working group 

USCIRF provides expertise at a briefing at the Migration Policy Institute 

in Washington on asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, February 2007. 

Left to right Commissioners Bishop Ricardo Ramirez and Preeta D. 

Bansal, USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer. 
63

sessions with NGOs to discuss national parole criteria and 

family detention standards. The Commission was invited 

to participate in the working group sessions and has 

requested a copy of the training CD. In the meeting with 

EOIR, the Commission learned more about the training 

of IJs and the Board, including ongoing training with new 

materials, such as some country-specific materials and 

better reference materials for IJs. EOIR also explained that 

they are interested in meeting with CBP for training on the 

sworn statements. 

U.S. Inter-agency Disagreement Hampering 

Protection for Many Who Fled Religious 

Persecution

A legislative development in the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (as 

amended in 2005 by the REAL ID Act) has inadvertently 

become a barrier for refugees and asylum seekers who have 

fled religious persecution at the hands of terrorists and 

terrorist regimes.2

 Essentially, an alien is now held inadmissible if he or she provided any in-kind or monetary assistance (i.e., “material support”) to any group that advocates, 

conspires to commit, or commits an illegal act of violence, 

even if such support was provided under duress or was 

directed toward a group supported by the U.S. government. This policy has left thousands of refugees stranded in 

camps overseas as their applications have been put on hold 

by DHS and UNHCR. 

The Departments of Justice, State, and Homeland Security may waive this so-called “material support bar” under 

certain circumstances. In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a waiver for the Burmese Karen, Karenni, 

and Chin ethnic groups and for the Tibetan Mustangs and 

Cuban Alzados, groups fighting for democracy in their 

respective countries. In January 2007, Secretary Chertoff 

announced that provisions of material support to terrorism 

do not apply to those seeking asylum or adjustment of status 

to those that provided support to the following groups: the 

Karen National Union and Karen National Liberation Army, 

Chin National Front and Chin National Army, China National League for Democracy, Kayam Mew Land Party, Arakan 

Liberation Party, Tibetan Mustangs, Cuban Alzados, and 

Karenni National Progressive Party. Additionally, a duress 

exemption has been granted for victims of Tier III terrorist 

groups.3

 The Departments also introduced legislation earlier 

this year to address problems raised by the material support 

provisions in the REAL-ID Act. 

These steps have not fully addressed the situation, 

however. Individuals who provided support under duress 

to Tier I or II terrorist groups are still barred from entry 

into the United States. This issue may cause substantial 

problems and delays as the United States starts processing 

Iraqis fleeing religious and other forms of persecution. Additionally, the situation of Montagnards and Hmong from 

Southeast Asian countries has yet to be addressed. Finally, 

the U.S. government may rescind waivers without notice 

and without allowing asylum seekers to challenge the revocations, raising due process concerns. 

 Individuals who have voluntarily supported foreign 

terrorist organizations, such as those designated by the 

Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, should certainly be excluded from the 

United States. However, denying refugees admission to the 

United States because they were physically forced against 

their will to assist a terrorist organization, or because they 

provided inconsequential support to organizations which 

oppose particularly repressive regimes, is not only undermining the international leadership of the United States 

in the field of human rights, it is endangering the lives of 

innocent refugees who have fled terror or repression.

The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to resolve this impasse without further delay. Bona 

fide refugees should not continue to be barred from the 

United States if they represent no genuine security threat.

Access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 

for those who have Fled Severe Violations of 

Religious Freedom

The Commission has repeatedly urged that the U.S. Refugee 

Program be made more accessible for refugee applicants 

who have fled severe abuses of religious freedom, particularly those who have fled countries of particular concern 

(CPCs). The Commission has been joined in this call by the 

Congress, which enacted a provision in the North Korea 

Human Rights Act of 2004 requiring that the President, in 

his annual report on proposed refugee admissions pursuant to section 207(d) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act, include information about specific measures taken to 

facilitate access to the U.S. Refugee Program for individuals from each CPC.4

 

The Congress also renewed for FY07 the Lautenberg 

(formerly Specter) Amendment, which provides relief to 

religious minority refugee applicants from Iran by clarifying 

IR F A
64

the adjudication standards specific to their claims.5 The 

Commission recommends that Congress and the President continue to extend the Lautenberg Amendment until 

the government of Iran ceases to engage in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.

The United States has the largest program in the 

world to interview and process refugees in third countries 

for resettlement, with a proposed ceiling (for FY07) of up 

to 70,000 refugee admissions. With more than 8 million 

refugees in the world, however, access to the U.S. Refugee 

Program is tightly controlled, to the extent that for every 

year since 1991, the refugee admissions level has been 

undersubscribed by 5,000 refugees or more. Refugees overseas may not submit an application to the Refugee Program 

unless they are referred by the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR), or unless they belong to a specific 

group that has been deemed a “processing priority” by the 

Secretary of State. U.S. embassies may also refer cases to the 

Refugee Program for resettlement, but such referrals are an 

insignificant percentage of the overall caseload. 

Since the release of its 2005 Annual Report, the 

Commission has called upon the Department of State 

to facilitate access for certain specific groups, including 

Afghan Hindus under threat of imminent deportation 

from Germany, ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Mandeans, 

Yazidis, and other religious minorities who have fled 

targeted violence in Iraq, and Sudanese Christians who, 

due to the severity of past persecution or special vulnerabilities, will be unlikely candidates for voluntary repatriation. Other groups that may warrant consideration 

include Jehovah’s Witnesses from Eritrea who have fled 

to Sudan, as well as ethnic and religious minorities from 

Burma—such as Chin and Karen Christians and Rohingya 

Muslims—who have no realistic hope of imminent integration into countries of first asylum or safe and voluntary 

repatriation to Burma.

Problems in Implementation of Title VI of IRFA

Training Consular Officers in Refugee and 

Asylum Adjudications and Human Rights, 

Particularly Religious Freedom

Section 602 of IRFA mandates training on the U.S. Refugee 

Program for consular officers. The Commission remains 

concerned, however, that training of State Department consular officers in the Refugee Program continues to fall short 

of IRFA requirements in that the training concentrates on 

only one narrow aspect of the Refugee Program. Although 

consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, as 

noted above they are authorized to refer individuals in need 

of protection to the Refugee Program.6

 Such referrals rarely 

take place. A report by Professor David Martin at the University of Virginia, commissioned by the State Department’s 

Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, recommended that the Department provide new Foreign Service 

officers with more systematic instruction on refugee and 

humanitarian programs and on the specific opportunities 

and procedures for referrals.7

 Further, the Commission’s 

Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal noted 

concern over evidence that it may be increasingly difficult 

for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain protection in 

the United States, and called for a study on the extent to 

which consular officers are trained in the Refugee Program, 

as is required by IRFA, and on the impact such training is 

having on referrals made by U.S. embassies to the Refugee 

Program. The Commission regrets that no such study has 

been undertaken to date.

IRFA Procedural Requirements Relating to the 

U.S. Refugee Admissions Program

Section 602 of IRFA also contains other requirements for the 

U.S. Refugee Program. Among these are the requirement 

that the State Department establish uniform procedures for 

overseas processing entities, which prepare, under contract 

with the Department, the applications of individuals seeking 

refugee status, as well as for personnel responsible for 

preparing refugee case files for refugee adjudications. 

Although the State Department has made progress 

in complying with this provision by developing a “Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System” (WRAPS) to 

promote uniformity in the preparation of refugee case files, 

WRAPS does not provide any substantive guidance in two 

central aspects of the preparation of refugee case files: the 

preparation of each refugee applicant’s persecution story 

and the filing of requests for reconsideration of refugee applications that are denied. 

In the Commission’s 2004 Annual Report, it was noted 

that the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, 

and Migration (PRM) had expressed its intention to establish an internal working group on overseas processing entities. Professor David Martin, in the paper commissioned 

by the Department, also recommended that such a group 
65

develop guidelines consistent with section 602 of IRFA.8 

The Commission reiterates its recommendation that the 

State Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration 

Bureau more fully implement the requirements set forth in 

this provision of IRFA.

Section 602 also requires the State Department to 

develop guidelines to address potential hostile biases in 

individuals working in the U.S. Refugee Program. While 

PRM has included a provision in the cooperative agreement 

requiring each overseas processing entity (OPE) to take 

steps to ensure against hostile biases of employees toward 

any particular refugee applicant, no guidelines have been 

developed. In November 2006, PRM did hold a session during its training of OPEs where this issue was discussed. The 

Commission urges PRM to draw guidance from this discussion to form the basis of such guidelines 

as mandated under IRFA.

Inadmissibility of Religious Freedom Violators

Although section 604 of IRFA holds any alien inadmissible 

who, as a foreign government official, was “responsible for 

or directly carried out...particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” the Commission has not seen any evidence 

that the Departments of State and Homeland Security have 

developed a lookout list of aliens who are inadmissible on 

this basis. This lifetime bar on admissions has only been 

invoked once to render an alien inadmissible. In March 

2005, it was used to exclude Governor Nahendra Modi of 

Gujarat state in India for his complicity in the reportedly 

pre-planned riots in 2002 that resulted in the deaths of 

nearly 2,000 Muslims. The Commission had issued a statement urging such an action. 

Directly related to identifying and barring severe 

religious freedom violators from entry to the United States, 

section 402(b)(2) of IRFA requires that the President determine the specific officials responsible for violations of 

religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments 

of CPCs. Section 408(a)(1) requires that the identities of 

these officials be published in the Federal Register (“when 

applicable and to the extent practicable”). To date, no individual officials responsible for particularly severe religious 

freedom violations have been identified from any CPCs, 

despite these requirements.

The Commission urges the Departments of State and 

Homeland Security to implement these provisions of IRFA 

to identify and exclude religious freedom violators.

ENDNOTES 

1

 The Report on asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal can be accessed at 

http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum_refugees/2005/february/index.html. 

The report card can be accessed at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/scorecard_FINAL.pdf.

2

 See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006), as amended by Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT ACT 

OF 2001 (P.L. 107-56) and Section 103 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13).

3

 Tier I and II terrorist organizations are defined as those designated under Title 8, U.S. 

Code, §1189, or subsequently by the Secretary of State. Tier III terrorist organizations are 

those that consist of two or more individuals, who engage in terrorist activities or have a 

subgroup that engages in terrorist activities.

4

 The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333) SEC. 305. ANNUAL 

REPORTS. (b) COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN.—The President shall include 

in each annual report on proposed refugee admission pursuant to section 207(d) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157(d)) information about specific 

measures taken to facilitate access to the United States refugee program for individuals 

who have fled countries of particular concern for violations of religious freedom, 

identified pursuant to section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(22 U.S.C. 6442(b)). The report shall include, for each country of particular concern, a 

description of access of the nationals or former habitual residents of that country to a 

refugee determination on the basis of—(1) referrals by external agencies to a refugee 

adjudication; (2) groups deemed to be of special humanitarian concern to the United 

States for purposes of refugee resettlement; and (3) family links to the United States.

5

 P.L. 110-5, Section 20412

6

 This is an important function, since individuals fleeing persecution may not submit 

an application for refugee status unless they either (1) receive such a referral from an 

Embassy or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or (2) fall into one of 

the narrowly defined processing priorities of “humanitarian concern” to the U.S. Refugee 

Program. 

7

 David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New 

Era of Refugee Resettlement (July 2004), p. 72 (http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/36495.pdf ). 

8

 See Martin, p. 143.

IR F A

An Iranian Kurdish girl displaced in Iraq (UNHCR/K. Brooks)
66

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL (CBP) 

(Inspections and Border Patrol)

RECOMMENDATION GRADE

Expand existing videotape systems F

Reconcile conflicting field guidance F

Inform Immigration Judges about forms used at ports of entry F

Do not place asylum seekers with valid passports in Expedited Removal F

Improve monitoring F

Overall Grade: F

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)

(Detention)

RECOMMENDATION GRADE

Train detention center personnel C

Ensure legal access for detainees D

Change detention standards F

Codify existing parole criteria F

Develop standardized forms and national review criteria F

Overall Grade: D

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS)

(Credible Fear)

RECOMMENDATIION GRADE

Amend credible fear review A

Expand existing pro bono program B

Allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage F*

Overall Grade: B

* grade shared by DHS, USCIS, EOIR

EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY REPORT CARD 
67

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

(Agency-Wide Coordination)

RECOMMENDATION GRADE

Create a high-level Refugee Coordinator position C

Correct implementation flaws before expanding Expedited Removal F

Create a reliable data management system F

Allow Asylum Officer to grant asylum at the credible fear stage F*

Overall Grade: D

* grade shared by DHS, USCIS, EOIR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ)/EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR)

(Immigration Adjudication)

RECOMMENDATION GRADE

Reinstate judicial training A

Expand Legal Orientation Program B

Improve quality of immigration court decisions C

Ensure legal access for detainees C

Improve administrative review of asylum appeals CAllow Asylum Officer to grant asylum at the credible fear stage F*

Overall Grade: C+

* grade shared by DHS, USCIS, EOIR

DHS/DOJ

RECOMMENDATION GRADE

Ensure legal access for detainees C (EOIR); D (ICE)

Allow Asylum Officer to grant asylum at the credible fear stage F (shared by DHS, USCIS, EOIR)

IR F A
Kim II Sung North Korea, near the Chinese border
I 69 n passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), Congress not only recognized 

the global importance of freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, but also made the promotion of this 

critical freedom a matter of U.S. law. This action ensured 

that advancing international religious freedom became an 

integral part of the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda. 

IRFA established a number of interrelated mechanisms to 

pursue this goal. These include: an Office of International 

Religious Freedom in the Department of State headed by an 

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; 

an annual report by the State Department on the conditions of religious freedom in each foreign country and U.S. 

actions to promote religious freedom; and the establishment of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom. 

The Commission was created by Congress through 

IRFA expressly to advocate a prominent place within U.S. 

foreign policy for the promotion of religious freedom 

throughout the world. The Commission was mandated both 

to monitor the status of freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief globally and to make recommendations to 

the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress on ways 

the U.S. government can further the protection and promotion of this freedom and related human rights in its relations 

with other countries. 

Under IRFA, the President is required to single out 

and explicitly name those countries that are the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom, and the Act contains a formal mechanism for doing so. Section 402(b)(1) 

of IRFA specifically directs the President at least annually 

to designate each country in which the government has 

engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom” as “a country of particular concern” or 

CPC. Particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

are defined as those that are “systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious.”1

 In defining violations of religious freedom, 

IRFA directly refers to the “internationally recognized 

right to freedom of religion and religious belief and 

practice” as laid out in such international instruments as 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2

 

The 2006 State Department Designations

One of the Commission’s chief responsibilities in the 

process of promoting religious freedom as required by 

IRFA is to draw the U.S. government’s attention to those 

countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated 

systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom 

and recommend that they be designated as CPCs. The 

designation of CPCs not only puts a spotlight on those 

countries where the most severe violations take place, but 

also lays the groundwork for important decisions in U.S. 

relations with these countries. 

As required by IRFA and pursuant to the Commission’s 

review of the facts and circumstances regarding violations 

of religious freedom around the world, the Commission 

wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in May 2007, 

continuing to recommend that she, using authority delegated to her by the President, designate as CPCs the following 

11 countries: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, People’s 

Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 

countries of particular concern & the 

commission watch list

The designation of CPCs not 

only puts a spotlight on those countries 

where the most severe violations 

take place, but also lays the 

groundwork for important decisions in 

U.S. relations with these countries. 
70

Re-Designation of Severe Religious 

Freedom Violators

In November 2006, Secretary Rice re-designated Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, Sudan, Iran, Eritrea, and Burma 

as CPCs. The Commission concurred with these 2006 CPC 

re-designations and concluded that there have been no 

changes substantial enough to warrant the removal of these 

seven countries from the list of CPC designations in 2007. 

• The Commission finds, as did the U.S. Department of 

State in previous years, that there is no religious freedom 

in Saudi Arabia, where the government persists in 

banning all forms of public religious expression other 

than that of the government’s own interpretation of 

one school of Sunni Islam and interfering with private 

religious practice. The government also continues to be 

involved in financing activities throughout the world that 

support extreme religious intolerance, hatred, and, in 

some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. 

• Every religious community in China continues to be subject to serious restrictions, state control, and repression. 

The most severe religious freedom abuses are directed 

against Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, Roman 

Catholics, house church and unregistered Protestants, 

and spiritual groups such as the Falun Gong, abuses 

involving imprisonment, torture, and other forms of 

ill treatment. Prominent religious leaders and others 

continue to be confined, imprisoned, tortured, “disappeared,” and subjected to other forms of ill treatment 

on account of their religion or belief. Religious freedom 

conditions deteriorated for communities not affiliated 

with any of the seven government-approved religious 

organizations, those considered by the government to be 

“cults,” and those closely associated with ethnic minority 

groups in China. 

• There are no personal freedoms in North Korea and no 

protections for universal human rights, including religious freedom. The government severely represses public 

and private religious activities and maintains a policy of 

pervasive control over government-sanctioned religious practice. As confirmed by the Commission’s study 

released in 2005 and based on new interviews with North 

Korean refugees, religious belief of any kind is viewed by 

the government as a potential competitor to the forcefully 

propagated cult of personality centered on Kim Jong Il 

and his late father, Kim Il Sung. 

• In Sudan, an authoritarian government—which has 

pursued coercive policies of Arabization and Islamization resulting in genocide—severely restricts the religious freedom and other universal human rights of an 

ethnically and religiously diverse population. Sudanese 

security forces have not been held to account for the 

human rights abuses committed during Sudan’s NorthCountries Named as CPCs 

by the Department of State

Countries Recommended for CPC 

Designation by the Commission

Countries on the 

Commission’s Watch List

• Burma

• China

• Eritrea

• Iran

• North Korea

• Saudi Arabia

• Sudan

• Uzbekistan

• Burma

• China

• Eritrea

• Iran

• North Korea

• Saudi Arabia

• Sudan

• Uzbekistan

• Pakistan

• Turkmenistan

• Vietnam

• Afghanistan

• Bangladesh

• Belarus

• Cuba

• Egypt

• Indonesia

• Iraq

• Nigeria
71

South Civil War, most of the victims of which were 

Christians or followers of traditional African religions.

With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, religious freedom conditions have improved in southern and central Sudan. 

However, there are serious problems with implementing 

the CPA, and the agreement has not yet resulted in significant changes in practice in government-controlled 

areas of the North. The government’s actions with regard to the continuing genocide in Darfur, as well as its 

failure to cooperate with the Security Council-mandated 

investigation by the International Criminal Court of alleged war crimes, impugn the commitment of Sudanese 

leaders to support human rights guarantees. 

• Over the past year, the poor religious freedom record 

of the government of Iran deteriorated, especially for 

religious minorities and for Baha’is, Sufi Muslims, and 

Evangelical Christians in particular. All minority groups 

faced arrests, imprisonment, other forms of detention, and harassment. There is a consistent stream of 

virulent and inflammatory statements by political and 

religious leaders against such groups and an increase 

in harassment and, in some cases, imprisonment of 

and physical attacks against them. President Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad’s denials of the Holocaust have intensified fears among Iran’s Jewish community. Dissidents 

and political reformers continue to be imprisoned on 

criminal charges of blasphemy and for criticizing the 

nature of the Islamic regime. More than 120 Baha’is 

have been arbitrarily arrested since early 2005, with 

dozens still awaiting trial; others have been sentenced to 

prison terms ranging from 90 days to one year on dubious charges that include “spreading propaganda against 

the regime.”

• Religious freedom conditions continued to deteriorate 

in Eritrea, where the government engages in systematic 

and egregious religious freedom violations, including: 

a prolonged ban on public activities by all religious 

groups that are not officially recognized; arbitrary 

denials of recognition; closure of places of worship; 

disruption of private religious and social gatherings of 

members of unregistered groups; arbitrary arrests and 

detention without charge of their members; and the 

mistreatment or torture of religious detainees, sometimes resulting in death. 

• The military junta that governs Burma monitors the 

activities of all religious organizations through a pervasive internal security apparatus. The government imposes 

restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and 

censors all religious publications, has supported, allowed, or instigated violence against religious minorities, 

and in some areas of the country, has forcefully promoted 

Buddhism over other religions. Ethnic minority Christians and Muslims have encountered the most difficulties 

in recent years. 

Vietnam: Still Deserving CPC Designation

Vietnam was removed from the State Department’s CPC 

list in November 2006, on the eve of President Bush’s visit 

to Hanoi for the Asian Pacific Economic Conference. The 

Commission expressed its disappointment that the CPC 

designation was lifted, citing continued arrests and detentions of individuals in part because of their religious activities 

and continued severe religious freedom restrictions targeting 

some ethnic minority Protestants and Buddhists, Vietnamese Mennonites, Hao Hoa Buddhists, and monks and nuns 

associated with the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam 

(UBCV). The Commission recognized positive religious 

freedom developments in Vietnam, as the government released prominent religious prisoners, introduced some legal 

reforms, facilitated the legal recognition of religious communities, and, except for isolated cases, ended large-scale 

forced renunciations of faith. However, the Commission 

C O U N T RI E S OF PAR T I C U L AR CONCE R N

2007 USCIRF Annual Report Press Conference. From left, Commissioners 

Preeta D. Bansal, Felice D. Gaer, Michel Cromartie, Nina Shea, Elizabeth 

H. Prodromou and Richard D. Land.
72

stated that these improvements were insufficient to warrant 

lifting the CPC designation because it was too soon to determine if legal protections would be permanent and whether 

such progress would last beyond Vietnam’s accession to the 

World Trade Organization (WTO). Moreover, the designation 

potentially removed a positive diplomatic tool that proved 

an effective incentive to bilateral engagement on religious 

freedom, and related human rights. 

Since the CPC designation was lifted and Vietnam 

joined the WTO, positive religious freedom trends have, for 

the most part, stalled, and Vietnam has initiated a severe 

crackdown on human rights defenders and advocates for 

the freedoms of speech, association and assembly, including many religious leaders who previously were the leading 

advocates for religious freedom in that country. Given the 

recent deterioration of human rights conditions in Vietnam 

and because of continued abuses of and restrictions on 

religious freedom, the Commission continues to believe 

that the lifting of the CPC designation was premature. The 

Commission therefore recommended that Vietnam be redesignated as a CPC in 2007. 

Uzbekistan: Severe Violations Finally 

Acknowledged

In November 2006, for the first time, Secretary Rice designated Uzbekistan a severe violator of religious freedom. 

The Commission welcomes the designation of Uzbekistan 

as a CPC, which the Commission has recommended for 

two years. The Uzbek government continues to exercise 

a high degree of control over the practice of the Islamic 

religion and to arrest Muslim individuals and crack down 

harshly on groups and mosques that do not conform to 

state-prescribed practices or that the government claims 

are associated with extremist political programs. This has 

resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons in 

recent years, many of whom are denied the right to due 

process. There are credible reports that many of those 

arrested continue to be tortured or beaten in detention, 

despite official Uzbek promises to halt this practice. Moreover, Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on religion 

that severely limits the ability of religious communities to 

function, leaving more than 100 religious groups currently 

denied registration. The government of Uzbekistan faces 

threats to its security, but these threats do not excuse or 

justify the scope and harshness of the government’s ill 

treatment of religious believers nor the continued practice 

of torture, which reportedly remains widespread.

Responding to the CPC Designation

The process of CPC designation as outlined under IRFA, and 

the implementation of meaningful policies in response to 

such designations, should be considered among the most 

serious actions taken by the U.S. government in its human 

rights policy. Under IRFA, however, the simple designation 

by the U.S. government of a severe violator of religious freedom as a CPC is not by itself sufficient action. CPC designation carries an obligation that one or more of certain actions 

specified in Section 405 of IRFA be taken, unless the Secretary of State, as the President’s designee, determines that 

pre-existing sanctions are adequate or otherwise waives the 

requirement.3

 If a CPC designee is already subject to ongoing, multiple, broad-based sanctions “imposed in significant 

part in response to human rights abuses,” then one or more 

The designation of an egregious 

religious freedom violator as a CPC, 

followed by the implementation of a clear 

and directed policy response, is an 

essential tool to promote religious 

freedom, and one explicitly 

required by IRFA. 

Congressional Task Force on International Religious Freedom Co-Chairs 

Trent Franks (R-AZ), foreground, and Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO), right, with 

USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer (left) and Vice Chair Nina Shea.
73

of these pre-existing sanctions can be designated as meeting 

the requirements of IRFA.4

The CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool. It provides 

the Secretary of State with a range of specific options to take 

to address serious violations of religious freedom. It does not 

automatically entail sanctions, but requires that the Secretary of State enter into direct consultations with a country to 

find ways to improve the situation. To avoid more punitive 

actions, one policy response under IRFA is for the CPC country to enter into a binding agreement with the United States 

that spells out specific actions the government will take to 

end the violations that gave rise to the designation.

When used properly, the CPC designation:

• sends the clear signal that U.S. interests include concern 

for human rights; 

• starts a dialogue where specific benchmarks on progress 

are agreed upon in order to avoid economic sanctions;

• allows the Secretary of State in an incremental fashion to 

employ or use the threat of punitive actions to address 

egregious abuses of religious freedom; and 

• allows the Secretary of State to waive any specific actions 

if progress is being made toward addressing serious violations of freedom of religion or belief.

Until 2004, the Secretary of State had continually 

named as CPCs Burma, China, Iran, North Korea (beginning in 2001), and Sudan, countries that had been, and 

continue to be, subject to multiple sanctions that predate 

the CPC designation. Until September 2005, the only official action taken by the U.S. government with respect to the 

CPCs had been to invoke those already existing sanctions, 

rather than to take additional measures pursuant to IRFA. 

Until that time, as permitted by Section 402 (c)(5) of IRFA, 

the Secretary had determined that the pre-existing sanctions in the box below satisfied the IRFA requirements.

In 2005, the State Department announced its decisions 

on three serious religious freedom violators, Saudi Arabia, 

Vietnam, and Eritrea, in fulfillment of statutory obligations outlined in IRFA. In September 2005, Secretary Rice 

announced the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of 

defense articles and services covered by the Arms Control 

Export Act, with some items exempted. This was the first 

unique presidential action to be undertaken under IRFA as 

a result of CPC designation. The Commission commended 

this action and has recommended subsequent actions that 

the Administration should take, in accordance with IRFA, 

in response to that designation.

Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s continued general 

reliance on pre-existing sanctions has provided little incentive for the other CPC governments to reduce or end egregious violations of religious freedom. While the reliance on 

pre-existing sanctions may be technically correct under the 

statute, it is unacceptable as a matter of policy. The designation of an egregious religious freedom violator as a CPC, 

followed by the implementation of a clear and directed 

policy response, is an essential tool to promote religious 

freedom, and one explicitly required by IRFA. The failure 

to take additional action under IRFA suggests that nothing 

further can, or will, be done by the U.S. government with 

respect to those countries that commit severe violations of 

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense articles and defense 

services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms Export Control Act.

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-246: restriction of 

exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment. 

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security assistance.

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): restrictions on normal trade 

relations and other trade benefits.

Sudan International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and vote of the United States to 

oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the International Financial Institutions to or for Sudan.

C O U N T RI E S OF PAR T I C U L AR CONCE R N
74

freedom of religion or belief. This is the case with the five 

countries listed below.

Responding to the Designation of Saudi Arabia

In July 2006, the Secretary decided to leave in place a waiver 

“to further the purposes of the Act” by announcing that 

bilateral discussions with Saudi Arabia had enabled the 

United States to identify and confirm a number of policies 

that the Saudi government “is pursuing and will continue 

to pursue for the purpose of promoting greater freedom 

for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious 

groups.” Because previous reform pledges made by the 

Saudi government have not been implemented in practice, the Commission remains concerned about whether 

and how the newly reported Saudi policies will be implemented and how the United States will monitor them. The 

Commission therefore has recommended that the State 

Department report publicly to Congress every 120 days on 

the implementation of the policies identified in the bilateral 

discussions. The newly confirmed policies—if actually 

implemented in full—could advance much-needed efforts 

to dismantle some of the institutionalized policies that have 

promoted severe violations of freedom of religion or belief 

in Saudi Arabia and worldwide.

Additional Countries that Warrant CPC 

Designation

Of the countries not on the State Department’s CPC list, in 

addition to Vietnam, the Commission found that Pakistan

and Turkmenistan have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The Commission therefore continued this year to recommend that these 

countries be designated as CPCs.

• Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in 

Pakistan, particularly against Shi’as, Ahmadis, Christians, 

and Hindus, and the government’s response to this problem, though improved, continues to be insufficient and 

not fully effective. In addition, a number of the country’s 

laws, including legislation restricting the Ahmadi community and laws against blasphemy, frequently result 

in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or 

vigilante violence against the accused. Just last month, six 

Christians in one city in Punjab province were charged 

with blasphemy under highly questionable circumstances; others in the area have reportedly gone into hiding out 

of fear of attack. These religious freedom concerns persist 

amidst the wider problem of the lack of democracy in 

Pakistan, an obstacle the current government has done 

little to address. 

• The death of President Saparmurat Niyazov last December presents an opportunity for the United States to 

encourage the new leadership in Turkmenistan to act 

immediately to reverse Niyazov’s gross abuses of human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief. Among the 

urgent reforms needed are ending Niyazov’s personality 

cult, which had reached the dimensions of a state-imposed religion; halting of the government’s interference 

with, and excessive control over, religious activities and 

organizations; and bringing the country’s religion law 

into conformity with Turkmenistan’s constitution and 

its international legal commitments. Although some 

steps have been taken by the new president to end the 

country’s isolation, they are not directly related to human 

rights and do not warrant the removal of Turkmenistan, 

one of the most repressive states in the world, from the 

Commission’s CPC list. 

Countries Requiring Close Monitoring: the 

Commission’s Watch List

In addition to its CPC recommendations, the Commission 

has established a Watch List of countries where conditions 

do not rise to the statutory level requiring CPC designation but which require close monitoring due to the nature 

and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or 

tolerated by the governments. Afghanistan, where the former Taliban regime was once designated under IRFA as a 

particularly severe violator, was added to the Commission’s 

Watch List last year, joining Belarus, Egypt, Bangladesh, 

Cuba, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The Commission is concerned about the serious abuses in these countries, and 

that the governments either have not halted repression 

and/or violence against persons amounting to severe violations of freedom of religion, or have failed to punish those 

responsible for perpetrating those acts. The Commission 

urges the U.S. government to pay particular attention to the 

poor situation for religious freedom in these countries, as 

the Commission itself will continue to do.

This year the Commission added Iraq to its Watch List, 

due to the alarming and deteriorating situation for freedom 

of religion and belief. Despite ongoing efforts to stabilize 

the country, successive Iraqi governments have not adequately curbed the growing scope and severity of human 
75

rights abuses. Although non-state actors, particularly the 

Sunni-dominated insurgency, are responsible for a substantial proportion of the sectarian violence and associated 

human rights violations, the Iraqi government also bears 

responsibility. That responsibility takes two forms. First, 

the Iraqi government has engaged in human rights violations through its state security forces, including arbitrary 

arrest, prolonged detention without due process, extrajudicial executions, and torture. These violations affect 

suspected Sunni insurgents, but also ordinary Sunnis who 

are targeted on the basis of their religious identity. Second, 

the Iraqi government tolerates religiously based attacks 

and other religious freedom abuses carried out by armed 

Shi’a factions including the Jaysh al-Mehdi (Mahdi Army) 

and the Badr Organization. These abuses include abductions, beatings, extrajudicial executions, torture and rape. 

Relationships between these para-state militias and leading 

Shi’a factions within Iraq’s ministries and governing coalition indicate that these groups operate with impunity and 

often, governmental complicity. Although many of these 

militia-related violations reveal the challenges evident in 

Iraq’s fragmented political system, they nonetheless reflect 

the Iraqi government’s tolerance—and in some instances 

commission—of egregious violations of religious freedom.

Finally, the Commission also noted the grave conditions for 

non-Muslims in Iraq, including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, 

Yazidis, and Sabean Mandaeans, who continue to suffer 

pervasive and severe violence and discrimination at the 

hands of both government and non-government actors.

The Commission has added Iraq to its Watch List with the 

understanding that it may designate Iraq as a CPC next year 

if improvements are not made by the Iraqi government. 2

• Conditions for freedom of religion or belief in Afghanistan

remain increasingly problematic. Flaws in the country’s 

new constitution, which does not contain clear protections 

for the right to freedom of religion or belief for individual 

Afghan citizens, failed to prevent a number of criminal 

court cases that were in violation of the rights of the accused. In addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan 

government to exercise authority effectively outside Kabul 

contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for 

religious freedom and other human rights in many of the 

provinces. As far back as 2002, the Commission raised 

strong concerns about the decision not to extend the international security presence outside of Kabul; it now seems 

clear that the political reconstruction process has indeed 

become seriously threatened as a result of the alarming 

and deteriorating security conditions. 

• In the past year, the government of Belarus appeared to 

be adopting increasingly tough sanctions against reliC O U N T RI E S OF PAR T I C U L AR CONCE R N

Rebiya Kadeer, President of the World Uyghur Congress, with USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer at a March 2007 event honoring the 

Congressional Task Force on International Religious Freedom.
76

gious leaders and others who take part in unregistered 

religious activity, including through short-term imprisonment. In addition, the highly authoritarian government persists in enforcing the country’s harsh 2002 law 

on religion, resulting in calculated and serious regulatory 

obstacles and bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the 

activities of many religious communities. In the past 

two years, the Belarusian authorities have increased the 

amount of the fines for “unauthorized” religious activity, 

as well as expanded the range of religious groups that are 

subject to fines, which in many cases now amount to five 

times the average monthly wage in Belarus. 

• The Commission traveled to Egypt in 2004 and found 

that serious religious freedom violations affect Coptic 

Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Baha’is, as well as members of minority Muslim communities, all of whom are 

also subject to religiously-motivated attacks. The Commission is deeply concerned about a December 2006 

decision by the Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt 

to uphold the Egyptian government’s discriminatory 

policy of prohibiting Baha’is from obtaining a national 

identity card. A lower court decision in April 2006 had 

allowed members of the Baha’i faith in Egypt to obtain 

national identity cards and to list their religious affiliation, but the Egyptian government appealed that ruling 

to the Supreme Administrative Court. Known converts 

from Islam to Christianity also receive attention from 

the state security services, and converts have been arrested for attempting to change their religious affiliation 

on identity documents. In addition, although religious 

pluralism in Egypt has been acknowledged, more can 

and should be done by the government to punish those 

responsible for the rise in religious violence in recent 

years, and to combat widespread and virulent antiSemitism and other intolerance in the media and in the 

education system. 

• Bangladesh has been in the throes of a major political and 

constitutional crisis, the resolution of which will determine 

whether religious freedom and other human rights will be 

protected by the rule of law or the country will continue on 

a downward spiral toward authoritarianism and intolerance. The Commission placed Bangladesh on its Watch 

List in 2005 due to concerns about increasing Islamist 

radicalism and violence and the threatening conditions for 

and discrimination against religious minorities, including 

Hindus, Christians, and Ahmadis. Members of religious 

minority communities have expressed concerns about 

being excluded from voter rolls, intimidated from voting in 

the next national election, or targeted by anti-minority violence as had followed the last national election in October 

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (right) speaking about her book The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, 

God, and World Affairs, with Commissioners (right to left) Preeta D. Bansal, Michael Cromartie, Nina Shea and Richard D. Land, and 

USCIRF Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa.
77

2001. After the January 2007 postponement of the election 

and the installation of a new caretaker government that 

has given the military a high-profile role in domestic law 

enforcement, there have been numerous reports of serious 

human rights abuses, including suspected extrajudicial 

killings by the security forces, arbitrary detentions, torture, 

and curbs on press freedom.

• Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba, where a 2005 law on religion reinforces 

the government’s efforts to maintain control over religious practice. Both registered and unregistered religious 

groups continued to experience varying degrees of official 

interference, harassment, and repression. Political prisoners and human rights and pro-democracy activists are 

increasingly being denied the right to worship. Religious 

leaders report pressure, sometimes blatant, by the government to expel pro-democracy or human rights activists 

from their church, and activists have been asked by church 

leaders to distance themselves from the congregation. 

• Although the situation has continued to improve in 

Indonesia, the Commission remains concerned about ongoing sectarian violence and the Indonesian government’s 

inability or unwillingness to hold those responsible to 

account; the forcible closures of places of worship belonging to religious minorities; and the growing political power 

and influence of religious extremists, who harass and 

sometimes instigate violence against moderate Muslim 

leaders and members of religious minorities. Violence 

targeting Ahmadiyah Muslims has risen dramatically in 

recent years and extremist groups are known to train, 

recruit, and operate in Central and South Sulawesi. In the 

last year, at least nine Protestant churches, four Ahmadiyah mosques, and one Hindu temple have been closed or 

damaged in areas of West Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara as a result of the influence 

of extremist groups who incited mobs and/or intimated 

local officials.

• In Nigeria, the government continues to have an 

inadequate—though improved—response to ongoing 

violent communal conflicts along religious lines, the 

expansion of sharia into the criminal codes of several 

northern states, and discrimination against minority 

communities of Christians and Muslims. In April 2006 

in Plateau state, at least 25 people, both Christian and 

Muslim, were killed and hundreds fled their homes during sectarian clashes over land ownership. In September 

2006, a mob of Muslim youths injured six Christians 

and burned nearly a dozen churches in Jigawa state in 

northern Nigeria.

Summaries of conditions in all of the countries discussed in this chapter, as well as the Commission’s policy 

recommendations, can be found in the country chapters of 

this report. 

ENDNOTES 

1

 IRFA § 402 (b)(1)(A).

2 IRFA § 3(13).

3 The authority to make these decisions has been delegated by the President to the Secretary 

of State.

4 IRFA § 402(c)(5). 

C O U N T RI E S OF PAR T I C U L AR CONCE R N

79

THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The Department of State’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom and the work 

of our Commission continue to demonstrate that the issue 

of religious freedom is connected to and affects numerous 

U.S. foreign policy concerns. In adopting the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), Congress determined that it would be the policy of the United States to 

promote respect for this right as a matter of U.S. foreign 

policy. The State Department’s Annual Report, which was 

released in September 2006, provides an opportunity to 

assess the status of religious freedom throughout the world, 

to focus on the countries that are particularly serious violators of religious freedom, and to appraise U.S. efforts to 

integrate this important freedom within its foreign policy.

The Annual Report on International Religious Freedom

is a critical part of the process of promoting religious freedom throughout the world. The Commission continues to 

conclude that the Annual Report is an important achievement that demonstrates the significant efforts of the Foreign Service Officers in our embassies around the world, as 

well as the Ambassador at Large for International Religious 

Freedom and his staff at the State Department’s Office of 

International Religious Freedom. 

Individual Country Reports

As in the past, many of the individual country reports in the 

2006 Annual Report are first-rate—thorough and accurate. 

However, the Commission is concerned about informational inaccuracies and troubling conclusions in a few 

important reports.

First and foremost, attention must be drawn to the 

country report on Saudi Arabia. When the Annual Report 

was released last September, the Commission noted the 

State Department’s decision to remove longstanding and 

widely quoted language from its report that freedom of 

religion “does not exist” in Saudi Arabia. The Commission 

continues to conclude that freedom of religion does not 

exist in Saudi Arabia. The Department’s own report states 

that “there generally was no change in the status of religious freedom during the reporting period.”

The government of Saudi Arabia persists in banning 

all forms of public religious expression other than that of 

the government’s own interpretation of one school of Sunni 

Islam and forcefully represses private religious practice.

Members of the Shi’a and other non-Sunni Muslim communities, as well as non-conforming Sunnis, are subject 

to government restrictions on public religious practices as 

well as official discrimination. There is a continuing pattern of punishment and abuse of non-Muslim foreigners for 

private religious practice. The government also continues 

to be involved in financing activities throughout the world 

that support extreme religious intolerance, hatred, and, in 

some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored 

Muslims. Given the State Department’s own conclusion 

that religious freedom conditions had not changed in Saudi 

Arabia, it is extremely troubling that its own report would 

omit language in such a way as to suggest that some significant improvement had taken place, which was not the case.

This year’s report on China contains stronger language 

in many areas, reflecting the deterioration in religious freedom conditions that several religious communities have 

experienced over the past year. However the report stops 

short of concluding that overall conditions had deteriorated, a conclusion that the Commission would support. 

The report’s assessment of China’s National Regulations on 

Religious Affairs, as promulgated in March 2005, takes due 

consideration of the problems that have arisen in many 

localities where officials are using the law as a means to 

interfere in the activities and practices of registered religious groups and to intimidate and harass the activities and 

leaders of unregistered groups. The Commission continues 

to find that given the vague and sometimes contradictory 

language of the Regulations, they do not adequately protect 

the rights and security of religious adherents and are not 

fully consistent with international norms.
80

However, it would be helpful if the report were to 

include more detail regarding the poor religious freedom 

conditions in Xinjiang, affecting primarily Uighur Muslims, 

as well as unregistered house church Christians and Orthodox Christians. The report contains language condemning 

the overall repression of religion in Xinjiang and especially 

the policies of the Chinese government that routinely 

conflate peaceful Uighur political opposition with violent 

separatist activities, extremism, and/or terrorism. On the 

other hand, it includes few details on the problems that religiously devout Uighur Muslims often face if they attempt 

to assemble for religious purposes, teach their children to 

be religiously observant, or celebrate certain Islamic traditions. In addition, according to statistics from the China Aid 

Association, instances of arrest of unregistered Christians 

are higher in Xinjiang than in all but one other province of 

China. Similarly, reports of torture of those arrested for illegal religious activity are more numerous in Xinjiang than 

in other localities. The country chapter on China contains 

a separate section on Tibet. Comparable treatment for 

the Xinjiang region may facilitate a more substantive and 

detailed accounting of the situation in that province. 

The North Korea report admirably illustrates the 

systematic violations and brutality of the Kim Jong Il 

government. Despite the difficulties of getting credible 

information out of that closed society, the report is nevertheless unnecessarily thin on details and background. For 

example, there is a wealth of information increasingly available from refugee interviews, including the Commission’s 

study Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts 

of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and 

Religion in North Korea, which provide specific information about executions, torture of repatriated refugees from 

China, and policies used to both control and suppress religious freedom in North Korea. A fuller accounting of these 

details would pull aside the curtain that envelops North 

Korea for an international audience and provide additional 

evidence that China’s repatriation of North Koreans is a 

violation of its international obligation to protect refugees. 

Religious Persecution and the U.S. 

Refugee Program

Section 601 of IRFA specifically directs that the Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom serve as a resource for refugee and asylum adjudicators. In that sense, 

the Annual Report plays an important role not merely in 

documenting religious freedom violations, but in facilitating refuge for those who are fleeing religious persecution.

Appendix E of the report, the Overview of Refugee 

Policy, continues to improve, with more comprehensive 

coverage of religious persecution and the U.S. Refugee 

Program than in past years. Once again, however, the 

2006 report contains little acknowledgment of the serious problem of intra-religious persecution, but instead 

focuses almost exclusively on the persecution of religious 

minorities by a majority religious community. Moreover, this section contains no mention of Iraq and only a 

passing reference to Eritrea; these are significant refugeesource countries where serious religious freedom problems persist. Indeed, the Secretary of State has designated 

Eritrea a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, and 

problems in Iraq—particularly with regard to the security 

of religious minority communities—are acute.

 The Overview of Refugee Policy section does cite Saudi 

Arabia, a CPC, as well as Pakistan, which the Commission 

has recommended be designated a CPC, for their mistreatment of religious minorities. The Overview fails, however, 

to indicate how the U.S. Refugee Program has responded to 

this mistreatment.

In its Report to Congress on Refugee Admissions for 

FY2007, the Department of State provides a more complete 

description of the way in which it is facilitating access to 

the Refugee Program, at least for those asylum seekers 

who have fled CPCs. The Report to Congress is required to 

include such information under Section 304 of the North 

Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. Such information should 

USCIRF Chair Felice D. Gaer testifying before the House International 

Relations Committee on the State Department’s 2006 International 

Religious Freedom Report, December 2006.
be in the Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom as well, even if not required by law. 

The Commission does remain concerned that other 

refugee and asylum provisions of IRFA have been unevenly implemented. For example, Appendix D of the 

Report, “Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 

International Religious Freedom Act,” accurately describes 

the measures taken by the Asylum and Refugee Corps to 

train its refugee and asylum adjudicators in international 

religious freedom, as required by sections 602 and 603 

of IRFA. Yet, this section makes no mention of the training—if any—on international religious freedom undertaken 

by DHS Border Patrol agents and inspectors exercising 

Expedited Removal authority, even though such training is 

also required under IRFA. Nor does the report mention the 

efforts by the Department of Justice to ensure that immigration judges comply with IRFA training requirements.

Finally, section 602(b) of IRFA requires that all consular officers be trained in refugee law and policy. Although 

consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, 

they are authorized to refer refugee applicants to the DHS 

for adjudication, since the vast majority of asylum seekers 

are not permitted to apply to the Refugee Program without a 

referral from a U.S. embassy or the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR). Appendix C of the Report, “Training at the Foreign Service Institute Related to the International Religious Freedom Act,” states that consular training 

“includes a lecture on Immigrant Visa (sic) that incorporates 

discussion of refugee and asylum issues as they pertain to 

consular officers.” Based on inquiries made by the Commission, however, it appears that the only training received by 

consular officers relevant to the Refugee Program is on the 

processing of immediate relative petitions filed by refugees 

and asylees. Such training does not comply with the broad 

requirements of section 602(b).1 Consequently, the Commission is concerned that consular officers remain unaware 

of their ability to facilitate access to the resettlement program 

for asylum seekers in need of protection. Once again, the 

Commission urges the Department of State to comply with 

this training requirement, which could save the lives of bona 

fide refugees, particularly those who may have access to a 

U.S. consulate but not UNHCR.

 

S TATE DEPAR TMENT

ENDNOTES 

1

 Section 602(b) of IRFA holds that “(t)he Secretary of State shall provide sessions on 

refugee law and adjudications and on religious persecution to each individual seeking a 

commission as a United States consular officer....”

Commission Recommendations

With regard to the State Department’s Annual Report 

on International Religious Freedom, the Commission 

continues to recommend that:

• the State Department expand and strengthen its reporting on specific U.S. policies and actions to advance 

religious freedom;

• the Annual Report describe the policies that the U.S. 

government has adopted and is implementing to oppose 

religious freedom violations, as well as to promote religious freedom, on a worldwide, regional, and individual 

country basis, including policies regarding foreign aid, 

public diplomacy, multilateral organizations, and international financial institutions;

• the Annual Report specify, for each foreign country 

in which religious freedom violations occur: the U.S. 

government’s objectives to advance religious freedom; 

U.S. policies that have been adopted and are being 

implemented to advance religious freedom; the religious 

freedom concerns that the U.S. government has raised 

with the foreign government, and the response of that 

government, including any specific actions taken; and 

the results, or lack thereof, of the actions taken by the 

U.S. government;

• the State Department describe in the Annual Report the 

specific actions taken pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 in response to the designation 

of a country as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) 

or in response to a finding that a foreign government has 

engaged in or tolerated a violation of religious freedom;

• where appropriate, activities designed to promote rule 

of law, effective law enforcement, and accountability for 

religious freedom and related human rights violations 

should be a significant component of U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom, and they should be described in 

the Annual Report; and

• the Annual Report describe in detail what measures 

have been taken to facilitate access to the U.S. Refugee 

Program for individuals fleeing from countries where 

religious freedom violations occur, including from 

countries designated as CPCs.

81

83

Eritrea 

The government of Eritrea continues 

to engage in systematic and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, and the situation appears 

to have deteriorated in the past year. Current violations 

include a prolonged ban on public religious activities 

by all religious groups that are not officially recognized, 

closure by the authorities of the places of worship of 

these religious groups, inordinate delays in acting on 

registration applications by religious groups, disruption of 

private religious and even social gatherings of members 

of unregistered groups, arbitrary arrests and detention 

without charge of their members, and the mistreatment 

or torture of religious detainees, sometimes resulting in 

death. In February 2004, the Commission recommended 

for the first time that the State Department designate 

Eritrea a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, which 

the State Department did in September 2004 and again 

in 2005 and 2006. In September 2005 Secretary of State 

Rice announced the denial of commercial export to 

Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the 

Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted, the 

first unique presidential action to be undertaken under 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) 

in response to the CPC designation, a move commended 

by the Commission. The Commission recommends that 

Eritrea remain a CPC.

 The Eritrean government officially recognizes only four 

religious groups: the (Coptic) Orthodox Church of Eritrea, 

Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea, a Lutheran-affiliated denomination.

Although there is no state religion, the government has 

close ties to the Orthodox Church, the largest and oldest of 

Eritrea’s Christian communities, and is suspicious of newer 

groups—in particular, Protestant Evangelical, Pentecostal, 

and other Christian denominations not traditional to Eritrea. 

Although relations among the four government-recognized religious communities are generally good, leaders of 

the established groups, in particular the Orthodox Church, 

have expressed concerns about the growth of newer, more

activist religious groups. Government officials have 

criticized non-traditional Christian groups for engaging 

in aggressive evangelism that is allegedly alien to Eritrea’s 

cultural traditions and socially divisive. Government 

officials have also pointed to foreign or foreign-inspired 

Muslim fundamentalists as seeking to radicalize Eritrea’s 

traditional, popular Islam and thus to create tensions in a 

society that is roughly half Christian and half Muslim. Government concerns regarding foreign backing for religious 

groups have resulted in strict controls both on humanitarian activities by international faith-based organizations and 

on foreign funding going to indigenous groups for religious 

or charitable activities. 

In 2002, the government imposed a registration requirement on religious groups requiring each group applying 

for approval to provide detailed financial and membership 

information, as well as background on its presence in Eritrea. 

Affected groups included Protestant Evangelical and Pentecostal Christian denominations, as well as the Baha’is. Some 

of these groups have operated in Eritrea for several decades. 

Exempted from the new requirements for registration were 

the four “sanctioned” faiths. Jehovah’s Witnesses were not 

among the groups offered the opportunity to register. By 

country reports: Africa

Hundreds of members of 

unregistered religious groups, as well as 

dozens of Muslims who oppose the 

government-appointed mufti, are believed 

to be detained at any given time, 

typically without charges, even 

for extended periods. 
84

stipulating that there could be no public religious activities 

pending registration, the decree effectively closed places of 

worship and prohibited public religious activities, including worship services, of all other religious communities in 

Eritrea. Although some groups submitted the required applications, to date, none have been approved. As a result of the 

registration requirement and of the government’s inaction 

on registration applications, all of Eritrea’s religious communities except the four government-sanctioned religious 

groups lack a legal basis on which to practice their faiths 

publicly. In September 2006, the government confiscated 

the assets and seized control of the charitable institutions, 

including schools and an orphanage, of one of the groups 

that had tried to register, the Kale Hiwot (“Word of Life”) 

Protestant Church. 

 As part of the campaign against the religious activities of those persons not belonging to officially recognized 

religious denominations, Eritrean security forces have 

disrupted private worship, conducted mass arrests of 

participants at religious weddings, prayer meetings, and 

other gatherings, and detained those arrested without 

charge for indefinite periods of time. Hundreds of members of unregistered religious groups, as well as dozens of 

Muslims who oppose the government-appointed mufti, are 

believed to be detained at any given time, typically without 

charges, even for extended periods. Among those detained 

have been elderly individuals and persons in poor health.

Following Eritrea’s designation as a CPC, the government’s 

religious crackdown intensified, with a series of arrests 

and detentions of clergy and hundreds of others. There are 

credible reports that the security forces have used coercion 

on detainees to secure repudiation of their faith. Some 

religious detainees have reportedly been beaten, tortured, 

confined in crowded conditions, or otherwise subjected to 

harsh conditions resulting in death. 

Government violations of religious freedom are alleged 

to be particularly severe in the armed forces. During the 

war with Ethiopia, some Eritrean soldiers accepted various 

forms of Protestantism, reportedly alarming government 

officials and leading to the banning of prayer meetings 

among armed forces members. Attendance at such meetings is punishable by imprisonment. Moreover, armed 

forces members and national service inductees reportedly 

face severe punishment for possession of religious literature, including Bibles.

Since 1994, the government of Eritrea has denied a 

range of government services and civil and political rights 

to members of the country’s small community of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses. Many Jehovah’s Witnesses refused on religious 

grounds to participate in the 1993 referendum on independence or to accept the national military service required of 

all citizens, both male and female. The government chose 

to interpret these actions as a rejection of Eritrean citizenship. In accordance with a presidential decree issued in 

October 1994, Jehovah’s Witnesses have been barred from 

obtaining government jobs, business licenses, and government-issued identity and travel documents. Lack of Eritrean 

identity cards prevents Jehovah’s Witnesses from obtaining 

legal recognition of marriages and land purchases. Jehovah’s 

Witnesses who have refused to serve in the military have 

been imprisoned without trial, some for over a decade. 

These government actions, which continued in the past year, 

are customarily taken without due process of law or any 

administrative appeal. Moreover, the requirement of a military training component for secondary school graduation 

effectively denies educational and employment opportunities to young Jehovah’s Witnesses, encouraging many to flee 

their homeland. Some children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have 

been expelled from school because of their refusal to salute 

the flag or to pay for membership in the officially sanctioned 

national organization for youth and students. Individual 

members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses are regularly arrested 

and imprisoned for expressing their faith to others. Some 

are quickly released, while others are held indefinitely 

without charge. Although there have been no recent reports 

of mass arrests, in 2003 and 2004, whole congregations of 

Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested while attending worship 

services. Currently 26 Jehovah’s Witnesses remain imprisoned because of their religious convictions.

Since 2005, the government has increasingly interfered 

in the internal affairs of the Orthodox Church of Eritrea. 

Security forces have targeted reformist elements in the 

Orthodox Church, arresting religious activists and preventing their meetings. The government has also tightened its 

grip on the highest levels of the Church. In August 2005, 

the Church’s Synod, allegedly acting at the government’s 

behest, stripped the Orthodox Patriarch of much of his authority, with his administrative duties being assumed by a 

government-appointed layperson. In January 2006, the Synod moved to depose the Patriarch. In a letter dated January 

15, 2006, the Patriarch denounced the Synod’s actions as 
85

illegal under canon law and announced the excommunication of the government-appointed administrator. These actions by the Patriarch, who, according to some reports, had 

been placed under virtual house arrest, have been ignored 

by Church leaders who are compliant in the government’s 

actions. In December 2006, the government reportedly 

ordered that all tithes and offerings to the Church must be 

placed in a government account, that priests’ salaries must 

be paid from this account, and that priests deemed by the 

government to be in excess of parish needs must report for 

military service. 

The government’s concerns regarding religious activities appear to be linked to real or perceived security threats, 

and government spokespersons have cited Pentecostals, 

along with Muslim extremists, as threats to national security. 

Islamic militants, operating out of Sudan, have engaged in a 

low-level insurgency against the government, occasionally 

employing terrorism as a tactic in their campaign to establish 

an Islamic state. However, human rights organizations report 

that they consider it likely that many 

of the Muslim suspects detained without charge by the security forces are being held primarily for their views, including 

their criticism of alleged anti-Muslim discrimination or their 

opposition to the government-recognized leadership of the 

Muslim community, rather than for supporting or engaging 

in violence. None of the suspect Christian groups is known to 

have engaged in or advocated violence. 

The Commission has met on a number of occasions 

with State Department personnel, Eritrean diplomats, 

religious community representatives, and others concerned 

with religious freedom in Eritrea. In October 2004, the 

Commission sent a staff delegation to Eritrea to study religious freedom conditions firsthand. During a six-day visit, 

the delegation discussed the religious freedom situation 

with senior Eritrean government officials, leaders of the 

four major faiths sanctioned by the Eritrean government, 

as well as with unregistered religious groups, representatives of non-governmental organizations, United Nations 

personnel, and members of the U.S. and foreign diplomatic communities. In a January 2005 letter to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice, the Commission commended 

the Administration for Eritrea’s designation as a CPC and 

recommended subsequent actions that the Administration 

should take, in accordance with IRFA, in response to that 

designation. The Commission welcomed the Secretary’s 

announcement in September 2005 that Eritrea would be 

subject to the first-ever presidential action under IRFA 

specifically taken in response to CPC designation.

e r i t r e a

Eritrean boys in Asmara
Eritrea Commission Recommendations 

As a consequence of the designa- 

 tion of Eritrea as a CPC, the 

Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government should:

• maintain the denial of commercial 

export to Eritrea of defense articles 

and services covered by the Arms 

Control Export Act, with some items 

exempted, as announced by the Secretary of State in September 2005;

• engage in vigorous advocacy of religious freedom and other universal 

human rights at all levels of involvement with the government of Eritrea 

and draw international attention 

to religious freedom abuses there, 

including in multilateral fora such as 

the United Nations; and

• review development assistance to 

Eritrea with the aim of redirecting 

such assistance to programs that 

contribute directly to democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law; 

increases in other forms of development assistance should depend 

on measurable improvements in 

religious freedom. On December 31, 

2005, USAID closed its offices and 

ended most assistance programs 

in Eritrea, with the exception of 

certain humanitarian activities. The 

Commission recommends that any 

resumption of U.S. development 

assistance should entail a thorough 

review as described. 

With regard to religious freedom 

conditions in Eritrea, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. 

government should:

• urge the government of Eritrea to 

undertake the following actions to 

improve respect for religious freedom in that country by:

• releasing detainees held solely on 

account of their peaceful religious 

activities; 

• implementing the constitution’s 

existing guarantees of freedom 

of thought, conscience, and 

religion, including the freedom 

to practice any religion and to 

manifest such practice;

• instituting a registration process 

for religious groups that is transparent, non-discriminatory, not 

overly burdensome, and otherwise in accordance with international standards;

• promptly registering those religious groups that comply with the 

requirements issued in 2002, and 

not requiring religious groups to 

provide identifying information on 

individual members;

• taking official, public action to 

permit religious groups to resume 

their public religious activities 

pending registration, including 

reopening of places of worship 

closed by the ban in 2002;

• issuing a public order to the 

security forces reminding them 

that religious practice is not to be 

interfered with except in those 

circumstances permitted by international law; and

• extending an official invitation 

for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief and by the UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention.

• encourage unofficial dialogue with 

Eritreans on religious freedom issues, specifically by:

• the promotion of a visit to Eritrea 

by U.S. leaders concerned with 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief in order to 

meet with Eritrean authorities and 

other opinion-makers and to facilitate dialogue among all of Eritrea’s 

religious communities;

• the expanded use of educational 

and cultural exchanges, such as the 

Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Program, and lectures 

by visiting American scholars and 

experts, in order to introduce more 

Eritreans to the workings and benefits of societies in which religious 

freedom and other human rights 

are respected; and

• seek the cooperation of other countries in promoting greater understanding by Eritreans of international 

standards regarding freedom of 

religion or belief;

• Intensify international efforts to 

resolve the current impasse between 

Eritrea and Ethiopia regarding 

implementation of the boundary 

demarcation as determined by the 

“final and binding” decision of the 

International Boundary Commission 

established following the 1998-2000 

war; and

• support, and offer to provide funding 

for, the creation of an independent 

human rights commission in Eritrea, 

in line with the Paris Principles1

 for

such organizations, including 

independence, adequate funding, a 

representative character, and a broad 

mandate that includes freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief.

1 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National 

Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm).

86
87

Nigeria

The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent 

religious freedom concerns in that country continues to 

be inadequate. These concerns include an ongoing series 

of violent communal conflicts along religious lines; the 

expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the criminal codes 

of several northern Nigerian states; and discrimination 

against minority communities of Christians and Muslims. 

In addition, there are reports of foreign sources of funding 

and support for Islamic extremist activities in northern Nigeria, activities that threaten to fracture the already fragile 

relations between the two main religious groups. However, 

during the past two years, Nigerian security forces have 

responded more quickly to quell sectarian violence and 

have taken steps to address the activities of Islamic extremist groups. Because of persistent concerns, the Commission 

continues to place Nigeria on its Watch List.

Over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience 

incidents of violent communal conflict along religious 

and ethnic lines, which are often intertwined. The popular 

movement in 12 northern Nigerian states to expand the 

legal application of sharia to criminal matters continues 

to spark communal violence and is an ongoing source of 

volatility and tension between Muslims and Christians at 

both the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of 

Muslim-Christian violence in the last few years threaten 

to divide further the populace along religious lines and to 

undermine the democratic transition and the foundations 

of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in 

Nigeria. Social, economic, and political conditions have not 

improved in the country, fostering a climate of even greater 

tension among ethnic and religious communities. 

Since President Olusegun Obasanjo came to power 

through popular elections in 1999, more than 10,000 Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and communal attacks 

and reprisals between Muslims and Christians. The most 

serious of these clashes occurred in Kaduna state (February and May 2000 and November 2002); Jos, Plateau state 

(September 2001); Kano state and Yelwa, Plateau state 

(February-May 2004); and more recently, in northern and 

southeastern Nigeria, in the wake of the controversy over 

depictions of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish press 

(February 2006). 

Ethnic and religious violence continued throughout 

the past year, although the number of deaths resulting from 

the violence decreased compared to previous years. Dozens 

of people were killed and dozens of churches and mosques 

destroyed in communal violence in several towns and villages in southeastern Nigeria, the Middle Belt region, and 

northern Nigeria. In February 2006, approximately 50,000 

people were displaced and at least 150 Muslims and Christians were killed in four days of sectarian violence across 

Nigeria, particularly in the cities of Onitsha, Maiduguri, 

Katsina, and Bauchi, after protests over caricatures of the 

Prophet Muhammad fueled underlying religious and ethnic 

tensions. Independent reports indicate that both Muslim 

and Christian groups initiated attacks on each other and 

reprisal attacks followed. Unlike in the past, the Nigerian 

government eventually raised the security alert level and 

directed law enforcement agents to deal decisively with 

eruptions of violence in any part of the country. At least 

400 people have since been arrested. In March 2006, the 

Nigerian Information Minister stated publicly that there 

are continuing efforts by some individuals, groups, and organizations to instigate “further violence and mayhem” in 

many northern and southern states and that those “already 

arrested for their roles in the violence will be fully prosecuted.” Widespread destruction of property took place, with 

numerous churches, mosques, and homes burned down.

Nig e ria

Despite the ongoing nature of sectarian 

violence, the number of those killed 

decreased in the past year due to a more 

rapid and effective response by security 

authorities. However, prosecution of those 

involved with instigating sectarian 

violence remains inadequate, and President 

Obasanjo has been criticized both inside 

and outside Nigeria for not responding more 

decisively to the violence and the 

communal tensions brought about by 

the sharia controversy. 
88

 Also in February 2006, students at a secondary school 

in the northern Nigerian state of Bauchi reportedly threatened a Christian teacher for handling the Koran improperly. In a subsequent demonstration that turned violent, 

two churches were burned and approximately 20 Christians 

were killed. The teacher reportedly came in contact with 

a copy of the Koran after taking it from a student who was 

reading it while class was in session. According to the State 

Department, although 25 arrests were made, the case was 

being handled as a state security matter with little information publicly available. In April 2006 in Plateau state, 

at least 25 people, both Christian and Muslim, were killed 

and hundreds fled their homes during sectarian clashes 

over land ownership between the Pan and Gomai people. 

In September 2006, a mob of Muslim youths injured six 

Christians and burned nearly a dozen churches in the predominantly Muslim town of Dutse, capital of Jigawa state in 

northern Nigeria. The attacks were sparked by allegations 

that a Christian woman had blasphemed the Prophet Muhammad. Demanding that she be stoned, angry Muslims 

incited a riot, destroying churches, 20 Christian homes, and 

40 shops, leaving more than 1,000 Christians displaced. 

According to news reports, 25 persons were arrested in that 

incident. As of this writing, none of those arrested have 

been prosecuted. 

Despite the ongoing nature of sectarian violence, the 

number of those killed decreased in the past year due to a 

more rapid and effective response by security authorities. 

However, prosecution of those involved with instigating 

sectarian violence remains inadequate, and President 

Obasanjo has been criticized both inside and outside Nigeria for not responding more decisively to the violence and 

the communal tensions brought about by the sharia controversy. He has primarily played a mediating role, stressing 

political negotiations rather than ordering the government 

to intervene to stop or prevent further violence. Moreover, 

many Christians and Muslims have been identified as 

perpetrators of violence over the years, but very few, if any, 

have been prosecuted or brought to justice. In fact, security 

and police forces have sometimes been accused of using 

excessive force, including extrajudicial killings, to curb 

communal violence. In an unprecedented admission, in 

August 2005, President Obasanjo stated publicly that the 

Nigerian police force had been guilty of torture and extrajudicial killings in numerous instances, and vowed to enforce 

adherence by police to universal human rights standards. 

After her visit to Nigeria in February-March 2005, the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief stated 

that the Nigerian government should ensure that investigations of communal and sectarian violence are thorough, 

including through the identification and prosecution of the 

alleged perpetrators. In addition, the Nigerian government 

“should take very firm positions whenever religion is at the 

origin of human rights violations, regardless of which religious community is concerned.” In October 2006, the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Maccido, widely regarded as 

the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims, died in an airplane 

accident. In recent years, Maccido frequently spoke out in 

an effort to end sectarian and communal violence between 

Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian states have 

extended or announced plans to expand the application 

of sharia in the state’s criminal law; however, there have 

not been further enactments in the past year. Although 

the particulars vary from state to state, each has adopted, 

or reportedly plans to adopt, a sharia-based penal code 

and provisions to extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts 

beyond personal status matters to include sharia crimes 

and punishments for Muslims only. Punishments include 

Zaria, northern Nigeria amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, oftentimes after 
89

trials that fall short of basic international legal standards. 

Defendants have limited rights of appeal and sometimes 

have no opportunity to seek legal representation. Women 

have faced particular discrimination under these codes, especially in adultery cases where pregnancy alone has been 

used as adequate evidence of guilt, and allegations of rape 

and sexual violence are rarely investigated by judges. In 

addition to criminal code changes that purportedly apply 

only to Muslims, some states have instituted or tolerated 

discriminatory practices such as banning the sale and consumption of alcohol and disadvantaging women in education, health care, and public transportation. These practices 

affect Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For example, in July 

2005, the state government in Kano banned women from 

riding in the same buses as men and from riding behind 

men on motorcycles. Moreover, a few northern Nigerian 

states—Kano, Zamfara, and Katsina—have sanctioned 

quasi-official Hisbah (religious police) to enforce sharia 

violations and other discriminatory practices. 

There have been several cases in which sharia courts 

have handed down sentences of death by stoning to Muslims for various offenses. In 2003, several such cases were 

overturned and thrown out on appeal; stoning sentences 

remain in several other cases pending appeal. No stoning 

punishments have been carried out as of the time of this 

report. Nevertheless, sentences involving amputation and 

flogging have been carried out in recent years, although no 

such sentences were carried out during the past year, and 

several cases of this kind have been reversed on appeal, are 

in the process of appeal, or are awaiting sentencing. There 

are pending amputation and/or stoning sentences in Jigawa, 

Bauchi, Niger, Kano, and Zamfara states. Many of these cases 

have been delayed continuously for various reasons. 

Sharia punishments such as death by stoning and 

amputation have been topics of a national debate in recent 

years on whether these punishments constitute torture 

or inhumane or degrading treatment under the Nigerian 

Constitution. The UN Committee Against Torture, as well 

as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that 

flogging, stoning, and amputation do breach the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment under 

international human rights standards and treaties. On this 

issue, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that the Nigerian 

government should ensure that practices and codes of all 

states are in compliance with international human rights 

conventions and it should conduct an “assessment of all the 

laws in force and analyze their compatibility with international human rights law.”

In addition to the sharia controversy and the violence 

it incites, Nigeria is plagued by a number of other serious 

problems regarding freedom of religion or belief. Christians in the northern states complain of what they view as 

discrimination at the hands of Muslim-controlled governments and describe their communities as having the status 

of “second-class citizens.” Most complaints predate the 

recent initiatives regarding sharia, and include allegations 

of official discrimination in the denial of applications to 

build or repair places of worship, access to education and 

state-run media, representation in government bodies, 

and government employment. Muslim communities in 

southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small fraction 

of the population, echo some of the complaints of minority Christian communities in northern Nigeria. Southern 

Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the media, education, and representation in 

government institutions. Although proselytizing is permitted by the Constitution, several northern states continue to 

ban some public religious activities to address public safety 

and security concerns. 

Since 2003, there have been an increasing number of 

small, vocal Muslim groups in northern Nigeria that advocate strict application of sharia, and which, some argue, are 

helping create a haven for radical Islamic militants from 

outside Nigeria. Though not organized as a nationwide 

a f r i c a

Zaria, northern Nigeria
90

movement, some of these groups advocate a more forcible 

Islamization of all Nigerian society, regardless of religious 

affiliation. Over the past two years, Nigerian security forces 

have dealt more decisively with Islamic extremist groups, 

resulting in a decrease in the number of incidents related 

to these groups’ activities, a positive development. However, in April 2007, 12 Nigerian police officers were killed 

after Islamist extremists attacked a police station in Kano.

Nigerian security forces responded by killing at least 25 of 

the self-styled “Taliban” militants, who Nigerian authorities 

said came into Nigeria from neighboring Chad.

Several observers inside and outside Nigeria have 

reported that financial support from Libya, Saudi Arabia, 

and Sudan has been used to build mosques and Islamic 

religious schools in northern Nigeria. Some have suggested 

that the extreme interpretation of Islam being preached in 

these mosques and religious schools is not a form of Islam 

that is traditional to Nigeria. Also, there are reports that an 

increasing number of Nigerian Islamic scholars and clerics 

are being trained in Saudi Arabia and return with a politicoreligious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred of, and 

violence against, non-Muslims.

The Commission has traveled twice to Nigeria, most 

recently in August 2003. In August 2004, the Commission 

issued a Policy Focus on Nigeria, which included recommendations for the U.S. government in relation to communal and sectarian violence, the expansion of sharia law in 

the north, discrimination against religious minorities, and 

increasing Islamic extremist activity. In addition, throughout the past year, Commission staff met with members 

of non-governmental organizations representing various 

religious communities in Nigeria, as well as human rights 

organizations, academics, and other Nigeria experts.

Since October 1999, 12 northern 

Nigerian states have extended or 

announced plans to expand the 

application of sharia in the state’s 

criminal law.... Punishments include 

amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, 

oftentimes after trials that fall short of 

basic international legal standards. 

A Nigerian shopkeeper
With regard to Nigeria, the 

Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• urge the Nigerian government to 

address the sharia controversy, 

oppose religious extremism, and 

hold accountable perpetrators of 

religious violence by:

• ensuring that sharia codes, as 

applied, provide the principle of 

equality under the law between 

men and women and between 

Muslims and non-Muslims, and 

do not result in violations of international human rights standards 

with regard to freedom of religion 

or belief, due process of law, equal 

treatment before the law, freedom 

of expression, and discriminatory 

practices against women;

• ensuring that sharia criminal 

codes do not apply to non-Muslims or to individual Muslims 

who do not wish to go before 

sharia courts, and preventing law 

enforcement activities in northern states by any quasi-official or 

private corps of sharia enforcers;

• taking effective steps to prevent 

and contain acts of sectarian and 

communal violence, prevent 

reprisal attacks, and bring those 

responsible for such violence 

to justice;

• ceasing immediately any official 

support for the so-called “religious 

police,” or Hisbah, and ensuring that state governments make 

greater efforts to halt the activities 

of these vigilante groups, including 

prosecuting those found to have 

taken the law into their own hands;

• expand U.S. presence and outreach 

efforts, primarily in northern 

Nigeria, by:

• opening a consulate or other 

official presence in Kano, or elsewhere in the north;

• providing adequate Embassy and 

Consulate staff with appropriate 

local language skills, and require 

political and public affairs officers to regularly travel throughout Nigeria;

• increasing the capacity of the 

Hausa Service of the Voice of 

America to report fair and balanced views on communal conflict and human rights; and

• sponsor several exchange programs each year on the topics 

of freedom of religion or belief, 

religious tolerance, and Islamic 

law and human rights, targeting 

religious leaders, human rights 

advocates, government officials, 

and northern Nigerians;

• expand U.S. support for communal 

conflict prevention and mitigation, 

through U.S. foreign assistance programs or otherwise, by identifying 

and supporting:

• Nigerian non-governmental organizations working on communal 

conflict prevention and mitigation, emphasizing capacity-building at the local level;

• human rights defenders, including 

legal aid groups that defend the 

constitutional and internationally 

recognized rights of individuals, 

especially women, impacted by 

sharia-based criminal codes;

• human rights defenders responding to credible allegations of 

religious discrimination in any 

part of Nigeria;

• funds for the expansion of training 

for the Nigerian federal police in 

human rights protection;

• programs and institutions, particularly where communal violence 

has occurred, that promote objective, unbiased, and non-inflammatory reporting, consistent with the 

right to freedom of expression; and

• the expansion of Nigeria’s InterReligious Council, formed to promote dialogue between Christians 

and Muslims, and replicate the 

Council at the state and 

local levels; and

• continue to support and adequately 

fund the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a regional U.S. 

security partnership, succeeding the 

previous Pan-Sahel Initiative and 

comprised of African and Maghreb 

countries, including Nigeria, which 

helps to identify, publicize, and 

counter foreign sources of terrorism 

and religious extremism. 

NIGERIA Commission Recommendations 

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Sudan

The government of Sudan commits egregious and systematic violations of freedom of religion or belief in the areas 

under its control, particularly against Christians, Muslims 

who do not follow the government’s extreme interpretation 

of Islam, and followers of traditional African religions. Due 

to the ongoing severe human rights violations committed by the government throughout much of the country, 

the Commission continues to recommend that Sudan be 

named a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State 

Department has repeatedly adopted the Commission’s 

recommendation that Sudan be designated a CPC. 

In the past, the Commission has identified Sudan as 

the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese 

government’s genocidal atrocities against civilian populations. As a result of the government’s policies of Islamization 

and Arabization, more than two million people were killed 

and four million driven from their homes in the North-South 

civil war from 1983 until January 2005. The civilian victims of 

that conflict were overwhelmingly Southern Christians and 

followers of traditional African religions in contrast to the 

Arabic-speaking Muslims dominant in Khartoum. 

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, conditions for religious 

freedom have improved in the South and in the contested 

areas in central Sudan. The Commission continues to be 

seriously concerned, however, over severe human rights 

violations being committed by the Sudanese government 

in other regions of the country, including against both nonMuslims and Muslims who dissent from the government’s 

interpretation of Islam, as well as in the western region of 

Darfur, where the State Department has determined that 

acts of genocide have taken place and may still be ongoing. 

Continued attention and monitoring by the United States 

and the international community are necessary to ensure 

that the terms of the CPA, particularly those relating to freedom of religion or belief and other universal human rights, 

are implemented fully. 

The CPA followed and subsumed a series of partial 

and preliminary agreements addressing the relationship 

of state and religion, the national capital, power-sharing, 

wealth-sharing (i.e., of oil revenue), and security. The CPA 

affirmed the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, which established a number of principles regarding freedom of religion 

or belief, and the Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 2004, 

which committed the parties to respecting a range of human rights. Moreover, the Protocol on Power-Sharing states 

explicitly that “The Republic of Sudan, including all levels 

of Government throughout the country, shall comply fully 

with its obligations under the international human rights 

treaties to which it is or becomes a party.” 

The CPA committed the parties to a number of interim 

measures for the governance of Sudan during a six-year 

Interim Period, to end in July 2011. According to the CPA: 

• a referendum would be held at the end of the Interim 

Period to determine whether the South stays within a 

united Sudan or becomes independent; 

• the 10 Southern states would be exempt from sharia 

(Islamic law), which, however, would continue to prevail 

in the North, and special provision would be made to 

protect the rights of non-Muslims in the national capital; 

• the National Congress Party in power in Khartoum and 

the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/

A) dominant in the South would form a Government of 

National Unity, with the SPLM/A having a minority share 

of offices; the SPLM/A would assume responsibility for 

the government of Southern Sudan;

• local autonomy would be granted to the contested areas of 

the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile State, which 

would, however, remain part of the North, and a special 

administration would be established in the oil-rich area 

of Abyei, whose boundaries would be determined by an 

independent commission; a popular referendum would 

determine whether Abyei continues to have a special status in the North or becomes part of the South; 

As a result of the government’s 

policies of Islamization and Arabization, 

more than two million people were 

killed and four million driven from 

their homes in the North-South civil war 

from 1983 until January 2005. 
93

• elections for President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, the national legislature, state governors, and all state 

legislatures would be held “not later than the end of the 

fourth year of the Interim Period” (i.e. by July 2009); and 

• constitutional arrangements for the Interim Period would 

be according to an Interim National Constitution and an 

Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan. 

Since July 2005, Sudan’s current Government of National Unity has officially governed under the Interim National Constitution, which contains provisions guaranteeing universal human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief. As of this writing, however, key institutions envisaged by the CPA and the Interim National Constitution for 

the protection of rights have not yet been established: e.g., 

the National Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in 

the national capital area. In the now autonomous South, 

the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, adopted in 

December 2005, separates religion and state and contains 

provisions for freedom of religion and for equality before 

the law regardless of religious belief. The Government of 

Southern Sudan has established a human rights commission for the South, as well as a special court to prosecute 

crimes committed for religious reasons, including crimes 

against members of the South’s Muslim minority. 

In government-controlled areas of the North, the 

religious freedom and other human rights protections 

agreed to in the CPA and enshrined in Sudan’s Interim 

National Constitution have not yet resulted in significant 

changes in the government’s practice of enforcing its 

interpretation of Islam to the detriment of those holding 

other views. Muslims are reported to receive preferential 

access to limited government services and preferential 

treatment in court cases involving Muslim against nonMuslim. All Sudanese in the North, including Christians 

and followers of traditional African religions, are subject 

to sharia. Corporal punishments adopted from sharia are 

imposed on non-Muslims and on Muslims who did not 

traditionally follow such practices. There is discrimination in granting governmental approvals required for 

the construction and use of places of worship. Although 

permits are routinely granted to build mosques, permission to build churches is usually withheld. Churches built 

without such official permission exist at the authorities’ 

sufferance. Church-owned properties that are legally 

recognized are nevertheless vulnerable to seizure in a 

legal atmosphere in which government action is not 

constrained by an independent judiciary. 

Public religious expression and persuasion of nonMuslims by Muslims is allowed, but that of Muslims by 

non-Muslims is forbidden. In May 2006, four Sudanese 

Christians, including an Episcopal priest, were detained 

following contact with a Muslim woman who may have 

been interested in converting to Christianity. As the woman 

was estranged from her family and in hiding, the police acted under cover of a “kidnapping” investigation. Although 

all the detained Christians were released after a few days, 

three of them reportedly had been beaten while in custody. 

SU D A N

Tomb of the Mahdi, Omdurman, Sudan 
94

The woman was returned to her family and no further legal 

action was taken.

Conversion from Islam is a crime theoretically punishable by death. In practice, suspected converts are subjected 

to intense scrutiny, intimidation, and sometimes torture 

by government security personnel who act with impunity.

Converts to Christianity from Islam face societal pressures 

and harassment from the security services to the point that 

they typically cannot remain in Sudan. The law against 

apostasy is also of concern to Muslims; the last instance 

in which the death penalty was applied was to a Muslim 

reformer in 1985. 

Government policies and societal pressure favor conversion to Islam. During the North-South civil war, some 

children from non-Muslim families captured and sold 

into slavery by pro-government militias were reportedly 

forced to convert. Reports continue of coerced conversion 

in government-controlled camps for internally displaced 

persons, as well as among prison inmates, Popular Defense 

Force trainees, and children in camps for vagrant minors.

The government has also allegedly tolerated the use of 

humanitarian assistance to induce conversion to Islam.

In government-controlled areas, children who have been 

abandoned or whose parentage is unknown are considered 

by the government to be Muslims and may not be adopted 

by non-Muslims.

Although relative North-South peace has brought 

improvement in human rights conditions in the South and 

in the Nuba Mountains, in the western region of Darfur, 

government forces and “Janjaweed” (government-backed 

militia from Arab tribes) since 2003 have employed abusive 

tactics and brutal violence against African Muslim civilians, 

tactics similar to those used previously against non-Muslim 

Africans during the North-South civil war. Serious human rights abuses have included aerial bombardment of 

civilians, forced starvation as the result of deliberate denial 

of international humanitarian assistance, and the forcible 

displacement of civilian populations.

To date, efforts by the UN and the African Union (AU) 

to protect Darfur’s civilian population have been wholly 

inadequate. On April 16, after months of obstruction, 

Khartoum agreed to accept a UN “heavy support package” 

of troops, police officers, civilian staff, and equipment necessary to assist the AU peacekeeping mission and protect 

civilians. Agreements such as this have been violated several times in the past, however, and close monitoring of the 

Sudanese government’s compliance with the agreement 

by the international community is necessary. Khartoum 

continues to block the deployment of a full, joint UN-AU 

peacekeeping force, as mandated by the UN Security Council. With villages destroyed and lives at risk from further 

attack by government-supported Arab militiamen, many 

civilians remain in camps, unable to return home to raise 

crops and thus end their dependence upon international 

humanitarian assistance. The perpetrators of these crimes, 

both members of the Sudanese armed forces and allied militias, have acted with impunity. This lack of accountability 

and the persistent use of such methods by the government 

of Sudan raise serious questions about the government’s 

commitment to abide by the terms of the CPA.

Actions resulting in mass killings by the government of 

Sudan against its own citizens have been repeatedly condemned as genocide. In the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Congress found that the Sudanese government had committed 

acts of genocide during the civil war. By concurrent resolution in July 2004, Congress found the atrocities being committed in Darfur to constitute genocide. In congressional 

testimony delivered in September 2004, then-Secretary of 

State Colin L. Powell announced that the State Department 

“had concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed 

bear responsibility—and genocide may still be continuing.” In a statement issued by the White House the same 

day, President Bush urged the international community to 

work with the United States to prevent and suppress acts of 

genocide in Darfur. Likewise, the State Department’s most 

recent annual report on human rights practices in Sudan, 

issued March 2007, stated “The government’s human rights 

record remained poor, and there were numerous serious 

problems, including evidence of continuing genocide in 

Darfur, for which the government and janjaweed continued 

to bear responsibility.” 

The government’s genocidal actions stem from a policy 

of the governing elite in Khartoum to advance an Arab and 

Muslim identity in all parts of Sudan. This policy effectively 

relegates non-Arabs and non-Muslims to a secondary status and, moreover, conflicts with the reality that Sudan is a 

religiously diverse country with a large minority of Christians and followers of traditional African beliefs, as well as 

Muslims from a variety of Islamic traditions. Opposition to 

this coercive policy has fueled support for armed resistance 

by non-Muslim and non-Arab populations in the South, the 

Nuba Mountains, and elsewhere. During the North-South 

civil war, the current regime in particular used appeals to 
95

Islam, including calls by senior government officials for 

“jihad,” to mobilize northern Muslim opinion. Religious incitement by government officials contributed to the horrific 

human rights abuses perpetrated by government security 

forces and government-backed militias.

The Plight of Sudan’s Internally Displaced 

Persons and Refugees

One of the major issues facing Sudan is the situation of 

the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 

North-South civil war and the conflict in Darfur have together driven approximately seven million people from their 

homes. Sudan’s total population today is just over 40 million. 

Although most of those displaced from the North-South civil 

war fled to other parts of Sudan, particularly to the North, 

hundreds of thousands became refugees in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 

Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda. The overwhelming majority of 

those who fled as a result of the North-South civil war are 

Christians or followers of traditional African religions. Since 

2003, the Darfur conflict has produced over two million internally displaced persons and sent another quarter million 

into neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic as 

refugees. Unlike those who fled the North-South civil war, the 

Darfurians are almost all Muslims, members of tribes identified as African as distinct from Arab. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

oversees refugee returns, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs coordinates IDP returns in 

Sudan. Both agencies emphasize that all return of refugees 

and IDPs must be voluntary. Surveys indicate that most 

Southerners indeed wish to return to the South. IDPs living 

in the Khartoum area, for example, have limited access to 

employment or basic services and continue to face discrimination and harassment based on religious identification. 

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, more than 100,000 

refugees have returned to the South, 30,000 with UNHCR assistance, and an estimated one million IDPs have 

returned spontaneously. Returnees face major challenges, 

however, including logistical hurtles, lack of infrastructure 

and health and education services, limited employment 

opportunities, funding shortages, and poor security. 

The capacity of Southern Sudan and the transitional 

areas to absorb large numbers of IDPs and refugees must be 

enhanced. Otherwise, significant dangers will be faced, not 

only by the individuals who choose to return, but also to the 

peace process itself and to the development prospects for the 

region. Without adequate preparation, large scale influxes 

SU D A N

Sudanese girls in a refugee camp in Chad (Christian Children’s Fund) 
96

would likely result in additional tensions within overstretched local communities, due to competition over scarce 

resources and services. This could result in further conflict 

and diversions of funding from recovery and development to 

pay for emergency humanitarian assistance.

A complicating factor for returns to some areas of 

Southern Sudan is the continued threat posed by the Lord’s 

Resistance Army (LRA). Sudan’s prolonged North-South 

civil war became intertwined with violence in neighboring 

Uganda, with the Sudanese military providing support to, 

and receiving support from, the LRA, a violent, cult-like 

insurgent group that draws its support from the Acholi, an 

ethnic group located principally in northern Uganda and 

neighboring areas of Sudan. Throughout 2006, the LRA 

remained a security threat in the South, with reports of LRA 

banditry targeting civilians, humanitarian workers, and the 

UN. Attacks by the LRA or by Sudanese groups imitating 

LRA methods have delayed the return of Sudanese refugees 

from Uganda.

Commission Actions on Sudan

Sudan was one of the first countries to be a focus of attention by the Commission. Since its inception, the Commission has met with a broad range of government officials, 

religious leaders, human rights monitors, civil society representatives, and others knowledgeable about Sudan; has 

held public events to focus attention on religious freedom 

abuses in Sudan; has testified on Sudan at congressional 

hearings; and has visited Sudan to see the situation on the 

ground, traveling most recently to Khartoum, Kadugli in 

the Nuba Mountains and Juba, as well as to Nairobi and 

Lokichokio in Kenya in January 2006. In March 2006, the 

Commission issued Policy Focus: Sudan at a press conference with Members of Congress. In March 2007, the Commission co-sponsored a Capitol Hill event with the Hudson 

Institute’s Center on Religious Freedom and the Jacob 

Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights 

of the American Jewish Committee, to highlight congressional efforts on human rights and religious freedom in Sudan, 

in particular the work of the Congressional Human Rights 

Caucus’s Task Force on International Religious Freedom. 

The same day, the Commission sent a letter to President 

Bush urging renewed U.S. leadership to achieve implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to 

advance United Nations protection efforts in Darfur. 

The Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan. In September 

2001, following a Commission recommendation that the 

U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent individual to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the 

North-South civil war in Sudan, President Bush appointed 

former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace 

in Sudan, energizing the peace process. In September 

2006, President Bush appointed former USAID Administrator and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan 

Andrew Natsios as Special Envoy for Sudan, again following a Commission recommendation. Other U.S. actions 

The capacity of Southern Sudan 

and the transitional areas to absorb 

large numbers of IDPs and refugees must 

be enhanced. Otherwise, significant 

dangers will be faced, not only by the 

individuals who choose to return, but also 

to the peace process itself and to the 

development prospects for the region. 

Displaced Sudanese women in Darfur (Peter Biro/International Rescue Committee via InterAction)
97

have followed Commission recommendations, including 

the Administration’s decisions to give peace in Sudan a 

higher priority on its foreign policy agenda, engage actively 

to move the warring parties toward peace, monitor progress 

toward implementation of a series of partial and preliminary peace agreements, and use U.S. assistance more effectively in alleviating the suffering of the Sudanese people 

and in aiding development in southern Sudan. 

In addition to recommending that Sudan continue 

to be designated a CPC, the Commission urges the U.S. 

government to remain engaged at the highest levels in 

bringing about a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan. 

Just as this report was being prepared, President Bush announced on April 18, in a major policy address on Sudan, 

that should diplomacy on Darfur continue to fail to secure 

Khartoum’s compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, the Administration will impose stronger measures 

on Khartoum, several of which the Commission recommends below. Commissioner Bishop Ricardo Ramirez at the Jebel Aulia camp 

for internally displaced persons near Khartoum.

Commissioner Michael Cromartie (second from right) with (right to left) John Prendergast of International Crisis Group, Ken 

Bacon of Refugees International, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, UN Under-Secretary General for 

Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari and Jennifer Cooke of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at a discussion on consolidating peace in Sudan, June 2006.

SU D A N
SUDAN Commission Recommendations 

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should 

take the lead in the following areas to: 

 Coalition Building

• build on the Special Envoy’s efforts 

by lending the President’s personal 

prestige to enlist international support, including from the European 

Union, Sudan’s neighbors and nations such as China and India that 

have major economic investments 

in Sudan, to press Khartoum to 

end its delaying tactics on CPA 

implementation. 

 CPA Verification and 

Follow-through

• continue to press for the complete 

and timely implementation of the 

CPA’s human rights, power-sharing, revenue-sharing, and security 

arrangements; complete compliance must include Khartoum’s 

unconditional acceptance of the 

decision of the Abyei Boundary 

Commission, the verifiable termination of all support for militias or 

elements of the Ugandan insurgent 

Lord’s Resistance Army operating in 

the South, and the lifting of restrictions on peaceful political activities 

throughout the country in advance 

of elections;

• hold both the Northern leadership 

and the SPLM/A to the current 

schedule for elections and referenda, ensuring that these are true 

expressions of popular will and 

that their results are accepted and 

implemented;

• investigate and publicly report to the 

Congress every six months on the 

status of implementation of the CPA, 

with a particular focus on violations, 

assessing responsibility and indicating what actions are to be taken by 

the U.S. government in response; 

violations to be investigated should 

include the role of the Sudanese 

Armed Forces and associated militias in the November 2006 fighting 

in Malakal and Khartoum's possible 

continued support for the Lord's 

Resistance Army; and

• consider new sanctions as needed to 

respond to non-compliance with the 

terms of the CPA, including targeted 

sanctions such as asset freezes and 

travel bans against individuals and 

institutions, e.g., the National Congress Party, identified as responsible 

for serious human rights abuses or 

for impeding CPA implementation. 

 Southern Sudan

• continue to support and strengthen 

the Government of Southern Sudan, 

assisting in the development of institutions and infrastructure necessary 

to protect human rights, to deter a 

resumption of civil war, to support 

the return of refugees and internally 

displaced persons, and to prepare 

the South for the 2011 referendum on 

the South's political future; 

• remove remaining U.S. sanctions 

from all areas under the control 

of the Government of Southern 

Sudan and local institutions in the 

border areas of Abyei, Southern 

Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains, including sanctions on communications equipment; and 

• provide, well in advance of the 

2011 referendum, specific security 

guarantees for the South in the 

event that Khartoum seeks to 

renew the North-South civil war or 

otherwise impose its will by force 

in violation of the CPA.

 Promotion of Human 

Rights, including Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

• use U.S. bilateral discussions with 

Sudan, as well as UN mechanisms 

and bilateral discussions with third 

countries with influence in Sudan, 

to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to:

• allow all religious groups to 

conduct their activities without 

harassment, discrimination or 

undue interference, including 

activities such as publishing or 

importing religious literature as 

well as building, repairing, and 

operating houses of worship and 

social service programs;

• repeal laws that punish changing 

one’s religion or encouraging another to do so; end official accusations of blasphemy, apostasy, “offending Islam,” or similar charges 

used to stifle public debate or 

restrict the right to freedom of 

expression;

• dismantle the burdensome bureaucratic obstacles the government places on international 

humanitarian assistance; remove 

the state security services from 

their current role in regulating 

humanitarian assistance;

• establish an independent and 

impartial national Human Rights 

Commission as called for in the 

Interim National Constitution and 

in accordance with the interna98

1

2

3

4
tional standards2

 for such bodies 

in terms of independence, adequate funding, a representative 

character, and a broad mandate 

that includes freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief;

• abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as 

non-governmental organizations 

under regulations that give government officials effective control 

over their activities;

• permit relations between national religious communities and 

their co-religionists abroad in accordance with universal human 

rights norms;

• reform the state security services to be representative of all 

Sudanese and ensure that all 

national institutions such as the 

military, law enforcement agencies, and the highest levels of the 

judiciary are representative and 

equally protective of all Sudanese 

regardless of religious affiliation 

or belief;

• end the impunity with which 

members of the security forces 

and others acting as agents of 

the government have engaged in 

human rights abuses; urge the 

establishment of effective mechanisms for accountability for past 

abuses; and in the absence of 

such bodies, provide full cooperation with international institutions, including those mandated 

by the UN Security Council;

• cease messages of intolerance 

and discrimination against nonMuslims in the government-controlled media;

• exclude negative stereotyping 

in school textbooks; include in 

school curricula, in textbooks, 

and in teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for 

human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; history texts 

should reflect the religious and 

cultural diversity of Sudan’s past;

• undertake a comprehensive 

review, in collaboration with 

Sudanese civil society and independent international experts, to 

bring Sudanese law into compliance with Sudan’s international 

human rights obligations; and 

• cooperate fully with international 

mechanisms on human rights 

issues, including inviting further 

visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, the Special Rapporteur on 

the Situation of Human Rights in 

Sudan, the UN Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention, and the UN 

Human Rights Council’s HighLevel Mission on the Situation 

of Human Rights in Darfur and 

comply with the Mission’s recommendations.

 Personnel Resources

• ensure that the Special Envoy has 

the personnel and other support 

needed to fulfill his mandate of 

facilitating the implementation 

of the CPA and of pursuing peace 

in Darfur;

• appoint a high-level official to 

ensure that U.S. resources and 

influence are used effectively to 

assist the safe and voluntary return 

of Sudan's refugees and internally 

displaced persons; and

• strengthen the capability of the U.S. 

Embassy in Khartoum to monitor implementation of the crucial 

human rights provisions of the 

CPA and to report on human rights 

abuses, including religious freedom 

in the North, as well as to advance 

the U.S. human rights agenda in Sudan by appointing a ranking official 

reporting to the Ambassador and 

working full-time on human rights. 

 U.S. Foreign Assistance

• ensure that USAID, the State 

Department’s Human Rights and 

Democracy Fund, and other providers of U.S. government assistance develop a strategy and fund 

specific programs to 1) promote implementation of the human rights 

and religious freedom provisions 

of the CPA, and 2) advance legal 

protections and respect for freedom 

of religion or belief throughout 

Sudan, in recognition of (a) the 

central role of religion as a factor 

in the North-South civil war, and 

(b) the emphasis within the CPA 

on religious freedom concerns; the 

programs funded by USAID’s Office 

of Transition Initiatives should be 

expanded; 

• adopt as specific objectives for 

these U.S. programs:

• improved citizen awareness of and 

enforcement of the legal protections for human rights included 

in the CPA, the Interim National 

Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and 

the international human rights 

treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and 

SU D A N

2

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions 

for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm.

99

5

6
Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 

Sudan is a party; 

• grassroots reconciliation and 

“peace through dialogue” among 

Sudanese, including building on 

steps USAID has already taken to 

promote reconciliation among 

Southern Sudanese, recognizing that participants in such 

programs must be transported, 

housed, and fed; participants 

should specifically include religious and other civil society leaders from Sudan’s diverse religious 

and ethnic communities;

• greater capacity of those elements 

of civil society throughout Sudan 

(i.e. the North, the South, and the 

transitional areas) that promote 

religious tolerance, respect for 

human rights, and the peaceful 

resolution of conflicts, to advance 

those goals on both the national 

and the local levels; and

• development of an independent 

and impartial judiciary in Southern Sudan, including through 

training of judges, prosecutors, 

and court administrators and 

support personnel, with the aim 

to ensure international standards 

of due process, fair trial, and nondiscrimination;

• expand the use of educational and 

cultural exchanges, such as the 

Fulbright Program, the International Visitors Program, and lectures 

by visiting American scholars and 

experts, in order to introduce more 

Sudanese to the experience of societies in which religious freedom and 

other human rights are protected by 

law; preference should be given to 

programs that bring together leaders 

from various religious and ethnic 

backgrounds from the North, South, 

and the transitional areas;

• expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan to provide objective sources of news and information and to improve awareness of 

the CPA and its implementation, 

including specific programming 

promoting grass-roots reconciliation 

and respect for freedom of religion; 

support independent television and 

radio broadcasting, including in the 

South, to the same end; and 

• promptly dispense financial assistance for humanitarian purposes, 

to build civil society, and to promote 

economic development in Southern 

Sudan, including in the area of an 

independent telecommunications 

network.

 Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons

• support UN agencies and their NGO 

partners in facilitating the spontaneous—as well as organized—voluntary return of refugees and the 

internally displaced, including by 

intensified efforts to provide safer 

modes of transportation, to demine roadways, to establish and 

maintain “way stations,” and to develop practical, community-based 

solutions to the current lack of basic 

infrastructure and health and education services for returnees;

• work with UN agencies and NGO 

partners to ensure that the populations that remain in refugee and 

IDP camps continue to receive at 

least the same level of humanitarian assistance as before, so they are 

not unduly pressured into making 

“voluntary” returns; and

• work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, and its NGO partners 

to ensure that UNHCR expeditiously identifies those refugees 

for whom repatriation is not an 

appropriate or imminent solution 

to their displacement, including 

those who have suffered from past 

persecution; secure, as appropriate, 

timely local integration in countries 

of first asylum or resettlement to 

third countries for such refugees; 

and promptly devise a strategy to 

achieve this concurrent with efforts 

to repatriate refugees to Sudan.

 Victims of Slavery and 

Human Trafficking

• urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to prosecute strictly 

the crime of abduction into slavery, 

most of whose victims are women 

and children taken during the 

North-South civil war or in Darfur 

by government-sponsored militias 

and to ensure the speedy identification, voluntary return, and family 

reunification of victims, as well as 

measures for their rehabilitation 

and reparation.

 Peace in Darfur

• closely monitor the Sudanese 

government’s compliance with UN 

Security Council Resolutions addressing the conflict in Darfur;

• support a stronger international 

presence in Sudan sufficient to 

protect civilian populations and to 

monitor compliance with the peace 

accords and Security Council resolutions, including by:

100

7

8

9
• urging the expansion of the man

-

date for international peacekeep-

ers in Darfur—whether UN, Afri-

can Union, or some combination 

of the two—explicitly to include 

the active protection of civilians 

and preventive protection;

• providing resources such as im-

proved communications equip-

ment, reliable vehicles and heli-

copters, and logistics assistance 

to enable peacekeepers to move 

quickly to places where abuses 

are occurring;

• bringing in advisors on civil-

ian protection issues in armed 

conflict to train and work with 

international force commanders;

• ensuring that there is a secure 

environment for the delivery of 

humanitarian aid and the return 

of refugees and the internally 

displaced; providing an early 

warning system with GPS (global 

positioning system) capability 

to warn camps and villages of 

approaching forces;

• supporting the assignment of 

designated protection teams to 

camps for internally displaced 

persons;

• supporting the active enforcement 

of the aerial “no-fly” zone already 

specified in Security Council 

Resolution of March 29, 2005, 

which calls for the immediate ces-

sation of “offensive military flights 

in and over the Darfur region;”

• taking measures to prevent—and 

providing aid to those victimized 

by—widespread sexual violence 

and rape in Darfur, including by 

training advisors for the inter-

national forces in Darfur and 

by encouraging participating 

nations to include female troops 

and female police officers in their 

deployment to handle rape cases 

effectively; and

• supporting a substantial increase 

in the number of human rights 

monitors from the UN Office of 

the Higher Commissioner for 

Human Rights and in the number 

of international peacekeepers 

deployed in Darfur;

• prevail upon the government of 

Sudan to provide needed humani-

tarian access to international relief 

organizations;

• continue efforts to aid the suffer-

ing civilian population of Darfur, 

including by seeking an end to kill-

ing, to ethnic cleansing and forced 

displacement, and to Sudanese 

government impediments to the dis-

tribution of international humani-

tarian assistance; assisting refugees 

and internally displaced persons to 

return home in safety; and promot-

ing a ceasefire as well as a peaceful 

and just resolution of the grievances 

that underlie the crisis; and

• urge the Sudanese authorities to 

cooperate with the international 

prosecution of those accused of 

violations of international humani-

tarian law and human rights law in 

connection with the events in Darfur 

since July 1, 2002, in accordance 

with Security Council Resolution 

1593 of March 31, 2005.

SUDAN

101
A novice monk praying in front of a Buddha figure, Burma
103

Burma 

S erious human rights abuses perpetuated by 

Burma’s military regime continue 

 to be widespread, including systematic and 

egregious violations of religious freedom. According to 

the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices, the Burmese government’s extremely poor 

human rights record worsened in the past year, with increasing hostility directed at ethnic minorities, democracy 

activists, and international humanitarian agencies. Since its 

inception, the Commission has recommended that Burma 

be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

The State Department has followed this recommendation 

and consistently named Burma a CPC.

The military junta that governs Burma, the State 

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), monitors the 

activities of all religious organizations through a pervasive 

internal security apparatus. The government imposes 

restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and 

censors all religious publications, has supported, allowed, 

or instigated violence against religious minorities, and, in 

some areas of the country, has forcibly promoted Buddhism over other religions. Ethnic minority Christians and 

Muslims have encountered the most difficulties in recent 

years. In the past year, SPDC policies have continued to 

isolate Burma from the international community, multilateral organizations, and its neighbors. 

The SPDC remains locked in a decades-long conflict 

with the pro-democracy opposition in the cities and armed 

groups of ethnic minorities in the countryside. Some clergy 

and followers of Buddhism and members of minority religions are politically active in opposition to the regime. The 

military junta continues to be suspicious of all organized, 

independent religious activity. This includes persons from 

among the ethnic minorities, for whom religion is often a 

defining feature. 

The SPDC maintains a policy promoting the predominance of the Burman ethnic group, which has included 

state support of Buddhist leadership that remains loyal to 

the current regime, coupled with efforts to minimize the 

influence and presence of other religious groups. 

As a part of Burma’s “Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy,” the National Convention, an assembly that meets 

periodically as part of the process to nullify the 1990 elections and draft a new constitution, met twice in the past 

year. The National Convention is made up of representatives from the military government, militia groups that have 

signed cease fire agreements with the government, political 

parties that are sanctioned by the regime and do not oppose its policies, and some ethnic groups. Opposition parties and ethnic groups critical of the current regime remain 

excluded from the Convention and the peace process. The 

National Convention has met several times since 2003 but 

has yet to produce a draft constitution. However, neither 

the National Convention, nor intermittent attempts to arrive at peace agreements with armed militia groups, have 

produced an improvement in the overall conditions for 

human rights and religious freedom in Burma. In fact, renewed government attacks on ethnic villages have resulted 

in additional human rights abuses, including killings, rapes, 

forced labor, communal violence, displaced persons, and 

forced renunciations of faith. Beginning in December 2005, 

during a renewed campaign of violence in Karen State, 

SPDC forces raided several villages, destroying churches 

and homes of Karen villagers. More than 25,000 people 

were internally displaced during this campaign alone. 

country reports: East ASIA

Tensions between the Buddhist 

and Muslim communities have resulted 

in outbreaks of violence over the past 

several years, some of it instigated 

by Burmese security forces against 

ethnic minority Muslims. 
104

In the past year, members of minority religious groups, 

especially Muslims and Christians, continued to face serious abuses of religious freedom and other human rights by 

the military. In some localities, military commanders have 

forcibly conscripted members of ethnic and religious minorities for forced labor. Those who refuse conscription are 

threatened with criminal prosecution or fined. Those who do 

not carry out their tasks have been shot or beaten to death. 

Christians and Muslims have been forced to engage in the 

destruction of mosques, churches, and graveyards and serve 

as military porters. They reportedly have also been forced to 

“donate” labor to build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and 

monasteries. In January 2006, military forces destroyed a 50-

foot cross on a hillside in Chin State and forced Christians to 

erect Buddhist shrines in its place. During the same month, 

the SPDC forcibly confiscated 15 acres of land in Chin State 

for construction of a Buddhist Monastery. The Chin Christian 

landowners received no compensation. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities have resulted in outbreaks of violence over the past 

several years, some of it instigated by Burmese security 

forces against ethnic minority Muslims. In 2003, Buddhists 

attacked shops, restaurants, and homes owned by Muslims 

in Irrawaddy Division. In January 2005, two Muslims were 

killed and one Buddhist monk severely injured in communal violence in Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan) state. 

Police and soldiers reportedly stood by and did not halt 

the violence against Muslims until Muslims started to fight 

back. In February 2006, violent clashes erupted between 

Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine and local authorities 

were hesitant to respond. During the violence, at least three 

people reportedly died in the riots and three mosques 

were destroyed. Authorities have prevented local efforts to 

rebuild the mosques.

In addition to violence, overt discrimination against 

Muslims, particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, is widespread and severe. The government has denied citizenship 

to Rohingya Muslims, who number approximately 800,000 

in Burma, on the grounds that their ancestors allegedly 

did not reside in the country prior to British colonial rule. 

Without citizenship, Rohingya face restrictions on their 

freedom of movement. Refugees report that some Rohingya 

are restricted from owning property legally, residing in certain townships, or attending state-run schools beyond the 

primary level. Since 1988, the government has permitted 

only three marriages per year per village in the predominantly Muslim parts of Rakhine state. Muslims also report 

difficulties in obtaining birth certificates for newborns. 

Enforcement of such policies widened in the past year. In 

June 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 

expressed concern over the situation among Rohingya 

children, particularly with regard to the denial of their right 

to food, health care, and education, as well as to their ability to survive, develop, and enjoy their own culture and be 

protected from discrimination. 

Muslims reported difficulties in constructing new 

mosques or re-building those previously destroyed. In 2002, 

authorities in Rakhine state destroyed 13 mosques, halting 

only in response to international pressure. Local authorities 

reportedly replaced the mosques with government-owned 

buildings and Buddhist temples and have refused to issue 

the necessary permission for mosque construction on other 

sites. In July 2005, authorities forced the closure of a Muslim 

school on the grounds that its teachers had tried to convert 

Buddhist children to Islam by offering private courses. In 

August 2006, Muslim sources in Rakhine state reported that 

border security forces issued an order requiring the closure 

of five mosques, four madrassas, and 18 pre-madrassas. 

At the end of 2006, only two madrassas had been permitted to reopen. Authorities in northern Rakhine state also 

stepped up arbitrary “inspections” of mosques. Congregation members reportedly were forced to destroy a total of 

nine mosques in the region when religious leaders failed to 

produce operation permits during inspection procedures. 

Christian groups continue regularly to experience difficulties in obtaining permission to build new churches, as 

well as to hold public ceremonies and festivals and import 

religious literature. Authorities have reportedly denied 

permission for the construction of new churches since 1994 

in certain parts of Chin state. Similar restrictions are reportedly imposed in the capital of Kachin state, in some localities in Karen state and among Catholics and Baptists in 

Karenni state. In all these areas, Christians are required to 

obtain a permit for any gathering of more than five people 

outside of a Sunday service. Permission is regularly denied, 

or secured only through bribes. In Rangoon in 2001-2002, 

authorities closed more than 80 Protestant house churches 

because they did not have proper authorization to hold 

religious meetings. Authorities refused to grant applications 

to obtain such authorization. Few of these churches have 

since been reopened. Additional reports of church closings 

in Rangoon and Mandalay have been received within the 

last year. In February 2006, authorities in Rangoon issued a 

ban on the Phawkkan church, which had been in operation 
105

for over twenty years. In October 2006, a Christian orphanage in Chin State was reportedly forced to close. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, there are 

credible reports that government and military authorities 

made active efforts to convert Christians to Buddhism. In 

2004, numerous reports emerged alleging that under the 

guise of offering free education, local officials separated 

children from their parents, with the children instructed 

to convert to Buddhism without their parents’ knowledge 

or consent. Some groups reported that these measures 

decreased in the past year; however, local human rights 

organizations report that the practice continues. In Chin 

state, there are continued reports that government authorities offered financial and career incentives to ethnic 

Burman Buddhist soldiers to marry Chin Christian women. 

Chin families who agreed to convert to Buddhism were offered monetary and material incentives, as well as exemption from forced labor. In February 2007, a Christian pastor 

was arrested for writing a letter to General Than Shwe, the 

chief of the military junta, urging an end to the persecution of Christians. Naga Christian refugees leaving Burma 

continually report that members of the army, together 

with Buddhist monks, closed churches in their villages 

and attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

In January 2007, a UK-based human rights and religious 

advocacy organization released a report claiming that an 

order had been circulated in Rangoon entitled “Program to 

Destroy the Christian Religion in Burma.” The document 

allegedly originated from the Ministry of Religious Affairs 

and reportedly instructed citizens to report the activities of 

Christian evangelists to the authorities. 

In addition to denying building permits, the government of Burma continues to discriminate against members 

of minority religious groups in education, publishing, and 

access to public sector services and jobs. In public schools 

nationwide, all students are required to recite a daily Buddhist prayer. While some Muslim students are permitted 

to leave the room during this time, some schools require 

non-Buddhist students to recite the prayer. 

Although the SPDC shows public preference for 

Theravada Buddhism, even the majority Buddhist religion 

is not immune from government repression. According to the State Department’s 2006 human rights report, 

members of the Buddhist “sangha” are subject to a strict 

bur m a

A young monk in Burma
106

code of conduct that is reportedly enforced through criminal penalties. Monks are not allowed to preach political 

sermons or make public views critical of SPDC policies, 

nor are they permitted to join political parties. Military 

commanders retain jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks 

in military court for “activities inconsistent with and 

detrimental to Buddhism.” Over the past several years, 

monks and nuns have been defrocked or imprisoned, and 

an estimated 100 monks and novices remain incarcerated. 

The number of Buddhist clergy in prison for supposed 

political activity has risen since May 2003, when the Burmese government organized an attack on the motorcade 

of Aung San Suu Kyi and placed her in “protective custody.” Travel restrictions, including an overnight curfew, 

remain in effect at several monasteries. In August 2006, 

authorities arrested five Buddhist monks and 15 laymen at 

a monastery in Rakhine state on the charge that they were 

allowing members of the NLD, the democratic opposition 

party that won the annulled 1990 parliamentary elections, to meet on monastery premises. At year’s end the 20 

remained in prison. 

There has been an unprecedented level of action from 

the UN in recent years concerning the deteriorating human rights situation in Burma. Only days after a meeting 

between UN Under Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari 

and Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2006, the government declared that Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention would be 

extended for another year. In December 2005, the United 

States initiated a briefing before the UN Security Council to 

discuss human rights conditions in Burma. In January 2007, 

nine of the 15 nations represented on the Security Council 

voted in favor of a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling on the 

junta to halt persecution of ethnic minorities and political dissidents. However, Russia and China both vetoed the 

resolution, causing it to fail. Despite allowing Gambari’s 

November 2006 visit, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar has not been permitted to visit the 

country since 2003. 

In 2006, Commission staff continued to meet with exiled 

Burmese ethnic and religious leaders, including Buddhists, 

Christians, and Muslims, and with members of congressional and international delegations that visited Burma. In 

February 2007, Commission staff participated in a briefing 

convened by the Congressional Taskforce on International 

Religious Freedom on religious persecution in Burma, which 

discussed the political and religious persecution of Christians and Muslims. 

Christian groups continue regularly 

to experience difficulties in obtaining 

permission to build new churches, as well 

as to hold public ceremonies and 

festivals and import religious literature. 

Pagodas in Bagan, Burma
I

n addition to recommending that 

Burma be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government urge the government of Burma to:

• halt the arrest and detention of 

persons on the basis of religion or 

belief and immediately and unconditionally release any person who 

has been detained for the peaceful 

exercise of the right to religious freedom, including 100 – 300 Buddhist 

monks and novices;

• publicly and officially order security 

forces to end violations of religious 

freedom, including compulsory 

contributions by non-Buddhists to 

the construction of pagodas, the 

closure of churches and mosques, 

the destruction of religious shrines 

and symbols, the instigation of communal violence against Muslims, 

the forcible promotion of Buddhism 

among ethnic minorities, and forced 

renunciation of belief;

• lift restrictions on the construction 

and renovation of churches and 

mosques and on printing religious 

literature, consistent with international standards, and end policies 

of forced eviction from, followed by 

the confiscation and destruction 

of, Muslim and Christian properties, including mosques, churches, 

religious meeting points, schools, 

and cultural centers; 

• end policies that discriminate on the 

basis of religion in land use, education, allocation of land, job promotion, marriage, access to government 

services, citizenship, freedom of 

movement, and marriage, and invite 

international technical assistance to 

help draft laws that conform to 

international legal standards on 

these matters;

• end the use of forced labor and the 

use of children and members of 

religious minorities as porters or 

military labor, and actively enforce 

its own Order 1/99 (May 1999) and 

Order Supplementing 1/99 (November 2000), which instruct SPDC officials and military commanders to 

refrain from employing forced labor 

of civilians, except in emergencies;

• comply with the recommendations 

of UN General Assembly Resolution 

A/C.3/60/L.53 on the Situation of 

Human Rights in Burma, adopted by 

the General Assembly in November 

2005, which includes the granting of 

unimpeded access to both the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Burma and 

the UN Secretary General’s Special 

Envoy on Burma;

• invite the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion and Belief 

for an immediate visit and grant her 

unrestricted access to religious communities and to regions where religious freedom abuses are reported 

and also allow unrestricted access 

of other independent human rights 

monitors and humanitarian aid 

organizations to all parts of Burma;

• ratify core international human 

rights instruments, including the 

International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights; and

• immediately and unconditionally 

release National League for Democracy Chairman Aung San Suu Kyi and 

engage in meaningful dialogue with 

the democratic opposition leading to 

a peaceful transition to civilian rule.

In addition, the U.S. government 

should continue to: 

• in light of the transnational problems stemming from Burma’s serious human rights abuses, press for 

additional multinational responses, 

including resolutions at UN bodies, 

such as the Human Rights Council, 

General Assembly, and Security 

Council, and support for the initiatives of ASEAN and its member 

states, for example, the Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, to 

address these problems where 

appropriate; 

• work to organize a coalition of democratic nations in Asia to construct a 

roadmap outlining the steps Burma 

needs to take to address humanitarian and human rights abuses and 

end economic and political sanctions, a coalition that could replace 

the moribund Bangkok Process; and 

• provide assistance, through the 

State Department’s Economic 

Support Fund (ESF), that empowers Burmese civil society groups to 

organize humanitarian assistance, 

conduct human rights documentation efforts (particularly religious 

freedom abuses faced by the 

Muslim and Buddhist communities), and provide public advocacy, 

leadership, and legal training to 

Burmese and ethnic Burmese living 

outside Burma. 

BURMA Commission Recommendations 

107
108

China

The Chinese government continues to engage in systematic 

and egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

Religious communities are growing rapidly in China and 

the freedom to participate in officially sanctioned religious 

activity increased in many areas of the country over the 

past year. All religious groups in China face some restrictions, monitoring, and surveillance, however, and religious 

freedom conditions deteriorated for communities not affiliated with one of the seven government-approved religious 

organizations, those considered by the government to be 

“cults,” and those closely associated with ethnic minority 

groups. Religious communities particularly targeted include Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, “underground” 

Roman Catholics, “house church” Protestants, and various 

spiritual movements such as Falun Gong. There continue to 

be reports that prominent religious leaders and laypersons 

alike are confined, tortured, “disappeared,” imprisoned, or 

subjected to other forms of ill treatment on account of their 

religion or belief. Moreover, legal reforms, which were 

issued with the promise of increased religious freedom

protections, have not halted abuses and are used in some 

cases to justify arrests and other restrictions. Since 1999, the 

Commission has recommended that China be designated 

as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State 

Department has followed the Commission’s recommendations and named China a CPC. 

Throughout the past year, the government continued 

to take steps to implement the National Regulations on 

Religious Affairs (NRRA), issued officially in March 2005. 

The regulations maintain procedures whereby all religious groups and religious venues are required to affiliate 

with one of seven government sanctioned and sponsored 

religious organizations. Provisions in the NRRA specify 

conditions with which registered religious communities must comply in order to gain permission to conduct 

religious activity, provide social services, accept donations 

from overseas, and host inter-provincial religious meetings. 

The NRRA includes provisions that protect government 

approved religious activity and safeguard the property of 

religious groups. However, it remains the Commission’s 

conclusion that the NRRA strengthens governmental management of religious affairs, offering Party leaders more 

extensive control over religious groups and their activities. The NRRA also makes unregistered religious activity 

illegal and subject to restriction. In addition, vague national 

security provisions can be applied to any religious group 

deemed to disrupt national unity or solidarity. In many 

regions, local Religious Affairs Bureaus (RAB) pressure unregistered groups to register or merge with the governmentsanctioned religious organizations. Religious groups that 

refuse registration have been shut down and their leaders 

have been detained or fined and, in some cases, made to 

face criminal prosecution. 

In order to implement the NRRA at the local level, new 

regulations were introduced in Henan, Zhejiang, Annhu, 

and Shanxi provinces and in Beijing and Shanghai. The 

regulations generally mirrored provisions in the NRRA; 

in regions with a large number of unregistered religious 

groups, however, the regulations increased the level of governmental interference in religious practice. For example, 

in Henan, religious organizations applying for registration 

are required to submit information that includes complete 

membership lists, detailed descriptions of activities and 

sources of funding, and identification of their leadership. 
109

The regulations also include vague provisions that “other 

materials as needed” will be required in the registration process, a standard that may be applied arbitrarily. 

In Zhejiang, provincial regulations specifically proscribe 

proselytizing, a term that is not defined in the regulation, 

and could be used arbitrarily to restrict religious teaching of 

any kind or to demand that it be conducted only in officially 

approved religious venues. 

The Chinese government requires all religious organizations to become registered as a means for the government to manage religious activity and maintain control 

of independent religious institutions and practice. Some 

Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and spiritual movements 

have refused to join the officially-sanctioned religious 

organizations due to their reluctance to: 1) provide the 

government with the names and contact information 

of their followers; 2) submit leadership decisions to the 

government or to one of the government approved religious 

organizations; and 3) seek advance permission from the 

government for all religious activities or theological positions. In addition, these groups do not trust the leaders of 

the officially approved religious organizations because they 

have been complicit in arrests and restrictions placed on 

unregistered religious activity. As an example of government methods of interference in religious activities and 

procedures of registered religious groups, in July 2006, authorities from the RAB in Shanxi forced a pastor associated 

with the government-approved Protestant organization 

to quit his post because he had not received permission 

c h i n a

The Chinese government acknowledges 

that more than 100 Tibetan Buddhist 

monks and nuns are being held in prison. 

Commissioner Bishop Ricardo Ramirez, right, with young monks at Drepung Monastery, Tibet.
110

to invite a pastor from Hong Kong to speak in his church. 

Religious leaders at the same church were also warned that 

children should not be permitted to listen to Bible stories 

or attend services. During the past year, police have closed 

unregistered mosques, churches, and temples, many with 

large memberships and networks, in the provinces of 

Henan, Zhejiang, Xinjiang, Shanxi, Anhui, and Hebei. Since 

passage of the March 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs, 

in some areas, problems have also continued with arbitrary 

denials of applications to register. For example, in Beijing, 

the Shouwang Church has twice filed papers to register 

following the procedures of the March 2005 regulations; on 

both occasions, however, its application was denied without any official statement on reasons for the rejection. 

In recent years, Chinese leaders have continued a 

campaign to root out what they view as “foreign infiltration,” a campaign that has, in some cases, targeted individuals and religious organizations that attempt to maintain affiliation with co-religionists abroad, although such 

contact is affirmed in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance. The campaign originated from 

Politburo level leadership and has been carried out with the 

most intensity in regions that have the largest number of 

unregistered religious activity and in ethnic minority areas, 

such as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In January 2006, 

Politburo Member Jia Qinling stated that religious organizations must continually guard against foreign infiltration 

while working for greater unity among religious believers. 

The campaign is reflected in renewed efforts of Communist 

Party leaders in Tibet to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama among Tibetan Buddhists. In August 2006, Zhang 

Qingli, the Party Secretary of the TAR stated in an interview 

with a German news magazine that the Dalai Lama was a 

“splittist,” a “false religious leader,” and that his actions had 

“destabilized Tibet.” Additionally, in May 2006, a South Korean pastor was expelled from China after he was detained 

during a police raid on a Bible study involving about 60 

house church Protestants in Jiangsu Province. 

During the year, the Commission, along with the State 

Department and several independent human rights organizations, noted a crackdown throughout the country targeting 

human rights activists, lawyers and others who attempted to 

use the Chinese legal system to defend the rights of Chinese 

citizens, including those who sought to manifest their right 

to freedom of religion. For example, prominent civil rights 

attorney Gao Zhisheng was arrested on August 15 and held 

without charges for over a month and his family was placed 

under house arrest. Gao was well known for his defense of 

religious leaders, his criticism of the crackdown on Falun 

Gong, and his outspoken open letters appealing to Chinese 

leaders to respect measures of their own law that protect 

human rights. On December 12, Gao Zhisheng, who had not 

been permitted to meet with his lawyer for the duration of 

his detention period, was tried in secret and forced to plead 

guilty on charges of incitement to subvert state power. His 

three-year sentence was eventually suspended and he was 

placed on probation for five years, during which time he 

will remain deprived of his political rights and under tight 

surveillance. Other human rights defenders who have been 

imprisoned, harassed, detained, or interrogated include Guo 

Feixiong, Fan Yafeng, Teng Biao, and Li Jinsong. The Commission expressed concerns that the crackdown reflects the 

unwillingness of the Chinese government to implement legal 

and political reforms that would offer Chinese citizens viable 

means to protect their human rights, especially rights to civil, 

political, and religious assembly. 

In Xinjiang, conditions for freedom of religion and belief 

are particularly poor. Official Chinese government policy 

Lhasa, Tibet
111

in the XUAR is to stamp out “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.” The government uses counterterrorism 

as a justification severely to curtail peaceful religious activity 

of the Uighur Muslim minority. During the last year, Uighur 

Muslim clerics and students have been detained for various 

“illegal” religious activities, “illegal religious centers” have 

been closed, and police continue to confiscate large quantities of “illegal religious publications.” There are also a growing number of reports that 179 practitioners of the Sala order, 

a local Sufi branch of Islam, were arrested in August 2005 following a government ban on the movement. Some religious 

leaders and activists who attempt to publicize these and 

other abuses, or to voice their opposition to such policies, 

have received prolonged prison terms, or even death sentences, on charges of “separatism” and “endangering social 

order.” All imams in Xinjiang are required to undergo annual 

political training seminars to retain their licenses, and local 

security forces maintain a dossier on them to make sure they 

meet political requirements. Imams at Uighur mosques are 

reportedly required to meet monthly with officials from the 

RAB and the Public Security Bureau to receive advice on the 

content of their sermons. Failure to report to such meetings 

can result in the Imam’s expulsion or detention. Xinjiang 

officials continue to restrict severely the building of new 

mosques and the teaching of Islam to children. 

During the Commission’s visit to China in August 2005, 

government officials confirmed that minors are restricted 

from participating in any religious activity or instruction 

before completion of nine years of compulsory education. The existence of such a policy contradicts statements 

made by Chinese central government officials who claimed 

that no restrictions exist prohibiting the religious activities of minors. Aminan Momixi, a woman in a rural area 

of Xinjiang, was arrested and detained in August 2005 for 

holding religious classes for 37 students in her home. Despite 

repeated inquiries, authorities in Xinjiang have refused 

to account for Momixi’s whereabouts. In several localities 

in Xinjiang, plainclothes police are reportedly stationed 

outside of mosques to enforce rules forbidding children and 

government employees from attending services. There are 

reports that in some areas, women and men under 30 are not 

allowed to attend mosque. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, 

professors, university students, and other government employees are prohibited from engaging in religious activities, 

such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious materials, 

and observing Ramadan, as well as wearing head coverings, and are reportedly subject to fines if they attempt to 

do so. Such standards are reportedly enforced more strictly 

in southern Xinjiang and in other areas of the XUAR where 

Uighurs account for a higher percentage of the population. 

In response to concerted and persistent international 

pressure, Chinese authorities released Uighur human rights 

activist Rebiya Kadeer in March 2005. Since Ms. Kadeer’s 

exile, her family members have faced harassment and 

arrest. In June 2006, Kadeer’s three sons, Kahar, Alim, and 

Ablikim, were detained and placed under arrest in order 

to prevent them from meeting with a visiting Congressional delegation. On October 27, Kahar and Alim were tried 

on charges of tax evasion and Alim was later sentenced to 

seven years imprisonment. The two were also fined a total 

of over US$75,000. In February 2007, the Kadeer family was 

informed that Ablikim was tried in secret on charges of subversion of state power. According to an official statement 

from the Chinese police, Ablikim was sentenced to nine 

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Urumqi, Xinjiang Province
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years imprisonment in April, however his whereabouts and 

physical condition remain unknown. 

The Chinese government retains tight control over religious activity and places of worship in Tibet. The religious 

activities of monks and nuns are monitored, monasteries 

are administrated by government-approved management 

committees, selection and training of reincarnate lamas 

must receive government approval, and monks and nuns 

are required to participate in “patriotic education” programs run by government officials. The Chinese government acknowledges that more than 100 Tibetan Buddhist 

monks and nuns are being held in prison. Tibetan human rights groups claim that these prisoners are subject 

to torture and other ill-treatment. Reports indicate that 

government campaigns to promote the “patriotic education” of Buddhist monks in Tibet intensified beginning in 

April 2005. In July 2005, 18 monks were expelled from Sera 

Monastery in Lhasa for refusing to participate in “patriotic 

education” sessions. Additionally, 40 nuns were expelled 

from Gyarak Convent in October for similar reasons. In 

November, five monks from Drepung Monastery in Lhasa 

were arrested and detained after they, along with several 

other monks, refused to renounce their loyalty to the Dalai 

Lama. During the Commission’s visit to Lhasa, government 

officials stated that it is not illegal for citizens to possess 

pictures of the Dalai Lama, but it is illegal to distribute them 

or to display them, since that could be interpreted as incitement to separatist activities. Despite this purported policy, 

in January 2006, authorities in Shigatse Prefecture reportedly arrested Phuntsok Tsering, the chant master of Magar 

Dhargyeling Monastery, on charges of possessing a portrait 

of the Dalai Lama. However, within the last year, diplomatic 

observers have reported an increase in the display of pictures of the Dalai Lama at Tibetan monasteries outside the 

Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). Both in May and in December, authorities in the TAR issued warnings to government workers and students that they should refrain from 

participating in celebrations of Tibetan Buddhist holidays. 

Following a series of high-profile releases of and 

reduced sentences for Tibetan Buddhists between 2001 and 

2005, the Chinese government has not responded to international calls for additional releases. In February 2005, the 

Chinese did release Phuntsog Nyidron, a nun who had been 

imprisoned since 1989, but placed her under strict house 

arrest and surveillance. The Commission was able to visit her 

in Tibet during its trip to China and later pressed the Chinese 

government to allow her to travel abroad for needed medical 

attention. She was permitted to travel to the United States 

in March 2006. The Chinese government continues to deny 

repeated international requests for access to the 18-year-old 

boy whom the Dalai Lama designated as the 11th Panchen 

Lama when he was six years old. Government officials have 

stated that he is being “held for his own safety,” while also 

claiming that another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, is the “true” 

Panchen Lama. In recent years, Chinese authorities have, 

on several occasions, featured Norbu in public ceremonies 

where he stresses the importance of loyalty to the Communist government and endorses the government’s official 

version of Tibetan history. The boy was featured prominently 

at an international conference on Buddhism in Zhejiang 

Province in April 2006. The Dalai Lama and other prominent 

Tibetan religious leaders were not permitted to attend the 

conference. In January 2003, Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was 

arrested on charges related to a 2002 bombing incident and 

The campaign against “evil cults” has, 

in recent years, expanded beyond the Falun 

Gong to include leaders of long-established 

Protestant and Catholic groups. 

Commissioners Richard D. Land, Felice D. Gaer, and Michael Cromartie, 

and USCIRF Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa at a hearing on Capitol 

Hill about religious freedom in China, January 2007.
113

later sentenced to death. U.S. officials were promised that the 

evidence used to convict Tenzin Delek would be reviewed by 

the Supreme People’s Court. After more than three years, the 

case has never been reviewed, though Tenzin Delek’s death 

sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in January 

2005. Additionally, Pawo Rimpoche, a reincarnate lama recognized by the Karmapa Lama in 1994, remains under strict 

surveillance and is not permitted to leave his monastery. 

There are increasing and disturbing reports that China 

is actively seeking to prevent Tibetans from leaving the 

country and encouraging the forcible repatriation of those 

who seek asylum in Nepal or India. In late September, 

Chinese guards on the Nepalese border opened fire on a 

group of about 70 Tibetan refugees, resulting in the death 

of a 17-year-old nun. The group included a large number of 

monks, nuns and children who were seeking refuge in India 

in order to receive religious education that they would not 

be permitted to receive in Tibet. Eyewitness accounts and 

video footage confirm that the soldiers fired upon the group 

from a distance and that the group was unarmed. Following 

the shooting, soldiers took several members of the group 

into custody. One member, a 15-year-old boy, who later 

reached asylum in India, reported that those detained were 

tortured with cattle prods and forced to perform hard labor. 

Juvenile members of the group were eventually released 

after their families paid fines; the whereabouts of several 

adult members of the group, however, remain unknown. 

Beginning with the banning of Falun Gong in 1999, the 

Chinese government has conducted a violent campaign 

against “evil cults” and “heretical sects.” Tens of thousands 

of Falun Gong practitioners have been sent to labor camps 

without trial or sent to mental health institutions for re-education because of their affiliation with an “evil cult.” Falun 

Gong practitioners claim that nearly 6,000 practitioners have 

been sent to prison and over 3,000 have died while in police 

custody. Some human rights researchers estimate that Falun 

Gong adherents comprise up to half of the 250,000 officially 

recorded inmates in reeducation through labor camps. The 

UN Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that Falun Gong 

practitioners make up two-thirds of the alleged victims of 

torture. Given the lack of judicial transparency, the number 

and treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in confinement 

is difficult to confirm. During the Commission’s August 

2005 visit, high level Chinese government officials defended 

the crackdown on the Falun Gong as necessary to promote 

“social harmony.” 

Police continued to detain current and former Falun 

Gong practitioners and place them in reeducation camps. 

Police reportedly have quotas for Falun Gong arrests and 

target former practitioners, even if they are no longer 

practicing. In the past year, reports continued to surface 

regarding the re-arrest of Falun Gong practitioners who 

had been released after completing terms of imprisonment 

originating from the original crackdown in 1999 and 2000. 

For example, Bu Dongwei, a lawyer in Beijing working on 

legal aid issues for the Asia Foundation, was arrested for 

possession of Falun Gong-related literature. In addition, the 

Chinese government has reportedly continued to pressure 

foreign businesses in China to sign statements denouncing 

the Falun Gong and to refuse to employ the group’s followers. Multiple allegations of government-sanctioned organ 

harvesting from incarcerated Falun Gong practitioners 

have surfaced within the last year. Independent investigation into the practices of a hospital in Sujiatun, Shenyang 

proved inconclusive. However, based upon a report on the 

allegations from two prominent Canadian human rights 

activists, several international human rights organizations 

have called for an independent investigation and continued 

international attention to allegations of such organ harvesting from prisoners. 

The campaign against “evil cults” has, in recent years, 

expanded beyond the Falun Gong to include leaders of 

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A Buddhist monastery in Lhasa,Tibet
114

long-established Protestant and Catholic groups. Over 

the past year, religious leaders have been imprisoned and 

followers detained and fined for “cultist activity.” Despite 

evidence that suggested witnesses had been threatened 

and tortured, leaders of the South China Church remain 

in jail facing serious charges. Family members alleged that 

the pastor of the church has been tortured while in prison. 

In August 2006, a female pastor in Inner Mongolia received 

a one-year sentence of “reeducation through labor” on 

charges of attempting to organize “cult related” activities. 

In November 2006, three leaders of the Three Grades of 

Servant Church were executed after conviction on murder 

and fraud charges and on charges of propagating an illegal 

cult. Lawyers claim that the case against the men was 

based upon confessions coerced through torture. At least 

12 people have been executed in relation to the case in the 

past two years. 

Relations between unregistered Roman Catholic congregations and the officially recognized Chinese Patriotic 

Catholic Association (CPA) are strained due to past government repression and the growing number of CPA bishops 

and priests secretly seeking ordination and approval of 

the Vatican. Chinese authorities continued to pressure 

unregistered Catholic clergy and laypersons to renounce 

ordinations approved by the Vatican and join the CPA or 

face fines, job loss, or detention. Also, in September 2006, 

Chinese officials refused to recognize a bishop in Shaanxi 

who was ordained with Vatican approval, but without 

government permission. The bishop was detained and 

forced to sign a document declaring the ordination illegal. 

In late 2005, there were signs that the Vatican and Beijing 

were working toward accommodation regarding the approval and selection of bishops in the CPA. In Shanghai and 

in Xian, through a process of consultation, the Vatican and 

the Chinese government agreed upon candidates to replace 

two aging bishops. Despite this example, in April, May, and 

November of 2006, the Chinese government and the CPA 

ordained three bishops without Vatican consultation in 

Anhui, Kunming, and Xuzhou Dioceses. In addition, during 

these ordination ceremonies, security personnel from the 

RAB detained bishops and priests from other dioceses to 

pressure them to participate in the ordination proceedings. Officials in Fujian Province demolished a church in 

September 2006. 

There remain at least 40 Roman Catholic bishops or 

priests under arrest, imprisonment, or detention, including 

the elderly Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in 

detention, under house arrest, or under strict surveillance 

since the 1970s. On August 24, 2006, An Shuxin, Bishop 

Su’s Auxiliary Bishop, was released after 10 years imprisonment. In February 2006, Father Lu Genjun, an underground 

priest of the Baoding Diocese in Hebei, was arrested at 

a local train station. No one has received notification of 

the charges against him or of his whereabouts. In March 

2005, Bishop Zhao Zhendong of Hebei was detained along 

with two other priests; their current whereabouts remain 

unknown. Clergy in Hebei, Fujian, and Zhejiang provinces 

were harassed, detained, and arrested on questionable 

charges during the past year. 

Conditions for unregistered Protestant groups in China 

remained poor during the last year. According to the State 

Department, in some regions of China, Protestant groups 

that refuse to affiliate with the government-sanctioned religious associations, either because of theological differences 

or political objections, are subject to intimidation, extortion, harassment, detention, as well as the forcible closure 

of their churches. In the last year, the Chinese government 

continued to raid house church meetings, fining and detaining pastors and lay leaders. In the last year, at least 110 

Protestant leaders were detained for a period of 10 days or 

more, with at least 17 of these receiving prison sentences of 

one or more years. 

In addition, the State Department estimates that 

“thousands” of house church members were detained for 

short periods in the last year. The majority of arrests and 

detentions occurred in Henan, Zhejiang, and Xinjiang 

provinces. In June 2006, Pastor Zhang Rongliang was senCommission Chair Felice D. Gaer testifying at a Congressional Human 

Rights Caucus briefing on Tibet and religious freedom in China, April 

2007, with Lodi Gyari, special envoy for the Dalai Lama.
115

tenced to seven and a half years imprisonment on charges 

of obtaining a false passport. In July 2005, Protestant Pastor 

Cai Zhuohua and two other relatives were sentenced to 

three years, two years, and 18 months in prison respectively 

for “illegal business activities,” stemming from their largescale publishing of Bibles and Christian literature without 

government approval. In October 2006, Protestant Pastor 

Wang Zaiqing was sentenced to two years of imprisonment on similar charges. Observers report that the use of 

criminal charges to target Protestant leaders is a recent 

tactic used by Chinese authorities to halt religious activity 

conducted without government permission. During the 

last year, demolition of Protestant churches was reported in 

Zhejiang, Jilin, Fujian, Anhui, and Inner Mongolia provinces; churches in the cities of Guangdong and Shandong were 

forced to close. In July 2006, officials demolished a church 

under construction in Zhejiang Province and arrested hundreds of its members. Several were beaten during interrogation and forced to pay fines in order to secure their release. In 

January 2007, eight leaders from this church were sentenced 

to prison terms ranging from one to three and a half years. 

Religious freedom conditions vary by region for unregistered Protestant congregations and, in some parts of 

the country, unregistered “house churches,” which range 

in size from a dozen to several hundred members, meet 

openly and with the full knowledge of local authorities. For 

example, in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Protestant leaders report that unregistered house churches are 

able to maintain their activities without interference from 

authorities. In other provinces, local officials have great 

discretion in determining whether “house churches” are allowed to exist. Protestant “house churches” encounter difficulties when their membership grows, when they arrange 

for the regular use of facilities, or when they forge links with 

other unregistered groups or with coreligionists overseas. 

The Chinese government’s 1997 White Paper on Religion 

states that it is unnecessary for “small groups of families 

and friends” who meet in homes to register their activities with the government. Chinese government authorities 

reiterated this claim during meetings with a delegation of 

USCIRF Commissioners in Beijing in August 2005. Provincial-level regulations also include language that permits 

“religious life in the home.” Within the last year, however, 

police conducted raids on hundreds of house church 

gatherings, confiscated literature, detained and questioned 

participants, and, in some cases, tried and imprisoned 

house church leaders. Such raids occurred most frequently 

in Henan and Zhejiang, where the majority of Protestant 

religious activity occurs, and in Xinjiang, where oppressive 

policies on religious affairs are more strictly implemented. 

 In January 2007, the Commission held a public hearing 

to receive testimony on religious freedom conditions in 

China and to discuss policy options that the United States 

might pursue to improve religious freedom and related 

human rights conditions. Witnesses included an expert 

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Mosque in Kashgar, Xinjiang Province
116

panel featuring the former Senior Director for Asian Affairs 

at the National Security Council and the Executive Director of the NGO Human Rights in China NGO. A second 

panel of witnesses included representatives from several 

major religious communities in China, including Tibetan 

Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, unregistered Catholics, house 

church Protestants, and Falun Gong. All witnesses who 

appeared on the panel confirmed that implementation of 

the March 2005 regulations on religious affairs had not led 

to any improvements in conditions of religious freedom for 

their respective religious denomination. 

In April 2006, then-Commission Chair Michael 

Cromartie offered remarks at a reception held by the 

International Campaign for Tibet to welcome Phuntsok 

Nyidron to the United States. Also in April, the Commission co-hosted a roundtable discussion with the National 

Endowment for Democracy focusing on religion and the 

rule of law in China, featuring presentations from academic 

experts on rule of law and political development in China. 

Participants discussed China’s implementation of the 

March 2005 NRRA and the various practices of implementing the policy in different regions of China. In May, the 

Commission hosted an additional roundtable for follow-up 

discussions on the same topic with a visiting delegation of 

Chinese human rights lawyers who have defended several 

prominent religious freedom-related cases. 

In April 2006, Commissioners Cromartie and Felice D. 

Gaer co-authored an op-ed piece in the New York Sun calling 

on President Bush to raise concerns of religious freedom and 

related human rights during meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao that were soon to occur in Washington.

In August 2005, a Commission delegation made a 

two-week visit to China to engage senior government officials on Chinese policies and practices relating to religious 

freedom. During the visit, the delegation traveled to the 

cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Urumqi, Kashgar, 

and Lhasa. The Commission delegation raised questions 

about Chinese law and international human rights norms, 

the control and management of religious affairs, new 

regulations on “cults” and religious affairs, the situations in 

Xinjiang and Tibet, religious education of minors, and other 

matters relating to freedom of religion or belief, as well as 

the condition of North Korean asylum-seekers in China. 

H. Con. Res. 365, introduced in March 2006 and passed 

in the House of Representatives, contains Commission 

findings regarding the practices of the Chinese government 

to suppress the religious freedom of unregistered religious 

communities and to severely persecute those associated 

with groups labeled as “evil cults,” such as the Falun Gong. 

The resolution called on the Chinese government to cease 

harassment of civil rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng and to remove legal and political obstacles for lawyers attempting to 

defend criminal cases in China, including those associated 

with politically and religiously sensitive defendants. 

Women in Lhasa, Tibet
CHINA Commission Recommendations 

I

n addition to recommending that 

China be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has made the following 

recommendations concerning U.S. 

policy toward China.

 Ending Human Rights 

Abuses in China

The U.S. government should continue 

to urge the Chinese government to 

end severe violations of religious 

freedom and other human rights and 

continue to allow effective monitoring 

of international human rights norms 

by various United Nations bodies 

and the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Human Rights. To this end, the U.S. 

government should urge the Chinese 

government to:

• end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual groups throughout China, including harassment, 

surveillance, arrest, and detention 

of persons on account of their 

manifestation of religion or belief; 

torture and ill-treatment of persons 

in prisons, labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of 

confinement; and the coercion of 

individuals to renounce or condemn any religion or belief; 

• release all those imprisoned or 

detained on account of their 

manifestation of religious belief in 

contravention of international human rights standards; 

• issue a national decree that renders 

provincial or local regulations obsolete and that guarantees the right 

of minors to manifest their religion 

or belief and the liberty of parents 

to ensure the religious and moral 

education of their children consistent with their own beliefs; 

• establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged with, 

offenses relating to state security, 

disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating 

in “illegal” gatherings or religious 

activities. This mechanism should 

also review cases of detained or 

imprisoned religious leaders, many 

of whom have been charged with 

specious criminal offenses; 

• extend an unconditional invitation 

to the UN Special Rapporteur on 

the Independence of Lawyers and 

Judges to China, and allow the Rapporteur full access in compliance 

with the terms of reference required 

by the Special Rapporteur; and

• determine dates for a visit to China 

by the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

in accordance with the terms of 

reference required by the Special 

Rapporteur. 

In addition, the U.S. government 

should: 

• raise publicly concerns about Chinese human rights abuses in multilateral fora, including at appropriate 

UN bodies or other international 

and multi-national fora, and ensure 

that preparations for such actions 

be made at appropriately high levels 

and with the widest possible support from other UN member states. 

 Building on Existing 

Efforts to Improve the Rule 

of Law in China

The U.S. government should make the 

promotion of the rule of law a greater 

priority of U.S. human rights diplomacy in China. To this end, the U.S. 

government should continue to urge 

the Chinese government to: 

• ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China 

signed in 1998;

• amend or repeal Article 306 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code, which 

has been used against attorneys 

who have vigorously defended the 

rights of their clients; 

• amend or repeal Article 111 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code, which labels as “state secrets” any published 

information deemed embarrassing 

to the government, and raise the 

issue of China’s use of “state security” as a rationale for suppressing 

dissent in bilateral and multilateral 

discussions and exchanges;

• repeal the Guiding Opinion on 

Lawyers Handling Collective Cases 

and similar local regulations that 

interfere with the ability of lawyers to 

represent the interests of their clients 

in collective cases, including cases 

involving defending religious freedom or related rights or violations on 

account of religion or belief;

• repeal Article 300 of the Criminal 

Procedure Code, which deals with 

individuals accused of crimes associated with “evil cults,” and also its 

associated legislation, the Decision 

of the Standing Committee of the 

National People’s Congress on 

Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and Punishing 

Cult Activities; and

• end the use of government filters on 

web sites and e-mail and remove 

official restrictions on Internet 

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2 
message boards and text messaging, including blockage of access to 

certain web sites related to religion, 

belief, or human rights; revise the 

September 2000 State Council 

regulations on Internet Content 

Providers (ICPs) and offer ICPs clear 

and consistent guidelines for web 

site content and usage to ensure 

that Chinese law and practice in this 

area conform to international standards on the freedoms of opinion 

and expression.

 Building Programs to 

Support Chinese Rights 

Defenders

The U.S. government should support 

programs that will strengthen the 

ability of Chinese lawyers and activists to defend religious freedom or 

related rights or violations on account 

of religion or belief, advocate state policies that comport with international 

standards and support of a vibrant civil 

society and media. To this end, the U.S. 

government should support initiatives 

that promote the following goals:

• through the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund, 

institute new programs that: 

• increase the capacity and networking ability of non-governmental organizations in China 

that are addressing issues of 

human rights, including religious 

freedom, as well as the freedoms 

of expression, association, and 

assembly, 

• expand contacts between U.S. 

human rights experts and Chinese 

government officials, academics, 

representatives of both registered 

and unregistered religious communities, and non-governmental 

organizations on international 

standards relating to the right of 

freedom of religion or belief; on 

the importance and benefits of 

upholding human rights, including 

religious freedom; on reforms to 

the Chinese criminal justice system, including planned changes in 

the criminal procedure code; and 

on the role of defense lawyers; and

• increase consultations between 

international human rights experts and Chinese officials, judges 

and lawyers on the compatibility 

of Chinese laws, regulations, and 

practices with ICCPR standards 

on freedom of religion or belief; 

• through the newly instituted Human 

Rights Defenders Fund, make support available to Chinese lawyers 

and others who defend the internationally recognized rights of individuals and communities targeted 

because of their religious belief 

or practice.

 Expanding U.S. Outreach 

and Public Diplomacy in 

Tibet and Xinjiang

The U.S. government should:

• urge the Chinese government to 

allow a U.S. government presence, such as consulates in Lhasa, 

Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang, which 

would be able to monitor religious 

freedom and other human rights 

conditions; and

• strengthen its efforts to highlight 

conditions faced by Uighur Muslims 

and Tibetan Buddhists by:

• increasing the number of educational opportunities in the United 

States that are available to religious 

and other leaders from these 

regions, in order to enhance their 

understanding of religious freedom and other human rights according to international standards;

• creating legal clinics to assist 

those in areas of high concentrations of Uighur Muslim and 

Tibetan Buddhist populations to 

enforce their human rights under 

the Chinese Constitution and 

international law, building on 

existing programs that serve other 

ethnic minority areas in China; 

• expanding ongoing assistance to 

civil society programs that promote Tibetan culture, language, 

and social welfare and developing 

similar programs for Uighurs; and 

• as the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors modifies its global 

priorities, ensuring continued 

availability of funds to maintain 

appropriate Tibetan and Uighur 

language broadcasting through 

Voice of America and Radio 

Free Asia.

 The U.S.-China Senior 

Strategic Dialogue and 

Promotion of Human Rights

Within the planning and structure of 

the Senior Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. 

government should: 

• continue to prioritize human rights 

and religious freedom issues as a 

key item within the agenda of the 

Senior Dialogue, raise a full range of 

religious freedom concerns in highlevel discussions at each dialogue 

session and, where appropriate, 

invite human rights experts from 

within the State Department and 

other U.S. government agencies, as 

well as non-governmental experts, 

to participate in both pre-Dialogue 

planning and actual negotiating 

sessions; and

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3 

4 5 
• ensure that religious freedom priorities raised in the 

Senior Dialogues are backed by appropriate U.S. government foreign 

assistance programs on such issues 

as legal reform, civil society capacity 

building, public diplomacy, and 

cultural and religious preservation 

and exchanges. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should:

• ensure that congressional oversight 

of U.S.-China human rights diplomacy is maintained by requiring the 

State Department to submit regular 

public report to the appropriate 

congressional committees detailing 

issues of concern discussed during 

the Senior Dialogue, or any future 

bilateral human rights dialogues, 

and describing progress made 

toward a series of “benchmarks” 

initiated by Congress. 

 Raising the Profile of 

Religious Freedom and 

Related Human Rights 

Promotion through the 2008 

Olympic Games in Beijing

The U.S. Congress should:

• within funds appropriated for the 

security of U.S. citizens in Beijing 

during the 2008 Olympic Games, allocate sufficient resources to ensure 

that training and related information materials include content that:

• instructs security officials, 

Olympic spectators, and athletes 

regarding China’s commitments 

to uphold for all visitors certain 

internationally recognized human rights standards during the 

Olympic Games; and

• informs U.S. citizens, participants, 

and spectators at the Olympic 

games of their rights protected under international law and identifies 

problem areas they may encounter 

with Chinese authorities, relating to the freedoms of expression, 

religion or belief, assembly, and 

association, including information 

on Chinese law and recent human 

rights practices of the Chinese 

government on these issues; 

• as part of such authorizations, 

designate consultations during the 

training process with the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom and relevant non-governmental organizations; and

• in order to promote a free and 

open environment, in concert with 

the principles of the International 

Olympic Committee (IOC) and the 

standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

designate appropriate funding to 

independent human rights organizations to monitor and report on 

human rights conditions during the 

summer games to ensure that the 

Chinese government is in compliance with relevant commitments 

made to the IOC to uphold human 

rights and international standards 

during the Summer Olympics. 

 Addressing the Conditions 

of North Koreans in China

The U.S. government should continue 

to urge the Chinese government to 

protect North Koreans in China. To this 

end, the U.S. government should urge 

the Chinese government to: 

• uphold its international obligations 

to protect asylum seekers by (1) 

working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

to establish a mechanism to confer 

at least temporary asylum on those 

seeking such protection; (2) provide 

the UNHCR with unrestricted access 

to interview North Korean nationals 

in China; and (3) ensure that any 

migrants who are being returned 

pursuant to any bilateral agreement 

are not potential asylum seekers 

refouled in violation of China’s 

obligations under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

• allow greater numbers of North 

Korean migrants who desire resettlement to have safe haven and 

secure transit until they reach third 

countries; 

• grant legal residence to the North 

Korean spouses of Chinese citizens 

and their children; and

• allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to 

North Koreans in China to address 

growing social problems experienced by this vulnerable population, including child and sexual 

trafficking and forced labor.

Chi n a

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Indonesia

Indonesia’s transition to democracy since 1998 has contributed to a gradual improvement in conditions for human 

rights, including religious freedom, over the past several 

years. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government 

continues to take positive steps to address terrorist and 

sectarian violence and to bring peace to the region of Aceh. 

In addition, the majority of Indonesia’s diverse religious 

communities operate openly and without many restrictions. Nevertheless, the Commission remains concerned 

about the continued instances of communal violence, the 

forcible closures of places of worship belonging to religious 

minorities, the growing political power and influence of 

religious extremists, the human rights abuses perpetuated 

by the military and police, and the harassment and arrest of 

religious individuals considered “deviant” under Indonesian law. Moreover, various segments of the Indonesian 

government sometimes tolerate discrimination and abuse 

of religious minorities by extremist groups. Because of these 

persistent concerns, the Commission continues to place 

Indonesia on its Watch List. 

Islam in Indonesia is known historically for its tolerance and its assimilation of a variety of indigenous cultural 

traditions. Over the past decade, there has been a revival 

of Islamic awareness and piety, previously repressed by 

the government. The wearing of Islamic dress has reemerged as an outward sign of devotion; the number of 

Islamic banks, businesses, and publications is growing; and 

Islamic-themed art and fiction are becoming more popular. Indonesian Muslim leaders have engaged in vibrant 

discussions on the nature of democracy and pluralism, 

the separation of religion and state, women’s rights, and 

human rights more generally. There are numerous religious 

political parties and the role of Islam in politics and society, 

as well as the growth of terrorism, are discussed widely on 

television and radio and in numerous public fora, including 

during the 2004 presidential debates. 

Religious extremists are a small but influential 

minority in Indonesia and there is evidence that support 

for extremist positions is on the rise among Indonesian 

Muslims. A recent nation-wide survey conducted by the 

Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI) concluded that the majority of Indonesians support such actions as the stoning to 

death of adulterers, the acceptance of polygamy, the cutting 

off of the hand of thieves, violence against those who blaspheme Islam, and a restricted social sphere for unmarried women—positions that depart from past attitudes on 

similar subjects. There are thus growing concerns that more 

militant strains of Islam are having a greater influence on 

attitudes, gaining political strength in some local areas, and 

possibly inciting mobs to communal violence or acts of terrorism. Moderate Muslim leaders and members of religious 

A temple in Ubud, Bali

Religious extremists are a small 

but influential minority in Indonesia 

and there is evidence that support 

for extremist positions is on the rise 

among Indonesian Muslims. 
121

minorities report that they continue to face pressure, intimidation, or sometimes violence from protestors organized 

by extremist groups. There are fears that Indonesia’s culture 

of pluralism and tolerance is being slowly eroded by those 

espousing an extremist interpretation of Islam. 

Over the past several years, members of such groups 

as Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of 

Martyrs (MMI), the Alliances for Anti-Apostates, the Islamic 

Umat Forum (FUI), and Laskar Jundullah have used pressure, 

intimidation, or violence against those whose views or actions they found unacceptable. Their actions have included 

intimidating judges and local officials; vandalizing and 

destroying buildings belonging to religious minorities, including Christian churches, Hindu temples, and Ahmadiyah 

mosques; threatening moderate Muslims or those considered “deviant”; and forcing the closure of some non-Muslim 

businesses during Ramadan. These actions have continued 

in the last year. The offices of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), 

whose appeals for pluralism and tolerance in Indonesia 

angered extremist groups, were attacked by mobs in August 

2005. Police prevented the mobs from destroying the JIL offices, but the lives of JIL leaders continue to be threatened by 

extremists. In February 2006, hundreds of protesters closed 

down a home used as a Hindu temple in Tangerang City, 

Banten Province; the protestors claimed that no Hindus lived 

in the region. In March 2006, members of Laskar Jundullah accused two foreign university linguists living in South 

Sulawesi of translating the Bible into the local dialect and 

demanded that the two long-time residents be deported. 

Police dispersed the crowd, but allowed some in the group to 

ransack the couple’s home. In October 2006, a mob in Bogor, 

West Java beat to death Muslim cleric Alih bin Hadi, who was 

accused of holding heretical views, including that the hajj to 

Mecca was unnecessary, that zakat could be paid later than 

is customary, and that religious services could be held late 

at night. Previously, Alih had agreed to leave Bogor and stop 

preaching, but he returned a month before he was beaten to 

death. An investigation into his death is ongoing. 

Violence targeting Ahmadiyah Muslims has risen 

dramatically since the July 2005 fatwa by the Indonesian 

Ulemas Council (MUI) that condemned the Ahmadiyahs as 

a heretical sect. The MUI is not a government entity and its 

fatwas do not carry the force of law; however, the Indonesian government has not publicly distanced itself from 

the MUI edicts. Mosques and individuals associated with 

Ahmadiyah were attacked by mobs on numerous occasions 

during the past year. Police and local government authorities have sometimes assisted the mobs or acquiesced in 

their activities. In February 2006, an Ahmadiyah housing 

complex in Gegerungan, Lombok was attacked; six persons were injured and 25 homes were destroyed. Reports 

indicate that police knew of the attack beforehand but were 

unable or unwilling to stop the violence. Although police 

briefly arrested several participants in the Gegerungan 

attack, they were quickly released when a mob protested at 

the police station. In March 2006, members of the Anti-Ahmadiyah Alliance destroyed homes of Ahmadiyah members in Prapen, Lombok; there were no arrests after this attack. As of this writing, 150 Ahmadiyah residents of Lombok 

were living in an Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in 

Mataram, since they have not been allowed to return to or 

rebuild their homes. 

In South Sulawesi province, mobs closed and vandalized Ahmadiyah mosques and threatened Ahmadiyah 

followers in February, April, and October 2006. No arrests 

were made in any of these attacks. In October 2006 in Bogor, West Java, a mob damaged an Ahmadiyah mosque and 

the house of a local resident; no arrests were made in this 

case. In addition, some local governments continue to ban 

the activities of Ahmadiyah and other “messianic” Islamic 

sects, as well as some non-Muslim groups. The province 

of West Nusa Tenggara issued a ban on 13 religious sects, 

including Ahmadiyahs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, 

and nine forms of indigenous beliefs as alleged deviations 

from Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. Reports indicate 

that the real targets of the legislation were Ahmadiyah and 

a messianic Islamic sect called Jamaah Salyifiah. Local bans 

on Ahmadiyah practice were extended or remain in force in 

parts of West Java and West Nusa Teggara. 

In recent years, extremist groups have incited mobs 

and intimated local officials to close churches, mosques, 

and temples. In 2005, at least 50 Protestant churches, nine 

Ahmadiyah mosques, and seven Hindu temples were 

forcibly closed or damaged. The number of closures and 

mob violence directed at religious venues declined in the 

last year, though reports continue to emerge of church, 

temple, and mosque closures. In the last year, at least nine 

Protestant churches, four Ahmadiyah mosques, and one 

Hindu temple have been closed or damaged in the areas 

of West Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and West 

Nusa Tenggara. Police almost never act to prevent forced 

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sisted militant groups in the closures. One factor in the 

large number of church and temple closures in recent years 

was a vaguely-worded decree issued in 1969 that required 

religious groups to gain “community approval” before they 

could expand, renovate, or open new religious venues. In 

areas where Christians, Hindus, or Muslims were in the minority, this provision made building permits difficult, if not 

impossible, to obtain. In addition, in some places, extremists pressured local government officials to revoke permits 

of longstanding places of worship and or destroyed those 

operating without permits. 

In response to persistent criticism from religious 

minorities and international observers, the Ministry of 

Religion issued a new decree last year, known as Joint 

Ministerial Decree 1/2006. Decree 1/2006 requires a religious group with a membership over 90 persons to obtain 

the support of 60 local residents for any plans to build or 

expand a religious venue. That petition must then be sent 

to the Joint Forum for Religious Tolerance (FKUB), a provincial panel of religious leaders chosen proportionally by 

the number of religious adherents in the province. If there 

remains strong community opposition to the religious 

venue, the FKUB can find an alternative location. Observers claim that the new decree is designed to stop the proliferation of “house churches” and small Hindu temples 

(fewer than 90 members) and to remove permit decisions 

from local authorities who are subject to intimidation and 

corruption. One supporter of the decree stated that it was 

issued to bring “social harmony.” He told the Jakarta Post, 

“if we don’t limit the places of worship they will be abundant. There would be competition from different religions 

or sects, and it would create public disorder.” Prominent 

Muslim religious leaders have stated publicly that the 

new decree is more restrictive than the previous one and 

might violate Article 18 of the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights. At this time, it is too soon to 

determine if the new decree has contributed to the overall 

decline in the number of religious venues closed over the 

last year. The Commission will continue to monitor the 

decree and the forced closure of religious venues. 

The number of violent and terrorist acts in Central 

Sulawesi and the Malukus has decreased in the last year 

and police have arrested some of those responsible for past 

violence. However, instances of mob and terrorist violence 

continue to occur in Central Sulawesi, where political, 

religious, and economic tensions between the Christian 

and Muslim communities has the potential to re-ignite past 

sectarian violence. Extremist groups, including members 

of Mujahadin Kompak (MK), a militant offshoot of Jemaah 

Islamiyah (JI), are known to train, recruit, and operate in 

Central and South Sulawesi. These militant groups frequently have been responsible for attacks on religious 

minorities and police, instigating mob actions to restrict 

religious activities, and organizing political efforts to segregate Central Sulawesi into Muslim and Christian districts. 

In 2005, extremists beheaded three Christian girls, shot 

two others waiting for a school bus, attacked Protestant 

religious leaders and services, and bombed a pork market 

and a Hindu temple in Poso and Palu, Central Sulawesi. 

Local religious leaders condemned the attacks as the work 

of “outside extremists” seeking to undermine interfaith 

reconciliation efforts. President Yudhoyono publicly 

condemned the violence in Central Sulawesi. Counter-terrorism units and police investigators from Jakarta were sent 

to coordinate investigations and seek out members of terrorist groups. These measures have produced some arrests, 

convictions, and the deaths of suspected terrorists. In May 

2006, police apprehended three men who confessed to the 

beheadings of the Christian schoolgirls in Poso. In March 

2007, the purported mastermind of the attacks was given a 

20 year sentence, and his accomplices 14 year sentences. In 

addition to these arrests, police also apprehended at least 

10 others who confessed to participating in various bombings, beheadings, and shootings in Central Sulawesi over 

the past two years. 

Despite these successes, police tactics and alleged 

judicial favoritism have exacerbated communal tensions. 

Muslims praying at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta For example, in September 2006, Fabianus Tibo, Doming-
123

gus da Silva, and Marianus Riwu were executed for their 

alleged roles in the 2000 killings of 191 Muslims at a local 

boarding school. Despite evidence that called into question 

the case against the three, including the public reservations of Poso’s former Chief of Police, subsequent higher 

courts allowed the execution to proceed. The executions 

led to violence in areas of East Nusa Tenggara Province 

(where the three men were born) and in Central Sulawesi. 

In Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, 3,000 Christians rioted and 

burned down government buildings. In Kefamananu and 

Atambua, West Timor, between 3,000 and 5,000 persons, 

largely Christian, rioted, destroying government buildings, 

homes, and vehicles. In Central Sulawesi, on the same day 

as the executions, a mob beat two Muslims to death in the 

predominately Christian village of Taripa. Police arrested 17 

people for participating in the killings; all of them admitted 

their involvement. Several other incidents occurred following the executions, including three small bombings, attacks 

on both Muslims and Christians, and an attack on the new 

Central Sulawesi police chief. 

The tactics of an elite counter-terrorism unit called 

Detachment 88, which is partially trained and equipped 

by U.S. foreign assistance grants, have also exacerbated 

tensions in Central Sulawesi. In the months following the 

executions of Tibo, da Silva, and Riwu, Detachment 88 units 

moved to arrest Muslim individuals suspected of participating in sectarian violence. In three separate raids during 

January 2007, police killed at least 16 people and captured 

28 other suspects. During the funerals for two of those 

killed in the raids, mobs rioted, killing three people, including a local policeman. A week later, bombs exploded in the 

Ecclesia Poso Church, though there were no casualties. Local religious leaders report that extremists are now portraying the police as thoghut (anti-Muslim forces). They are also 

concerned that the tactics used by Detachment 88 had only 

increased sympathy for extremists in Central Sulawesi, will 

attract jihadists from other regions to Sulawesi, and may 

increase attacks against local Christians. Many grievances 

remain about the sectarian conflict that occurred in 1999-

2001, including fears that few of those responsible for instigating the violence will be held accountable. An estimated 

35,000 people continue to live in IDP camps. 

The Indonesian government has made some notable 

progress in other areas, however. For example, the government has prosecuted more than 50 persons accused of 

religiously motivated terrorism, including six individuals 

responsible for the suicide attack on the Australian Embassy 

and 32 individuals for involvement in extremist violence in 

the Malukus during 1999-2001. There have been no instances 

of communal and sectarian violence in the Malukus during 

the past two years. In addition, the Indonesian government 

continues to encourage inter-religious tolerance and cooperation. Some Indonesian government officials have continued 

to work with local Muslim and Christian community leaders 

to defuse tensions in conflict areas. There are also a growing 

number of inter-religious non-governmental organizations 

initiating discussions on pluralism, democracy, religious 

tolerance, and human rights. 

Currently, there are 13 individuals being held on 

charges based primarily on religion or belief. Most have 

been charged under Article 156 and 156a of the criminal 

code, according to which “expressing feelings of hostility, 

hatred or contempt against religions” and “disgracing a 

religion” are punishable by up to five years in jail. Lia Eden, 

leader of the messianic Muslim sect Jamaah Alamulla, was 

sentenced to two years in jail for “denigrating religion.” 

Iman Muhammad Yusman Roy was sentenced to two 

years in jail in East Java’s Malang District Court for reciting 

prayers in the Indonesian language, which local officials 

claimed tarnished the purity of Islam. Sumardi Tappaya, 

a Muslim high school religious teacher on Sulawesi, was 

sentenced to six months in jail in June 2006 on charges 

of heresy. A relative had accused him of whistling during 

prayers, and local religious officials declared that whistling 

was “deviant.” A foreign citizen and an Indonesian were 

sentenced to five months and two and half years in prison 

for “proselytizing” and “denigrating religion” while working 

as humanitarian aid workers on the island of Madura in 

November 2006. Six counselors at an East Java drug and 

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An Indonesian village
124

cancer treatment center were arrested and sentenced to 

between five and three years in jail for violating key precepts of Islam. Local religious leaders characterized their 

rehabilitation center’s teachings as heretical. Rus’an, a 

lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University in Palu, Central Sulawesi, was charged with heresy and is currently 

under house arrest for publishing an article entitled 

“Islam, A Failed Religion,” about corruption in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He was arrested after 2,000 people 

protested and closed the Palu paper where the article had 

been published. Also in prison are three Protestant women 

who were sentenced to three years in jail under the Child 

Protection Law for allegedly attempting to convert Muslim 

children at their daycare center and youth recreation programs. The women claimed that family members had given 

permission for their children to attend the event and that 

no proselytizing had occurred. Witnesses failed to support 

the women during the trial because of alleged intimidation 

from the community and local mobs. The judge at the trial 

also admitted to being intimidated by extremist groups 

that attended the trial. The case remains on appeal at the 

Supreme Court.

In August 2005, the Indonesian government concluded 

a comprehensive peace agreement with the insurgent 

group Free Aceh Movement (GAM), ending a 30-year conflict that had resulted in significant human rights abuses. 

The agreement has recently led to a newly elected government and hope for a region hard hit by the tsunami and 

decades of civil conflict. However, neither the peace agreement nor the elections overturned Aceh’s special autonomy 

status, which allowed the province to establish and implement sharia law and establish sharia courts. Since 2003, 

there has been a dramatic expansion of the role and power 

of sharia courts and their vice patrols, locally known as the 

Wilayatul Hisbah. Over the past year, reports indicate that 

at least 100 persons in Aceh were caned for crimes such as 

being alone with persons of the opposite sex who were not 

blood relatives, consuming alcohol, and gambling. Public 

canings sometimes have drawn crowds in the thousands. 

Though religious leaders insist that public caning is supposed to be a method of “shame not pain,” there are reports 

that some persons required hospitalization. The jurisdiction of sharia courts and the power of the Wilayatul Hisbah

will be controversial issues for the new Acehese government to face and will require continued monitoring. 

The expansion of sharia in Aceh has influenced local 

initiatives elsewhere in Indonesia. Efforts to implement 

sharia provisions nationally have consistently been defeated 

by a coalition of religious minorities and the largest Muslim 

organizations. However, some provinces and localities are 

enforcing Islamic law at the municipal and regional levels. 

Indonesian non-governmental organizations estimate that at 

least 66 perda syaria or local sharia laws have been promulgated and enforced in the past three years. In South Sulawesi, 

Madura, and Padang, West Sumatra, local authorities issued 

laws extending sharia provisions to all Muslims, including enforcement of Islamic dress, prohibition on alcohol, 

and caning punishments. In Madura and South Sulawesi, 

civil servants are required to cease work activities during 

the call to prayer and recitation of the Koran is reportedly 

being required for promotion. Similar laws have already 

been implemented in parts of West Java, including Cianjur, 

Tasikmalaya, and Garut. In the city of Tangerang, Banten 

Province, local laws have banned public displays of affection, 

alcohol consumption, and prostitution. These laws apply 

to Muslims and non-Muslims. The anti-prostitution ban is 

being challenged in Indonesian courts because it defines a 

prostitute as anyone who draws attention to him or herself by 

attitude, behavior, or dress. In the past year, according to the 

State Department, 31 women were arrested as prostitutes, 

including a married mother waiting at a bus stop during the 

early evening. Fifty-six Indonesian parliamentarians issued 

a petition calling for a review of local sharia legislation to determine if the laws conflicted with constitutional protections 

and national laws. The petition was later dropped, and no 

review was instituted. Indonesian human rights advocates 

have expressed fears that local perda syaria legislation is a 

backdoor attempt to implement sharia nationally and may 

be used to mobilize political support for the more extremist 

Muslim parties during the 2009 elections. 

U.S. government assistance currently supports programs in conflict resolution, multi-religious dialogue and 

tolerance, pluralism, and education, programs that are in 

line with previous recommendations by the Commission.

The Commission regularly meets with Indonesian 

political leaders, human rights activists and defenders, 

journalists, and religious leaders, including representatives 

of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu communities from the regions of Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi, Java, Bali, and the Malukus. 
The Commissions recommends 

that the U.S. government urge the 

government of Indonesia to: 

• disarm fully and disband all outside 

militia forces in Sulawesi, the Malukus, and Papua, such as Laskar 

Jundullah, Mujahidin Kompak, and 

Laskar Merah Putih;

• continue efforts to bring those who 

participated in, or are responsible 

for, sectarian and ethnic violence 

in Central Sulawesi, Malukus, and 

Papua to justice, by providing fair 

and transparent trials;

• provide protection for religious venues, as well as restitution to religious 

communities whose venues have 

been destroyed or closed due to mob 

violence or protest, and ensure that 

those responsible for such acts are 

prosecuted; 

• establish an independent commission, composed of prominent 

persons in Poso, with a presidential 

mandate to question civilian and 

military authorities about police 

and military activities during the 

violence in 2000-2001, to examine 

grievances from the 2000-2001 

conflict and suggest ways to address 

them, and to make recommendations about civilian and police 

activities to address current communal and terrorist activities; 

• commit sufficient resources for 

the resettlement of an estimated 

35,000 Internally Displaced Persons 

(IDPs) in Central Sulawesi and the 

Malukus, who are a reminder of the 

1999-2002 sectarian violence and 

a potential recruitment pool for 

extremists; 

• publicly address the July 2005 

Indonesian Ulamas Council (MUI) 

fatwas prohibiting interfaith prayer, 

interfaith marriage, interfaith 

inheritance, religious pluralism, 

liberalism, and secularism, as well 

as the decisions condemning the 

Ahmadiyah community, as contradicting the ideals of religious freedom and tolerance in Indonesia’s 

Constitution, and condemn publicly 

the communal violence and harassment that followed the issuance 

of the fatwas targeting moderate 

Muslim organizations, such as the 

Liberal Islam Network (JIL), as well 

as Ahmadiyah mosques and religious centers;

• amend the Joint Ministerial Decree 

No. 1/2006 (Regulation on Building 

Houses of Worship) to bring it into 

compliance with the Indonesian 

Constitution’s protection of religious freedom as well as international standards, and removes any 

restrictive barriers on building and 

re-furbishing places of worship for all 

religious groups in Indonesia; and

• transfer or remove from Papua any 

security, police, and militia personnel who were indicted for activities 

related to serious human rights abuses and war crimes by the UN’s Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) 

and the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court 

for East Timor in Jakarta.

In addition, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government 

should:

• commend the government of Indonesia for its efforts to curb terrorism, 

establish peace in Aceh, and promote inter-religious understanding, 

conflict mitigation, and a vibrant 

discussion among members of civil 

society on the role of Islam in supporting human rights, democracy, 

and pluralism; 

• consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States 

(2006), continue to expand U.S.-Indonesian cooperation in economic 

development, democracy, education, good governance, pluralism, 

and rule of law programs by: 

• supporting Indonesia’s evolving 

legal and human rights reform 

agenda by providing training, 

capacity building, and targeted 

exchanges with Indonesian 

government agencies, legal and 

judicial institutions and legal and 

human rights-focused civil society 

organizations, including the 

National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the Supreme 

Court, and the Directorate General 

of Human Rights in the Ministry of 

Justice and Human Rights;

• expand exchange programs that 

bring Indonesian scholars, judges, 

lawyers, and activists to the United 

States to initiate discussions with 

governmental, academic, and nongovernmental experts on human 

rights, including religious freedom, 

rule of law, and the relationship 

between religion and the state;

• establish programs and work with 

allies in Europe and elsewhere 

to support monitoring of the 

implementation of sharia law in 

Aceh and other parts of Indonesia 

to determine if individual rights 

and freedoms, including religious 

freedom, are being guaranteed for 

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INDONESIA Commission Recommendations 
all citizens and making sure that 

U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance programs do not support 

sharia police or courts in Aceh or 

other municipalities in Indonesia; 

• monitoring and publicly reporting 

on the impact of U.S.-funded humanitarian relief and post-conflict 

development programs on the 

promotion of religious freedom 

and other human rights, monitoring that should include, for 

example, a report to the appropriate congressional committees;

• establishing programs that 

promote training and capacitybuilding for Indonesian human 

rights-focused civil society organizations involved in conflict resolution, inter-religious dialogue, 

reconciliation, public interest law, 

and economic and social development in areas of communal and 

sectarian conflict; 

• prioritizing support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

and human rights-focused civil 

society organizations pursuing 

programs on inter-religious 

economic development, conflict 

prevention and social cohesion, 

and the resettlement of internally 

displaced persons in potential 

flashpoint areas such as Central 

Sulawesi, the Malukus, Papua, or 

parts of West Java;

• expanding U.S. government support for the promotion of religious 

pluralism in Indonesia by supporting seminars and conferences, international exchanges, 

intra-religious dialogue, and new 

radio, television, and publishing 

activities of interfaith and private 

organizations that promote 

respect for religious freedom and 

human rights; and

• expanding support for media, 

dialogue, and publishing ventures of Indonesian organizations 

seeking to promote intra-Muslim 

dialogue on the compatibility of 

Islam and human rights, democracy, and pluralism, including the 

translation of books by prominent 

Indonesian scholars into, as appropriate, Arabic, Urdu, Persian, 

Turkish, and English; and

• ensure that any ties with the Indonesian military and police should 

include, as priorities:

• reform of the Indonesian military, 

including transfer to civilian 

control, training in international 

human rights standards, and 

technical assistance in military 

law and tribunals; 

• dedicated funds for training 

Indonesian police in counter-terrorism techniques and protecting 

human rights in areas of sectarian 

conflict, including fellowships to 

the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand and participation 

in UN Police training programs 

(UNPOL); and 

• denial of U.S. assistance to any 

police or military unit found to 

engage in a pattern of violations 

of human rights.

126
127

Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of

By all accounts, there are virtually no personal freedoms in 

the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK or 

North Korea) and no protection for universal human rights. 

In pursuit of absolute control of all facets of politics, society, 

and the flow of information, the government headed by 

Kim Jong Il has created an environment of fear in which 

dissent of any kind is not tolerated. Freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief does not exist, as the 

government severely represses public and private religious activities and maintains a policy of tight control over 

government-sanctioned religious practice. Religious belief 

of any kind is viewed by the government as a potential competitor to the officially propagated cult of personality centered on Kim Jong Il, and his late father, Kim Il Sung. In the 

past several years, North Korean government officials have 

arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed 

those discovered engaging in clandestine religious activity. 

There is no evidence that religious freedom conditions have 

improved in the past year. The Commission continues to 

recommend that North Korea be designated a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, which the Department of State 

has done since 2001. 

Because of the North Korean government’s extremely 

tight control over all information entering and leaving the 

country, detailed data about religious freedom conditions 

is difficult to obtain. In 2005, the Commission authorized 

researchers to interview 40 North Korean refugees living 

in South Korea. The resulting study, authored by David 

Hawk and entitled Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, 

Conscience, and Religion in North Korea, shows how successive North Korean governments suppressed the country’s 

once vibrant religious and intellectual life and put in its place 

a quasi-religious cult of personality surrounding the Kim 

family. The report also describes the survival of very limited 

religious activity in North Korea. 

The government has established bodies, referred to 

as “religious federations,” for Buddhists, Chondokyists 

(referring to Chondokyo, or “Eastern Learning,” a syncretic 

belief largely based on Confucianism but which also incorporates elements of Taoism, Shamanism, Buddhism, and 

Catholicism), and Christians, which operate in Pyongyang 

to project a presence of religious observance to outsiders. 

These federations are led by political operatives whose goal 

is to implement the government’s policy of control over 

religious activity, as well as to gain foreign humanitarian 

assistance and maintain religious sites as cultural centers. 

For example, the official Korean Buddhist and Christian 

Federations restrict religious activities at monasteries, 

temples, and churches in North Korea. Although the religious federations maintain offices in Pyongyang and their 

delegates on occasion travel abroad, they have no presence 

in any other city or region in the country. The federations 

also operate churches, temples, and shrines in North Korea. 

One Catholic and two Protestant churches, built 

between 1988 and 1992, operate in Pyongyang. Services 

have been held in these churches since the mid-1990s in 

response to the growing presence of foreign aid workers 

in Pyongyang. Access to these church services is tightly 

controlled and monitored, and most North Korean refugees 

ko r e a

Unloading food supplies (World Food Program/Gerald Bourke)

Religious belief of any kind is 

viewed by the government as a potential 

competitor to the officially propagated cult 

of personality centered on Kim Jong Il, 

and his late father, Kim Il Sung. 
128

report that they exist as showpieces for foreign visitors. 

Nevertheless, in addition to foreign visitors, those permitted to participate in services include some North Korean 

citizens who were known to practice prior to the Korean 

War. The absence of a priest for Roman Catholics means 

that mass cannot be celebrated and most sacraments cannot be performed. According to South Korean religious 

groups working in Pyongyang, a fraction of North Koreans 

who attend services at the churches in Pyongyang are genuine in their faith; however, the largest presence in these 

churches are security personnel sent to monitor and report 

on church activities. International observers who attend 

services at the churches in Pyongyang report that North 

Korean congregants regularly arrive and depart as a group 

in tour buses. The Korean Presbyterian Church of South 

Korea reports that it has reached an agreement with the 

North Korean government to build a new church in Pyongyang; however, construction plans have not progressed. 

According to written responses from the North Korean 

government to UN treaty bodies, the government claims 

that some 500 house churches operate in North Korea with 

official approval. Until recently, it was not possible to verify 

who attended these house services and whether they existed 

outside of Pyongyang. Reports, including the Commission’s 

study, are emerging that indicate that house church participants are largely made up of individuals whose families were 

Christians before the Korean War and that some do in fact 

operate outside of Pyongyang. It is unclear whether these 

meetings are permitted to occur regularly, and experts report 

that they are generally monitored by government representatives. It is impossible to ascertain the number of house 

churches permitted to operate by the government or the 

extent of their activities and membership, as visiting religious 

leaders and scholars are repeatedly denied access to such 

gatherings in rural areas. 

The Commission continues to receive credible reports 

that underground religious activity, or that which takes 

place outside of government sanction and control, is 

growing, despite pervasive suppression by North Korea’s 

all-encompassing security apparatus. There is no reliable 

estimate of the number of religious believers practicing underground. Anyone discovered taking part in unauthorized 

religious activity, which includes carrying religious literature in public, distributing religious literature, or engaging 

in public religious expression and persuasion, is subject to 

severe punishment, such as long-term imprisonment in labor camps, torture, and possible execution. There continue 

to be reports of torture and execution of religious believers, including a January 2005 report of the execution of six 

religious leaders. Additionally, in March 2006, authorities 

in Pyongyang sentenced Son Jong Nam to death on charges 

of spying for South Korea. Son’s contact with Protestants in 

China, his religious conversion, and his private criticism of 

the North Korean regime reportedly served as a basis for 

the sentence. As of this writing, it is not possible to verify 

whether Son Jong Nam was executed. 

The practice of imprisoning religious believers is apparently widespread. However, neither the State Department nor any other official or non-governmental source 

has been able to document the number of religious detainees or prisoners. According to some reports, an estimated 

6,000 Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15” located 

in the northern part of the country. According to testimony 

at the Commission’s January 2002 hearing, prisoners held 

on the basis of their religious beliefs are treated worse 

than other inmates. For example, religious prisoners are 

reportedly given the most dangerous tasks while in prison.

In addition, they are subject to constant abuse from prison 

officials in an effort to force them to renounce their faith.

When they refuse, they are often beaten and sometimes 

tortured to death. North Korean refugees and refugee assistance organizations report a growing number of Christian 

adherents in the prison system due to a spread of Christianity from cross-border proselytizing of South Korean and 

Chinese missionaries in the border area. 

A North Korean mother and child (World Food Program/Gerald Bourke)
129

The North Korean government forcefully propagates 

an ideology known as “Juche” or “KimIlSungism” centered 

on the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung and Kim 

Jong Il. Pictures of the “Great Leader” (Kim Il Sung) and 

the “Dear Leader” (Kim Jong Il) hang on the walls of every 

house, schoolroom, and workplace. The only exception is the 

churches of Pyongyang, where crosses hang in their place. 

Under threat of fines and other penalties, North Koreans 

are required to maintain and display the portraits of their 

leaders. Every North Korean wears a lapel pin of the Great 

Leader. Schools are required to study and memorize the 

“Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology 

System of the Party.” On several occasions throughout the 

past year, North Korean media sources quoted Kim Jong Il’s 

instructions that ideological education must take precedence over academic subjects in the nation’s schools. North 

Korean refugees report that each village contains a “Kim Il 

Sung Research Center” where they are required to attend 

weekly meetings. One scholar estimated that there may be as 

many as 450,000 such centers, including one in the infamous 

Yodok prison camp. Meetings include watching inspirational 

films on the Dear Leader’s life, indoctrination sessions on the 

principles of Juche, and public self-criticism sessions. 

The government also forcefully controls all means of 

transmitting information in the country, including television, radio and print media, access to the Internet, and 

cellular and landline phone communication. The regime 

prevents North Koreans from learning about improved human rights developments in other countries, telling those 

outside their country about abuses of religious freedom and 

other human rights inside North Korea, and maintaining 

contact with co-religionists abroad. Possessing anti-state 

written materials, listening to foreign radio broadcasts, or 

altering radios so that they might receive foreign broadcasts 

constitute crimes punishable by long-term imprisonment, 

and international phone lines are available only under 

highly restricted circumstances. Cell phone use for the 

general population has been banned since 2004.

North Korean officials have stratified society on the basis of family background and perceived loyalty to the regime 

into 51 specific categories. Religious adherents are by definition relegated to a lower category, receiving fewer privileges 

and opportunities, such as education and employment, than 

others. An extensive report by Amnesty International in 2003 

details evidence that persons in lower categories have, in 

some cases, been forcibly relocated to remote and desolate 

areas of the country and then systematically denied access to 

food aid and therefore left to starve. 

As a result of the prolonged famine and the highly oppressive nature of the regime, an estimated 300,000 refugees 

have fled North Korea to China during the past eight years. 

With the easing of famine conditions, an estimated 50,000 

to 100,000 remain in China today. China, according to an 

agreement with North Korea, considers all of these refugees 

to be economic migrants who are subject to forcible repatriation. According to North Korean law, leaving the country is 

tantamount to treason and all returnees are subject to arrest 

and imprisonment, often accompanied by torture. According 

to refugee testimony, those determined to have migrated to 

avoid famine conditions are sometimes released after a short 

period of detention. However, within the last year, some 

reports indicate that repatriated North Koreans are facing 

harsher penalties upon their return, with increased numbers 

of first time returnees being sentenced to one to five years 

imprisonment, regardless of their reasons for fleeing North 

Korea. Anyone suspected of having contact with either South 

Korean humanitarian or religious organizations is reportedly 

extensively interrogated. Security forces try to determine 

if those repatriated have become adherents of Christianity 

or otherwise “contaminated” by their contact with South 

Koreans. Reports continue to emerge from those repatriated 

that security forces use torture during interrogation; anyone 

found to have had contact with Protestant or other religiously-based aid organizations in China is subject to long-term 

imprisonment in hard labor facilities designated for 

N o r t h ko r e a

Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal (second from right), moderating a panel 

session on human rights in North Korea at the Asia Society in New York, 

with Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Roberta Cohen (left), Republic 

of Korea National Assembly Member Chung Eui-yong and Japan’s Human 

Rights Ambassador Fumiko Saiga, May 2006.
130

political prisoners. The North Korean government also 

continues to offer rewards to its citizens for providing information that leads to the arrest of individuals suspected of 

involvement in cross-border missionary activities. 

The Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church opened in 

Pyongyang in August 2006. Two North Koreans are reportedly receiving Orthodox theological training in Moscow. 

There are also reportedly three Buddhist temples and a 

Chondokyist shrine in Pyongyang. Government officials 

have claimed that Buddhist temples are cultural relics that 

need to be preserved. There is a department of religion at 

Kim Il Sung University, but graduates and faculty are said to 

be involved in training security forces to identify repatriated 

refugees who may have become Christian adherents during 

their time in China. Many graduates also reportedly work 

with the officially sanctioned religious federations and 

interact with foreign religious visitors. 

In November 2004, the North Korea Human Rights 

Act was signed into law. The legislation cites Commission 

findings and includes provisions reflecting several Commission recommendations, including the appointment of a 

Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea. In August 

2005, President Bush appointed Jay Lefkowitz to this position. Commissioners met with Ambassador Lefkowitz in 

November 2005 to present its study, Thank You, Father Kim 

Il Sung, and to discuss USCIRF policy recommendations on 

religious freedom and human rights issues in North Korea. 

In the last year, the Commission continued to conduct 

activities in Washington, DC and elsewhere to raise public 

awareness of violations of religious freedom in the DPRK 

and to engage policy makers and Members of Congress in 

implementation of policy recommendations that would 

address these violations. In November 2005, the Commission 

released Thank You Father Kim Il Sung at a press conference 

with several Members of Congress. Commissioners and staff 

also briefed relevant policy makers at the National Security Council, the State Department, and in both Houses of 

Congress about the findings of the study. In March 2006, the 

Commission hosted, together with the American Enterprise 

Institute, a panel presentation entitled “Religious Freedom 

in North Korea: Update and Options,” at which David Hawk, 

lead researcher of the Commission’s study on North Korea, 

gave a presentation on the findings of the study, with commentary from other panelists. Then-Commission Chair 

Michael Cromartie presented opening remarks and Ambassador Lefkowitz gave a keynote address at the event.

In May 2006, in cooperation with the Asia Society and 

with Refugees International, the Commission co-hosted a 

conference in New York to discuss options for raising human 

rights concerns within the spectrum of security concerns 

involving the Korean Peninsula. Commissioner Preeta 

Bansal moderated a panel that discussed the key strategies 

and mechanisms needed to establish a broader security 

agenda for Northeast Asia that would include human rights 

concerns. The panel included presentations from Republic of 

Korea National Assembly Member Chung Eui-yong, Japan’s 

Human Rights Ambassador Fumiko Saiga, and Brookings 

Institution Senior Fellow Roberta Cohen. On an earlier panel 

focusing on human rights issues in North Korea, David Hawk 

offered a presentation on the Commission’s study.

Also in May 2006, the Commission hosted a briefing on 

Capitol Hill to discuss the situation of North Korean refugees in China. The briefing included statements from Kato 

Hiroshi, General Secretary of Life Funds for North Korean 

Refugees; Joel Charny, Vice President of Refugees International; and Marcus Nolan of the International Institute 

for Economics. The panelists discussed the struggles that 

North Korean refugees face in China, including trafficking in persons, fear of deportation, and recovery from the 

ordeals they faced while still inside the DPRK. Commission 

Executive Director Joseph Crapa served as a moderator. 

In July 2006, at a town hall meeting convened by 

Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York, the Commission released a Korean language version of its study, Thank 

You, Father Kim Il Sung. During the event, Congressman 

Ackerman moderated a panel that included presentations 

from Commission Chair Felice Gaer and David Hawk, lead 

researcher on the study. 

The Commission continues to receive

credible reports that underground 

religious activity, or that which takes place 

outside of government sanction and 

control, is growing, despite pervasive 

suppression by North Korea’s 

all-encompassing security apparatus. 
I

n addition to recommending 

that North Korea continue to be 

designated a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government 

should:

• use all diplomatic means to urge 

the North Korean government to 

undertake the following measures 

that would help bring the DPRK into 

compliance with its international 

legal obligations with respect to 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief:

• end the severe human rights 

violations, including imprisonment and execution on account 

of religion or belief, against 

individuals not affiliated with the 

state-sponsored religious federations or those North Koreans having contact with foreign religious 

groups in China;

• release prisoners from administrative detention in kwan-li-so

political penal labor colonies, 

such as those reported to be 

in certain villages in the “total 

control zone” at Camp No. 15 

(“Yodok”), as well as those who 

remain detained in other facilities 

for exercising their right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief and rehabilitate 

remaining religious adherents 

held in lifetime detention;

• end the coercive enforcement of 

the official ideology, Juche/Kimilsungism, that results in discrimination and other human rights 

violations against adherents of 

other religions or belief systems; 

• enable adherents of systems of 

thought and belief not covered by 

the existing federations, such as 

Confucianism, Shamanism, and 

other indigenous Korean belief 

systems, to practice their religion 

or belief without government 

interference and to form organizations for that purpose;

• implement the existing Constitutional provision allowing for the 

construction of places of worship outside the capital city of 

Pyongyang, including for religious 

groups who are not affiliated with 

the state-sponsored federations 

or for which there is no applicable 

federation;

• end prohibitions and punishments for importing religious 

literature from abroad;

• allow individuals and religious 

groups to engage in public expression of their religion or belief and 

to inform others of their belief 

systems; 

• allow religious groups to operate 

religious education programs for 

young persons and adults; 

• allow clergy or religious leaders to 

travel abroad for higher education 

and/or training, and allow the 

residence of foreign clergy where 

there are shortages; and

• distribute widely Korean language 

translations of and other information on the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties to 

which North Korea is a party.

• work with regional and European 

allies to fashion a comprehensive 

plan for security concerns on the 

Korean peninsula—modeled after 

the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and 

the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe—as suggested by the Commission and in 

Sec. 106 of the North Korean Human Rights Act and

• consider, with this model, expanding the Six-Party talks on 

nuclear security to include separate discussions on issues related 

to human rights and human security, using ongoing security negotiations to press North Korea for 

improvements in areas of mutual 

concern, including monitoring of 

humanitarian aid, resettlement 

of refugees, family reunifications, 

abductions, and other pressing 

human rights issues, including 

religious freedom; such discussions should proceed on both the 

bilateral and multilateral levels 

within the working group format 

of the Six Party Talks;

• ensure that the Special Envoy on 

Human Rights in North Korea, 

appointed by President Bush in 

accord with the Envoy’s mandate 

in the North Korea Human Rights 

Act of 2004, retains full authority 

to move forward on assistance to 

North Korean refugees, new human 

rights and democracy programming, and expanded public diplomacy programs;

• urge the Chinese government to uphold its international obligations to 

protect asylum seekers, by (1) working with the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR) to establish 

a mechanism to confer at least 

temporary asylum on those seeking 

such protection; (2) providing the 

ASIA

131

North Korea Commission Recommendations 
UNHCR with unrestricted access to 

interview North Korean nationals 

in China; and (3) ensuring that any 

migrants who are being returned 

pursuant to any bilateral agreement 

are not potential asylum seekers 

refouled in violation of China’s 

obligations under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

• in bilateral relations with China, 

Russia, Mongolia, and other countries in the region, place a higher 

priority on working to provide safe 

haven, secure transit, and clear 

resettlement procedures for North 

Koreans;

• promote further cooperation 

among the Department of State, the 

Department of Homeland Security, 

and regional allies, including South 

Korea, to facilitate more efficient 

resolution of remaining technical or 

legal issues that hinder programs for 

resettlement of North Koreans in the 

United States and other countries;

• urge the Chinese government to allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to North 

Koreans in China, to address growing social problems experienced by 

this vulnerable population;

• encourage nations with diplomatic relations with North Korea 

to include religious freedom and 

other human rights in their talks 

with North Korea, and to urge the 

North Korean government to invite 

UN Special Rapporteurs and other 

appropriate UN bodies to assess the 

human rights and humanitarian 

situation, to monitor the delivery 

of humanitarian assistance, and to 

recommend reforms and technical 

assistance programs; 

• continue to use appropriate international fora to condemn egregious 

human rights abuses in North Korea 

and seek protections and redress for 

victims, including by co-sponsoring 

of resolutions on North Korean human rights practices by appropriate 

UN bodies; and

• expand radio, television, Internet, 

and print information available to 

the North Korean people through:

• the expansion of appropriations 

to the Broadcasting Board of Governors earmarked to allow Radio 

Free Asia and Voice of America to 

increase shortwave and mediumwave broadcasting to North Korea 

to provide a total of 12 original 

hours of daily broadcasting; and 

• the funding of programs through 

the National Endowment for 

Democracy and the Department 

of State Human Rights and Democracy Fund that disseminate 

information on human rights, including religious freedom, inside 

North Korea in the form of written 

and electronic materials, DVDs, 

and digital programming.

In addition, the U.S. Congress 

should: 

• fund a regional task force involving prominent political, academic, 

religious, and other non-governmental experts from Asia and the United 

States to raise the public profile of 

North Korea’s human rights and human security concerns and to make 

recommendations to regional governments for establishing a permanent framework that addresses both 

human rights and other outstanding 

security and economic concerns on 

the Korean Peninsula;

• continue to appropriate funds authorized in the North Korea Human 

Rights Act for public diplomacy, 

refugee assistance, and democratization programs; 

• establish a congressional caucus to 

focus specifically on North Korean 

human rights and refugees and to 

explore new ideas for establishing 

an “Helsinki Option” for security 

talks on the Korean Peninsula; and 

• raise religious freedom and related human rights as a prominent 

concern in every Congressional or 

Congressional staff visit to North 

Korea and reiterate requests seeking 

access for international monitors to 

North Korean prisons as promised 

by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gyegwan to a visiting Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee delegation in 

August 2003. 

132

Military celebration for Kim II Sung
133

Pha That Luang Buddhist temple in Vientiane, Laos

Laos

The Commission removed Laos from its Watch List in 2005. 

In taking this action, the Commission cited the positive 

steps taken by the Lao government to address the religious 

freedom concerns expressed by the Commission and the 

international community. Most of these steps were taken in 

advance of Laos being granted Permanent Normal Trade 

Relations (PNTR) with the United States in October 2005. 

Religious freedom conditions are improved relative to the 

past and some positive developments continue, particularly 

in urban areas and among the majority Buddhist population. 

However, Laos’ respect for religious freedom continues to 

be marred by problems at the provincial level, especially for 

ethnic and religious minorities. The Commission remains 

concerned that the Lao government appears unable or 

unwilling to curtail the actions of provincial authorities. In 

view of the Lao government’s continued poor overall human 

rights record, past religious freedom abuses could re-emerge, 

so the Commission continues to monitor closely the actions 

of the Lao government with regard to religious freedom to 

determine if a return to the Watch List is warranted. 

Since the end of 2002, religious groups, particularly in 

the largest cities and districts of Laos, have reported steadily 

improving religious freedom conditions, including a better 

relationship with the Lao government. The government 

continues to monitor the activities of some religious groups, 

including Protestants, Baha’is, Catholics, and some Muslims; however, in major urban areas, religious leaders report 

few restrictions on their worship activities. In addition, the 

government has allowed them to re-open, build, and/or 

expand new places of worship and carry out charitable work 

in recent years. During the past year, the government has 

allowed the ordination of two new Catholic priests, the first 

such ordinations in 30 years. The government also allowed 

the building of a Catholic church in the northern province of 

Sayaboury and provided the Bishop of Luang Prabang more 

freedom to visit Catholics in the northern provinces, areas 

where both Protestant and Catholic religious practices were 

once severely restricted. Four new Protestant churches were

built in the former Saisomboun Special Zone and Bolikhamsai Province. Vientiane Province authorities also permitted 

the Lao Evangelical Church to rebuild a destroyed church in 

Phone Ngam Village. 

The government remains wary, however, of religious 

traditions other than Theravada Buddhism, particularly 

of various forms of Protestantism popular among ethnic 

minority groups. Theravada Buddhism, which is closely 

associated with Lao culture, is generally exempt from the 

restrictions and oversight experienced by other religious 

groups. Increasingly, Buddhist rituals and ceremony are 

being incorporated into state functions and Buddhism is 

sometimes promoted by government officials. The rapid 

growth of Protestantism in the last decade and contacts 

between its adherents and co-religionists abroad have 

made many Communist government officials suspicious. 

However, there continue to be reports that the Lao Front for 

National Construction (LFNC), the agency that oversees religious policy and regulates religious activities, has publicly 

called for greater religious reconciliation and tolerance. The 

LFNC continued to train local officials on religious tolerance and has met with provincial and village-level officials 

to promote better understanding of Protestantism. 

Nevertheless, troubling reports persist that provincial 

and village-level officials harass individuals, confiscate 

property, and detain and arrest persons for participating in religious activities. In the past year, at least five Lao 

Christians were detained for several days after attempting 

to bring Bibles into the country at the Lao-Thai Friendship 

Bridge. A Protestant in Salavan Province has been under 

house arrest since April 2006 for refusing to renounce 

his religious belief. In late 2005, authorities in the Muang 

Phin District of Savannakhet Province detained 24 ethnic 

Brou Protestants for several days in order to force them to 

renounce their religion. All but two of the men recanted 

their faith. These two men were imprisoned for approximately one year, but were reportedly released in early 

2006. In December 2005, a group of 27 ethnic Hmong 
134

Protestants were detained in Bolikhamsai Province. The 

group was detained after being repatriated from Thailand. 

Reports indicate that the 27 were detained in part because 

of their religious affiliation. In the period 2003–2004 Lao 

authorities released all but two of the religious prisoners 

known to be incarcerated at the time, but the State Department estimates that there are currently 30 prisoners held for 

reasons related to their religious belief or practice, a figure 

that includes the 27 ethnic Hmong mentioned above. 

Between 1999 and 2002, the State Department 

reported that campaigns of coerced renunciation of faith 

occurred in nearly every Lao province. These reports 

have diminished significantly over the past several years. 

However, reports persist that local officials in Oudomasai, 

Salavan, and Bolikhamsai provinces pressured minority 

Protestants to renounce their religion on threat of arrest or 

forceful eviction from their villages. In April 2006, officials 

in Salavan Province reportedly arrested a village leader and 

expelled two families for refusing to renounce their religion. 

In early 2006, a village chief reportedly confiscated land 

belonging to Protestant families in Oudomsai Province after 

they refused to give up their beliefs. In this case, however, 

there are reports from Lao Protestant leaders that the land 

confiscation issue was resolved. In addition, in February 

2005, local authorities expelled ethnic Khmu Protestants 

from the Ban Kok Pho village in Bolikhamsai Province. 

Another ongoing concern of the Commission is the 

potential for restrictions and other abuses through Decree 

92, the Lao government’s 2002 decree on religious activities. 

During its visit to Laos in February 2002, the Commission was 

assured that passage of the decree would improve religious 

freedom in Laos by legalizing religious activities, protecting 

the religious practices of ethnic minorities, and providing 

guidelines to local and provincial officials to ensure that 

abuses by those officials would cease. Decree 92 legitimized 

activities previously regarded as illegal, such as public 

religious persuasion, printing religious material, owning and 

building places of worship, and maintaining contact with 

overseas religious groups. Lao religious leaders report that 

these provisions have proved to be positive elements of the 

law. There also continue to be credible reports that the LFNC 

uses Decree 92 to facilitate religious practice in some areas 

and to promote cooperation among religious communities. 

Nevertheless, through Decree 92, the Lao government 

continues to provide government officials with a potential legal basis for control of, and interference in, religious 

activities. For example, the government remains able to 

impose restrictions on religious activities through an approval process that has become increasingly burdensome 

on religious groups. The government requires most religious groups, with the exception of the Buddhists, to report 

their activities to the LFNC. According to some religious 

leaders, the government now requires that these reports be 

submitted every quarter, with detailed lists of the group’s 

present and future activities. Religious leaders in Laos also 

claim that there continue to be restrictions on the publication of religious materials, despite provisions in Decree 

92. In addition, many religious activities can be conducted 

only with government approval, and the decree contains 

vague national security provisions that prohibit activities 

that create “social division” or “chaos,” reiterating Article 9 

of the Lao Constitution and Article 66 of the criminal code, 

used in the past by government officials to arrest and detain 

arbitrarily ethnic minority Christians. Thus, Decree 92 can 

be used to restrict and suppress religious activities, rather 

than protect and promote the freedom of religion or belief. 

In practice, the government continues to oversee religious 

practice and asserts its right to direct religious practice 

toward serving the national interest. This has led local and 

provincial leaders to intervene in the activities of ethnic 

minority Protestants whom they perceive as disloyal and 

potentially dangerous. The Commission will continue to 

monitor how the decree is implemented and whether the 

central government has made progress in controlling the 

alleged abusive acts of local officials. 

Buddhist monks in Luang Prabang, Laos
I

n the past year, the Commission 

and its staff have met with Lao 

government officials and religious 

leaders, domestic and international 

human rights activists, academics and 

other experts on Laos. The Commission traveled to Laos and issued a 

report on its findings in February 2003. 

With regard to Laos, the Commission 

has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• make clear to the government of 

Laos that continued improvements 

in the protection of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief is essential to further 

improvements in and expansion of 

U.S.-Laos relations, and urge Lao 

officials to:

• ratify the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights and 

invite the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and other relevant UN mechanisms to visit the country; 

• release all individuals arrested 

and detained in part because of 

their religious belief and practice, 

including at least 30 ethnic minority Protestants;

• halt any harassment and detention of persons on account of their 

religion by local government officials and hold any such officials 

responsible for violations of the 

religious freedom of Lao citizens, 

particularly in such provinces 

as Oudomasai, Salavan, and Bolikhamsai, and Savannakhet;

• criminalize forced renunciations 

of faith by passing a law in the 

National Assembly providing for 

specific penalties for those who 

carry out such practices;

• repeal or amend Article 66 of 

the Lao Criminal Code so that it 

cannot be used to arrest or detain 

individuals for engaging in religious activities that are protected 

by the Lao Constitution and under 

international law;

• amend those elements of Decree 

92 on religious activities that are 

inconsistent with international 

human rights law; 

• respect and fully implement 

the freedom of individuals and 

organizations to engage in social, 

humanitarian, and charitable 

activities, free from undue government interference; and

• provide access to all parts of Laos 

by foreign diplomats, humanitarian organizations, and international human rights and religious 

organizations, in particular, to Savannakhet, Oudomasai, Salavan, 

Bolikhamsai, and Saisomboune 

Special Zone; 

• establish measurable goals and 

benchmarks, in addition to those 

listed above, for further human 

rights progress in Laos as a guide for 

diplomatic engagement between 

Laos and the United States or for 

initiating a formal human rights 

dialogue with the government of 

Laos, addressing such human rights 

issues as ethnic and religious discrimination, torture and other forms 

of ill-treatment in prisons, unlawful 

arrest and detention, the absence 

of due process, and practical steps 

to ensure the right to freedom of expression, association, and assembly; 

• expand Lao language broadcasts 

on Voice of America (VOA) and 

Radio Free Asia (RFA) while ensuring that the content of the Lao 

language broadcasts on VOA and 

RFA includes adequate information 

about the importance of human 

rights, including religious freedom, 

within Laos; and

• initiate and expand technical assistance and human rights programs 

that support the goals of protecting 

and promoting religious freedom, 

including: 

• rule of law programs that provide 

assistance in amending, drafting, and implementing laws and 

regulations; 

• human rights and religious 

freedom training programs for 

specific sectors of Lao society, 

including government officials, 

religious leaders, academics, lawyers, police, and representatives of 

international non-governmental 

organizations; 

• training, networking, and capacity-building for Lao groups that 

carry out charitable, medical, and 

development activities; 

• educational initiatives to combat 

intolerance of religious and ethnic 

minorities and to promote human 

rights education; and 

• the expansion of the number and 

funding of educational, academic, 

government, and private exchange programs with Laos that 

will bring a wide cross-section of 

Lao society to the United States. 

135

LAoS Commission Recommendations 
136

Vietnam

Since Vietnam was named a “country of particular concern” (CPC) in 2004, Vietnam and the United States have 

engaged diplomatically to address a number of religious 

freedom concerns. In the process, conditions for many 

religious communities have improved in some respects, as 

Vietnam has expanded the zone of permissible religious 

activity and issued new administrative ordinances and 

decrees that outlined registration procedures and outlawed 

forced renunciations of faith. In addition, Vietnam has also 

granted early release to specific prisoners whose cases were 

presented by the United States. These advances were cited 

by the State Department in November 2006 when it lifted 

the CPC designation. 

The Commission has noted this progress in Vietnam, 

but has concluded that these improvements were insufficient to warrant lifting the CPC designation. This conclusion 

was reached because it was too soon to determine if legal 

protections would be permanent and whether such progress 

would last beyond Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade 

Organization. In addition, the Commission’s view was that 

lifting the CPC designation potentially removed a positive 

diplomatic tool that had proved to be an effective incentive 

to bilateral engagement on religious freedom and related 

human rights.

In the last year, there have been arrests and short-term 

detentions of individuals because of their religious activity. 

There were also reports of individuals threatened unless 

they renounced their religious affiliations, and new legal 

regulations were used, in some cases, to restrict religious 

freedom. Targeted in particular were religious leaders and 

individuals associated with ethnic minority Protestants, 

Hoa Hao Buddhists, Vietnamese Mennonites, Khmer Krom 

Buddhists, and monks and nuns of the government-banned 

Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV). In addition, since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), 

the government of Vietnam has initiated a crackdown on 

human rights defenders and advocates for the freedoms 

of speech, association, and assembly, including many religious leaders who previously were the leading advocates for 

religious freedom in Vietnam. Given the recent deterioration of human rights conditions in Vietnam and because of 

continued abuses of and restrictions on religious freedom, 

the Commission recommends that Vietnam be re-designated as a CPC in 2007.

Since November 2006, Vietnam has received a state 

visit from President Bush, was granted Permanent Normal 

Trade Relations (PNTR) with the United States, had the CPC 

designation lifted, and joined the WTO. However, since January 2007, Vietnam has carried out a wide-ranging crackdown 

on individuals associated with human rights, democracy, 

legal reform, labor, and free speech organizations. Among 

the first arrested were Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and lawyer Nguyen 

Van Dai, two well-known advocates for religious freedom 

and legal reform in Vietnam. Previously, Father Ly had been 

arrested in 2001 and sentenced to 15 years in prison after 

submitting written testimony to the Commission. After 

Father Ly was granted early release in 2005, he founded the 

Vietnam Progression Party, became an editor of “Freedom 

of Speech” magazine, and helped organize the Block 8406 

democracy movement, which began in April 2006 when 

hundreds of people signed public petitions calling for greater 

democracy and human rights, including religious freedom, 

in Vietnam. On April 2, 2007, Fr. Ly and several associates 
137

were sentenced under Article 88 of Vietnamese criminal 

code for “propagandizing against the state.” Fr. Ly received a 

sentence of eight years in prison and five years house arrest. 

Nguyen Van Dai, one of Vietnam’s few human rights lawyers, 

was arrested in Hanoi in March 2007. Lawyer Dai defended 

individuals arrested for their religious activities; he is also the 

co-founder of the Committee for Human Rights in Vietnam 

and one of the principal organizers of Block 8406. He is 

currently awaiting trial. Some of the public charges leveled 

against Fr. Ly and Lawyer Dai are related to their religious 

freedom activities. In Family and Society newspaper, Fr. Ly is 

described as “joining hands with black forces and reactionary elements to build a force under the cover of freedom of 

religion activities.” In the online publication of the Ministry 

of Public Security entitled Law and Order, Dai is accused of 

collecting “evidence of Vietnam’s religious persecution” to 

send to “enemy powers and overseas reactionaries.”1

Religious leaders and religiously-motivated dissidents 

like Fr. Ly and Nguyen Van Dai have fought for religious 

freedom in Vietnam and have become leaders in the fight 

for legal reforms and human rights. The step from advocating for religious freedom to peacefully advocating for 

legal and political reforms and the freedoms of speech, 

assembly, and association was a small one for many of the 

leaders of Vietnam’s dissident community. They contend 

that freedom of religion or belief is intimately connected 

to other human rights and that religious freedom cannot 

be fully protected without legal and some political reform. 

Vietnam’s recent wave of harassments, arrests, and criminal 

prosecutions are a direct challenge to the positive trajectory of U.S.-Vietnamese relations. They also endanger all of 

Vietnam’s human rights advocates and call into question 

the Vietnamese government’s commitment to protect and 

advance religious freedom over the long term.

In the 18 months leading to President Bush’s visit 

in November 2006, however, Vietnam made progress in 

addressing some of the longstanding religious freedom 

concerns. In May 2005, the State Department announced 

it had reached an agreement with Vietnam on benchmarks 

to demonstrate an improvement in religious freedom 

conditions. Under the agreement, the Vietnamese government committed to: 1) implement fully the new legislation 

on religious freedom and render previous contradictory 

regulations obsolete; 2) instruct local authorities strictly 

and completely to adhere to the new legislation and ensure 

compliance; 3) facilitate the process by which religious congregations can open houses of worship; and 4) give special 

consideration to prisoners and cases of concern raised by 

the United States during the granting of prisoner amnesties. 

The U.S. government agreed to consider taking Vietnam off 

the CPC list if these conditions were met. 

Following the signing of the agreement, the United 

States and Vietnam held productive diplomatic discussions 

leading to noticeable improvements in law and practice 

for many Vietnamese religious groups and a decline in the 

overall number and frequency of forced renunciations of 

faith, imprisonments, and torture. Vietnamese Catholics 

and Buddhists associated with the government-sanctioned 

Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha (VBS) report that they experience few restrictions in conducting worship activities and 

the number of religious adherents of these communities 

continues to grow. The government has also gradually eased 

restrictions on the Catholic Church. In the past year, the government approved a new bishop for the newly created Ba Ria 

Vung Tau Diocese, allowed additional priests to be ordained, 

approved the establishment of a new seminary, and permitted several local dioceses to conduct religious education 

classes for minors and some charitable activities. In addition, 

Hanoi continues to discuss with the Holy See conditions for 

the normalization of relations, discussions that included a 

v i etn a m

Pha That Luang Buddhist temple in Vientiane, Laos

1

 Other human rights advocates who have been temporarily detained, interrogated, beaten, arrested, or had warrants issued for their arrest since January 2007 include Fr. Chun 

Tin and Fr Phan Van Loi, Mennonite Pastors Nguyen Quang, Nguyen Cong Chinh, and Tran Van Hoa, Catholic seminary professor Nguyen Chinh Ket, and lawyers Li Thi Cong 

Nhan and Le Quoc Quan.
138

meeting between Pope Benedict XVI and Prime Minister 

Nguyen Tan Dung at the Vatican and a corresponding visit of 

a high-level Vatican delegation to Vietnam in February 2007. 

Vietnam also issued several decrees and ordinances 

that outlawed forced recantations of religion and provided 

new guidelines to help ease the process of registration. Over 

the past year, the government has extended some form of 

legal recognition or permission to a diverse and growing 

number of religious communities and individual congregations, including the United Christian Mission Church of Danang, the Baha’is, Seventh-Day Adventists, and individual 

churches in Ho Chi Minh City, including Grace Baptist, the 

Mennonite Church of Pastor Nguyen Trung, and a reported 

91 individual “house churches.” The government has also 

allowed hundreds of previously closed churches and meeting points to open and operate in the Central Highlands 

and northwest provinces, though only an estimated 25 

percent of these churches have gained some form of legal 

recognition or permission to operate. Religious leaders 

from Protestants groups in urban areas report that disruptions of their activities occur less frequently than in the past 

and they are allowed to conduct some large-scale meetings 

and religious education classes. The government has also 

granted, for the first time, permission to print Bibles in two 

ethnic minority languages. In addition, Vietnam continued 

to grant early release of individuals incarcerated for their 

religious activities, including Brother Nguyen Thien Phung, 

a member of the order of Mother Co-Redemptrix, Ma Van 

Bay, a leader of the Hmong Protestant community, and 

Y’ Oal Nie, a Protestant leader of the Ede ethnic minority. Finally, the Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA), the 

government organization that oversees the regulation of 

religious affairs, has held at least three meetings to explain 

the new laws to religious leaders, and there are some 

reports of training for local CRA officials as well. These are 

important and positive steps, and most were taken in the 

months immediately preceding Vietnam’s WTO accession.

Despite these positive developments and a corresponding decline in the intensity of religious freedom abuses in 

Vietnam, the government continues to maintain overall 

control of religious organizations and restricts their activities and growth through a pervasive security apparatus and 

the process of recognition and registration. Unregistered 

religious activity is illegal and legal protections for government-approved religious organizations are both vague and 

subject to arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations based 

on political factors.

The Vietnamese government continues to remain 

suspicious of ethnic minority religious groups, such as 

Montagnard and Hmong Protestants and Khmer Buddhists; those who seek to establish independent religious 

organizations, such as the UBCV, Hao Hoa, and Cao Dai; 

and those it considers to pose a threat to national solidarity 

or security, such as “Dega” Protestants and individual Mennonite, Catholic, Buddhist, and house church Protestant 

leaders. In addition, Vietnam’s new ordinances and decrees 

on religion continue to require that religious groups seek 

advance permission for most religious activity and ban any 

religious activity deemed to cause public disorder or “sow 

divisions.” In some cases, the new laws are being used to 

restrict, rather than promote, religious freedom. 

In the past year, Vietnamese security forces detained, 

interrogated, arrested, imprisoned, beat, harassed, or 

threatened adherents from many of Vietnam’s diverse religious communities. In January 2007, security forces briefly 

detained the congregation and tore down part of the church 

structure of Pastor Nguyen Quang in Ho Chi Minh City. Pastor Quang had previously been arrested in 2004, along with 

five other members of his congregation. In February 2007, 

security forces reportedly beat Mennonite pastor Nguyen 

Cong Chinh in Kontum. In June and July 2006, police beat 

two men and two women from an unregistered Protestant 

church in Thanh Hoa Province, after a dispute erupted over 

the home used by the congregation as a place of worship. 

There are reports that security officials were punished for 

the June incident, although another member of the Thanh 

Hoa congregation was beaten in October 2006 when he 

refused police orders to leave a prayer meeting. In September 2006, Protestant pastor Tran Van Hoa was arrested and 

detained for two weeks. In addition, security officials closed 

down Christmas celebration services in a Baptist church 

in Haiphong, Bac Giang province. In Quang Ngai province, 

In the past year, Vietnamese security 

forces detained, interrogated, arrested, 

imprisoned, beat, harassed, or threatened 

adherents from many of Vietnam’s 

diverse religious communities. 
139

security officials reportedly told ethnic Hre Protestants that 

“unless they behave,” their churches would be destroyed 

and leaders arrested “once APEC [the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting] is over.” In June 2005, 

police detained 17 ethnic Hre Protestants. When community members refused to cease their religious activities, their 

homes and rice fields were burned and land confiscated.

Relations between ethnic minority residents and 

government officials in the Central Highlands remain tense 

and there continue to be reports of a large and intrusive security presence in the region. In 2001 and 2004, over 45,000 

people demonstrated for religious freedom and land rights 

in Gai Lai, Dak Lak, and Dak Nong provinces. Numerous 

eyewitnesses report that the 2004 demonstrations were disrupted by attacks on protestors by security forces and hired 

proxies. There are credible reports of severe violence occurring in Dak Lak province, including the deaths of at least 

10 demonstrators. No public investigation or accounting of 

police action during the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations has 

occurred. Since the demonstrations, however, Vietnamese 

officials imprisoned those believed to have organized the 

protests, as well as others suspected of taking part, or those 

who sought asylum in Cambodia. Vietnamese security 

officials have also pursued Montagnards into Cambodia to 

stop the flow of asylum seekers. Montagnard villages and 

communes remain under tight control, and no international observer has been allowed unobstructed access to 

the region, though diplomats have occasionally visited. 

However, in the last year, the Vietnamese government has relaxed some restrictions on ethnic minority 

Protestants associated with the Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam, South (SECV), particularly in Gai Lai province. 

The government has allowed a reported 80 churches in the 

Central Highlands to register legally with the SECV. Several 

hundred more have been given de facto or official permission to operate. Religious leaders in the Central Highlands 

claim that nearly 800 of the 1,250 churches and meeting 

points closed since 2001 have been re-opened. However, 

outside of Gai Lai province, there remain severe restrictions 

on the activities of religious groups and believers. In the 

last year, Human Rights Watch (HRW) conducted extensive 

interviews with Montagnard Protestants and concluded 

that they face severe restrictions on religious practice and 

association. Most repression targeted Protestants who refused to join the SECV or those suspected of affiliating with 

the banned Tin Lanh Dega (Dega Protestant Church).

The Vietnamese government has forcibly repressed 

remnants of the Tin Lahn Dega, which it views as a subversive institution combining religion and advocacy of political autonomy. A recent study commissioned by the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees found that few self-identified adherents of Tin Lanh Dega sought any type of political 

autonomy. Most sought “enhancement of their human 

rights position” and the “need to gather in independent Tin 

Lahn Dega church communities” separate from what they 

viewed as the Vietnamese-led SECV. Even those Tin Lanh 

Dega leaders who expressed a desire for greater political 

autonomy sought to advance this position peacefully. 

Nevertheless, to suppress Tin Lanh Dega activity or 

sympathy with the group, security officials in Dak Nong, 

Dak Lak, and parts of Gai Lai and Kontum provinces have 

engaged in severe violations of religious freedom and 

related human rights. HRW found that police do not allow 

people to gather for worship, often live in the homes of 

known religious leaders, constantly monitor and interrogate religious leaders, and arrest and detain those found 

meeting clandestinely for prayer. In addition, police also 

use a variety of methods to “refer” suspected Dega Protestants to join the SECV. In February and March 2006, 

police in Gai Lai province reportedly detained individuals 

from several Tin Lahn Dega congregations in an attempt 

to force them to join the government-approved religious 

organization. Police asked those detained whether they 

would remain “political” or whether they would follow the 

“Christianity of [the Prime Minister].” Those who refused to 

cease their religious activity were beaten and later released. 

Others were pressured to sign pledges agreeing to “abandon Christianity and politics.” 

v i etn a m

A river on the Mekong Delta
140

Only isolated cases of forced renunciations have 

occurred in the Central Highland since the practice was 

outlawed in a February 2005 decree. However, the practice 

still occurs in places and has taken on different forms. In 

September 2006, a pastor in Dak Nong province reported 

that the deputy chairman of Dak Mil District accused him 

and his church of “anti-government activities” for not 

participating in required Sunday buffalo sacrifices. There 

were other instances of fines, police “summons,” short-term 

detentions, or threats of withholding government benefits used to induce individuals to abandon their religion, 

including 30 ethnic minority Protestants in Coastal Ninh 

Thuan Province. 

Over the past year, even members of the governmentapproved SECV have been subjected to arrest, beatings, 

and other restrictions. According to the State Department, 

“one-third” of the SECV churches in Dak Lak Province that 

were closed in 2001 face severe restrictions on their activities. 

Police regularly prevent people from gathering and break up 

meetings, halting religious activity in as many as 100 congregations. In Say Thay, Kontum province, district officials 

told visiting State Department diplomats that “no religion” 

existed in the area and refused to provide details about the 

alleged beatings of two ethnic minority Dzao Protestants 

leaders. In July 2006, police in Dak Nong province arrested 

and reportedly mistreated 10 ethnic minority M’Nong 

Protestants and accused them of “participating in American 

Protestantism” and “anti-government activities.” Six were 

detained for between three and six months. At this time, four 

remain incarcerated pursuant to vague national security and 

national solidarity provisions of the legal code. Religious 

leaders from Dak Nong report that most of those arrested 

were young people holding unauthorized prayer meetings 

outside of a recognized religious venue and for possessing cell phones. Since November 2006, religious leaders in 

the Central Highlands have reported that progress made 

in the previous year has stalled, new legal registrations and 

recognitions have stopped, officials are refusing to approve 

building permits, and the authorities have not renewed permission to hold additional theology classes. 

Hmong Protestants in the northwest provinces continue to experience restrictions and abuses. Since 2001, 

the government has conducted campaigns of harassment, 

detentions, beatings, monitoring, and forced renunciations 

of faith among Hmong Protestants, including in the 2002- 

2003 beating death of at least two pastors and the forcing 

underground of hundreds of churches and meetings points. 

The Vietnamese government has long connected the 

growth of Hmong Protestantism with the “receive the king” 

tradition of Hmong culture. This tradition was interpreted 

as a harbinger of political secession, requiring a security 

response from the government. 

Leaders from the Evangelical Church of Vietnam, 

North (ECVN) reported to the Commission in April 2006 

that police continue to beat and threaten Hmong Protestants in Dien Bien Province in order to get them to 

renounce Christianity. This is consistent with reports that 

police have forced Hmong Protestants to take part in selfcriticism sessions or sign written renunciation pledges. For 

example, in May 2005, police in Dien Bien province issued 

at least 21 “re-education” summons to local Hmong Protestants. At the time, religious believers were threatened with 

beatings, loss of government services, or fines if they did 

not give up their religious beliefs. Also in Muong Lay district, Dien Bien province, police forced several Protestants 

to construct traditional animistic altars in their homes and 

A pagoda in Hanoi
141

to sign documents renouncing Protestantism. In Ha Giang 

province in November 2005, police forced an ethnic minority Protestant pastor to sign a pledge to renounce his faith 

and cease religious activities after his congregation sought 

to register legally with the government approved ECVN. 

At the same time, four Hmong Protestants in Hoang Su 

Phi district, Ha Giang province were pressured unsuccessfully by border guards to sign documents renouncing their 

faith. In January 2007, security officials threatened to freeze 

the bank account of a Protestant leader in Muong Khong 

district, Dien Bien province unless he either left the district 

or renounced his faith. In some of the cases just mentioned, 

Hmong Protestants are refusing to abandon their religious 

traditions or are ignoring threats and fines. There are no 

reports, however, that security officials are being punished 

for these actions, which have been illegal since the February 2005 decree prohibiting forced renunciation of faith.

Hmong Protestants have also been harassed and 

detained for carrying Protestant literature and training 

materials and for providing researchers with information 

about religious freedom conditions. In Muon Nhe district, 

Dien Bien province, a “house church deacon” was detained 

after he returned from Hanoi carrying church documents 

and applications for registration. Since that time, there are 

reports that a special task force of security personnel has 

been living in the district to monitor activities of Hmong 

Protestants there. Two Protestant leaders from Lao Cai 

province were detained for two weeks and fined because 

they traveled to Hanoi to acquire registration applications 

forms from ECVN leaders. In January 2007, four Protestants 

from Tuyen Quang province were arrested for transporting 115 Christian books and training materials. They were 

released after a week and fined $1,000 (approximately five 

years’ wages). Police have threatened to charge the village 

chief of Muong Nhe district, Dien Bien province, with national security crimes for sending to researchers documents 

about government attempts to “prohibit Christian practice” 

in the northwest provinces. In 2002 – 2004, police in Dien 

Bien province beat to death Protestant leader Mu Bua Sehn, 

imprisoned his brother Mua Say So, for seeking to bring 

those responsible to account, and severely beat elder Lau 

Vang Mua for continuing to conduct religious activities in 

the district despite their orders to stop. Mua left Vietnam 

for Laos with 19 Protestant families. In December 2006, 

Vietnamese police arrested Mua and his brother in Laos 

and took them back to Dien Bien province. Mua’s brother 

was released, but there remains no word on the conditions 

or charges Mua faces.

The Vietnamese government is beginning to allow 

Hmong Protestants to organize and, according to the State 

Department, conduct religious activity in homes and “during the daytime.” In the last year, the government has given 

an estimated 30 churches official permission to conduct 

religious activity as a pilot project. An estimated 1,000 other 

religious communities in the northwest provinces are seeking affiliation with the ECVN. At this time, 532 religious 

venues have applied for registration. Though required by law 

to respond to such application in a timely manner, Vietnamese government officials have denied or ignored all of these 

applications. ECVN officials were told that they should not 

expect approval of new registration applications this year. 

ECVN leaders who have visited those churches given 

legal permission to operate are concerned about the way 

local authorities are interpreting the new laws on religion. 

In a survey of current conditions, Hmong religious leaders report that security officials regularly attend religious 

services and check church membership lists and force 

anyone not on the list to leave. In some locations, security 

officials reportedly bar anyone under the age of 14 from attending services, ban mid-week meetings and programs for 

children and young people, and have insisted that religious 

leaders be chosen under their supervision. Such restrictions may be directly related to a handbook published by 

the Committee on Religious Affairs in Hanoi to train local 

officials how to manage religious affairs. Though the handbook recognizes that “some” Hmong have a “genuine need” 

for religion, it instructs officials to manage tightly religious 

communities and to restrict their growth. The most troubling aspect of the handbook is its advisory that officials 

take active measures to “resolutely subdue” new religious 

growth, to “mobilize and persuade” new converts to return 

to their traditional Hmong religions, and to be vigilant 

against anyone who “abuses religion” to undermine “the 

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Buddhists throughout Vietnam 

have become increasingly vocal about past 

and current religious freedom abuses. 
142

revolution.” On the one hand, the handbook is important 

because it finally recognizes the legitimacy of some Hmong 

Protestant religious activity. However, it also indicates that 

the Vietnamese government will continue strictly to control 

and manage religious growth, label anyone who seeks to 

propagate Protestantism in the northwest provinces as 

a national security threat, and use unspecified tactics to 

get new converts to renounce Protestantism. In this case, 

the government is using law to restrict rather than protect 

religious freedom.

Significant pressure remains on leaders, monks, and 

nuns associated with the UBCV. UBCV leaders Thich Quang 

Do and Thich Huyen Quang are still restricted in their 

contacts and movement. Western diplomats and high-level 

Vietnamese officials have met with both leaders in the last 

year, and Thich Huyen Quang was allowed to seek needed 

medical treatment. However, at least 11 other senior UBCV 

monks remain under some form of administration probation or “pagoda arrest.” Charges issued in October 2004 

against UBCV leaders for “possessing state secrets” have 

not been rescinded. Repression of the UBCV is not entirely 

focused on its leadership, but also on local attempts to 

organize “provincial committees” and the “UBCV Buddhist 

Youth Movement.” Police reportedly detain and interrogate 

monks suspected of organizing these activities in Quang 

Nam-Danang, Thua Thien-Hue, Binh Dinh, Dong Nai, and 

Bac Lieu provinces. In August and September 2005, monks 

were detained in these provinces and ordered to withdraw 

their names from the committees and cease all connections with the UBCV. In the last year, police have briefly 

detained monks attending a youth conference in Hue and 

have subjected the organizers of the conference to constant 

interrogations and harassment. There are reports that the 

UBCV’s national youth leader, Le Cong Cau, is being held in 

virtual house arrest. Former religious prisoner Thich Thien 

Minh continues to face constant harassment and local 

officials in March 2007 reportedly tore down the pagoda in 

which he was living. The next day he was presented with 

a “police order” accusing him of “activities opposing the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” In addition, Thich Thien 

Minh was ordered to renounce his position as UBCV Youth 

Commissioner, cease all contacts with the outlawed UBCV 

leadership and disband operation of the Former Political 

and Religious Prisoners Association which the authorities 

consider an “illegal organization.”

Vietnamese authorities continue to threaten and 

detain monks, adherents of UBCV affiliated monasteries, 

and others seeking to meet UBCV leaders. In December 

2005, reports emerged that UBCV nun Thich Nu Thong Man 

was subject to a “denunciation campaign” and expulsion 

order by provincial authorities in Khanh Hoa province. 

Police threatened local villagers with the loss of jobs and 

government services unless they publicly denounced the 

nun and asked provincial authorities to have her expelled 

from the local monastery. In January 2007, security officials 

from Binh Dinh province issued orders prohibiting future 

religious gatherings at the Thap Thap Monastery, reportedly 

threatening that local Buddhists would lose their jobs or 

their children expelled from school if they did not obey. In 

March 2007, police detained Therese Jebsen of the Norwegian Rafto Foundation as she tried to visit Thich Quang Do 

to present him with the foundation’s annual award.

Buddhists throughout Vietnam have become increasingly vocal about past and current religious freedom 

abuses. Since 2003, local Buddhists in Bac Gian province 

issued multiple petitions to protest the arrest and torture 

of eight Buddhists, including the beating death of monk 

Thich Duc Chinh. In July 2006, an appeals court ordered the 

temporary release of the eight citing the “lack of evidence” 

against them. Nonetheless, 50 monks and nuns from the 

government-recognized VBS demonstrated for their complete acquittal and to demand that those responsible for the 

monk’s death be held accountable. In Soc Triang province, 

there are also multiple reports of large scale demonstrations against the defrocking and arrest of several ethnic 

Khmer Buddhist monks. The monks who were arrested 

reportedly conducted their own peaceful protest over 

longstanding restrictions placed on the religious, cultural, 

and language traditions of the Khmer ethnic minority. 

In response, police have expanded arrests, harassment, 

and restrictions on Khmer Buddhist religious activity. As 

Theravada Buddhists, the Khmer have distinct ethnic and 

religious traditions from the dominant Mahayana tradition 

of the VBS. Some Khmer Buddhists have called for a separate religious organization from the VBS. The situation of 

the Khmer Buddhist will require additional monitoring, as 

information from that remote region is difficult to confirm. 

U.S. Ambassador Michael Marine stated in September 

2006 that there are “no longer any prisoners of concern” 

in Vietnam. Yet, at least 10 Hoa Hao followers remain in 

prison, in part for their role in organizing protests over the 
government’s harassment of their fellowship in An Giang 

province and also over the arrest of monk Vo Van Thanh 

Liem, who was arrested partly for submitting written statements to a U.S. congressional hearing on human rights in 

Vietnam. The Vietnamese government continues to ban 

participation in unregistered Hoa Hao groups, many of 

whom refuse to join the officially-approved organization 

because of the government’s role in selecting the leadership 

of that organization. Also incarcerated are Hmong Protestants Mua Say So, Lau Vang Mua, Cao Dai Hong Thien 

Hanh, and Hoa Hao Bui Tan Nha. There are also at least 

four ethnic M’Nong Protestants incarcerated in Dak Nong 

province. In addition, according to the State Department, 

Vietnam continues to hold at least 13 individuals under 

house arrest, including the UBCV leadership and Fr. Phan 

Van Loi of Hue.

In addition to more recent cases, there remain credible 

reports of religious leaders and individuals being held in 

long-term detention and re-education camps. In May 2006, 

UBCV monk Thich Thien Minh published a list of 62 “prisoners of conscience” held at the Z30A re-education camp 

in Xuan Loc, Dong Nai province. Religious prisoners on 

his list include Roman Catholic priests, a Buddhist monk, 

and several Hoa Hao Buddhists. Also, Nguyen Khac Toan, 

sentenced to 12 years in prison in 2002 for his advocacy 

of Internet and speech freedoms, stated that in the prison 

where he was held were “225 ethnic Protestant Montagnards,” including several minors. Toan’s testimony confirms 

HRW’s well-documented prisoner list, which includes 

355 ethnic Montagnards. The number of Montagnard 

Protestants currently remaining in prisons is a significant 

ongoing religious freedom concern. Most arrests stem 

from participation in the 2001 and 2004 peaceful demonstrations for land rights and religious freedom, for alleged 

connection to outside groups with political aspirations, for 

organizing refugee flights to Cambodia, or for affiliation 

with the banned Tin Lahn Dega. Because of tight security 

and government secrecy, it is difficult to determine whether 

any or all Montagnards on these lists are imprisoned for 

their religious practice or affiliation. However, an official 

in the SECV has compiled a list of 153 prisoners who, he 

claims, are innocent religious leaders arrested for alleged 

sympathy with Tin Lanh Dega or because they failed to turn 

in members of their congregations who participated in the 

2001 and 2004 demonstrations.

Commissioners and staff have traveled to Vietnam and 

met with Vietnamese government officials and religious 

leaders. In addition, the Commission has met with officials 

in the U.S. government, Members of Congress, the Acting 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and congressional staff about current U.S. policy toward Vietnam 

and the Commission’s policy recommendations.

In March 2006, Commission Vice Chair Michael 

Cromartie testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Human Rights and International Organizations at a hearing entitled “Vietnam: The 

Human Rights Dialogue with Vietnam: Is Vietnam Making 

Significant Progress?” In June 2005, Commission Vice 

Chair Nina Shea testified before the House International 

Relations Committee hearing entitled “Human Rights in 

Vietnam.” Shea discussed Vietnam’s record on religious 

freedom and related human rights, the provisions of the 

May 2005 agreement on religious freedom, as well as the 

Commission’s recommendations for U.S. policy. In July 

2005, then-Commission Chair Cromartie testified at a joint 

Congressional Caucus on Vietnam and Congressional 

Human Rights Caucus hearing on Vietnam entitled, “The 

Ongoing Religious Freedom Violations in Vietnam.”

In the past year, the Commission has also issued 

statements about the State Department’s lifting of the CPC 

designation and the arrest of Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and Nguyen 

Van Dai and other human rights advocates. All of the 

Commission’s statements on Vietnam can be found on the 

Commission’s Web site. 

v i etn a m

143

Commissioner Michael Cromartie testifying on Vietnam, March 2006.
144

I

n addition to its recommendation 

that Vietnam continue to be named 

a CPC, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• Work to implement fully the Montagnard Development Program 

(MDP) created last year as part 

of the House and Senate Foreign 

Operations conference report. The 

MDP should provide targeted humanitarian and development funds 

to ethnic minorities whose demands 

for land rights and religious freedom 

are closely connected. This program 

is consistent with Vietnam’s own 

stated goals of reducing poverty in 

the Central Highlands and northwest provinces and with the need 

for reform, transparency, and access 

to regions where many religious 

freedom abuses continue to occur. 

• Re-allocate foreign assistance funds 

that formerly supported the STAR 

(Support for Trade Acceleration 

Program) to new projects in human 

rights training, civil society capacity 

building, non-commercial rule of law 

programs in Vietnam, education programs for minors and young adults, 

and exchange programs between the 

Vietnamese National Assembly and 

the U.S. Congress. The Commission 

suggests the funds go to the creation 

of the Promoting Equal Rights and 

the Rule of Law (PEARL) program.

Previously, the Commission has 

urged the U.S. government to make 

clear to the government of Vietnam 

that ending violations of religious 

freedom is essential to the continued 

expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations, 

urging the Vietnamese government to 

meet certain benchmarks consistent 

with international religious freedom 

standards including:

• establishing a non-discriminatory 

legal framework for religious groups 

to engage in peaceful religious activities protected by international law 

without requiring groups to affiliate 

with any one officially registered 

religious organization; for example:

• allow the Unified Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam and Khmer 

Buddhists to legally operate independently of the official Buddhist 

organization, the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha;

• allow leaders chosen by all Hoa 

Hao adherents to participate in 

the Executive Board of the Hoa 

Hao Administrative Council or 

allow a separate Hoa Hao organization to organize and register 

as the Hoa Hao Central Buddhist 

Church with the same privileges 

as the Administrative Council;

• allow Presbyterian, Assembly 

of God, Baptist, Mennonite, 

Jehovah’s Witness, and any other 

Christian denominations that 

do not wish to join either the 

Southern Evangelical Church or 

the Northern Evangelical Church 

of Vietnam, to register independently; and

• allow Cao Dai leaders opposed to 

the Cao Dai Management Council 

to form and register a separate 

Cao Dai organization with management over its own affairs; 

• amending the 2004 Ordinance on 

Religious Beliefs and Religious Organizations, Decree 22, and the “Prime 

Minister’s Instructions on Protestantism” and other domestic legislation 

so that it does not restrict the exercise 

of religious freedom and conforms to 

international standards for protecting the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

• establishing a legal framework 

that allows for religious groups to 

organize and engage in humanitarian, medical, educational, and 

charitable work; 

• enforcing the provisions in the 

Prime Minister’s “Instructions on 

Protestantism” that outlaw forced 

renunciations of faith, and establish 

in the Vietnamese Criminal Code, 

specific penalties for anyone who 

carries out such practices; 

• repealing those ordinances and 

decrees that empower local Security Police to detain citizens in 

administrative detention for vague 

national security or national solidarity offenses, including Ordinance 44, 

Decree 38/CP, and Decree 56/CP; 

• setting up a national commission of 

religious groups, government officials, and independent, non-governmental observers to find equitable 

solutions on returning confiscated 

properties to religious groups;

• releasing or commuting the sentences of all those imprisoned or 

detained on account of their peaceful advocacy of religious freedom 

and related human rights including, among others, UBCV Patriarch 

Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Quang 

Do, 13 UBCV leaders detained since 

144

Vietnam Commission Recommendations 
145

the 2003 crackdown, members of 

ethnic minorities in the Central 

Highlands and northwest provinces, 

Hoa Hao followers arrested in July 

2005, and Fr. Ly, Nguyen Van Dai, 

and others arrested since January, 

11 2007; 

• re-opening all of the churches, 

meeting points, and home worship 

sites closed after 2001 in the Central 

Highlands and northwest provinces;

• investigating and publicly reporting on the beating deaths of Hmong 

Protestant leaders Mua Bua Senh 

and Vang Seo Giao, and prosecuting 

anyone found responsible for these 

deaths; 

• allowing ethnic minorities in the 

Central Highlands safely to seek 

asylum in Cambodia and continue 

to allow representatives of the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNCHR) and other appropriate international organizations 

unimpeded access to the Central 

Highlands in order voluntarily to 

monitor repatriated Montagnards 

consistent with the Memorandum 

of Understanding (MoU) signed 

on January 25, 2005 between the 

UNHCR, Cambodia, and Vietnam, 

and provide unhindered access for 

diplomats, journalists, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 

members of all religious communities in Vietnam, particularly those 

in the Central Highlands and the 

northwestern provinces; and

• halting incursions into Laos and 

Cambodia by the Vietnamese 

military and police in pursuit those 

seeking asylum because of abuses 

of and restrictions on their religious 

freedom. 

The Commission has also recommended that religious freedom 

in Vietnam be both protected and 

promoted through expanded foreign assistance programs in public 

diplomacy, economic development, 

education, good governance, and the 

rule of law; including by:

• expanding funding for additional 

Voice of America (VOA) and Radio 

Free Asia (RFA) programming for 

Vietnam and to overcome the jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts;

• working to improve the capacity 

and skills of Vietnamese civil society 

organizations, including medical, 

educational, development, relief, 

youth, and charitable organizations 

run by religious organizations; 

• targeting some of the Fulbright 

Program grants to individuals and 

scholars whose work promotes 

understanding of religious freedom 

and related human rights;

• requiring the Vietnam Educational 

Foundation, which offers scholarships to Vietnamese high schoolage students to attend college in 

the United States, to give preferences to youth from ethnic minority group areas (Montagnard and 

Hmong), from minority religious 

communities (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, 

Catholic, Protestant, Cham Islamic, 

and Kmer Krom), or former novice 

monks associated with the Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam and 

Khmer Krom Buddhists;

• providing grants to educational 

NGOs to bring Vietnamese high 

school students to the United States 

for one year of study, prioritizing 

minority groups and communities 

experiencing significant poverty and 

human rights abuses; 

• creating new exchange programs 

between the Vietnamese National 

Assembly and its staff and the 

U.S. Congress; 

• working with international corporations seeking new investment in 

Vietnam to promote international 

human rights standards in Vietnam 

and find ways their corporate presence can help promote and protect 

religious freedom and related human rights; and

• expanding existing rule of law programs to include regular exchanges 

between international experts on 

religion and law and appropriate 

representatives from the Vietnamese government, academia, and 

religious communities to discuss 

the impact of Vietnam’s laws and 

decrees on religious freedom and 

other human rights, to train public 

security forces on these issues, and 

to discuss ways to incorporate international standards of human rights 

in Vietnamese laws and regulations.

In addition, the U.S. Congress 

should appropriate additional funds 

for the State Department’s Human 

Rights and Democracy Fund for new 

technical assistance and religious freedom programming. Funding should 

be commensurate with new and ongoing programs for Vietnamese workers, 

women, and rule of law training.

 

v i etn a m
City hall in Vienna, Austria
147

country reports: EUROPE & EURASIA

1

 In July 2004, the institution itself came under more pointed attack when these countries accused the OSCE of failing to respect their sovereignty. Having been criticized—in some 

cases, repeatedly—by OSCE election monitors for holding elections that failed to meet democratic standards, the nine countries accused the OSCE of interfering in their internal affairs.

2

 Yet, on the invitation of the United States, the OSCE deployed an Election Assessment Mission for the U.S. November 2006 Congressional elections; in November 2006, ODIHR also sent 

an Election Assessment Mission to the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands.

The International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation 

in multilateral organizations as a way to advance respect for 

freedom of religion or belief, which is enshrined in numerous international human rights declarations and conventions. The 56 participating States of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), i.e., Europe 

East and West and the states of the former Soviet Union, 

along with the United States and Canada, committed themselves to uphold extensive standards to protect freedom of 

religion or belief and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. Freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief is singled out in the OSCE 

founding document, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. After the 

fall of the Soviet Union, the OSCE has continued to be an 

important forum in which participating States have been 

held accountable for their human rights commitments. 

Moreover, uniquely for an international organization, the 

OSCE since its inception has involved non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) as partners in its review of members’ 

human rights practices. 

In recent years, however, some participating States have 

sought to curtail the organization’s human rights activities. 

In 2004, delegations from nine countries, led by Russia along 

with eight other former Soviet states—Armenia, Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and 

Uzbekistan—issued a written statement demanding that 

the OSCE give more weight to security matters.1 Russia, in 

particular, has often protested in recent years that the OSCE 

focuses too much of its criticism on the countries of the former USSR, while downplaying human rights problems in the 

West.2

 Russia withheld needed approval for the OSCE 2005 

budget, which must be agreed to by all participating States, 

thereby delaying its implementation and putting in jeopardy 

many of the OSCE human rights activities. These activities 

demonstrating an increasing lack of commitment to their 

human rights obligations, including efforts to combat racism,

xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance and discrimination. The OSCE, citing an agreement made in Moscow in 

1991, has frequently reiterated that OSCE participating States 

have “categorically and irrevocably” declared that the “commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension 

of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to 

all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the 

internal affairs of the State concerned.”

Background on Racism, Xenophobia, 

Discrimination, and Intolerance

In recent years, there has been a rise in incidents of racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance toward 

members of religious and ethnic minorities in the OSCE 

region, including, for example, in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as in such democratic countries as France, 

Germany, and the United Kingdom. Extremist rhetoric that 

goes uncontested by political and societal leaders has also 

promoted an environment of intolerance toward members 

of various ethnic and religious minorities. Indeed, officials 

and state-run media are sometimes involved in efforts to 

inflame public opinion against minority groups in some 

parts of the OSCE region. 

Anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic views and actions also 

continue to be problems in many OSCE participating States 

and officials often fail to hold the perpetrators of anti-Semitic 

attacks to account. Anti-Zionism and vilification of Israel 

can also mask anti-Semitism. Reportedly, many of the recent 

anti-Semitic incidents in Western Europe have been committed by angry and marginalized young North African Muslim 

immigrants. According to monitoring organizations, there 

The Organization for

Security and Cooperation

in Europe
148

were twice as many physical assaults on Jews in 2006 in comparison with the previous year, with the greatest increases 

in the United Kingdom, Canada, and France. A disturbing 

number of anti-Semitic incidents were recorded elsewhere, 

for example, in Norway, Belgium, Germany, and Ukraine.

“Skinhead” gangs and neo-Nazi groups are other 

sources of hate-filled rhetoric and violence in many 

countries in the OSCE region. Various ethnic and religious 

minorities, including Muslims, Jews, migrants, and members of other minorities, are targeted. Vandalism against 

religious and other property is also on the rise. Violent acts 

are often well documented, but they are rarely investigated 

and prosecuted as hate crimes. Instead, officials, prosecutors, and judges often trivialize such violence by treating it 

as “hooliganism.” When burnings, beatings, and other acts 

of violence target members of a particular group because 

of who they are and what they believe, such acts should be 

viewed not merely as police problems, but as human rights 

violations that require an unequivocal response. 

The OSCE Response 

In the last few years, the OSCE has set up several mechanisms to address intolerance and related human rights 

issues as mandated by the 2003 OSCE Ministerial Meeting. As a result of U.S. diplomatic leadership on this issue, 

the OSCE has convened a series of high-level meetings to 

address anti-Semitism and other tolerance-related issues. 

As the Commission recommended, in late 2004, the OSCE 

Chairman-in-Office appointed three Personal Representatives to promote tolerance. The OSCE also became the first 

international organization to name a prominent independent appointee specifically to examine anti-Semitism. At 

the same time, it established a Personal Representative 

monitoring intolerance toward Muslims, and a third who 

tracks other forms of intolerance, including xenophobia, 

racism, and intolerance against Christians and members of 

other religions. Finally, a new Tolerance Program within the 

OSCE’s Office of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions (ODIHR) was set up in late 2004 to monitor and 

encourage compliance with OSCE commitments to combat 

xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia, as well as to 

promote freedom of religion or belief.

Several OSCE institutions expressed concern in 2006 

over the rise of intolerance and discrimination in the OSCE 

region. These included a declaration issued by the OSCE 

Parliamentary Assembly at its July session in Brussels and 

the OSCE Brussels Ministerial Council decision in December 2006 on measures to combat intolerance and discrimination and promote mutual respect and understanding.

OSCE Meetings on Tolerance and Related Topics

The OSCE Ministerial Council in 2003 mandated a major 

international conference to address anti-Semitism in the 

then-55 states of the OSCE region. The Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism in April 2004 was attended by 600 

officials from 55 nations and by hundreds of NGOs. The 

conference recommended specific steps to fight antiSemitism, including collecting and regular reporting on 

hate crimes data, bolstering national laws, promoting 

educational programs, and combating hate crimes fueled 

by racist propaganda in the media and on the Internet. 

In the 2004 Ministerial Council, the participating States 

authorized the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to appoint three 

Personal Representatives to coordinate and highlight OSCE 

activities in this field. The OSCE has also held a series of 

high-level and expert-level meetings on other tolerancerelated issues, including the Conference on Tolerance and 

the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination 

(Brussels, September 2004); the Human Dimension Seminar on Migration and Integration (Warsaw, May 2005); the 

OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms 

of Intolerance (Cordoba, June 2005); and the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Human Rights and the 

Fight against Terrorism (Vienna, July 2005). 

The 2005 Ministerial Council in Ljubljana called for the 

emphasis of OSCE activities in 2006 to be on thematic, implementation-focused meetings, including on tolerance-related topics. In June 2006, Kazakhstan hosted the first OSCE 

Tolerance Implementation Meeting, followed by meetings 

on Holocaust education in Croatia in October and on the 

deficit of hate crimes data in November in Austria. The 2006 

Human Dimension (HDim) meeting in Warsaw, Europe’s 

largest conference involving the NGO community, drew a 

wide variety of religious and ethnic groups, notably from 

Muslim minority communities. The HDim plenary session 

on freedom of religion and belief attracted a record number 

of speaking requests from 57 OSCE delegations and NGOs. 

In March 2007, a Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Assembly, Association and Expression 

also included NGO activity relating to freedom of religion. 

These conferences have raised awareness among the 

governments of the OSCE participating States, NGOs, and 

the public regarding anti-Semitism, discrimination against 

Muslims, and other tolerance-related issues in the OSCE re-
149

gion. The challenge remains, even after all of the meetings, 

for the OSCE and its 56 members to act on the ideas that 

have emerged from these conferences and reports and to 

translate them into activities and programs that will combat 

these forms of intolerance in OSCE participating States. 

OSCE Personal Representatives 

In December 2004, the 55 OSCE participating States 

authorized the then-Chairman-in-Office (CiO), Bulgarian 

Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, to name three Personal 

Representatives to promote tolerance. Anastasia Crickley 

of Ireland, chairperson of the European Monitoring Centre 

on Racism and Xenophobia, was appointed as the Personal 

Representative on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and 

Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions; 

Gert Weisskirchen, German parliamentarian and professor 

of higher education, was named the Personal Representative on Combating Anti-Semitism; and Omur Orhun, 

former Turkish Ambassador to the OSCE, was appointed 

the Personal Representative on Combating Intolerance and 

Discrimination against Muslims. 

These appointments have been re-confirmed by each 

subsequent CiO, namely, Slovenia, Belgium, and Spain and 

will extend at least through the end of 2007. The mandates 

of these Representatives include the promotion of better 

coordination of the implementation of decisions by the 

OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Councils on Tolerance 

and Non-discrimination as well as cooperation between 

the CiO and the ODIHR. 

The mandates of the three Personal Representatives 

address separate but interrelated issues that call for distinct, yet coordinated, responses. The persons selected by 

the OSCE CiO for these honorary and part-time positions 

come from a variety of backgrounds. The OSCE CiO has expressed the view that the Personal Representatives should 

coordinate with the various relevant OSCE institutions 

and among themselves in order to fulfill their mandates. 

Indeed, the Commission is concerned that the work of the 

Representatives has been hampered by inadequate funding 

for staff and travel expenses, and other demands on their 

time and attention. The Commission also believes that the 

activities of the Personal Representatives should be given 

more prominence in the work of the OSCE. 

During the past year, the Personal Representatives 

made contributions to various OSCE meetings. For example, Crickley made a presentation on the role of various 

international organizations on tolerance education at the 

October 2006 meeting on education and the Holocaust. 

Orhun made a presentation on the “cartoon controversy” 

at the July 2006 OSCE meeting on the media. In addition to 

playing an active role at relevant OSCE meetings, country 

visits have played a key role in the work of the Personal 

Representatives and in their regular reports to the OSCE 

Permanent Council. They have all visited the United States; 

Orhun has held meetings in Turkey and has made visits to 

the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, and France, as 

well as consulting with the Organization of Islamic Conference; Crickley also met with the UN in Geneva and has 

visited Great Britain and Austria, as well as consulted with 

the EU; and Weisskirchen has held meetings in Germany 

and Canada and has visited Russia. Invitations from the 

participating States to the Personal Representatives would 

enable them to meet with relevant government officials and 

raise key issues of concern directly with them, and to meet 

with NGOs, and with community and religious leaders and 

activists, without interference. 

The Commission also encourages each of the three 

Personal Representatives to undertake events with relevant 

non-governmental communities as well as with the media. 

In 2006, Weisskirchen held roundtables involving the 

T h e o rga n izat i on fo r s ec uri ty a nd coope r at i on i n e u r ope

OSCE headquarters in Vienna, Austria (Photo: OSCE Mikhail Evstafiev)
150

civil society sector in Germany, the United Kingdom and 

Canada, which addressed the issue of anti-Semitism and, 

together with the German delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, he convened an expert meeting on 

anti-Semitism with specialists from countries throughout 

the OSCE region. Orhun, working with the ODIHR, convened several roundtables with representatives of Muslim 

communities across the OSCE region. For example, a 2005 

meeting in Warsaw identified key issues of concern and 

possible areas of cooperation. A 2006 meeting, attended 

by NGOs and media experts, addressed the portrayal of 

Muslims in public discourse. Based on these recommendations, the ODIHR announced in 2006 that it is developing a 

resource guide on improved reporting on Islam and Muslim 

communities in OSCE States. 

The Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights Tolerance Program

One of the major institutional responses of the OSCE to 

growing concerns regarding religious intolerance was to 

set up a new Tolerance Program in late 2004 within the 

ODIHR. The mandate of the Tolerance Program includes 

OSCE efforts to promote tolerance and to combat intolerance and xenophobia, as well as to advance freedom of 

religion or belief. The United States has been a strong 

advocate for the establishment of the program and for 

sufficient funding for its activities. The Tolerance Program 

staff includes specialists on the issues of anti-Semitism, 

Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism, as well as on 

freedom of religion or belief. These specialists monitor 

and conduct research, write reports, conduct programs, 

and provide staff expertise for the three Personal Representatives and the ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief. The Tolerance Program 

was charged with setting up a database of information, as 

well as projects on such issues as data collection for hate 

crimes legislation, police training on hate crimes, and 

Holocaust education in specific countries. 

In accordance with a decision by the 2003 OSCE Ministerial Council, many of the Tolerance Program’s activities 

have centered on gathering and publicizing information 

related to tolerance and non-discrimination. The Program’s 

Web site, http://www.osce.org/odihr/16431.html, which 

became operational in 2006, brings together previously 

hard-to-find material that is directly relevant to addressing 

discrimination and to combating intolerance by providing access to information from OSCE participating States, 

NGOs, and inter-governmental organizations on international standards and instruments. The Web site also references Legislationline, ODIHR’s online database, and the 

Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems 

International index to 3,000 NGO Web sites, and provides 

customized access to more than 1.5 million documents. 

The Tolerance Program has developed a “Web site Guide to 

Tolerance Education” and a curriculum unit on “Holocaust 

Education and Anti-Semitism.” The Tolerance Program 

has also issued several useful publications on addressing 

priorities in various OSCE States, including “Combating 

Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: An Overview of Statistics, 

Legislation, and National Initiatives” and “Education on the 

Holocaust and on Anti-Semitism: An Overview and Analysis of Educational Approaches.” 

In 2006, the ODIHR published further information on 

tolerance-related topics, including “Teaching Materials on 

the History of Jews and Anti-Semitism in Europe,” in cooperation with experts from seven pilot countries: Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, and 

Ukraine. This publication includes material on the history of 

anti-Semitism; contemporary forms of anti-Semitism, antiSemitism as a form of discrimination, and a teaching guide 

on the subject. The ODIHR also produced two publications 

related to the struggle against hate crime: “Challenges and 

responses to hate-motivated incidents in the OSCE region 

for the period January-June 2006,” and a fact sheet on the 

ODIHR Law Enforcement Officer Program on combating 

hate crime, issued in English, Russian, Polish, and Serbian. 

During the past year, the Tolerance Program has translated 

When burnings, beatings and other 

acts of violence target members of a 

particular group because of who they are 

and what they believe, such acts should be 

viewed not merely as police problems, 

but as human rights violations that 

require an unequivocal response. 
151

many of its key publications into the Russian language, 

particularly useful in light of the rising levels of xenophobia, 

racism, and various forms of intolerance in Russia and other 

former Soviet republics. 

To date, ODIHR’s Tolerance Program has emphasized 

activities with external organizations, but the Program could 

examine work with the 18 OSCE Field Presences and other 

OSCE institutions. The 2003 OSCE Ministerial Council also 

tasked the Tolerance Program with acting as a focal point for 

the various national contact points on hate crime set up by 

the OSCE participating States. Information about practical 

initiatives from participating States, NGOs, and other institutions can also be submitted online. In 2006, the Tolerance 

Program ran special programs to train police and the judiciary in Spain and Croatia on ways to combat hate crimes. 

As mentioned above, part of the Tolerance Program’s 

current mandate is to address freedom of religion or belief. 

Responsibility for the issue of religious freedom was removed 

from the ODIHR Human Rights Department when the issue 

was assigned to the Tolerance Program in late 2004. The 

Commission is concerned that as a result of this bureaucratic 

reassignment, freedom of religion or belief will be relegated 

as a corollary to tolerance work and will no longer be included in the ODIHR human rights programs. Furthermore, 

only one staff person in the Tolerance Program is assigned 

to the issue of freedom of religion or belief, and that person 

is also assigned to work with NGOs; in 2007, this position 

was removed from the unified budget, thus endangering 

its permanent status and changing its recruitment basis. In 

2006, the ODIHR planned to hold workshops on freedom 

of religion issues with NGOs, religious communities, and 

government officials in Russia and Tajikistan. However, little 

news and information about those meetings was available in 

the out-of-date and sparse freedom of religion section of the 

ODIHR Tolerance Program Web site. 

OSCE Venues for Addressing Freedom of 

Religion or Belief Issues

Freedom of religion or belief is defined as a basic human 

rights principle in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Since then, 

the issue has been addressed in various ways by the OSCE: 

through the periodic OSCE and later ODIHR conferences 

to review implementation of human rights commitments 

by the 56 participating States; during several conferences 

which specifically addressed these issues, such as the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Human Rights 

and the Fight against Terrorism, held in Vienna in July 2005; 

in the structure of the ODIHR, where, until the Tolerance 

Program was set up, freedom of religion or belief was part 

of the Human Rights Department portfolio; through the 18 

OSCE Field Presences, where freedom of religion or belief 

can also be the subject of monitoring, reports, and related 

activities; and through the inclusion of the views of relevant 

international, regional, and non-governmental human 

rights organizations in connection with each of the other 

venues described above. 

Under the auspices of the ODIHR, the OSCE also hosts 

annual conferences, traditionally held in Warsaw in October, to review implementation by the 56 OSCE participating 

States of their OSCE human rights commitments, including 

freedom of religion or belief. Known as the Conferences 

on the Human Dimension (HDim), these 10-day meetings 

bring together diplomats, representatives of other international organizations, and, reportedly, the largest number 

of NGOs for a general European human rights conference. 

These conferences have been criticized by some government representatives for being too lengthy, for not attracting enough press and public attention, and increasingly, 

for the failure of participating States to respond—either 

in words or in deeds—to criticism of their human rights 

records voiced at the HDim.

The ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief was re-organized in 2004 and expanded to a total of 58 persons nominated by countries 

from throughout the OSCE region, including an Advisory 

Council of 15 members. The Panel functions primarily as 

a consultative body for the governments of participating 

States considering new or amended legislation affecting 

freedom of religion, as well as for expert opinions on individual cases. The Panel reviews both proposed and enacted 

legislation under guidelines developed by the ODIHR and 

the Council of Europe Venice Commission, guidelines 

that are based on international conventions and on OSCE 

commitments. The Panel then issues recommendations to 

the participating States on bringing such legislation into 

conformance with international human rights standards. 

The Panel has advised the governments of Macedonia, 

Romania, and Serbia on legislation and Panel recommendations on relevant legislation were also taken into consideration by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Bulgaria. In the case of Uzbekistan, the government has not 

responded to the Panel’s recommendations for revisions of 

T h e o rga n izat i on fo r s ec uri ty a nd coope r at i on i n e u r ope
152

its religion laws. In two recent examples of expert opinions 

on individual cases, the Panel determined that the situation 

of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow is illustrative of problems 

in other post-Soviet countries, where registration requirements are being used to control religious groups. The Panel 

has also been critical of official threats to destroy Hare Krishna property in an agricultural cooperative in Kazakhstan, 

and in November 2006 offered its assistance in resolving this 

dispute. The Commission is convinced that the activities of 

the Panel should be better known and more transparent, in 

particular with respect to those governments that ignore its 

recommendations. In addition, every year the Panel should 

hold at least one meeting of its entire membership. 

Commission Activities 

Since 2001, the Commission has participated with, often in 

the capacity as members of, U.S. delegations to OSCE meetings and has made extensive recommendations relating to 

the work of the OSCE on protecting freedom of religion or 

belief and on combating intolerance and anti-Semitism in 

the OSCE region. Then-Commission Vice Chair Felice D. 

Gaer made public statements on behalf of the Commission 

at the first-ever special meeting on anti-Semitism in June 

2003, as well as at the ODIHR HDim meeting the following 

October. In July 2004, the Commission recommended that 

the U.S. government should advocate an active role for NGOs 

in monitoring religious intolerance. In September 2004, at 

the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against 

Racism, Xenophobia, and Discrimination (Brussels), Vice 

Chair Gaer stressed the importance of freedom of religion or 

belief in the OSCE region. At the October 2004 OSCE HDim, 

the Commission made certain that public information on the 

status of freedom of religion or belief in various OSCE states 

and the Commission’s concerns about religious freedom 

were included in the concluding intervention by the U.S. 

delegation to the HDim meeting. 

At the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other 

Forms of Intolerance, held in Cordoba in June 2005, thenCommission Vice-Chair Nina Shea spoke at the Panel of 

Experts Workshop on Promoting Tolerance and Ensuring 

Freedom of Religion and Belief on restrictive registration 

practices. Serving as official advisers to the U.S. delegation 

to the Cordoba meeting, then-Commission Chair Michael 

Cromartie and Vice Chair Shea met with various diplomats 

and NGO representatives. Archbishop Charles Chaput, a 

member of the Commission, served in his private capacity 

on the U.S. official delegation to the 2005 Cordoba meeting. During the 2005 OSCE HDim meeting in Warsaw, Gaer 

served as a member of the U.S. delegation and made a plenary statement on the problems faced by ethnic minorities, 

including anti-Semitism. She also held meetings with the 

three OSCE Personal Representatives and with numerous 

delegations and NGO representatives. The Commission staff 

also took part in a roundtable on intolerance and discrimination against Muslims and made a presentation on ways the 

Commission has addressed this issue. During the 2006 OSCE 

HDim Conference, Gaer, as Chair of the Commission, served 

as an official member of the U.S. delegation and presented 

a plenary statement on freedom of religion. Together with 

Commission staff, she also held meetings with OSCE Personal Representatives, as well as with numerous delegations 

and NGOs. The Commission staff also made a presentation 

during an event on freedom of religion in Turkmenistan, 

held during the 2006 HDim Conference. 

The Commission was one of the first official bodies 

to speak out against the rise in anti-Semitic violence in 

Europe; it has also addressed anti-Semitism and related 

issues in countries such as Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, 

France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. 

The U.S. Congress introduced and unanimously passed 

resolutions in the Senate and the House on the rise of 

anti-Semitism in Europe. The Senate version cited the 

Commission’s findings and urged the Commission to 

continue documenting the issue.

The Commission has recommended that the U.S. 

government work with the OSCE and the U.S. delegation to 

ensure that separate attention is paid to anti-Semitism in 

the region and successfully advocated for the OSCE’s first 

special meeting on anti-Semitism. During preparations for 

that meeting, Gaer stressed that acts of anti-Semitism must 

not be seen as hooliganism, but as a human rights abuse 

that States should combat by robust implementation of 

their international human rights commitments. Participating on the U.S. delegation at the Berlin meeting, Vice Chair 

Gaer discussed anti-Semitism in the OSCE region and 

met with a wide variety of delegations and NGOs. During 

the Berlin conference on anti-Semitism, the Commission 

brought to the attention of the U.S. delegation the key role 

played by NGOs in monitoring anti-Semitism, intolerance, 

and discrimination, and this language was included in the 

delegation’s concluding speech. The resulting OSCE “Berlin 

Declaration” on anti-Semitism has served as a precedent 

for the UN in organizing its own public event on combating 

anti-Semitism. 
the organization for security and cooperation 

in europe C ommission R ecommendations

With regard to the institution of 

the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 

the Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should:

• express continued strong support 

for the OSCE in the face of attacks 

led by the Russian government, 

particularly on the OSCE’s human 

rights activities carried out by the 

Office of Democratic Institutions 

and Human Rights (ODIHR); 

• authorize and appropriate funds in 

addition to existing U.S. contributions to the OSCE for the purpose 

of expanding programs that combat 

anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and 

discrimination against Muslims, 

Christians, and members of other 

religions, and of developing ways to 

advance freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

• hold regular briefings at the State 

Department for members of the U.S. 

government and NGO community 

concerned with OSCE issues and 

make efforts to expand the number 

and scope of invitees; 

• urge that the State Department 

ensure that U.S. OSCE delegations 

include representatives of relevant 

U.S. government agencies, such as 

Homeland Security and the Justice 

Department, as well as expand the 

number and range of civil society groups involved in the OSCE 

process;

• ensure that U.S. OSCE delegations 

make an effort to organize regular 

briefings for the civil society groups 

at OSCE meetings.

With regard to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief and the promotion of tolerance, 

the Commission has recommended 

that the U.S. government urge that 

OSCE participating States undertake 

the following steps:

• ensure that they are complying 

with their commitments to combat 

discrimination, xenophobia, and 

anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 

1990 Copenhagen Document on 

the Human Dimension, including 

adopting laws against incitement to 

violence and ensuring effective remedies for acts of discrimination;

• engage in a regular public review 

of compliance with OSCE commitments on freedom of religion 

or belief, on racial and religious 

discrimination, and on anti-Semitism, including by facilitating a 

more active role by NGOs as part of 

that process; 

• commit to condemn promptly, publicly, and specifically hate crimes 

and to investigate and prosecute 

their perpetrators; 

• take all appropriate steps to prevent 

and punish acts of anti-Semitism, 

such as publicly to condemn specific 

anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of attacks on 

Jews and their communal property, 

and, while vigorously protecting 

freedom of expression, to counteract 

anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized 

anti-Semitic activities;

• condemn in a public fashion, 

while vigorously protecting 

freedom of expression, attacks 

targeting Muslims and pursue and 

prosecute the perpetrators of such 

attacks; 

• ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be used as an unrestrained 

justification to restrict the human 

rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief, of members of religious 

minorities; 

• bring national legislation and practice, as well as local laws, into conformity with international human 

rights standards and OSCE commitments by: permitting all religious 

groups to organize and conduct 

their activities without undue 

interference; discontinuing excessive regulation of the free practice 

of religion, including registration 

or recognition requirements that 

effectively prevent members of religious communities from exercising 

their freedom to manifest religion 

or belief; and permitting limitations 

on the right to freedom of religion or 

belief only as provided by law and 

consistent with participating States’ 

obligations under international law; 

• monitor the actions of regional and 

local officials who violate the right 

to freedom of religion or belief and 

provide effective remedies for any 

such violations; and

• establish mechanisms to review the 

cases of persons detained under 

suspicion of, or charged with, religious, political, or security offenses 

and to release those who have been 

imprisoned solely because of their 

religious beliefs or practices, as 

well as any others who have been 

unjustly detained or sentenced.

153

THe organization for security and cooperation 

in europe Commission Recommendations 
With regard to freedom of religion 

or belief and the promotion of tolerance, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government urge 

the OSCE to:

• ensure reappointment of the three 

Chairman-in-Office Personal Representatives on tolerance issues;

• make the country-specific reports of 

the three Personal Representatives 

available to the public;

• provide the ODIHR the necessary 

mandate and adequate resources 

to hire as part of the Unified Budget 

experienced staff at the working level, to direct the Tolerance 

Program, to monitor compliance 

with OSCE obligations on freedom 

of religion or belief, and to combat 

discrimination, xenophobia, and 

anti-Semitism;

• provide funding for each of the 

three OSCE Personal Representatives on Tolerance to ensure travel 

and other program support;

• take concrete action within the 

OSCE to ensure that all participating 

states are living up to their commitments to combat discrimination and 

intolerance, in particular to combat 

anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 

1990 Copenhagen Document, action which should include adopting 

laws to protect against incitement 

to violence based on discrimination, including anti-Semitism, and 

providing the individual with effective remedies to initiate complaints 

against acts of discrimination;

• consider opening the sessions of the 

OSCE Permanent Council to members of the press and public; 

• consider ways to attract more public 

attention to the activities of the OSCE 

Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, including by bringing 

greater transparency to its activities;

• encourage the convening of an annual meeting of the OSCE Panel of 

Experts on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief that is open to its entire 

membership; 

• undertake a public review of compliance by participating States within 

the OSCE on a regular basis of their 

commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism; 

• convene expert conferences on antiSemitism and freedom of religion 

or belief, as well as other tolerance 

issues, during 2008 and 2009;

• consider holding the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 

(HDim) in September and October 

in several areas in the OSCE region, 

preferably in areas with major OSCE 

Field Presences;

• consider reorganization of the 

HDim conference into thematicallylinked issues, such as Rule of Law 

(Elections; Judiciary; Penal System), 

Fundamental Freedoms (Religion, 

Expression/Media, Assembly/Association, Movement), and Tolerance 

and Non-Discrimination (Gender 

and Minorities—Religious, Ethnic, 

Economic); 

• provide funding for added staff to 

deal with freedom of religion or 

belief, working within the ODIHR 

Human Rights Program; 

• provide funding for the OSCE 

Field Presences and the ODIHR to 

hold public roundtables with local 

government officials, NGOs, and 

community leaders to discuss the 

concept, definition, and implementation of steps to counter hate 

crimes and hate crimes legislation;

• ensure that the ODIHR Tolerance 

Program staff take part in ODIHR 

training of Field Presences and 

other OSCE staff; and 

• provide funding for the translation 

of additional ODIHR Tolerance 

Program reports into OSCE languages, particularly Russian, and 

for at least one ODIHR Tolerance 

Program staffer with Russian-language capability.

154
155

Belarus

Belarus has a highly authoritarian government, with almost 

all political power concentrated in the hands of President 

Aleksandr Lukashenko and his small circle of advisors. The 

Lukashenko regime has engaged in a widespread pattern 

of serious human rights abuses, including involvement in 

the “disappearances” of several key opposition figures, the 

imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, and 

strict media controls. Human rights conditions deteriorated 

further after the March 2006 presidential elections, which 

observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other organizations deemed 

fraudulent. The government of Belarus also continues 

to commit serious violations of the right of its citizens to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

Religious freedom conditions, which had already declined 

as a result of the strict law on religion passed in October 

2002, deteriorated further in the past year. The Commission 

continues to place Belarus on its Watch List, and will maintain scrutiny throughout the year to determine whether the 

government’s record has deteriorated to a level warranting 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC.

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the human rights 

record of the Belarus government “remained very poor and 

worsened in some areas, as the government continued to 

commit frequent serious abuses.” The State Department 

reports that the Belarus government continued to engage in 

arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonment of citizens 

for political reasons, criticizing officials, or participating in 

demonstrations. Court trials, whose outcomes were usually 

predetermined, were often conducted behind closed doors 

without an independent judiciary or independent observers. 

Government structures to control and restrict religious 

groups are extensive and intrusive, leading some human 

rights groups to compare today’s situation for religious 

freedom in Belarus to that under the former Soviet regime. 

For example, authorities reportedly issued a warning to 

three Christians in Brest for holding in a 24-hour silent vigil 

in June 2006 to express solidarity with victims of political 

repression in the country; the three protesters were told 

they needed prior permission to organize and conduct 

religious events outside designated worship areas. Belarus 

also maintains its Soviet-era religious affairs bureaucracy, 

which includes a Plenipotentiary for Religious and Nationality Affairs and its staff in Minsk (known, until July 2006, as 

the State Committee for Religious and Nationality Affairs), 

as well as several of its officials in each of the country’s six 

regions. According to the Forum 18 News Service, the six 

regions have 20 districts, with each district having a Department for Relations with Religious and Social Organizations, 

as well as a Commission for Monitoring Compliance with 

Legislation on Religion. 

Legislation on religion passed in October 2002 led to 

greater restrictions on religious freedom in Belarus. The law 

codified the activities of the official Committee of Religious 

and Nationality Affairs (since renamed) of the Council of 

Ministers (CRNA) and set up severe regulatory obstacles 

and major bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the activities of many religious communities. Essentially, the 2002 

religion law prohibits: all religious activity by unregistered 

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Church in Brest fortress, Brest, Belarus
156

groups; any activity of religious communities except in 

areas in which they are registered; foreign citizens from 

leading religious activities; and unapproved religious activity in private homes, with the exception of small, occasional 

prayer meetings. The law set up a three-tiered system 

of registration, and particularly restricts the activities of 

groups on the lowest tier. The law also mandated that all 

existing religious communities in Belarus re-register with 

the CRNA by November 2004. Most previously registered 

groups were re-registered, but the law was viewed as a 

strengthening of the government’s opportunities to deny 

registration to disfavored groups. 

Since coming to power in 1994, President Lukashenko 

has openly favored the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), 

an Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate Russian Orthodox 

Church, resulting in a privileged position for the BOC. This 

relationship was codified in June 2003, when the Belarus 

government and the BOC signed a concordat setting out 

the Church’s influence in public life, which has contributed 

to the difficulties for many religious minorities (described 

below). In March 2004, the Belarusian government granted 

the BOC the exclusive right to use the word “Orthodox” in 

its title. Several “independent” Orthodox churches that do 

not accept the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow have been denied registration, including the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (BAOC) and the True 

Orthodox Church, a branch of the Orthodox Church that 

rejected the compromise with the Soviet government made 

by the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1920s. In 2005, the 

State Department reported that authorities confiscated a 

building in Semkov Gorodok, which the local BAOC community had renovated. In June 2005, authorities warned the 

priest of the unregistered Russian Orthodox Church Abroad 

(ROCA) that he could be jailed and fined for conducting 

“illegal religious activities,” including small gatherings 

in private homes. In November 2005, authorities denied 

registration to another ROCA parish in Ruzhany; a religious 

affairs official in Brest reportedly told ROCA members to 

worship at the BOC. In recent years, ROCA members have 

been fined four times, totaling over $2,000, for worshiping 

in private homes. The community again applied for registration, but in October 2006, there were credible reports 

that BOC officials were pressuring parishioners to withdraw 

their signatures from registration applications.

Some religious groups have been consistently denied 

registration, particularly Protestant groups. One frequent 

basis for registration or re-registration denials has been 

failure to provide a valid legal address, although, in some 

cases, registration is required before such an address can be 

obtained. Another is an alleged failure to limit activities to 

a required location. In many cases, officials do not provide any reason for the denial of re-registration requests. 

In 2006, the Belarus government rejected the UN Human 

Rights Committee’s decision that it had violated religious 

freedom by refusing to register a nation-wide Hare Krishna 

association. The authorities maintained that their refusal 

was “justified” because it was in accordance with Belarusian law, but they failed to address the UN Committee’s 

finding that a requirement for state-approved physical 

premises to gain legal registration is “a disproportionate 

limitation of the Krishna devotees’ right to manifest their 

religion” under the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights. In June 2006, a Minsk court deregistered 

the Christ’s Covenant Reformed Baptist Church for lack of 

legal addresses.

Without state registration, religious communities 

can be liable to fines levied under a Soviet-era provision 

of the Administrative Violations Code. Evidence indicates 

that since 2004, the Belarus authorities have increased the 

amount of the fines and expanded the range of religious 

groups that are subject to them. Until two years ago, such 

fines were usually approximately $15, and most often 

imposed on Council of Churches Baptist congregations, 

which refuse on theological grounds to register with any 

state authorities. Since 2006, such fines have increased, in 

some cases dramatically. According to Forum 18, the pastor 

and administrator of New Life Church were fined a total of 

Some religious groups have been 

consistently denied registration, 

particularly Protestant groups. One frequent 

basis for registration or re-registration 

denials has been failure to provide a valid 

legal address, although, in some cases, 

registration is required before such

 an address can be obtained.
157

$5,455 for “unsanctioned” religious activity, a Pentecostal 

church was assessed fines that totaled $2,767, and members of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad were given 

fines totaling $1,857. In July and August 2006, a Union of 

Evangelical Christians Salvation Church pastor was fined 

$2,170 and $300, respectively, for holding an unauthorized 

religious service and performing a baptism in a lake. In 

October 2006, independent media reported that authorities 

levied a fine of $29 against a 78-year-old Roman Catholic 

priest for conducting an “unauthorized” religious service in 

Minsk; the priest, a Belarus-born Polish citizen, had worked 

in the city of Slutsk for 15 years. The average monthly wage 

in Belarus is estimated to be $139.

In addition to fines, the Belarusian authorities appear to 

be adopting tougher sanctions, such as short-term detentions and imprisonment, against church leaders and parishioners who take part in unregistered religious activity. In 

March 2006, the pastor of the Minsk-based Christ’s Covenant 

Reformed Baptist Church received a 10 day prison term for 

conducting religious worship in his home, the first time in 20 

years that a religious leader was sentenced to imprisonment 

in Belarus. The church’s re-registration request had previously been denied. Pentecostal bishop Sergey Tsvor faced 

similar charges, but they were dropped because of technical 

errors made by the police. Also in March 2006, authorities 

sentenced human rights lawyer Sergey Shavtsov to 10 days in 

detention for conducting an unsanctioned interdenominational seminar in a private cafe. 

While re-registered religious organizations, including Muslims, Lutherans, and Baha’is, have held worship 

services at residential addresses without prosecution, the 

Administrative Violations Code (Article 167) and the 2002 

religion law forbids most religious meetings in private 

homes and religious activity outside designated houses 

of worship without advance approval from state authorities. A first offense is punishable by a warning, a fine of 

between 20 and 150 times the minimum monthly wage, 

or three to 15 days’ imprisonment. A second violation 

within one year is punishable by a fine of between 150 and 

300 times the minimum monthly wage or 10 to 15 days’ 

imprisonment. While the law permits persons to gather in 

private homes to pray, it requires that individuals obtain 

permission from local authorities to hold rituals, rites, or 

ceremonies in homes. Police interfered with religious meetings in residences several times in 2006, sometimes fining 

participants. Baptists, Pentecostals, and other Protestants 

were warned or fined for illegally conducting and hosting 

religious services. 

In addition to problems for home worship, the government continued to limit the ability of a number of groups to 

own or use property for religious purposes. The government 

permits the use of residential property for religious services 

only after it has been formally converted from residential 

use. This interpretation of the law effectively requires all 

religious organizations to re-register their properties as 

religious properties. However, authorities continued to reject 

requests for property registration from many Protestant 

churches, as well as from other religious groups seen as new 

to Belarus. In January 2006, police visited a residence during 

a worship service of a registered Minsk-based Pentecostal 

congregation and drew up a protocol against the bishop for 

b el arus

A woman in Mogilev, Belarus (OSCE) 
158

alleged violations of the public demonstrations law, which 

requires advance official permission for all public events. 

This is despite the fact that the congregation is registered 

to hold worship services in that building. In July 2006, a 

Minsk court ordered the New Life Church to sell to the city 

a building the church had purchased as a place of worship 

at a price far below market value and to vacate the premises 

by the following October. The authorities refused to re-register the New Life Church because it tried to use a former 

cow barn as its legal residence; the pastor and other leaders 

were then assessed large fines for conducting services in 

the barn. After church members began a hunger strike, the 

authorities reviewed their decision. The Higher Economic 

Court, however, has postponed its ruling five times since 

December 2006. Members of a Catholic parish in the city of 

Grodno halted a hunger-strike after receiving endorsement 

for church construction from the Grodno city administration. According to the church’s parish priest, the church has 

not yet received permission to build, but intends to “ask for 

final permission from the president.” 

Various other laws, regulations, and directives also 

restrict the activities of registered religious communities. For 

example, groups are not allowed to function outside their 

geographic area of registration. If a registered religious community does not qualify as a “central association”—meaning 

it has not been legally recognized for over 20 years or it does 

not have enough members—it cannot own media outlets or 

invite people from outside Belarus to work with the community, as in the case of the Greek Catholic Church. The Society 

for Krishna Consciousness also does not qualify as a central 

association and therefore cannot rent a hall or produce a 

publication with a print run of over 300. 

Generally speaking, the Belarus government continues 

to interfere with religious education or deny parents the 

right to provide religious education for their children. In 

August 2006, border guards transported to Minsk 47 Baptist 

children and adults who had been on a religious retreat on 

private property in the Grodno region. Local authorities 

had ordered the gathering to disperse and threatened to 

take the children to a police juvenile facility. According to 

the State Department, after their release, a senior religious 

affairs official in Minsk conceded that the retreat was legal 

since private individuals had organized the event. 

The government does not deal sufficiently with antiSemitism and has not responded adequately to find and 

hold accountable those responsible for vandalism against 

Jewish memorials, cemeteries, or other property. Reported 

anti-Semitic incidents continued in 2006, though there 

were fewer reported incidents than in previous years. In 

October 2006, vandals damaged property and gravestones 

at Jewish and Christian cemeteries in Orsha. At the Jewish 

cemetery, where 7,000 Holocaust victims are buried, 10 

tombstones and the fence around the property were damaged. Police stated they would not file criminal proceedings 

for vandalism if the perpetrators were found. In November, 

Minsk’s Yama Holocaust Memorial was again vandalized 

on the same weekend that the Israeli Cultural and Information Center was also vandalized with swastikas and 

anti-Semitic graffiti. Although authorities initially refused 

to investigate these incidents, claiming they were cases of 

teenage hooliganism, later in November, Deputy Foreign 

Minister Viktor Gaysenok pledged that police would do 

Statue of St. Michael at St. Simon and St. Helena Catholic 

Church, Minsk, Belarus 
159

everything possible to find and punish those who damaged 

the memorial. The investigation was pending at year’s end. 

In late November, the Brest Jewish memorial, dedicated 

in 1992 to the memory the Brest ghetto, was the subject of 

the sixth attack of vandals since the memorial was built. 

Police were investigating the incident. On another issue, 

due to a requirement in the 2002 religion law that religious 

organizations do not have priority in reclaiming property 

confiscated in Soviet times if a former worship building 

is now used for culture or sports activities, only nine of 92 

historic synagogues in Belarus have been returned to the 

Jewish community since the country gained independence 

in 1991. 

The government did not permit foreign religious workers to engage in religious activities outside the institutions 

that invited them. Observers have expressed concern that the 

lack of standardized government guidance on how to implement recent changes to visa laws may affect the ability of foreign religious workers to live and function in the country. For 

10 years, authorities have refused to renew the work permit 

of the founder of the Minsk-based New Testament Church 

and the pastor of its congregation. Forum 18 reported that in 

July 2006, authorities denied permission for the Full Gospel 

Union to invite a Nigerian pastor to preach at three member 

churches. In October, authorities refused to renew visas for 

seven Polish Catholic priests and five nuns from the Grodno 

region who had been working in the country for 10 years and 

ordered them to leave by the end of the year. Of the approximately 350 Catholic priests who serve in the three Roman 

Catholic dioceses in Belarus, over half are foreigners, mostly 

from Poland. In September 2006, a Catholic priest from Poland was summoned to Minsk for celebrating mass without 

state permission in that city a week earlier. Religious workers 

of other denominations with a long history in the country, 

particularly some Protestant groups, continued to have difficulties obtaining visas. 

In contrast to the harsh measures described above, 

Lukashenko signed a law in late 2005 that exempted from tax 

the land and property of many religious organizations. The 

list of eligible religious organizations includes some denied 

re-registration but not yet liquidated by court order, such as 

the Minsk-based New Life Church and the Minsk Society for 

Krishna Consciousness. However, the recently liquidated 

Minsk-based Belarusian Evangelical Church and Belarusian 

Evangelical Reformed Union reportedly are not included.

The Commission has traveled to Belarus and met 

with officials of the State Committee on Religious and 

Nationalities Affairs as well as with representatives of various religious and human rights groups. The Commission 

released a report on Belarus in May 2003 with recommendations for U.S. policy, reflecting the findings from its visit 

to that country. The Commission welcomed passage of the 

Belarus Democracy Act, approved by Congress in October 

2004. President Bush’ signature on the Belarus Democracy 

Reauthorization Act in January 2007 renewed the original 

legislation. This legislation has implemented certain Commission recommendations regarding freedom of religion 

in Belarus. Throughout the past year, Commission staff has 

met with independent human rights activists from Belarus, 

including the author of the “White Book,” an extensive 

report on religious persecution in that country. In 2004, 

2005, and 2006, the Commission took part in meetings of 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presenting information on freedom of religion in Belarus 

and meeting with Belarusian officials. 

b el arus

The government does not deal 

sufficiently with anti-Semitism and 

has not responded adequately to find 

and hold accountable those responsible for 

vandalism against Jewish memorials, 

cemeteries, or other property.
BELARUS Commission Recommendations 

With regard to Belarus, the Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should undertake 

the following policies in multilateral 

relations and in regard to international 

organizations:

• use every measure of public and 

private diplomacy to advance the 

protection of human rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus, 

including enhanced monitoring and 

public reporting by the U.S. Department of State and the appropriate 

international organizations;

• coordinate with the European 

Union on the application of financial sanctions and visa bans on 

high-ranking Belarusian officials, 

particularly those who are directly 

responsible for, or who have carried 

out, the government’s abuses of 

religious freedom;

• undertake efforts to prevent Belarus 

from gaining membership in the 

new UN Human Rights Council; and

• urge the Belarus government to 

issue invitations to the UN Special 

Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special 

Rapporteur on Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Special 

Rapporteur on the Promotion and 

Protection of the Right to Freedom 

of Expression; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

on the Situation of Human Rights 

Defenders; the Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

as well as the Working Group on 

Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.

The U.S. government should 

undertake the following policies in 

bilateral relations:

• urge the Belarus government to take 

immediate steps to end repression, 

including: 

• repealing the highly repressive 

religion law; 

• ending the practice of denying 

registration to religious groups 

and then erecting obstacles to 

religious practice because of that 

unregistered status; 

• providing the right to conduct 

religious education and distribute 

religious material; 

• halting government attacks on the 

persons and property of minority 

religious groups; 

• ensuring a greater effort on the 

part of government officials to 

find and hold to account perpetrators of attacks on the persons 

and property of members of 

religious minorities; and 

• providing free access by domestic 

and international human rights 

groups and others to sites of religious violence or the destruction 

of places of worship; 

• urge the Belarus government to 

ensure that no religious community 

is given a status that may result in or 

be used to justify impairment of the 

rights of members of other religious 

groups; 

• urge the Belarus government to 

publicly condemn, investigate, and 

prosecute criminal acts targeting 

Jews and the Jewish community, as 

well as members of other ethnic and 

religious communities;

• continue to support, publicly and 

privately, persons and groups 

engaged in the struggle against 

repression in Belarus, including the 

group of religious and opposition 

activists who make up the Freedom 

of Religion Initiative that published 

the “White Book”; and

• organize roundtables inside Belarus 

between members of registered and 

unregistered religious communities and international experts on 

freedom of religion.

In addition, the U.S. government 

should implement or modify the 

following U.S.-funded programs and 

policies: 

• institute fully the measures set forth 

in the 2007 Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which expresses 

the Sense of Congress that sanctions 

be applied against the government 

of Belarus until the U.S. president 

“determines and certifies to the 

appropriate congressional committees that the government of Belarus 

has made significant progress” in 

meeting human rights conditions 

designated in the bill, including: 

the release of individuals who have 

been jailed on account of their 

political beliefs; the withdrawal of 

politically motivated charges against 

opposition figures; a full accounting 

of the “disappearances” of noted 

opposition leaders and journalists; 

and the cessation of all forms of 

harassment of independent media, 

non-governmental organizations, 

opposition groups, and religious 

160
organizations; specific sanctions 

would include: the denial of entry 

into the United States to high-ranking Belarusian officials, and the 

prohibition of strategic exports and 

U.S. government financing to the 

Belarusian government, except for 

humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products;

• ensure that the activities to promote democracy authorized by the 

Belarus Democracy Act include the 

right to freedom of religion or belief 

and the promotion of religious tolerance;

• urge that Congress and the State 

Department ensure that U.S. government-funded radio broadcasts 

to Belarus, including those of Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, continue at least at their present levels 

and that efforts are made to secure 

sufficient transmission capacity to 

ensure reliable reception throughout that country; and

• provide increased international 

travel opportunities, particularly to 

attend international conferences, 

for Belarusian civil society leaders, 

including representatives of human 

rights groups and religious leaders, 

and others who defend freedom of 

religion in that country. 

b el arus

161

An Orthodox Christian church in Belarus. (OSCE)
162

Georgia

Georgia’s former government under President Eduard 

Shevardnadze exhibited a slow and inadequate response to 

three years of vigilante violence against members of some 

of the country’s religious minorities. However, under the 

government of President Mikheil Saakashvili, elected in 

January 2004, the number of reported incidents of violence 

against minority religious communities has markedly 

decreased. In January 2005, two leaders of vigilante violence 

were sentenced to prison for their involvement in the attacks. 

In the past year, President Saakashvili, the National Security 

Council Secretary, and the Government Human Rights Ombudsman have advocated on behalf of religious freedom and 

spoken out in support of minority religious groups. In late 

2004, Georgian officials permitted the Jehovah’s Witnesses 

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society to operate legally in the 

country for the first time. Under a new registration process 

established by parliament in April 2005, 14 religious communities were able to obtain legal status as non-commercial 

organizations. While the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) 

remains the only religious group with formal legal status as a 

religious organization and other religious freedom issues remain unresolved in Georgia, major improvement in religious 

freedom conditions led the Commission to remove Georgia 

from its Watch List in 2004.

Georgia’s 1995 Constitution mandates the separation 

of church and state, guarantees religious freedom, and forbids “persecution of an individual for his thoughts, beliefs 

or religion.” In practice, however, violations of religious 

freedom have occurred, especially at the regional level, 

where local officials have restricted the rights of members 

of mainly non-traditional religious minorities, who in past 

years were subjected to societal violence. However, according to the State Department, increased investigations and 

prosecutions of the perpetrators led to further improvements in the status of religious freedom in 2006.

The precipitous drop in the number of violent attacks 

on religious minorities and the sentencing of the ringleaders of the violence represent significant improvements for 

religious freedom in Georgia. Under the Shevardnadze 

government, members of minority religious groups, including Baptists, Roman Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, and members of Orthodox churches that do not 

accept the primacy of the GOC Patriarchate, were subjected 

to over 100 violent vigilante attacks. Jehovah’s Witnesses, as 

well as members of independent Orthodox churches, were 

particularly targeted. Local police were implicated in these 

attacks, as they often refused to intervene to protect the 

victims. What began in 1999 as a series of isolated attacks 

in the capital of Tbilisi escalated by 2002 into a nation-wide 

scourge of widely publicized mob assaults against members 

of religious minorities. 

The main instigators of these attacks were the defrocked GOC priest Basil Mkalavishvili and director of 

the Orthodox “Jvari” Union, Paata Bluashvili, the latter 

of whom was reportedly supported by some in the GOC 

hierarchy. In November 2003, after years of government 

delay and inaction and only days after the fall of the 

Shevardnadze government, a court in Rustavi sentenced 

Bluashvili and four associates to suspended prison terms 

ranging from two to four years for their role in leading the 

two attacks against Jehovah’s Witnesses. In November 2005, 

after Jehovah’s Witnesses rented a hall in Rustavi to conduct 

meetings, Bluashvili and members of his group threatened 

the owner of the meeting hall, who then cancelled the 

contract with the group. Pending investigation of the November incident, Bluashvili was re-arrested and sentenced 

to pretrial detention. Upon his appeal of the new detention, 

a court overturned the sentence of pre-trial detention and 

again released him, awaiting trial. In April 2006, a Rustavi 

court reinstated the sentence, but Bluashvili failed to appear at the hearing and as of this writing one year later, 

was still being sought by authorities. Mkalavishvili was also 

tried and convicted on criminal charges, though only after 

somewhat drawn-out legal proceedings. He and an associate were sentenced in January 2005; Mkalavishvili received 

a six-year term and his associate a four-year term. 

Despite improvements, other religious freedom concerns remain. Although the primary leaders of the violent 

The precipitous drop in the number of 

violent attacks on religious minorities 

and the sentencing of the ringleaders of the 

violence represent significant improvements 

for religious freedom in Georgia. 
163

mob attacks against members of religious minorities have 

been convicted, many others accused of participating in 

this violence—including local police officials—have not 

been held to account by the Georgian authorities, reportedly due to fears of offending the GOC hierarchy. In October 

2006, the news service Forum 18 reported that Georgian 

courts have tried and sentenced only nine perpetrators in 

12 violent mob attacks against religious minorities, and 

only two of these defendants have received prison sentences. Jehovah’s Witnesses, the victims of most mob attacks in 

Georgia, have reportedly turned to the European Court of 

Human Rights in Strasbourg, where four of their cases are 

under consideration. Moreover, occasional mob attacks 

on religious minorities still occur. According to Forum 18, 

in September 2006 a hostile mob invaded and damaged a 

new religious and cultural center under construction by the 

Assyrian Catholic community in Tbilisi. 

There are various concerns about the status of the 

GOC, to which 65 percent of the country’s population claims 

adherence. Article 9 of Georgia’s constitution recognizes the 

“special importance of the GOC in Georgian history.” In October 2002, the Georgian government signed a “concordat” 

with the GOC, granting the Church some approval authority over state school textbooks, the construction of religious 

buildings, and the publication of religious literature by other 

religious groups. Although the agreement was reaffirmed in 

January 2005, a new law in April 2005 provided for the separation of state schools and religious teaching and narrowed 

the application of the concordat, such as limiting teaching 

by the GOC to after-school hours and eliminating school and 

teacher involvement. Reports continue, however, of social 

pressure against students who are members of religious minorities, including Yezidis, an ancient religion with a majority 

of ethnic Kurdish adherents, who refuse to take part in GOC 

religious education.

In recent years, Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Lutherans, 

Muslims, Old Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Roman 

Catholics have stated that the GOC Patriarchate has often 

acted to prevent them from acquiring, building, or reclaiming places of worship. Roman Catholics, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the True Orthodox 

Church reportedly continue to face GOC pressure, condoned 

by government officials, preventing them from building 

houses of worship. The GOC Patriarchate has also reportedly 

denied permission for Pentecostals, the Salvation Army, and 

the True Orthodox Church to print some religious literature 

in Georgia, although Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Baptists, 

Roman Catholics, and Yezidis have not reported difficulties 

in this regard. Other Orthodox communities, for the most 

part ethnic Russian adherents from three dissident Orthodox denominations—the Molokani (an Orthodox heterodox 

pacifist group), Staroveriy (Old Believers), and Dukhoboriy 

(Spirit Strugglers)—as well as some other minority Christian groups, report periodic difficulties from local officials 

and the GOC in building places of worship or displaying 

their literature in bookstores. An affiliate organization of the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses has been allowed, however, to register as 

a civic association, which should ease problems with regard 

to the import of religious literature. 

E UR OPE & E URASIA

Tbilisi, Georgia 

In recent years, Assyrian Chaldean 

Catholics, Lutherans, Muslims, Old 

Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Roman 

Catholics have stated that the GOC 

Patriarchate has often acted to prevent them 

from acquiring, building, or reclaiming 

places of worship. Roman Catholics, 

Baptists, Pentecostals, the Armenian 

Apostolic Church, and the True Orthodox 

Church reportedly continue to face 

GOC pressure, condoned by government 

officials, preventing them from 

building houses of worship.
164

In April 2005, a new law was passed allowing religious 

communities to register as non-commercial organizations. 

This new law was in response to the fact that the GOC 

was the only religious community to have legal status in 

Georgia. As a result, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 

Day Saints (Mormons), Seventh Day Adventists, and 12 

other religious denominations were approved for registration. While this remedy generally is considered a satisfactory mechanism to grant legal personality to some religious 

groups, Muslims, the Roman Catholic and Armenian 

Apostolic churches, and some other groups reportedly are 

trying to devise a different arrangement with the government better to accommodate their internal hierarchical 

structures. The leaders of other religious minority groups 

are also still seeking recognized legal status, a prerequisite 

for the community collectively to own property or organize most religious activities. The absence of formal legal 

status, however, generally has not prevented most religious 

communities from functioning through affiliated registered 

non-governmental organizations. Members of various religious minority communities have noted the positive role 

played by the government’s Human Rights Ombudsman 

in advancing their rights in accordance with international 

law. In December 2005, for example, the Human Rights 

Ombudsman issued a report calling for equal recognition 

under the law for all religions, a suggestion to which some 

Members of Parliament reportedly objected due to the 

historic role of the GOC. 

Despite general tolerance toward minority religious 

communities viewed as traditional to Georgia, opinion 

polls and the Georgian media reflect significant societal intolerance towards Protestants and other religions relatively 

new to Georgia. The State Department has reported that 

public opinion polls continue to show that most Georgians view minority or new religious groups as a threat to 

the GOC and national cultural values, and that violence 

against, and the prohibition of, such groups would be acceptable. Some GOC representatives have argued that foreign Christian religious workers should confine their activities to regions of Georgia where Muslims are the majority of 

the population. The government human rights ombudsman 

has also reported hostility towards non-Orthodox religious 

communities, including reports that children in state 

orphanages are sometimes baptized by GOC clergy without 

their parents’ permission (it is not uncommon in Georgia 

and other post-Soviet countries for impoverished parents to 

place their children in orphanages on a temporary basis). 

S TATE DEPAR TMENT

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Georgia, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should: 

• encourage the Georgian government to continue to 

investigate and prosecute those individuals, including 

local officials, who are alleged to have been complicit or 

engaged in violence against members of religious minority communities;

• encourage the Georgian government to establish a 

mechanism to enable all religious communities to gain 

legal personality under Georgian law in a manner that 

reflects internal structural characteristics of the communities and is consistent with international human 

rights standards; 

• fund programs in Georgia for journalists, religious leaders, and members of non-governmental organizations to 

promote religious tolerance and provide education on international standards on freedom of religion or belief; and

• encourage the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OSCE Field Presence in 

Tbilisi, and the OSCE Panel of Experts on Religion and 

Belief to conduct activities in Georgia to increase public 

and official awareness of the importance of freedom of 

religion or belief and tolerance. 

Tbilisi, Georgia
165

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan continues to engage in systematic and 

egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief. Until 

the sudden death of the country’s president, Saparmurat Niyazov, in December 2006, Turkmenistan had been dominated by Niyazov’s all-pervasive authoritarian rule and escalating personality cult. While Niyazov’s government had made 

small adjustments to the laws that closely regulate religious 

practice, these changes had done little to alter in practice 

the country’s generally repressive policies. After his highly 

orchestrated electoral win in February 2007, the country’s 

new president, Kurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, moved 

swiftly to implement educational reforms and has also 

promised reforms in the agricultural, health, and other social 

sectors. He has also expanded Internet access and promised 

to allow more international contacts, indicating his intention 

to curtail the country’s isolation. It is too early, however, to 

ascertain whether significant reform will also be undertaken 

with regard to human rights and, in particular, freedom of 

religion or belief. Until such reforms are implemented, the 

Commission continues to recommend that the Secretary 

of State designate Turkmenistan a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. Although religious freedom continues to 

be severely proscribed in Turkmenistan and there is scant 

evidence that the situation has improved substantially, the 

Secretary of State has not named Turkmenistan a CPC. 

President Niyazov’s personality cult, which had 

become comparable to a state-imposed religion, was bolstered by the official imposition of his book of “spiritual 

thoughts,” the Rukhnama. According to the State Department, the Rukhnama had been used “in part to supersede 

Tur kmen i s ta n

New primary, secondary, and 

university textbooks are being printed, 

with greater focus on science, mathematics, 

English, Russian, and Turkmen, thus 

presumably curtailing the previous 

(and almost exclusive) emphasis on the 

Rukhnama in the educational system. 

A statue of the late Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat (OSCE/Armonds Pupols)
166

other established religious codes, as well as historical and 

cultural texts and thereby influence citizens’ religious and 

cultural behavior.” Students were required to study the 

Rukhnama at all public schools and institutes of higher 

learning. A July 2002 law enjoins parents and guardians 

“to bring [children] up in the spirit of ...the unshakeable 

spiritual values embodied in the holy Rukhnama.” Credible reports indicate that mullahs in Turkmenistan were 

told in late 2005 to stop reading the Koran in mosques 

and restrict themselves to the Rukhnama. Niyazov had 

ordered that his books be displayed in mosques and 

churches alongside the Koran and the Bible. Rukhnama

quotations have also been carved alongside Koran citations in the country’s largest mosque.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted that while the February 2007 Turkmenistan presidential election was an “improvement,” it was not 

“genuine,” not least because exiled members of Turkmenistan’s political opposition were not allowed back into the 

country to compete in the election. The former chairman of 

the Turkmen parliament, Ovezgeldy Atayev, was sentenced 

on specious charges involving the suicide death of a relative 

to a five-year prison term after a closed trial in March 2007; 

his wife was later also convicted of unknown charges and 

is currently in a prison camp. According to the country’s 

constitution, Atayev was the next in line to succeed Niyazov. 

The new president has renamed the heads of the powerful 

Defense and Interior Ministries, as well as the secret police 

and the Presidential Guard. 

Turkmenistan’s new leader has, however, taken some 

steps to end Niyazov’s 20-year legacy of isolated one-man 

rule. His first official action was to order the opening of 15 

Internet cafes in various cities, although access fees are 

high, politically sensitive sites are reportedly blocked, and 

copies of the Rukhnama are displayed. In January, prominent Turkmen ecologist Andrei Zatoka, who was arrested 

in late 2006, received a suspended three-year sentence. In 

the president’s first decree, aimed at the educational system 

which Niyazov had done much to destroy, secondary 

schooling was increased from nine to 10 years in the 2007 

school year and higher education from two to five years; 

he also promised to facilitate access for Turkmen citizens 

to universities and institutes in other countries. In March 

2007, the Turkmen president signed an educational reform 

decree that recognizes foreign diplomas and initiates 

reform of the high school curriculum. Reportedly, 23,000 

teachers have returned to work and the country’s new 

leaders reportedly have told diplomats that they want more 

international exchange programs. Police and street controls 

on travel inside Turkmenistan have also been eased. 

The new leadership has also begun to distance itself 

from Niyazov’s personality cult. Berdymukhammedov has 

made some initial attempts to curtail the imposition of 

the sworn oath of loyalty to Niyazov, calling for assigning a 

specific time and place when the oath should be made and 

suggesting that it should be restricted to special occasions. 

According to news reports, in televised comments in March 

2007, Berdymukhammedov in effect called for cutting back 

on public expressions of adherence to Niyazov, including by 

designating only one day, December 21, as the official day 

of mourning for Niyazov; proposing a new law on loyalty 

oath procedures and regulations; and suggesting that official greeting ceremonies be trimmed. In March 2007, a 

new presidential decree was signed ordering that Niyazov’s 

name by replaced by the words “Turkmen president” on 

the presidential banner. New primary, secondary, and university textbooks are being printed, with greater focus on 

science, mathematics, English, Russian, and Turkmen, thus 

presumably curtailing the previous (and almost exclusive) 

emphasis on the Rukhnama in the educational system. 

The Turkmen Academy of Sciences has been re-opened, 

and a series of articles by Turkmen scholars exploring the 

country’s history, including Islamic and archeological sites, 

have recently been published on official websites. 

Security police continue to 

break up religious meetings in private 

homes, search homes without warrants, 

confiscate religious literature, and 

detain and threaten congregants with 

criminal prosecution and deportation. 

Family members of detained religious

 leaders have been subjected to 

harassment and internal exile. 
167

Despite these small changes, the prevalence of the 

Niyazov cult persists and the Rukhnama reportedly still 

plays a prominent role in the country’s educational system 

and official ceremonies. The Rukhnama also continues to 

be ritualistically referred to in print and broadcast media. 

Houses are still decorated with Niyazov’s portraits and 

his statue continues to revolve with the sun in the capital 

city of Ashgabat. Although Berdymukhammedov took his 

presidential oath on the Turkmen constitution, he also 

bowed towards a copy of the Koran and the Rukhnama and

swore to continue Niyazov’s policies. Lavish state celebrations to mark what would have been Niyazov’s 67th birthday 

on February 19, 2007 included huge Rukhnama banners, 

the opening of a new museum to honor the deceased 

president, and the unveiling of a new biography of Niyazov. 

In April 2007, the Turkmen government sponsored an 

international youth conference, with participants from 40 

countries, to study the country’s “spiritual constitution,” the 

Rukhnama. The Rukhnama is also still being taught in all 

schools, and remains a required element of school exams.

In the sphere of protections for religious freedom and 

related human rights, no reforms have been undertaken by 

the new government. Indeed, some observers believe that 

reforms are unlikely in this sphere because the country’s 

tight control of religious practice also reflects the views of 

the country’s current security apparatus. Turkmenistan’s 

parliament did designate funds in March 2007 to speed 

up construction of a mosque in the city of Mary. However, there have been no moves to reform the country’s 

repressive laws on religion. The former chief mufti of 

Turkmenistan, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, is still serving a 

22-year prison term handed down during a closed trial in 

2004. Ibadullah, who opposed Niyazov’s decree that the 

Rukhnama be displayed next to the Koran in the country’s 

mosques, was officially charged with treason for an alleged 

role in a 2002 assassination attempt on Niyazov. According 

to Amnesty International, the mullah’s family has not been 

allowed to see him since his arrest, and given the generally 

dire prison conditions in Turkmenistan, there are serious 

concerns about his health. Furthermore, the Turkmen 

government has not responded to repeated official requests 

from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief to visit the country.

Since independence in 1991, religious groups have been 

required to register with the government in order to engage 

in religious activities. The 1997 version of the country’s 

religion law effectively banned all religious groups except 

the state-controlled Sunni Muslim Board and the Russian 

Orthodox Church, though religious instruction even for these 

two communities remains severely limited. In March 2004, 

Niyazov proclaimed that no new mosques should be built 

anywhere in the country and seven mosques are reported 

to have been destroyed in that year. Niyazov ordered the 

publication of a list of religious rituals common to all Turkmen and reportedly secret police attend mosques to identify 

Muslims who perform religious rites in a way that differs 

from the officially-prescribed Turkmen practice. The Turkmen authorities continue to limit the number of Muslims 

permitted to perform the hajj; in early November 2006, the 

government announced that only 188 of the country’s official 

quota of 4,500 would be allowed to go to Mecca. Nevertheless, the country’s official newspaper declared in April 2007 

that it was the duty of every Muslim to undertake the hajj. 

The Turkmen State University Theological Faculty has been 

dissolved and absorbed into another department, leaving 

only one institution of Islamic education open, with the 

government controlling its curriculum. 

The Russian Orthodox community has also been affected by the repressive policies of Niyazov, who banned 

the country’s residents from receiving Russian publications 

by mail, including the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 

All Russian Orthodox parishes were re-registered by NoTur kmen i s ta n
168

vember 2005. Yet, Turkmen authorities refuse to allow the 

Russian Orthodox community to build a new cathedral in 

the capital of Ashgabat, though Niyazov allocated land for 

that purpose 10 years ago. According to the Forum 18 News 

Service, final construction work on the community-funded 

convent next to St Nicholas’ Church in Ashgabat was halted 

in late 2005, after Niyazov allegedly privately warned 

Orthodox clergy that if construction went ahead he would 

order demolition of all the country’s Orthodox churches. 

In addition, the Turkmen government has attempted to 

isolate local parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church, in 

part by pressuring the local Church to take Turkmenistan’s 

parishes from the jurisdiction of the Central Asian diocese 

in Uzbekistan and put them under the Patriarch of Moscow, 

which in July 2005 rejected this proposal. 

A new law on religion in 2003 further codified the 

Turkmen government’s highly repressive policies, effectively banning most religious activity, and setting criminal 

penalties for those found guilty of participating in “illegal” 

religious activity. The law also required religious groups to 

coordinate with the Turkmen government any contacts with 

co-religionists abroad. In response to international pressure, 

Niyazov issued a decree in March 2004 stating that religious 

communities may register “in the prescribed manner,” and 

reduced the registration requirement from 500 members to 

five. In May 2004, President Niyazov issued several decrees 

decriminalizing unregistered religious activities and easing 

other requirements for registration, resulting in the registration of nine small groups, in addition to the majority Sunni 

Muslims and the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, 

Turkmen officials have stated that “eased” registration 

requirements do not mean that religious communities may 

gather in private homes or that religious adherents will no 

longer be required to request official permission before 

holding worship services. In fact, some reports indicate that 

registration is actually being used as a method of more effective state control over religious communities, as it affords 

officials the right to know what occurs at every meeting of 

a religious group. Participants in religious meetings who 

refuse to provide details about their gatherings risk having 

their communities charged with being in violation of registration requirements. Moreover, religious groups that do not 

meet the often arbitrary registration rules still face administrative penalties that may include imprisonment and large 

fines due to their unregistered status.

Though such raids were fewer than in previous years, 

police have continued to interfere in the activities of both 

registered and unregistered religious communities in the 

past year. Security police continue to break up religious 

meetings in private homes, search homes without warrants, 

confiscate religious literature, and detain and threaten congregants with criminal prosecution and deportation. Family 

members of detained religious leaders have been subjected 

to harassment and internal exile. In addition, members of 

some religious minority groups, particularly Protestants, 

Hare Krishnas, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, have faced official 

pressure to renounce their faith publicly, and been forced 

to swear an oath on the Rukhnama. 

In 2006, Baptists, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Seventh-day Adventists reported disruption 

of meetings, along with detentions (including of children), 

and administrative fines. In June 2006, a Russian Baptist 

reportedly was deported from Turkmenistan for his religious activities and forced to leave his wife and two young 

children behind. According to Forum 18, two Protestants 

are facing official charges or harassment, reportedly linked 

to their religious activism. Jehovah’s Witnesses reportedly 

Kipchak Mosque, Ashgabat
169

experienced eight incidents of harassment or short-term 

detention during a three-month period in the last year. One 

Jehovah’s Witness was confined to a psychiatric hospital in 

June 2006 for refusing military conscription, reportedly at 

the order of a deputy defense minister. In late June 2006, 

another Jehovah’s Witness was forcibly confined for five 

days to a drug treatment center for refusing military service; 

according to Forum 18, he became very ill as a result. 

Police raided a home in Konye-Urgench where a group 

of Jehovah’s Witnesses had gathered; at the local police 

station they were interrogated, insulted, and released. A 

Hare Krishna adherent received a seven-year jail sentence 

on unknown charges; in October 2006, she was released as 

part of a general prisoner amnesty. 

No religious literature is printed in Turkmenistan and 

the import of religious materials is essentially impossible.

In addition, known religious adherents are sometimes 

banned from travel. In recent years, the Turkmen government has refused entry visas to three or four priests who are 

Russian citizens, while church delegations to Turkmenistan 

from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Moscow have been forced 

by Turkmen officials to reduce their numbers. Muslims 

are not allowed to travel abroad for religious education; 

however, Russian Orthodox men from Turkmenistan are allowed to study for the priesthood at the Tashkent seminary. 

For several years, the Commission has raised public 

concerns about the status of religious freedom in Turkmenistan at meetings of the OSCE. In October 2006, Commission staff took part in a roundtable on Turkmenistan 

sponsored by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) at 

the OSCE Human Dimension Meeting in Warsaw. In January 2007, Commissioners met with Assistant Secretary of 

State Richard Boucher to discuss concerns over U.S. policy 

on Turkmenistan and the failure to name the country a 

CPC. The Commission has met with the U.S. Ambassador 

to Turkmenistan to discuss bilateral relations, the status of 

religious freedom and other human rights, and steps the 

United States might take to ameliorate the situation. As 

recommended by the Commission, the UN Commission on 

Human Rights (UNCHR) passed resolutions condemning 

Turkmenistan for repression of religious and political rights 

in 2004. In March 2005, the Commission met with delegation heads from the United States and European Union 

(EU) countries at the 61st session of the UNCHR session 

and presented information about violations of religious 

freedom in Turkmenistan, questioning the decision of the 

United States and the EU not to introduce a resolution on 

Turkmenistan at the 2005 UNCHR. 

The Commission also continues to issue statements and 

take part in meetings with U.S.-based experts and activists concerned with Turkmenistan. In January 2007, the 

Commission co-sponsored and spoke at an event entitled 

“Religious Freedom and State Policy in Central Asia,” together with the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS). After Niyzov’s death, the Commission issued a press 

statement with an extensive set of new recommendations 

on ways to promote religious freedom and other human 

rights in Turkmenistan. In July 2005, the Commission held a 

public briefing with the CSIS, on “U.S. Strategic Dilemmas in 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.” The briefing discussed the 

human rights situation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the 

nature of local extremist and terrorist threats, and U.S. and 

other strategic interests in the region. 

No religious literature is printed 

in Turkmenistan and the import of religious 

materials is essentially impossible. 

Tur kmen i s ta n

Women at a market in Turkmenistan (OSCE).
Turkmenistan Commission Recommendations 

I

n addition to continuing to recommend that Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, the Commission has 

further recommended that the U.S. 

government should urge the government of Turkmenistan to undertake 

the following steps:

• dismantle the personality cult of 

former President Niyazov, including eliminating the requirement 

that the Rukhnama be quoted and 

displayed in mosques, and drop 

the Rukhnama from the school and 

university curricula;

• undertake a major reform of the 

country’s laws and regulations to 

bring them into conformity with 

its international legal obligations, 

such as dropping imprisonment or 

fines of individuals who engage in 

unregistered religious activities; allowing children to receive religious 

education; allowing the publication and distribution of religious 

literature inside Turkmenistan; and 

permitting freedom of movement 

for members of all religious and 

other communities;

• adopt reform of the country’s 

policies toward religion, including ending state interference in the 

selection, training, and management of religious communities, such 

as those of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims 

and the Russian Orthodox Church, 

as well as of Protestant and other 

minority communities;

• identify specific immediate steps to 

improve religious freedom conditions, which should include (1) 

ending harassment and deportation of religious leaders; (2) halting 

unjust arrest, detention, imprisonment, torture, and residential and 

workplace intimidation of religious 

leaders and their adherents; and (3) 

releasing immediately and unconditionally any persons who have been 

detained because of their religious 

beliefs, practices, or choice of 

religious association, including Nazrullah ibn Ibadullah, the country’s 

former chief mufti; 

• respond to longstanding requests 

for visits by the UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief; on Torture; on the Right to 

Education; on the Right of Everyone 

to the Enjoyment of the Highest 

Attainable Standard of Physical and 

Mental Health; on Extra-judicial, 

Summary or Arbitrary Executions; 

and on the Independence of the 

Judiciary; as well as the Representative of the UN Secretary General 

on the Human Rights of Displaced 

Persons; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 

Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Working Group on Arbitrary 

Detention, and representatives of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including 

the Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief, and provide the 

full and necessary conditions for 

such visits; and

• implement the new education law 

by undertaking a thorough review 

and reform of the country’s educational system, including revising texts and lessons to eliminate 

Niyazov’s personality cult, and to 

add education on human rights.

The Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should:

• suspend non-humanitarian assistance to the government of 

Turkmenistan, with the exception 

of programs that serve identifiable U.S. national security interests 

in connection with the current 

campaign against terrorism. This 

recommendation does not apply to 

U.S. assistance to appropriate nongovernmental organizations, private 

persons, or cultural or educational 

exchanges, including the specific 

items discussed below;

• scrutinize all aspects of any assistance programs in Turkmenistan 

to ensure that these programs do 

not facilitate Turkmen government 

policies or practices that result in 

religious freedom violations. The 

United States should also examine 

its programs in Turkmenistan to determine if opportunities exist within 

those programs to promote the 

development of genuine respect for 

human rights, including religious 

freedom, in that country;

• support efforts to facilitate Turkmenistan’s sale of natural gas on 

world markets, including support 

for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, 

only if the Turkmen government 

takes definitive steps to improve 

substantially conditions for human 

rights and religious freedom in 

Turkmenistan;

• identify specific steps that the 

government of Turkmenistan could 

take in order to have its currently 

suspended assistance reinstated 

and to avoid triggering further 

170
restrictions on assistance programs, 

steps which should include, but 

not be limited to (1) the lifting of 

oppressive legal requirements on 

religious groups and allowing all 

such groups to organize and operate 

freely; (2) the end to harassment 

and deportation of religious leaders; 

and (3) the halting of unjust arrest, 

detention, imprisonment, torture, 

and residential and workplace 

intimidation of religious leaders and 

their adherents, including releasing 

those currently detained or imprisoned; and (4) the reform of laws and 

policies that violate international 

human rights standards; and 

• develop assistance programs to 

encourage civil society groups that 

protect human rights and promote 

religious freedom, including by:

• expanding “train-the-trainer” 

legal assistance programs for 

representatives of religious communities to act as legal advisers in 

the registration process; and

• specifying freedom of religion as a 

grants category and area of activity in the Democracy and Conflict 

Mitigation program of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and the Democracy Commission Small Grants program 

administered by the U.S. Embassy.

The Commission recommends 

that, in the longer term, the U.S. 

government expand the following programs with regard to Turkmenistan:

• increase radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasts of objective news and 

information, including educational 

topics, human rights, freedom of 

religion, and tolerance;

• increase exchange programs, 

including for civil society leaders, 

students, and others concerned 

with human rights, and continue 

the expansion of the Peace Corps 

program in Turkmenistan;

• use appropriate avenues of public 

diplomacy to explain why religious 

freedom is an important element of 

U.S. foreign policy, as well as specific 

concerns about violations of religious 

freedom in Turkmenistan; and

• expand “American corner” reading 

rooms in various regions. 

The Commission also recommends that the U.S. government work 

with other governments to adopt 

the following policies with regard to 

Turkmenistan:

• freeze Niyazov’s overseas financial 

assets, releasing such funds only 

with verifiable guarantees that these 

funds will be used to implement 

human rights and democratic 

reforms inside Turkmenistan; 

• encourage the new government of 

Turkmenistan to abide by the recommendations of the October 2006 

Report of the UN Secretary General 

on the Situation of Human Rights in 

Turkmenistan; 

• expand the activities of the OSCE’s 

office in Ashgabat, particularly on 

human rights, tolerance, and freedom of religion or belief, including 

programs with local schools, universities, and institutes; consider providing extra-budgetary funding for 

the OSCE Field Presence in Ashgabat 

to assist it in the effective implementation of additional programs during 

the post-Niyazov transition;

• encourage scrutiny of freedom of 

religion or belief in appropriate 

international fora such as the OSCE 

and other multilateral venues and 

also raise the issue of religious 

freedom violations in Turkmenistan 

at those UN bodies that consider 

human rights questions; and

• continue to support discussions 

among representatives of Turkmenistan’s religious communities, religious affairs officials, and 

experts on international norms on 

religious freedom, in conjunction 

with the OSCE and with representatives of other relevant international organizations.

Tur kmen i s ta n

171
172

Uzbekistan

Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991, fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, 

have been under assault. A restrictive law on religion severely limits the ability of religious communities to function 

in Uzbekistan, facilitating the Uzbek government’s exercise 

of a high degree of control over religious communities 

and the approved manner in which the Islamic religion is 

practiced. The Uzbek government has continued to arrest 

Muslim individuals and harshly repress the activities of 

groups and mosques that do not conform to governmentprescribed practices or that the government claims are 

associated with extremist political programs. This policy 

has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons 

in recent years, many of whom are denied the right to due 

process, and there are credible reports that many of those 

arrested continue to be tortured or beaten in detention. 

Though security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including 

from members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups that 

claim a religious linkage, these threats do not excuse or justify the scope and harshness of the government’s ill treatment of religious believers. The Commission recommends 

to the Secretary of State that Uzbekistan continue to be 

designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The 

Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should 

not in any way be construed as an exculpatory defense of 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist and highly intolerant organization that promotes hatred of the West, moderate Muslims, 

Jews, and others. In 2006, the State Department followed 

the Commission’s recommendation and for the first time 

designated Uzbekistan a CPC.

Despite the constitutional separation of religion and 

state, the Uzbek government strictly regulates Islamic institutions and practice through the officially sanctioned Muslim 

Spiritual Board (the Muftiate). In 1998, the Uzbek government closed down approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 mosques 

that were open at that time. In the Ferghana Valley, viewed 

as the country’s most actively religious region, the state has 

confiscated a number of mosques and used them as warehouses or for other state purposes. Uzbek human rights defenders reported that as of late 2006, the Uzbek government 

had introduced various administrative and other obstacles 

to daily prayer practice in the Ferghana valley. For example, 

in the Andijon region, the regional head of administration 

introduced other restrictions on Islamic practice, such as a 

ban on the five daily public calls to prayer from mosques and 

on preaching by mullahs at weddings. Despite the presence 

of a Shi’a minority in the country, there is no training for Shi’a 

religious leaders, nor does the government recognize foreign 

Shi’a religious education. 

 The state fully controls the training, appointments, and 

dismissals of Muslim leaders through the official Muftiate. 

There are 10 state-controlled madrassas (including two for 

women), which provide secondary education in Uzbekistan. 

In addition, the official Islamic Institute and Islamic University in Tashkent provide higher educational instruction. The 

State Department reported in 2006 that regional leaders in 

Uzbekistan have been instructed that children should not 

attend mosque; in the city of Bukhara, police have reportedly prevented children from doing so. The state also closes 

or confiscates privately-funded religious schools for its own 

purposes. For example, in Margilan and Andijon the government in 2004 and 2005 confiscated two religious schools, 

or madrassas, reportedly built with community funds. The 

state-controlled Muslim Board publishes some books and 

periodicals, as does the independent former Chief Mufti 

Muhamad Sadyk Muhamad Yusuf. 

 Over the past decade and particularly since 1999, 

the Uzbek government has arrested and imprisoned, with 

sentences of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who 

reject the state’s control over religious practice or who the 

government claims are associated with extremist groups. 

As of 2005, according to a State Department estimate, there 

were at least 5,500 such persons, including individuals 

sent to psychiatric hospitals. According to Uzbek human 

rights activists, in the past year, the number of arrests and 

Though security threats do exist in 

Uzbekistan, including from members of 

Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups that 

claim a religious linkage, these threats 

do not excuse or justify the scope and 

harshness of the government’s ill 

treatment of religious believers. 
173

detentions linked to religious convictions has risen sharply 

in the Uzbek capital Tashkent and its surrounding region. 

These Uzbek sources also estimate that during the first 

half of 2006, an estimated 150 Muslims were arrested and 

sentenced on charges related to their religious beliefs. Most 

of those arrested have no political connections, Uzbek 

human rights activists claim, and their only “crime” is that 

of performing their daily prayers and learning about Islam. 

According to the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports 

on Human Rights Practices, “authorities made little distinction between actual [Hizb ut-Tahrir] members and those 

with marginal affiliation with the group, such as persons 

who had attended Koranic study sessions with the group.” 

Human rights organizations report that many of those in 

detention were arrested on false drug charges or for possession of literature of a banned organization. Once arrested, 

they often are denied access to a lawyer or are held incommunicado for weeks or months. Many of those imprisoned 

or detained for charges related to religion are treated 

particularly harshly; prisoners who pray or observe Muslim 

religious festivals are by many accounts subjected to further 

harassment, beatings, and other torture, in efforts to force 

them to renounce their religious or political views. 

The use of torture continues to be widespread in Uzbekistan, despite promises from the government to halt the 

practice. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in his February 2003 report on Uzbekistan, concluded that “torture or 

similar ill-treatment is systematic” and that the “pervasive 

and persistent nature of torture throughout the investigative process cannot be denied.” Even after the publication 

of the Rapporteur’s report, reliance on the use of torture 

in detention did not significantly decrease. According to 

the State Department’s 2006 human rights report, “police, 

prison officials, and the [security services] allegedly used 

suffocation, electric shock, deprivation of food and water, 

and sexual abuse, with beating the most commonly reported method of abuse [and] torture.” Convictions in the 

cases described above are based almost entirely on confessions, which, according to the State Department and many 

human rights organizations, are frequently gained through 

the use of torture.

UZB E K IS TA N

Mosques on the Registan, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
174

The government of Uzbekistan does face threats to 

its security from certain extremist or terrorist groups that 

claim religious links, including the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan, which has used violence but whose membership reportedly declined after U.S. military action in 

Afghanistan in late 2001 killed its leaders. Uzbekistan continues to be subject to violent attacks; there were several incidents in 2004, although the motivation of those involved 

is difficult to determine. In the city of Andijon in May 2005, 

there were daily peaceful protests in support of 23 businessmen on trial for alleged ties to Islamic extremism. A small 

group reportedly seized weapons from a police garrison, 

stormed the prison holding the businessmen, released the 

defendants, and attacked other sites in the city. In connection with these events, on May 13, after several thousand 

mostly unarmed civilians gathered on the central square, 

Uzbek armed forces fired indiscriminately and without 

warning into the crowd. Estimated fatalities range from an 

official total of 187 to over 700 according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); some 

reports of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) say as 

many as 1,000 men, women, and children were killed. The 

Uzbek government has rejected repeated calls from the 

United States, the European Union, the OSCE, and the UN 

High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent 

international investigation into these events. 

In the aftermath of Andijon, Uzbek authorities jailed 

hundreds of local residents, human rights activists, and 

journalists on suspicion of involvement in the events. One 

Uzbek human rights NGO compiled a list of arrestees totaling 363 persons, in addition to those already convicted by 

the end of 2005, including dozens of people who had spoken to the press or reported on the events. Relatives of human rights defenders have also been targeted in attempts 

to pressure activists to stop speaking out about human 

rights violations; those related to human rights activists 

have reportedly been threatened, dismissed from their jobs, 

beaten, and sometimes arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned on fabricated criminal charges. In January 2006, one 

arrestee, human rights activist Saidjahon Zaynabitdinov, 

with whom a Commission delegation met in October 2004, 

was convicted of extremist activity and other offenses and 

sentenced to seven years in prison. He had reportedly 

shown journalists bullet casings used by the Uzbek authorities against the Andijon demonstrators. The State Department reported that in several cases, the Uzbek government 

has pressured other countries forcibly to return Uzbek 

refugees who were under the protection of the Office of the 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned in most Muslim countries, purports not to engage in violence but is intolerant of other religions and has in some circumstances sanctioned violence. 

The group calls for a worldwide caliphate to replace existing 

governments and the imposition of an extremist interpretation of Islamic law. Although it does not specify the methods 

it would use to attain those goals, it does, according to the 

State Department, reserve the “possibility that its own members might resort to violence.” In addition, the State Department reports that Hizb ut-Tahrir material includes “strong 

anti-Semitic and anti-Western rhetoric.” Alleged members 

of Hizb ut-Tahrir comprise many of the thousands in prison; 

in most cases, however, Uzbek authorities have failed to 

present evidence to the court that these persons have committed violence. Many of those arrested and imprisoned are 

not affiliated with Hizb ut-Tahrir but are wrongfully accused 

of membership or association, sometimes due to alleged—

or planted—possession of the group’s literature at the time 

of arrest. 

A community leader in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan
175

After the May 2005 Andijon events, the number of 

court cases against independent Muslims in Uzbekistan 

reportedly increased considerably. While before May 2005, 

the authorities often accused arrested Muslims of being 

members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, since that time, arrested Muslims are usually accused—frequently without evidence—of 

being “Wahhabis” or members of another banned Islamist 

group, Akromiya, which played an important role in the 

Andijon events. “Wahhabi” is a term that usually refers to 

followers of a highly restrictive interpretation of Sunni Islam 

practiced in Saudi Arabia. In Uzbekistan, however, “Wahhabi” is a catchphrase used to refer to a range of Muslim 

individuals and groups, such as genuine extremists, those 

that oppose the Karimov regime, and those who practice 

Islam independently of government strictures. For the Uzbek 

authorities, all these groups and individuals are equally 

suspect and subject to government repression.The Uzbek 

criminal code distinguishes between “illegal” groups, which 

are not properly registered, and “prohibited” groups, such 

as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tabligh, a Muslim missionary movement 

which originated in South Asia in 1920, and Akromiya, a 

group based on the 1992 writings of an imprisoned Uzbek 

mathematics teacher, Akram Yuldashev, which, according to 

human rights defenders in Uzbekistan, espouses charitable 

work and a return to Islamic moral principles. According 

to the State Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report, the 

Uzbek government has pressured and prosecuted members 

of Akromiya (also known as Akromiylar) since 1997, claiming 

that the group is a branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and that it attempted, together with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

to overthrow the government through an armed rebellion in 

May 2005 in Andijon. The charges against the 23 local businessmen on trial in Andijon in May 2005 included alleged 

membership in Akromiya. 

Some 20 policemen searched a house in Tashkent in 

June 2006, confiscating a copy of the Koran, the hadiths (sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad), religious books, 

and tape recordings of the exiled mullah Obid kori Nazarov 

and his pupil Hairullah Hamidov, the Uzbek “Human Rights 

Initiative Group” reported. The items were seized as material 

evidence against two men who were arrested and accused of 

“Wahhabism,” although reportedly they merely sought independent religious education. Human rights sources indicate 

that Nazarov, who had been forced to flee the country after 

the authorities branded him a “Wahhabi” leader, was not 

promoting extremism, but simply operating outside of government strictures. The State Department reported that in 

September 2006, Ruhitdin Fakhrutdinov, a former imam of a 

Tashkent mosque, was sentenced in a closed trial to 17 years 

in prison. During his trial, which involved clear violations of 

due process, the independent imam was accused of being 

an extremist and charged with involvement in a 1999 car 

bombing in Tashkent, although no evidence was presented 

to the court of involvement in violent acts. Fakhrutdinov was 

delivered in 2005 to the Uzbek authorities from his place of 

asylum in Kazakhstan, allegedly with the assistance of the 

Kazakh authorities.

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Organizations passed in May 1998 severely restricts the 

exercise of religious freedom. Through regulations that are 

often arbitrarily applied, the law imposes onerous hurdles 

for the registration of religious groups, such as stipulating 

that a group must have a list of at least 100 members who 

are Uzbek citizens and a legal address; criminalizes unregistered religious activity; bans the production and distribution of unofficial religious publications; prohibits minors 

from participating in religious organizations; prohibits 

private teaching of religious principles; and forbids the 

wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other than 

clerics. Only six entities meet the law’s requirement that 

religious groups must have a registered central administrative body so as to train religious personnel. The law also 

limits religious instruction to officially sanctioned religious 

schools and state-approved instructors, does not permit 

private instruction, and levies fines for violations. In December 2005, the government modified the country’s criminal and administrative codes to introduce much heavier 

UZB E K IS TA N

Over the past decade and particularly 

since 1999, the Uzbek government has 

arrested and imprisoned, with sentences 

of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who 

reject the state’s control over religious 

practice or who the government claims are 

associated with extremist groups. 
176

fines for repeated violations of rules on religious meetings, 

processions, and other religious ceremonies, as well as for 

violations of the law on religious organizations. As a result, 

police monitoring of places of worship has intensified. 

While the government has not intervened significantly in 

Christian training and appointments, it prohibits the Jewish community from establishing a rabbinate or yeshiva to 

train rabbis.

According to the State Department, seven evangelical 

groups repeatedly have been denied registration in 2006. All 

Protestant churches in the autonomous region of Karakalpakistan lost their registration appeals by September 2005, 

and Karakalpakistan authorities also continued to exert 

pressure on the Hare Krishna community. As of late 2006, the 

Uzbek government was threatening to close the country’s last 

registered Jehovah’s Witnesses community. Sometimes the 

state-run media engages in harassment of religious minorities. Two prime-time Uzbek-language programs, broadcast 

on national state TV in late 2006, claimed that Protestants 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses turned people into “zombies.” 

Protestant leaders have reported fears that these programs 

were part of a campaign to prepare the Uzbek population for 

further repression of minority religious communities. 

In past years, Christian leaders have reportedly been 

detained in psychiatric hospitals, severely beaten, and/or 

sentenced to labor camps. Some Christian communities 

continue to have their churches raided, services interrupted, 

Bibles confiscated, and the names of adherents recorded by 

Uzbek officials. In late 2006, the Uzbek authorities stepped 

up their campaign against the leaders of several unregistered 

Protestant communities. In Karakalpakistan, two Pentecostal 

Christians have been charged for their religious activity and 

if convicted, each faces five years of imprisonment. In March 

2007, a court in Andijon sentenced local Protestant pastor 

Dmitry Shestakov to four years internal exile for “illegal” religious activity; he was arrested in January 2007 and had faced 

a possible total of 20 years of imprisonment. Government harassment of Shestakov dates back almost a decade, increasing in May 2006, reportedly because some ethnic Uzbeks had 

converted to Christianity. 

It has become more difficult to secure permission to 

publish religious literature in the past year, the Forum 18 

News Service reports. Permission is still required from the 

state Committee for Religious Affairs and the state-controlled Muslim Spiritual Board (Muftiate), but reportedly, 

a secret instruction was issued in 2006 limiting publications to less than 1,000 copies of any single religious 

book. Amendments to the criminal and administrative 

codes, which came into force in June 2006, instituted new 

penalties for the “illegal” production, storage, import, and 

distribution of religious literature, with penalties of up to 

three years’ imprisonment for repeat offenders. Reportedly, 

the Chairman of the state Committee for Religious Affairs 

has said that the import of foreign literature for Muslims 

had practically ceased. Fines for violations of these codes 

can be up to 100 – 200 times the minimum monthly wage or 

“corrective labor” of up to three years.

The Russian Orthodox Church publishes a newspaper 

and a journal (both in Russian) and maintains a website. 

The Catholic Church in Tashkent maintains an internet 

news agency. Various Christian churches have set up a 

Bible Society in Tashkent, which produces limited supplies 

of Christian books, but the Religious Affairs Committee 

must approve each edition. Other religious minorities are 

almost entirely banned from producing religious literature in Uzbekistan, especially in the Uzbek language. The 

Jehovah’s Witnesses note that they cannot print or import 

their religious literature in Uzbek; the Religious Affairs 

A market in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan Committee limits imports of Russian-language literature 
177

to registered congregations, making imports to the many 

unregistered Jehovah’s Witnesses communities prohibited.

For many years, the Uzbek government has allowed 

only about 20 percent of the country’s quota of pilgrims to 

make the religious hajj to Mecca. Since May 2005, the Uzbek 

government has intensified its efforts to isolate the people 

of Uzbekistan. It has cracked down on both domestic and 

foreign-based NGOs in order to minimize Western influence; after many audits targeting a number of international, 

human rights oriented NGOs, almost three-fourths of these 

organizations were closed during 2006, the State Department reported. Other elements of this campaign include: the 

detention and deportation in 2005 of a Forum 18 reporter 

and the demand, in March 2006, that the UNHCR close its office within one month. In April 2007, the Uzbek government 

granted a three-month extension of the work accreditation 

for the Tashkent office director of Human Rights Watch.

In October 2004, the Commission traveled to Uzbekistan and met with senior officials of the Foreign, Internal 

Affairs, and Justice Ministries, the Presidential Administration, the Committee on Religious Affairs, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s office. The delegation also met with 

the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, as well as 

other religious groups, Uzbek human rights activists and 

lawyers, alleged victims of repression and their families, 

Western NGOs active in Uzbekistan, and U.S. Embassy personnel. In November 2006, the Commission issued a press 

statement welcoming the designation of Uzbekistan as a 

Country of Particular Concern.

Commission staff continue to take part in meetings 

with delegations of Uzbek religious leaders, human rights 

groups and academics from Uzbekistan, and U.S.-based 

experts and activists concerned with Uzbekistan. In January 2007, the Commission co-sponsored an event entitled 

“Religious Freedom and State Policy in Central Asia,” 

together with the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS), to discuss religious freedom conditions in 

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states.

In July 2005, the Commission held a public briefing on “U.S. 

Strategic Dilemmas in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,” also 

with CSIS. At a June 2005 Carnegie Endowment roundtable 

on Andijon, the Commission released its Policy Focus 

report, which includes numerous policy recommendations. 

In May 2005, then-Commission Chair Michael Cromartie 

testified on Uzbekistan at a hearing of the U.S. Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Language reflecting a Commission recommendation on 

Uzbekistan was included in the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act of 2005. The Congress conditioned funds to Uzbekistan on its “making substantial and continuing progress in 

meeting its commitments under the ‘Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the 

Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States of America,’” 

such as respect for human rights, including religious freedom. The Commission’s recommendation to re-open the 

Voice of America’s (VOA) Uzbek Service was adopted in June 

2005, but the U.S. Board for Broadcasting Governors and the 

President’s Budget request for fiscal year 2008 have again 

proposed the closure of the VOA’s Uzbek Service.

“Wahhabi” is a term that usually 

refers to followers of a highly restrictive 

interpretation of Sunni Islam practiced 

in Saudi Arabia. In Uzbekistan, however, 

“Wahhabi” is a catchphrase used to 

refer to a range of Muslim individuals 

and groups, such as genuine extremists, 

those that oppose the Karimov regime, 

and those who practice Islam independently 

of government strictures. For the 

Uzbek authorities, all these groups and 

individuals are equally suspect and 

subject to government repression. 
UZBEKISTAN Commission Recommendations 

 The U.S. government 

should ensure that it speaks 

in a unified voice in its 

relations with the Uzbek 

government. To that end, 

the U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. statements and actions are coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. concerns 

about human rights conditions in 

Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings with the Uzbek government; 

• following the European Union’s October 2005 decision, reduce aid and 

arms sales to Uzbekistan and ban 

visits by high-level Uzbek officials in 

response to the Uzbek government's 

refusal to allow an independent 

investigation into the violence in 

Andijon in May 2005; 

• ensure that U.S. assistance to 

the Uzbek government, with the 

exception of assistance to improve 

humanitarian conditions and 

advance human rights, be made 

contingent upon establishing and 

implementing a specific timetable 

for the government to take concrete steps to improve conditions 

of freedom of religion or belief 

and observe international human 

rights standards, steps which 

should include:

• ending reliance on convictions 

based solely on confessions, a 

practice that often is linked to 

ill-treatment of prisoners, and 

implementing the recommendations of the UN Committee 

Against Torture (June 2002) and 

the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Torture (February 2003);

• establishing a mechanism to 

review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion of 

or charged with religious, political, or security offenses, including 

Criminal Code Articles 159 (criminalizing “anti-state activity”) and 

216 (criminalizing membership in 

a “forbidden religious organization”); releasing those who have 

been imprisoned solely because 

of their religious beliefs or practices as well as any others who 

have been unjustly detained or 

sentenced; and making public a 

list of specific and detailed information about individuals who are 

currently detained under these 

articles or imprisoned following 

conviction;

• implementing the recommendations of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts 

on Religion or Belief to revise the 

1998 law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and bring it into accordance 

with international standards;

• registering religious groups that 

have sought to comply with the 

legal requirements; and 

• ensuring that every prisoner has 

access to his or her family, human 

rights monitors, adequate medical 

care, and a lawyer, as specified in 

international human rights instruments, and allowing prisoners 

to practice their religion while 

in detention to the fullest extent 

compatible with the specific nature of their detention;

• ensure that U.S. security and other 

forms of assistance are scrutinized 

to make certain that this assistance 

does not go to Uzbek government 

agencies, such as certain branches 

of the Interior and Justice Ministries, which have been responsible 

for particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 (IRFA); and

• use appropriate avenues of public 

diplomacy to explain to the people 

of Uzbekistan why religious freedom 

is an important element of U.S. foreign policy, as well as specific concerns about violations of religious 

freedom in their country.

 The U.S. government 

should encourage greater 

international scrutiny of 

Uzbekistan’s human rights 

record. To that end, the U.S. 

government should:

• work with other governments to 

urge the UN Human Rights Council 

to reverse its recent decision to end 

human rights scrutiny of Uzbekistan 

under confidential resolution 1503 

and to address this situation in a 

public country resolution at 

the Council;

• encourage scrutiny of Uzbek human rights concerns in appropriate 

international fora such as the OSCE 

and other multilateral venues and 

facilitate the participation of Uzbek 

human rights defenders in multilateral human rights mechanisms; and

• urge the Uzbek government to agree 

to a visit by UN Special Rapporteurs 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

1 

2 

178
and the Independence of the Judiciary and provide the full and necessary conditions for such a visit.

 The U.S. government 

should support Uzbek human 

rights defenders and religious 

freedom initiatives. To that 

end, the U.S. government 

should:

• respond publicly and privately to 

the recent expulsions of U.S. nongovernmental organizations and the 

numerous new restrictions placed 

on their activities; unless these 

restrictions are rescinded, the U.S. 

government should make clear that 

there will be serious consequences 

in the U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relationship, including a ban on high-level 

meetings; 

• continue the careful monitoring of 

the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged religious, political, 

and security offenses and continue 

efforts to improve the situation of 

Uzbek human rights defenders, 

including by pressing for the registration of human rights groups and 

religious communities;

• support efforts to counteract the 

Uzbek government’s blockade on 

information into the country by 

increasing radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasting of objective news and 

information on issues relevant to 

Uzbekistan, including education, 

human rights, freedom of religion, 

and religious tolerance;

• reinstate funding for the Voice of 

America (VOA) Uzbek Language 

Service to the fiscal year 2007 

level of $600,000 so as to meet the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors’ 

stated goal of outreach to the 

Muslim world; reinstatement of the 

VOA Uzbek Service would reach 

the news-deprived population of 

Uzbekistan, in addition to the large 

Uzbek diaspora in Afghanistan and 

other neighboring countries; 

• increase foreign travel opportunities 

for civil society activists, religious 

leaders, and others concerned with 

religious freedom to permit them to 

take part in relevant international 

conferences;

• continue to attempt to overcome the 

objections of the Uzbek government in order to develop assistance 

programs for Uzbekistan designed 

to encourage the creation of institutions of civil society that protect 

human rights and promote religious 

freedom, programs that could include training in human rights, the 

rule of law, and crime investigation 

for police and other law enforcement officials; since such programs 

have been attempted in the past 

with little effect, they should be 

carefully structured to accomplish, 

and carefully monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of these 

specific goals: 

• expanding legal assistance 

programs for Uzbek relatives of 

detainees, which have sometimes 

led to the release of detainees;

• expanding “train-the-trainer” 

legal assistance programs for 

representatives of religious communities to act as legal advisers in 

the registration process;

• specifying freedom of religion 

as a grants category and area of 

activity in the Democracy and 

Conflict Mitigation program of 

the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Democracy Commission Small Grants 

program administered by the U.S. 

Embassy; and

• encouraging national and local 

public roundtables between Uzbek officials and representatives 

of Uzbek civil society on freedom 

of religion; and

• increase opportunities in its 

exchange programs for Uzbek human rights advocates and religious 

figures, and more specifically:

• expand exchange programs for 

Uzbek religious leaders to include 

representatives from all religious 

communities; 

• expand exchange programs for 

Uzbek human rights defenders, 

including participation in relevant 

international conferences and opportunities to interact with Uzbek 

officials; and

• ensure that the U.S. Embassy 

vigorously protests cases when an 

Uzbek participant in an exchange 

program encounters difficulties 

with the Uzbek authorities upon 

return to Uzbekistan, and if such 

difficulties continue, inform the 

Uzbek authorities that there will 

be negative consequences in 

other areas of U.S.-Uzbek bilateral 

relations, including a ban on highlevel meetings. 

 

UZB E K IS TA N

3 

179
A mosque in Esfahan, Iran
181

country reports: MIDDLE EAST

Egypt

Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations 

 against members of religious minorities, 

as well as non-conforming Muslims, remain widespread in 

Egypt. Over the past few years, the Egyptian government 

has adopted several measures to acknowledge the religious 

pluralism of Egypt’s society, including increased efforts in 

promoting interfaith activity. Yet the government has not 

taken sufficient steps to halt repression of and discrimination against religious believers, including the indigenous 

Coptic Orthodox Christians, or, in many cases, to punish 

those responsible for violence or other severe violations of 

religious freedom. A December 2006 Supreme Administrative Court ruling upheld the government’s discriminatory 

policy of prohibiting Egyptian Baha’is from obtaining a 

national identity card, and the government has also not 

taken adequate steps to combat widespread and virulent 

anti-Semitism in the government-controlled media. Egypt 

remains on the Commission’s Watch List, and the Commission continues to monitor the actions of the government 

of Egypt to see if the situation rises to a level that warrants 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record that 

includes repressive practices which seriously violate freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The government maintains tight control over all Muslim religious 

institutions, including mosques and religious endowments, 

which are encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned 

interpretation of Islam. According to Egyptian officials, the 

government regulates these Muslim institutions and activities as a necessary precaution against religious extremism 

and terrorism. The state appoints and pays the salaries of all 

Sunni Muslim imams; all mosques must be licensed by the 

government, and sermons are monitored by the government. 

Human rights organizations inside the country are 

seriously concerned that Islamic extremism is advancing in 

Egypt, with detrimental effects on the prospects for democratic reform, religious tolerance, and the rights of women 

and girls and members of religious minorities.

Some believe that the government is not acting to its fullest 

ability to counteract this problem, especially in the areas of 

public education and the media, where extremist influence 

is growing.

There is continued prosecution in state security courts 

and imprisonment for those accused of “unorthodox” Islamic religious beliefs or practices that insult the three “heavenly 

religions”: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Article 98(f) of 

the Penal Code, which prohibits citizens from “ridiculing 

or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife,” 

has been applied to prosecute alleged acts by purportedly 

“unorthodox” Muslims. These include Muslim groups, such 

as the Koranites—a very small group in Egypt that does not 

accept as authentic hadith, the oral traditions of the life of 

the Prophet Muhammad, or Sunna, accounts of the way 

the Prophet Muhammad lived his life—who are accused 

of practicing beliefs deemed to deviate from Islamic law. 

Over the past few years, the Egyptian 

government has adopted several 

measures to acknowledge the religious

 pluralism of Egypt’s society, including 

increased efforts in promoting interfaith 

activity. Yet the government has not taken 

sufficient steps to halt repression of 

and discrimination against religious 

believers, including the indigenous Coptic 

Orthodox Christians, or, in many cases, to 

punish those responsible for violence or other 

severe violations of religious freedom. 
182

In December 2003 and March 2004, state security services 

arrested and imprisoned at least nine Shi’a Muslims without 

charge and subsequently interrogated them concerning their 

religious beliefs; they were reportedly also physically abused.

Most were released within weeks while others served several 

months in prison; all had been released by June 2005. In December 2004, 13 “unorthodox” Muslims were referred to trial 

by a State Emergency Court on charges of “insulting heavenly religions”; their status remains unknown. In February 

2007, a court in Alexandria convicted and sentenced Abdel 

Karim Suleiman, a 22 year-old Internet blogger and former 

student at Al-Azhar University, to four years in prison: three 

years for blaspheming Islam and inciting sectarian strife and 

one year for criticizing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. 

Suleiman had used his blog to criticize some activities of 

Al-Azhar University and the attacks on Coptic Christians 

in Alexandria in October 2005. In March, an appeals court 

upheld his sentence.

The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 

1981 and was renewed for another two years in May 2006, 

restricts many human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief as well as freedom of expression, assembly, and 

association. The Law must be extended again before May 

2008 or it will expire. During his 2005 presidential campaign 

for a fifth six-year term, President Mubarak had pledged to 

rescind the Law; in late December 2006, Mubarak stated that 

he intended to replace the Emergency Law with new antiterror legislation. Under the Emergency Law, the security 

forces mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and 

detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests. Thousands of 

persons have been detained without charge on suspicion 

of illegal terrorist or political activity; others are serving 

sentences after being convicted on similar charges. Egyptian 

and international human rights groups have asserted that the 

primary purpose of the state emergency and military courts 

is to punish political activism and dissent, even when that 

dissent is peaceful. These courts are also used to detain and 

try individuals deemed by the state to have “unorthodox” 

or “deviant” Islamic or other religious beliefs or practices. In 

2005, Egypt’s National Human Rights Commission formally 

called for the Emergency Law to be lifted. 

Members of Egypt’s non-Muslim religious minorities, 

particularly Christians and Baha’is, report discrimination, 

interference, harassment, and surveillance by the Egyptian 

state security services. There was an upsurge of attacks 

targeting Coptic Orthodox Christians in late 2005 and early 

2006. In addition, Coptic Orthodox and other Christian 

denominations face societal intolerance and violence by 

Muslim extremists. Egyptian authorities have been accused of being lax in protecting the lives and property of 

these groups, as well as prosecuting those responsible for 

violent acts against them. In October 2005, Christians in 

Alexandria were targets of rioting by extremists angered by 

the distribution of a DVD; the resulting clashes left three 

Muslims dead and a Christian nun wounded. In February 

2006, a criminal court in Alexandria sentenced a man to 

three years in prison for physically attacking the nun. In 

All Baha’i institutions and 

community activities have been banned 

since 1960 by a presidential decree. 

As a result, Baha’is are unable to meet 

and engage in group religious activities. 
183

January 2006 near Luxor, more than a dozen Christians and 

Muslims were injured after clashes broke out when Muslim 

youths torched a house that Coptic Christians had been 

using as a makeshift church. Despite the government claim 

that investigations have been conducted, the results of 

these investigations have not been made public. 

In April 2006, three Coptic Christian churches in Alexandria were attacked on Palm Sunday by a Muslim man, 

resulting in the death of one Christian and the wounding of approximately a dozen others. In the three days of 

demonstrations that followed the attacks, rioting broke 

out, leaving one Muslim man dead and almost 40 Christians and Muslims injured. Some groups blamed excessive 

police force for some of the injuries to both Muslims and 

Christians. According to the Interior Ministry, the man who 

attacked the churches was caught and is being held; he is 

believed to be “mentally unstable.” At least 100 persons 

were detained in response to these events, some for questioning and others on suspicion of incitement to riot and 

taking part in the riot. A People’s Assembly fact-finding 

committee was formed to investigate the incident and to 

report its findings; as of this writing, the committee had not 

yet released its findings publicly. 

Violent attacks on Christian communities over the 

years have resulted in very few prosecutions of perpetrators, including the 2004 Court of Cassation decision to 

uphold the acquittal of 94 of 96 suspects who were charged 

with various offenses in connection with the killing of 21 

Christians in Al-Kosheh in late 1999 and early 2000. Some 

Egyptian human rights advocates believe that Egyptian authorities should investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in the violence. 

In addition to violence, Christians face official and 

societal discrimination. Although Egyptian government 

officials claim that there is no law or policy that prevents 

Christians from holding senior positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian community faces de facto discrimination in 

appointments to high-level government and military posts. 

There are only a handful of Christians in the upper ranks 

of the security services and armed forces; one Christian 

governor out of 26; one elected member of parliament 

out of 444 seats; no known university presidents or deans; 

and very few legislators and judges. According to the State 

Department, public university training programs for Arabic 

language teachers exclude non-Muslims because the curriculum involves the study of the Koran. Under Egyptian 

law, Muslim men can marry Christian women but Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men. 

Romantic relationships across this divide are often a source 

of tension between Muslim and Christian communities in 

Egypt. In February 2007, Muslim groups reportedly set fire 

to several Christian-owned shops in southern Egypt due 

to rumors of a relationship between a Muslim woman and 

a Coptic Christian man. Seven Muslims and one Coptic 

Christian were arrested on suspicion of taking part in arson 

attacks on Christian-owned stores and property.

For all Christian groups, government permission must 

still be sought to build a new church or repair an existing 

church, and the approval process for church construction is time consuming and inflexible. President Mubarak 

continues to have the authority to approve applications for 

new construction of churches and more than 100 applications to build new churches await his decision. Though 

most of these applications were submitted more than five 

years ago, the majority have not received a response. Even 

some permits that have been approved cannot, in fact, be 

acted upon because of interference by the state security 

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A Bedouin man in the desert, Egypt
184

services, at both the local and national levels. In December 

2005, President Mubarak signed Decree 291 transferring 

authority for renovating or repairing existing churches 

from the president to the country’s 26 governors. Although 

initially viewed as a welcome step, more than one year later, 

churches continue to face significant delays in receiving 

permits and some local authorities continue to prevent 

maintenance and renovation of existing churches.

Although neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code 

prohibits proselytizing or conversion, the State Department 

has observed that the Egyptian government uses the Penal 

Code to discourage proselytizing by non-Muslims. Article 

98(f) of the Code is used frequently to prosecute alleged 

acts of proselytism by non-Muslims. Known converts from 

Islam to Christianity generally receive attention from the 

state security services; most conversions are reportedly 

done privately. Egyptian government officials have stated 

that no law prevents conversion, but some individuals have 

been arrested for falsifying identity documents. In some 

instances, converts, who fear government harassment if 

they officially register their change in religion from Islam 

to Christianity, reportedly have altered their own identification cards and other official documents to reflect their 

new religious affiliation. However, in an important case, 

an Egyptian court affirmed that the state could not prevent 

a woman from changing the religion on her identity card 

from Muslim to Christian. According to the State Department, it is not clear if this decision will set a precedent for 

similar future cases, although there have been at least 32 

court verdicts since 2004 allowing Christians who converted to Islam to re-convert to Christianity and identify 

themselves as such on identity cards. In contrast to these 

re-conversion cases, the Egyptian government does not 

recognize conversions of Muslims to other religions. In 

2006, Egyptian authorities re-arrested Baha Al-Accad, a 

citizen who was born Muslim but converted to Christianity. Al-Accad, who was first detained in April 2005, had 

been acquitted by a court for “contempt of religion”; he was 

subsequently released, detained again without charge, and 

transferred to a prison in Wadi Natroun, where he remains 

as of this writing. 

All Baha’i institutions and community activities have 

been banned since 1960 by a presidential decree. As a 

result, Baha’is are unable to meet and engage in group religious activities. Over the years, Baha’is have been arrested 

and imprisoned because of their religious beliefs, often on 

charges of insulting Islam. Almost all Baha’i community 

Egyptian authorities have not taken adequate steps to combat anti-Semitism 

in the media, despite official claims that they have advised journalists to avoid antiSemitism. Human rights groups also cite persistent, virulent anti-Semitism in the education 

system, which is increasingly under the influence of Islamic extremists, a development 

the Egyptian government has not adequately addressed. 

Commissioners Felice D. Gaer and Bishop Ricardo Ramirez, 

and USCIRF Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa with Egyptian 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit.
185

Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (center) with 

USCIRF delegation.

members are known to the state security services, and 

many are regularly subject to surveillance and other forms 

of harassment. Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center has 

issued fatwas (religious edicts) in recent years urging the 

continued ban on the Baha’i community and condemning 

Baha’is as apostates. There has been increased intolerance 

of Baha’is in both the independent and government-controlled media in recent years. 

The Egyptian government’s requirement that religious 

affiliation be included on national identity cards particularly affects the Baha’i community. Egyptian government 

officials have stated that only the three “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) are recognized 

and protected under the Constitution. Although no such 

limitation appears in the Constitution itself, the state has 

interpreted the text in this way because only three religions 

are recognized in Islam. Since “Muslim, Jew, or Christian” 

are the only choices, Baha’is are effectively prevented from 

obtaining identity cards, which are needed for many basic 

transactions, such as opening a bank account, buying a car, 

or obtaining a driver’s license. Moreover, the Egyptian government has recently made it illegal to be in public without 

an identity card. Because the Baha’i faith is banned, the 

community also has difficulty obtaining birth and death 

certificates, as well as obtaining or renewing passports. 

In April 2006, a lower Egyptian administrative court 

ruled that a Baha’i couple should be permitted to identify 

their religious affiliation on official government documents. This positive development proved short-lived, as the 

Interior Ministry appealed the ruling following the advice 

of religious authorities and some parliamentary members.

A higher court suspended the original decision in May, 

creating a sense of insecurity in the Baha’i community. In 

August, Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), 

a government-appointed advisory body, held an unprecedented public symposium in Cairo focused solely on the 

Egyptian government’s policy requiring citizens to list their 

religion on national identification cards. At the symposium, 

human rights and civil society groups testified that the 

Egyptian government should reverse its policy. Nevertheless, 

in December, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the 

Egyptian government’s discriminatory policy of prohibiting Baha’is from obtaining a national identity card. Because 

Baha’is are forced to choose between claiming adherence to 

a religion other than their own or foregoing an identity card 

and other official documents, the court’s ruling effectively 

denies Egyptian Baha’is their rights as citizens of Egypt and 

subjects them to particular hardship in obtaining education, 

employment, and social services. The Egyptian government 

has stated that all citizens must be in possession of new, 

computerized identity cards by January 2007; those who 

do not carry identity cards will be subject to detention and 

arrest. As of this writing, no such arrests had been made; 

however, a Baha’i was dismissed from a job and at least two 

Baha’is (a student and lecturer) were expelled from universities because they were unable to obtain identity cards.

Material vilifying Jews—with both historical and new 

anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears regularly in the statecontrolled and semi-official media. This material includes 

anti-Semitic cartoons, television programming such as a 

24-part series based on the notorious anti-Semitic “Protocols 

of the Elders of Zion,” and spurious Holocaust denial literature. Egyptian authorities have not taken adequate steps to 

combat anti-Semitism in the media, despite official claims 

that they have advised journalists to avoid anti-Semitism. 

Human rights groups also cite persistent, virulent anti-Semitism in the education system, which is increasingly under the 

influence of Islamic extremists, a development the Egyptian 

government has not adequately addressed. The small Jewish 

community maintains and owns its property and performs 

required maintenance largely financed through private donations. However, state security services continue to regulate 

and approve those permitted to make repairs, which, in 

some cases, has created problems and delays. 

After several years of close surveillance, authorities 

had increased repressive measures in late 2005 and early 

2006 against the small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

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186

who are not recognized by the Egyptian government. In the 

past year, however, Jehovah’s Witnesses reported improved 

conditions and a significant decrease in harassment and 

abuse by government officials. Moreover, Egyptian Jehovah’s Witnesses are currently pursuing legal recognition.

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political 

groups, which advocate or seek to establish an Islamic state 

in Egypt based on their interpretation of Islamic law, are 

considered illegal organizations by the Egyptian government under a law prohibiting political parties based on religion. Despite these restrictions, the Muslim Brotherhood 

has become more visible in Egypt’s political landscape. In 

fact, more than 100 members of the Muslim Brotherhood 

ran as independent candidates in the December 2005 

parliamentary elections and won 88 seats, up significantly 

from their previous 15. The Muslim Brotherhood and other 

Islamist political groups have used violence in the past to 

achieve their aims, including the assassination of President 

Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and attacks on foreign tourists. Some 

of these groups persist in advocating violence. Egyptian 

security forces continue to arrest hundreds of suspected 

Islamists every year, and some are subject to torture and/or 

prolonged detention without charge. According to Egyptian 

and international human rights groups, there are several 

thousand political detainees, including members of the 

Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups, in 

administrative detention at any given time whose cases are 

not being investigated. Most groups that closely monitor the 

detention of such individuals claim that the vast majority 

of these prisoners are in prison as a result of their political 

beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

On a positive note, in November 2005, the National 

Council for Human Rights (NCHR) announced the formation of a sub-group, the “Citizenship Committee,” to focus 

on religious freedom issues. As a result, the NCHR’s 2006 

annual report contained increased reporting on religious 

freedom concerns. Issues addressed in the recent report 

included the situation of Baha’is; problems facing Jehovah’s 

Witnesses; violence targeting Christians; and the need for 

the government to pass a law on the construction of new 

places of worship for all religious groups. 

In July 2004, a Commission delegation traveled to Egypt.

While there, the delegation met with senior government 

officials, religious leaders, human rights groups, scholars, 

educators, legal specialists, and others active in civil society. 

In June 2005, the Commission released a Policy Focus brief 

on Egypt at an event at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. The Policy Focus on Egypt provides details about the 

Commission’s visit to Egypt and presents recommendations 

for U.S. policy. 

In November 2006, the Commission issued a statement calling for the Egyptian government to reverse its discriminatory policy on national identity cards. In December, 

the Commission expressed deep regret over a decision by 

the Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt to uphold the 

Egyptian government’s discriminatory policy of prohibiting 

Baha’is from obtaining national identity cards. In January 

2006, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State Rice requesting that the United States urge President Mubarak to 

prevent the imminent deportation of hundreds of refugees 

and asylum seekers back to Sudan, where many of them reportedly faced religious persecution. Approximately 3,000 

Sudanese had been staging a peaceful protest in Cairo since 

On a positive note, in November 2005, 

the National Council for Human Rights 

(NCHR) announced the formation of a 

sub-group, the “Citizenship Committee,” 

to focus on religious freedom issues. 

Democracy and human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (center) with 

Commissioners Bishop Ricardo Ramirez and Felice D. Gaer.
187

September 2005. In late December 2005, Egyptian police 

attempted to disperse the assembly by firing water cannons at the protesters and beating many; at least 25 men, 

women, and children died. 

In July 2005, Commission Vice Chair Felice D. 

Gaer testified before a Members’ Briefing of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus entitled, “The Human Rights 

Situation in Egypt: An Overview.” In November 2005, 

Commissioner Elizabeth Prodromou testified before 

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus at a hearing 

entitled “Religious Freedom in Egypt.” Also in July 2005, 

House Resolution 413 was introduced, expressing the 

concern of the House of Representatives that the amount 

of U.S. foreign assistance provided to Egypt over the past 

25 years has increased despite the lack of any meaningful 

political reforms by the government of Egypt. The resolution contains a significant number of the Commission’s 

recommendations with regard to Egypt.

Throughout the past year, the Commission and its staff 

met with Egyptian government officials, members of nongovernmental organizations representing various religious 

communities in Egypt, as well as civil society and human 

rights groups, and other Egypt experts. 

E G YPT

Ibn Tulun Mosque, Cairo
 Taking Most Responsibility 

for Religious Affairs Out of 

the Hands of the Egyptian 

Security Services

With regard to Egypt, the Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government should urge the Egyptian 

government to:

• remove de facto responsibility for 

religious affairs from the state 

security services, with the exception 

of cases involving violence or the 

advocacy of violence;

• repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 1981, in order to allow 

for the full consolidation of the rule 

of law in Egypt;

• implement procedures that would 

ensure that all places of worship 

are subject to the same transparent, 

non-discriminatory, and efficient 

regulations regarding construction 

and maintenance; and

• repeal Article 98(f) of the Penal 

Code, which “prohibits citizens 

from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian 

strife”; allow for full access to the 

constitutional and international 

guarantees of the rule of law and 

due process for those individuals 

charged with violating Article 98(f); 

and release Internet blogger Abdel 

Karim Suleiman and any individuals convicted under Article 98(f) on 

account of their religion or belief.

 Implementing Additional 

Reform in Order to Comply 

with International Human 

Rights Standards

• repeal a 1960 presidential decree 

banning members of the Baha’i community from practicing their faith;

• exclude from all educational 

textbooks any language or images 

that promote enmity, intolerance, 

hatred, or violence toward any 

group of persons based on faith, 

gender, ethnicity, or nationality, 

and include in school curricula, in 

school textbooks, and in teacher 

training the concepts of tolerance 

and respect for human rights, including religious freedom, ensuring 

that textbooks meet the standards 

set out in the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights;

• cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews 

and Baha’is, in the government-controlled media and take active measures to promote understanding 

and respect for members of these 

and other minority religious 

communities;

• take all appropriate steps to prevent 

and punish acts of anti-Semitism, 

including condemnation of antiSemitic acts, and, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, 

counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric 

and other organized anti-Semitic 

activities;

• ensure that every Egyptian is 

protected against discrimination 

in social, labor, and other rights by 

modifying the national identity card 

either (a) to omit mention of religious affiliation from identity documents, or (b) to make optional any 

mention of religious affiliation on 

identity documents, since currently, 

individuals must identify themselves as adherents of one of the 

three faiths recognized by the state: 

Islam, Christianity, or Judaism;

• more actively investigate religiousbased violence against Egyptian citizens, particularly Coptic Christians, 

prosecute perpetrators responsible 

for the violence, and ensure compensation for victims;

• investigate claims of police negligence and inadequate prosecution of 

those involved in the Al-Kosheh case;

• request the National Council for Human Rights to investigate allegations 

of discrimination against Coptic Orthodox Christians as a human rights 

issue and to publish its findings and 

recommendations; and

• implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN Committee Against 

Torture. 

 Ensuring that U.S. 

Government Aid Promotes 

Prompt and Genuine Political 

and Legal Reforms and is 

Offered Directly to Egyptian 

Civil Society Groups

In addition, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• establish a timetable for implementation of political and human rights 

reforms, including steps described 

in the recommendations above; if 

deadlines are not met, the U.S. government should reconsider the 

appropriate allocation of its assistance to the Egyptian government;

188

1 

2 

3 

EGYPT Commission Recommendations 
• continue direct support for human 

rights and other civil society or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

without vetting by the Egyptian 

government;

• urge the Egyptian government to 

ensure that NGOs engaged in human rights work can pursue their 

activities without undue government interference, and monitor 

and report to what extent this is 

accomplished; and

• expand support of initiatives to 

advance human rights, promote 

religious tolerance, and foster civic 

education among all Egyptians, 

including support for:

• civic education and public 

awareness programs that reflect 

the multi-confessional nature of 

Egyptian society and the diversity 

of Egypt’s religious past;

• efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to review Egyptian educational curricula and 

textbooks for messages of hatred, 

intolerance, and the advocacy of 

violence, and to monitor equal 

access to education by girls and 

boys regardless of religion or 

belief; and

• preservation of Egyptian Jewish 

properties and antiquities in a 

publicly accessible site, such as in 

a museum, so that all Egyptians 

can better understand past and 

present Jewish contributions to 

their history and culture. 

In the context of the annual congressional appropriation for U.S. 

assistance to Egypt, Congress should 

require the State Department to report 

to it annually on the extent to which 

the government of Egypt has made 

progress on the issues described in 

this chapter, as well as on the progress 

of the U.S. government on offering 

funding directly to Egyptian NGOs 

without prior Egyptian government 

approval. 

E G YPT

189
190

Iran

The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily 

or entirely upon the religion of the accused. Over the past 

year, the Iranian government’s poor religious freedom record 

deteriorated, especially for religious minorities and in particular for Baha’is, Sufi Muslims, and Evangelical Christians, 

including intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and 

imprisonment. Heightened anti-Semitism and Holocaust 

denial rhetoric and activities by senior government officials have increased fear among Iran’s Jewish community. 

Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, significant numbers from 

religious minority communities have fled Iran for fear of persecution. Dissident Muslims also continue to be subject to 

abuse. Since 1999, the State Department has designated Iran 

as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission continues to recommend that Iran remain a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaims Islam, specifically the doctrine of the Twelver (Shi’a) 

Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the country. It 

stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic criteria. The head of state, 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 

Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, 

the internal security forces, and the judiciary. The Council 

of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the 

Supreme Leader, reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis

(parliament) for adherence to Islamic and constitutional 

principles. The Constitution grants the Council of Guardians 

the power to screen and disqualify candidates for elective 

offices based on a vague and arbitrary set of requirements, 

including candidates’ ideological and religious beliefs. 

In recent years, hundreds of prominent Muslim activists and dissidents from among the Shi’a majority advocating political reform have been sentenced to lengthy prison 

terms by the Revolutionary Court, on charges of seeking 

to overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; others have been 

arrested and detained for alleged blasphemy and criticizing 

the nature of the Islamic regime. Reformists and journalists are regularly tried under current press laws and the 

Penal Code on charges of “insulting Islam,” criticizing the 

Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that deviate 

from Islamic standards. Prominent Iranian investigative 

journalist Akbar Ganji was released from prison in March

2006 after serving a six-year prison sentence on reportedly spurious charges of “harming national security” and 

“spreading propaganda” against the Islamic Republic. Ganji 

was arrested and convicted as a result of attending a human 

rights conference in 2000 in Germany, where he publicly 

expressed views critical of the Iranian regime. Following 

a visit to Iran, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 

Freedom of Opinion and Expression concluded in early 

2004 that such charges brought by Iranian courts “lack any 

objective criteria” and are open to “subjective and arbitrary 

interpretation by judges implementing them.” 

A number of senior Shi’a religious leaders who have 

opposed various religious and/or political tenets and practices of the Iranian government have also been targets of 

state repression, including house arrest, detention without 

charge, trial without due process, torture, and other forms 

of ill treatment. In October 2006, a senior Shi’a cleric, 

Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi, who opposes 

religious rule in Iran, and a number of his followers were 

arrested and detained after clashes with riot police. Iranian 

officials charged him with “sacrilege” for having claimed 

to be a representative of the hidden Imam, a venerated 

figure in Shi’a Islam. Boroujerdi has denied these charges. 

While the current status of Boroujerdi and his followers is 

unknown, it appears that he and several of his followers 

remain in detention. 

In recent years, hundreds of prominent 

Muslim activists and dissidents 

from among the Shi’a majority advocating 

political reform have been sentenced 

to lengthy prison terms by the Revolutionary 

Court, on charges of seeking to 

overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; 

others have been arrested and detained 

for alleged blasphemy and criticizing 

the nature of the Islamic regime. 
191

Muslim minorities continue to face repression. Some 

Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread abuses 

and restrictions on their religious practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics, as well as bans on Sunni 

teachings in public schools and Sunni religious literature, 

even in predominantly Sunni areas. Sufi and Sunni Muslim 

leaders are regularly intimidated and harassed by intelligence and security services and report widespread official 

discrimination. The Sunni community still has not been 

able to build a mosque in Tehran. In February 2006, Iranian 

authorities closed and destroyed a Sufi house of worship in 

the northwestern city of Qom and arrested approximately 

1,200 Sufis who took to the streets in protest. Most were 

released within hours or days, although dozens reportedly 

suffered serious injuries. More than 170 Sufis were detained 

and reportedly tortured in order to extract confessions that 

would be broadcast on national television. Those who were 

released were forced to sign agreements saying they would 

not attend Sufi religious activities in Qom and would make 

themselves known to intelligence offices. Some were forced 

to sign documents renouncing their beliefs. In May, a court 

sentenced more than 50 Sufis to jail on various charges in 

connection with the February incident. According to the 

State Department, the defendants and their two lawyers 

were sentenced to a year in prison, fines, and 74 lashes. In 

addition, there were reports in the past year that the government is considering banning Sufism outright. 

The constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, 

Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected religious minorities 

who may worship freely and have autonomy over their own 

matters of personal status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and inheritance). Nevertheless, the primacy of Islam and Islamic 

laws and institutions adversely affects the rights and status 

of non-Muslims. Members of these groups are subject to 

legal and other forms of discrimination, particularly in 

education, government jobs and services, and the armed 

services. Non-Muslims may not engage in public religious 

expression and persuasion among Muslims; some also face 

restrictions on publishing religious material in Persian. 

Since August 2005, the Iranian government has 

intensified its campaign against non-Muslim religious 

minorities. A consistent stream of virulent and inflammatory statements by political and religious leaders and 

an increase in harassment and imprisonment of, and 

physical attacks against, these groups indicate a renewal 

of the kind of oppression seen in previous years. Ayatollah 

Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, has publicly 

attacked non-Muslims and referred to them as “sinful 

animals” and “corrupt.” In November 2005, after publicly 

criticizing Ayatollah Jannati’s remarks, the lone Zoroastrian 

member of the Iranian parliament was charged with the 

“dissemination of false information, slander and insult” by 

Iranian authorities, though as of this writing, the case has 

not gone to trial. In March 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur 

for Freedom of Religion or Belief confirmed that religious 

freedom conditions are worsening for all religious minorities in Iran, particularly Baha’is. 

The Baha’i community has long been subject to 

particularly severe religious freedom violations in Iran. 

Baha’is, who number approximately 300,000 – 350,000, are 

viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities, and may face 

repression on the grounds of apostasy. Since 1979, Iranian 

government authorities have killed more than 200 Baha’i 

ira n

Women in Qom, Iran, considered a holy city by Shi’a Muslims.
192

leaders in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed 

from government and university jobs. Baha’is may not 

establish places of worship, schools, or any independent 

religious associations in Iran. In addition, Baha’is are 

barred from the military and denied government jobs and 

pensions as well as the right to inherit property, and their 

marriages and divorces are not recognized. Baha’i cemeteries, holy places, and community properties are often seized 

and many important religious sites have been destroyed. 

In recent years, Baha’is in Iran have faced increasingly 

harsh treatment. Baha’i property has been confiscated or 

destroyed and dozens of Baha’is have been harassed, interrogated, detained, imprisoned, or physically attacked. In 

2005, the personal property of several Baha’is in Yazd was 

confiscated and destroyed and a Baha’i cemetery in Yazd was 

razed. In the past several years, a series of articles in the government-controlled newspaper Kayhan, whose managing 

editor is appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, 

have vilified and demonized the Baha’i faith and its community in Iran. In March 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief exposed a confidential 

October 2005 letter from the Iranian Chairman of the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces to several Iranian 

government agencies directing these entities to collect information on all members of the Baha’i community in Iran and 

to monitor their activities. In the past, waves of repression 

against Baha’is began with government orders to collect such 

information, and the new directives have created a renewed 

sense of insecurity and fear among Baha’i adherents.

In the past two years, dozens of Baha’is have been arrested, detained, interrogated, and subsequently released 

after, in some cases, weeks or months in detention. Charges 

typically ranged from “causing anxiety in the minds of the 

public and of officials” to “spreading propaganda against 

the regime.” In December 2005, Zabihullah Mahrami, 

a Baha’i who had been jailed for more than 10 years on 

charges of apostasy, died in prison under mysterious circumstances. In May 2006, 54 Baha’is, mostly young women 

in their teens and twenties, were arrested in Shiraz while 

teaching underprivileged children non-religious subjects 

such as math and science. Throughout the fall of 2006, several other Baha’is were arrested and released pending trial. 

In none of these cases were any formal charges ever filed. 

More than 120 Baha’is have been arbitrarily arrested since 

early 2005. Dozens are awaiting trial, while others have 

been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 90 days to 

one year. All of those convicted are in the process of appealing the verdicts. As of this writing, there are more than 60 

Baha’is awaiting trial on account of their religious beliefs. 

In the past, members of the Baha’i religion have not 

been allowed to attend university. Significantly, in the fall of 

2006, for the first time in decades, nearly 200 Baha’i students 

were admitted to a number of universities and colleges in 

Iran, although more than 90 of those admitted have since 

been expelled after university officials learned that they were 

Baha’is. Furthermore, during the past year, young Baha’i 

schoolchildren in primary and high schools increasingly 

have been pressured to convert to Islam, and in some cases, 

expelled on account of their religion. In December 2006, the 

UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the 

Iranian government’s poor human rights record, including its continued human rights abuses targeting religious 

minorities and its escalation and increasing frequency of 

violations against members of the Baha’i faith. 

Christians in Iran continue to be subject to harassment, 

arrests, close surveillance, and imprisonment; many are 

reported to have fled the country. Over the past few years, 

there have been several incidents of Iranian authorities 

raiding church services, detaining worshippers and church 

leaders, and harassing and threatening church members. 

As a result of one of these raids, an Evangelical pastor, 

Hamid Pourmand, was imprisoned in September 2004 and 

sentenced in February 2005 to three years in prison by a 

military court. In November 2005, he was acquitted by an 

Since August 2005, the Iranian 

government has intensified its campaign 

against non-Muslim religious minorities. 

A consistent stream of virulent and 

inflammatory statements by political and 

religious leaders and an increase in 

harassment and imprisonment of, and 

physical attacks against, these groups 

indicate a renewal of the kind of 

oppression seen in previous years. 
193

Islamic court of charges of apostasy but was ordered to serve 

the balance of his original three year sentence. In July 2006, 

without explanation, Pourmand was released from prison 

but was reportedly warned by authorities that if he attended 

any church services, his release orders would be revoked. It 

is a common practice, particularly in cases involving offenses 

based on religious belief, for Iranian authorities to release 

prisoners but to leave the charges against them or their convictions in place in order to threaten them with re-imprisonment at any time in the future.

In May 2006, a Muslim convert to Christianity, Ali 

Kaboli, was taken into custody in Gorgan after several years 

of police surveillance and threatened with prosecution if he 

did not leave the country. He was interrogated, held incommunicado, and released after a month. No charges have 

been filed against him. According to the State Department, 

a Christian couple who had been arrested in September 

2006 for leading a house church in Mashhad was released 

after almost two weeks in detention. Formal charges have 

still not been pressed against the couple, but authorities 

have indicated that the couple’s arrest and detention were 

in connection with their Christian beliefs and activities. 

In December 2006, at least eight house church leaders 

were arrested in a sweep by authorities in four different 

cities. The church leaders were charged with evangelization and “acts against the national security of the Islamic 

Republic.” All but one was released either within days or 

weeks of the original arrests; as of this writing, Behrouz 

Sadegh-Khandjani is the only one from among that group 

who remains in police custody in Tehran. Iranian President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly has called for an end to 

the development of Christianity in Iran. During the past few 

years, representatives of the Sabian Mandaean Association reported that even the small, unrecognized Mandaean 

religious community, numbering between five and ten 

thousand is facing intensifying harassment and repression 

by authorities. 

Official policies promoting anti-Semitism are on the 

rise in Iran, though members of the Jewish community 

have usually been singled out on the basis of “ties to Israel,” 

whether real or perceived. President Ahmadinejad and 

other top political and clerical leaders have made public 

remarks in the past year denying the existence of the Holocaust and stating that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” 

Anti-Semitic tracts have also increased in the governmentcontrolled media, including editorial cartoons depicting 

demonic and stereotypical images of Jews along with 

Jewish symbols. In the fall of 2006, and in response to the 

Danish cartoon controversy, a prominent newspaper, Hamshahri, cosponsored a cartoon contest in which the paper 

solicited submissions from around the world attacking Jews 

and the Holocaust. Iran’s official Cultural Ministry awarded 

the contest’s first prize of $12,000. In past years, several government-controlled newspapers celebrated the anniversary 

of the anti-Semitic publication, the Protocols of the Elders of 

Zion. In February 2006, the leader of Iran’s Jewish community, Haroun Yashayaei, sent an unprecedented public 

letter to President Ahmadinejad expressing serious concern 

about the President’s repeated Holocaust denial statements 

and the extent to which these statements have intensified 

fears among Iran’s 30,000-member Jewish community. 

Official government discrimination against Jews continues 

to be pervasive. According to the State Department, despite 

minimal restriction on Jewish religious practice, education of Jewish children has become increasingly difficult in 

recent years, and distribution of Hebrew religious texts is 

strongly discouraged. In December 2006, President Ahmadinejad hosted a Holocaust denial conference in Tehran. 

In response, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan denounced 

the conference, and the UN Security Council issued a 

Presidential Statement condemning statements made by 

President Ahmadinejad denying the Holocaust.

 

 

M i ddle e a s t
 

The government’s monopoly on and enforcement of 

the official interpretation of Islam negatively affect the 

human rights of women in Iran, including their right to 

freedoms of movement, association, thought, conscience, 

and religion, and freedom from coercion in matters of 

religion or belief. The Iranian justice system does not 

grant women the same legal status as men; for example, 

testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of two 

women. Provisions of both the Civil and Penal Codes, in 

particular those sections dealing with family and property 

law, discriminate against women. In early April, Iranian 

authorities arrested five women’s rights activists for their 

involvement in collecting signatures for a project aimed 

at ending discrimination against women in the application of Islamic law in Iran. Some of the activists’ demands 

included: 1) that women’s testimony in court carry the 

same weight as that of men; 2) equality of inheritance 

rights between men and women; 3) eliminating polygamy; 

and 4) the equality of compensation payments between 

women and men in the event of wrongful death. Two were 

released after one day and the other three were released 

on bail after nearly two weeks in detention.

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing 

various religious communities in Iran, as well as human 

rights groups and other Iran experts and policymakers. 

In February 2006, the Commission issued a statement 

documenting recent religious freedom abuses by Iranian 

authorities and expressing concern about the worsening 

treatment of religious minorities in Iran. In June, Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human 

Rights and International Operations at a hearing titled “The 

Plight of Religious Minorities: Can Religious Pluralism Survive?” Commissioner Shea’s testimony focused on religious 

freedom conditions in five countries—Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—and presented recommendations for U.S. policy. 

In August, the Commission called on the National Cathedral to ensure that former Iranian President Mohammad 

Khatami would be questioned about his record on human 

rights and religious freedom during any presentation he 

made at the Cathedral in September. The Commission wrote 

a letter to Reverend Canon John Peterson of the National 

Cathedral’s Center for Global Justice and Reconciliation 

pointing out the irony of inviting Mr. Khatami to speak on the 

role of the Abrahamic faiths in the peace process when, in 

his own country, Mr. Khatami presided as President during a 

time when religious minorities—including Jews, Christians, 

Sunni and Sufi Muslims, Baha’is, dissident Shia Muslims, 

and others—faced systematic harassment, discrimination, 

imprisonment, torture, and even execution based on their 

religious beliefs. In September, Commission Chair Felice D. 

Gaer and Vice Chair Nina Shea published an op-ed in the 

Washington Post citing a “troubling irony” in inviting President Khatami to speak at the National Cathedral on the role 

the Abrahamic faiths can play in shaping peace in the world. 

The op-ed stated that Khatami held office as president from 

1997 to 2005 while religious minorities—including Jews, 

Christians, Sunni and Sufi Muslims, Baha’is, dissident Shiite 

Muslims, and Zoroastrians—faced systematic harassment, 

discrimination, imprisonment, torture, and even execution 

because of their religious beliefs. Also during his term, Iranian officials persecuted reformers, students, labor activists, 

and journalists for “insulting Islam” and publishing materials 

deemed to deviate from Islamic standards.

194

In the fall of 2006, and in response 

to the Danish cartoon controversy, 

a prominent newspaper, Hamshahri, 

cosponsored a cartoon contest in which the 

paper solicited submissions from around 

the world attacking Jews and the Holocaust. 

Iran’s official Cultural Ministry awarded 

the contest’s first prize of $12,000. 
russia

 

I

n addition to recommending that 

Iran continue to be designated a 

CPC, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• at the highest levels, vigorously 

speak out publicly about the deteriorating conditions for freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief in Iran, including drawing attention to the need to hold 

authorities accountable in specific 

cases where severe violations have 

occurred, such as:

• extremely poor treatment of the 

Baha’i community; 

• increasing problems facing Christians, Sufi Muslims, and dissident 

Muslims; and

• state-sponsored virulent antiSemitism and Holocaust denial 

activities; 

• work within its current overall 

policy framework to ensure that 

violations of freedom of religion and 

belief, and related human rights, are 

included in any multilateral or bilateral discussions with the Iranian 

government;

• ensure that funding budgeted to 

promote democracy and human 

rights in Iran includes support 

for effective initiatives advancing 

freedom of religion or belief, as 

well as ways to promote rule of law 

programs that specifically seek to 

protect religious minorities in Iran; 

• increase funding for U.S. public 

diplomacy entities, such as Voice 

of America and Radio Farda, and 

expand and develop new programming solely focusing on the situation of human rights—including 

the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief—in Iran;

• continue to support a UN General 

Assembly resolution condemning 

severe violations of human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, in Iran, and calling for officials 

responsible for such violations to be 

held to account;

• call on the UN Human Rights 

Council to monitor carefully and 

demand compliance with the 

implementation of recommendations of the representatives of 

those special mechanisms that 

have already visited Iran, particularly those of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief (1995), the Working Group 

on Arbitrary Detention (2003), and 

the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression 

(2003); and

• encourage the UN Human Rights 

Council to continue to use its 

procedures to maintain oversight of 

conditions for freedom of religion 

or belief in Iran, including, as Iran 

has issued a standing invitation, 

continued visits and reporting by 

the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, and other 

relevant special rapporteurs and 

working groups.

SAU D I ARABIA

IRAN Commission Recommendations 

195
196

Saudi Arabia

The government of Saudi Arabia engages in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief. Since its inception, the Commission has 

recommended that Saudi Arabia be designated a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. In September 2004, the State 

Department for the first time followed the Commission’s 

recommendation and designated Saudi Arabia a CPC. In 

September 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice approved a temporary 180-day waiver of further action, as a 

consequence of CPC designation, to allow for continued 

diplomatic discussions between the U.S. and Saudi governments and “to further the purposes of the International Religious Freedom Act.” In July 2006, the Secretary decided to 

leave in place the waiver “to further the purposes of the Act” 

by announcing that these bilateral discussions with Saudi 

Arabia had enabled the United States to identify and confirm 

a number of policies that the Saudi government “is pursuing 

and will continue to pursue for the purpose of promoting 

greater freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups.” Despite this potentially positive 

development, the Commission has studied the situation 

and again determines that freedom of religion does not exist 

in Saudi Arabia and that the country should continue to be 

designated a CPC.

The Saudi government continues to engage in an array 

of severe violations of human rights as part of its repression 

of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

Abuses include: torture and cruel and degrading treatment 

or punishment imposed by judicial and administrative 

authorities; prolonged detention without charges and often

 incommunicado; and blatant denials of the right to liberty 

and security of the person, including coercive measures 

aimed at women and the broad jurisdiction of the mutawaa

(religious police), whose powers are vaguely defined and 

exercised in ways that violate the religious freedom of others. 

The government of Saudi Arabia persists in enforcing 

vigorously its ban on all forms of public religious expression 

other than the government’s interpretation and enforcement of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. This policy has 

violated the rights of the large communities of non-Muslims 

and Muslims from a variety of doctrinal schools of Islam who 

reside in Saudi Arabia, including Shi’as, who make up 10 – 15 

percent of the population. The government tightly controls 

even the restricted religious activity it does permit—through 

limits on the building of mosques, the appointment of 

imams, the regulation of sermons and public celebrations, 

and the content of religious education in public schools—

and suppresses the religious views of Saudi and non-Saudi 

Muslims who do not conform to official positions. 

Members of the Shi’a and other non-Sunni communities, as well as non-conforming Sunnis, are subject to 

government restrictions on public religious practices and 

official discrimination in numerous areas, particularly in 

government employment. In past years, prominent Shi’a 

clerics and religious scholars were arrested and detained 

without charges for their religious views; some were reportedly beaten or otherwise ill-treated. Reports indicate that 

some of these Shi’a clerics have been released, but the 

current status of a number of others remains unknown. Between 2002-2004, several imams, both Sunni and Shi’a, who 

spoke out in opposition to government policies or against 

the official government interpretation of Islam, were harassed, arrested, and detained. Some members of the Shi’a 

community remained unjustly imprisoned though there 

were no known arrests of Shi’a religious leaders on account 

of religion in the past year. On a positive note, in February 2006, thousands of members of the Shi’a community 

in Qatif, in the Eastern Province, made their largest public 

appearance in observance of Ashura without government 

interference. However, authorities continue to disallow 

observance in other areas of the Eastern Province, such as 

Al-Ahsa and Dammam. 

Spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” continue to be used by the Saudi authorities against non-conforming Muslims. Several individuals remain in prison on 

these charges. Human rights advocates report that Ismailis, 

The government of Saudi Arabia 

persists in enforcing vigorously its ban 

on all forms of public religious expression 

other than the government’s interpretation 

and enforcement of the Hanbali 

school of Sunni Islam. 
197

a Shi’a sect numbering some 700,000 inside Saudi Arabia, 

continue to suffer severe discrimination and abuse by 

Saudi authorities. In 2000, in the Najran region, after the 

mutawaa raided an Ismaili mosque for practicing “sorcery,” 

approximately 100 Ismailis, including clerics, were arrested.

Many were released after serving reduced sentences, but 

dozens remain in prison. In late October 2006, Saudi 

state media reported that any remaining Ismaili religious 

prisoners held in Najran as a result of the 2000 riots would 

be pardoned and released. Despite these reports, only 10 

Ismailis were released and at least 18 other religious prisoners still remain in jail; some of those that remain in prison 

are reportedly subject to flogging. 

In late December 2006, approximately 49 foreign guest 

workers, all members of the Ahmadi Muslim religious 

movement, were arrested by the mutawaa at a place of 

worship in Jeddah. In January and February, nine more 

Ahmadis were arrested. In January, Saudi authorities began 

deporting several of the Ahmadi prisoners, mostly Indian 

and Pakistani nationals, and international human rights 

groups called on the Saudi government to halt expulsions 

of foreign workers on account of their religious beliefs and 

affiliations. Despite this call, by early April, all 58 of the 

Ahmadis who had been arrested were deported. None of 

those deported are known to have been charged with any 

criminal offenses. In addition, two other Ahmadi religious 

leaders, who were not in Saudi Arabia during the initial 

arrests of 49 in December, have not returned to the country 

for fear of arrest and prosecution by Saudi authorities. 

Over the past few years, members of the Sufi community have been harassed, arrested, and detained because of 

their non-conforming religious views, although there have 

been no new reports of such incidents in the past year. In 

September 2003, the mutawaa arrested 16 foreign workers 

for allegedly practicing Sufism; their status remains unknown. In June 2005, Saudi authorities shut down a weekly 

gathering held by a Sufi leader who adheres to the Shafi’i 

school of Islamic jurisprudence. 

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing the nature of the regime are used by the Saudi government to suppress discussion and debate and silence dissidents. Promoters of political and human rights reforms, 

as well as those seeking to debate the appropriate role of 

religion in relation to the state, its laws, and society are typically the target of such charges. For example, in April 2007, 

an Egyptian Muslim guest worker reportedly was sentenced 

to death in the town of Arar in northern Saudi Arabia for allegedly desecrating the Koran and renouncing Islam. Media 

reports indicated that a court found the man guilty of no 

longer being a Muslim for “violating the boundaries set by 

God.” Hadi Al-Mutaif, an Ismaili man, was originally sentenced to death in 1994 for a remark deemed blasphemous 

that he made as a teenager. In 1999, his death sentence was 

commuted to life in prison. In late 2006, Saudi state media 

reported that Ismaili religious prisoners held in Najran 

would be pardoned and released. However, Al-Mutaif 

continues to serve a life sentence on blasphemy charges. 

In April 2006, a Saudi journalist was arrested and detained 

by Saudi authorities for almost two weeks for “denigrating Islamic beliefs” and criticizing the Saudi government’s 

strict interpretations of Islam. In November 2005, a Saudi 

high school teacher, accused for discussing topics such as 

the Bible, Judaism, and the causes of terrorism, was tried on 

charges of blasphemy and insulting Islam and sentenced 

to three years in prison and 750 lashes. Although he was 

pardoned by King Abdullah in December 2005, he nevertheless lost his job and suffered other repercussions. 

Restrictions on public religious practice, for both Saudis and non-Saudis, are officially enforced in large part by 

the mutawaa, and fall under the direction of the Ministry 

of Interior. The mutawaa conduct raids on worship services, including in private homes. They have also harassed, 

S a u d i A rabia
198

detained, whipped, beaten, and otherwise meted out extrajudicial punishments to individuals deemed to have strayed 

from “appropriate” dress and/or behavior, including any 

outward displays of religiosity, such as wearing Muslim 

religious symbols not sanctioned by the government. In 

recent years, the Saudi government has stated publicly that 

it has fired and/or disciplined members of the mutawaa for 

abuses of power, although reports of abuse persist. 

Although the government has publicly taken the 

position—reiterated again in 2006—that it permits nonMuslims to worship in private, the guidelines as to what 

constitutes “private” worship are vague. Surveillance by the 

mutawaa and Saudi security services of private non-Muslim religious activity continues. Many persons worshipping 

privately continue to be harassed, arrested, imprisoned, 

and then tortured and deported. They are generally forced 

to go to great lengths to conceal religious activity from the 

authorities. Foreign migrant workers without diplomatic 

standing, and with little or no access to private religious 

services conducted at diplomatic facilities, face great difficulties. Moreover, the Saudi government does not allow 

clergy to enter the country for the purpose of performing 

private religious services for foreigners legally residing in 

Saudi Arabia.

There is a continuing pattern of punishment and abuse 

of non-Muslim foreigners for private religious practice in 

Saudi Arabia. According to the State Department, there 

was a decrease in both long and short-term detentions and 

arrests and deportations of non-Muslims in the past year. 

However, there were also reports that the mutawaa continued to target non-Muslim religious leaders and groups 

for harassment, arrest, and deportation in an effort to deter 

these groups from conducting private religious services. 

In March 2005, a Hindu temple constructed near Riyadh 

was destroyed by the mutawaa, and three guest workers 

worshiping at the site were subsequently deported. Also 

in March 2005, the mutawaa arrested an Indian Christian 

and confiscated religious materials in his possession; he 

was released in July 2005 after four months of detention. In 

April 2005, the mutawaa raided a Filipino Christian private 

service in Riyadh and confiscated religious materials such 

as Bibles and Christian symbols. Also in April 2005, at least 

40 Pakistani, three Ethiopian, and two Eritrean Christians 

were arrested in Riyadh during a raid on separate private 

religious services. All of the Pakistani Christians were 

released within days and all five of the African Christians 

were released after a month in detention. 

In May 2005, at least eight Indian Protestant leaders 

were arrested, interrogated, and subsequently released 

for reportedly being on a list, obtained by the mutawaa, of 

Christian leaders in the country. Six were deported or left 

the country on their own accord and the status of the other 

two is unknown. In April 2006, an Indian Roman Catholic 

priest, who was visiting Saudi Arabia, was deported after 

being detained for four days in Riyadh for conducting a 

private religious service. Also in April 2006, the mutawaa

reportedly arrested a female Shi’a student in Riyadh, allegedly for proselytizing to other students. She was released 

several days later. In June, four East African Christians were 

arrested in Jeddah while leading a private worship ceremony. All were deported the following month. In October, 

the mutawaa raided a private religious service in Tabuk, 

detained a Christian Filipino religious leader, and confiscated Bibles and other religious materials. 

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of 

Islam and other violations of freedom of religion adversely 

affect the human rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including freedom of speech, movement, association, and 

religion, freedom from coercion, access to education, and 

full equality before the law. For example, women must 

adhere to a strict dress code when appearing in public and 

can only be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment 

with the consent of a male relative. Women need to receive 

written permission from a male relative to travel inside or 

outside the country and are not permitted to drive motor 

vehicles. Religiously based directives limit women’s right to 

choose employment by prohibiting them from studying for 

certain professions such as engineering, journalism, and 

architecture. In addition, the Saudi justice system, in which 

courts apply Islamic law to the cases before them, does 

not grant women legal status equal to men’s. For example, 

testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of two 

women; daughters receive half the inheritance that their 

brothers receive; and women have to demonstrate legally 

specified grounds for divorce, while men may divorce without giving cause.

In March 2006, the Saudi Embassy in Washington published a report summarizing efforts by the Saudi government 

to revise the state curriculum and a number of school textbooks to exclude language promoting religious intolerance. 

Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations from outside 

Saudi Arabia continue to report the presence of highly intolerant and discriminatory language, particularly against Jews, 

Christians, and Shi’a Muslims, in these educational materials 
199

published by the Saudi Ministry of Education.1 Furthermore, 

in the past year, there were frequent reports, including by 

the State Department, of virulently anti-Semitic and antiChristian sentiments expressed in the official media and in 

sermons delivered by clerics who are under the authority of 

the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. 

In March 2004, the Saudi government approved the 

formation of a National Human Rights Association, the 

country’s first purportedly independent human rights body, 

but, as of this writing, there is no indication that this entity 

is publicly reporting on or investigating religious freedom 

concerns. It is comprised of 40 members and chaired by 

a member of the Consultative Council, a 150-member 

advisory body appointed by then-King Fahd. In September 

2005, the Council of Ministers, chaired by King Abdullah, 

approved the establishment of a government-appointed, 25-

member Human Rights Commission. The following month, 

King Abdullah appointed, with the rank of minister, Turki 

bin Khaled al-Sudairi, a former state minister and Cabinet 

member, as chairman of the Commission. The Human Rights 

Commission is mandated to “protect human rights and create awareness about them ... in keeping with the provisions 

of Islamic law.” It is not yet possible to determine if either 

human rights body will prove to be a positive mechanism for 

addressing human rights concerns in Saudi Arabia. 

In recent years, senior Saudi government officials, 

including the Crown Prince and the Grand Mufti, made 

statements with the reported aim of improving the climate 

of tolerance toward other religions; both also continued 

publicly to call for moderation. In a public interview in 

2005, King Abdullah reiterated that non-Muslims are free 

to practice their faith privately but that public worship 

by non-Muslims is not permitted. He also said that to 

allow any non-Muslim places of worship to be built in 

Saudi Arabia “would be like asking the Vatican to build a 

mosque inside of it.” 

S a u d i A rabia

A mosque in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

1

 Center for Religious Freedom and Institute for Gulf Affairs, Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance, Freedom House, 2006 (http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/CRF_

SaudiReport_2006.pdf).
I

n July 2006, the State Department announced that 

ongoing bilateral discussions with Saudi Arabia had 

enabled the United States to identify and confirm a 

number of policies that the Saudi government “is pursuing 

and will continue to pursue for the purpose of promoting 

greater freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups.” This announcement followed 

extensive discussions between the U.S. and Saudi governments as a result of CPC designation. Among the measures 

that were confirmed by Saudi Arabia as state policies are:

Halt the Dissemination of Intolerant Literature 

and Extremist Ideology in Saudi Arabia and 

around the World

• Revise and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant references that disparage Muslims or non-Muslims 

or that promote hatred toward other religions or religious 

groups, a process the Saudi government expects to complete in one to two years. 

• Prohibit the use of government channels or government 

funds to publish or promote textbooks, literature, or 

other materials that advocate intolerance and sanction 

hatred of religions or religious groups. 

• Ensure Saudi embassies and consulates abroad review 

and destroy any material given to them by charities or 

other entities that promote intolerance or hatred.

Protect the Right to Private Worship and the Right 

to Possess Personal Religious Materials

• Guarantee and protect the right to private worship for all, 

including non-Muslims who gather in homes for religious 

practice. 

• Address grievances when this right is violated.

• Ensure that customs inspectors at borders do not confiscate personal religious materials.

Curb Harassment of Religious Practice

• Ensure that members of the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (also known as the mutawaa) do not 

detain or conduct investigations of suspects, implement 

punishment, violate the sanctity of private homes, conduct 

surveillance, or confiscate private religious materials. 

• Require all members of the mutawaa to wear identification badges with their pictures and names.

Empower the Human Rights Commission

• Bring the Kingdom’s rules and regulations into compliance with human rights standards.

The Commission welcomed the announcement and 

stated that the newly-reported Saudi policies—if actually 

implemented in full—could advance much-needed efforts 

to dismantle some of the institutionalized policies that have 

promoted severe violations of freedom of religion or belief in 

Saudi Arabia and worldwide.

The State Department reports that during the past year, 

the Saudi government took limited measures to remove from 

educational curricula what it deemed to be disparaging references to other religious traditions. In 2006, the Saudi government reportedly put into place policies to limit harassment 

of religious practice and curb violations by the mutawaa. 

According to the State Department, reports of harassment 

of non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims by the mutawaa 

continue, but there were fewer reports in 2006 than in previous years. The sixth National Dialogue, held in late November 2006, resulted in many prominent Saudi educators and 

scholars calling for reforms of religious education materials 

and curricula.

In addition to the Saudi government’s violations of religious freedom within its own borders, evidence has mounted 

that funding originating in Saudi Arabia has been used to 

finance globally religious schools and other activities that 

support religious intolerance, and, in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. For example, the 

Saudi government operates a network in over a dozen world 

capitals, including one outside of Washington, DC, of Islamic 

academies, chaired by the local Saudi ambassador, reportedly 

using the same religious curriculum as the public educational 

system in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government itself has been 

implicated in promoting and exporting views associated with 

certain Islamic militant and extremist organizations in several 

parts of the world, and a number of reports have identified 

members of extremist and militant groups that have been 

trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia. These reports point to a role 

for the Saudi government in propagating worldwide an ideology that is incompatible with universal norms of the right to 

freedom of religion or belief. 

The Saudi government funds mosques, university chairs, Islamic study centers, and religious schools 

(madrassas) all over the world. During Afghanistan’s war 

against the former Soviet Union, Saudi-funded madrassas 

were established in Pakistan that were reportedly less focused on education than on promoting an extremist agenda 

glorifying violence. These madrassas provided ideological 

training for some of those who went on to fight in Kashmir, 

Chechnya, and Afghanistan. The peaceful expression and 

propagation of religious beliefs, including Islam, is a human 

right. However, there is legitimate concern when a government may be propagating an ideology that promotes hatred 

and violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims.

200
The religious extremism reportedly preached by some 

Saudi clerics and the violence incited and perpetrated 

by certain state-supported radicals continues to warrant 

further investigation by the U.S. government. The Commission has urged the U.S. government to address publicly 

concerns that have arisen from the propagation of religious 

hatred and intolerance from Saudi Arabia. The Commission 

has published reports and held public hearings over the 

past several years regarding this issue, and issued a number 

of recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission 

welcomed the public statements made in the past year by 

Ambassador Hanford raising concerns about the role of the 

Saudi government in the promotion of religious intolerance 

and extremist ideology. 

Throughout the past year, the Commission has spoken 

out numerous times about religious freedom concerns in 

Saudi Arabia. In June 2006, Commission Vice Chair Nina 

Shea testified on behalf of the Commission before the 

House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Human Rights and International Operations at 

a hearing entitled “The Plight of Religious Minorities: 

Can Religious Pluralism Survive?” Commissioner Shea’s 

testimony focused on religious freedom conditions in five 

countries—Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—

as well as recommendations for U.S. policy. In September, 

the Commission publicly expressed concern that the State 

Department had removed longstanding and widely quoted 

language, “freedom of religion does not exist,” from its 2006

Report on International Religious Freedom on Saudi Arabia, 

despite the fact that the report states that “there generally 

was no change in the status of religious freedom during 

the reporting period.” In October, the Commission held a 

briefing on the current status of human rights and reform 

in Saudi Arabia with Ibrahim al-Mugaiteeb, President of 

Human Rights First Society, a human rights organization in 

Saudi Arabia that, despite repeated attempts to gain official 

recognition, has never been granted a license to function 

by the Saudi government. Mr. al-Mugaiteeb operates in 

the Kingdom at his own risk. In November, the Commission issued a statement and wrote to U.S. Ambassador to 

Saudi Arabia James Oberwetter about misleading claims 

by Saudi authorities regarding the purported release of 

religious prisoners in the southwestern region of Najran.

In April 2007, Commissioners Gaer and Shea met with the 

newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Ford M. 

Fraker, to discuss persistent religious freedom concerns.

Throughout 2006, the Commission continued to meet 

with representatives of a variety of human rights and other 

non-governmental organizations, academics, and other 

experts on Saudi Arabia. 

S a u d i A rabia

201

Criminal charges of apostasy, 

blasphemy, and criticizing the nature of 

the regime are used by the Saudi 

government to suppress discussion and 

debate and silence dissidents. 

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry, Riyadh
Saudi Arabia Commission Recommendations 

I

n light of the July 2006 confirmation 

of Saudi government policies on 

religious practice and tolerance, the 

Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should:

• urge the Saudi government to 

identify specific benchmarks and 

timetables for implementation of 

those benchmarks;

• create a formal mechanism to monitor implementation of the July 2006 

confirmation of policies as part of 

every Ministerial Meeting of the 

United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic 

Dialogue, co-chaired by Secretary 

of State Rice and Foreign Minister of 

Saudi Arabia Prince Saud al-Faisal;

• ensure that U.S. representatives to 

the relevant Working Group of the 

Strategic Dialogue, after each session, or at least every six months, 

report its findings to Congress; 

the policies that can be monitored 

with clear-cut criteria for progress 

include:

• analyzing the content of Saudi 

textbooks at the beginning of every new school year (September); 

• retraining teachers and principals 

in schools to ensure that tolerance 

is promoted; 

• revising teacher manuals to 

include promotion of tolerance; 

• retraining and reassigning 

imams who espouse intolerance; 

vensuring that customs inspectors at borders do not confiscate 

religious materials; 

• ensuring that Saudi embassies 

and consulates abroad destroy 

any material given to them that 

promote intolerance and hatred; 

• ensuring that members of the 

mutawaa do not operate outside 

of agreed-upon parameters; 

• ensuring that all mutawaa wear 

identification badges; 

• holding accountable any member 

of the mutawaa who commits an 

act of torture; and 

• monitoring sermons in mosques 

regularly; and

• communicate and share information with other concerned governments about the confirmed policies 

of the July 2006 announcement, 

particularly those policies related to 

Saudi exportation of hate literature 

and extremist ideology.

With regard to religious freedom 

conditions in Saudi Arabia, the Commission reiterates its recommendations that the U.S. government should:

• press for immediate improvements 

in respect for religious freedom, 

including: 

• establishing genuine safeguards 

for the freedom to worship privately; 

• entrusting law enforcement to 

professionals in law enforcement 

agencies subject to judicial review 

and dissolving the mutawaa; 

• permitting non-conforming 

Muslim and non-Muslim places 

of worship in specially designated 

areas and allowing clergy to enter 

the country to carry out such worship services; 

• reviewing cases and releasing 

those who have been detained or 

imprisoned on account of their 

religious belief or practices; 

• permitting independent nongovernmental organizations to 

advance human rights; 

• ending state prosecution of individuals charged with apostasy, 

blasphemy, sorcery, and criticism of the government; 

• ceasing state-sponsored messages 

of hatred, intolerance, or incitement to violence against Muslims 

and members of non-Muslim 

religious groups in the educational curricula and textbooks, as 

well as in government-controlled 

mosques and media; 

• inviting the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief to conduct a fact-finding 

mission; and 

• ratifying international human 

rights instruments, including the 

International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, and cooperating with UN human rights 

mechanisms; and

• use its leverage to encourage implementation of numerous Saudi government statements to ensure that 

the Saudi government carries out 

political, educational, and judicial 

reforms in the Kingdom by: 

• raising concerns about human 

rights, including religious freedom, both publicly and privately 

in the U.S. anti-terrorism dialogue 

with the Saudi government; 

• expanding human rights assistance, public diplomacy, and 

other programs and initiatives—

such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative—to include more 

202
components specifically for Saudi 

Arabia; 

• continue to seek proposals from 

private entities to conduct religious freedom programs in Saudi 

Arabia; and 

• increase the number of International Visitor and other exchange 

programs to include educators, 

religious leaders, journalists, and 

other members of civil society.

With regard to the exportation 

of religious intolerance from Saudi 

Arabia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should:

• continue efforts, along with those 

of the Congress, to monitor Saudi 

state promises to end its sponsorship of government officials and 

programs, individual members of 

the royal family, and Saudi-funded 

individuals or institutions that 

directly or indirectly propagate 

globally, including in the United 

States, an ideology that explicitly 

promotes hate, intolerance, human 

rights violations, and, in some cases, 

violence, toward members of other 

religious groups, both Muslim and 

non-Muslim; 

• request the Saudi government to 

provide an accounting of what kinds 

of Saudi support have been and 

continue to be provided to which 

religious schools, mosques, centers 

of learning, and other religious 

organizations globally, including in 

the United States;

• request the Saudi government to 

stop funding religious activities 

abroad until it knows the content 

of the teachings and is satisfied 

that such activities do not promote 

hatred, intolerance, or other human 

rights violations;

• request the Saudi government 

to monitor, regulate, and report 

publicly about the activities of Saudi 

charitable organizations based 

outside Saudi Arabia in countries 

throughout the world; and 

• request the Saudi government to: a) 

cease granting diplomatic status to 

Islamic clerics and educators teaching outside Saudi Arabia; and b) 

close down any Islamic affairs sections in Saudi embassies throughout 

the world that have been responsible for propagating intolerance. 

The Commission urges the U.S. 

Congress to hold biannual hearings at 

which the State Department reports 

on what issues have been raised with 

the Saudi government regarding violations of religious freedom and what 

actions have been taken by the United 

States in light of the Saudi government’s response.

S a u d i A rabia

203
Market scene in Afghanistan
205

country reports: South Asia

Afghanistan

Conditions for freedom of religion or belief 

in Afghanistan have become increasingly 

problematic in recent years. Flaws in the country’s new 

constitution, which does not contain clear protections for 

the right to freedom of religion or belief for individual Afghan citizens, failed to prevent a number of criminal court 

cases that were in violation of the rights of the accused. In 

addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan government 

to exercise authority over much of the country outside 

Kabul contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom and other human rights in many 

of the provinces. Although the status of religious freedom 

has improved since the fall of the Taliban regime, these 

developments indicate that religious extremism, including 

through the return of the Taliban, is an increasingly viable 

threat once again in Afghanistan. In light of these very real 

dangers to the declared U.S. goal of instituting democracy 

and human rights protections in Afghanistan, the Commission has determined to place the country on its Watch 

List. Since the United States has a crucial role to play, the 

Commission will continue carefully to monitor the situation in Afghanistan. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution. The constitution contains an explicit recognition 

of equality between men and women and a reference to 

Afghanistan’s commitment to abide by its international 

human rights obligations. However, though the Constitution provides for the freedom of non-Muslim groups to 

exercise their various faiths, it does not contain explicit 

protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief that 

would extend to every individual, particularly to individual 

Muslims, the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s 

population. Other fundamental rights, such as the right 

to life and free expression, can be superseded by ordinary 

legislation. This omission is compounded by a repugnancy 

clause that states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs 

and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” as well as by 

provisions for a judicial system empowered to enforce the 

repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi jurisprudence to cases 

where there is no other applicable law.

The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to 

religious freedom and the inclusion of a judicial system instructed to enforce Islamic principles and Islamic law mean 

that the new constitution does not fully protect individual 

Afghan citizens who dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy 

against unjust accusations of religious “crimes” such as 

apostasy and blasphemy. There are also fewer protections for 

Afghans to debate the role and content of religion in law and 

society, to advocate the rights of women and members of religious minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic 

precepts without fear of retribution or being charged with 

“insulting Islam.” There is concern that these constitutional 

deficiencies could permit a harsh, unfair, or even abusive 

interpretation of religious orthodoxy to be officially imposed, 

violating numerous human rights of the individual by stifling 

potential dissent within the Afghan population. 

Both of these cases, involving 

Muslim individuals exercising their 

internationally guaranteed rights, indicate 

that the inadequate guarantees for 

individual human rights in the 

constitution represent a significant 

problem for Afghanistan’s development 

as a democratic, rule of law based 

state where fundamental human 

rights are protected. 
206

These concerns are not merely theoretical, since in 

the past two years, several very troubling cases exemplifying the constitution’s inadequacies came before the courts. 

In October 2005, Afghan journalist and editor Ali Mohaqiq 

Nasab was imprisoned after being found guilty of charges of 

blasphemy and “insulting Islam.” The purported “crime” of 

Nasab, editor of the journal Haqooq-i-Zan (Women’s Rights), 

was to question discrimination against women and the use 

of certain harsh punishments under traditional Islamic law, 

including amputation and public stoning. Although Nasab, 

who is also an Islamic scholar, was initially sentenced to two 

years of hard labor, the prosecutor in the case reportedly 

intended to seek the death penalty against him. In December, Nasab’s term was reduced to a six-month suspended 

sentence, but only after he apologized to the court. 

In March 2006, Abdul Rahman, an Afghan citizen, 

was arrested and threatened with execution on the charge 

of changing his religion. His offense, according to a public 

prosecutor in Afghanistan, was “rejecting Islam.” Rahman 

was to face the death penalty if found guilty of apostasy. 

The prosecutor in the case called Rahman “a microbe [who] 

should be cut off and removed from the rest of Muslim 

society and should be killed.” The judge overseeing the trial 

publicly affirmed that if Rahman did not return to Islam, 

“the punishment will be enforced on him, and the punishment is death.” Within a few weeks, in the face of a massive 

international outcry about the case, the court dismissed the 

charges against him, citing lack of evidence and suspicions 

about his mental state, but concerns about his personal 

safety forced him to seek asylum abroad. Both of these cases, 

involving Muslim individuals exercising their internationally 

guaranteed rights, indicate that the inadequate guarantees 

for individual human rights in the constitution represent 

a significant problem for Afghanistan’s development as a 

democratic, rule of law based state where fundamental 

human rights are protected. 

The constitutional concerns are intensified by the fact 

that the task of interpreting many of these provisions has 

been left to the Supreme Court, which until recently was 

headed by Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, who had demonstrated little tolerance for those who disagreed with his 

hard-line interpretation of Islam. As a consequence of his 

actions, a sitting Minister in the interim Afghan government 

was forced to resign after she was charged with blasphemy 

for questioning the role of Islamic law in Afghanistan, 

journalists were jailed on charges of offending Islam, and 

during the October 2004 presidential elections, a presidential candidate was threatened with disqualification for 

purported “anti-Islamic remarks” on women’s rights and 

family law. In an important development, a new Supreme 

Court Chief Justice was named in August 2006, Abdul Salam 

Azimi, who, unlike his predecessor, is formally trained in 

civil jurisprudence. It remains to be seen, however, whether 

he will be a positive force for religious freedom and other 

human rights in Afghanistan.

These constitutional pitfalls have been extended to 

other legislation also. The current media law prohibits 

publication or broadcast of information that insults “the 

sacred religion of Islam and other religions.” According 

to the State Department, the vagueness in the definition of 

what constitutes offensive material allows for the potential 

abuse of this clause with the aim of limiting freedom of 

the press and intimidating journalists. Indeed, incidents of 

this sort of abuse have already occurred, as when former 

Supreme Court Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari in November 2004 successfully appealed to the Afghan government to 

have cable television taken off the air because its “immoral” 

programs allegedly insult religion. In January 2006, the Afghan Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism declared 

that though Afghan law allows citizens access to a free press, 

Afghan Women
207

there are limitations that are “not imposed by the government but are in line with Islamic and national principles.” 

That same month, cable television was shut down in Balkh 

province for broadcasting films and music that were “against 

Islam and Afghan culture.” In February 2006, the Afghan 

government, through a special media commission, imposed 

a fine on Afghan TV, one of four private stations in Kabul, for 

broadcasting “unIslamic materials.” At the end of 2006, the 

Ministry of Information and Culture proposed a new media 

law that, if enacted, would more explicitly curtail freedom of 

expression by, among other measures, prohibiting content 

deemed to be “against Islamic values.” Because the term 

“against Islamic values” is not defined in the proposed law, 

media organizations fear that censorship in the name of 

religion will expand significantly.

In July 2006, there were reports that Afghanistan’s 

Ulema, or council of Muslim clerics, proposed the establishment of a Department for the Promotion of Virtue and 

Prevention of Vice, an organization troublingly reminiscent 

of a similarly named body used by the Taliban to enforce 

its strict religious codes through public beatings, imprisonment, torture, and execution, including stoning to death.

At the time, Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister for Religious 

Affairs was quoted as stating that the new Vice and Virtue 

agency will not be the same as that under the Taliban but 

would instead be aimed at promoting religious values 

through “education, preaching, and encouragement.” The 

proposal has reportedly been referred to the country’s parliament, but as of this writing, had not yet been enacted.

Due to continued security problems, the government 

of President Karzai does not exercise full control over the 

country. As a result, the situation for religious freedom and 

other human rights is increasingly both precarious and 

problematic in many parts of the country. Concerns that 

the government of Pakistan has been providing sanctuary 

to the Taliban intensified in late 2006, as evidence began 

to indicate that the Taliban has re-armed and stepped up 

attacks inside Afghanistan, posing a threat to the stability of 

the government. Many of the human rights abuses practiced 

by the Taliban reportedly persist today under the rule of 

the regional warlords, who continue to operate in regions 

that are effectively outside of central government control. 

These abuses include political killings, torture, coercion to 

enforce social and religious conformity, and abuses against 

women and girls, sometimes with the active support of the 

local courts and police. In some areas of Afghanistan, there 

is reportedly now a “parallel Taliban state,” and Afghans are 

increasingly receptive to Taliban courts, as they are, once 

again, seen as less corrupt than those administered by the 

tribal warlords. These substantial security threats, which 

have increased in the past year, present a persistent danger 

to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law 

throughout Afghanistan. 

As far back as 2002, the Commission raised strong 

concerns about the decision not to extend the international 

security presence outside of Kabul and the repercussions 

that could potentially ensue as a consequence of this decision. In its report from that year, the Commission recommended that the “U.S. government should actively support

expanding the international security presence beyond 

Kabul, as there was an urgent need to expand security in 

order to safeguard the process of political reconstruction 

in the country and to protect religious freedom and other 

human rights for all Afghans both in the near term and into 

the future.” It seems clear that the political reconstruction 

process has indeed become seriously threatened as a result 

of the alarming and deteriorating security conditions.

Despite these concerns, some religious freedom problems 

have diminished since the rule of the Taliban. For example, 

the active persecution of Afghanistan’s Shi’a minority 

(approximately 15 percent of the population) that was 

perpetrated by the Taliban has ended, and Shi’as are once 

again able to perform their traditional processions and to 

participate in public life. In January 2005, President Karzai 

appointed a Shi’a scholar to the country’s Supreme Court, 

the first Shi’a scholar ever to be appointed to that body. The 

State Department reports that in February 2006, six people 

were killed during a Shi’a Ashura procession in Herat, 

though some consider the violence to have been politically 

rather than strictly religiously motivated. Most Shi’a are 

a f gha n i s ta n

Because the term “against Islamic 

values” is not defined in the proposed

 law, media organizations fear that 

censorship in the name of religion 

will expand significantly. 
208

from the Hazara ethnic group, which has traditionally been 

harshly discriminated against and segregated from the rest 

of society due to a combination of political, ethnic, and 

religious reasons. The situation of Afghanistan’s religious 

minorities, which include small communities of Hindus 

and Sikhs, has also improved since the fall of the Taliban, 

as there is no longer any official discrimination, though 

societal violence against both groups, particularly in the 

areas outside of government control, continues to be a concern. Although there are no churches, expatriate Christians 

are reportedly able to meet for private worship services in 

Kabul and one or two other major urban centers. However, some religious advocacy organizations are reporting 

instances of societal intolerance of and violence against 

persons who have converted to Christianity. 

In the past year, the Commission spoke out several 

times about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. In 

July 2006, the Commission issued a statement raising several concerns about the proposed creation of a Department 

for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. The 

Commission noted that the creation of such a government 

institution in Afghanistan charged with the promotion 

of religious adherence to state-imposed orthodoxy could 

amount effectively to a religious police force that could: violate Afghan citizens’ universal right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, including the right to be 

free from state compulsion with regard to religious worship 

and practice; abridge the human rights of Afghan women 

and girls; impose political conformity and stifle political 

debate about human rights and political freedom in Afghanistan, as well as the role of religion in Afghan law and 

society; and arbitrarily determine the “correct” nature of 

religious adherence and what constitutes a “violation”—a 

significant problem given the wide variety of doctrines and 

practices that exist within the majority Muslim community 

in Afghanistan.

In March 2006, the Commission wrote to President 

Bush expressing its concern about the trial and threatened 

execution of Abdul Rahman on charges of apostasy. In 

April, Commission Vice-Chair Felice D. Gaer testified on 

behalf of the Commission before a Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ Briefing on “Anti-Conversion Laws and Religious Freedom in South Asia and the 

Middle East: The Case of Abdul Rahman.” In her testimony, 

Commissioner Gaer described the weak state of human 

rights protections in Afghanistan today, and cautioned that 

freedom and democracy are still in peril in that country. 

In October 2005, the Commission issued a statement 

condemning the arrest and trial of Ali Mohaqiq Nasab on 

charges of blasphemy and “insulting Islam.” In December, 

the Commission wrote to the State Department asking 

that it urgently communicate with the German government to prevent the imminent involuntary deportation of 

thousands of particularly vulnerable asylum seekers from 

Germany to Afghanistan, including Hindu refugees who 

face the threat of violence upon return to Afghanistan. 

The U.S. government should provide greater leadership and resources 

needed to secure freedom for all in Afghanistan, which regrettably appears to be reverting 

more and more to Taliban-like practices. The U.S. government should therefore 

step up its leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate the 

Afghan people’s gains in the protection of human rights, since the United States has 

been so directly involved in the country’s political reconstruction. Failure 

will leave Afghanistan not only less free but also more unstable, thereby 

contributing to regional insecurity and potentially serving again as a future 

haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. interests. 
209

During the period that the constitution was being 

drafted, the Commission met with numerous high-ranking 

U.S. government officials to articulate the importance of 

institutionalizing human rights guarantees in the document that adequately protect the rights of each individual. 

The Commission also briefed Members of Congress and 

relevant committee staff on its policy findings and recommendations. In January 2003, the Commission held an 

international forum, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom 

in Crisis?” in cooperation with George Washington University Law School, which brought together Afghan leaders, 

U.S. policymakers, and other experts to discuss ways of 

integrating adequate human rights protections into judicial 

and legal reform processes. The Commission also raised the 

issue of religious freedom in numerous public statements, 

as well as in two separate op-ed articles, in The Washington 

Post and The New York Times, authored by Commissioners 

Michael K. Young, Felice D. Gaer, and Preeta D. Bansal. In 

late 2003, the Commission was cited on this issue in over a 

dozen editorials in major newspapers worldwide. 

In August 2003, a Commission delegation visited 

Afghanistan for an intensive series of discussions with 

senior officials of the Transitional Administration, U.S. officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations 

and of Afghan civil society, former President Burhanuddin 

Rabbani, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic 

community, including the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In September 2004, the 

Commission issued a press release criticizing the Supreme 

Court Chief Justice’s attempt to stifle freedom and electoral 

democracy by calling for the disqualification of a candidate 

who made comments of which Chief Justice Shinwari did 

not approve.

The U.S. government should provide greater leadership 

and resources needed to secure freedom for all in Afghanistan, which regrettably appears to be reverting more and 

more to Taliban-like practices. The U.S. government should 

therefore step up its leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate the Afghan people’s 

gains in the protection of human rights, since the United 

States has been so directly involved in the country’s political reconstruction. Failure will leave Afghanistan not only 

less free but also more unstable, thereby contributing to 

regional insecurity and potentially serving again as a future 

haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. interests. 

a f gha n i s ta n

A street vendor in Afghanistan
With regard to Afghanistan, the 

Commission has also recommended that the U.S. government 

should:

 On Promoting the 

Individual Right to Religious 

Freedom and Other Human 

Rights

• vigorously support respect for the 

right of every individual to freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and be prepared to make 

great efforts to ensure protection of 

fundamental human rights, including freedom of conscience and the 

equal rights of women, as outlined 

in international human rights 

instruments to which Afghanistan 

is a party; 

• use its influence to protect freedom 

of expression against charges that 

may be used to stifle debate, such 

as blasphemy, “offending Islam,” 

apostasy, or similar offenses, including expression on sensitive subjects 

such as the role of religion in society 

and the rights of women and members of minority groups; 

• act to bolster the position of those 

reformers who respect, and advocate respect for, human rights, since 

those persons in Afghan society 

who would promote respect for 

internationally recognized human 

rights are currently on the defensive, 

even threatened, and these people 

need U.S. support to counter the 

influence of those who advocate an 

Islamic extremist agenda; 

• amplify the voices of political reformers and human 

rights defenders by, among other 

things, encouraging President Karzai to appoint independent human 

rights defenders to the country’s 

independent national human rights 

commission; 

 On Addressing the 

Deteriorating Security 

Conditions

• make greater efforts to improve 

security outside Kabul in order for 

Afghanistan’s political reconstruction to succeed, because without 

adequate security, the warlords will 

continue to hold sway over much of 

the country, undermining the rule 

of law and Afghanistan’s nascent 

democratic institutions; 

• direct measurable, concrete support and benefits, including the 

improved, country-wide security 

referred to above, to the Afghan 

people, which, in turn, will enable 

the Karzai government and other 

moderates to make the hard choices 

necessary to oppose religious 

extremism;

 On Advancing Institutional 

Reform

• ensure that programs, administered 

by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, to help develop 

primary and secondary education, 

including through the printing of 

textbooks, and to provide civic education, incorporate, as part of the 

content, education on international 

standards with regard to human 

rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief, and religious tolerance;

• strengthen efforts to reform the 

judicial system, including through 

helping to develop sorely needed 

infrastructure and through strongly 

supporting the reconstruction in 

Afghanistan of a judicial sector 

operating under the rule of law and 

upholding civil law and international standards of human rights, 

and work to ensure that all judges 

and prosecutors are trained in civil 

law and international human rights 

standards, women are recruited 

into the judiciary at all levels, and 

all Afghans have equal access to the 

courts; and

• assist legal experts in visiting 

Afghanistan, engaging their Afghan 

counterparts, and providing information to the Afghan public on the 

universality of human rights and the 

compatibility of Islam and universal 

human rights, including freedom 

of religion and belief, and expand 

existing programs to bring Afghans 

to this country to experience how 

Islam and other faiths may be practiced in a free society. 

afghanistan Commission Recommendations 

1 

2 

3 

210
211

Bangladesh

During the past year, Bangladesh has been in the throes of 

a major political and constitutional crisis, the resolution of 

which will determine whether religious freedom and other 

universal human rights will be protected by democratic 

institutions and the rule of law or whether the country will 

continue on a downward spiral toward authoritarianism 

and intolerance. In January 2007, a state of emergency was 

declared, normal political activities banned, and previously scheduled national elections indefinitely postponed. 

Recent deviations from democratic norms and reports 

of serious human rights abuses raise troubling questions 

about the future prospects for respect for a range of freedoms, including potentially freedom of religion or belief.

The Commission placed Bangladesh on its Watch List in 

2005 due to a number of concerns: 

• Islamist radicalism and violence, as well as the then 

government’s initial downplaying of the problem;

• the anti-minority, particularly anti-Hindu, violence that 

occurred following the last general election in 2001 and 

the failure to investigate and hold perpetrators to account 

for that violence and other instances of violence against 

members of religious minorities; 

• the inadequate police response to the sometimes violent 

campaign against the minority Ahmadi religious community;

• discrimination against members of religious minority 

communities in public employment and access to government services; and 

• the repeated and sometimes fatal attacks against journalists, authors, and academics for debating sensitive 

social or political issues or otherwise expressing opinions 

deemed by militants to be offensive to Islam. 

These concerns led the Commission to visit Bangladesh in February-March 2006 and to hold a public forum 

on Bangladesh in October 2006. Although the political 

context has altered considerably with changes in government in October 2006 and January 2007, the Commission finds that religious freedom remains under threat 

in Bangladesh. If left unchecked, current trends toward 

greater intolerance and religiously-motivated violence, 

particularly toward Hindus, Ahmadis, and Christians, 

could further undermine human rights protections for 

all Bangladeshis. Accordingly, the Commission continues 

to place Bangladesh on its Watch List. 

Since 1991, notwithstanding relatively difficult 

economic conditions, Bangladesh has had a representative government, regular changes of power through free 

elections, a judiciary that sometimes rules against those in 

authority, a lively press often critical of government policies, active participation of women in the workplace, and a 

functioning civil society with active human rights groups, 

women’s organizations, and numerous non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs). Democratically-elected governments in office since 1991 have, however, left untouched 

and in some cases further elaborated on Islamic elements 

introduced in the constitution by previous military regimes, 

including the establishment of Islam as Bangladesh's official religion, as described below.

Following independence from Pakistan in 1971, 

Bangladesh was established as a secular state in which 

national identity was based on Bengali language and culture. 

The constitution contains strongly-worded guarantees for 

freedom of religious belief and practice, as well as equal 

treatment by the government for citizens regardless of reliB a n g l a de s h

Women in Bangladesh
212

gious affiliation. Subsequent military regimes amended the 

constitution, however, to introduce Islamic elements, including the affirmation that “absolute trust and faith in Allah” is 

to “be the basis for all actions” by the government. Although 

not judicially enforceable, this change in the constitution 

has been cited by minority rights advocates as diminishing 

the status of non-Muslims as equal members of Bangladeshi 

society. Islam was made Bangladesh’s state religion in 1988 

under the military dictatorship of H.M. Ershad.

Aided by the expansion of Islamic schools (madrassas), charities, and other social welfare institutions, some 

receiving foreign funding, Islamist activists have gained in 

political, economic, and social influence in Bangladesh in 

recent years. Explicitly Islamist parties first entered government in 2001. Those with the agenda of making Bangladesh 

an Islamic state, including Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, 

helped the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 

win the last national election in October 2001 and allegedly 

then used their positions in the BNP-led government to 

deny funding to or otherwise disadvantage groups viewed 

as opposing an Islamist political and social agenda which 

Jamaat championed. Although many some of those who 

call for a more Islamist Bangladesh have been engaged 

in peaceful political and social activities, others, drawing 

inspiration from extremist movements elsewhere in the 

Islamic world, have adopted a jihadist ideology of violent 

struggle against perceived opponents of Islam.

This lack of accountability for anti-minority violence 

associated with the 2001 election led the Commission, 

minority advocates, and many others to be concerned that 

Bangladesh’s next national elections would also result in 

anti-minority violence. Some with whom the Commission 

met during the February-March 2006 visit to Bangladesh 

were themselves experiencing difficulties in becoming 

registered. Others claimed that locations dominated by 

minority voters had not been visited by the enumerators 

conducting the registration or, on the other hand, alleged 

that non-citizens believed to favor Islamist parties were 

being registered. Widespread concerns with the registration 

process were underlined when a study undertaken by the 

U.S. National Democratic Institute found 13 million more 

names on the voter rolls than would be eligible according to 

Bangladesh’s population. 

Controversy over the impartiality of the electoral 

process, including over voter registration, resulted in the indefinite postponement of the national election scheduled for 

January 2007. On January 11, 2007, Bangladesh’s President 

resigned, under opposition pressure, from his controversial 

position as head of the caretaker government charged with 

administering the country during the national election period. A state of emergency was declared, during which public 

political activities were banned and elections postponed, 

pending correction of deficiencies in the electoral process, 

including the voter rolls. The head of the current caretaker 

government, a former World Bank official, has publicly 

declared his intention to hold “free, fair, and participatory” 

elections “within the shortest possible time.” 

Despite the caretaker government’s public promises 

to uphold human rights, there were numerous reports of 

serious human rights abuses, including suspected extrajudicial killings by the security forces, arbitrary detentions, 

torture, curbs on press freedom, and violations of the 

right of due process. Many of the reported abuses were 

associated with a high-profile anti-corruption campaign 

If left unchecked, current trends 

toward greater intolerance and 

religiously-motivated violence, particularly 

toward Hindus, Ahmadis, and Christians, 

could further undermine human rights 

protections for all Bangladeshis. 

Dhaka, Bangladesh
213

spearheaded by the military. In addition, charges of corruption or other serious crimes, including murder, were 

brought against a number of senior politicians, including 

Awami League leader and former Prime Minister Sheikh 

Hasina. BNP leader and former Prime Minister Khaleda 

Zia was also reportedly under virtual house arrest. The 

role of the military under the current caretaker government raises questions about the future of democracy, rule 

of law, and respect for human rights in Bangladesh. These 

institutions, important guarantors for religious freedom, 

could be further eroded if the country’s current caretaker 

government seeks to prolong its tenure beyond what is 

strictly needed to prepare for the free and fair election of 

a national government truly representative of the popular 

will. On the positive side, the political turmoil that led to 

the postponement of the 2007 elections has not resulted 

in widespread anti-minority, particularly anti-Hindu, 

attacks, attacks such as those that occurred following 

national elections in 2001. As of this writing, no new 

election date has been set.

Bangladesh’s high levels of political violence and 

instability have provided opportunities for religious and 

other extremists to expand their influence. Due to a weak 

legal system and corrupt law enforcement, gangs employed 

by politicians engage in criminal activities with relative 

impunity. Armed groups of Islamist vigilantes and leftist 

guerrillas terrorize remote rural areas. Authors, journalists, and academics expressing opinions allegedly offensive 

to certain interpretations of Islam are subject to violent, 

sometimes fatal, attacks. Extremists oppose NGOs that 

promote the economic betterment of women and protection of women’s rights. Some such organizations have been 

bombed, presumably by these extremists.

Although Bangladesh has the unusual distinction 

of having its two major parties, the BNP and the Awami 

League, led by women relatives of slain leaders who had 

both served as Prime Minister, religious extremism, mostly 

among Muslims, victimizes Bangladeshi women of all 

faiths. Some Muslim clerics, especially in rural areas, 

have sanctioned vigilante punishments against women 

for alleged moral transgressions. Rape is also reportedly a 

common form of anti-minority violence. The government 

commonly fails to punish the perpetrators of these acts 

against women, since the law enforcement and the judicial 

systems, especially at the local level, are vulnerable to 

corruption, intimidation, and political interference. 

 Politically-motivated bombings, assassinations, and 

other terrorist acts, often ascribed to Islamist militants, have 

exacerbated partisan tensions and increased the vulnerability of minority communities. In August 2004 and January 

2005, such attacks resulted in the deaths of prominent 

opposition political figures. In February 2005, the government banned two militant groups implicated in a series of 

bomb attacks on NGOs. Militants have been blamed for a 

coordinated wave of almost simultaneous bomb attacks, 

numbering in the hundreds, carried out in all but one of 

Bangladesh’s 64 districts on August 17, 2005. Militants were 

also implicated in a series of bomb attacks on Bangladesh’s 

judiciary in October-November 2005. Among the victims 

was one of the country’s few judges from a religious minority 

community, a Hindu. The bomb attacks were accompanied 

by militant demands to substitute sharia, or Islamic law, for 

Bangladesh’s current system of secular jurisprudence and by 

threats against courts and judges who do not apply sharia. 

The then government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia responded with a campaign of arrests of militants suspected of 

involvement in the bombings and in other violent incidents. 

As a result of arrests made during this campaign, more than 

30 suspected militants were detained and later sentenced to 

death. In March 2007, six members of the Islamist militant 

group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), including 

JMB leader Sheikh Abdur Rahman and notorious Islamist 

vigilante Siddiqul Islam, better known as “Bangla Bhai,” 

B a n g l a de s h

Commissioners Preeta D. Bansal (center, back row) and Felice D. Gaer 

(right, back row) with women’s rights activists in Bangladesh 
214

were executed for their involvement in bombings that took 

place in 2005.

Despite constitutional protections, Hindus and other 

non-Muslims in Bangladesh face societal discrimination 

and are disadvantaged in access to government jobs, public 

services, and the legal system. They are also underrepresented in elected political offices, including the national 

parliament. Minority group advocates claim that religion 

plays a role in property and land disputes, pointing to expropriations of Hindu property since the Pakistan era and 

the gradual displacement of non-Muslim tribal populations 

by Bengali Muslims in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other 

traditionally tribal areas. Such disputes occasionally result 

in violence.

The Commission was told on its visit to Bangladesh 

that Hindus have left the country in large numbers in the 

past three decades because of the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear under which religious minorities must live. 

Hindus, Christians, and representatives of other minority 

religious communities continue to express concerns regarding the safety of their co-religionists, citing the growth 

in Islamist radicalism and instances of violence, including fatalities, in which the victims’ religious affiliation or 

activities may have been factors. In June 2005, there were 

arson or bombing attacks against Ahmadi mosques in three 

locations. In July 2005, two Bangladeshis working for a 

Christian NGO were murdered, allegedly for showing a film 

depicting the life of Jesus. As of this writing, there have been 

no charges brought in this case or in the September 2004 

murder of a prominent Christian convert from Islam. 

The most serious and sustained conflict along ethnic 

and religious lines has been in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 

located in Bangladesh’s eastern border region neighboring 

India and Burma. The varied but wholly non-Bengali/nonMuslim indigenous peoples in this formerly autonomous 

area had opposed inclusion in East Pakistan, due to their 

identification with other tribal groups in northeast India.

After Bangladesh won its independence, Bangladeshi 

authorities ignored appeals for restoring local autonomy 

in the Hill Tracts and indeed promoted an acceleration 

in Bengali settlement. The resulting insurgency ended 

in December 1997 with the signing of a peace agreement. Resentment remains strong, however, over settler 

encroachment, human rights abuses by the Bangladeshi 

military, and the slow pace of the government’s implementation of the peace agreement. Muslim Bengalis, once a tiny 

minority in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, are now believed to 

outnumber members of indigenous groups.

 Islamist extremists in Bangladesh have engaged in a 

public campaign against the Ahmadi community, which is 

viewed as heretical by many Muslims. The Ahmadis, also 

referred to as Ahmadiyya, are estimated to number about 

100,000 in a population of over 140 million. Anti-Ahmadi 

demonstrators have called on the government of Bangladesh 

to declare Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” as was done in 

Pakistan, and subsequently used in Pakistan to justify a range 

of legal limitations on the Ahmadi community and individual Ahmadis. The demonstrators have also called for curbs 

on Ahmadi missionary outreach to the broader Muslim community. Although Bangladesh has thus far refused to declare 

Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, in January 2004, the then 

BNP-led government bent to militant pressure and banned 

the publication and distribution of Ahmadi religious literaPalace in Dhaka, Bangladesh
215

ture. Police seized Ahmadi publications on a few occasions. 

The ban was stayed by the courts in December 2004, with 

further legal action still pending. Although the ban is not currently being enforced, it was not withdrawn by the BNP-led 

government before leaving office in October 2006 

Anti-Ahmadi activists object to Ahmadi houses of worship being called “mosques” and on a number of occasions 

have organized mass demonstrations against them in order 

to occupy or attempt to occupy the sites. In several instances, anti-Ahmadi activists have forcibly replaced signs 

identifying Ahmadi places of worship as mosques, putting 

in their place anti-Ahmadi signs warning Muslims away, 

sometimes with the assistance of the police. According to 

Ahmadi sources, as of this writing, anti-Ahmadi signs have 

now been taken down from all Ahmadi mosques, with the 

exception of one in the city of Bogra. In some instances, the 

anti-Ahmadi agitation has also been accompanied by mob 

violence in which Ahmadi homes have been destroyed and 

Ahmadis held against their will and pressured to recant. 

Although the campaign against the Ahmadis has continued, the violence has diminished in recent months, due to 

improved and more vigorous police protection. In February 

2007, Ahmadis in Brahmanbaria were able to hold a major 

convention, which they had been unable to do for over a 

decade because of hostility from anti-Ahmadi militants.

The Commission visited Bangladesh February 26 

– March 2, 2006 at the invitation of the government of 

Bangladesh. The Commission delegation met with a broad 

range of individuals, including government officials, political leaders, human rights monitors, journalists, women’s 

rights advocates, Muslim religious leaders, leading 

members of the Ahmadi, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian 

communities, and civil society representatives. The government of Bangladesh received the delegation at a high level, 

including individual meetings with four members of the 

Cabinet: the Foreign Minister; the Minister for Law, Justice, 

and Parliamentary Affairs; the Minister of Education; and 

the Minister of Industries, the last mentioned being the 

head of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. The delegation also 

met with the Minister of State for Religious Affairs and 

with the Secretary for Home Affairs, whose responsibilities 

include law enforcement. 

The Commission also has met on a number of occasions 

with human rights monitors, representatives of religious 

communities, Bangladeshi diplomats, and others to discuss 

religious freedom in Bangladesh. On October 17, 2006, with 

the participation of the International Republican Institute 

and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Commission held a public forum in Washington, 

D.C. on the topic “The Bangladesh Elections: Promoting 

Democracy and Protecting Rights in a Muslim-majority 

Country.” Coincident with the forum, the Commission 

issued Policy Focus on Bangladesh, with a number of policy 

recommendations. In April 2004, the Commission, together 

with Congressman Joseph Crowley, a member of the House 

Committee on International Relations, held a public hearing 

in Flushing, New York, on “Bangladesh: Protecting the 

Human Rights of Thought, Conscience, and Religion.” 

B a n g l a de s h

Bangladesh’s high levels of 

political violence and instability have 

provided opportunities for religious and 

other extremists to expand their influence. 

Due to a weak legal system and corrupt 

law enforcement, gangs employed by 

politicians engage in criminal activities 

with relative impunity. 

A USCIRF roundtable on Capitol Hill about Bangladesh’s national elections
BANGLADESH Commission Recommendations 

With regard to Bangladesh, 

the Commission makes the 

following recommendations. 

 Urgent Measures to 

Prevent Anti-Minority 

Violence in the Upcoming 

Elections

In light of Bangladesh’s upcoming 

national elections, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government 

should: 

• urge Bangladesh’s caretaker government to set and to adhere strictly to 

a publicly announced timetable for 

undertaking all necessary actions 

to safeguard the voting rights of all 

Bangladeshis in the next national 

elections, and to ensure that those 

elections are held freely and fairly 

and at the earliest practical date by:

• restoring public confidence in the 

non-partisan and independent 

character of both the Election 

Commission and the election-period caretaker government;

• making every effort to prevent 

violence before and after the 

election, including instructing law 

enforcement bodies to ensure the 

security of all Bangladeshi citizens 

throughout the voting process;

• instituting a registration process 

that will facilitate the enrollment 

of the maximum number of eligible voters before the election, in 

a manner that does not discriminate on the basis of perceived 

religious or political affiliation 

or ethnic background, deleting names of extra or ineligible 

voters, ensuring the inclusion of 

minority voters, and investigating 

and resolving complaints about 

the registration process fairly, 

promptly, and well in advance of 

the actual election;

• using all practical technical 

means of ensuring the security 

of the ballot, including the use of 

“transparent” and numbered ballot boxes; 

• permitting and facilitating 

international and domestic nongovernmental monitoring of the 

entire electoral process; Bangladesh should be encouraged as a 

member of the United Nations 

and of the Commonwealth to 

avail itself of the resources of 

these and other international 

organizations with experience 

in assisting member states in 

conducting credible elections; 

• satisfying the requirements of 

monitors from the U.S. National 

Democratic Institute, the U.S. 

International Republican Institute, and the European Union, as 

well as election experts from the 

UN, all of whom refused to offer 

legitimacy to the severely flawed 

election scheduled for January 

2007; and 

• investigating fully the acts of violence committed in the aftermath 

of the 2001 elections and holding 

the perpetrators to account, with 

the aim of preventing potential 

similar recurrences in 2007 and 

during any other election period 

in the future;

• encourage Bangladeshi authorities, 

and in particular the caretaker government overseeing the election

period, to ensure that the elections 

are not marred by violence by: 

• deploying security forces to work 

now to identify and prepare 

against specific threats to vulnerable localities and communities, 

including religious and ethnic 

minorities;

• publicly ordering the security 

forces to undertake a maximum 

effort to prevent and punish election-related violence, particularly 

violence targeting members of 

minority religious communities, whether during the election 

campaign, on election day, or in its 

aftermath; and

• publicly condemning, outlawing, 

and swiftly responding to antiminority violence and discrimination in advance of the election 

and ensuring, through legislation 

if necessary, that election-related 

violence will be thoroughly investigated and that those responsible 

will be brought to justice; 

• prepare and publicize a comprehensive pre- and post-election analysis 

of the election process with recommendations for needed reform; 

• provide for official U.S. government 

monitors in advance of, and in connection with, the upcoming elections 

in addition to those already planned 

by the National Democratic Institute 

for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute; and

• urge other states and international 

organizations to work together to 

increase monitoring and other efforts to forestall violence, with the assistance of indigenous human rights 

and other civil society organizations, 

216

1 
and coordinate actions in support of 

a peaceful, free, and fair election in 

Bangladesh with other countries and 

international organizations.

 Urgent Measures to Protect 

Those Threatened 

by Religious Extremism 

The Commission recommends that 

the U.S. government should urge the 

government of Bangladesh to:

• investigate and prosecute to the 

fullest extent of the law perpetrators of violent acts, including future 

acts and those already documented, 

against members of minority 

religious communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

promoting women’s human rights, 

and all those who oppose religious 

extremism; 

• rescind its January 2004 order banning publications by the Ahmadi 

religious community, continue to 

reject extremist demands to declare 

Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, protect the places of worship, persons, 

and property of members of this 

religious community, and fully 

investigate and promptly bring 

to justice those responsible for 

violence against Ahmadis; and 

• protect women from vigilante or 

anti-minority violence, combat 

claims of religious sanction or justification for violence against women, 

and vigorously investigate and 

prosecute the perpetrators of such 

violent incidents. 

 Longer-Term Measures 

to Protect Universal Human 

Rights

The Commission recommends that 

the U.S. government should urge the 

government of Bangladesh to:

• ensure that decisions on public 

employment in national institutions such as the civil service, the 

military, law enforcement agencies, 

and the judiciary, including at the 

highest levels, do not discriminate 

on the basis of religious affiliation, belief, or ethnic background; 

conduct and publicize the results of 

a comprehensive survey of minority 

representation in the public service; 

• establish effective, legally transparent mechanisms for handling 

complaints regarding discrimination 

in public employment;

• ensure that law enforcement and 

security services are equally protective of the rights of all, regardless of 

political or religious affiliation or belief, including due process for all who 

are accused of crimes, according to 

Bangladesh’s own constitution and 

relevant international standards;

• establish the independence of the 

judicial system from the executive at 

all levels in order to prevent political 

interference in the judicial process 

and to ensure that the courts afford 

equal access and equitable treatment 

to all citizens; 

• include in all school curricula, in 

school textbooks, and in teacher 

training for both public schools and 

government-regulated madrassas

information on tolerance and respect 

for human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; 

• promote the use of history and social 

studies texts in public schools that 

reflect the country’s religious diversity and are reviewed by an independent panel of experts to exclude 

language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, hatred, or violence 

toward any group of persons based 

on religion or belief; 

• repeal the Vested Property Act of 

1974, discriminatory legislation that 

has been used unjustly to seize Hindu-owned property in the decades 

since Bangladesh’s independence 

and has continued to be used under 

successive governments to reward 

well-connected members of the majority community in Bangladesh; 

• ensure that publicly-funded support 

for domestic faith-based charitable, 

humanitarian, developmental, or 

educational activities be awarded 

on a non-discriminatory basis;

• permit NGOs to conduct legitimate 

humanitarian and developmental 

activities without harassment, undue interference, or discrimination 

and ensure that they are protected 

from extremist intimidation or 

violence; and

• guarantee the right of human rights 

defenders to receive funding from 

foreign sources, as set forth in the 

relevant UN instruments 1, without 

harassment, unless such foreign 

funding incites or supports religious 

extremism, hatred, or the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 

guaranteed to Bangladeshi citizens.

B a n g l a de s h

1

 Article 13 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms, passed in 1998, states that “Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of 

promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means...”

217

2 

3 
 U.S. Assistance to Promote 

Human Rights, Including 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

The Commission recommends that 

the U.S. government should:

• use public diplomacy, including 

international exchange programs, 

to bolster the position of Bangladesh’s voices of moderation and of 

those reformers who respect, and 

advocate respect for, internationally 

recognized human rights, including 

the human rights of women and 

of members of minority religious 

communities;

• assist Bangladeshi educational authorities in improving and expanding public education in order to 

enhance the availability and quality 

of education of all Bangladeshis, regardless of faith, gender, or ethnicity, and support non-governmental 

review of curricula and textbooks of 

public schools and madrassas;

• support efforts to improve the human rights performance and professional competence of the security 

forces so that they can better protect 

all Bangladeshis from violence and 

intimidation by extremists;

• act to counter the extremist assault 

on Bangladesh’s secular legal system, including by (1) strengthening 

U.S. assistance to promote the rule 

of law and to enhance access to the 

legal system by women and members of religious minorities, and (2) 

informing Bangladeshis, through 

educational and cultural exchanges, 

broadcast and print media, and 

other means of public diplomacy, 

on the universality of human rights 

and the compatibility of Islam and 

universal human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief; and 

• support, and provide technical 

assistance for, the creation of an 

independent national human rights 

commission in Bangladesh able to 

investigate, publicize, and bring to 

the courts all categories of human 

rights abuses, including violence 

and discrimination against religious 

minorities, in accordance with 

international standards2

 for such 

organizations, i.e., independence, 

adequate funding, a representative 

character, and a broad mandate that 

includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

218

2

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions 

for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

4 
219 INDIA

The positive developments in India affecting freedom of 

religion or belief that began in 2004, when parliamentary 

elections resulted in installation of a coalition government led by the Congress Party, continued in the past year. 

Under the previous leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party 

(BJP), the Commission in prior years found that the Indian 

government’s response to increasing violence against 

religious minorities in the state of Gujarat and elsewhere to 

be inadequate. In addition, several senior BJP government 

leaders had publicly allied themselves with, or refused to 

disassociate themselves from, extremist organizations that 

were implicated in that religious violence. In response, 

from 2002 – 2004, the Commission recommended that India be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

As a result of the changes that took place in India after the 

2004 elections, the Commission in 2005 no longer recommended that India be designated a CPC. 

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, India has a democratically elected government, is governed generally by the rule of law, and has a tradition of secular governance that dates back to the country’s 

independence. India has a judiciary that is independent, 

albeit slow-moving and frequently unresponsive, that can 

work to hold the perpetrators of religious violence responsible; contains a vibrant civil society with many vigorous, independent non-governmental human rights organizations 

that have investigated and published extensive reports on 

the rise of religiously motivated violence; and is home to a 

free press that has widely reported on and strongly criticized 

the situation on the ground in India and the growing threats 

in the past decade to a religiously plural society.

Despite this, religious minorities in India have been the 

victims of violent attacks by fellow citizens, including killings, 

in what is commonly called “communal violence.” In the late 

1990s, there was a marked increase in violent attacks against 

members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and

Christians, throughout India, including killings, torture, 

rape, and destruction of property. Those responsible for 

communal violence were rarely held responsible for their 

actions, helping to foster a climate in which it was believed 

that attacks on religious minorities could be carried out with 

impunity. The increase in such violence in India coincided 

with the rise in political influence of groups associated with 

the Sangh Parivar, a collection of organizations that view 

non-Hindus as foreign to India and aggressively press for 

governmental policies to promote a Hindu nationalist agenda. Although it was not directly responsible for instigating 

the violence against religious minorities, the BJP-led national 

government clearly did not do all in its power to pursue the 

perpetrators of the attacks and to counteract the prevailing 

climate of hostility against these minority groups, especially 

at the state and local levels. 

S O U T H ASIA

The dome of a Jain temple in India

On the Ganges River at Varanasi, India, an important pilgrimage site for Hindus
220

Of particular concern to the Commission were the February 2002 events in the state of Gujarat, when, after a fire 

on a train resulted in the death of 58 Hindus, hundreds 

of Muslims were killed across Gujarat by Hindu mobs. In addition, hundreds of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses 

and other kinds of infrastructure were looted or destroyed. 

More than 100,000 people fled their homes and, in the end, 

as many as 2,000 Muslims were killed. India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an official body, found 

evidence of premeditation in the killings by members of 

extremist groups espousing Hindu nationalism, complicity 

by Gujarat state government officials, and police inaction in 

the midst of attacks on Muslims. Christians were also victims 

in Gujarat, and many churches were destroyed. 

In the months following the violence, the BJP-led state 

government in Gujarat headed by State Minister Narendra 

Modi was widely accused of being reluctant to bring the 

perpetrators of the killings of Muslims to justice. Few persons had been arrested and held to account for the deaths. 

In response to the failures of the Gujarat government, 

India’s Supreme Court declared in October 2003 that it had 

“no faith left” in the state’s handling of the investigations 

and instructed the Gujarat state government to appoint 

new prosecutors to examine the religious violence of 2002. 

In April 2004, in what was described as an indictment of 

the Gujarat government, the Supreme Court overturned 

the controversial acquittal of the 21 accused in a particular 

case and ordered a new trial of those indicted. In August 

2004, the Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat government 

to reopen its investigation of the 2002 violence, criticizing 

the local police officials for poor investigative practices 

and follow-up. The Court set up an inquiry committee to 

reexamine 2,000 cases; as a result, it was announced in 

February 2006 that the Gujarati police would reopen nearly 

1,600 cases and take action against 41 police officials for 

their alleged role in the Gujarat violence. In addition, Gujarati police announced that they would pursue more than 

600 others accused in these reopened cases. In July 2006, a 

report from a committee attached to the Prime Minister’s 

office chastised the Gujarat government for failing to improve the situation for Muslims in that state, noting that a 

“state of fear and insecurity” still existed for many Muslims 

there. The report also expressed concern about the divisions between Hindus and Muslims that had developed in 

many Gujarati towns since the 2002 events.

In addition to the steps taken by the Supreme Court, 

the current Congress-led government continued its efforts 

to redress a number of aspects of the Hindu nationalist 

agenda of the previous government. In June 2004, a government-appointed committee of historians was tasked with 

removing the “distortions and communally biased portions” of school textbooks that had been introduced by the 

BJP. Those texts were replaced in 2005 with revised editions. 

Because several states continued to use objectionable texts, 

including social science books published in Gujarat in June 

2005 that contained language minimizing Hitler’s role in 

the Holocaust (Hitler is a respected figure among some 

extreme Hindu nationalists) and belittling religious minorities, the federal government decided to take further action 

by forming a National Textbook Council to ensure that such 

books would no longer be used.

The government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 

has also continued to act decisively to prevent communal 

violence in situations where it has erupted in the past. In 

July 2005, six Muslim militants attacked a religious site 

in Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where in 1992 

Hindu extremists destroyed the sixteenth century Babri 

mosque, resulting in nationwide riots that left up to 3,000 

dead, mostly Muslims. There were protests organized by the 

BJP in response to the July attack, but police dispersed the 

crowds and no violence ensued. In February 2006, a mass 

rally of Hindu nationalists was held in the Dangs district 

of Gujarat calling on members of the indigenous “tribal” 

people to “reconvert” to Hinduism. In the weeks leading up 

to the event, the Hindu groups issued a number of highly 

inflammatory statements, particularly against Christians, 

and violence against local Christian communities was 

feared, as has happened in the past. However, the military 

was sent into the area to maintain peace; riot police were 

reportedly posted outside churches and temples and no 

violence occurred. In March 2006, after bombs exploded in 

In July 2006, after reports implicated 

Muslim extremists in train bombings 

in Mumbai (Bombay) in which more than 

200 people were killed, successful efforts 

were made to prevent anti-Muslim rioting. 
221

the Hindu holy city of Varanasi killing 20 persons, allegedly 

instigated by Islamist groups, authorities reportedly acted 

swiftly to prevent retaliation against Muslims. Prime Minister Singh appealed for calm, and soldiers and police were 

deployed at holy sites across the country. In July 2006, after 

reports implicated Muslim extremists in train bombings in 

Mumbai (Bombay) in which more than 200 people were 

killed, successful efforts were made to prevent anti-Muslim 

rioting. In November 2006, a central government-appointed 

panel known as the Sachar Committee acknowledged that 

Muslims in India face discrimination and other hardships. 

In response to the report’s findings, Prime Minister Singh 

pledged to do more to “address the imbalances.”

Despite the improved situation, concerns about 

religious freedom in India remain. Attacks on Christian 

churches and individuals, largely perpetrated by individuals associated with Hindu nationalist groups, continue to 

occur, and perpetrators are rarely held to account by the 

state legal apparatus. Dozens of violent attacks carried out 

or incited by Hindu extremist groups against Christian institutions and persons continued throughout the past year. 

In January 2007, in the state of Karnataka, members of the 

Bajrang Dal, a Hindu nationalist group, attacked a Christian 

pastor and his wife in a village near Bangalore; after the 

couple fled the area, the group found them and attacked 

them again, accusing them of “forcible conversions.” The 

following week in the same state, a similar group attacked 

two more pastors; when the police arrived, the pastors, 

rather than the attackers, were taken to the police station. 

In February 2007, about 100 members of an extremist 

group attacked a pastors’ conference in the Raipur district 

of Chhattisgarh state, severely beating 30 persons. Also 

in February, in the state of Orissa, a mob of 400 persons 

led by members of the Bajrang Dal attacked a Christian 

school in the Jharsuguda district, causing five persons to 

be hospitalized from the violence. The mob also destroyed 

church property. That same month in Maharashtra, a mob 

of 15-20 persons beat five Christian students near the town 

of Panvel, leaving two with severe head injuries and the 

others with serious internal injuries. In that incident, doctors reportedly refused to treat the students until a police 

complaint was filed, forcing them to receive treatment in a 

private hospital. Similar attacks occur, sometimes in greater 

numbers, every month, particularly in states where the 

BJP heads the state government, including in Rajasthan, 

Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhatisgarh, and Jharkhand. In 

some instances, the police respond appropriately; in others, 

however, the police reportedly look the other way or even 

appear to be complicit in the attacks.

I N D IA

Indian girls at the seashore
222

Several of the BJP-led states, including Orissa, 

Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh, as well as Arunchal 

Pradesh, have laws against “forced” or “induced” religious conversions, which require government officials to 

assess the legality of conversions and provide for fines and 

imprisonment for anyone who uses force, fraud, or “inducement” to convert another. However, reports of persons 

having been arrested, still less prosecuted, under these laws 

are not common. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised 

that these laws can sometimes result in a hostile atmosphere 

for religious minorities, as states in which these laws exist 

tend to be those in which attacks by extremist groups are 

more common—and often happen with greater impunity 

than elsewhere in India. For example, the state of Madhya 

Pradesh, which is headed by the BJP, was the scene of an 

increasing number of attacks in the past year. In June 2006, 

a report by the Indian national government’s National Commission for Minorities (NCM) found that Hindu extremists 

had frequently invoked the state’s anti-conversion law as a 

pretext to incite mobs against Christians. The NCM report 

also found that police in Madhya Pradesh were frequently 

complicit in these attacks. In Rajasthan, the BJP-headed state 

parliament passed a law against forced conversions in April 

2006, but in May, the governor refused to sign the bill, so it 

has not become law. Until the end of last year, the only states 

that had passed such laws were those headed by the BJP. In 

December 2006, however, the state of Himachal Pradesh, 

which has a Congress Party-led government, passed legislation on conversions similar to that found in other states, the 

first time such a law has been passed by a state ruled by the 

Congress Party, which usually opposes such legislation. In 

February 2007, the governor signed the bill into law. Significantly, the government of Tamil Nadu rescinded its law 

against forced conversions after the May 2004 elections. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted 

personal interviews with members of non-governmental 

organizations representing various religious communities 

in India, as well as human rights organizations, academics, 

and other India experts. In March 2005, the Commission 

issued a statement encouraging the Department of State 

to prevent the planned visit to the United States of Gujarat 

State Minister Narendra Modi, citing evidence presented 

by India’s NHRC and numerous domestic and international 

human rights investigators of the complicity of Gujarat state 

officials, led by State Minister Modi, in the February 2002 

mob attacks on Muslims.

With regard to India, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should: 

• press the government of India to make more vigorous and 

effective efforts to halt the violent attacks against religious 

minorities that continue to occur with troubling regularity 

in India and to hold state governments and state government officials accountable for the violence and other 

unlawful acts that occur in their states; and

• urge the Indian government to continue its policies aimed 

at returning the country to its tradition of religious tolerance, including by:

• continuing to pursue, investigate, and lay charges 

against the perpetrators of the killings in Gujarat and 

hold them to account; 

• following through on the determination to eliminate 

religiously intolerant language from school textbooks; 

• taking steps to prevent and punish communal violence, 

including by following through on a pledge made in 

2004 to enact a law criminalizing inter-religious violence; and

• continuing the kinds of measures that have successfully 

prevented outbreaks of violence in high-tension situations, and engaging in pre-planning to ensure that 

the police and other law enforcement agencies have 

the resources necessary to avert communal violence

 in the future.

S TATE DEPAR TMENT

Commission Recommendations

With regard to India, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• press the government of India to make more vigorous 

and effective efforts to halt the violent attacks against 

religious minorities that continue to occur with troubling 

regularity in India and to hold state governments and 

state government officials accountable for the violence 

and other unlawful acts that occur in their states; and

• urge the Indian government to continue its policies 

aimed at returning the country to its tradition of religious 

tolerance, including by:

• continuing to pursue, investigate, and lay charges 

against the perpetrators of the killings in Gujarat and 

hold them to account;

• following through on the determination to eliminate 

religiously intolerant language from school textbooks;

• taking steps to prevent and punish communal violence, including by following through on a pledge 

made in 2004 to enact a law criminalizing inter-religious violence; and

• continuing the kinds of measures that have successfully prevented outbreaks of violence in high-tension 

situations, and engaging in pre-planning to ensure 

that the police and other law enforcement agencies 

have the resources necessary to avert communal 

violence in the future. 
223

Pakistan

Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in 

Pakistan, particularly against Shi’as, Ahmadis, Christians, 

and Hindus, and the government’s somewhat improved 

response to this problem continues to be insufficient and 

not fully effective. The current government’s political alliance with militant religious parties has served to strengthen 

such groups and give them influence in the country’s affairs 

disproportionate to their support among the Pakistani 

people. Substantial evidence that Musharraf’s government 

has been complicit in providing sanctuary in Pakistan to 

the Taliban also intensified in the past year. In addition, a 

number of the country’s laws, including legislation restricting the rights of the Ahmadi community and laws against 

blasphemy, frequently result in imprisonment on account 

of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence against the 

accused. These religious freedom concerns persist amid 

the wider problem of the lack of democracy in Pakistan, 

an issue the current government has done little to address. 

Proposals by President Musharraf to have the outgoing parliament elect him to another term as president have raised 

serious questions about whether the next parliamentary 

elections, scheduled to be held in 2007, will be free and fair. 

In light of these persistent, serious concerns, the Commission continues to recommend that Pakistan be designated 

a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. To date, the State 

Department has not designated Pakistan a CPC.

Successive governments have severely violated 

religious freedom in Pakistan. Discriminatory legislation, 

promulgated in previous decades and persistently enforced, has fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance 

and eroded the social and legal status of members of religious minorities, including Shi’as, Ahmadis, Hindus, and 

Christians. Government officials do not provide adequate 

protections from societal violence to members of these 

religious minority communities, and, with some exceptions, perpetrators of attacks on minorities are seldom 

brought to justice. In some recent instances, the government of Pakistan has directly encouraged religious intolerance. In March 2006, it was reported that, in an attempt to 

persuade people in the regions bordering on Afghanistan 

not to support Islamist militants, the Pakistani military 

dropped leaflets claiming that those militants were fighting 

against Pakistan “in connivance with Jews and Hindus.”

Many religious schools, or madrassas, in Pakistan 

provide ongoing ideological training and motivation to 

those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad. In mid-2005, the government 

of Pakistan renewed its effort to require all madrassas to 

register with the government; in addition, madrassas were 

ordered to expel all foreign students. By year’s end, and 

despite an outcry from some militant groups, most of the 

religious schools had registered. However, reports indicate 

P a k i s ta n

Many religious schools, or madrassas, 

in Pakistan provide ongoing ideological 

training and motivation to those who 

take part in violence targeting religious 

minorities in Pakistan and abroad. 

Badshahi Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan
224

that the registration process will have no effect on the 

content of the schools’ curricula, which remains extremist and includes exhortations to violence, and there are 

still no government controls on the madrassas’ sources 

of funding. It therefore continues to be doubtful whether 

these belated official efforts to curb extremism through 

reform of the country’s Islamic religious schools will be 

accompanied by other measures to make them effective. 

Moreover, these efforts do not adequately address the 

much wider problem of religious extremism in Pakistan 

and the continued, unwarranted influence of militant 

groups on the rights and freedoms of others. By issuing 

proclamations that are not acted upon, the government 

has only strengthened sectarian and extremist forces. The 

reach of these groups was demonstrated in February 2007, 

when the Punjab Minister for Social Welfare, Zille Huma 

Usman, was shot dead by a man whom police described 

as a religious fanatic. The accused perpetrator, who was 

arrested, reportedly stated that he shot the minister 

because she was not wearing what he believed to be the 

proper clothing for women.

Despite President Musharraf’s appeals for religious 

moderation and tolerance, religiously motivated violence, 

much of it committed against Shi’a Muslims by Sunni militants, remains chronic in Pakistan. Ahmadis, Christians, 

and Hindus have also been targeted by Sunni extremist 

groups and mob violence. To its credit, the government 

has made some attempts to respond to these attacks. For 

example, when, in November 2005, a mob of over 1,500 

persons, incited by local Muslim clerics on the basis of a 

false accusation of blasphemy against a local Christian 

man, set fire to and destroyed several churches, schools, 

and homes of Christian families in the town of Sangla Hill, 

political leaders condemned the violence and its perpetrators were arrested and brought to trial. After the February 

2006 bombings of a procession of Shi’a Muslims in the town 

of Hangu in the North West Frontier Province that killed at 

least 43 people, the central government condemned the 

blasts and the perpetrators were identified as a result of a 

government investigation.

Nevertheless, religiously motivated violence continues to be a serious problem. Sunni Muslims are also 

victims of reprisal attacks, sometimes carried out by Shi’a 

militant groups. In January 2007, at least 14 people were 

killed in a suicide bombing attack in Peshawar shortly 

before a Shi’a religious procession was scheduled to 

come through. One day later, another suicide bomber 

killed himself and two policemen at a checkpoint near 

the Afghan border, after they successfully prevented him 

from approaching a Shi’a Ashura procession and detonating a bomb. And on the same day in Bannu, further north, 

two rockets landed near a Shi’a mosque where worshipers were arriving to mark Ashura. Eleven people were 

wounded. In February, it was reported that six suspected 

members of a Sunni militant group had been arrested. 

In June 2006, a mob, stirred up by allegations that some 

Ahmadis had desecrated the Koran, attacked an Ahmadi 

locality near Sialkot, injured two persons, and set fire to 

several vehicles, shops, and homes. When the police arrived, seven Ahmadis, rather than the perpetrators, were 

arrested. In March 2007, an assistant sub-inspector of 

police shot dead an Ahmadi man after accusing him of 

being an “infidel” in Seera village near Phalian, killing him 

instantly. The perpetrator reportedly told police that he 

killed the man for changing his religion from Sunni Islam 

to the Ahmadi religion. According to news reports, the 

perpetrator went to a police station and turned himself in 

and a case has been lodged against him.

In the past few years, the minority Christian community also continued to be the target of extremist and mob 

violence. In November 2005, a mob of over 1,500 persons, 

incited by local Muslim clerics on the basis of a false accusation of blasphemy against a local Christian man, set fire 

to and destroyed several churches, schools, and homes of 

Christian families in the town of Sangla Hill, in the province 

of Punjab. Political leaders condemned the violence and 

perpetrators were arrested and reportedly will be brought to 

trial. In January 2006, the blasphemy charge was dropped. In 

February 2006, in the furor that erupted in Pakistan after the 

Blasphemy allegations, which are 

often false, result in the lengthy detention 

of, and sometimes violence against, 

Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and 

members of other religious minorities, 

as well as Muslims on account of 

their religious beliefs. 
225

A mosque in Karachi, Pakistan

publication of highly controversial cartoons in the Danish 

press, mobs threatened Christian communities in a number 

of areas in Pakistan. In the town of Sukkur, in Sindh province, 

a crowd of Muslims burned down two churches, an attack 

that was triggered in part by rumors that a Christian man 

had committed blasphemy. Provincial authorities ordered 

an investigation into the incident and reportedly a number 

of people have been arrested. In August 2006, a church and 

several Christian homes were attacked in a village outside 

Lahore in what was called a dispute over land. Three Christians were injured after 35 Muslim men reportedly burned 

buildings and desecrated Bibles.

Ahmadis, who number between 3 and 4 million in 

Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the full 

practice of their faith. Pakistan’s constitution declares 

members of the Ahmadi religious community to be 

“non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. 

Barred by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis are 

also proscribed by law from many other actions. They may 

not call their places of worship “mosques,” worship in 

non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are 

otherwise open to all Muslims, perform the Muslim call 

to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, 

publicly quote from the Koran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also illegal for Ahmadis to 

preach in public, to seek converts, or to produce, publish, 

and disseminate their religious materials. In August 2005, 

Pakistani authorities banned 16 Ahmadi-run publications 

in the Punjab province. Ahmadis have been arrested—two 

persons were arrested as a result of the action in the 

Punjab—and imprisoned for terms of up to three years 

for all of the above acts, and they are reportedly subject 

to ill treatment by prison authorities and fellow prisoners. According to the State Department, as of late 2006, 17 

Ahmadis faced criminal charges under the anti-Ahmadi 

laws. What is more, because they are required to register 

to vote as non-Muslims, a policy that was reaffirmed by 

Pakistani government officials in February 2004, Ahmadis 

who refuse to disavow their claim to being Muslims are 

effectively disenfranchised. The one potentially positive 

development—the December 2004 abolition of the religious identification column in Pakistani passports, which, 

among other advances, enabled Ahmadis to participate in 

the hajj—was derailed in March 2005, when members of a 

government ministerial committee restored the column, 

reportedly in response to pressure from militant religious 

parties. There is no indication that the current government 

intends to institute any reforms to the anti-Ahmadi laws.

Prescribed criminal penalties for what is deemed to be 

blasphemy include life imprisonment and the death penalty. 

Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in the 

lengthy detention of, and sometimes violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious 

minorities, as well as Muslims on account of their religious 

beliefs. Although the penalties were amended in October 

2004 with the aim of reducing the more maliciously applied 

charges, the minor procedural changes have not had a significant affect on the way the blasphemy laws are exploited 

in Pakistan. The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is 

further compounded by the lack of due process involved 

in these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, 

Islamic militants often pack the courtroom and make public 

threats about the consequences of an acquittal. Such threats 

have proven credible, since the threats have sometimes been 

followed by violence. Although no one has yet been executed 

by the state under the blasphemy laws, some persons have 

been sentenced to death. Several of those accused under 

the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by vigilantes, including while in police custody; those who escape 

official punishment or vigilante attack are sometimes forced 

to flee the country. 

In November 2006, two Christian men were sentenced, 

in a closed hearing, to 10 years in prison for committing 

blasphemy. The lawyer for the two men claimed that due 
226

process was not followed and that the judge wanted to 

release the accused but was pressured by extremists to 

sentence them. In January 2007, a Christian woman was 

charged under the blasphemy law for allegedly “uttering derogatory remarks” about the Prophet Muhammad. 

According to the State Department, at least five Ahmadis 

were in prison on blasphemy charges. There have also been 

some acquittals of those accused of blasphemy charges. In 

November 2006, a Christian man was acquitted of blasphemy charges by the Lahore High Court after spending 

eight and a half years in prison, and a Christian woman was 

acquitted of the blasphemy charge she was facing. In January 2007, the Lahore High Court overturned the blasphemy 

sentence of a Christian man who had been in prison for 

five years. That same month, a Christian youth who was accused of desecrating the Koran was granted post arrest bail, 

one of the few times a person accused of blasphemy was 

granted bail after arrest. More frequently the accused spend 

years in prison while their cases are being investigated. 

While the acquittals are welcomed, in virtually all cases, 

those acquitted have been forced into hiding because of 

fears of vigilante violence.

Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced alongside the country’s secular 

legal system, provide for harsh punishments, including amputation and death by stoning, for violations of Islamic law. 

Rape victims run a high risk of being charged with adultery, 

for which death by stoning remains a possible sentence. 

In October 2003, the National Commission on the Status 

of Women in Pakistan issued a report on the Hudood Ordinances that stated that as many as 88 percent of women 

prisoners, many of them rape victims, are serving time in 

prison for allegedly violating these decrees, which make 

extramarital sex a crime and adultery a criminal offense. 

The Hudood laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims 

alike. The UN Committee Against Torture, as well as the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and 

amputation do constitute acts in breach of the obligation to 

prevent torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 

or punishment under international human rights standards 

and treaties. Although these extreme corporal punishments 

have not been carried out in practice, lesser punishments 

such as jail terms or fines have been imposed. In a positive 

development, correcting one of the most heavily criticized 

crimes that were prosecuted by the standards of these religious ordinances, in December 2006, President Musharraf 

signed into law a bill curtailing the scope of the Hudood 

ordinances regarding rape charges. The new law removed 

the crime of rape from the sphere of the Hudood laws and 

put it under the penal code, thereby doing away with the 

requirement that a rape victim produce four male witnesses 

to prove the crime. Under the new legislation, convictions for rape will be based on forensic and circumstantial 

evidence. This change followed another amendment to the 

Ordinances enacted in July 2006 allowing women convicted 

of purported sexual transgressions to be released on bail 

rather than having to remain in prison—sometimes for 

lengthy periods—waiting for their cases to come to trial.

Finally, evidence that Musharraf’s government is giving 

sanctuary to the Taliban intensified in late 2006, especially 

as it became apparent that the Taliban has re-grouped and 

stepped up reported cross-border attacks inside Afghanistan. 

In January 2007, a UN representative confirmed the claim 

that Pakistan was harboring Taliban leaders. In September 

2006, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander of the U.S. European Command, General James Jones, told a Senate panel 

that it is “generally accepted” that the Taliban has its headquarters somewhere near the town of Quetta in Pakistan. The 

State Department had named the Taliban regime of Afghanistan a “particularly severe violator” of religious freedom from 

1999 until the regime was deposed in 2001.

The Commission’s May 2001 report on Pakistan 

played a key role in highlighting to U.S. and Pakistani 

government officials the undemocratic nature of the Pakistani separate electorate system for religious minorities. 

In January 2002, the Pakistani government abolished the 

system of separate electorates.

In June 2005, the Commission held a hearing on 

Capitol Hill entitled, “The United States and Pakistan: 

Navigating a Complex Relationship,” during which experts 

examined U.S. policy toward Pakistan, highlighting the serious religious freedom and other human rights problems 

in Pakistan. In July, the Commission issued a press statement expressing serious concern about legislation, the 

so-called “Hasba bill,” passed that month by the provincial assembly in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province 

that proposed the creation of a “watchdog” position to 

monitor the observance of “Islamic values” in public 

places. The bill would have empowered a person, called 

the mohtasib, to enforce one interpretation of religious 

requirements on such activities as participation in Friday 

prayers, the conduct of business on Fridays, and the ap-
227

pearance of unrelated men and women in public. There 

were concerns that the bill would also have imposed 

Taliban-like restrictions on women’s movement and dress. 

The cause of outcry in other parts of Pakistan and abroad, 

the law was later declared to be unconstitutional by 

Pakistan’s Supreme Court.

Throughout 2006, the Commission continued to meet 

with representatives of the various religious communities in Pakistan, including Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, 

and Hindus, as well as with human rights organizations, 

academics, and other experts. The Commission also met 

with representatives of the Pakistani government. In January 2006, the Commission wrote to President Bush urging 

him to discuss in his January meeting with Pakistani Prime 

Minister Shaukat Aziz the need to promote and protect 

religious freedom and religious tolerance in Pakistan. In 

March 2006, the Commission wrote again to the President, 

urging him, during his meeting abroad with President 

Musharraf, to indicate that improvements in religious freedom conditions in Pakistan are essential to any meaningful 

advances in the war on terrorism and to successes in the 

global promotion of democracy. In addition, then-Commission Chair Michael Cromartie, together with Commissioner Elizabeth H. Prodromou, published an op-editorial 

in the Philadelphia Inquirer on March 3, 2006 calling on 

President Bush to raise religious freedom concerns with 

President Musharraf.

P a k i s ta n

Evening prayer
PAKISTAN Commission Recommendations 

I

n addition to recommending that 

Pakistan be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government should: 

• urge the government of Pakistan 

to make much more serious efforts 

to combat Islamic extremism in 

that country, noting especially 

the current government’s political alliance with Islamist political 

parties, which affords an inordinate amount of influence to these 

groups, and which, in turn, has 

had a strong negative impact on 

religious freedom in Pakistan; 

• urge the government of Pakistan 

to decriminalize blasphemy and 

until such time as that is possible, 

to implement procedural changes 

to the blasphemy laws that will 

reduce and ultimately eliminate 

their abuse; and ensure that those 

who are accused of blasphemy and 

people who defend them are given 

adequate protection, including 

by investigating death threats and 

other actions against them carried 

out by militants, and that full due 

process is followed; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to 

take more effective steps to prevent 

sectarian violence and punish its 

perpetrators, including by making 

greater efforts to disarm militant 

groups and any religious schools that 

provide weapons training; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to 

rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, 

which effectively criminalize the 

public practice of their faith and 

violate their right to freedom of 

religion guaranteed in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and 

the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights; 

• urge the government of Pakistan 

to sign and ratify the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights;

• expand U.S. government contacts 

beyond the Pakistani government 

to include a more open and public 

dialogue with a variety of representatives of civil society in Pakistan, 

including groups and political 

parties that may be critical of the 

current government;

• give greater attention and assistance 

to institutions in Pakistan that are 

crucial to its democratic development, particularly the judiciary and 

the police, which are reported to 

be especially corrupt, ineffective, 

and lacking accountability, thereby 

contributing to violations of human 

rights, including religious freedom, 

in Pakistan; and 

• in administering its education 

assistance to Pakistan, focus more 

specifically on promoting reform in 

the state schools, where the State 

Department reports that textbooks 

regularly include derogatory statements about religious minorities, 

particularly Jews and Hindus, and 

religious intolerance is presented 

as acceptable.

228
229

Sri Lanka

In recent years, the Commission turned its attention to 

Sri Lanka because of two primary concerns: an increasing 

number of attacks targeting members of religious minorities and their worship buildings; and proposed legislation 

on religious conversion that, if enacted, would have violated 

international law norms and resulted in abuses of freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. In February 

2006, the Commission visited Sri Lanka to seek information 

about reports of growing religious intolerance. The delegation met with Sri Lankan government officials, Members of 

Parliament, representatives of political parties, human rights 

organizations and other non-governmental groups, and representatives of the Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim 

communities. Attacks on religious minorities, particularly 

Christians and Ahmadis, continue in Sri Lanka. Since April 

2006, the proposed legislation on religious conversions has 

been before a parliamentary standing committee. The Commission will continue to monitor the situation in Sri Lanka 

and report on any further attempts to restrict freedom of 

religion in that country.

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, Sri Lanka is, despite years of civil war, a 

functioning democracy. The primary new development in 

the past year was the return in April 2006 of serious fighting 

between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or 

Tamil Tigers), who are seeking an independent state in the 

north of the country, and Sri Lankan government security 

forces. A ceasefire of several years’ standing broke down 

and peace talks were suspended, resulting in the renewal of 

the brutal civil conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka for over 

20 years. Since then, there have been reports of a renewal of 

the kind of human rights violations, perpetrated by the forces of both sides of the conflict, that were common throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the context of the civil war, 

violence against civilians based on ethnicity and/or religion 

has occurred throughout the country. Reports indicate 

that both sides in the conflict fail to take steps to prevent or 

stop incidents of communal violence between or among 

Buddhist Sinhalese, Hindu Tamils, Muslims, and Christians 

in Sri Lanka. In April 2006, in the ethnically and religiously 

mixed town of Trincomalee, mobs of Sinhalese, reportedly 

well organized, responded to an alleged LTTE bombing by 

attacking and destroying dozens of Tamil businesses and 

homes and killing several people. Police and other law 

enforcement personnel reportedly stood by for more than 

two hours before making efforts to halt the violence. 

Not directly connected to the civil conflict, there have 

been continuing instances of violent attacks on churches, 

ministers, and other Christian individuals in the past few 

years, reportedly carried out by members of, or persons affiliated with, extremist groups espousing Buddhist nationalism. 

There are reports that in the rural areas churches and individual Christians, who comprise approximately 7 percent 

of the population, have been physically assaulted by one 

or more persons or by large groups, particularly for alleged 

attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity. Churches are 

sometimes desecrated and/or burned to the ground. Reports 

indicate that over the past five years, approximately 200 

attacks have been carried out against churches and/or individuals; during the same period, 200 other persons reportedly have received verbal threats. The violence has mainly affected Evangelical churches, but other Protestant and Roman 

Catholic institutions have also been targeted. Although few 

deaths have resulted, dozens of Christian individuals have 

been injured enough to require hospitalization. 

Though diminished in number since the peak of violence in 2003, the attacks have continued. The police sometimes respond quickly to the attacks and on occasion provide 

extra security for churches. Other sources suggest that these 

actions are pro forma and not effective. In August 2006, a 

mob of 200 persons led by three Buddhist monks attacked 

a children’s home run by the Dutch Reformed Church in 

central Sri Lanka. They forced their way in, destroyed much 

SRI L A N K A

A Buddha statue, Dambula, Sri Lanka
230

of the property, and threatened staff with death if they did 

not leave the premises. In October 2006, a mob of 50 people 

led by four Buddhist monks arrived at a church service in 

Gampaha and demanded that the service cease. Because he 

feared that his congregation would be attacked, the pastor 

agreed to cancel the service. The pastor filed a complaint 

with the police and the church met without incident the 

following November. In November, a church in Gampola, 

Gandy district, came under attack, damaging windows and 

other parts of the church. In February 2007, a church near 

Colombo that had been attacked and had property destroyed 

in December was attacked again, when a group of people 

began throwing stones at the church. A police complaint was 

reportedly made. 

In addition, in the past year there have been an increasing number of reported attacks on the country’s small 

Ahmadi community, a group that considers itself to be 

Muslim but which is deemed unorthodox by some Muslims. This violence, which consists of attacks on Ahmadi 

individuals and property, is reportedly carried out by 

groups of Muslims who object to the Ahmadis’ religious 

views. Some reports indicate that the antagonism against 

Ahmadis in Sri Lanka is being provoked in part by persons 

who are connected to the current government, including an 

advisor to the president. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, who traveled to Sri Lanka in May 2005, concluded 

in her report that, with regard to acts of religious violence 

or intolerance by non-state actors, the Sri Lankan government’s obligation to promptly investigate and prosecute 

all perpetrators has not “been satisfactorily fulfilled.” This 

problem was compounded by the fact that due to wider, 

more chronic deficiencies in the judicial system in Sri 

Lanka, including corruption, a lack of police training, and 

inadequate infrastructure, arresting perpetrators and moving them through the criminal court system was a serious 

problem, regardless of the crime involved.

 In 2004, two draft laws purporting to restrict religious 

conversion as well as the act of attempting to convert 

another person were circulated in Sri Lanka. The first was a 

private member’s bill drafted by the Jathika Hela Urumaya 

(JHU) party comprised of nationalist-minded Buddhist 

monks, targeting “forced” conversions; the second was 

a bill proposed by the government, a much stricter bill 

that essentially prohibited any and all attempts to convert 

another person—even inadvertently. In July 2004, the 

government’s bill was sent to committee for re-drafting. The 

JHU bill was tabled that same month and sent for analysis 

on its constitutionality to the Supreme Court, where over 

20 challenging petitions had been filed. In August 2004, 

Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court ruled that certain clauses of the 

JHU bill violated several articles of the constitution. As a 

result of the Supreme Court’s ruling, in order for it now to 

become law, the bill in its entire form would require a twothirds majority in the parliament and the approval of the 

people of Sri Lanka in a referendum. 

In March 2005, the JHU again introduced legislation 

on conversions. Called “Bill on the Prohibition of Forcible 

Conversions,” the legislation was the same as that tabled 

the previous year, including the provisions of that bill that 

had been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 

This bill against religious conversions would have: (1) 

provided for prison terms of up to five years for anyone 

who attempted to convert a person from one religion to 

another by “the use of force or by allurement or by any 

fraudulent means,” with the terms “fraud” and “allurement” 

vaguely defined such that many charitable activities could 

be included; (2) established reporting requirements for any 

person who adopts a new religion as well as for any person 

who takes part “directly or indirectly” in the conversion of 

another person, requiring individuals to inform government authorities of their action or face the threat of jail 

time and fines; and (3) provided an opportunity for “any 

interested person” having “reason to believe” a violation 

of the act to bring cases in the public interest. According to 

the UN Special Rapporteur, the proposed law was not “an 

appropriate response to the religious tensions and is not 

compatible with international human rights law.” 

USCIRF delegation meeting with representatives of Sri Lanka’s Jathika Hela 

Urumaya (JHU) Party.
231

The JHU bill was sent to a parliamentary standing 

committee for discussion. After elections in November 2005, newly-elected President Mohinda Rajapaksa 

prorogued parliament, thereby annulling all bills going 

through any stage of the process of being enacted by parliament, including the JHU’s bill on religious conversion. It 

later came up once more before parliament and was referred again to a parliamentary standing committee, where 

it has reportedly been since April 2006.

In the past few years, there have been reports, particularly in the period immediately after the December 2004 

“tsunami” disaster, of some groups and individuals engaging in efforts to encourage people to convert—reportedly 

amounting to “unethical” practices—that are said to have 

led to increased tensions among religious communities in 

Sri Lanka. Some in Sri Lanka suggest that the anti-conversion legislation came about in response to these reports. 

These claims have included, for example, the offering of 

money, employment, access to education or health care, or 

some other material good as an incentive to convert or join 

a particular church, taking advantage chiefly of the poorest 

people among Sri Lanka’s population. Though there have 

been allegations, concrete evidence of any such practices 

has not been found. The December 2005 report of the UN 

Special Rapporteur stated that despite repeated requests, 

she “did not meet any person who had changed his or her 

religion because of allurement or other form of inducement.” She also reported that she did not come across 

any substantiated cases of religious conversion that would 

constitute a violation of the right to freedom of religion or 

belief. The Commission on its visit also requested to meet 

with persons who had been subject to “unethical” practices 

regarding conversion but was not provided with any such 

cases. However, some involved in evangelizing activities 

have also been accused of denigrating Sri Lanka’s other 

religious communities by referring to those religions as evil, 

pagan, or unworthy of consideration, and thereby sowing 

contention and even violence among religious groups. 

Religious communities in Sri Lanka must register 

either as a corporation, which enables them to be treated as 

a corporate entity in financial and real estate transactions, 

or as a charitable organization, which entitles them to some 

tax exemptions. In 2003, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court denied the incorporation petition of a Roman Catholic group, 

the Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of 

Saint Francis, claiming that incorporation is impermissible 

if the group is engaged in proselytization and/or providing material benefit. The group took its petition to the UN 

Human Rights Committee (HRC), a treaty body, which 

in November 2005 decided in the group’s favor. The HRC 

found that articles 18 and 26 (non-discrimination) of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had 

been violated. It stated that the grounds advanced by the 

Supreme Court and the government of Sri Lanka in support 

of the restrictions were insufficient to demonstrate that 

these restrictions were necessary to further one or more of 

the limitations on rights permitted by the Covenant.

In addition to the February 2006 visit to Sri Lanka, the 

Commission issued a statement in July 2005 expressing 

concern about growing religious intolerance in Sri Lanka, 

particularly the ongoing violence against religious minorities and the proposed bill addressing forced religious 

conversions. In September 2005, the Commission issued a 

statement about the proposed amendment to the constitution, expressing concern about articles in the amendment 

discussed above that would have violated the internationally guaranteed rights primarily of members of the majority 

Buddhist community as well as minority religious groups. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff continued 

to meet with religious leaders, academics, human rights 

activists and others from Sri Lanka, and with members of 

congressional and international delegations and others that 

visited the country. 

Commissioners Felice D. Gaer, Michael Cromartie and Preeta D. Bansal 

and USCIRF Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa meeting with Sri Lanka 

Foreign Ministry officials.

SRI L A N K A
Havana, Cuba
233

country reports: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cuba

Religious belief and practice continue 

to be tightly controlled in Cuba. 

Religious freedom conditions have been affected in part 

by the ongoing government crackdown on democracy and 

free speech activists, resulting in a generally deteriorating 

situation for human rights, including religious freedom. A 

2005 law on religion meant to “legalize” house churches 

has reinforced the government’s efforts to increase control 

over some religious practice. The Commission continues 

to place Cuba on its Watch List, and will monitor conditions of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba to determine 

if they rise to a level warranting designation as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba’s human rights record, which deteriorated 

significantly in 2003, continued to be poor in 2006. Cuba 

remains a communist party-dominated dictatorship. 

Since seizing power in 1959, President Fidel Castro has 

maintained strong, centralized control of all facets of life in 

Cuba. While parliamentary, judicial, and executive institutions exist in name, all are under his control, and there 

is no legal or political avenue of dissent. Individuals who 

engage in dissent are harassed, jailed, and mistreated in 

prison. In February 2003, the Cuban government initiated 

an extensive crackdown on democracy activists, including those supporting the Varela Project and the Christian 

Liberation Movement. Seventy-five human rights activists 

were arrested and sentenced in 2003; 59 were still in prison 

at the end of 2006. The crackdowns have continued, and 

several more human rights activists have been imprisoned 

since 2003. In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban 

National Assembly unanimously passed an amendment 

making socialism the irrevocable basis of the constitution. 

Since Fidel Castro became incapacitated in July 2006, all of 

his policies have been maintained by his brother, Raul, who 

is currently acting president.

Since 1959, the communist government has sought to 

suppress religious belief and practice because it was “counterrevolutionary.” During the early years of the Castro 

regime, government and Communist Party officials forced 

priests, pastors, and other religious leaders into labor 

camps or exile and systematically discriminated against 

those who openly professed religious belief by excluding them from certain jobs or educational opportunities. 

In the past decade, however, the state instituted a limited 

rapprochement with religious believers, and it seemed 

as though conditions might improve. For example, the 

government abandoned its official policy of atheism in the 

early 1990s. Castro welcomed a visit from Pope John Paul II 

in 1998 and visited Havana’s Jewish Community Center for 

its Hanukah celebration that same year. In 2000, religious 

holidays were reinstated, and members of Cuba’s Jewish 

community were allowed to emigrate to Israel. The Pope’s 

visit, in particular, sparked great hopes within the religious 

communities in Cuba, as well as among democracy activists, who viewed these steps as a softening of past government policies. 

Yet, despite optimism that religious freedom conditions 

would improve, violations and restrictions have continued, 

as has the government’s strong degree of control and generally hostile attitude toward religion. Although the Cuban 

government seeks to project the image that the right to religious freedom is respected, in fact, government authorities 

Although the Cuban government 

seeks to project the image that the right 

to religious freedom is respected, in fact, 

government authorities continue to view 

the influence of religion as a threat to 

the ideology of Castro’s revolution. 
234

continue to view the influence of religion as a threat to the 

ideology of Castro’s revolution. In early 2001, the Communist 

Party in Havana prepared a report that criticized inroads 

made by churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, 

into Cuban society, and asserted that the social work of the 

churches violated the law. Communist Party officials reportedly apologized to the Catholic Church hierarchy after the 

report became public. Nevertheless, Havana’s Catholic Cardinal, Jaime Ortega y Alamino, gave an interview in 2003 in 

which he asserted that “restrictions on religious freedom are 

returning” in Cuba, and that they represent a “return to the 

ideology of repression.” The crackdowns on the freedoms of 

speech, assembly, and association in Cuba since 2003 have 

affected religious freedom conditions also. In 2004 there 

were reports that a marked shift in government propaganda 

had taken place favoring strict interpretations of communist 

orthodoxy, including an assault on religious freedom and 

related human rights. 

The government’s main interaction with, and control 

of, religious denominations is through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban 

government also requires churches and other religious 

groups to register with the relevant provincial office of the 

Registry of Associations within the Ministry of Justice. According to the State Department, the Cuban government 

is most tolerant of those religious groups that maintain 

“close relations” with the state or those who “often supported government policies.” Currently, there are approximately 50 state-recognized religious groups, primarily 

Christian denominations, half of which are members of 

the government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches 

(CCC). Reportedly, the government in recent years has not 

granted recognition to any relatively new denominations 

and, in 2006, did not move on any pending applications. 

The government, however, has not prevented activities of 

the Baha’is and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 

Saints (Mormons), groups that are not officially registered, 

and has registered groups that do not belong to the CCC, 

including the Jehovah’s Witnesses. There are also small 

Jewish and Muslim communities. In the past, there were reports that conditions for Jehovah’s Witnesses had improved 

substantially; however, in the past year, there has been 

harassment of and discrimination against members of this 

group by local Communist Party and government officials. 

In recent years, the Cuban government has rarely 

permitted the construction of new places of worship, and 

the government did not grant permission for the construction of any new worship buildings in 2006. Many religious 

groups, registered and unregistered, hold services in private 

homes or similar accommodations, commonly known as 

San Francisco de Asis Church in Old Havana
235

“house churches.” There are reports that at least 10,000 

house churches exist nationwide, the majority of which 

are technically illegal. Permission for such meetings is 

frequently denied to those outside the recognized religious 

faiths and to those the government deems to be “an independent religious movement” (i.e. not recognized or hostile 

to government policies). If a complaint is made against a 

house church meeting, it can be broken up and the attendees imprisoned. 

A new law went into effect in September 2005 requiring all house churches to register. In order to receive legal 

registration, the new law requires that there be no more 

than three meetings per week; that a house church cannot 

be within two kilometers of another house church of the 

same denomination; and that detailed information on the 

number of members, when services will be held, and the 

names and ages of the inhabitants of the house be provided. The new requirements also prohibit the participation 

of foreign citizens without government permission and 

such individuals are prohibited altogether in the mountainous regions. Put into effect as Directive 43 and Resolution 

46, the new law has increased concerns primarily among 

Protestant and Santeria religious groups, many of which 

hold unauthorized religious meetings in private homes 

several times per week. If the registration application is refused, the members of the house church are not permitted 

to meet. There are reports that at least one house church 

was demolished, one was threatened with demolition, 

and several were shut down or confiscated since Direction 

43 and Resolution 46 were promulgated. There are also 

reports of individual worshippers receiving citations and 

some churches repeatedly being forced to pay large fines. 

However, there is no evidence that the new legislation has 

resulted in a systematic crackdown on house churches. 

In the past year, both registered and unregistered 

religious groups continued to experience varying degrees of 

official interference, harassment, and repression. The State 

Department reports that Cuban Interior Ministry officials 

regularly engage in efforts to monitor and control the country’s religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration, and harassment of religious clerics and laypersons. 

In January 2004, a Ministry of Interior official revealed in an 

interview that government infiltration of civil and religious 

organizations remains widespread. There have been reports 

of religious leaders being attacked, beaten, or detained for 

opposing certain actions of the local or state government. 

Some Protestant house churches continued to be harassed 

and evangelical denominations reported evictions from 

houses used for worship (most of which were unauthorized 

and thus illegal). Because an estimated 70 percent of the 

Afro-Caribbean population engages in at least some religious 

practice, which is viewed as presenting a potential grassroots 

threat to the government, religious groups in these communities are more heavily targeted than political opposition 

organizations. According to the State Department, in the past 

year, independent Santeria priests have been threatened 

and pressured to assimilate into the government-sanctioned 

Yoruba Cultural Association. 

 

 

Other means by which the government restricts 

religious practice include: enforcement of a regulation that 

prevents any Cuban or joint enterprise, except those with 

specific authorization, from selling computers, facsimile 

machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church 

other than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an 

almost total state monopoly on printing presses; a prohibition on private religious schools; limitations on the entry of 

foreign religious workers; denial of Internet access to religious organizations; restrictions on making repairs to church 

buildings; and the denial of religious literature such as Bibles 

to persons in prison. Additionally, there is a requirement that 

religious groups receive permission from local Communist 

Party officials prior to holding processions or events outside 

of religious buildings. Refusal of such permission is often 

C UBA

Because an estimated 70 percent 

of the Afro-Caribbean population 

engages in at least some religious 

practice, which is viewed as presenting 

a potential grassroots threat to the 

government, religious groups in 

these communities are more 

heavily targeted than political 

opposition organizations. 
236

 

based on the decision of individual government officials 

rather than the law.According to the State Department, in 

2005, the Catholic Church decided to stop seeking permits 

for religious processions in some areas.

In February 2006, Church of God Reverend Carlos 

Lamelas, an advocate for religious freedom and a critic of 

the state’s interference in the church, was arrested and held 

for four months, although he was never formally charged. 

He was not brought to trial until December, and then on 

human trafficking charges. However, a new prosecutor 

dropped the charges days later due to lack of evidence. 

Political prisoners and human rights and pro-democracy activists are increasingly being limited in their right to 

practice their religion. Religious leaders report pressure, 

sometimes blatant, by the government to expel pro-democracy or human rights activists from their church and some 

activists have, in response, been asked by church leaders to 

distance themselves from the congregation. There are reports that two Roman Catholic priests were told their visas 

would not be renewed because of their contact with human 

rights activists. Additionally, political prisoners report being 

denied the right to receive visits from clergy members, having Bibles and rosaries confiscated, and being prevented 

from attending religious services with other prisoners. Family members of these prisoners are also affected. In many 

churches, security officials reportedly continue to monitor 

sermons and sit behind the wives of political prisoners in 

order to intimidate them. In March 2006, government-directed mobs physically prevented at least five wives, many 

from the “Ladies in White” organization, from traveling to 

Havana for mass at Santa Rita Catholic Church. The Ladies 

in White organization was the joint winner of the European 

Parliament’s 2006 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. 

The State Department also reports that several other political prisoners’ wives were warned they would be arrested if 

they attempted to join the other wives at mass. 

Havana, Cuba
 

CUBA Commission Recommendations 

With regard to Cuba, the Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should:

• raise religious freedom and other 

human rights violations in Cuba 

more effectively in multilateral fora, 

particularly in the UN, and demand that the government of Cuba 

respond to and initiate a dialogue 

with the UN Special Representative of the High Commissioner on 

Human Rights on the situation of 

human rights in Cuba; and 

• use all diplomatic means to urge the 

Cuban government to undertake 

the following measures aimed at 

bringing Cuba into compliance with 

its international legal obligations 

with respect to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief:

• order, publicly and officially, the 

state security agencies to end 

the instigation of mob violence 

against religious persons and 

other human rights activists, 

including those recently released 

from prison; the mistreatment of 

indigenous religious communities; and the harassment of the 

spouses of imprisoned human 

rights activists during religious 

services and hold those involved 

in any further incidents accountable for their conduct;

• revise government Directive 43 

and Resolution 46 restricting religious services in homes or other 

personal property, as well as other 

national laws and regulations on 

religious activities, to bring them 

into conformity with international 

standards on freedom of religion 

or belief; 

• cease, in accordance with international standards, interference with 

religious activities and the internal affairs of religious communities, such as denials of visas to 

religious workers, limitations on 

freedom of movement of religious 

workers, infiltration and intimidation of religious communities, 

arbitrary prevention of religious 

ceremonies and processions, and 

attempted interference in the 

elections in religious bodies; and

• take immediate steps to end 

restrictions on religious activities 

protected by international treaties 

and covenants including:

• ending the practice of arbitrarily 

denying registration to religious 

groups, as well as detaining or harassing members of religious groups 

and interfering with religious activities because of that unregistered 

status; 

• issuing permits for construction of 

new places of worship; 

• ending the practice of evictions and 

requisition of personal property of 

religious individuals or communities without due process, restitution, or provision of alternative 

accommodation; 

• securing the right to conduct 

religious education and distribute 

religious materials; and 

• lifting restrictions on humanitarian, medical, charitable, or social 

service work provided by religious 

communities and protecting persons who conduct such activities in 

Cuban law.

W E S T E R N H E M IS P H E R E

237
238 Biographies of Members of the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Felice D. Gaer, Chair

Felice D. Gaer, Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, heads 

the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American 

Jewish Committee, which conducts research and advocacy to strengthen international 

human rights protections and institutions. 

Ms. Gaer is the first American to serve as an Independent Expert on the UN Committee 

against Torture. Nominated by the Clinton Administration and renominated by the Bush 

Administration, she has served on the Committee since 2000, including as Vice Chair 

(2004-6) and as Rapporteur on Follow-up to Country Conclusions (2003 to present). 

 A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ms. Gaer serves on the advisory 

committee of Human Rights Watch/Europe and Central Asia and is Vice President of 

the International League for Human Rights. Encyclopedia Judaica describes Ms. Gaer as having “played the key 

role in assuring passage by consensus of the UN General Assembly’s first-ever condemnation of anti-Semitism” 

in 1998, and being an “architect of many initiatives linking women’s rights to human rights.” 

Ms. Gaer writes and lectures widely on U.S. and UN human rights policy, addressing issues including protecting civilians under threat, advancing the human rights of women, eradicating religious persecution abroad, 

resolving ethnic conflicts, and preventing genocide. One of the first to call for the issue of rape in armed conflicts 

to be addressed by the international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia, she was a key negotiator on the 

U.S. delegation to the Beijing World Conference on Women. 

Ms. Gaer was a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human rights negotiations. She serves on 

the board of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, the Eleanor Roosevelt Center and the Franklin and Eleanor 

Roosevelt Institute. In 2002 and 2003 she was cited in the annual Forward 50 list of Jewish Americans who are 

making a difference.

Ms. Gaer is a graduate of Wellesley College, from which she received the Alumni Achievement Award in 

1995. She also received advanced degrees from Columbia University. 

 Ms. Gaer, who has served on the Commission since 2001, was appointed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.).

APPENDIX 1
239

Michael Cromartie, Vice Chair

Michael Cromartie, a Vice Chair of the Commission, is Vice President of the Ethics and Public 

Policy Center in Washington, D.C., where he directs the Evangelicals in Civic Life and the Media 

and Religion programs. The Ethics and Public Policy Center was established in 1976 to clarify and 

reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and domestic and foreign policy 

issues. Cromartie is also a Senior Advisor to The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in Washington and a Senior Fellow with The Trinity Forum.

Mr. Cromartie has contributed book reviews and articles to First Things, Books and Culture, 

The Washington Post, The Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, 

Stewardship Journal, and World. He is the editor of 16 books on religion and politics including, 

most recently, “Religion, Culture, and International Conflict: A Conversation,” “Religion and 

Politics in America: A Conversation,” and “A Public Faith: Evangelicals and Civic Engagement.”

He is an advisory editor at Christianity Today and an adjunct professor at Reformed Theological Seminary, and was an 

advisor to the PBS documentary series “With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Christian Right in America.” 

Frequently asked to comment on the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, Mr. Cromartie has been 

interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, including National Public Radio, CNN, ABC News, The News Hour 

with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, and PBS. He has been quoted frequently in the Washington Post, New York Times, The New Republic, 

Christianity Today, Time, the National Catholic Reporter and U.S. News and World Report. He holds an M.A. in Justice from 

The American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia.

Commissioner Cromartie was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Vice Chair

Elizabeth H. Prodromou is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University, where she is also a Research Associate at the Institute on Culture, Religion and World 

Affairs. She has published widely on issues of religion and human rights, democracy, and security 

in Europe and the United States. Her publications have appeared in scholarly and policy journals 

such as European Journal of Political Research, Social Compass, Journal of the American Academy of 

Religion, Orbis, and Survival, as well as in numerous anthologies on Southeastern Europe.

A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Prodromou has 

been an invited policy consultant in the United States and Europe, and has received academic 

awards and grants from Harvard University, New York University, and Princeton University. 

She is the editor, co-editor, or author of four forthcoming books on religion and world 

affairs: Church-State Relations in Greece: European Enlargement, Democracy, and Religion; Religious Pluralism in 21st

Century American Public Life: the Challenges and Opportunities for Orthodox Christianity; Thinking through Faith: 

Perspectives from Orthodox Christian Scholars; and, The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State 

and Society in an Era of Transitions.

Dr. Prodromou holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 

as well as an M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.A. in International Relations and History 

from Tufts University. She has served as consultant at the U.S. State Department, the Foreign Affairs Training Center of the 

Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Council, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the Council on 

Foreign Relations.

Commissioner Prodromou was appointed to the Commission by then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) in 

October 2004. She is now serving as a Commission Vice Chair.

A PPEND I X 1
240

Nina Shea, Vice Chair

An international human-rights lawyer for 25 years, Nina Shea joined Hudson Institute, where she 

directs the Center for Religious Freedom, in November 2006.

For the 10 years prior to joining Hudson, Ms. Shea worked at Freedom House, where she 

directed the Center for Religious Freedom, an office which she had helped found in 1986 as the 

Puebla Institute.

Ms. Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, where she is currently vice chair, since 1999. She was appointed as a U.S. delegate to the United 

Nations’ Commission on Human Rights by both Republican and Democratic administrations.

For over a decade, she has worked extensively for the advancement of individual religious 

freedom and other human rights in U.S. foreign policy as it confronts Islamic extremism, as well 

as authoritarian regimes. For seven years, until 2005, she helped organize and lead a coalition of churches and religious 

groups that worked to end a religious war against Christians and dissident Muslims in southern Sudan; in 2004 and 2005, 

she contributed to the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution’s religious freedom provision; and she authored and edited two 

widely acclaimed reports, Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance (2006) and Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade 

American Mosques (2005), both of which translated and analyzed Saudi governmental publications that teach hatred and 

violence against the religious “other.” She regularly presents testimony before Congress, delivers public lectures, organizes 

briefings and conferences, and writes frequently on religious freedom issues. Her 1997 book on anti-Christian persecution, 

In the Lion’s Den, remains a standard in the field.

Ms. Shea is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia. She is a graduate of Smith College and American 

University’s Washington College of Law.

Commissioner Shea was appointed to the Commission by then-Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL).

Preeta D. Bansal

Preeta D. Bansal is a lawyer whose career has spanned government service and private practice. 

A partner at the international law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Ms. Bansal 

heads the appellate litigation group. She regularly represents major Wall Street and corporate clients on significant issues of law before the federal and state appellate courts, including the United 

States Supreme Court. She maintains a high-profile pro bono practice for public interest clients 

on novel issues of constitutional law. She is an Advisory Board Member of the Clinton Global 

Initiative, a member of the United States Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch, and a 

member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and she serves on the boards of several national and 

international organizations. 

Ms. Bansal was Solicitor General of the State of New York during New York Attorney General (now 

Governor) Eliot Spitzer’s first term, beginning in 1999. The New York Times called her a “legal superstar” and a “nimble, 

unorthodox thinker,” and the New York Law Journal referred to her as “one of the most gifted lawyers of her generation, 

who combines a brilliant analytical mind with solid, mature judgment.” 

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College and a magna cum laude

graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising Editor of the Harvard Law Review. She served as a law clerk 

to U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, and to then-Chief Judge James L. Oakes of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit. She served in the Clinton Administration as a Special Counsel in the White House and as a Counselor 

in the U.S. Justice Department. She has taught constitutional law, and was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Politics at 

Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
241

A PPEND I X 1

Ms. Bansal was appointed to the Commission by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD). She served 

as Chair of the Commission in 2004-2005.

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput, O.F.M. Cap., D.D.

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput has led the Archdiocese of Denver since April 1997 after being 

appointed by the late Pope John Paul II. He has written and spoken widely on the relationship 

between religious faith and public life and the importance of building moral cooperation and acceptance between religions and denominations.

Archbishop Chaput joined the Order of Friars Minor Capuchin, St. Augustine Province, in 

1965. After earning a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from St. Fidelis College Seminary in Herman, 

Pennsylvania, he completed studies in psychology at Catholic University in Washington, D.C. He 

earned a Master of Arts in Religious Education from Capuchin College in Washington, D.C. and 

was ordained to the priesthood in August 1970.

Archbishop Chaput also received a Master of Arts in Theology from the University of San Francisco. He served as an instructor in theology and spiritual director at St. Fidelis from 1971-1974 and as executive secretary and 

director of communications for the Capuchin Province of St. Augustine in Pittsburgh from 1974-1977.

Archbishop Chaput then became pastor of Holy Cross Parish in Thornton, Colorado, and vicar provincial for the 

Capuchin Province of Mid-America. He was named secretary and treasurer for the province in 1980, and he became chief 

executive officer and provincial minister three years later. Archbishop Chaput served as Bishop of Rapid City, South Dakota, for nine years before being appointed Archbishop of Denver. 

The Archbishop serves on the Board of Directors of The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., of the 

Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN) in Birmingham, Alabama, and of The Catholic Foundation and the St. John 

Vianney Theological and Redemptoris Mater Seminaries in Denver. He also chairs the Ad Hoc Committee on Native 

American Catholics and is a member of the Committee on Marriage & Family of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Archbishop Chaput was appointed to the Commission by President George W. Bush. 

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl

Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl is Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. He has also been a Visiting 

Professor at Yale Law School, where he taught national security law, Islamic law and immigration law. Dr. Abou El Fadl holds degrees from Yale University, the University of Pennsylvania Law 

School, and Princeton University. An Islamic jurist and scholar, Sheikh Abou El Fadl received 

formal training in Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt and Kuwait. 

A world-renowned expert in Islamic law and American lawyer, Dr. Abou El Fadl serves as an 

expert in a wide variety of cases ranging from human rights and political asylum to international 

and commercial law.

Dr. Abou El Fadl is a prolific author and prominent public intellectual on Islamic law and 

Islam and is most noted for his scholarly approach to Islam from a moral point of view. He writes 

extensively on universal themes of morality and humanity, and the notion of beauty as a moral value. Dr. Abou El Fadl is a 

staunch advocate and defender of women’s rights, and focuses much of his written attention on issues related to women. 

He regularly appears on national and international television and radio. His most recent published works focus on issues 

of authority, terrorism, tolerance, Islam, and Islamic law. 

Commissioner Abou El Fadl was appointed by President George W. Bush.
242

Dr. Richard Land

Dr. Richard Land has served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious 

Liberty Commission since 1988. During his tenure as representative for the largest Protestant 

denomination in the country, Dr. Land has represented Southern Baptist and other Evangelicals’ 

concerns in the halls of Congress, before U.S. Presidents, and in the media.

As host of For Faith & Family, For Faith & Family’s Insight, and Richard Land Live!, three 

nationally syndicated radio programs, Dr. Land has spoken widely on the social, ethical, and public policy issues facing the United States. He is also Executive Editor of FFV, a national magazine 

dedicated to coverage of traditional religious values, Christian ethics, and cultural trends.

Dr. Land was featured in Time Magazine in 2005 as one of “The Twenty-five Most Influential 

Evangelicals in America.” The previous year, he was recognized by the National Journal as one of the 

10 top church-state experts “politicians will call on when they get serious about addressing an important public policy issue.”

Dr. Land’s latest book is The Divided States of America? What Liberals and Conservatives are Missing in the God-andCountry Shouting Match. Dr. Land has also recently authored Imagine! A God-Blessed America (2005) and Real Homeland 

Security (2004). He earned his A.B. magna cum laude at Princeton University and his D.Phil. at Oxford University.

Then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist reappointed Dr. Land to U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

in 2005. President Bush selected him for his two previous terms at the Commission (September 2001 to September 2004).

The Most Reverend Bishop Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B.

The Most Reverend Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B., is Bishop of Las Cruces, New Mexico. A champion of 

ecumenism, he has worked as an advocate for immigrant rights and a proponent of Hispanics in 

the Catholic Church in the United States.

Bishop Ramírez was ordained to the priesthood in 1966. He was named Titular Bishop of Vatarba 

and Auxiliary Bishop of San Antonio in 1981, and the following year he became the first Bishop 

of the Diocese of Las Cruces, New Mexico. He holds a B.A. from the University of St. Thomas in 

Houston, Texas; an M.A. from the University of Detroit, Michigan; a Doctor of Laws honoris causa

from Neumann College, Wichita, Kansas; a Doctor of Divinity honoris causa from the University of 

St. Michael’s College, Toronto, Canada; and a Doctor of Humane Letters honoris causa from Siena 

Heights University in Adrian, Michigan. Bishop Ramírez attended St. Basil’s Seminary in Toronto, 

Canada, Seminario Conciliar in Mexico City, Mexico, and the East Asian Pastoral Institute in Manila, Philippines.

Bishop Ramírez currently serves on the New Mexico Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and 

the Catholic Church Extension Society Board. He is Episcopal Advisor of the Institute for Hispanic Liturgy and Episcopal 

Moderator of the Asociación Nacional de Sacerdotes Hispanos (ANSH). He is also a member of the U.S. Conference of 

Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) International Policy Committee, Committee on the Liturgy; and Committee on the Catholic 

Common Ground Initiative, and he is Consultant for the USCCB Committee on Hispanic Affairs. The bishop has also 

served as a member of the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad and chaired the 

USCCB’s Catholic Campaign for Human Development and Committee for the Church in Latin America. He served as 

administrative secretary for the Comisión para el Estudio de la Historia de la Iglesia en Latinoamérica (Commission for the 

Study of the History of the Church in Latin America), and was elected a delegate for the United States at the 1997 Synod for 

America. In 2007, the President of the USCCB appointed him to the U.S. delegation for the Fifth General Conference of the 

Latin American Episcopate.
243

A PPEND I X 1

Bishop Ramírez was appointed to the Commission by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD) in 2003 

and reappointed by former Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid in 2005.

Ambassador John V. Hanford III

Ambassador Hanford serves ex officio as a non-voting member of the Commission.

Joseph R. Crapa, Executive Director

Joseph R. Crapa, the Commission’s Executive Director, joined the Commission in November 

2002. Prior to coming to the Commission, Mr. Crapa served as Chief of Staff to Senator Charles 

E. Schumer, the senior Senator from New York. Before that, Mr. Crapa spent four years as an official in the Executive Branch from 1997-2001, where he was nominated by President Clinton and 

confirmed by the Senate to serve as an Assistant Administrator at the U.S. Agency for International 

Development. He also held positions of Assistant Secretary at the Department of Agriculture and 

Associate Administrator at the Environmental Protection Agency where his portfolio included 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs.

Mr. Crapa has extensive experience dealing with foreign and domestic policy issues. For ten 

years he served as Chief of Staff to Rep. David Obey (D-WI), currently the Chairman of the House 

Appropriations Committee, and also as counsel to the House Appropriations Committee. He was an Adjunct Professor of 

Government at Georgetown University (1990-1995) and was chosen as a Stennis Fellow of Congress (1995-1997); he continues as a Senior Fellow and Mentor. He also is a Lecturer for the Washington Campus, a consortium of universities where 

he lectures on Congress and the policy process.

Mr. Crapa graduated from Cathedral College Preparatory Seminary, received a B.A. from St. John’s University, and 

earned his M.A. from Duke University, and his Ph.D. at the University of Arizona where he was a National Defense Teaching Fellow.
244 The International Religious Freedom Act Of 1998 1

SELECTED PROVISIONS

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402)

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom’’ means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations such as—

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;

(B) prolonged detention without charges;

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom’’ means violations of the 

internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth in the international 

instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as—

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for—

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary registration 

requirements;

(ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs;

(iii) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation;

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or

(v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice; or

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s religious belief or practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious 

conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution. 

APPENDIX 2

1

 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the Commission’s Web site, www.uscirf.gov.
245

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY SEVERE 

VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442)

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President2

 shall review the status of religious freedom in 

each foreign country to determine whether the government of that country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom in that country during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review of that 

country under this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall designate each country the government 

of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a country of particular concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445)

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President shall, according to 

section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out consultations with the foreign government in question, carry out one or more of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as determined by the 

President. The President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with section 

116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the 

Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, insurance, 

extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance with section 502B 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing the United States 

executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific 

foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any goods or 

technology to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President 

to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition 

for the export or reexport of goods or services;

2

 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of State.
246

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than 

$10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or 

determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, 

any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402.

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding agreement with the respective 

foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, 

policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President 

determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already subject to multiple, broad-based 

sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing, the President 

may determine that one or more of these sanctions also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 402(c)(5).]

Section 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447)

(a) In General.—Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in substitution thereto) with respect to a country, if the 

President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action;

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority.

(b) Congressional Notification.—Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a), the President 

shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver or the intention to exercise the waiver, together with a 

detailed justification thereof.
247 International Human Rights Standards: Selected Provisions on 

Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as further information concerning 

international standards concerning the protection of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

A. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18:

 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 

 religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 

 religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18:

 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 

have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others 

and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 

 2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 

his choice.

 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 

are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 

convictions.

• In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), The treaty body that reviews compliance with the 

ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects: theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess 

any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to 

those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any 

religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities 

that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.

 —Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22

• European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), Art. 9: 

 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 

 his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 

 manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

APPENDIX 3
248

• Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII: 

 The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of though,

 conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

• UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 

Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

 (1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 

freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 

with others and in public or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (2) No one shall be subject 

to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest 

one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 

protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief include:

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)]

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)]

• Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or 

belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief; 

• No limitations permitted on this freedom; and

• No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to Have or To Adopt a Religion 

or Belief of His or Her Choice

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)]

• No limitations are permitted on this freedom.

• The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

• Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief include:

 (a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to specific 

beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief, or to convert; and

 (b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting political rights 

protected under article 25 of the ICCPR or access to education, medical care or employment

–Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)
249

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(d)]

• This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with others.

• This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms:

 (a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain, including the 

building of places of worship, freely accessible places for these purposes;

 (b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, and seminaries or 

 religious schools;

 (c ) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, observance of 

dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with 

certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group;

 (d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

 (e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

 (f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;

 (g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace appropriate leaders, priests and teachers 

called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 

 (h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; and

 (i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at 

the national and international levels.1

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)]

Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 

protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

• No derogation2

 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, even during “time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” (ICCPR, Art. 4(2) and UDHR, Arts. 29 & 30)

• Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed 

in article 18. 

• Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even 

if they would be allowed as limitations to other rights protected in the Covenant (for example, a limitation based on 

national security is impermissible). 

• Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and 

proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 

• Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. 

• Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on 

principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition or religion.

Append i x t h r ee

1

 See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna Document

2 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of war or serious public emergency, take measures that limit the applicability of certain 

rights for the period of the emergency. Such measures could go well beyond the scope of limitations to rights that are permissible at any other time.
250

• Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to manifest 

their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of the constraint. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

• Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any 

activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth therein. 

— UDHR Art. 30

B. PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHALL NOT BE DENIED THE RIGHT, 

IN COMMUNITY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUP, TO PROFESS AND PRACTICE 

THEIR OWN RELIGION

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, and UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, Arts. 1-2 and 4]

• In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 

be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 

practice their own religion, or to use their own language

 —ICCPR, Article 27

• States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities 

within their respective territories, shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity, and shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

 —UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

• The State “will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity 

of national minorities on their territory. They will respect the free exercise of rights by persons belonging to such 

minorities and ensure their full equality with others.”

 —OSCE Vienna Document

C. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST 

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 40(1-2)] 

This right includes the following components:

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and Subject to its 

Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without Distinction of Any Kind, Including Religion

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any Discrimination to the Equal Protection 

of the Law.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons Equal and Effective Protection Against 

Discrimination on Any Ground, Including Religion.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]
251

• The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR is not limited to those 

rights which are provided for in the Covenant, and extends to prohibit discrimination in law or in fact in any field 

regulated and protected by public authorities; 

• The term “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction 

or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 

national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 

the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms;

• The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical treatment in 

every instance;

• The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or 

eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR; and

• Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13)

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons or Person on the Grounds of Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4]

• States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in 

the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, 

political, social and cultural life.

• States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination.

• States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in 

this matter.

—UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2)

• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 

human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups ....

—UDHR Art. 26(2)

• State parties will “foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different communities as well 

as between believers and non-believers.”

—OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

D. STATES SHALL PROHIBIT BY LAW ANY ADVOCACY OF NATIONAL, RACIAL OR 

RELIGIOUS HATRED THAT CONSTITUTES INCITEMENT TO DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILITY 

OR VIOLENCE

[ICCPR, Art. 20]

• No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious 

hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility or violence... [and] States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 

Append i x t h r ee
252

• State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in article 20 of the ICCPR, and 

should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or advocacy.

—HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2)

• Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of 

free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

 —United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20

•States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, 

hostility or hatred, including anti-Semitism.

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

•States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect persons or groups who may be 

subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 

religious identity, and to protect their property;

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f) and 16(g)]

•State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

—ICCPR Article 18(4)

•The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.

•Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is permitted if it is given in a 

neutral and objective way.

•Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with ICCPR Art. 18 (4) 

unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of 

parents and guardians.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8)

•Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing 

in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

•Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the 

wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against 

the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

•The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.

•In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken 

of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of 

the child being the guiding principle. 

•Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or 

to his full development, taking into account article 1(3) of the present Declaration.

 —UN 1981 Dec., art. 5
253

F. FURTHER ELABORATION ON SELECTED TOPICS

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7]

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring:

•effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated;

•that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; and

•that such remedies are enforced when granted.

2. Relationship Between Religion and the State

•The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or traditional, or that its followers 

comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights 

under the ICCPR, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. 

•In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to them, or imposing special restrictions on the practice of other faiths are not in accordance 

with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under ICCPR 

article 26.

•If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in 

actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized 

under the ICCPR nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9)

•State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared to practice their faith within constitutional boundaries, “recognition of the status provided for them in their respective countries.”

—OSCE Vienna Document

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief

•The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to ensure the equal right of men and 

women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2)

•Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and 

culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses. States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to 

equal enjoyment of all ICCPR rights.

•State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and women’s rights, including:

•pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as gender-disaggregated data on infant mortality rates; 

•information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on measures to eliminate it; 

•measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, such as female infanticide, the burning of 

widows and dowry killings; 

Append i x t h r ee
254

•regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and

•whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men; whether measures are taken to ensure 

women equal access to legal aid, in particular in family matters; and whether certain categories of women are 

denied the enjoyment of the presumption of innocence.

•Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than those authorized by the ICCPR and 

must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules requiring permission from third parties, or by interference from fathers, 

husbands, brothers or others. Article 18 may not be relied upon to justify discrimination against women by reference 

to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

•The commission of so-called “honor crimes” which remain unpunished constitutes a serious violation of the ICCPR 

and laws which impose more severe penalties on women than on men for adultery or other offences also violate the 

requirement of equal treatment.

—HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

•Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women’s rights. These practices include :

• cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious extremism, and regulation of women’s clothing;

•discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, traditional childbirth practices, and 

dietary restrictions;

•discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, including practices related to marriage 

and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family planning, division of responsibilities);

• discrimination related to transmission of nationality;

• discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of finances;

• discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment of widows, and honor crimes, 

• attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse;

•social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of access to professional fields such as 

politics and religion; and

• aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a minority community.

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential that this freedom not be 

understood as a right of indifference with respect to the status of women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and 

Traditions (Amor Report) 3

3

 Commission staff translation.
255

NOTES
256

NOTES

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International Religious Freedom

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Email: Communications@uscirf.gov