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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 124,291

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

MARIO STEVE ZAMORA BARAJAS,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JENNIFER L. MYERS, judge. Opinion filed June 3, 2022. 

Affirmed.

Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Kayla Roehler, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., POWELL and WARNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Mario Barajas challenges his convictions for battery against a law 

enforcement officer. He asserts that because Kansas law imposes lengthier sentences for 

battery against a law enforcement officer than for battery, his convictions violate equalprotection principles. This argument fails, however, because there is a rational basis for 

the legislature's decision to impose lengthier sentences for crimes against a law 

enforcement officer. We thus affirm Barajas' convictions.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2019, a Wyandotte County Sheriff's deputy responded to a call concerning 

a stolen vehicle parked on the street across from Barajas' house. While the deputy 

examined the car, Barajas came outside and asked what the deputy was doing. During 

their conversation, Barajas clenched his fists and told the deputy to drop his gun and fight 

him "like a man"; Barajas then returned inside. The deputy requested backup, and several 

officers from the Kansas City Police Department arrived.

Two officers went to the back of the house and saw Barajas in the backyard. 

Because Barajas was a suspect in the reported theft, the officers explained that they 

needed to handcuff him during their investigation. But Barajas resisted as they restrained 

him. He punched one officer in the back of the head and placed the other in a headlock,

hitting the officer multiple times and cutting the officer's nose. The officers eventually 

subdued and handcuffed Barajas.

The State charged Barajas with two counts of battery against a law enforcement 

officer under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c)(2) and with theft and criminal deprivation of 

property, charged in the alternative. Before trial, Barajas filed a motion challenging the 

constitutionality of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c), arguing the statute violates his right to 

equal protection of the law under the Kansas and United States Constitutions by

mandating lengthier sentences for individuals who commit battery against law 

enforcement officers. The district court delayed consideration of the motion until after 

trial.

In June 2021, a jury convicted Barajas of both counts of battery against a law 

enforcement officer—one under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c)(2) and the other under 

K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c)(1)—and criminal deprivation of property. At sentencing,
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the district court denied Barajas' equal-protection motion, granted his motion for a 

departure sentence, and imposed a controlling 24-month prison sentence.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Barajas argues the district court erred by rejecting his equal-protection

claims. But we find no error in the district court's ruling. In particular, because imposing

lengthier sentences acts as a deterrent that is rationally related to the goals of promoting

safety and ensuring individuals can perform their duties, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c)

does not violate Barajas' equal-protection rights.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees persons

equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Kansas 

Constitution Bill of Rights essentially provides the same protection as its federal 

counterpart. Downtown Bar and Grill v. State, 294 Kan. 188, 192, 273 P.3d 709 (2012).

These provisions require that states treat "similarly situated persons similarly." State v. 

LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299, 316, 434 P.3d 850 (2019). Neither provision absolutely prohibits

laws that only affect certain groups of people; instead, differential treatment may be 

permissible if there is some appropriate justification for the legislative disparity. Henry v. 

Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, Syl. ¶ 2, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).

Kansas courts review equal-protection challenges under a three-step framework. 

First, as a threshold matter, a statute must treat similarly situated individuals differently

before equal protection is implicated. LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299, Syl. ¶ 5 (individuals must 

be "'arguably indistinguishable'"). If it does, courts look at the basis of the 

classification—that is, what groups are being treated differently—to determine the 

appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for analyzing the challenged law. Finally, courts

review the statute under that level of scrutiny. 309 Kan. 299, Syl. ¶ 5.
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We employ three levels of judicial scrutiny to equal-protection claims—rationalbasis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny—commensurate with the protected 

status of the legislature's classification. Downtown Bar and Grill, 294 Kan. 188, Syl. ¶ 9. 

Statutes that implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect class—such as race, ancestry, or 

gender—must pass a more stringent review under either intermediate or strict scrutiny,

depending on the classification. State v. Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, 257-58, 160 P.3d 794 

(2007). But in all other instances, rational-basis review applies, and the legislature "is 

presumed to act within its constitutional power despite the fact the application of its laws 

may result in some inequity." Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 609, 522 P.2d 1291 

(1974). We thus will uphold a law under rational-basis review when a classification bears 

"some rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose." Downtown Bar and Grill, 294 

Kan. 188, Syl. ¶ 9; State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275, 284, 122 P.3d 22 (2005). Under this 

deferential standard, any reasonably conceivable facts may support the classification; the 

parties need not demonstrate that the legislature was actually motivated by the offered 

justification. In re Care & Treatment of Snyder, 308 Kan. 626, 630, 422 P.3d 85 (2018). 

In most instances, equal-protection challenges are purely legal questions that 

appellate courts review de novo. Downtown Bar and Grill, 294 Kan. 188, Syl. ¶ 4. When 

a party challenges a statute as facially unconstitutional under the rational-basis standard, 

that party bears the burden of proving no rational basis exists that could support the 

classification. 294 Kan. 188, Syl. ¶ 10.

Battery includes two types of conduct: (1) knowingly or recklessly causing bodily 

harm to another person and (2) knowingly causing physical contact with another person 

when done in a rude, insulting, or angry manner. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(a)(1)-(2). 

These same provisions apply when the victim is a law enforcement officer. K.S.A. 2019

Supp. 21-5413(c)(1)-(2). But the sentences for the crimes committed against a law 

enforcement officer differ from other batteries:
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• Battery is a class B person misdemeanor. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(g)(1). 

• Battery against a law enforcement officer is a class A person misdemeanor if it 

involves physical contact. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(g)(3)(A).

• Battery against a law enforcement officer is a severity level 7 person felony if it 

involves bodily harm. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(g)(3)(B).

Class B misdemeanors result in a maximum six-month jail sentence. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 

21-6602(a)(2). Class A misdemeanors carry a maximum 12-month jail sentence. Severity 

level 7 felonies may carry a prison sentence of 11 to 34 months, depending on the 

defendant's criminal history score. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6602(a)(1); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 

21-6804(a).

Barajas argues individuals who commit batteries are similarly situated to those 

who commit batteries against law enforcement officers. Both commit the same conduct—

either causing bodily harm or rude or insulting physical contact. But the second group is 

treated more severely based on the victim's status as a law enforcement officer. For this 

appeal, we accept that the two groups are comparable for purposes of our equalprotection analysis. 

We thus must determine how closely we must scrutinize this legislative 

classification. Barajas claims that intermediate scrutiny should apply, analogizing 

criminal defendants to the medical malpractice victims discussed in Farley v. Engelken, 

241 Kan. 663, 672-74, 740 P.2d 1058 (1987) (Herd, J., plurality). He asserts that both 

groups are politically powerless groups deserving heightened scrutiny. 

But unlike medical malpractice victims generally, the class of people implicated 

by Barajas' claim does not encompass all criminal defendants. It only includes those 
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convicted of battery against a law enforcement officer. And neither criminal defendants 

generally nor defendants accused of violating K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c) constitute a 

suspect class: Barajas does not explain how either group constitutes a class requiring 

heightened scrutiny, and Kansas courts have long recognized that legislative 

classifications distinguishing types of criminal conduct are subject to rational-basis 

review. See, e.g., Logsdon v. State, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1, 4-5, 79 P.3d 1076 (2002)

(applying rational basis to challenge against sentencing classifications for aggravated 

escape from custody), rev. denied 275 Kan. 965 (2003); Smith v. McKune, 31 Kan. App. 

2d 984, 994, 76 P.3d 1060 (prisoners and indigents are not a suspect class), rev. denied

277 Kan. 925 (2003); see also Merryfield v. State, 44 Kan. App. 2d 817, 823, 241 P.3d 

573 (2010) (status as a sex offender is not a suspect class). We review Barajas' claim 

under this more deferential standard.

The crimes of battery and battery against a law enforcement officer are both meant 

to deter rude and harmful contact, regardless of the victim's status. But the lengthier 

sentences for battery against a law enforcement officer also protect individuals carrying 

out their official obligations. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c) applies to batteries 

committed against certain individuals, including city, county, state, and federal law 

enforcement officers, judges, and court services officers, but only while they are 

performing their duties. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c)(1)(A)-(F), (2)(A)-(F). The 

lengthier sentences attached to these crimes suggest an additional purpose of deterring 

violence against protected individuals so they can perform their important 

responsibilities.

Promoting public safety and protecting those who interact with criminal suspects 

are valid legislative purposes. Accord State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 959, 368 P.3d 342 

(2016) (finding public safety and officer safety to be compelling interests under strict 

scrutiny). And the deterrent effect of lengthier sentences bears a rational relationship to 

achieving those goals.
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K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5413(c) serves a valid purpose, and its lengthier sentences 

are rationally related to that purpose. The legislature did not violate Barajas' equalprotection rights by imposing more stringent presumptive punishments for battery against 

a law enforcement officer. The district court correctly denied Barajas' motion challenging 

his convictions on that ground.

Affirmed.