UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM

2022

ANNUAL

REPORT
Afghan nationals residing in India hold placards as they participate in a protest demanding better 

rights for women in Afghanistan, during a demonstration in New Delhi, India on October 30, 2021. 

(Photo by Mayank Makhija/NurPhoto via AP)

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Media date: 11 Jun. 2017

Photographer: Parwiz Parwiz

Headline: A girl looks on among Afghan women 

lining up to receive relief assistance, during the holy 

month of Ramadan in Jalalabad

People view the damage inside of a mosque following a bombing in Kunduz, province northern 

Afghanistan, Friday, Oct. 8, 2021. A powerful explosion in the mosque frequented by a Muslim 

religious minority in northern Afghanistan on Friday has left several casualties, witnesses and the 

Taliban’s spokesman said. (AP Photo/Abdullah Sahil)

System ID: RTXI6PE3

Fixture ID: RC2B4Q9HTAKG

Media date: 6 Oct. 2021

Photographer: Jorge Silva

Headline: Women walk past a shop with a defaced 

picture of a woman in Kabul

In this image provided by the U.S. Marine Corps, evacuees wait to board a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III 

during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, Monday, Aug. 30. 2021. 

(Staff Sgt. Victor Mancilla/U.S. Marine Corps via AP)

Afghan Sikh man mourns over a coffin during 

a funeral procession and cremation ceremony 

for those who were killed on Wednesday by a 

lone Islamic State gunman, rampaged through 

a Sikh house of worship, in Kabul, Afghanistan, 

Thursday, March 26, 2020. An explosive device 

disrupted Thursday’s funeral service for 25 

members of Afghanistan’s Sikh minority community, killed in an attack by the Islamic State 

group on their house of worship in the heart of 

the capital. (AP Photo/Tamana Sarwary)
ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

COMMISSIONERS

Nadine Maenza

Chair

Nury Turkel

Vice Chair

Anurima Bhargava

James W. Carr

Frederick A. Davie

Khizr Khan

Sharon Kleinbaum

Tony Perkins

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

APRIL 2022
PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

Dwight Bashir, Director of Outreach and Policy 

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of Research and Policy

Roy Haskins, Director of Finance and Operations

Thomas Kraemer, Director of Human Resources

Danielle Ashbahian, Supervisory Public Affairs Officer

Kirsten Lavery, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Jamie Staley, Supervisory Policy Advisor

Scott Weiner, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Kurt Werthmuller, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Keely Bakken, Senior Policy Analyst

Susan Bishai, Policy Analyst

Mingzhi Chen, Policy Analyst

Patrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst

Gabrielle Hasenstab, Communications Specialist

Niala Mohammad, Senior Policy Analyst

Jason Morton, Senior Policy Analyst

Dylan Schexnaydre, Victims List and Outreach Specialist

Zachary Udin, Researcher

Nina Ullom, Congressional Relations and Outreach Specialist

Madeline Vellturo, Policy Analyst

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

(P) 202–523–3240

www.uscirf.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview 1

About this Report. 

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. 

USCIRF’s 2022 CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. 

Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion. 

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act 5

Key Findings. 

Recommendations to the Administration. 

Recommendations to Congress. 

Key USCIRF Resources & Activities. 

Legal Framework. 

Key Developments in 2021 and Early 2022. 

Countries Recommended for Designation as 

Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) 12

Afghanistan. .

Burma. .

China. .

Eritrea. .

India. .

Iran. .

Nigeria. .

North Korea. .

Pakistan. .

Russia. .

Saudi Arabia. .

Syria. .

Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Turkmenistan. .

Vietnam. .

Countries Recommended for the 

State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL) 42

Algeria. .

Azerbaijan. .

Central African Republic. .

Cuba. .

Egypt. .

Indonesia. .

Iraq. .

Kazakhstan. .

Malaysia. .

Nicaragua. .

Turkey. .

Uzbekistan. .
Other Key Developments 67

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Religious Freedom. .

Blasphemy and Hate Speech Law Enforcement  .

Transnational Repression  .

Religious Intolerance in Europe. .

Deterioration in South Asia. .

Political Upheaval Raises Religious Freedom Concerns. .

Key USCIRF Recommendations Implemented in 2021 71

Designating the Worst Violators. .

Filling IRF-Related Appointments. .

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions. .

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 – Advancing International Religious Freedom. .

Increasing the Refugee Ceiling. .

Designation of Uyghur Genocide. .

Diplomatic Boycott of the Beijing Olympics. .

Confucius Institutes. .

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement. .

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement  .

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience. .

Increased Aid to Support Religious Freedom and Religious Minorities. .

Congressional Action Promoting Religious Freedom. .

Appendix 1 Commissioner Biographies 75

Appendix 2 Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List 77

Appendix 3 Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project 81

Appendix 4 Highlights of USCIRF’s Public Activities in 2021 89
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 

has monitored and reported on religious freedom conditions in 

Afghanistan for more than two decades, but 2021 was particularly difficult. Following U.S. withdrawal from the country, the Taliban 

took control on August 15, 2021. The Taliban’s victory was calamitous 

for many reasons, including the detrimental effect it had on religious 

freedom. USCIRF has long raised concern that the Taliban’s brutal application of its extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam violates the freedom 

of religion or belief of all Afghans who do not adhere to that interpretation, including Muslims and adherents of other faiths or beliefs.

With the Taliban’s return to power, religious freedom conditions 

in Afghanistan, and the overall human rights situation, significantly 

deteriorated in 2021. Religious minorities faced harassment, detention, 

and even death due to their faith or beliefs. The one known Jew and 

most Hindus and Sikhs fled the country. Christian converts, Baha’is, 

and Ahmadiyya Muslims practiced their faith in hiding due to fear of 

reprisal and threats from the Taliban. Years of progress toward more 

equitable access to education and representation of women and girls 

disappeared. Throughout 2021, USCIRF consistently called attention 

to the escalating persecution of religious minorities in the country, 

including in two virtual events, two podcast episodes, and a factsheet. 

Given the sharp decline in religious freedom conditions witnessed in the country in 2021, USCIRF recommends in this Annual 

Report that the U.S. Department of State designate Afghanistan under 

the Taliban’s de facto government as a “country of particular concern” 

(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). 

The last such recommendation by USCIRF was in 2001, right before 

the ousting of the previous Taliban regime that controlled most of the 

country starting in 1996.

Even before its return to power, the Taliban presented a grave 

threat to religious freedom, including in 2020 and the first half of 2021. 

The group committed violent attacks, excluded religious minorities, 

and punished residents in areas under their control in accordance 

with their extreme interpretation of Islam. The government 

of Afghanistan, under then 

President Ashraf Ghani, faced 

difficulties maintaining territorial 

control and security, impacting 

the safety of religious minority 

communities. Given these 

conditions, USCIRF in its 2021 

Annual Report recommended 

that the Taliban be designated 

as an “entity of particular concern” (EPC) under IRFA and that Afghanistan be placed on the State 

Department’s Special Watch List (SWL), a lesser category than CPC. 

The State Department has designated the Taliban as an EPC every 

year since its first set of EPC designations in 2018, most recently in 

November 2021. The State Department caveated that this designation 

was based on information analyzed as of August 15, 2021, before the 

Taliban’s takeover as the de facto governing authority.

The crisis in Afghanistan should serve as a collective call to action 

to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable religious communities 

around the globe. Beyond Afghanistan, this report sounds the alarm 

regarding the deterioration of religious freedom conditions in a range 

of other countries and provides policy recommendations to the U.S. 

government to respond to violations occurring in these places. This 

year, these countries include the Central African Republic (CAR), which 

USCIRF removed from last year’s annual report following improvements in religious freedom conditions, after previously reporting 

on the country since 2015. During 2021, Central African authorities 

and their partners committed egregious and ongoing violations of 

religious freedom in CAR—including targeted abductions, torture, 

and killings of Muslims—which led USCIRF to reinstate its recommendation to place CAR on the SWL. 

USCIRF is also concerned about the potential for backsliding in 

countries that did not meet the CPC or SWL standard this year, particularly Sudan, where the October 2021 military takeover threatens

recent advancements in religious freedom protections made by the 

civilian-led transitional government. USCIRF continues to monitor the 

situation in Sudan closely. In all contexts where the freedom of religion 

or belief is violated or under threat, we urge the U.S. government 

to actively promote this fundamental right and protect persecuted 

religious communities.

About This Report 

Created by IRFA, USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body, separate from the U.S. Department of State, that 

monitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy 

recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its 

authorizing legislation and the 

standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights (ICCPR), and 

other international documents. 

USCIRF’s mandate and annual 

reports are different from, and 

complementary to, the mandate 

and annual reports of the State 

Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. 

USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report assesses religious freedom 

violations and progress in 27 countries during calendar year 2021 

and makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key 

The crisis in Afghanistan should serve 

as a collective call to action to ensure the 

protection of the most vulnerable 

religious communities around the globe.
2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

findings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on 

a year’s research by USCIRF, including hearings, meetings, and briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners. Under 

the statute, each Commissioner has the option to include a statement 

with his or her own individual views. Although USCIRF was not able 

to travel in 2021 to observe religious freedom conditions abroad 

due to the coronavirus pandemic, USCIRF was able to meet virtually 

with various stakeholders to further substantiate reports received 

throughout the year. 

The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first, 

those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should 

designate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should place on its SWL. The report 

also includes USCIRF’s recommendations of nonstate actors 

for designation by the State 

Department as EPCs under 

IRFA. In addition, the report 

analyzes the U.S. government’s 

implementation of IRFA during 

the reporting year and provides 

recommendations to bolster 

overall U.S. efforts to advance 

freedom of religion or belief 

abroad. It also includes a section 

discussing key trends and developments in religious freedom 

globally during the reporting 

period, including in countries that are not recommended for CPC or 

SWL status. This year, that section covers topics including the COVID19 pandemic and religious freedom, blasphemy and hate speech law 

enforcement, transnational repression of religious freedom, religious 

intolerance in Europe, deterioration of religious freedom conditions in 

South Asia, and political upheaval raising religious freedom concerns. 

Finally, the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented since USCIRF’s 

previous annual report. 

In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably 

to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected under 

international human rights law.

Standards for CPC, SWL, and 

EPC Recommendations 

IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in 

or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It 

defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom. 

Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including 

violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C) 

causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine 

detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to 

life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute does not 

specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, in making 

SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that 

meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and ongoing, 

systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious). 

To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate 

group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that 

exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside 

the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence 

in pursuit of its objectives.”

The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities that, in 

USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended to 

focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on the worst violators of religious 

freedom globally. The fact that a country or nonstate group is not 

covered in this report does not 

mean it did not violate religious 

freedom during the reporting 

year. It only means that based 

on the information available to 

USCIRF, the conditions during 

that year did not, in USCIRF’s 

view, meet the high threshold—

the perpetration or toleration 

of particularly severe or severe 

violations of religious freedom—required to recommend 

the country or nonstate group 

for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In the case of a nonstate 

group, it also could mean that the group did not meet other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant political power and 

territorial control. 

USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom 

conditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief 

perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered 

in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety of 

countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.

USCIRF’s 2022 CPC, SWL, and 

EPC Recommendations 

For 2022, based on religious freedom conditions in 2021, USCIRF 

recommends that the State Department:

• Redesignate as CPCs the following 10 countries: Burma, China, 

Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;

• Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries: 

Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam; 

• Maintain on the SWL the following three countries: Algeria, 

Cuba, and Nicaragua; 

• Include on the SWL the following nine countries: Azerbaijan, 

CAR, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Turkey, and 

Uzbekistan; 

• Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors: 

al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 

(HTS), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State 

in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (also referred to as ISIS-West 

Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The Annual Report highlights the countries 

and entities that, in USCIRF’s view, 

merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; 

it is intended to focus 

U.S. policymakers’ attention on the 

worst violators of religious freedom globally.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 3

The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation 

for each country are described in the relevant country chapters of 

this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for 

Boko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and for 

HTS in the Syria chapter. 

For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions: 

Although al-Shabaab’s territorial control continued to shrink, the 

group actively operated in the southern and southcentral regions of 

Somalia in 2021. The terrorist group carried out a series of deadly 

attacks in Somalia and in neighboring Kenya against both Muslims 

and non-Muslims. Reportedly, the group carried out amputations, 

floggings, and executions of Muslims who disagreed with its interpretation of Sunni Islam. In Lamu County, Kenya, a priest reported that 

the group attacked Christians and destroyed a church. 

In 2021, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, 

expanded its territorial holdings throughout Yemen. In March 2021, 

Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi accused the United States of 

“seeking to establish Baha’i, Ahmadiyya and atheist [communities] in 

Yemen in order to undermine Islam.” The group forced Yemenis living 

in Houthi-controlled areas to take indoctrination “trainings,” even when 

these trainings were contrary to their religious beliefs. Prison officials 

also forced detainees to take Islamic religious trainings as a condition 

for their release, even when the detainees were not Muslim. The group’s 

slogan, posted widely throughout Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, 

includes the phrase “a curse on the Jews,” and the tiny remaining

Jewish community faced ongoing and severe repression from Houthi 

authorities. Houthi authorities 

continued to detain Jewish prisoner of conscience Libi Marhabi 

despite a court order for his 

release. Houthi authorities also 

continued to prosecute Baha’is 

released from prison in 2020 and 

blocked Baha’i bank accounts 

in March 2021. Christians, 

especially converts, were also 

persecuted by Houthi authorities. In 2021, Houthi authorities 

detained two Christian convert

priests and arrested a Christian 

man on charges of apostasy and promoting Christianity.

In 2021, militant Islamist groups ISGS and JNIM continued to 

control territory in parts of Mali and Niger. While reporting during the 

calendar year is sparse, these groups likely continued trends of executing individuals with differing religious beliefs, restricting religious 

practice and preaching, and imposing harsh punishments based on a 

singular interpretation of Islamic law.

Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion

USCIRF’s mission is to advance international freedom of religion or 

belief (FoRB) by independently assessing and unflinchingly confronting threats to this fundamental right. Within this conception, USCIRF 

is committed to addressing human rights violations perpetrated based 

on the coercive enforcement of interpretations of religion and has 

done so since it was created by Congress in 1998. USCIRF fulfills this 

commitment through its reporting, advocacy, and policy recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

Some foreign governments enforce laws and policies that permit 

or condone violations of human rights of minority groups and other 

vulnerable communities on the basis of religion. Under international 

human rights law, however, religion is not a legitimate justification for 

egregiously violating individuals’ fundamental rights. As explained

by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee—the body 

of independent experts charged with interpreting provisions of the 

ICCPR—the existence of a state or majority religion cannot result in 

the impairment of the rights of individuals under the ICCPR. International law requires states to respect FoRB and other human rights for 

everyone, equally. Thus, states must not coercively enforce religious 

interpretations on individuals or communities who do not adhere to 

those interpretations. Individuals and religious communities enjoy 

the right to hold and follow diverse views on religious precepts free 

from government interference. Governments are accountable to 

international human rights standards guaranteeing FoRB and other 

fundamental human rights to all.

To that end, USCIRF has provided qualitative and quantitative information in its annual reports, publications, and other work 

(see Appendix 4) highlighting problematic laws and policies of foreign countries that permit or condone violations of human rights 

of minority groups and other vulnerable communities on the basis 

of religion. Some of USCIRF’s key recent activities on this topic are 

discussed below.

Throughout 2021, USCIRF published products and held public 

events that provide examples of states’ abuses of human rights on the 

basis of religion. USCIRF’s Country Update: Iran, released in August 

2021, detailed how the Iranian 

government uses religion as a 

basis for violating the rights of 

its citizens, including by executing members of its lesbian, 

gay, bisexual, transgender, and 

intersex (LGBTI) community. 

USCIRF’s September 2021 

Country Update: Saudi Arabia

described Saudi authorities’ 

enforcement of the government’s interpretation of Sunni 

Islam and the country’s guardianship system, which severely 

limits women’s rights. These themes were further explored in USCIRF’s 

December 2021 hearing on “State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom 

Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran.” 

Additionally, USCIRF released a factsheet on Religious Minorities 

in Afghanistan in October 2021, outlining the Taliban’s imposition of 

its strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that violates the freedom of 

religion or belief of Afghanistan’s religious minorities and others who 

do not share the same religious beliefs. USCIRF further highlighted the 

impact of the coercive application of these beliefs on religious minorities and other vulnerable Afghans during the “USCIRF Conversation: 

Update on At-Risk Religious Communities in Afghanistan” event held 

in October 2021. Also in October, USCIRF released a factsheet on 

Religious Freedom Violations in the Republic of Chechnya describing 

how the Chechen dictatorship maintains hegemony through the 

imposition of a purported “traditional” version of Islam, including by 

conducting violent purges of the LGBTI community and witch hunts 

that often target elderly women. In November 2021, USCIRF published 

Country Update: Malaysia addressing how the implementation of 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

USCIRF is committed to 

addressing human rights violations 

perpetrated based on the coercive 

enforcement of interpretations 

of religion and has done so since it was 

created by Congress in 1998.
religion-based law in Malaysia’s dual court system can violate religious 

freedom and related rights. In this report, USCIRF details the use of 

these religious laws to target members of vulnerable groups, such as 

Malaysia’s Muslim LGBTI community.

USCIRF also conducted research on the coercive enforcement 

of interpretations of religion by nonstate actors, particularly EPCs. In 

November 2021, USCIRF published a report on EPCs and Religious 

Freedom, which outlines the human rights responsibilities of EPCs 

and other armed nonstate actors. USCIRF also released reports on 

Violent Islamist Groups in the Central Sahel and Violent Islamist Groups 

in Northern Nigeria, which address the imposition of a strict interpretation of Shari’a by EPCs and other violent Islamist groups in these 

areas and its impact on human rights.

USCIRF continued to highlight the ways in which the enforcement 

of blasphemy or apostasy laws, which are based on religious interpretations, undermines human rights—including freedom of religion 

or belief and freedom of expression—and often targets vulnerable 

religious and other communities. Commission reports on this topic 

published in 2021 include Country Update: Egypt, Factsheet on Religious Freedom Violations in Kano State, Nigeria, and Factsheet on 

Ahmadiyya Muslims. At the end of 2021, USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List 

showcased 73 victims targeted under blasphemy or apostasy laws. 

USCIRF’s 2021 work on other problematic laws based on religious 

interpretations included the March factsheet on The Use of Shari’a as 

Religious Justification for Capital Punishment against LGBTI Persons

discussing how such laws violate the human dignity and rights of 

LGBTI persons and embolden societal hostility, discrimination, and 

violence against them.

In addition to the work described above, USCIRF also raises 

awareness on these issues through its public hearings, briefings, and 

other events, which seek to highlight the Commission’s research and 

recommendations and showcase diverse panelists offering a variety of 

perspectives. In May 2021, for example, USCIRF hosted an event with 

Nasreldin Mufrih, Sudan’s then Minister of Religious Affairs, where 

he provided an update on how the country’s transitional government 

was addressing the previous regime’s violations of human rights 

based on religion. These efforts were further discussed in USCIRF’s 

Policy Update on Sudan, released in November 2021. In February, a 

USCIRF event focused on ways the U.S. government can protect and 

assist refugees and asylum seekers, including those fleeing the coercive enforcement of religion. During 2021, USCIRF’s podcast series, 

Spotlight, offered in-depth analysis about developments that have 

implications for religious freedom and other human rights. Examples 

of episodes that discuss the official imposition of religious norms 

include Pakistan’s Laws that Enable Islamist Extremism, Hazara Community Threatened in Afghanistan, Enforcing Blasphemy Laws Have 

Dire Consequences, Religious Restrictions in Iran, and Governments 

Using Shari’a to Impose Death Sentences on LGBTI Persons.

Information on all of USCIRF’s activities can be found at

https://www.uscirf.gov/.

4 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Key Findings

Since taking office in January 2021, the administration of President 

Joseph R. Biden has maintained and continued many of the international religious freedom (IRF)-related initiatives from the previous 

administration of Donald J. Trump. The administration indicated that 

its foreign policy priorities will include championing human rights. 

During his confirmation process, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken 

expressed the administration’s commitment to human rights and IRF. 

The U.S. government continued to serve as the Secretariat of 

the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). During 

2021, the Alliance made multi-country statements regarding religious freedom in Burma and 

Afghanistan, on behalf of missing Yazidi women and children, 

and in support of persecuted 

Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Biden 

administration continued to 

implement the executive order

on Advancing International Religious Freedom, signed by then 

President Trump in June 2020, 

by bolstering religious freedom 

within the priorities and programming of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

This included activities to address the needs of vulnerable religious 

minority communities in various parts of the world as well as organizational initiatives such as the IRF Sector Council to foster agency-wide 

coordination and cooperation.

In March 2021, the Biden administration announced its candidacy 

to rejoin the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. At the session 

that month, the United States cosponsored a resolution in the council 

on freedom of religion or belief. In October, the United States was 

elected to serve on the council for the next term, beginning in 2022.

In February 2021, consistent with USCIRF recommendations, 

President Biden announced his intent to raise the refugee ceiling to 

125,000 for fiscal year (FY) 2022, which began on October 1, 2021. In 

May 2021, President Biden announced he was raising the refugee ceiling for FY 2021 from 15,000 to 62,500 and that he intended to “push 

hard to complete the rigorous screening process for those refugees 

already in the pipeline for admission.”

Also in February, President Biden signed an executive order that, 

among other actions, initiated a review of the Expedited Removal process, the implementation of which USCIRF has monitored under IRFA. 

Among other IRF-related appointments, the Biden administration 

nominated Rashad Hussain in July 2021 to serve as the ambassador 

at large for IRF, and the Senate confirmed him in December 2021.

In November 2021, the 

U.S. Department of State designated 10 countries as “countries 

of particular concern” (CPCs) 

under IRFA, all of which USCIRF 

recommended for such designation. The State Department 

designated Russia as a CPC for 

the first time, an action USCIRF 

has recommended every year 

since 2017. The Biden administration chose not to redesignate 

Nigeria as a CPC again after it was added to the list for the first time 

in 2020. For the 10 designated countries, the State Department reimposed existing sanctions on six and issued waivers on taking any 

action for the other four. USCIRF has long called on administrations 

to discontinue the practice of relying on waivers or existing sanctions 

in response to CPC designations. The State Department also placed 

four countries on its “Special Watch List” (SWL) for severe religious 

freedom violations, adding Algeria for the first time, an action USCIRF 

has recommended since 2020. In addition, the State Department 

designated nine “entities of particular concern” (EPCs) pursuant to 

IRFA, which are nonstate actors that engage in particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom.

STATE DEPARTMENT 2021 DESIGNATIONS

CPC Designations Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

SWL Countries Algeria, Comoros, Cuba, and Nicaragua

EPC Designations Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Houthis, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISISGreater Sahara, ISIS-West Africa, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and the Taliban

The State Department designated Russia 

as a CPC for the first time, 

an action USCIRF has recommended 

every year since 2017.
6 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION

• Promptly appoint a well-qualified individual as a special adviser for IRF on the 

National Security Council (NSC) staff and 

provide them with the financial resources 

and staff needed to fulfill their mandate;

• Maintain the United States’ leadership 

roles in the Alliance and the International 

Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, participate in and support future 

events to advance religious freedom, 

and continue to implement the executive order on “Advancing International 

Religious Freedom”; 

• Prioritize freedom of religion or belief in 

the United States’ renewed engagement 

with the UN human rights system, including at the UN Human Rights Council, and 

work with countries to counter the efforts 

to undermine that system by states that 

egregiously violate religious freedom and 

other human rights; 

• Increase the use of human rights-related 

financial and visa authorities to impose 

asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious 

freedom violations, citing specific abuses, 

and coordinate with other countries with 

similar sanctions regimes on such targeted 

sanctions whenever possible;

• Review U.S. policy toward the four 

CPC-designated countries for which waivers on taking any action based on those 

designations are in place—Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—

and make appropriate policy changes to 

demonstrate meaningful consequences 

and encourage positive change;

• Increase funding for existing data analytics programs that assess atrocities, state 

fragility, and civilian security to extend 

and expand the collection and analysis of country-specific data on religious 

repression to inform U.S. foreign policy 

and strategy; 

• In accordance with the definition of who 

constitutes a refugee in international and 

U.S. law, prioritize for resettlement through 

the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 

(USRAP) survivors of the most egregious 

forms of religious persecution, including 

Iranian religious minorities eligible for processing under the Lautenberg Amendment, 

members of other severely persecuted religious or belief communities, and survivors 

of genocide or other atrocity crimes; and

• Address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, including by enhancing the quality and oversight of the initial processing 

of noncitizens, improving detention conditions, and appointing a high-level official at 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) to coordinate and oversee reforms.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

• Hold oversight hearings on U.S. IRF 

policy; highlight IRF issues through 

legislation, hearings, briefings, and 

other actions; and examine, during 

congressional delegation trips abroad, 

conditions for persons of all faiths and 

beliefs or none; 

• As individual members of Congress, 

advocate for IRF by sponsoring religious 

prisoners of conscience through the Tom 

Lantos Human Rights Commission’s 

(TLHRC) Defending Freedoms Project, 

collaborating with the International 

Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, and joining the U.S. 

House of Representatives or U.S. Senate Bipartisan Task Force for Combating 

Antisemitism and caucuses such as the 

House IRF Caucus and Ahmadiyya Muslim Caucus; 

• Adopt S. Res 80 to create the Senate 

Human Rights Commission, as a similar 

initiative to the House’s TLHRC, to monitor 

and address human rights abuses abroad, 

including violations of the freedom of religion or belief; and

• Evaluate the policy tools available for 

targeted human rights-related sanctions 

to ensure maximum impact in curtailing 

abuses.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: International Religious Freedom Act

• Factsheet: Recommendations for State Department CPC and SWL Designations

• Factsheet: EPCs and Religious Freedom

• Hearing: Ending Genocide: Accountability for Perpetrators

• Hearing: Targeted Sanctions: Implications for International Religious Freedom

• Event: USCIRF Conversation on the Global Compact on Refugees

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 7

Legal Framework 

IRFA, as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016, seeks to make religious freedom a higher priority 

in U.S. foreign policy through a range of mechanisms and tools. 

These include governmental institutions (USCIRF as an independent 

legislative branch agency, the ambassador at large and the State 

Department’s IRF Office, and a position on the White House NSC 

staff); ongoing monitoring and annual reports on religious freedom 

violations; and the imposition of consequences for the worst violators. 

The consequences set forth in IRFA consist of CPC designations and 

related actions, placement on the State Department’s SWL, the ability 

to bar entry to the United States of foreign officials responsible for 

particularly severe religious freedom violations, and EPC designations 

for nonstate actors.

IRFA includes religious freedom as an element of U.S. foreign 

assistance, cultural exchange, and international broadcasting programs and requires training on religious freedom and religious 

persecution for State Department foreign service officers and U.S. 

immigration officials. Further, it includes provisions on U.S. refugee and asylum policy. It also specifically cites U.S. participation 

in multilateral organizations as an avenue for advancing religious 

freedom abroad. IRFA is centered on the right to freedom of religion 

or belief as recognized in international law, as articulated in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments and 

regional agreements.

For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history, 

and its implementation, see USCIRF’s Factsheet: IRFA.

Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, 

such as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act 

(CISADA, P.L.111-195). More broadly, the 2016 Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act allows the president, who has delegated these authorities to the secretaries of treasury and state, to 

deny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S.-based assets of any foreigner 

responsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally protected human rights” against someone 

seeking to expose illegal government activity or to exercise 

or defend internationally protected rights. Executive Order 

(E.O.) 13818, issued in December 2017 to implement and 

build on the Global Magnitsky 

Act, authorizes visa bans and 

asset freezes against foreign 

persons involved in “serious 

human rights abuse,” providing 

an even more expansive basis 

for targeted sanctions. 

In addition, Section 7031(c) of the State Department’s annual 

appropriations law (P.L. 116-260 for FY 2021) requires the secretary 

of state to make foreign officials and their immediate family members 

ineligible for U.S. entry if there is credible evidence that such individuals have been involved in “a gross violation of human rights.” Unlike 

the visa ineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, visa bans under this 

provision can be announced publicly. 

Key Developments in 2021 and Early 2022

Key U.S. Government IRF Positions

On January 24, 2022, Rashad Hussain was sworn in as the sixth 

ambassador at large since IRFA’s enactment. Ambassador Hussain immediately began implementing his mandate through public 

speeches, travel, and meetings, including with the nongovernmental 

organization (NGO) IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. 

In July, the Biden administration nominated Deborah Lipstadt as 

the special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, granting the 

rank of ambassador to the position for the first time, and the Senate 

confirmed her in March 2022. 

In December, the administration appointed Under Secretary for 

Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya to serve 

concurrently as the special coordinator for Tibetan issues. USCIRF 

welcomed this appointment but noted that “double hatting” positions 

could undermine the U.S. government’s important efforts to promote 

religious freedom abroad. 

Lack of Designation for Nigeria

The State Department designated Nigeria as a CPC in 2020 for the 

first time, an action USCIRF has recommended every year since 2009. 

In 2021, the State Department chose not to redesignate Nigeria as a 

CPC, despite religious freedom conditions in the country not changing 

significantly from the previous year. Furthermore, the State Department completely bypassed downgrading the country to the SWL, 

indicating that Nigeria is a country with no severe religious freedom 

violations as defined by IRFA. USCIRF issued a public statement criticizing the State Department’s decision. Information on the particularly 

severe religious freedom violations that took place in Nigeria in 2021 

can be found in the chapter on Nigeria in this report.

Individual Violators

During 2021, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials 

for particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section 212(a)

(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision added by 

IRFA. However, the U.S. government continued its use of newer 

accountability tools to deny U.S. 

visas to or block the U.S.-based 

assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses.

As of December 2021, 

the U.S. government had 

sanctioned 419 foreign individuals and entities under the 

2016 Global Magnitsky Human 

Rights Accountability Act and 

the related 2017 executive order, 

E.O. 13818. Of these sanctions, 38 related directly to religious freedom. 

In January 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed Global 

Magnitsky sanctions on Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman and former National Security Advisor Falih al-Fayyadh for engaging 

in egregious human rights abuses. In March, the U.S. government

imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on two Chinese officials for their 

involvement in atrocities committed against Uyghurs and other Turkic 

Muslims in Xinjiang. These sanctions were issued in conjunction with 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

In 2021, the State Department chose 

not to redesignate Nigeria as a CPC, 

despite religious freedom conditions in the 

country not changing significantly 

from the previous year.
8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

targeted sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom, Canada, and 

the European Union against the same abusers. In July, the Treasury 

Department sanctioned religious freedom violators in Syria, including 

the Turkish-backed militia Ahrar al-Sharqiya as well as individuals Ahmad 

Ihsan Fayyad al-Hayes—commonly known as Abu Hatem Shaqra—and 

Farrukh Fayzimatov. In July, the Treasury Department sanctioned individuals in Cuba for suppressing peaceful protests, including the beating 

of a Catholic priest. In September, the Treasury Department sanctioned

four Iranian intelligence operatives for attempting to kidnap an Iranian 

American activist living in Brooklyn who advocated for Iranian women’s 

freedom to choose whether or not to wear Islamic headscarves.

Countries continued to join the United States in passing laws that 

enable targeted sanctions against human rights violators. Australia 

adopted Global Magnitsky-style sanctions in December 2021. Legislation in Japan is still pending, and there have been calls for similar 

actions in New Zealand.

Programs

IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs, authorizing U.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal protections 

and cultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY 2021, the State 

Department was required to make funds available for international 

religious freedom programs. During 2021, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) issued several 

requests for proposals to advance religious freedom and/or provide 

protection to religious minority groups—including to support projects 

in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Sudan—along with thematic and regionally focused programs on issues such as combating 

antisemitism online. 

During 2021, the Biden administration continued to provide 

humanitarian aid for religious groups targeted for persecution or 

genocide and programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, 

and pluralism. In May 2021, 

USAID announced an additional 

$155 million in humanitarian 

assistance to meet the urgent 

needs of Rohingya refugees and 

other minority groups affected 

by ongoing violence in Burma 

that has specifically targeted 

them because of their religion 

and ethnicity. Similarly, the U.S. 

government continued to assist 

Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities to rebuild communities 

devastated by ISIS. In June, the 

State Department announced an 

additional $436 million in humanitarian assistance for the people of Syria. In July, the State Department 

announced an additional $155 million in humanitarian assistance for 

the people of Iraq as well as for Iraqi refugees in the region and the 

communities hosting them.

Refugee Resettlement

Under the USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees 

the United States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA, 

religious persecution should be considered in this determination. 

Over the course of the Trump administration, the refugee ceilings 

for each fiscal year were set at successively declining levels, with the 

administration focusing instead on humanitarian assistance for those 

displaced abroad and programs to help enable their return home. 

USCIRF consistently called for a return of the annual resettlement 

ceiling to the previously typical level of 95,000.

In October 2020, then President Trump set the annual ceiling for 

FY 2021 at 15,000, the lowest in the program’s history. The administration dedicated 5,000 of those slots to refugees fleeing religious 

persecution, including refugees eligible for U.S. resettlement under 

the Lautenberg Amendment—a special program for certain persecuted religious minority groups.

In February 2021, President Biden announced his intent to 

raise the refugee ceiling to 125,000 for FY 2022, which then began 

on October 1, 2021, and issued an executive order to take steps to 

position the administration to be able to do so. In May 2021, the 

administration announced it was raising the refugee ceiling for FY 

2021 from 15,000 to 62,500 and that it intended to develop new 

priority access categories for several especially vulnerable groups, 

including Turkic Muslim refugees who are nationals or last habitual 

residents of China, Rohingya Muslim refugees who are nationals 

or last habitual residents of Burma, and Iraqi and Syrian nationals 

who are members of a religious or ethnic minority. At the end of FY 

2021, the United States had admitted only 11,411 refugees during 

that fiscal year.

USCIRF held a hearing on “Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution” in February 2021 that explored opportunities to improve U.S. 

refugee resettlement, asylum, and humanitarian aid policies.

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal

As authorized by IRFA, USCIRF has examined the U.S. government’s 

treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, the process that 

allows DHS officers to deport 

quickly—without immigration 

court hearings—noncitizens 

who arrive at U.S. ports of entry 

or cross the border without 

proper documents, unless they 

can establish a credible fear of 

persecution or torture. USCIRF’s 

reports on the subject, released 

in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016, 

documented major problems 

that successive administrations 

have not addressed. Specifically, 

USCIRF found that DHS officials 

often fail to follow required 

procedures to identify asylum 

seekers and refer them for credible fear determinations; that they 

detain asylum seekers in inappropriate, prison-like conditions; and 

that funding disparities and a lack of high-level oversight hamper the 

complicated, multi-agency process. These flaws raise serious concerns that the United States is erroneously returning asylum seekers 

to countries where they could face persecution or torture in violation 

of both U.S. and international law—a risk that the expanded use of 

Expedited Removal over the years has only exacerbated. 

In February 2021, President Biden ordered the secretary of 

homeland security to review Expedited Removal procedures and make 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

In February 2021, President Biden 

announced his intent to raise the 

refugee ceiling to 125,000 for FY 2022, 

which then began on October 1, 2021, 

and issued an executive order 

to take steps to position 

the administration to be able to do so.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 9

recommendations for “creating a more efficient and orderly process 

that facilitates timely adjudications and adherence to standards of 

fairness and due process,” a step that USCIRF welcomed.

Notable Congressional Efforts to Promote Religious 

Freedom Abroad

In 2021, Congress’ IRF promotion efforts included its oversight of the 

Biden administration’s implementation of IRFA. In May, a bipartisan 

group of senators and representatives wrote to President Biden urging 

him to quickly nominate a well-qualified individual as ambassador at 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

large for international religious freedom and to prioritize religious 

freedom in the administration’s foreign policy.

Congress also highlighted religious freedom violations through 

legislation, hearings, and other initiatives. Notable actions by Congress in 2021 to promote IRF included passage of the Uyghur Forced 

Labor Prevention Act in December. Congressional hearings on topics 

related to IRF included a TLHRC hearing on the state of religious 

freedom around the globe and also a hearing cohosted with USCIRF 

on ending genocide and holding perpetrators accountable. Members 

of Congress also advocated for the release of religious prisoners of 

conscience through the TLHRC’s Defending Freedoms Project.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 11

2022 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Central African Republic

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Turkey

Uzbekistan
12 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

AFGHANISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan worsened 

as the Taliban took control of the country on August 15. Despite 

initial statements from the Taliban that they had reformed some 

elements of their ideology, Afghans who do not adhere to the Taliban’s harsh and strict interpretation of Sunni Islam and adherents of 

other faiths or beliefs are at risk of grave danger. Reports indicate 

that the Taliban continue to persecute religious minorities and punish residents in areas under their control in accordance with their 

extreme interpretation of Islamic law. USCIRF has received credible 

reports that religious minorities, including nonbelievers and Muslims with differing beliefs from the Taliban, were harassed and their 

houses of worship desecrated. By year’s end, the one known Jew 

and most Hindus and Sikhs had fled the country. Christian converts, 

Baha’is, and Ahmadiyya Muslims practiced their faith in hiding due 

to fear of reprisal and threats from the Taliban and separately from 

the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). 

In September 2021, despite promises to form an “inclusive” 

government, the Taliban announced an all-male and religiously and 

ethnically homogenous government cabinet. The Taliban also reinstated the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention 

of Vice, which uses a notoriously violent hardline Islamist policing 

system. Since September 2021, the ministry has banned practices 

it deems un-Islamic, including wearing Western-style haircuts and 

listening to music. The ministry also imposed a new dress code as 

well as work, education, and travel restrictions on women. 

Prior to the Taliban taking over, the government of Afghanistan 

under then President Ashraf Ghani faced difficulties maintaining 

KEY FINDINGS

territorial control and security, impacting the safety of religious 

minority communities, particularly Shi’a Muslims (including ethnic 

Hazaras), Sikhs, Hindus, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, and Christian 

converts, all of whom are at greater risk of persecution from the 

Taliban and ISIS-K.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

(UNAMA) documented at least 20 attacks targeting Shi’a Hazaras 

in the first half of 2021. After the Ghani administration lost control 

in August, there was a resurgence of Taliban and ISIS-K attacks targeting the Shi’a community. During their time in power from 1996 

to 2001, the Taliban discriminated against and violently persecuted 

the Shi’a Hazara community, which they labeled as heretical. In 

early July, after the Taliban took control of Ghazni Province in their 

advance toward Kabul, Taliban fighters massacred nine Shi’a Hazara 

men there. In September 2021, Taliban fighters are reported to have 

forcibly evicted at least 2,800 Shi’a Hazaras from their homes in Daikundi and Uruzgan provinces and seized their properties. Shortly 

afterward, in October 2021, there were confirmed reports that the 

Taliban killed 13 Shi’a Hazaras in Daikundi Province.

ISIS-K—which maintains a presence primarily in Kunar and 

Nangarhar provinces—also targeted religious minority communities. In October 2021, ISIS-K took responsibility for two separate 

attacks on Shi’a mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar, killing scores 

of Shi’a worshipers during Friday prayers. According to reports, 

ISIS-K made marginal gains in territory during 2021, although not 

to the extent of what it controlled when designated as an “entity of 

particular concern” by the U.S. Department of State prior to 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Designate Afghanistan under the de facto 

rule of the Taliban as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systemic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Expand the existing Priority 2 (P-2) designation granting U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program (USRAP) access for certain Afghan 

nationals and their family members, explicitly including Afghan religious minorities at 

extreme risk of religious persecution;

• Incorporate protections for freedom of 

religion or belief into dialogue between 

the U.S. government and the Taliban, 

continue to publicly condemn ongoing 

and severe atrocities committed by the 

Taliban and ISIS-K, and emphasize to 

Taliban leadership the close relationship 

between religious freedom and overall 

security; and

• Impose targeted sanctions on Taliban 

officials responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or banning their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities—citing specific religious freedom 

violations—and coordinate with allies to 

impose similar sanctions.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Create by law a P-2 designation for members of religious groups at extreme risk of 

persecution by the Taliban.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Calls on the State Department to Prioritize Refugee Resettlement of Afghan Religious Minorities

• Factsheet: Religious Minorities in Afghanistan 

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Update on At-Risk Religious Communities in Afghanistan

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: The Exodus of Religious Minority Communities in Afghanistan 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 13

AFGHANISTAN

Background

Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, including 

Pashtuns (42 percent), Tajiks (27 percent), Hazaras (nine percent), 

Uzbeks (nine percent), Turkmen (three percent), and Baloch (two 

percent). Historically, the nation was religiously diverse, but the vast 

majority of non-Muslims fled after the Taliban consolidated control of the government in 1996. The country’s current population is 

approximately 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 percent Sunni and 

10–15 percent Shi’a, including Ismailis and Ahmadis), with the few 

remaining non-Muslims (Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, Christians, Buddhists, 

Zoroastrians, and others) comprising the remaining 0.3 percent. By the 

end of 2021, there appears to be no remaining Jews in Afghanistan. 

Gathering statistics on religious communities that practice in secret 

is difficult but estimates for the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in 

Afghanistan range from 450 to 2,500. There are an estimated 12,000 

Christian converts throughout the country. 

The Taliban takeover and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan 

in August led to mass panic, with a violent crackdown on civil society, targeted killings, beatings and detentions, severe restrictions 

on women’s rights, diminished local media presence, mass exodus, 

and violent targeted attacks claimed by ISIS-K on Kabul Airport and 

houses of worship. 

Exodus and Persecution of Sikhs, Hindus, and Jews

Afghanistan’s overall instability has led to the near extinction of religious minorities, particularly the Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh communities. 

While the last known remaining Jew left Afghanistan in September 

2021 out of fear of persecution by the Taliban, the Hindu and Sikh 

community population dwindled to 140 at the end of 2021, a near 

extinction of the once robust community. Soon after the takeover, 

armed Taliban representatives went to the Sikh gurdwara in Karte 

Parwan in Kabul to urge Sikh and Hindu community members to “not 

feel fear or anxiety” in an attempt to assure them of their safety in 

Afghanistan. In October 2021, however, videos of alleged Taliban 

members vandalizing and ransacking the Sikh gurdwara in Karte 

Parwan emerged. Sikhs and Hindus have felt pressured to leave 

Afghanistan and take refuge in India due to the lack of safety and 

security following the Taliban takeover and ongoing targeted attacks 

on their houses of worship. 

Practicing Faith in Fear 

Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, and nonbelievers are unable 

to express their faiths or beliefs openly because they face dire consequences, including death, if discovered by the Taliban or ISIS-K. 

Ahmadiyya Muslims are not recognized by either the Sunni or Shi’a 

Muslim faiths and have experienced a long history of persecution 

in Afghanistan. Today, Ahmadis practice their faith in secret due to 

continued societal persecution and discrimination. According to the 

Ahmadiyya Muslim community leader, some Ahmadis were detained

in 2021. 

Afghans who converted to Christianity from Islam over the past 20 

years are considered “apostates,” a crime punishable by death according to the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islam. Converts, who already 

faced ostracization and the threat of honor killings by family and village 

members, are at heightened risk following the Taliban takeover. USCIRF 

received reports that the Taliban have gone door to door looking for 

Christian converts. Christians have received threatening phone calls, 

and one leader of a house church network received a threatening letter 

in August from Taliban militants. Some Christians have turned off their 

phones and moved to undisclosed locations. 

In Afghanistan, followers of the Baha’i faith have faced persecution, exacerbated by a 2007 ruling from the General Directorate 

of Fatwas and Accounts under the Supreme Court that declared the 

Baha’i faith blasphemous and its followers infidels. Since then, the Baha’i 

community has lived in secret. 

Key U.S. Policy

Following the Taliban takeover, over 120,000 Afghans, including 

religious minorities, were evacuated to the United States and ally 

countries. Additionally, masses fearing persecution at the hands of 

the Taliban fled to neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, 

and Iran, where they continue to face uncertainty. In response to the 

crisis, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a government-wide program, Operation Allies Welcome, to coordinate efforts 

to support vulnerable Afghan populations. In August 2021, the State 

Department announced a P-2 designation for certain Afghan nationals 

and eligible family members.

The Taliban takeover prompted the U.S. government and other 

international actors to halt aid programs, suspend financial assistance, 

freeze billions in Afghan central bank assets, and impose stringent 

sanctions on the Taliban. Despite these restrictions, in October 2021 the 

United States announced more than $144 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. This additional funding brought 

total U.S. humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in 

the region to nearly $474 million in 2021. 

While the United States has not recognized the Taliban regime as 

the government of Afghanistan, in November 2021 a U.S. delegation 

met with Taliban representatives. The U.S. officials emphasized the 

importance of the Taliban fulfilling its public commitments, including 

protecting the rights of all Afghans, particularly women, girls, and 

religious minorities. In December, the State Department designated a 

Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights to support 

vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. 

On November 15, the State Department designated the Taliban 

as an “entity of particular concern,” or EPC, under IRFA for engaging 

in particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The State Department caveated that the Taliban’s designation is based on information 

analyzed as of August 15, 2021, before its takeover as the de facto

governing authority. ISIS-K was not designated as an EPC, as the State 

Department determined in 2020 that it lost control of the territory it 

previously controlled. 
14 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

BURMA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Burma declined significantly. On February 1, the Burmese military, known as the 

Tatmadaw, seized the institutions of the state, arrested members 

of the civilian government, including leader Aung San Suu Kyi, 

and placed Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in effective control 

of the country. The coup ended a decade of quasi-democracy 

and triggered an escalation of violence. Conditions for ethnoreligious minorities, such as the predominantly Muslim Rohingya and 

Christian Chin, deteriorated alongside the breakdown of order 

and violations of civil and political rights. The Tatmadaw targeted

houses of worship, faith leaders, and religious communities in its 

crackdown on opposition. The Tatmadaw arrested religious leaders, including those from the Buddhist majority, for opposing the 

military junta.

Faith communities, including ethnoreligious Christian minorities, now face persecution that some have likened to what the 

Rohingya have faced since 2017. Previous civilian governments and 

the Tatmadaw institutionalized discrimination against Rohingya 

Muslims and denied Rohingya basic rights and dignity. In 2017, the 

Tatmadaw under General Hlaing perpetrated mass killings and 

rapes against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, forcing over 

745,000 to flee to Bangladesh within days. Each year since 2017, 

hundreds of thousands of Rohingya continued to flee due to ongoing violence. There is a pending case at the International Court of 

Justice (ICJ) for violations of the Genocide Convention.

The Tatmadaw increased its persecution of Christian communities during 2021. In February, the Tatmadaw raided the Hakha Baptist 

Church in the capital of Chin State, arresting the pastor. The same 

month, the Tatmadaw raided a Kachin Baptist Church in Shan State. 

KEY FINDINGS

In March in Kalay township in Sagaing Region, the military shot and 

killed 25-year-old pastor Chung Lian Ceu and three other civilians. 

In May, the military attacked a Catholic Church in Kayah State. In 

June, airstrikes damaged another Catholic church in Kayah State. In 

September, the Tatmadaw gunned down Baptist pastor Cung Biak 

Hum in Chin State as he went to help put out a fire caused by military 

shelling. Soldiers have torched homes and churches. 

The Tatmadaw has closely associated itself with Buddhist 

nationalism to promote its legitimacy. In September, it released 

from jail Wirathu, a nationalist monk notorious for advocating 

violence and hate against Muslims. General Hlaing has publicly

demonstrated his support for those monks that align with the 

military junta, its violent crackdown, and its targeting of ethnoreligious communities such as the Rohingya. Conversely, many monks 

have been jailed for protesting the military junta and some have 

been disrobed. 

In opposition to the military junta, members of the National 

League for Democracy (NLD) and others have formed the National 

Unity Government (NUG). The NUG has attempted to unite the 

non-Tatmadaw-controlled areas of Burma and coordinate various 

armed ethnic groups to stand against the military junta. The NUG 

has pledged to undo decades of abuse and disenfranchisement 

of the Rohingya. Members of the NUG also have issued personal 

statements of apologies to the community. While the NUG has not 

yet committed to fully embracing an agenda of religious freedom 

and equality, it has declared its acceptance of the International 

Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction. As a possible way to protect 

minority ethnic and religious communities, the NUG has suggested

transitioning post-coup Burma into a federal system. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Actively support international efforts to 

hold the Tatmadaw, Burmese agencies, 

and officials accountable through the 

international legal system for atrocities 

against religious communities, including 

by intervening in the case of The Gambia 

v. Myanmar at the ICJ and using coordinated sanctions against Tatmadaw leaders 

for particularly severe violations of religious freedom; and

• Increase engagement with multilateral 

and regional partners—in particular the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN)—as well as domestic actors 

in Burma, including the NUG, to stem 

ongoing religious freedom violations and 

promote accountability.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Support initiatives that prioritize the pursuit of religious freedom in Burma, such 

as language in the Burma Act of 2021 

(H.R. 5497) and the National Defense 

Authorization Act (S. 1605), that require 

the imposition of targeted sanctions, and 

encourage accountability mechanisms 

in relation to the atrocities committed 

against the Rohingya. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Hearing: Ending Genocide—U.S. Government Genocide Determinations and Next Steps

• Hearing: Ending Genocide—Accountability for Perpetrators

• Podcast: Fourth Anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide

• Country Update: Burma—Religious Freedom since February 1, 2021 Coup
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 15

BURMA

Background

Burma’s population consists of Buddhists (87.9 percent), Christians (6.2 

percent), Muslims (4.3 percent), Animists (0.8 percent), and Hindus 

(0.5 percent). The 2008 constitution treats Buddhism as the de facto

state religion but also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and 

Animism. Despite the recognition, religious and ethnic minorities not 

belonging to the Buddhist faith have faced longstanding persecution. 

In 2015, Burma passed race and religion laws supported by Buddhist 

nationalists such as the Ma Ba Tha. These laws regulate religious 

conversion, marriage, and births and restrict the religious freedom of 

non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims. 

Since the coup on February 1, 2021, the economy and political 

order of the country have collapsed. On August 1, 2021, General 

Hlaing, in defiance of international calls for a return to democracy, 

declared himself prime minister until 2023. The Tatmadaw arrested and 

sentenced leaders of the civilian government and opposition forces, 

including Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint. Clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups, as well as the military’s crackdown 

on peaceful protests for democracy, resulted in at least 1,300 deaths 

and hundreds of arrests. By November 2021, the violence perpetrated 

by the Tatmadaw caused 223,000 Burmese to be internally displaced 

and placed three million in dire need of humanitarian aid. As violence 

escalated in December, thousands fled into neighboring countries. 

Rohingya and Other Refugees

Tatmadaw violence since the coup has pushed at least 200,000 people 

from different communities to be internally displaced or seek refuge in 

neighboring countries. An estimated 30,000 predominantly Christian 

Chin fled into neighboring India in December 2021, adding to the 1.1 

million refugees who have fled from Burma in the past five years. Also 

in December, both Indonesia and Malaysia refused a boat of over 100 

Rohingya refugees stranded at sea, but Indonesia ultimately changed 

course and took them in.

At the end of 2021, around one million registered refugees who 

fled violence in Rakhine State resided in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. 

In September, amid escalating violence in the camps, prominent 

Rohingya leader Mohib Ullah was assassinated in Cox’s Bazar. The 

Bangladeshi government has been relocating some of these refugees 

to an island, Bhasan Char. Among the first of those to be relocated 

have been Rohingya Christians. Some observers worry they could be 

exposed to significant environmental risks, especially given worsening 

climate change. In December, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur for Myanmar Tom Andrews noted with concern the Bangladeshi 

government’s decision to close down educational opportunities 

for Rohingya children. He also expressed concern for the 130,000 

Rohingya internally displaced within Burma held in internment camps.

The coup has rendered impossible the safe and voluntary return 

home of Rohingya refugees displaced in the region. Nevertheless, 

host countries to Rohingya refugees, as well as ASEAN, have not 

departed from rhetoric centered on ultimately repatriating refugees 

back to Burma. 

International Justice and the Influence of 

Social Media

In November 2019, The Gambia, on behalf of the Organization of 

Islamic Cooperation, initiated a case at the ICJ against Burma alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in its 2017 crackdown on 

the Rohingya. The ICC is also investigating the military’s actions in 

Rakhine, although the court’s jurisdiction is limited. The legal proceedings in these cases continued during 2021, even after the coup. In 

November, Argentina’s justice system announced it would investigate 

allegations of war crimes committed by the Tatmadaw through the 

principle of universal jurisdiction.

There has been increased discussion of the role of social media in 

escalating violence against religious minorities in Burma, particularly 

the Rohingya. In August, Facebook acknowledged that hundreds of 

military personnel had used its platform to create troll accounts to 

disseminate incendiary comments and posts, including calling Islam 

a threat to Buddhism. In December, Rohingya refugees in the United 

States filed a $150 billion class action suit against Facebook’s parent 

company, Meta, for allowing content that promoted violence against 

the Rohingya. Also in December, Meta banned Tatmadaw-owned 

firms from its platforms.

Key U.S. Policy

Throughout 2021, particularly in response to the February 1 military coup, the U.S. government has provided funding for Rohingya 

refugees in Bangladesh and others impacted by violence in Burma. 

The United States sanctioned several Burmese government officials, including high-ranking officials of the Tatmadaw. While these 

sanctions cited numerous human rights abuses, they have not cited 

religious freedom violations or targeted the oil and gas industry, which many argue could cripple the financial backbone of the 

military junta. U.S. officials met with representatives of ASEAN 

and regional countries to discuss peacefully resolving the military 

coup and transitioning the country back to democracy; they also 

worked multilaterally through the UN. After the reporting period 

on March 22, 2022, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced

the United States had determined that the atrocities committed by 

the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya constitute genocide and crimes 

against humanity. 

On November 15, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Burma as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the relevant presidential action the existing, ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 

126.1. The State Department has designated Burma as a CPC every 

year since 1999.

On December 27, President Biden signed into law the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. The NDAA 

included provisions relating to Burma, including calling for the U.S. 

government to support and legitimize the NUG and deny legitimacy 

and resources to the Tatmadaw. The law urges the return to democracy and accountability for atrocities and human rights violations 

committed by the Tatmadaw. 
16 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

CHINA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in China deteriorated. 

The government continued to vigorously implement its 

“sinicization of religion” policy and demand that religious groups 

and adherents support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule 

and ideology. In December, top CCP and government officials 

held the National Conference on Religious Work in Beijing, after 

which authorities and state-controlled religious organizations at 

all levels organized meetings to study and implement the CCP’s 

religious policies. Throughout 2021, the State Administration for 

Religious Affairs (SARA)—a government agency under direct 

control of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD)—

and other agencies issued new legal measures, imposing further 

restrictions on clergy, religious schools, and religious content on 

the internet. Although China recognizes Buddhism, Catholicism, 

Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism, adherents of groups with perceived foreign influence—such as underground Catholics, house 

church Protestants, Uyghurs and other Muslims, and Tibetan 

Buddhists—and those from other religious movements, such 

as Falun Gong and the Church of Almighty God, are especially 

vulnerable to persecution. 

During the year, Xinjiang authorities continued to detain

Uyghur and other Turkic Muslims arbitrarily in concentration camps, 

prisons, and forced labor camps for a variety of religiously related 

reasons. Former detainees and witnesses reported physical and 

psychological torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 

forced labor, and forced sterilization and abortion while in custody. 

Moreover, authorities separated as many as 880,000 Muslim children from their parents and destroyed or desecrated important 

religious and cultural sites throughout Xinjiang. In 2021, the U.S. 

government and the parliaments of Canada and several European 

countries, research organizations, and the United Kingdom (UK)-

based Uyghur Tribunal determined the atrocities in Xinjiang to be 

genocide and/or crimes against humanity. Furthermore, evidence 

suggests that Chinese authorities began to implement similar 

repressive policies against Hui Muslims—a group the government 

previously tolerated—throughout China. 

KEY FINDINGS

The Chinese government continued its pervasive control and 

suppression of Tibetan Buddhism. In May, it issued a white paper on 

Tibet that included an emphasis on sinicizing religion there. In July, 

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Tibet and stressed the 

importance of “fully implementing” the Party’s religious policies. 

Local authorities organized seminars to indoctrinate monks and 

nuns at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, restricted Tibetans’ access 

to temples with heavy security presence, destroyed sites and symbols of religious significance, and detained and punished Tibetans 

for listening to the Dalai Lama’s teachings or possessing his portrait. 

Despite the Vatican-China agreement on bishop appointments, authorities continued to harass and detain underground 

Catholic priests who refuse to join the state-controlled Catholic association, such as Bishop Joseph Zhang Weizhu of Xixiang, 

Hebei Province. They also intensified persecution of Protestants 

by harassing, detaining, arresting, and physically abusing leaders 

of Protestant house churches who refuse to join the state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement, such as Elder Zhang Chunlei 

of Ren’ai Reformed Church and Pastor Yang Hua of Living Stone 

Church in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province. Pastor Wang Yi of Early 

Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, remained 

imprisoned, serving a nine-year sentence amid reports of his deteriorating health. Moreover, authorities throughout China routinely 

raided churches, detained Christians, and confiscated religious 

materials. The government also continued to demolish church 

buildings and crosses—including the Sacred Heart Catholic Church

in Xinjiang—under its “sinicization of religion” campaign. 

The government continued its persecution of other religious 

movements, often using the “anti-cult” provisions under Article 300 

of China’s Criminal Law. Falun Gong source Minghui reported that 

in 2021, authorities harassed and arrested thousands of Falun Gong 

practitioners and sentenced 892 to prison terms. At least 101 practitioners died as a result of government persecution. The government 

escalated its persecution of the Church of Almighty God, reportedly 

arresting thousands of its members throughout China and torturing 

many for practicing their faith. Some reportedly died in custody. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

• Expand financial and visa sanctions to 

target Chinese officials and entities 

responsible for carrying out severe religious freedom violations, especially 

within the CCP’s UFWD, SARA, the public 

security and state security apparatus, and 

localities where particularly egregious violations occur; 

• Work with like-minded countries in 

international fora, including the United 

Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, to 

collectively hold the Chinese government accountable for severe religious 

freedom violations, including by creating a UN Commission of Inquiry to 

investigate and identify perpetrators 

of genocide and other atrocity crimes 

in Xinjiang and document other severe 

human rights abuses throughout China; 

and

• Enforce China-related human rights legislation to ensure that U.S. companies do 

not contribute to religious freedom violations in China. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Work with the administration to ensure 

that China-related human rights legislation, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor 

Prevention Act and Tibet Policy and Support Act, are fully enforced.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 17

CHINA

Background

China is officially an atheist state. Of China’s estimated 1.4 billion 

people, approximately 18 percent are Buddhist, including Tibetan 

Buddhists; five percent are Christian; and two percent are Muslim. 

Other significant religious traditions include Taoism, Falun Gong, and 

folk religion practices. 

The CCP, whose members are banned from believing in or practicing any faith, has long repressed religious freedom, and in recent 

years it has become increasingly hostile toward religion, implementing 

campaigns to “sinicize” Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity to 

rid them of alleged “foreign” influences. These policies require religious groups to support CCP rule and its political objectives, including 

by altering their religious teachings to conform to CCP ideology and 

policy. Both registered and unregistered religious groups and individuals who run afoul of the CCP face harassment, detention, arrest, 

imprisonment, and other abuses. 

National Religious Work Conference

At the National Conference on Religious Work, top CCP officials 

reiterated many of the same policy priorities from the 2016 conference, 

which was followed by severe religious freedom violations in subsequent years. General Secretary Xi emphasized “fully implementing” the 

Party’s theory and policies on religious affairs, including the “sinicization 

of religion” policy. He called for strengthening control and management 

of religion, requiring officials to adhere to Marxist views of religion, and 

demanding state-controlled religious groups to support the CCP’s rule 

and its religious policies. 

In addition to the top leadership, other central, provincial, and 

military officials—including officials from Xinjiang and the Xinjiang 

Production and Construction Corps—attended the conference virtually. Afterward, government authorities and state-controlled religious 

organizations at all levels organized separate meetings to study General Secretary Xi’s speech and to implement the policies. Minister of 

Public Security Zhao Kezhi convened one such meeting and emphasized that his agency must “effectively prevent and resolve major risks 

within the religious sphere [and] safeguard national security and unity, 

ethnic unity, and social stability.” Specifically, Minister Zhao called for 

a crackdown on “religious extremist thoughts and forces,” “illegal 

missionary activities,” “cults,” religious activities associated with the 

Dalai Lama, and “illegal religious activities on the internet.”

Accountability for International Crimes 

against Uyghurs

In December 2021, the UK-based and civil society-led Uyghur Tribunal 

judged that China has committed—beyond a reasonable doubt—

genocide and crimes against humanity under international law. The 

tribunal considered and reviewed extensive evidence presented by 

victims, witnesses, and experts, and it linked the repressive policies 

and abuses in Xinjiang to the highest echelon of Party and government leadership, including General Secretary Xi and former Xinjiang 

Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. The tribunal invited the 

Chinese government to take part in its proceedings but did not receive 

a response. The Uyghur Tribunal was formed in large part due to the 

lack of meaningful UN actions and inaccessibility to international 

courts. The International Criminal Court (ICC) stated in December 

2020 that it would not investigate abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang 

as China is not a party to the ICC. 

Key U.S. Policy

In January 2021, the administration of then President Donald J. Trump 

designated China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims 

in Xinjiang as genocide and crimes against humanity. In March, the 

administration of President Joseph R. Biden affirmed this determination. That same month, the United States, Canada, the UK, and the 

European Union imposed coordinated, targeted sanctions on two 

Chinese officials—Wang Junzheng and Chen Mingguo—for their 

involvement in serious human rights abuse in Xinjiang. In May, the 

U.S. Department of State announced visa sanctions against Chinese 

official Yu Hui for his involvement in the persecution of Falun Gong 

practitioners. In December, the U.S. government sanctioned Shohrat 

Zakir and Erken Tuniyaz, former and current chairman of Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region, respectively, for their involvement in 

serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang, as well as Chinese company 

SenseTime for developing facial recognition programs that targeted 

Uyghurs. That same month, the Biden administration implemented

a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics given the 

Chinese government’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity 

in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses. Also in December, the 

Biden administration appointed Under Secretary for Civilian Security, 

Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya to serve concurrently as the 

special coordinator for Tibetan issues. On November 15, the State 

Department redesignated China as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed 

as the relevant presidential action existing restrictions on exports to 

China of crime control or detection instruments or equipment.

In July, the U.S. government issued an updated Xinjiang Supply 

Chain Business Advisory, which warned businesses with supply chain 

and investment ties to Xinjiang of heightened legal risks due to serious 

human rights abuses in the region. In December, Congress passed 

the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act—legislation USCIRF had 

recommended Congress support—and President Biden signed it 

into law. The law creates a “rebuttable presumption” that all goods 

and products from Xinjiang are made with forced labor and bans their 

import, unless U.S. Customs and Border Protection certifies by “clear 

and convincing evidence” that forced labor was not involved. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Factsheet: China’s 2021 Measures on the Management of Religious Clergy

• Op-Ed: I Grew Up Witnessing Forced Labor. U.S. Companies Must Step Up. (New York Times)

• Podcast: China Sanctions U.S. Religious Freedom Officials

• Hearing: Ending Genocide—Accountability for Perpetrators

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Gulmira Imin, Jimmy Lai, The Panchen Lama, Hu Shigen, Adil Tuniyaz
18 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

ERITREA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea improved slightly, 

but overall, they remain poor. The government released approximately 130 religious prisoners from various prisons. Allegedly, some 

of these releases were made due to fears of COVID-19 spreading in 

prisons. Eritrean authorities continue to recognize only four religious 

groups as official: Sunni Islam, the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the 

Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea. 

The government deems unregistered religious groups to be 

illegal and punishes them for practicing their faiths publicly. The 

government regularly invokes Proclamation No. 73 to prosecute 

members of unregistered religious groups and intervene in the 

internal affairs of registered groups. This law was passed in 1995, 

shortly after Eritrea’s independence, to justify the persecution of 

political, civic, and religious dissidents. The law enables the government to intervene in and regulate political and religious activities as 

well as pursue those who disagree with the government’s position. 

President Isaias Afwerki and his government use this and other 

restrictive laws to torture, imprison, and even kill individuals who 

oppose the government. Based on Proclamation No. 73, authorities brought nine Catholic Church-run primary schools under the 

administration of the government and threatened to do the same 

to 19 other schools, including Muslim-run ones. 

KEY FINDINGS

All Eritreans above the age of 18 are required by law to 

participate in military service. Military conscription can extend 

indefinitely, and the government often restricts religious expression during that service. The government only exempts the 

physically disabled and pregnant women from mandatory military 

service. Individuals who refuse to participate are stripped of their 

citizenship and punished with long jail time. When Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to take part in the Eritrean War of Independence 

(1961-1991), the government imprisoned many of them and denied 

them citizenship. As of December 2021, there were 20 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses in jail, some of whom have been imprisoned for more 

than 20 years. 

At least a thousand individuals are believed to be imprisoned 

due to their religious activity or religious freedom advocacy. These 

prisoners include Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and 

USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Abune Antonios. Patriarch 

Antonios was illegally removed from his position in May 2007 and 

placed under house arrest. He passed away after 16 years of house 

arrest in February 2022. The government also continues to jail other 

religious leaders, including ones from the Full Gospel Church, the 

Orthodox Church, and the Salafi Muslim community. Some of these 

religious leaders have been in imprisonment since 2004.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

• Maintain the existing, ongoing arms 

embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) of 

the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

as the presidential action imposed as a consequence of CPC designation, to encourage 

religious freedom improvements;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Eritrean government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom 

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; 

• Call on the Eritrean government to end 

religious persecution of unregistered religious communities, grant full citizenship 

rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses, and release 

the remaining detainees held on account 

of their religious activities ; and 

• Encourage the Eritrean government to 

extend an official invitation for unrestricted 

visits by the United Nations (UN) Special 

Rapporteur on the situation of human 

rights in Eritrea, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the 

UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 

and the International Red Cross. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Highlight religious freedom issues in 

Eritrea through legislation, hearings and 

briefings, and a congressional delegation 

trip to Eritrea to engage with Eritrean 

officials to encourage them to advance 

human rights and religious freedom. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Eritrea 

• Issue Update: The Condition of Nonbelievers in Africa 

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Patriarch Abune Antonios
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 19

ERITREA

Background

The Democracy and Justice party (PFDJ), under the leadership of 

President Afwerki, has been leading Eritrea since its independence in 

1993. Although the constitution protects citizens’ rights to freedom of 

thought, belief, and conscience as well as individuals’ rights to practice 

the religion of their choice, the government regularly violates these 

rights in practice. As of July 2021, the U.S. government estimates the 

total population of Eritrea at a little over six million. The population is 

divided in half between Muslims (49 percent) and Christians (49 percent). The majority of the Muslim population lives in the northern region 

and Christians reside in the southern and central regions of the country. 

Eritrean Muslims are predominately Sunni, and the Christian community 

is mainly Orthodox. The other Christian communities consist of various 

denominations, including Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

and Pentecostals. The remaining two percent of the population are followers of different religions. These mainly include adherents of African 

traditional religions, Baha’is (approximately 200 individuals), and a tiny 

Jewish community. Those who practice African indigenous religions 

reside in the southwestern part of the country. 

Eritrean authorities signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and 

Friendship with neighboring Ethiopia in July 2018. The accord ended 

over two decades of war between the two countries. Following the 

peace treaty, President Afwerki delivered a much anticipated speech 

on Independence Day, saying “the beginning of a new era” had come 

to Eritrea. Historically, Eritrea justified its oppression of political and 

civil rights by citing the ongoing war with Ethiopia. Many observers 

anticipated that the President’s commitment would translate into 

advancements on human rights, including religious freedom. However, 

three years after the agreement, over a thousand political prisoners, 

including many imprisoned for exercising their freedom of religion or 

belief, remained behind bars.

The 2020 Ethiopian civil war has had a direct impact on religious 

freedom issues in Eritrea. Eritrean troops were spotted participating 

in the civil war alongside the Ethiopian national army, fighting against 

the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF accused Eritrea 

of committing gross human rights violations as the Ethiopian army 

engaged in an armed struggle in the Tigray region, including the 

destruction of the two oldest places of worship: the al-Nejashi Mosque 

in Negash and the Church of St. Mary in Mekelle. Eritrean troops also 

detained hundreds of Eritrean refugees—who had crossed the border 

into Ethiopia to flee torture, forced military services, and imprisonment—and forcibly returned them to Eritrea. Some of these refugees 

were living in the Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps since the war of 

independence. To retaliate against Eritrea, the TPLF has launched airstrikes into Eritrea, forcing thousands of Eritreans to flee to neighboring 

Sudan, Ethiopia, and beyond. 

Government Oppression of Unregistered 

Religious Groups 

The Eritrean government requires all religious groups to register 

with the Office of Religious Affairs. The government considers 

unregistered groups illegal and therefore bans them from practicing 

their faith in public. The most prominent of these groups include Shi’a 

Muslims, Salafi Muslims, Protestants (Pentecostals and Seventh-day 

Adventists), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Baha’is, and adherents of 

African indigenous religions. The government consistently deprives 

the practitioners of these religions of their civil and human rights by 

harassing and arresting them. The government particularly perceives 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and Salafi Muslims as political forces and severely 

restricts their activities and punishes them with long prison sentences 

for practicing their faith. Similarly, Eritreans professing atheism or 

casting doubt on any religion or deity run the risk of arrest and social 

ostracization. Nontheists are often forced to associate online on 

platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp groups because in-person 

association carries the risk of arrest. 

Positive Developments

Eritrean authorities continued to take some steps that enhanced 

religious freedom. Similar to its actions in 2020, in 2021 authorities in 

Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, set free approximately 130 prisoners of 

conscience from various religions and denominations. Most of those 

released were women, and some were released conditionally. In February 2021, the Eritrean government released on bail 70 prisoners of 

conscience from different prisons. The government followed with the 

release of 21 prisoners in March and 36 prisoners in April 2021, many 

of them Christians. In August 2021, the Eritrean embassy in Washington, D.C. engaged with USCIRF on issues of freedom of religion or 

belief for the first time. USCIRF acknowledged the Eritrean authorities’ 

release of more than 350 prisoners and encouraged them to release 

the remaining religious prisoners as well as remove legal barriers to 

promote religious freedom.

Key U.S. Policy

Due to disagreements on critical issues, the United States and Eritrea 

have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010. In recent years, however, diplomatic engagement has increased. In May 2021, newly 

appointed U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador 

Jeffrey Feltman, and Deputy Ambassador Payton Knopf traveled to 

Eritrea during a regional visit focused on the crisis in Ethiopia and 

pressed the Eritrean government to withdraw its troops from the 

Tigray region where they reportedly had been committing grave 

human rights violations, including religious freedom abuses. Finally, 

the U.S. Embassy in Asmara continues to highlight the importance 

of advancing human rights issues by releasing all human rights and 

religious activists who are still imprisoned as well as allowing the 

registration of political and religious organizations. 

Since 2004, the U.S. Department of State has designated Eritrea 

as a CPC for systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious 

freedom. Most recently, on November 15, the State Department 

redesignated Eritrea as a CPC under IRFA and maintained an arms 

embargo on the country under 22 CFR 126.1 of the International Traffic 

in Arms Regulations. 
20 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

INDIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in India significantly worsened. During the year, the Indian government escalated its 

promotion and enforcement of policies—including those promoting a Hindu-nationalist agenda—that negatively affect Muslims, 

Christians, Sikhs, Dalits, and other religious minorities. The government continued to systemize its ideological vision of a Hindu 

state at both the national and state levels through the use of both 

existing and new laws and structural changes hostile to the country’s religious minorities. 

In 2021, the Indian government repressed critical voices—

especially religious minorities and those reporting on and 

advocating for them—through harassment, investigation, detention, and prosecution under laws such as the Unlawful Activities 

Prevention Act (UAPA) and the Sedition Law. The UAPA and Sedition Law have been invoked to create an increasing climate of 

intimidation and fear in an effort to silence anyone speaking out

against the government. Father Stan Swamy, an 84-year-old Jesuit 

priest and longtime human rights defender of Adivasis, Dalits, 

and other marginalized communities, was arrested on dubious 

UAPA charges in October 2020 and never tried. He died in custody 

in July 2021 despite repeated concerns raised about his health. 

The government arrested, filed complaints against, and launched 

criminal investigations into journalists and human rights advocates 

documenting religious persecution and violence, including Khurram Parvez, a prominent Muslim human rights advocate who has 

reported on abuses in Jammu and Kashmir. The government also 

broadly targeted individuals documenting or sharing information 

about violence against Muslims, Christians, and other religious 

minorities; as one example, UAPA complaints were filed against 

individuals for tweeting about attacks on mosques in Tripura. In 

September, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human 

Rights stated that the “[o]ngoing use of the [UAPA] throughout India 

is worrying, with [the Muslim-majority state of] Jammu and Kashmir 

having among the highest number of cases in the country.”

The government erected hurdles against the licensure and 

receipt of international funding by religious and charitable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under the Foreign Contribution 

KEY FINDINGS

(Regulation) Act (FCRA), significantly impacting religious communities. Numerous groups that document religious freedom violations 

or aid marginalized religious communities have been forced to shut 

down operations in the country given the restrictions under FCRA

that regulate access to and reporting on foreign funds and prohibit 

their receipt for any activities purportedly “detrimental to the 

national interest.” At the close of 2021, the licenses of nearly 6,000 

organizations, including religious and humanitarian organizations 

such as Missionaries of Charity and Oxfam India, were not renewed 

under the FCRA (after an outcry, Missionaries of Charity’s license 

was renewed in January 2022).

Government action, including the continued enforcement 

of anti-conversion laws against non-Hindus, has created a culture 

of impunity for nationwide campaigns of threats and violence by 

mobs and vigilante groups, including against Muslims and Christians accused of conversion activities. Anti-conversion laws have 

increasingly focused on interfaith relationships. Existing laws 

in approximately one-third of India’s 28 states limit or prohibit 

religious conversion. Since 2018 (and continuing in 2021), multiple states have introduced and enacted laws or revised existing 

anti-conversion laws to target and/or criminalize interfaith marriages. Public notice requirements for interfaith marriages have 

at times facilitated violent reprisals against couples. Authorities 

also assisted, if not encouraged, the targeting by nonstate actors 

of interfaith couples, converts, their families, and their religious 

communities in an effort to prevent interfaith marriages. 

National, state, and local governments demonized and 

attacked the conversion of Hindus to Christianity or Islam. In October 2021, Karnataka’s government ordered a survey of churches and 

priests in the state and authorized police to conduct a door-to-door 

inspection to find Hindus who have converted to Christianity. In 

June 2021, Yogi Adityanath, chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, warned

that he would invoke the National Security Act, which allows for 

the detention of anyone acting in any manner that threatens the 

security of state, and that he would also deploy a team of over 500 

officials to counter those (including, by his account, children) who 

were carrying out conversion activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Designate India as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom 

, as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for severe 

violations of religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ or entities’ assets 

and/or barring their entry into the United 

States; and

• Advance human rights of all religious communities in India and promote religious 

freedom, dignity, and interfaith dialogue 

through bilateral and multilateral forums 

and agreements, such as the ministerial 

of the Quadrilateral.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Raise religious freedom issues in the 

U.S.-India bilateral relationship and 

highlight concerns through hearings, 

briefings, letters, and congressional 

delegations.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 21

INDIA

Background

India is the world’s most populous democracy, with an estimated 

population exceeding 1.3 billion, 79.8 percent of whom are Hindu, 14.2 

percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, and 1.7 percent Sikh. Smaller 

religious groups include Buddhists, Jains, Baha’is, Jews, Zoroastrians 

(Parsis), and nonreligious persons. India’s constitution establishes 

the nation as secular and a democratic republic, and Article 25 of the 

constitution grants all individuals freedom of conscience, including 

the right to practice, profess, and propagate religion. 

The Indian government has been led since 2014 by the Bharatiya 

Janata Party (BJP). The BJP-led government, leaders at the national, 

state, and local levels, and increasingly emboldened Hindu-nationalist 

groups have advocated, instituted, and enforced sectarian policies 

seeking to establish India as an overtly Hindu state, contrary to India’s 

secular foundation and at grave danger to India’s religious minorities.

The Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) and 

National Register of Citizens (NRC) 

The religiously discriminatory Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA)—a 

fast track to citizenship for non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, 

Bangladesh, and Pakistan who are residing in India—passed in December 2019 and came into force in January 2020. In conjunction with a 

proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) requiring all residents to 

provide documentation of citizenship, the CAA could subject Muslims, 

in particular, to “statelessness, deportation or prolonged detention.”

In an ongoing state-level NRC effort in Assam, in 2019 approximately 1.9 million persons were omitted from Assam’s NRC list; 

approximately 700,000 Muslim residents of Assam are at risk of being 

stripped of citizenship. It is unclear how those excluded can be reinstated. This process has left families in fear, in turmoil, and deeply 

harmed, as documented in a 2021 report. In May, the government 

of Assam asked for reverification of the Assam NRC list of citizens 

in some districts, threatening to exclude more Muslims. The NRC 

process in Assam has further aggravated communal tensions, and 

in September, escalating tensions led to government security forces 

violently evicting thousands of primarily Muslim villagers, resulting in 

the brutal deaths of at least two. 

Attacks on Religious Communities 

In 2021, numerous attacks were made on religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, and their neighborhoods, businesses, 

homes, and houses of worship. Many of these incidents were violent, 

unprovoked, and/or encouraged or incited by government officials. 

Both officials and nonstate actors have used social media platforms 

and other forms of communication to intimidate and spread hatred 

and disinformation against religious minority communities. The quick 

spread of misinformation online has contributed to violent attacks. In 

October, mobs attacked mosques and torched properties of Muslim 

residents in Tripura, which borders Bangladesh. USCIRF received 

documented reports of at least 50 incidents between June and 

October 2021 targeting the Christian community in the state of Uttar 

Pradesh alone. 

Violent attacks have been perpetrated across the country 

under the guise of protecting cows in line with India’s constitution 

and laws in 20 states (and growing) criminalizing cow slaughter in 

various forms. Vigilante mobs, often organized over social media, 

have attacked religious minorities—including Muslims, Christians, 

and Dalits—under suspicion of eating beef, slaughtering cows, or 

transporting cattle for slaughter. Most such violent incidents are 

reported in states where cattle slaughter is banned. For example, 

in June 2021, three Muslim men were lynched on suspicion of cow 

smuggling in Tripura, and a vigilante mob beat two men they accused 

of smuggling cattle, resulting in one’s death and hospitalization of 

the other in Madhya Pradesh.

Other Developments 

Throughout the pandemic, patients reported different treatment by 

religion and by caste in hospitals, hindering their access to healthcare. In a survey conducted by Oxfam India during the alarming 

surge in COVID cases within India in 2021, 33 percent of Muslims said 

that they experienced religious discrimination in hospitals. Dalit and 

Adivasi survey respondents also reported discrimination in hospitals 

at significant rates. 

In 2021, mass protests continued against farm laws enacted in 

September 2020. Despite the widespread and diverse nature of the 

protests, efforts—including by government officials—were still made 

to discredit the protesters, especially Sikh protesters, as terrorists and 

religiously motivated separatists. The government repealed the farm 

laws in November 2021.

Key U.S. Policy

With shared interests in global security and economic trade, in 2021 

the United States and India continued to maintain strong relations 

through various bilateral and multilateral engagements. In January, 

the United States welcomed India joining the UN Security Council 

for a two-year term and supports a reformed council that includes 

India as a permanent member. In July, Secretary of State Antony J. 

Blinken traveled to India to meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi 

and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar to discuss a wide range 

of issues, including continued cooperation on COVID-19 response 

efforts, Indo-Pacific engagement, shared regional security interests, 

shared democratic values, and the climate crisis. In September, Prime 

Minster Modi attended the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, hosted 

by President Joseph R. Biden, to discuss China’s growing global influence. Also in September, Atul Keshap, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in 

India, met with Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of Rastriya Swayamsevak 

Sangh (RSS). In December, Prime Minister Modi participated in the 

Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Death of Jesuit Priest Imprisoned in India

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Democracy and Religious Freedom

• Podcast: Religion, Law, and Citizenship in Assam, India
22 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

IRAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Iran remained poor. In 

February, then President Hassan Rouhani signed amendments 

to articles 499 and 500 of Iran’s penal code imposing prison time 

on those guilty of “insulting Islam” and conducting “deviant activity” that “contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islam.” In 

June, three Christians were arrested, charged, and sentenced to 

five years in prison each on the basis of these amendments. Iran 

also continued using charges of “corruption on Earth,” “enmity 

against God,” and national security-related charges to persecute 

religious minorities. In April, the Arak Criminal Court sentenced two 

men to death for “insulting the Prophet,” and upheld the sentence 

on appeal in August. Iran’s government also continued to arrest, 

charge, sentence, and jail scores of Christians on charges including 

“propaganda against the regime.” Christian converts from Islam 

faced particular targeting for persecution. Despite the prevalence 

of COVID-19 in Iran’s prisons, scores of religious minorities, including Christians, Baha’is, and Sunnis, were called to begin prison 

sentences. Iran also continued to spread antisemitism. It released

the results of its third Holocaust denial cartoon contest in January. 

Several submissions critical of Israel contained explicitly antisemitic 

tropes. In December, a state media outlet criticized a Shab-e Yalda 

display reminiscent of a Jewish Sukkah as a “distortion.” Smaller 

religious communities, including nontheists, also faced severe 

persecution. While Iran’s government considers followers of the 

Yarsan faith to be Shi’a Muslims who practice Sufism, members 

identify as a distinct and separate religion and are estimated to 

number up to two million. The Yarsani community’s January bid to 

KEY FINDINGS

gain recognition under Iran’s constitution failed, and Iran’s National 

Defense University published an article in Spring 2021 calling the 

community a “security threat.” 

Iran continues to detain those calling for greater religious 

freedom, including USCIRF Religious Prisoners of Conscience 

Golrokh Iraee and Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani. On April 12, 2021, 

Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Iraee in 

abstentia to an additional year in prison, a two-year travel ban, 

and a two-year ban on participating in political organizations. 

Authorities arrested Iraee in 2016 for “insulting Islamic sanctities” after discovering an unpublished short story in her home 

criticizing the religiously-grounded practice of stoning adulterous 

women to death.

Iran continues to harass and imprison women who protest 

religious headscarf laws. In July, officials in Mashhad arrested five 

people for not observing “Shari’a criteria” after women modeled 

at a fabric store’s opening event without headscarves. Iran also 

continued detaining lawyer Nasrin Soutudeh despite serious health 

problems requiring multiple prison furloughs to receive medical 

treatment throughout the year. The Iranian government also targets 

and fails to protect members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and intersex (LGBTI) community. Iran actively executes people 

who engage in same-sex relations, citing religious grounds. The 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) arrested a lesbian woman 

in November on charges including “supporting homosexuality.” In 

May, authorities failed to fully prosecute the honor killing of a 20 

year-old gay nonbinary person.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Iranian 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;

• Raise religious freedom and other human 

rights abuses in bilateral and multilateral 

negotiations with Iran’s government on 

issues of regional and international security;

• Work with members of the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance as 

well as others throughout the international 

community to exert multilateral pressure 

on Iran to improve religious freedom conditions; and

• Press for the release of all religious prisoners of conscience, including Youcef 

Nadarkhani and Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Reauthorize and exercise oversight to 

ensure implementation of the Lautenberg 

Amendment, which aids persecuted Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee 

status in the United States, and extend this 

Amendment to religious minorities in Iran 

who are citizens of Afghanistan.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Iran

• Hearing: State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran

• Podcast: Religious Restrictions in Iran
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 23

IRAN

Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a theocratic, authoritarian government 

that allows only restricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent 

of the population are Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 

5–10 percent. Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, 

including the Baha’i faith, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. 

While the Jaafari school of Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends full respect to the five major Sunni schools. The 

constitution also recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as 

protected minorities. Five of the Parliament’s 290 seats are reserved 

for religious minorities—two for Armenian Christians and one each 

for Assyrian/Chaldean Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. There are 

two Hindu temples, and Buddhism has historic influences in Iran, but 

current data on the populations of both communities are sparse. Iran 

is home to several other smaller persecuted religious groups, including 

Mandeans, Yarsanis, nonbelievers, and spiritual movements. 

Religious Minorities

Throughout 2021, the government arrested scores of Baha’is across 

Iran. Many detained Baha’is were held incommunicado or taken to 

undisclosed locations. Ministry of Intelligence agents also searched 

the home of a Baha’i citizen and confiscated her belongings. Iranian 

universities continued to deny education to Baha’is on account of their 

faith. In November, Places Administration agents in Qaemshahr closed

six Baha’i businesses. In August, officials from the Natural Resources 

Department of Mazandaran Province demolished the homes of three 

Baha’is without warning. In December, the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) announced the auction of thirteen Baha’i farms in 

Kata. The government of Iran also continued to deny Baha’is the right 

to bury their deceased in empty plots at the Golestan Javid cemetery 

outside Tehran which the community has used for decades. Instead, 

Baha’is are being forced to use the Khaveran mass grave site where 

victims of the 1988 prison massacres are buried.

Iran also continued to target Christians, especially Christian 

converts. In January, Christian converts Sam and Mariam Khosravi 

lost an appeal against a sentence for charges of “propaganda against 

the state,” months after a judge forced them to give up custody of 

their daughter on the basis of their religious beliefs. In February, the 

prosecutor’s office in Sarbaz summoned Christian convert Ibrahim 

Firouzi after he published six online videos regarding his mistreatment. After being jailed in Zahedan prison for “insulting the sacred,” 

Firouzi undertook a hunger strike until receiving assurances he would 

be freed. Iranian authorities released him on bail in late February but 

charges against him remain in place. In April 2021, Christian convert 

Hamid Ashouri was sentenced to ten months in prison on charges 

of “propaganda against the state,” which he began serving at Karaj 

Central Prison in July. 

Iran continued detaining USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, who led a 400-member house 

church and was arrested in 2018 on charges of “acting against 

national security” and “promoting Zionist Christianity.” In February 

2021, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 

declared Nadarkhani’s detention a violation of international law. In 

November, Iran’s Supreme Court ruled that nine Christian converts 

serving prison sentences for involvement in house churches did not 

“act against national security,” a decision that may positively affect 

similar cases. The converts were released in December pending 

review of their sentences.

Sunni Muslims in Iran, particularly religious leaders, faced 

persecution and sentences on spurious charges. Authorities demolished the foundations of a Sunni mosque in Iranshahr in January, 

and demolished another in Zahedan in December. In March, the 

Urmia Special Clerical Court sentenced cleric Rasul Hamzepour to 

three years in prison for “propaganda against the state.” In June, the 

Special Court for the Clergy summoned a Sunni cleric, Fazul al-Rahman Kuhi, during his furlough from Vakilabad prison. In December, 

intelligence officials in Azadshahr arrested Sunni cleric Nemotallah 

Mashouf after he refused to lead Friday prayers following the removal 

of the previous cleric. 

Gonbadi Sufis in Iran also faced ongoing persecution in 2021. 

Journalist Kasra Nouri remains in prison on a six-year term at Adelabad Prison. After being denied medical care at Evin Prison, Sufi 

prisoner Benham Mahjoubi fell into a coma in February and died 

soon thereafter. Also in February, Branch 28 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Abbas Deghan to prison time following 

his participation in 2018 protests against the Gonbadi Sufi leader’s 

house arrest. Iran executed a Sufi man, Hossein Mohammadi, in 

July. In August, Sufi cleric Hafiz Sedigh was arrested in Zabol. In 

November, Azad University denied Gonbadi Sufi Mostafa Daneshjoo 

admission despite a court order. During demonstrations in Isfahan 

over water scarcity in November, Persian social media websites likely 

funded by Iran’s government blamed the protests on the Gonbadi 

Sufi community.

Key U.S. Policy

The Joseph R. Biden administration began negotiations with Iran’s 

government in November 2021 over nuclear issues. At a United 

Nations (UN) speech in September, President Biden confirmed the 

administration’s intention to seek a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

In April 2021, a bipartisan group of senators led by Ronald L. 

Wyden (D-OR) introduced S.Res. 183, condemning Iran’s treatment of 

Baha’is and citing USCIRF’s 2021 Annual Report. Representative Theodore E. Deutsch (D-FL) introduced a companion bill in the House, 

H.Res. 744 in October. That same month, members of Congress 

sent a bipartisan letter to the White House urging steps to promote 

greater internet freedom in Iran, which is often particularly critical 

for religious minority communities. In December, Senator Patrick J. 

Toomey (R-PA) and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) introduced 

a bill to impose mandatory sanctions on Iranian officials targeting 

dissidents inside and outside Iran, including dissidents actively supporting religious freedom.

On November 15, the U.S. Department of State designated Iran a 

CPC under IRFA and imposed as the relevant presidential action sanctions on Iranian officials who targeted peaceful protesters. Following 

Iran’s attempted kidnapping of an American-Iranian in New York who 

opposes religious headscarf laws, the State Department sanctioned 

on Iranian officials who target dissidents abroad.
24 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

NIGERIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained poor as 

both state and nonstate actors continued to commit widespread 

and egregious religious freedom violations. Despite Nigeria’s 

constitution protecting religious freedom, Nigerian citizens faced 

blasphemy charges and convictions, violence, and attacks during 

religious ceremonies.

State authorities in the north of the country, particularly in Kano 

State, charged and convicted several individuals for blasphemy in 

2021. In June 2021, the Department of State Security (DSS) arrested 

Ahmad Abdul for allegedly insulting Allah in a song he released 

that was not vetted by the Kano Censorship Board. The chair of the 

board had recently announced a new policy that required poets 

and singers to submit their material to the board for approval. In 

July, authorities arrested Sheikh Abduljabara Kabara and charged 

him with blasphemy and incitement, claiming his sermons were 

“mortifying [to] the companions and the Holy Prophet Muhammad.” 

The arrest followed a debate organized by the government in which 

Kabara argued precepts of Islam with state-backed clerics. Also in 

July, authorities charged prominent humanist leader Mubarak Bala 

with causing a public disturbance by posting blasphemous content 

on social media. Authorities had detained Bala without charge for 15 

months prior to announcing the official charges. Moreover, a mob in 

Kano State killed a reverend in retaliation for his alleged involvement 

in converting a local member of a Muslim family to Christianity.

In a positive development, in January the Kano State High 

Court overturned the blasphemy conviction and death sentence 

of 16-year-old Omar Farouq, citing irregularities. The same court, 

citing the same irregularities, ordered that the blasphemy case 

against Muslim gospel musician Yahaya Sharif-Aminu be retried, 

but he remains in detention. In July, a court acquitted Ibrahim 

el-Zakzaky of all charges related to his activities leading the Shi’a 

Muslim group the Islamic Movement of Nigeria.

A diverse array of nonstate actors in Nigeria also continued 

to conduct attacks on houses of worship, religious leaders, and 

religious congregations in 2021. Activity by criminal and armed 

groups throughout the year accounted for six attacks on houses 

of worship, including at least five attacks against mosques in Katsina, Niger, and Zamfara states and six attacks against churches in 

Kaduna State. In November, churches in Zamfara State received 

threatening messages from local armed groups demanding that 

they close or risk ferocious attacks. At least 13 religious leaders 

were kidnapped for ransom over the course of the year, including 

eight priests, two pastors, and two imams. Although government 

efforts to hold perpetrators accountable appear to have increased 

compared with previous years, the Nigerian government has often 

failed to respond sufficiently to violence against religious leaders 

and congregations.

While Boko Haram’s top general, Abubakar Shekau, died this 

year, militant Islamist groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State 

in West Africa Province (ISWAP) continued to control territory, 

conduct attacks based on belief, and enforce their interpretations

of religious law and practice in communities under their control.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious 

freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), and 

redesignate Boko Haram and ISWAP as 

“entities of particular concern,” or EPCs, 

for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, 

as defined by IRFA;

• Fund programs to:

• Support interfaith civil society action on 

decriminalizing blasphemy and promoting religious freedom in Nigeria; 

• Increase access to justice for victims of 

attacks on religious leaders and congregations, including supporting judicial and 

security sector reform where appropriate 

and considering options for utilizing the 

recent $2.1 billion (USD) assistance package announced in November 2021; and

• Direct U.S. Embassy officials to urge the 

Nigerian government develop and implement a plan to decriminalize blasphemy 

across the country and, in the interim, 

make blasphemy a bailable offense and 

protect the safety of individuals accused 

of blasphemy

The U.S. Congress should:

• Request a briefing from the U.S. Department of State to explain how it is 

implementing U.S. policy on Nigeria to 

promote religious freedom and report on 

the effectiveness of such efforts.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria

• Issue Update: Religious Freedom Violations in Kano State, Nigeria

• Hearing: Religious Freedom in Nigeria
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 25

NIGERIA

Background

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 219 

million people. Of its population, an estimated 53.5 percent identify as 

Muslim; 45.9 percent as Christian; and 0.6 percent with other religious 

beliefs, including atheism, African traditional religions, the Baha’i faith, 

Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism. Religious traditions, practices, 

and communities play a strong role in social life across Nigeria, with 

religious institutions providing health and educational services and 

opportunities for community and civic engagement.

Nigeria’s constitution protects freedom of religion or belief and 

prohibits the state from establishing a state religion and from discriminating on the basis of religion. The Nigerian Criminal Code includes a 

penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment for insulting a person’s religion. 

Additionally, 12 northern states use criminal and family codes based in 

Islamic Shari’a alongside civil and customary laws; these codes prohibit 

blasphemy and other offenses based on a particular state interpretation 

of Islamic law. 

Other Religious Restrictions in Kano State

In addition to the blasphemy cases discussed above, in February 

2021, the Kano government sent heavily armed personnel from the 

DSS to prevent a local Muslim community from protesting the closure 

of their mosque and prohibited the community from carrying out its 

annual Mauqibi religious festival. This action followed Kano authorities banning Sheikh Abduljabar Nasiru Kabara from preaching in the 

state and ordering the closure of his mosque and schools in February, 

accusing him of inciteful rhetoric and sermons. 

In July 2021, Kano’s Hisbah Board, which oversees a religious 

police force, arrested and charged five men suspected of engaging 

in homosexual activity. Individuals convicted of sodomy under Kano’s 

Shari’a Criminal Code may be sentenced to caning of 100 lashes and 

one year in prison if unmarried or with stoning to death (rajm) if married or previously married. 

Attacks on Religious Leaders and Congregations

Throughout the year, religious leaders and congregations faced both 

state and nonstate violence based on their beliefs or their religious 

identity. State officials reportedly used violence against Shi’a Muslims during a procession marking the religious holiday of Arbaeen 

in September. During Ramadan, bomb blasts near a mosque killed 

at least 27 worshipers in Mubi, while armed assailants kidnapped 

11 worshipers from a mosque in Katsina State. In May, armed actors 

burned down a church during an attack in Kaduna State that killed 

eight people. In July, armed actors reportedly burned four churches 

in attacks against communities in Kaduna. In September, a violent 

mob in Kano State attacked and killed a local reverend in retaliation 

for his alleged involvement in converting a member of a Muslim family to Christianity. In October, two worshipers were killed in Kaduna 

State in an attack on a church during morning prayers. In November, 

churches in Zamfara State received threatening messages from local 

armed actors demanding that they close or risk ferocious attacks. 

Attacks on mosques killed 18 worshipers in Niger State in October, 

five worshipers in Zamfara State in November, and 16 worshipers in 

Niger State in December. 

Meanwhile, criminal gangs substantially increased their kidnap-for-ransom activities and did not spare religious institutions. 

Attacks and abductions targeting religious institutions, regardless of 

their motives, infringe on Nigerians’ freedom to worship safely and 

impinge on their rights of religious practice. Across the country, at 

least 13 religious leaders were kidnapped for ransom in 2021. While 

most abducted religious leaders have been released, some have died 

during these abductions, including a pastor in Akoko Ondo, a priest 

and an imam in Katsina, and an imam in Ogun. Kidnappers also targeted two religious schools, abducting hundreds of school children 

from Salihu Tanko Islamic School and Bethel Baptist High School. 

Key Developments Regarding EPCs

Since 2002, militant Islamist group Boko Haram has operated out of 

northeastern Nigeria and conducted attacks on the basis of religion 

and belief throughout the Lake Chad Basin region. In June 2021, 

Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was reportedly killed. More 

than 6,000 Boko Haram fighters then surrendered to the Nigerian 

military and disarmed.

Despite the loss of its top general, Boko Haram reportedly 

expanded its reach in northcentral Nigeria in 2021. In areas they have 

infiltrated, Boko Haram elements have reportedly directed residents to 

remove their children from formal schools and ordered both Muslim and 

Christian parents to marry off their daughters at the age of 12 or “face 

consequences.” Additionally, ISWAP continued to conduct violence in 

pursuit of its goals to enforce a particular interpretation of Islam, including 

continuing to hold Leah Sharibu hostage for refusing to convert to Islam.

Key U.S. Policy

Throughout the year, U.S. officials raised religious freedom issues, 

including societal abuses and discrimination against individuals based 

on religion in the context of growing insecurity throughout the country, in meetings with key Nigerian government officials. U.S. officials 

in the country also frequently engaged faith leaders and stakeholders 

in interfaith dialogue and broader peacebuilding work, including in 

Kaduna and Plateau states where religious violence has historically 

been particularly high.

In 2021, the U.S. government paused some military sales to Nigeria 

in response to alleged human rights violations in the country. While in July 

Nigeria received six of the 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack airplanes 

it bought from the U.S. in 2017, Congress halted a nearly $1 billion USD 

arms sale that same month after allegations emerged of human rights 

abuses by the Nigerian military in its campaign to neutralize terrorists 

in its territory.

On November 15, the State Department removed Nigeria from its 

list of governments that engaged in and tolerated particularly severe 

religious freedom violations, despite the country being designated as 

a CPC the previous year based on conditions similar to those in 2021. 

Also in November, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced 

a $2.1 billion development assistance package during a visit to Abuja. 
26 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

NORTH KOREA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in North Korea remained 

among the worst in the world. North Korea’s ruling ideology, 

known as Juche, forbids competing ideologies—including religious 

ones—and treats religion as an existential threat. Rooted in Juche, 

the Ten Principles for Establishing a Monolithic Leadership System 

require absolute and unconditional loyalty and obedience to the 

teachings of the North Korean leader. The Ten Principles effectively 

override the rights and freedoms enshrined in international law and 

the North Korean constitution, which nominally grants religious freedom. The ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) actively enforces the 

Ten Principles at all levels of government and across society, monitors 

and controls religious belief and activities, and systematically denies 

North Korean citizens the right to religious freedom. 

North Korea’s songbun system classifies citizens based on 

their perceived loyalty to the state. Religious practitioners belong 

to the “hostile” class and are considered enemies of the state, 

deserving “discrimination, punishment, isolation, and even execution.” The government attempts to provide an illusion of religious 

freedom to the outside world through state-backed religious organizations and sites such as the Jangchung Cathedral. In reality, 

religious freedom remains nonexistent in North Korea as authorities 

actively and systematically target and persecute religious groups 

and adherents, including Christians, shamanic adherents, Buddhists, and Chondoists. 

According to Korea Future’s 2021 report on religious freedom 

violations in North Korea, authorities persecuted religious adherents 

for their religious practice, religious activities in China, possession 

of religious items, contact with religious persons, and sharing of 

religious beliefs. Religious adherents suffered a range of official violations and mistreatments, including arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 

torture, sexual violence, forced labor, and execution. Under WPK 

command, myriad central and local party and government organizations are directly involved in carrying out these egregious abuses. 

KEY FINDINGS

Protestant Christians remain especially vulnerable to persecution. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Open Doors has 

long ranked North Korea as the country where Christians face the 

“most extreme” persecution. Most North Korean Christians are 

unable to meet for collective worship due to pervasive surveillance 

and severe repression. Owning religious materials such as Bibles is 

considered extremely risky and life threatening, if discovered. Christians who are caught practicing their faith face harsh abuses such as 

long-term imprisonment in various prisons or prison-like facilities, 

torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and summary execution. 

Korea Future characterizes the state’s persecution of Christians as 

“systematic” in nature and “purposely directed at the destruction 

of Christian communities.” The United Kingdom’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea concluded in its 2021 report that 

the atrocities against Christians in the country could amount to 

genocide. Based on credible evidence, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is believed to be principally responsible for persecution 

against Christians. In addition, the Border Security Command works 

closely with the MSS and Chinese authorities to detain, identify, 

and repatriate North Korean Christians who are caught possessing 

Bibles or engaging in religious activities in China. 

The practice of shamanism—which authorities define as a 

crime of “superstition”—is pervasive in North Korean society. 

Persecution of shamanic adherents has escalated in recent years 

after the WPK issued directives to “eradicate superstitious activities.” Some shamanic adherents reportedly received sentences of 

life in prison or death. The Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) is 

believed to be primarily responsible for abuses against shamanic 

adherents, though more recent reporting suggests that the MSS 

is becoming more involved in their persecution. Information on 

the condition of adherents of other major religious traditions—

such as Buddhism, Catholicism, and Chondoism—in North Korea 

remains very limited. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate North Korea as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Integrate security and human rights as 

complementary objectives in broader U.S. 

policy toward—and in bilateral negotiations with—North Korea;

• Fill and maintain the position of Special 

Envoy for North Korean Human Rights 

Issues at the U.S. Department of State to 

promote and integrate religious freedom 

and human rights in U.S. policy toward 

North Korea, including by coordinating 

multilateral efforts in international fora, 

such as in the United Nations, and with 

the European Union and other like-minded 

countries; and 

• Impose targeted and broad sanctions—

including coordinated, multilateral 

sanctions with international partners—as 

appropriate for religious freedom violations in North Korea, and consider lifting 

certain sanctions in return for concrete 

progress in religious freedom and related 

human rights. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Reauthorize the North Korean Human 

Rights Act and urge the Biden administration to appoint the Special Envoy for 

North Korean Human Rights Issues. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Special Report: Organized Persecution: Documenting Religious Freedom Violations in North Korea

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Religious Freedom Violations in North Korea
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 27

NORTH KOREA

Background

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated. North 

Koreans traditionally followed Buddhism and an indigenous syncretic 

religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion of the Heavenly 

Way). The country had a sizeable Christian community before the 

Korean War (1950–1953), with Pyongyang known as the “Jerusalem 

of the East,” but successive crackdowns have shrunk the Christian 

population to an estimated 2 percent of the total population. Shamanism and traditional folk religion practices, such as fortunetelling, 

are widespread.

North Korean Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees from North Korea are primary sources of 

information about religious freedom conditions in the country. In 

recent years, however, the number of North Koreans arriving in South 

Korea has decreased significantly due to tightened security along 

borders between China and North Korea as well as between China 

and Southeast Asian countries. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted 

in a further decrease. In 2021, the Chinese government reportedly 

detained at least 1,170 North Korean refugees in China due to 

pandemic-related border closures, but it began to repatriate them to 

North Korea after the China-North Korea border reopened in July. 

According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, only 63 North 

Koreans defected to South Korea in 2021, the lowest number in 20 

years. The Chinese government views all North Korean refugees as 

illegal economic migrants and repatriates them if discovered, without 

regard to their risk of persecution on return, which is a violation of its 

international obligations.

North Korean Christians who have contact with Christian missionaries and NGO workers in China face severe punishment when 

repatriated to North Korea. Since 2017, Chinese authorities have 

expelled hundreds of South Korean missionaries, many of whom 

played an instrumental role in helping North Korean refugees escape. 

The situation of Deacon Zhang Wen Shi—whom USCIRF adopted as 

a Religious Prisoner of Conscience—remains unknown. North Korean 

authorities reportedly abducted Zhang in November 2014 and subsequently sentenced him to 15 years in prison in connection to his work 

assisting North Koreans in China. 

United Nations Activity 

In January 2021, the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report to promote accountability for 

human rights violations in North Korea. It found that the North Korean 

government committed crimes against humanity targeting “people 

considered a threat to the country’s political system and leadership, 

including people who [practice] religion,” and these atrocities may 

be ongoing.

In March 2021, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted 

a resolution condemning “long-standing and ongoing systematic, 

widespread and gross human rights violations and other human rights 

abuses committed” by North Korea. It expressed grave concerns 

over North Korea’s persecution of individuals on religious and other 

grounds; denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion, including the right to adopt a religion or belief; and discrimination based on the songbun system, including consideration of 

religion. The UNHRC also called on the North Korean government to 

ensure the right to freedom of religion or belief. The United States 

cosponsored the resolution, but South Korea did not. 

In December, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield delivered a joint statement to the UN Security Council on behalf 

of eight nations condemning North Korea’s human rights violations 

and abuses that include religious persecution. The joint statement also 

called on UN Security Council members to support an open briefing 

next year to discuss the dire human rights situation in North Korea 

and its implications for peace and security. That same month, the UN 

General Assembly passed a resolution—sponsored by more than 60 

countries—condemning North Korea’s human rights violations. The 

resolution called for swift investigations into these violations, which 

may amount to crimes against humanity, and a referral to the International Criminal Court. South Korea did not cosponsor this resolution 

for the third year in a row. 

Key U.S. Policy

There has been little progress in U.S.-North Korea relations in 2021. In 

April, the Biden administration indicated that it completed its North 

Korea Policy Review, the content of which likely will remain classified. 

The Biden administration stated its intention to take a “calibrated and 

practical approach” toward North Korea and its willingness to engage 

without preconditions. The administration has repeatedly reached out

to the North Korean government for dialogue, but as of December 

2021 it had not received a positive response. During South Korean 

President Moon Jae-in’s visit with President Joseph R. Biden in May, 

the two leaders issued a joint statement that affirmed a mutual commitment to promote human rights—including efforts to improve the 

human rights situation in North Korea—and to expand cooperation 

to ensure the freedom of religion and belief. 

On November 15, the State Department redesignated North 

Korea as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the relevant presidential action existing, ongoing restrictions to which the country is 

already subject under Sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974. 

In December, pursuant to Executive Order 13687, the U.S. Department 

of the Treasury sanctioned North Korea’s Central Public Prosecutors 

Office and senior official Ri Yong Gil for human rights violations. In 

March, 11 members of Congress sent a bipartisan letter urging the 

Biden administration to appoint the Special Envoy for North Korean 

Human Rights Issues and promote human rights in North Korea. 
28 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

PAKISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Pakistan continued their 

negative trajectory. The year was filled with reports of targeted 

killings, lynching, mob violence, forced conversions, and desecration of houses of worship and cemeteries. These violations targeted 

religious minorities, including the Ahmadiyya Muslim, Christian, 

Hindu, Sikh, and Shi’a Muslim communities. The government continued systematically enforcing blasphemy, anti-Ahmadiyya, and 

cybercrime laws while failing to protect religious minorities from 

nonstate actors such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a farright Sunni Islamist organization with growing influence in Pakistan. 

Those accused of blasphemy faced violence, imprisonment 

with limited opportunity for bail, and even death. USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List highlights 55 individuals 

detained or imprisoned on blasphemy charges in Pakistan. Mere 

accusations of blasphemy have incited mobs to violence against 

members of minority communities and those with differing beliefs. 

In January 2021, Tabitha Gill, a Christian nurse accused of blasphemy by her colleagues, was beaten and tortured by hospital 

staff in Karachi. In December, a violent mob in Sialkot killed and 

burned the body of a Sri Lankan national, Priyantha Kumara, over 

blasphemy allegations. In August, an angry mob attacked a Hindu 

temple in Punjab Province after courts granted bail to an eightyear-old Hindu boy who was accused of blasphemy for allegedly 

desecrating a local religious school. In July, a man acquitted of 

blasphemy charges was hacked to death by a police constable in 

Punjab. Though the government has publicly condemned mob 

violence, it has done little to protect religious minorities or provide justice. 

KEY FINDINGS

Targeted killings remained a threat to members of religious 

minorities. In September, a Sikh medical practitioner and community 

leader was gunned down at his clinic in Peshawar. In March, a Hindu 

journalist was shot dead in Sukkar for his reporting. There were also 

two reported targeted killings of Ahmadiyya Muslims, including a 

homeopathic doctor who was shot and killed in Peshawar in February. 

Ahmadiyya Muslims continued to face severe official and societal persecution for their beliefs and self-identification as Muslims. 

In 2021, the Ahmadiyya community reported 49 police cases for 

reasons of faith as well as the desecration of 121 Ahmadiyya graves 

and 15 places of worship by mobs often assisted by authorities. In 

December, 70-year-old Asghar Ali Kalaar, who was accused of blasphemy, died in detention awaiting a bail hearing.

Abduction, forced conversion to Islam, rape, and forced marriage remained imminent threats for religious minority women and 

children, particularly from the Christian, Hindu, and Sikh faiths. 

In October 2021, a parliamentary committee rejected a bill proposed to protect minorities against forced conversion that was 

also opposed by Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs. Parliamentarians argued that setting an age limit for conversions by 

non-Muslims “goes against Islam and the Constitution of Pakistan.” 

In December, the Sindh High Court handed custody of Arzoo Raja, 

a 14-year-old Christian girl who was abducted, forcefully married, 

and converted to Islam, back to her parents with the condition 

that she remain Muslim. Raja’s 44-year-old abductor and the cleric

who conducted the marriage and conversion certification maintain 

their innocence, stating that Raja had reached puberty or the age 

of consent according to Shari’a law.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Pakistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

• Enter into a binding agreement, under 

Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the Pakistani 

government to encourage substantial steps 

to address religious freedom violations with 

benchmarks, including but not limited to: 

• Release blasphemy prisoners and other 

individuals imprisoned for their religion 

or beliefs;

• Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya 

laws; until repeal is accomplished, enact 

reforms to make blasphemy a bailable 

offense, require evidence by accusers, 

ensure proper investigation by senior 

police officials, allow authorities to dismiss unfounded accusations, and enforce 

existing Penal Code articles criminalizing 

perjury and false accusations; 

• Remove requirements for self-identification of religion on identity documents;

• Address extremist rhetoric often preceding attacks on minorities while protecting 

freedom of expression;

• Hold accountable individuals who incite 

or participate in vigilante violence, targeted killings, forced conversions, and 

other hate crimes; and

• Reform educational textbooks, curricula, and teacher training materials 

to ensure content is inclusive of and 

not discriminatory toward religious 

minorities. 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Pakistan 

bilateral relationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations, and 

advocate for the release of religious prisoners of conscience in Pakistan, including 

Junaid Hafeez, Asif Pervaiz, Stephen Masih, 

Notan Lal, and Aneeqa Ateeq. 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 29

PAKISTAN

Background

Pakistan’s population is 96.3 percent Muslim (85–90 percent Sunni, 

10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.2 percent Ahmadi) with smaller populations 

of Hindus (1.6 percent); Christians (1.6 percent); and Sikhs, Buddhists, 

Baha’is, and Zoroastrians (<1.0 percent). Pakistan was established as 

an Islamic Republic in 1956 with special status for Islam—for example, 

only Muslims can serve as president and prime minister. Its constitution nominally protects religious freedom by prohibiting faith-based 

discrimination and guaranteeing the right to religious practices and 

religious education. The constitution reserves 10 seats for religious 

minorities in the National Assembly, four seats in the Senate, and 23 

seats in four provincial assemblies. Furthermore, the second amendment, added in 1974, declares Ahmadis non-Muslims, excluding them 

from representation. 

Blasphemy Law

Sections 295 and 298 of Pakistan’s Penal Code criminalize acts and 

speech insulting religion or defiling the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, places of worship, or religious symbols. These vague provisions 

are frequently abused to levy false accusations against Shi’a Muslims, 

Ahmadiyya Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and others who do 

not adhere to the majority Sunni interpretation of Islam. Cases often 

violate legal procedures, and judges come under extreme pressure 

from religious groups to convict. The law sets severe punishments, 

including the death penalty. Although some individuals have received 

death sentences and others have died in detention while awaiting 

trial, Pakistan has not executed anyone for blasphemy. Even lawyers 

defending those charged with blasphemy, presiding judges, and 

individuals speaking against the law are targeted. Pakistani lawyer Saif 

ul Malook—who has successfully overturned several convictions for 

blasphemy cases, including those of Asia Bibi and of Shagufta Kausar 

and her husband Shafqat Emanuel—said he and others like him face 

grave danger from extremists.

In 2021, some individuals charged with blasphemy were acquitted 

while some others were released on bail. Shagufta Kausar and Shafqat 

Emanuel, a Christian couple sentenced to death in 2014, were acquitted by the Lahore High Court in June. Their acquittal came after the 

European Parliament adopted a resolution demanding that Pakistan 

allow greater freedom of religion or belief and asked the European 

Union (EU) to reconsider Pakistan’s preferential trade status. In October, Sajjad Masih Gill was acquitted by the Lahore High Court after 

being sentenced to life in prison for allegedly insulting the Prophet 

Muhammad in 2011. 

Growing Intolerance and Extremism 

Extremist and intolerant rhetoric put forth on digital platforms or in 

public spaces by organizations or individuals—including government 

officials, politicians, and religious clerics—often precede attacks 

on religious minorities. The spread of extremist Islamist ideology 

in Pakistan has created an environment of increasing intolerance, 

exacerbating existing prejudices and inducing fear among religious 

minorities. The effects can be seen at both the micro and macro levels. 

For example, in December 2021, staff at a bakery in Karachi refused to 

write “Merry Christmas” on cakes for Christian customers. Although 

the bakery relented after a public outcry on social media, instances 

like these are indicative of the intolerant climate fostered in Pakistan. 

At the macro level, extremist organizations such as the TLP, which 

espouses intolerance toward religious minorities, often act with impunity. In April 2021, the TLP demanded that the Pakistani government 

expel the French ambassador over the republication of cartoons in 

France depicting the Prophet Muhammad. Authorities responded by 

arresting TLP leader Saad Hussein Rizvi for inciting violence and banning the organization, prompting supporters to hold violent protests 

across Pakistan that resulted in several killed and hundreds wounded. 

However, in November 2021, the government came to an agreement 

with TLP leaders and released Rizvi, removed his name from the state’s 

terrorism watchlist, and lifted the ban on the TLP, allowing it to contest 

in elections and participate in political activities. 

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws

In addition to the constitution’s second amendment declaring Ahmadis 

non-Muslim, Articles 298(b) and 298(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 

prohibit Ahmadis, who consider themselves Muslim, from self-identifying as such. They are forced to sign a declaration swearing they 

are non-Muslim to obtain basic civil rights, such as the right to vote or 

receive national identification cards. It is a crime punishable by fine, 

imprisonment, or death for Ahmadis to profess their faith verbally or in 

writing. They are prohibited from citing the Qur’an or Hadith; displaying 

Qur’anic text on gravestones, houses of worship, wedding invitations, 

home decor, or jewelry; sharing their faith; printing or obtaining material related to their faith; or calling their places of worship “mosques.” 

Key U.S. Policy

Pakistan continues to be one of the largest recipients of foreign 

aid from the United States since the onset of the war on terror, but 

the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 raised tensions in the bilateral relationship. In September, Secretary of State 

Antony J. Blinken warned the House of Representatives Foreign 

Affairs Committee that some of Pakistan’s interests in the region 

conflicted with those of the United States. Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley told the Senate Armed Services Committee the United States needed to examine Pakistan’s

sanctuary for the Taliban. 

On November 15, the State Department redesignated Pakistan 

as a CPC under IRFA but again issued a waiver on any related sanctions 

“as required in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’”

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Ahmadiyya Muslims 

• Factsheet: Shari’a and LGBTI Persons 

• Factsheet: Destruction of Cemeteries

• Podcast: Pakistan’s Laws Enable Islamist Extremism
30 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

RUSSIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in the Russian Federation 

continued to deteriorate, with the government accelerating 

its persecution of “nontraditional” religious minorities. Russian authorities punished peaceful Jehovah’s Witnesses with 

record-breaking prison sentences of up to eight years for alleged 

“extremism.” During the year, the state convicted 105 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, including elderly and disabled members as well those 

residing in Russian-occupied Crimea in Ukraine. Since the group 

was banned in 2017, there have been 1,678 raids and searches of 

members’ homes, with 404 occurring in 2021. 

The Russian government continued to use an array of problematic legislation to persecute religious minorities, including Muslims, 

Protestants, members of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Falun 

Gong, and adherents of indigenous religions. The 1996 religion law

sets strict registration requirements and empowers state officials 

to impede and monitor religious groups’ activities. It also broadly 

defines and prohibits “missionary activities,” including preaching, 

praying, disseminating religious materials, and answering questions 

about religion outside of officially designated sites. On April 5, 

President Vladimir Putin signed amendments to this law that further 

expanded the state’s ability to restrict religious practice, including 

more frequent reporting requirements for religious organizations, 

a mandate for all foreign-educated clergy to be recertified within 

Russia, and prohibitions for anyone on the government’s expansive 

extremism and terrorism list from participating in or leading religious groups. Other Russian legislation criminalizes “extremism” 

without adequately defining the term, and charges of “terrorism” require no advocacy or participation in violence, enabling the 

state to target a vast range of nonviolent religious activity. In 2021, 

the Russian government began applying the vague “undesirable 

organization” label to religious entities, including four Evangelical 

KEY FINDINGS

groups and several organizations linked to the Church of Scientology. Although the legal consequences of this designation remain 

unclear, it is widely perceived as a step toward an eventual ban on 

the peaceful religious activity of those targeted.

In 2021, as in past years, peaceful Muslims comprised the 

majority of political prisoners persecuted in connection with the 

realization of their right to freedom of religion, according to the 

Memorial Human Rights Center. Numerous prison sentences were 

given to peaceful adherents of the moderate Muslim theologian 

Said Nursi and the Tablighi Jamaat missionary group. Crimean 

Tatar Muslims opposed to the Russian occupation of their Ukrainian 

homeland continued to receive lengthy prison sentences for unsubstantiated charges of terrorism based on their Muslim identity and 

alleged involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a nonviolent Islamist 

group that is legal in Ukraine and most Western countries. Russia 

considers HT a terrorist group despite the lack of any corroborating 

evidence, and its prosecution of alleged members is often characterized by allegations of torture during interrogation, planted 

evidence, and the use of “secret witnesses” with links to Russian 

security services.

In the Republic of Chechnya, the authoritarian dictatorship of 

Ramzan Kadyrov maintained domination through the imposition of 

an official version of Islam that venerates the Kadyrov family and 

falsely claims to defend local belief and culture and combat violent 

extremism. President Kadyrov, who was recently reelected with an 

alleged 99.7 percent of the vote, oversaw or condoned egregious 

abuses based on his religious views, including against women and 

members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 

(LGBTI) community. In 2021, authorities continued to force Chechens to apologize publicly in humiliating televised confessions for 

a variety of offenses, including witchcraft and criticizing Kadyrov.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Russia as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Russian 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom, including Chechen Minister of 

Information and Press Akhmed Dudaev 

and Blagoveshchensk City Court Judge 

Tatyana Studilko, by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, citing 

specific religious freedom violations; and

• Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into Russia-facing diplomatic strategy 

with European allies, including the use of 

targeted sanctions to pressure Russia to 

end religious freedom abuses, release religious prisoners of conscience, and permit 

the establishment of an international monitoring presence in occupied Crimea.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Engage with affected religious communities in Russia and occupied Ukraine and 

raise ongoing religious freedom issues 

through hearings, meetings, letters, congressional delegation trips abroad, or 

other actions for community representatives to inform the U.S. government and/

or public of existing conditions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Issue Update: Religious Freedom Violations in the Republic of Chechnya

• Press Statement: USCIRF Concerned by Russian Prosecution of International Memorial Society

• Podcast: Abuses of Traditional Religion in Russia

• Podcast: Unrest in Russia

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Dennis Christensen
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 31

RUSSIA

Background

The Russian government views independent religious activity as a 

threat to stability and to its own control, yet it simultaneously cultivates relationships with what it deems “traditional” religions. The 

country’s population is religiously diverse: around 68 percent identify 

as Russian Orthodox Christian; seven percent identify as Muslim; and 

25 percent comprise an array of communities, including Protestants, 

Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Baha’is, and followers of indigenous religions. 

The government enforces laws that restrict religious freedom, 

including a 1996 religion law; a 2002 law on combating extremism; 

and more recent laws on blasphemy, “stirring up religious hatred,” 

and “missionary activity.” These vague laws give authorities broad 

powers to define and prosecute any religious speech or activity or to 

ban any religious literature they deem harmful. 

Muslims

Russian authorities continued to target followers of Turkish theologian 

Said Nursi (who died in 1960). Although Nursi’s work emphasizes scientific rationalism and tolerance, the government accuses his followers 

of trying to establish a Turkic Muslim state. Outside observers find 

no evidence of this among those charged or of extremist content in 

Nursi’s writings. Between October 5 and 6, 2021, at least 16 individuals 

were detained in Moscow for supposed ties to Nursi. On November 

2, Gabdrakhman Naumov, a respected Islamic scholar at the Russian 

Islamic University in Tatarstan, was sentenced to six and a half years 

in prison for allegedly leading a Nursi group. Also in November, seven 

individuals in Dagestan were charged with extremism for supposedly 

belonging to a Nursi “cell.” On December 17, Nakia Sharifullina, a 

respected teacher and founder of Islamic schools for girls in Tatarstan, 

remained under house arrest after losing her appeal against charges 

of possessing Nursi literature.

In occupied Crimea, Russian authorities continued to conflate 

ethnic Muslim identity with terrorism in their efforts to suppress 

opposition to their rule from the indigenous Crimean Tatar population. In March 2021, Mustafa Jemilev, a former leader of the Crimean 

Tatar Majlis (or parliament), was barred from entering Crimea for 13 

years. Upon invading Crimea in 2014, Russia labeled the Majlis an 

“extremist” organization and banned it. On June 1, 2021, Refat Chubarov, another exiled leader of the Majlis was sentenced to six years 

in prison. In August, four Crimean Tatar activists were sentenced 

to between 12 and 18 years for religious studies supposedly linked 

to HT, which is legal in Ukraine and not credibly linked to acts or 

advocacy of violence. Imprisoned Crimean Tatars report inhumane 

conditions, including rat-infested cells and lack of access to beds, 

medicine, clean water, and sanitary toilet facilities. In October, four 

Crimean Tatar activists were sentenced to between 14 and 17 years 

for alleged ties to HT. A Crimean Tatar activist, Zekirya Muratov, 

currently faces 12 years in prison for religious studies supposedly 

related to HT after refusing pressure to provide false testimony 

against fellow activists.

Jehovah’s Witnesses and 

Other Religious Minorities

As of November 2021, five Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned in 

Russian-occupied Crimea, with seven more under house arrest and 

two forbidden from traveling outside their immediate locale. In 2021, 

sentences given to Jehovah’s Witnesses were longer than ever, with 

Judge Tatyana Studilko condemning Aleksei Berchuk in June to eight 

years in prison, the harshest sentence to date. On October 28, the 

Supreme Court ruled that the criminal prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses for collective worship was unlawful, but courts subsequently 

sentenced eight members to prison. On January 17, 2022, after the 

reporting period, father-of-three Maksim Beltikov was sentenced to 

two years in prison for being a Jehovah’s Witness. On January 19, 

2022, Alexei Yershov was sentenced to three years for participating 

in Jehovah’s Witness collective worship. On January 25, 2022, Anna 

Safronova received six years in prison, the longest sentence yet given 

to a female Jehovah’s Witness.

On September 24, 2021, Russia designated several institutions 

linked to the Church of Scientology as “undesirable organizations” that 

posed “a threat to the security of the Russian Federation.” This designation, which could criminalize possession of Scientologist literature, 

included the L. Ron Hubbard Library. Members of the indigenous Mari 

religion continued to face hostility, with one local official instructing 

municipal authorities to block the Mari from worshiping on public 

property, which includes forests sacred to their religion.

Closure of Memorial International Society

On December 29, 2021, the Supreme Court ordered the liquidation of 

the Memorial International Society, the umbrella organization for the 

oldest and most prestigious human rights network in Russia. Memorial documents religious freedom abuses and maintains extensive 

lists of current political prisoners in Russia, the majority of whom are 

imprisoned for their peaceful religious belief or practice. The closure 

of this esteemed institution irreparably harms future efforts by Russian 

citizens to hold their government accountable for its many abuses of 

religious freedom.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Russia relations continued to deteriorate in 2021 amid concerns 

that Russia was poised to expand its invasion of Ukraine, elevating 

existing tensions over Russian military involvement in Syria, the 

illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory, and allegations of Russian 

tampering in U.S. elections. On April 15, 2021, the U.S. government 

expanded sanctions against the Russian Federation. On November 

15, the U.S. Department of State for the first time designated Russia as a CPC under IRFA for its systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom. On December 7, President Joseph 

R. Biden met with President Putin. U.S.-Russian relations collapsed 

dramatically in response to Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion 

of Ukraine in February 2022, as the United States and its allies levied 

unprecedented sanctions.
32 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

SAUDI ARABIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remained 

poor but had some incremental improvements. The government 

lifted some restrictions to allow women to change their legal 

names and conduct the Hajj pilgrimage without a male guardian’s 

permission. As in years prior, the government also removed from 

textbooks some intolerant content directed at religious minorities, but other intolerant passages remained, and the government 

continued to support intolerant messaging in other areas. At the 

same time, Saudi Arabia continued to violate religious freedom 

egregiously, targeting religious minorities in particular. 

In June, the government executed Mostafa al-Darwish, a Shi’a 

Muslim participant in 2011 protests in the Eastern Province. In 

August, the government executed Ahmed bin Sa’eed Al Janabi for 

his participation in the same protests. In March 2021, the government commuted the death sentences of Shi’a prisoners Ali al-Nimr, 

Dawood al-Marhoon, and Abdullah al-Zaher, arrested in relation 

to protest activity in 2011. All were minors at the time, and human 

rights organizations allege they were tortured into confessions. 

Also in March, several United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs 

expressed concern that the charges against them represented 

“criminalization of the exercise of fundamental rights.” The Saudi 

Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) resentenced the accused to 10 

years in prison. However, Saudi Arabia released Ali al-Nimr in 

October 2021, Abdullah al-Zaher in November 2021, and Dawood 

al-Marhoon in February 2022. 

The government also persecuted those who published 

dissenting religious views on social media. In October, a court 

sentenced Yemeni journalist Ali Abulohoom to 15 years in prison 

on apostasy charges for posts on his Twitter account. Throughout the year, the government also continued to forbid any public 

non-Muslim worship or the construction of non-Muslim houses 

of worship. It also delayed trials for several religious prisoners of 

conscience, including Hassan Farhan al-Maliki and Salman al-Ouda. 

Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh remains in prison on an eight-year 

sentence on charges of blasphemy and promoting atheist thought. 

Four members of the Bohra Shi’a community remained in 

prison in Riyadh on multiyear sentences following spurious charges 

of money laundering and violating charity collection regulations. 

Three are in their 60s and two have underlying medical issues, 

putting them at high risk. The government also continues to detain 

activists who protested peacefully against religious guardianship 

laws that position women as legal minors for life. In February, 

authorities released anti-guardianship activist Loujain al-Hathloul 

following the suspension of her prison sentence. In March, however, 

the Public Prosecution called for reimposition and extension of 

her sentence. In May, the Interior Ministry’s General Directorate of 

Investigation in Riyadh summoned al-Hathloul to sign a document 

informing her that the Supreme Court had upheld her conviction. 

She remains under a travel and media ban. In June, the President 

of State Security arrested Asmaa al-Subaie over tweets criticizing 

the harsh sentences against those calling for changes to the guardianship system and other laws affecting women.

While the government has limited the power of the Committee 

for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), it 

continues to harass religious minorities. During 2021, the CPVPV 

and police officers harassed pilgrims who visited cemeteries with 

religious significance in Mecca and Medina. Those who paused to 

reflect at significant gravesites were ordered to leave for allegedly 

worshiping those buried at the cemetery, a practice forbidden 

under the Saudi government’s interpretation of Islam. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation; and

• Impose targeted sanctions on Saudi government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom 

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United 

States under human rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific 

religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over prisoners of 

conscience in Saudi Arabia, and work 

with like-minded parliamentarians in 

other countries to advocate for them 

and other prisoners of conscience to be 

released; and

• Pass the bipartisan Saudi Educational 

Transparency and Reform Act, which 

requires the U.S. Department of State to 

report annually on religious intolerance 

in Saudi textbooks and efforts to remove 

this content.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia

• Factsheet: Saudi Arabia’s Specialized Criminal Court

• Press Release: USCIRF Condemns Saudi Arabia’s Latest Execution of Shi’a Man

• Hearing: State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Raif Badawi
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 33

SAUDI ARABIA

Background

Saudi Arabia has a population of approximately 34.8 million, 85–90 

percent of whom are Sunni Muslims and 10–15 percent of whom are 

Shi’a Muslims. The UN estimates that 37 percent of the population 

are expatriates, including at least two million Christians, Hindus, 

Buddhists, Sikhs, practitioners of folk religions, and the unaffiliated. 

Non-Muslim or atheist citizens often hide their identity to avoid harsh 

social and official consequences. The ruling monarch, King Salman 

bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud, holds the title “Custodian of the Two Holy 

Mosques.” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has systematically 

cracked down on both religious and political dissent despite overseeing economic reforms associated with Saudi Vision 2030.

According to the 1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the constitution is the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). The 

judicial system is largely governed by a Saudi interpretation of Shari’a 

as informed by Hanbali jurisprudence, which imposes capital punishment for apostasy; openly declaring one’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, 

transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) identity; and peaceful religious or 

political dissent. In February 2021, the Crown Prince announced the 

drafting of four laws, including a Personal Status Law, Civil Transactions Law, Penal Code for Discretionary Sentences, and Law of 

Evidence, that would standardize elements of Saudi law that directly 

impact freedom of religion or belief and would also mitigate discrepancies in court decisions on similar issues. In October, Minister of 

Justice Waleed al-Samani confirmed that creation of the draft laws 

was still in progress.

Restrictions on Minority Religions and Dissent

Saudi Arabia continued serious restrictions on freedom of religion or 

belief in 2021. No non-Muslim houses of worship may be constructed in 

the country. Shi’a Muslims continued to face discrimination in education, 

employment, and the judiciary, and they lack access to senior positions 

in the government and military. The building of Shi’a Muslim mosques 

remained restricted outside majority-Shi’a Muslim areas in the Eastern 

Province, and authorities often prohibit the Shi’a Muslim call to prayer 

in these areas. Christians, Jews, and other religious minorities meet only 

in private and have in the past faced harassment and targeting by the 

government. Saudi Arabia has sometimes used charges of espionage 

to target religious dissidents, a position endorsed on religious grounds 

by the CPVPV. In April 2021, the CPVPV posted a clip of a sermon on 

Twitter entitled “The Obligation to Kill Spies,” in which the late Sheikh 

Mohammed bin Saleh al-Othman says that Crown Prince Mohammed 

bin Salman is “obligated” to kill spies and that they are “not Muslim.”

Detention of Religious Prisoners of Conscience

While it has commuted the sentences of some Shi’a Muslim minors, 

the Saudi government continued its systematic persecution of 

prisoners on the basis of religion of belief. Saudi Arabia’s SCC 

routinely targets religious minorities and dissidents, imposing 

egregious and unduly harsh sentences, denying access to legal 

counsel, delaying judicial decisions, and convicting defendants 

based partially on confessions obtained through torture. Many SCC 

verdicts enforce laws whose overly vague and poorly defined terms 

lead to severe restrictions on Saudis’ freedom of religion or belief, 

including the Anti-Cybercrimes Law (2007) and the Penal Law for 

Crimes of Terrorism and Its Financing (2014). The court also targets 

both Shi’a and Sunni clerics. Throughout 2021, the SCC continued 

to deny Sunni cleric Hassan Farhan al-Maliki due process. Authorities detained al-Maliki in September 2017 and charged him with 

14 crimes for allegedly calling into question the fundamentals of 

Islam. A September 2021 SCC hearing for Maliki was postponed 

until October, then November, and finally December. Shi’a cleric 

Mohammad Hassan al-Habib, whom the SCC convicted in 2018, 

suffered a serious deterioration in health in 2021 while jailed at 

Dammam Prison. Authorities arrested al-Habib over the content of 

his sermons and his support of 2011 protests opposing government 

discrimination against Shi’a Muslims. In March 2021, the UN Human 

Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded

that Sheikh al-Habib’s detention was “a direct consequence of the 

exercise of his fundamental rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” Saudi Arabia also continued its detention of 

talk show host Ali al-Omari, who discussed religious issues on his 

television network “4Shbab” and on his personal website. In 2017, 

he was arrested and charged in the SCC with “forming a terrorist 

youth organization,” among many other charges. His trial has not 

yet been completed, nor a sentence delivered.

Key U.S. Policy

The Joseph R. Biden administration indicated its intent to “recalibrate” 

the U.S.-Saudi relationship in February 2021. It released a report noting 

Saudi state responsibility for the killing of U.S. resident and journalist 

Jamal Khashoggi and announced a new form of visa restriction, a 

“Khashoggi Ban,” that can be imposed on people who engage in 

“serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident activities” on behalf of a 

foreign government. 

In June 2021, Senators Marco A. Rubio (R-FL) and Ronald L. 

Wyden (D-OR) introduced S.2142, the Saudi Educational Transparency 

and Reform Act. Similar to a 2019 resolution introduced in the House 

of Representatives by Joseph C. Wilson (R-SC), S.2142 would require 

the State Department to publish an annual report assessing the state 

of religious intolerance in textbooks in Saudi Arabia.

On November 15, the State Department redesignated Saudi Arabia as a CPC under IRFA but issued a national security waiver exempting 

it from punitive actions to which it would otherwise be subjected.
34 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

SYRIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom in Syria remained threatened from 

numerous quarters, reflecting the country’s 10-year violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. President Bashar al-Assad’s May 

reelection further cemented his authoritarian regime, which styles 

itself as protecting religious minorities from militant Islamists—even 

as the fallout from its clashes with opposition groups imperiled 

religious minority communities in contested areas, including their 

property and places of worship. While the regime preserved 

synagogues and promoted outreach to exiled Syrian Jewish communities abroad, this likely was an attempt to maintain its posture 

of paternalism toward religious minorities. Although ostensibly 

secular, the regime is dominated by the President’s Alawi-minority 

branch of Islam; in 2021, it accelerated its nationalization of religion by increasingly subsuming the Sunni Muslim majority’s power 

within its own religious institutions. In November, Assad fired the 

most senior Sunni leader, Sheikh Ahmed Hassoun, by abolishing 

his position of Grand Mufti—the powers of which the President 

had already limited since 2018—and redistributing authority to 

the Majlis al-Ilm al-Fiqhi, a regime-managed jurisprudential council. The government also continued to strip religious minorities of 

their autonomy; in February, it finalized its classification of Yazidis 

as a sect within Islam, forcing them under the legal and religious 

jurisdiction of a religion to which they do not subscribe. 

At the same time, armed opposition forces and militant Islamist 

groups targeted vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities in their 

attempts to wrest power from the Assad regime and one another. 

The al-Qaeda offshoot Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) remained the 

KEY FINDINGS

dominant governing and religious force in the northwestern region 

of Idlib. It continued to brutalize minority communities, restricting

the worship of Idlib’s indigenous Christians and displacing them by 

seizing their properties and churches—already rendered vulnerable 

from attacks by the Assad regime. Additionally, Turkish-supported 

Syrian armed opposition groups—collectively sometimes called 

“TSOs”—such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and factions of 

its Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) leveraged their Turkish 

financing and military support to merge under the Syrian Liberation 

Front, further enabling their campaigns of destruction and harassment against minority communities. In acts of religious and ethnic 

cleansing, TSOs near Afrin terrorized Yazidis and Kurds with shelling 

and targeted them—especially women and girls—for kidnapping, 

sex trafficking, and lethal torture. Although the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) did not regain territory, it increased its presence in 

areas defended by the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 

such as Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria, where the militant Islamist group 

waged almost daily attacks on SDF bases and checkpoints. 

Promising environments for religious freedom and intrareligious cooperation remained limited to the areas of north and east 

Syria held by the Autonomous Administration of North and East 

Syria (AANES), including its military branch, the SDF, and the Syrian 

Democratic Council (SDC). As in prior years, the AANES continued 

to openly support pluralism and collaboration among religious and 

ethnic groups. That positive environment reflected the AANES’s 

status as one of the only principal actors within Syria to actively and 

intentionally foster religious freedom and diversity. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Designate Syria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA), and redesignate 

HTS as an “entity of particular concern,” 

or EPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious 

freedom, as defined by IRFA; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

Syrian government agencies and officials, HTS principals, and the leadership 

of TSOs responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities, 

citing specific religious freedom violations;

• Exert pressure on Turkey to withdraw from 

all territory that it occupies as a result of 

cross-border operations into north and 

east Syria; in the interim, ensure enforcement of Turkey’s obligations under the 

2019 ceasefire agreement; and demand 

that Turkey order armed factions under its 

control or influence to cease all activities 

negatively impacting religious and ethnic 

minorities in Syria;

• Recognize the AANES as a legitimate, 

local government; grant a waiver of sanctions in areas it governs; and demand its 

inclusion in any U.S.-backed final solution 

for Syria, pursuant to United Nations (UN) 

Resolution 2254, including Geneva-based 

talks to resolve the Syrian conflict “as the 

basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned 

political transition”; and

• Contribute to efforts in AANES-governed territory to fund and develop local 

programs to promote religious pluralism and advance religious freedom and 

related rights. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Commends Targeted Sanctions against Religious Freedom Violators in Syria 

• Press Statement: USCIRF Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of ISIS Genocide Recognition

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Accountability for Crimes against Humanity
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 35

SYRIA

Background

Article 3 of Syria’s constitution identifies Islam as the religion of the 

President and Islamic jurisprudence as a major source of legislation. It 

also requires the state to ensure the freedom of religious rituals that 

do not disrupt “public order.” Other laws and legal interpretations 

restrict religious freedom, including bans on Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

prohibition of Muslims’ conversion to other religions, and deterrents 

to religious extremism and proselytization.

Despite Syria’s rich history of religious and ethnic diversity, 

a decade of conflict and instability has significantly affected its 

demography, displacing Syrians from both the Sunni Muslim majority 

and religious minority communities inside and outside the country. 

Approximately 87 percent of Syria’s estimated current population 

of 20 million belong to branches of Islam; Sunni Muslims represent 

up to 74 percent, while Alawi, Shi’a, and Isma’ili Muslims together 

comprise at least 13 percent. Christians, including Syriac-Assyrians, 

Maronites, Armenians, and other groups, officially comprise 10 

percent—although some estimates suggest that emigration has 

dramatically reduced that figure. Druze comprise three percent and 

Jews are nearly nonexistent. Estimates for the numbers of Yazidis 

remain confounded by the Syrian government’s classification of 

them as Muslims. 

Alawi Muslims rose to power in the 1970s under the late Hafez 

al-Assad, whose son President Bashar al-Assad has further advanced 

the group’s dominance since assuming the presidency in 2000. The 

civil war—which began in 2011 after a peaceful grassroots uprising 

triggered a brutal crackdown—has amplified once-subdued fault lines 

between religious groups, imparting a heightened sectarian element

to the conflict. 

In 2021, the Assad regime—buoyed by relationships with outside 

actors such as Russia and Iran—maintained or had regained control of 

approximately 70 percent of Syria; various opposition forces continued 

to control or contest the remaining territory. The regime has actively 

contributed to intrareligious tensions by casting many Sunnis as violent 

extremists who threaten both religious minorities and the purported 

modernism of the state. 

Contrasting Religious Freedom Conditions in 

AANES- and Turkish-Controlled Areas 

The AANES’s Executive Council and Bureau of Religions and Beliefs 

maintained a diverse leadership and membership of Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, and Turkmen; Yazidis; Syriac-Assyrians and other Christians; 

and Sunni Muslims. Following several years of efforts to increasingly 

reflect such diversity, the SDF is now majority Arab and the AANES 

offers a broadly pluralistic environment, including religious minorities—in stark contrast to the violent intolerance of nearby TSOs in 

Turkish-occupied areas.

Turkey continued to threaten the AANES and religious freedom 

in north and east Syria. Direct Turkish occupation and military attacks 

in northern Syria as well as TSO operations—by factions such as Faylaq 

al-Sham and others—laid waste to vulnerable Yazidi, Christian, and 

Turkmen areas. Turkish attacks included airstrikes and continuous 

shelling in AANES/SDF areas across northeastern Syria and a September attack on the civilian infrastructure of the Christian-majority 

town of Tel Tamer, forcing many residents into targeted displacement. 

The Turkish government also persisted in falsely conflating 

the AANES with the U.S.-designated terrorist group the Kurdistan 

Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey made similar accusations of terrorism 

against other Syrian Kurdish and Arab actors, including the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a division of the SDF. In June, a Turkish 

court sentenced three Syriac Orthodox Christians to life in prison for 

“membership in a terrorist organization” for alleged or actual ties to 

the YPG in fighting the Turkish occupation of their village in northern 

Syria. These men were among up to 200 other Syrian nationals whom 

TSO forces had captured in 2019 outside Ras al-Ain following Turkey’s 

invasion and transferred to detention in Turkey. 

Key U.S. Policy

In May 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and the foreign 

ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom issued a 

statement warning that the forthcoming presidential elections in Syria 

would be “neither free nor fair” and “denouncing” the Assad regime for 

holding an election outside UN Security Council Resolution 2254’s roadmap for the Syrian peace process. In June, Secretary Blinken announced 

$436 million in humanitarian assistance, building on the more than $13.5 

billion the United States has provided to Syrians during the conflict. 

Although the United States withdrew the majority of its forces 

from northeastern Syria in 2019, it has maintained a small military 

presence that many local religious and ethnic minority communities 

regarded as crucial to maintaining stability. On February 25, the 

United States executed airstrikes on the Syria-Iraq border in response 

to Iran-backed militias’ rocket attack on U.S. coalition personnel at an 

airport in Erbil, Iraq. 

Pursuant to the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, the administration continued to issue targeted sanctions against Syrian officials 

and TSO leaders for atrocities against civilians. In July, the Departments of State and the Treasury sanctioned TSO Ahrar al-Sharqiya. 

The Treasury Department also sanctioned Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s leader 

Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad al-Hayes—commonly known as Abu Hatem 

Shaqra—for trafficking Yazidi women and children and integrating 

former ISIS members into his TSO’s ranks. Additional Treasury Department sanctions targeted the Syria-based terrorist Farrukh Fayzimatov

for his “material support” to HTS, which the State Department in 

November redesignated as an EPC. 
36 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

TAJIKISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, the Tajikistani government’s record on religious freedom 

remained bleak. State repression of the country’s Muslim majority 

gained momentum amidst government fears about threats emanating from neighboring Afghanistan, especially after the Taliban’s 

August takeover. In Tajikistan, alleged extremism and terrorism are 

punishable without requiring acts that involve violence or incitement of imminent violence. Charges are often arbitrarily issued 

against religious individuals and their trials lack due process and 

procedural safeguards. During 2021, the government conducted 

several mass arrests and imprisoned individuals for alleged involvement in illegal Muslim groups. 

Muslim women reported an intensification of the government’s anti-hijab campaign, with frequent checkpoints at 

hospitals, schools, and public facilities in the capital denying 

entrance to covered women. Male police publicly harassed women 

in hijabs and in some cases detained them. Bearded young men 

continue to report being denied passports unless they shave, 

although there is no legal requirement for them to do so. In 

October, the lower house of Parliament introduced legislation 

increasing the punishment for “underground” religious education, 

including over the internet. In 2016, Tajikistan banned private religious education and children are only allowed religious instruction 

by their parents at home. Since 2011, minors are barred from all 

public religious activity except funerals and receive only limited 

instruction in the history of religion at public schools. The new 

legislation introduces higher fines for illegal instruction and now 

includes the possibility of prison sentences of up to three years. 

The state claims there have been at least 1,833 incidents of illegal 

KEY FINDINGS

religious instruction since 2019, involving 43 imams, 983 unofficial 

clerics, and 32 teachers. 

In 2021, the government continued its sweeping campaign 

against Muslim clerics, leaders, and intellectuals. On February 12, 

Imam Sirojiddin Abdurahmonov was sentenced to five-and-a-half 

years in prison. Despite being widely acknowledged as not critical 

of the regime, the state targeted him for preaching without an 

official appointment and his case has become a warning to other 

independent clerics, many of whom are reportedly afraid to speak 

publicly. Official appointment is also no guarantee of immunity. 

On March 5, Mahmadsodyk Sayidov, the state-appointed imam

of a mosque in Kulob, was arrested immediately after refusing to 

preach the official sermon provided by the State Committee on 

Religious Affairs (SCRA). On June 4, Sayidov was sentenced to 

five years in prison for allegedly participating in an “extremist” 

organization. Tajikistan regularly uses extradition treaties to target political dissidents and religious non-conformists abroad. On 

September 5, Russian authorities arrested Barakatullo Ghoziev at 

Tajikistan’s request to repatriate him to the country to face up to 

25 years in prison for “high treason and inciting religious hatred.” 

Ghoziev is the son of late cleric and Islamic Renaissance Party of 

Tajikistan (IRPT) member Eshoni Ghozi, who was supposedly killed 

by Islamic State supporters during a prison riot in 2019. Shamil 

Khakimov, a 70-year-old Jehovah’s Witness, remains in prison in 

Tajikistan for “extremism” despite his seriously declining health and 

in September was forbidden from attending the funeral of his son 

in violation of the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for 

the Treatment of Prisoners.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

• Condition U.S. security assistance to the 

Tajikistani government on 1) reform of the 

2009 religion law and the improvement 

of conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief, and 2) mandated religious freedom 

training for Tajikistani officials, including 

education about the benefits of religious 

freedom for countering and preventing 

violent extremism;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Tajikistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Press the Tajikistani government at the 

highest levels to identify and immediately 

release individuals imprisoned in Tajikistan for their peaceful religious activities 

or religious affiliations; account for the 

whereabouts of all prisoners of conscience, including those imprisoned on 

religious grounds; and allow international 

observers to monitor conditions in Tajikistani prisons.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan in 2021

• Press Statement: Tajikistan’s Inhumane Treatment of Religious Prisoner Indicative of Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions

• Podcast: Religious Freedom and Taliban Fears in Tajikistan

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Shamil Khakimov
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 37

TAJIKISTAN

Background

Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia and ruled since 1992 

by President Emomali Rahmon, who has concentrated power in his 

family’s hands. The government faces financial catastrophe in the 

wake of the COVID-19 crisis. In 2021, the situation was further complicated by numerous crises, including a border conflict with neighboring 

Kyrgyzstan, violent protests in the ethnic Pamiri city of Khorog, and 

the Taliban takeover of neighboring Afghanistan. The population is 

predominantly Sunni Muslim—around 86 percent—while Shi’a Muslims, mostly ethnic Pamiris located in the mountainous east, account 

for roughly four percent. The remaining 10 percent includes Russian 

Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, 

Jews, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians. 

Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of religion or belief 

sharply declined after the adoption of several highly restrictive laws 

in 2009. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Unions set 

onerous registration requirements; criminalized unregistered religious 

activity, private religious education, and proselytism; set strict limits 

on the number and size of mosques; allowed state interference in the 

appointment of imams and the content of sermons; required official 

permission for religious organizations to provide religious instruction 

and communicate with foreign coreligionists; and imposed state controls on the content, publication, and import of religious materials. In 

2011 and 2012, administrative and penal code amendments set new 

penalties, including large fines and prison terms, for religion-related 

charges such as organizing or participating in “unapproved” religious 

meetings. A 2011 law on parental responsibility banned minors from 

any organized religious activity except funerals. Since 2014, the state 

has paid imams’ salaries and required them to wear state-issued religious garments, and the content of sermons is commonly dictated 

by the government. 

Mass Arrests of Muslims

Similar to its activities in 2020, the government continued to conduct 

mass arrests and detentions for alleged religious extremism in 2021. 

On April 9, 117 individuals received prison sentences between five 

and 23 years for supposed involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Defendants came from all over the country and included prominent 

Muslim leaders, scholars, and local politicians. In June, a closed trial 

began against 18 men accused of Salafism, an ill-defined but illegal 

category in Tajikistan, frequently applied to Muslims who do not practice in the state-approved fashion. Defendants claim they confessed to 

the charges under torture, which is endemic in Tajikistan, particularly 

in prisons. Religious prisoners are singled out for particularly harsh 

treatment by both authorities and fellow prisoners. 

UN Human Rights Review

During Tajikistan’s Universal Periodic Review in November, the UN 

Human Rights Council noted Tajikistan’s misuse of vague and broad 

legislation concerning terrorism and extremism to limit peaceful 

religious practice, target political dissidence, and facilitate authoritarian overreach. The Council noted that Tajikistan routinely applies 

unfounded extremism charges to journalists, human rights activists, 

political opposition, and religious minorities or non-conformists. A 

planned trip by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, Ahmed Shaheed, was canceled after the Tajikistani government 

failed to extend a promised official invitation.

Repression of the IRPT 

In 2021, Tajikistan continued its relentless campaign against the 

IRPT, a moderate Islamic party that constituted the only real political opposition in the country prior to the state banning it in 2015 

on unsubstantiated charges of terrorism. State persecution of the 

IRPT is motivated by fear of political opposition, but justifications are 

framed in terms of combating religious extremism and terrorism. On 

June 1, a former IRPT member was sentenced to five years in prison 

for membership in a banned extremist organization, despite having 

cut ties with the party in 2015. In September, the imprisoned 70 yearold spokesman for the IRPT, Hikmatullo Sayfullozoda, was attacked 

in the prison hospital while recovering from heart surgery. Violent 

attacks against IRPT members are common in prison and numerous 

prominent members have been murdered while serving out their 

sentences. In November, the wife of an imprisoned IRPT leader was 

inexplicably denied her bi-annual visitation and suspects that her 

husband is recovering from torture.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2021, the United States and Tajikistan marked 30 years of “productive and friendly relations” on the anniversary of the U.S. 

government’s recognition of an independent Tajikistan in 1991. Since 

that time, the U.S. government has provided $1.8 billion in assistance to promote economic development, education, and health, 

as well as regional security, including $330 million in security sector 

assistance to help combat terrorism and narco-trafficking. Over the 

next two years, the U.S. government has pledged an additional $60 

million in security sector assistance. Since 2020, the United States 

has provided Tajikistan with 2.5 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, 

and more than $12 million in equipment and technical support to 

combat the pandemic. 

On December 6, Peter Riley was sworn in as the first director of 

the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) new mission 

in Tajikistan. USAID initiatives in Tajikistan work to foster food security, 

support civil society and nongovernmental organizations, improve 

education quality and access, combat human trafficking, and help 

reintegrate migrant workers into their home communities. In July, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Tajikistan Foreign Minister 

Sirojiddin Muhriddin in Washington, D.C. reaffirming the strength and 

importance of the U.S.-Tajikistan bilateral relationship and expressing 

appreciation for continued leadership on regional security issues. 

On November 15, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Tajikistan as a CPC under IRFA, although it has also maintained a 

waiver on imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required 

in the important national interest of the United States.” It has designated Tajikistan as a CPC each year since 2016.
38 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TURKMENISTAN

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained 

among the worst in the world. Government control of religion is 

highly restrictive, with the state appointing Muslim clerics, surveilling and dictating religious practice, and punishing nonconformity 

through imprisonment, torture, and administrative harassment. 

Turkmenistan is an extremely closed society, described as an informational “black hole” with an abysmal record on freedom of the 

press. This landscape makes it difficult to chronicle the actual extent 

of religious freedom abuses in the country, which are certainly more 

extensive than the limited number of reports indicate. Nevertheless, the available information presents a bleak picture. 

The government continued to treat all independent religious 

activity with suspicion, maintaining a large surveillance apparatus that monitors believers at home and abroad. Turkmenistani 

law requires religious groups to register under intrusive criteria, 

strictly controls registered groups’ activities, and punishes religious 

activities by unregistered groups, which are effectively banned. In 

March 2021, authorities in the region of Dashoguz posted notices 

in residential buildings warning residents not to participate in 

unregistered religious activity. Sources continue to report official 

harassment of religious individuals, including local police detaining groups of bearded men and forcing them to shave and drink 

alcohol to prove they are not “extremists.” In the city of Mary, a 

man was arrested for “sorcery” apparently linked to his practice of 

traditional medicine.

Persons accused of criminal religious offenses are often tried 

in closed-regime courts where sentences remain secret. Convicts 

are often disappeared in the state’s prison system and presumed 

to be held without contact with the outside world. On December 

1, 2021, the Prove They Are Alive campaign published an updated 

list of disappeared prisoners, which now includes 162 individuals. 

Of these, 58 individuals are vaguely accused of “Islamic extremism,” including many affiliated with Kurdish theologian Said Nursi 

and Fethullah Gülen, an influential Turkish preacher heavily influenced by Nursi’s moderate teachings. The authorities hold many 

religious prisoners at the notorious Ovadan-Depe Prison, located 

in the remote desert 50 miles north of the capital city of Ashgabat. 

Ovadan-Depe was built to house high-level political dissidents 

and enemies of the state, and its prisoners routinely die from harsh 

conditions that include torture and starvation. 

COVID-19 restrictions have made public religious practice 

even more difficult than normal. Periodic lockdowns limited most 

in-person public activity, but mosques and other religious facilities were even more stringently targeted, remaining closed when 

parks and restaurants were allowed to open. Inexplicably, the 

government continued to deny the existence of the virus in Turkmenistan even as it imposed these measures. Large mandatory 

public mourning ceremonies in regional mosques for President 

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s father, who died on April 18, were 

a notable exception to the rule. Senior male officials and some in 

the private sector were ordered to shave their heads and wear 

skullcaps for a month-long mourning period, while women in state 

offices were ordered to wear black.

Online activity remained limited by blocked internet access 

and extremely slow network speeds. On January 12, 2022, after the 

reporting period, President Berdimuhamedow instructed the head 

of the Ministry for State Security to further increase state control 

of the internet and restrict public access to internet sources that 

“threaten the constitutional order.”

President Berdimuhamedow’s May 9 pardon of all 16 Jehovah’s Witnesses imprisoned for their conscientious objection to 

military service was one significant positive development.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Take presidential action to limit security 

assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22)

• Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

 to hold the government of 

Turkmenistan accountable for its particularly severe violations of religious freedom;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Turkmenistan government agencies and 

officials responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations; and

• Urge the government of Turkmenistan to 

provide an acceptable civilian alternative 

to military service and to cease imprisoning citizens for conscientious objection. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Controlling Civil Society’s Purse Strings

• Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Amnesty of Jehovah’s Witness Prisoners in Turkmenistan
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 39

TURKMENISTAN

Background

Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian country under the rule of President Berdimuhamedow since 2007, enforcing a cult of personality 

that proliferates his image in golden monuments and fawning official 

coverage. The 2016 Constitution removed the presidential age limit 

and Berdimuhamedow was “reelected” in 2017 with 97 percent of the 

vote. On February 11, 2022, the 64-year-old president, who is rumored 

to be in bad health, announced the nomination of his 40-year-old 

son, Serdar, to the presidency, to be confirmed at snap “elections” 

currently scheduled for March 12, 2022. This managed transition 

comes at a moment of significant political and social fragility amid 

the ongoing pandemic and the August 2021 takeover of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. For several years, the government 

has been extremely concerned about the possibility of mass unrest 

amid a crippling economic decline, and it is rapidly implementing an 

“anti-terrorist plan” that includes the installation of facial recognition 

cameras and “smart city” technology in public places, including small 

businesses. The government typically charges its critics with terrorism, 

targeting their families and friends if it cannot extradite them from 

abroad. This has not stopped it from hosting official visits from the 

Taliban, with whom it maintains relatively cordial relations in pursuit of 

regional economic connectivity and especially a proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline to transport Turkmen 

gas to southern ports.

The majority is Sunni Muslim (89 percent), while Orthodox Christians represent the second-largest group, comprising around nine 

percent. Although the 2016 Religion Law asserts that Turkmenistan is 

a secular state with religious freedom, it requires religious groups to 

register with the Ministry of Justice under intrusive criteria, mandates 

that the government be informed of all foreign financial support, bans 

private religious education and worship, and prohibits the public 

wearing of religious garb except by clerics. The State Commission on 

Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation of Religious Information Resources (SCROEERIR) oversees all religious activity, including 

registrations, the appointment of religious leaders, the building of 

houses of worship, and the import and publication of religious literature. The registration process requires religious organizations to 

provide detailed information about founding members, including 

names, addresses, and birth dates. Recognized communities must 

reregister every three years, and religious activity is forbidden in 

prisons and the military. 

Targeting Religious Holidays

Although the government continued to deny the existence of COVID19 in Turkmenistan, the country’s mosques have been largely closed as 

a “prophylactic” measure since 2020—a restriction that did not apply 

to public memorials for President Berdimuhamedow’s father in the 

month following his death on April 18, 2021. Large public gatherings in 

honor of Turkmenistan’s national horse and national dog also remained 

unaffected by the general moratorium on public assembly.

In stark contrast, Turkmenistani authorities appeared to target 

Muslim religious holidays deliberately in 2021. During the festival 

of Eid al-Fitr in May, mosques remained closed even though cafes, 

restaurants, and parks were allowed to remain open. On May 13, 

worshipers who attempted to commemorate the holiday by praying 

outside the main mosque in the city of Mary were forcibly dispersed. 

On July 21, during the Islamic festival of Eid al-Adha, police in Lebap 

conducted raids on private homes in at least four cities, demanded 

that residents turn over all religious literature, and said that only possession of the Qur’an was permitted in Turkmenistan. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and Conscientious Objection

Although not technically banned, Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been 

granted registration and are therefore unable to operate legally. 

Article 58 of the 2016 Constitution describes defense as a “sacred 

duty” incumbent on everyone. After 2018, when the state renewed 

its campaign against conscientious objection, Turkmenistan imprisoned at least 25 Jehovah’s Witnesses under Article 219(1) of the 

Criminal Code for the absence of a legal basis for exemption from 

military service. In early 2021, Turkmenistan continued this trend, 

again conscripting Ruslan Artykmuradov, a 20-year-old Jehovah’s 

Witness who previously served time in prison for his conscientious 

objection. In an unexpected development, on May 9, 2021, President Berdimuhamedow pardoned all 16 Jehovah’s Witnesses who 

remained imprisoned for their conscientious objection. Although 

mass presidential amnesties are a regular state ritual in Turkmenistan, they rarely include religious prisoners. It is notable that the 

pardons did not include any Muslim religious prisoners despite 

occurring during the month of Ramadan. 

Despite the presidential pardon, conscientious objection 

remains illegal in Turkmenistan, and Jehovah’s Witnesses—or any 

believers who refuse military service for religious reasons—face 

legal jeopardy. Although the government did propose a non-combat alternative service option to Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2021, it was 

perceived as too closely affiliated with the military and rejected by 

community representatives.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States engages with the Turkmenistan government in 

border and regional security programs, along with educational and 

cultural exchanges. Turkmenistan enjoys most-favored-nation trading 

status and receives direct U.S. assistance to strengthen the security 

of its border with Afghanistan. On November 12, 2021, President 

Joseph R. Biden sent a letter to President Berdimuhamedow expressing gratitude for assistance and cooperation offered during the U.S. 

withdrawal from Afghanistan. Although the U.S. government is cognizant of the deplorable state of human rights in Turkmenistan, it has 

prioritized security concerns. 

The U.S. Department of State has designated Turkmenistan as 

a CPC under IRFA since 2014 and redesignated it on November 15, 

2021, but it has repeatedly used a waiver against any related sanctions 

“as required in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’” 

This waiver effectively neutralizes the consequences of Turkmenistan’s 

CPC designation, removes any incentive for the government to reform 

its brutal policies, and lends credence to the regime’s claims that 

security concerns warrant its harsh repression of religious freedom.
40 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

VIETNAM

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam generally trended 

the same as in 2020. The government continued to enforce the 

2018 Law on Belief and Religion, which, as written and implemented, contravened international human rights standards. 

Authorities persecuted members of unregistered independent 

groups and subjected believers and religious freedom advocates 

to long-term imprisonment.

Authorities continued to persecute independent religious 

communities, including Protestant Hmong and Montagnard Christians, Hoa Hao Buddhists, Unified Buddhists, Cao Dai followers, and 

adherents of other religious movements such as Falun Gong, Duong 

Van Minh, the World Mission Society Church of God, and Ha Mon. 

The government designated many of these groups as “strange,” 

“evil,” or “heretical” religions and often cited security grounds to 

suppress them, causing some—such as Ha Mon—to reportedly 

face extinction. As of April 2021, the Government Committee for 

Religious Affairs (GCRA) listed 85 groups as “strange religions.” 

In June, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and head of the GCRA 

Vu Chien Thang stated that “Vietnam is ready to welcome all religions, even strange ones.” In an official document published in 

November, the GCRA discussed the positive and negative aspects 

of new religious movements but offered no indication as to when 

the government would recognize and permit these new religions. 

Throughout 2021, authorities routinely disrupted religious 

services, training, and ceremonies and harassed, detained, and 

threatened adherents and activists belonging to independent 

religious groups. Unregistered Hmong and Montagnard Christian groups remain particularly vulnerable to persecution. Local 

authorities harassed, detained, intimidated, and physically abused

members of the Montagnard Evangelical Church of Christ in 

Phu Yen Province. The group reportedly tried to register with 

the government but received no response in the past few years. 

The Protestant Church of Christ in Dak Lak Province similarly had 

KEY FINDINGS

trouble registering their religious activities and gatherings with 

local authorities. Moreover, authorities subjected members of 

these Protestant groups to “criticism sessions” and forced them 

to renounce their faith in public. Thousands of Hmong and Montagnard Christians remain effectively stateless because local 

authorities refused to issue them identity cards and household 

registration documents, in many instances in retaliation against 

Christians who refuse to renounce their faith. In a positive development, this past year Lam Dong provincial authorities issued 

identity cards to stateless residents of Subdivisions 179 and 181 

and allowed them to vote in elections. 

Authorities harassed independent Hoa Hao Buddhists and 

disrupted their observance of important religious rituals and holidays, forcing them to carry out religious activities at home. USCIRF 

received reports that in January 2021, local authorities in Ben Cau 

Township, Tay Ninh Province, harassed adherents of a home-based 

independent Cao Dai group and disrupted its religious service. In 

September, authorities in Cho Gao District, Tien Giang Province, 

detained and interrogated independent Cao Dai followers and 

forced them to join the state-sanctioned group. Several independent Cao Dai groups tried to register their religious activities in 

early 2021 but received no response. 

Land disputes between the Catholic community and local 

governments persisted. The An Hoa Parish dissented from the Da 

Nang City government’s decision that sold and repurposed the land 

the parish owned prior to 1975. The parish petitioned the government to return its land and cease construction by a private entity 

that had begun in March 2021. The Da Nang government, however, 

agreed to resettle Catholic residents of Con Dau Parish after over 

10 years of land disputes that had led to violent clashes between 

parishioners and local authorities in the past. Moreover, authorities 

in Loan My Village, Tam Binh District, Vinh Long Province, denied

a Khmer-Krom Buddhist group’s request to build a religious site.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and enter into a new binding agreement with the government to address key 

areas of concern to further improve religious freedom; 

• Engage with the Vietnamese government 

and relevant academic and civil society 

stakeholders to encourage amendments 

to the Law on Belief and Religion and its 

implementing decree to conform to international standards, including by making 

registration simpler and optional; 

• Work with the Vietnamese government 

to provide a pathway to full citizenship—

based on the existing model of Subdivisions 

179 and 181 in Lam Dong Province—for all 

Hmong and Montagnard Christians in the 

Northern and Central Highlands, including 

by providing funding to facilitate improving 

religious freedom conditions among those 

communities; and

• Direct the U.S. Mission in Vietnam to highlight and monitor the conditions of religious 

prisoners of conscience and to advocate for 

their wellbeing in prison and their release. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Support legislation pertaining to religious 

freedom in Vietnam, such as the Vietnam 

Human Rights Act. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: The State of Religious Freedom in Vietnam

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Vietnam in 2021

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Nguyen Bac Truyen
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 41

VIETNAM

Background

Vietnam’s constitution states that citizens “can follow any religion or 

follow none” and that “all religions are equal before the law.” The constitution also mandates respect and protection for freedom of belief 

and religion. However, it allows authorities to restrict human rights, 

including religious freedom, for reasons of “national defense, national 

security, social order and security, social morality, and community 

wellbeing.” Vietnam’s 2018 Law on Belief and Religion contains similar 

provisions permitting restrictions on the right to religious freedom. 

Vietnam is a religiously diverse country with religious demographics varying greatly across research studies and reports. Religious 

traditions with a significant presence in the country include Buddhism, 

Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Catholicism, and Protestantism. At the 

end of 2020, the government had officially recognized a total of 16 

religions and 43 religious organizations. Many groups, however, refuse 

to register for fear of persecution or concern over their independence, 

which has led state-sponsored and independent religious groups to 

compete over who represents their religion. 

Legal and Policy Developments

The 2018 Law on Belief and Religion presents notable improvements 

compared to the 2004 ordinance, including reducing the waiting 

period for religious organizations to register with the government and 

granting legal personhood to registered religious organizations. Nevertheless, the law imposes burdensome and complex requirements 

on religious groups to register with the government. For example, 

the law requires religious groups to register for religious activities, 

religious gatherings, and official recognition. Each of these steps 

entails a separate registration process, requiring groups to submit 

extensive information about their organizations and activities. Moreover, groups seeking official recognition as a religious organization 

must have legally operated for at least five years before applying. 

Over the past three years of implementation, USCIRF has observed 

uneven and inconsistent application of the law throughout Vietnam. 

In September 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued an Action 

Plan for State Management of Belief and Religion, which included an 

emphasis on state control of religion to ensure political and social 

stability. In November, the GCRA held a meeting to amend and supplement the implementing Decree (162/2017/ND-CP) for the 2018 Law 

on Belief and Religion. Deputy Minister Vu Chien Thang stated that the 

decree has demonstrated shortcomings that need to be addressed, 

but he did not identify these shortcomings. 

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

USCIRF has long expressed concerns regarding religious prisoners 

of conscience in Vietnam. This year, many believers and religious 

freedom advocates remained in prison, serving long sentences. These 

prisoners included Montagnard Christian pastor Y Yich (sentenced to 

12 years), founder of the Buddhist An Dan Dai Dao religious group 

Phan Van Thu (sentenced to life imprisonment), and many others 

who reportedly have been abused or otherwise mistreated in prison 

and are suffering from deteriorating health conditions. USCIRF has 

consistently advocated for the release of Hoa Hao Buddhist Nguyen 

Bac Truyen (sentenced to 11 years)—a renowned religious freedom 

advocate adopted under USCIRF’s Religious Prisoners of Conscience 

(RPOC) project—who has reportedly been in poor health. 

Key U.S. Policy

The Biden administration has emphasized that human rights—which 

includes the fundamental freedom of religion and belief—are an 

integral part of U.S. foreign policy, including policy toward Vietnam. In 

his July 2021 visit to the country, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin 

expressed concerns over Vietnam’s human rights record. Prior to Vice 

President Kamala D. Harris’ trip to Vietnam in August 2021, members 

of Congress and politicians in other countries, as well as civil society 

groups, called on the Vice President to raise Nguyen Bac Truyen’s case 

and urge the government of Vietnam to release him immediately and 

unconditionally. Vice President Harris later said at a news conference 

in Hanoi that she had raised the issues of human rights abuses and 

the release of dissidents with her Vietnamese counterparts. Then 

nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper voiced the 

same concerns during his Senate confirmation hearing and said that 

bilateral relations could only reach their fullest potential if Vietnam 

makes significant progress on human rights. In November 2021, during 

the 25th U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, U.S. officials raised 

concerns with their Vietnamese counterparts about religious freedom conditions, the situation of ethnic minority groups, and other 

human rights issues. With U.S.-Vietnam relations trending in a positive 

direction and the United States considering a potential upgrade of 

bilateral relations from a “comprehensive partnership” to a “strategic 

partnership,” experts observe that human rights remain a challenge 

in the growing relationship.

In May, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) introduced the bipartisan Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 3001), which would allow the 

U.S. government to sanction Vietnamese officials and others who are 

complicit in systematic violations of internationally recognized human 

rights, including particularly severe violations of religious freedom. 

In August, Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) sent a letter to Secretary 

of State Antony J. Blinken urging him to take action to address the 

Vietnamese government’s human rights abuses and discrimination 

against religious groups and religious expression. While USCIRF 

has recommended Vietnam’s designation as a CPC every year since 

2002—finding that despite some areas of progress, “systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious” violations of religious freedom within the 

meaning of IRFA persist—the State Department designated it as a 

CPC only in 2004 and 2005.
42 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

ALGERIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Algeria deteriorated, 

with the government increasingly enforcing blasphemy laws and 

continuing to restrict worship. Algerian authorities convicted 

and sentenced individuals for blasphemy and proselytization, 

maintained the closure of dozens of Protestant churches, and 

charged religious minorities with illegally gathering while not 

providing a legal path for them to worship collectively. These 

actions impacted religious minorities across many faiths and 

beliefs, including Protestant Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, 

and freethinkers.

In January 2021, a court sentenced Hamid Soudad, a Christian, to five years in prison for “insulting the prophet of Islam” by 

sharing a caricature of the Prophet on social media. In February, 

a court sentenced freethinker Said Djabelkhir, an expert on 

Sufism and advocate for a progressive interpretation of Islam, 

to three years in prison for “offending the precepts of Islam.” In 

March, authorities sentenced opposition activist Walid Kechida

to three years in prison for “offending the precepts” of Islam in 

internet memes. In June, a court upheld a proselytization conviction against pastor and bookshop owner Rachid Mohamed 

Seighir and his book shop assistant Mouh Hamimi, sentencing 

them to suspended one-year prison sentences. In October, a 

court sentenced two Ahmadiyya Muslims to two years in prison 

KEY FINDINGS

for defamation based on religion and denigration of common 

rituals of Islam.

In June, a court in Oran ordered the government to physically 

seal three churches despite the ongoing appeal by the Protestant 

community protesting the order for their closure. Since 2017, the 

Algerian government has ordered the closure of 20 Protestant 

churches under Ordinance 06-03, which prohibits non-Muslim 

organizations from establishing places of worship without authorization. The Evangelical Protestant Association (EPA) applied for 

authorization but the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, which reportedly never meets, has not adequately 

responded to the request. 

In November, following the U.S. Department of State’s 

announcement adding Algeria to its Special Watch List for engaging 

in and tolerating severe religious freedom violations, the Algerian 

government summoned the president of the EPA to court for practicing non-Muslim rites without permission. Algerian authorities 

also continued to prosecute Ahmadiyya Muslims and Protestants 

for gathering without authorization. The Algerian government 

insists the Ahmadiyya Muslim community register with the Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, while Ahmadis, who 

consider themselves Muslim, believe that to be in violation of their 

conscience as Muslims.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Maintain Algeria on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

and

• Direct U.S. Embassy officials to:

• Urge the Algerian government to develop 

and implement a plan to decriminalize 

blasphemy and proselytization;

• Meet with the National Commission 

for Non-Muslim Religious Groups and 

other relevant government officials, 

and insist the Algerian government 

deliver clear and timely responses to 

registration requests by non-Muslim 

organizations as required by Ordinance 

06-03; and

• Attend and observe court proceedings 

on blasphemy charges or cases related to 

houses of worship to emphasize the U.S. 

government’s concerns about such cases. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Continue to raise the implementation of 

blasphemy laws and closure of houses of 

worship with the State Department and 

relevant Algerian counterparts to ensure 

religious freedom concerns are incorporated into the U.S.-Algeria bilateral 

relationship.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Algeria

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in Algeria

• Factsheet: Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslims
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 43

ALGERI

Background

A

Algeria is home to nearly 43 million people, 99 percent of whom 

are estimated to be Sunni Muslim. The remaining 1 percent of the 

population is comprised of Jews, nonbelievers, Muslim minorities 

(including Ahmadiyya and Shi’a Muslims), and Christians (including 

Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Evangelicals, 

Lutherans, the Reformed Church, and Egyptian Coptic Christians). 

Algeria’s constitution establishes Islam as the official state religion.

Algeria has a long history of repression and persecution of religious minorities, including against Jews, Baha’is, Protestant Christians, 

and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Despite Algeria’s constitution affording all 

Algerians the right to freedom of opinion and worship, the Algerian 

government limits the free expression and practice of belief through 

the enforcement of laws that favor a particular interpretation of Islam 

and restrict religious activities. Algeria’s penal and information codes 

criminalize blasphemy with punishments including imprisonment for 

up to five years and a fine of up to approximately $829 USD (100,000 

Algerian dinars). Algeria’s Criminal Code also censors publications by 

prohibiting content that is “contrary to Islamic morals.” 

Through Ordinance 06-03 passed in 2006, the Algerian government requires all non-Muslim organizations register with the Algerian 

government to conduct affairs and establish places of worship. The 

process for registration has been opaque and poorly implemented, 

yielding legal uncertainty for some non-Muslim religious communities, 

which the government exploits to repress and prosecute religious 

minorities. Ordinance 06-03 also criminalizes proselytization by 

non-Muslims with punishments of up to five years in prison and a 

maximum fine of approximately $8,347 USD (1 million dinar).

Blasphemy and Proselytization Convictions

In January, a court sentenced Hamid Soudad, a Christian, to five years 

in prison for “insulting the prophet of Islam” by sharing a caricature 

of the Prophet on social media. Upon appeal, the Oran City Court 

of Justice upheld the sentence in March. Soudad has appealed the 

verdict, a process that can take over a year, and in the meantime 

remains imprisoned. In April, a court convicted Said Djabelkhir, a 

scholar and free thought leader, of blasphemy for “offending the 

precepts of Islam” and sentenced him to three years in prison and an 

approximately $375 USD fine (50,000 dinar), reportedly after a fellow 

academic filed a complaint that his writings constituted “an attack and 

mockery of the authentic hadiths of the Sunna [the custom and practice] of the Prophet,” and had caused individuals psychological harm.

In March, authorities sentenced opposition activist Walid Kechida

to three years in prison for insulting President Abdelmadjid Tebboune 

and “offending the precepts” of Islam in internet memes. Also, in April 

authorities detained Christian convert Foudhil Bahloul, interrogating 

him on his conversion, searching his house, and confiscating Christian materials. In July 2021, a court sentenced Bahloul to six months 

imprisonment and fined approximately $750 USD (100,000 dinar) 

for “illegally accepting donations” from religious groups when local 

Christians raised funds to help him cover costs after he lost his job 

due to his conversion.

In June, a court upheld a proselytization conviction against pastor and bookshop owner Rachid Mohamed Seighir and his book 

shop assistant Mouh Hamimi for “printing, storing, or distributing 

materials that can ‘shake’ the faith of a Muslim,” sentencing them to 

a suspended one-year prison sentence and an approximately $1,500 

USD (200,000 dinar) fine. In August, alleged plainclothes agents 

abducted Algerian national, Christian convert, and UN-recognized 

refugee Slimane Bouhafs in Tunisia and transferred him to Algeria, 

where he remains detained on several charges including blasphemy. 

In October, advocates reported that two Ahmadiyya Muslims were 

convicted of defamation based on religion and denigration of common rituals of Islam and unlicensed fundraising and sentenced to two 

years in prison, although they were not incarcerated after the verdict 

due to time served awaiting trial for six months.

Restrictions on Houses of Worship

In 2021, Algerian authorities continued to uphold and implement 

restrictions on houses of worship for both Protestants and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Since 2017, Algerian officials have ordered the closure 

of 20 Protestant churches. The Algerian government justifies these 

closures by citing Ordinance 06-03, which requires that non-Muslim 

religious organizations register to establish houses of worship. Protestant organizations report that government authorities systematically 

refuse to provide them the necessary receipt for registration, effectively rendering their activities illegal. In June 2021, a court in Oran 

ordered the physical sealing of three churches despite the ongoing 

appeal by the Protestant community protesting the order for their 

closure. In November, a court charged the leader of the country’s 

largest Protestant church and three other Christians with worshiping 

without the prior approval of the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups. 

Algerian authorities have also restricted Ahmadiyya Muslims

from establishing houses of worship. The Algerian government, which 

does not consider Ahmadiyya Muslims to be Muslims, has required 

that the Ahmadiyya Muslim community register as a non-Muslim 

organization under Ordinance 06-03. Since doing so would violate 

Ahmadiyya Muslims’ conscience, as the community considers themselves Muslim, the Ahmadiyya community remains unregistered in 

Algeria and is subject to forced closure of its mosques and prosecution 

for unauthorized gathering under existing regulations. The majority of 

pending court cases against Ahmadiyya Muslims pertain to accusations of unauthorized gatherings for the purposes of worship.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States is one of Algeria’s top trading partners, and professional exchanges play a valuable role in strengthening the U.S.-Algeria 

law enforcement and security partnership at both the senior and 

working levels. The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) “has 

supported the work of Algeria’s civil society through programming 

that provides training to journalists, businesspeople, female entrepreneurs and parliamentarians, legal professionals, and the heads of 

leading non-governmental organizations.”

In April, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with 

Algeria’s Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum over the phone and 

discussed strengthening the bilateral relationship founded on shared 

values and mutual interests. In July, a group of bipartisan Senators 

sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that the State Department take action against systematic, discriminatory treatment toward 

members of religious minority groups. On November 15, the State 

Department placed Algeria on its Special Watch List for the first time 

for severe violations of religious freedom. 
44 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AZERBAIJAN

KEY FINDINGS

refuted that claim. Azerbaijan’s human rights commissioner additionally hinted that the government may repeal a ban prohibiting 

women and girls from wearing headscarves in passport photos.

In mid-March, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev unexpectedly 

pardoned 31 religious activists, many of whom were considered 

members of the Muslim Unity Movement (MUM), as part of a 

broader release of prisoners ahead of the Novruz holiday. The 

pardon and release of other religious activists upon the completion 

of their sentences brought down the total number of individuals 

imprisoned for their religious affiliations or activities to between 

11–21 prisoners. However, law enforcement authorities detained 

or arrested other religious activists throughout the year, including 

MUM members Razi Humbatov and Vugar Hajiyev, and briefly 

rounded up a number of Shi’a Muslim clerics before releasing all 

but one of them.

Concerns remained regarding the protection and preservation of religious and cultural heritage sites in Nagorno-Karabakh 

and the territories returned to Azerbaijani control following the 

November 2020 ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Caucasus Heritage Watch, a research initiative supported by Cornell 

University, documented through satellite imagery the razing of 

two Armenian cemeteries and a mosque. It also catalogued several 

churches that appeared damaged or that researchers considered 

“threatened” due to nearby construction projects. And while the 

Azerbaijani government announced in 2020 that two soldiers would 

face charges for destroying Armenian gravestones, authorities have 

since refused to release any information regarding those cases. 

In December, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan to “take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of 

vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, 

including . . . churches and other places of worship . . . [and] cemeteries.” Finally, Azerbaijani military forces reportedly blocked a 

group of pilgrims from visiting monasteries in these areas.

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan generally 

trended negatively, with a few notable positive developments. In 

the beginning of the year, the Azerbaijani government unexpectedly announced plans to amend the country’s restrictive 2009 law 

On Freedom of Religious Beliefs (religion law); these amendments 

passed swiftly and entered into force mid-year. Several entities, 

including USCIRF and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, 

had previously called for the government to revise the law to guarantee the protection of freedom of religion or belief and to remove 

provisions that constituted violations of this right. The amendments 

not only failed to address existing problems but also introduced 

new restrictions on religious communities. Prominent among those 

additions were requirements that the government approve the 

appointment of essentially all religious leaders; religious communities cease religious activity in the absence of an appointed cleric; 

certain categories of religious activities only take place in approved 

spaces; and worship and religious ceremonies only be carried out 

by Azerbaijani citizens, unless given express permission otherwise. Moreover, despite public urging, the Azerbaijani government 

declined to seek feedback on the amendments from the general 

public or international organizations such as the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

Ongoing issues stemming from the religion law and other 

policies that impact the exercise of freedom of religion or belief 

also saw no improvement. During 2021, the government did not 

register any non-Muslim religious communities that had pending 

applications under the religion law. According to the official State 

Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA), the 

government registered at least 16 Muslim communities. Although 

sources stated that the Azerbaijani government was considering 

adopting a civilian alternative to mandatory military service for conscientious objectors, nongovernmental organization (NGO) Forum 

18 reported that an official from the Presidential Administration 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Azerbaijan on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Work with the government of Azerbaijan to 

revise the 2009 religion law, as most recently 

amended in 2021, to comply with international human rights standards and to bring 

it into conformity with recommendations 

made in 2012 by the Council of Europe’s 

Venice Commission and the OSCE;

• Assist the Azerbaijani government, in collaboration with international partners, to 

develop an alternative civilian service and 

permit conscientious objection pursuant 

to its commitment made to the Council of 

Europe, obligations under international 

human rights law, and the Azerbaijani constitution; and

• Allocate funding to the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and 

U.S. Embassy in Baku to restore, preserve, and protect places of worship 

and other religious or cultural sites in 

Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding 

territories.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Raise concerns, through public hearings 

and other actions, about Azerbaijan’s 

religious freedom and broader human 

rights abuses, including treatment of 

the MUM, directly with the Azerbaijani 

Embassy and other government officials 

and advocate for the release of all prisoners of conscience.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 45

AZERBAIJAN

Background

The U.S. government estimates the population of Azerbaijan at nearly 

10.3 million people. Roughly 97 percent of citizens are Muslim, with 

around 65 percent identifying as Shi’a Muslim and 35 percent identifying as Sunni Muslim. The remaining less than three percent of 

the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Catholics, 

Georgian Orthodox, members of the International Society for Krishna 

Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, Protestants, 

and Russian Orthodox.

Although Azerbaijan defines itself as a secular state whose constitution requires the separation of state and religion, the Azerbaijani 

government conversely actively involves itself in, regulates, and interferes in religious affairs. Primarily, it has legislated an increasingly 

complex set of regulations that require official approval, consent, or 

notification for most religious activities.

Problematic Amendments to the Religion Law

In February, chair of the SCWRA Mubariz Gurbanli stated that the 

government planned to introduce changes to the country’s religion 

law to “further improve the legal framework regulating the sphere 

of religion.” In the following months, Azerbaijan’s National Assembly 

rapidly considered and passed a series of amendments that the President signed into law on June 16, 2021. Rather than reduce bureaucratic 

barriers to the free practice and expression of one’s beliefs, the updates 

further tightened existing restrictions on worship and other religious 

activities. Several additions to the law require government authorization 

or notification for certain actions, such as holding “mass religious worship, rites, and ceremonies” outside designated places of worship and 

organizing religious pilgrimages abroad. Furthermore, the appointment 

of all religious leaders in the country requires official approval, and 

religious communities must cease religious activities in the absence of 

an approved religious figure until a new one is appointed. The law also 

bans “forcing children to believe in a religion,” which a representative of 

the official Caucasus Muslim Board claimed would only apply to “certain 

religious movements whose participation in rituals and religious conversations is not considered appropriate by the state.” The representative 

clarified that it would not prevent children from practicing Azerbaijan’s 

“traditional religions,” namely Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, despite 

concerns that the vagueness of the amendment would give law enforcement such wide discretion that it could easily be abused. 

Imprisonment of Religious Activists

Various NGOs have maintained lists of political prisoners in Azerbaijan 

for years. In recent years, the total number of individuals imprisoned 

in connection with their religious activism has continued to decrease. 

In March, President Aliyev issued a sweeping pardon in advance of 

the Novruz holiday that released from prison an estimated 31 religious activists, the majority of whom had some connection to the 

MUM. Other individuals were released following the completion of 

their sentences. By the end of the year, NGOs assessed that between 

11–21 religious activists remained behind bars, a significant drop 

compared to previous years. In spite of these releases, however, a 

report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found

that “the problem of political prisoners in Azerbaijan. . . has been 

neither duly recognized nor adequately addressed by the authorities, 

let alone resolved.”

Authorities continued to detain or arrest others, ostensibly on 

charges related to their religious affiliations or activities. In May, 

authorities detained MUM representative Elchin Gasimli for unclear 

reasons. In July, news outlets reported the detention of Razi Humbatov, a MUM member, on seemingly spurious drug charges that 

he believed were in retaliation for his criticism of the government. 

According to human rights defenders, Humbatov was tortured for 

six days to extract a confession. Yet another MUM member, Vugar 

Hajiyev, was also arrested during this period on similar charges. 

Relevant to the ongoing official pressure against the MUM, human 

rights activists in the country maintained that authorities continued 

to restrict access to the settlement of Nardaran, often associated 

with the group, and enforced a ban on visiting mosques there. In 

October, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service detained six Shi’a religious leaders, including cleric Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, likely as a result of 

increased tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran. Family members 

reported that government agents brought the clerics in for questioning and confiscated several personal possessions, including phones, 

computers, and religious books. Ultimately, all but one individual 

were released by the end of the reporting period.

Key U.S. Policy

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan 

is motivated mainly by joint efforts to promote European energy 

security, increase trade and investment, and combat terrorism and 

transnational threats. In its role as a cochair—along with France and 

the Russian Federation—of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States 

also continued to push for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The State Department engaged the Azerbaijani government 

publicly on religious freedom and human rights concerns. In March, 

the Office of International Religious Freedom welcomed the Novruz 

pardoning of hundreds of individuals and called for the release of all 

prisoners of conscience. In June, the same office criticized the government’s passage of new restrictive amendments to the country’s 

religion law. Over the course of the year, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Earle D. Litzenberger visited Quba, where he noted the country’s 

“spirit of tolerance,” and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, where 

it has been difficult to monitor religious freedom conditions. It is not 

clear whether the ambassador raised issues related to religious freedom during that trip.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Stalled Progress in Azerbaijan

• Factsheet: Destruction of Cemeteries

• Interview: Azerbaijan and Turkey Should Be Included in Special Watch List (in ArmNews TV)

• Press Statement: USCIRF Concerned by Azerbaijan Religion Law Amendments, Condition of Ghazanchetsots Cathedral
46 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions deteriorated in the Central 

African Republic (CAR). Following a year of progress and reduced 

religious freedom violations in 2020, violence on the basis of 

religion, especially the targeting of Muslim minorities, appears to 

have increased in CAR in 2021. CAR authorities in select prefectures and state-backed foreign fighters with links to the Russian 

government committed arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, 

and torture and inhumane treatment against Muslims based on 

their assumed affiliation with rebel groups due to their religious or 

ethnoreligious identity. 

In February, national security forces and foreign fighters 

overran a mosque in Bambari and shot dead at least three Muslims. 

In May, CAR authorities arrested a Muslim shopkeeper in Kaga 

Bandoro and the next day his charred body was found on the outskirts of town, cut into pieces. In June, foreign fighters reportedly 

stormed the home of the Sultan of Koui and insisted he and two 

companions accompany them. The Russian-linked fighters returned 

a few hours later and told the Sultan’s family that he and his companions had been killed by a landmine. A United Nations (UN) 

human rights investigation found that they had in fact been shot. 

A few months later, foreign fighters reportedly raided the home of 

the second most influential Muslim cleric in Koui, the imam of Koui 

central mosque, and disappeared him after harassing him for weeks 

to stop teaching children in the Quranic School. 

KEY FINDINGS

In January, CAR security forces arrested a Muslim man accused 

of being an informant to rebel groups and tortured him for two 

days to obtain a confession. In April, CAR authorities in Bambari 

arbitrarily arrested 18 Muslim civilians and subjected them to cruel, 

inhumane, and degrading treatment. Also in April, CAR authorities 

arrested a Muslim trader and beat him and confiscated his motorbike and a sum of money. In May, CAR security forces in Bang 

arrested and tortured 20 Muslim civilians due to their perceived 

association with a local armed group.

The CAR government has opened investigations into some 

of these allegations against national security forces and foreign 

fighters, but it has thus far not held anyone accountable for these 

violations and has even obstructed some investigations. CAR 

authorities have also obstructed the work of the Special Criminal Court (SCC), a hybrid court mandated to investigate and try 

individuals responsible for grave human rights abuses during the 

civil war.

Muslim Central Africans also continue to face discrimination 

and displacement. Government authorities charge Muslims higher 

fees and fines than non-Muslims for the same services or penalties. 

Displacement increased in 2021, with more than 100,000 Central 

Africans newly displaced. Although data is lacking, analysts familiar 

with the situation on the ground assess that Muslims are disproportionately represented among CAR’s displaced population.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include CAR on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List (SWL) for 

engaging in and tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA);

• Provide financial, administrative, and 

diplomatic support to the SCC and other 

investigations into ethnoreligious targeting and other human rights abuses 

by state actors or state-backed foreign 

fighters in CAR, including urging the CAR 

government to cease all obstructions to 

such investigations;

• Impose targeted sanctions on CAR government agencies and officials and other 

relevant foreign actors responsible for 

severe violations of religious freedom by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; and

• Continue to allocate funding for humanitarian assistance, including for refugees, 

internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 

returnees, as well as funding programs 

to rebuild mosques destroyed during the 

civil conflict.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Central African Republic

• Factsheet: Religious Tensions and Fulani Communities in West and Central Africa

• Podcast: Central African Republic: From Sectarian Violence to Progress on Religious Freedom
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 47

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Background

CAR’s constitution provides for freedom of religion and equal protection under the law regardless of religion. It prohibits all forms of 

religious intolerance and “religious fundamentalism.” The law also 

requires the head of state to take an oath of office that includes a 

promise to fulfill the duties of the office without any consideration of 

religion. Roughly 89 percent of CAR’s population identify as Christian, 

while nine percent identify as Muslim, one percent practice folk religions, and one percent are religiously unaffiliated. 

In 2012, predominantly Muslim militias in CAR’s north mobilized 

and marched on the capital in response to longstanding grievances 

based in the government’s marginalization of and discrimination 

against Muslim minorities. In response, militias from predominantly 

Christian- and folk religion-practicing communities mobilized for 

self-protection and began retaliating against Muslim civilian communities. This triggered more than half a decade of political and 

ethnoreligious violence, including attacks on individuals based on 

their religious identity and deliberate attacks on houses of worship 

and religious enclaves in cities across CAR. Muslim minorities bore the 

brunt of the conflict, with violence displacing an estimated 80 percent

of CAR’s Muslim population in the first two years. In light of these 

violations, from 2015 to 2019 USCIRF recommended that the State 

Department designate CAR as a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC, under IRFA for engaging in or tolerating particularly severe 

religious freedom violations.

In 2019, the CAR government signed a peace accord with 14 

armed groups. CAR authorities also began to increase cooperation 

with Russian nationals, including fighters affiliated with the Wagner 

Group, a military contractor with ties to the Russian government. In 

2017, the UN Security Council loosened an arms embargo on CAR 

to facilitate Russian security assistance and training to the CAR government, and by 2021 there were an estimated 1,200 Russian-linked 

fighters operating there. In 2019 and 2020, instances of religious 

violence decreased leading USCIRF to recommend SWL status, a 

lesser category, for CAR in 2020 and then to remove CAR from its 

SWL recommendations in its 2021 Annual Report.

However, following contested elections at the end of 2020 and 

the remobilization of a united rebel militia, state-sponsored abuses 

against Muslims have been on the rise. In June, the UN Secretary 

General found that targeted arrests of alleged rebel collaborators 

“disproportionately affected religious and ethnic minorities such 

as Muslims and Fulanis.” A joint human rights investigation by the 

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 

African Republic (MINUSCA) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported a notable “increase in 

targeted attacks against the civilian population, especially Muslims,” in several prefectures and found that CAR authorities used 

a state of emergency in early 2021 to commit abuses that “specifically targeted certain communities (Muslims and Peuhl).” 

Executions, Abductions, and Torture

In 2021, CAR authorities and state-sanctioned foreign fighters with 

links to the Russian government killed or facilitated the execution 

of Muslims on the basis of their religious identities. These violations 

included shooting three Muslims as they exited a mosque in Bambari, abducting and allegedly dismembering a Muslim shopkeeper

in Kaga Bandoro, and abducting and allegedly executing Muslim 

leaders in Koui in June and October. CAR authorities also subjected 

religious minorities to torture and inhumane treatment, detaining 

and torturing at least 39 Muslim civilians in four separate incidents 

detailed in the Key Findings section. . 

Obstructions of Justice

The CAR government has been inconsistent in its response to the 

abuse and religious targeting committed by its security forces and 

partners. In May, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights established 

a Special Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of human 

rights abuses, among other infractions, committed by state-backed 

security personnel in the country between December 2020 and April 

2021. However, the UN recently criticized actions the CAR government has taken to obstruct ongoing human rights investigations in 

the country. 

National security forces have also obstructed judicial institutions from fulfilling their mandates. In November, the SCC issued a 

warrant for the arrest of Hassan Bouba Ali, a former armed group 

leader and current government official. However, national security 

forces prevented the SCC from accessing Mr. Bouba for his scheduled 

appearance and released him in contravention of the SCC’s warrant. 

Houses of Worship

In April, government authorities collaborated with local civil society 

and the UN to rehabilitate and reopen the Petevo mosque in Bangui. While this demonstrates progress, Muslims in CAR continue to 

struggle to access houses of worship, as the civil conflict destroyed

an estimated 417 of the country’s 435 mosques.

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. government continued to support religious freedom efforts in 

CAR, including increasing its financial support for the SCC and imposing 

sanctions on a warlord who broke with the 2019 peace accord. The 

United States also continued to restrict defense assistance to the CAR 

government because “control mechanisms for the use of U.S.-provided 

equipment had not been fully implemented.” In 2022, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas Greenfield expressed deep concern

over human rights abuses in CAR during a Security Council meeting, 

specifically calling out CAR security forces and foreign mercenaries for 

targeting predominantly Muslim communities.
48 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

CUBA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, religious freedom in Cuba remained highly restricted. The 

Cuban government continued to use surveillance, harassment, 

and ad hoc interpretations of legislation to suppress religious 

freedom and persecute religious freedom advocates. During 

2021, the Cuban government’s crackdown on widespread protests 

severely impacted religious communities.

On July 11, Cubans all over the country held unprecedented, 

large-scale protests, initially in response to the deepening economic 

and COVID crises and eventually encompassing criticisms of the 

Cuban government’s rule and crackdown on human rights. In the 

largest demonstrations in decades, protesters rallied for liberty and 

freedom, chanting “Patria y Vida” (“homeland and life”). The Cuban 

authorities responded by detaining, often violently, an estimated

700 demonstrators and activists. Those detained included several 

religious leaders and members of religious communities. For example, Pastor José Alvarez Devesa was beaten by police in Camaguey 

and released the following day. At the end of the year, an unknown 

number of protesters, including religious leaders and members of 

religious communities, remained detained, disappeared, and under 

house arrest. Others were released during 2021 but continued to 

face ongoing harassment. Many were held incommunicado without 

access to family or legal support. Cuban authorities have charged 

some of the detained individuals with crimes such as inciting unrest 

and disobedience and held mass “trials” that lack any semblance of 

due process. Some faced criminal charges, including “disrespect” 

and “public disorder,” while others were placed under house arrest

or fined. 

Four months later, a group of artists and activists known as 

Archipiélago planned another country-wide protest for November 

15. In the weeks preceding the protest, the nongovernmental organization Christian Solidarity Worldwide received over 30 reports of 

authorities targeting religious leaders and religious freedom advocates. Police issued summons and interrogated religious leaders 

about their connection to the planned protest or warned them not 

KEY FINDINGS

to participate in the protest under threat of arrest. Others were 

placed under house arrest in the weeks leading up to the protest. 

As a result of the government’s repression of religious and lay 

community leaders before November 15, the protests did not take 

place as planned. 

Additionally, the Office of Religious Affairs (ORA) continued 

its repressive enforcement of religious restrictions. The Law of 

Associations requires religious organizations to apply to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), where the ORA is housed, for registration. 

Despite existing criteria, registration decisions are often arbitrary 

and discriminatory. Unregistered religious groups are particularly 

vulnerable, as membership or association with an unregistered 

religious group is a crime. The ORA exercises direct and arbitrary control over the affairs of registered religious organizations, 

requiring permission for virtually any activity other than regular 

worship services. 

A month after the July protests, the Cuban government 

enacted a new telecommunications law that severely restricts

freedom of expression online and threatens religious freedom. 

Under Decree-Law 35, telecommunications providers must interrupt, suspend, or terminate their services when a user disseminates 

“fake” information or affects “public morality” and the “respect 

of public order.” This effectively criminalizes online criticism of 

the government and incitement to “public disturbances,” which 

is the same term the government used to describe the peaceful 

July 11 protests. 

The government continued to target independent journalist 

Yoel Suárez and his family for his reporting on religious freedom 

issues. This ongoing harassment prompted the Inter-American 

Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to request that the Cuban 

government protect the rights to life and personal integrity of 

Suárez and his family and allow him to “carry out his activities as an 

independent journalist without being subjected to acts of violence, 

intimidation, harassment and detention.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Maintain Cuba on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom—including Caridad Diego, head 

of the ORA—by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific 

religious freedom violations; and

• Encourage Cuban authorities to extend an 

official invitation for unrestricted visits by 

USCIRF, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for 

International Religious Freedom, and the 

United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur 

on freedom of religion or belief.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Support legislation to require sanctions 

against Cuban officials responsible for 

severe violations of religious freedom.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: Protests in Cuba Impact Religious Freedom

• Factsheet: Protests in Cuba and Religious Freedom

• Podcast: Santería in Cuba

• Factsheet: Santería in Cuba 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 49

CUBA

Background

While there are no independent sources on Cuba’s religious demographics, a reported 60–70 percent of Cuba’s estimated population 

of 11.1 million self-identify as Catholic. Approximately 25–30 percent identify as unaffiliated or another religion, such as Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, Quakers, Moravians, 

and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. An 

estimated 70 percent of Cubans engage in one or more practices 

associated with Santería, a syncretic religion borne out of the Yoruba 

tradition mixed with elements of Catholicism.

Cuba is a one-party system under the ruling Cuban Communist 

Party, with no independent judiciary. The state tightly controls religious institutions. A new constitution adopted in April 2019 protects 

the freedom of religion or belief and prohibits religious discrimination, 

but provisions in the penal and administrative codes contravene these 

protections, such as Decree-Law 35. A timetable was set to review and 

amend corresponding legislation to codify the constitutional changes, 

including the Law of Associations. However, this process has been 

delayed, resulting in some constitutional rights existing only on paper. 

Detention of Religious Leaders following 

July 11 Protests

USCIRF received reports of a number of religious leaders and members 

of religious communities detained during and following the July 11 

protests. Select cases are included in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or 

Belief Victims List, including Christian pastors and Santería practitioners. 

Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo of the independent Monte 

de Sion Independent Church participated in the July 11 protests and 

was detained that day. In the months since his detention, Rosales 

Fajardo endured beatings, degrading treatment by prison guards, 

and the denial of familial contact. The government sought to impose 

a 10-year sentence and tried him in December on charges of “disrespect,” “assault,” “criminal incitement,” and “public disorder.” He 

was told he would be sentenced in January 2022, but the process has 

been repeatedly delayed. 

In the Santería community, at least five members of the independent and unregistered Free Yoruba Association of Cuba (Asociación 

de Yorubas Libres de Cuba or “Free Yorubas”) were detained for 

their participation in the protests, while others were fined. Donaida 

Pérez Paseiro, President of the Free Yorubas, and Loreto Hernández 

García, the community’s vice president, were detained and charged 

with “public disorder,” “disobedience,” “spreading the epidemic,” and 

“incitement.” USCIRF received reports in January 2022 indicating that 

Paseiro and Hernández García were on trial at that time. Prosecutors 

were reportedly seeking eight years imprisonment for both of them.

Harassment of Religious Communities and Leaders

During 2021, Cuban authorities harassed and intimidated certain 

religious communities and their leaders. The Cuban government 

continued to harass Pastor Alain Toledano Valiente, leader of the 

Emanuel Church in Santiago de Cuba and member of the Apostolic Movement, an unregistered religious group. Pastor Toledano 

received several police summons falsely accusing him and his church 

of holding services allegedly in contravention of COVID protocols, 

which banned such gatherings. However, Pastor Toledano produced 

written permission from the MOJ that guaranteed his right to hold 

services with proper health protocols starting in August and testified 

that his congregation observed all such protocols. Yet, in August, 

police arbitrarily detained Pastor Toledano in his home for holding 

a service and threatened to charge him with the crime of “spreading 

the epidemic.” Followers of Pastor Toledano also suffered threats 

and intimidation from police. 

Police searched the residence of Pastor Karel Parra Rosabal, 

leader of the unregistered Fuego y Dinámica Apostolic Church in 

Jobabo and owner of a small bicycle repair shop. In January, police 

conducted a search of the pastor’s home, informed him that he was 

under arrest for the crime of “hoarding” due to the number of tools he 

owns for the bicycle repair shop, and confiscated nearly $2,000 USD 

(50,000 Cuban pesos) worth of his equipment. Pastor Parra Rosabal 

was detained for 10 days. 

Key U.S. Policy

Upon taking office, the Biden administration considered taking a 

review of the United States’ policy toward Cuba. The administration indicated that the forthcoming policy would put democracy 

and human rights at its center and empower the Cuban people 

to determine their own future. Following the July 11 protests, the 

administration and members of Congress declared their support for 

the Cuban people and denounced the detentions and violence by 

Cuban authorities. President Joseph R. Biden expressed solidarity 

with Cuban protesters asserting their fundamental rights and later 

reiterated his support and unequivocally condemned the arrests and 

sham trials. Congress drew attention to the situation and expressed 

solidarity with the Cuban people, including by holding a hearing on 

the protests and resulting crackdown and introducing legislation and 

resolutions such as Senate Res. 310 and H.Res.760, which condemn the 

Cuban regime’s acts of repression and call for the release of arbitrarily 

detained Cuban citizens.

The U.S. government continued to impose robust sanctions 

against Cuban officials. The Biden administration took steps to hold 

accountable those responsible for repression in the wake of the July 

11 protests, including issuing sanctions under the Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act on Cuban security forces on July 

22, July 30, August 13, and August 19. Among those sanctioned were 

Cuba’s Policia Nacional Revolucionaria, responsible for the assault 

on Father Álvarez. Additionally, on November 30, the administration 

imposed visa restrictions on Cuban officials responsible for repression 

in advance of the planned November 15 protests. On November 15, 

the State Department again placed Cuba on its Special Watch List for 

severe violations of religious freedom.
50 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

EGYPT

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, while religious freedom conditions in Egypt improved 

somewhat, several systematic and ongoing obstacles to religious freedom remained. The administration of President Abdel 

Fattah El-Sisi publicly promoted religious tolerance as a goal for 

Egyptian society. The President himself again attended a Coptic 

Orthodox Christmas liturgy in January, and in a September public 

statement referenced his “respect [for] nonbelievers . . . [who] are 

free to choose.” At the same time, the Egyptian government continued to closely manage church construction and the legalization 

of preexisting buildings for church-related purposes. As in 2020, 

the pace of approvals for existing churches requesting legalization reflected a substantial decline from prior years, leaving a 

backlog of applications and many rural Christian communities 

unable to worship legally. Construction of churches remained 

largely limited to new, government-planned cities, as governors 

in rural communities with large Christian populations failed to 

reply to construction applications within the legally mandated 

four-month limit. 

Egypt’s criminal justice system was responsible for a significant 

number of religious freedom violations. Throughout 2021, authorities maintained the long-term detention of religious prisoners 

of conscience, including Christians Patrick Zaki and Ramy Kamel 

and Qur’anist Muslim Reda Abdel Rahman. Zaki and Kamel were 

released in December 2021 in advance of trial and January 2022, 

respectively, and Abdel Rahman was released in February 2022. 

State security continued to harass religious minorities such as Shi’a 

Muslims, while the judiciary maintained its robust enforcement of 

blasphemy laws and wielded counterterrorism and other laws disproportionately against both religious minorities and human rights 

and religious freedom advocates. While President El-Sisi lifted the 

state of emergency that his administration had long invoked to 

justify violations of civil liberties, the administration also introduced 

amendments that functionally replaced the emergency laws, and 

KEY FINDINGS

detainees already subject to the emergency law remained bound

by courts’ flawed judicial procedures. 

As in 2020, reports of anti-Christian mob attacks and church 

destruction decreased in 2021, possibly corresponding to the 

ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) maintained a presence in the Sinai region, with affiliated groups claiming responsibility for the April 2021 execution of 

a Copt (Egyptian Christian), Nabil Habashi Salama. Acts of violence 

against individual Coptic victims, especially in rural areas, occurred 

in social environments with persistent imbalances in the treatment 

of perpetrators from the Muslim majority and their Coptic victims. 

The government did not ban communities’ use of “customary reconciliation” councils, extra-judicial local tribunals that regularly 

issue minimal penalties to assailants from the religious majority and 

often revictimize Christians by forcing them to admit culpability in 

attacks against them.

The Egyptian government did not take visible, systematic 

efforts to address ongoing obstacles to religious freedom specified 

in USCIRF’s Annual Reports and recommendations from recent 

years, including 2021. The government’s requirement for national 

identity cards to list religion continued to render all religious 

minorities vulnerable to forced self-identification and potential 

discrimination. Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other smaller 

communities’ religions are excluded from the short list of approved 

faiths from which ID card applicants may choose, causing additional 

marginalization. In December, the Alexandria Administrative Court 

ruled that authorities in the governorate did not need to provide 

cemetery space for Baha’is and members of other minority religions. The single Cairo cemetery with space allotted to Baha’is is 

limited in capacity and situated hundreds of miles away from many 

Baha’i communities. In justification for its ruling, the court referred

to a State Litigation Authority opinion stating that only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are recognized as religions in Egypt. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Egypt on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Urge the Egyptian government to 1) 

remove religion as a required category 

from official identity documents, 2) take 

concrete steps toward phasing out the 

longstanding use of customary reconciliation councils to resolve incidents of 

violence against religious minorities, and 

3) repeal Article 98(f) of the Criminal Code, 

which penalizes “ridiculing or insulting a 

heavenly religion or a sect following it,” 

and until that is accomplished limit the conditions under which the law is applied and 

allow charged individuals to post bail; 

• Encourage Egypt to 1) resume expeditious 

approval of church registrations under Law 

80 of 2016, and 2) fully implement national 

educational curriculum reforms promoting 

religious diversity and tolerance; and

• Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. 

assistance to Egypt and continue to withhold a portion of Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) for specified international religious 

freedom violations along with broader 

human rights concerns.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Raise religious freedom issues through 

hearings, meetings, letters, congressional 

delegation trips abroad, or other actions.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 51

EGYPT

Background

Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion and 

the “principles of Shari’a” as the primary source of legislation. Article 

64 provides for “absolute” freedom of belief, although only adherents 

of “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) may practice 

their religion publicly and build places of worship. Bans from 1960 

remain in effect on Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha’is.

Egypt’s population is approximately 105 million people, an estimated 90 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims; non-Sunni Muslims, 

such as Shi’a, are believed to comprise less than one percent. At an 

estimated 10 percent or more, Egypt’s indigenous Copts constitute 

the largest Christian minority in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Christian leaders estimate over 90 percent of Copts belong to the 

traditional Coptic Orthodox Church, with Coptic Catholics, Coptic 

Evangelical Protestants, and other denominations forming small 

but prominent subcommunities. There are reportedly at least 2,000 

Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses, and fewer than 

20 Jews.

Legal and Judicial Challenges to Religious Freedom 

In 2021, Egypt continued to enforce Law 98(f) of Egypt’s Penal Code, 

a blasphemy statute that bans “insulting the heavenly religions,” presenting one of the most serious and systematic challenges to religious 

freedom. On June 14, State Security officers arrested Marco Girgis 

Salib Shehata, a Copt, for possessing sexual-themed material on his 

phone characterized as “offensive to Islam.” Authorities detained 

him for a month before interrogating him on his personal behaviors 

including possible consumption of alcohol—permissible in Christianity—and prosecuted him on charges including violation of Law 98(f), 

eventually convicting and sentencing him in early 2022. Prosecutors 

likewise invoked the blasphemy law in the November trial and sentencing to five years in prison of Ahmed Abdo Maher, a Muslim lawyer and 

scholar whose critiques of the Islamic conquest attracted attention on 

social media and satellite television.

Throughout 2021, Egyptian authorities also targeted religious 

minority group members and human rights and religious freedom 

activists through strategic deployment of other laws, such as counterterrorism statutes and laws penalizing “spreading false news [against 

Egypt].” Courts operating under state security emergency laws issued 

multiple consecutive renewals of the detentions of religious prisoners 

of conscience, including Ramy Kamel and Patrick Zaki, the latter of 

whom—though released after 22 months of detention—is scheduled 

to stand trial for publishing an online testimonial of the harassment 

he and other Copts have endured. Security forces likewise continued the detention since August 2020 of USCIRF Religious Prisoner 

of Conscience Reda Abdel Rahman—a blogger from the Qur’anist 

community, a Muslim minority that holds the text of the Qur’an as 

the only legitimate source of authority for religious rulings—finally 

releasing him in February 2022.

Other Positive Developments 

In a potential boost to religious tourism, the government undertook, 

completed, and planned projects renovating historic houses of worship and shrines of importance to Christians, Jews, and Shi’a Muslims

around the world. President El-Sisi demonstrated attention to Copts’ 

internal diversity through his decree establishing separate religious 

endowments for the country’s smaller Catholic and Evangelical Protestant communities, distinct from the predominant Coptic Orthodox 

Patriarchate. 

In September, the administration widely publicized its release 

of a new National Human Rights Strategy, touted as the first in the 

nation’s history, which promotes religious tolerance and anti-sectarianism within educational, religious, and community institutions. 

The Strategy refers to a “target result” of addressing “guarantees 

related to the regulation, justifications, and durations of pretrial 

detention [so that they] are enhanced in national laws.” The document also makes several references to programs to reform the 

curricula of schools run by both the government and Al-Azhar—a 

leading academic institution within Sunni Islam—to remove exclusionary material and reflect messages of religious tolerance. The 

Ministry of Education has long promised such reforms, which remain 

a work in progress. 

Key U.S. Policy

Egypt remained an important U.S. partner in 2021, mediating 

between parties to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and maintaining 

vigilance toward potential threats of Islamist insurgent violence. Its 

“critical role” in securing a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas-led 

Gaza in May garnered praise from President Joseph R. Biden. However, the Biden administration also took steps to fulfill a campaign 

pledge that the United States would issue “no more blank checks” 

to Egypt given its human rights abuses. 

In February, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken “raised concerns 

over human rights” in his first call with Egyptian Foreign Minister 

Sameh Shoukry and during November’s strategic dialogue. The FMF 

aid package to Egypt emerged early in the year as a focal point for 

both the executive branch and Congress. In January, Representatives 

French Hill (R-AR) and David Cicilline (D-RI) cosponsored a House 

resolution calling on the Egyptian government to “end this culture of 

impunity,” while in May, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) called on the 

Biden administration to freeze a tranche of aid contingent on Egypt’s 

improvements in human rights. 

In September, President Biden imposed temporary human 

rights-related conditions on $130 million of the $300 million FMF 

tranche. Early in 2022, the State Department announced the United 

States would reprogram the $130 million for Egypt’s failure to meet 

U.S. demands, which included releasing 16 detainees, although the 

administration allocated as planned $170 million in aid and authorized 

$2.5 billion in arms sales. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Egypt in 2021

• Podcast: Qur’anists in Egypt

• Press Statement: USCIRF Calls on Egypt to Release Qur’anist Reda Abdel Rahman

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Reda Abdel Rahman
52 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

INDONESIA

I

n 2021, Indonesia’s religious freedom conditions trended the 

same as in 2020. Despite ongoing rhetoric from national leaders—including President Joko Widodo (Jokowi)—promoting 

Indonesia’s moderate version of Islam, there was minimal to no 

progress in addressing parts of the legal system that conflict with 

international standards of freedom of religion or belief. These 

include laws utilized to hinder faith communities’ right to build and 

maintain houses of worship, such as the 2006 joint regulation on 

houses of worship, as well as blasphemy laws, such as Presidential 

Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965, Criminal Code Article 156(a), and Law 

No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (known as 

the ITE law) Articles 27(3) and 28(2). 

Authorities actively enforced blasphemy laws, with a majority 

of charges and allegations stemming from perceived insults to Islam. 

Minister of Religious Affairs Cholil Qoumas asked the police “to 

equally” crack down on people from different religions who commit 

blasphemy. In May, Desak Made Darmawati, a professor in Jakarta, 

was questioned for blasphemy after making an online video declaring that Hinduism had many deities and Hindu cremation rituals 

were strange. In July, the Singaraja District Court in Bali sentenced

a Danish citizen to two years imprisonment for blasphemy after he 

kicked a temple. In August, police arrested Muhammad Kece in Bali 

for blasphemy under the ITE law after he made a YouTube video 

that criticized the Islamic religious curriculum used in Indonesia and 

allegedly insulted the Prophet Muhammad. In August, police arrested

preacher Yahya Waloni in East Jakarta for blasphemy and hate speech 

under the ITE law for a sermon stating the Bible was fiction and for 

statements on social media that Jesus was a failed prophet and that 

the Prophet Muhammad did not instruct people to pray.

KEY FINDINGS

Efforts continued to replace the existing Criminal Code, which 

dates to the Dutch colonial era. In 2019, a draft Criminal Code 

was introduced, infringing on the rights of religious minorities. 

The draft code also expanded the criminalization of blasphemy 

to include insulting a religious leader during a religious service, 

persuading someone to become an atheist, and defiling or unlawfully destroying houses of worship or religious artifacts. Following 

protests, the 2019 draft was withdrawn in September 2019, but 

revising the Criminal Code remained on the legislative agenda 

throughout 2020 and 2021. Reports from the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community continue to indicate that the 

government has failed to revise the problematic provisions in the 

2019 draft that would violate international human rights standards, 

including religious freedom. 

Throughout 2021, Islamist extremist attacks remained a 

threat to minority faith communities in certain regions. In March, a 

suicide bombing occurred outside a Catholic cathedral in Makassar, Sulawesi, injuring 21 parishioners and killing the two bombers. 

In June, suspects linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

were arrested for targeting a Papuan bishop. In July, Indonesia 

security forces killed two suspected ISIS members in Sulawesi 

following the murder of Christian farmers. There is some evidence that regional Islamist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 

is attempting to evolve into a militant-political force to pursue 

its goal of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia through militancy. In 

November, Detachment 88, Indonesia’s counterterrorism squad, 

arrested Farid Okbah, the head of the political party People’s 

Da’wah Party, alleging the party was operating as a political cover 

for JI.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Indonesia on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Work with the Indonesian government 

to revise the draft Criminal Code bill to 

comply with international human rights 

standards, including by removing criminal sanctions for blasphemy; to repeal 

or amend the existing blasphemy laws, 

including Indonesia’s ITE law; and to 

release all individuals currently detained 

or imprisoned on blasphemy charges; 

• Urge the Indonesian government to repeal 

or revise the 2006 Joint Regulation on 

houses of worship;

• Incorporate training on international 

human rights standards related to religious freedom—including concerns 

regarding enforcement of blasphemy 

laws—into U.S.- funded programs, such 

as the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Harmoni and MAJu 

projects, and work with the Ministry of 

Education to incorporate programming on 

tolerance and inclusivity into compulsory 

education courses on religion; and 

• Urge the Indonesian government to use 

its relationships and upcoming leadership in regional organizations, particularly 

in the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN’s Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 

to publicly advocate for religious tolerance, plurality, and inclusion throughout 

the region.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Raise Indonesia’s ongoing religious freedom issues through hearings, meetings, 

letters, congressional delegation trips 

abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: Indonesia’s State Ideology of Pancasila

• Event: USCIRF Conversation: Democracy and Religious Freedom

• Podcast: Enforcing Blasphemy Laws Have Dire Consequences
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 53

INDONESIA

Background

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of Indonesia’s 267 million citizens, while 

Protestant Christians comprise seven percent, Roman Catholics 2.9 

percent, and Hindus 1.7 percent; 0.9 percent identify as adhering to 

another minority religion such as Buddhism or Confucianism. 

In light of this diversity, Indonesia has a long tradition of religious 

pluralism. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees the independence 

of each resident to embrace religion and worship according to their 

respective religions and beliefs.” The government has long promoted 

Pancasila, an ideology that comprises five principles: monotheism 

(broadly defined as any religion with a supreme deity, holy figure, 

scripture, and established rituals), civilized humanity, national unity, 

deliberative democracy, and social justice. However, in recent years, 

the country has experienced a simultaneous increase in religious intolerance and a democratic backsliding. In the last two decades, more 

than 700 Shari’a-inspired regulations have been put in place across 

the 34 provinces of Indonesia.

The government requires all citizens to list their religious affiliation 

on their identification cards—a practice that has historically forced 

nonbelievers and members of unrecognized religious minorities to misrepresent their faith or leave the field blank. This omission can impact 

access to licenses and permits, education, and government jobs. 

Shari’a in Aceh 

The autonomous province of Aceh remains a site of significant 

religious freedom violations. Religious police enforce a strict interpretation of Shari’a that includes and administers corporal punishment. 

Muslims have no ability to opt out of this official interpretation, and 

their behavior is heavily regulated within its framework. In July, a 

woman was caned for being “too close” to her boyfriend. Women 

are also prevented from straddling motorbikes and are forced to wear 

hijabs. Religious minorities are not exempt from the Shari’a criminal 

system. In February, two Christians were publicly flogged for drinking 

and gambling.

The 2006 Joint Regulation on Houses of Worship

The 2006 joint regulation on houses of worship continued to prevent the construction and renovation of faith centers, especially for 

minority communities. In March, the Ministry of Religion explored the 

idea to update the regulation, but at the end of the calendar year no 

changes had been applied. 

Throughout 2021, the application of the regulation continued 

to restrict minority faith communities’ ability to maintain houses of 

worship and emboldened violence and harassment against them. In 

June in Ponorogo, East Java, residents appealed against the plans 

for a new church. In July, residents protested in Banyuwangi against 

the construction of a Muhammadiyah mosque, attempting to use the 

joint regulation to prevent the faith center. In West Java, Bogor, the 

ongoing dispute over the construction of the Yasmin church continued 

without resolution. 

In September in Balai Harapan, West Kalimantan, 10 people were 

arrested for attacking an Ahmadiyya Muslim mosque and burning 

a nearby building. In January 2022, just after the reporting period, 

these men were sentenced to four months, 15 days imprisonment in 

what local activists decried as a lenient sentence for the attack on the 

house of worship. 

In December, Jakarta governor Anies Basweden granted permission to a Catholic community to build a church in Kampung Duri, 

noting the need for all faith communities to have the impartial opportunity to obtain building permits. 

Promotion of State Interpretation of Islam and 

Religious Tolerance

The government of President Jokowi has emphasized tolerance, 

Indonesia’s moderate form of Islam, and mutual respect for faith 

communities, including through the promotion of its favored interpretation of Islam and the revamping of Pancasila. Minister Qoumas 

continued to advocate for tolerance and mutual respect. In September, he condemned mob attacks on an Ahmadiyya mosque in Sintag, 

West Kalimantan. Minister Qoumas has consistently spoken of the 

need to protect the rights of all citizens, regardless of their faith identity. In 2021, there were also displays of intercommunal harmony as 

Indonesian Muslims and Hindus celebrated religious holidays in the 

same month, and Christian communities in Bali went silent in celebration of the Hindu Day of Silence. However, these efforts to promote 

tolerance exclusively among officially recognized religions have not 

resulted in greater religious freedom or expanded recognition of 

other religious minorities.

Mandatory Religious Attire in Schools

Ongoing struggles over what women and girls can wear have led 

schools to enact over 60 mandatory religious attire regulations since 

2001. In May, the Supreme Court revoked a ban on mandatory religious attire in state schools, despite outcry after a Christian girl was 

forced to wear the hijab in school. Reportedly, women have also been 

denied access to government services because of their decision not 

to wear the hijab. 

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Indonesia recently celebrated 70 years of bilateral relations. On November 1, President Joseph R. Biden met with 

President Jokowi, and on December 13 Secretary of State Antony J. 

Blinken traveled to Indonesia and also met with President Jokowi. The 

United States continued to engage on several initiatives and commitments, such as combating climate change and maintaining a free and 

open Indo-Pacific region.

Throughout 2021, the USAID-funded Harmoni program continued 

to support the Ministry of Social Affairs and local organizations. Harmoni 

funding was applied to strengthen Inter-Religious Harmony Forums; 

counter extremist narratives through community, university, and schoolbased campaigns; and rehabilitate women and children returning from 

conflict zones in the Middle East and Philippines. The United States also 

maintains exchange programs such as the International Visitor Leadership 

Program to host Indonesian leaders in the United States. 
54 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

IRAQ

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Iraq improved slightly but 

remained concerning. Both the Iraqi Federal Government (IFG) 

and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) took several positive steps. In March, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi designated 

March 6 as a national holiday to celebrate the country’s ethnic and 

religious diversity. In March, Iraq’s Parliament passed the Yazidi 

Survivor Law to compensate members of the Yazidi community. In 

October, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani declared Ankawa, the 

Christian suburb of Erbil, a district, giving its residents more authority 

in their local affairs. Internationally, the German government was the 

first to prosecute members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

for committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide 

against the Yazidis. In April, it prosecuted one of its citizens who 

abused Yazidi women while she was an ISIS member; the court found 

her guilty of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, among 

other crimes. Similarly, in November, a German court sentenced

another ISIS fighter to life in prison for killing a five-year-old Yazidi girl.

However, nearly five years after the United States and its 

allies declared ISIS defeated, religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq 

continue to struggle to return and live peacefully in their homes. 

Almost one million Sunni Arab Muslims, over 200,000 Yazidis, 

tens of thousands of Christians, and smaller numbers of Kaka’is, 

Turkmen, and others remain forcibly displaced. Renewed ISIS 

attacks in 2021 reignited fear among religious and ethnic minorities 

seeking to return and rebuild their homes in former ISIS-controlled 

areas. Militias, some backed by foreign actors such as Iran and 

operating under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—also 

known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)—routinely targeted 

Sunni Arab Muslims and accused them of affiliation with ISIS. The 

PMF also regularly used checkpoints to stop and harass Sunni 

KEY FINDINGS

Arab Muslims returning to territories once controlled by ISIS. 

These militias reportedly used similar tactics against other religious 

minorities, including Yazidis, Christians, Kaka’is, and others. The 

Iraqi government continued to allow these groups to operate with 

impunity; for example, in June, authorities released Gasim Muslih, 

the head of PMF operations in Anbar Province, without prosecution. He was accused of targeting members of non-Shi’a Muslim 

communities, and authorities had arrested him for the killing of 

Sunni Muslim activist Ihab al-Wazni. Al-Wazni’s murder in May had 

led to protests to which the government responded with lethal 

force, killing more than 600 peaceful protesters. 

Seven years after the ISIS genocide, Yazidis continued to 

languish in internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Duhok and 

elsewhere, and the whereabouts of around 3,000 abducted Yazidi 

women and girls remained unknown. In June, a fire at the Sharya 

IDP camp destroyed almost 1,400 homes, temporarily leaving 

many Yazidis without shelters. Similarly, many Iraqi Christians 

remained displaced, with the PMF making returns to their homes 

in the Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq extremely difficult. Individuals and families who managed to return found some of their lands, 

including sacred places, either destroyed or expropriated. 

Ongoing airstrikes in northern Iraq by the Turkish military 

against alleged positions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 

and the Sinjar Resistance Unit (YBS), for its alleged alignment with 

the PKK, further impeded religious freedom improvement in 2021. 

These operations disproportionately impacted ethnic and religious 

minority groups, particularly Yazidis, in Sinjar and Dohok, impeding 

their ability to resettle in their original communities and to worship

safely. The Turkish government reportedly made little effort to 

minimize or avoid civilian causalities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Iraq on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Use diplomatic and other available channels to encourage the IFG and the KRG to 

resolve conflicts over the disputed areas 

per Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, 

while including all religious and ethnic 

minorities in the process, and to comprehensively implement the Sinjar Security 

Agreement with full inclusion of the Yazidi 

community in particular; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

PMF leaders who direct militia engagement 

in severe violations of religious freedom by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; and 

• Continue to assist Iraqi religious and 

ethnic minorities to rebuild communities 

devastated by ISIS and to advocate for their 

own interests, including opening a broad 

discussion on governance to hold fair and 

free local and regional elections to select 

their own representatives. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Iraq 

bilateral relationship through hearings, 

letters, and congressional delegations. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Iraq in 2021

• Hearing: Strategies for Religious Freedom in Fragile States

• Factsheet: CPC and SWL Recommendations 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 55

IRAQ

Background

The population of Iraq was about 39.7 million in 2021. Most of the 

population is Muslim; 64–69 percent are Shi’a Muslims, who live predominantly in the southern and eastern regions of the country, and 

29–34 percent are Sunni Muslims, who mainly reside across the western, center, and northern regions. The remaining 1–5 percent of the 

population are from various religious and ethnic groups, including 

Yazidis and Christians of different denominations (Syriac, Catholic, 

Orthodox, Protestant, and Assyrian Church of the East), Kaka’is (also 

known as the Yarsan or Ahl al-Haq), and a small number of Jews. These 

communities predominantly live in the northern region as well as in 

Baghdad and Erbil. Reportedly, there is a growing number of atheists, 

agnostics, and religiously unaffiliated individuals in Iraq, mainly living 

in large cities.

Political instability remained of serious concern throughout the 

country, particularly given the role it has played in enabling religious 

violence in prior years. For example, Iraqis took to the streets to 

express their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the October parliamentary elections and reportedly clashed with security forces. In 

November, several drones carrying explosives targeted Prime Minister 

Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s Baghdad residency, injuring six bodyguards; 

although no group openly claimed responsibility, Iranian-backed PMF 

groups have been widely blamed for the attack.

Positive Developments

There were some positive developments to advance religious freedom in Iraq in 2021. Following the announcement of March 6 as a 

national holiday of tolerance and coexistence, Pope Francis, on a 

historic visit to Iraq, and preeminent Shi’a cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani jointly released a statement to encourage religious and ethnic 

minorities to work together to advance peaceful coexistence in Iraq 

and beyond. The Pope’s visit and prayers with victims of ISIS in Mosul 

and other Iraqi cities reinvigorated religious minorities, especially Iraqi 

Christians. Reacting to his visit, Qaraqosh resident Yusra Mubarak 

said, “I can’t describe my happiness, it’s a historic event that won’t 

be repeated.” The passage of the Yazidi Survivors Law represented 

crucial governmental recognition of the particularly heinous crimes 

the community suffered under ISIS rule. However, this law had not 

been implemented by the end of the reporting period. The lack of a 

lasting solution for Yazidi children born as a result of ISIS’s rampant 

use of sexual violence remains another challenge for the community. 

Ongoing Border Dispute between the 

IFG and KRG 

Longstanding border disputes between the KRG and IFG continued to 

represent another challenge to the advancement of religious freedom 

in 2021. Although the 2020 Sinjar Security Agreement was aimed at 

reducing tension between the two parties and protecting the Yazidi 

community, its slow implementation and lack of Yazidi representation 

have raised concerns about the future of the accord. In fact, there was 

no meaningful implementation of the agreement by any of the signatories throughout 2021; for example, the two parties failed to appoint 

an independent mayor or deport militia groups from Sinjar, both of 

which are terms mandated by the accord. This failure has directly 

impeded the ability of Yazidis to return to their Sinjar homeland. 

Other Religious Freedom Issues in Iraq

In 2021, religious freedom conditions in the KRG-controlled areas 

remained consistent with the previous year. The region continued to 

be a crucial safe destination for Iraqis displaced from elsewhere in the 

country, and the KRG’s extension of greater municipal representation 

for religious and ethnic components is commendable. However, the 

lack of security for religious and ethnic minority groups in and along 

disputed areas continued to hinder religious freedom improvements. 

Furthermore, some of those minority communities—particularly Syriac-Chaldean-Assyrian Christians—maintained their longstanding 

demands for the restitution of land and properties that had been 

previously expropriated by or under KRG authorities. 

In 2021, blasphemy and apostasy laws remained in place throughout the country, and the federal government continued to deny formal 

recognition of religious minorities and nontheist groups such as the 

Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, humanists, Kaka’is, and others. Finally, 

the federal government continued to exploit the “de-Ba’athification” 

process, originally intended to remove former Baath party officials 

post-2003, as a pretext to discriminate against Sunni Muslims in government employment and other practices. 

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Iraq continues to prioritize stability, development, 

and democratization. In July 2021, President Joseph R. Biden met with 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in Washington to formally 

conclude the United States combat mission in Iraq by the end of 2021. 

In July 2021, the State Department provided an additional $155 million 

in humanitarian assistance for Iraq and Iraqi refugees in the region, 

totaling over $200 million dollars for fiscal year 2021. The additional 

funds were primarily earmarked to support Iraqis who were displaced 

by ISIS, including members of several religious minority communities. Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

maintained financial and programmatic support for Iraqi religious 

and ethnic minorities to recover and rebuild what ISIS had destroyed. 

Since the defeat of ISIS, USAID has spent almost $500 million dollars 

on reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Additionally, the U.S. government 

has used punitive measures against individuals responsible for human 

rights violations. In January 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on PMF Chairman and Iraqi 

former National Security Advisor Falih al-Fayyadh, who has also been 

accused of direct links to religious freedom violations, for engaging 

in serious human rights abuses.
56 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KAZAKHSTAN

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan improved in 

some areas but remained problematic as the government failed 

to deliver on long-promised reforms. Since 2019, Kazakhstan 

has engaged in a religious freedom working group in consultation 

with U.S government representatives, including USCIRF, and civil 

society stakeholders. At those sessions, and in numerous separate 

meetings between USCIRF and Kazakhstani officials, the government of Kazakhstan solicited and received recommendations 

for reforming the 2011 Religion Law to bring it into compliance 

with international standards. Despite repeated assurances that 

the recommendations would be considered and implemented in 

certain cases, the amendments passed on December 29, 2021, did 

not contain substantive reforms and seem likely to further restrict 

religious activity in Kazakhstan in some cases. 

There were 128 known administrative prosecutions for religious offenses in 2021, virtually identical to the 131 known cases 

in 2020. This marked the first year since 2017 without a significant 

decline in such cases from the previous year. These prosecutions 

included significant punitive fines, in some cases equivalent to four 

months’ average wages, for peaceful religious activities such as 

selling religious literature, instructing children in religion without 

state approval, praying without state approval, and unregistered 

missionary activity. Although USCIRF has been encouraged by the 

previous decline in such cases, the prosecutions still constitute 

systematic and ongoing violations of religious freedom.

The government of Kazakhstan participated in religious freedom roundtables across the country, enabling representatives of 

various religious communities to meet with government officials 

KEY FINDINGS

and discuss their concerns and recommendations for reform. While 

such initiatives are admirable, some participants have expressed 

frustration that officials have not seriously considered their input 

and that the meetings were largely symbolic. On July 15, 2021, the 

government of Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Love Your Neighbor Committee (LYNC), a U.S.-based 

nonprofit that organizes religious freedom roundtables, facilitates 

interreligious dialogue, and provides cross-cultural religious literacy 

training for officials and law enforcement. 

Although seldom rising to the level of egregious, ongoing 

religious freedom violations and allegations of abuse remained. In 

September 2021, 1,641 parents from across Kazakhstan signed a 

petition to the government requesting that Muslim girls be allowed 

to wear hijabs in public school. Authorities denied the request and 

Muslim girls are still forbidden to wear head coverings in school. 

As in years past, the government used vague charges of “propaganda of terrorism,” “extremism,” or “inciting religious hatred” 

to justify the arrests of religious activists and political opponents. 

In June 2021, local officials slandered residents protesting the 

illegal and unexplained closure of their historic local mosque in 

Zhympity as adherents of a “nontraditional” religious interpretation. The community, which recently renovated the mosque at 

its own expense, denies any links to extremism or terrorism and 

only seeks to preserve a beloved and iconic local landmark. The 

Kazakhstani government continued to persecute opponents of 

China’s ethnoreligious genocide in Xinjiang and even banned a 

prominent researcher of these tragic events from entering Kazakhstan for five years.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Kazakhstan on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Discontinue the U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious 

Freedom Working Group until the government delivers on promised reforms, including: 

• The repeal or amendment of religious 

registration laws, including reducing the 

required number of founding members 

of a religious organization to register, 

currently set at 50;

• The end of mandatory expert review 

of founding documents and religious 

literature, or a significant reform of the 

process to make it more transparent;

• The reduction of the specific personal 

data from founding members required 

to register and the inclusion of legal protections to ensure that such information 

shall not be used to discriminate against 

or harass individuals; and

• The repeal of provisions that allow for the 

prosecution of individuals for “insulting 

religious feelings” in violation of international standards of religious freedom and 

freedom of expression.

• Advocate for religious freedom reforms in 

all engagement with the government of 

Kazakhstan on improving the human rights 

landscape; and

• Provide religious freedom training to law 

enforcement and local officials through the 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) mission in Kazakhstan as part of 

broader initiatives to combat corruption 

and promote good governance.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Advocate for religious freedom reform 

and other measures aimed at improving 

the human rights landscape in Kazakhstan 

through the Congressional U.S.-Kazakhstan Caucus.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: Reforms in Kazakhstan Could Improve Religious Freedom

• Factsheet: CPC and SWL Recommendations

• Factsheet: Controlling Civil Society’s Purse Strings
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 57

KAZAKHSTAN

Background

Kazakhstan is territorially the largest state in Central Asia and has the 

region’s second-largest population, with around 19 million citizens. 

The population is approximately 70 percent Sunni Muslim, 26 percent 

Christian (including Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, and Jehovah’s 

Witnesses), 3 percent other (including Jews, Buddhists, Baha’is, and 

Hare Krishnas), and one percent Shi’a and Sufi Muslim. Approximately 

two-thirds of the population are ethnic Kazakhs, a Turkic people, while 

the rest are ethnic Slavs and other Turkic peoples, including Uzbeks 

and Uyghurs. Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with a large 

ethnic Russian population, mostly in the north. 

The government is avowedly secular and seeks to control religion, which it views as a potentially destabilizing force. It maintains 

influence over—and preference for—what it considers the “traditional” Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and is generally 

wary of Islamic practices emanating from other countries. It classifies 

other religions with a long-established presence and good relations 

with the government as traditional and nonthreatening—like Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism—while it views 

newer arrivals to the region with suspicion, such as Evangelical Christianity and Scientology. The government is particularly concerned 

about the spread of religious extremism—which it defines broadly 

and uses as a charge to target political opponents—as well as the 

potential for perceived social disruption from proselytism and missionary activity. While the government has legitimate concerns about 

extremist violence, its vague concept of religious extremism is often 

applied to any activity it sees as potentially disruptive, even targeting 

households and familial practices.

Failure to Reform 

Since 2019, the government of Kazakhstan has engaged in the 

U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group (RFWG) with 

counterparts in the U.S. government and civil society stakeholders 

to discuss the reform of its problematic 2011 Religion Law. Before it 

enacted this law, Kazakhstan was one of the least repressive post-Soviet Central Asian states with regard to freedom of religion or belief. 

That law, however, set stringent registration requirements with high 

membership thresholds, and it banned or restricted unregistered 

religious activities, including those relating to offering education, 

distributing literature, and training clergy. Other vague criminal and 

administrative statutes enable the state to punish most unauthorized 

religious or political activities.

The RFWG was predicated on the government’s recognition of 

deficiencies in the existing 2011 Religion Law and its stated intent to 

address these problems through tangible legislative reforms. In 2021, 

USCIRF held more meetings with Kazakhstani government officials 

than in previous years. As late as November 2021, Kazakhstan once 

again provided the U.S. government with assurances that at least 

some of the key issues raised during nearly three years of engagement 

would be addressed in legislative amendments by the end of the year. 

However, the amendments, which passed on December 29, 2021, 

reflected minimal consideration of U.S. government recommendations 

and, on the contrary, contained new and problematic restrictions on 

peaceful religious activity. 

The new amendments failed to address some of the most troubling features of the 2011 law, including the mandatory nature of 

registration, the number of members required for registration, restrictions on religious materials by nonregistered religions, registration of 

missionary activity, and ambiguity about whether missionary materials used by registered religious organizations need expert review. 

Although the government had promised to replace the requirement 

of official permission for religious activity outside of registered spaces 

with a notification system that presumed approval, the system that 

the government passed is virtually indistinguishable from a permission-based system. The requirements are extremely onerous and 

leave significant discretion for officials to forbid the notified event. 

Furthermore, it is unclear whether these requirements will apply to 

communities without an officially registered space every time they 

wish to meet.

Popular Protest and Government Crackdown

Although occurring immediately after the reporting period, the 

government’s response to widespread popular unrest in Kazakhstan from January 2–11, 2022, raises significant concerns about the 

trajectory of serious religious freedom reform. USCIRF has long 

been troubled by the extent to which authorities use Kazakhstan’s 

vague and expansive “extremism” laws and supposed counterterrorism concerns as an excuse for authoritarian overreach. The 

government’s unsuccessful attempt to attribute popular anger 

over corruption and unrealized reforms to religious extremism 

only reinforces this perception. While USCIRF cannot rule out the 

participation of extremists and terrorists in these events, it is clear 

that they were not a significant contributing factor. The Kazakhstani 

government’s response, which included mass arrests, torture, and 

the indiscriminate shooting of unarmed civilians, raises concerns 

over human rights and religious freedom.

Key U.S. Policy

The governments of the United States and Kazakhstan enjoyed a 

close partnership in 2021, as in past years. On October 18, 2021, 

USAID announced $2.4 million in COVID assistance, which builds on 

more than $6.8 million in COVID assistance it provided since the start 

of the pandemic. On December 9, 2021, USAID publicly supported 

Kazakhstan’s application to the Open Government Partnership, an 

international platform that includes 78 governments and thousands 

of civil society organizations committed to making their governments 

more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens. On December 

13, 2021, the State Department sought bids for a religious freedom 

initiative that would allocate $740,740 for a project that would support efforts to improve national laws impacting religious freedom in 

Kazakhstan and help bring them in line with international standards. 

On December 16, 2021, the United States congratulated Kazakhstan 

on 30 years of independence and joined celebrations to mark the 

occasion. On January 6, 2022, Secretary Blinken spoke to Kazakhstani 

Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi about the unrest in Kazakhstan 

to express concern over Russian influence in the region and reiterate 

U.S. support for the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine.
58 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

MALAYSIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia trended downward. The government requires members of the Sunni Muslim 

majority to adhere to a strict, state-approved interpretation of 

Islam and regulates the internal affairs of Muslims, leaving increasingly little freedom to practice their religion according to their 

conscience. Article 160 of the constitution links Malay ethnicity 

with Islam, which continues to infringe on the religious freedom 

rights of ethnic Malays.

Malaysia maintains a dual legal system that devolves the maintenance and regulation of Shari’a to the states. Some states use this 

ability to restrict the freedom of religion or belief for Muslim and 

non-Muslim residents. Political actors in the federal government 

have consistently supported these restrictions, including during 

2021. Article 11(4) of the constitution provides that state and federal law “may control or restrict the propagation of any religious 

doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.” 

In February, then Minister of Religious Affairs Zulkifli Mohamad 

Al-Bakri cited this article in justifying the states’ power to formulate laws to prohibit conversion of Muslims. In March, then Deputy 

Religious Affairs Minister Datuk Ahmad Marzuk Shaary supported 

state governments’ actions to ensure adherents of religions other 

than Islam would be limited in propagating their beliefs, also citing 

Article 11(4). 

Throughout 2021, federal and state authorities continued 

to implement and expand measures that infringe on religious 

freedom. In May, the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) 

digitalized Pendedahan Agenda Kristian (Exposing the Christian 

Agenda), a 2014 book that portrays Christians as “enemies of 

Islam.” Curriculum for Muslim students in public schools at the 

Form 5 level (ages 16–17) includes federally approved material 

claiming Sunni Islam as the “superior” and only acceptable form 

of Islam, labeling Shi’a Islam as “deviant.” In November, the Sultan 

of Kelantan, Muhammad V, consented to the Kelantan Shariah 

Criminal Code (I) Enactment 2019, allowing it to come into effect. 

This new code contains 24 provisions that all Muslims in the state 

KEY FINDINGS

of Kelantan are now obliged to follow, including the criminalization 

of attempting to convert out of Islam, distorting Islamic teachings, 

and disrespecting the month of Ramadan. Penalties include imprisonment of up to three years and a fine or corporal punishment. 

Blasphemy is criminalized at the federal level in Malaysia’s secular 

Penal Code, and at least five states criminalize apostasy with fines, 

imprisonment, and/or detention in a “rehabilitation” center. 

In early 2021, two judicial decisions asserted the secular courts’ 

purview over certain issues that involve religious freedom. On February 25, Malaysia’s Federal Court ruled against Selangor’s religious 

court and declared that state Syariah laws banning gay sex “against 

the order of nature” were unconstitutional; however, the judgment 

does not repudiate federal statutes that criminalize same-sex relations. On March 10, the Kuala Lumpur High Court overturned a ban 

on the use of the word “Allah” by certain non-Muslim publications. 

Another case relevant to religious freedom remained unresolved: 

on January 11, the High Court set March 19 as the date to determine whether Ahmadiyya Muslims would be considered Muslim in 

Malaysia, regardless of how they self-identify. This deadline passed 

without a ruling. The determination will affect Ahmadiyya Muslims’ 

ability to use Islamic terms in their faith practices and will decide if 

they are subject to official interpretations of Islam as regulated by 

the state Shari’a systems. 

The leading Malay-majority parties and political institutions continue to be existentially afraid of perceived threats to 

the supremacy of Islam and ethnic Malays, which has heightened 

tensions between the secular and Shari’a court systems and interethnic/confessional communities. On March 24, the Malaysian 

Islamic Party (PAS) pledged to “harmonize” Malaysia’s dual-track 

legal system, arguing that the foundation of Malaysia’s legal system 

was Islamic. On March 28, the president of leading Malay-ethnic 

party United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Ahmad Zahid 

Hamidi, pledged that should the party gain a supermajority in 

Parliament, it would amend the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 

to “empower” Shari’a law. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Malaysia on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Extend training by the U.S. Department 

of Justice and Department of Homeland 

Security to their Malaysian counterparts 

on community-based policing to promote 

better shared practices on interacting with 

faith communities and protecting houses of 

worship and other religious sites; and

• Urge the Malaysian government to repeal 

the federal and state-level laws criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy, remove the 

constitutional link between the ethnic Malay 

identity and Islam, and release the findings of the special task force investigating 

enforced disappearances, such as the case 

of Pastor Raymond Koh.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Raise Malaysia’s ongoing religious freedom 

issues in any engagement through hearings, 

meetings, letters, congressional delegation 

trips abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Ahmadiyya Persecution Factsheet

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Malaysia

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project: Pastor Raymond Koh
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 59

MALAYSIA

Background

Malaysia is a highly pluralistic society. Around 61.3 percent of the 

population identify as Muslim, the vast majority of whom adhere 

to state-sponsored Sunni Islam. Buddhists comprise 19.8 percent; 

9.2 percent are Christian; 6.3 percent are Hindu; 1.3 percent practice Confucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions; 

and about 0.8 percent identify with no religion. Although Malaysia 

was founded as a secular state, Article 3 of the 1957 Constitution 

places Islam—interpreted as Sunni Islam—as the federation’s official religion, while Article 160 links Malay ethnic identity with Islam. 

This constitutional construct has long been used to advance social 

policies—many of which amount to legally mandated religious 

discrimination—that give ethnic Malays preferential treatment, 

including in education and employment, to offset historical economic disparities. 

Malaysia is one of a few multiparty democracies in Southeast 

Asia. However, throughout 2021, Malaysia continued to experience 

political instability at the federal level. At the beginning of the year, 

then Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin suspended Parliament through 

a declaration of a state of emergency over the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Before the suspension, observers had noted the fragility of Yassin’s 

coalition. When the suspension of Parliament ended in August 2021, 

at the urging of the king, the Perikatan Nasional coalition collapsed 

with the resignation of Yassin. On August 20, 2021, the king appointed 

Ismail Sabri Yaakob, a member of UMNO, as prime minister.

Continuing Politicization of Ethnicity and Religion

Against the backdrop of this political instability, the leading 

Malay-Muslim parties, UMNO and PAS, continued to emphasize the 

ethnoreligious supremacy of ethnic Malays and Islam to garner support. In August, with Yaakob’s appointment as prime minister, UMNO 

returned as the dominant political power. PAS, as well as other political 

actors, have attempted to reorient Malaysia’s secular constitutional 

foundation based on Article 3(1)’s proclamation of Islam as the official 

religion. During the long period of UMNO-dominated government 

from 1957 until 2018, the political branches of government consistently 

restricted the civil courts, including the Federal Court, with amendments to the constitution that curtailed their authority, especially over 

religious issues. 

Interfaith and Child Forced Marriages

The dual legal system complicates the issue of interfaith marriage and 

the right to choose or change one’s religion. Children of interfaith 

marriages are sometimes automatically registered as Muslims on their 

national identification cards, even if they do not identify as Muslim, 

placing them in the Shari’a court system to abide by certain rules. 

In January, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) 

highlighted this issue for indigenous communities in Sarawak where 

interfaith marriages occur. With strict apostasy laws, official registration as a Muslim limits a person’s ability to identify and practice 

according to their own faith identity.

Some nongovernmental organizations, including Sisters in Islam, 

have reported an increase in child marriages during the pandemic. 

This may be due in part to the lowered age of marriage for Muslim 

women, who can legally marry at 16, as compared to non-Muslim 

women, who cannot marry until 18. In December, the federal Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) committed to maintaining this 

system. There has been ongoing debate as to whether to harmonize 

the protected rights of women and girls regardless of faith. 

Criminalization of Blasphemy and Apostasy

Blasphemy is a criminal act under Articles 295–298A of the Penal 

Code. In June, a task force within the federal government proposed 

modifying laws governing social media to link the “promotion” of 

“LGBTI [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex] lifestyles” 

to laws that target insulting Islam. Such changes affect members of 

the LGBTI community who either identify as Muslim or, in the case 

of ethnic Malays, are constitutionally classified as Muslim, equating 

the expression of their sexual or gender identity to blasphemy and 

insulting Islam. 

On January 6, the Shah Alam Syariah High Court charged Nur 

Sajat, a trans woman, with bringing contempt to Islam for dressing in clothes that matched her gender identity at a religious event. 

In March, the Selangor State Religious Authority (JAIS) prompted 

authorities to find and arrest Nur Sajat for failing to appear in court. 

In October, Nur Sajat announced she received political asylum in 

Australia. In December, the state auctioned her household items. 

Enforced Disappearances of Religious Leaders

The government of Malaysia continued to withhold the report of the 

special taskforce set up by the former governing coalition Pakatan 

Harapan to investigate the whereabouts and disappearances of several individuals, including USCIRF’s Religious Prisoners of Conscience 

Pastor Raymond Koh and Amri Che Mat. There were no updates in 

2021 on their whereabouts or when the report would be made publicly available.

Key U.S. Policy

Malaysia and the United States maintain strong bilateral ties. There is 

continued partnership in counterterrorism efforts through information 

sharing, capacity-building programs for law enforcement and judicial 

authorities, and assistance to improve immigration security and border controls. On December 15, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken 

met with Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah to discuss regional and 

international issues of mutual interest, which included Malaysia-U.S. 

bilateral relations, regional security, COVID-19, and other matters. 

The United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and 

the two countries share numerous educational and cultural exchange 

programs. Those programs include the International Visitor Leadership 

Program, which brings Muslim educational leaders to the United States 

in part to observe conditions for freedom of religion or belief. 
60 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

NICARAGUA

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua remained the 

same as in 2020. During April 2018 protests against reforms to the 

public pension system, Catholic clergy provided aid and sanctuary to and voiced support for the protesters. As a result, President 

Daniel Ortega used his government and supporters to persecute 

members of the clergy, worshipers, and Catholic organizations. 

This pattern of harassment continued in 2021, as the government 

maintained its campaign against the Catholic Church. In 2021, the 

backdrop for religious freedom violations was not ongoing protests 

as in the last few years, but rather the runup to the general election 

in which President Ortega sought reelection for a fourth consecutive term. In the process, President Ortega’s government arrested

or disqualified numerous opposition candidates, imprisoned other 

critical figures such as journalists and human rights defenders, and 

raided the last remaining printed newspaper, La Prensa. Members 

of the Nicaraguan Catholic Church denounced the government’s 

tactics, expressed their support for free and fair elections and 

human rights, and called for the release of political prisoners.

As in preceding years, in 2021, President Ortega and his 

wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, made verbal attacks against 

the Catholic Church that contributed to the perilous environment 

in which the Church operated. In June, Vice President Murillo 

accused priests of stealing and raising funds to distribute among 

themselves. At an anniversary celebration of the Nicaraguan 

Army Air Force in July, President Ortega called priests “Pharisees . . . speaking as if they were saints [with] no respect for Christ, 

no respect for God.” USCIRF received reports that on August 13, 

President Ortega said that protesters opened fire on their fellow 

KEY FINDINGS

citizens and tortured police officers “with the applause and support of priests.” The next day, Vice President Murillo called clergy 

“sons of the devil” and accused them of condoning crimes and 

approving of the deaths of Nicaraguans. In the same speech, she 

said bishops were “fake shepherds” performing “satanic rites” 

and “witchcraft” to allegedly overthrow the government. On 

October 4, President Ortega again attacked clergy by calling the 

bishops “terrorists,” a potentially grave accusation considering 

the government adopted a wide-reaching and strict antiterrorism 

law in the wake of the 2018 protests. 

The government also continued to cancel visas or prevent 

the return of foreign-born priests as a tactic to pressure Catholic 

clergy. In January and February, the Directorate General of Immigration and Nationality (DGME) prevented two Franciscans—Friar 

Santos Fabián Mejía, head of the San Francisco de Asís parish in 

Juigalpa, and José Lemus Aguilar, parish priest of the Immaculate 

Heart of Mary Church in Matagalpa—from returning to Nicaragua 

from El Salvador. There was no official reason given for the denials 

of entry, but an immigration officer allegedly told Friar Fabián that 

he had gotten too involved in politics. On April 30, the DGME 

canceled the permanent residency of another Franciscan, Father 

Damián Muratori, director of El Tepeyac, a Franciscan sanctuary 

in the city of San Rafael del Norte. He was given 90 days to leave 

the country. Originally born in Italy, Father Muratori had lived in 

Nicaragua since 1976. Although he was given no explanation for 

why he was being deported, he suspects it may be because of his 

popular sermons and the false accusation that he had participated 

in the 2018 protests.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Maintain Nicaragua on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan 

government agencies and officials responsible for violence and other punitive actions 

against houses of worship, religious leaders, and organizations by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights-related financial and visa authorities, 

citing specific religious freedom violations; 

and

• Collaborate with and encourage multilateral organizations, such as the Organization 

of American States, to monitor and investigate religious freedom violations that 

occur in Nicaragua and work to identify 

perpetrators and tolerators of religious 

freedom violations, and seek the repeal 

of problematic laws such as the Foreign 

Agents Regulation Law.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Continue to raise human rights and democracy concerns in Nicaragua and bring 

attention to religious leaders and organizations silenced by the Ortega regime.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: Nicaragua’s Assault on Religious Freedom

• Factsheet: Controlling Civil Society’s Purse Strings
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 61

NICARAGUA

Background

President Ortega is the head of state and government of Nicaragua. 

He and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), exercise authoritarian control over the government and electoral process. 

Roman Catholics account for about 50 percent of Nicaragua’s population, followed by Evangelical Christians at 33.2 percent; followers 

of unspecified religions at 13.2 percent; Jews, Muslims, and others at 

2.9 percent; and 0.7 percent adhering to no religion. 

Nicaragua is embroiled in a social and political crisis that started 

after the government’s repression of peaceful protests in April 2018. 

The Ortega administration began lashing out at the Catholic Church 

after it aided demonstrators and individual Catholic clergy voiced 

opposition to the government. 

Leading up to the 2021 November election, Catholic clergy 

were outspoken in their support for free elections and the release of 

political prisoners. In a June 10 letter, Nicaraguan bishops decried 

“arbitrary and illegal restrictions of citizens’ freedoms and the persecution of the opposition and media outlets.” Clergy increasingly called 

the election illegitimate and an Ortega victory a forgone conclusion. 

Monsignor Carlos Aviles, spokesman for the Archdiocese of Managua, 

posited that “[these] are not elections. It’s a way to legitimize a period 

of increasing dictatorship.” 

Harassment of Worshipers and Clergy

Supporters of the Ortega regime continued to enter churches disruptively during Mass. In the northwestern town of Chinandega, a mob 

shouting slogans in favor of the Ortega government interrupted an 

April mass held in tribute to the victims of the violence against April 

2018 protesters and political prisoners. Also in April, Father Edwin 

Román claimed that at a mass he held at the St. Michael the Archangel 

Parish in Masaya nearly 80 police, paramilitaries, and other bystanders 

gathered outside. At the end of the mass, some of those outside threw 

stones at the church.

The Archbishop of Managua, Cardinal Leopoldo Brenes, is an 

outspoken critic of the Ortega regime and was vocal in the runup to 

the election. According to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 

police have kept Cardinal Brenes under supervision ever since he 

left the hospital after contracting COVID-19 in September. Agents 

surround his home and monitor his movements with the intention of 

intimidating him, despite the fact that he has not been charged with 

a crime and is not a suspect in any ongoing investigation. 

Vandalism and Theft of Church Property

In late March, thieves stole money from El Tepeyac, supposedly entering the church via the roof and hogtying the security guard. On July 5, 

the Immaculate Conception of Mary parish church in Jalapa was broken into in the middle of the night, with damage to the church’s door 

and a statue of Jesus and Mary. Later in July, an unknown assailant 

broke into the chapel at the San Caralampio Church in Diriamba, stealing sound equipment and desecrating the Eucharist. As in previous 

years, no one has been held to account for crimes committed against 

churches, and the government did not offer additional security for 

houses of worship.

Abuses against Protestants

The government also targeted Protestant institutions and individuals, 

especially those who have spoken out against the government. USCIRF 

received reports that the government exerted pressure on Protestants 

by increasing taxes on institutions, closely examining foreign funding, 

and harassing pastors who speak out against government abuses. In 

January, police in Jinotepe arrested and beat Pastor Rudy Palacios on 

his way to a meeting of the Democratic Restoration Party (PRD), a popular Protestant political party in Nicaragua. Pastor Palacios supported 

and provided food supplies to protesters in 2018.

After the elections, the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services (TELCOR) arbitrarily canceled the license 

for Enlace Canal 21, Nicaragua’s only Christian television channel. It is 

believed that the government took this action after the leader of the 

channel, Pastor Guillermo Osorno, challenged the results of the presidential election and denounced electoral irregularities. 

Key U.S. Policy

In February, the State Department issued a press statement expressing concern for the Nicaraguan government’s crackdown on civil 

society, specifically through the Foreign Agents Law passed last year. 

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken condemned the Ortega-Murillo government for “repression and electoral manipulation” that 

“stripped the November 7 vote of any real significance.” Around the 

time of the election, the U.S. Congress passed and President Joseph 

R. Biden signed the RENACER Act. The act establishes “measures to 

monitor, report on, and address corruption and human rights abuses 

in Nicaragua,” including calling for sanctions on Nicaraguan officials 

responsible for the unfair election, requiring State Department reports 

on senior government officials involved in gross human rights violations, and advocating oversight of foreign assistance for projects in 

the country. 

The U.S. government continued to enact robust sanctions against 

Nicaraguan officials, though none referred to religious freedom violations. On June 9—a week after the Nicaraguan government arrested 

four presidential candidates—the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four government 

officials, including President Ortega’s daughter. Then, on November 

15 OFAC imposed sanctions on the Public Ministry of Nicaragua and 

nine government officials in response to the sham elections. On January 10, 2022, the State Department announced “visa restrictions on 

116 individuals complicit in undermining democracy in Nicaragua,” 

including local leaders and justice officials. OFAC also sanctioned six 

members of the Ortega regime. On November 15, 2021, the State 

Department again placed Nicaragua on its Special Watch List for 

severe violations of religious freedom.
62 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

TURKEY

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Turkey remained poor, 

with no improvement from the previous year. Many religious 

communities continued to face bureaucratic obstacles that prevented or seriously impeded their ability to practice their religion or 

belief. Notably, the government maintained its refusal to grant legal 

personality to religious groups and yet again rejected a petition to 

allow religious foundations to hold long-delayed board member 

elections. Similarly, the government took no steps to reopen the 

Theological School of Halki (Halki Seminary), preventing the Ecumenical Patriarchate from training clergy for more than 50 years. 

The Turkish government also did not permit conscientious objection 

to mandatory military service and convicted those who attempted 

to exercise that right. 

Throughout the year, both religious and ethnic minorities faced 

governmental or societal targeting along religious lines. In July, 

police reportedly detained 28 imams—and of those, they formally 

arrested nine—for preaching in Kurdish. Police officers questioned 

the imams about praying in Kurdish and their failure to adhere to the 

government’s official sermons, acts that law enforcement equated 

with support for a terrorist organization. As in previous years, Alevis 

were beset by a number of threatening incidents. In August, unidentified individuals broke into and damaged an Alevi house of worship 

(cemevi) in Istanbul, and several Alevis’ houses were marked and 

vandalized in separate episodes in the cities of Adana and Yalova. 

Protestant communities experienced persistent difficulties. Foreign Protestants whom the Turkish government either deported or 

prevented from entering the country in recent years unsuccessfully 

sought to overturn those bans and appealed to the European Court 

of Human Rights (ECtHR). In late December, a Protestant church in 

KEY FINDINGS

the Istanbul neighborhood of Kadıköy was discovered with “Allah 1” 

graffitied across the front door. The Turkish government also failed 

to protect other religious sites, including historical places of worship 

and cemeteries. For instance, a private citizen demolished the Surp 

Toros Armenian church in Kütahya, and construction in the province 

of Van toppled headstones in an Armenian cemetery.

Government officials at various levels expressed antisemitism through statements and social media posts. In May, Turkish 

President Recep Tayyip Erdog ̆ an used antisemitic language in a 

televised speech, prompting strong condemnation from the U.S. 

Department of State. In November, a court in Bursa ruled that a man 

who called President Erdog ̆ an “a Jew” on social media had insulted 

the President, and it ultimately convicted the man and fined him 

approximately 721 USD (7,000 Turkish lira). President Erdog ̆ an’s 

lawyer argued that the remark was “humiliating [and] damaging to 

his honor and respectability.” In other instances of antisemitism, 

unknown individuals set fire to the gateway of a disused synagogue, 

and online groups hacked and carried out cyberattacks on S ̧alom, 

Turkey’s only Jewish newspaper, and Avlaremoz, a Turkish-language 

Jewish news platform. The Turkish government maintained its 

law criminalizing blasphemy, or “insulting religious values,” and 

penalized those perceived to have insulted or mocked Islam. In 

January, authorities arrested two university students on charges 

of insulting religious values after they displayed a poster depicting 

a religious site alongside lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 

intersex (LGBTI) flags, and in March, a government body fined two 

news networks on a similar basis. Individuals, including atheists, 

reported experiencing discrimination in societal and professional 

settings due to their beliefs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Turkey on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest 

levels for the reopening of the Theological 

School of Halki (Halki Seminary) and for full 

compliance with ECtHR rulings on freedom 

of religion or belief; 

• Track and comprehensively document 

in the State Department’s International 

Religious Freedom Report religious communities’ efforts to open, regain, renovate, 

and protect places of worship and other 

religious sites of spiritual, cultural, or historic importance; include information on 

the vandalization, damage, and destruction of such sites; and work with the Turkish 

government to ensure their protection; and

• Prioritize travel to Turkey for officials at the 

highest levels of the State Department’s 

Office of International Religious Freedom 

and Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor 

and Combat Antisemitism to raise issues 

related to freedom of religion or belief 

and antisemitism directly with Turkish 

counterparts. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Incorporate consideration of Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities and broader 

human rights issues into its continued 

evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey bilateral 

relationship, including in the context of 

proposed legislation such as the Turkey 

Human Rights Promotion Act of 2021 and 

the Turkey and Ecumenical Patriarchate 

Religious Freedom Act of 2021.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in Turkey in 2021

• Factsheet: Destruction of Cemeteries

• Podcast: Sivas Massacre and Turkey’s Persecution of the Alevi Community

• Podcast: 50 Years and Counting: The Continued Closure of Halki Seminary in Turkey
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 63

TURKEY

Background

Turkey has an estimated population of nearly 82.5 million people, of 

whom more than 99 percent identify as Muslim. Most Muslims in the 

country follow Sunni Islam, but between 10 million and 25 million identify as Alevi. Alevis represent the country’s largest religious minority, 

but the government refuses to recognize or grant the community 

certain rights it accords to some other religious groups. Around 0.2 

percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, 

Baha’is, Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean Catholics, Greek Orthodox, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Russian 

Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Yazidis, and others. 

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and guarantees the freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction. 

However, the government also exercises extensive control over both 

majority Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities through either 

the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which oversees the practice of Islam, or the General Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel 

Müdürlüg ̆ü), which regulates other religious communities.

President Erdog ̆ an and his government continued to support 

efforts to promote Sunni Islam, including through educational policies 

and controversial moves to raise the profile and influence of the Diyanet. 

Although many religious communities encountered obstacles related 

to their freedom of religion or belief, the government rebuffed their 

requests to try and resolve these issues during the year and instead 

insisted that “everyone lives as they wish, regardless of their beliefs.” 

Turkey’s acts of military aggression beyond its borders, including in 

Iraq and Syria, also contributed to destabilizing conditions for religious 

and ethnic minorities residing in those areas. For more information on 

religious freedom violations by Turkey and Turkish-backed forces, see 

the Annual Report chapters on Iraq and Syria.

Government Stifling of Religious and 

Other Minorities

Government policies—many of which have existed and been implemented for years and in some cases decades—stifled the ability of 

religious and nonreligious communities to express and practice their 

beliefs. Regulations and acts of government interference regularly 

impeded the functioning of those communities (both by denying them 

status as legal entities and blocking elections), prevented them from 

opening places of worship, and restricted them from training clergy 

and future religious leaders. 

Authorities increasingly cracked down on members of religious 

and other minority groups in connection with elements of their speech 

and religion. In the case of the imams detained or arrested for conducting sermons in Kurdish, the prosecution pointed to their use of 

certain Kurdish words as “evidence” of their alleged connection with 

a terrorist organization. As of the end of the reporting period, their 

trial was still ongoing. In September, civil servant and head of the 

Diyanet Ali Erbas ̧ warned that citizens should conduct themselves on 

social media in line with Islamic values and suggested that the government introduce regulations with this aim. Many charges related to 

blasphemy originated with social media posts that officials believed 

insulted Islam. In January, a prosecutor’s office launched an investigation into an individual who posted commentaries on Islam to 

YouTube. In March, journalist Hakan Aygün received a 7.5-month 

prison sentence for a Twitter post in which he criticized President 

Erdog ̆an through a religious pun.

Vandalism and Threats to Religious Sites

Government negligence, vandals, and so-called “treasure hunters” 

posed serious threats to, damaged, or destroyed religious sites over 

the course of the year. In the city of Erzurum, an urban development 

project threatened to further damage the 18th-century Surp Minas 

Armenian church. Unknown individuals carrying out an unauthorized excavation also caused damage to the Surp Toros Gregoryan 

Armenian church in Kayseri. Finally, in yet another example of the 

government converting a former church into a mosque, the Diyanet 

opened the Hagia Sophia in Edirne to Muslim worship in December.

Key U.S. Policy

Relations between the United States and Turkey remained strained 

despite continued high-level engagement that sought a return to 

“constructive relations” and the “effective management of disagreements.” Although the U.S. government frequently reiterated

its interest in improving the bilateral relationship, a host of issues 

continued to stymie cooperation, including the Turkish government’s 

purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system and its ongoing disregard for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In October, 

President Erdog ̆ an threatened to expel then U.S. Ambassador to 

Turkey David M. Satterfield, along with nine other ambassadors, after 

they called for the release of Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala on 

the fourth anniversary of his unjust imprisonment. Both countries are 

allies as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The U.S. government took a stronger stance on religious freedom issues in Turkey compared to previous years in both its public 

messaging and engagement. In June, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price issued a press statement on the occasion of the 50th 

anniversary of the closing of Halki Seminary urging the Turkish government to respect freedom of religion or belief, allow the reopening 

of Halki Seminary, and permit all religious groups to train clergy. In 

October, President Joseph R. Biden hosted His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and discussed, among other issues, “the 

importance of religious freedom as a fundamental human right.” 

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken also met with the Ecumenical 

Patriarch during his visit, and he underscored U.S. concern for religious 

minorities in Turkey and the U.S. government’s continued prioritization 

of the reopening of Halki Seminary.
64 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

UZBEKISTAN

I

n 2021, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan began to trend 

negatively. The government of Uzbekistan in some ways departed 

from its forward-leaning religious freedom reform agenda and 

resumed the use of certain repressive policies against Muslims and 

those who advocate on their behalf. Research by USCIRF found that 

the government continued to imprison approximately 2,200 political prisoners in connection with their religious activities or real or 

alleged religious affiliations. Although many of these prisoners were 

sentenced under the previous regime, the current administration 

has done little to review their cases systematically or release those 

wrongfully imprisoned. Moreover, the government added to that 

figure through the detention, arrest, and imprisonment of unknown 

numbers of Muslim individuals for peaceful religious activities such 

as possessing religious literature or meeting to pray. Notably, and 

particularly following the Taliban’s late summer takeover in Afghanistan, authorities in Uzbekistan detained hundreds of individuals 

with purported links to the Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir, often based 

on allegations related to their peaceful religious activity, association, or expression without evidence of the use or advocacy of 

violence. Over the course of the year, prisoners were allegedly 

subjected to beatings and other forms of torture at the hands of 

prison authorities. 

In June, the government clamped down on citizens’ ability 

to pursue religious education abroad, requiring prospective students to obtain permission from the government’s Committee 

on Religious Affairs (CRA) and recalling over 1,500 students from 

religious schools in Egypt and Turkey. That same month, government officials fined employees of news outlets Kun.uz and Azon.uz

KEY FINDINGS

for publishing religious material without having submitted it to 

the CRA for prior approval. On several occasions, law enforcement authorities throughout the country rounded up Muslim men 

and forced them to shave their beards, and police in the cities of 

Bukhara and Samarqand reportedly warned Shi’a Muslims against 

posting religious materials on their social media accounts.

In July, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed into law changes 

to Uzbekistan’s “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” law. The changes resulted from more than three years 

of effort to revise this legislation that governs virtually all religious 

activity in the country. Despite having received extensive feedback from international partners, including USCIRF and the U.S. 

Department of State, the government declined to incorporate 

many recommendations to bring the law in line with international 

standards. While the amended law presented some improvements—halving the number of members required for a religious 

community to obtain registration from 100 to 50 and removing a 

provision that prohibited wearing religious clothing—it preserved 

many of the previous legislation’s most problematic and restrictive 

elements. Of note, the law maintained bans on unregistered religious activity, private religious education, and missionary activity; 

placed limitations on the location of religious rites and ceremonies; 

and continued to require the official review and approval of all religious literature and related materials. Similarly, a draft version of 

the Criminal Code published in February indicated that the government would likely retain provisions commonly used against political 

and religious prisoners, which Human Rights Watch has asserted

“violate the rights to freedom of speech, association, and religion.” 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

• Include Uzbekistan on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Work with the government of Uzbekistan to revise the 1998 religion law, as 

amended in 2021, and other relevant legislation to comply with international human 

rights standards, including by removing 

registration requirements on religious 

communities, permitting the possession 

and distribution of religious literature, and 

permitting the sharing of religious beliefs; 

• Press at the highest levels for the immediate release of individuals imprisoned for 

their peaceful religious activities or religious affiliations, and press the government 

of Uzbekistan to treat prisoners humanely 

and allow for independent prison monitoring; and

• Allocate funding for the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and 

U.S. Embassy in Tashkent to provide litigation support to individuals and religious 

communities prosecuted in connection 

with their peaceful religious activities.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Special Report: Uzbekistan’s Religious and Political Prisoners: Addressing a Legacy of Repression

• Podcast: Uzbekistan’s Religious and Political Prisoners

• Press Statement: USCIRF Concerned by New Uzbekistan Religion Law

• Podcast: Uzbekistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 65

UZBEKISTAN

Background

The government of Uzbekistan estimates the population of the country 

at around 34 million people. Between 88 and 96 percent of people identify as Sunni Muslim; one percent identify as Shi’a Muslim; 2.2 percent 

identify as Russian Orthodox Christian; and 1.8 percent identify as atheist, Baha’i, Buddhist, Catholic, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Protestant, 

or a member of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness. 

Over the past few years, the government pursued unprecedented 

reform and sought out recommendations from the international 

community to improve conditions for freedom of religion or belief 

in Uzbekistan. In 2021, however, the government appeared to cease 

some of those efforts, resuming a number of repressive practices 

against Muslim individuals and dismissing continued calls for Parliament 

to further revise its changes to the “On Freedom of Conscience and 

Religious Organizations” law. 

Renewed Repression and Imprisonment of Muslims

While the government’s recent expansion of religious freedom did 

not generally focus on members of the country’s Muslim majority, 

many Muslims nevertheless noted positive changes under the reform 

agenda of the last several years, which better enabled them to practice and express their beliefs. Events of the past year, though, have 

led observers to characterize the government’s shifting approach as 

a renewed “campaign on non-state Islam” (Islam practiced outside 

of that which is specifically promulgated and permitted by the state), 

with officials “reverting to restrictive practices” commonly used under 

the previous regime. Principally, the government continues to incarcerate roughly 2,200 individuals on religious grounds and has resumed 

prosecuting and imprisoning others on similar charges, subjecting

some of them to torture.

Many arrests were tied to an alleged connection to Hizb ut-Tahrir 

or other groups the government has deemed “extremist,” but the evidence used is of a religious nature. In addition, some arrests have been 

linked directly to speech on religious subjects or the possession of 

religious texts. In June and July, authorities detained Muslim blogger 

Fazilhoja Arifhojaev twice—for 15 days and five months, respectively—after he questioned a progovernment imam. Law enforcement 

then opened a criminal case against Arifhojaev after discovering a 

months-old Facebook post he had shared on the subject of Muslims 

congratulating non-Muslims on their religious holidays. After the end 

of the reporting period, he received a sentence of 7.5 years in prison. 

Odilbek Hojabekov, a Muslim who received a five-year suspended sentence for bringing unauthorized Islamic literature into the country from 

the Hajj, had a new warrant issued for his arrest in October following a 

change in the authorities’ testimony. Muslim Laziz Asadov reportedly 

fled the country in December after the State Security Service raided 

his home and seized two Qur’ans, among other possessions, in what 

he believed was a reprisal for his public criticism of the government’s 

religious policies.

Uzbekistan’s Shi’a Muslim minority also continued to endure 

difficulties. In March, a court in the city of Samarqand fined Shi’a 

Muslim Rashid Ibrahimov under the Administrative Code for having 

unauthorized religious materials on his cell phone. In June, authorities reportedly warned Shi’a Muslims in the cities of Bukhara and 

Samarqand not to publish religious materials on their social media. 

Shi’a Muslim communities also remained unable to open mosques 

that had been shut down during the Soviet era, despite an increasing 

need for the additional space. 

Legislative and Policy Changes

The government’s adoption of a revised religion law in July did not 

deliver the sweeping changes required to comply with international 

human rights standards. Although the amended version simplified 

some aspects of the mandatory registration process that religious 

groups must complete to operate legally, it did not result in the successful registration of all those that applied, including communities 

of Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Protestants. The law retained 

broad prohibitions on unregistered religious activity, missionary 

activity, and private religious education; in particular, Muslims have 

stated that they exert caution when teaching or preaching due to 

these strict state controls. During the year, the government fined

Baptists and Shi’a Muslims for the unapproved distribution or possession of religious materials, and it introduced new limitations on 

citizens’ ability to obtain a religious education abroad. In one positive 

development, in September the Minister of Education announced

that girls would be permitted to wear certain styles of headscarves 

in schools, but it remained to be seen whether schools would revise 

internal dress code policies and allow the wearing of religious garb 

or symbols in practice.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationship has focused 

primarily on addressing regional security and improving economic 

relations. In the leadup to and aftermath of the Taliban’s seizure of 

power in Afghanistan and the U.S. military’s withdrawal in August, 

both sides have sought increased engagement on mutual security 

concerns. Discussion of Afghanistan featured prominently in separate meetings between Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, Secretary of 

State Antony J. Blinken, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin 

amid rumors that the U.S. government was gauging interest among a 

handful of Central Asian states about hosting a continued U.S. military 

presence in the region. Throughout the year, Uzbekistan also received 

several congressional delegations. As part of the U.S. government’s 

efforts to combat the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, the United 

States donated over six million vaccine doses to the country.

The State Department frequently raised human rights concerns 

with counterparts in Uzbekistan and highlighted persistent issues 

related to freedom of religion or belief. In December, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled 

to Uzbekistan to participate in the inaugural U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue, where delegations from both countries

“expressed their interest in further expanding cooperation in promoting respect for freedom of religion or belief.” On International 

Human Rights Day in December, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan 

Daniel Rosenblum cohosted a roundtable—attended by various 

government officials—on the rehabilitation of former political and 

religious prisoners.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 67

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

This section highlights some important developments and trends 

that impacted religious freedom conditions around the world 

in 2021, particularly—but not only—in countries and regions 

not covered elsewhere in this report.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Religious Freedom

The COVID-19 global pandemic continued to affect freedom of religion 

or belief in 2021. Public health measures and general concern over 

the virus’s spread reduced the extent of public association, including 

to teach, practice, worship, and observe religion. As such, repressive 

governments had fewer opportunities to actively stifle religious freedom despite little change in their policies toward religious minorities 

and those who peacefully dissented from officially endorsed religious 

beliefs. In some isolated cases, 

governments continued to 

enforce crackdowns in ways that 

discriminated against religious 

minorities. In Algeria, for example, Christian communities were 

unable to reopen their churches, 

even as mosques capable of 

supporting social distancing 

measures reopened. Finally, governments often failed to respond 

to, or in some cases encouraged, 

misinformation targeting religious minorities and blaming them for spreading COVID-19.

Several governments continued to gravely endanger the health 

and lives of religious prisoners of conscience by failing to provide 

adequate protection against COVID-19. They also continued to arrest 

and imprison scores of religious minorities (including nontheists) and 

dissidents on the basis of religion, creating potentially life-threatening conditions for those whose religious views differed from that of 

the government. In May, for example, two Baha’is in Iran contracted

severe cases of COVID while detained at Adelebad Prison in Shiraz. 

Both survived and were released on bail in May but were rearrested

to serve prison sentences in March 2022 after their sentences were 

upheld upon appeal. In India, advocates for and families of prisoners 

detained for religious freedom issues, such as protesting the 2019 

Citizenship Amendment Act, raised renewed concerns regarding the 

alarming rise in COVID-19 cases in overcrowded prisons. 

Blasphemy and Hate Speech Law Enforcement

As USCIRF has previously noted, 84 countries around the world continued to criminalize blasphemy as of 2020 in violation of international 

standards on freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. 

In 2021, individuals accused of blasphemy continued to face state 

violence, mob violence, persecution for peacefully expressing their 

beliefs (including on social media), and violations of due process in 

countries that USCIRF recommends for “country of particular concern” (CPC) or Special Watch List (SWL) status in this report. Social 

media companies also censored expression based on requests from 

governments that enforce blasphemy laws. For example, from January 

to June 2021, Facebook restricted access to 2,286 items reported by 

the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority as blasphemy and 415 

items related to sectarian enmity. It also restricted several allegedly 

blasphemous posts based on a request from the Indonesian Ministry 

of Information and Communications Technology. 

In addition, blasphemy prosecutions occurred in 2021 in countries not recommended for CPC or SWL status, including in Europe. 

In Poland, for example, three lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 

and intersex (LGBTI) activists 

faced charges in January for 

“offending religious feelings” 

by displaying posters depicting 

the Virgin Mary with a rainbow 

halo. In February, a heavy metal 

singer was convicted on similar 

charges for posting a photo on 

social media of his foot stepping on an image of the Virgin 

Mary. In positive developments, 

the former group was found not 

guilty in March and a judge overturned the latter’s conviction on appeal in September. 

Vague and overbroad hate speech laws criminalizing speech that 

does not amount to incitement of violence also present human rights 

concerns. The peaceful public sharing of one’s religious beliefs is both 

an integral part of religious freedom and protected by freedom of 

expression. This includes the expression of beliefs that may be offensive to others or controversial in society. During 2021 and early 2022 

in Finland, authorities pursued such a prosecution against a member 

of Parliament and a bishop for a tweet, radio interview, and pamphlet 

expressing their religious views about homosexuality.

Transnational Repression

In addition to repression within their borders, some governments 

also continued to violate religious freedom abroad, targeting religious dissidents residing outside their borders and engaging in other 

forms of violations. In July, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

revealed an Iranian attempt to kidnap an Iranian American activist 

who protested Iranian religious head covering laws on U.S. soil. Iran 

has also influenced others in the Arabian Peninsula region, such as the 

Houthi movement in Yemen, to increase their repression of Baha’is. 

In northern Syria, Turkey’s recalcitrant occupation of a wide swath of 

Several governments continued to 

gravely endanger the health and lives of 

religious prisoners of conscience 

by failing to provide adequate protection 

against COVID-19.
68 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

cross-border territory since late 2019 remained the locus of serious 

religious freedom and broader human rights violations against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities, largely by Islamist militias under 

its influence and control.

The Chinese government continued its transnational repression 

campaign—which, according to Freedom House, is the most sophisticated, far-reaching, and comprehensive in the world—targeting ethnic 

and religious minorities, human rights activists, dissidents, and others. 

The government used its economic and geopolitical influence to 

pressure foreign countries, including majority Muslim countries such as 

Saudi Arabia and Morocco, to repatriate Uyghurs, sometimes through 

Interpol Red Notices. Through its Sky Net and Fox Hunt operations, 

the Chinese government also employed other methods of “involuntary 

returns” to force its victims to return to China where they face severe 

persecution, including by threatening their family members in China 

and by sending undercover Chinese agents abroad to harass, intimidate, coerce, “persuade,” and in some cases kidnap victims. It used 

similar tactics to silence critics and their activities abroad. 

Religious Intolerance in Europe 

Religious intolerance remained a serious concern across Europe. For 

several years, including 2021, Muslims and Jews have faced rising 

levels of xenophobia and discrimination that have prompted many 

in both communities to reconsider whether Europe is a safe place in 

which to live. Christians also have experienced increasing religious 

intolerance in Europe in recent years. 

Muslims and Jews in Europe face a confusing patchwork of ritual 

slaughter laws that adversely affect their ability to procure halal and 

kosher meat. In some countries, such as France, governments restrict 

the wearing of religious dress in public and/or in public employment, 

as do some private employers. In July 2021, the Court of Justice of 

the European Union ruled that employers may under certain considerations forbid the wearing of visible religious symbols, such as Islamic 

headscarves and Jewish kippahs, but they must have a genuine need 

to do so and the employee’s rights must be considered. The decision 

reaffirmed and expanded upon a ruling by the same body in 2017. 

A familiar pattern of antisemitism persisted in 2021 in the form of 

verbal attacks, physical assaults, discrimination, holocaust distortion, 

and rampant vandalism. France

and England saw sharp percentage increases in the number of 

antisemitic incidents throughout 

the year, while Jews in Germany, 

Belgium, France, Italy, England,

and more experienced episodes 

of antisemitic physical and verbal 

aggression. Jewish cemeteries, 

synagogues, and kosher restaurants were targets for vandalism 

that involved swastikas, the 

destruction of headstones, pig 

meat, and antisemitic slogans. Poland began to enforce a 2018 law 

that made it illegal to blame the Polish nation for crimes committed 

by the Nazis. In February, two historians went on trial for their study of 

the role of a group of villagers who aided Nazis in the murder of Jews 

hiding in a nearby forest in 1944. In a positive development, an appeals 

court eventually overturned a verdict that had ordered the scholars to 

apologize for their research. The month of May was particularly fraught 

with antisemitism due to the two-week violent conflict in Israel, leaving many Jews despondent about their safety in Europe. Numerous 

demonstrations across the continent featured antisemitic language, the 

burning of Israeli flags in front of synagogues and community centers, 

violent threats, and vandalism. A record number of antisemitic incidents were reported in London that month. USCIRF released a report

in April analyzing antisemitism in 11 countries in Europe and examining 

U.S. foreign policy as it relates to combating antisemitism in Europe.

As USCIRF highlighted in a February 2022 hearing on “AntiMuslim Policies and Bias in Europe,” such bias manifests through laws, 

discrimination in public institutions, prejudice in the immigration process, online harassment, and violent attacks. An inquiry into the United 

Kingdom’s Conservative Party found that the party is viewed as “insensitive” to Muslims and that “anti-Muslim sentiment remains a problem” 

at local and individual levels. Austria’s government released a map that 

showed the locations of more than 600 mosques and Muslim associations in the country in a move to reportedly “fight political ideologies, 

not religion,” ostensibly referring to political Islam. However, Austrian 

politicians and advocacy groups noted that the map would only foster

more ill-will toward Muslim groups and could further endanger the lives 

of Muslims living in Austria. Muslim women in Germany continued to be 

denied job opportunities because they wear headscarves. Hungarian 

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his spokesman came under scrutiny

for their suggestion that the integration of Bosnia into the European 

Union will be difficult due to the country’s large Muslim population.

French President Emmanuel Macron is responding to the spread 

of what he calls “Islamist separatism,” alleging that it undermines 

French values and the principle of laïcité. As a result, in July the French 

government enacted the Law Reinforcing Respect of the Principles 

of the Republic, which strengthens state oversight of mosques and 

other Islamic organizations. The government now has the power to 

close houses of worship and dissolve religious organizations without 

a court order if any members are “provoking violence or inciting 

hatred.” In addition, religious organizations must obtain a government permit every five years and are subject to an annual audit if 

they receive foreign funding. Critics of the new law say that it gives 

the government too much power over civic and religious groups and 

unfairly targets Islam in a country where Muslims have faced decades 

of discrimination, hate crimes, and marginalization. Contributing 

to this unease in 2021 were the 

presidential aspirations of Eric 

Zemmour, a journalist with a 

history of anti-Muslim rhetoric.

European Christians also 

faced intolerance and hate 

crimes, representative of a rising 

problem over the past several 

years. Christians endured physical and verbal assaults, and in 

some cases their community 

property experienced vandalism, desecration, theft, and 

arson. Two French lawmakers investigated religious-based hate crimes 

in their country and found evidence of 857 anti-Christian incidents 

in 2021 alone, including an incident in which unidentified vandals 

destroyed a Marseille church’s marquee and burned all of its bibles. 

A series of vandalism incidents plagued a church in Italy in the fall, and 

there were arson attacks on numerous churches across the continent, 

including in France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. In December, 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Muslims and Jews have faced rising levels 

of xenophobia and discrimination 

that have prompted many in 

both communities to reconsider whether 

Europe is a safe place in which to live.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 69

Catholics taking part in a Marian procession in Paris were subjected

to threats and doused in water. 

While some governments struggled to contain physical and verbal 

threats to members of religious groups, social media companies have 

also come under fire for failing to contain hateful messaging on their 

platforms. This failure has been particularly acute regarding threats 

from extremist groups, who often express vehemently xenophobic, 

anti-immigrant rhetoric and commit crimes aimed at Muslims and 

Jews. In May, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer acknowledged

that “right wing extremism is the biggest threat” in Germany. A recent 

study showed that TikTok is a hotbed for targeting Muslims and Jews 

and espousing “violence-endorsing, hateful ideologies” such as the 

“Great Replacement theory” and “white genocide.” In one instance, 

a video showing a rabbi speaking about growing solidarity between 

Jews and Muslims was used as a justification for arguments that these 

communities were “against Europeans.” Similarly, antisemitic and 

anti-Muslim COVID-19 conspiracy theories continue to be created and 

disseminated on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, such as that Jews 

and Muslims are deliberately spreading the virus. 

Deterioration in South Asia

USCIRF has long noted deteriorating religious freedom conditions 

across South Asia, and that trend persisted in 2021. In addition to 

its recommendations to designate Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan 

as CPCs, USCIRF is deeply concerned about worsening religious 

freedom conditions in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives. In Bangladesh, communal 

violence erupted in October 

during Durga Puja festivities. 

The week-long wave of violence led to widespread attacks 

on the Hindu community and 

its places of worship despite 

government efforts to contain violence. The Bangladesh 

government continued to 

leave refugees, predominately 

Rohingya Muslims, in untenable 

conditions, closing schools and 

moving some of them to the 

remote island of Bhasan Char. 

In Sri Lanka, the government has exploited legal means such as 

the blasphemy law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act to 

target religious minorities and deepen societal discrimination toward 

Muslims since the 2019 Easter bombings. State-led intimidation and 

surveillance of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, have led to 

communal tension in an otherwise multi-ethnic and religious society. 

Elsewhere in the region, the persecution of Christian converts

under Nepal’s proselytization laws continued to violate the religious 

freedom of those individuals who chose to convert from Hinduism. 

Religious intolerance toward non-Muslims in the Maldives—including tourists and foreign laborers—remained concerning, as they are 

only allowed to practice their religion in private; there are no places 

of worship for adherents of religions other than Islam. The Maldives 

government further prohibits the importation of icons (e.g., crosses) 

and religious statues, but it generally allows non-Muslims or foreigners 

to import religious literature, such as bibles, for personal use.

Political Upheaval Raises 

Religious Freedom Concerns

USCIRF has applauded Sudan’s dramatic improvement of religious freedom conditions following that country’s historic revolution in April 2019, 

which ended the 30-year regime of then President Omar al-Bashir. The 

hybrid military and civilian transitional government made the advancement of human rights, including religious freedom, a top priority. For 

example, in July of 2020, the government passed the Miscellaneous 

Amendment Act, which repealed the apostasy law, ended flogging 

for blasphemy, banned female genital mutilation (FGM), permitted 

non-Muslims to drink alcohol, and abolished the guardianship law that 

required women to get a permit from a male guardian for traveling 

abroad with their children. However, on October 25, 2021, Sudan’s 

top military leader, Lt. Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Burhan, led a military 

coup, declaring a national emergency and dissolving the civilian-led 

government. The general also suspended the transitional constitution and arrested key civilian cabinet members, including then Prime 

Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who had been central to religious freedom 

advancements over the prior two years. Sudan’s religious minority 

communities fear that returning the military to power and banishing 

civilian leaders who led national advancements in religious freedom and 

broader human rights may presage a reversal of those changes 

and improvements. 

In Belarus, religious freedom conditions continued to 

follow a troubling trajectory 

in 2021. The government of 

authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has pressured 

religious institutions and officials 

over their support of political 

opposition following fraudulent

presidential elections in August 

2020. During 2021, the government continued to pressure the 

Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) to remove pro-protest clergy and 

reportedly demanded that church officials provide a list of more than 

100 priests whom it considered disloyal. Several priests included on 

this list were stripped of their positions in 2021, including Archbishop 

Artemy, a popular cleric who refused to stop his public condemnation 

of regime violence. In addition, all foreign clergy must obtain official 

permission to serve in the country, the permits for which range from 

three months to a maximum of one year. They must constantly reapply 

and can be denied without explanation, which happens frequently in 

the case of Polish Catholic priests. According to Father Vyacheslav 

Borok, who fled the country under pressure in July 2021, “the Catholic 

Church is ready for repression and many bishops are simply prepared 

to go to prison.” 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Sudan’s religious minority communities fear 

that returning the military to power and 

banishing civilian leaders who led 

national advancements in religious freedom 

and broader human rights may presage a 

reversal of those changes and improvements.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 71

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS 

IMPLEMENTED IN 2021

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended

(IRFA) mandates USCIRF to make independent policy recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

The recommendations are based on USCIRF’s research on religious 

freedom conditions abroad and assessment of U.S. policy. In addition, USCIRF’s mandate also includes tracking the U.S. government’s 

implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations and reviewing, to the 

extent practicable, the effectiveness of such implemented recommendations in advancing religious freedom internationally. While notable 

U.S. government actions pursuant to USCIRF’s recommendations are 

detailed throughout this report, this section highlights the key USCIRF 

recommendations implemented during 2021, including several longstanding recommendations. The list, which is not exhaustive, is meant 

to showcase the effectiveness of U.S. government actions resulting 

from the implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations. Unless otherwise noted, the recommendations highlighted here were included 

in USCIRF’s 2021 Annual Report. 

Designating the Worst Violators

• In November 2021, the U.S. Department of State designated

10 countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under 

IRFA, all of which USCIRF recommended for such designation. 

The State Department designated Russia as a CPC for the first 

time, an action USCIRF has recommended every year since 2017. 

• In November, the State Department placed four countries on its 

Special Watch List (SWL) under IRFA, three of which—Algeria, 

Cuba, and Nicaragua—USCIRF recommended for such placement. Algeria was added for the first time, an action USCIRF has 

recommended since 2020. 

• In November, the State Department also designated nine nonstate actors as “entities of particular concern” (EPCs), seven of 

which USCIRF has recommended for such designation.

Filling IRF-Related Appointments

• USCIRF urged the administration of President Joseph R. Biden 

to swiftly nominate or appoint well-qualified individuals to key 

IRF positions:

• In July 2021, the Biden administration nominated Rashad 

Hussain to serve as the ambassador at large for IRF, and the 

Senate confirmed him in December 2021.

• In July, the Biden administration nominated Deborah Lipstadt as 

the special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, granting 

the rank of ambassador to the position for the first time, and the 

Senate confirmed her in March 2022. 

• In December, the Biden administration appointed Under 

Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights 

Uzra Zeya to serve concurrently as the special coordinator for 

Tibetan issues.

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions

• USCIRF has consistently called on the U.S. government to 

increase the use of human rights-related financial and visa 

authorities to impose asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious freedom violations, citing 

specific abuses. Over the course of 2021, the U.S. government 

issued eight Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

(Global Magnitsky) sanctions against individuals and entities specifically for religious freedom abuses. Significant sanctions issued 

during the year for religious freedom abuses are listed below.

• In January 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on Iraq’s Popular 

Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman and former National 

Security Advisor Falih al-Fayyadh for engaging in egregious 

human rights abuses. 

2021 State Department Designations Pursuant to USCIRF Recommendations

CPC Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

SWL Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua

EPC al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Houthis, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-Greater Sahara, Jamaat Nasr 

al-Islam wal Muslimin, the Taliban
72 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

• USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government work with 

U.S. allies in a multilateral effort to coordinate targeted sanctions against Chinese leaders for their treatment of religious 

minorities. Pursuant to this recommendation, in March 2021, 

the U.S. government imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on 

two Chinese officials for their involvement in atrocities committed against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. 

These sanctions were issued in conjunction with targeted 

sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 

European Union against the same abusers. 

• In July, the Treasury Department sanctioned religious freedom violators in Syria, including the Turkish-backed militia 

Ahrar al-Sharqiya as well as individuals Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad 

al-Hayes—commonly known as Abu Hatem Shaqra—and 

Farrukh Fayzimatov.

• In July, the Treasury Department sanctioned individuals in 

Cuba for suppression of peaceful protests, including the 

beating of a Catholic priest. 

• In September, the Treasury Department sanctioned four 

Iranian intelligence operatives for attempting to kidnap an 

Iranian American activist living in Brooklyn who advocated 

for Iranian women’s freedom to choose whether or not to 

wear Islamic headscarves.

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 – 

Advancing International Religious Freedom

• USCIRF called on the Biden administration to continue to implement the executive order on Advancing International Religious 

Freedom, signed by then President Donald J. Trump in June 

2020. The executive order included several of USCIRF’s longstanding recommendations related to the prioritization of 

religious freedom abroad in U.S. foreign policy. This included 

increasing related foreign assistance and developing an overall 

strategy for promoting religious freedom abroad and country-specific action plans. In 2021, the Biden administration 

implemented the executive order by:

• At the State Department, continuing to pursue country-specific action plans, again dedicating $50 million to IRF-related 

programming, and continuing to provide training on IRF 

issues to foreign service officers. 

• At the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

continuing to advance religious freedom within USAID’s 

priorities and programming, including through activities to 

address the needs of vulnerable religious minority communities in various parts of the world as well as organizational 

initiatives such as the IRF Sector Council to foster agency-wide coordination and cooperation.

Increasing the Refugee Ceiling

• USCIRF has called for a return of the annual U.S. refugee resettlement ceiling to the previously established level of 95,000. In 

February 2021, President Biden announced his intent to raise 

the refugee ceiling to 125,000 for fiscal year (FY) 2022, which 

then began on October 1, 2021. In May 2021, President Biden 

announced he was raising the refugee ceiling for FY 2021 from 

15,000 to 62,500 and that he intended to prioritize vulnerable 

religious groups, including at-risk Uyghurs and Rohingya.

Designation of Uyghur Genocide

• In June 2020, USCIRF warned that the Chinese government’s 

repressive population control measures against Uyghurs and 

other Turkic Muslims were evidence of genocide and urged the 

State Department to investigate whether these policies meet the 

legal definition for genocide under international law. In January 

2021, the Trump administration designated China’s treatment of 

Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as genocide and 

crimes against humanity. In March, the Biden administration 

affirmed the designation when it released the State Department’s annual country reports on human rights practices.

Diplomatic Boycott of the Beijing Olympics 

• USCIRF urged the U.S. government to express concerns about 

Beijing hosting the 2022 Winter Olympic Games and for U.S. 

government officials to not attend the games if the Chinese 

government’s crackdown on religious freedom continues. In 

December 2021, the Biden administration announced that U.S. 

officials will boycott the Olympic Games because of the Chinese 

government’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in 

Xinjiang and other human rights abuses. 

Confucius Institutes

• Since 2019, USCIRF has recommended the U.S. government 

strengthen efforts to counter Chinese government influence 

operations in the United States that suppress information regarding religious freedom violations in China, such as Confucius 

Institutes. In large part due to U.S. government and congressional scrutiny over the Confucius Institute’s foreign influence in the 

United States—for example, a provision in the FY 2019 National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the designation of the 

Confucius Institute U.S. Center as a foreign mission in 2020—

many American universities have severed ties with or closed 

Confucius Institutes on their campuses. The National Association 

of Scholars reported there were approximately 103 Confucius 

Institutes in the United States in 2017, but as of February 22, 2022, 

there are only 19 left, with four more scheduled to close. Many of 

the remaining institutes are likely near the end of their operation.

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement

• Over the past year, USCIRF urged the Biden administration to 

maintain the United States’ leadership role in the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). In 2021, the U.S. 

government continued to serve as the Secretariat of IRFBA. 

During the year, the Alliance made multi-country statements 

regarding religious freedom in Burma and Afghanistan, on behalf 

of missing Yazidi women and children, and in support of persecuted Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

• USCIRF recommended the U.S. government continue to support and participate in future Ministerials to Advance Religious 

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2021
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022 73

Freedom. . The United Kingdom is set to host the next Ministerial 

in July 2022 and the U.S. government plans to participate.

• USCIRF recommended the U.S. government prioritize freedom 

of religion or belief in its renewed engagement in the United 

Nations (UN) human rights system. In March 2021, the State 

Department announced its candidacy to rejoin the UN Human 

Rights Council. At the session that month, the United States 

cosponsored a resolution in the council on freedom of religion 

or belief. In October, the United States was elected to serve on 

the council for the next term, beginning in 2022.

• USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government support the 

UN Alliance of Civilizations in the implementation of the UN 

Plan of Action to Safeguard Holy Sites. In January 2021, the 

United States supported a UN General Assembly resolution

condemning attacks on religious sites. Among its provisions, this 

resolution called on UN member states and other stakeholders 

to support the continued implementation of this plan.

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement

• In certain contexts, USCIRF has recommended that the U.S. 

government raise religious freedom issues consistently in its 

bilateral engagement. In line with these recommendations, U.S. 

government officials raised concerns with their counterparts 

in many countries, including Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Sustained U.S. attention and 

engagement contributed to or encouraged tangible actions 

and/or improvements to religious freedom conditions in some 

of these countries. This includes the government of Kazakhstan ending mandatory expert review of founding documents 

and religious literature for registered religious groups and 

the Uzbek government releasing some religious prisoners 

of conscience. 

• USCIRF recommended the U.S. government expand its engagement with the Autonomous Administration of North and East 

Syria (AANES). State Department and National Security Council 

officials visited northeast Syria in May and met with the AANES, 

including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and senior U.S. 

officials met with a delegation from the SDC in Washington, D.C. 

in September.

• USCIRF called on the U.S. government to conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. assistance to Egypt and require the 

State Department to provide explicit justification for the release 

of any previously withheld Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 

including public disclosure of justification for its certification of 

Egypt’s progress toward improving human rights and religious 

freedom conditions. In September 2021, and then confirmed 

in January 2022, the Biden administration reprogrammed $130 

million in military aid to Egypt because of the country’s failure 

to remedy specified human rights abuses, including religious 

freedom violations. 

• USCIRF urged the U.S. government to press at the highest levels for the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary in 

Turkey. In July 2021, the State Department issued a statement 

on the 50th anniversary of the closure of the seminary urging the 

Turkish government to reopen it and allow the Ecumenical Patriarchate to again train clergy in the country. In October, Secretary 

of State Antony J. Blinken reaffirmed that opening the seminary 

is a priority for the Biden administration.

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience

• USCIRF has recommended that U.S. government officials and 

members of Congress press foreign governments for the release 

of religious prisoners of conscience (RPOCs). Pursuant to this 

recommendation, U.S. officials actively engaged on RPOC cases 

around the globe. 

• The State Department highlighted the cases of Pastor Rosales 

Fajardo in Cuba and imprisoned Jehovah’s Witness Alexander 

Ivshin in Russia. It furthermore called for the release of all 

Jehovah’s Witnesses imprisoned for practicing their faith. 

• Members of Congress actively advocated for the release 

of RPOCs, including by adopting RPOCs through the Tom 

Lantos Human Rights Commission’s Defending Freedoms 

Project, pushing for the release of Egyptian RPOCs, posting

videos commemorating RPOC birthdays, providing remarks 

for events, speaking on the Senate floor, and bringing attention to RPOC cases during hearings.

Increased Aid to Support Religious Freedom and 

Religious Minorities

• Several of USCIRF’s recommendations regarding the U.S. government increasing aid to support religious freedom and religious 

monitories were implemented in 2021. 

• In May 2021, the U.S. government announced an additional 

$155 million in humanitarian assistance to meet the urgent 

needs of Rohingya refugees and other minority groups 

affected by ongoing violence in Burma that specifically has 

targeted them because of their religion and ethnicity.

• USCIRF recommended the U.S. government continue to 

assist Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities to rebuild communities devastated by ISIS. In July, the State Department 

announced an additional $155 million in humanitarian assistance for the people of Iraq as well as for Iraqi refugees in the 

region and the communities hosting them.

Congressional Action Promoting 

Religious Freedom

• USCIRF recommended Congress highlight international religious 

freedom issues through legislation. 

• In January 2021, the Senate introduced the Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Reauthorization Act.

• In January, Congress reintroduced the Ukraine Religious 

Freedom Support Act. 

• In March, the Senate introduced a resolution establishing the 

Senate Human Rights Commission.

• In May, the Turkey and Ecumenical Patriarchate Religious 

Freedom Act of 2021 was introduced in the House. 

• The Senate reintroduced the Saudi Educational Transparency 

and Reform Act in June.

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2021
74 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

• In October, Congress introduced the Burma Act of 2021 to 

address widespread human rights abuses in Burma, including 

religious freedom violations.

• The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act passed Congress 

and was signed by President Biden in December.

• USCIRF recommended Congress hold hearings and briefings 

highlighting IRF issues. In July, for example, the Tom Lantos Human 

Rights Commission held a hearing on the state of religious freedom around the globe and also a hearing cohosted with USCIRF 

on ending genocide and holding perpetrators accountable. 

• USCIRF urged Congress to hold public hearings highlighting 

religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua and U.S. policy toward 

the country. Congress held hearings on the human rights situation in Nicaragua, including religious freedom violations, and 

passed the RENACER Act in November 2021, addressing broad 

human rights issues in the country.

Strong action by the U.S. government in 2021, including the 

developments highlighted above, have significantly contributed to 

advancing freedom of religion or belief internationally. Pursuant to 

USCIRF’s mandate, USCIRF will continue to track the implementation 

of its recommendations by the U.S. government and their effectiveness, to the extent practicable. USCIRF encourages the Biden 

administration and Congress to continue to implement USCIRF’s 

recommendations, including those detailed throughout this report, 

and to continue supporting the advancement of freedom of religion 

or belief abroad.

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2021
APPENDIX 1 75

APPENDIX 1 COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

Nadine Maenza, 

Chair

REAPPOINTED BY

Former President Donald J. Trump (R) for 

a term expiring in May 2022. President of 

Patriot Voices and serves on the Board 

of Directors for the Institute for Global 

Engagement, Sinjar Academy, and Freedom Research Foundation.

Nury Turkel, 

Vice Chair

APPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), Speaker of the 

U.S. House of Representatives, for a term 

expiring in May 2022. Lawyer, author, 

human rights advocate, Senior Fellow at 

the Hudson Institute, and member of the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

Anurima Bhargava,

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), Speaker of the 

U.S. House of Representatives, for a term 

expiring in May 2022. Dignity and Justice 

Advocate, President of Anthem of Us, 

former Justice Department official.

Khizr Khan, 

Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term 

expiring in May 2022. Founder of Constitution Literacy and National Unity 

Center, author, attorney, and religious 

freedom advocate.

James W. Carr, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), House Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2022. 

President and Chairman of Highland 

Home Holdings investment fund and 

formerly served on the National Security 

Education Board.

Frederick A. Davie, 

Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 

2022. Senior Strategic Advisor at the 

Union Theological Seminary in New York 

City and Senior Advisor on Racial Equity 

at Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC).

Sharon Kleinbaum, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term 

expiring in May 2023. Spiritual leader of 

Congregation Beit Simchat Torah in New 

York City and Commissioner on New York 

City's Commission on Human Rights.

Tony Perkins,

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate 

Minority Leader, for a term expiring 

in May 2022. President of the Family 

Research Council (FRC), a religious public policy organization.

APPENDIX 2 77

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION 

OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as 

amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom 

Act of 2016, requires USCIRF to:

“make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . lists 

of persons it determines are imprisoned or detained, have 

disappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured, or subjected to forced renunciation of faith for their 

religious activity or religious freedom advocacy by the 

government of a foreign country that the Commission 

recommends for designation as a country of particular 

concern [CPC] . . . or by a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends for designation as an entity of particular 

concern [EPC].”

To implement this provision, USCIRF created the Freedom of 

Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims List, a database that catalogues individuals who have been detained, imprisoned, disappeared, tortured, 

placed under house arrest, or subjected to forced renunciation of 

faith for their religion or belief in countries USCIRF recommends for 

CPC or Special Watch List status as well as nonstate actors USCIRF 

recommends for EPC status.

Due to limited resources, USCIRF has been unable to identify 

and document all victims that meet the statutory requirements to be 

included on the FoRB Victims List and has typically relied on receiving 

submissions from outside individuals and organizations. As such, the 

data contained in the database does not reflect country, regional, or 

global trends. Furthermore, percentages highlighted in this section 

should not be used for extrapolation purposes nor interpreted as a particular group experiencing greater violations than another or a particular 

country committing violations at a greater rate than another. To support 

this project, USCIRF invites those with credible information on victims to 

submit information using the Victims List Intake Form. Additional information about the FoRB Victims List can be found on USCIRF’s website.

Perpetrators

By the end of 2021, the FoRB Victims List included over 1,300 individuals targeted by 21 different countries and entities. More than 1,000 

victims remain in some form of state or entity custody, while fewer 

than 200 have been released. The detention status of approximately 

40 cases remains unknown. Three individuals are listed as deceased 

after dying in state custody.

Among the violators, China imprisoned the most FoRB victims 

in the database, constituting half of all entries, followed by Russia, 

Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Eritrea. All other countries 

and entities individually constituted less than 1 percent of the victims 

in the database. 

Perpetrator Number of 

Victims Documented

Algeria 2

Azerbaijan 2

China 646

Cuba 13

Egypt 4

Eritrea 47

Houthis 2

India 3

Iran 115

Islamic State - West Africa Province (ISWAP) 1

Kazakhstan 13

Malaysia 4

Nigeria 7

North Korea 9

Pakistan 62

Russia 191

Saudi Arabia 17

Tajikistan 10

Turkmenistan 22

Uzbekistan 81

Vietnam 50

Total 1,301
78 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Religion or Belief

The FoRB Victims List contains individuals from a wide variety of 

religions and faith backgrounds. Over 40 percent are identified as 

Muslim. Christians represent the second-largest group in the database. The third-largest group is Falun Gong practitioners, followed 

by Buddhists and then Baha’is. 

Religion or Belief Number of 

Victims Documented

Baha’i 27

Buddhist - Hoa Hao 6

Buddhist - Tibetan 3

Buddhist - Unspecified/Other 22

Christian - Catholic 17

Christian - Jehovah’s Witness 96

Christian - Orthodox 4

Christian - Protestant 66

Christian - Unspecified/Other 281

ECKist (Eckankar) 1

Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner 2

Falun Gong 208

Hindu 2

Humanist 1

Jewish 1

Muslim - Ahmadiyya 14

Muslim - Shi’a 14

Muslim - Sufi 58

Muslim - Sunni 237

Muslim - Unspecified/Other 219

Santeria 5

Scientologist 1

Unknown/Unspecified/Other 16

Total 1,301
APPENDIX 2 79

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Charges

Individuals included in the FoRB Victims List face a range of charges. 

Although USCIRF excludes from the FoRB Victims List individuals 

known to have promoted violence, most victims face unsubstantiated 

national security-related charges, including terrorism, extremism, 

separatism, subversion, affiliation with a banned group or cult, and 

other related accusations such as promoting, financing, organizing, or 

participating in any of these activities. The second-most-identified category of charges is related to apostasy, blasphemy, and hate speech. 

Other charges include public disorder, refusing military service, and 

miscellaneous offenses. USCIRF is also in the process of identifying 

charges for almost a third of the victims.

Dozens of victims are not facing any charges, yet they remain 

imprisoned or have been subjected to other violations included in 

the FoRB Victims List—such as enforced disappearance or forced 

renunciation of faith—that do not involve legal charges.

Charge Type Number of 

Victims Documented

National Security 712

Unknown 388

Apostasy, Blasphemy, & Hate Speech 86

Other 59

None/Not Applicable 56

Total 1,301

APPENDIX 3 81

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

Through the Religious Prisoners of Conscience (RPOC) Project, USCIRF seeks to raise awareness of individuals imprisoned for 

their religion or belief, reduce their numbers, and highlight the religious freedom conditions in their country of imprisonment. 

Current RPOCs, for whom USCIRF Commissioners are advocating, are only a fraction of the many individuals who have been 

unjustly imprisoned for their religious beliefs, actions, and/or advocacy. 

 Current RPOCs

CHINA

China pervasively tries to control and suppress various religious groups as it seeks to sinicize perceived foreign religions and crack down on religious 

beliefs and actors viewed as incompatible with Communist Party ideology. 

GULMIRA IMIN

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Anurima Bhargava

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Uyghur Muslim

STATUS

Detained since July 14, 2009; sentenced to life 

imprisonment, reduced to 19 years and eight months 

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Moderator of Salkin, a Uyghur-language website; 

participated in demonstration protesting deaths of 

Uyghur migrant workers

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Splittism, leaking state secrets, and organizing an 

illegal demonstration” 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION

Reports of torture

AGE

45

JIMMY LAI

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Tony Perkins

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Catholic Christian

STATUS

Detained since December 12, 2020; sentenced on 

May 28, 2021, to 14 months plus the six months 

already served; on December 13, 2021, sentenced to 

an additional 13 months for “unauthorized assembly” for participating in a June 2020 Tiananmen 

Square vigil

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Political activism and outspoken criticism of the 

government’s human rights abuses, including abuses 

of religious freedom 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Alleged collusion with foreign forces under National 

Security Law, as well as fraud 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

73
82 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

CHINA (continued)

PANCHEN LAMA 

(GEDHUN CHOEKYI NYIMA) 

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Nadine Maenza

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Tibetan Buddhist 

STATUS

Unconfirmed since kidnapping May 17, 1995

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Second-highest-ranking leader in Tibetan Buddhism

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

N/A 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

33

HU SHIGEN

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Tony Perkins

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Protestant Christian

STATUS

Detained July 10, 2015; sentenced August 3, 2016, 

to 7 1⁄2 years

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Founding figure for China Free Democratic Party 

and the China Free Labor Union; leader of Protestant 

house churches

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Subverting” state power through his religious 

activities

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

In poor health because of ill treatment in prison; 

request for medical parole denied

AGE

66

ADIL TUNIYAZ

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Nury Turkel

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Uyghur Muslim

STATUS

Detained since December 25, 2017

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Translated religious materials, 

including hadiths

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Unknown

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

51
APPENDIX 3 83

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

IRAN

The Iranian government severely represses its citizens’ freedom of religion, belief, and expression, often through legal amendments designed for 

persecuting specific religious minorities. 

GOLROKH EBRAHIMI IRAEE

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Anurima Bhargava

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Shi’a Muslim 

STATUS

Detained since October 2016; sentenced to six years 

in prison; sentenced to additional year in 2021

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Human and women’s rights advocate; critic of the 

official policy of stoning women to death for adultery

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Insulting Islamic sanctities” and 

“spreading propaganda”

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Conducted hunger strike due to bad prison 

conditions; denied family visits and phone access; 

prohibited from visits with her husband, Arash 

Sadegi, who is ill with cancer.

AGE

41

YOUCEF NADARKHANI

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Nadine Maenza

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Evangelical Christian 

STATUS

Originally sentenced July 6, 2017, to 10 years in 

prison and two years of internal exile; imprisoned 

July 22, 2018; sentence reduced to six years in prison 

in 2020

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Practicing Christianity as a convert from Islam

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Acting against national security” and promoting 

“Zionist Christianity”

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Conducted hunger strike 

AGE

45

MALAYSIA

The Malaysian government imposes a state-sponsored version of Sunni Islam through a vast network of state and federal religious laws. Non-Muslim 

communities face extreme pressure from authorities, and religious converts and those evangelizing face dire consequences. Malaysian authorities 

have continued to refuse to release the report of an official investigation into cases of enforced disappearances.

PASTOR RAYMOND KOH

USCIRF ADVOCATE

James W. Carr

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Christian

STATUS

Disappeared February 13, 2017 

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Humanitarian actions motivated by his Christian 

religious beliefs; allegations of proselytizing 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

N/A 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

67
84 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

NIGERIA

Both state and nonstate actors in Nigeria commit egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief, including the abduction and detention of 

individuals based on their beliefs. State courts have sentenced individuals to death for blasphemy and held individuals accused of blasphemy in 

prolonged detention, while militant Islamists have violently targeted individuals who do not share their religious beliefs. 

MUBARAK BALA

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Frederick A. Davie

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Humanist

STATUS

Arrested April 28, 2020

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Expression of humanist views 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Formally charged in August 2021 for causing a public 

disturbance by posting “blasphemous” content

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Held incommunicado for several months; detained 

without charge for over a year; poor response to 

health issues while in detention

AGE

37

LEAH SHARIBU

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Tony Perkins

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Christian

PERPETRATOR

Islamic State - West Africa Province (ISWAP)

STATUS

Abducted February 19, 2018

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Refused to convert to Islam

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

N/A

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unconfirmed

AGE

18

YAHAYA SHARIF-AMINU

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Frederick A. Davie

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Sufi Muslim; part of Tijaniyya Order

STATUS

Detained since March 2020; sentenced to death 

August 10, 2020; higher court ordered a retrial in 

January 2021

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Circulating a private audio message on WhatsApp 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Blasphemy

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Held incommunicado for several months

AGE

23
APPENDIX 3 85

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

NORTH KOREA

Religious freedom conditions in North Korea are among the worst in the world, with the government viewing religion as a competing ideology that 

poses an existential threat to its absolute control. 

DEACON ZHANG WEN SHI 

(JANG MOON SEOK)

USCIRF ADVOCATE

James W. Carr

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Protestant Christian

STATUS

Kidnapped from China and detained since November 

2014; sentenced to 15 years in prison

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Ministered to North Koreans who crossed into China

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Defaming the regime, attempting to incite subversion of state power, and providing aid and gospel to 

North Koreans”

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

Unknown

RUSSIA

The Russian government views independent religious activity as a threat to its control and social and political stability, enforces laws restricting 

religious freedom, and persecutes religious and ethnic groups. 

DENNIS CHRISTENSEN

USCIRF ADVOCATE

James W. Carr

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Jehovah’s Witness

COUNTY OF ORIGIN

Denmark

STATUS

Detained May 25, 2017; sentenced February 6, 2019, 

to six years in prison

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Peacefully expressing his faith 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Continuing the activities” of an extremist group 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Inadequate medical care; harassment and arbitrary 

reprimands 

AGE

49

TAJIKISTAN

The Tajik government suppresses displays of public religiosity by people of all faiths, represses the country’s Muslim majority, and persecutes 

minority communities. 

SHAMIL KHAKIMOV

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Nury Turkel

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Jehovah’s Witness

STATUS

Detained since February 26, 2019; sentenced to five 

years in prison

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Sharing his faith with others

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Inciting religious hatred”

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Health has deteriorated in detention

AGE

71
86 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

VIETNAM

The Vietnamese government systematically violates the religious freedom of government-recognized groups and especially independent religious 

minority communities, including Protestant Hmong and Montagnard Christians, Hoa Hao Buddhists, Unified Buddhists, Cao Dai followers, Catholics, and Falun Gong practitioners.

NGUYEN BAC TRUYEN 

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Anurima Bhargava

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Hoa Hao Buddhist

STATUS

Arrested July 30, 2017; sentenced April 5, 2018, to 11 

years’ imprisonment and three years’ probation

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Human rights and religious freedom advocacy 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

“Carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the 

people’s administration”

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Medical neglect

AGE

53
APPENDIX 3 87

APPENDIX 3 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

 Former RPOCs

EGYPT

The Egyptian government uses its laws, regulations, and practices to target a wide range of religious minorities and their civil society allies.

REDA ABDEL RAHMAN

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Sharon Kleinbaum

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Qur’anist Muslim

STATUS

Released February 27, 2022; detained August 2020

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Religious beliefs; blogging about Qur’anism; familial 

relationship with a prominent Qur’anist scholar

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 

promoting religious extremism

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Denied adequate medical care 

AGE

45

ERITREA

The Eritrean government severely restricts the activities of officially recognized religious groups and systematically persecutes members of unregistered religious communities.

PATRIARCH 

ABUNE ANTONIOS

USCIRF ADVOCATE

James W. Carr

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Eritrean Orthodox Christian 

STATUS

Died under house arrest February 9, 2022 

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Called for release of political prisoners and refused 

to excommunicate 3,000 parishioners who opposed 

the government 

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Unknown

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Unknown

AGE

94

SAUDI ARABIA

The Saudi government imprisons dissenting members of the majority Sunni Muslim community, imposes harsh punishments on Shi’a Muslim 

detainees, and forbids non-Muslims from public communal worship. 

RAIF BADAWI

USCIRF ADVOCATE

Nadine Maenza

RELIGION OR BELIEF

Muslim

STATUS

Released March 11, 2022; detained since June 17, 

2012; sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes

REASON FOR PERSECUTION

Blogger who criticized Islam and the Saudi government

CHARGES/BASIS OF ARREST

Violating Islamic values and propagating liberal 

thought 

TREATMENT IN DETENTION 

Flogged 50 times January 9, 2015; deemed too 

unwell to endure more lashes; health has worsened 

since flogging; hunger strike in 2019

AGE

38

APPENDIX 4 89

APPENDIX 4 HIGHLIGHTS OF 

USCIRF’S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN 2021

In addition to releasing an Annual Report by May 1 of each year, 

USCIRF presents research and additional information related to 

international religious freedom throughout the year. This Appendix highlights USCIRF’s events and other materials from calendar 

year 2021. USCIRF’s 2021 press releases and statements and op-eds

are available on USCIRF’s website at www.uscirf.gov. USCIRF’s 2021 

Tweets can be found here. 

Hearings

• February 2021: “Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution”

• March 2021: “A Religious Minority Enslaved: Addressing the 

Complicity of U.S. Companies in Uyghur Forced Labor”

• May 2021: “Ending Genocide - U.S. Government Genocide 

Determinations and Next Steps”

• June 2021: “Religious Freedom in Nigeria”

• July 2021: “Ending Genocide - Accountability for Perpetrators”

• September 2021: “Strategies for Religious Freedom in Fragile 

States”

• October 2021: “Targeted Sanctions - Implications for International Religious Freedom”

• December 2021: “State-Sanctioned Religious Freedom Violations and Coercion by Saudi Arabia and Iran”

Events

• February 2021: “Engaging State and Local Government in 

Nigeria to Protect Religious Freedom”

• February 2021: “FoRB Victims List and Religious Prisoners of 

Conscience Project Update”

• April 2021: “New Report on Antisemitism in the OSCE Region 

and U.S. Policy Responses”

• April 2021: “USCIRF 2021 Annual Report Virtual Launch”

• May 2021: “Update on Religious Freedom Progress in Sudan”

• June 2021: “Ten Years after the Arab Spring: How Has Religious Freedom Changed across the Middle East?”

• June 2021: “Exodus of Religious Minority Communities in 

Afghanistan”

• August 2021: “New Report on Religious Freedom Violations in 

North Korea”

• August 2021: “Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in 

Algeria”

• September 2021: “Accountability for Crimes against Humanity”

• October 2021: “Update on At-Risk Religious Communities in 

Afghanistan”

• October 2021: “New Report on Uzbekistan’s Religious 

Prisoners”

• December 2021: “Democracy and Religious Freedom: India 

and Indonesia”

Publications

• January 2021: “Key U.S. Government Positions Related to 

International Religious Freedom” (Factsheet)

• February 2021: “Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria”

(Factsheet)

• February 2021: “The Santería Tradition in Cuba” (Factsheet)

• March 2021: “Indonesia’s Pancasila” (Factsheet)

• March 2021: “The Use of Shari’a as Religious Justification for 

Capital Punishment against LGBTI Persons” (Factsheet)

• March 2021: “Stalled Progress in Azerbaijan” (Country Update)

• March 2021: “International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA)”

(Factsheet)

• March 2021: “The Impact of Financial Regulations on Religious 

Organizations and Religious Freedom” (Factsheet)

• April 2021: “Antisemitism in Europe: Implications for U.S. Policy”

(Special Report)

• May 2021: “Violent Islamist Groups in the Central Sahel”

(Factsheet)

• June 2021: “The Conditions of Nonbelievers in Africa”

(Factsheet)

• June 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Central African 

Republic” (Country Update)

• August 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Iran”

(Country Update)

• August 2021: “Organized Persecution: Documenting Religious 

Freedom Violations in North Korea” (Special Report)

• August 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Eritrea”

(Country Update)

• September 2021: “Destruction of Cemeteries” (Factsheet)

• September 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Yemen”

(Country Update)

• September 2021: “Laos’ Decree 315” (Factsheet)

• September 2021: “Protests in Cuba and Religious Freedom”

(Factsheet)
90 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2022

APPENDIX 4 HIGHLIGHTS OF USCIRF'S OTHER REPORTING IN 2021

• September 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi 

Arabia” (Country Update)

• October 2021: “Religious Freedom Violations in Kano State, 

Nigeria” (Issue Update)

• October 2021: “Uzbekistan’s Religious and Political Prisoners: 

Addressing a Legacy of Repression” (Special Report)

• October 2021: “Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslims”

(Factsheet)

• October 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Algeria”

(Country Update)

• October 2021: “Religious Freedom Violations against Muslims 

in Africa” (Factsheet)

• October 2021: “Religious Freedom Conditions in Sri Lanka”

(Country Update)

• October 2021: “Religious Freedom Violations in the Republic 

of Chechnya” (Issue Update)

• October 2021: “Religious Minorities in Afghanistan”

(Factsheet)

• October 2021: “China’s 2021 Measures on the Management 

of Religious Clergy” (Factsheet)

• November 2021: “Burma: Religious Freedom since February 

2, 2021, Coup” (Country Update)

• November 2021: “USCIRF Recommendations for State 

Department CPC and SWL Designations” (Factsheet)

• November 2021: “Entities of Particular Concern (EPCs) and 

Religious Freedom” (Factsheet)

• November 2021: “Religious Freedom in Egypt in 2021”

(Country Update)

• November 2021: “Religious Freedom in Malaysia”

(Country Update)

• November 2021: “Preserving Religious Freedom Progress in 

Sudan” (Policy Update)

• November 2021: “Religious Freedom in Belarus in 2021”

(Country Update)

• December 2021: “Saudi Arabia’s Specialized Criminal Court”

(Factsheet)

• December 2021: “Protecting Religious Freedom Online”

(Factsheet)

• December 2021: “Religious Freedom in Turkey in 2021”

(Country Update)

Spotlight Podcast Episodes

• January 2021: “Nigeria: A Country of Particular Concern”

• January 2021: “2021 Update on Religious Freedom 

Conditions”

• January 2021: “Uyghur Genocide”

• February 2021: “Religious Freedom Priorities for the Biden 

Administration”

• February 2021: “Unrest in Russia”

• February 2021: “The Situation in Sinjar”

• February 2021: “Repercussions of the Burma Coup for 

Rohingya Muslims”

• March 2021: “Santería in Cuba”

• March 2021: “Uzbekistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”

• March 2021: “Shifting Trends of Religious Freedom in Egypt”

• March 2021: “Governments Using Shari’a to Impose Death 

Sentences on LGBTI Persons”

• April 2021: “China Sanctions U.S. Religious Freedom Officials”

• April 2021: “Indonesia’s State Ideology of Pancasila”

• April 2021: “The State of Religious Freedom in Vietnam”

• April 2021: “USCIRF Releases 2021 Annual Report with Recommendations for U.S. Policy”

• May 2021: “Religious Restrictions in Iran”

• May 2021: “Violent Insurgents in the Sahel Region of Africa”

• May 2021: “50 Years and Counting: The Continued Closure of 

Halki Seminary in Turkey”

• May 2021: “Enforcing Blasphemy Laws Have Dire 

Consequences”

• June 2021: “Bahrain Takes Steps to Improve Religious Freedom”

• June 2021: “Top Priorities of the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief”

• June 2021: “Do USCIRF Policy Recommendations Get 

Implemented?”

• June 2021: “Ethiopia’s Tigray Massacre and Implications for 

Religious Freedom”

• July 2021: “Sivas Massacre and Turkey’s Persecution of the 

Alevi Community”

• July 2021: “Central African Republic: From Sectarian Violence 

to Progress on Religious Freedom”

• July 2021: “Qur’anists in Egypt”

• July 2021: “Protests in Cuba Impact Religious Freedom”

• August 2021: “Reforms in Kazakhstan Could Improve Religious Freedom”

• August 2021: “The Impact of Majoritarianism on Religious 

Minorities in South Asia”

• August 2021: “Fourth Anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide”

• September 2021: “Religion, Law, and Citizenship in Assam, 

India”

• September 2021: “Islam in Africa”

• September 2021: “Hazara Community Threatened in 

Afghanistan”

• September 2021: “Why the State Department Should Redesignate Nigeria as a CPC”

• September 2021: “Religious Freedom and Taliban Fears in 

Tajikistan”

• October 2021: “Saudi Arabia’s Religious Reforms Not 

Enough”

• October 2021: “Religious Cemeteries as Targets of 

Destruction”
APPENDIX 4 91

APPENDIX 4 HIGHLIGHTS OF USCIRF'S OTHER REPORTING IN 2021

• October 2021: “Ahmadiyya Muslims Face Persecution, 

Discrimination, and Hostility”

• October 2021: “Abuses of Traditional Religion in Russia”

• November 2021: “Algeria’s Increasing Hostility towards Religious Minorities”

• November 2021: “Political Instability Fuels Decline for Religious Freedom in Malaysia”

• November 2021: “Religious Tolerance Efforts in the Middle East”

• November 2021: “Uzbekistan’s Religious and Political Prisoners”

• December 2021: “Renewed Concerns over Religious Tensions 

in Bosnia”

• December 2021: “An Update on Religious Freedom Conditions 

in Turkey”

• December 2021: “State Department Designations and USCIRF 

Recommendations: Where Do They Line Up?”

• December 2021: “Pakistan’s Laws Enable Islamist Extremism”


2022 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ■

Afghanistan 

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES ■

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Central African Republic

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Turkey

Uzbekistan

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

Telephone: (202) 523–3240

www.uscirf.gov