alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 99.5**SECTION 302 CERTIFICATIONI, Pierre Rivard, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 40-F of Hydrogenics Corporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presentedin this report;  4. The company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the company, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annualreport that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and theaudit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the company’s internal control overfinancial reporting.     Date: March 14, 2006      /s/Pierre Rivard         Pierre Rivard    President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
Exhibit 32.1


Stratus Services Group, Inc.Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
  Act of 2002 
  (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)



In connection with the quarterly report of Stratus Services Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Joseph J. Raymond, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                     
|-- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | the information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|  

|Dated: |  | August 16, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ Joseph J. Raymond                
|------ |  | --------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------
|       |  |                 |  |     |  | Joseph J. Raymond                    
|       |  |                 |  |     |  | Chairman of the Board of Directors,  
|       |  |                 |  |     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer



---
# Who is Issued This Document?

For guidelines on which documents on Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, are issued to which categories of individuals, see the chart below.

*Unrestricted Social Security cards that are acceptable List C documents are only issued to:
                - U.S. citizens
                - Noncitizen nationals of the U.S.
                - Lawful permanent residents
                - Refugees
                - Asylees
                - Citizens of the Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or the Republic of Palau admitted under a Compact of Free Association

## More Information

                  - Handbook for Employers M-274
                  - Take a Free Webinar

07/26/2023

0 / 2000To protect your privacy, please do not include any personal information in your feedback. Review our Privacy Policy.
Argued and submitted January 12,

reversed February 17, 1999

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*STEPHEN M. BAKER, *Appellant.*

(971050046; CA A100980)

974 P2d 790

Douglas L. Schaeffer argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

Before De Muniz, Presiding Judge, and Haselton and Linder, Judges.

DE MUNIZ, P. J.

*439DE MUNIZ, P. J.

Defendant appeals his conviction in a trial to the bench for possession of a loaded firearm in a public place in violation of Portland City Code (PCC) 14.32.010. PCC 14.32.010(c) provides that it is unlawful for a person to carry a loaded firearm upon his person on a public street or in a public place. Subsection (a) defines firearm as *“a*pistol, revolver, gun, *rifle,*or other ordnance[.]” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (e) provides a statutory defense:

> “The prohibitions in Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this Section do not apply * * * to any person having a valid permit issued to him by lawful authority to carry or use firearms.”

At the time of the alleged offense, defendant was in possession of a valid Oregon permit. However, the trial court rejected defendant’s contention that he was excluded from prosecution, holding that “the fact that the defendant had a concealed handgun permit is not sufficient to take him out of the scope of the ordinance where the particular firearm in question here is a rifle.”

On appeal, defendant argues that he comes “squarely within the exclusion created by PCC 14.32.010(e)” and that his conviction should, therefore, be reversed. Under the plain language of the ordinance, defendant is correct: The ordinance is not violated if a person has a valid permit to carry firearms, and “firearm” is defined to include rifles. On appeal, no party demonstrates why the plain language of the ordinance does not require that interpretation. The City made no appearance before this court, and the state has specifically declined to take a position on the correct interpretation of PCC 14.32.010. On these facts and arguments, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

We do not need to reach defendant’s remaining assignment of error.

Reversed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             102
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      251
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,714
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,454
<PP&E>                                           1,417
<DEPRECIATION>                                      39
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  11,486
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,978
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            12
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,254
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    11,486
<SALES>                                          3,688
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,688
<CGS>                                            2,435
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,513
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,332
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 150
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,742)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,742)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,742)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.22)


</TABLE>
Order entered June 6, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-00299-CR

No. 05-12-00300-CR

COURTNI MICHELLE SCHULZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F10-00501-J, F11-00342-J

ORDER

On April 12, 2013, we ordered the trial court to file a supplemental record containing an 

order modifying the conditions of community supervision setting out the amount of restitution as 

agreed by the parties. To date, we have not received the order modifying the conditions of 

community supervision.

Accordingly, we ORDER the Honorable Gracie Lewis, Presiding Judge of the Criminal 

District Court No. 3, to file a supplemental record, within FIFTEEN DAYS from the date of this 

order, that contains an order modifying the conditions of community supervision setting out the 

amount of restitution as agreed by the parties.

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE
|   | *** ***

**Kesselman & Kesselman**

Certified Public  Accountants (Isr.)

Trade Tower, 25    Hamered Street

Tel Aviv 68125 Israel

P.O Box 452 Tel Aviv 61003 Israel

Telephone  +972-3-7954555

Facsimile  +972-3-7954556 |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

* *

**REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMAUDITORS**

*** ***

To the shareholders of

**KEDDEM BIOSCIENCE LTD.**

 

Wehave audited the balance sheet of Keddem Bioscience Ltd. (the "Company")as of December 31, 2004 and statement of operations, changes inshareholders` equity and cash flows for the period from August 1, 2004 (date of commencement of operation) to December 31, 2004. These financial statementsare the responsibility of the Company`s Board of Directors and management. Ourresponsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based onour audit.

* *

Weconducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in  Israel and with the standards of the Public Company Accounting OversightBoard (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform theaudit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements arefree of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis,evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. Anaudit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significantestimates made by the Company`s Board of Directors and management, as well asevaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that ouraudit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

* *

Inour opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in allmaterial respects, the financial position of the Company as ofDecember 31, 2004 and the results of its operations, changes inshareholders` equity and its cash flows for the period from August 1, 2004(date of commencement of operations) to December 31, 2004 in conformity withaccounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.

* *

Withoutqualifying our opinion we draw the attention to the Company`s deficiency andability to continue as a going concern. The abovementioned financial statementshave been prepared assuming that the Company will continue operating as a goingconcern. As discussed in note 1a to the financial statements regardingmanagement plans, the Company has not yet derived income from its operationsand its continuance as a going concern is contingent upon obtaining financialsupport from the shareholders and other investors until profitable results areachieved. The financial statements do not include any adjustments that mightresult from the outcome of this uncertainty.

 

 

 

 

* *

| Tel Aviv, Israel              | /s/ Kesselman & Kesselman |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|    February 2, 2005 |                          |

* *

**1**
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clarence Byrdsong, Appellant.

by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Groh, J.), rendered May 16, 1985, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, attempted sodomy in the first degree and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the *165defendant’s motion to change counsel particularly in light of the fact that the defendant had already been represented by five prior attorneys and also because the motion was made on the eve of trial after the *Sandoval*hearing had commenced and while the jury panel was waiting in the hallway outside the courtroom *(see, People v Arroyave,*49 NY2d 264).

Since the defendant failed to challenge the facial validity of the third and fourth counts of the indictment in a pretrial motion to dismiss (CPL 210.20, 210.25), this issue has not been preserved for appellate review *(see, People v Soto,*44 NY2d 683; *People v Iannone,*45 NY2d 589, 600; *People v Di Noia,*105 AD2d 799, *lv denied sub nom. People v Rapetti,*64 NY2d 763).

Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the People presented prima facie cases concerning the charges of attempted rape in the first degree and attempted sodomy in the first degree *(see, People v Glover,*107 AD2d 821, *affd*66 NY2d 931, *cert denied*476 US 1161; *People v Pereau,*99 AD2d 591, *affd*64 NY2d 1055; *People v Troy,*119 AD2d 880, *lv granted*68 NY2d 774, *appeal dismissed*68 NY2d 998; *People v Robare,*109 AD2d 923). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]). The two complaining witnesses saw the defendant’s face at close range, under good lighting conditions for at least five minutes. In addition, each of the complaining witnesses identified the defendant at a pretrial lineup, again at the pretrial hearing, and during the trial.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Niehoff, J. P., Weinstein, Rubin and Kooper, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 20, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-51146 Summary Calendar

BLANCA OCHOA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-01-CV-993

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Blanca S. Ochoa has appealed the magistrate judge’s judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Supplemental Security Income. In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits, this court determines whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied in evaluating the evidence. Brown v. Apfel , 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as aNo. 02-51146 -2- reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ochoa contends that the ALJ failed to obtain and consider records from one of her treating physicians. Because Ochoa was not prejudiced, there was no reversible error. See Kane v. Heckler , 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984). Ochoa contends that the ALJ erred in giving more weight to the opinion of Dr. Robert L. Jones than to that of another consulting physician, Dr. Salvador P. Baylan. Under the substantial-evidence standard, this court “will not re-weigh the evidence, try the questions de novo, or substitute [its] judgment for the Commissioner’s, even if . . . the evidence weighs against the Commissioner’s decision.” Masterson v. Barnhart , 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002). “In short, conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). It was not unreasonable for the ALJ to give more weight to Dr. Jones’s opinion. See Brown , 192 F.3d at 496; see also Moore v. Sullivan , 919 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1990). Ochoa contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Ochoa argues only that the decision was based on Dr. Jones’s opinion, which she contends is at odds with Dr. Baylan’s opinion and the opinions of her treating physicians. Again, Ochoa’s argument demonstrates only that there was a conflict in the evidence. Such a conflict isNo. 02-51146 -3- not sufficient for reversal under the substantial-evidence standard. See Brown , 192 F.3d at 496. The Commissioner’s decision is

AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

Misc. No. 10-20

IN RE: STANDING PANEL ON ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINE

O R D E R

Pursuant to Rule 1(c) of the Court's Rules of Admission and Practice (Rules), the Court 

created a Standing Panel on Admission and Discipline (Standing Panel) to consider disciplinary 

cases coming before the Court. The Court's March 11, 2011 Resolution regarding the Standing 

Panel provides that "[e]ach August 1, the longest serving member of the Standing Panel will be 

removed automatically from the Standing Panel with regard to any new cases assigned to the 

Standing Panel." It further provides that "the Clerk shall designate as the next member of the 

Standing Panel the regular active judge with highest precedence among judges who have not yet 

been designated as a member of the Standing Panel, or . . . the regular active judge with the longest 

period of time since last service as a regular member of the Standing Panel."

Judge Allen is currently the longest serving member, and Judge Falvey is the regular active 

judge with highest precedence among judges who have not yet been designated as a member of 

the Standing Panel. Accordingly, the current Standing Panel, comprised of Judges Allen,

Meredith, and Toth, will be reconstituted effective August 1, 2020, to comprise Judges Meredith, 

Toth, and Falvey.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that, effective August 1, 2020, the Standing Panel consists of Judges Meredith, 

Toth, and Falvey.

DATED: September 18, 2020 FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Gregory O. Block

GREGORY O. BLOCK

Clerk of the Court
# What Happens After You File Form I-589 With USCIS

After you file a Form I-589 with USCIS, we will review your immigration records to determine next steps for processing your Form I-589.

If you change your address while your Form I-589 is pending with a USCIS asylum office, you must notify us within 10 calendar days after you move.  Please visit our page on How To Change Your Address for additional information.  You should also submit written notification of your change of address to the asylum office with jurisdiction over your case.

If you are issued an NTA, the immigration court will send you a Notice of Hearing with information about the date and location of your hearing once your NTA is filed and docketed with EOIR. This notice will be sent to your current address in EOIR’s records. If your address changes, you must file a Form EOIR-33/IC, Alien’s Change of Address Form/Immigration Court, with EOIR within five days of your move.

If you have a hearing scheduled with the immigration court, and you would like to confirm that we have sent your Form I-589 to EOIR, check USCIS Case Status Online (CSOL). If no status is listed, or if CSOL does not state that your Form I-589 has been sent to EOIR, contact the USCIS asylum office with jurisdiction over your Form I-589 in writing or in person to ask us to send your Form I-589 to EOIR.

**Note:** If you file a Form-I-589 with USCIS, and we notified you that we sent it to EOIR, you do not need to refile it with EOIR. We will send your Form I-589 filing date to EOIR when we send your Form I-589 to EOIR for adjudication. You should bring a copy of your filed Form I-589 and any notices USCIS sent you about your Form I-589 to your EOIR immigration court hearings.

01/26/2021

0 / 2000To protect your privacy, please do not include any personal information in your feedback. Review our Privacy Policy.