UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4853

WILLIAM JARRET EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4854

ALOYSIUS WAYNE STANLEY HALL,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(CR-99-162)

Submitted: November 30, 2000

Decided: May 8, 2001

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Andrew D. Grimes, ANDREW D. GRIMES, P.A., Summerville,

South Carolina; James D. Dotson, Jr., Lake City, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Assistant United States

Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

William Jarret Edwards and Aloysius Wayne Stanley Hall pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994). They were sentenced to 100 months and

108 months, respectively. Counsel for Edwards has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but addressing the

following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in advising

Edwards of the mandatory minimum sentence and the statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) rather than 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B); (2) whether Edwards entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily; and (3) whether the district court erred in

increasing Edwards’ base offense level by two levels under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998) for possessing a

dangerous weapon. Counsel for Hall has also filed an Anders brief

alleging that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea. Both Edwards and Hall have filed pro se supplemental

briefs. We affirm. 

Both Edwards and Hall argue on appeal that their guilty pleas were

not knowing or voluntary. A guilty plea must be "a voluntary and

intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the

defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Upon reviewing the

transcript of the plea hearing with respect to both Defendants, we find

that Edwards’ and Hall’s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. 

2 UNITED STATES v. EDWARDS
On appeal, Edwards also argues that the district court violated Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11 by misinforming him of the mandatory minimum and

statutory maximum sentence during the plea colloquy. In his informal

brief, Hall indirectly makes the same claim. This Court generally

reviews the adequacy of a guilty plea de novo, but in the Rule 11 context, violations are evaluated for harmless error. United States v.

Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 564 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States

v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir. 1995)). Any variance from the

Rule 11 requirements that does not affect the substantial rights of the

defendant is disregarded. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h); United States v.

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the district court informed both Edwards and Hall that the

"worst case scenario" would place them under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A), which provides for a mandatory minimum of ten

years imprisonment and a statutory maximum of life imprisonment.

Both Defendants received less than a ten-year sentence and were

therefore not detrimentally affected by the district court’s statement.

We further hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is not implicated in these cases

because both Defendants were sentenced under the statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). See United States v. Kinter,

235 F.3d 192, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi does

not apply to a judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendant’s sentence is not set beyond the

maximum term specified in the substantive statute), cert. denied, 121

S. Ct. 1393 (2001); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 219 (4th

Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926,

933-34 (8th Cir.) (finding that Apprendi is not violated under 21

U.S.C.A. § 841 when the sentence is less than twenty years), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 600 (2000). 

Edwards also maintains that the district court erred in increasing

his base offense level by two levels for possessing a weapon under

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Because Edwards did not raise this issue in the

district court, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). We find no error in the district court’s

application of the enhancement. 

In his Anders brief, Hall maintains that the district court erred in

failing to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant

UNITED STATES v. EDWARDS 3
has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty. United States v.

Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1992). This Court reviews the district court’s refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1996). Rule 32 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure permits withdrawal of a guilty plea if the

"defendant shows any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e).

A trial court, when considering whether to allow a defendant to

withdraw a guilty plea, must apply the six-factor analysis announced

by this Court in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.

1991). Under Moore, a district court considers: (1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing and

voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal

innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between the entry of

the plea and the filing of the motion; (4) whether the defendant had

close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will

cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether withdrawal will

inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. Id. Although all

the factors in Moore must be given appropriate weight, the key to

determining whether a Rule 32(e) motion should be granted is

whether the Rule 11 hearing was properly conducted. United States

v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). This Court closely

scrutinizes the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding

is adequate. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.

1992). 

In this case, the district court heard argument on Hall’s motion,

specifically considered each of the factors enunciated in Moore, and

concluded that Hall did not present a "fair and just reason" warranting

withdrawal of his guilty plea. We find no abuse of discretion in the

court’s denial of Hall’s motion. 

Accordingly, we affirm Edwards’ and Hall’s respective convictions

and sentences. We have reviewed the arguments posed by Edwards

and Hall in their respective pro se supplemental briefs and find them

without merit. We further deny Edwards’ motion to deconsolidate

these cases and Hall’s motion for the production of documents. 

4 UNITED STATES v. EDWARDS
We have examined the entire record in these cases in accordance

with the requirements of Anders, and find no meritorious issues for

appeal. This Court requires that counsel inform their clients, in writing, of their right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States

for further review. If the client request that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

may move in this Court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. EDWARDS 5