(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., ET AL. v. SEB S. A. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 10–6. Argued February 23, 2011—Decided May 31, 2011 

After respondent SEB invented an innovative deep fryer, obtained a

U. S. patent for its design, and began selling its fryer in this country,

Sunbeam Products, Inc., asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises,

Ltd., a Hong Kong home appliance maker and wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., to supply Sunbeam

with deep fryers meeting certain specifications. Pentalpha purchased

an SEB fryer that was made for sale in a foreign market and thus 

lacked U. S. patent markings, copied all but the fryer’s cosmetic features, and retained an attorney to conduct a right-to-use study without telling him it had copied directly from SEB’s design. Failing to

locate SEB’s patent, the attorney issued an opinion letter stating that

Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he had

found. Pentalpha then started selling its fryers to Sunbeam, which 

resold them in this country under its own trademarks at a price that

undercut SEB’s. 

SEB then sued Sunbeam for patent infringement. Though Sunbeam notified Pentalpha of the lawsuit, Pentalpha went on to sell its

fryers to other companies, which resold them in the U. S. market under their respective trademarks. After settling the Sunbeam lawsuit,

SEB sued Pentalpha, asserting, as relevant here, that it had contravened 35 U. S. C. §271(b) by actively inducing Sunbeam and the 

other purchasers of Pentalpha fryers to sell or offer to sell them in

violation of SEB’s patent rights. The jury found for SEB on the induced infringement theory, and the District Court entered judgment 

for SEB. Affirming, the Federal Circuit stated that induced infringement under §271(b) requires a showing that the alleged infringer knew or should have known that his actions would induce actual infringements; declared that this showing includes proof that the 
2 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Syllabus 

alleged infringer knew of the patent; held that, although there was

no direct evidence that Pentalpha knew of SEB’s patent before it received notice of the Sunbeam suit, there was adequate proof that it

deliberately disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent; and said that such disregard is not different from, but a form of,

actual knowledge. 

Held: 

1. Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the

induced acts constitute patent infringement. Pp. 3–10.

(a) Section 271(b)’s text—“[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer”—is ambiguous as to

the intent needed to impose liability. In referring to a party that “induces infringement,” the provision may require merely that the inducer must lead another to engage in conduct that happens to 

amount to infringement. On the other hand, the reference to a party

that “induces infringement” may also be read to mean that the inducer must persuade another to engage in conduct that the inducer 

knows is infringement. Pp. 4–5. 

(b) Like §271(b)’s language, the pre-1952 case law is susceptible

to conflicting interpretations. However, Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible 

Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476 (Aro II), resolves the question at 

issue. Pp. 5–8.

(c) Induced infringement was not considered a separate theory of

indirect liability in the pre-1952 case law, but was treated as evidence of “contributory infringement,” i.e., the aiding and abetting of 

direct infringement by another party. When Congress enacted §271,

it separated the contributory infringement concept into two categories: induced infringement, covered by §271(b), and sale of a component of a patented invention, covered by §271(c). In the badly fractured Aro II decision, a majority concluded that a violator of §271(c)

must know “that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.” 377 U. S., at 488. 

That conclusion, now a fixture in the law, compels this same knowledge for liability under §271(b), given that the two provisions have a

common origin and create the same difficult interpretive choice. Pp.

8–10. 

2. Deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists does

not satisfy the knowledge required by §271(b). Nevertheless, the 

Federal Circuit’s judgment must be affirmed because the evidence in 

this case was plainly sufficient to support a finding of Pentalpha’s 

knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness. Pp. 10–16. 

(a) The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted 

knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine have held 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Syllabus 

that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that 

are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for the doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are 

just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge. This Court endorsed a concept similar to willful blindness over a century ago in 

Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S. 728, 735, and every Federal Court

of Appeals but one has fully embraced willful blindness. Given the 

doctrine's long history and wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary,

there is no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits

for induced patent infringement under §271(b). Pp. 10–13. 

(b) Although the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all agree on two basic requirements. First, the defendant must subjectively believe that there

is a high probability that a fact exists. Second, the defendant must 

take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. These requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence. Pp. 13–14. 

(c) Although the Federal Circuit’s test departs from the proper 

willful blindness standard in important respects, the evidence when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict for SEB was sufficient under the correct standard. Pentalpha believed that SEB’s

fryer embodied advanced technology that would be valuable in the

U. S. market as evidenced by its decision to copy all but the fryer’s

cosmetic features. Also revealing is Pentalpha’s decision to copy an

overseas model of SEB’s fryer, aware that it would not bear U. S. 

patent markings. Even more telling is Pentalpha’s decision not to inform its attorney that the product to be evaluated was simply a

knockoff of SEB’s fryer. Taken together, the evidence was more than

sufficient for a jury to find that Pentalpha subjectively believed there 

was a high probability that SEB’s fryer was patented and took deliberate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and that it therefore willfully 

blinded itself to the infringing nature of Sunbeam’s sales. Pp. 14–16. 

594 F. 3d 1360, affirmed. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and SCALIA, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–6 

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. SEB S. A. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[May 31, 2011] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

We consider whether a party who “actively induces infringement of a patent” under 35 U. S. C. §271(b) must know 

that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. 

I 

This case concerns a patent for an innovative deep fryer 

designed by respondent SEB S. A., a French maker of 

home appliances. In the late 1980’s, SEB invented a “cooltouch” deep fryer, that is, a deep fryer for home use with

external surfaces that remain cool during the frying process. The cool-touch deep fryer consisted of a metal frying 

pot surrounded by a plastic outer housing. Attached to the 

housing was a ring that suspended the metal pot and

insulated the housing from heat by separating it from the

pot, creating air space between the two components. SEB 

obtained a U. S. patent for its design in 1991, and sometime later, SEB started manufacturing the cool-touch fryer 

and selling it in this country under its well-known “T-Fal” 

brand. Superior to other products in the American market

at the time, SEB’s fryer was a commercial success. 
2 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc., a U. S. competitor of 

SEB, asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to

supply it with deep fryers meeting certain specifications. 

Pentalpha is a Hong Kong maker of home appliances and 

a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.1 

In order to develop a deep fryer for Sunbeam, Pentalpha

purchased an SEB fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but 

its cosmetic features. Because the SEB fryer bought in

Hong Kong was made for sale in a foreign market, it bore

no U. S. patent markings. After copying SEB’s design,

Pentalpha retained an attorney to conduct a right-to-use

study, but Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney

that its design was copied directly from SEB’s. 

The attorney failed to locate SEB’s patent, and in August 1997 he issued an opinion letter stating that Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he

had found. That same month, Pentalpha started selling

its deep fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them in the 

United States under its trademarks. By obtaining its

product from a manufacturer with lower production costs,

Sunbeam was able to undercut SEB in the U. S. market. 

After SEB’s customers started defecting to Sunbeam, 

SEB sued Sunbeam in March 1998, alleging that Sunbeam’s sales infringed SEB’s patent. Sunbeam notified 

Pentalpha of the lawsuit the following month. Undeterred, Pentalpha went on to sell deep fryers to Fingerhut 

Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co., both of which resold

them in the United States under their respective trademarks. 

SEB settled the lawsuit with Sunbeam, and then sued 

Pentalpha, asserting two theories of recovery: First, SEB

claimed that Pentalpha had directly infringed SEB’s

patent in violation of 35 U. S. C. §271(a), by selling or 

—————— 

1We refer to both petitioners as “Pentalpha.” 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

offering to sell its deep fryers; and second, SEB claimed

that Pentalpha had contravened §271(b) by actively inducing Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward to sell or

to offer to sell Pentalpha’s deep fryers in violation of SEB’s

patent rights. 

Following a 5-day trial, the jury found for SEB on both

theories and also found that Pentalpha’s infringement had

been willful. Pentalpha filed post-trial motions seeking 

a new trial or judgment as a matter of law on several

grounds. As relevant here, Pentalpha argued that there 

was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of 

induced infringement under §271(b) because Pentalpha

did not actually know of SEB’s patent until it received the 

notice of the Sunbeam lawsuit in April 1998.

The District Court rejected Pentalpha’s argument, as

did the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 

affirmed the judgment, SEB S. A. v. Montgomery Ward & 

Co., 594 F. 3d 1360 (2010). Summarizing a recent en banc 

decision, the Federal Circuit stated that induced infringement under §271(b) requires a “plaintiff [to] show

that the alleged infringer knew or should have known 

that his actions would induce actual infringements” and 

that this showing includes proof that the alleged infringer 

knew of the patent. Id., at 1376. Although the record

contained no direct evidence that Pentalpha knew of 

SEB’s patent before April 1998, the court found adequate 

evidence to support a finding that “Pentalpha deliberately 

disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent.” Id., at 1377. Such disregard, the court said, “is not

different from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual 

knowledge.” Ibid. 

We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___ (2010). 

II 

Pentalpha argues that active inducement liability under 

§271(b) requires more than deliberate indifference to a 
4 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

known risk that the induced acts may violate an existing 

patent. Instead, Pentalpha maintains, actual knowledge

of the patent is needed. 

A 

In assessing Pentalpha’s argument, we begin with the

text of §271(b)—which is short, simple, and, with respect

to the question presented in this case, inconclusive. Section 271(b) states: “Whoever actively induces infringement 

of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 

Although the text of §271(b) makes no mention of intent, 

we infer that at least some intent is required. The term 

“induce” means “[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to 

move by persuasion or influence.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945). The addition of the 

adverb “actively” suggests that the inducement must 

involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring about the

desired result, see id., at 27. 

When a person actively induces another to take some

action, the inducer obviously knows the action that he or 

she wishes to bring about. If a used car salesman induces 

a customer to buy a car, the salesman knows that the

desired result is the purchase of the car. But what if it 

is said that the salesman induced the customer to buy a 

damaged car? Does this mean merely that the salesman

induced the customer to purchase a car that happened to

be damaged, a fact of which the salesman may have been 

unaware? Or does this mean that the salesman knew that 

the car was damaged? The statement that the salesman 

induced the customer to buy a damaged car is ambiguous. 

So is §271(b). In referring to a party that “induces 

infringement,” this provision may require merely that the 

inducer lead another to engage in conduct that happens to

amount to infringement, i.e., the making, using, offering to 

sell, selling, or importing of a patented invention. See 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

§271(a).2 On the other hand, the reference to a party 

that “induces infringement” may also be read to mean that

the inducer must persuade another to engage in conduct 

that the inducer knows is infringement. Both readings are 

possible. 

B 

Finding no definitive answer in the statutory text, we

turn to the case law that predates the enactment of §271

as part the Patent Act of 1952. As we recognized in Aro 

Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476 

(1964) (Aro II), “[t]he section was designed to ‘codify in

statutory form principles of contributory infringement’ 

which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years.’” Id., 

at 485–486, n. 6 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 

2d Sess., 9 (1952)).

Unfortunately, the relevant pre-1952 cases are less clear 

than one might hope with respect to the question presented here. Before 1952, both the conduct now covered 

by §271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now 

addressed by §271(c) (sale of a component of a patented 

invention) were viewed as falling within the overarching 

concept of “contributory infringement.” Cases in the latter 

category—i.e., cases in which a party sold an item that

was not itself covered by the claims of a patent but that

enabled another party to make or use a patented machine,

process, or combination—were more common.

The pre-1952 case law provides conflicting signals regarding the intent needed in such cases. In an oft-cited 

decision, then-Judge Taft suggested that it was sufficient

if the seller of the component part intended that the part 

—————— 

2Direct infringement has long been understood to require no more

than the unauthorized use of a patented invention. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. 

Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476, 484 (1964); 3 A. Deller,

Walker on Patents §453, p. 1684 (1937) (hereinafter Deller). Thus, a 

direct infringer’s knowledge or intent is irrelevant. 
6 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

be used in an invention that happened to infringe a patent. He wrote that it was “well settled that where one 

makes and sells one element of a combination covered by a

patent with the intention and for the purpose of bringing 

about its use in such a combination he is guilty of contributory infringement.” Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. 

Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (CA6 1897).3 

On the other hand, this Court, in Henry v. A. B. Dick 

Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion 

Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 

502 (1917), stated that “if the defendants [who were accused of contributory infringement] knew of the patent and 

that [the direct infringer] had unlawfully made the pat­

—————— 

3For an article that is particularly clear on this point, see H. Howson,

Paper before American Association of Inventors and Manufacturers,

Washington, D. C., Contributory Infringement of Patents 9 (Jan. 1895) 

(reading late 19th-century case law to require only that a party “intentionally contribut[e] to the act, which the Court holds to be an infringement” (emphasis in original)). Other authorities from this era 

likewise suggest that it was sufficient if the seller intended a component part to be used in a manner that happened to infringe a patent. 

See, e.g., Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper 

Co., 152 U. S. 425, 433 (1894) (“There are doubtless many cases to the 

effect that the manufacture and sale of a single element of a combination, with intent that it shall be united to the other elements, and so 

complete the combination, is an infringement”); Individual Drinking 

Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739–740 (CA2 1924) (“[B]efore one may be 

held for contributory infringement, it must be shown that he had 

knowingly done some act without which the infringement would not

have occurred”); New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 

(CA8 1915) (“Contributory infringement is the intentional aiding of one 

person by another in the unlawful making, or selling, or using of a third 

person’s patented invention”); 3 Deller §507, at 1764–1765 (“[W]here a

person furnishes one part of a patented combination, intending that it 

shall be assembled with the other parts thereof, and that the complete

combination shall be used or sold; that person is liable to an action, as

infringer of the patent on the complete combination”); 3 W. Robinson, 

Patents §924, p. 101 (1890) (“To make or sell a single element with the

intent that it shall be united to the other elements, and so complete

the combination, is infringement”). 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

ented article . . . with the intent and purpose that [the 

direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they

would assist in her infringing use.” 224 U. S., at 33 (emphasis added and deleted).4 Our decision in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 

913 (2005), which looked to the law of contributory patent

infringement for guidance in determining the standard to 

be applied in a case claiming contributory copyright infringement, contains dicta that may be read as interpreting the pre-1952 cases this way. In Grokster, we said that 

“[t]he inducement rule . . . premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.” Id., at 937. 

While both the language of §271(b) and the pre-1952

case law that this provision was meant to codify are susceptible to conflicting interpretations, our decision in Aro 

II resolves the question in this case. In Aro II, a majority

held that a violator of §271(c) must know “that the combi­

—————— 

4The earlier case of Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 

U. S. 196 (1907), contains language that may be read as adopting a

similar position. In that case, the Neostyle Company had a patent for

a “stencil duplicating machine” called the “rotary Neostyle,” and it 

licensed the use of its machine pursuant to a license requiring the

licensee to use only Neostyle’s ink. Id., at 198. Another company,

Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., sold its ink to a Neostyle licensee, and 

Neostyle sued the Johnson company, claiming that it was “inducing a 

breach of the license contracts” and was thus indirectly infringing 

Neostyle’s patent rights. Id., at 199. The Court held that the defendant did not have “sufficient evidence of notice” to support liability.

The Court wrote: 

“True, the defendant filled a few orders for ink to be used on a rotary

Neostyle, but it does not appear that it ever solicited an order for ink to 

be so used, that it was ever notified by the plaintiffs of the rights which 

they claimed, or that anything which it did was considered by them an 

infringement upon those rights.” Id., at 200 (emphasis added). 

The italicized language above may suggest that it was necessary to

show that the defendants had notice of Neostyle’s patent rights. See 

also Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (CC Mass. 

1898) (“a necessary condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge 

of the complainant’s patent”). 
8 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

nation for which his component was especially designed 

was both patented and infringing,” 377 U. S., at 488, and 

as we explain below, that conclusion compels this same

knowledge for liability under §271(b). 

C 

As noted above, induced infringement was not considered a separate theory of indirect liability in the pre-1952

case law. Rather, it was treated as evidence of “contributory infringement,” that is, the aiding and abetting of

direct infringement by another party. See Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U. C. D. L. Rev. 225, 227 

(2005). When Congress enacted §271, it separated what

had previously been regarded as contributory infringement into two categories, one covered by §271(b) and the 

other covered by §271(c). 

 Aro II concerned §271(c), which states in relevant part: 

“Whoever offers to sell or sells . . . a component of a 

patented [invention] . . . , constituting a material part

of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 

made or especially adapted for use in an infringement

of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity

of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing

use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.” (Emphasis added.) 

This language contains exactly the same ambiguity as 

§271(b). The phrase “knowing [a component] to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement” may be read to mean that a violator must know 

that the component is “especially adapted for use” in a

product that happens to infringe a patent. Or the phrase

may be read to require, in addition, knowledge of the

patent’s existence. 

This question closely divided the Aro II Court. In a 

badly fractured decision, a majority concluded that knowl­
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

edge of the patent was needed. 377 U. S., at 488, and n. 8; 

id., at 514 (White, J., concurring); id., at 524–527 (Black, 

J., dissenting).5 Justice Black’s opinion, which explained

the basis for the majority’s view, concluded that the language of §271(c) supported this interpretation. See id., at 

525. His opinion also relied on an amendment to this 

language that was adopted when the bill was in committee. Id., at 525–527. 

Four Justices disagreed with this interpretation and

would have held that a violator of §271(c) need know only 

that the component is specially adapted for use in a product that happens to infringe a patent. See id., at 488–490, 

n. 8. These Justices thought that this reading was supported by the language of §271(c) and the pre-1952 case

law, and they disagreed with the inference drawn by the 

majority from the amendment of §271(c)’s language. Ibid. 

While there is much to be said in favor of both views 

expressed in Aro II, the “holding in Aro II has become 

a fixture in the law of contributory infringement under

[section] 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents §15:20, 

p. 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)—so much so that SEB has not 

asked us to overrule it, see Brief for Respondent 19, n. 3.

Nor has Congress seen fit to alter §271(c)’s intent requirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was 

decided. In light of the “‘special force’” of the doctrine of 

stare decisis with regard to questions of statutory interpretation, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 

552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008), we proceed on the premise that 

§271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent

that is infringed. 

—————— 

5Although Justice Black disagreed with the judgment and was thus

in dissent, he was in the majority with respect to the interpretation of

§271(c), and his opinion sets out the reasoning of the majority on this

point. Three other Justices joined his opinion, and a fourth, Justice 

White, endorsed his reasoning with respect to the interpretation of

§271(c). See 377 U. S., at 514 (White, J., concurring). 
10 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced infringement under §271(b). As 

noted, the two provisions have a common origin in the pre1952 understanding of contributory infringement, and the

language of the two provisions creates the same difficult 

interpretive choice. It would thus be strange to hold that 

knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under §271(c) 

but not under §271(b).

Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement 

under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts 

constitute patent infringement. 

III 

Returning to Pentalpha’s principal challenge, we agree

that deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent 

exists is not the appropriate standard under §271(b). We 

nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals

because the evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to 

support a finding of Pentalpha’s knowledge under the

doctrine of willful blindness. 

A 

The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in 

criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a

defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants 

cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately

shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts

that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The 

traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants 

who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those 

who have actual knowledge. Edwards, The Criminal 

Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 302 (1954)

(hereinafter Edwards) (observing on the basis of English 

authorities that “up to the present day, no real doubt has

been cast on the proposition that [willful blindness] is as 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

culpable as actual knowledge”). It is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof

of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those

facts. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697, 700 (CA9 

1976) (en banc). 

This Court’s opinion more than a century ago in Spurr 

v. United States, 174 U. S. 728 (1899),6 while not using the

term “willful blindness,” endorsed a similar concept. The 

case involved a criminal statute that prohibited a bank 

officer from “willfully” certifying a check drawn against 

insufficient funds. We said that a willful violation would 

occur “if the [bank] officer purposely keeps himself in 

ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank.” 

Id., at 735. Following our decision in Spurr, several federal prosecutions in the first half of the 20th century 

invoked the doctrine of willful blindness.7 Later, a 1962 

proposed draft of the Model Penal Code, which has since

become official, attempted to incorporate the doctrine by 

—————— 

6The doctrine emerged in English law almost four decades earlier

and became firmly established by the end of the 19th century. Edwards 

298–301. In American law, one of the earliest references to the doctrine 

appears in an 1882 jury charge in a federal prosecution. In the charge, 

the trial judge rejected the “great misapprehension” that a person may

“close his eyes, when he pleases, upon all sources of information, and

then excuse his ignorance by saying that he does not see anything.” 

See United States v. Houghton, 14 F. 544, 547 (DC NJ). 7 United States v. Yasser, 114 F. 2d 558, 560 (CA3 1940) (interpreting

the crime of knowingly and fraudulently concealing property belonging 

to the estate of a bankrupt debtor to include someone who “closed his 

eyes to facts which made the existence of” the receiver or trustee

“obvious”); Rachmil v. United States, 43 F. 2d 878, 881 (CA9 1930) (per 

curiam) (same); United States v. Erie R. Co., 222 F. 444, 448–451 (DC

NJ 1915) (approving a “willful ignorance” jury instruction to a charge

that a rail carrier knowingly granted a concession to a shipper); Grant 

Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 13 Ariz. 388, 400, 114 P. 955, 959 

(1911) (interpreting the crime of knowingly encouraging the importation of contract laborers to include those who “willfully and intentionally ignored facts and circumstances known to them, which would have

led to [actual] knowledge”). 
12 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

defining “knowledge of the existence of a particular fact”

to include a situation in which “a person is aware of a

high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he actually 

believes that it does not exist.” ALI, Model Penal Code 

§2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Our Court has 

used the Code’s definition as a guide in analyzing whether 

certain statutory presumptions of knowledge comported

with due process. See Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 

398, 416–417 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 

46–47, and n. 93 (1969). And every Court of Appeals—

with the possible exception of the District of Columbia 

Circuit, see n. 9, infra—has fully embraced willful blindness, applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal 

statutes. 

Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide

acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason

why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for 

induced patent infringement under 35 U. S. C. §271(b).8 

Pentalpha urges us not to take this step, arguing that 

§271(b) demands more than willful blindness with respect 

to the induced acts that constitute infringement. See 

Reply Brief for Petitioners 13–14. This question, however,

is not at issue here. There is no need to invoke the doctrine of willful blindness to establish that Pentalpha knew 

that the retailers who purchased its fryer were selling that

product in the American market; Pentalpha was indisputably aware that its customers were selling its product 

in this country. 

—————— 

8Unlike the dissent, we do not think that utilitarian concerns demand a stricter standard for knowledge under §271(b), see post, at 3 

(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). The dissent does not explain—nor can we

see—why promoting “ ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ ” ibid., 

requires protecting parties who actively encourage others to violate 

patent rights and who take deliberate steps to remain ignorant of those 

rights despite a high probability that the rights exist and are being

infringed, see infra, at 13–14. 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

Pentalpha further contends that this Court in Grokster 

did not accept the Solicitor General’s suggestion that 

Grokster and StreamCast could be held liable for inducing

the infringement of copyrights under a theory of willful

blindness. Reply Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Brief for 

United States, O. T. 2004, No. 04–480, pp. 29–30). But the 

Court had no need to consider the doctrine of willful 

blindness in that case because the Court found ample

evidence that Grokster and StreamCast were fully

aware—in the ordinary sense of the term—that their filesharing software was routinely used in carrying out the 

acts that constituted infringement (the unauthorized 

sharing of copyrighted works) and that these acts violated

the rights of copyright holders. See 545 U. S., at 922–927, 

937–940. 

B 

While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of

willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to 

agree on two basic requirements: (1) the defendant must 

subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a 

fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate

actions to avoid learning of that fact.9 We think these 

—————— 

9 United States v. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F. 3d 31, 41 (CA1 2010); 

United States v. Svoboda, 347 F. 3d 471, 477–478 (CA2 2003); United 

States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F. 3d 238, 257 (CA3 2010); United States v. 

Schnabel ̧ 939 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA4 1991) (“The willful blindness instruction allows the jury to impute the element of knowledge to the

defendant if the evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to

avoid knowing what was taking place around him”); United States v. 

Freeman, 434 F. 3d 369, 378 (CA5 2005); United States v. Holloway, 

731 F. 2d 378, 380–381 (CA6 1984) (per curiam) (upholding jury instruction on knowledge when “it prevent[ed] a criminal defendant from 

escaping conviction merely by deliberately closing his eyes to the 

obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct”); United States v. 

Draves, 103 F. 3d 1328, 1333 (CA7 1997) (“knowledge may in some 

circumstances be inferred from strong suspicion of wrongdoing coupled 

with active indifference to the truth”); United States v. Florez, 368 F. 3d 
14 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

requirements give willful blindness an appropriately 

limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.

Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is one 

who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high

probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to

have actually known the critical facts. See G. Williams, 

Criminal Law §57, p. 159 (2d ed. 1961) (“A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said 

that the defendant actually knew”). By contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial 

and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing, see ALI, Model

Penal Code §2.02(2)(c) (1985), and a negligent defendant is 

one who should have known of a similar risk but, in fact, 

did not, see §2.02(2)(d). 

The test applied by the Federal Circuit in this case

departs from the proper willful blindness standard in two

important respects. First, it permits a finding of knowledge when there is merely a “known risk” that the induced

acts are infringing. Second, in demanding only “deliberate

indifference” to that risk, the Federal Circuit’s test does 

not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing

about the infringing nature of the activities. 

In spite of these flaws, we believe that the evidence

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict for 

SEB is sufficient under the correct standard. The jury

could have easily found that before April 1998 Pentalpha

willfully blinded itself to the infringing nature of the sales

it encouraged Sunbeam to make.10 

—————— 

1042, 1044 (CA8 2004) (“Ignorance is deliberate if the defendant was 

presented with facts that put her on notice that criminal activity was 

particularly likely and yet she intentionally failed to investigate those 

facts”); United States v. Heredia, 483 F. 3d 913, 917, 920 (CA9 2007) (en 

banc); United States v. Glick, 710 F. 2d 639, 643 (CA10 1983); United 

States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F. 3d 1552, 1564 (CA11 1994). But see United 

States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F. 3d 331, 339–341 (CADC 2006). 10The District Court did not instruct the jury according to the stan­
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

SEB’s cool-touch fryer was an innovation in the U. S. 

market when Pentalpha copied it. App. to Brief for Respondent 49. As one would expect with any superior

product, sales of SEB’s fryer had been growing for some 

time. Ibid. Pentalpha knew all of this, for its CEO and 

president, John Sham, testified that, in developing a

product for Sunbeam, Pentalpha performed “market research” and “gather[ed] information as much as possible.” 

App. 23a. Pentalpha’s belief that SEB’s fryer embodied 

advanced technology that would be valuable in the U. S. 

market is evidenced by its decision to copy all but the 

cosmetic features of SEB’s fryer.

Also revealing is Pentalpha’s decision to copy an overseas model of SEB’s fryer. Pentalpha knew that the product it was designing was for the U. S. market, and Sham—

himself a named inventor on numerous U. S. patents, see 

id., at 78a–86a—was well aware that products made for 

overseas markets usually do not bear U. S. patent markings, App. in No. 2009–1099 etc. (CA Fed.), pp. A–1904 to 

A–1906. Even more telling is Sham’s decision not to inform the attorney from whom Pentalpha sought a right-touse opinion that the product to be evaluated was simply a 

knockoff of SEB’s deep fryer. On the facts of this case, we 

cannot fathom what motive Sham could have had for 

withholding this information other than to manufacture a

claim of plausible deniability in the event that his company was later accused of patent infringement. Nor does 

Sham’s testimony on this subject provide any reason to 

—————— 

dard we set out today, see App. to Brief for Respondent 26–27, and

Pentalpha asks us to remand the case so it can move for a new trial.

We reject that request. Pentalpha did not challenge the jury instructions in the Court of Appeals, see Brief for Appellants in No. 2009–1099

etc. (CA Fed.), pp. 21–22, and that court did not pass upon the issue. 

Finding no “exceptional” circumstances in this case, we follow our usual

course and refuse to consider the issue. See Youakim v. Miller, 425 

U. S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam). 
16 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

doubt that inference. Asked whether the attorney would

have fared better had he known of SEB’s design, Sham

was nonresponsive. All he could say was that a patent 

search is not an “easy job” and that is why he hired attorneys to perform them. App. 112a.

Taken together, this evidence was more than sufficient

for a jury to find that Pentalpha subjectively believed 

there was a high probability that SEB’s fryer was patented, that Pentalpha took deliberate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and that it therefore willfully blinded itself 

to the infringing nature of Sunbeam’s sales. 

* * * 

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit is 

Affirmed. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–6 

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. SEB S. A. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[May 31, 2011] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting. 

The Court is correct, in my view, to conclude that 35 

U. S. C. §271(b) must be read in tandem with §271(c), and 

therefore that to induce infringement a defendant must

know “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” 

Ante, at 10. 

Yet the Court does more. Having interpreted the statute to require a showing of knowledge, the Court holds 

that willful blindness will suffice. This is a mistaken step. 

Willful blindness is not knowledge; and judges should not 

broaden a legislative proscription by analogy. See United 

States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697, 706 (CA9 1976) (en banc) 

(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When a statute specifically 

requires knowledge as an element of a crime, however, the

substitution of some other state of mind cannot be justified 

even if the court deems that both are equally blameworthy”) In my respectful submission, the Court is incorrect

in the definition it now adopts; but even on its own terms 

the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury’s finding of

inducement. 

The Court invokes willful blindness to bring those who 

lack knowledge within §271(b)’s prohibition. Husak & 

Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal 
2 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of 

the Principle of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 35; see also 

L. Alexander & K. Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law 34–35 (2009) (cautioning against

the temptation to “distort” cases of willful blindness “into

cases of knowledge”); G. Williams, Criminal Law: The

General Part §57, p. 157 (2d ed. 1961). The Court’s definition of willful blindness reveals this basic purpose. One 

can believe that there is a “high probability” that acts

might infringe a patent but nonetheless conclude they do 

not infringe. Ante, at 14; see also ibid. (describing a willfully blind defendant as one “who can almost be said 

to have actually known the critical facts”). The alleged

inducer who believes a device is noninfringing cannot be 

said to know otherwise. 

The Court justifies its substitution of willful blindness

for the statutory knowledge requirement in two ways, 

neither of which is convincing.

First, the Court appeals to moral theory by citing the

“traditional rationale” that willfully blind defendants “are

just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.” 

Ante, at 10. But the moral question is a difficult one. Is it 

true that the lawyer who knowingly suborns perjury is no 

more culpable than the lawyer who avoids learning that 

his client, a criminal defendant, lies when he testifies that 

he was not the shooter? See Hellman, Willfully Blind 

for Good Reason, 3 Crim. L. & Philosophy 301, 305–308 

(2009); Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 Geo. L. J. 957 

(1999). The answer is not obvious. Perhaps the culpability of willful blindness depends on a person’s reasons for

remaining blind. E.g., ibid. Or perhaps only the person’s

justification for his conduct is relevant. E.g., Alexander & 

Ferzan, supra, at 23–68. This is a question of morality

and of policy best left to the political branches. Even if 

one were to accept the substitution of equally blameworthy mental states in criminal cases in light of the retribu-
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

tive purposes of the criminal law, those purposes have no

force in the domain of patent law that controls in this case. 

The Constitution confirms that the purpose of the patent

law is a utilitarian one, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 

Second, the Court appeals to precedent, noting that

a “similar concept” to willful blindness appears in this

Court’s cases as early as 1899. Ante, at 11. But this Court 

has never before held that willful blindness can substitute 

for a statutory requirement of knowledge. Spurr v. United 

States, 174 U. S. 728, 735 (1899), explained that “evil 

design may be presumed if the [bank] officer purposefully 

keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has 

money in the bank or not, or is grossly indifferent to his 

duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact.” The 

question in Spurr was whether the defendant’s admitted 

violation was willful, and with this sentence the Court 

simply explained that wrongful intent may be inferred 

from the circumstances. It did not suggest that blindness

can substitute for knowledge. Neither did Turner v. 

United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970), or Leary v. United 

States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969). As the Court here explains, 

both cases held only that certain statutory presumptions

of knowledge were consistent with due process. Ante, at 

12. And although most Courts of Appeals have embraced

willful blindness, counting courts in a circuit split is not 

this Court’s usual method for deciding important questions of law. 

The Court appears to endorse the willful blindness

doctrine here for all federal criminal cases involving

knowledge. It does so in a civil case where it has received 

no briefing or argument from the criminal defense bar, 

which might have provided important counsel on this 

difficult issue. 

There is no need to invoke willful blindness for the first 

time in this case. Facts that support willful blindness are 
4 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A. 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

often probative of actual knowledge. Circumstantial facts 

like these tend to be the only available evidence in any 

event, for the jury lacks direct access to the defendant’s

mind. The jury must often infer knowledge from conduct,

and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may 

justify such inference, as where an accused inducer avoids 

further confirming what he already believes with good 

reason to be true. The majority’s decision to expand the 

statute’s scope appears to depend on the unstated premise

that knowledge requires certainty, but the law often permits probabilistic judgments to count as knowledge. Cf. 

Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U. S. 612, 

620 (1884) (Harlan, J.) (“[B]eing founded on actual observation, and being consistent with common experience and

the ordinary manifestations of the condition of the mind, it

is knowledge, so far as the human intellect can acquire 

knowledge, upon such subjects”). 

The instant dispute provides a case in point. Pentalpha

copied an innovative fryer. The model it copied bore no

U. S. patent markings, but that could not have been a 

surprise, for Pentalpha knew that a fryer purchased in

Hong Kong was unlikely to bear such markings. And 

Pentalpha failed to tell the lawyer who ran a patent 

search that it copied the SEB fryer. These facts may

suggest knowledge that Pentalpha’s fryers were infringing, and perhaps a jury could so find. 

But examining the sufficiency of the evidence presented 

in the 5-day trial requires careful review of an extensive

record. The trial transcript alone spans over 1,000 pages.

If willful blindness is as close to knowledge and as far 

from the “knew or should have known” jury instruction

provided in this case as the Court suggests, then reviewing the record becomes all the more difficult. I would 

leave that task to the Court of Appeals in the first instance on remand. 

For these reasons, and with respect, I dissent.