[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 13184 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 0:18

- cv - 61330

- BB ERIC WATKINS , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

versus OFFICER A. JOY , Defendant

- Appell ee .

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (August 1, 2019) Before JORDAN , BRANCH and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
E ric Watkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismissal of his 42

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 1 of 72 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action . Mr. Watkins alleged Fourteenth Amendment D ue P rocess and F ourth A mendment violations by Officer A. Joy, in her individual capacity, when she ordered him to vacate a private parking lot

. Because Mr. Watkin s d id not state a valid D ue P rocess claim, we affirm in that regard

. A lthough the district court may have erred in failing to address Mr. Watkin’s F ourth A mendment claim , the potential error was harmless because the facts alleged in Mr. Watkin’s complaint do not amount to a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
I On June 16, 2014, Mr. Watkins was in a parking lot adjacent to a shopping center. Officer Joy and two other officers from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BSO”) arrived, advised him that he was trespassing, and instructed him to leave.
Mr. Watkins told the officers they did not have auth ority to order him to leave because there were no “No Trespassing” signs or signs indicating that the BSO had authority to issue trespass warnings on the property. The officers threatened to arrest him if he did not leave, and Mr. Watkins left. Mr. Watk ins filed suit , arguing that Florida’s trespass statute g rants Florida citizens a due process right to not be ordered to leave property by law enforcement officers who have no authority to do so, and that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized a liberty inter est to be on property open to the public. He also raised a Fourth Amendment claim, a sserting that Officer Joy and the other officers had stopped or

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 2 of 73 detained him without reasonable suspicion and unreasonably seized him without probable cause. Mr. Watkins moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis , which the district

court denied , stating without elaboration that the complaint failed to allege a plausible due process claim

. Th e district court noted in its written order a 2015 lawsuit that Mr. Watkins had filed against City of Lauderhill police officers raising procedural due process and equal protection claims , which also proved unsuccessful. See Watkins v. Elmore , 589 F. App’x 524 (11th Cir. 2015). T he district court did not address Mr. Watk ins ’ F ourth A mendme nt claim. Mr. Watkin s appeals, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his case “on the grounds that [he] was raising the same due process claims he allegedly raised in a p re vious complaint . . . .” and for failing to consider his F ourth
A mendment claim.
II We review the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true. See Alba v. Mont ford , 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court is obligated to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it determines that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii)

. “ Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 3 of 74 standard as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civi l Procedure.” Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp. , 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017)

. Thus, to survive dismissal, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to support a plausible claim to relief. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
III
M r. Watkins’ framing of the first issue o n appeal suggests that the district court gave preclusive effect to his previous lawsuit. Th at is incorrec t. T he district court discussed the previous lawsuit and suggested that this case “raise s the same due process claims for a similar incident , ” b ut it expressly dismissed this action for “fail[ure] to allege th at Officer Joy deprived [Mr. Watkins] of a constitutionally protected interest in liberty or property.” Mr. Watkins imprecisely formula ted and argued the first issue, but , constru ing his brief liberally , it is sufficient to appeal that determination

. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Mr. Watkins’ two lawsuits are factually and legally dist inct. In Watkins v. Elmore , officers ordered Mr. Watkins to remove his broken

- down vehicle from a city

- owned property and, when he failed to comply, towed the vehicle to a public lot. A panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Watkins’ procedura l due process and equal protection claims. See Watkins , 589 F. App’x at 525.

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 4 of 75 In this case, Mr. Watkins contends that Florida’s trespass statute , Fla. Stat

. § 810.08 , c onfers on Florida citizens a due process right to not be ordered or warned to leave private property by officers who are not authorized to do so. We find no support in Eleventh Circuit or Florida precedent for the recognition of a substantive due process right on this basis , and Mr. Watkins points us to none . Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its “reluctance to expand the doctrine of substantive due process.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003)

. Had Mr. Watkins been arrested and charged with trespassing, and had the BSO officers indeed had no authority under those circumstances to enforce the trespassing statute against him, it is possible the state would not have been able to prove a prima facie cas e against him. See, e.g., I.M. v. State , 95 So. 3d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). But that is not what happened, and Mr. Watkins was able to vacate the property without further incident . We decline to infer a substantive due process right to remain on pri vate property from Florida’s trespassing statute. Thus, Mr. Watkins’ first claim fails.
I V The district court may have erred in failing to address Mr. Watkin’s F ourth
A mendment claim in its order

. Nevertheless, t his potential error was harmless be cause we conclude that Mr. Watkins has not stated a plausible claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment

. See Grant v. Seminole Cty., Fla. , 817 F.2d 731, 732

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 5 of 76 (11th Cir. 1987) (“ [T] he failure of a lower court to give reasons for its disposition of an acti on . . . does not necessarily preclude affirmance . . .

. ”). The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “seizure” occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [a person’s] freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.” Chandler v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Transp. , 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original and quotations omitted). We ask whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Id. (quotation mark s omitted). A seizure violates the Fourth Amendment when it is un supported by probable cause

— “fact and circumstances within the officer[’s] knowledge [that] would cause a prudent person to believe . . . that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Jordan v. Mosley , 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation mark s omitted). But t here is no violation when an officer conducts a brief, investigatory stop supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal

act ivity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). E ven when an officer has no reasonable suspicion, she may approach and speak with citizens, as “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions

Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 6 of 77 to anyone on the streets.” United States v. Franklin , 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true. See Alba , 517 F.3d at 1252. Mr. Watkins alleged that the private property he was occupying lacked a “ N o T respassing ” sign or a notice that the BSO had a uthority to issue trespass warnings. He also allege d that “ the owners of the private property did not call BSO [or] accompany the Defendant [or] order [Mr. Watkins] to leave.” Nevertheless, Officer Joy and another officer approached Mr. Watkins and instr ucted him to leave. If he did not, they warned him, he would be arrested. “To avoid arrest[, Mr. Watkins] left the proper t y.” Because Mr. Watkins was never “seized,” by Officer Joy or anyone else , he has not alleged a plausible claim under the Fourth Amendment. At no point was Mr. Watkins’ movement restricted, and he was free to leave. See Chandler , 695 F.3d at 1199. See also California v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. 621, 626, 629 (1991) ( holding that a seizure requires an application of physical force or some show of authority to which the subject yields)

. Accordingly, Mr. Watkins’ second claim also fails. V For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal. AFFIRMED. Case: 18-13184 Date Filed: 08/01/2019 Page: 7 of 7