RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

James Chin

BACKGROUND

One area of concern for religious freedom in Malaysia and Indonesia is the role played by 

Saudi Arabia. Since the early 1980s, the Saudis have tried to export their version of Islam, 

widely called Wahhabism. I will not go into details about the belief system of Wahabism 

other than to say that it is a form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia that developed in the 18th

century led by a cleric Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In Southeast Asia, scholars normally

call them Salafi. In very general terms. Wahhabism/Salafism refers to an interpretation of 

Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith and practice to the way they existed at the time of 

Prophet Muhammad, ie, “pure Islam”. It is widely considered to be a very conservative and 

intolerant view of Islam, towards non-Muslims and other Islamic sects. They do not accept 

there are other faiths in human society or other interpretations of the Koran. Many of them 

believe other faiths are simply Idolatry. They support the death sentence for apostasy. They 

view religious freedom and liberalism as a Western import that is contradictory to Islamic 

values. They are part of the Sunni Muslim world.

Saudi Arabia began to “export” Wahhabism starting in the early 1980s. One can make a 

strong argument that the Saudis, with oil money, were using Wahhabism as a means to create 

a network of influence around the world. They saw themselves in competition with Iran

although Iran is Shia. There are some reports that the Saudis spent more than USD 80-100 

billion on this project to assert their influence in the Muslim world through the use of 

Wahhabism. 

SAUDI ARABIA, INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

Indonesia and Malaysia were targeted by Saudi Arabia because both are Muslim-majority 

countries in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, with a population of 280 million, is the world’s largest 

Muslim country. About 88% of Indonesians called themselves Muslim. Malaysia, with a 

population of 32 million, is widely seen as an influential, moderate country in the Islamic 

World. This was especially true in the 1990s when Mahathir Mohammad was the prime 

minister of Malaysia. He was an important voice in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 

(OIC). About 65% of Malaysia’s population is Muslim.

The methods used to export Wahhabism to Indonesia and Malaysia are quite straightforward. 

1) Funding of mosques, religious activities, madrassahs, and Islamic groups (many doing 

charity work).

2) Scholarships for young Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims to study in Saudi 

institutions. The numbers will easily exceed one hundred thousand. 

3) Penetrating the political parties and the civil service through funded visits by Saudi 

theologians and clerics and exchange of visits 

Many of the activities I have outlined above are done openly via the Saudi Embassy in both 

countries. It is also important to note that the Saudis are playing the long game and do not 
expect immediate results. The Saudis are looking to influence the next generation. In both 

countries, many of those influenced by Salafi doctrine would be in mid- to senior-level 

positions since the influence program began in the 1980s. 

WHAT IS SAUDI ARABIA AIMING FOR IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA?

The Saudis appear to be aiming for the following: 

1) Reinforce the message that Saudi Arabia is the center of Islam

2) Major player in the Indonesian and Malaysian political and religious class

3) Block any potential Iranian influence and spread of Shia beliefs 

4) Pushing for their version of Political Islam and slowly pushing for the establishment 

of an Islamic state in Indonesia and Malaysia with Salafi features. 

The Saudi interest in Indonesia and Malaysia goes back even before they started the 

worldwide project to export Wahhabism. In the early 1970s, the Saudis were already 

funnelling money and arms to the Muslim separatists in the Southern Philippines. There was

also funding of Indonesian and Malaysian dakwah movements (propagation of the Islamic 

religion to covert non-believers) during this time. 

POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPACT

It is difficult to precisely measure the Salafi influence because many Indonesians and 

Malaysian Muslims do not identify themselves as Salafi in public. There is also confusion 

among the Muslim population themselves. Many of them would see the Salafi as simply very 

conservative or strict Muslims. What we do know is that in the past decade, there has been a 

rise in conservative political Islam in both countries and it is certain that some of the political 

parties and political culture are influenced by Salafi teachings. Today there are thousands of 

religious figures in both countries who promote the idea that the state needs to be more 

Islamic and, over the long run, the country should turn into an Islamic state. 

Let me deal with Indonesia first.

An area where we can clearly see Salafi influence is the huge increase in the number of 

private madrassahs (religious schools) operated by graduates from Saudi institutions. There 

are approximately 120,000 madrassahs in the country, and many are outside the control of the 

government. In other words, they are free to teach what they want, including a Salafiinfluenced curriculum. Some of the students and their parents may not even know they are 

using a Saudi-inspired curriculum. 

The two organizations in Indonesia that openly identified themselves with Saudi Arabia are 

the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) and 

the College for the Study of Islam and Arabic (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab).

They established educational institutions such as a branch of the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud 

University in Indonesia. 

Like Indonesia, Saudi Arabia promotes Wahhabism indirectly, via scholarships to Saudi 

institutions, funding for madrassah and Islamic NGOs, and visits by Saudi theologians and 

religious figures. The Saudis also fund and control the Al-Madinah International University.
There are no political parties in Indonesia, or Malaysia, that subscribe to the Salafi ideology. 

What you have are political parties that support more Islamisation of the population and the 

country’s institutions. There are Salafi individuals inside some of the major political parties in 

both countries but, as far as I can tell, none of the present top political leaders in both 

countries are Salafi. 

I also need to state here that for some purists Salafis, politics is a distraction. They see their 

main role in education and missionary work. 

Many scholars will argue Salafi ideology played a major role in the radicalization of 

Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims. This is a huge topic by itself. All I wish to say here is 

that some of these groups are involved in terror activities, both internally and externally. For 

example, ISIS (Islamic State) has a brigade called Katibah Nusantara, comprising Malayspeaking militants from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. ISIS even had a special 

Malay-language newsletter called al-Fatihin (the Conquerors) to recruit fighters from 

Southeast Asia. ISIS-inspired attacks have taken place in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 

Philippines. Internally in Indonesia, Salafi followers were known to be associated with 

Laskar Jihad (Warriors of Jihad). They were responsible for killing Christians in Ambon, 

Sulawesi, and Maluku Islands in the early 2000s. In Malaysia, there has not been large-scale 

violence traced to the Salafi network. 

THE UNIQUE CASE OF MALAYSIA

I want to spend a bit of time talking about Malaysia because I think Malaysia is in a much 

more dangerous space with it comes to religious freedom when compared to Indonesia. 

I mentioned earlier that political parties in Indonesia that the Salafi infiltrates have not been 

able to take leadership positions in any of the major Indonesian political parties. This is partly

due to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two biggest Islamic NGOs in 

Indonesia. They act as a shield against intolerant Islamisation. Both organizations, with a 

combined membership of more than 100 million, explicitly reject the Saudi version of 

Wahhabism and instead promote what is loosely called Islam Nusantara. This essentially 

means Islam in Indonesia must take into account the local socio-cultural conditions. Thus, 

they believe in religious tolerance, religious pluralism, and moderation. Both organizations 

said they do not believe Indonesia should be an Islamic state and are committed to a secular 

Indonesian state. 

The national ideology of Indonesia, Pancasila, also helps. Comprising of five principles, the 

first one states Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (Belief in the one and only God). This is important 

as it does not name God as Allah. On top of this, there is a Ministry of Religious Affairs 

(Kementerian Agama ), which provides state recognition to Islam, Protestantism, 

Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. 

I should also mention here during the Jokowi administration (2014-2024), the government 

saw conservative Islam as a threat to the republic and they took measures in trying to weed 

out the Islamists from the bureaucracy. I mention this event to show that the highest level of 

the Indonesian Government sees conservative Islam as a potential threat to the state. 

This of course does not mean it will not change. The good news is that all three contenders 

for the Indonesian presidency in the upcoming Indonesian elections this year have ruled out 
Indonesia becoming an Islamic state. All three candidates accept that Indonesia is a 

multicultural, multireligious state.

I would like to contrast this with the situation in Malaysia. 

In Malaysia, Islam as a whole is getting more intolerant and conservative. A large part of it 

has to do with the Malaysian Constitution and identity politics. One unique feature of the 

Malaysian constitution is that it binds Islam with the Malay ethnic group. If you are classified

as Malay in government records, then you are Muslim. Thus, from the time of independence 

in 1957, the identity of the Malay ethnic group is tied with Islam. Under the law, if you are 

born Malay, there is no legal avenue to leave Islam. This makes Islam a potent weapon in the 

political arena. The easiest way to gain support among the Malay community is to become an 

Islamic champion. 

Over the years Islamism has also been purposely inserted into the civil and some scholars 

have termed this as bureaucratized Islam. A powerful government department, Jabatan 

Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) (JAKIM) was 

established to deal with all issues related to Islam. There is widespread agreement among 

scholars that JAKIM has played a decisive role in making Malaysia a much more

conservative Islamic state. For example, all the Friday sermons given throughout the country 

are written by JAKIM. Some of these sermons can be described as hate speech towards nonMuslims, especially Jews and Christians. You can also detect Salafi- influence in some of the 

educational materials produced by JAKIM for religious and national schools. It is almost 

certain that some of the senior theologians working in JAKIM are Salafi adherents or lean 

towards Salafi beliefs. Other scholars point to a process of Arabisation among the Malays as a 

sign that the Salafi is getting more influential. Many of the policies pursued by JAKIM 

showed they do not accept religious freedom and do not support a religious plural society. 

This of course is similar to core Salafi beliefs. 

The result is that although the Malaysian Constitution does not explicitly state Islam as the 

state or official religion, the entire Malay political class and the bureaucracy act as if Islam is 

the defacto official religion. 

Unlike Indonesia, the Salafis have made inroads into political parties in Malaysia. The Salafis

are known to have a significant influence on Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) (Islamic Party of 

Malaysia). As the name suggests, PAS wants to create an Islamic state in Malaysia. PAS is 

now the largest bloc in the Malaysian parliament after the 2022 elections, and there is a 

possibility that they will be elected to power in the next two decades. This does not mean 

PAS will immediately change Malaysia’s Constitution to become an Islamic state. It is more 

likely that there will be a period of rapid Islamisation before the country officially becomes 

an Islamic state. One of the key components of this Islamisation phase will be to restrict nonIslamic religions as much as possible. I expect the Salafis in PAS to play a major role in this 

process. 

There are Salafi sympathizers in the current government led by Anwar Ibrahim. However, 

they are constrained by the fact that the largest party in the “Unity” coalition government is

led by non-Muslims. Another important block in the Anwar administration comes from the 

Borneo states. They are not likely to support any attempts to impose hardline Islamic policies. 
DANGER TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Coming back to the work of this committee, the clear danger posed by Saudi Arabia's

influence and Salafi beliefs is the creation of an intolerant religious environment. They 

simply do not subscribe to the idea that there are other faiths and freedom of religion for the 

individual. Their ultimate aim is to create an Islamic state where non-Muslims do not have 

any political rights unless they convert to Islam and if they don’t, they are regarded as 

“protected people” with limited rights. 

In contemporary Saudi Arabia, there are reports that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 

has reign-in the kingdom's Wahhabi religious establishment, declaring its ultra-conservative 

interpretation of Islam as out of date and often based on a faulty interpretation of the Koran. 

How this will impact the Salafis in Indonesia and Malaysia remains unclear. Thus far there is 

no evidence that the Saudi Embassy in both countries has revamped and reduced their 

religious outreach activities. I would instead argue that even if the Saudi embassy does not 

promote Salafi beliefs, this will have a very limited impact as most of the outreach is done by 

the Indonesians and Malaysians themselves. They are unlikely to change their beliefs no 

matter what happens in Saudi Arabia under Prince Mohammed bin Salman. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the main points I wish to make before this hearing, are:

1) The export of Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia started a long ago, more than half a 

century ago. They want to be a major player in Islam and a major player in world 

affairs. Money was the main reason why they were successful in spreading Salafi 

beliefs, especially in poor Muslim countries. Competition with Iran is another major 

factor.

2) Islam in Southeast Asia has traditionally been very tolerant, moderate, and 

accommodating to other faiths, traditions, and cultures.

3) The spread of Salafi and other radical teachings has changed the nature of Islam in 

Indonesia and Malaysia. The biggest change is the element of violence and 

intolerance towards other faiths and cultures.

4) In Indonesia, the Salafis are diverse and decentralized. Politically they have not had a 

major impact on the major parties.

5) Threats to freedom of religion are far more serious in Malaysia when compared to 

Indonesia. The increasingly intolerant brand of Islam that is being promoted in 

Malaysia by the government, bureaucracy, and key political parties, can only lead to 

even more restrictions on Islamic groups deemed incompatible with the official Sunni 

Islam of the Shafi'i school of thought, and non-Islamic religions. There is no political 

leader in Malaysia, or Islamic NGOs, on the horizon, who appears willing or able to 

stop the trend of moving Malaysia into a defacto Malay Islamic state over the long 

term.

6) Dealing with the issue in Malaysia is complicated by the way the Malaysian 

Constitution ties the religious identity of the majority Malay ethnic group with Islam.

7) In Indonesia, other religions are recognized by the state through the Ministry of 

Religious Affairs while in Malaysia, it is the total opposite. The state only recognized

Islam, and even holding interfaith dialogues is problematic.
Thank you for listening.