ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

UNITED STATES COMMISSION 

ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

MAY 2005 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

800 North Capitol Street, NW 

Suite 790 

Washington, DC 20002 

202-523-3240 

202-523-5020 (fax) 

www.uscirf.gov 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Commissioners 

Preeta D. Bansal 

Chair 

Felice D. Gaer 

Nina Shea 

Vice Chairs 

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl 

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput 

Michael Cromartie 

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou 

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez 

Michael K. Young 

Amb. John V. Hanford, III, ex officio 

Joseph R. Crapa 

Executive Director 

 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Staff 

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy 

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach 

Christy Klaassen, Director of Government Affairs 

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications 

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration 

Patricia Carley, Associate Director for Policy 

Eileen A. Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications 

Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Analyst 

Robert C. Blitt, Legal Policy Analyst 

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst 

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist 

Scott Flipse, Policy Analyst 

Caroline Gobble, Communications & Outreach Assistant/Web Master 

Mark Hetfield, Immigration Counsel 

Mindy Larmore, Research Assistant 

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant 

Tina Ramirez, Research Assistant 

Allison Salyer, Government Affairs Assistant 

Danielle L. Simms, Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy 

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 2, 2005

The PRESIDENT 

The White House 

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

 PREETA D. BANSAL 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 2, 2005

Hon. CONDOLEEZZA RICE 

Secretary of State 

Department of State

 DEAR MADAME SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

PREETA D. BANSAL 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 2, 2005 

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT 

Speaker of the House 

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-

292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

PREETA D. BANSAL 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 2, 2005

Hon. TED STEVENS 

President Pro Tempore 

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. STEVENS: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-

292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

PREETA D. BANSAL 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 
ABOUT THE COMMISSION

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor violations of the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to give 

independent policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress. 

The Commission is the first government commission in the world with the sole mission 

of reviewing and making policy recommendations on the facts and circumstances of violations of 

religious freedom globally. The Commission’s impact and success in accomplishing its mission 

is achieved through its efforts to bring advice and accountability to U.S. foreign policy in the 

promotion of religious freedom abroad. By providing reliable information and analysis, and 

careful and specific policy recommendations, the Commission provides the U.S. government and 

the American public with important tools necessary to promote this fundamental freedom 

throughout the world. 

In the words of a key drafter of IRFA, the Commission was established for the purpose of 

ensuring “that the President and the Congress receive independent recommendations and, where 

necessary, criticism of American policy that does not promote international religious freedom.”1

The Commission, which began its work in May 1999, is not a part of the State 

Department and is independent from the Executive Branch. 

The Commission is composed of 10 members. Three are appointed by the President. 

Three are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, of which two are appointed 

upon the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader. Three are appointed by the Speaker of 

the House of Representatives, of which two are appointed upon the recommendation of the 

House Minority Leader. The system of appointments thus provides that leaders of the party in 

the White House appoint five voting members, and leaders of the other party appoint four. The 

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom within the Department of State serves 

ex officio as a non-voting member. 

Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise and experience in foreign affairs, human 

rights, religious freedom, and international law. The membership also reflects the religious 

diversity of the United States. 

This report covers the period May 2004 through April 2005. In May of 2004, Michael 

K. Young completed his term as the Chair of the Commission, and Felice D. Gaer and Nina Shea 

served as Vice Chairs. In June 2004, Preeta D. Bansal was elected Chair, and Felice D. Gaer and 

Nina Shea were re-elected to serve as Co-Vice Chairs. Each member of the Commission is 

currently serving a two-year term and can be reappointed. Terms are staggered, with some 

having begun on May 15, 2003 and others on May 15, 2004. 

 

1 Congressional Record, S12999, November 12, 1998. 
In carrying out its mandate, the Commission reviews information on violations of 

religious freedom as presented in the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices and its Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. The Commission also 

consults regularly with State Department and National Security Council officials, U.S. 

Ambassadors, and officials of foreign governments, as well as with representatives of religious 

communities and institutions, human rights groups, other non-governmental organizations, 

academics, and other policy experts. It visits foreign countries to examine religious freedom 

conditions firsthand. The Commission also holds public hearings, briefings, and roundtables. 

The Commission has met with President George W. Bush and senior members of his 

Administration, including the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss its 

findings and recommendations. The Commission also briefs Members of Congress, U.S. 

Ambassadors, and officials from international organizations. In addition, the Commission 

testifies before Congress, participates with U.S. delegations to international meetings and 

conferences, helps provide training to Foreign Service Officers and other U.S. officials, and 

advises the Administration and Members of Congress and their staff on executive and legislative 

initiatives. 

The Commission raises issues and brings its findings and recommendations to the 

American public through its public speaking activities, press conferences, other public events 

such as roundtables and briefings, its publications, Web site, and media outreach. During this 

reporting period the Commission’s activities were covered by the Christian Science Monitor, 

International Herald Tribune, Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, The 

Washington Post, The Washington Times, the news wire services, National Public Radio, and 

PBS, to name a few. 

Commissioners reside throughout the United States, and the Commission has traveled 

around the country to hold public hearings, public meetings, and other activities to inform the 

American people of its work. 

Although the work of the Commission is conducted year round, the Commission 

compiles an annual report of its policy recommendations in May to the President, the Secretary 

of State, and Congress. This report covers the period from May 2004 – April 2005. 
2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

May 2005 

Table of Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................................1

Freedom and Iraq’s Political Transition: the Permanent Constitution.........................11 

Comparative Study of Constitutions of Muslim Countries........................................21 

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List..............................27 

Country Reports: Africa..................................................................................39

Eritrea................................................................................................39 

Nigeria................................................................................................42 

Sudan.................................................................................................47 

Country Reports: East Asia..............................................................................53

Burma.................................................................................................53 

China...................................................................................................55 

Indonesia.............................................................................................61 

Korea, People’s Democratic Republic of.........................................................64 

Laos...................................................................................................68 

Vietnam...............................................................................................71 

Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia.................................................................79 

OSCE: Advancing Religious Freedom and Combating Anti-Semitism.....................79

Belarus................................................................................................83 

Georgia................................................................................................87 

The Russian Federation.............................................................................90 

Turkmenistan........................................................................................94 

Uzbekistan............................................................................................98

Country Reports: Middle East..........................................................................105

Egypt................................................................................................105 

Iran...................................................................................................110 

Saudi Arabia........................................................................................113 
Country Reports: South Asia...........................................................................121

Afghanistan.........................................................................................121 

Bangladesh..........................................................................................124 

India.................................................................................................126 

Pakistan..............................................................................................129 

Country Reports: Western Hemisphere..............................................................133 

Cuba.................................................................................................133

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs: 

Commission Study on Expedited Removal...........................................................137

The State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom..................153

Appendix 1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom........................................................................................159 

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions.......169 

Appendix 3: International Human Rights Standards: Summary of Provisions on 

Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief.........................................173 
1

INTRODUCTION 

“The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United 

States.” So affirms the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, or IRFA, which also reminds 

us that “freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and fundamental 

freedom articulated in numerous international documents, including the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief is thus not only a foundation of our country, but a 

right and freedom available and due to all persons. It is a national security imperative in this 

post-9/11 world. 

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by 

Congress to advocate within U.S. policy a prominent place for the promotion of religious 

freedom and other freedoms throughout the world. Now in its sixth year of operation, the 

Commission is drawing the attention of policymakers to the growing strategic importance of the 

protection of religious freedom to U.S. national interests, raising greater public awareness as to 

why religious freedom is a critical component of how countries treat their own people and deal 

with the world around them, and working with Members of Congress in a truly bipartisan effort 

to promote religious freedom abroad. 

 During the past year, the Commission has been especially focused on developing 

innovative ways of responding to particularly severe religious freedom violators. Until 2004, the 

State Department limited itself to designating as severe violators, referred to as “countries of 

particular concern,” or CPCs, only those countries already subject to existing Presidential 

actions. The U.S. government’s need to respond to the CPC designation with a direct action 

under IRFA was thereby diminished. 

When Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea were designated as CPCs for the first time in 

September 2004, following the Commission’s continued recommendations, the Commission 

faced a new challenge in encouraging utilization, for the first time, of the full panoply of 

statutory mechanisms enacted by Congress in IRFA. The Commission has turned its attention to 

ways of addressing religious freedom violations in those countries by actively encouraging the 

U.S. government to initiate responsive actions under IRFA. These responses need not solely be 

punitive or negative, since IRFA also encourages the U.S. government to take positive steps to 

promote religious freedom. In the course of its activities, the Commission has emphasized that 

CPC designation is not an end in itself, but only the beginning of focused diplomatic activity to 

promote freedom of religion or belief. 

 This annual report of the Commission provides a comprehensive review of the 

Commission’s activities—its findings, recommendations, and achievements—during the past 

year to promote the universal right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

This report describes conditions for religious freedom and inter-related human rights in the 

countries of concern to the Commission, highlights key findings, reports on the actions the 

Commission has taken to raise the public’s awareness of persistent religious freedom violations, 

refers to the Commission’s efforts to keep Congress informed of religious freedom conditions 

throughout the world, and presents the Commission’s U.S. policy recommendations to ensure 

that the promotion of freedom of religion or belief becomes a more integral part of U.S. foreign 
2

policy. In the six years of its operation, many of the Commission’s recommendations concerning 

countries that violate international norms of freedom of religion or belief have been implemented 

by the President, the State Department, and Congress, and have had a significant impact on the 

protection of human rights, including religious freedom, in those countries. 

Religious Freedom: A National Security, as well as Human Rights, Imperative 

Religious conviction motivates and inspires human behavior like few other forces. We 

must confront the fact that some people are not only willing to die for their convictions, but are 

willing to kill for them also-killing others who do not adhere to their own religious beliefs. 

Today's armed conflicts increasingly are internal ones, rather than wars between or among 

different states. As the U.S. National Security Strategy pointed out, "America is now threatened 

less by conquering states than by failing ones,"1

 and it is religious convictions, from diverse 

directions, that have played a key role in so many of the internal conflicts that reflect the 

instability inherent in these failed or failing states. Moreover, it is the ability of these religiously 

disaffected few to use highly powerful arms and utilize other modern technologies against their 

perceived enemies that have posed a new security threat, one that reaches beyond national 

borders. 

Extremism and hatred from any source or any religious tradition is a problem that, in 

turn, may threaten the security of the United States or any other nation. It is only in protecting 

the universal human rights of each individual that all individuals and all communities will be 

secure. 

When 15 Saudi nationals and four others, armed with jetliners filled with people and a 

religiously motivated ideology of terror, caused the events of September 11, 2001, the world was 

reminded again that promotion of freedom—especially religious freedom—is not simply a 

matter of altruism. It is the keystone of regional peace and American security. Indifference to 

tyranny abroad has allowed the growth of radical forces who, in the name of religion, now aim to 

destroy the West, as well as misinterpret the traditions of Islam. It is in our enlightened selfinterest to pursue foreign policies that help minorities persecuted for their religious beliefs and 

help ensure that international rights to religious freedom be respected for every individual, 

Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 

More than three years later, as the third anniversary of September 11 approached, the 

Commission investigating the September 11 attacks (the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the 

“United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a civilization.... Usama bin Ladin and 

other Islamist terrorist leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within [a minority] 

stream of Islam,” a stream “motivated by religion and [which] does not distinguish politics from 

religion, thus distorting both.”2

 The 9/11 Commission concluded that the United States must 

engage in the struggle of ideas in the Muslim world by promoting voices of moderation within 

Islam “and prevail[] in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”3

 

1

 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 1.

2

 The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, Official Government Edition, July 2004, p. 362. 

3

 Ibid., p. 363 and 375. 
3

As President Bush laid out in his State of the Union address this year, engaging in this 

struggle requires a political as well as military approach. Yet, the U.S. government’s political 

strategies, particularly with respect to religious freedom, have been hesitant, and on occasion 

even self-defeating. The Commission has served to promote such a political strategy in several 

ways: (1) by encouraging governments throughout the world to adopt policies that promote the 

right of each individual to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, along with 

policies to prevent abuses and punish perpetrators of abuses, so that religious differences and 

potential fault lines within societies may be addressed in ways that increase freedom, prosperity, 

and stability; (2) by encouraging the adoption of new structural and constitutional arrangements 

that ensure religious freedom and related human rights so that debate and dissent from prevailing 

orthodoxies within majority traditions, and alternative voices from within those traditions, can be 

given the breathing room necessary to emerge; (3) by confronting the global propagation of 

government-funded ideologies that are rooted in religious hatred and extremism, especially in the 

case of the Saudi Arabian regime’s propagation of Wahhabism, a highly intolerant form of Islam 

that directs Muslims actively to hate those who hold different views and to reject democracy as 

“un-Islamic”; and (4) by denouncing arbitrary and abusive repression of persons, organizations, 

or activities by governments on account of religion, on the basis that such repression can be 

counterproductive and can fuel religious extremism, hatred, and violence that spill outside 

national borders. 

Promoting religious freedom and related human rights abroad is vital to U.S. foreign 

policy and to our strategic, as well as humanitarian, interests. When observed, freedom of 

religion or belief is one of the linchpins of stable, democratic, and productive societies in which 

the rule of law and human rights are accorded value. When denied, hatred and societal 

instability are sown for generations. This security imperative for human rights is echoed in the 

opening words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, crafted in the wake of the horrors 

of the Second World War: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 

rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 

world.” 

The events of the past several years confirm that global powers ignore religion at their 

peril. Since passage of the Universal Declaration more than 50 years ago, our history has shown 

us that we cannot understand the global conflicts of the world without taking the role of religion 

seriously. Most of the conflicts of the world since World War II—the Middle East, Northern 

Africa, the southern Sahara, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia—have 

occurred in places where the world’s great religions intersect. Some of these conflicts may not 

have been explicitly religious wars. Yet, religion matters in all of them, because it shapes 

worldviews and perceptions of people. It makes them live compassionately, at best, or 

encourages hatred and violence, at worst. 

Through its focus on critical foreign policy concerns of the day, especially in Iraq, Saudi 

Arabia, and North Korea, and its ongoing work of drawing attention to religious freedom 

conditions worldwide, the Commission has sought to promote a foreign policy that furthers our 

nation’s humanitarian as well as national security interests. 
4

Focusing on Critical Foreign Policy Concerns of the Day 

Iraq 

 The Commission continues to be especially active on Iraq, highlighting the importance of 

guaranteeing that the right of every individual to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief is protected in the new permanent constitution. In 2004, the Commission worked 

successfully with senior Administration officials, Members of Congress, and others to ensure 

that explicit guarantees of this human right for every Iraqi were included in the country’s interim 

constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Throughout the past year, the 

Commission met with senior Administration officials, including President George W. Bush, to 

urge the U.S. government to remain highly engaged in the process of restoring freedom and 

building democracy in Iraq, a key element of which is the development of a new permanent 

constitution that will guarantee every Iraqi’s right to freedom of religion or belief and other 

human rights in accordance with Iraq’s international commitments. In March 2005, Commission 

Chair Preeta D. Bansal traveled to Jordan to participate in a working session of Iraqi civil society 

leaders concerning the drafting of Iraq’s permanent constitution, convened under the auspices of 

the American Bar Association’s Iraq Legal Development Program. 

 The Commission also worked to develop and publish information that would be useful to 

policymakers, experts, and others involved in the constitutional process. In March 2005, the 

Commission released a survey entitled, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to 

Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of 

Predominantly Muslim Countries, that examines the text of Muslim constitutions from 44 

nations in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The study demonstrates that 

predominantly Muslim countries—including those where Islam is the state religion—encompass 

a variety of constitutional arrangements addressing the role of Islam, the scope of the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, and equality of human rights and 

fundamental freedoms, including for women. The study finds that more than half of the world’s 

Muslim population (estimated at over 1.3 billion) lives in countries that are neither Islamic 

republics nor countries that have declared Islam to be the state religion. Moreover, countries in 

which Islam is the declared state religion may provide constitutional guarantees of the right to 

freedom of religion or belief, as well as related human rights, that compare favorably with 

international legal standards. 

These findings from the Commission’s constitutional study demonstrate that as Iraq 

begins work on drafting a permanent constitution to replace the TAL, Iraqis and legal experts 

aiding in the drafting process can look within the Muslim world for examples of constitutions 

that protect international standards of human rights, including religious freedom. In addition to 

these constitutional concerns, the Commission also issued statements in the past year expressing 

deep concern about the violent attacks in Iraq targeting religious places of worship, holy sites, 

and individual members of religious communities. In addition, it expressed concern that U.S. 

political reconstruction aid was not being passed through to the villages and areas inhabited by 

Christians, Yezidis, and Mandeans by Kurdish and Arab governates, forcing many of these nonMuslim peoples to leave Iraq. Details about this issue, the constitutional study, and the crucial 
5

significance of individual rights in the protection of human freedom can be found in the chapters 

in this report on Iraq’s Political Transition and on the Comparative Study of Constitutions. 

Saudi Arabia 

Over the past year, the Commission also has continued to focus attention on Saudi 

Arabia’s repression of religious freedom at home and exportation of intolerance abroad. With 

regard to the situation inside Saudi Arabia, the Commission met with then-Secretary of State 

Colin L. Powell to urge that the U.S. Department of State designate Saudi Arabia a CPC for its 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. Following the designation of 

Saudi Arabia as a CPC in September 2004 and in the spirit of the Commission’s new focus on 

finding ways to contend with countries named CPCs, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice in February 2005 to recommend specific actions that the U.S. government 

should take pursuant to the requirements of IRFA. In March 2005, 15 U.S. Senators sent a 

bipartisan letter to Secretary Rice in which they supported the Commission’s recommendations 

relating to Saudi Arabia’s CPC designation. 

The Commission has strongly recommended that the U.S. government in its bilateral 

relationship with Saudi Arabia raise the Saudi government’s involvement in the propagation 

globally of an ideology that promotes religious hatred and intolerance. The Commission 

welcomes public statements addressing the issue by State Department officials during the past 

year. In a report in May 2004, an independent task force on terrorist financing of the Council on 

Foreign Relations endorsed several specific Commission recommendations on Saudi Arabia, 

including that the U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Saudi government should 

more frequently identify serious human rights violations and that Congress should initiate and 

make public a study on Saudi exportation of intolerance. Also in May 2004, the Commission, 

together with the Senate Governmental Affairs and the House Government Reform Committees, 

announced that the General Accounting Office (GAO) would undertake a comprehensive review 

of U.S. oversight of Saudi support for an ideology promoting violence and intolerance globally. 

In conducting the study, the GAO said it would seek information from relevant U.S. government 

agencies, including the Commission, and consult with outside experts on Saudi promotion of 

religious extremism. 

North Korea

The North Korean government is one of the most repressive regimes in the world. In 

January 2004, the Commission held a hearing in Los Angeles, California, entitled “North Korea: 

Human Rights Ground Zero,” focusing on the conditions of human rights, including religious 

freedom, in North Korea, the plight of North Korean refugees, and recommendations for U.S. 

policy. The Commission is currently conducting a study, in collaboration with David Hawk, 

interviewing North Korean refugees and escapees about the conditions of freedom of religion or 

belief in North Korea and efforts by the North Korean government to suppress or replace 

religious practice. The final report is expected in summer 2005. In March 2005, Commission 

Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer and Commissioner Michael Cromartie presented the preliminary 

findings from the study at a luncheon hosted in the Commission’s honor by the U.S. Mission to 

the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Commissioners also met with Acting High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Wendy Chamberlin and her senior staff, with whom they 
6

discussed ways to provide protection for North Korean refugees in China. In addition, the 

Commission met with the Special Rapporteur for North Korea Vitit Muntabhorn, updating him 

on preliminary findings of the study. 

Drawing Attention to Religious Freedom Violators 

One of the Commission’s chief statutory responsibilities is to make recommendations to 

the Secretary of State on countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic 

and egregious violations of the universal right to freedom of religion or belief. Under IRFA, 

those countries that meet the statutory criteria must be designated by the Secretary of State as 

CPCs. In May 2005, concurrent with the release of this report, the Commission wrote to 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to recommend that 11 countries be designated as CPCs this 

year. It recommended that eight countries remain on the CPC list: Burma, China, the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and 

Vietnam. It also identified three countries not previously designated by the U.S. government: 

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

 In addition to CPC recommendations, the Commission wrote that Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, 

Indonesia, and Nigeria would remain on the Commission’s Watch List of countries where 

religious freedom conditions do not rise to the statutory level requiring CPC designation but 

which warrant close monitoring because of violations engaged in or tolerated by their 

governments, and that Bangladesh would be added to that list. In addition, in response to 

positive developments in the past year, the Commission no longer recommends that India be 

named a CPC and removed Laos and Georgia from its Watch List. More information about the 

three new CPC designations, as well as the Commission’s 2005 CPC recommendations and 

Watch List countries, can be found in this report. 

Raising Public Awareness 

Over the past year, the Commission held public events highlighting critical religious 

freedom concerns. In April 2004, the Commission held a hearing at the City University of New 

York School of Law at Queens College on religious freedom conditions in Bangladesh. 

Congressman Joseph Crowley, representative of New York’s seventh congressional district and 

member of the House Committee on International Relations, also participated in the hearing. In 

September 2004, the Commission convened an event with the Folger Shakespeare Library in 

Washington, at which Dr. Azar Nafisi, the author of the New York Times bestseller Reading 

Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books, spoke about the need to encourage greater respect for 

freedom and the protection of human rights amid rising religious intolerance and repression in 

the world today. The event was held in conjunction with an exhibit at the Folger on religious 

tolerance and persecution in 16th- and 17th- century Europe entitled Voices for Tolerance in an 

Age of Persecution. 

In May 2004, the Commission held two public briefings on Turkmenistan, one jointly 

with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) and the 

other with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). In July 2004 and January 2005, the 

Commission convened two roundtables on the troubling decline of religious freedom in Russia, 

hosting academics, human rights activists, and representatives of non-governmental 
7

organizations (NGOs). In November 2004, the Commission organized a China Human Rights 

Forum on Capitol Hill with U.S. and foreign government officials, Hill staff, international and 

academic experts, NGO representatives, and human rights activists to assess bilateral human 

rights dialogues with China. More detail about these and other events is found in the sections on 

the individual countries covered by this report. 

In June 2004, Commissioner Richard Land traveled to Houston, Texas, where he gave a 

keynote address entitled, “Global Security and U.S. National Interests: Why Religious Freedom 

Matters,” at The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. Also in 

Houston, Commissioner Land held an interfaith roundtable hosted by the Houston chapters of the 

American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League. In College Station, Texas, 

Commissioner Land met with the Dean and faculty at The Bush School of Government and 

Public Service at Texas A&M University to discuss areas of mutual concern. 

In November 2004, Commission Chair Bansal gave the keynote address at the Asia 

Society in New York, titled "Promoting Religious Freedom Abroad: The Scope of U.S. Foreign 

Policy." Her keynote was followed by a panel discussion among prominent experts in the human 

rights community. 

Chair Bansal also addressed an interdepartmental working group on religion at the 

Harvard University Pluralism Project. She discussed the work of the Commission and how that 

work fits into U.S. foreign policy to advance international religious freedom. She subsequently 

gave a presentation on the Commission’s work to the Memorial Church at Harvard University. 

Commission members also pressed issues of concern to the public through numerous 

appearances on radio broadcast programs and interviews with the print media, including 

appearances on National Public Radio and USA Radio Networks, and editorial board meetings 

with the Boston Globe and Los Angeles Times. In August 2004, the Commission received the 

Judge George Alexander Teitz Award from the Touro Synagogue Foundation, a nondenominational, non-sectarian institution based in Rhode Island. The award is given annually to 

“an individual or program that best exemplifies the ideals of religious, ethnic, and racial 

tolerance and freedom, as set forth in President George Washington’s Letter to the Hebrew 

Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island in 1790.” The award, given in recognition of the 

Commission’s work to promote religious freedom and to combat religious intolerance 

throughout the world, was presented to the Commission during a weekend celebration of the 

Annual Washington Letter Reading at the Touro Synagogue, at which United States Supreme 

Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the keynote speaker. 

Assessing Religious Freedom First Hand 

As part of its annual deliberative process, the Commission assesses religious freedom 

conditions first hand. In July 2004, the Commission traveled to Egypt, and in October 2004, the 

Commission traveled to Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Eritrea. In each country, Commission 

delegations met with a broad range of individuals including senior government officials, human 

rights organizations and other NGOs, religious leaders, scholars, educators, legal specialists, and 

others. The Commission consulted with these individuals on human rights concerns, including 

freedom of religion or belief, as protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
8

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other instruments. In November 2004, 

the Commission met in New York with Asma Jahangir, the newly appointed UN Special 

Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief. In March 2005, the Commission participated 

through the U.S. delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, where 

Commissioners met with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the acting director of 

the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, and Ambassadors from 29 countries. 

In addition, the Commission has participated through the U.S. delegations in various 

meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, throughout the 

year. The Commission has recommended that the U.S. government work with the OSCE to 

ensure that separate attention is paid to the rise of anti-Semitism in the OSCE region and has 

collaborated with the U.S. delegation successfully to urge participating States to agree to 

convene the OSCE’s first-ever special meeting on anti-Semitism, held in Berlin in April 2004. 

In July 2004, the Commission recommended that the OSCE create two high-level positions to be 

appointed by the Chairman-in-Office: a Special Representative on Discrimination and 

Xenophobia and a Special Representative on Anti-Semitism. In December 2004, this 

recommendation was acted upon when the OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office appointed three Personal 

Representatives to promote greater tolerance and combat racism, xenophobia, and discrimination 

in the OSCE region. 

 

Keeping Congress Informed

 In Washington, Commissioners testified before Congress addressing a number of 

Commission concerns. In May 2004, Commissioner Richard D. Land testified at a 

Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ briefing titled “Pakistan: A Human Rights 

Update.” In October 2004, Commission Chair Preeta D. Bansal testified before the U.S. House 

of Representatives International Relations Committee on the State Department’s 2004 Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom and Secretary of State Powell’s CPC designations. 

In November 2004, Commission Chair Bansal testified at a hearing held by the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China that examined the Chinese government’s continued violations 

of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The individual country chapters in this report 

contain more information about these events as well as other Commission activities. 

In February 2005, the Commission released the findings of a Report on Asylum Seekers 

in Expedited Removal and recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security and 

Department of Justice. As part of the IRFA legislation, Congress authorized the Commission to 

appoint experts to conduct a study examining how certain aspects of Expedited Removal is 

implemented: whether the process is sufficiently protecting all legitimate asylum seekers, 

whether asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal are being detained under inappropriate 

conditions, and whether asylum seekers are being returned to countries where they might face 

persecution. It was the first major study on this subject that obtained access to ports of entry, 

directly observed secondary inspection, and visited detention centers, thus answering the 

questions posed by Congress on the basis of extensive data-gathering and analysis. The study 

received front page coverage in The New York Times, and extensive coverage in major national 

newspapers. Details of the study may be found in the chapter entitled IRFA and the U.S. 

Refugee and Asylum Programs. 
9

 In addition to testifying before Congress, the Commission held congressional staff 

briefings, including bi-partisan, bi-cameral briefings on the 2004 Annual Report and the Report 

on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal. The Commission also worked with a number of 

individual congressional offices to include its findings and policy recommendations in over two 

dozen bills and resolutions, ranging from the Global anti-Semitism Review Act of 2004 to the 

North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. On several occasions, the Commission’s findings and 

recommendations were also cited in congressional letters and statements. 

Through its activities and publications, the Commission seeks positive ways to protect 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief globally. In the coming year, the 

Commission will continue to work with policymakers, the public, the non-governmental 

community, religious communities, the media, and others to promote universal rights and 

fundamental freedoms. 
10
11

FREEDOM AND IRAQ’S POLITICAL TRANSITION: 

THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION 

Introduction 

In January 2005, Iraqi voters elected a transitional national assembly as a first 

independent step towards establishing democratic rule in their country. Achieving this goal will 

require Iraqi institutions and laws, including a new permanent constitution, that protect the 

fundamental rights and freedoms of every Iraqi. The current phase of Iraq’s political transition 

will focus on the drafting and ratification of a permanent constitution that will effectively replace 

the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which has served as Iraq’s interim constitution since 

March 2004. The new constitution will establish the guiding principles for Iraq’s political, 

social, legal, and economic future. Incorporating recognized human rights guarantees, including 

the right of every person to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, into such a 

document represents a fundamental step in demonstrating Iraq’s commitment to international 

standards, and a necessary prerequisite for the genuine advancement of freedom among the Iraqi 

people. 

In the Commission’s view, it is imperative that Iraq’s transitional government be made 

aware of its international obligations and that relevant human rights standards be incorporated 

into the permanent constitution. Such action would not undermine Iraq’s justifiable desire to 

ensure an independent constitution-drafting process, but rather infuse the process, as well as the 

parties involved, with a clear understanding of international obligations regarding the minimum 

human rights standards that must be afforded to all Iraqis equally and without discrimination of 

any kind. 

While international standards explicitly bestow upon every individual the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, this right has all too frequently been 

diluted or misconstrued. For example, international attention typically is directed toward 

protecting the freedoms of religious groups or communities, including their freedom to worship, 

educate, and organize affairs according to their own doctrines. As important as these aspects of 

religious freedom are, particularly for religious minorities, protecting religious freedom extends 

beyond guaranteeing the freedom of groups to engage in religious activities. 

Advancing the right to freedom of religion or belief in a manner that fully comports with 

international standards requires that protection from repression by the majority not be limited to 

members of religious minorities. Rather, religious freedom also entails protection for individual 

members of a majority religion from those who use prevailing religious orthodoxy as a weapon 

to stifle political dissent and democratic debate. In other words, the right to religious freedom 

includes the freedom of every Iraqi, including Muslims, not only to worship and to practice his 

or her faith, but also the right to debate and dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy on issues 

related to religion. 
12

From the TAL to Elections 

Developing a robust understanding of freedom of religion or belief is particularly 

important in Iraq, a country with diverse and complex religious and ethnic identities. During the 

months before the adoption of the TAL, the Commission persistently engaged senior 

Administration officials, Members of Congress, and others on the need for the interim 

constitution to ensure explicit guarantees of the right to freedom of religion or belief for each 

individual, fully consistent with international standards. Following weeks of intensive 

negotiations between the Coalition Provision Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council, the 

final TAL as adopted in March 2004 codified these principles, signaling an important step for the 

Iraqi people, and a clear break away from the egregious violations of religious freedom 

committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. While the TAL holds the potential to serve as a model 

for the human rights provisions in Iraq’s permanent constitution, the Commission has expressed 

concern that language in the TAL requiring that legislation not be contrary to the “universally 

agreed upon tenets of Islam” may be used by judges to abridge the internationally recognized 

human rights of political and social reformers, including those voicing criticism of abusive 

government policies. 

Although the TAL enshrines human rights, including the right to freedom of religion or 

belief, for every Iraqi, continuing developments on the ground underscore the urgent need to 

further safeguard these rights in the country’s permanent constitution. Throughout the past year, 

a number of religiously motivated attacks specifically targeted Iraq’s religious communities: 

• Insurgents repeatedly bombed Shi’a mosques and targeted Sunni and Shi’a clerics for 

assassination. The largest such coordinated attack to date occurred in March 2004, resulting 

in the deaths of over 200 Shi’a pilgrims attending religious festivals in Karbala and Baghdad. 

• Insurgents launched simultaneous bombing campaigns against churches belonging to the 

indigenous Christian minority community, and bombed or otherwise closed down Christianowned businesses. 

The escalation of religious terror has had a particularly devastating effect on Iraq’s nonMuslim minorities, including the ChaldoAssyrians,1

 Mandaeans, and Yezidis. This has caused a 

push from some leaders of the ChaldoAssyrian community to establish a separate governorate in 

the Nineveh Province. In addition, the kidnapping epidemic in Iraq has disproportionately 

targeted Iraqi Christians. According to the Department of State, more than 30,000 Christian 

families fled Iraq during the year,2 raising concern about the very survival of these ancient 

communities. 

 

1

 The term “ChaldoAssyrian” is used in the TAL, and refers to the indigenous Assyrian, 

Chaldean, and Syriac people of Iraq. 

2

 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41722.htm, accessed April 14, 2005). 
13

In the Commission’s view, this string of violent attacks represents a concerted effort to 

instigate an inter-religious conflict among Muslims and between the Muslim and Christian 

communities in Iraq. In an August 2004 letter to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John D. Negroponte, 

the Commission—while noting that many leading Muslim clerics and political leaders, including 

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, vociferously condemned the attacks against Iraq’s Christian 

minority—urged the Ambassador to encourage leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government to take a 

clear and public stand in affirmation of the TAL’s provisions on freedom of religion or belief. 

According to the Commission’s letter, “The TAL provides a common touchstone for all Iraqis to 

uphold religious tolerance and coexistence; its public reaffirmation by the Interim Government 

would serve a stabilizing function and lend Iraqis committed to building a democratic society the 

confidence they need to bring this vision closer to reality.” 

In addition to the threat posed by the insurgency, Iraqis also are being forced to contend 

with the unlawful imposition of Islamic laws and principles by grassroots vigilante groups, as 

well as the operation of extra-judicial Islamic courts that seek to impose an extremist version of 

Islamic law on all Iraqis, regardless of their beliefs. According to the Department of State 2004 

Country Report on Human Rights Practices, “There were numerous incidents of violence against 

the Christian community...ranging from individual killings to intimidation and assaults on 

women for not wearing a headscarf (hijab).”3 Media sources have further reported several cases 

where personal choices are being imposed forcibly based on a particular interpretation of Islam. 

Some of these cases include university campuses imposing separate entrances, classrooms, and 

campuses for women; barbershops being forcibly shut down for offering to shave beards or 

provide modern haircuts; and teachers and schoolchildren being threatened with beheading if 

they observed the Interim Government’s decision to extend the Friday weekend to include 

Saturday, a day associated by Islamic militants with the Jewish day of rest. 

During this period, the Commission received reports that reconstruction funds from the 

United States earmarked for the governorate level were not reaching ChaldoAssyrian villages. 

Given the lack of input by ChaldoAssyrian civic administrators and other appropriate bodies into 

the use of reconstruction funds, Christian communities have been uniquely unable to rebuild 

basic infrastructure in their villages, including water and electrical systems, school facilities, and 

housing. 

In the face of these alarming and unlawful activities, the Commission, in a December 

2004 letter to President George W. Bush, pointed to the fact that “Without the right to religious 

freedom, guaranteed in law and observed in fact, Iraqi non-Muslim minorities will be persecuted 

and driven out, and Iraqi Muslims, particularly women and dissident reformers, will be stifled 

and suppressed.” Additionally, the Commission expressed its concern that the continuing exodus 

of Iraq’s indigenous Christian minority “would signal the demise of one of the world’s historic 

religious communities and also would diminish the country’s prospects for political and 

economic development,” noting that the “ChaldoAssyrians are an educated and skilled 

community, who strongly support the formation in Iraq of a liberal democracy that protects the 

human rights of every individual.” In conclusion, the Commission stated that continuing 

religiously-motivated assaults on all faiths constituted “an egregious denial of fundamental 

 

3

 Ibid. 
14

human rights, and threatened the stability of a unified Iraqi state, as well as the ultimate success 

of U.S. policy objectives in the region.” In February 2005, the Commission met privately with 

President Bush to discuss firsthand its concerns and policy recommendations regarding the need 

to protect freedom of religion or belief for all Iraqis. 

Efforts to Promote Freedom of Religion or Belief in Iraq’s Permanent Constitution 

Developments in Iraq underscore the critical need to ensure that the right of every Iraqi 

to freedom of religion or belief, regardless of religious affiliation, is guaranteed in the country’s 

permanent constitution. Throughout the past year, the Commission has continued to engage 

Administration officials, non-governmental organizations, and legal experts to ensure that this 

priority is understood and advanced at all levels. It should be noted that this effort does not 

reflect a desire to impose American values on the Iraqi people, since this right is recognized and 

entrenched in international law and moreover, is similarly provided for in several other 

constitutions in the Muslim and Arab world. 

Accordingly, at this critical juncture, the United States should not take a hands-off policy 

approach to Iraq’s permanent constitution. Rather, universal human rights standards should 

continually be invoked as a basis for dialogue and engagement with Iraqis, as a fundamental 

aspect of any constitution-related assistance programs, and finally, as a yardstick for measuring 

the success of Iraq’s constitutional process. Significantly, this message recently has been 

reflected in the statements of top U.S. officials. In March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice publicly affirmed that “In places where religion has been used to separate people—places 

like Lebanon or places like Iraq—it is especially important that...the constitution recognize that 

the right to individual conscience is the key to democracy. Because people will never be truly 

free if this most personal of decisions is imposed upon them.”4

The need for effective guarantees in the permanent constitution of the right of every 

person to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is not merely a theoretical 

concern, but the sine qua non of genuine democracy and peace. These guarantees protect those 

who question prevailing orthodoxies and seek to debate key issues facing their societies, 

especially where law, politics, and religion intersect. These guarantees further protect those 

working through democratic means to promote respect for the human rights of their fellow 

citizens, and also help to inhibit those who would use religion as a weapon to obtain and hold 

power through undemocratic means, such as by stifling debate, impinging the efforts of political 

moderates and reformers, jailing opponents, and sowing fear. 

Undoubtedly, the incorporation of individual human rights guarantees in Iraq’s 

permanent constitution, and especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, is critical. Such 

guarantees can serve to: 

• Protect against the doctrine of intolerance espoused by leaders of the ongoing insurgency and 

by elements within Iraqi society. 

 

4

 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at Sophia University,” Tokyo, Japan, March 

19, 2005. 
15

• Promote stability among Iraq’s major ethnic and religious communities by ensuring that no 

single community’s interpretation of religion will be enforced on others, and that interference 

in religious affairs will not be used as a means of repression, decisively breaking with the 

past practice of Saddam Hussein’s regime. 

• Promote stability within Iraq’s internal political and social structures by providing open 

space for discussion and dissent within and among members of Iraq’s religious communities. 

Upholding freedom of religion in line with international standards will enable every 

individual to determine independently his or her relationship with religion, not only 

concerning worship and practice, but also debate and dissent. This right would extend to 

members of Iraq’s religious minorities, such as the ChaldoAssyrians, as well as to other 

Iraqis, including individual Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, who espouse views that may differ 

from the mainstream. 

• Promote moderation in Iraq’s legal regime. A constitution that enshrines freedom of religion 

or belief and associated human rights represents the foundation to a judicial system capable 

of counterbalancing potentially discriminatory legislation. 

• Promote stability in the region by reducing tension among the ethnic and religious 

communities which span Iraq’s borders, and by establishing a model of governance that 

affirms the ability of various religious and ethnic communities to live side by side peacefully 

within a democratic framework that respects universal human rights. The success of such a 

model also represents a stated objective of U.S. foreign policy. As President Bush observed 

in his 2005 State of the Union address: “victory of freedom in Iraq will...inspire democratic 

reformers from Damascus to Tehran, [and] bring more hope and progress to a troubled 

region.”5

Commission Actions 

In addition to meetings with the President and senior U.S. officials, the Commission has 

worked to develop and publish information useful to policymakers, experts, and others involved 

in Iraq’s constitutional process. In March 2005, the Commission released a comparative survey 

of the constitutions of predominantly Muslim countries, examining provisions relating to the role 

of Islam and guarantees of religious freedom and related human rights. This 100-page 

document, entitled The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries, 

sets out the international human rights standards associated with freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief alongside the relevant constitutional provisions of 44 Muslim countries. 

The survey found that no single model exists in Muslim countries, which range from declared 

Islamic states to declared secular states. Moreover, several countries examined, including those 

where Islam is the declared religion of the state, have constitutional provisions that favorably 

reflect a state’s international human rights obligations.6

 

5

 President George W. Bush, State of the Union, February 2, 2005. 

6

 The study, in its entirety, is available on the Commission’s web site.
16

To be certain, actual implementation of any constitutional provision is dependent on a 

number of diverse factors, including level of state control, system of government, independence 

of the judiciary, individual access to the courts, and enforcement of judicial remedies. 

Constitutional text alone may not necessarily reflect what is done in practice, especially with 

regard to human rights. That said, a constitution remains important as an aspirational document 

and a statement of national principles. It can also provide the foundation for political, social, and 

legal reconstruction. Even if not fully implemented, constitutional text remains fixed as 

fundamental law, and its guarantees and protections can be invoked by those seeking to protect 

human rights in the future. 

The Commission’s comparative constitution survey serves a dual purpose. In the first 

instance, it is a valuable tool for policymakers to understand the constitutional landscape of the 

Muslim world with regard to the role of Islam and guarantees for freedom of religion and belief 

and other associated rights, by providing models of constitutional text that reflect international 

standards. The survey also has begun to serve as the basis for dialogue with Iraqis engaged in 

the unfolding constitutional process. At a March 2005 working session on the constitutional 

process convened in Jordan under the auspices of the American Bar Association’s Iraq Legal 

Development Program, Commission Chair Preeta D. Bansal briefed Iraqi civil society leaders on 

the survey’s findings. The ensuing discussion demonstrated a range of opinions concerning 

issues related to freedom of religion, a willingness to explore questions in an open and frank 

manner, and significantly, a desire for more detailed comparative information. Accordingly, it is 

expected that the constitutional survey will be translated into Arabic. The Commission is also 

exploring additional opportunities to engage Iraqis, including members of the expected 

constitutional drafting committee, with relevant information on international standards related to 

freedom of religion or belief and the constitutional experiences of other Muslim countries. 

Commission Recommendations 

Concerning the Permanent Constitution

In light of the current situation in Iraq, the Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government: 

y direct all U.S. efforts to encourage the inclusion of human rights guarantees in the permanent 

constitution that are consistent with the obligations set forth in international instruments to 

which Iraq is a party, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Iraq’s permanent constitution 

should include explicit guarantees that: 

--“everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,” as affirmed in 

article 18 of the UDHR and specified in article 18 of the ICCPR; 

--coercion in all matters related to religion shall be prohibited, and no Iraqi shall be 

detained or arrested because of his or her religious beliefs; 
17

--prohibit discrimination and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of every Iraqi, 

regardless of religion or belief, without which the human rights of individuals, whether 

women or disfavored or non-conformist Muslims, will be at risk; 

--Iraq shall abide by the international human rights treaties, conventions, and instruments 

to which it is a party, such as the ICCPR and the UDHR; 

--the principles of democracy, pluralism, social justice, rule of law, and Iraq’s international 

obligations are fundamental sources of legislation; 

--every woman and member of a religious minority shall have equal rights with every Iraqi 

citizen, shall have equal protection of the law, and shall be equal before the law; and 

--no law shall be contrary to the rights expressed in the permanent constitution.

Guarantees of this kind form the basis of minimum human rights protections recognized 

under international law, and are found in the constitutions of other predominantly Muslim 

countries, as well as in Iraq’s TAL. 

In addition, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government: 

y urge Iraq’s transitional government and national assembly to include underrepresented 

religious minorities, i.e. Christians and Sunnis, in the constitutional drafting body; 

y call on the United Nations and other allies to support actively and publicly the incorporation 

of individual human rights in line with international standards in Iraq’s permanent 

constitution; 

y appoint a high-level U.S. human rights envoy to Iraq, reporting directly to the U.S. 

ambassador, to encourage the incorporation of human rights principles in Iraq’s permanent 

constitution, to serve as the point of contact for Iraqi human rights institutions and assist 

these institutions in consolidating their roles within the emerging political structure, to 

facilitate access to American expertise and other assistance supporting Iraq’s effort to 

confront human rights challenges, and to advance human rights through U.S. reconstruction 

programs in Iraq; and 

y fund workshops and training sessions on religion/state issues for Iraqi officials, 

policymakers, legal professionals, representatives of non-governmental organizations, 

religious leaders, and other members of key sectors of society who will have input on the 

permanent constitution. 

Concerning Reconstruction Efforts

With regard to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government: 
18

y promote and prioritize, in all reconstruction programs for Iraq and in contacts with Iraqis, 

coalition partners, and other potential donors including the United Nations, an Iraqi political 

system that respects freedom of religion and belief, endorses equality for women, and 

guarantees the universal human rights of all Iraqis, including members of religious minorities 

and individual women; 

• ensure that U.S. funding and other forms of support are not going to Iraqi political parties 

and other organizations that advocate or condone policies at odds with recognized 

international human rights norms; 

y publicly express at the highest level support for political parties and other Iraqi groups that 

demonstrate a genuine commitment to international human rights, including freedom of 

religion, and give clear directives to American officials and recipients of U.S. democracybuilding grants to assign priority to projects that seek to encourage the inclusion of effective 

human rights guarantees for every Iraqi in the permanent constitution, in addition to projects 

that promote multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to meet human needs, religious 

tolerance and understanding, knowledge among Iraqis about international human rights 

standards, and discussion of values central to good governance and democracy;7

• declare a proportional allocation of funds for ChaldoAssyrian communities, ensure that the 

use of these funds are determined by independent ChaldoAssyrian national and town 

representatives, and establish direct lines of input by such independent ChaldoAssyrian 

structures into the allocation process of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, separate 

from the Kurdish Regional Government; 

y support efforts to establish official Iraqi institutions, including the national human rights 

commission provided for in the TAL, that meet international standards and have the 

resources and mandates necessary to monitor, investigate, and take action to remedy human 

rights abuses, and that encourage Iraq’s judicial and human rights institutions to operate in 

accordance with international standards; and 

y establish an Iraqi visitors program through the State Department to focus on exchange and 

education opportunities in the United States related to freedom of religion and religious 

tolerance. 

Concerning Ongoing Abuses of Freedom of Religion

With regard to ongoing religious freedom abuses, the Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government: 

 

7

 The State Department’s current “Human Rights and Democratization Initiatives in Iraq” 

Request for Grant Proposals fails to prioritize proposals that promote the inclusion of 

international human rights standards or a bill of rights in the permanent constitution, or proposals 

that promote knowledge among Iraqis about international human rights standards. 
19

y publicly condemn attacks having a religious character or motivation and encourage the 

transitional government to capture and prosecute responsible parties; 

y speak out at the highest level against violence against women and unlawful efforts to impose 

extrajudicial religious and/or traditional law in violation of international human rights 

standards; 

y in cooperation with Iraqi law enforcement, prioritize locating and shutting down extrajudicial courts unlawfully imposing an extremist version of Islamic law; and 

• raise with the regional Kurdish authorities the issue of reports that ChaldoAssyrian property 

is being expropriated and seek assurances that there will be no official discrimination 

practiced against this or other minority communities. 
20
21

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES 

Introduction 

Several current developments in constitutional drafting are spurring renewed analysis of 

the existing constitutional landscape of the Muslim world. In 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new 

permanent constitution, and Iraq’s Governing Council approved an interim constitutional 

document for Iraq (the Transitional Administrative Law or TAL). Iraq’s newly elected 

transitional national assembly is expected to draft a permanent constitution by August 2005. In 

Sudan, a new interim constitution is anticipated as a product of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. 

Although the drafting and approval processes have differed markedly in these countries, 

international legal norms and international actors have played—and will continue to play—

important roles. In each country, questions have been raised about the relationship between 

international legal/human rights norms and existing political arrangements—especially with 

respect to the universal right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The 

search for reliable answers to these questions has been hindered by the dearth of specific 

comparative information available regarding relevant constitutional provisions in predominantly 

Muslim countries,1

 and the absence of any comprehensive survey of texts to provide an overall 

picture of the constitutional arrangements in such countries. The Commission’s survey of 

constitutional text of 44 Muslim countries, released in March 2005, represents a small but 

important first step in filling this urgent resource gap. 

About The Study 

The Commission’s study analyzes the constitutional provisions currently in place 

concerning the relationship between religion and the state, freedom of religion or belief, and 

other related human rights in predominantly Muslim countries. 

The Muslim world stretches from Europe to Africa, through the Middle East and into 

Asia. Indeed, its geographical diversity mirrors a central finding of the study, that predominantly 

Muslim countries encompass a variety of constitutional arrangements addressing the role of 

Islam and the scope of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief and 

other human rights. 

In other words, although the countries reviewed in this study share the common 

denominator of having a majority Muslim population, the documents surveyed here establish a 

broad assortment of constitutional views—ranging from Islamic republics with Islam as the 

official state religion, to secular states with strict separation of religion and state. Moreover, 

diversity on the role of Islam and the extent of guarantees for universal human rights are also 

found in the constitutions of those states where Islam is proclaimed the religion of the state. 

 

1

 The study defines predominantly Muslim countries as those where more than half of the 

population is Muslim. 
22

Table: Predominantly Muslim Countries Classified by Constitutional Role for Religion 

Declared Islamic 

States 

Declared Islam as the 

State Religion 

No Constitutional 

Declaration 

Declared Secular 

States 

1. Afghanistan 

2. Bahrain 

3. Brunei 

4. Iran 

5. Maldives 

6. Mauritania 

7. Oman 

8. Pakistan 

9. Saudi Arabia 

10. Yemen 

Ten Islamic states and: 

11. Algeria 

12. Bangladesh 

13. Egypt 

14. Iraq (TAL) 

15. Jordan 

16. Kuwait 

17. Libya 

18. Malaysia 

19. Morocco 

20. Qatar 

21. Tunisia 

22. U.A.E. 

1. Albania 

2. Lebanon 

3. Syria 

4. Indonesia 

5. Comoros 

6. Djibouti 

7. Gambia 

8. Sierra Leone 

9. Somalia*

10. Sudan**

11. Uzbekistan 

1. Burkina Faso 

2. Chad 

3. Guinea 

4. Mali 

5. Niger 

6. Senegal 

7. Azerbaijan 

8. Kyrgyzstan 

9. Tajikistan 

10. Turkey 

11. Turkmenistan 

Estimated Muslim 

Population: 

285.5 million or 

approximately 28 percent 

of Muslims living in 

predominantly Muslim 

countries. 

Estimated Muslim 

Population (including 

declared Islamic states): 

602.5 million or 

approximately 58 percent 

of Muslims living in 

predominantly Muslim 

countries. 

Estimated Muslim 

Population: 

287.5 million or 

approximately 28.5 

percent of Muslims living 

in predominantly Muslim 

countries. 

Estimated Muslim 

Population: 

140 million or 

approximately 13.5 percent 

of Muslims living in 

predominantly Muslim 

countries. 

Map: Predominantly Muslim Countries Classified by Constitutional Role for Religion 

 

*

 At the time of writing, Somalia has no recognized constitution. ** At the time of writing, parties to Sudan’s long-running civil war are contemplating the drafting 

of a new interim constitution.
23

In addition to the diversity of constitutional structures, several important realities come to light 

through this comparative review: 

• More than half of the world’s Muslim population (estimated at over 1.3 billion) lives in 

countries that are neither Islamic republics nor that have declared Islam to be the state 

religion. Thus, the majority of the world’s Muslim population currently lives in countries 

that either proclaim the state to be secular or that make no pronouncements concerning 

Islam to be the official state religion. 

• Countries in which Islam is the declared state religion may provide constitutional 

guarantees of the right to freedom of religion or belief that compare favorably with 

international legal standards. 

• Similarly, countries with Islam as the declared state religion may maintain constitutional 

provisions protecting the related rights to freedom of expression, association, and 

assembly—or the rights of equality and nondiscrimination with regard to, inter alia, 

religion and gender—which compare favorably with international standards. 

• A number of constitutions of predominantly Muslim countries incorporate or otherwise 

reference international human rights instruments and legal norms. 

This wide diversity in the constitutional provisions of predominantly Muslim countries, 

and especially in those countries declaring themselves to be Islamic states or declaring Islam to 

be the state religion, is not necessarily well understood. For example, the Commission has 

observed the perception that a provision found in Afghanistan’s new constitution—that “no law 

can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam”—represents the norm in the constitutions of 

predominantly Muslim countries.2

 As this study shows, that perception is incorrect. 

Human Rights as International and Universal Legal Norms 

Yet, such perceptions and assumptions are not new. Since the adoption of the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, critics have questioned the particular religious 

roots of human rights, and have explored claims of the universality of human rights in the face of 

contradictory religious attitudes and practices. However, the need for protection of certain 

individual rights deemed inherent and universal—and not contingent upon particular cultures or 

political arrangements—became a matter of global concern after the horrors of World War II. 

The world then came together under the auspices of the United Nations to enshrine the natural 

rights and freedoms available to all persons—including the right of religious freedom—as 

universal human rights. 

The UDHR recognizes in its first sentence the “inherent dignity and the equal and 

inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice 

and peace in the world.” Article 18 of the Declaration addresses the relationship between 

religion and human rights, forbidding distinctions of any kind, including on the basis of religion, 

with regard to the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. It states, “Everyone has the right to 

 

2

 The study demonstrates that out of 44 predominantly Muslim countries, only 15 constitutions 

provide for Islamic law, principles, or jurisprudence as a source of, or limitation on, general 

legislation. 
24

freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 

belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 

manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 

The crucial role played by the delegate from Egypt, Dr. Mahmoud Azmi, during the 

drafting and passage of the Declaration serves as an illustration of the aspired universality of this 

document.3

 Dr. Azmi was an active defender of human rights for all individuals, including for 

women and minorities. He fervently advocated the passage of the Declaration and pointed to the 

long, multi-civilizational and multi-religious history of his own country to demonstrate that a 

commitment to human rights is not a western but a universal human concept. 

In the end, out of 58 states then in existence, no country voted against the Universal 

Declaration.4 The Declaration thus represented a consensus at that moment in history on the 

subject of fundamental human rights, including the freedom of religion or belief. From the early 

years of the United Nations, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and other 

religious individuals and groups have worked together to advance human rights. These religious 

groups have emphasized the religious bases for human rights within their own traditions. 

Now, more than 50 years later, as Iraq and Afghanistan have embarked on their own 

constitutional processes, and Sudan may soon follow, questions about the compatibility of 

international human rights norms within Islamic societies are being raised anew. In particular, 

three contentious issues concerning religion permeated the drafting and approval of 

Afghanistan’s constitution and Iraq’s TAL: the appropriate constitutional role for Islam; the 

scope of guarantees for fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief; and the equality of rights and freedoms, especially for women. 

As Iraq’s newly elected transitional national assembly begins the process of drafting a permanent 

constitution, it is likely that matters concerning religion and human rights will resurface as key, 

potentially divisive, issues. 

Minimum International Standards for Constitutional Provisions on Freedom of Religion 

and the Role of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

The minimum international standards required for an effective constitutional guarantee of the 

right of freedom of religion or belief may be extracted from the UDHR and the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These minimum standards include: 

y Universal applicability to everyone as individuals, regardless of religion or belief; 

y The freedom to manifest a religion or belief, either individually or in community with 

others, in public or private; 

y Freedom to manifest all aspects of a religion or belief, including worship, teaching, 

practice, and observance; 

 

3

 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “Egypt’s Path to Rights,” The Washington Post, April 4, 2004. 

4

 Eight states abstained from the UN General Assembly vote on the UN Declaration of Human 

Rights: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the former Soviet 

Union, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. 
25

y No coercion that would impair the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 

one’s choice;5 and 

y Limitations on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief only in 

certain circumstances as provided for under international law. 

Freedom of religion or belief protects the rights not only of members of religious 

minorities within a society, but also protects the rights of individuals within a majority faith to 

debate and dissent from state-imposed orthodoxies. Promoting religious freedom and related 

human rights abroad therefore is vital to the world’s strategic, as well as humanitarian, interests. 

When respected, freedom of religion or belief is one of the cornerstones of stable, democratic, 

productive societies in which the rule of law and human rights are observed and accorded value. 

When denied, generations of intolerance, authoritarianism, and resulting societal instability may 

be sown. 

The Commission has made specific recommendations on constitutional human rights 

guarantees in Afghanistan and Iraq in light of the unique role of the U.S. government in these 

situations. These recommendations are based on the standards set forth in international human 

rights instruments including the UDHR and the ICCPR, to which both Afghanistan and Iraq are 

party. 

During their constitutional drafting sessions, Afghan and Iraqi participants, as well as 

international actors, sought models of constitutional text that reflect international human rights 

standards. While many such models exist globally, the Commission found that there was a 

dearth of collected materials on constitutional arrangements in predominantly Muslim countries, 

including countries where Islam is the state religion, which may afford more readily applicable—

and potentially positive—examples. 

The comparative analysis of constitutional text prepared by the Commission’s legal 

policy staff is intended as a departure point, and an invitation for further examination of the 

interpretation and application of these texts—especially with regard to their practical impact on 

society, and on the protection of internationally recognized human rights. The Commission 

hopes that others may take up this task to further advance human rights, including the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, around the globe. 

The comparative constitution study, in its entirety, is available on the Commission’s web 

site.

 

5

 Aspects of a constitution that could constitute coercion include: (a) no provision for equality; 

(b) no provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion; or (c) separate political rights 

for citizens of different religions. 
26

Table: Comparison of Constitutional Provisions on Freedom of Religion to International Standards 

Generally 

Compare 

Favorably 

Establish Specific 

Safeguards 

Against Religious 

Coercion 

No Provisions or 

Provision only for 

the Right to Worship 

Provisions that Do Not Define 

Rights on an Individual Basis or 

Limit Rights to One or More 

Enumerated Groups 

Provisions that Permi

Enumerated Under Inter

Middle East & North Africa Iraq (TAL) South AsiaBangladesh Pakistan East AsiaIndonesia Malaysia Africa Chad Djibouti Gambia Guinea Mali Niger Senegal Sierra Leone Sudan Eastern Europe & EurasiaAlbania Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 

Middle East & North Africa Iraq (TAL) South Asia Bangladesh Pakistan East Asia Malaysia Africa Sierra Leone Sudan Eastern Europe & Eurasia Albania Azerbaijan Turkey Uzbekistan 

Middle East & North Africa Algeria*

Bahrain Egypt Iran Jordan Kuwait*

Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia*

Syria Tunisia*

U.A.E. Yemen*

South Asia Afghanistan East Asia Brunei Maldives*

Africa Comoros*

Mauritania*

Somalia**

Eastern Europe & Eurasia n/a 

Middle East & North Africa Bahrain Egypt Iran Jordan Lebanon Libya Oman Syria U.A.E. South Asia Afghanistan East Asia Maldives Africa Burkina Faso Eastern Europe & Eurasia n/a 

Middle East & North AfricBahrain Iran Jordan Kuwait Libya Oman U.A.E. South Asia Afghanistan East Asia Brunei Maldives Africa Djibouti Gambia Niger Sierra Leone Eastern Europe & Eurasia Turkey 

* Countries with no constitutional provisions concerning freedom of religion specifically. ** At the time of writing, Somalia has no recognized constitution. 
27

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN AND THE COMMISSION WATCH LIST 

In passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), Congress not only 

recognized the global importance of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, but 

also made the promotion of this critical freedom a matter of U.S. law. This action ensured that 

advancing international religious freedom became an integral part of the U.S. government’s 

foreign policy agenda. IRFA established a number of interrelated mechanisms to pursue this 

goal. These include: an Office of International Religious Freedom in the Department of State 

headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; an annual report by the 

State Department on the conditions of religious freedom in each foreign country and U.S. actions 

to promote religious freedom; and the establishment of the United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom. 

The Commission was created by Congress through IRFA expressly to advocate a 

prominent place within U.S. foreign policy for the promotion of religious freedom and other 

freedoms throughout the world. The Commission was mandated both to monitor the status of 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief globally and to make recommendations to 

the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress on ways the U.S. government can further the 

protection and promotion of this freedom and related human rights in its relations with other 

countries. 

Under IRFA, the President is required to single out and explicitly name those countries 

that are the most egregious violators of religious freedom, and the Act contains a formal 

mechanism for doing so. Section 402(b)(1) of IRFA specifically directs the President at least 

annually to designate each country in which the government has engaged in or tolerated 

“particularly severe violations of religious freedom” as “a country of particular concern” or CPC. 

Particularly severe violations of religious freedom are defined as those that are “systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious.”1

 In defining violations of religious freedom, IRFA directly refers to 

the “internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice” as 

laid out in such international instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2

 

Countries of Particular Concern: Commission Recommendations 

One of the Commission’s chief responsibilities under IRFA is to draw attention to those 

countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and egregious violations 

of religious freedom and recommend that they be designated as CPCs. 

In compliance with IRFA, the Commission has assessed the facts and circumstances, 

including those in the State Department’s 2004 Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, regarding violations of religious freedom around the world. As a result of this review 

process, and in furtherance of the Commission’s statutory responsibility, the Commission wrote 

to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in April 2005 recommending that she designate as CPCs 

 

1

 IRFA § 402 (b)(1)(A). 

2

 IRFA § 3(13).
28

the following 11 countries: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), 

Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 

Countries Named as CPCs 

by the Department of State 

Countries Recommended for 

CPC Designation by the 

Commission 

Countries on the 

Commission’s 

Watch List 

Burma 

China 

Eritrea 

Iran 

North Korea 

Saudi Arabia 

Sudan 

Vietnam 

Burma 

China 

Eritrea 

Iran 

North Korea 

Saudi Arabia 

Sudan 

Vietnam 

Pakistan 

Turkmenistan 

Uzbekistan 

Bangladesh 

Belarus 

Cuba 

Egypt 

Indonesia 

Nigeria 

During last year’s CPC process, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in September 

2004 re-designated Burma, China, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan as CPCs. The Commission 

concluded this year that there have been no changes with regard to freedom of religion or belief 

to warrant the removal of these five countries from the list of CPC designations. 

y The military junta that governs Burma uses a pervasive internal security apparatus to 

monitor the activities of all religious organizations. The government imposes restrictions on 

many religious practices, controls and censors all religious publications, and, in some areas 

of the country, forcefully promotes the majority religion over other religions. Members of 

minority religious groups, especially Muslims and Christians, are subjected to serious abuses 

of religious freedom and other human rights; in some areas, children are taken from parents 

and forcibly converted to Buddhism. Military commanders have conscripted religious 

minority members by force as porters, killing some who have refused. 
29

y In China, the government continues to be responsible for pervasive and severe violations 

of religious freedom and related human rights. Every religious community in China is 

subject to restrictions, discrimination, and state control. The most serious religious freedom 

abuses are experienced by Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, Roman Catholics, house 

church and unregistered Protestants, and spiritual groups such as the Falun Gong, abuses 

involving imprisonment, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Though the Chinese 

government issued a new Ordinance on Religion in March 2005, its provisions in fact restrict 

rather than protect religious freedom, offering Party leaders more extensive control over all 

religious groups and their activities. 

y The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and execution of persons based 

primarily or entirely upon the religion of the accused. Over the past year, the Iranian 

government’s poor religious freedom record has deteriorated, particularly for Muslims who 

oppose the regime’s interpretation of Islam, Baha’is, and Christians, all of whom have faced 

intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and imprisonment. Just last month, a Christian 

man faced a second trial before an Islamic court on charges of apostasy, which carries a 

death sentence in Iran. For the first time in many years, the Iranian government has 

confiscated or destroyed Baha’i community property, including holy sites. 

y There are no personal freedoms of any kind in North Korea and no protection for human 

rights. In pursuit of absolute control of all facets of politics and society, the government 

under dictator Kim Jong Il has created an environment of fear in which dissent of any kind is 

not tolerated. Freedom of religion or belief is essentially non-existent, as the government 

severely represses public and private religious activities and has a policy of actively 

discriminating against religious believers. In addition, North Korean refugees report that any 

unauthorized religious activity inside North Korea is met with arrest, imprisonment, torture, 

and sometimes execution by order of the government. The massive human rights abuses of 

the government constitute an enduring security threat on the Korean peninsula. 

y The government of Sudan commits egregious and systematic violations of freedom of 

religion or belief against Christians, Muslims who do not follow the government’s extremist 

interpretation of Islam, and followers of traditional African religions, and has been 

recommended for CPC designation since the Commission’s founding. As a result of the 

government’s policies of Islamization and Arabization, two million people, mostly nonMuslim Africans in southern and central Sudan, died in the now-concluded North-South civil 

war, a conflict in which the Commission identified religious persecution by the government 

to be a major factor. Many of the Commission’s recommendations on U.S. policy toward 

Sudan were taken up by the Bush Administration, including the Administration’s decision to 

give peace in Sudan a higher priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. With the signing of 

comprehensive North-South peace accords during the past year, the conditions for religious 

freedom in certain parts of the country have changed significantly from previous years. The 

Commission’s ongoing concerns are the egregious violations being committed by the 

Sudanese government in the North, and also in the western region of Darfur, where the 

government has exploited ethnic and religious differences in committing abuses against 

African Muslim civilians that the State Department has found to be genocide. 
30

Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea 

In September 2004, Secretary Powell for the first time designated as CPCs Saudi 

Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea. The Department of State’s designation of these three new CPC 

countries followed the Commission’s own recommendations. As with the other five redesignated countries, the Commission determined this year that each of these three newly listed 

countries continues to warrant CPC designation. In the case of all three countries, it is important 

that the U.S. government not erroneously construe certain actions on their part, such as releasing 

a few prisoners while arresting others, issuing ambiguous decrees that are applied restrictively, 

and making as yet unfulfilled promises to the U.S. government, as genuine progress. 

For example, despite the State Department’s contention in the 2004 Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom that there were slight improvements in Saudi government 

efforts to foster religious tolerance in Saudi society, the report again concluded that freedom of 

religion “does not exist” in Saudi Arabia. The Commission concurs, and finds that the 

government of Saudi Arabia not only persists in banning all forms of public religious expression 

other than that of the government’s own interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam, but also 

continues to be involved in financing activities throughout the world that support extreme 

religious intolerance, hatred, and, in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored 

Muslims. The government of Vietnam continues to harass, detain, imprison, and discriminate 

against leaders and practitioners of all religious communities. There is particular concern about 

ongoing pressure on the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam and on Montagnard and Hmong 

Christians, involving harassment, fines, and physical abuse to gain renunciations of faith. The 

government of Eritrea continues to ban the activities of all unregistered religious groups and has 

closed their places of worship. It has arrested participants at prayer meetings and other 

gatherings, and detained members of unregistered churches and other religious activists for long 

periods and without charge. 

Recommendations for Additional CPC Designations 

In addition to the eight countries previously designated last year by Secretary Powell as 

CPCs, the Commission finds that the governments of Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and recommends 

that they be designated as CPCs this year. 

• In Pakistan, the government does not provide an adequate response to vigilante violence 

frequently perpetrated by Sunni Muslim militants against Shi’as, Ahmadis, Hindus, and 

Christians. Discriminatory legislation effectively bans many of the activities of the Ahmadi 

community. Blasphemy allegations, routinely false, result in the lengthy detention, 

imprisonment of, and sometimes violence against, Ahmadis and Christians as well as 

Muslims, some of whom have been sentenced to death. Belated efforts to curb extremism 

through reform of Pakistan’s thousands of Islamic religious schools appear to have had little 

effect thus far, and many of these schools continue to provide ideological training and 

motivation to those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and 

abroad. 
31

• President Saparmurat Niyazov’s monopoly of power and absolute control over Turkmen 

society render any independent religious activity impossible in Turkmenistan, where the 

president is also imposing an increasingly oppressive personality cult that impinges on all 

aspects of public life in the country. It is regrettable that a few insignificant developments 

that in no way change the fundamental absence of religious freedom in Turkmenistan 

repeatedly enable that country to evade the CPC designation it so unequivocally deserves. 

The decree on registration cited in the State Department’s 2004 religious freedom report as 

evidence of “improvement” in fact resulted in the registration of four small groups and even 

they report continued difficulties. It is thus not clear what practical benefits registration 

provides. 

• In addition to a restrictive law on religion that severely limits the ability of religious 

communities to function in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek government continues to exercise a high 

degree of control over the manner in which the Islamic faith is practiced. Uzbek authorities 

also continue to crack down harshly on Muslim individuals, groups, and mosques that do not 

conform to government-prescribed practices or that the government claims are associated 

with extremist political programs. This has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of 

persons in recent years, many of whom are denied the right to due process, and there are 

credible reports that many of those arrested continue to be tortured or beaten in detention. 

Though security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of Hizb ut-Tahrir

and other groups that claim a religious linkage, these threats do not excuse or justify the 

scope and harshness of the government’s ill treatment of religious believers. The 

Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should in no way be construed as a 

defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist and highly intolerant organization that promotes 

hatred against moderate Muslims, the West, Jews, and others. 

Responding to the CPC Designation 

The process of CPC designation as outlined under IRFA, and the implementation of 

meaningful policies in response to such designations, should be considered among the most 

serious actions taken by the U.S. government in its human rights policy. The designation of 

CPCs brings into the spotlight those countries where the most egregious violations take place and 

the exercise of a person’s right to freedom of religion or belief is systematically repressed. The 

designation also guides important decisions in U.S. relations with these countries. 

Under IRFA, however, the simple designation by the U.S. government of a severe 

violator of religious freedom as a CPC is not by itself sufficient action. IRFA makes explicit that 

the policy of the United States must be to take active steps with regard to those countries deemed 

to be particularly severe violators of religious freedom. CPC designation carries an obligation 

that one or more of certain actions specified in Section 405 of IRFA be taken, unless the 

Secretary of State, as the President’s designee, determines that pre-existing sanctions are 

adequate or otherwise waives the requirement.3 If a CPC designee is already subject to ongoing, 

multiple, broad-based sanctions “imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses,” 

 

3

 The authority to make these decisions has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of 

State. 
32

then one or more of these pre-existing sanctions can be designated as meeting the requirements 

of IRFA.4

The CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool. It provides the Secretary of State with 

a range of specific options to take to address serious violations of religious freedom. It does not 

automatically entail sanctions, but requires that the Secretary of State enter into direct 

consultations with a country to find ways to improve the situation. To avoid more punitive 

actions, one policy response under IRFA is for the CPC country to enter into a binding 

agreement with the United States that spells out specific actions the government will take in the 

future to end the violations that gave rise to the designation. 

When used properly, the CPC designation: 

• sends the clear signal that U.S. interests include concern for human rights; 

• starts a dialogue where specific benchmarks on progress are agreed upon in order to avoid 

economic sanctions; 

• allows the Secretary of State in an incremental fashion to employ or use the threat of punitive 

actions to address egregious abuses of religious freedom; and 

• allows the Secretary of State to waive any specific actions if progress is being made toward 

addressing serious violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

Since the passage of IRFA, the Secretary of State has continually named as CPCs Burma, 

China, Iran, North Korea (beginning in 2001), and Sudan, countries that had been, and continue 

to be, subject to multiple sanctions that predate the CPC designation. Regrettably, the only 

official action taken by the U.S. government with respect to those CPCs has been to invoke those 

already existing sanctions, rather than to take additional measures pursuant to IRFA. In previous 

years, as permitted by Section 402 (c)(5) of IRFA, the Secretary has determined that the 

following pre-existing sanctions satisfied the IRFA requirements: 

The U.S. government’s reliance on pre-existing sanctions has provided little incentive for 

those CPC governments to reduce or end egregious violations of religious freedom. While the 

reliance on pre-existing sanctions may be technically correct under the statute, it is unacceptable 

as a matter of policy. The designation of an egregious religious freedom violator as a CPC, 

followed by the implementation of a clear and directed policy response, is an essential tool to 

promote religious freedom, and one explicitly required by IRFA. The failure to take additional 

action under IRFA suggests that nothing further can, or will, be done by the U.S. government 

with respect to those countries that commit severe violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

The Commission has regularly drawn attention to, and expressed strong concern about, this 

failure in U.S. foreign policy. 

 

4

 IRFA § 402(c)(5). 
33

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense 

articles and defense services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms 

Export Control Act. 

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 

101-246: restriction of exports of crime control and detection 

instruments and equipment. 

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security 

assistance. 

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): 

restrictions on normal trade relations and other trade benefits. 

Sudan International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and 

vote of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of 

the International Financial Institutions to or for Sudan. 

 In addition, since the passage of IRFA, the State Department has not made public any 

actions it has taken under IRFA with respect to CPCs, despite provisions in the statute that 

require public dissemination of that information.5 The Commission is also concerned that the 

State Department has not submitted to the Congress the required evaluation of the effectiveness 

of prior actions against CPCs.6

The New CPC Designations: the Need to Take Action 

The recent designation of Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea as CPCs, none of which is 

subject to pre-existing sanctions, provides the U.S. government with an opportunity to respond 

decisively to severe religious freedom violators. According to the statutory requirements of 

IRFA, for these three countries the U.S. government must: (1) request consultations with the 

government on the violations that gave rise to the designation, and consult with humanitarian and 

other U.S. organizations on the potential impact of actions that could be taken; (2) either (a) 

conclude a binding agreement to cease the particularly severe violations, or (b) take an action 

from one of several options specified in the statute (or a “commensurate” action); and (3) report 

to Congress on the action taken. 

 

5

 See IRFA §§102(b)(1)(F)(i) (requiring the executive summary of the State Department’s annual 

report to include a description of actions taken to promote religious freedom and to oppose 

violations thereof), and §408 (generally requiring publication in the Federal Register of a 

description of the actions taken as a result of designation as a CPC). 

6

 See IRFA §§402(c)(4) and 404(a)(1)(B) (requiring the President to submit a report to Congress 

containing, among other information, an evaluation of the impact of the actions taken as a result 

of designation as a CPC).
34

In February 2005, in accordance with its statutory obligations, the Commission wrote to 

Secretary Rice and recommended the following actions by the U.S. government in response to 

the designations of Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea as CPCs. In doing so, the Commission 

emphasized that the recommended actions were only initial steps that should be taken, in concert 

with diplomatic efforts at all levels, to urge the governments of these countries to abide by their 

international human rights commitments and cease severe violations of freedom of religion or 

belief. The Commission also recognized that IRFA authorizes more stringent actions that could 

be taken should severe violations continue. 

With regard to the three new CPC designations, the Commission recommended that the 

U.S. government should: 

Saudi Arabia 

1) identify those Saudi agencies and officials thereof who are responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with 

respect to Saudi Arabia, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Saudi 

government official who was responsible for or directly carried out such violations; 

2) issue a proclamation, under the President’s authority pursuant to section 212(f) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1182(f)), to bar those Saudi government 

officials from entering the United States who have been responsible for propagating 

globally an ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and human rights 

violations; 

3) issue a demarche urging the government of Saudi Arabia to cease funding or other 

support for written materials or other activities that explicitly promote hate, intolerance, 

and human rights violations, including the distribution of such materials in the United 

States and elsewhere outside of Saudi Arabia; and 

4) order the heads of appropriate U.S. agencies, pursuant to section 405(a)(13) of IRFA, not 

to issue any specific licenses and not to grant any other specific authority for the export 

of any item on the U.S. Commerce Control List of dual-use items [Export Administration 

Regulations under part 774 of title 15] to any agency or instrumentality of the 

government of Saudi Arabia that is responsible for committing particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom. In FY 2004, the Commerce Department approved 

approximately $67 million worth of such articles for Saudi Arabia, including, for 

example, thumbcuffs, leg irons, shackles, and other items that could be used to perpetrate 

human rights violations. 

Vietnam 

1) identify those Vietnamese agencies and officials who are responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with 

respect to Vietnam, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any 

Vietnamese government official who was responsible for, or directly carried out, such 

violations; and 
35

2) dedicate no less than $1 million for FY 2005 and FY 2006, if discretionary funds are 

allocated to Vietnam above its annual earmark, to programs that will directly promote 

freedom of religion and belief and related human rights in Vietnam.

Eritrea 

1) engage in vigorous advocacy on religious freedom and other universal human rights at all 

levels of involvement with the government of Eritrea and draw international attention to 

religious freedom abuses in Eritrea, including in multilateral fora such as the United 

Nations Commission on Human Rights; and 

2) conduct a review of U.S. development assistance to Eritrea with the aim of redirecting 

such assistance to programs that contribute directly to democracy, human rights, and the 

rule of law. Increases in other forms of development assistance should depend on 

measurable improvements in religious freedom. 

 Although the IRFA legislation allows the President to waive the taking of any action in 

response to the CPC designations, the Commission firmly expressed to Secretary Rice that to do 

so would effectively render meaningless the IRFA process and undermine our nation’s 

commitment to the promotion of freedom of religion or belief throughout the world. To maintain 

the integrity of the process and the principle, a stronger response, as outlined in IRFA, is 

essential. 

The Delay in Responding 

As of the time this report went to print, the deadline had passed for the United States to 

take action on the CPC designation of Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea. IRFA requires that 

the President not only name those countries that are the most egregious violators of religious 

freedom, as occurred last September, but also take specific policy actions within 180 days. 

When that deadline was reached on March 15, 2005, the State Department announced that it had 

asked Congress for “a little extra time,” noting that there had been “real engagement” with Saudi 

Arabia. However, the Commission had seen no evidence of genuine progress with regard to 

freedom of religion or belief in any of these countries. By taking timely action on Saudi Arabia, 

Vietnam, and Eritrea, the U.S. government had an opportunity, in one small but critical way, to 

make President Bush’s words in his second inaugural address about promoting peace through 

spreading freedom a reality. The persistent delays in the process have served only to signal that 

the U.S. government does not take seriously its stated—and mandated—commitment to promote 

religious freedom and other human rights throughout the world. 

Commission Watch List 

In addition to its CPC recommendations, the Commission has established a Watch List of 

countries where religious freedom conditions do not rise to the statutory level requiring CPC 

designation but which require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations of 

religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments. Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, 

Indonesia, and Nigeria remain on the Commission’s Watch List, and Bangladesh has been 

added this year. The Commission is concerned about the serious abuses in these countries, and 
36

by the fact that the governments of these countries have either not halted repression and/or 

violence against persons amounting to severe violations of freedom of religion, or failed to 

punish those responsible for perpetrating those acts. 

Government authorities in Belarus persist in enforcing the harsh 2002 law on religion, 

resulting in calculated serious regulatory obstacles and bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the 

activities of many religious communities. Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly 

controlled in Cuba, where religious freedom conditions have been affected in part by the 

ongoing government crackdown on democracy and free speech activists, resulting in a generally 

deteriorating situation. The Commission traveled to Egypt last year and found that serious 

problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations against members of 

religious minorities, including non-conforming Muslims, remain widespread. In Indonesia, 

though the situation has improved since 2002, the Commission continues to be concerned about 

ongoing sectarian violence and the Indonesian government’s inability or unwillingness to hold 

those responsible to account. The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent religious 

freedom concerns continues to be inadequate, particularly with regard to an ongoing series of 

violent communal conflicts along religious lines, the controversy over the expansion of sharia 

(Islamic law) in the criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states, and discrimination against 

minority communities of Christians and Muslims. Finally, in Bangladesh, the Commission is 

concerned that democratic institutions and constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion are 

threatened by religious extremism and by the country’s chronic political strife. Islamic militants 

have been implicated in violent attacks on politicians, members of religious minorities, 

particularly Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, authors who promote different interpretations of 

Islam, and non-governmental institutions. The perpetrators of these crimes have largely gone 

unpunished. 

Changes in Recommended Status 

Significant developments affecting freedom of religion or belief have taken place in 

India in the past year, and the Commission no longer recommends that it be designated a CPC. 

The May 2004 parliamentary elections resulted in a defeat for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, 

or BJP, a political party associated with a group of Hindu extremist nationalist organizations that 

had been implicated in growing violence against religious minorities in the country and the 

killing of as many as 2,000 Muslims in the state of Gujarat in 2002. India’s Supreme Court has 

taken significant steps designed to bring to justice those responsible for the violence in Gujarat. 

The new government has pledged to reject any kind of religious intolerance and return the 

country to its pluralistic traditions; proposed a law to halt and criminalize inter-religious 

violence; and taken immediate steps to remove the religiously intolerant portions of school 

textbooks issued by the BJP government. Despite these improvements, concerns about religious 

freedom in India remain, particularly indications that attacks on Christian churches and 

individuals persist, without adequate prosecution. The Commission will continue to monitor the 

situation in India to determine if the new government carries out its efforts to counteract the 

lately prevailing climate of hostility against religious minorities. 

In light of recent developments, the Commission is also removing Laos and Georgia

from its Watch List. The government of Laos, responding to the concerns of the international 

community as well as of the Commission, has taken a number of steps in the past 18 months to 
37

address religious freedom abuses, including the re-opening of most of its closed churches, a 

public denunciation of official campaigns of forced renunciation of faith, and the release of 

almost all religious prisoners. In Georgia, the number of reported incidents of violence against 

minority religious communities has markedly decreased since the fall of the Shevardnadze 

government in late 2003. In addition, the sentencing in January 2005 of two of the leaders of this 

vigilante violence indicates that the current government has begun to hold the perpetrators to 

account. Nonetheless, concerns about religious freedom in both of these countries persist. 

Previous restrictions on religious practice put in place by the Lao government could easily 

reemerge, and the Georgian government’s determination to pursue the perpetrators of vigilante 

violence could fade. The Commission will thus maintain its scrutiny of the situation in both 

these countries to determine whether developments continue to move in a positive direction or if 

a return to the Watch List is warranted. 

Summaries of conditions in all of the countries discussed in this chapter, as well as the 

Commission’s policy recommendations, can be found in the country chapters of this report. 
38
39

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA 

Eritrea 

The government of Eritrea engages in particularly severe violations of freedom of 

religion or belief. It has banned public religious activities by all religious groups that are not 

officially recognized, closed their places of worship, inordinately delayed action on registration 

applications by religious groups, arrested participants at prayer meetings and other gatherings, 

detained members of unregistered churches and other religious activists indefinitely and without 

charge, mistreated or even tortured some religious detainees, and severely punished armed forces 

members and national service inductees for possession of religious literature, including Bibles. 

In February 2004, the Commission recommended that the State Department designate Eritrea a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department acted on that recommendation, 

designating Eritrea a CPC in September 2004. The Commission continues to recommend that 

Eritrea be named a CPC. 

The Eritrean government officially recognizes the Orthodox Church of Eritrea, Sunni 

Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Lutheran-affiliated Evangelical Church of Eritrea. 

Although there is no state religion, the government has close ties to the Orthodox Church and is 

suspicious of newer groups—in particular, Protestant Evangelical, Pentecostal, and other 

Christian denominations not traditional to Eritrea. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses were the first religious group to experience the Eritrean 

government’s harsh policies. Negative official and popular views about Jehovah’s Witnesses 

developed as a result of their refusal to take part in the 1993 independence referendum or to 

serve obligatory tours of military service, for which the Eritrean government has provided no 

alternate service. Jehovah’s Witnesses experience official harassment, including prolonged 

detention for refusing military service. The President has ordered that Jehovah’s Witnesses be 

dismissed from government jobs, as well as denied a range of important government services, 

including business licenses, national identity cards, marriage licenses, passports, and exit 

permits. Some Jehovah’s Witnesses who have refused to serve in the military have been 

imprisoned without trial for a decade; others cannot graduate from secondary school, as the 

curriculum includes a mandatory military training component. 

Relations among the four government-recognized religious communities are generally 

good. In recent years, however, Protestant Evangelical, charismatic, and Pentecostal churches 

have faced societal and government pressure. The Orthodox Church has publicly expressed 

concern about the growth of denominations it views as heretical, and the loss, particularly of its 

younger members, to them. The government has restricted foreign faith-based humanitarian 

organizations, apparently fearing the destabilizing effect of proselytism by outside groups, both 

Christian and Muslim. Government spokespersons have cited Pentecostals, along with extremist 

Islamist groups, as threats to national security. There are reports that Islamic militants, allegedly 

backed by Sudan, have indeed engaged in terrorism in a campaign to establish an Islamic state in 

Eritrea. None of the suspect Christian groups is known to have engaged in or to have advocated 

violence. 
40

In 2002, the government imposed a registration requirement on religious groups. Each 

group applying for approval was required to provide detailed financial and membership 

information, as well as background on its presence in Eritrea. Exempted from the new 

requirements for registration were the four “sanctioned” faiths. By stipulating that there could be 

no public religious activities pending registration, the decree closed places of worship and 

prohibited public religious activities, including worship services, of all other religious 

communities in Eritrea. To date, no other religious groups have gained government registration, 

even though some groups submitted applications over two years ago, with the result that all 

except the four government-sanctioned religious groups operate without a legal basis. Jehovah’s 

Witnesses were not among the groups offered the opportunity to register. 

As part of the campaign against the religious activities of those persons not belonging to 

officially recognized religious denominations, Eritrean security forces have disrupted private 

worship, conducted mass arrests of participants at prayer meetings and other gatherings, and 

detained those arrested without charge for indefinite periods of time. Hundreds of members of 

unregistered churches are believed to be detained at any given time, typically without charges, 

even for extended periods. Among those detained have been elderly individuals and persons in 

poor health. In recent months, following Eritrea’s designation as a CPC, the government’s 

religious crack-down has intensified with a series of arrests and detentions of clergy and 

hundreds of others. Among those arrested were individuals whom Commission staff met during 

a visit in October 2004. There are credible reports that the security forces have used coercion on 

detainees to secure repudiation of their faith. Mistreatment of some religious detainees has 

reportedly included beatings and torture. Almost all allegations of religious freedom violations 

by international human rights or advocacy groups are routinely denied or ignored by the Eritrean 

authorities, who have not permitted investigations by these organizations. 

Government violations of religious freedom are alleged to be particularly severe in the 

armed forces. During the war with Ethiopia, many Eritrean soldiers accepted various forms of 

Protestantism, reportedly alarming government officials and leading to the banning of prayer 

meetings among armed forces members. Attendance at such meetings is punishable by 

imprisonment. Moreover, armed forces members and national service inductees reportedly face 

severe punishment for possession of religious literature, including Bibles. 

During the past year, the Commission met on a number of occasions with State 

Department personnel, Eritrean diplomats, and religious community representatives regarding 

religious freedom in Eritrea. In October 2004, concerned about mounting reports of religious 

freedom abuses, the Commission sent a staff delegation to Eritrea. During a six-day visit, the 

delegation discussed the religious freedom situation in formal meetings with senior Eritrean 

government officials, leaders of the four major faiths sanctioned by the Eritrean government, as 

well as with unregistered religious groups, representatives of non-governmental organizations, 

United Nations personnel, and members of the U.S. and foreign diplomatic communities. In a 

January 2005 letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Commission commended the 

Administration for Eritrea’s designation as a CPC and recommended subsequent actions that the 

Administration should take, in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 

in response to that designation. 
41

As a consequence of the designation of Eritrea as a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• engage in vigorous advocacy on religious freedom and other universal human rights at all 

levels of involvement with the government of Eritrea and draw international attention to 

religious freedom abuses there, including in multilateral fora such as the United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights; and 

• conduct a review of development assistance to Eritrea with the aim of redirecting such 

assistance to programs that contribute directly to democracy, human rights, and the rule of 

law; increases in other forms of development assistance should depend on measurable 

improvements in religious freedom. 

With regard to religious freedom conditions in Eritrea, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• urge the government of Eritrea to undertake the following actions to improve respect for 

religious freedom in that country: 

--implementation of the Constitution’s existing guarantees of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion, including the freedom to practice any religion and to manifest 

such practice; 

--institution of a registration process for religious groups that is transparent, nondiscriminatory, not overly burdensome, and otherwise in accordance with international 

standards; 

--prompt registration of those religious groups that comply with the requirements issued in 

2002; religious groups should not be required to provide identifying information on 

individual members; 

--official, public action by Eritrean authorities to permit religious groups to resume their 

public religious activities pending registration, including reopening of places of worship 

closed by the ban in 2002; 

--issuance of a public order to the security forces reminding them that religious practice is 

not to be interfered with except in those circumstances permitted by international law; 

--release of detainees held solely on account of their peaceful religious activities; and 

--increased engagement by the Eritrean authorities with the international community 

regarding respect for freedom of religion or belief, including by making an official 

invitation for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and 

by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. 

• encourage unofficial dialogue with Eritreans on religious freedom issues, specifically by: 
42

--the promotion of a visit to Eritrea by U.S. leaders concerned with freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief in order to meet with Eritrean authorities and other 

opinion-makers and to facilitate dialogue among all Eritrea’s religious communities; 

--the expanded use of educational and cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, 

the International Visitor Program, and lectures by visiting American scholars and experts, 

in order to introduce more Eritreans to the workings and benefits of societies in which 

religious freedom and other human rights are respected; and 

--support for a conference that would bring together international experts, government 

officials, and representatives of international organizations, religious communities, and 

civil society to discuss international human rights standards and best practices related to 

a) the registration of religious organizations and b) conscientious objection to military 

service; 

• seek the cooperation of other countries in promoting greater understanding by Eritreans of 

international standards regarding freedom of religion or belief; 

• support, and offer to provide funding for, the creation of an independent human rights 

commission in Eritrea, in line with the Paris Principles1

 for such organizations, including 

independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad mandate that 

includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief; and 

• intensify international efforts to resolve the current impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia 

regarding implementation of the boundary demarcation as determined by the “final and 

binding” decision of the International Boundary Commission established following the 1998-

2000 war. 

Nigeria 

The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent religious freedom concerns in 

that country continues to be inadequate. These concerns include an ongoing series of violent 

communal conflicts along religious lines; the controversy over the expansion of sharia (Islamic 

law) into the criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states; and discrimination against 

minority communities of Christians and Muslims. In addition, there are increasing reports of 

foreign sources of funding and support for Islamic extremist activities in northern Nigeria, 

activities that threaten to fracture already fragile relations between the two main religious groups. 

Nigeria remains on the Commission’s Watch List and the Commission continues to monitor the 

actions of the Nigerian government to determine if the situation rises to a level warranting 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. In August 2004, the Commission 

 

1

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and 

Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for 

the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed January 31, 2005). 
43

released a Policy Focus on Nigeria, containing recommendations for the President, Secretary of 

State, and Congress. 

Over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience incidents of violent communal 

conflict along religious and ethnic lines, which are often intertwined, as well as pervasive 

mistrust among religious and ethnic communities. The popular movement in 12 northern 

Nigerian states to expand the legal application of sharia to criminal matters has continued to 

spark communal violence and is an ongoing source of volatility and tension between Muslims 

and Christians at both the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of Muslim-Christian 

violence in the last few years threaten to divide further the populace along religious lines and to 

undermine the democratic transition and the foundations of freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief in Nigeria. Social, economic, and political conditions have not improved in the 

country, fostering a climate of even greater tension among ethnic and religious communities. 

Since President Olusegun Obasanjo came to power through popular elections in 1999, 

more than 10,000 Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and communal attacks and reprisals 

between Muslims and Christians. The most serious of these clashes have occurred in Kaduna 

state (February and May 2000); Jos, Plateau state (September 2001); Kaduna state (November 

2002); and most recently in Kano state and Yelwa, Plateau state (February-May 2004). Ethnic 

and religious violence continued in 2004 and into the early part of 2005. 

In the past year, hundreds of people have been killed, and dozens of churches and 

mosques destroyed, in communal violence in several towns and villages in the Middle Belt 

region and northern Nigeria. In February and March 2004 in particular, violence and reprisal 

attacks between Christians and Muslims in Plateau state in the Middle Belt resulted in the deaths 

of several hundred people. The violence reached its peak in May when a mainly Christian militia 

from a nearby town in Plateau state killed more than 500 predominantly Muslim Hausa/Fulani 

residents in Yelwa village. A week later in Kano state, Muslims staged a peaceful rally 

protesting the violence against Muslims in Plateau state. When unemployed Muslim youth 

began vandalizing businesses belonging to Christians, mob violence erupted in which more than 

300 Muslims and Christians were killed. That same month, after the violence subsided, 

President Obasanjo suspended the governor of Plateau state for six months and declared a state 

of emergency. In November, the state of emergency was lifted and relative calm has followed. 

President Obasanjo has been criticized both inside and outside Nigeria for not responding 

more decisively to religious violence and the communal tensions brought about by the sharia 

controversy. He has primarily played a mediating role, stressing political negotiations rather 

than ordering the government to intervene to stop or prevent further violence. Moreover, many 

Christians and Muslims have been identified as perpetrators of violence over the years, but very 

few, if any, have been prosecuted or brought to justice. However, in May 2004, President 

Obasanjo for the first time responded directly to sectarian killings by declaring a state of 

emergency in Plateau state after violence erupted there. 

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian states have extended or announced plans to 

expand the application of sharia in the state’s criminal law. Although the particulars vary from 

state to state, each has adopted, or reportedly plans to adopt, a sharia-based penal code and 

provisions to extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts beyond personal status matters to include 
44

sharia crimes and punishments for Muslims only. Punishments include amputation, flogging, or 

death by stoning, oftentimes after trials that fall short of basic international legal standards. 

Defendants have limited rights of appeal and sometimes no legal representation. Women have 

faced particular discrimination under sharia, especially in adultery cases where pregnancy alone 

has been used as adequate evidence of guilt, and allegations of rape and sexual violence are 

rarely investigated by judges. Some states have instituted or tolerated, as a result of these 

imposed codes, discriminatory practices disadvantaging women in education, health care, and 

public transportation. 

There have been several cases in which sharia courts have handed down sentences of 

death by stoning to Muslims for various offenses. In 2003, some high profile cases involving 

sentences of death by stoning were overturned and thrown out on appeal; stoning sentences 

remain in several other cases pending appeal. No stoning punishments have been carried out as 

of the time of this report. There have been sentences involving amputation and flogging carried 

out in recent years, although no amputations have taken place in the past year. Sharia 

punishments such as death by stoning and amputation have been topics of a national debate in 

recent years on whether these punishments constitute torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

under the Nigerian Constitution. The UN Committee Against Torture, as well as the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation do constitute inhuman or 

degrading treatment under international human rights standards and treaties.

In addition to the sharia controversy and the violence it has incited, Nigeria is plagued by 

a number of other serious problems regarding freedom of religion or belief. Christians in the 

northern states complain of what they view as discrimination at the hands of Muslim-controlled 

governments and describe their communities as having the status of “second class citizens.” 

Most complaints predate the recent initiatives regarding sharia, and include allegations of official 

discrimination in the denial of applications to build or repair religious institutions, access to 

education and state-run media, representation in government bodies, and government 

employment. Muslim communities in southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small fraction 

of the population, echo some of the complaints of minority Christian communities in northern 

Nigeria. Southern Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the 

media, education, and representation in government institutions. Although proselytizing is 

permitted by the Constitution, several northern states continue to ban some public religious 

activities to address public safety and security concerns. 

Over the past few years, there have been an increasing number of small, vocal Muslim 

groups in northern Nigerian that advocate strict application of sharia, and which, some argue, are 

helping create a haven for radical Islamic militants from outside Nigeria. Though not organized 

as a nationwide movement, some of these groups advocate a more forcible Islamization of all of 

Nigerian society, regardless of religious affiliation. In late 2003 and early 2004, a wave of 

extremist activities, including attacks on police stations and churches, resulted in at least 18 

deaths in Yobe state in northeastern Nigeria. A group of about 200 young militants killed two 

policemen and seized guns and ammunition. Police responded by killing dozens of militants. A 

UN press report stated that a Sudanese man was arrested for spearheading the insurrection and 

that the Islamic foundation he headed, which builds new mosques in Nigeria, was funded by 

Saudi nationals. The man who heads the militant group reportedly fled to Saudi Arabia. Similar 
45

militant activity, resulting in more than a dozen deaths and kidnappings of Christians, continued 

in September and November 2004 in Borno and Jigawa states. 

Several observers inside and outside Nigeria have reported that financial support from 

Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan has been the most visible in helping build mosques and Islamic 

religious schools in northern Nigeria. Some have suggested that the strict interpretation of 

Islamic theory and practices being preached in these mosques and religious schools is not a form 

of Islam that is traditional to Nigeria. Also, there are reports that an increasing number of 

Nigerian Islamic scholars and clerics are being trained in Saudi Arabia and have brought back 

with them a politico-religious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred of, and violence against, 

non-Muslims. 

The Commission has traveled twice to Nigeria, most recently in August 2003. In 

addition, throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted personal interviews with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in 

Nigeria, as well as human rights organizations, academics, and other Nigeria experts. 

In May 2004, the Commission released a public statement strongly condemning the 

sectarian violence occurring in Plateau and Kano states, which had claimed hundreds of lives. 

The Commission urged the U.S. government to press President Obasanjo to expand efforts by the 

Nigerian government to address sectarian violence in order to prevent further killings and to 

advance protections of the constitutionally guaranteed human rights of all Nigerian citizens, 

including religious freedom. The Commission also urged the U.S. government to encourage the 

Nigerian government to examine the impact of sharia in exacerbating the sectarian violence. 

In August 2004, the Commission issued a Policy Focus on Nigeria, which included 

recommendations for the U.S. government in relation to communal and sectarian violence, the 

expansion of sharia law in the north, discrimination against religious minorities, and increasing 

Islamic extremist activity. In March 2005, a Commission representative testified at a Staff 

Briefing of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on “Nigeria: Crises of Religion and 

Resource Control.” 

With regard to Nigeria, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• urge the Nigerian government to address the sharia controversy, oppose religious extremism, 

and hold accountable perpetrators of religious violence by: 

--ensuring that sharia criminal codes do not apply to non-Muslims or to individual Muslims 

who do not wish to go before sharia courts, and preventing law enforcement activities in 

northern states by any quasi-official or private corps of sharia enforcers; 

--ensuring that sharia codes, where applied, do not result in violations of international 

human rights standards with regard to freedom of religion or belief, due process of law, 

equal treatment before the law, freedom of expression, and discriminatory practices 

against women; 
46

-- identifying, publicizing, and countering foreign sources of religious extremism as part of 

its counter-terrorism efforts; to assist in this effort, the U.S. government should include 

Nigeria in its Pan-Sahel initiative, a U.S. military training partnership with four Saharan 

African nations fostering anti-terrorist and anti-extremist cooperation among countries of 

North and West Africa; 

--taking effective steps to prevent and contain acts of sectarian and communal violence, 

prevent reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for such violence to justice; 

--ceasing immediately any official support for the so-called “religious police,” or Hisbah, 

and ensuring that state governments make greater efforts to halt the activities of these 

vigilante groups, including prosecuting those found to have taken the law into their own 

hands;

• expand U.S. presence and outreach efforts, primarily in northern Nigeria by: 

--opening a consulate or other official presence in Kano, or elsewhere in the north; 

--providing adequate Embassy and Consulate staff with appropriate local language skills, 

and require political and public affairs officers to regularly travel throughout Nigeria; 

--increasing the capacity of the Hausa Service of the Voice of America to report fair and 

balanced views on communal conflict and human rights; 

--expand in northern Nigeria the American Corners program; and 

--sponsor several exchange programs each year on the topics of freedom of religion or 

belief, religious tolerance, and Islamic law and human rights, targeting religious leaders, 

human rights advocates, government officials, and northern Nigerians; 

• expand U.S. support for communal conflict prevention and mitigation, through U.S. foreign 

assistance programs or otherwise, by identifying and supporting: 

--Nigerian non-governmental organizations working on communal conflict prevention and 

mitigation, emphasizing capacity-building at the local level; 

--human rights defenders, including legal aid groups that defend the constitutional and 

internationally-recognized rights of individuals, especially women, impacted by shariabased criminal codes; 

--human rights defenders responding to credible allegations of religious discrimination in 

any part of Nigeria; 

--funds for the expansion of training for the Nigerian federal police in human rights 

protection; 
47

--programs and institutions, particularly where communal violence has occurred, that 

promote objective, unbiased, and non-inflammatory reporting, consistent with the right to 

freedom of expression; and 

--the expansion of Nigeria’s Inter-Religious Council, formed to promote dialogue between 

Christians and Muslims, and replicate the Council at the state and local levels. 

Sudan 

The government of Sudan commits egregious and systematic violations of freedom of 

religion or belief in the Northern part of the country, in the Western region of Darfur, and in 

other areas under its control, particularly against Christians, Muslims who do not follow the 

government’s extreme interpretation of Islam, and followers of traditional African religions. 

Due to the ongoing severe human rights violations committed by the government throughout 

much of the country, the Commission continues to recommend that Sudan be named a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has repeatedly adopted the Commission’s 

recommendation that Sudan be designated a CPC. 

The signing of comprehensive North-South peace accords provides new opportunities for 

promoting human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, in Sudan. The U.S. government 

must act decisively to advance respect for human rights throughout Sudan, as respect for human 

rights is crucial to securing lasting peace. 

In the past, the Commission has identified Sudan as the world’s most violent abuser of 

the right to freedom of religion and belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese government’s 

genocidal atrocities against civilian populations. As a result of the government’s policies of 

Islamization and Arabization, two million people, mostly non-Muslims in southern and central 

Sudan, died in the now-concluded North-South civil war. With the signing of comprehensive 

North-South peace accords during the past year, the conditions for religious freedom in certain 

parts of the country have changed significantly from previous years. However, the Commission 

continues to be seriously concerned over severe human rights violations being committed by the 

Sudanese government in other regions of the country, including against both non-Muslims and 

Muslims who dissent from the government’s interpretation of Islam, as well as in the Western 

region of Darfur, where the State Department has determined that acts of genocide have taken 

place and may continue to be occurring. In addition, despite the signing of the North-South 

peace accords, continued attention and monitoring by the United States and the international 

community are necessary to ensure that the terms of the accords are implemented. 

Following prolonged negotiations, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Movement/Army formally ended 23 years of conflict with the signing of 

comprehensive peace accords on January 9, 2005. The peace accords affirmed a series of prior 

agreements, including the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, which established a number of 

principles regarding freedom of religion or belief, and the Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 

2004, which addresses a number of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Protocol on 

Power-Sharing states explicitly that “The Republic of Sudan, including all levels of Government 

throughout the country, shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human 
48

rights treaties to which it is or becomes a party.” The rights specified in the Machakos and 

Power-Sharing Protocols are supposed to be reflected in a new permanent national constitution. 

Under the terms of the peace accord, at the end of a six-year interim period, a popular 

referendum will be held on whether the South will remain within Sudan or become 

independent. Until the permanent national constitution is adopted, Sudan will be under an 

interim constitution, a draft of which is expected shortly. 

Peace efforts have brought improvement in human rights conditions in the South and in 

the Nuba Mountains. In the Western region of Darfur, however, since 2003, government forces 

and “Janjaweed” (government-backed militia from Arab tribes) have employed abusive tactics 

and brutal violence against African Muslim civilians, tactics similar to those used previously 

against non-Muslim Africans during the North-South civil war. The government has exploited 

ethnic and religious differences in the Darfur conflict, consistent with its continuing coercive 

policies of Arabization and Islamization. Serious human rights abuses have included aerial 

bombardment of civilians, forced starvation as the result of deliberate denial of international 

humanitarian assistance, and the forcible displacement of civilian populations. 

Following a visit to Sudan in June 2004, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 

Summary or Arbitrary Executions reported that “it is beyond doubt that the Government of 

Sudan is responsible for extrajudicial and summary executions of large numbers of people over 

the last several months in the Darfur region” and “the current humanitarian disaster unfolding in 

Darfur, for which the Government is largely responsible, has put millions of civilians at risk, and 

it is very likely that many will die in the months to come as a result of starvation and disease.” 

The report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, issued in January 2005, 

“established that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious 

violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 

international law.” To date, efforts by the United Nations and the African Union to protect 

Darfur’s civilian population have been wholly inadequate; the general protection of civilians is 

not a part of the mandate of the African Union forces in Darfur. With villages destroyed and 

lives at risk from further attack by government-supported Arab militiamen, many civilians 

remain in camps, unable to return home to raise crops and thus end their dependence upon 

international humanitarian assistance. 

The perpetrators of these crimes, both members of the Sudanese armed forces and allied 

militias, have acted with impunity. This lack of accountability and the persistent use of such 

methods by the government of Sudan raise serious questions about the government’s 

commitment to abide by the terms of the peace accords. Close U.S. monitoring of compliance, 

and sanctions for non-compliance, will be necessary to ensure a just and lasting peace. 

Actions by the government of Sudan against its own citizens have been repeatedly 

condemned as genocide. In the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Congress found that the Sudanese 

government had committed acts of genocide during the civil war. By concurrent resolution in 

July 2004, Congress found the atrocities being committed in Darfur to constitute genocide. In 

congressional testimony delivered in September 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced that 

the State Department “had concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the 

government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may still be 

continuing.” In a statement issued by the White House the same day, President Bush urged the 
49

international community to work with the United States to prevent and suppress acts of genocide 

in Darfur and called on the United Nations to undertake a full investigation. 

The government’s genocidal actions stem from a policy of the governing elite in 

Khartoum to advance an Arab and Muslim identity in all parts of Sudan. This policy effectively 

relegates non-Arabs and non-Muslims to a secondary status and, moreover, conflicts with the 

reality that Sudan is a religiously diverse country with a large minority of Christians and 

followers of traditional African beliefs, as well as Muslims from a variety of Islamic traditions. 

Opposition to this coercive policy has fueled support for armed resistance by non-Muslim and 

non-Arab populations in the South, the Nuba Mountains, and elsewhere. During the North-South 

civil war, the current regime in particular used appeals to Islam, including calls by senior 

government officials for “jihad,” to mobilize northern Muslim opinion. Religious incitement by 

government officials contributed to the horrific human rights abuses perpetrated by government 

security forces and government-backed militias. 

In the areas under its control, the government of Sudan continues severely and 

systematically to violate the religious freedom of Christians and followers of traditional African 

religions, as well as of Muslims who are associated with opposition groups or who dissent from 

the government’s interpretation of Islam. The government’s policies of Islamization and 

Arabization result in severe violations and discrimination against non-Muslims and non-Arabic 

speakers. In government-controlled areas, Muslims are reported to receive preferential access to 

limited government services and preferential treatment in court cases involving Muslim against 

non-Muslim. Public religious expression and persuasion of non-Muslims by Muslims is allowed, 

but that of Muslims by non-Muslims is forbidden. Conversion from Islam is a crime punishable 

by death. In practice, suspected converts are reportedly subjected to intense scrutiny, 

intimidation, and torture by government security personnel who act with impunity. Corporal 

punishments adopted from sharia, Islamic law, are sometimes imposed on non-Muslims and on 

Muslims who did not traditionally follow such practices. Government approval is required for 

the construction and use of places of worship. Although permits are routinely granted to build 

mosques, permission to build churches is routinely denied. For over 30 years, the government 

has denied permission to construct Roman Catholic churches in areas under its control. 

During the North-South civil war, some children from non-Muslim families captured and 

sold into slavery by pro-government militias were reportedly forced to convert to Islam. Reports 

continue of coerced conversion in government-controlled camps for internally displaced persons, 

as well as among prison inmates, Popular Defense Force trainees, and children in camps for 

vagrant minors. The government has also allegedly tolerated the use of humanitarian assistance 

to induce conversion to Islam. In government-controlled areas, children who have been 

abandoned or whose parentage is unknown are considered by the government to be Muslims and 

may not be adopted by non-Muslims. 

The Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward 

Sudan, including that the U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent individual to bring 

about a peaceful and just settlement of the war in Sudan. In September 2001, President Bush 

appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, energizing the 

Sudan peace process. Other U.S. actions followed Commission recommendations, including the 

Administration’s decisions to give peace in Sudan a higher priority on its foreign policy agenda, 
50

engage actively to move the warring parties toward peace, monitor progress toward 

implementation of a series of partial and preliminary peace agreements, and use U.S. assistance 

more effectively in alleviating the suffering of the Sudanese people and in aiding development in 

southern Sudan. The Commission’s consistent advocacy of strong U.S. pressure on the 

Khartoum regime, including economic sanctions, was also reflected in the Comprehensive Peace 

in Sudan Act of 2004, signed by President Bush on December 23, 2004. 

In addition to recommending that Sudan be designated a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should remain engaged at the highest levels in bringing 

about a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan through: 

Efforts to build on the peace accords and to protect civilian populations, including by 

• closely monitoring compliance with and implementation of the peace accords and continuing 

to urge compliance by the government of Sudan with Security Council Resolutions 

addressing the conflict in Darfur; 

• supporting a stronger United Nations and African Union presence in Sudan sufficient to 

protect civilian populations and monitor compliance with the peace accords and Security 

Council resolutions, including by 

--urging the expansion of the African Union's mandate in Darfur to explicitly include active 

protection of civilians and preventative protection; 

--providing resources such as improved communications equipment, reliable vehicles and 

helicopters, and logistics assistance to enable African Union troops to move quickly to 

places where abuses are occurring; 

--bringing in advisors on civilian protection issues in armed conflict to train and work with 

African Union commanders; 

--ensuring that there is a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the 

return of refugees and the internally displaced; providing an early warning system with 

GPS capability to warn camps and villages of approaching forces; 

--supporting the assignment of designated protection teams to camps for internally 

displaced persons; 

--supporting the active enforcement of the aerial "no fly" zone already specified in Security 

Council Resolution 1591 of March 29, 2005, which calls for the immediate cessation of 

“offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region;” 

--taking measures to prevent—and providing aid to those victimized by—

widespread sexual violence and rape in Darfur, including by training advisors for 

the African Union mission and encouraging the African Union to include female troops 

and female police officers in their deployment to handle rape cases effectively; and 
51

--supporting a substantial increase in the number of human rights monitors from the Office 

of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and in the number of African Union 

troops deployed in Darfur; 

• holding the government of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 

(SPLM/A), and officials at all levels of administration accountable for violations of the peace 

accords, including by mandating UN and African Union monitors to take the names and 

other information about attacking forces and report them to central command for 

consideration regarding possible future prosecutions;

• prevailing upon the government of Sudan to provide needed humanitarian access to 

international relief organizations; 

• continuing efforts to aid the suffering civilian population of Darfur, including by seeking an 

end to killing, to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement, and to Sudanese government 

impediments to the distribution of international humanitarian assistance; assisting refugees 

and internally displaced persons to return home in safety; and promoting a ceasefire as well 

as a peaceful and just resolution of the grievances that underlie the crisis; 

• dispersing funds quickly for humanitarian purposes, to build civil society, and to promote 

economic development in southern Sudan; 

• urging the Sudanese authorities to cooperate with the international prosecution of those 

accused of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in connection 

with the events in Darfur since July 1, 2002, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 

1593 of March 31, 2005; and 

• continuing to keep in place existing sanctions on Sudan pending the cessation of particularly 

severe violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief and the resolution of the 

situation in Darfur.

Efforts to promote respect for international human rights, including by 

• ensuring that universal human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, are guaranteed 

in Sudan’s new constitution and subsequently implemented in all parts of Sudan; 

• urging the government of Sudan to (a) allow all religious groups to conduct their activities 

freely; (b) ensure that all religious groups are free to build, repair, and operate houses of 

worship and social service ministries without delay or harassment; and (c) repeal any laws 

that punish changing one’s faith or encouraging another to do so; 

• urging the government of Sudan to ensure that (1) Islamic law, sharia, (a) is not applied to 

non-Muslims or to individual Muslims who do not wish to be subject to sharia; (b) does not 

result, in practice, in violations of international human rights standards with regard to 

freedom of religion or belief, due process of law, or freedom of expression; and (c) does not 

violate the right of women to equal treatment before the law, and that (2) all individuals are 
52

protected against coercion by quasi-official or private groups purporting to enforce sharia or 

Islamic social norms; 

• insisting that national institutions such as the military, law enforcement, and the highest level 

of the judiciary be representative of and equally protective of all Sudanese regardless of 

religious affiliation; 

• supporting the Human Rights Commission mandated by the peace accords and urging that it 

meet international standards for such organizations in terms of a broad mandate, 

independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and fair application of human 

rights protections for all; 

• building upon the work of the International Eminent Persons Group to end enslavement that 

followed abduction by government-sponsored militias and to ensure the voluntary 

repatriation and family reunification of all victims; 

• working to increase reporting on human rights abuses in Sudan, including through the media, 

and to promote grassroots reconciliation among Sudanese; 

• providing adequate staffing in the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum and in any new constituent 

posts, such as may be established in the South, for monitoring and reporting issues relating to 

religious freedom and other universal human rights and for the promotion of these rights; and 

• appointing a high-ranking official to the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum to advance human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 
 

53

COUNTRY REPORTS: EAST ASIA 

Burma 

Serious human rights abuses perpetuated by Burma’s military regime continue to be 

widespread, including systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom. According to 

the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Burmese 

government's extremely poor human rights record deteriorated even further in the past year. 

Since its inception, the Commission has recommended that Burma be designated a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has followed this recommendation and 

consistently named Burma a CPC. 

The military junta that governs Burma, the State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), uses a pervasive internal security apparatus to monitor the activities of all religious 

organizations. The government imposes restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and 

censors all religious publications, and, in some areas of the country, forcefully promotes 

conversion to Buddhism from other religions. 

The SPDC is locked in a decades-long conflict with the pro-democracy opposition in the 

cities and armed ethnic minorities in the countryside. There have been some attempts to reach 

peace accords with armed militias in the last year. However, the military junta remains 

suspicious of all organized, independent religious activity, in part because some clergy and 

religious followers of Buddhism and other minority religions are politically active in opposition 

to the regime. This includes members of ethnic minorities, for whom religion is often a defining 

feature. 

 Members of minority religious groups, especially Muslims and Christians, face serious 

abuses of religious freedom and other human rights by the military. In some localities, military 

commanders have forcibly conscripted members of religious minorities as porters, killing some 

who have refused. Christians and Muslims have been forced to engage in the destruction of 

churches and graveyards for the purpose of clearing sites for military camps. They reportedly 

have also been forced to “donate” labor to build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and monasteries. 

The Burmese military has instigated violence by the Buddhist majority against Muslims. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities resulted in outbreaks of violence over 

the past several years. During one such outbreak in Irrawaddy Division in 2003, Buddhists 

attacked shops, restaurants, and homes owned by Muslims. Police and soldiers reportedly stood 

by and did not halt the violence against Muslims until the latter began to fight back. Muslim 

groups claimed that seven people were killed and two mosques were destroyed in violence near 

Mandalay in that same year. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, there are credible reports that government 

and military authorities actively sought ways to convert Christians to Buddhism. The State 

Department’s 2004 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom reports that under the 

guise of offering free education, local officials have separated children from their parents, with 

the children instructed to convert to Buddhism without their parents’ knowledge or consent. In 

Chin state, there are reports that government authorities offered financial and career incentives to 
 

54

ethnic Burman Buddhist soldiers to marry Chin Christian women. Among Naga Christians, 

refugees leaving Burma report that members of the army, together with Buddhist monks, closed 

churches in local villages and attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

Christian and Muslim groups continue regularly to experience difficulties in obtaining 

permission to build new churches and mosques, as well as to hold public ceremonies and 

festivals and import religious literature. Authorities have reportedly denied permission for the 

construction of new churches since 1997 in certain parts of Chin state. Similar restrictions are 

reportedly imposed in the capital of Kachin state and among Protestants in Karen state. In 

Rangoon during 2001-2002, authorities closed more than 80 Protestant house churches because 

they did not have proper authorizations to hold religious meetings. Few of these churches have 

since been reopened, and, according to the Department of State, other closures continued in the 

last year. Similarly, Muslims reported difficulties in constructing new mosques or re-building 

those previously destroyed. In 2002, authorities in Rakhine state destroyed 13 mosques until 

international pressure forced them to stop further demolitions. Local authorities reportedly 

replaced the mosques with government owned buildings and Buddhist temples and have refused 

to issue the necessary permission for mosque construction on other sites. 

The government of Burma seriously discriminates against members of minority religious 

groups in education, publishing, building permits, and access to public sector services and jobs. 

In public schools nationwide, all students are required to recite a daily Buddhist prayer. While 

some Muslim students are permitted to leave the room during this time, some schools require 

non-Buddhist students to recite the prayer. 

In most cases the government has denied citizenship to Rohingya Muslims in Arakan 

State on the grounds that their ancestors allegedly did not reside in the country prior to British 

colonial rule. Due to this denial of legal status, the Rohingya face strict restrictions on their 

freedom of movement, and in some areas are not permitted to own property or reside in certain 

townships. Government provisions reserving access to secondary education only to citizens of 

Burma deny Rohingya Muslims access to state-run schools beyond the primary level and 

prohibit them from obtaining most positions in the civil service. 

The SPDC shows public preference for Theravada Buddhism; however, even the majority 

Buddhist religion is not immune from government repression. According to the State 

Department’s 2004 human rights report, members of the Buddhist “sangha” are subject to a strict 

code of conduct that is reportedly enforced by criminal penalties. Since 1990, all Buddhist 

monks have been required to affiliate with one of nine state-recognized monastic orders, all of 

which remain under the authority of the State Monk Coordination Committee. Military 

commanders retain jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks in military court for “activities 

inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism.” In February 2004, the government handed 

down jail terms ranging from seven to 16 years for 26 monks who were defrocked and arrested 

in December 2003 for refusing to accept government donations of robes and other items. 

The government also prohibits all monks from being members of a political party. Since 

the 1990s, Buddhist monks have been active in the pro-democracy movement. The government 

imprisoned more than 100 Buddhist monks for advocating democracy and encouraging dialogue 

between the government and pro-democracy forces. Many members of the Buddhist clergy 
 

55

remain imprisoned; though a precise number is unavailable, credible sources report that this 

number has risen since May 2003, when the Burmese government, after organizing an attack on 

her motorcade, placed democracy activist and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi under 

“protective custody.” 

In March 2005, Senator Gordon Smith introduced S. Res. 91, a resolution to urge the 

European Union (EU) to maintain its arms embargo on China. The resolution cited Commission 

findings on the role of the Burmese military in perpetuating religious and ethnic conflict in that 

country, in which China has played a role as a key supplier of weapons materials. The resolution 

also recommended greater cooperation between the EU and the United States to bring “a 

permanent and verifiable end to the ongoing proliferation by state and non-state owned entities 

and individuals of the People’s Republic of China of munitions materials, and military 

equipment and trade in such items involving countries, such as Burma and Sudan, whose armies 

have played a role in the perpetration of violations of human rights and of humanitarian law 

against members of ethnic and religious minorities.” 

In 2004, Commission staff met with exiled Burmese ethnic and religious leaders, 

including Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims, and with members of congressional and 

international delegations that visited Burma. 

China 

The Chinese government continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations of 

religious freedom. The State Department has stated publicly that conditions for human rights, 

including religious freedom, deteriorated in 2004. Chinese government officials control, 

monitor, and restrain the activities of all religious communities – including Uighur Muslims, 

Tibetan Buddhists, various spiritual movements such as the Falun Gong, “underground” 

Catholics, and “house church” Protestants – maintaining final authority over leadership decisions 

and doctrinal positions. Prominent religious leaders and laypersons alike continue to be 

confined, tortured, imprisoned and subjected to other forms of ill treatment on account of their 

religion or belief. Since 1999, the Commission has recommended that China be designated as a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has followed the Commission’s 

recommendations and named China a CPC. 

In November 2004, the Chinese government announced a new set of regulations on 

religious affairs. Though Chinese leaders have heralded the regulations as “a significant step 

forward in the protection of religious freedom,” the bulk of the regulations codify provisions 

once scattered throughout several sets of laws, ordinances, and regulations. The regulations do 

include several new provisions, however, including conditions under which religious 

organizations can provide social services in local communities, accept donations from overseas 

religious groups, and host inter-provincial religious meetings. The regulations also do not 

specify that official recognition is limited to the five “official religions” (Protestantism, 

Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and Taoism) as was the case under previous policy. 

Legal and human rights experts agree that the new regulations were not issued to protect 

the rights and security of religious believers, but to regularize management practices, thus 
 

56

offering Party leaders more extensive control over all religious activity and groups. Moreover, 

the regulations threaten criminal punishments and civil fines for groups engaging in religious 

activities without having registered with the official “patriotic” religious organizations. 

In May 2004, a joint document issued by the Department of Propaganda offered 

instructions on “integrating Marxist atheism propaganda and education” into the national 

education system, civil society and economic sectors, the media, and academia. Observers have 

suggested that this document, along with several directives to discourage “superstitious activity,” 

represent a pointed effort on the part of the Chinese government to stem the burgeoning spread 

of religious belief among the Chinese people. 

In the largely Uighur Muslim Xinjiang Autonomous Region, freedom of religion or belief 

is severely curtailed by the government, which conflates peaceful Uighur political opposition 

with violent separatist activities, extremism, and/or terrorism. In response to heavy pressure 

from the U.S. and European Union governments, Chinese authorities released Uighur 

businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer in March 2005, on the eve of a visit from U.S. Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice to Beijing. Kadeer was arrested in 1999 for trying to deliver a letter to a 

visiting Congressional staff delegation. The letter was critical of the Chinese government’s 

policies in Xinjiang, including its suppression of Islam. 

Since September 11, 2001, the government has used concerns about international 

terrorism as a pretext for the ongoing crackdown on Muslim religious leaders and activities. 

Uighur Muslim clerics and students have been detained for “illegal” religious activities, “illegal 

religious centers” have been closed, and minors have been banned from attending mosque. 

Growing numbers of religious leaders have received death sentences and prolonged prison terms 

on charges of “separatism” and “endangering social order.” All imams in Xinjiang are required 

to undergo yearly political training seminars, and local security forces maintain a dossier on each 

to make sure they meet political requirements. 

An April 2005 report from Human Rights Watch notes that Xinjiang has experienced at 

least nine separate campaigns to root out “illegal religious activities,” including last year’s 

“strike hard campaign against separatism, religious extremism and terrorism.” Such themes were 

echoed in a March 2005 speech from Politburo Member Luo Gan in a call “to be vigilant against 

separatist...activities [and] immediately strike at any attempts discovered.” The Human Rights 

Watch report documents that provincial level directives prohibit participation of minors in 

religious activity or education. Also, daily prayers, wearing of head coverings, distribution of 

religious materials, and the observance of Ramadan are cited as “disruptive” activities for Party 

Members. Teachers, professors, university students, and other government employees are 

prohibited from engaging in these activities. 

The Chinese government retains tight control over religious activity and places of 

worship in Tibet. The religious activities of monks and nuns are tightly controlled, monasteries 

are administrated by government-approved management committees, and the Communist Party 

interferes in the selection and training of reincarnate lamas. The Chinese government admits that 

more than 100 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns are being held in prison. Tibetan human rights 

groups agree with this figure and claim that the prisoners are subject to torture and other illtreatment. There have been several high-profile amnesties of Tibetan Buddhists, however, in the 
 

57

past several years. In February 2004, authorities released Phuntsog Nyidrol, a nun who had been 

held in Drapchi Prison since 1989. However, human rights organizations report that Phuntsog 

Nyidrol remains under strict surveillance and the Chinese authorities have imposed restrictions 

on her freedom of movement and association. Nevertheless, neither recent prisoner releases nor 

renewed contact between China and the Dalai Lama’s representatives have brought any 

significant changes to the government’s overall policy of strict control over religion in Tibet. 

The Chinese government continues to deny repeated international requests for access to 

the 16-year old boy whom the Dalai Lama designated as the 11th Panchen Lama. Government 

officials have stated that he is being “held for his own safety,” while also claiming that another 

boy, of their choosing, is the “true” Panchen Lama. In October 2004, Radio Free Asia reported 

that police in Qinghai shot and killed a Tibetan monk following a dispute over compensation for 

medical injuries suffered while in custody. In January 2003, Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was 

arrested for a 2002 bombing incident and later sentenced to death. U.S. officials were promised 

that the evidence used to convict Tenzin Delek would be reviewed by the Supreme People’s 

Court. After two years, the case has never been reviewed, though Tenzin Delek’s death sentence 

was commuted to life imprisonment in January 2005. In October 2003, another monk, Nyima 

Dragpa, died, reportedly as a result of repeated torture while serving a nine-year sentence for 

advocating Tibetan independence. 

Beginning with the banning of Falun Gong in 1999, the Chinese government has 

continued to carry out a campaign against what it calls “evil cults” and “heretical sects.” 

Thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been sent to labor camps without trial or sent to 

mental health institutions for re-education due to their affiliation with an “evil cult.” Falun Gong 

practitioners claim that between 1,000 to 2,000 practitioners have been killed as a result of police 

brutality. Given the lack of judicial transparency, the number and treatment of Falun Gong 

practitioners in confinement is difficult to confirm. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence 

from foreign diplomats, international human rights groups, and human rights activists in Hong 

Kong that the crackdowns on the Falun Gong are widespread and violent. In addition, the 

Chinese government has reportedly continued to pressure foreign businesses in China to sign 

statements denouncing the Falun Gong and to discriminate against its followers in hiring. Local 

officials in foreign countries have also stated that they were warned by Chinese diplomatic 

personnel about the loss of potential business contacts if they continued to advocate on behalf of 

Falun Gong. 

The campaign against “evil cults” has, in recent years, expanded beyond the Falun Gong 

and similar groups to religious communities that are not part of the officially-sanctioned 

religious organizations. This campaign has targeted leaders and members of newer as well as 

long-established Protestant and Catholic groups that, for various reasons, have refused to register 

with the government. Religious leaders have been imprisoned and followers detained and fined 

for “cultist activity.” For example, Pastor Gong Shengliang of the unregistered South China 

Church—sentenced to death for founding an “evil cult” and on questionable charges of sexual 

violence—remains in prison, where he continues to be denied proper medical care. Many of his 

congregants and family remain in jail facing serious charges and are allegedly subject to torture 

and other ill treatment in prison. 
 

58

The government also continues its repression of the unregistered Roman Catholic Church 

in China, which maintains its allegiance to the Vatican. There are at least 20 Catholic bishops or 

priests under arrest, imprisoned or detained, including Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in 

prison, in detention, under house arrest, or under strict surveillance since the 1970s. Clergy in 

Hebei, Fujian, and Heilongjiang provinces were harassed, detained, and arrested during the past 

year. In October 2003, Hebei provincial officials reportedly arrested 12 Catholic priests and 

seminarians attending a religious retreat. In August 2004, Bishop Gao Kexian died of unknown 

causes in a prison where he had been since 1997. In September 2004, the Vatican issued a 

statement condemning the arrest of eight priests and two seminarians during a religious gathering 

in Hebei. In April 2005, one week after the death of Pope John Paul II, authorities in Hebei 

arrested a bishop and two priests, reportedly for their continued refusal to register with the 

Patriotic Catholic Church. 

Conditions for unregistered Protestant groups have deteriorated in the last year. 

According to the State Department, in some regions of China, members of Protestant house 

church groups that refuse to register, on either theological or political grounds, are subject to 

intimidation, extortion, harassment, detention, and the closing of their churches. Over a period 

of six months during 2004, the Chinese government carried out large-scale raids on several 

meetings of house church pastors in various parts of the country. More than 100 pastors were 

arrested, briefly detained, and then released, in Heilongjiang in April, in Hubei in June, in 

Xinjiang in July, and in Henan Province in August. At least 18 pastors remain in custody from 

the series of mass arrests. In September 2003, house church historian Zhang Yinan was arrested 

along with approximately 100 others in Nanyang, Henan Province, and was subsequently 

sentenced to two years of “re-education” through labor. In November 2004, the United Nations 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reviewed Zhang’s case and found that his detention was 

indeed arbitrary. In August 2004, house church activists Liu Fenggang, Xu Yonghai, and Zhang 

Shengqi were sentenced to prison terms ranging from one to three years for sending materials on 

persecution of Christians in China to organizations in the United States. In June 2004, a Chinese 

newspaper reported that a woman in Guizhou died in police custody and that her body showed 

signs of torture. The paper stated that she was detained for distributing Bibles. 

In March 2005, the State Department announced that it would not introduce a resolution 

at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), citing “significant steps” taken by the 

Chinese government to address “structural issues concerning human rights.” Among the steps 

mentioned by the State Department was a public announcement by the Chinese government that 

“religious education of minors is consistent with Chinese law and policy” and new regulations 

that exempt small family or home worship activities from governmental registration. These are 

concerns that this Commission has repeatedly raised in the past; yet, it is too soon to determine 

whether there will be any substantive impact from these steps. The Commission will continue to 

monitor the actions of the Chinese government and report on whether the cited “significant 

steps” lead to any measurable progress in the protection of the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief. 

In addition to the steps mentioned above, the State Department also cited as evidence of 

progress invitations from the Chinese government to the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture and 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and 

the High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China in 2005. Similar promises were 
 

59

mentioned the last time the United States decided to forgo a resolution on China at the 2003 

session of the UNCHR. Later that year, however, promised visits by this Commission and 

various UN thematic mechanisms were cancelled or postponed by the Chinese government. 

The Commission received an invitation to visit China in 2005. Previous Commission 

attempts to visit China were postponed at the last minute due to unacceptable conditions placed 

on the trips by the Chinese government. In August 2003, the Chinese government insisted that 

the Commission remove Hong Kong from its itinerary. In December 2003, the Chinese 

government agreed to allow the Commission a stopover in Hong Kong, but insisted it hold no 

meetings. These conditions were unacceptable, as they violated the “one country, two system” 

concept that ensures Hong Kong’s autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. In January 2004, a 

Commission delegation traveled to Hong Kong and, with the permission of the Hong Kong 

government, held meetings with religious leaders, China experts, human rights advocates, and 

members of the Legislative Council. The conditions of Hong Kong’s autonomy are of critical 

concern in order for Hong Kong to preserve the ability to pursue human rights policies and 

practices that are independent from Beijing. 

In November 2004, the Commission convened a forum focusing on the future of the 

bilateral human rights dialogues between China and other nations. Several speakers who 

attended the forum had participated in bilateral human rights dialogues between China and the 

United States, Canada, Switzerland, and Denmark. Participants discussed ways to make the 

dialogues more effective by ensuring that the dialogue process and the effort to promote religious 

freedom and other human rights become more fully integrated into the U.S.-Chinese relationship. 

Also in November, Commission Chair Preeta D. Bansal testified at a hearing before the 

Congressional Executive Commission on China entitled “Religious Freedom in China.”

 

In the past year, the Commission and its staff have met with Chinese human rights and 

religious leaders representing Buddhists, Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, and various spiritual 

movements, including Falun Gong. 

In addition to recommending that China be designated as a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• urge the Chinese government to a) end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual 

groups throughout China, including harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of persons 

on account of their manifestation of religion or belief; the detention, torture, and ill-treatment 

of persons in prisons, labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of confinement; 

and the coercion of individuals to renounce or condemn any religion or belief; b) respect 

fully the universality of the right to freedom of religion or belief and other human rights; and 

c) ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

• raise Chinese human rights abuses in multilateral fora, including, as appropriate, through 

seeking resolutions at the UN Commission on Human Rights or other international and 

multi-national fora, and ensure that when the United States pursues such measures, 

preparations should be pursued at appropriately high levels; 
 

60

• organize annual or regular meetings of the 15 nations with technical assistance and human 

rights programs in China in order to coordinate programs already in place, share “best 

practices,” and improve existing and new assistance programs; 

• provide new incentives, including breaks on Export-Import Loans and OPIC insurance rates, 

to U.S. companies whose conduct and business practices promote and protect international 

standards of human rights, including the promotion of the freedom of religion or belief; 

• endeavor to establish an official U.S. government presence, such as a consulate, in Lhasa, 

Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang, in order to monitor religious freedom and other human rights; 

• continue to expand public diplomacy efforts in China by: 

--raising the profile of the conditions of Uighur Muslims by addressing religious freedom 

and human rights concerns in bilateral talks, increasing the number of educational 

opportunities in the United States available to Uighurs, establishing technical assistance 

programs to create legal clinics serving Uighurs, and increasing radio broadcasts in the 

Uighur language; 

--supporting exchanges between a diverse segment of Chinese government officials and 

academic experts and U.S. scholars, experts, representatives of religious communities and 

non-governmental organizations regarding the relationship between religion and the state, 

the role of religion in society, international standards relating to the right to freedom of 

religion or belief, and the importance and benefits of upholding human rights, including 

religious freedom; and 

• continue to promote Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, 

including upholding the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, by:

--opposing the introduction of any “national security” provision to Hong Kong’s Basic Law 

that would suppress internationally recognized human rights, including the right to 

freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression; and 

--urging the Chinese government to uphold the “one country, two systems” concept by 

allowing the Hong Kong people and their elected government officials to have the 

decisive voice in the determination of the pace and scope of advances toward direct 

elections. 

In addition, the Commission has recommended that the Congress should: 

y require the State Department to submit an annual report to the appropriate Congressional 

committees detailing issues discussed at the previous year’s U.S. human rights dialogue with 

China and describing the progress made by the government of China toward a series of 

“benchmarks” specified by the Congress; and 

y authorize additional funds for the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy 

Program to initiate new human rights and rule of law programs on freedom of religion or 
 

61

belief, targeting both religious and ethnic minorities. Funding should be commensurate to 

ongoing rule of law programs funded by the State Department for Chinese workers, women, 

and public interest law training. 

Indonesia 

The Commission is concerned about ongoing sectarian violence in Indonesia, and the 

Indonesian government’s inability or unwillingness to hold those responsible to account. Since 

2002, the size, scope, and intensity of religiously-related violence has decreased. There are 

expectations that Indonesia’s recent democratic elections and the growing number of 

organizations devoted to religious reconciliation will further reduce sectarian conflict. 

Nevertheless, violence between Muslims and Christians has continued in Central Sulawesi, the 

Malukus, Papua, and parts of Java. In some of these regions, militant and terrorist groups 

operate freely and with impunity. Greater protections for the human rights of all Indonesians, 

including the right to freedom of religion or belief, will strengthen that country’s commitment to 

pluralism and its transition to democracy, interests shared by both the United States and 

Indonesia. The Commission continues to place Indonesia on its Watch List. 

 

Over the past six years, Christian-Muslim violence in the Malukus and Sulawesi has 

resulted in thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. While 

many factors added fuel to these conflicts, the killings, destruction of places of worship, and 

forced conversions were spurred by religious motivations and religious actors. Peace 

agreements, known as the Malino Peace Accords, were signed in late 2001 and early 2002, 

formally ending the conflicts in these regions. 

Despite the signing of these peace agreements, violence has continued. In the past year, 

sectarian conflict claimed at least 46 lives in Central Sulawesi and at least 47 in the Malukus, an 

increase over the previous year. In Sulawesi in particular, new violence between religious 

groups is especially troubling. Attacks on Christian villages staged on the second anniversary of 

the October 2002 Bali bombing resulted in the loss of 13 lives; in that instance, police responded 

quickly to the attacks and killed six of the perpetrators. Despite the swift response by security 

forces in this case, reports suggest that Sulawesi may be a staging ground for additional terrorist 

violence by extremist organizations. Leaflets have appeared in the capital of Poso calling for 

“jihad.” Indonesian human rights activists link these calls to the increased number of bombings 

and shootings of religious leaders in the past year. 

During the last year, attacks on places of worship increased slightly. At least ten 

churches and one mosque were attacked in various regions including Central Sulawesi, Maluku, 

the West Java districts of Purwodadi, Margahayu, Tangerang, Bogor, and Benten, the Jakarta 

suburbs of Ciputat and Pamulang, and the Central Java city of Yogyakarta. Indonesia’s 

“Regulation on Building Houses of Worship (Joint-Ministerial Decree No. 1/1969)” requires 

community approval for the expansion of existing or the building of new religious venues. In 

areas where Christians or Muslims are in the minority, new building permits are often difficult to 

obtain and militants have burned or destroyed places of worship for which permits had been 

sought. 
 

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After the Malino Accords were signed, the Indonesian government pressured a number of 

Islamic militant groups responsible for the worst violence, including the Islamic Defenders’ 

Front and Laskar Jihad, to cease their activities and disband. The dissolution of Laskar Jihad in 

particular was prompt and extensive. However, former members have reportedly joined other, 

more militant organizations such as Laskar Jundullah and Mujahidin Kompak. These groups 

openly operate training camps in Sulawesi and are reported to be behind much of the recent 

sectarian violence in that province. 

The Indonesian government has made little progress in holding accountable those 

responsible for past sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus. In one of the few 

actions taken to date, officials recently issued indictments for two deaths that occurred during 

2001 in Ambon, the capital of South Maluku. Moreover, concerns about judicial independence 

continue to fuel grievances that exacerbate religious tensions. Jaffar Thalib, the leader of Laskar 

Jihad, the group responsible for killing thousands of people in the Malukus, was acquitted after 

standing trial on charges of instigating violence and weapons possession. Yet, Sulawesi 

Christian leader Rinaldy Damanik was sentenced to three years in prison on similar charges, 

even after the trial court itself acknowledged that there was little evidence to support the 

allegations against him. After two years in prison, Damanik was released in November 2004, 

one year ahead of his scheduled release. The disparate treatment of Damanik and Thalib suggest 

that serious inadequacies remain in the Indonesian judicial system. 

 

Government progress to examine and report on the causes of sectarian violence has also 

been slow. As part of the Malino Peace Accords, a panel of experts was required to prepare a 

report on the causes of the 2000-2001 violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus. The report 

was completed in 2003, but to date has not been publicly released. The report reportedly is 

critical of the role played by the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in 

fueling sectarian conflict, including allegedly aiding radical militia groups, such as Laskar Jihad. 

Human rights organizations have been critical of the TNI’s activities in regional conflicts 

throughout Indonesia. The TNI operates independently of civilian political control and only 30 

percent of its revenue is allocated by the National Assembly, the Indonesian legislature; the other 

70 percent comes from the TNI’s private business investments and other ventures. The TNI held 

expansive political and economic power during the former Suharto regime, and has only recently 

relinquished its reserved seats in the National Assembly. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 

has cautioned that a move to assert civilian control of the TNI too quickly could have ominous 

consequences for democratic stability in Indonesia. Nevertheless, reigning in the TNI’s power 

and holding its senior officers accountable for human rights violations is a critical element of 

addressing ongoing sectarian violence and other human rights problems in Indonesia. 

The State Department’s 2004 human rights report notes that the TNI has begun 

prosecuting junior officers and enlisted men for human rights violations. However, senior 

officers are rarely held accountable for abuses against civilians, including extra-judicial 

executions, forced disappearances, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on 

freedom of movement and association. For example, senior officers escaped with small 
 

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sentences, most of which were overturned on appeal, for atrocities committed in 1999 what is 

now independent East Timor. 

Some of the very officers indicted for human rights abuses in East Timor, including 

Timbul Silaen and Eurico Guterres, now hold similar positions of authority in the eastern region 

of Papua. Papua’s population has swelled in recent years, due to large flows of economic 

migrants and other civilians fleeing conflict elsewhere in Indonesia. Indigenous Papuans are 

predominantly rural and Christian, while the migrant groups are predominantly urban and 

Muslim, creating a volatile mix similar to that found in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus at the 

time those violent sectarian conflicts erupted. The presence of Silaen and Guterres in the area 

has raised fears that additional sectarian conflict and human rights abuses will occur in Papua. 

 

The Indonesian government has taken some important steps to root out domestic terrorist 

groups, particularly after the terrorist bombings in Bali in October 2002 and Jakarta in August 

2003. The government arrested and sentenced Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, the alleged leader of Jemaah 

Islamiah (JI), and 23 of his former followers for their role in planning and carrying out the Bali 

bombings and for links with terrorist groups in the Philippines. Despite the limited sentence 

given to Ba’asyir, his two trials are seen as milestones in Indonesia’s efforts to address Islamic 

extremism. The government announced in March 2005 that it will ban JI. However, some 

senior government officials continue to deny that JI even exists in Indonesia. 

A vocal and influential minority of Indonesians continue to call for implementation of 

Islamic law, or sharia, in Indonesia. An August 2002 proposal to implement sharia at the 

national level was withdrawn from consideration by the National Assembly when it became clear 

that the motion would not have sufficient support to pass. Efforts to revive the legislation 

continue and could reemerge during the current National Assembly session, though the effort is 

unlikely to gain further support, as most parliamentarians and the country’s two largest Muslim 

organizations remain opposed to the proposal. 

In June 2003, the National Assembly passed an education bill, which, if enforced, would 

require both public and private schools to provide religious instruction to their students. Because 

few non-Muslim students attend Indonesia’s Islamic schools, the impact of the law would fall 

most heavily on private Christian schools, where Muslims comprise a significant percentage of 

the student body. To comply with the law, those schools would have to hire instructors and 

institute religious instruction, as well as create spaces for worship, for students of other religions. 

Catholic and Protestant organizations, church groups, and parochial schools view the law as 

inappropriate state interference in private religious affairs. Many moderate Muslim political 

parties, organizations, and intellectuals opposed the legislation for similar reasons. The law does 

have considerable popular support, however. At this time, the government has not yet 

implemented the controversial provisions of the law described above. 

Some notable advances in inter-religious tolerance and cooperation occurred during the 

past year. Indonesian government officials continued to work with local Muslim and Christian 

community leaders to diffuse tensions in conflict areas, and a growing number of inter-religious 

non-governmental organizations initiated discussions on pluralism, democracy, religious 

tolerance, and human rights. 
 

64

U.S. government assistance currently supports limited programs in conflict resolution, 

multi-religious dialogue, pluralism, and education, programs that are in line with previous 

recommendations by the Commission. 

 

In the past year, Commission staff met with Indonesian political leaders, human rights 

activists, and religious leaders. The religious leaders included representatives of Muslim, 

Christian, and Hindu communities from the regions of Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi, Java, Bali, and the 

Malukus. 

Korea, Democratic Republic of 

By all accounts, there are virtually no personal freedoms in North Korea and no 

protection for universal human rights. In pursuit of absolute control of all facets of politics and 

society, the government under dictator Kim Jong Il has created an environment of fear in which 

dissent of any kind is not tolerated. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief 

remains essentially non-existent, as the government severely represses public and private 

religious activities and has a policy of actively discriminating against religious believers. There 

are a growing number of reports from North Korean refugees that any unauthorized religious 

activity inside North Korea is met with arrest, imprisonment, torture, and sometimes execution 

by North Korean officials. There is no evidence that religious freedom conditions have 

improved in the past year. The Commission continues to recommend that North Korea be 

designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, which the State Department has done since 

2001. 

The humanitarian disaster caused by years of famine and food shortages in North Korea, 

coupled with the government’s systematic and severe violations of the human rights and 

fundamental freedoms of its people, constitute a threat to regional stability and a continuing 

source of friction with neighboring countries. The United States has taken the lead in 

establishing a multi-national forum, known as the Six-Party Talks, to address security issues on 

the Korean peninsula, including North Korea’s reported development of nuclear weapons. At 

this point, the Six-Party talks have not addressed human rights issues, on the grounds that human 

rights and humanitarian issues cannot be combined with negotiations on security matters. Yet 

the same mistrust and megalomania that drive Kim Jong Il to develop nuclear weapons also drive 

his regime to perpetrate egregious human rights abuses, suggesting that complete security on the 

Korean peninsula cannot be assured until human rights and security issues are dealt with 

collectively. 

In recent years, the government has formed several “religious” organizations to 

implement its policy of severely restricting religious activities in the country. For example, the 

Korean Buddhist Federation prohibits Buddhist monks from worshiping at North Korean 

temples. Similarly, the Korean Christian Federation restricts Christian activities. Three 

churches, two Protestant and one Catholic, were opened in Pyongyang in 1988, though it is 

believed that these churches operate primarily as showcases for foreign visitors. The absence of 

a priest at the Roman Catholic Church means that mass cannot be celebrated and most 
 

65

sacraments cannot be performed. According to South Korean pastors operating exchanges with 

the Korean Christian Federation, although some fraction of North Koreans who attend services at 

the Catholic and Protestant churches in Pyongyang may be genuine believers, the majority 

reportedly attend services to monitor and report to the government on church activities. In 

January 2004, a former official of the North Korean National Security Agency testified before 

the Commission that these churches are controlled and operated directly by that agency. A 

Russian Orthodox Church has been under construction since 2003 but remains unfinished, 

though two North Korean men have been sent to Moscow to train as Orthodox priests. There are 

also reportedly three Buddhist temples and a Chondogyoist shrine in Pyongyang. Government 

officials have claimed that Buddhist temples are cultural relics that need to be preserved. 

Although Kim Il Sung University boasts a department of religion, graduates and faculty of the 

department are reportedly involved in training security forces to identify new Christian 

practitioners. 

While the North Korean government reports that some 500 house churches operate with 

government approval outside of Pyongyang for religious believers in rural areas, independent 

observers have questioned the existence of such facilities or gatherings. These observers cite 

consistent denials of repeated requests to visit them. The Commission has received information 

that there are underground Christians who meet in small groups and operate in complete secrecy 

inside North Korea. Researchers in South Korea have also reported on the existence of 

underground Christians, although there are no reliable estimates of the numbers of believers in 

these groups or the areas of the country in which they might operate. 

Persons found carrying Bibles in public, distributing religious literature, or engaging in 

unauthorized religious activities such as public religious expression and persuasion are arrested 

and imprisoned. There continue to be reports of torture and execution of religious believers, 

including a January 2005 report of the execution of six religious leaders. Although the practice 

of imprisoning religious believers is apparently widespread, the State Department has been 

unable to document fully the number of religious detainees or prisoners. In the past year, 

refugees and refugee assistance organizations have reported a growing number of Christians in 

the prison system due to increased contact between refugees and South Korean and Chinese 

religious groups in the border regions. According to press reports, an estimated 6,000 Christians 

are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15,” located in the northern part of the country. According to 

testimony heard at the Commission’s January 2002 hearing on North Korea, prisoners held on 

the basis of their religious beliefs are treated worse than other inmates. For example, religious 

prisoners are reportedly given the most dangerous tasks while in prison. In addition, these 

prisoners are subject to constant abuse from prison officials in an effort to force them to 

renounce their faith. When they refuse, they are often beaten and sometimes tortured to death. 

The North Korean government forcefully propagates an ideology, known as “Juche,” 

based on the personality cult of the regime’s current leader, Kim Jong Il, and his late father, Kim 

Il Sung. Korean law reportedly mandates that pictures of the “Great Leader” (Kim Il Sung) and 

the “Dear Leader” (Kim Jong Il) hang on the wall of every house, school room, and work place. 

There are credible reports that each village contains a “Kim Il Sung Research Center.” Citizens 

are reportedly required to attend weekly meetings where they watch inspirational films on the 

Dear Leader’s life and hold public confessions about political and moral failings. 
 

66

North Korean officials have stratified society into 51 specific categories on the basis of 

family background and perceived loyalty to the regime. Religious adherents are by definition 

relegated to a lower category, receiving fewer privileges and opportunities than others in areas 

such as education and employment. An extensive report by Amnesty International in 2003 

details evidence that persons in lower categories have, in some cases, been forcibly relocated to 

remote and desolate areas of the country and then systematically denied access to food aid and 

therefore left to starve. 

As a result of the prolonged famine and the highly oppressive nature of the regime, up to 

300,000 refugees have fled North Korea across the border to China in the past five to eight years. 

After the easing of the worst of the famine conditions, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 refugees 

remain in China. According to an agreement with North Korea, the Chinese government 

considers all such refugees to be economic migrants who are subject to forcible repatriation. 

North Korean authorities consider a decision to leave the country tantamount to treason and all 

returnees are subject to arrest, imprisonment, and often torture. There are growing numbers of 

reports from North Korean escapees that all North Koreans repatriated from China are 

interrogated to determine if they have converted to Christianity or had contact with South Korean 

Christians. If they answer affirmatively to these questions they are subject to long prison terms 

with hard labor. 

In September 2004, the Commission began work on a study of conditions of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief in North Korea. The study focuses on all religious 

communities in the country, relying primarily on interviews with former North Koreans who 

have escaped their country and are now residing in South Korea. In October 2004, the 

Commission and the study’s lead researcher met with Vitit Muntarbhorn, UN Special Rapporteur 

on Human Rights in North Korea, to discuss the study and other aspects of the Commission’s 

work on North Korea. In March 2005, Commissioners accompanied the lead researcher to 

Geneva to present preliminary findings to delegations at the 61st Session of the UN Commission 

on Human Rights. Commission representatives in Geneva also met with the acting UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees to discuss the situation of North Korean refugees in China and 

further updated the Special Rapporteur on preliminary findings of the study. 

In April 2004, the Commission met with North Korean defectors in Washington as a part 

of North Korea Freedom Day activities. In November 2004, the North Korea Human Rights Act 

was signed into law. The legislation cites Commission findings and includes provisions 

reflecting several Commission recommendations, including the expansion of programs to 

advance democracy and human rights in North Korea and increased funding for programs to 

promote access to information inside North Korea. The law also expresses the sense of the 

Congress that the human rights of North Koreans should remain a key element in future 

negotiations between the United States, North Korea and other concerned parties in Northeast 

Asia; that UN human rights mechanisms, including Special Rapporteurs, should be permitted to 

gather information and report on conditions in North Korea; and that the United States should 

explore the possibility of a regional dialogue with North Korea that is modeled on the Helsinki 

process, engaging all countries in the region in a common commitment to respect human rights. 

All of these provisions follow Commission recommendations. 
 

67

In addition to recommending that North Korea continue to be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• work with regional and European allies to fashion a comprehensive plan for security 

concerns on the Korean peninsula—modeled after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—as suggested in Sec. 106 of the North 

Korean Human Rights Act; 

--consider, with this model, expanding the Six-Party talks on nuclear security to include 

separate discussions on issues related to human rights and human security, using ongoing 

security negotiations to press North Korea for improvements in areas of mutual concern, 

including monitoring of humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees, family reunifications, 

abductions, and other pressing human rights issues, including religious freedom; 

 

• as soon as possible, appoint a Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, as mandated 

in the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, and give the Special Envoy full authority to 

move forward on assistance to North Korean refugees, new human rights and democracy 

programming, and expanded public diplomacy programs; 

 

• urge the Chinese government to uphold its international obligations to protect asylum 

seekers, by (1) establishing a mechanism to confer at least temporary asylum on those 

seeking such protection; (2) providing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in China; and (3) 

ensuring that any migrants who are being returned pursuant to any bilateral agreement are not 

potential asylum seekers refouled in violation of China’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol; 

• in bilateral relations with China, Russia, Mongolia, and other regional allies, place a higher 

priority on working to provide safe and secure migration channels for North Korean asylum 

seekers; 

• promote further cooperation between the Department of State, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and regional allies, including South Korea, to resolve quickly the remaining 

technical or legal issues surrounding the resettlement of North Koreans in the United States 

and other countries; 

• urge the Chinese government to allow international humanitarian organizations greater 

access to North Koreans in China, to address growing social problems such as child and 

sexual trafficking, forced labor, and other crimes associated with the vulnerability of North 

Korean migrants in China; 

• encourage nations with diplomatic relations with North Korea to include religious freedom 

and other human rights in their talks with North Korea, and to urge the North Korean 

government to invite UN Special Rapporteurs and other mechanisms, as appropriate, to 

assess the human rights and humanitarian situation, to monitor the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance, and to recommend reforms and technical assistance programs; 
 

68

• continue to use appropriate international fora to condemn egregious human rights abuses in 

North Korea and seek protections and redress for victims, by 

--co-sponsoring and working for passage of a resolution on North Korea at the UN 

Commission on Human Rights; and 

--co-sponsoring and working for passage of a resolution that places human rights abuses in 

the context of regional and nuclear security at the First Committee of the United Nations, 

if North Korea continues to refuse cooperation with international monitors and declines 

UN technical assistance programs; 

• expand radio, television, Internet, and print information alternatives for North Korea, 

including expanding broadcasts on Radio Free Asia and Voice of America and producing 

video and other digital programming to accommodate growing DVD circulation and satellite 

dish technology in North Korea. 

In addition, Congress should: (a) continue to appropriate funds authorized in the North 

Korea Human Rights Act for public diplomacy, refugee assistance, and democratization 

programs; (b) establish a congressional caucus to focus specifically on human rights and 

refugees and to explore new ideas for establishing an “Helsinki Option” for security talks on the 

Korean Penisula; and (c) if Congressional delegations visit North Korea, seek access for 

international monitors to North Korean prisons as promised by Vice-Premier Gew Yan-un to a 

visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee delegation in 2004. 

Laos 

In response to the concerns of this Commission and the international community, 

violations of freedom of religion or belief have decreased in Laos over the past two years. 

Forced renunciations of faith have been condemned by the ruling party, the government has reopened most of the churches and other religious buildings closed in recent years, and all but two 

of the known religious prisoners in Laos have been released. In addition, the government 

currently interprets and enforces its religion law in a way that has facilitated religious activities 

and inter-religious cooperation. Though concerns remain, the recent improvement in conditions 

for freedom of religion or belief has led the Commission to remove Laos from its Watch List. 

The Commission continues to be concerned about Laos’ overall human rights record, 

which the State Department describes as “poor.” Laos is a one-party, authoritarian state. In 

view of its continued poor human rights practices, there remains a possibility that past religious 

freedom abuses will reemerge. The Commission will therefore maintain its scrutiny of the 

actions of the Lao government with regard to religious freedom to determine whether 

developments continue to move in a positive direction or if a return to the Watch List is 

warranted. 
 

69

Since the end of 2002, religious groups, particularly in the largest cities and districts of 

Laos, report steadily improving religious freedom conditions, including a more constructive 

relationship with the Lao government. The government remains wary of religious traditions 

other than Theravada Buddhism, particularly the various forms of Protestantism found among 

some ethnic minority groups. However, the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), the 

agency that oversees religious policy and regulates religious activities, has recently sought to 

promote conciliation and tolerance among religious groups and has intervened with local 

officials in cases where minority religious practitioners have been harassed, threatened, or 

detained. In the past, the LFNC was reluctant to intervene in local disputes, due to the 

significant measure of power given provincial governors in the Lao system of government. The 

LFNC has also cooperated with the U.S. Embassy in Laos in organizing, participating in, and 

conducting seminars on human rights, including religious freedom. 

In most parts of the country, adherents from all religious communities are allowed to 

practice their religion with few restrictions. There continue to be reports, however, that 

provincial and local officials harass individuals, confiscate property, and, on occasion, detain 

persons for participating in religious activities. These problems are concentrated in parts of 

Savannakhet and Attapeu provinces, and often involve ethnic and religious minorities. In the last 

year, at least 30 Christians in Savannakhet and Attapeu provinces were detained. Most were 

released in a matter of days. In response to U.S. and international pressure, all but two religious 

prisoners were released by October 2004. There have been no new detentions since May 2004. 

Catholics, Baha’is, and Protestants in particular continue to report discrimination in the rural 

provinces. 

Between 1999 and 2002, the State Department reported that campaigns of coerced 

renunciation of faith occurred in nearly every Lao province. These reports have diminished 

significantly in the past several years. Moreover, there have been no recent reports of incidents 

where security forces required the ritualistic drinking of animal blood mixed with alcohol which 

was the primary method used in past renunciation campaigns. However, there were a few 

occasions in the past year in which security forces in Attapeu Province’s Sanamsai district used 

threats of arrest, expulsion, and property confiscation to coerce ethnic Protestants in the district 

to give up their faith. One member of a Protestant congregation was expelled from the district. 

Following growing international attention however, official harassment of Christians in Attapeu 

province diminished markedly. 

 

According to the State Department, between 1999 and 2001 local authorities closed 

approximately 20 of Vientiane province’s 60 Protestant churches, primarily those in Hin Hoep, 

Feuang, and Vang Vieng districts, and approximately 65 Protestant churches in Savannakhet and 

Luang Prabang provinces. Many of these churches were allowed to reopen in the past eighteen 

months, especially in Vientiane and Luang Prabang provinces. Six of Savannakhet’s 40 

churches remain closed, though recently, officials in Kengkok returned property seized in 1999 

to a small Protestant congregation. 

One ongoing concern is the potential for abuses through the implementation of Decree 

92, the Lao government’s 2002 decree on religious activities. During its visit to Laos in 

February 2002, the Commission was assured that passage of the decree would improve religious 
 

70

freedom in Laos by legalizing religious activities, protecting the religious practices of ethnic 

minorities, and providing guidelines to local and provincial officials to ensure that abuses by 

those officials would cease. Nevertheless, the decree provides government officials with a 

potential legal basis for control of, and interference in, religious activities. Many religious 

activities can be conducted only with government approval, and the decree contains a prohibition 

on activities that create “social division,” or “chaos,” reiterating parts of the Lao’s criminal code, 

including Article 66, used in the past by government officials to arrest and detain ethnic minority 

Christians. Thus, Decree 92 and several provisions of the criminal code can be used to restrict 

and suppress religious activities, rather than protect and promote the freedom of religion and 

belief. However, there are credible reports that the LFNC is using Decree 92 to facilitate 

religious practice and to promote cooperation among religious communities. The Commission 

will continue to monitor how the decree is implemented and whether the central government has 

made progress in controlling the alleged abusive acts of local officials. 

In the past year, the Commission and its staff have met with Lao government officials 

and religious leaders, domestic and international human rights activists, academics and other 

experts on Laos. The Commission has traveled to Laos and issued a report on its findings in 

February 2003. 

In 2003, Resolution 402 was introduced in the House, stating the sense of Congress that 

the U.S. government should work to implement the Commission’s recommendations on Laos. 

Commission findings and accompanying recommendations were also cited in several letters from 

Members of Congress to the Administration regarding human rights in Laos in 2004. 

With regard to Laos, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• make clear to the government of Laos that continued improvements in the protection of 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is essential to further improvements 

and in expansion of U.S.-Laos relations, and urge Lao officials to: 

--ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and invite the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and other relevant UN mechanisms to visit 

the country; 

--halt any harassment and detention of persons on account of their religion by local 

government officials and hold any such officials responsible for violations of the 

religious freedom of Lao citizens, particularly in such provinces as Savannakhet, Attapeu, 

Luang Prabang, and Saisomboune Special Zone; 

--criminalize forced renunciations of faith by passing a law in the National Assembly 

providing for specific penalties for those who carry out such practices; 

--repeal or amend Article 66 of the Lao Criminal Code so that it cannot be used to arrest or 

detain individuals for engaging in religious activities that are protected by the Lao 

Constitution and under international law; 
 

71

--amend those elements of Decree 92 on religious activities that are inconsistent with 

international human rights law; 

--respect and fully implement the freedom of individuals and organizations to engage in 

social, humanitarian, and charitable activities, free from undue government interference; 

and 

--provide access to all parts of Laos by foreign diplomats, humanitarian organizations, and 

international human rights and religious organizations, in particular, to Savannakhet, 

Attapeu, and Saisomboune Special Zone; 

• establish measurable goals and benchmarks, in addition to those listed above, for further 

human rights progress in Laos as a guide for diplomatic engagement between Laos and the 

United States or for initiating a formal human rights dialogue with the government of Laos, 

addressing such human rights issues as ethnic and religious discrimination, torture and other 

forms of ill-treatment in prisons, unlawful arrest and detention, the absence of due process, 

and practical steps to ensure the right to freedom of expression, association, and assembly; 

• expand Lao language broadcasts on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

while ensuring that the content of the Lao language broadcasts on VOA and RFA adequately 

includes information about the importance of human rights, including religious freedom, 

within Laos; and 

• initiate and expand technical assistance and human rights programs that support the goals of 

protecting and promoting religious freedom, including: 

--rule of law programs that provide assistance in amending, drafting, and implementing 

laws and regulations; 

--human rights and religious freedom training programs for specific sectors of Lao society, 

including government officials, religious leaders, academics, police, and representatives 

of international non-governmental organizations; 

--educational initiatives to combat intolerance of religious and ethnic minorities and to 

promote human rights education; and 

--the expansion of the number and funding of educational, academic, government, and 

private exchange programs with Laos that will bring a wide cross-section of Lao society 

to the United States. 

Vietnam 

The government of Vietnam continues to commit systematic and egregious violations of 

religious freedom by harassing, detaining, imprisoning, and discriminating against leaders and 

practitioners from all of Vietnam’s religious communities. Religious freedom conditions in 
 

72

Vietnam remain poor, and the overall human rights situation has deteriorated in the past two 

years. The government has targeted popular religious leaders, intellectuals, free speech and 

democracy advocates, and members of ethnic and religious minority groups, who are accused of 

encouraging “peaceful evolution,” a term used to describe anyone suspected of quietly eroding 

the Communist Party’s legitimacy. Since 2002, the Commission has recommended that Vietnam 

be designated a “country of particular concern” or CPC. In September 2004, the State 

Department followed the Commission’s recommendation and designated Vietnam a CPC. 

In response to this designation, the government of Vietnam released from prison several 

prominent democracy, free speech, and religious freedom advocates, including Father Thadeus 

Nguyen Van Ly, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, Nguyen Dinh Huy, and Thich Thien Minh. While the 

Commission particularly welcomed the release of Fr. Ly, who was imprisoned after submitting 

written testimony to a Commission hearing in 2001, there are reports that security forces 

continue to accompany him at all times. Two others released with Fr. Ly, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que 

and Thich Thien Mien, are reportedly also under constant police surveillance. 

The Vietnamese government also responded to the CPC designation by issuing two legal 

documents to clarify and implement Vietnam’s 2004 Ordinance on Religious Beliefs and 

Religious Organizations. In February 2005, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai issued “Instructions 

on Protestantism,” which purports to allow Protestant “house churches” in the Central Highlands 

and northwest provinces to operate legally, if they renounce connections to groups that Hanoi 

has accused of organizing anti-government protests. The new instructions also prohibit forced 

renunciation of faith efforts by government officials, but do not specify criminal penalties for 

those who carry out these practices. 

In March 2005, the Prime Minister issued Decree 22, establishing specific requirements 

and deadlines for government approval of all religious groups, venues, seminaries, conferences, 

donations, festivals, ceremonies, and the selection and training of religious leaders. Although the 

regulations affirm the rights of Vietnamese citizens to freedom of religion and belief, there are 

also prohibitions on any religious activities that “undermine peace, independence and national 

unity; incite violence or wage war; disseminate information against prevailing State law and 

policies; sow division among the people, ethnic groups, and religions; cause public disorder; do 

harm to other people’s lives, health, dignity, honor, and property; hinder people from exercising 

their public obligations; spread superstitious practices and commit acts to breach the law.” 

These limitations go far beyond those permitted under international human rights law; they are 

broad, vague, and have been used in the past by the Vietnamese authorities to justify the 

imprisonment of religious leaders and other serious human rights abuses. The primary benefit of 

the new decree appears to be streamlining the process of registration and obtaining permits; 

deadlines for an official response are outlined in the decree and, in some cases, religious groups 

can expect a written explanation on why their application was denied. 

It remains to be seen how these new instructions and regulations are interpreted and 

enforced by security forces and local officials. The new laws codify existing rules and practices, 

yet, with the exception of the prohibition on forced renunciation of faith, they contain few 

protections against continued violations of religious freedom. They do not constitute sufficient 

progress to warrant either waiving action under the CPC designation, as required by the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, or removing the CPC designation. 
 

73

 

Over the past 15 years, the government of Vietnam has slowly carved out a noticeable 

“zone of toleration” for authorized religious practice. At the same time, it has actively repressed, 

and targeted as subversive, unauthorized religious activity, particularly among ethnic minority 

Christians in the Central Highlands and northwest provinces, “house-church” Protestants, leaders 

of the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam, and followers of religious minority groups such as 

the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. This repression continued in the last year. 

Religious leaders from the banned United Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) continue 

to face harassment and most are imprisoned or under house arrest. UBCV founders, the Most 

Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and the Very Venerable Thich Quang Do, remain under house 

arrest in Qui Nhon and Ho Chi Minh City respectively. They face charges of possessing “state 

secrets,” which carry with them a possible death sentence. There is urgent concern for Thich 

Huyen Quang’s failing health and access to medical care while under detention. Pressure on the 

UBCV leadership continues, despite Prime Minister Pham Van Khai’s March 2002 promise that 

arrests and harassment would end. 

The crackdown in the Central Highlands continues following last year’s Easter weekend 

(April 12-13, 2004) demonstrations. At that time, ethnic Montagnards were attacked by police, 

military, and other civilians during what were described as largely peaceful protests concerning 

land rights and religious freedom. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 

International state that at least 10 demonstrators were killed and dozens wounded. In addition, 

an undetermined number of Montagnards sought asylum in Cambodia. Vietnamese security 

forces are currently stationed in Montagnard villages, tracking down those who participated in 

the demonstrations and pursuing asylum seekers into Cambodia. The UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees has been granted limited access to Montagnard asylum seekers on the border by the 

Cambodian government. At least 700 Montagnards are now being processed for resettlement or 

repatriation in Phenom Penh. But restrictions remain on travel to the affected border regions and 

there is no protection granted to Montagnards who are repatriated to Vietnam. Credible reports 

are emerging from Gai Lai province that recently repatriated Montagnards were detained and 

beaten and are now held under house arrest. 

 

Given the lack of judicial transparency, accurate figures on the number of religious 

prisoners in Vietnam are difficult to obtain. According to the State Department, close to 120 

Montagnard Christians remain in prison either for religious activities or participation in public 

demonstrations for land rights and greater religious freedom. At least 10 Hmong Christians are 

in prison in the northwest provinces of Lai Chau and Ha Giang. Six Mennonite leaders, 

including the outspoken activist and human rights lawyer Rev. Nguyen Hong Quang, were 

sentenced in July 2004 for up to three years in prison after a brief scuffle with security forces 

who had been harassing church members. On April 12, 2005 an appeals court upheld the 

sentences of Pastor Quang and Evangelist Pham Ngoc Thach; three of those arrested with Pastor 

Quang were released after serving their sentences. Le Thi Hong Lien remains in prison despite 

reportedly suffering from physical and emotional problems. At least three Catholic priests from 

the Congregation of Mother Co-Redemptrix remain in prison for distributing religious books 

without permission. They were charged with security-related offenses and sentenced to 20 years. 

One of the three, Fr. Pham Minh Tri, has reportedly developed severe dementia while in prison, 
 

74

but has not been granted humanitarian parole. The State Department reports that at least one 

member of the Hoa Hao sect of Buddhism is in prison, though Hoa Hao groups in the United 

States claim the number to be much higher. 

 

There continue to be troubling reports that Vietnamese security forces use harassment, 

detention, church closings, beatings, and fines to force ethnic Hmong and Montagnard Christians 

to abandon their faith in both the Central Highlands and northwest provinces. In pursuit of this 

goal, the church and offices of Rev. Nguyen Cong Chinh, superintendent of the Mennonite 

churches in the Central Highland city of Kontum, were destroyed twice in the last year. 

 

Communist party and government officials interfere in the internal affairs of all organized 

religious communities, registered or unregistered. The government continues to impose limits on 

the number of candidates allowed to study for the Roman Catholic priesthood and requires 

prospective seminarians to obtain government permission before attending. Though relations 

with the Vatican are improving, the government continues to control the appointment and 

promotion of Catholic clergy and plays an active role in the selection of bishops, effectively 

vetoing those papal appointments of which it disapproves. Church property seized in 1975 also 

remains in government hands. Leaders of the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai religious communities 

are subject to surveillance, harassment, and discrimination. Though both organizations were 

granted official status, their governing management boards are dominated by individuals 

appointed by the Vietnamese government. Board positions are denied to long-standing and 

recognized Hoa Hao and Cao Dai leaders. 

 

In November 2004, the government of Vietnam issued a long-awaited Ordinance on 

Religion. Although the Ordinance affirms the right to freedom of religion or belief in the first 

clause, the remaining provisions extend government control by requiring religious groups to seek 

permission for virtually every religious activity. The Ordinance also continues to ban religious 

practice outside the officially recognized religious organizations, as well as any religious activity 

that threatens the vaguely defined notions of national security, national unity, and public order. 

The Ordinance does standardize religious management practices that had been subject to local 

variations. Nevertheless, while it purports to protect the rights and security of religious believers 

in Vietnam, the Ordinance also offers government officials more extensive control over all 

religious activity. 

Commissioners and staff have traveled to Vietnam and met with Vietnamese government 

officials and religious leaders. In addition, the Commission has met with officials in the 

Administration, Members of Congress, the Acting UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), and congressional staff about current U.S. policy and the Commission’s policy 

recommendations. 

 

In February 2004, then-Commission Chair Michael K. Young testified before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee’s hearing “Trade and Human Rights: The Future of U.S.-

Vietnamese Relations.” He discussed Vietnam’s record on religious freedom, as well as the 

Commission’s recommendations for U.S. policy. In October 2003, Commission Vice Chair Nina 

Shea testified at a joint Congressional Caucus on Vietnam and Congressional Human Rights 

Caucus hearing on Vietnam entitled, “Vietnam: A People Silenced.” 
 

75

The Commission issued press statements after the release of Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and the 

Prime Minister’s “Instructions on Protestantism.” The Commission also sent a letter to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice recommending policy options for Vietnam as a consequence of that 

country being named a CPC. 

 

Following the designation of Vietnam as a CPC, the Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government should: 

y identify those Vietnamese agencies and officials who are responsible for particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with respect to 

Vietnam, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Vietnamese government 

official who was responsible for or directly carried out such violations; and 

y re-prioritize human rights programming and technical assistance in Vietnam by dedicating no 

less than $1 million for FY 2005 and FY 2006, if discretionary funds are allocated to 

Vietnam above its annual earmark, to new or existing programs that will directly promote 

freedom of religion and belief and related human rights in Vietnam. 

With regard to religious freedom conditions in Vietnam, in addition to recommending 

that Vietnam be designated a CPC, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

y make clear to the government of Vietnam that ending violations of religious freedom is 

essential to the continued expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations, urging the Vietnamese 

government to: 

--establish a non-discriminatory legal framework for religious groups to engage in peaceful 

religious activities protected by international law without requiring groups to affiliate 

with officially registered religious organizations; for example: 

• allow the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam to register and operate independently 

of the official Buddhist organization, the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha; 

• allow leaders chosen by all Hoa Hao adherents to participate in the Executive Board 

of the Hoa Hao Administrative Council or allow a separate Hoa Hao organization to 

organize and register as the Hoa Hao Central Buddhist Church with the same 

privileges as the Administrative Council; 

• allow Presbyterian, Assembly of God, Baptist and any other Protestant denominations 

that do not wish to join either the Southern Evangelical Church or the Northern 

Evangelical Church of Vietnam, to register independently; and 

• allow Cao Dai leaders opposed to the Cao Dai Management Council to form and 

register a separate Cao Dai organization with management over its own affairs; 
 

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--establish a legal framework that allows for religious groups to engage in humanitarian, 

medical, educational, and charitable work; 

--amend the 2004 Ordinance On Religious Beliefs and Religious Organizations and Decree 

22, and other domestic legislation that may restrict the exercise of religious freedom, so 

that they conform to international standards for protecting the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief; 

--enforce the provisions in the Prime Minister’s “Instructions on Protestantism” that outlaw 

forced renunciations of faith and establish in the Vietnamese Criminal Code specific 

penalties for anyone who carries out such practices; 

--repeal Decree 31/CP of the Vietnamese Criminal Code which empowers local Security 

Police to detain citizens for up to two years without trial, as this decree is routinely 

invoked to detain religious followers and members of non-recognized religious 

denominations; 

--set up a national commission of religious groups, government officials, and independent, 

non-governmental observers to find equitable solutions on returning confiscated 

properties to religious groups; 

--release or commute the sentences of all those imprisoned or detained on account of their 

peaceful manifestation of religion or belief; including, among others, UBCV Patriarch 

Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Quang Do and six UBCV leaders detained in the 2003 

crackdown, members of ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and northwest 

provinces, and the six Mennonites arrested in July 2004, using the list compiled by the 

State Department pursuant to Section 108 of IRFA; 

--re-open all of the churches, meeting points, and home worship sites closed during 2001 in 

the Central Highlands and northwest provinces; 

--investigate and publicly report on the beating deaths of Hmong Protestant leaders Mua 

Bua Senh and Vang Seo Giao, and prosecute anyone found responsible for these deaths; 

--halt the practice of diplomatic pressure, offering of bounties, or cross-border police 

incursions into Cambodia for the purpose of forcibly repatriating Montagnards; and, 

--allow representatives of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), or some other 

appropriate international organization, unhindered access to the Central Highlands in 

order to monitor voluntarily repatriated Montagnards consistent with the Memorandum of 

Understanding (MoU) signed on January 25, 2005 between the UNHCR, Cambodia and 

Vietnam and provide unhindered access for diplomats, journalists, and non-governmental 

organizations to members of all religious communities in Vietnam, particularly those in 

the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces; and 
 

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• expand existing programs and initiate new programs of public diplomacy for Vietnam, 

including,

--expanding funding for additional Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

programming for Vietnam and to overcome the jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts; 

--targeting some of the Fulbright Program grants to individuals and scholars whose work 

promotes understanding of religious freedom and related human rights; 

--requiring the Vietnam Educational Foundation, which offers scholarships to Vietnamese 

high school age students to attend college in the United States, to give preferences to 

youth from ethnic minority groups areas (Montagnard and Hmong), from minority 

religious communities (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic, Protestant, Cham Islamic, and Kmer 

Buddhist), or former novice monks associated with the United Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam; 

--providing grants to educational NGOs to bring Vietnamese high school students to the 

United States for one year of study; 

--creating new exchange programs between the Vietnamese National Assembly and its staff 

and the U.S. Congress; 

• continue to expand its economic development, democracy, education, good governance, and 

rule of law programs in Vietnam by: 

--working with interested nations and international donors to create a development fund for 

ethnic and religious minorities that targets business creation, micro-enterprise 

development loans, and grants to improve agricultural, educational, health, and technical 

training, a fund that would prioritize areas with both rural poverty and significant human 

rights problems; 

--expanding existing rule of law programs to include regular exchanges between 

international experts on religion and law and appropriate representatives from the 

Vietnamese government, academia, and religious communities to discuss the impact of 

Vietnam’s laws and decrees on religious freedom and other human rights, to train public 

security forces on these issues, and to discuss ways to incorporate international standards 

of human rights in Vietnamese laws and regulations. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should appropriate additional money for the State 

Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund for new technical assistance and religious 

freedom programming. Funding should be commensurate to new and ongoing programs for 

Vietnamese workers, women, and rule of law training. 
 

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79

COUNTRY REPORTS: EUROPE AND EURASIA 

The OSCE: Advancing Religious Freedom and Combating Anti-Semitism

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) explicitly mentions U.S. 

participation in multilateral organizations as a method to advance respect for the right to freedom 

of religion or belief, which is enshrined in numerous international human rights declarations and 

conventions. The 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), i.e., all of Europe and the former Soviet republics along with the United States 

and Canada, have agreed to extensive and forward-looking standards in protecting freedom of 

religion or belief and combating discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. 

These issues comprise part of what is called in the OSCE the “Human Dimension.” 

Responding to a rise in incidents of racism, xenophobia, and discrimination, as well as 

intolerance towards Jews, Christians, Muslims, and members of other minority religions in the 

OSCE region, the Commission recommended in July 2004 that the OSCE create two high-level 

positions to be appointed by the Chairman-in-Office (CiO): a Special Representative on 

Discrimination and Xenophobia and a Special Representative on Anti-Semitism. In December 

2004, this recommendation was acted upon; the OSCE’s CiO appointed three Representatives to 

promote greater tolerance and combat racism, xenophobia, and discrimination in the OSCE 

region. These appointments, confirmed by the OSCE Permanent Council in December 2004, 

will extend through 2005 under the current Chairmanship. The mandates of these new 

Representatives include promoting better co-ordination of participating States' efforts to 

implement decisions taken at the OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Councils in the field of 

tolerance and non-discrimination, and co-operating on these tasks with the CiO and the Office of 

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Each Representative will focus on a 

particular problem area: combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination, including intolerance 

and discrimination against Christians and members of other religions; combating anti-Semitism; 

and combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims. 

In December 2004, the OSCE organized a new Tolerance Unit within the ODIHR to 

monitor, and encourage compliance with, OSCE commitments to combat xenophobia, antiSemitism, and Islamophobia and to promote freedom of religion. The United States has been 

particularly active in advocating the creation of the unit and funding its activities. Among other 

actions, the ODIHR Tolerance Unit will coordinate with other relevant international 

organizations, set up a database of information, and work on specific projects, such as hate 

crimes legislation and Holocaust education in specific countries. 

Also in the past year, the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief was 

re-organized and expanded to a total of almost 60 members from the OSCE region, including a 

new Advisory Council of fifteen members. At its February 2005 meeting, the Advisory Council 

approved a new structure of activities: country-specific engagement and dialogue, such as the 

review of relevant legislation; comparative policy papers, which may be published as ODIHR 

documents; and education and training activities on tolerance, international standards on freedom 

of religion or belief, inter-faith dialogue, and conflict prevention or resolution. 
 

80

Since it was established in 1975, the OSCE has been a highly successful multilateral 

venue for the promotion of human rights concerns, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, which is singled out for special mention in the Helsinki Final Act. After 

the fall of the Soviet Union, the organization has increased in importance as a forum in which the 

countries of the former Soviet Union are held accountable for their human rights practices. 

Moreover, since its inception, the OSCE has traditionally included non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) as valuable contributors in its unique process of consensual diplomacy. 

In the past year, however, the delegations from nine countries, led by Russia along with 

eight other former Soviet states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 

Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, issued a written statement demanding that the OSCE give 

less emphasis to human rights concerns, including religious freedom, and more weight to 

security matters. In July 2004, the institution itself came under more pointed attack when these 

countries accused the OSCE of failing to respect their sovereignty. Having been criticized—in 

some cases, repeatedly—by OSCE election monitors for holding elections that failed to meet 

democratic standards, the nine countries accused the OSCE of interfering in their internal affairs. 

Russia, in particular, has protested frequently in recent years that the OSCE focuses too 

much of its criticisms on the countries of the former USSR, while downplaying human rights 

problems in the west. Yet, on the invitation of the United States, the OSCE deployed an Election 

Observation Mission for the U.S. November 2004 presidential elections. Nevertheless, Russia 

withheld its consensus for the OSCE’s 2005 budget, thereby preventing its implementation and 

putting in jeoopardy many of the organization’s human rights activities. Reportedly, 

negotiations on the resolution of the 2005 OSCE budget crisis were underway in April 2005, 

along with possible major organizational reforms. The OSCE’s human rights activities are 

particularly crucial at a time when the government of Russia—and those of many other countries 

of the former USSR—are demonstrating an increasing lack of commitment to their human rights 

obligations, including in efforts to combat racism, xenophobia, and various other forms of 

intolerance and discrimination. 

Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief

For several years, the Commission has participated in U.S. delegations to OSCE meetings 

and made recommendations relating to the work of the OSCE on protecting freedom of religion 

or belief and on combating anti-Semitism in the OSCE region. In advance of the OSCE 

Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia, and Discrimination in 

September 2004, the Commission issued a statement with recommendations to the U.S. 

government, as part of its engagement with the OSCE and its participating States, asking the 

U.S. delegation to the OSCE to urge the participating States to: 

--take specific steps to ensure that they are complying with their commitments to combat 

discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen 

Document on the Human Dimension, including adopting laws against incitement to 

violence and ensuring effective remedies for acts of discrimination; 

--take concrete action to engage in a regular public review of compliance with OSCE 

commitments on freedom of religion or belief, on racial and religious discrimination, and 
 

81

on anti-Semitism, including by facilitating a more active role by NGOs as part of that 

process; 

-- condemn in a public fashion, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, attacks 

targeting Muslims and pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of such attacks; 

 --take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, such as publicly to 

condemn specific anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of attacks on 

Jews and their communal property, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of 

expression, to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized anti-Semitic activities; 

--ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict 

the human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, of members of religious 

minorities; 

--bring national legislation and practice, as well as local laws, into conformity with 

international human rights standards and OSCE commitments by: permitting all religious 

groups to organize and conduct their activities without undue interference; discontinuing 

excessive regulation of the free practice of religion, including registration or recognition 

requirements that effectively prevent members of religious communities from exercising 

their freedom to manifest religion or belief; and permitting limitations on the right to 

freedom of religion or belief only as provided by law and consistent with participating 

States’ obligations under international law; 

--monitor the actions of regional and local officials who violate the right to freedom of 

religion or belief and provide effective remedies for any such violations; and 

--establish mechanisms to review the cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or 

charged with, religious, political, or security offenses and to release those who have been 

imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices, as well as any others who 

have been unjustly detained or sentenced. 

In 2003 and 2004, the Commission participated with the U.S. delegation to several 

special OSCE meetings, contributing to official statements and recommendations on freedom of 

religion or belief and tolerance. The Commission sought to ensure that the U.S. statements 

named particular countries where the government had engaged in or tolerated serious violations 

of religious freedom. It also sought to highlight problems in several OSCE countries where (a) 

laws unduly restrict official registration or recognition, which is in some cases necessary in order 

to engage lawfully in organized religious activities, or (b) governments have established specific 

initiatives targeting so-called “sects” or “cults.” 

In September 2004, at the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism, 

Xenophobia, and Discrimination, Commissioner Felice D. Gaer made a presentation stressing the 

importance of freedom of religion and belief in the OSCE region. At the October 2004 OSCE 

Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM), the Commission publicized information on 

the status of freedom or belief in various countries of the OSCE region, including Azerbaijan, 

Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Commission’s concerns about 

religious freedom were included in the concluding intervention by the U.S. delegation to the 
 

82

HDIM meeting. At the HDIM, the Commission also met with delegations from Belgium and 

Russia, as well as with numerous NGOs from the OSCE region, including France, Russia, 

Belarus, the Netherlands, and Uzbekistan. 

Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region 

As numerous studies attest, anti-Jewish sentiment is surfacing again in a number of 

OSCE participating states; failure to hold the perpetrators of anti-Semitic attacks to account is 

frequently the official response. Many, albeit not all, of the recent anti-Semitic incidents in 

Western Europe reportedly have been committed by disaffected, marginalized young members of 

North African Muslim immigrant communities. France and other Western European countries 

are becoming more and more nations of immigrants. Another source of the violence and antiSemitic rhetoric in Europe is the so-called “skinhead” gangs. These gangs target Jews and 

members of other ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslim immigrants, with bombings 

and other violence and seek to inflame public opinion against them. Anti-Semitism by extremist 

nationalist groups in Eastern Europe and Russia is documented, but officials rarely investigate 

and prosecute acts of violence. Anti-Zionism and vilification of Israel can also mask antiSemitism. 

To compound the problem, anti-Semitic and extremist rhetoric emanating from some 

intellectual circles that goes uncontested by political and societal leaders has promoted an 

environment of intolerance toward Jews and members of other ethnic and religious minorities. 

The problem is widespread. When burnings, beatings, and other acts of violence are directed at a 

particular group because of who they are and what they believe, such violent acts should not be 

viewed merely as police problems, but as human rights violations. The U.S. government should 

be unequivocal in its position that anti-Semitism and other acts of violence directed against 

ethnic and religious minorities are human rights matters and should be addressed as such. 

The Commission was one of the first official bodies to draw specific attention to, and 

speak out against, the rise in anti-Semitic violence taking place in Europe. The Commission has 

addressed anti-Semitism and related issues in the course of its work on several countries, both 

inside and outside of the OSCE region, including Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, France, Russia, 

Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. Congress introduced and unanimously passed 

resolutions in both the Senate and House concerning the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe. The 

Senate version cited the Commission’s findings and urged the Commission to continue 

documenting the issue. 

 The Commission has recommended that the U.S. government work with the OSCE to 

ensure that separate attention is paid to the rise of anti-Semitism in the region and collaborated 

with the U.S. delegation successfully to urge participating States to agree to convene the OSCE’s 

first-ever special meeting on anti-Semitism, held in Berlin in April 2004. The Commission 

participated in the preparations for that meeting, including a consultation by the U.S. government 

with the German government, and participated with the official U.S. delegation to the meeting. 

Addressing those preparatory meetings, Commissioner Gaer stressed that acts of anti-Semitism 

must be seen not as hooliganism, but as a form of human rights abuse that states should 

vigorously combat by implementing their international human rights commitments. 
 

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At the Berlin meeting itself, Commissioner Gaer discussed anti-Semitism in the OSCE 

region and met with a wide variety of delegations and NGOs from among the OSCE 

participating States. Also at that meeting, Commission staff met with representatives of the 

German, British, and Russian delegations, as well as with NGOs from Azerbaijan, the 

Netherlands, France, and Russia. The resulting OSCE “Berlin Declaration” on anti-Semitism 

has served as a precedent for the United Nations in organizing its own public event on combating 

anti-Semitism. In July 2004, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government should 

advocate an active role for NGOs in monitoring religious intolerance. During the Berlin 

conference on anti-Semitism, the Commission called the attention of the U.S. delegation to the 

key role played by NGOs in monitoring anti-Semitism, intolerance, and discrimination, and this 

language was included in the delegation’s concluding speech. 

With regard to the institution of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• express continued strong support for the OSCE in the face of attacks led by the Russian 

government on the OSCE, particularly on its human rights activities carried out by the Office 

of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); and 

y authorize and appropriate additional funds to existing U.S. contributions to the OSCE for the 

purpose of expanding programs that advance freedom of religion or belief and combat 

xenophobia and discrimination against Muslims, Christians, and members of other religions, 

and against anti-Semitism. 

Calling the recognition by the OSCE of a resurgence of anti-Semitism throughout the 

region a good first step, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government: 

• take concrete action within the OSCE to ensure that all participating states are living up to 

their commitments to combat discrimination and intolerance, in particular to combat antiSemitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, action which should include 

adopting laws to protect against incitement to violence based on discrimination, including 

anti-Semitism, and providing the individual with effective remedies to initiate complaints 

against acts of discrimination; 

• undertake a public review of compliance by participating States within the OSCE on a 

regular basis of their commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism; 

and 

• provide the ODIHR the necessary mandate and adequate resources to hire experienced staff 

at the working level to monitor compliance with OSCE obligations on freedom of religion or 

belief and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. 

Belarus 

The government of Belarus continues seriously to violate the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief and related human rights. Belarusian authorities persist in 
 

84

enforcing the harsh 2002 law on religion, resulting in severe regulatory obstacles and 

bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the activities of many religious communities. Officials 

continue to harass, fine, or detain adherents of various denominations, including the Greek 

Catholic Church and the Belarusian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, as well as religious 

communities relatively new to the country, such as Evangelical Protestants and the Hare 

Krishnas. The government also refuses to acknowledge ongoing anti-Semitism and does not 

prosecute those responsible for vandalism and other criminal activities directed against Jews or 

the Jewish community. There have also been instances of violence directed against members of 

other religious minorities, such as the country’s small Hindu minority. The Commission 

continues to place Belarus on its Watch List, and will maintain its scrutiny to determine whether 

the government’s record rises to a level warranting designation as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. 

Belarus has a highly authoritarian government that does not respect the human rights of 

its citizens. Almost all political power is concentrated in the hands of President Aleksandr 

Lukashenko and a small circle of advisors. The Lukashenko regime has been widely accused of 

serious human rights abuses, including involvement in the “disappearances” of several 

opposition figures, as well as the imprisonment of journalists and strict controls on the media. 

According to the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the 

Belarusian government continued to restrict the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly 

and association. Commencing in late 2003, the Belarusian authorities stepped up their campaign 

against all independent actors in their country, including independent media outlets, trade unions 

and non-governmental organizations. 

Since coming to power in 1994, Lukashenko has constructed a set of regulatory and 

bureaucratic obstacles that make legitimate religious activities impossible for members of many 

religious communities. Some minority religious groups have been attacked in the state-run 

media, and their members have experienced violent attacks against their persons and property. 

Police have dispersed worship services and some religious leaders continue to face arrest, heavy 

fines, and other forms of harassment. In October 2002, Lukashenko signed new legislation on 

religion that led to further restrictions on religious freedom in Belarus. Although the law 

purports to codify protections for religious freedom, in fact, it provides government officials in 

the nation-wide Committee of Religious and Nationality Affairs of the Council of Ministers 

(CRNA) with further tools to repress and control religious activities without providing any clear 

mechanisms to check abuses by these officials. 

Considered by many observers to be the most repressive religion law in Europe, the 2002 

Belarus law essentially prohibits all unregistered religious activity by organized groups; religious 

communities with fewer than 20 members; foreign citizens from leading religious activities; and 

religious activity in private homes, with the exception of small, occasional prayer meetings. The 

law set up a three-tiered system of registration, and particularly restricts the activities of groups 

on the lowest tier. The law also requires all religious organizations to apply for re-registration 

within two years. The registration criteria laid out in the law are vague, thus facilitating 

continued abuse by government officials. According to the law, religious publishing and 

education are restricted to religious groups that have 10 or more registered communities, 

including at least one that was in existence in 1982. This requirement of at least 20 years 

existence in Belarus is especially onerous, since the cutoff date of 1982 falls during the Soviet 
 

85

period of religious repression when few religious groups were able to operate openly. Moreover, 

all religious literature is now subject to compulsory government censorship, and most 

communities are denied the right to establish institutions to train clergy. 

The 2002 religion law mandated that all religious communities in Belarus re-register with 

the CRNA by November 2004. Although the majority of previously registered groups have been 

able to re-register, over 100 have been unsuccessful or pointedly denied registration. The CRNA 

claims that many of the remaining 105 unregistered communities had been dissolved. However, 

several groups, including the Hare Krishna community, are appealing their registration denials. 

Due to the refusal to register the Hindu Light of Kaylasa community, its leaders have sought 

asylum abroad and that group no longer functions inside Belarus. Since the new law bans 

registered religious communities from using residences as their legal addresses without specific 

authorization from the government, many other groups, such as some Greek Catholic and 

Pentecostal communities that meet in private homes because they cannot rent or buy meeting 

space, now face the additional risk of being unable to re-register. 

The religion law makes clear that without registration, a group’s activities are technically 

illegal. As a result, a number of church leaders and other individuals have been subject to fines 

and other prosecution. In 2005, an unregistered Hare Krishna community was given an official 

warning for holding an unauthorized religious meeting. Two official warnings can lead to court 

proceedings to liquidate a religious organization. In late December 2004, the pastor of the 

charismatic New Life Church in Minsk was given a fine equal to 150 times the minimum 

monthly wage for organizing religious worship without state permission. Under the 2002 

religion law, a second such fine provides the legal basis to ban the congregation. In March 2005, 

the pastor faced criminal charges for repeatedly organizing illegal worship, and a court levied a 

second fine against him. According to the religion law, therefore, the authorities can now close 

down his church. 

In addition to the registration issue, various other laws, regulations, and directives restrict 

the activities of registered religious communities. For example, groups are not allowed to 

function outside their geographic area of registration. Furthermore, if, as in the case of the Greek 

Catholic Church, even a registered religious community does not qualify as a “central 

association,” it cannot own media outlets or invite people from outside Belarus to work with the 

community. 

Attacks on Jews or Jewish property continue to be reported in Belarus, with little attempt 

made by the authorities to hold perpetrators to account. Memorials, cemeteries, and other 

property are regularly subject to violence, and, although President Lukashenko sometimes 

condemns the attacks, only rarely are cases against the perpetrators raised or pursued. According 

to one Belarusian Jewish leader, official inaction results in impunity for attackers. In January 

2005, a leading Jewish activist was arrested in central Minsk when he protested the on-going 

destruction of Jewish sites in Belarus. Anti-Semitic literature is sold in government buildings, in 

stores, and at events directly and indirectly connected with the Belarusian Orthodox Church. In 

addition, because the 2002 religion law states that religious organizations do not have priority in 

reclaiming property if a former worship building is now used for culture or sport, only nine of 92 

historic synagogues in Belarus have been returned to the Jewish community since 1991. 
 

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Since 1994, President Lukashenko has openly favored the Belarusian Orthodox Church 

(BOC, an Exarchate of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church), resulting in a privileged 

position for the BOC in relation to other religious communities. This relationship was codified 

in June 2003, when the Belarus government and the BOC signed a concordat setting out the 

Church’s influence in government affairs and other facets of public life. Relations between the 

BOC and the Belarus government have created particular problems for many Protestant groups, 

which have sometimes been denied registration or permission to rent or build a place of worship 

by regional authorities who have been influenced by local Orthodox leaders. Several 

“independent” Orthodox churches that do not accept the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in 

Moscow have been denied registration, before and after the new law was passed. These 

churches include the Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the True Orthodox Church, a branch 

of the Orthodox Church that rejected the compromise with the Soviet government made by the 

Russian Orthodox Church in the 1920s. In March 2004, the Belarusian government granted the 

BOC the exclusive right to use the word “Orthodox” in its title, although there are other 

Orthodox communities in Belarus. 

The Commission has traveled to Belarus and met with officials for the State Committee 

on Religious and Nationalities Affairs as well as with representatives of various religious and 

human rights groups. In 2004, Commission staff met with independent human rights activists 

from Belarus, including the author of the “White Book,” an extensive report on religious 

persecution in that country. The Commission released a report on Belarus in May 2003 that 

presented findings and recommendations for U.S. policy. In 2004, the Commission participated 

in meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, presenting information 

on freedom of religion in Belarus. In March 2005, the Commission met with delegation heads 

from the United States and European Union (EU) countries at the 61st session of the UNCHR 

session and presented information about violations of religious freedom in Belarus. 

The Commission pressed for passage of the Belarus Democracy Act, which was passed 

by Congress in October 2004. 

With regard to Belarus, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• use every measure of public and private diplomacy to advance the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus, including enhanced monitoring and public 

reporting, especially in light of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 

weakened monitoring mandate inside Belarus; 

• urge the Belarus government to take immediate steps to end repression, including: 

--repealing the highly repressive religion law; 

--ending the practice of denying registration to religious groups and then erecting obstacles 

to religious practice because of that unregistered status; 

--providing the right to conduct religious education and distribute religious material; 
 

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--halting government attacks on the persons and property of minority religious groups; 

--ensuring a greater effort on the part of government officials to find and hold to account 

perpetrators of attacks on the persons and property of members of religious minorities; 

and 

-- providing free access by domestic and international human rights groups and others to 

sites of religious violence or destruction of places of worship; 

• ensure that the activities to promote democracy authorized by the Belarus Democracy Act 

include the right to freedom of religion or belief and religious tolerance;

• urge the Belarus government to issue invitations to the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 

and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression; the Special Representative of the 

Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary 

Disappearances; 

• urge the Belarus government to ensure that no religious community is given a status that may 

result in or be used to justify the impairment of the rights of members of other religious 

groups; 

• urge the Belarus government to publicly condemn, investigate and prosecute criminal acts 

against Jews and the Jewish community, as well as members of other ethnic and religious 

communities, and 

• continue to support, publicly and privately, persons and groups engaged in the struggle 

against repression in Belarus, including the group of religious and opposition activists who 

make up the Freedom of Religion Initiative that published the “White Book.” 

Georgia

Georgia’s former government under President Eduard Shevardnadze exhibited a slow and 

inadequate response to three years of vigilante violence against members of some of the 

country’s religious minorities. However, under the new government of President Mikheil 

Saakashvili, the number of reported incidents of violence against minority religious communities 

markedly decreased in 2004. Moreover, in January 2005, two of the leaders of this vigilante 

violence were sentenced to prison for their involvement in the attacks. Georgian officials have 

also permitted the Jehovah’s Witnesses Watchtower Bible Society to operate legally in the 

country for the first time. Though other religious freedom issues remain unresolved in Georgia, 

such as that only the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has formal legal status, significant 

improvement in religious freedom conditions in the past year has led the Commission to remove 

Georgia from its Watch List. 
 

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Georgia’s 1995 Constitution mandates the separation of church and state, guarantees 

religious freedom, and forbids “persecution of an individual for his thoughts, beliefs or religion.” 

In practice, however, violations of religious freedom have occurred, especially at the regional 

level, where local officials have restricted the rights of mainly non-traditional religious 

minorities, who in past years were subjected to societal violence. 

The precipitous drop in the number of violent attacks on religious minorities and the 

sentencing of the ringleaders of the violence represent improvements for religious freedom in 

Georgia. Under the Shevardnadze government, minority religious groups in Georgia, including 

Baptists, Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Orthodox churches that do not 

accept the primacy of the GOC Patriarchate, were subjected to more than 100 violent vigilante 

attacks. Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as members of independent Orthodox churches, were 

particularly targeted. Local police were implicated in these attacks, as they often refused to 

intervene to protect the victims. What began in 1999 as a series of isolated attacks in the capital 

of Tbilisi escalated by 2002 into a nation-wide scourge of widely publicized mob assaults against 

members of religious minorities. 

The main instigators of these attacks were defrocked GOC priest Basil Mkalavishvili and 

director of the Orthodox “Jvari” Union Paata Bluashvili, the latter of whom was reportedly 

supported by some in the GOC hierarchy. After years of government delays and inaction, in 

November 2003, only days after the Shevardnadze government fell, a court in Rustavi sentenced 

Bluashvili and four associates to suspended prison terms, ranging from two to four years, for 

their role in spearheading the violence in two attacks against Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

The other leader of mob violence against religious minorities, Basil Mkalavishvili, a 

priest who is currently under the jurisdiction of Greek Old Calendarist Bishop Metropolitan 

Cyprian of Oropos and Fili, has also been convicted on criminal charges, though only after 

somewhat drawn-out legal proceedings. Over 100 police stormed Mkalavishvili’s church in 

Tbilisi in March 2004, and he was taken into three-month pre-trial detention in conformity with a 

June 2003 court order; a later closed court hearing ruled that seven of his followers also be held 

for three months of pre-trial detention. In response to a public outcry over the way these arrests 

were conducted, President Saakashvili denied that his government was undermining Orthodoxy 

and justified Mkalavishvili’s detention as a way to “defend” the GOC from “extremist religious 

groups [which] threaten the Orthodox church.” Also in March 2004, the Georgian Orthodox 

Patriarchate issued a statement that the GOC had in fact defrocked Mkalavishvili in 1996. 

Mkalavishvili and an associate were sentenced in January 2005; Mkalavishvili received a fiveyear term and his associate a four-year term. Their lawyers reportedly plan to appeal the 

sentences. 

Despite improvements, some religious freedom concerns remain. Although the primary 

leaders of the violent attacks against members of religious minorities have been convicted, many 

of the people accused of participating in this violence—including local police officials—have not 

been held to account by the Georgian authorities, reportedly due to fears of offending the GOC 

hierarchy. Moreover, Orthodox communities other than the GOC and some other minority 

Christian denominations encounter difficulties from local officials and the GOC in building 

places of worship or displaying their literature in bookstores. 
 

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The current absence of a mechanism for religious groups to obtain legal status means that 

only one religious community in the country, the GOC, enjoys such status as a result of its 2002 

concordat with the Georgian government. In September 2003, the Roman Catholic Church 

failed to gain legal status in Georgia when the Georgian government suddenly cancelled plans to 

sign an agreement with the Vatican. The leaders of many other religious minority groups also 

seek recognized legal status, a prerequisite for the community collectively to own property or 

organize most religious activities. However, the absence of formal legal status generally has not 

prevented most religious communities from functioning through affiliated nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) that are registered with the government as NGOs or as individual 

members of the community. As of this writing, President Saakashvili is considering a law to 

grant legal status to religious communities via the civil code. 

Other concerns involve the role of the GOC, to which 65 percent of the country’s 

population claim adherence. Article 9 of the Constitution recognizes the “special importance of 

the GOC in Georgian history.” In October 2002, the Georgian government signed an agreement, 

or concordat, with the GOC, granting the Church some approval authority over state school 

textbooks, the construction of religious buildings, and the publication of religious literature by 

other religious groups. In recent years, Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Lutherans, Muslims, Old 

Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Roman Catholics have stated that the GOC Patriarchate has 

often acted to prevent them from acquiring, building, or reclaiming places of worship. The 

Patriarchate has also reportedly denied permission for Pentecostals, the Salvation Army, and the 

True Orthodox Church to print some religious literature in Georgia, although Assyrian Chaldean 

Catholics, Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Yezidis (an ancient religion with a majority of ethnic 

Kurdish adherents) have not reported difficulties in this regard. 

Despite general tolerance toward minority religious communities seen as traditional to 

Georgia, opinion polls and the Georgian media reflect significant societal intolerance towards 

Protestants and other religions relatively new to Georgia, seen as a threat to the GOC and 

national cultural values. Public opinion polls continue to show that a majority of Georgians view 

minority or new religious groups as detrimental and that violence against and the prohibition of 

such groups would be acceptable, according to the State Department’s 2004 human rights report. 

Some GOC representatives have argued that foreign Christian missionaries should confine their 

activities to the country’s non-Christian areas. The Georgian media has also reflected intolerant 

views towards religious minorities. 

With regard to Georgia, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

y encourage the Georgian government to continue to investigate and prosecute those 

individuals, including local officials, who are alleged to have been complicit or engaged in 

violence against members of religious minority communities; 

y encourage the Georgian government to establish a mechanism to enable religious 

communities to gain legal personality under Georgian law, consistent with international 

human rights standards; and 
 

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y direct funding to initiate programs in Georgia for journalists, religious leaders, and members 

of non-governmental organizations to promote religious tolerance and provide education on 

international standards on freedom of religion or belief. 

The Russian Federation 

Since its inception, the Commission has monitored and reported on the status of freedom 

of religion or belief in the Russian Federation. During these years, Russia has been of consistent 

concern to the Commission not so much because of the severity of the country’s religious 

freedom violations, but rather due to its fragile human rights situation, including that of religious 

freedom. Of primary concern are the trends which have emerged in the past few years which 

raise serious questions about Russia’s commitment to democratic reform and the protection of 

religious freedom. This is also critical because Russia continues to be a model, especially for 

other former Soviet states and other nations struggling to establish democratic systems after a 

history of despotism. 

The Commission expressed strong concern in its May 2003 report that the Russian 

government was retreating from democratic reform, endangering the significant human rights 

gains, including freedom of religion or belief, in the dozen years since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. Current curtailments in media freedom and in the role of political parties, as well as 

legal restrictions on freedom of assembly, popular referenda and the end to popular election of 

regional governors, all reveal that progress towards democracy is being halted, if not reversed. 

Most, if not all, of the concerns about freedom of religion or belief raised by the Commission 

appear to be directly related to the growing influence of authoritarian, and perhaps even 

chauvinistic, strains in the Russian government. The country’s progress, based on the rule of 

law, the protection of human rights, and democratic freedoms, is now in peril. 

Clearly, the practice of religion in Russia is far freer now than during the Soviet period, 

when militant atheism was the preferred state policy. Yet, despite that improvement, problems 

remain. A 1997 law on religious organizations contains provisions that have prevented some 

religious groups from registering and thus practicing freely. Many regional governments have 

passed ordinances that result in discrimination against minority religious groups, and acts of 

violence against members of religious and other minorities are widespread. The government has 

granted preferential treatment to the Russian Orthodox Church, calling into question whether 

religious freedom will be guaranteed for all. Until the late 1990’s, however, the Russian 

government responded to some of these concerns, and Russian courts provided some protection 

against violations. 

Developments in the past few years, however, raise very serious doubts about Russia’s 

commitment to the protection of religious freedom. Russian authorities have denied registration 

to certain religious communities, based on the allegedly insufficient time they have existed, 

despite a February 2002 Russian Constitutional Court decision that found that an active religious 

organization registered before the 1997 law could not be deprived of its legal status for failing to 

re-register. The March 2004 Moscow court decision banning the Jehovah’s Witnesses in that 

city, upheld on appeal, marked the first time a national religious organization in Russia has had a 

local branch banned under the 1997 law. The protracted trial took place even though 135,000 
 

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Jehovah’s Witnesses practice their faith in registered communities in many other parts of Russia. 

The trial has led to increased difficulties for Jehovah’s Witnesses in renting facilities to hold 

worship services in other parts of Russia. The Salvation Army has not been re-registered, 

despite a Constitutional Court ruling that overturned the government’s decision not to register 

the organization in Moscow. 

Official efforts to portray “foreign sects,” mostly Evangelical Protestants, as alien to 

Russian culture and society continue. Members of unregistered Baptist and Pentecostal 

communities faced particular hardships in 2004. On the eve of hosting a major national 

conference, a Baptist church in Tula was burned. In the Buryatia republic, authorities removed 

children from Pentecostal families and placed them in orphanages. In the Udmurtia republic, 

police raided a registered Pentecostal church in Izhevsk in April 2005, and threatened four 

women with rape. 

This official campaign appears to be part of an increased effort by the Russian 

authorities to promote the status of Russia’s so-called “traditional” religions: Russian 

Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. A “Law on Traditional Religions,” first proposed in 

February 2002 and whose status remains unclear, would formalize benefits already granted de 

facto, in varying degrees, to organizations from these four religions. In March 2004, the Russian 

press reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin, while acknowledging the legal separation 

of church and state, said that he supports a legal initiative to “support the spiritual leaders of the 

traditional confessions,” including on property issues. 

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has played a special role in Russian history and 

culture. However, there is continued concern that the ROC enjoys a favored status among many 

Russian government officials, a situation that sometimes results in restrictions on other religious 

communities. Particularly on the local level, evidence suggests that the Orthodox Church has a 

very close relationship with officials and other state bodies. There continue to be frequent 

reports that minority religious communities must secure permission from the local Orthodox 

Church before being allowed to build a place of worship. Adherents of minority faiths, 

including Muslims, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Old Believers, Protestants, and Hare Krishnas, 

report that government officials sometimes create other barriers to their activities, often at the 

behest of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. 

Due to their perceived links to the decade-long conflict in Chechnya, Muslims throughout 

Russia are increasingly subject to widespread discrimination, media attacks and occasional acts 

of violence. Meeting in secret session in February 2004, the Russian Supreme Court banned 15 

Muslim groups because of their alleged ties to international terrorism. The Court’s factual 

findings on which the court made its decision have not been made public. Yet, police, 

prosecutors, and courts reportedly have used those secret findings to arrest and imprison 

individuals from among Russia’s estimated 20 million Muslims. Individuals of nationalities 

traditionally associated with Islam have also been subjected to numerous attacks in Russia and 

rarely is anyone held to account. Cemeteries and mosques have been vandalized, including five 

Muslim cemeteries in Moscow in 2004. There are reports that Russian authorities have also 

taken steps—including arrests, allegedly on the basis of fabricated evidence—against Muslims, 

Muslim human rights activists and Muslim groups that are independent of the country’s official 
 

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Muslim organizational structures. In response, Muslim individuals and communities 

increasingly are engaging in public protests. 

Many in Russia’s Jewish community say that conditions for the country’s Jews are better 

than before 1991 because, unlike in the Soviet period, the state no longer has an official policy of 

sponsoring anti-Semitism. Despite this, anti-Semitic acts, including vandalism and physical 

attacks, are on the rise, particularly in the cities of Moscow, Volgograd, Voronezh, 

Petrozavodsk, St. Petersburg, Penza, and the Kaliningrad region,. According to one report, the 

number of anti-Semitic articles in the Russian media in the first few months of 2005 equaled the 

number for all of 2004. Moreover, at the same time that President Putin told an international 

audience at the Auschwitz commemoration ceremonies in late January 2005, that “no one has the 

right to be indifferent to anti-Semitism, nationalism, and racial and religious intolerance,” 20 

members of the Russian State Duma (Parliament) called on the Procurator General to ban all 

Jewish organizations in Russia for alleged incitement of religious and ethnic hatred. Though the 

letter was later officially withdrawn, none of the signers have expressed regret for the views it 

expressed. In April 2005, another letter, expressing similarly virulent anti-Semitic views, was 

signed by 5,000 people, including many well-known Russian public figures and church officials. 

Both letters were publicly condemned by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Jews have been 

assaulted in Moscow, Ulyanovsk, and Voronezh; official investigations of these incidents have 

been inconclusive. Last year, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries and memorials were vandalized 

in St. Petersburg, Petrozavodsk, Pyatigorsk, Kaluga, Makhachkala, and Derbent. There have 

been few prosecutions in response to these incidents. 

Russian authorities continue to deny visas or residence permits for Catholic, Protestant, 

and Muslim clergy and other religious workers or to grant short-term visas, although, according 

to the 2004 State Department human rights report, a new government publication on the rights of 

foreign religious workers helped resolve a number of these problems. Yet, in April 2005, the 

head of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of European Russia was denied re-entry to Russia and 

his one-year residence permit was annulled. Responding to many requests from the Buddhist 

community in Russia, the Dalai Lama finally received a visa and was allowed to visit Kalmykia 

for several days in late November 2004, though strict limits were imposed on his itinerary and 

activities. 

Members of minority religions continue to face prejudice, societal discrimination and 

occasional physical attacks. The perpetrators of this vandalism and violence are rarely held to 

account. Incidents of religiously, racially, or ethnically motivated attacks have markedly 

increased in recent years, though the exact motivation for such attacks is difficult to determine. 

The total number of extremist youth groups, conventionally known as “skinheads,” according to 

some estimates, is 50,000 in 85 cities, particularly in several major cities in European Russia. 

Skinhead groups frequently express anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic views as well as hostility 

towards “foreigners” and “foreign” religions. 

In April 2004, Commissioner Felice D. Gaer took part in the Berlin Conference on AntiSemitism of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where she 

discussed anti-Semitism in the OSCE region, including in Russia. In September 2004, at the 

Brussels OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia, and 
 

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Discrimination, Commissioner Gaer made a presentation on religious freedom conditions in 

Russia and other countries in the OSCE region. During the October 2004 OSCE Human 

Dimension Meeting, the Commission staff presented information on the status of freedom of 

religion or belief in numerous countries from the OSCE region, including in Russia. 

In July 2004, the Commission hosted a briefing in Washington DC on religious freedom 

conditions in Russia, featuring a video-taped interview with Aleksandr Chuev, a Russian Duma 

deputy, who has said that the Duma should adopt an amendment to punish those who insult 

“traditional” religious beliefs. In August 2004, the Commission released a press statement 

noting concern about the increasing influence of authoritarian and chauvinistic strains within the 

Russian government that appear to be directly related to growing religious freedom problems. In 

February 2005, the Commission held a joint briefing with the Kennan Institute for Advanced 

Russian Studies on “Russia: Religious Communities, Extremist Movements and the State,” 

chaired by Commissioner Gaer, at which findings were presented by experts on the current 

status of Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities, as well as on increased acts of ethnic and 

religious extremism. Also in February, the Commission issued a press statement calling on 

President Bush to raise with President Putin the state of freedom of religion or belief in Russia at 

their then-upcoming meeting. In April 2005, the Commission hosted a briefing with Oleg 

Mironov, the former Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, and Mufti Ismagil 

Shangareev, director of the Islamic Human Rights Defense Center in Russia. 

The Commission has advocated continued inclusion of the “Smith Amendment” in the 

Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, which conditions foreign assistance to the Russian 

government if the President certifies that the Russian government has not implemented any 

statute, executive order, or regulation that discriminates against religious groups or religious 

communities, in violation of accepted international agreements on human rights and religious 

freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party. Congress included this provision in the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. 

With regard to Russia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• make clear its concern to the Russian government that efforts to combat terrorism should not 

be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict the rights, including religious freedom, of 

members of Russia’s religious minorities; 

• urge the Russian government to ensure that any special role for the Orthodox Church or any 

other religious community does not result in violations of the rights of, or discrimination 

against, members of other religious groups; 

• make clear its concern to the Russian government that hostile rhetoric against Muslims and 

the Islamic faith is fueling an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack 

Muslim or Muslim-appearing persons with impunity; 

y urge the Russian government to take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of antiSemitism, including condemnation of anti-Semitic acts, the investigation and prosecution of 

the perpetrators of violent incidents of anti-Semitism, and, while vigorously protecting 
 

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freedom of expression, counteracting anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic 

activities;

• continue to press the Russian government to ensure that a previously reported government 

policy of grouping of Catholics, Protestants, and others together with Islamic extremists—

collectively labeled as threats to Russia’s national security—is not adopted as Russian 

government policy; 

• continue to urge the Russian government to cease interference in the internal affairs of 

religious communities, such as denials of visas and work permits to religious workers and 

attempted interference in the elections in religious bodies; 

• urge the government of Russia to monitor the actions of regional and local officials who 

interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, take steps to bring local laws and 

regulations on religious activities into conformity with the Russian Constitution and 

international human rights standards, and bring those who commit crimes to justice; 

• ensure that the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya remains a key issue in its 

bilateral relations with Russia and urge the Russian government to end, and prosecute acts of, 

torture, arbitrary detention, rape, and other abuses by members of the military in Chechnya; 

to accept a site visit to Chechnya from the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Extrajudicial 

Executions, and Violence Against Women; and to provide full cooperation to the UN High 

Commissioner for Human Rights in connection with her upcoming visit to Chechnya; 

• raise religious freedom and other human rights violations in multilateral fora, including the 

OSCE and the UN, and continue, on a bilateral basis, to encourage the government of Russia 

to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to 

visit Russia and to provide full cooperation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary 

Forms of Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance in connection with his planned visit 

to Russia in June 2005; 

• use every possible means to engage and support the genuine democrats in the Russian 

government at the federal and local levels, and ensure that U.S. aid programs are not being 

used to support the activities in Russia of authoritarian-minded officials; and 

• advance human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia by continuing to provide 

assistance, as appropriate, to non-governmental organizations, public interest groups, 

journalists, and academic institutions, and by expanding programs aimed at encouraging 

religious tolerance and supporting international standards on freedom of religion and other 

human rights. 

Turkmenistan 

Turkmenistan is among the most repressive states in the world today and engages in 

systematic and egregious violations of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

Since 1985, the country has been ruled by President Saparmurat Niyazov, who, after 
 

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Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991, has assumed total control of the country. His allpervasive authoritarian rule and escalating “personality cult” effectively prevent any opposition 

or independent religious activity within the country. The overall human rights situation in 

Turkmenistan deteriorated significantly after November 2002, when, in response to a reported

assassination attempt, Niyazov began arresting hundreds of relatives or associates of dissidents. 

Many have been sentenced to as many as 25 years in prison and others have been sent to 

psychiatric hospitals. Although religious freedom is severely proscribed in Turkmenistan and 

there is scant evidence that the situation for religious freedom has improved in the past year, the 

Secretary of State has not named Turkmenistan a CPC. The Commission continues to 

recommend that the Secretary of State designate Turkmenistan as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. 

President Niyazov has promoted a state-controlled version of Islam as a key part of 

Turkmen identity. Since independence in 1991, religious groups must register with the 

government in order to engage in religious activities. The 1997 version of the religion law 

effectively banned all religious groups except the state-controlled Sunni Muslim Board and the 

Russian Orthodox Church, though religious instruction even for these two communities is 

severely limited. Niyazov has allowed only one madrassa, or Islamic school, to remain open. In 

late March 2004, he proclaimed that no new mosques should be built and at least seven mosques 

are reported to have been destroyed in 2004. Imams have been instructed by the government to 

repeat an oath of loyalty to the “fatherland” and to the President after each daily prayer. 

The status of religious freedom declined further after the passage of a new law on 

religion in November 2003. This law further codified the Turkmen government’s already highly 

repressive policies that effectively ban most religious activity in Turkmenistan and established 

criminal penalties for those found guilty of participating in “illegal religious activity.” The law 

also requires religious groups to coordinate with the Turkmen government any contacts with coreligionists abroad. In response to international pressure, Niyazov issued a decree in March 2004 

that religious communities may register “in the prescribed manner” and will no longer have to 

meet the requirement of 500 members to do so. The March decree only amended those portions 

of the law relating to the numerical requirements for registration and not the penalties for 

violating it. 

In May 2004, President Niyazov issued two decrees revoking criminal penalties and 

financial and reporting requirements from the law on religious organizations. As a result, the 

majority Sunni Muslims and the Russian Orthodox Church, along with four small groups 

(Adventists, Baptists, Baha’is and the Hare Krishnas) were registered, but their situation has 

scarcely improved in practice. In April 2005, the Turkmen authorities indicated that they were 

willing to register five more small religious communities. Turkmen officials have noted, 

however, that this apparent easing of registration requirements does not mean that religious 

communities will be able to meet in private homes to conduct services, or that there is an easing 

of the requirement that religious groups must request permission from the Turkmen government 

before holding worship services of any kind. It is thus not clear what practical benefits 

registration provides. 

President Niyazov has bolstered his personality cult with the publication of a threevolume work, Rukhnama, containing his “spiritual thoughts,” which is required reading in all 
 

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schools. Rukhnama quotations have been carved alongside citations from the Koran in the 

country’s largest mosque and copies of Rukhnama are now reportedly mandatory in mosques and 

churches throughout the country and must be given equal prominence with the Koran and the 

Bible. Opposition on religious grounds to this requirement is considered a grave affront to 

Niyazov’s power. Indeed, in March 2004, the country’s former chief mufti, Nazrullah ibn 

Ibadullah, who had opposed the requirement to elevate the Rukhnama, was sentenced in a closed 

trial to 22 years in prison, reportedly on charges of treason for his stand on the Rukhnama and his 

purported involvement in the alleged November 2002 assassination attempt against Niyazov, 

though Ibadullah had publicly condemned it. The former chief mufti remains in prison and 

reportedly has been maltreated by prison guards. 

Even before the adoption of the new law on religion, the 1997 version of the religion law 

made it all but impossible for religious minorities to register and function legally. Turkmen 

security forces routinely interrogate and intimidate believers, especially those attempting to 

fulfill the registration requirement. Members of unregistered religious communities—including 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, and Shi’a and other Muslims operating independently of the 

Sunni Muslim Board—continue to be arrested, detained, imprisoned, and reportedly tortured, 

deported, harassed, and fined. In addition, they have had their congregations dispersed, services 

disrupted, religious literature confiscated, and places of worship destroyed. Members of some 

religious minority groups in Turkmenistan have reportedly been forced to renounce their faith 

publicly, swearing an oath on a copy of Rukhnama. Security officials regularly break up 

religious meetings in private homes, search homes without warrants, confiscate religious 

literature, and detain and threaten congregants with criminal prosecution and deportation. 

Family members of detained religious leaders have been subjected to harassment and internal 

exile. The import of religious materials is virtually impossible. Although several Jehovah’s 

Witnesses who had refused to serve in the military were released in 2004, several others were 

later jailed and then released by presidential decree in April 2005. One of the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, released from imprisonment in 2004, reportedly had been subjected to torture. Even 

the registered Russian Orthodox community has been affected by the repressive policies of 

Niyazov, who issued a decree banning residents of Turkmenistan from receiving Russian 

publications by mail, a ban that included the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 

In 2004, the Commission raised concerns about the lack of religious freedom in 

Turkmenistan at several meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

The Commission also met with Tracey Jacobson, U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan, to discuss 

bilateral relations, the status of human rights, including religious freedom, and possible steps the 

United States might take to ameliorate the situation. As recommended by the Commission, the 

UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) passed resolutions condemning Turkmenistan for 

repression of religious and political rights in 2003 and 2004. In March 2005, the Commission 

met with delegation heads from the United States and European Union (EU) countries at the 61st

session of the UNCHR session and presented information about violations of religious freedom 

in Turkmenistan, questioning the decision of the United States and the EU not to introduce a 

resolution on Turkmenistan at the 2005 UNCHR. 

In May 2004, the Commission organized two public briefings on “Religious Freedom in 

Turkmenistan: the U.S. Response to One of the World’s Worst Religious Freedom 

Violators,” one held with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other 
 

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with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Also in May, the Commission released a public 

statement in response to the Turkmen Ministry of Justice’s declaration that unregistered religious 

activity continues to be illegal, noting that “CPC designation would likely lead to significant 

improvements for the religious communities in Turkmenistan who have been ignored by the 

outside world for too long.” 

In addition to recommending that Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, the Commission 

has further recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• suspend all non-humanitarian assistance to the government of Turkmenistan, with the 

exception of programs that serve specifically identifiable U.S. national security interests in 

connection with the current campaign against terrorism. This recommendation does not 

apply to U.S. assistance to appropriate non-governmental organizations, private persons, or 

cultural or educational exchanges; 

• scrutinize all aspects of any remaining assistance programs in Turkmenistan to ensure that 

these programs do not facilitate Turkmen government policies or practices that result in 

religious freedom violations. The United States should also examine its programs in 

Turkmenistan to determine if opportunities exist within those programs to promote the 

development of genuine respect for human rights, including religious freedom, in that 

country; 

• support efforts to facilitate Turkmenistan’s sale of natural gas on world markets, including 

support for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, only if the Turkmen government takes definitive 

steps to improve substantially conditions for religious freedom in Turkmenistan; 

• identify specific steps that the government of Turkmenistan could take in order to have its 

currently suspended assistance reinstated and to avoid triggering further restrictions on 

assistance programs, steps which should include, but not be limited to (1) the lifting of 

oppressive legal requirements on religious groups and allowing all such groups to organize 

and operate freely; (2) the end to harassment and deportation of religious leaders; and (3) the 

halting of unjust arrest, detention, imprisonment, torture, and residential and workplace 

intimidation of religious leaders and their adherents, including releasing those currently in 

detention or imprisoned; 

• press the government of Turkmenistan: (a) to release immediately and unconditionally any 

persons who have been detained solely because of their religious beliefs, practices, or choice 

of religious association; (b) to ensure that all people in Turkmenistan are able to exercise 

their right to religious freedom without threat of harassment, detention, imprisonment, or 

torture; and (c) to permit all religious groups to organize and worship freely; 

• suspend state visits between the United States and Turkmenistan until such time as religious 

freedom conditions in the country have improved significantly; and 

• encourage scrutiny of religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan in appropriate 

international fora such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other 

multilateral venues and also raise the issue of religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan at 
 

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those UN bodies that consider human rights questions, including the UN Commission on 

Human Rights (UNCHR) and, because the United States and the EU did not introduce a 

resolution on Turkmenistan at the UNCHR in 2005, at the UN General Assembly’s Third 

Committee. The United States should advocate for creation of a UN Special Rapporteur to 

investigate and report publicly on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan to the UNCHR 

and the General Assembly. 

Uzbekistan 

Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1992, fundamental human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, have not been respected. In addition to a restrictive law on religion 

that severely limits the ability of religious communities to function in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek 

government continues to exercise a high degree of control over the manner in which the Islamic 

religion is practiced. Uzbek authorities also continue to crack down harshly on Muslim 

individuals, groups, and mosques that do not conform to government-prescribed practices or that 

the government claims are associated with extremist political programs. This has resulted in the 

imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent years, many of whom are denied the right to due 

process, and there are credible reports that many of those arrested continue to be tortured or 

beaten in detention. Though security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of 

Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups that claim a religious linkage, these threats do not excuse or 

justify the scope and harshness of the government’s ill treatment of religious believers. Because 

the government of Uzbekistan has engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, 

the Commission recommends to the Secretary of State that Uzbekistan be designated a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should 

not in any way be construed as a defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist and highly intolerant 

organization that promotes hatred against moderate Muslims, the West, Jews, and others. 

The Uzbek government continues to exercise tight control over all religious practice in the 

country. Despite the constitutional guarantee of the separation of religion and state, the 

government under President Islam Karimov strictly regulates Islamic institutions and practice 

through the officially-sanctioned Muslim Spiritual Board. The Uzbek government has also closed 

approximately 3,000 of the country’s 5,000 mosques that were open in 1998. In what many view 

as the country’s most actively religious area, the Ferghana valley, some mosques are being used as 

warehouses or have been confiscated by the state for other purposes; in the Kashkadarya region, 

some mosques are allowed to open only for major religious holidays. 

Over the past 10 years, and particularly since 1999, the Uzbek government has arrested and 

imprisoned, with sentences of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who reject the state’s control 

over religious practice or who the government claims are associated with extremist groups. 

According to the State Department’s 2004 human rights report, there are an estimated 5,500 such 

people currently imprisoned in Uzbekistan. In some cases, piety alone is reported to result in state 

suspicion and arrest. Human rights organizations report that many of those in detention were 

arrested on specious drug charges or for possession of literature of a banned religious organization. 

Once arrested, they frequently are denied access to a lawyer or are held incommunicado for weeks 

and sometimes even months. Many individuals detained for these reasons are treated especially 

severely in prison; those who pray or who observe Muslim religious festivals are by many 
 

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accounts subjected to further harassment, beatings, and possibly torture, in efforts to force them 

to renounce their religious or political views. 

The use of torture is widespread and, despite promises from the government to halt it, has 

not diminished. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in his February 2003 report on 

Uzbekistan, concluded, “torture or similar ill-treatment is systematic” in Uzbekistan and that the 

“pervasive and persistent nature of torture throughout the investigative process cannot be 

denied.” The report also pointed out that “the practice of maintaining families in a state of 

uncertainty with a view to punishing or intimidating them and others must be considered 

malicious and amounting to cruel and inhuman treatment.” Even after the publication of the 

Rapporteur’s report, reliance on the use of torture in detention has not decreased significantly. 

One human rights organization has documented 10 deaths from torture over a five-year period; 

two prisoners are known to have died in early 2005. 

The government of Uzbekistan does face threats to its security from certain groups that 

claim religious links, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has used violence in 

the past but whose membership reportedly declined significantly as a result of U.S. military 

action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Uzbekistan continues to be subject to violent attacks, as 

occurred in several incidents in 2004, although the motivation of those responsible has not been 

fully established. 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned in most Muslim countries, purports not to engage in violence but 

is intolerant of other religions and has sanctioned violence in some circumstances. The group 

calls for the establishment of a worldwide caliphate in place of existing governments and the 

imposition of an extremist interpretation of Islamic law. Although it does not specify the methods 

it would use to attain those goals, it does, according to the State Department, reserve the 

“possibility that its own members might resort to violence” in an effort to achieve them. In 

addition, the State Department reports that the literature of the Hizb ut-Tahrir includes “strong antiSemitic and anti-Western rhetoric.” Alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir make up most of the 

thousands in prison; however, in the majority of cases, Uzbek authorities have presented no 

evidence that these persons have participated in any violent acts. Many of those arrested and 

imprisoned are not in fact affiliated with Hizb ut-Tahrir but are only accused of membership or 

association, sometimes due to possession of the group’s literature when they are arrested. Some 

reportedly had the group’s literature planted on them at the time of arrest. 

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations passed in May 1998 

severely restricts the exercise of religious freedom. Through a series of regulations that are often 

subjectively applied, the law imposes onerous hurdles for the registration of religious groups; 

criminalizes unregistered religious activity; bans the production and distribution of unofficial 

religious publications; prohibits minors from participating in religious organizations; prohibits 

private teaching of religious principles; and forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by 

anyone other than clerics. A total of 100 religious communities of all faiths are known to be 

currently seeking registration. Although the only religious community registered in 2004 was a 

Jewish group in Ferghana, a Jewish organization in Tashkent was denied registration last year. In 

denying the registration application, Uzbek officials reportedly told the group that a Jewish 

organization already exists in Tashkent and the Jewish community does not need another one. 
 

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As with Muslims, pastors or other members of Protestant churches have been arrested on 

spurious drug or other charges. Several Christian leaders have reportedly been detained in 

psychiatric hospitals, severely beaten, and/or sentenced to labor camps. In the past year, 

Christian groups continued to have their churches raided, services interrupted, Bibles 

confiscated, and the names of adherents recorded by Uzbek officials. There are frequent reports 

that, in such official actions, they are accused of being members of alleged extremist 

organizations. In this atmosphere, some Christian groups in various parts of Uzbekistan have 

been forced to operate underground; the situation of Protestants is particularly difficult in 

Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic in the country’s northwest, where it is almost 

impossible for churches to be registered. 

In October 2004, the Commission traveled to Uzbekistan and met with senior officials of 

the Foreign, Internal Affairs, and Justice Ministries, the Presidential Administration, the 

Committee on Religious Affairs, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s office. The delegation 

also met with Islamic, Jewish, and Christian communities and other religious groups, Uzbek 

human rights activists and lawyers, victims of repression and their families, Western nongovernmental organizations that are active in Uzbekistan, and U.S. Embassy personnel. In 

March 2005, the Commission held a briefing with representatives of the Russian human rights 

group Memorial and the Uzbek Legal Aid Society on religious freedom in Uzbekistan; the 

panelists, along with Commission staff, were later interviewed by the Russian Service of the 

Voice of America. 

Language reflecting a Commission recommendation on Uzbekistan was included in the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. The Congress conditioned funds to Uzbekistan on its 

“making substantial and continuing progress in meeting its commitments under the ‘Declaration 

of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and 

the United States of America,’” such as respect for human rights, including religious freedom. 

Throughout the past year, the Commission held numerous meetings with various 

delegations of Uzbek religious leaders, as well as with human rights groups and academics. 

In addition to recommending that Uzbekistan be named a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

y ensure that it speaks in a unified voice in its relations with the Uzbek government and that 

U.S. statements and actions are coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. concerns 

about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings with the Uzbek 

government; 

y ensure that U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the exception of assistance to 

improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, be made contingent upon 

establishing and implementing a specific timetable for the government to take concrete steps 

to improve conditions of freedom of religion or belief and observe international human rights 

standards, steps which should include: 

--ending reliance on convictions based solely on confessions, a practice that often is linked 

to ill treatment of prisoners and implementing the recommendations of the UN 
 

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Committee Against Torture (June 2002) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 

(February 2003); 

--halting the detention and imprisonment of persons on account of their religious beliefs 

and practices; 

--establishing a mechanism to review the cases of persons previously detained under 

suspicion of or charged with religious, political, or security offenses, including Criminal 

Code Articles 159 (criminalizing “anti-state activity”) and 216 (criminalizing 

membership in a “forbidden religious organization”); releasing those who have been 

imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices as well as any others who 

have been unjustly detained or sentenced; and making public a list of specific and 

detailed information about individuals who are currently detained under these articles or 

imprisoned following conviction; 

--implementing the recommendations of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts on Religion or Belief to revise the 1998 law on 

Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and bring it into accordance with 

international standards; 

--registering religious groups that have sought to comply with the legal requirements; and 

--ensuring that every prisoner has access to his or her family, human rights monitors, 

adequate medical care, and a lawyer, as specified in international human rights 

instruments and allowing prisoners to practice their religion while in detention to the 

fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of their detention; 

y ensure that U.S. security and other forms of assistance are scrutinized to make certain that 

this assistance does not go to Uzbek government agencies, such as certain branches of the 

Interior and Justice Ministries, which have been found to be responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom as defined by IRFA; 

y reinstate Uzbek-language radio broadcasts at the Voice of America (VOA), and use VOA 

and other appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to explain to the people of Uzbekistan 

why religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign policy, as well as specific 

concerns about violations of religious freedom in their country; 

y establish “American corner” reading rooms in various regions of Uzbekistan, including in the 

capital Tashkent, which should include materials on democracy, civic education, human 

rights, the role of religion in society and other relevant topics; 

y encourage scrutiny of Uzbek human rights concerns in appropriate international fora such as 

the OSCE and other multilateral venues and facilitate the participation of Uzbek human 

rights defenders in multilateral human rights mechanisms; 
 

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y urge the Uzbek government to agree to visits by UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief and the Independence of the Judiciary and provide the full and necessary 

conditions for such visits; 

y respond publicly and privately to the recent expulsions of U.S. non-governmental 

organizations and the numerous new restrictions placed on their activities; unless these 

restrictions are rescinded, the U.S. government should make clear that there will be serious 

consequences in the U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relationship, including a ban on high-level 

meetings; 

y conduct continued careful monitoring of the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged 

religious, political, and security offenses and continue efforts to improve the situation of 

Uzbek human rights defenders, including by pressing for the registration of human rights 

groups and religious communities; 

y continue to develop assistance programs for Uzbekistan designed to encourage the creation 

of institutions of civil society that protect human rights and promote religious freedom, 

programs that could include training in human rights, the rule of law, and crime investigation 

for police and other law enforcement officials; since such programs have been attempted in 

the past with little effect, they should be carefully structured to accomplish, and carefully 

monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of, these specific goals: 

--expanding legal assistance programs for Uzbek relatives of detainees, which have 

sometimes led to the release of arrestees; 

-- expanding “train-the-trainer” legal assistance programs for representatives of religious 

communities to act as legal advisers in the registration process; 

--specifying freedom of religion as a grants category and area of activity in the Democracy 

and Conflict Mitigation program of the U.S. Agency for International Development and 

the Democracy Commission Small Grants program administered by the U.S. Embassy; 

and 

--encouraging Uzbek authorities to move ahead with a planned series of national and local 

public roundtables between Uzbek officials and representatives of Uzbek civil society on 

freedom of religion; 

y increase opportunities in its exchange programs for Uzbek human rights advocates and 

religious figures, and more specifically: 

--expand exchange programs for Uzbek religious leaders to include representatives from all 

religious communities; 

--expand exchange programs for Uzbek human rights defenders, including participation in 

relevant international conferences and opportunities to interact with Uzbek officials; and 
 

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--in case an Uzbek participant in an exchange program encounters difficulties with the 

Uzbek authorities upon return to Uzbekistan, ensure that the U.S. Embassy vigorously 

protest such action and if it continues, inform the Uzbek authorities that there will be 

negative consequences in other areas of U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations, including a ban on 

high-level meetings. 

 
 

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COUNTRY REPORTS: THE MIDDLE EAST 

Egypt 

Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations 

against members of religious minorities, including non-conforming Muslims, remain widespread 

in Egypt. In the last two years, the Egyptian government has adopted some measures to 

acknowledge the religious pluralism of Egypt’s society, including the addition of materials in its 

public school curriculum on Coptic Christian contributions to Egypt’s history; the issuance of a 

presidential decree designating Coptic Christmas as an official national holiday; the formation of 

a National Council for Human Rights; and increased efforts in promoting interfaith activity. Yet, 

the government has not taken adequate steps to halt repression of and discrimination against 

religious believers, including the indigenous Coptic Orthodox Christians, or, in many cases, to 

punish those responsible for violence or other severe violations of religious freedom. Nor has 

the government taken steps to combat widespread and virulent anti-Semitism in the media. 

Egypt remains on the Commission’s Watch List, and the Commission continues to monitor the 

actions of the government of Egypt to see if the situation rises to a level that warrants 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record that includes repressive practices which 

seriously violate freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The government 

maintains tight control over all Muslim religious institutions, including mosques and religious 

endowments, which are encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned interpretation of Islam. 

According to Egyptian officials, the government regulates these Muslim institutions and 

activities as a necessary precaution against religious extremism and terrorism. The state appoints 

and pays the salaries of all Sunni Muslim imams; all mosques must be licensed by the 

government; and sermons are monitored by the government. 

There is a growing sense among human rights organizations that Islamic extremism is 

advancing in Egypt with detrimental effects on the prospects for democratic reform, religious 

tolerance, and the rights of women and girls. Some believe that the government is not acting to 

its fullest ability to counteract this problem, especially in the area of public education and the 

media, where the extremist influence is growing. 

There is continued prosecution in State Security Courts and imprisonment for those 

accused of “unorthodox” Islamic religious beliefs or practices that insult the three “heavenly 

religions”: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Article 98(f) of the Penal Code, which prohibits 

citizens from “ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife,” continues to 

be applied to prosecute alleged acts by purportedly “unorthodox” Muslims. These include 

Muslims groups, such as the Koranites, who are accused of practicing beliefs deemed to deviate 

from Islamic law. In May 2002, a group of 21 persons were referred to trial in a State 

(Emergency) Security Court, accused of “insulting religion due to unorthodox Islamic beliefs 

and practices.” Several of those charged were convicted and sentenced to prison terms. 

Amnesty International reports that in February 2003, State Security Courts sentenced six people 

to six months imprisonment for “contempt of religion” in connection with holding private 

religious gatherings and advocating modifications to basic Islamic rules. In December 2003, 
 

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state security services arrested and imprisoned 20 Shia Muslims without charge and subsequently 

interrogated them concerning their religious beliefs; they were reportedly physically abused. 

According to the State Department, 19 of the Shia were released by August 2004, though one 

remains in detention. In December 2004, 13 “unorthodox” Muslims were referred to trial by a 

State Emergency Court on charges of “insulting heavenly religions”; their status is currently 

unknown. 

 Members of Egypt’s non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Christians, Jews, and 

Baha’is, report discrimination, interference, harassment, and surveillance by the Egyptian state 

security services. Although neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code prohibits proselytizing 

or conversion, the State Department has observed that the Egyptian government uses the Penal 

Code to discourage proselytizing by non-Muslims. Article 98 (f) of the Code is used frequently 

to prosecute alleged acts of proselytism by non-Muslims. 

Coptic Orthodox and other Christian denominations face ongoing problems with societal 

intolerance and violence by Muslim extremists, and the government has not adequately 

addressed those problems. Egyptian authorities have been accused of being lax in protecting the 

lives and property of Christians, though some Christian groups have reported fewer attacks by 

extremists in the last year. Egyptian government officials have confirmed that in June 2004, the 

Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal of 94 of 96 suspects who were charged with various 

offenses in connection with the killing of 21 Christians in Al-Kosheh in late 1999 and early 

2000. The decision has left public prosecutors and Christian advocates with no further legal 

options within the Egyptian legal system. Some Egyptian human rights advocates believe that 

the only recourse is to urge Egyptian authorities to investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in the violence. 

In addition to violence, Christians face official and societal discrimination. Although 

Egyptian government officials claim that there is no law or policy that prevents Christians from 

holding senior positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian community faces de facto discrimination 

in appointments to high-level government posts. For all Christian groups, government 

permission must still be sought to build or repair a church, and the approval process for church 

construction is time consuming and inflexible. Although President Mubarak reportedly approves 

applications for new construction and that, under new regulations, provincial governors now 

have the authority to approve applications for church repair, hundreds of applications are 

languishing in the system. Even some permits that have been approved cannot be acted upon 

because of interference by the state security services, at both the local and national levels. 

Known converts from Islam to Christianity generally receive attention from the state 

security services, and converts have been arrested for attempting to change their religious 

affiliation on identity documents. Most conversions are reportedly done quietly and privately. 

Egyptian government officials have stated that no law prevents conversion, but some individuals 

have been arrested for falsifying documents. In some instances, converts, who fear government 

harassment if they officially register their change in religion from Islam to Christianity, have 

reportedly altered their own identification cards and other official documents to reflect their new 

religious affiliation. A recent court decision in 2004 affirmed that the state could not prevent a 

woman from changing the religion on her identity card from Muslim to Christian. According to 
 

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the State Department, it is not clear if this decision will set a precedent for future cases involving 

conversion of individuals from Islam to Christianity. 

Baha’is also face repression and violations of their rights. All Baha’i institutions and 

community activities have been banned since 1960 by a presidential decree. As a result, Baha’is 

are unable to meet and engage in communal religious activities. Over the years, Baha’is have 

been arrested and imprisoned because of their religious beliefs, often on charges of insulting 

Islam. Almost all Baha’i community members are known to the state security services, and 

many are regularly subject to surveillance and other forms of harassment. Al-Azhar’s Islamic 

Research Center has issued fatwas (religious edicts) in recent years urging the continued ban on 

the Baha’i community and condemning Baha’is as apostates. There has reportedly also been 

increased intolerance of Baha’is in both the independent and government-controlled media in 

recent years. The Egyptian government’s requirement that religious affiliation be included on 

national identity cards particularly affects the Baha’i community. Because “Muslim, Jew, or 

Christian” are the only allowable choices, Baha’is are effectively prevented from obtaining the 

cards, which are necessary to engage in many basic transactions such as opening a bank account, 

buying a car, or obtaining a driver’s license. Moreover, the Egyptian government has recently 

made it illegal to be in public without an identity card. Because the Baha’i faith is banned, the 

community also has difficulty obtaining or renewing passports, birth certificates, and death 

certificates. Egyptian government officials have stated that the rights of Baha’is are not 

protected under the Constitution, since, in accordance with Islamic principles, protection applies 

only to adherents of the three “heavenly religions”: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. 

Material vilifying Jews—with historical and new anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears 

regularly in the state-controlled and semi-official media. This material includes Holocaust 

denial, anti-Semitic cartoons, and television programming, such as a 24-part series based on the 

notorious anti-Semitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” Egyptian authorities have not taken 

adequate steps to combat anti-Semitism in the media. Human rights groups also cite persistent, 

virulent anti-Semitism in the education system, which is increasingly under the influence of 

Islamic extremists, a development that the Egyptian government has not adequately addressed. 

The small Jewish community maintains and owns its property and performs required 

maintenance through private donations without excessive interference from local authorities. 

However, state security services continue to regulate and approve those permitted to make 

repairs, which, in some cases, has created problems and delays. 

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, who believe in or seek to establish 

an Islamic state in Egypt based on their interpretation of Islamic law, are considered illegal 

organizations by the Egyptian government under a law prohibiting political parties based on 

religion. The Muslim Brotherhood and some of these other groups have used violence in the 

past to achieve their aims, including the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and 

attacks on foreign tourists. Some groups continue to advocate violence. Egyptian security forces 

continue to arrest hundreds of Islamists every year, and some are subject to torture and/or 

prolonged detention without charge. According to human rights groups, there are currently 

12,000-15,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in administrative 

detention whose cases are not being addressed. Groups that closely monitor the detention of 
 

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such individuals claim that the vast majority of these prisoners are in prison as a result of their 

political beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

In July 2004, a Commission delegation traveled to Egypt. While there, the delegation 

met with senior government officials, religious leaders, human rights groups, scholars, educators, 

legal specialists, and others active in civil society. Throughout the past year, the Commission 

and its staff met with members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious 

communities in Egypt, as well as civil society and human rights groups, and other Egypt experts. 

With regard to Egypt, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should 

urge the Egyptian government to: 

y shift de facto responsibility for religious affairs from the state security services, with the 

exception of cases involving violence, and establish a body or position (e.g., an ombudsman) 

in the office of the President to oversee religious affairs in Egypt; 

y repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 1981, in order to allow for the full 

consolidation of the rule of law in Egypt; 

y repeal the nineteenth-century, Ottoman-era Hamayouni Decree, which requires non-Muslims 

to obtain a presidential decree to build a new place of worship, and ensure that all places of 

worship are subject to the same transparent, non-discriminatory, and efficient criteria and 

procedures for construction and maintenance; 

y allow full access to the constitutional and international guarantees of the rule of law and due 

process for those individuals charged with violating Section 98 (f) of the Penal Code, which 

“prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife,” 

instead of having those cases heard by the State Security Courts; 

y exclude from all educational textbooks any language or images that promote enmity, 

intolerance, hatred, or violence toward any group of persons based on faith, gender, ethnicity, 

or nationality, and include in school curricula, in school textbooks, and in teacher training the 

concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights, including religious freedom, ensuring that 

textbooks meet the standards for education set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights; 

y cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews and Baha’is, in the 

government-controlled media and take active measures to promote understanding and respect 

for members of these and other minority religious communities; 

y take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, including 

condemnation of anti-Semitic acts, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, 

counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic activities; 

y ensure that every Egyptian is protected against discrimination in social, labor, and other 

rights by modifying the national identity card either (a) to omit mention of religious 

affiliation from identity documents, or (b) to make optional any mention of religious 
 

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affiliation on identity documents, since currently, individuals must identify themselves as 

adherents of one of the three recognized faiths: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism; 

y urge the Egyptian government more actively to investigate societal violence against any 

individuals or groups on the basis of their religion, particularly the targeting of Coptic 

Orthodox Christians, to bring those responsible for such violence to justice, and to ensure 

compensation for those targeted; 

y investigate claims of police negligence and inadequate prosecution of those involved in the 

Al-Kosheh case; 

y request the National Council for Human Rights to investigate allegations of discrimination 

against Coptic Orthodox Christians as a human rights issue and to publish their findings and 

recommendations; 

y repeal a 1960 presidential decree banning the Baha’i community from practicing their faith; 

and 

y implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN Committee Against Torture. 

In addition, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• negotiate an agreement with the Egyptian government to establish a timetable and specific 

steps to be taken to make progress on political and legal reforms, including the steps 

described in the recommendations above; if deadlines are met in a timely manner, the U.S. 

government should consider, within the boundaries of its overall aid to Egypt, providing 

economic assistance to areas where significant progress has been made, but if deadlines are 

not met, the U.S. government should re-consider the dimension and direction of its economic 

assistance;

• offer direct support for human rights and other civil society non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) without prior approval by the Egyptian government; 

• urge the Egyptian government to ensure that NGOs engaged in human rights work can 

pursue their activities without undue government interference, and monitor and report to 

what extent this is accomplished; 

• expand support of initiatives to advance human rights, promote religious tolerance, and foster 

civic education among all Egyptians, including support for: 

--civic education and public awareness programs that reflect the multi-confessional nature 

of Egyptian society and the diversity of Egypt’s religious past; 

--efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to review Egyptian educational curricula and 

textbooks for messages of hatred, intolerance, and the advocacy of violence, and to 

monitor equal access to education by girls and boys regardless of religion or belief; and 
 

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--preservation of Egyptian Jewish properties and antiquities in a publicly accessible site, 

such as in a museum, so that all Egyptians can better understand past and present Jewish 

contributions to their history and culture; and 

• as mandated by section 104 of IRFA, train Foreign Service Officers at Embassy Cairo about 

universal human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, the history, 

experiences, and contributions of different religions to Egyptian history, and ways to identify 

and respond to discriminatory and other abridgements of the rights of persons belonging to 

these communities. 

 In the context of the annual congressional appropriation for U.S. assistance to Egypt, 

Congress should require the State Department to report to it annually on the extent to which the 

government of Egypt has made progress on the issues described in this chapter, as well as on the 

progress of the U.S. government on offering funding directly to Egyptian NGOs without prior 

Egyptian government approval. 

Iran 

The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily or 

entirely upon the religion of the accused. Over the past year, the Iranian government’s poor 

religious freedom record deteriorated, particularly for Baha’is, Evangelical Christians, and 

Muslim dissidents, all of whom have faced intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and 

imprisonment. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, significant numbers from all religious minority 

communities have fled Iran for fear of persecution. Since 1999, the State Department has 

designated Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission continues to 

recommend that Iran remain a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaims Islam, particularly the 

doctrine of the Twelver (Shia) Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the country. It 

stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic 

criteria. The Head of State, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 

Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, the internal security forces, and the 

judiciary. The Council of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme 

Leader, reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis (parliament) for adherence to Islamic and 

constitutional principles. The Constitution grants the Council of Guardians the power to screen 

and disqualify candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, 

including candidates’ ideological and religious beliefs. In February 2004, elections were held for 

the 290-seat Parliament in Iran. In a move to diminish pro-reformist re-election chances, the 

Guardian Council disqualified approximately one-third of the 8,200 submissions for candidacy, 

including those of more than 80 reformists holding Majlis seats, effectively limiting the 

democratic alternatives available to Iranian voters. 

In recent years, dozens of prominent Muslim activists and dissidents advocating political 

reform have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms by the Revolutionary Court, ostensibly on 
 

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charges of seeking to overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; others have been arrested and 

detained for alleged blasphemy and criticizing the nature of the Islamic regime. Reformists and 

journalists are regularly tried under current press laws and the Penal Code on charges of 

“insulting Islam,” criticizing the Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that deviate from 

Islamic standards. Following a visit to Iran, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom 

of Opinion and Expression concluded in early 2004 that such charges brought by Iranian courts 

“lack any objective criteria” and are open to “subjective and arbitrary interpretation by judges 

implementing them.” In a positive development, Hashem Aghajari, a prominent Iranian 

academic who was sentenced to death for blasphemy in November 2002, was released in July 

2004 after a retrial and a reduction of his sentence. 

The government’s monopoly on and enforcement of the official interpretation of Islam 

negatively affect the human rights of women in Iran, including their right to freedoms of 

movement, association, thought, conscience, and religion, and freedom from coercion in matters 

of religion or belief. The Iranian justice system does not grant women the same legal status as 

men; for example, testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of two women. Provisions 

of both the Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those sections dealing with family and property 

law, discriminate against women. 

Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread abuses and restrictions on their religious 

practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics as well as bans on Sunni teachings in 

public schools and Sunni religious literature, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Sunni and Sufi 

Muslims also report widespread official discrimination, and Sunnis report the absence of a 

mosque in Tehran. Even Shia clerics are affected by government repression. A number of 

senior Shia religious leaders who have opposed various religious and/or political tenets and 

practices of the Iranian government have also been targets of state repression, including house 

arrest, detention without charge, unfair trials, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Grand 

Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most senior dissident Shia cleric, was sentenced to house 

arrest in 1997 and banned from teaching Islam or criticizing Iran’s Supreme Leader. His house 

arrest and ban was lifted in 2003. 

The Constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as 

protected religious minorities who may worship freely and have autonomy over their own 

matters of personal status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and inheritance). However, members of these 

groups are subject to legal and other forms of discrimination, particularly in education, 

government jobs and services, and the armed services. Non-Muslims may not engage in public 

religious expression and persuasion among Muslims; some also face restrictions on publishing 

religious material in Persian. 

The primacy of Islam and Islamic laws and institutions also adversely affects the rights 

and status of non-Muslims. While all religious minorities reportedly suffer, severe violations are 

directed principally towards the 300,000 to 350,000 followers of the Baha’i faith in Iran. Baha’is 

are often viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities, and may face repression on the grounds of 

apostasy. Since 1979, Iranian government authorities have killed more than 200 Baha’i leaders 

in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed from government and university jobs. 

Baha’is may not establish houses of worship, schools, or any independent religious associations 

in Iran. In addition, Baha’is are denied government jobs and pensions as well as the right to 
 

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inherit property, and their marriages and divorces are not recognized. Baha’i cemeteries, holy 

places, and community properties are often seized and some have been destroyed. Members of 

the Baha’i faith are not allowed to attend university. According to the State Department, 

restrictions on the Baha’i community steadily intensified after the UN Commission on Human 

Rights ended formal monitoring of the human rights situation in Iran in the spring of 2002. 

Though a few Baha’i prisoners have been released in recent years, Baha’is in Iran 

continue to face harsh treatment. Over the past year, Baha’i property has been confiscated or 

destroyed and several Baha’is have been harassed, interrogated, detained, imprisoned, or 

physically attacked. In February 2004, Iranian authorities destroyed a tomb at a Baha’i holy site, 

and in June, the authorities razed the historic house of the father of the founder of the Baha’i 

faith, marking the first time in 25 years that Baha’i holy sites had been destroyed. In December 

2004, seven Baha’is were detained, interrogated, and subsequently released in the city of Yazd; 

others were reportedly physically beaten by authorities. In January 2005, the personal property 

of several Baha’is in Yazd was confiscated and destroyed and in February 2005, a Baha’i 

cemetery in Yazd was razed. In early March 2005, five Baha’is were arrested without charge in 

Tehran by Iranian officials. Two have been released but three remain in custody. In April, six 

more members of the Baha’i community were arrested and are reportedly still in detention. One 

Baha’i who was arrested in 1995 and charged with apostasy is still serving a life sentence.

Over the past 15 years, numerous Evangelical Christians reportedly have been killed at 

the hands of government authorities and more than a dozen are reported missing or 

“disappeared.” According to a 2001 report of the UN Special Representative on Iran, some are 

said to have been convicted of apostasy. Evangelical Christians in Iran continue to be subject to 

harassment, close surveillance, and imprisonment; many are reported to have fled the country. 

In the summer of 2004, several Christians in the Mazandaran province in northern Iran were 

arrested for several days and subsequently released. In September, Iranian authorities raided an 

Evangelical church detaining more than 80 congregants—some were held for days without 

charge—and imprisoning its pastor, a former military colonel, Hamid Pourmand. Sentenced to 

three years in prison by a military court in February 2005, Pourmand now faces a second trial 

before an Islamic court on charges of apostasy, an offense which carries the death penalty. 

Iran’s anti-Israel policy continues to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation among 

Iran’s Jews, and members of the Jewish community have been singled out on the basis of “ties to 

Israel,” whether real or perceived. Official government discrimination against Jews is reportedly 

pervasive. According to the State Department, despite minimal restriction on Jewish religious 

practice, in recent years, education of Jewish children has become increasingly difficult and 

distribution of Hebrew religious texts is strongly discouraged. Furthermore, several independent 

reports indicate that anti-Semitism in Iran’s government-controlled media has increased 

significantly over the past year. In 2004, several state-controlled and privately-owned 

newspapers celebrated the 100th anniversary of the publication of the notorious anti-Semitic 

publication “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” which fabricates a worldwide Jewish 

conspiracy. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with members of non-governmental 

organizations representing various religious communities in Iran, as well as human rights groups 

and other Iran experts. In January 2004, the Commission held a meeting with a diverse group of 
 

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individuals from the Iranian American community in Los Angeles to discuss religious freedom 

and human rights conditions in Iran and implications for U.S. policy. 

In addition to recommending that Iran be designated a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• at the highest levels, vigorously speak out publicly about the deteriorating conditions for 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Iran, including drawing attention to 

specific cases where severe violations have occurred; 

y increase funding for Voice of America and Radio Farda programming on the situation of 

human rights—including the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief—in Iran; 

• advocate for creation of a UN Special Rapporteur to investigate and report publicly on the 

human rights situation, including freedom of religion or belief, in Iran at the UN Commission 

on Human Rights (UNCHR) and the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee; 

• call on the UNCHR to monitor carefully and demand compliance with the implementation of 

recommendations of the representatives of those special mechanisms that have already 

visited Iran, particularly those of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief (1995), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (2003), and the Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2003); 

• encourage the UNCHR to continue to use its procedures to maintain oversight of conditions 

for freedom of religion or belief in Iran, including continued visits and reporting by relevant 

UNCHR rapporteurs and working groups; and 

• strongly urge the European Union, through its human rights dialogue with Iran initiated in 

2002, to press the Iranian government actively to address and rectify its severe human rights 

violations, including violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

Saudi Arabia 

The government of Saudi Arabia engages in systematic, ongoing and egregious violations 

of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Despite the State Department’s contention in its 

2004 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom that there were slight improvements in 

Saudi government efforts to foster religious tolerance in Saudi society, the report again 

concluded that freedom of religion “does not exist” in Saudi Arabia. Since its inception, the 

Commission has recommended that Saudi Arabia be designated a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. In September 2004, the State Department for the first time followed the 

Commission’s recommendation and designated Saudi Arabia a CPC. 

The Saudi government continues to engage in an array of severe violations of human 

rights as part of its official repression of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

These violations include: torture and cruel and degrading treatment or punishment imposed by 
 

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judicial and administrative authorities; prolonged detention without charges and often 

incommunicado; and blatant denials of the right to liberty and security of the person, including 

coercive measures aimed at women and the broad jurisdiction of the mutawaa (religious police), 

whose powers are vaguely defined and exercised in ways that violate the religious freedom of 

others. 

The government of Saudi Arabia continues to enforce vigorously its ban on all forms of 

public religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and presentation of the 

Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. This policy violates the rights of the large communities of nonMuslims and Muslims from a variety of doctrinal schools of Islam who reside in Saudi Arabia, 

including Shi’as, who make up 8-10 percent of the population. The government tightly controls 

even the restricted religious activity it permits—through controls on the building of mosques, the 

appointment of imams, the regulation of sermons and public celebrations, and the content of 

religious education in public schools—and suppresses the religious views of Saudi and nonSaudi Muslims that do not conform to official positions. In recent years, prominent Shi’a clerics 

and religious scholars have been arrested and detained without charge for their religious views; 

several remain in prison and reportedly have been beaten or otherwise ill-treated. Several 

imams, both Sunni and Shi’a, who have spoken in opposition to government policies or against 

the official government interpretation of Islam, have been harassed, arrested, and detained. 

Spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” continue to be used by the Saudi authorities 

against non-conforming Muslims. Several individuals remain in prison on these charges. In the 

past, Saudi authorities have arrested and detained Ismaili clerics for allegedly practicing sorcery. 

Restrictions on public religious practice, for both Saudis and non-Saudis, are enforced in 

large part by the mutawaa, public enforcers of religious behavior. The mutawaa conduct raids 

on worship services, including in private homes. They have also harassed, detained, whipped, 

beaten, and meted out extrajudicial punishments to individuals deemed to have strayed from 

“appropriate” dress and/or behavior, including any outward displays of religiosity, such as 

wearing Muslim religious symbols not sanctioned by the government. In November 2004, a 

press report identified a former member of the mutawaa as the leader of an attack on the U.S. 

consulate in Jeddah that resulted in the deaths of five people. In recent years, the Saudi 

government has stated publicly that it has fired and/or disciplined members of the mutawaa for 

abuses of power, although reports of abuse persist. 

Although the government has publicly taken the position—reiterated again in 2004—that 

it permits non-Muslims to worship in private, the guidelines as to what constitutes “private” 

worship are vague. Surveillance by the mutawaa and Saudi security services of private nonMuslim religious activity continues unabated. Many persons worshipping privately continue to 

be harassed, arrested, imprisoned, tortured, often deported, and generally forced to go to great 

lengths to conceal private religious activity from the authorities. Even diplomatic personnel 

from Western countries report difficulties in their religious practices. Foreign guest workers 

without diplomatic standing, and with little or no access to private religious services conducted 

at diplomatic facilities, face even greater difficulties. Moreover, the Saudi government does not 

allow clergy to enter the country for the purpose of performing private religious services for 

foreigners legally residing in Saudi Arabia. 
 

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There is a continuing pattern of punishment and abuse of non-Muslim foreigners for 

private religious practice in Saudi Arabia. In April 2003, two Christian foreign workers, Eritrean 

and Ethiopian expatriates, were arrested for worshipping privately. In June 2003, the Ethiopian 

was deported, followed by the Eritrean in July. In September 2003, the mutawaa arrested 16 

foreign workers for practicing Sufism; their status remains unknown. In October 2003, two 

Egyptian Christians were arrested and jailed on religious grounds and released three weeks later. 

In December 2003, a foreign worker was arrested and charged with apostasy; in early March 

2004, a press report indicated that the charge had been reduced from apostasy, which is 

punishable by death, to blasphemy and that he had been sentenced to two years in jail and 600 

lashes. In February 2004, a resident Christian was deported after providing an Arabic Bible to a 

Saudi citizen. In March 2004, an Indian Christian foreign worker was reportedly arrested and 

tortured for “preaching Christianity,” among other charges. He was deported in November 2004. 

In March 2005, a press report stated that a Hindu temple constructed near Riyadh was destroyed 

by the mutawaa, and that three foreign guest workers worshiping at the site were subsequently 

deported. In April 2005, approximately 40 Pakistani Christians were detained, some for several 

hours and others for two days, and subsequently released by the mutawaa for holding a religious 

worship service in a private home in Riyadh. 

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and other violations of 

freedom of religion adversely affect the human rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including 

freedom of speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom from coercion, access to 

education, and full equality before the law. For example, women must adhere to a strict dress 

code when appearing in public and can only be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment with 

the consent of a male relative. Women need to receive written permission from a male relative 

to travel inside or outside the country and are not permitted to drive motor vehicles. Religiouslybased directives limit a woman’s right to choose employment by prohibiting them from studying 

for certain professions such as engineering, journalism, and architecture. In addition, the Saudi 

justice system does not grant women the same legal status as men. 

Despite claims by the Saudi government that it has made limited revisions to the 

intolerant and inflammatory content in the state curriculum and textbooks, several groups 

continue to report highly intolerant and discriminatory language, particularly against Jews, 

Christians, and Shi’a Muslims. Moreover, in the past year, there were frequent reports of 

violently anti-Semitic and anti-Christian sentiments expressed in the media and in sermons 

delivered by clerics who are under the authority of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. In some 

cases, the State Department reported, clerics prayed for the death of Jews and Christians. In May 

2004, following a terrorist attack in Yanbu, western Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah 

publicly stated that he was “95 percent sure” that supporters of Zionism were behind the attack. 

In 2004, the Saudi government approved the formation of a National Human Rights 

Association, the country’s first purportedly independent human rights body, chaired by a 

member of the Consultative Council, a 150 member advisory body appointed by Saudi King 

Fahd. It is not yet possible to determine if this body will prove to be a positive mechanism for 

addressing human rights concerns; the only issue the Association has publicly addressed thus far 

is the country’s poor prison conditions.
 

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In addition to the Saudi government’s violations of religious freedom within its own 

borders, evidence has mounted that funding originating in Saudi Arabia that has been used to 

finance globally religious schools and other activities that support religious intolerance, and, in 

some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. The Saudi government itself 

has been implicated in promoting and exporting views associated with certain Islamic militant 

and extremist organizations in several parts of the world, and a number of reports have identified 

members of extremist and militant groups that have been trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia. 

These reports point to a role for the Saudi government in propagating worldwide an ideology that 

is incompatible with internationally recognized guarantees of the right to freedom of religion or 

belief. 

The Saudi government funds mosques, university chairs, Islamic study centers, and 

religious schools known as madrassas all over the world. During Afghanistan’s war against the 

former Soviet Union, Saudi-funded madrassas were established in Pakistan that were concerned 

less with scholarship than implementing an extremist agenda. These madrassas provided 

ideological training for some of those who went to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya, and 

Afghanistan—and many of these schools still do. The peaceful propagation of religious beliefs, 

including Islam, is a human right. However, there is legitimate concern when a government may 

be propagating an ideology that promotes hatred and violence against both Muslims and nonMuslims. 

The line separating the form of Islam allegedly preached by some Saudi clerics from the 

violence incited and perpetrated by radicals is a thin one, and warrants further investigation by 

the U.S. government. In the past year, both the Dutch Interior Ministry and a German state 

government entity publicly have issued reports presenting evidence that Saudi-funded activities 

in their countries have promoted radicalization of the Muslim communities and hatred against 

non-Muslims.1

 

The Commission has urged the U.S. government to address publicly concerns arising 

from the propagation of religious hatred and intolerance from Saudi Arabia. The Commission 

has published reports and held public hearings over the past several years regarding this issue, 

and issued a number of recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission is pleased to note 

public statements made in the last year by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, John V. Hanford III, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Kozak, raising concerns about the role of the Saudi 

government in the promotion of religious intolerance and extremism. 

 

1

 In January 2005, the Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations released an English 

translation of a 2004 report entitled, “Saudi Influences in the Netherlands: Links Between the 

Salafist Mission, Radicalization Processes and Islamic Terrorism,” 

(http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/10887/saudiinfluencesinthenetherlands.pdf, accessed April 

14, 2005). In June 2004, the German North Rhine-Westphalia’s State Institute for Schools 

issued a study of more than 40 books used by the Saudi government-funded King Fahd Academy 

in Bonn (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1245760,00.html, accessed April 14, 2005).
 

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In the spring of 2004, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked by 

the Governmental Affairs Committees of the Senate and the House to undertake a 

comprehensive review of U.S. oversight of Saudi support for an ideology promoting violence 

and religious intolerance globally. In conducting the study, the GAO was asked to seek 

information from relevant U.S. government agencies and consult with outside experts, including 

the Commission, on Saudi promotion of religious extremism. The study was inspired by the 

Commission’s 2003 recommendation that Congress initiate a review of Saudi global exportation 

of religious hatred and intolerance. 

In June 2004, an independent task force on terrorist financing of the Council on Foreign 

Relations released a report endorsing the Commission’s recommendations for a study on Saudi 

exportation of intolerance and calling on the U.S. government publicly to acknowledge that 

serious human rights violations in Saudi Arabia are significant issues in the bilateral relationship. 

In advance of his July 2004 visit to Saudi Arabia, the Commission urged Secretary of 

State Powell to call on the government of Saudi Arabia to cease its exportation and support 

globally of a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred and intolerance. The Commission 

also urged Secretary Powell to press for immediate improvements in respect for religious 

freedom. 

In August 2004, the Commission welcomed the introduction by Senators Charles 

Schumer and Susan Collins of a resolution (S.Con.Res. 131) calling on Secretary of State Powell 

to designate Saudi Arabia a “country of particular concern.” The resolution also called on the 

government of Saudi Arabia to cease its exportation of religious intolerance and other abuses of 

internationally recognized human rights. A number of the resolution’s provisions reflected 

Commission recommendations. 

In December 2004, the Commission met with a delegation of academic and religious 

scholars from Saudi Arabia through a visit sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Religion 

and Peacemaking Initiative. 

In March 2005, a bi-partisan group of 15 members of Congress wrote a letter to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice urging implementation of the Commission’s recommendations in 

response to the State Department’s designation of Saudi Arabia as a CPC. The letter also urged 

the Secretary to condemn Saudi government support of materials that promote hatred and 

intolerance and to urge the Saudi government to curtail any further distribution of such materials. 

As a consequence of the designation of Saudi Arabia as a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• identify those Saudi agencies and officials thereof who are responsible for particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with respect to 

Saudi Arabia, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Saudi government 

official who was responsible for or directly carried out such violations; 

• issue a proclamation, under the President’s authority pursuant to section 212(f) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1182(f)), to bar those Saudi government officials 
 

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from entering the United States who have been responsible for propagating globally an 

ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and human rights violations; 

• issue a demarche urging the government of Saudi Arabia to cease funding or other support 

for written materials or other activities that explicitly promote hate, intolerance, and human 

rights violations, including the distribution of such materials in the United States and 

elsewhere outside of Saudi Arabia; and 

• order the heads of appropriate U.S. agencies, pursuant to section 405(a)(13) of IRFA, not to 

issue any specific licenses and not to grant any other specific authority for the export of any 

item on the U.S. Commerce Control List of dual-use items [Export Administration 

Regulations under part 774 of title 15] to any agency or instrumentality of the government of 

Saudi Arabia that is responsible for committing particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom. In FY 2004, the Commerce Department approved approximately $67 million worth 

of articles for Saudi Arabia, including, for example, such items as thumbcuffs, leg irons, 

shackles, and other items that could be used to perpetrate human rights violations. 

With regard to religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• press for immediate improvements in respect for religious freedom, including: (1) 

establishing genuine safeguards for the freedom to worship privately, (2) entrusting law 

enforcement to professionals in law enforcement agencies subject to judicial review and 

dissolving the mutawaa, (3) permitting non-Wahhabi places of worship in certain areas and 

allowing clergy to enter the country, (4) reviewing cases and releasing those who have been 

detained or imprisoned on account of their religious belief or practices, (5) permitting 

independent non-governmental organizations to advance human rights, (6) ending state 

prosecution of individuals charged with apostasy, blasphemy, sorcery, and criticism of the 

government, (7) ceasing messages of hatred, intolerance, or incitement to violence against 

non-Wahhabi Muslims and members of non-Muslim religious groups in the educational 

curricula and textbooks, as well as in government-controlled mosques and media, (8) inviting 

the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to conduct a fact-finding 

mission, and (9) ratifying international human rights instruments, including the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms; 

and 

• use its leverage to encourage implementation of numerous Saudi government statements to 

ensure that the Saudi government carries out political, educational, and judicial reforms in 

the Kingdom by: (1) raising concerns about human rights, including religious freedom, both 

publicly and privately in the U.S. anti-terrorism dialogue with the Saudi government, (2) 

institutionalizing a high-level ongoing dialogue on the Saudi reform agenda, and (3) 

expanding human rights assistance, public diplomacy and other programs and initiatives—

such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative—to include components specifically for Saudi 

Arabia. 
 

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With regard to the exportation of religious intolerance from Saudi Arabia, the 

Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• continue efforts, along with those of the Congress, to determine whether and how—and the 

extent to which—the Saudi government, individual members of the royal family, or Saudifunded individuals or institutions are directly or indirectly propagating globally, including in 

the United States, a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, human 

rights violations, and, in some cases, violence, toward members of other religious groups, 

both Muslim and non-Muslim; 

• request the Saudi government to provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi support have 

been and continue to be provided to which religious schools, mosques, centers of learning, 

and other religious organizations globally, including in the United States; 

• urge the Saudi government to stop funding religious activities abroad until the Saudis know 

the content of the teachings and are satisfied that they do not promote hatred, intolerance, or 

other human rights violations; 

• urge the Saudi government to monitor, regulate, and report publicly about the activities of 

Saudi charitable organizations based outside Saudi Arabia in countries throughout the world; 

and 

 

• urge the Saudi government to: a) cease granting diplomatic status to Islamic clerics and 

educators teaching outside Saudi Arabia; and b) close down any Islamic affairs sections in 

Saudi embassies throughout the world that have been responsible for propagating intolerance. 

The Commission urges the U.S. Congress to hold biannual hearings at which the State 

Department reports on what issues have been raised with the Saudi government regarding 

violations of religious freedom and what actions have been taken by the United States in light of 

the Saudi government’s response. 
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COUNTRY REPORTS: SOUTH ASIA 

Afghanistan 

The Commission continues to monitor the situation in Afghanistan, where the United 

States has played, and continues to play, a crucial role. Conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief improved markedly after the fall of the Taliban regime and the establishment in 2002 of 

the transitional government headed by President Hamid Karzai, who was popularly elected 

president under Afghanistan’s new Constitution in October 2004. Despite the improved 

situation, however, concerns about religious freedom remain. The new Constitution, while 

positive in some aspects, does not contain clear protections for the right to freedom of religion or 

belief for individual Afghan citizens, particularly those in the majority Muslim community. 

There is also continued concern about the role and power of the country’s Supreme Court, which 

is currently headed by a man who has shown little regard for international human rights 

standards, indicating that religious extremism remains a threat. 

 In contrast to the Taliban era, the right to religious freedom is now largely respected in 

the areas under government control. Although some discrimination continues, the active 

persecution of Afghanistan’s Shi’a minority (approximately 15 percent of the population) that 

was perpetrated by the Taliban has ended, and Shi’as are once again able to perform their 

traditional processions and to participate in public life. In January 2005, President Karzai 

appointed a Shi’a scholar to the country’s Supreme Court, the first Shi’a scholar ever to be 

appointed to that body. The situation of Afghanistan’s religious minorities, which include small 

communities of Hindus and Sikhs, has also improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban. 

Although there are no churches, expatriate Christians are reportedly able to meet for informal 

worship services in Kabul and one or two other major centers. 

Due to continued security problems, however, the government of President Karzai does 

not exercise full control over the country. As a result, the situation for religious freedom and 

other human rights remains both precarious and problematic in some parts of the country. 

Taliban remnants remain active in various regions and continue to pose a threat to the stability of 

the government. Many of the human rights abuses practiced by the Taliban reportedly persist 

today under the rule of the regional warlords, who continue to operate in regions that are 

effectively outside of central government control. These abuses include political killings, 

torture, coercion to enforce social and religious conformity, and abuses against women and girls, 

sometimes with the active support of the local courts and police. These substantial security 

threats present a persistent danger to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law 

throughout Afghanistan. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution. The Constitution contains an 

explicit recognition of equality between men and women and a reference to Afghanistan’s 

commitment to its international human rights obligations. However, though the Constitution 

provides for the freedom of non-Muslim groups to exercise their various faiths, it does not 

contain explicit protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief that would extend to 

every individual, particularly to individual Muslims, the overwhelming majority of 

Afghanistan’s population. This omission is compounded by a repugnancy clause that states that 

“no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam,” as well as by provisions for a 
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judicial system empowered to enforce the repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi jurisprudence to 

cases where there is no other applicable law. 

The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to religious freedom and the inclusion 

of a judicial system instructed to enforce Islamic principles and Islamic law mean that the new 

Constitution does not fully protect individual Afghan citizens against unjust accusations of 

religious “crimes” such as apostasy and blasphemy. There are also fewer protections for 

Afghans to debate the role and content of religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of 

women and members of religious minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic precepts 

without fear of retribution. There is concern that these constitutional deficiencies could permit a 

harsh, unfair, or even abusive interpretation of religious orthodoxy to be officially imposed, 

violating numerous human rights of the individual by stifling dissent within the Islamic tradition. 

These concerns are not merely theoretical, as the task of interpreting many of these 

provisions has been left to the Supreme Court, currently headed by Chief Justice Fazl Hadi 

Shinwari, who has shown little tolerance for those who disagree with his hard-line interpretation 

of Islam. In August 2003, Chief Justice Shinwari told a visiting Commission delegation that he 

rejects three crucial freedoms—those of expression, religion, and equal rights for men and 

women—all of which are protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a 

consequence of his actions, a sitting Minister in the interim Afghan government was forced to 

resign after she was charged with blasphemy for questioning the role of Islamic law in 

Afghanistan, journalists have been jailed on charges of offending Islam, and during the October 

2004 presidential elections, a presidential candidate was threatened with disqualification for 

purported “anti-Islamic remarks” on women’s rights and family law. These incidents suggest 

that despite the gains since 2002 and the adoption of a new constitution, religious freedom and 

other human rights, along with democracy itself, remain under threat from extremism. 

These constitutional pitfalls have been extended to other legislation also. For example, in 

2002, Afghanistan adopted a new press law that contains a sanction against publication of 

“matters contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions and sects.” According 

to the State Department’s 2004 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, the 

vagueness in the definition of what constitutes offensive material allows for the potential abuse 

of this clause with the aim of limiting freedom of the press and intimidating journalists. Indeed, 

incidents of this sort of abuse have already occurred, as when the Chief Justice Shinwari in 

November 2004 successfully appealed to the Afghan government to have cable television taken 

off the air because of its “immoral” programs that insult religion. Earlier in the year, the Chief 

Justice had also protested the presence of female singers on radio and television and attempted to 

have the practice halted, though in this effort he was ultimately not successful. 

During the period that the Constitution was being drafted, the Commission met with 

numerous high-ranking U.S. government officials to articulate the importance of 

institutionalizing human rights guarantees in the document that adequately protect the rights of 

each individual. The Commission also briefed Members of Congress and relevant committee 

staff on its policy findings and recommendations. In January 2003, the Commission held an 

international forum, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom in Crisis?” in cooperation with 

George Washington University Law School, which brought together key Afghan leaders, U.S. 

policymakers, and other experts to discuss ways of integrating adequate human rights protections 
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into current judicial and legal reform processes. The Commission also raised the issue of 

religious freedom in numerous public statements, as well as in two separate opinion-editorial 

articles, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, authored by Commissioners Michael 

K. Young, Felice D. Gaer, and Preeta D. Bansal. In late 2003, the Commission was cited on this 

issue in over a dozen editorials in major newspapers worldwide. 

In August 2003, a Commission delegation visited Afghanistan for an intensive series of 

discussions with senior officials of the Transitional Administration, U.S. officials, 

representatives of non-governmental organizations and of Afghan civil society, former President 

Burhanuddin Rabbani, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic community, including 

the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In September 2004, the 

Commission issued a press release denouncing the Supreme Court Chief Justice’s attempt to 

stifle freedom and electoral democracy by calling for the disqualification of a candidate who 

made comments of which Chief Justice Shinwari did not approve. 

 The U.S. government should provide the leadership, sound policy, and resources needed 

to secure freedom for all in Afghanistan, which is still at a juncture from which it can either 

move forward to secure greater protections for the rights of its people or revert to Taliban-like 

practices. It should also step up its leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and 

consolidate the Afghan people’s gains in the protection of human rights, since no other nation or 

international institution can substitute for the United States in this daunting task, and failure will 

leave Afghanistan not only less free but also more unstable, thereby contributing to regional 

insecurity and potentially serving again as a future haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. 

interests. 

With regard to Afghanistan, the Commission has also recommended that the U.S. 

government should: 

y vigorously support respect for the right of every individual to freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion or belief in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and be prepared to make great 

efforts to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, including freedom of conscience 

and the equal rights of women, as outlined in international human rights instruments to which 

Afghanistan is a party; 

y use its influence to protect freedom of expression against charges that may be used to stifle 

debate, such as blasphemy, “offending Islam,” apostasy or similar offenses, including 

expression on sensitive subjects such as the role of religion in society and the rights of 

women and members of minorities; 

y act to bolster the position of those reformers who respect, and advocate respect for, human 

rights, since those persons in Afghan society who would promote respect for internationally 

recognized human rights are currently on the defensive, even threatened, and these people 

need U.S. support to counter the influence of those with an Islamic extremist agenda; 

y ensure that its programs, administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development, to 

help develop primary and secondary education, including through the printing of textbooks, 

and to provide civic education, incorporate, as part of the content, education on international 
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standards with regard to human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and religious 

tolerance; 

y strongly support the reconstruction in Afghanistan of a judicial sector operating under the 

rule of law and upholding civil law and international standards of human rights, and work to 

ensure that all judges and prosecutors are trained in civil law and international human rights 

standards, women are recruited into the judiciary at all levels, and all Afghans have equal 

access to the courts; 

• assist legal experts to visit Afghanistan, engage their Afghan counterparts, and provide 

information to the Afghan public on the universality of human rights and the compatibility of 

Islam and universal human rights, including freedom of religion and belief, and expand 

existing programs to bring Afghans to this country to see how Islam and other faiths may be 

practiced in a free society; and 

• improve security outside Kabul in order for Afghanistan’s political reconstruction to succeed, 

because without adequate security, the warlords will continue to hold sway over much of the 

country, undermining the rule of law and Afghanistan’s nascent democratic institutions. 

Bangladesh 

 In Bangladesh, growing religious militancy and chronic political violence threaten to 

undermine the institutions that protect religious freedom and silence the country’s voices of 

religious tolerance and moderation. Islamic militants have been implicated in attacks on 

politicians, authors who oppose extremist interpretations of Islam, members of religious 

minorities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Left unchecked, the trend toward 

intolerance and violent vigilantism, particularly toward Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, could 

have an increasingly negative impact on the religious freedom of all Bangladeshis. In response 

to these growing concerns, the Commission has decided to place Bangladesh on its Watch List. 

Although Bangladesh was established as a secular state following independence from 

Pakistan in 1971, Islam was made the state religion in 1988 under a military regime. The 

Constitution retains strongly worded guarantees of freedom of religious belief and practice, as 

well as equal treatment by the government for citizens regardless of religious affiliation. Further, 

although Bangladesh’s Constitution states that “absolute trust and faith in Allah” is to “be the 

basis for all actions” by the government, this provision is not judicially enforceable. Bangladesh 

has a representative government, regular changes of power through free elections, a judiciary 

that sometimes issues rulings against those in authority, a lively press often critical of 

government policies, and a functioning civil society with active human rights groups and other 

NGOs. 

Despite these democratic practices, rising militancy is threatening the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief for all in Bangladesh. Following the Soviet 

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, at least some of the Bangladeshis serving with the 

Mujahideen there brought home a jihadist ideology of violent struggle against perceived 

opponents of Islam. This ideology in turn gave rise to domestic radical groups such as 
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Harakatul-Jihad-Islami/Bangladesh (“Movement of Islamic Holy War”). Aided by the 

expansion of Islamic schools (madrasas), charities, and other social welfare institutions, some 

receiving foreign funding, Islamic militants have continued to gain influence. Explicitly Islamic 

parties were not included in Bangladeshi governments until the current government was elected 

in October 2001. 

Bangladesh’s high levels of political violence and instability have also provided 

opportunities for religious and other extremists to expand their influence. Due to a weak legal 

system and corrupt law enforcement, gangs employed by politicians engage in criminal activities 

with relative impunity. Armed groups of Islamic vigilantes and leftist guerrillas terrorize remote 

rural areas. Politically-motivated bombings, assassinations, and other terrorist acts, often 

ascribed to Islamic militants, have exacerbated partisan tensions and increased the vulnerability 

of minority communities. In February 2005, the government announced that police 

investigations had implicated two Islamic militant groups in a series of bomb attacks on nongovernmental organizations and other civil society targets. Following domestic and international 

criticism, the government banned the two groups, announced the arrest of one militant leader, 

and publicly ordered the police to intensify efforts to apprehend another. 

The current government, led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was elected in 

October 2001 with the support of two small Islamic parties. Following the October 2001 

elections, there were numerous reports of killings, sexual assaults, illegal land-seizures, arson, 

extortion, and intimidation of religious minority group members. Hindus in particular were the 

targets of these attacks. Minority group representatives and human rights groups ascribed these 

attacks to religious extremists or to partisans of the BNP and its Islamic allies. Forced by a court 

order to investigate election violence against minorities, the government downplayed the issue, 

asserting that victims were only incidentally members of minority groups or that reported 

incidents were false or exaggerated. The lack of accountability for reported crimes against 

minority group members during the last election raises serious concerns about an atmosphere of 

impunity for such crimes, as well as the possibility of a renewal of violence against Hindus and 

members of other religious minorities in the next general election. 

Although reports of anti-minority violence have dropped off sharply since the 2001 

election, Hindus, Christians, and representatives of other minorities continue to express concerns 

regarding the safety of their coreligionists, citing the growth in Islamic radicalism and occasional 

instances of violence, including fatalities, in which the victims’ religious affiliation appears to 

have been a factor. Minority group representatives claim that religion plays a role in property 

and land disputes, alleging discrimination in the resolution of the past expropriations of Hindu 

property and pointing to the continuing displacement of non-Muslim tribal populations by 

Bengali Muslims in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other traditionally tribal areas. Despite 

constitutional protections, in practice, non-Muslims face societal discrimination and are 

disadvantaged in access to government jobs and public services. 

Islamic extremists in Bangladesh have engaged in a public campaign against the small 

Ahmadi community, estimated at 100,000 out of a population of 140 million. The campaign has 

the avowed aim of pressuring the government to declare Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” as has 

been done in Pakistan. Ahmadis or “Qadiyanis,” most of whom live in Pakistan and India, are 
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viewed as heretical by some Muslims. Although the government of Bangladesh has thus far 

refused to follow Pakistan’s lead on this issue, in January 2004, it bent to militant pressure and 

banned the publication and distribution of Ahmadi religious literature. Since then, police have 

seized Ahmadi publications on some occasions. In December 2004, Bangladesh’s High Court 

stayed the government’s order of January 2004 banning Ahmadi publications; further legal 

action is pending. 

The anti-Ahmadi agitation has been accompanied by incidents of mob violence, including 

attempts to occupy Ahmadi places of worship. In Rangpur in northern Bangladesh in April 

2004, several Ahmadi homes were destroyed and Ahmadi converts held against their will and 

pressured to recant. Police protection of Bangladesh’s Ahmadi citizens has often been 

inadequate, and, in some cases, police have reportedly assisted the extremists. In March 2005, in 

the town of Bogra in northern Bangladesh, police, under pressure from an anti-Ahmadi mob, 

were photographed affixing to an Ahmadi place of worship a sign reportedly reading “A place of 

worship of the Qadiyanis...no Muslim should be deceived into considering it a mosque.” 

 

Authors, journalists, and academics expressing opinions deemed by some segments of the 

population to be offensive to Islam are subject to violent, sometimes fatal, attacks. In February 

2004, militants stabbed Dr. Humayun Azad, a prominent scholar whose writings support 

women’s rights and criticize Islamic extremism. Dr. Azad subsequently died from his wounds. 

Islamic extremists oppose NGOs that promote improvements in protections for the rights 

of women. Such organizations were targeted in the bombings that led to the ban, cited above, on 

two militant groups. Some Muslim clerics, especially in rural areas, have sanctioned vigilante 

punishments against women for alleged moral transgressions. Rape is reportedly a common 

form of anti-minority violence. The government often fails to punish the perpetrators of these 

acts against women, as the law enforcement and the judicial systems, especially at the local level, 

are vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, and political interference. 

 During the year, Commission staff met on a number of occasions with human rights 

monitors, representatives of religious communities, Bangladeshi diplomats, and others to discuss 

religious freedom in Bangladesh. In April 2004, the Commission, together with Congressman 

Joseph Crowley, a member of the House Committee on International Relations, held a public 

hearing at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law at Queens College in 

Flushing, New York, on “Bangladesh: Protecting the Human Rights of Thought, Conscience, 

and Religion.” The purpose of the hearing was to examine religious freedom conditions for 

members of the majority Muslim community as well as for members of religious minority 

communities in Bangladesh, and the implications of those trends for U.S. policy. The 

Commission notes with concern reported efforts by Bangladeshi security officials and others to 

intimidate hearing witnesses. 

India 

Significant developments affecting freedom of religion or belief have taken place in India 

in the past year. Parliamentary elections in May 2004 resulted in a defeat for the ruling 

Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, which was replaced by a coalition government headed by the 
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Congress Party. Under the previous BJP leadership, the Commission found the Indian 

government’s response to increasing violence against religious minorities in the state of Gujarat 

and elsewhere to be inadequate. In addition, several senior BJP government leaders had publicly 

allied themselves with, or refused to disassociate themselves from, extremist Hindu 

organizations that were implicated in that religious violence. In response, in 2002-2003, the 

Commission recommended that India be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Following the May 2004 parliamentary elections, however, the new prime minister, Manmohan 

Singh, promptly stated that the Congress-led government would reject any kind of religious 

intolerance and vowed to return the country to its pluralistic traditions. As a result of the 

dramatic changes taking place in India since the 2004 elections, the Commission no longer 

recommends that India be designated a CPC. 

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, India has a 

democratically elected government, is governed essentially by the rule of law, and has a tradition 

of secular governance that dates back to the country’s independence. India has a judiciary that is 

independent, albeit slow-moving and frequently unresponsive, that can work to hold the 

perpetrators of religious violence responsible; contains a vibrant civil society with many 

vigorous, independent non-governmental human rights organizations that have investigated and 

published extensive reports on the rise of religiously-motivated violence; and is home to a free 

press that has widely reported on and strongly criticized the situation on the ground in India and 

the growing threats under the BJP government to a religiously plural society. 

Despite these democratic traditions, religious minorities in India have been the victims of 

violent attacks, including killings, in what is called “communal violence.” In the late 1990s, 

there was a marked increase in violent attacks against members of religious minorities, 

particularly Muslims and Christians, throughout India, including killings, torture, rape, and 

destruction of property. Those responsible for communal violence were rarely held responsible 

for their actions. This violence against religious minorities coincided with the rise in political 

influence of groups associated with the Sangh Parivar, a collection of Hindu extremist nationalist 

organizations that view non-Hindus as foreign to India and aggressively press for national 

governmental policies to promote “Hindutva,” or the “Hinduization” of culture. The ascent to 

power in 1998 of the Sangh Parivar’s political wing, the BJP, helped to foster a climate in which 

violence against religious minorities was not systematically punished. Although it was not 

directly responsible for instigating the violence against religious minorities, it was clear that the 

BJP-led government did not do all in its power to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to 

counteract the prevailing climate of hostility against these minority groups. 

Of particular concern to the Commission were the February 2002 events in the state of 

Gujarat, when, after a fire on a train resulted in the death of 58 Hindus, hundreds of Muslims 

were killed across Gujarat by Hindu mobs. In addition, hundreds of mosques and Muslimowned businesses and other kinds of infrastructure were looted or destroyed. More than 100,000 

people fled their homes and, in the end, as many as 2,000 Muslims were killed. India’s National 

Human Rights Commission, an official body, found evidence of premeditation in the killings by 

members of Hindu extremist groups; complicity by Gujarat state government officials; and 

police inaction in the midst of attacks on Muslims. Christians were also victims in Gujarat, and 

many churches were destroyed. 
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In the months following the violence, the BJP-led state government in Gujarat headed by 

State Minister Narendra Modi was widely accused of being reluctant to bring the perpetrators of 

the killings of Muslims to justice. Few persons had been arrested and held to account for the 

deaths. 

In response to the failures of the Gujarat government, India’s Supreme Court declared in 

October 2003 that it had “no faith left” in the state’s handling of the investigations and instructed 

the Gujarat state government to appoint new prosecutors to examine the religious violence of 

2002. In April 2004, in what was described as an indictment of Modi’s Gujarat government, the 

Supreme Court overturned the controversial acquittal of the 21 accused in a particular case and 

ordered a new trial of those indicted. India’s highest court also ordered a transfer of that trial to 

neighboring Maharashtra state and directed both state governments to provide protection to 

witnesses and victims, appoint a new public prosecutor, and institute new police investigations 

into the case. In August 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat government to reopen its 

investigation of the 2002 violence, criticizing the local police officials for poor investigative 

practices and follow-up. 

In addition to the steps taken by the Supreme Court, the defeat of the BJP in the May 

2004 parliamentary elections and the actions taken by the new government have resulted in a 

marked improvement in conditions for freedom of religion or belief in India. In contrast to the 

“culture of impunity” in place under the previous BJP-led government, in July 2004, Prime 

Minister Manmohan Singh was quoted in the Indian press as saying that “under my government 

the violence against Christians of recent years will be a thing of the past.” Prime Minister Singh 

reportedly stated that among the priorities of his government would be “promoting social 

harmony and rejecting every kind of fundamentalism.” The new government also pledged to 

take immediate steps to reverse the “communalization” of education that had occurred under the 

BJP government; one of the Congress-led government’s first actions was to appoint a committee 

of historians to remove the “distortions and communally-biased portions” of the textbooks 

introduced in 2002 promoting the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva views. Another positive step was 

the rapid repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which many had charged was unfairly 

targeting Muslims. In addition, several reports have indicated that the central government in 

2005 will be proposing a law to halt and criminalize inter-religious violence, a bill that will 

reportedly include compensation for victims and swifter investigations to identify perpetrators of 

attacks on places of worship and individuals on account of their religion. 

 Despite the improved situation, concerns about religious freedom in India remain. 

Attacks on Christian churches and individuals, largely perpetrated by members of Hindu 

extremist groups, continue to occur, and perpetrators are rarely held to account by the state legal 

apparatus. In December 2004, two church leaders were attacked in the state of Rajasthan, 

allegedly by members of a Sangh Parivar-affiliated organization; in January 2005, militants 

reportedly set fire to a newly opened Catholic school in the northeastern state of Asam; and in 

March 2005, also in Rajasthan, a Christian worship service was interrupted by Hindu extremists 

and eight church workers were beaten. In some instances, police provided protection from the 

attackers; in other cases, the police reportedly failed to intervene. Members of the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses also continue to be assaulted. In addition, several Indian states, including Orissa, 

Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh (formerly part of Madhya Pradesh), still have laws 

against “forced” or “induced” religious conversions, which require government officials to assess 
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the legality of conversions and provide for fines and imprisonment for anyone who uses force, 

fraud, or “inducement” to convert another. However, reports of persons having been arrested 

under these laws are extremely rare. Significantly, the government of Tamil Nadu rescinded its 

law against forced conversions after the May 2004 elections. 

 Throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted personal interviews with members 

of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in India, as well 

as human rights organizations, academics, and other India experts. In March 2005, the 

Commission issued a statement encouraging the Department of State to prevent the planned visit 

to the United States of Gujarat State Minister Narendra Modi, citing evidence presented by 

India’s NHRC and numerous domestic and international human rights investigators of the 

complicity of Gujarat state officials, led by State Minister Modi, in the February 2002 mob 

attacks on Muslims. 

 With regard to India, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

y urge the Indian government to continue its policies aimed at returning the country to its 

tradition of religious tolerance, including by: 

--continuing to pursue the perpetrators of the massacres in Gujarat and hold them to 

account; 

--taking steps to prevent and punish communal violence, including through legislative 

measures such as the proposed law to criminalize inter-religious violence; and 

--continuing the effort to remove religiously intolerant language from school textbooks; 

• persistently press the Indian government to pursue perpetrators of violent acts that target 

members of minority religious groups, acts that, though decreased in number, still continue; 

and 

• take into account, in the course of working toward improvements in U.S.-Indian economic 

and trade relations, the efforts of the Indian government to protect religious freedom, prevent 

and punish violence against religious minorities, and promote the rule of law. 

Pakistan 

The response of the government of Pakistan to persistent sectarian and religiously 

motivated violence in Pakistan continues to be inadequate. In addition, official government 

policies, such as the anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws, frequently result in imprisonment and 

other violations of freedom of religion or belief. The Commission continues to recommend that 

Pakistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. To date, the State Department 

has not designated Pakistan a CPC. 

Successive governments have severely violated religious freedom in Pakistan. 

Discriminatory legislation has fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded the 
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social and legal status of members of religious minorities. Government officials provide fewer 

protections from societal violence to non-Muslims than to members of the majority Sunni 

Muslim community. Perpetrators of attacks on minorities are seldom brought to justice. Belated 

efforts to curb extremism through reform of Pakistan’s thousands of Islamic religious schools 

continue to have little effect. Many of these schools provide ongoing ideological training and 

motivation to those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and 

abroad. President Pervez Musharraf did ban a number of militant groups several years ago, but 

most of those have since reemerged, under new names, and have continued to function. 

Sectarian and religiously-motivated violence, much of it committed against Shi’a 

Muslims by Sunni militants, is chronic in Pakistan. Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus have also 

been targeted by Sunni extremist groups. In January 2005, a leading Shi’a cleric was seriously 

wounded by gunmen, sparking sectarian violence that killed 15. In March 2005 in Baluchistan 

province, the scene of recent tribal violence, a bomb killed 24 worshippers at the tomb of a Shi’a 

saint. Sunni Muslims are also victims of Shi’a militant groups. In the last two years, there has 

been an upsurge in anti-Christian violence, including fatal attacks on churches and other 

Christian institutions. In January 2004, a church compound that includes a Christian school for 

girls was bombed. On Easter 2005, gunmen attacked Christian worshippers as they emerged 

from services in a village church near Lahore, killing one man and injuring seven others. In 

April 2005, a Christian pastor and his driver were found dead in Peshawar; both had been shot, 

and the pastor had reportedly been mutilated. Police protection from these attacks appears 

ineffective, and rarely has anyone been successfully prosecuted for these crimes. Although 

arrests have been made, the case of the brutal murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 

early 2002, whose Jewish background was highlighted in a video of his decapitation by his 

Islamic extremist killers, is not yet fully resolved. 

Ahmadis, who number three-four million in Pakistan, are prevented by law from 

engaging in the full practice of their faith. The Constitution of Pakistan declares members of the 

Ahmadi religious community to be “non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. 

Barred by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their places of worship 

“mosques,” worship in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are otherwise open 

to all Muslims, perform the Muslim call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, 

publicly quote from the Koran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also 

illegal for Ahmadis to preach in public, to seek converts, or to produce, publish, and disseminate 

their religious materials. Ahmadis have been arrested and imprisoned for terms of up to three 

years for all of the above acts, and they are reportedly subject to ill treatment from prison 

authorities and fellow prisoners. Because they are required to register to vote as non-Muslims, a 

policy that was reaffirmed by Pakistani government officials in February 2004, Ahmadis who 

refuse to disavow their claim to being Muslims are effectively disenfranchised. The one 

potentially positive development, the December 2004 abolition of the religion column in 

Pakistani passports, thereby, among other advances, enabling Ahmadis to participate in the hajj, 

was derailed the following March, when members of a government ministerial committee 

decided to restore the column. The decision reportedly came after religious parties demonstrated 

against the change. There continues to be no indication that the current government intends to 

institute any reforms to the anti-Ahmadi laws. 
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Prescribed penalties for blasphemy include death for whoever “defiles the sacred name of 

the Holy Prophet Muhammad” and life imprisonment for whoever “willfully defiles, damages, or 

desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.” Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in the 

lengthy detention of, and sometimes violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and 

members of other religious minorities, as well as Muslims on account of their religious beliefs. 

The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is further compounded by the lack of due process 

involved in these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often pack 

the courtroom and make public threats about the consequences of an acquittal. Such threats have 

proven credible, since they have sometimes been followed by violence. Although no one has yet 

been executed by the state under the blasphemy laws, some persons have been sentenced to 

death. Several accused under the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by vigilantes, 

including while in police custody; those who escape official punishment or vigilante attack are 

sometimes forced to flee the country. Others have died in police custody under allegedly 

suspicious circumstances. In December 2004, an Ahmadi was given a life sentence and a heavy 

fine for purported blasphemous statements. In January 2005, a Christian was acquitted of 

blasphemy charges; however, he remains in hiding due to death threats from extremists. 

Following an abortive attempt in 2000 at introducing procedural reforms, the Musharraf 

government has made no further effort to reform, much less repeal, the blasphemy laws. 

Although they were amended in October 2004 with the aim of reducing the more maliciously 

applied charges, the procedural changes called for will not likely have a significant affect on the 

way the blasphemy laws are exploited in Pakistan. 

Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced 

alongside the country's secular legal system, provide for harsh punishments, such as amputation 

and death by stoning, for violations of Islamic law. The UN Committee Against Torture, as well 

as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation do constitute 

inhuman or degrading treatment under international human rights standards and treaties. 

Although these extreme corporal punishments have not been carried out in practice due to high 

evidentiary standards, lesser punishments such as jail terms or fines have been imposed. Rape 

victims run a high risk of being charged with adultery, for which death by stoning remains a 

possible sentence. In October 2003, the National Commission on the Status of Women in 

Pakistan issued a report on the Hudood Ordinances that stated that as many as 88 percent of 

women prisoners, many of them rape victims, are serving time in prison for violating these 

decrees, which make extramarital sex a crime and adultery a criminal offense. The Hudood laws 

apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 

The Commission’s May 2001 report on Pakistan played a key role in highlighting to U.S. 

and Pakistan government officials the un-democratic nature of the Pakistani separate electorate 

system for religious minorities. In January 2002, the Pakistan government abolished the system 

of separate electorates. 

In May 2004, Commissioner Richard D. Land testified on behalf of the Commission at a 

Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing titled “Pakistan: A Human Rights Update.” 

Commissioner Land discussed Pakistan’s record on religious freedom and the Commission’s 

recommendation to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that Pakistan be designated a “country of 

particular concern.” 
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Throughout 2004, the Commission continued to meet with representatives of the various 

religious groups in Pakistan, including Muslims, Ahmadis, and Christians, as well as with human 

rights organizations, academics, and other experts. Also in 2004, Commissioners received 

briefings from noted Pakistan experts on domestic developments in, and U.S. policy toward, 

Pakistan. 

In addition to recommending that Pakistan be designated a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• take the position that the existence and enforcement of laws targeting Ahmadis which 

effectively criminalize the public practice of their faith violate the right to freedom of 

religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that 

will reduce and ultimately eliminate their abuse; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent sectarian violence and 

punish its perpetrators, including disarming militant groups and any religious schools that 

provide weapons training; and 

• support, in conjunction with other donors: (a) improvements in the public education system; 

(b) judicial reform and law enforcement training; (c) legal advocacy to protect the right to 

freedom of religion; and (d) educational programs in religious tolerance. 
 

 

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COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Cuba 

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba. Religious 

freedom conditions have been affected in part by the ongoing government crackdown on 

democracy and free speech activists, resulting in a generally deteriorating situation for human 

rights. The Commission continues to place Cuba on its Watch List, and will monitor conditions 

of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba to determine if they rise to a level warranting 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a human rights record that, after 

deteriorating significantly in 2003, continued to be poor in 2004. Since seizing power in 1959, 

President Fidel Castro has maintained strong, centralized control of all facets of life in Cuba. 

While parliamentary, judicial, and executive institutions exist in name, all are under his control, 

and there is no legal or political avenue of dissent. Individuals who engage in dissent are 

harassed, jailed, and mistreated in prison. In February 2003, the Cuban government initiated an 

extensive crackdown on independent journalists, leaders of independent labor unions and 

opposition parties, and other democracy activists, including those supporting the Varela Project 

and the Christian Liberation Movement. Seventy-five human rights activists were arrested and 

sentenced in 2003. In the past year, the crackdowns have continued, with the imprisonment of 

an additional 22 human rights activists. 

Since Castro came to power, the communist government has sought to suppress religious 

belief and practice because it was “counterrevolutionary.” In the early years of the Castro 

regime, government and Communist Party officials forced priests, pastors, and other religious 

leaders into labor camps or exile and systematically discriminated against those who openly 

professed religious belief by excluding them from certain jobs or educational opportunities. In 

the past decade, however, the state instituted a limited rapprochement with religious believers. 

For example, the government abandoned its official policy of atheism in the early 1990s. Castro 

welcomed a visit from Pope John Paul II in 1998 and Castro visited Havana’s Jewish 

Community Center for its Hanukah celebration that same year. In 2000, religious holidays were 

reinstated and members of Cuba’s Jewish community were allowed to emigrate to Israel. The 

Pope’s visit, in particular, sparked great hopes within the religious communities in Cuba, as well 

as among democratic activists, who viewed these steps as a softening of past government 

policies. 

Yet, despite optimism that religious freedom would improve, violations have continued, 

as has the government’s strong degree of control and generally hostile attitude toward religion. 

Although the Cuban government seeks to project the image that the right to religious freedom is 

respected, in fact, government authorities continue to view the influence of religion as a threat to 

the ideology of Castro’s revolution. In early 2001, the Communist Party in Havana prepared a 

report that criticized inroads made by churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, into 

Cuban society, and asserted that the social work of the churches violated the law. Communist 

Party officials reportedly apologized to the Catholic Church hierarchy after the report was 

leaked. Nevertheless, Havana’s Catholic Cardinal gave an interview in 2003 in which he 

asserted that “restrictions on religious freedom are returning” in Cuba, and that they represent a 
 

 

134

“return to the ideology of repression.” After visiting Cuba in Spring 2004, a British religious 

advocacy organization reported a marked shift in government propaganda towards a communist 

orthodoxy, including an assault on religious freedom and related human rights. 

The government's main interaction with, and control of, religious denominations is 

through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban government 

also requires churches and other religious groups to register with the relevant provincial office of 

the Registry of Associations within the Ministry of Justice. Currently, there are approximately 

50 state-recognized religious groups, primarily Christian denominations, half of which are 

members of the government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches. Reportedly, the 

government in recent years has not granted recognition to any denominations that are relatively 

new to the country, although it has tolerated the presence of some new groups, such as the 

Baha’is and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, though they are not technically 

registered. In the last year, the Jehovah Witnesses report that they were allowed to open a 

central office in Havana, proselytize door-to-door, and publish their literature. According to the 

State Department’s 2004 human rights report, the Cuban government is most tolerant of religious 

groups that maintain “close relations” with the state or those who are “generally supportive of 

government policies.” 

In recent years, the Cuban government has rarely permitted the construction of new 

places of worship. Thus, those religious groups that are not recognized, or those without 

adequate space, are forced to meet in private homes or other similar accommodations, commonly 

known as “house churches.” Permission for such meetings may be granted from the state if the 

church is from one of the recognized or official faith groups, but permission is frequently denied 

to those the government deems to be “an independent religious movement” (i.e. not recognized 

or hostile to government policies). Members of house churches outside the recognized religious 

communities feel the brunt of this regulation; because they are not registered, their meetings are 

in violation of the law. If a complaint is made against a house church meeting, it can be broken 

up and the attendees imprisoned. In the past year, several Protestant groups reported evictions 

from houses used for these purposes. The Cuban government did permit the opening of a 

Russian Orthodox and a Greek Orthodox Church in 2004, which the official media declared to be 

evidence of the Cuban government’s religious tolerance. 

In the past year, both registered and unregistered religious groups continued to 

experience varying degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The State 

Department reports that house church pastors are routinely questioned and detained for several 

days by police and security forces. The State Department also reports that Cuban Interior 

Ministry officials engage in efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, 

including through surveillance, infiltration, and harassment of religious clerics and laypersons. 

In January 2004, a Ministry of Interior official revealed in an interview that government 

infiltration of civil and religious organizations is widespread. In many churches, officials 

reportedly monitor sermons and sit behind the wives of political prisoners in order to intimidate 

them. The Conference of Catholic Bishops reports that monitoring of church services and 

harassment of parishioners has increased in the last year. 

Other means by which the government restricts religion include: enforcement of a 

regulation that prevents any Cuban or joint enterprise, except those with specific authorization, 
 

 

135

from selling computers, facsimile machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church 

other than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an almost total state monopoly on 

printing presses; a prohibition on private religious schools; limitations on the entry of foreign 

religious workers; denial of Internet access to religious organizations; restrictions on making 

repairs to church buildings; and the denial of religious literature such as the Bible to persons in 

prison. Additionally, there is a requirement that religious groups receive permission from local 

Communist Party officials before being allowed to hold processions or events outside of 

religious buildings. Refusal of such permission is often based on the decision of individual 

government officials rather than the law. In the past year, La Pastora Catholic Church in Santa 

Clara was prohibited from distributing medicine and soap because these activities were not 

authorized and resulted in “illegal public gatherings.” A procession to mark the feast day of the 

patron saint of Managua was denied in 2003 because the Catholic priest, a Spanish citizen, was 

deemed “politically unreliable.” Cuban officials revoked his visa authorization, and he was 

forced to leave the country. In 2004, however, the town of Managua was permitted to hold its 

procession. Cuban authorities continue to deny or revoke visa authorization for religious 

workers whose activities are deemed too visible or whose opinions are viewed as contrary to 

government policy. 

In the past year, Commission staff has met with Cuban human rights activists, regional 

experts, and religious leaders. 
 

 

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137

IRFA AND THE U.S. REFUGEE AND ASYLUM PROGRAMS 

As stated in the preamble of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: 

The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the 

United States. Many of our Nation's founders fled religious persecution abroad, 

cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom. They 

established in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to 

freedom of religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized this 

legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by standing for religious 

freedom and offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution. 

REFUGEE, ASYLUM, AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES 

Consistent with the language in the preamble of the legislation, the 1998 International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) included a number of provisions related to asylum seekers and 

refugees, with particular attention to those fleeing religious persecution. In its 2004 Annual 

Report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reaffirmed its call to 

strengthen the institutional linkages between efforts to promote religious freedom and to provide 

access to the U.S. Refugee and Asylum programs. Specifically, the Commission recommended: 

(1) a systematic effort to improve access to resettlement for those who have fled “countries of 

particular concern,” or CPCs, and other countries where there are severe violations of religious 

freedom; (2) better training of refugee and consular officers in refugee and asylum adjudications 

and human rights, particularly religious freedom, as required by sections 602 and 603 of IRFA; 

and (3) the implementation of certain operational requirements imposed on the Refugee and 

Asylum programs by IRFA. 

While the Commission remains concerned that some of the refugee and asylum 

provisions of IRFA remain under-implemented, there have been notable improvements over the 

last year in the capacity of U.S. and other international refugee regimes to protect those who 

have fled religious persecution. These are discussed below. 

Improving Access to Resettlement for Those Who Have Fled CPCs 

Over the past year, two notable positive developments improved access to resettlement 

for those who have fled CPCs and other countries where there are severe violations of religious 

freedom. First, in October 2004, the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA) was 

signed into law by President Bush. In addition to a number of provisions designed to facilitate 

access to the U.S. and other refugee programs for North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, 

section 305(b) of the NKHRA requires that the President, in his annual report on proposed 

refugee admissions pursuant to section 207(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, include 

information about specific measures taken to facilitate access to the U.S. Refugee Program for 

individuals from each CPC.1

 

 

1

 The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333), SEC. 305 (b), Annual Report,
 

 

138

The Commission regrets, however, that only nationals fleeing religious persecution from 

one CPC—Iran—may currently apply for refugee status (under “Priority Two”) without a 

referral from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While nationals from Iran, 

Burma, and Sudan are also permitted to apply for refugee status under the Priority Three 

designation, they may do so only if they have a spouse, child, or, in some circumstances, parent 

in the United States who has already been granted asylum or refugee status.2

 The Commission 

looks forward to continuing to work with the U.S. Refugee Program, through regional working 

groups and other channels, to promote better access to resettlement for those who have fled 

CPCs and other places where religious beliefs, identity, or membership in a particular 

community result in persecution. 

The second positive development concerns access to the Refugee Program by religious 

minorities from Iran. The Commission welcomes the fact that the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447) extended the application of the Specter Amendment to Iranian 

Religious Minorities through FY2005. The Specter Amendment was originally enacted in 

FY2004 shortly after Austria, which has long hosted U.S. refugee processing for Iranian 

religious minorities, stopped issuing visas to Iranian Christians seeking to apply to the U.S. 

Refugee Program, citing the high denial rate of this group by refugee adjudicators in the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The amendment alleviated this situation by clarifying 

the adjudication standards for refugee applications from members of Iranian religious minorities. 

In October 2003, the Commission endorsed the application of the Specter Amendment when it 

 

Countries of Particular Concern. “The President shall include in each annual report on proposed 

refugee admission pursuant to section 207(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1157(d)), information about specific measures taken to facilitate access to the United States 

refugee program for individuals who have fled countries of particular concern for violations of 

religious freedom, identified pursuant to section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)). The report shall include, for each country of particular concern, 

a description of access of the nationals or former habitual residents of that country to a refugee 

determination on the basis of—(1) referrals by external agencies to a refugee adjudication; (2) 

groups deemed to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States for purposes of 

refugee resettlement; and (3) family links to the United States.” 

2

 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will not interview a refugee applicant unless he 

or she falls within one of the “processing priorities” designated by the Department of State. 

There are currently three processing priorities. Priority One (P-1) refers to refugees who are 

referred to DHS by a U.S. embassy or who meet UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) resettlement criteria and are referred to the US Refugee Program by that agency. 

Priority Two (P-2) refers to refugee applicants who belong to a group designated by the 

Department of State to be of “special humanitarian concern” to the United States. Priority Three 

(P-3) refers to refugee applicants of designated nationalities with a close relative in the United 

States who has been found to be an asylee or refugee. For a complete overview of the U.S. 

Refugee Program, see Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2005—Report to the 

Congress Submitted on Behalf of the President of the United States

(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36228.pdf, accessed April 18, 2005). 
 

 

139

was first under consideration by Congress. The Commission now recommends that Congress 

and the President continue to extend the Amendment until the government of Iran ceases to 

engage in systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom. 

Training of Refugee and Consular Officers in Refugee and Asylum Adjudications and 

Human Rights, Particularly Religious Freedom 

Sections 602 and 603 of IRFA mandate training requirements for asylum officers, 

immigration judges, refugee officers, immigration inspectors, and consular officers on religious 

persecution and other issues relating to the refugee and asylum programs. The DHS and 

Department of Justice (DOJ) have complied, to varying degrees, with these requirements. In 

particular, the DHS Asylum Division, which adjudicates asylum applications in the United 

States, has developed and implemented specific training programs on religious freedom issues. 

Commission staff participated in a DOJ video training session on violations of religious freedom 

abroad for all U.S. immigration judges in 2004. The DHS is now in the process of creating a 

professional corps of officers, called the Refugee Corps, specially trained in refugee law who 

will focus exclusively on refugee adjudications overseas. In the past, the U.S. Refugee Program 

relied primarily on immigration officers who performed refugee adjudications only as a collateral 

or temporary duty. The Refugee Corps will create an opportunity to ensure that, like asylum 

applications, refugee applications will now be adjudicated by specialists who receive the training 

required by IRFA. 

There has been another positive development within the past twelve months which will 

likely facilitate better training and guidance for refugee and asylum adjudicators. Specifically, in 

April 2004, the UNHCR released the first international guidelines on the adjudication of 

religion-based refugee claims.3

 These guidelines were originally conceived during an October 

2002 roundtable in Baltimore, Maryland, in which Commissioner Felice D. Gaer and 

Commission staff participated as experts on freedom of religion or belief, together with other 

refugee and human rights experts. The Guidelines are intended to facilitate training of refugee 

adjudicators worldwide. 

The Commission remains concerned, however, that refugee-related training of State 

Department consular officers continues to fall short of requirements set forth in section 602(b) of 

IRFA. While consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, they are authorized to 

refer individuals in need of protection to the U.S. Refugee Program.4

 Such referrals rarely take 

place. A recent report by Professor David Martin at the University of Virginia, commissioned by 

the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), recommended 

 

3

 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based 

Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to 

the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/04/06) (28 April 2004). (The Guidelines are available at 

http://www.unhcr.ch, accessed April 18, 2005). 

4

 This is an important function, as individuals fleeing persecution may not submit an application 

for refugee status unless they either: (1) receive such a referral from a U.S. embassy or the 

UNHCR; or (2) fall into one of the narrowly defined processing priorities of “humanitarian 

concern” under the U.S. Refugee Program. 
 

 

140

that the State Department provide new Foreign Service Officers with more systematic instruction 

on refugee and humanitarian programs generally and on the specific opportunities and 

procedures for referrals.5

 Further, in the Expedited Removal study which the Commission 

released on February 8, 2005 (see below), the Commission expressed concern over evidence 

indicating that it may be increasingly difficult for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain 

protection from the United States, and called for a study on the extent to which consular officers 

are trained in the Refugee Program, as is required by IRFA, and the impact which such training 

is having on referrals made by U.S. embassies to the Refugee Program. 

IRFA Procedural Requirements Relating to the U.S. Refugee Program 

Section 602 of IRFA details additional requirements for the U.S. Refugee Program. 

Among these requirements is the provision that the State Department establish uniform 

procedures for overseas processing entities (OPEs), which prepare, under contract with the State 

Department’s PRM, the applications of individuals seeking refugee status, as well as for 

personnel responsible for preparing refugee case files for refugee adjudications. 

The State Department has made progress in complying with this provision by developing 

a “Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System” (WRAPS) to promote uniformity in the 

preparation of refugee case files. However, WRAPS does not provide any substantive guidance 

in two central aspects of the preparation of refugee case files: the preparation of each refugee 

applicant’s persecution story and the filing of requests for reconsideration of denied refugee 

applications. 

In its May 2004 Annual Report, the Commission noted that PRM had expressed its 

intention to establish a working group on OPEs. Professor David Martin, in the paper 

commissioned by the Department of State, also recommended that such a group develop 

guidelines consistent with section 602 of IRFA.6

 The Commission would like to reiterate its 

recommendation that PRM more fully implement the requirements set forth in this provision of 

IRFA. 

Inadmissibility of Religious Freedom Violators 

Although section 604 of IRFA established a ground of inadmissibility for certain 

religious freedom violators, this provision was limited to foreign government officials who 

committed particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined by IRFA, within the 

previous 24 months. In fact, from the enactment of IRFA in 1998 until March 2005, the 

provision had never been invoked for a single visa denial. The Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), signed into law in December 2004, broadened 

this provision to cover any alien who, while serving as a foreign government official, was 

responsible for—or carried out—at any time, such violations. Subsequently, on March 17, 2005, 

 

5

 David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of 

Refugee Resettlement (July 2004), p. 72 

(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf, accessed April 18, 2005). 6

 See Martin, p. 143. 
 

 

141

the State Department revoked the visa of Indian national Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of the 

Indian state of Gujarat, who was traveling to the United States in an unofficial capacity. Modi 

had been criticized for failing to act in 2002 as Hindu mob violence raged in the province, killing 

as many as 2,000 Muslims in the wake of an incident in which Muslims set fire to a train, killing 

58 Hindus. Moreover, India’s National Human Rights Commission, an official body, as well as 

numerous domestic and international human rights investigators, found evidence of complicity in 

the attacks by officials of the Gujarat state government, headed then and now by Chief Minister 

Modi. 

It is important to prevent religious freedom violators from entering the United States, just 

as it is to protect refugees who flee from them. Accordingly, the Commission is looking forward 

to the State Department and the DHS expanding its “lookout lists” to prevent violators of 

religious freedom from being admitted to the United States. To facilitate this process, the State 

Department should identify those government officials who are responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom in all countries where such violations occur, as required by 

IRFA section 402(b)(2). 

THE COMMISSION’S STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, 

AS AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 605 OF IRFA 

In addition to several refugee and asylum provisions specifically related to individuals 

who fled religious persecution, IRFA also authorized the Commission to appoint experts to 

conduct a study to determine whether certain legislative changes, enacted in 1996, were 

impairing America’s obligation—and founding tradition—to offer refuge to those suffering 

persecution. The Commission’s study, entitled the Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited 

Removal, was released in February 2005. 

The Congress authorized the Commission to appoint experts to examine how the new 

immigration procedure, known as “Expedited Removal,” was affecting asylum seekers, 

regardless of whether or not the claim was based on religion, race, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion. 

What is Expedited Removal? 

In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), the most comprehensive immigration reform legislation in over 

30 years. Among other reforms, the legislation established Expedited Removal, a process which 

was intended to strengthen the security of America’s borders without closing them to those 

fleeing persecution. 

Prior to IIRAIRA, immigration inspectors could not compel an improperly documented 

alien to depart the United States. The inspector had the discretion to offer the alien the 

opportunity to withdraw his application for admission, or to refer the alien to an immigration 

judge for a hearing. If the inspector did refer the alien to an immigration judge, the alien could 

be detained until the hearing, but in practice would generally be released due to bed-space 

shortages. 
 

 

142

The IIRAIRA changed these procedures. It authorized immigration inspectors summarily 

to remove aliens who lacked appropriate travel documents, or who obtained their travel 

documents through fraud or misrepresentation. Concerned, however, that bona fide asylum 

seekers not be removed to countries where they may be persecuted, Congress also included 

provisions to prevent the Expedited Removal of refugees fleeing persecution.7 Specifically, an 

alien who indicates an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of return is entitled to a “credible 

fear interview” by an asylum officer. If the asylum officer determines that an alien has a 

“significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for asylum, he or she is entitled to ask the 

immigration judge for relief from removal.8

 If credible fear is not found, the asylum officer 

orders the alien removed, although this decision is subject to review by an immigration judge. 

Congress also required that aliens, including asylum seekers, subject to Expedited 

Removal be detained until actual removal, after which they may not return to the United States 

for five years. If an asylum officer determines that an alien has credible fear, however, the alien 

may be considered for release while awaiting an asylum hearing. While decisions of release 

(“parole”) are discretionary, agency memoranda instruct that “parole is a viable option and 

should be considered for aliens who meet the credible fear standard, can establish identity and 

community ties, and are not subject to any possible bars to asylum involving violence or 

misconduct.”9

In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the lead agency on 

Expedited Removal, was abolished by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The functions of the 

former INS were dispersed to various components within the newly created Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). The immigration judges, however, remained in the Executive Office 

for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ).10 

 

7

 Under the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the 

United States has ratified, as implemented by the Refugee Act of 1980 and other amendments to 

the Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States may not return any individual to a 

country where that individual may face persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In addition, the United States has 

ratified and implemented regulations to execute the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and may 

not remove anyone to a country where he or she is in danger of being tortured. 

8

 “Credible fear” is defined in section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 

U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(5) (2004). 

9

 INS Memorandum, Expedited Removal: Additional Policy Guidance (Dec. 30, 1997) from 

Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, Office of Field 

Operations, to Regional Directors, District Directors, Asylum Office Directors, reproduced in 75 

Interpreter Releases 270 (Feb. 23, 1998). 

10 EOIR oversees the Immigration Judges who review negative credible fear determinations 

made by asylum officers and who hear asylum claims from aliens placed in Expedited Removal. 

It also houses the Immigration Judges’ appellate review unit, the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA). 
 

 

143

Expedited Removal is mandatory for aliens arriving at ports of entry. Congress, 

however, also authorized the Attorney General to exercise discretion in applying Expedited 

Removal in the interior of the United States to undocumented aliens apprehended within two 

years after entry. On November 13, 2002, Expedited Removal was expanded by the INS to 

apply to undocumented non-Cubans who entered the United States by sea within the prior two 

years. 

On August 11, 2004, the DHS announced that, effective immediately, it was exercising 

its discretion to expand further Expedited Removal authority to the Border Patrol for 

undocumented aliens apprehended within 14 days after entry and within 100 miles of the border, 

initially in the Tucson and Laredo Border Patrol sectors, but subject to further expansion.11

The Commission Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal 

IRFA authorized the Commission to appoint experts to examine whether immigration 

officers, in exercising Expedited Removal authority over aliens who may be eligible for asylum, 

were: 

(1) improperly encouraging withdrawals of applications for admission; 

(2) incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for credible fear determinations; 

(3) incorrectly removing such aliens to countries where such aliens may face persecution; or 

(4) improperly detaining such aliens, or detaining them under inappropriate conditions. 

Congress also authorized the Commission-appointed experts to have virtually unrestricted access 

to Expedited Removal proceedings. 

At the same time, IRFA required the General Accounting Office (GAO, now known as 

the Government Accountability Office) to complete its own study on asylum seekers in 

Expedited Removal, which was released in September 2000. That study found that, despite 

some deficiencies in the process, INS was generally in compliance with its own Expedited 

Removal procedures. GAO, however, relied primarily on the review of INS records and 

statistical analyses, and whether INS was following its own procedures. GAO chose not to 

review critically legal determinations made by INS or the EOIR. 

As authorized by section 605 of IRFA, the Commission appointed experts on refugee and 

asylum issues to undertake the study.12 While not directly involved in the development of the 

 

11 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (2004). 

12 The experts appointed by the Commission were: Mark Hetfield (Immigration Counsel on 

Commission staff and Director of the study); Professor Kate Jastram (University of California at 

Berkeley); Dr. Allen Keller (Director of the New York University-Bellevue Center for Survivors 

of Torture); and Charles H. Kuck (Weathersby, Howard and Kuck in Atlanta). Mr. Kuck 

replaced Robert C. Divine, who resigned from the study in order to accept an appointment as 

Chief Legal Advisor to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of 

Homeland Security. The Commission also retained Professor Craig Haney (University of 

California at Santa Cruz) as the study’s detention expert, as well as Dr. Fritz Scheuren of the 
 

 

144

study methodology, the Commissioners formed an active subcommittee to liaise with the experts, 

and visit some of the ports of entry, Border Patrol stations, asylum offices, and detention centers 

with them.13

The Commission study began in Fall 2003, after the absorption of most Expedited 

Removal operations into the DHS. The Commission-appointed experts chose to focus on 

building on the file review and statistical analyses gathered by GAO. The Commission study, 

however, differed from the GAO effort in several respects. Specifically, the Commissionappointed experts chose to: 

• observe inspections at seven major ports of entry (GAO did not collect data from 

observations of Expedited Removal proceedings); 

• compare the detention standards to correctional standards, and ascertain whether 

correctional standards were “appropriate” for a non-criminal asylum seeker population 

(GAO instead accepted the INS detention standards, and measured INS compliance with 

some of those standards); 

• review the use of documents created during the Expedited Removal process that were 

used as evidence during asylum hearings; and 

• examine the impact of representation on asylum claimants subject to Expedited Removal. 

Data collection for the study occurred from March through December 2004. Under the 

guidance of a chief methodologist and other experts in research methods, the experts: 

• together with members of the Commissioners subcommittee, performed preliminary site 

visits to inspection and detention facilities in the following areas: Arizona; Atlanta; 

Chicago; Detroit; Houston; Laredo; Los Angeles; Miami; New York/Newark; Puerto 

Rico; San Ysidro; San Francisco; and Washington, D.C. During these visits, experts and 

Commissioners met with inspectors (Customs and Border Protection or CBP), detention 

officials (Immigration and Custom Enforcement or ICE), asylum officers (U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services or USCIS); immigration judges (EOIR); asylum 

seekers who have experienced Expedited Removal proceedings; and non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs); 

 

National Opinion Research Center (NORC, University of Chicago) and President of the 

American Statistical Association), as chief methodologist. 

13 The Expedited Removal study subcommittee was chaired by Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal. 

Other members included Commissioners Michael Cromartie, Bishop Ricardo Ramirez, and 

Michael K. Young. Commissioner Felice D. Gaer, Vice-Chair of the Commission, also 

participated in the activities and deliberations of the subcommittee. 
 

 

145

• observed and collected data from 404 secondary inspections and interviewed 194 aliens 

in Expedited Removal proceedings, with 155 of those aliens being both interviewed and 

observed; 

• reviewed randomly selected subsamples of an additional 339 files from ports of entry, 32 

files of aliens who dissolved their asylum claims, 163 records of proceeding from the 

Board of Immigration Appeals, and 321 Alien Files of Asylum Seekers who were 

referred for credible fear; 

• surveyed all eight asylum offices and the 19 largest detention facilities; 

• interviewed and collected data from 39 asylum seekers who were dissolving their asylum 

claims; 

• reviewed 50 files provided by DHS of negative credible fear determinations; and 

• compiled nation-wide statistics with the assistance of EOIR and DHS. 

The Commission appointed experts received valuable feedback on earlier drafts from the 

GAO, as well as from the interested bureaus and offices within the DOJ and DHS. The 

Commission acknowledges and appreciates the cooperation demonstrated by all of these 

agencies in preparing this report. 

In February 2005, the Commission experts finalized their reports and unanimously 

adopted a set of findings and recommendations, with which the Commission concurred.14 The 

Commission is convinced that, if carried out, these recommendations will allow Expedited 

Removal to protect U.S. borders while protecting bona fide asylum seekers. This is how 

Expedited Removal was intended to work, and how it often does work in practice. 

The Commission regrets, however, that serious problems were also identified, which 

place some asylum seekers at risk of improper return (refoulement). The Commission also found 

that most asylum seekers in Expedited Removal are detained under conditions which may be 

suitable in the criminal justice system, but are entirely inappropriate for asylum seekers fleeing 

persecution. Nevertheless, the Commission and the experts concluded that these issues can be 

addressed without amending the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Finally, the study uncovered statistics which, the Commission believes, require further 

investigation and analysis. Since the events of September 11, while the number of aliens 

traveling to the United States has declined by 20 percent, the number of asylum seekers who 

arrive through Expedited Removal proceedings has plummeted by 50 percent. 

 

14 Due to personal demands on her time, Commissioner Nina Shea did not review or participate 

in the study. 
 

 

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Under U.S. law, an alien has a legal right to apply for asylum once he or she arrives in the 

United States. No one, however, has a legal right to travel to the United States in order to apply 

for asylum. Indeed, increasing numbers of DHS employees stationed overseas are being enlisted 

to help foreign airline personnel identify improperly documented aliens to prevent them from 

boarding planes to the United States. Whatever the implications of these actions are for national 

security, they will likely have an adverse impact on the number of bona fide asylum seekers 

fleeing to the United States, as they are often unable to obtain legitimate travel documents from 

the state which persecutes them. Moreover, it has long been the case that U.S. consular officers 

have denied visas when they suspect the applicant intends to apply for asylum after landing in 

the United States. 

Recognizing that asylum seekers who cannot get a visa to the United States may still 

have serious protection needs, the Department of State, in consultation with Congress, developed 

discretionary mechanisms to allow such individuals to be referred for resettlement. One such 

mechanism allows embassies and consular officers to refer individuals with protection needs to 

the U.S. Refugee Program. In order to promote better understanding and use of this protection 

mechanism, section 602 of IRFA requires the Secretary of State to “provide sessions on refugee 

law and adjudications and on religious persecution to each individual seeking a commission as a 

United States consular officer.” The Commission has raised concerns regarding the State 

Department’s failure to implement this requirement.15

Given the dramatic decline in the number of asylum seekers entering the United States, 

the Commission urges Congress to authorize a study on the reasons for the decline and the extent 

to which consular officers are being trained in, and utilizing, the refugee referral mechanism 

referred to in section 602 of IRFA. 

Indeed, although the data collected in the Commission’s study answered the four 

questions about Expedited Removal posed to the experts by Congress, it also posed many more. 

The Commission expects that the hundreds of pages of data compiled by the experts will 

continue to be reviewed and analyzed by others to provide further guidance on how the 

Expedited Removal process can be improved. 

The study, in its entirety, is available on the Commission’s web site.

Overview of Findings and Recommendations of the Commission Study 

The study found mandatory procedures in place to ensure that asylum seekers are 

protected under Expedited Removal. Some procedures were applied with reasonable 

consistency, but compliance with others varied significantly, depending upon where the alien 

arrived and which immigration judges or inspectors addressed the alien’s claim. Most 

procedures lacked effective quality assurance measures to ensure that they were consistently 

followed. Consequently, the outcome of an asylum claim appears to depend not only on the 

strength of the claim, but also on which officials consider the claim, and whether or not the alien 

 

15 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2004, p. 101. 
 

 

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has an attorney. Similarly, while DHS has developed criteria relating to the release of detained 

asylum seekers, the implementation of these criteria also varies widely from place to place. 

There are a few areas, however, where the study identified problems other than 

inconsistent practices. For example, with regard to detention, the study found that asylum 

seekers are consistently detained in jails or jail-like facilities, which the experts found 

inappropriate for non-criminal asylum seekers. There were, however, a small number of 

exceptions to this rule, the most prominent being a DHS contract facility in Broward Country, 

Florida, which is a secure, but appropriate and non-correctional, environment for non-criminal 

asylum seekers. 

The study also found that asylum seekers without a lawyer had a much lower chance of 

being granted asylum (two percent) than those with an attorney (25 percent). This difference 

was consistent whether the alien resided—or was detained—in an area with a high rate of 

representation of asylum claimants, or a low rate of representation. The study does, however, 

identify a number of locations where public-private initiatives involving DHS, the EOIR, and 

NGOs, have put legal assistance within reach of some detained asylum seekers. These programs, 

however, are limited to only a few select locations. 

With regard to credible fear determinations, the study found that asylum officers 

screened-in more than 90 percent of credible fear applicants, and made a negative credible fear 

finding in only one percent of cases. Quality assurance procedures, requiring much more 

extensive documentation and review of negative claims than of positive ones, may have created a 

built-in bias in the credible fear screening, undermining the objectivity of the process. 

Each stage of the Expedited Removal process relies upon the information collected in 

previous stages: 

(1) The alien is referred by CBP for a credible fear interview, or removed; then 

(2) Referred by an asylum officer at USCIS for an asylum hearing, or ordered removed, subject 

to immigration judge review of the negative credible fear determination; then 

(3) Detained or paroled by ICE; and then 

(4) With the participation in the courtroom by an ICE trial attorney, granted or denied asylum, 

withholding, or Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief by the immigration judge (DOJEOIR). 

The impediments to communication and information sharing within DHS, however, are 

serious. By the end of the process—the asylum hearing—unreliable and/or incomplete 

documentation from CBP and USCIS is susceptible to misinterpretation by the ICE trial attorney, 

misapplication by the immigration judge, and may ultimately result in the denial of the asylum 

seeker’s claim. The study did not seek to determine whether asylum claims were incorrectly 

denied, but did determine that immigration judges, even within the same court, had significantly 

different rates of granting or denying asylum claims. Furthermore, in denying asylum 

applications on the basis of credibility, immigration judges frequently cited documents which the 

study found to be unreliable and incomplete records. 
 

 

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The study also noted that Expedited Removal has been expanded twice in recent years, 

without first addressing the flaws in the system that undermine the protections for asylum 

seekers. 

In April 2005, a Commission delegation met with Secretary of Homeland Security 

Michael Chertoff to discuss the findings and recommendations of the study. The Commission 

urged the Secretary, as he moves forward with his reconsideration of the structure of the DHS, to 

take steps to ensure that the Secretary will no longer be responsible for coordinating refugee and 

asylum policy among the various bureaus, but that a high ranking official who reports to him or 

her will carry out this function. Without day-to-day oversight of asylum policy and its 

implementation department-wide, the flaws in the system identified in the Commission’s study 

cannot be effectively addressed, leaving asylum seekers in Expedited Removal at risk of being 

returned to countries where they may face persecution. 

Also in April, a delegation of Commissioners and study experts met with the leadership 

of EOIR, including Director Kevin Rooney, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, and 

Board of Immigration Appeals Chair Lori Scialabba, to thank EOIR for its cooperation in the 

study and to discuss findings and recommendations. EOIR assured the Commission that the 

study report has been posted on the EOIR Electronic Bulletin Board System for all judges to 

review, and that the Commission would be invited to participate in trainings for immigration 

judges on the study’s findings. 

In June 2005, the American Immigration Lawyers Association will be awarding the 

Commission and the Expedited Removal study team the Arthur C. Helton Memorial Human 

Rights Award in recognition of outstanding service in advancing the cause of human rights. 

Findings 

Question One 

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING EXPEDITED REMOVAL AUTHORITY,

IMPROPERLY ENCOURAGING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO WITHDRAW APPLICATIONS FOR 

ADMISSION?

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations and Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) procedures and training materials make it clear to CBP inspectors that the withdrawal of 

an application for admission is “strictly voluntary” and “must not be coerced in any way.” While 

most officers observed complied with these procedures, in one port of entry the study observed a 

few instances in which immigration officers improperly encouraged asylum seekers to withdraw 

their applications for admission. 

 Question Two 

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING EXPEDITED REMOVAL AUTHORITY,

INCORRECTLY FAILING TO REFER ASYLUM SEEKERS FOR A CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW?
 

 

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DHS regulations state that an immigration inspector must refer an alien for a credible fear 

determination if that alien indicates “an intention to apply for asylum, a fear of torture, or a fear 

of return to his or her country.” In accordance with these regulations, nearly 85 percent (67/79) 

of arriving aliens observed by the study expressing a fear of return were referred for a credible 

fear interview. CBP Guidelines, however, provide the inspector with more discretion than the 

regulations, allowing the inspector to decline referral in cases where the fear claimed by the 

applicant is unrelated to the criteria for asylum. Indeed, in 15 percent (12/79) of observed cases 

when an arriving alien expressed a fear of return to the inspector, the alien was not referred. 

Moreover, among these twelve cases were several aliens who expressed fear of political, 

religious, or ethnic persecution, which are clearly related to the grounds for asylum. Of 

particular concern, in seven of these twelve cases, the inspector incorrectly indicated on the 

sworn statement for the file that the applicant claimed he or she had no fear of return. 

DHS regulations require immigration inspectors to follow a standard script informing 

each alien that he or she may ask for protection if he or she has a fear of returning home. In 

approximately half of inspections observed, inspectors failed to inform the alien of the 

information in that part of the script. Aliens who did receive this information were seven times 

more likely to be referred for a credible fear determination than those who were not. 

While DHS guidance requires that asylum seekers at land ports of entry be placed in 

Expedited Removal and referred for a credible fear interview, the study interviewed two groups 

of aliens, one from the Middle East, the other from East Africa, who requested the opportunity to 

apply for asylum but were refused and “pushed back” at primary inspection. The study became 

aware of these cases only because, in each case, the asylum seekers tried again on a different day 

and were referred into Expedited Removal as well as for a credible fear interview. CBP has 

stated that it is “very concerned and dismayed that this is happening contrary to policy, and is 

taking steps to address this.”16 

Question Three 

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING EXPEDITED REMOVAL AUTHORITY,

INCORRECTLY REMOVING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO COUNTRIES WHERE THEY MAY FACE 

PERSECUTION?

The second study question concerned bona fide asylum seekers who are improperly 

denied a referral for a credible fear determination. The fact that such asylum seekers may be 

removed to a country where they may face persecution is addressed under question two. In this 

section, the focus is on asylum seekers who are removed after the credible fear interview. In 

addressing this question, it is also appropriate to examine asylum seekers ordered removed by 

 

16 Letter from Michael J. Hrinyak, Acting Executive Director, Immigration Policy and Programs, 

Office of Field Operations, to Mark Hetfield, USCIRF (February 2, 2005). See also “Aliens 

Seeking Asylum at Land Border Ports of Entry,” Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, 

Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, to Regional Directors (February 6, 2002). 
 

 

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the immigration judge at the conclusion of their asylum hearing, focusing on the characteristics 

of the proceeding which are unique to cases that originate in Expedited Removal. 

 

Asylum officers reach a negative credible fear determination in only one percent of cases 

referred. Moreover, a negative credible fear determination is subject to strict quality assurance 

procedures by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) headquarters, and may then 

be reviewed by an immigration judge, who vacates negative credible fear findings reached by 

asylum officers more than ten percent of the time. 

Under the current system, immigration judges—not asylum officers—determine 

eligibility for asylum for aliens in Expedited Removal proceedings. The study found very 

significant variations in the asylum approval rates of individual judges Furthermore, in nearly 

40 percent of the immigration judge decisions examined where relief was denied, the judge cited 

that the applicant’s testimony was inconsistent with his or her initial asylum claim, as expressed 

to the immigration inspector or the asylum officer at the time of the credible fear interview. In 

nearly one-fourth of these cases, the judge found that the asylum-seeker’s testimony was not 

credible because the alien “added detail” to the prior statements. Such negative credibility 

findings fail to take into account that the records of these prior statements are, according to the 

findings of the study, often unreliable and incomplete. The study found that, in the majority of 

observed cases, the alien signed the sworn statement without reading it and without the CBP 

officer reading it back to him or her. The study also found that immigration judges granted relief 

to 25 percent of represented asylum applicants, but to only two percent of unrepresented asylum 

seekers. 

After being denied asylum, an alien who continues to claim a fear of persecution or 

torture may appeal a negative immigration judge decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA). While the BIA sustained 23 percent of Expedited Removal asylum appeals in FY2001, 

only two to four percent of such appeals have been granted since 2002, when the court began 

allowing the issuance of “summary affirmances” rather than detailed decisions. Statistically, it 

is highly unlikely that any asylum seeker denied by an immigration judge will find protection by 

appealing to the BIA. 

Question Four 

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING AUTHORITY UNDER EXPEDITED REMOVAL,

DETAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS IMPROPERLY OR UNDER INAPPROPRIATE CONDITIONS? 

Asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal must, by law, be detained until an asylum 

officer has determined that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture, unless release 

(parole) is necessary to meet a medical emergency need or legitimate law enforcement objective. 

The study found that most asylum seekers are detained in jails and in jail-like facilities, often 

with criminal inmates as well as aliens with criminal convictions. While DHS has established 

detention standards, these detention facilities closely resemble, and are based on, standards for 

correctional institutions. 
 

 

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In one particularly innovative Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contract 

facility, located in Broward County, Florida, asylum seekers are detained in a secure facility 

which does not closely resemble a jail. While Broward could be the model in the United States 

for the detention of asylum seekers, it is instead the exception among the network of 185 jails, 

prisons, and “processing facilities” utilized by DHS to detain asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal. 

DHS policy favors the release of asylum seekers who have established credible fear, 

identity, community ties, and no likelihood of posing a security risk. However, there was little 

documentation in the files to assess how these criteria were actually being applied by ICE. 

 Moreover, DHS statistics show that its release criteria are being applied with extreme 

inconsistency. Asylum seekers in New Orleans are released 0.5 percent of the time prior to an 

asylum decision in their case, four percent of the time in New Jersey, and eight percent of the 

time in New York. In Harlingen, however, the release rate is 98 percent, in San Antonio it is 98 

percent, and in Chicago, 81 percent. 

The Study’s Recommendations 

Recommendation One. In order to more effectively protect both homeland security and 

bona fide asylum seekers, the Department of Homeland Security should create an office, 

headed by a high-level official, authorized to address cross cutting issues relating to asylum 

and expedited removal. 

Recommendation Two. The burden on the detention system, the immigration courts, and on 

bona fide asylum seekers in Expedited Removal themselves should be eased by allowing 

asylum officers to grant asylum in approvable cases at the time of the credible fear interview, 

just as they are already trained and authorized to do for other asylum seekers. Aliens who 

establish credible fear but for whatever reason have not yet established an approvable asylum 

claim, should continue to be referred to an immigration judge. 

Recommendation Three. DHS should establish detention standards and conditions 

appropriate for asylum seekers. The agency should also promulgate regulations to promote 

more consistent implementation of existing parole criteria, to ensure that asylum seekers with 

a credible fear of persecution—who establish identity and who pose neither a flight nor a 

security risk—are released from detention.

 

Recommendation Four. Expand existing private-public partnerships to facilitate legal 

assistance for asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal, and improve administrative 

review and quality assurance procedures to improve consistency in asylum determinations by 

immigration judges. 

Recommendation Five. The DHS should implement and monitor quality assurance 

procedures to ensure more reliable information for Homeland Security purposes, and to 

ensure that asylum seekers are not turned away in error. Specifically, DHS should: 
 

 

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y create a reliable inter-bureau system that tracks real-time data of aliens in Expedited 

Removal proceedings; 

y reconcile conflicting field guidance to require that any expression of fear at the port 

of entry must result in either a referral for a credible fear determination or, in cases in 

which the inspector or Border Patrol agent believes the alien would “clearly not 

qualify” for asylum or Committee Against Torture relief, contact with an asylum 

officer to speak to the alien via a telephonic interpretation service to determine 

whether or not the alien needs to be referred; 

 

y improve quality assurance by expanding and enhancing the videotape systems 

currently used at Houston and Atlanta to all major ports of entry and Border Patrol 

stations unintrusively to record all secondary interviews, and consider employing the 

use of undercover “testers” to verify that Expedited Removal procedures are being 

properly followed; 

y include, on Sworn Statement Form I-867B, an explanation of the specific purpose for 

which the document is designed to serve, and its limitations; and 

y enhance the efficiency of the Expedited Removal process by amending DHS quality 

assurance procedures for the credible fear interview to subject both negative and 

positive determinations to similar quality assurance procedures. 

Concluding Recommendation 

The Commission’s study on Expedited Removal has provided temporary transparency to 

Expedited Removal, a process which is opaque not only to the outside world, but even within the 

DHS. As a result of this transparency, serious—but not insurmountable—problems with 

Expedited Removal have been identified. The study’s recommendations concerning better data 

systems, quality assurance measures, access to representation, and a DHS Refugee Coordinator 

would all contribute to a more transparent and effective Expedited Removal process. The study 

also recommends that Congress require the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to 

prepare and submit reports, within twelve months of the release of this study, describing agency 

actions to address the study’s findings and recommendations. 
 

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S 

ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

In passing the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), Congress sought to ensure 

that advancing international religious freedom was an integral part of the U.S. government’s 

foreign policy agenda. It is the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom (Annual Report) that provides Congress and the public an opportunity to assess not 

only the state of religious freedom around the world but also what the U.S. government is doing 

to advance this key U.S. foreign policy objective. 

As the only U.S. government account devoted especially to religious freedom conditions 

worldwide, the Annual Report remains a crucial reporting tool. In addition to providing a 

detailed description of country conditions, IRFA requires that the Annual Report fully describe 

the active steps the U.S. government is taking or has taken to promote religious freedom and to 

respond to religious freedom violations in all countries where such violations occur. 

The Annual Report continues to contain abundant information on religious freedom 

conditions throughout the world. However, the section describing U.S. actions with regard to 

individual countries remains uneven and, in some respects, inadequate. The Commission 

maintains that a better balance between these two aspects of the report should be applied, since 

underreporting on U.S. policies weakens the report’s usefulness as a policy tool. Topics that 

should be found in this section include: the U.S. government’s goals and objectives to promote 

respect for religious freedom in the country reported on, along with the relative priority of these 

objectives; U.S. policies that have been adopted and are being implemented to advance religious 

freedom there; U.S. concerns that have been raised with the foreign government in question, as 

well as the response of that foreign government; the results, or lack thereof, of specific actions 

taken by the U.S. government; and the nature of foreign aid, public diplomacy, and other 

programs sponsored by the U.S. government to promote religious freedom in that country. 

Unfortunately, it is still not apparent from the lists of actions presented in the Annual 

Report that the State Department has conducted its activities with respect to religious freedom in 

a coordinated and deliberate fashion, or used all of the available policy tools to advance religious 

freedom in countries where violations occur. For example, IRFA provisions encouraging 

positive measures—and not just punitive ones—are still underutilized. Accordingly, the 

Commission recommends that the Annual Report include a detailed description of foreign aid, 

public diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, and other programs sponsored by the U.S. 

government that seek to promote respect for freedom of religion or belief and other related 

human rights, as well as religious tolerance. Some information of this type is scattered 

throughout the Annual Report, but the reports on several important countries that receive 

substantial funding allocations under the democracy and governance programs of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development contain very little of this type of information, giving the 

reader the impression that religious freedom concerns have not been integrated into the mission’s 

program planning. 
 

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The 2004 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom

The 2004 Annual Report is, characteristically, a significant accomplishment that 

continues to demonstrate the substantial efforts of the Foreign Service Officers in our embassies 

around the world, as well as the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, John 

V. Hanford III, and his staff at the State Department’s Office on International Religious 

Freedom. Many of the individual country reports in the 2004 Annual Report continue to be 

lengthy and revealing. However, the Commission remains concerned about a number of 

informational inaccuracies in several important country reports. 

The country report on Saudi Arabia gives the impression that the religious freedom 

situation is improving there, despite the fact that the essential characteristic—the absence of 

religious freedom—remains unchanged. Although the country has for the first time been named 

by the Secretary of State as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, the report on Saudi Arabia 

for the first time contains a section describing purported “Improvements and Positive 

Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom,” which too enthusiastically champions as 

positive a set of actions that did little to alter the actual situation. What is more, the report 

continues to omit any mention of reports of the Saudi export of an intolerant and hate-filled 

religious ideology to a number of countries throughout the world. The Commission welcomes 

the fact that senior officials in the State Department, including Ambassador Hanford, have 

publicly addressed the issue. In March 2005, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor Michael G. Kozak testified before Congress that the Saudi 

government “failed to take responsibility for the propagation of religious intolerance and 

incitement to violence at home and abroad.” Clearly, this important issue should be addressed in 

the Annual Report. 

The report on Afghanistan does not address what the Commission has termed the 

potentially “fatal flaw” in the country’s new Constitution. Though mention is made that nonMuslims are free to exercise their faith, the report does not address the fact that Muslims are not 

granted the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The report also fails 

to mention that even the limited group right extended to non-Muslims can be restricted by 

ordinary law, as are most of the other rights outlined in the Constitution. Furthermore, the 

Afghanistan report states that “The Constitution does not grant preferential status to the Hanafi 

school” of Islamic jurisprudence. This is simply incorrect. Article 130 in the Constitution says 

that if there is no other law on point, decisions of the courts “shall be within the limits of the 

Constitution in accord with Hanafi jurisprudence.” Similarly, the report states that “The new 

Constitution makes no reference to Shari’a law.” However, this sentence is somewhat 

misleading, as the article mentioned above provides a constitutional basis for sharia law to be 

applied in Afghanistan through the default position of Hanafi jurisprudence. Finally, the 

Afghanistan report does not explicitly address the profound threat to religious freedom that exists 

in the form of the new Constitution’s “repugnancy clause” that states that “no law can be 

contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam,” and the fact that the Supreme Court is 

empowered to make this crucial determination. Given that the Supreme Court is currently 

headed by a judge who told a Commission delegation visiting Afghanistan in 2003 that he does 

not fully accept freedom of religion, these clauses in the Constitution represent potentially grave 

threats to religious freedom in Afghanistan. 
 

155

The 2004 country report on Sudan drops the previous year’s treatment of the issue of the 

abduction of women and children and the taking of slaves, a practice that was sometimes 

accompanied by forced conversion to Islam. It would have been useful for the report to have 

included an update on both of these issues, noting, for example, whether any progress had 

occurred, due to the lessening of the North-South armed conflict, on the return to their ancestral 

home-areas of persons who had been displaced or enslaved. 

The country report on Turkmenistan concludes that “the status of government respect 

for religious freedom, from a legislative perspective and in practice, improved during the period 

covered by this report.” While it is true that four, very small minority religious communities 

were registered (Seventh-Day Adventists, Baha’is, Baptists, and Hare Krishnas) under eased 

registration requirements, there are also reliable reports that even members of these newly 

registered religious communities have continued to suffer harassment at the hands of the police. 

It is therefore not clear that registration in fact provides any benefits. Six Jehovah’s Witnesses 

imprisoned as conscientious objectors to military service were released, but two more were later 

jailed. In addition, the country’s former chief mufti was given a 22-year term of imprisonment, 

after a closed trial, during this period of reporting. Given Turkmen President Saparmurat 

Niyazov’s ever-growing repressive cult of personality and its imposition on the religious life of 

the country via enforced pressure to praise and promote his self-proclaimed spiritual writings, 

including in mosques and churches, the status of religious freedom in Turkmenistan has not 

genuinely improved. 

The report on China was more forceful than last year’s report on the matter of the 

violations of the religious freedom of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. In addition, the section on 

Tibet was more detailed than in previous years and in some areas contained stronger, more 

explicit language about developments in that region. For example, the report had better coverage 

of conditions for Tibetans in Sichuan and other regions outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 

However, the report makes no mention of new laws dealing with “illegal religious activity” 

adopted in several areas, including in the city of Qingdao and in counties in Hunan and Jiangsu. 

The adoption of these laws in the fall of last year was followed by a spate of church closings and 

destruction of church buildings in areas where these laws came into effect. The report also 

inaccurately describes Zhejiang as a province where unregistered religious activity faces less 

pressure than in other places. In fact, in 2003, approximately 10 underground churches in 

Zhejiang were destroyed. Some of this activity is noted at other places in the report, but the 

language makes it seem as if the situation in Zhejiang has largely improved, and that is not the 

case. 

Although the China country report mentions the forced postponement of the 

Commission’s visits to China (though the reason for the postponements was not given), it does 

not mention the postponement of a planned visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in 

June 2004, a visit that was postponed by Chinese officials who claimed they did not have time to 

prepare the locations, including labor camps, where visits were requested. 

Finally, the report on North Korea now states more clearly that repression “has 

increased” in North Korea, that churches in Pyongyang are “controlled by the state,” and that 
 

156

refusal to conform to expected rituals and practices of the worship of Kim Jong Il “may result in 

severe punishment.” In other sections of the report, however, unnecessarily hesitant language is 

employed. Documentation from the reports of a number of non-governmental organizations and 

from numerous refugee testimonies provides ample evidence that North Korean refugees who 

admit contact with religious groups while in China are subject to immediate detention, torture, 

and sometimes execution. Yet, the State Department’s report continues to use tentative 

language, stating, for example, that “harsher” treatment “appears” to occur. 

Religious Persecution and the U.S. Refugee Program: Appendix E 

Congress intended the Annual Report to serve as an important resource for officials 

hearing the claims of those persons seeking asylum or refugee status in this country. The United 

States has a long tradition of welcoming those fleeing religious persecution. The flow of 

refugees and religious persecution are inextricably linked, and this is acknowledged throughout 

Title VI of IRFA. 

Noting the Annual Report’s role as a resource for immigration adjudicators, the 

Commission has previously reported on its concern that Appendix E of the Annual Report, the 

“Overview of U.S. Refugee Policy,” contained misleading and incomplete information, 

particularly about East Asia. The Commission welcomes changes to the 2004 Annual Report 

that resulted in significant improvements in this section. However, the Commission remains 

concerned that, as in last year’s report, the 2004 Overview of U.S. Refugee Policy section 

contains little information on the serious problem of intra-religious persecution, but instead 

focuses almost exclusively on the persecution of religious minorities by a majority religious 

community. Moreover, there is no mention of significant refugee-source countries such as 

Eritrea and Afghanistan, where serious religious freedom problems persist; indeed, Eritrea was 

designated a CPC this year. Saudi Arabia, a newly-designated CPC, and Pakistan, which the 

Commission has recommended be designated a CPC, are cited in the refugee section for their 

mistreatment of religious minorities, but the section does not indicate how the U.S. Refugee 

Program has been responsive to this mistreatment. 

The report’s refugee section describes in some detail how the U.S. Refugee Program is 

responding to the needs of religious minorities who have fled Iran. However, the document 

contains only generic descriptions of how the United States assists other refugee groups that are 

fleeing religious persecution. The Commission hopes that future reports will describe in greater 

detail how the Refugee Program is responding to the needs of specific groups of refugees who 

have fled severe violations of religious freedom. 

Commission Recommendations 

With regard to the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, the Commission has recommended that: 

• the State Department should expand and strengthen its reporting on U.S. policies and actions 

to advance religious freedom; 
 

157

• the Annual Report should describe the policies that the U.S. government has adopted and is 

implementing to oppose religious freedom violations, as well as to promote religious 

freedom, on a worldwide, regional, and individual country basis, including policies regarding 

foreign aid, public diplomacy, multilateral organizations, and international financial 

institutions; 

• the Annual Report should specify, for each foreign country in which religious freedom 

violations occur: the U.S. government’s objectives to advance religious freedom; U.S. 

policies that have been adopted and are being implemented to advance religious freedom; the 

religious freedom concerns that the U.S. government has raised with the foreign government, 

and the response of that government, including any specific actions taken; and the results, or 

lack thereof, of the actions taken by the U.S. government; 

• the State Department should describe in the Annual Report the specific actions taken 

pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act in response to the designation of a 

country as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) or in response to a finding that a foreign 

government has engaged in or tolerated a violation of religious freedom; 

• where appropriate, activities designed to promote rule of law, effective law enforcement, and 

accountability for religious freedom and related human rights violations should be a 

significant component of U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom, and they should be 

described in the Annual Report; and 

y the Annual Report should describe in detail what measures have been taken to facilitate 

access to the U.S. Refugee Program for individuals fleeing from countries where religious 

freedom violations occur, including from countries designated as CPCs. 
 
 

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APPENDIX 1 

BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Preeta D. Bansal, Chair 

Preeta D. Bansal is the Chair of the Commission. She is Of Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 

Meagher & Flom in New York City. She is a constitutional lawyer whose career has spanned 

government service, private law practice, and academia. She served as the Solicitor General of 

the State of New York from 1999 through 2001, during the first three years of New York 

Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s administration. As Solicitor General, Ms. Bansal helped 

supervise a staff of 600 lawyers in the New York Department of Law and directly oversaw 45 

lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office who handle appeals for the State of New York and its 

agencies in state and federal courts, wrote Attorney General opinions to state and municipal 

agencies on issues of state law, and provided advice and counsel to state agencies on 

constitutional and statutory matters. Ms. Bansal argued cases in the United States Supreme 

Court, the en banc Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the New York Court of Appeals on 

behalf of New York state; implemented managerial and administrative reforms to enhance the 

credibility and quality of written and oral advocacy performed by the office; and helped to 

formulate and articulate a vision for a proactive enforcement role for state attorneys general 

nationwide in the wake of the Supreme Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence. 

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College, 

and a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising Editor of 

The Harvard Law Review. She served as a law clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the United 

States Supreme Court (1990-1991) and to Chief Judge James L. Oakes of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1989-1990). Prior to her appointment as New York Solicitor 

General, Ms. Bansal practiced appellate, constitutional, and media law with private law firms in 

Washington, D.C. and New York City. She also served in the Clinton Administration (1993-

1996) as Counselor in the U.S. Justice Department and as Special Counsel in the Office of the 

White House Counsel. 

Ms. Bansal has been a regular speaker and lecturer on constitutional law, First Amendment, and 

intellectual property issues in the United States and abroad, and has authored and co-authored 

pieces published in The Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, The Fordham Intellectual 

Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and The Villanova Law Review, among other 

publications. She has been profiled in many national news and legal publications, including The 

New York Times and The New York Law Journal, in which she has been referred to as a “legal 

superstar” and “one of the most gifted lawyers of her generation, who combines a brilliant 

analytical mind with solid, mature judgment.” She has taught constitutional law and served as a 

public policy fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 

Commissioner Bansal was appointed by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (DSD). 
 

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Felice D. Gaer, Vice Chair 

Felice D. Gaer has served on the Commission since 2001. She is currently a Vice Chair of the 

Commission. She served as Chair from June 2002 to June 2003, and on the Commission’s 

Executive Committee from September 2001 to June 2002. 

Ms. Gaer is a human rights specialist, serving as Director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the 

Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee. The Institute, founded in 

1971, works creatively to enrich thinking, discourse, and action for the protection of international 

human rights for all. 

She is Vice President of the Committee Against Torture, a United Nations human rights treaty 

body composed of 10 individuals elected as independent experts. The Committee reviews reports 

by governments on their compliance with the Convention Against Torture, a treaty ratified by 

over 130 countries, and considers individual communications about alleged violations of the 

Convention. Nominated by the United States, elected in 1999, and again in 2003, she is the first 

American to serve on the Committee. 

Ms. Gaer was appointed as a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human rights 

negotiations between 1993 and 1999, including the UN Commission on Human Rights, the 

World Conference on Women, and the World Conference on Human Rights. 

Felice Gaer was cited as “the American Jewish international human rights expert” in the 

November 2002 and November 2003 lists of the “Forward Fifty,” in which The Forward

newspaper’s editorial board commended her for addressing major human rights issues “long 

before they bubble to the surface” and remarked that “during the last 20 years, no communal 

official has accumulated such a wealth of experience and contacts with activists, governments, 

and the United Nations in the field of human rights.” 

She is also a member of the steering committee of Human Rights Watch/Eurasia, Vice President 

of the International League for Human Rights, and a member of the Board of Directors of the 

Andrei Sakharov Foundation and the Eleanor Roosevelt Center at Valkill. She also serves as a 

member of the Human Rights Executive Directors Leadership Group. Ms. Gaer is a frequent 

author on international human rights topics, including reforming the United Nations, advancing 

the human rights of women, the role of non-governmental organizations, and related topics. 

In 1995, she was awarded the Alumnae Achievement Award from Wellesley College, from 

which she received an A.B. (with honors). She also received advanced degrees from Columbia 

University in political science (Masters of Philosophy; Master of Arts) and a Certificate from the 

Russian Institute. 

Commissioner Gaer was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 
 

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Nina Shea, Vice Chair 

Since 1999, Nina Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom and, in 2003 and 2004, she was elected a Vice Chair of the Commission. 

Ms. Shea has been an international human rights lawyer for 25 years, and for 19 years she has 

focused specifically on the issue of religious freedom in American foreign policy as the director 

of the Center for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, America’s oldest human 

rights group. 

She is a co-author of a newly-released book on governance by extreme sharia, Radical Islam’s 

Rules (Rowman & Littlefield) and the author of a widely acclaimed book on anti-Christian 

persecution around the world entitled In the Lion’s Den (Broadman & Holman Publishers). In 

2005, she edited a path-breaking report on publications by the government of Saudi Arabia 

promoting an ideology of hate in America. Ms. Shea has been one of the activists at the forefront 

of a movement to make religious freedom abroad a U.S. foreign policy priority. It was a 

conference that Ms. Shea organized under Freedom House auspices in January 1996 that brought 

100 top Christian leaders together for the first time to address the issue of worldwide antiChristian persecution. This marked the beginning of an interfaith coalition she has played a key 

leadership role in that has turned into a nationwide movement to advance religious freedom 

worldwide. In a profile of her, Newsweek magazine credited her with “making Christian 

persecution Washington’s hottest cause.” The Far Eastern Economic Review cited Nina Shea as 

one of the “leading voices in the fight to put religious persecution at the center of U.S.-China 

relations.” 

Ms. Shea has organized and sponsored numerous fact-finding missions to Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, 

China, Egypt and elsewhere and has testified before Congress on these and other governments. 

She has written and contributed to articles in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los 

Angeles Times, National Review, The Weekly Standard, The New Republic and numerous other 

publications. She has been a guest on hundreds of talk shows on Christian radio and has 

appeared on Fox, CBS, ABC and PBS news programs, as well as numerous religious broadcasts. 

In 2001, Ms. Shea was appointed by President Bush to serve on the U.S. delegation to the UN 

Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. During the Clinton Administration, she had also 

served on the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad to the U.S. Secretary of State 

and for one year as a U.S. delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights. 

She graduated from Smith College and American University Law School and has an honorary 

degree from Alvernia Franciscan College in Reading, PA. She is a dame of the Knights of Malta. 

Commissioner Shea was appointed by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL). 

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl 

Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl has been described as the most important and influential Islamic 

thinker in the modern age. He is currently a Full Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. 

He was also a Visiting Professor at Yale Law School, where he taught National Security law, 
 

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Islamic law and Immigration law. Dr. Abou El Fadl holds degrees from Yale University, 

University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Princeton University. An Islamic jurist and scholar, 

Sheikh Abou El Fadl received formal training in Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt and Kuwait. 

A world-renowned expert in Islamic law and an American lawyer, Dr. Abou El Fadl is a strong 

proponent of human rights and is on the Board of Directors of Human Rights Watch. He 

regularly serves as an expert in a wide variety of cases ranging from human rights and political 

asylum to international and commercial law. 

Dr. Abou El Fadl is a prolific author and prominent public intellectual on Islamic law and Islam 

and is most noted for his scholarly approach to Islam from a moral point of view. He writes 

extensively on universal themes of morality and humanity, and the notion of beauty as a moral 

value. Dr. Abou El Fadl is a staunch advocate and defender of women’s rights, and focuses 

much of his written attention on issues related to women. As the most critical and powerful 

voice against puritan and Wahhabi Islam today, he regularly appears on national and 

international television and radio, and is published and cited extensively in all media venues. 

His most recent works focus on issues of authority, terrorism, tolerance, Islam, and Islamic law. 

His newest book entitled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, is due out in 

Fall 2005 from HarperSanFrancisco. 

Other books by Dr. Abou El Fadl include: Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in 

Islam (University Press of America/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); And God Knows the 

Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses (UPA/Rowman and 

Littlefield, 2001); Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic law, Authority and Women (Oneworld 

Press, Oxford, 2001); Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 

2001); The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Beacon Press, 2002); and Islam and the Challenge of 

Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2004). Other forthcoming books include: Reasoning 

with God: Rationality and Thought in Islam (Oneworld Press, Oxford) and Jihad in Islam

(Cambridge University Press). 

Commissioner Abou El Fadl was appointed by President George W. Bush. 

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput 

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput, Archbishop of Denver, was born September 26, 1944, in 

Concordia, Kansas, the son of Joseph and Marian DeMarais Chaput. He attended Our Lady of 

Perpetual Help Grade School in Concordia and St. Francis Seminary High School in Victoria, 

Kansas. He joined the Order of Friars Minor Capuchin, St. Augustine Province, in 1965. 

After earning a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from St. Fidelis College Seminary in Herman, 

Pennsylvania, in 1967, Archbishop Chaput completed Studies in Psychology at Catholic 

University in Washington, D.C., in 1969. He earned a Master of Arts in Religious Education 

from Capuchin College in Washington, D.C., in 1970 and was ordained to the priesthood on 

August 29, 1970. 

Archbishop Chaput received a Master of Arts in Theology from the University of San Francisco 

in 1971. He served as an instructor in theology and spiritual director at St. Fidelis from 1971-
 

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1974 and as executive secretary and director of communications for the Capuchin Province of St. 

Augustine in Pittsburgh from 1974-1977. 

In 1977, Archbishop Chaput became pastor of Holy Cross Parish in Thornton, Colorado, and 

vicar provincial for the Capuchin Province of Mid-America. He was named secretary and 

treasurer for the province in 1980, and he became chief executive officer and provincial minister 

three years later. 

Archbishop Chaput was ordained Bishop of Rapid City, South Dakota, on July 26, 1988. Pope 

John Paul II appointed him Archbishop of Denver on February 18, 1997. 

Archbishop Chaput was appointed by President George W. Bush. 

Michael Cromartie 

Michael Cromartie is Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., 

where he directs the Evangelicals in Civic Life program and the Media and Religion program. 

He is also a Senior Advisor to The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in Washington. The 

Ethics and Public Policy Center was established in 1976 to clarify and reinforce the bond 

between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and domestic and foreign policy issues. 

Cromartie has contributed book reviews and articles to First Things, Books and Culture, The

Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, Stewardship Journal, and 

World. He is the editor of 12 books on religion and politics including, most recently, “A Public 

Faith: Evangelicals and Civic Engagement,” “A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics, and 

Natural Law,” “Caesar’s Coin Revisited: Christians and the Limits of Government,” “Creation 

at Risk: Religion, Science, and Environmentalism,” “The Nine Lives of Population Control,” 

“Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics,” 

“Might and Right After the Cold War,” “No Longer Exiles: The Religious Right in American 

Politics,” “Piety and Politics: Evangelicals and Fundamentalists Confront the World,” “Peace 

Betrayed: Essays on Pacifism and Politics,” and “Evangelicals and Foreign Policy.” 

He is the host of Radio America’s weekly show “Faith and Life,” an adjunct professor at 

Reformed Theological Seminary, an advisory editor at Christianity Today, on the Board of 

Directors of Mars Hill Audio, and was an advisor to the PBS documentary series “With God on 

Our Side: The Rise of the Christian Right in America.” 

Frequently asked to explicate the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, 

Cromartie has been interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, including National 

Public Radio, CNN, ABC News, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, PBS and quoted 

frequently in the Washington Post, New York Times, The New Republic, Christianity Today, 

Time, the National Catholic Reporter and U.S. News and World Report. He holds an M.A. in 

Justice from The American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia. He is 

married to Jennifer Seel Cromartie and they have three children, Ethan, Eric, and Heather. 

Commissioner Cromartie was appointed by President George W. Bush. 
 

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Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou 

 

Professor Prodromou is the Associate Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion and World 

Affairs and Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Prior to joining 

the faculty at Boston University, she taught at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson 

School for Public and International Affairs. A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the 

Eastern Mediterranean, Prodromou’s scholarship and policy work concentrate on religion and 

international relations, nationalism and conflict resolution, and non-traditional security threats. 

Prodromou has published articles and chapters in books in several languages in numerous 

academic and policy journals in the United States and Europe, including in Journal of 

Democracy, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Orbis, International Review of 

Sociology of Religion, Survival, European Journal of Political Research, and Mediterranean 

Quarterly. She is currently working on two books, both forthcoming in 2005, on Orthodox 

Christianity, Civil Society and Democracy in Post-Community Russia and Orthodox Christianity 

in American Public Life: The Challenges and Opportunities of Religious Pluralism in the 21st 

Century. 

She has been a policy consultant to the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Council, the 

Central Intelligence Agency, and the Council on Foreign Relations. She has received numerous 

awards and grants, including research fellowships from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of 

Government and Center for European Studies, New York University’s Center for European 

Studies, and the University Committee on Research in Humanities and Social Sciences at 

Princeton University. She is active and has held elected positions in many professional 

organizations, and is listed in Whose Who of American Women, 21st Edition of Outstanding 

Women of North America. She helped found and sat as Executive Director at the Cambridge 

Foundation for Peace, a non-profit, public charity dedicated to sustainable peacebuilding in 

Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Prodromou holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology (MIT), as well as an M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 

and a B.A. in International Relations and History from Tufts University. She is married and has a 

daughter. 

Commissioner Prodromou was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 

The Most Reverend Bishop Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B.

The Most Reverend Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B., is currently Bishop of Las Cruces, New Mexico. 

He was ordained to the priesthood in 1966. Bishop Ramírez was named Titular Bishop of 

Vatarba and Auxiliary Bishop of San Antonio in 1981. In 1982 he became the first Bishop of the 

Diocese of Las Cruces, New Mexico. He holds a B.A. from the University of St. Thomas, in 

Houston, Texas, an M.A. from the University of Detroit, Michigan, a Doctor of Laws honoris 

causa from Neumann College, Wichita, Kansas, a Doctor of Divinity honoris causa from the 

University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, Canada, and a Doctor of Humane Letters honoris 
 

165

causa from Siena Heights University, Adrian, Michigan. Bishop Ramírez attended St. Basil’s 

Seminary in Toronto, Canada, Seminario Conciliar in Mexico City, Mexico, and the East Asian 

Pastoral Institute in Manila, Philippines. 

Bishop Ramírez currently serves as a Member of the New Mexico Advisory Committee to the 

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; the Catholic Church Extension Society Board; Episcopal 

Advisor of the Institute for Hispanic Liturgy; Episcopal Moderator of the Asociación Nacional 

de Sacerdotes Hispanos (ANSH); Member of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’ 

(USCCB) International Policy Committee; USCCB Committee for Migration and Refugee 

Services; USCCB Committee on the Liturgy; Member of the Committee on the Catholic 

Common Ground Initiative; and Consultant of the USCCB Committee on Hispanic Affairs. He 

has also served as a member of the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Religious 

Freedom Abroad; chairman of the USCCB’s Catholic Campaign for Human Development; and 

chairman of the USCCB Committee for the Church in Latin America. He served as 

administrative secretary for the Comisión para el Estudio de la Historia la Iglesia en 

Latinoamérica (Commission for the Study of the History of the Church in Latin America). 

Bishop Ramírez was also elected as delegate for the United States at the 1997 Synod for 

America. 

Bishop Ramirez was appointed by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD). 

Michael K. Young 

Michael K. Young began his tenure as the 14th president of the University of Utah in August 

2004. He served as the Commission’s Chair twice, from September 2001 to June 2002 and from 

July 2003 to June 2004. He also served as its Vice Chair from June 1999 to June 2000, and from 

June 2002 to June 2003. Prior to his appointment at Utah, he was Dean and Lobingier Professor 

of Comparative Law and Jurisprudence at the George Washington University Law School (1998-

2004). Prior to that, he was the Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions at the 

School of Law of Columbia University. At Columbia, he also served as Director of the Center 

for Japanese Legal Studies, the Center for Korean Legal Studies, and the Project on Religion, 

Human Rights and Religious Freedom. Young has been a Visiting Professor and Scholar at the 

Law Faculties of the University of Tokyo, Waseda University and Nihon University. He has also 

been a Japan Foundation Fellow. 

During the Administration of President George H.W. Bush, he served as Ambassador for Trade 

and Environmental Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, and 

Deputy Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State. In 1996, Young also served as Counsel to 

the Select Subcommittee on Transfers of Iranian Arms to Bosnian Muslims of the U.S. House of 

Representatives. He is also a member of the Committee on International Judicial Relations of the 

Judicial Conference of the United States, as well as a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. 

Young has published extensively, including articles and books on the Japanese legal system, 

dispute resolution, mergers and acquisitions, labor relations, the legal profession, comparative 

law, industrial policy, international trade law, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
 

166

(NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international environmental 

law, and international human rights and freedom of religion. 

He is a graduate of the Brigham Young University (B.A., summa cum laude with highest honors, 

1973) and Harvard Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 1976), where he served as Note Editor 

of The Harvard Law Review. Before beginning his teaching career, Young served as Law Clerk 

to Supreme Court Justice William H. Rehnquist and to Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the Supreme 

Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 

Commissioner Young was appointed by Senate Majority Leader William Frist (R-TN). 

Ambassador John V. Hanford III, Non-Voting, Ex Officio

In May 2002, John V. Hanford III, was sworn in as the second U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom. This position, created by the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 (IRFA), is charged with promoting religious freedom worldwide, promoting 

reconciliation in those areas where conflict has been implemented along religious lines, and 

making sure that this issue is woven into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Hanford 

serves as an Ex-Officio member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

Ambassador Hanford, originally from Salisbury, North Carolina, attended the University of 

North Carolina at Chapel Hill on a John Motley Morehead Scholarship (BA in Economics) and 

holds a Master of Divinity degree from the Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South 

Hamilton, Massachusetts. 

For the past 15 years, Hanford has served as an expert on international religious freedom while 

working as a Congressional Fellow on the staff of Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana). During 

that time, he worked at the forefront of efforts to mobilize strong and compassionate intervention 

through U.S. governmental channels on behalf of persons persecuted for their religious beliefs. 

Ambassador Hanford and Senator Lugar have led numerous efforts in Congress to address some 

of the world’s most severe problems of religious persecution. Their initiatives have rallied 

Senators, Members of Congress, Presidents, and Secretaries of State in successful interventions 

to halt execution orders, secure the cessation of torture or harassment on religious grounds, gain 

the release of religious prisoners, or oppose the policies of governments which repress religious 

freedom. 

In 1998, Ambassador Hanford spearheaded a bipartisan congressional effort to develop a strong 

and responsible U.S. policy on international religious freedom. Ambassador Hanford organized 

and led the group of offices that co-authored the IRFA. He worked closely with the IRFA’s chief 

sponsor, Senator Don Nickles, and his staff in guiding IRFA through the legislative process to a 

unanimous (98-0) Senate vote and a unanimous voice vote in the House of Representatives. 

IRFA ensures U.S. vigilance and an ongoing process of effective action in addressing religious 

persecution overseas. IRFA is regarded as one of Congress’s most significant legislative 

achievements in human rights. Since the passage of IRFA, the U.S. government’s attention to 

problems of religious persecution has increased significantly. On this and other projects, 
 

167

Ambassador Hanford has worked closely with a broad spectrum of human rights and religious 

organizations at home and abroad. 

Prior to his work in the Senate, Ambassador Hanford served in pastoral ministry on the staff of 

West Hopewell Presbyterian Church in Hopewell, Virginia. Hanford is married to Laura Bryant 

Hanford. 

Joseph R. Crapa, Executive Director 

Joseph R. Crapa, the Commission’s Executive Director, joined the Commission in November 

2002. Prior to coming to the Commission, Mr. Crapa served as Chief of Staff for Senator Charles 

E. Schumer, the senior Senator from New York. Before that, Crapa spent four years as an official 

in the Executive Branch from 1997-2001, where he was nominated by President Clinton and 

confirmed by the Senate to serve as an Assistant Administrator at the U.S. Agency for 

International Development. He also held positions of Assistant Secretary at the Department of 

Agriculture and Associate Administrator at the Environmental Protection Agency where his 

portfolio included Congressional Relations and Public Affairs. 

Mr. Crapa has extensive experience dealing with foreign and domestic policy issues. For ten 

years he served as Chief of Staff for Rep. David Obey (D-WI) and also as counsel to the House 

Appropriations Committee. 

Mr. Crapa graduated from Cathedral College Preparatory Seminary, received a B.A. from St. 

John’s University, went on to earn his M.A. from Duke University, and his Ph.D. at the 

University of Arizona where he was a National Defense Teaching Fellow. 

He has been an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University teaching courses in the Government 

Department on Congressional policy making. Mr. Crapa is also a Senior Stennis Fellow of 

Congress. 
 

168
 

169

APPENDIX 2 

 THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 19981

Selected Provisions 

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402) 

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term 

``particularly severe violations of religious freedom'' means systematic, ongoing, egregious 

violations of religious freedom, including violations such as— 

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 

(B) prolonged detention without charges; 

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those 

persons; or 

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom'' 

means violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious 

belief and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and 

as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as— 

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including 

arbitrary registration requirements; 

(ii) speaking freely about one's religious beliefs; 

(iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; 

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 

(v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice; or 

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious belief or 

practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced 

mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, 

enslavement, murder, and execution. 

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY 

SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442) 

 

1

 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the 

Commission’s Web site, www.uscirf.gov. 
 

170

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM.— 

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President2 shall review the 

status of religious freedom in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that 

country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom in that 

country during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review of that country under 

this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall designate each country the 

government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a 

country of particular concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445) 

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President 

shall, according to section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out 

consultations with the foreign government in question, carry out one or more of the actions 

described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as determined by the President. The 

President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in 

accordance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private 

Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of 

any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in 

the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or 

official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 

or 402; 

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in 

accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 

directing the United States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose 

and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, 

instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations 

under section 401 or 402; 

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a 

specified number of ) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a 

specified number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign 

 

2

 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the 

President to the Secretary of State. 
 

171

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under— 

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979; 

(B) the Arms Export Control Act; 

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government 

as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services; 

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing 

credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign 

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or 

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any 

contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or 

officials found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 

or 402. 

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding 

agreement with the respective foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or 

take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the 

violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President 

determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already subject to 

multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses, 

and such sanctions are ongoing, the President may determine that one or more of these sanctions 

also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 402(c)(5).] 

Section 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447) 

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the 

actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in 

substitution thereto) with respect to a country, if the President determines and so reports to the 

appropriate congressional committees that-- 

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential 

action; 

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or 

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver 

authority. 
 

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(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under 

subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver 

or the intention to exercise the waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof. 
 

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APPENDIX 3 

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: SELECTED PROVISIONS ON 

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION OR BELIEF 

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as further 

information concerning international standards concerning the protection of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief. 

A. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND 

RELIGION 

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 

includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 

community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 

in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18: 

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 

right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, 

and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 

private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 

teaching. 

2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to 

adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 

limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 

order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 

liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 

moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 

• In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), The treaty 

body that reviews compliance with the ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects: 

theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess 

any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly 

construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions 

or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices 

analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views 

with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief 

for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or 

represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the 

part of a predominant religious community. 

 —Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22
 

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• European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 

1950 (ECHR), Art. 9: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 

freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 

others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 

practice and observance. 

• Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII: 

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 

the freedom of though, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, 

sex, language or religion. 

• UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 

Based on Religion or Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 

This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his 

choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 

public or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (2) No one shall be 

subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of 

his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to 

such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 

safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief include: 

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)] 

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice 

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)] 

• Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right 

to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, 

as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief; 

• No limitations permitted on this freedom; and 

• No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a 

religion or belief. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to Have or To 

Adopt a Religion or Belief of His or Her Choice 

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)] 

• No limitations are permitted on this freedom. 

• The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature. 
 

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• Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a 

religion or belief include: 

(a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers 

or non-believers to adhere to specific beliefs and congregations, to recant 

their religion or belief, or to convert; and 

(b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for 

example, those restricting political rights protected under article 25 of the 

ICCPR or access to education, medical care or employment 

 –Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(d)] 

• This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with 

others. 

• This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms: 

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to 

establish and maintain, including the building of places of worship, freely 

accessible places for these purposes; 

(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian 

institutions, and seminaries or religious schools; 

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and 

materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including the 

use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, observance of 

dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, 

participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a 

particular language customarily spoken by a group; 

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; 

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from 

individuals and institutions; 

(g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace 

appropriate leaders, priests and teachers called for by the requirements and 

standards of any religion or belief; 

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in 

accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; and 

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and 

communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and 

international levels.1

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief 

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)] 

 

1

 See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna 

Document. 
 

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Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed 

by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental 

rights and freedoms of others. 

• No derogation2 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, even 

during “time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” (ICCPR, Art. 

4(2) and UDHR, Arts. 29 & 30) 

• Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would 

vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. 

• Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on 

grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as limitations to other rights 

protected in the Covenant (for example, a limitation based on national security is 

impermissible). 

• Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and 

must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are 

predicated. 

• Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a 

discriminatory manner. 

• Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting 

morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition or 

religion. 

• Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to 

enjoy their rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with 

the specific nature of the constraint. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

• Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or 

person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 

destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth therein. 

 — UDHR Art. 30 

B. PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHALL NOT BE DENIED 

THE RIGHT, IN COMMUNITY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUP, TO 

PROFESS AND PRACTICE THEIR OWN RELIGION 

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, and UN 

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 

Minorities, Arts. 1-2 and 4] 

• In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 

belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 

 

2

 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of 

war or serious public emergency, take measures that limit the applicability of certain rights for 

the period of the emergency. Such measures could go well beyond the scope of limitations to 

rights that are permissible at any other time. 
 

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other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their 

own religion, or to use their own language 

 —ICCPR, Article 27

• States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 

linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, shall encourage 

conditions for the promotion of that identity, and shall adopt appropriate legislative 

and other measures to achieve those ends. 

 —UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

• The State “will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, 

linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory. They will 

respect the free exercise of rights by persons belonging to such minorities and ensure 

their full equality with others.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document 

C. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 

AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, 

Art. 40(1-2)] 

This right includes the following components: 

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and 

Subject to its Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without Distinction of Any 

Kind, Including Religion 

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any 

Discrimination to the Equal Protection of the Law. 

[ICCPR, Art. 26] 

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons Equal 

and Effective Protection Against Discrimination on Any Ground, Including 

Religion. 

[ICCPR, Art. 26] 

• The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of the 

ICCPR is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant, and extends 

to prohibit discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public 

authorities; 

• The term “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply any 

distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as 

race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 

property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 

impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of 

all rights and freedoms; 
 

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• The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean 

identical treatment in every instance; 

• The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in 

order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 

discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR; and 

• Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for 

such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose 

which is legitimate under the ICCPR. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13) 

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons or Person 

on the Grounds of Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4] 

• States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the 

grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights 

and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural 

life. 

• States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit 

any such discrimination. 

• States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of 

religion or other beliefs in this matter. 

 —UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2) 

• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 

strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 

understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups .... 

 —UDHR Art. 26(2)

• State parties will “foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of 

different communities as well as between believers and non-believers.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

D. STATES SHALL PROHIBIT BY LAW ANY ADVOCACY OF NATIONAL, RACIAL OR 

RELIGIOUS HATRED THAT CONSTITUTES INCITEMENT TO DISCRIMINATION, 

HOSTILITY OR VIOLENCE 

[ICCPR, Art. 20] 

• No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy 

of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; 

hostility or violence... [and] States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to 

prohibit such acts. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 
 

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• State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in 

article 20 of the ICCPR, and should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or 

advocacy. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2) 

• Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United 

States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States. 

 —United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20 

• States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide 

protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or 

groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, hostility or hatred, 

including anti-Semitism. 

 —OSCE Copenhagen Document

• States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect 

persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or 

violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, and 

to protect their property; 

 —OSCE Copenhagen Document

E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 

BELIEF 

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f) and 16(g)] 

• State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 

 —ICCPR Article 18(4) 

• The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be 

restricted. 

• Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is 

permitted if it is given in a neutral and objective way. 

• Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is 

inconsistent with ICCPR Art. 18 (4) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory 

exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and 

guardians. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8) 

• Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with their 

religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child 

should be brought up. 

• Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief 

in accordance with the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to 

receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the 

best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 

• The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or 

belief. 
 

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• In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due 

account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the 

matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 

• Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his 

physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1(3) of the 

present Declaration. 

 —UN 1981 Dec., art. 5 

F. FURTHER ELABORATION ON SELECTED TOPICS 

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations 

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7] 

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to 

give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring: 

• effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated; 

• that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 

authorities; and 

• that such remedies are enforced when granted. 

2. Relationship Between Religion and the State 

• The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or 

traditional, or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not 

result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the ICCPR, 

nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. 

• In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members 

of the predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to them, or imposing 

special restrictions on the practice of other faiths are not in accordance with the 

prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of 

equal protection under ICCPR article 26. 

• If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, 

proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in 

any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized 

under the ICCPR nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the 

official ideology or who oppose it. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9) 

• State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared 

to practice their faith within constitutional boundaries, “recognition of the status 

provided for them in their respective countries.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document 

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 

• The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to ensure 

the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ICCPR. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2) 
 

181

• Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded 

in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of 

women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and 

abortion of female fetuses. States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, 

religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to 

equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all ICCPR rights. 

• State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and 

women’s rights, including: 

o pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as genderdisaggregated data on infant mortality rates; 

o information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on 

measures to eliminate it; 

o measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, 

such as female infanticide, the burning of widows and dowry killings; 

o regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and 

o whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as 

men; whether measures are taken to ensure women equal access to legal 

aid, in particular in family matters; and whether certain categories of 

women are denied the enjoyment of the presumption of innocence. 

• Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than those 

authorized by the ICCPR and must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules requiring 

permission from third parties, or by interference from fathers, husbands, brothers or 

others. Article 18 may not be relied upon to justify discrimination against women by 

reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 

• The commission of so-called “honor crimes” which remain unpunished constitutes a 

serious violation of the ICCPR and laws which impose more severe penalties on women 

than on men for adultery or other offences also violate the requirement of equal 

treatment. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

• Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women’s rights. These practices 

include : 

o cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious 

extremism, and regulation of women’s clothing; 

o discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, 

traditional childbirth practices, and dietary restrictions; 

o discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, 

including practices related to marriage and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family 

planning, division of responsibilities); 

o discrimination related to transmission of nationality; 

o discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of 

finances; 

o discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment 

of widows, and honor crimes, 

o attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse; 
 

182

o social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of 

access to professional fields such as politics and religion; and 

o aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a 

minority community. 

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential 

that this freedom not be understood as a right of indifference with respect to the status of 

women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief and the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and Traditions 

(Amor Report)3

 

3

 Commission staff translation.