NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WITOLD KOWBEL,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Defendant

- Appellee,
and C.L. MAX NIKIAS, USC President; AINSLEY CARRY, USC Vice President of Student Affairs,
Defendants. No. 19

- 55936
D.C. No. 2:17

- cv - 07896

- JAK

- AS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 26, 2020 * *

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 29 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 55936

Witold Kowbel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his diversity action alleging a breach of implied contract claim against defendant University of Southern California arising out of Kowbel’s son’s academic disciplinary proceedings

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a cla im under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm

. The district court properly dismissed Kowbel’s breach of implied contract
claim because Kowbel failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existenc e of an implied contract between himself and the University of Southern California

. See
Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341

- 42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings
are construed liberally, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim ) ; Retired Emps Ass’n. of Orange Cty., Inc. v. County of Orange , 266 P.3d

287 , 291 ( Cal. 2011) (“[A] contract implied in fact consists of obligations arising from a mutual agreem ent and intent to promise where the agreement and promise have not been expressed in words.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim,

we do not consider the parties’ r emaining arguments regarding the rule of judicial
noninterven tion into the academic affairs of schools

.3 19

- 55936

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Kowbel’s operative second amended complaint without further leave to amend because
amend ment would have been futile. See Cervantes , 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining t hat dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kowbe l’s motion
for reconsideration because Kowbel failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See
C.D. Cal. L.R. 7

- 18 (explaining the grounds for reconsideration and noting that “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion”); Bias v. Moynihan , 508 F.3 d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review
for a district court’s enforcement of local rules ) ; Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262

- 63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds fo r relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59). We reject as meritless Kowbel’s contentions regarding the exhaustion of judicial remedies.

AFFIRMED.