If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

December 14, 2023

v No. 364906

Branch Circuit Court

CURTIS ALLEN MORRIS, LC No. 2021-113288-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by leave granted1the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to 

knowingly or intentionally possessing methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i). The trial court 

sentenced defendant to serve 38 months to 12 years in prison. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arose from an incident when a small bag containing 0.33 grams of 

methamphetamines fell from defendant’s pocket onto the floor of the Branch County Jail’s 

booking area. Defendant had just been arrested for absconding from parole and was out on bond 

for two additional offenses. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant as previously noted,

and defendant objected to the court’s scoring of OV 19 in both this case and a companion case 

involving resisting and obstructing a police officer. Defendant argued that the court had wrongly 

concluded that he was in the jail when the drugs fell out of his pocket. He also argued that the trial 

court could not have assessed 25 points under OV 19 using conduct that formed the basis of a 

crime that the prosecutor dropped as part of a plea deal. Lastly, he claimed that the court’s OV 19 

score was incorrect, given that he informed the officers when the methamphetamines fell out of 

his pocket.

 

I People v Morris, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 20, 2023 (Docket 

No. 364906).
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The trial court disagreed, finding that defendant’s actions constituted a serious danger to a 

penal institution. At sentencing, the court heard the statement of a probation agent who asserted 

that the assessment of the 25 points rested on the fact that defendant was on bond at the time for 

two prior offenses. Although the underlying charge had been dropped per the plea agreement, 

defendant’s conduct nevertheless constituted conduct that occurred after the sentencing offense. 

Moreover, the court considered the inherently dangerous nature posed by the methamphetamines. 

Therefore, the court found that OV 19 was properly scored. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s only claim of error on appeal is that the trial court improperly assigned 

25 points under OV 19, thus extending his maximum sentence. Defendant bases his appeal on the 

claim that his conduct did not threaten the security of the jail as he was not actually in the jail when 

the offense occurred. Defendant also argues that the trial court wrongly considered postoffense

conduct when assigning 25 points for OV 19, pointing out that he warned the officers of the drugs’ 

presence when they fell out of his pocket. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the 

relevant law to the facts. People v Clark, 330 Mich App 392, 415; 948 NW2d 604 (2019). This 

Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings in support of a particular score under 

an offense variable. See People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 20-21; 909 NW2d 24 (2017). A 

finding is clearly erroneous when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a trial 

court made a mistake. Id. at 21.

Michigan law states that “a person shall not sell, give, or furnish, either directly or 

indirectly, any alcoholic liquor, prescription drug, poison, or controlled substance to a prisoner 

who is in or on a correctional facility . . . .” MCL 800.281(1). The law further forbids any 

disposing “of that liquor, drug, poison, or controlled substance in any manner that allows a prisoner 

or employee of the correctional facility who is in or on a correctional facility access to it.” 

MCL 800.281(1). Additionally, this Court has unequivocally acknowledged that any “smuggling 

of controlled substances into a jail” poses “a threat to the security of a penal institution” given the 

“dangers of controlled substances to the users and those around them.” People v Carpenter, 322 

Mich App 523, 531; 912 NW2d 579 (2018). Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated

that “[a] 25-point score under OV 19 requires the trial court to find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant by his or her conduct threatened the security of a penal institution or 

court.” People v Dixon, 509 Mich 170, 177; 983 NW2d 385 (2022) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also MCL 777.49(a). Satisfying this standard requires the trial court to find “(1) that 

the defendant engaged in some conduct and (2) that conduct threatened the security of the prison.” 

Dixon, 509 Mich at 177.

Defendant contends that his conduct, which occurred in the booking area of the jail, could 

not have threatened the jail’s security as the booking area technically lies outside the jail’s 

facilities. However, MCL 801.251(4) broadly defines a “jail” as a facility “operated by a county 

for the detention of persons charged with . . . criminal offenses . . . .” Michigan’s Health and

Safety Fund Act, MCL 141.471 et seq., similarly defines a “[j]ail facility,” as “a jail, holding cell, 

holding center, or lockup as those terms are defined in [MCL 791.262].” MCL 141.472. 

MCL 791.262(a) defines “[h]olding cell” as a “cell or room in a facility of a local unit of 
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government that is used for the detention of . . . persons awaiting processing, booking, [or] court 

appearances . . . .” Additionally, Subdivision (b) defines “[h]olding center” as a “facility . . .

operated by a local unit of government for the detention of persons awaiting processing, booking, 

[or] court appearances . . . .” Taken together, these provisions of Michigan law establish that the 

booking phase of detention remains a significant part of the overall detention process. As the 

facilities used for booking constitute an important component of the detention facility, defendant 

was legally in the jail when the methamphetamines fell out of his pocket. Thus, defendant’s 

argument on this point lacks merit.

Defendant’s argument that OV 19 does not contemplate postoffense conduct is equally 

unavailing. Contrary to his claim, this Court has recognized that OV 19 “explicitly contemplates 

postoffense conduct.” Carpenter, 322 Mich App at 530. Additionally, the sentencing offense 

need not involve a threat to a penal institution’s security. Id. When a defendant is in custody at 

the time a “controlled-substance” offense occurs in a penal institution, that defendant is in the 

“administration of justice phase of the sentencing.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

defendant was in the “administration of justice” phase when the methamphetamines fell from his 

pocket. See id. Additionally, when the offense took place, defendant was being placed in jail for 

a separate, underlying offense, namely parole absconding. That the underlying charge did not 

involve a threat to the jail and that it was eventually dropped per a plea bargain is irrelevant. 

Because the assignment of OV 19 points contemplates postoffense conduct, the trial court acted 

properly in assessing defendant’s conduct while in police custody.

Finally, defendant’s contention that his conduct did not constitute a threat to the jail’s 

security also lacks merit, notwithstanding defendant’s warning to officers about the drugs. The 

Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that “possession alone” of controlled substances, “even 

constructive possession,” could threaten the security of a penal institution. Dixon, 509 Mich 

at 179. Defendant’s possession of methamphetamines while in the jail posed a risk to the jail’s 

security. Because defendant was in an area considered part of the jail, he possessed the drugs 

while in the jail and its facilities. Given the danger posed by the drugs and defendant’s possession 

of them while in the jail, we may, but need not, inquire into defendant’s handling of the substances 

to justify the trial court’s assignment of 25 points under OV 19. See id. at 180-182. Regardless, 

defendant’s conduct suggests, though does not confirm, the possibility of drug smuggling.

As for defendant warning the officers of the drugs’ presence, this claim remains somewhat 

suspect as this assertion admittedly originated from defendant, not the officers. Also, it remains 

unclear whether defendant’s decision to inform the officers was based on a desire to follow the 

law or to simply lessen the consequences of being discovered with drugs after his arrest. More 

importantly, this act fails to nullify the fact that defendant brought the drugs into the jail’s booking 

area, thus within the reach of its facilities, inmates, and employees. The law clearly forbids the 

disposing of a controlled substance “in any manner” that enables a “prisoner or employee” of a 

jail to access it. MCL 800.281(1). By bringing the drugs within reach of the officers and having 

the drugs in his possession while in the jail, defendant posed a security risk to the jail that could 

have been very serious if he had managed to get past the booking area without their presence being 

detected. On this record, defendant has not shown that the trial court plainly erred when it assessed

25 points under OV 19. See Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 21.
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Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick 

/s/ Noah P. Hood