1

 The Board remanded the disability rating issue for the VA regional office (RO) to obtain current medical evidence

regarding the severity of the disabilities.

This version includes the errata dated 30Jun09-e

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 07-0349

RICHARD S. BROKOWSKI, APPELLANT,

V.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals

(Argued December 3, 2008 Decided June 8, 2009)

Lewis C. Fichera, of Sewell, New Jersey, for the appellant.

Kerry J. Loring argued for the appellee; Shayla N. McGee, with whom Paul J. Hutter,

General Counsel; R. Randall Campbell, Assistant General Counsel; and Brian B. Rippel, Deputy

Assistant General Counsel, were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellee.

Before HAGEL, LANCE, and SCHOELEN, Judges.

SCHOELEN, Judge: The appellant, Richard S. Brokowski, through counsel, appeals a

January 11, 2007, Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) decision in which the Board found service

connection for peripheral neuropathy was warranted, but denied an effective date for the award of

service connection earlier than February 15, 1994. In the same decision, the Board remanded the

issue of entitlement to adisabilityratingin excess of 40% for peripheral neuropathy of the right and

left lower extremities. Record (R.) at 1-31. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction to 1

review the Board's decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). For the following
2

 Claudication is limping or lameness that is often characterized by pain, tension, and weakness in a limb. DORLAND'S

ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 361 (29th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DORLAND'S]. Claudication is seen in occlusive arterial disease

of the limbs. Id.

 A Morton's neuroma is a tumor that develops as a result of chronic compression of a plantar nerve in the foot. 3

DORLAND'S at 1206.

2

reasons, the Court will affirm the Board's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Service History and Medical Evidence

The appellant served in the U.S. Navy from February 1965 to September 1969. R. at 32. In

December 1976, he was hospitalized with complaints of pain in his right foot radiating into his calf,

and burning and numbness on the bottom of his right foot. R. at 244-45. On physical examination,

the appellant's right foot was discolored and cool to the touch. Id. A specialized radiograph showed

that the appellant's superficial femoral artery, located in his thigh, was totally blocked and that the

artery located over his knee had deposits of calcium obstructing blood flow. These conditions

resulted in weakness in his leg. R. at 244-45. Dr. Robinson, one of the appellant's private physicians,

noted that 

[t]he patient had many unusual aspects of his pain in that he did have tenderness to

touch along the area of the lateral aspect of his right foot. It was my impression that

it is possible that the patient did have some other neurological problem that would

be accounting for this pain other than on a vascular basis. It is quite surprising to see

pain to touch without any evidence of rest pain at all. The patient did definitely have

a vascular lesion, did have symptoms of claudication.2

R. at 245. Dr. Robinson recommended that if the appellant received no relief from this surgery, he

undergo further neurological and orthopedic consultations to rule out the possibility of some other

neurological or orthopedic disease as a source of the appellant's pain. R. at 246.

In January 1977, the appellant underwent surgeryin his lumbar region in an effort to relieve

his pain. R. at 242. At that time, Dr. Robinson noted that the appellant suffered from both pain

resulting from the obstructed blood flow and a "second pain which could possibly be secondary to"

a neuroma (tumor) growing from a nerve. R. at 241. Dr. Robinson diagnosed the appellant with
4

 Radiculopathy is a disease involving the nerve roots. DORLAND'S at 1511.

 The right great saphenous vein runs along the inner thigh into the lower right leg. DORLAND'S at 1942. 5

 Peripheral vascular diseases ofthe extremities may involve arteries and veins. THE MERCK MANUAL 555 (15th ed. 1987).

6

The initial symptoms of the disorder involve intermittent claudication on walking. Id. at 556. The pain is usually relieved by rest.

Id. If the disease progresses there may be ischemic pain at rest as well as when walking. Id.

A severely ischemic foot is painful, cold, and often numb. Id.

 An occlusion is an obstruction. DORLAND'S at 1252. 7

3

"arterial vascular insufficiency, right lower extremity with lesion of his right superficial femoral

artery, possible Morton's neuroma, right metatarsal area, and status postop right lumbar [3] 

sympathectomy." R. at 242.

The appellant's pain persisted after the January1977 surgery. In February1977, radiographs

of the spine were performed, and the appellant was diagnosed with compression and disease of the

L5 nerve root with herniated disc at L4-5 and L5-S1 and L5-S1 radiculopathy. R. 232-33. The 4

appellant underwent an operation to remove a portion of his vertebrae. Id. The appellant's pain

persisted after this surgery, and in April 1977, he was hospitalized again by Dr. Robinson to treat the

blocked arteries in his right leg. R. at 262-65. The appellant underwent a surgery that involved

"excisionofright greater saphenous vein with ligation of its tributaries; right femoral anterior tibial [5]

bypass using the patient's saphenous vein; right femoral arteriograft." Id. 

At the time of the appellant's discharge from the hospital, Dr. Robinsondiagnosed him with

"peripheral vascular disease manifested by complete occlusion of the right superficial femoral, [6] [7]

right popliteal and right posterior tibial arteries; status postop right lumbar sympathectomy; status

postop right femoral anterior tibial bypass using patient's own saphenous vein." R. at 263. Unlike

Dr. Robinson's January 1977 diagnosis, his April 1977 diagnosisdidnot mention Morton's neuroma

as a possible disorder, and there was no suggestion that Dr. Robinson continued to suspect that the

appellant had an unidentified neurological or orthopedic disorder.

B. Pension Claim

In January 1977, the appellant filed a claim for non-service-connected pension benefits. 
8

 In January 1978, the appellant's pension award was terminated after the RO determined that his income exceeded the

statutory limits for eligibility for pension benefits. R. at 294.

4

In August 1977, the RO granted the claim. R. at 250, 285. 8

C. Anxiety Disorder Claim 

In June 1978, the appellant filed a statement in support of claim stating: "I would like to

claim service connection for mypresent conditionofacutedepression[and] anxiety. I have had this

condition since discharge from service and was treated for this condition." R. at 299. He

indicated that hehad "received treatment in the service as follows: Acute [d]epression San Diego,

Ca[lifornia and] anxiety Service School Command approx[imately] 1968." Id. He also stated:

"This is also a claim for service[]connection for all disabilities of record." Id. No other

documents accompanied his statement in support of claim. In July 1978, the RO denied benefits

based on anxiety and depression. R. at 305. No other disabilities were mentioned in the rating

decision. R. at 306. The notice letter that was sent to the appellant only discussed denial of

service connection for a nervous condition. R. at 305. The appellant did not appeal that RO

decision. 

D. Peripheral Vascular Disease Claim

In October 1989, the appellant filed a claim for VA benefits for "severe peripheral vascular

disease" that he claimed began in 1976. R. at 310-13. In support of the claim, the appellant submitted

medical evidence indicating that he had been diagnosed and treated for peripheral vascular disease.

R. at 319-22. In February 1990, the RO denied the claim after concluding that the appellant's

peripheral vascular disease was not incurred or aggravated in service. R. at 333-35. The appellant

filed a timely Notice of Disagreement (NOD). R. at 337. However,theROdid not process the appeal

by issuing a Statement of the Case (SOC).

E. Retention of Counsel and Peripheral Neuropathy Claim

In April 1993, the appellant retained his present counsel who notified the RO by letter that

the appellant was filing a claim for benefits based on peripheral vascular disease. R. at 345-46. The

appellant's counsel attached an application for VA benefits to his correspondence. Id. In the

application, the appellant stated that he was seeking service connection for "severe peripheral

vascular disease," which became "manifest in 1976." R. at 349. In February 1994, the appellant's
9

 Peripheral neuropathy is a disorder involving a disturbance in the peripheral nervous system. The peripheral nervous

systeminvolvesthose nerveslocated outside the central nervous system (outside the brain and spinal cord). DORLAND'S at 1198, 1212.

5

counsel sent the RO a letter to "clarify" the appellant's claim. R. at 373-75. He indicated that in

addition to peripheral vascular disease, the appellant was seeking service connection for peripheral

neuropathy, a disorder that the appellant's physicians recently diagnosed in October 1993. Id. 

9

In support of the appellant's claim for benefits based on peripheral neuropathy, he submitted

an October 1993 nerve conduction study diagnosing him with peripheral neuropathy and an October

1993 medical statement from one of his treating physicians stating that he began treating the

appellant for peripheral neuropathy in 1977. R. at 377-80. In June 1994, the RO continued its denial

of the claim for disability compensation for peripheral vascular disease. R. at 409-11. In January

1995, the RO denied the appellant's claim for VA benefits for peripheral neuropathy.

R. at 417-18. 

In November 2002, after lengthy proceedings before the RO, which included two Board

remands, the Board granted disabilitycompensation benefits for bilateral peripheral neuropathy and

it denied benefits for peripheral vascular disease. R. at 882-95. 

In December 2002, the RO assigned a 40% disability rating for peripheral neuropathy of the

right lower extremity and a 20% disability rating for peripheral neuropathy of the left lower

extremity, effective December 1994. R. at 897-901. After several medical examinations, in April

2004 the RO issued a rating decision continuing the disability ratings for the appellant's right and

left leg peripheral neuropathy. R. at 964. 

F. Appeal of RO Decision Regarding Peripheral Neuropathy Claim

In May2004, the appellant filed an NOD with the April 2004 rating decision contesting

both the disability rating and the effective date of the disability ratings for peripheral neuropathy.

R. at 973. In November 2004, the RO increased the disability rating for the appellant's left lower

extremity to 40%, awarded a 100% disability rating based on individual unemployability, and

amended the effective date for peripheral neuropathy for both extremities to February 15, 1994, the
6

date on which the RO received correspondence from the appellant's attorney stating that the appellant

was seeking service connection for peripheral neuropathy. R. at 1102-14. 

In the January 11, 2007, decision here on appeal, the Board denied an effective date earlier

than February 15, 1994, for service connection for peripheral neuropathy. R. at 1-29. The Board

concluded that the appellant did not file a claim for benefits for peripheral neuropathy prior to that

date. R. at 20-22. In its decision, the Board concluded:

The veteran first submitted a claim for service connection for peripheral neuropathy

that was received on February 15, 1994. He submitted medical evidence of that

disorder at that time, the first evidence of record of the disorder. Earlier claims and

earlier medical evidence do not reflect an intent to apply for service connection of

peripheral neuropathy and do not establish the veteran as having peripheral

neuropathy. The RO established the effective date as the date of claim and that is the

earliest effective date available to the veteran. The veteran's claim is denied. 

R. at 22 (emphasis added).

II. ANALYSIS

The appellant argues that because the medical record contains evidence of peripheral

neuropathy existing prior to February 15, 1994, he is entitled to an earlier effective date for the

commencement of his disability compensation award based on peripheral neuropathy. He contends

that he filed an informal claim for benefits based on this disabilitywhen he filed his 1978 application

seeking service connection for depression and anxiety and "all disabilities of record." Appellant's

Brief (Br.) at 9-14. He further asserts that what he characterizes as his 1978 claim for benefits for

peripheral neuropathyremained pending until January 1995 when the RO denied service connection

for this disorder. Appellant's Br. at 11-13. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to an earlier

effective date on the basis of his October 1989 application for VA benefits for peripheral vascular

disease. Id. at 14-19. He contends that his 1989 application for peripheral vascular disease also

included a claim for VA benefits for peripheral neuropathybecause the evidence of record disclosed

that the appellant suffered from peripheral neuropathy. Id. 

The Secretary counters that the appellant did not request VA benefits for peripheral

neuropathy until February 1994 and that prior to that date there was no evidence of an intent to file

a claim for benefits for peripheral neuropathy because that disorder had not even been diagnosed
7

until October 1993, after the appellant filed his 1978 and 1989 claims. Appellee's Br. at 14- 21. 

In general, the effective date for the commencement of disability compensation awarded as

the result of a service-connected disability can be no earlier than thedatethat VA received the claim

for benefits based on that particular disability. Section 5110(a) of title 38, U.S. Code, provides, in

relevant part:

[T]he effective date of an award based on an original claim, a claim reopened after

final adjudication, or a claim for increase, of compensation, dependency and

indemnity compensation, or pension, shall be fixed in accordance with the facts

found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor. 

38 U.S.C. § 5110(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2008). The Board's determination of the effective

date for disabilitycompensation for a service-connected disability is a finding of fact that the Court

reviews under the "clearly erroneous" standard set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4). See Evans v.

West, 12 Vet.App. 396, 401 (1999); Hanson v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 29, 32 (1996). "A factual finding

'is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Hersey

v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 91, 94 (1992) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

395 (1948)). The Court maynot substitute its judgment for the factual determinations of the Board

on issues of material fact merely because the Court would have decided those issues differently in

the first instance. See id.

A claim of entitlement to VA benefits may be either a formal or an informal written

communication requesting a determination of entitlement or evidencing a belief in entitlement to a

benefit. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p) (2008). "Any communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for

one or more benefits under the laws administered by [VA] . . . maybeconsidered an informal claim.

Such informal claim must identify the benefit sought." 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2008) (emphasis added).

Thus, it follows that (1) an intent to apply for benefits, (2) an identification of the benefits sought,

and (3) a communication in writing are the essential requirements of any claim, whether formal or

informal. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(3) (2008) (defining a "[s]ubstantially complete application" for

benefits as one that, inter alia, identifies "the benefit claimed and any medical condition(s) on which

it is based");see also MacPhee v. Nicholson, 459 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Section 3.155(a)

is directed to an original informal claim and requires the informal claim 'identify the benefit sought'

and 'indicat[e] an intent to apply for one or more benefits.'" (emphasis added)); Brannon v. West, 12

Vet.App. 32, 35 (1998) (holding that before VA can adjudicate an original claim for benefits, "the

claimant must submit a written document identifying the benefit and expressing some intent to seek

it"); see also Criswell v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 501, 504 (2006) ("The mere existence of medical
8

records generally cannot be construed as an informal claim; rather, there must be some intent by the

claimant to apply for a benefit." (citing Brannon, 12 Vet.App. at 35)). Although the Board must

interpret a claimant's submissions broadly, "the Board is not required toconjure upissues that were

not raised by the claimant." Brannon,12Vet.App. at 35; see Criswell, 20 Vet.App. at 503-04 ("[I]t

follows logically that where there can be found no intent to apply for VA benefits, a claim for

entitlement to such benefits has not been reasonably raised.") However, a claimant's identification

of the benefit sought does not require any technical precision. See Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App.

232, 256-57 (2007) ("It is the pro se claimant who knows what symptoms he is experiencing and that

are causing him disability, . . . . [and] it is the Secretary who knows the provisions of title 38 and can

evaluate whether there is a potential under the law to compensate an averred disability based on a

sympathetic reading of the material in a pro se submission." (citations omitted)). The determination

of whether an informal claim has been filed is a substantially factual determination that the Court

reviews under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); Ellington v.

Nicholson, 22 Vet.App. 141, 144 (2007), aff'd 541 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Criswell, 20 Vet.App.

at 504. 

VA is required to identify and act on informal claims for benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3);

38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(p), 3.155(a), and must fully and sympathetically develop a veteran's claim to its

optimum before reachingthe claim on its merits. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir.

1998). Developing a claim to its optimum requires that, except where a represented claimant requests

revision of a final decision based on clear and unmistakable error, the Secretary give a sympathetic

reading to a pro se veteran's filings by "determin[ing] all potential claims raised by the evidence,

applying all relevant laws and regulations, regardless of whether the claim is specifically labeled as

a claim for [a particular benefit]." Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001);

Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d.

1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that "[i]n direct appeals, all filings must be read 'in a liberal

manner' whether or not the veteran is represented"). 

Moreover, "the Board is required to adjudicate all issues reasonably raised by a liberal

reading of . . . all documents and oral testimony in the record prior to the Board's decision." Brannon,

12 Vet.App. at 34; see Solomon v. Brown,6 Vet.App. 396 (1994). Whether a sympathetic reading
9

of prior filings raises an informal claim for benefits is essentially a factual inquiry that is reviewed

under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir.

2004); Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005).

A "pending claim" is "[a]n application, formal or informal, which has not been finally

adjudicated." 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2008). Consistent with this regulation, this Court has held that

"[a] reasonably raised claim remains pending until there is either a recognition of the substance of

the claim in [an RO] decision from which a claimant could deduce that the claim was adjudicated

or an explicit adjudication of a subsequent 'claim' for the same disability." Ingram, 21 Vet.App. at

243; see also Myers v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 228, 236 (2002) (explaining that a pending claim can

be addressed in a subsequent adjudication); Hanson, 9 Vet.App. at 31 (stating that a claim remains

pending until final action is taken or the claim is withdrawn); Meeks v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 284, 287

(1993) (holding that a "1970 rating decision was not a final decision and [the case] remains

pending"). When a claimant files a timely NOD as to a claim, but the RO fails to respond by issuing

an SOC, that appeal remains pending despite anysubsequent denials at the RO level. See Tablazon

v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995); see also Juarez v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 537, 543 (2008)

(noting that "[o]nly a subsequent Board decision can resolve an appeal that was initiated but not

completed"). 

A. An Informal Claim for Benefits for Peripheral Neuropathy 

Based on the Appellant's 1978 Application

The appellant argues that at the time that he filed his 1978 claim for benefits for depression

and anxiety, theBoardshould havesympatheticallyread hisapplication to includean informal claim for

benefits for peripheral neuropathy. Appellant's Br. at 14. In support of this argument, he contends

that by including the term "all disabilities of record," in his 1978 application, he made his intent clear

that he was seekingbenefits for more than anxietyand depression. Appellant's Br. at 1011. He argues

further in his brief that because the medical information in the record at the time of his 1978

application "contained diagnoses of a neurological disease in the lower extremities," he filed an

informal claim for benefits for peripheral neuropathy. Appellant's Br. at 7, 10-11. Elsewhere, he

argues that he had submitted evidence that "diagnosed neuropathy" with his claim. Id. at 3. We

disagree with the appellant's arguments. 
10

As noted above, an informal claim for VA benefits must identify the benefit sought. 38

C.F.R. § 3.155(a). The appellant asserts that by including the phrase "and all disabilities of record"

he indicated an intent to apply for disability compensation benefits for peripheral neuropathy.

Appellant's Br. at 7. In essence, he argues that the use of that phrase indicates an intention to apply

for every benefit that might be implied by some entryin the record then before VA. In this case, the

use of the phrase "all disabilities of record" is insufficient to satisfy the specificity required by §

3.155(a)'s requirement that a claim must "identifythe benefit sought." Therefore, the Court holds that

the Board's finding that the appellant did not file an informal claim for compensation for peripheral

neuropathy in 1978 is supported by the record because the appellant did not identify peripheral

neuropathy as a benefit for which he was seeking disability compensation. 

The requirement to identifythe benefit sought means that a claimant must describe the nature

of the disabilityfor which he is seeking benefits. See Ingram, 21 Vet.App. at 256. A claimant may

satisfy this requirement by referring to a body part or system that is disabled or by describing

symptoms of the disability. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23Vet.App. 1, 5 (2009) (stating that, when

determining the scope of a claim, the Board must consider "the claimant's description of the claim;

the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary

obtains in support of that claim"); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(3); see also R. at 220 (VA Form 21-526

Veteran's Application for Compensation and Pension, Block 25 instructing the appellant to provide

the "NATURE OF SICKNESS, DISEASE OR INJURIES FOR WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE").

Here, the appellant's 1978 application contained no reference to peripheral neuropathy and provided

no description of the symptoms he was experiencing. Furthermore, the medical records submitted

in support of that application provided no information that would enable VA to determine that the

nature of his disability involved peripheral neuropathy. 

Contrary to the appellant's argument, the medical records submitted in connection with his

1978 application do not include a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. In this regard, the Board's

finding that the medical records in the appellant's claims file in 1978 did not contain any reference

to peripheral neuropathy is supported by the record on appeal. R. at 20, 22, 229-46. Indeed, the

medical records reflect that when the appellant sought treatment for his disabilityin December 1976

and January 1977, Dr. Robinson initially believed that it was possible that he had a neurological or
11

orthopedic problem that was partly responsible for his symptoms. R. at 245-46. In January 1977,

Dr. Robinson identified the suspected neurological disease as a Morton's neuroma (a tumor involving

nerve cells) located in theappellant's right foot. R. at 241-42. After the appellant underwent further

testing recommended by Dr. Robinson in February 1977, he was diagnosed with an orthopedic

problem involving a herniated disk and radiculopathy in his lower back. R. at 232-33. 

Dr. Robinson's discharge diagnoses after the appellant underwent bypass surgery in April

1977, to address his blocked artery, does not contain any further discussion regarding a suspected

neurological disorder. Furthermore, Dr. Robinson did not recommend that the appellant undergo

any further testing to rule out a neurological disorder. Thus, the medical records indicate that even

during the short period between December 1976 and January 1977 when Dr. Robinson suspected that

the appellant had a neurological disorder, he never mentioned peripheral neuropathy as a possible

diagnosis. Id. In fact, as the Board correctly noted, a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy was not

made until 1993–15 years after the appellant filed his 1978 application. R. at 20, 377-80. Therefore,

to the extent that the medical records the appellant submitted to support the 1978 application

discussed thepossibilitythat hehad anyneurological disorder,theBoard had a plausible basis for

finding that there was no indication that peripheral neuropathy was considered to bea cause of the

appellant's disability. In fact, the medical records indicate that when the appellant filed his 1978

application, his treating physicians had concluded that the disability involving his lower extremities

was attributed solely to a peripheral vascular disorder and a lumbar back disorder.

To further support the appellant's argument, he relies on a January 1977 medical report that

indicated that the appellant had "neuropathic changes" in his lower extremities. R. at 428;

Appellant's Br. at 10. However, this report does not support the appellant's argument for two reasons.

First, the 1977 medical report was not before the RO at the time of the 1978 application. The record

showsthat this document was not included in therecord until after the appellant filed his claim in

February 1994. R. at 421-28. Second, it is clear that the January 1977 medical report attributes the

"neuropathic changes"to a back disability and not to peripheral neuropathy. R. at 428. Therefore,

the Court is not persuaded by the appellant's argument that the January 1977 document demonstrates

that the Board erred in finding that there was no diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy in the record

until the appellant filed his claim in February 1994. R. at 20. 
12

The Court is also not persuaded by the appellant's argument that a reference in the

medical records to one specific neurological disorder–Morton's neuroma–is sufficient to raise an

informal claim for benefits based on another specific neurological disorder–peripheral

neuropathy–that was not diagnosed until many years after the appellant filed his 1978 application

with VA. Although a medical diagnosis is not a requirement to establish service connection,

there must be sufficient information to identify the nature of the disability. See Boggs v. Peake,

520 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that there is no requirement that a veteran must

submit a diagnosis by a medical doctor to establish a claim for service connection); Clemons, 23

Vet.App. at 6-7. Here, the Board correctly determined that there was no information in the

appellant's 1978 application to identify peripheral neuropathy as a disability for which the

appellant was seeking benefits. The "sympathetic reading" requirement does not obligate the

Board to conduct an exercise in prognostication, but onlyrequires that it consider all claims

reasonably raised by the evidence. See Talbert v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 352, 356-357 (1995). 

A VA adjudicator is not required to anticipate a claim for benefits for disabilities that have

not been identified in the record by medical professionals or bycompetent lay evidence at the time

that a claimant files a claim or during the claim's development. The requirement that a claimant

identify the benefit that he is seeking makes it possible for VA to develop and adjudicate the claim.

Here, although thelimited questionofpossible neurological involvement in the appellant's disability

picture was brieflyraised bythe one of the appellant's physicians, that question appears to have been

resolved negatively bythetime theappellant had filed his 1978 claim. When the appellant filed his

1978 claim, VA had no reason to suspect that the appellant had a neurological disorder, much less

peripheral neuropathy. By requiring the Secretary to have opened an informal claim in 1978 as to

any possible neurological disorder with which this appellant might be diagnosed at a future date

would have created uncertainty as to what disabilities were involved in the 1978 claim. This would

have created an unreasonable burden on VA to develop and adjudicatea claim for benefits based on

a disorder that was not identified at the time the 1978 claim was filed.

We do not hold that the inclusion of the term "all disabilities of record" in an application

for VA benefits coupled with the submission of particular medical records can be ignored in

determining whether the appellant has sufficiently identified the benefit he is
10

 Whether a claimant's blanket statement that he or she is seeking service connection for "all disabilities of record," in

isolation, may trigger the Secretary's section 5102(b) duty to notify the claimant of the incomplete nature the application was not

argued by the appellant, and consequently is not an issue that the Court need address at this juncture. See 38 U.S.C. § 5102 (providing

that if a claimant's application is incomplete, "the Secretary shall notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of the

information necessary to complete the application"); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(3) (defining a "substantially complete application" for

benefits as one that, inter alia, identifies "the benefit claimed and any medical condition(s) on which it is based"). 

13

seeking. Forexample, if that term is used and if selected records are submitted to support the 10

claim and they clearlydiscuss disabilities or specific symptoms other than those listed on the

application, it may be inferred that those records were submitted because the appellant intended

to apply for benefits for those conditions or conditions that are suggested by the specified

symptoms. Moody, 360 F.3d at 1310; Szemraj, 357 F.3d at 1373; Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384;

Hodge, 155 F.3d at 1362-63. However, the Court cautions that such language or the

indiscriminate inclusion of materials with an application for benefits cannot be used as a pleading

device to require the Secretary to conduct an unguided safari through the record to identify all

conditions for which the veteran may possibly be able to assert entitlement to a claim for

disability compensation. Such a requirement would nullify the specificity required by § 3.155(a). 

See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 193 (1991) ("The duty to assist is not always a one way

street."); cf. Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 470, 472 (1992) ("[T]he duty to assist is not a

license for a 'fishing expedition' to determine if there might be some unspecified information

which could possibly support a claim"). Also, if allowed, any veterans representative would be

remiss if the representative failed to advise a claimant to use such language in his or her

application. It is the Secretary's duty to "know[] the provisions of title 38 and . . . evaluate

whether there is a potential under the law to compensate an averred disability based on

asympathetic reading of the material ina pro se submission." Ingram, 21 Vet.App. at 256-57. 

Here, the Secretary satisfied his duty and we are not firmly convinced that the Board erred in

finding that the appellant did not file an informal claim for benefits forperipheral neuropathy in

1978. See Hersey, 2 Vet.App. at 94.
14

B. An Informal Claim for Benefits for Peripheral Neuropathy 

Based on the Appellant's 1989 Application

The appellant makes an alternative argument. He contends that he is entitled to an earlier

effective date because he filed an informal claim for benefits for peripheral neuropathy when he

submitted his 1989 application for VA benefits. Appellant's Br. at 14-19. The appellant argues

further that his February 1994 correspondence in which he stated that he was filing a claim for

service connection for peripheral neuropathy should not be considered a new claim for benefits based

on that disorder but that it should instead be considered as "additional correspondence" pertaining

to the 1989 claim, which was pending at the time that he submitted his February 1994

correspondence. Id. at 18. 

The Court is not persuaded bytheappellant's arguments. In the1989 application for benefits,

the appellant indicated that he was seeking service connection for "severe peripheral vascular

disease." R. at 311. The Board found that the appellant's 1989 application did not raise a claim for

peripheral neuropathy. R. at. 19-20. Rather, the Board found that the appellant did not file a claim

for peripheral neuropathy until February 1994 when his attorney notified the RO that the appellant

was seeking service connection for that disorder. Id. 

The appellant's 1989 application makes no reference to peripheral neuropathy. It appears that

when the appellant filed his 1989 claim for benefits for peripheral vascular disease he did so on the

basis of the contemporaneous medical diagnoses that he had received from his physicians at that

time. The medical records the appellant submitted in conjunction with his 1989 application reflect

that the appellant was uniformly and consistently diagnosed by his treating physicians with

peripheral vascular disease. R. at 319-22. Notably, peripheral neuropathy is not mentioned in any

of the medical reports submitted by the appellant in support of his 1989 application. Id. Indeed,

none of the medical reports submitted in conjunction with the 1989 application even suggests that

the appellant had any neurological disorder at that time.

By contrast, in February 1994, when the appellant notified the RO that he was seeking service

connection for peripheral neuropathy, he provided the RO with medical reports containing diagnoses

of peripheral neuropathy. As the Board correctly determined, the record shows that the appellant

was first diagnosed with peripheral neuropathy in 1993. R. at 20. The record further reveals that it
15

was not until 1993 that the appellant's doctors concluded that he suffered from both peripheral

vascular disease and peripheral neuropathy. In fact, the appellant stated that it was on the basis of

the new diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy that he filed his February 1994 claim. R. at 373-75, 426.

Although a medical diagnosis is not necessaryto initiate a claim, it was not until February 1994 that

the appellant provided the RO with sufficient information to identify compensation for peripheral

neuropathy as the benefit that he was seeking. See Boggs, 520 F.3d at 1356; Clemons, supra. 

In summary, the Court is not firmly convinced that the Board erred in finding that February

1994 was the first time that the appellant notified the RO that he was seeking service connection for

peripheral neuropathy. See Hersey, 2 Vet.App. at 94. The Court agrees with the Board that the

appellant's February 1994 correspondence constituted a claim for benefits based on peripheral

neuropathy. The February 1994 correspondence is the earliest document in the record that satisfied

all three requirements for an informal claim for disability compensation for peripheral neuropathy.

The communication is written; it indicates an intent to file a claim for benefits; and it identifies the

benefit sought by the appellant as peripheral neuropathy. For this reason, the Court rejects the

appellant's argument that his February 1994 correspondence was not a new claim but merely

additional correspondence pertaining to the pending 1989 claim for benefits based on peripheral

vascular disease. Because the Court is not firmlyconvinced that the Board erred in concluding that

the appellant's 1989 claim was limited to one seeking benefits based on peripheral vascular disease,

the appellant's February 1994 correspondence was not in furtherance of his 1989 claim; rather, it

raised a new claim for benefits for peripheral neuropathy. 

III. CONCLUSION

Afterconsideration ofthe appellant's and the Secretary's briefs, and a review of the

record on appeal, the Board's January 11, 2007, decision is AFFIRMED.