UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4561 WILLIAM BARNETT, a/k/a Big Pork,

a/k/a Pork, a/k/a Porky, a/k/a

William Clagett,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4732

TYRELL K. LEE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-01-58)

Submitted: March 31, 2003

Decided: April 11, 2003

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
COUNSEL

L. Barrett Boss, ASBILL, MOFFITT & BOSS, Washington, D.C.;

Paul S. Rosenzweig, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Washington,

D.C.; Eric M. Glass, Savage, Maryland, for Appellants. Thomas M.

DiBiagio, United States Attorney, James M. Trusty, Assistant United

States Attorney, Mythili Raman, Assistant United States Attorney,

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

In these consolidated appeals, William Barnett (No. 02-4561) and

Tyrell Lee (No. 02-4732) appeal their convictions and sentences for

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more

than five kilograms of cocaine and more than fifty grams of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), 846. Barnett

was also convicted of two counts of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (2000). On July 9, 2002, Barnett was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit

assets valued at $175,000. Lee was convicted pursuant to his guilty

plea and sentenced to 120 month’s imprisonment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm their convictions and sentences. 

I. BARNETT, No. 02-4561

A. Wiretap Evidence

Barnett contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence

obtained through the use of wiretaps and other means of electronic

surveillance because the Government failed to establish that it had

2 UNITED STATES v. BARNETT
exhausted ordinary investigation techniques before requesting authorization for electronic surveillance. Further, he argues that the Goetz

affidavit omits material facts, in violation of the statute. 

This court reviews de novo whether the applicant submitted a full

and complete statement of facts in compliance with 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(1)(c) (2000), and reviews for an abuse of discretion the district

court’s decision whether the wiretap was necessary under the statute.

United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The affidavit was exhaustive of the facts surrounding the investigation of the Adams drug organization. The Government set forth

numerous investigative techniques implemented during the investigation as of its date, November 22, 2000. Barnett has not made a sufficient showing that the Government failed to meet the necessity

requirement under the wiretap statute. 

Barnett argues that the Goetz affidavit omits material facts and

contains material misrepresentations, in violation of the statute, warranting a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1978). As Barnett has failed to show any evidence that the Government knowingly or recklessly made material misrepresentations in the

Goetz affidavit, the district court did not exceed the bounds of deference accorded it by authorizing the electronic surveillance. See United

States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1991). 

B. Expert Testimony

Barnett also contends the district court abused its discretion by

allowing Special Agent Matthew Carbone to testify as an expert witness with regard to drug code language.

Federal courts have repeatedly found the interpretation of drug

codes a specialized body of knowledge appropriate for expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 in drug trafficking cases. See United

States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

123 S.Ct. 924 (2003); United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 17

(1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 139 (2nd Cir.

2002); United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1096 (9th Cir.

UNITED STATES v. BARNETT 3
2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 2003 WL 183256 (U.S. Feb. 24,

2003) (No. 02-8542); United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307 (3d

Cir. 2001); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.

1994). As Carbone was fully qualified to testify regarding drug codes

by his extensive experience in narcotics investigations, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting him as an expert. See

United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 816 (4th Cir. 2000). 

Barnett contends that Carbone had no reliable basis for his testimony regarding the drug code terms "sweet potato joints" and "cabaret." Under Rule 702, experts may only testify if: "(1) the testimony

is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product

of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." Barnett

argues that Carbone never adequately explained the method he used

to arrive at his interpretations of words which he had never encountered before. Because Barnett did not object to Carbone’s testimony

in pretrial motions or at trial with regard to the reliability or methodology of his expert testimony, this court reviews for plain error. Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

The district court conducted a full voir dire of Carbone, demonstrating that his knowledge and experience in drug trafficking investigations and drug "codes" was extensive. In addition, Carbone’s expert

testimony was corroborated by Adams’ explanation of the conversations in which he took part. 

Barnett argues the Government improperly "bolstered" Adams’ testimony with expert testimony by Carbone. However, the Government

properly compared Adams’ and Carbone’s testimony, as corroboration. 

C. Admission of Prior Bad Acts

Barnett maintains that the district court improperly admitted certain

"prior bad acts" into evidence in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). He

specifically challenges the court’s admission of his 1991 prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and the testimony of John Simpson, a Maryland State Police Officer, who

executed a search warrant of Barnett’s home on April 5, 1990. 

4 UNITED STATES v. BARNETT
Rule 404(b) forbids admission of prior bad acts evidence to show

later action in conformity therewith. Rule 404(b) provides for exclusion of prior bad acts only if it is admitted to show character. It does

not require exclusion of such evidence offered to establish opportunity, motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence

of mistake. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

To be relevant under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be sufficiently

related to the charged offense. Powers, 59 F.3d at 1465. Evidence is

necessary when, considered in the light of other evidence available to

the government, it is an essential part of the crimes on trial, or when

it furnishes part of the context of the crime. United States v. Queen,

132 F.3d 991, 998 (4th Cir. 1997); Powers, 59 F.3d at 1466. Finally,

the evidence is reliable if it is sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the

actor. Powers, 59 F.3d at 1467. 

The evidence showed Barnett’s previous participation in drug distribution activities. Simpson testified that the evidence gathered during the previous search in that case included a police scanner, a digital

scale, food storage containers and baggies used to hold cocaine, and

a lockbox containing $5740 in cash. The evidence also proved that

Barnett’s intent when he made coded phone calls was to deal cocaine.

Simpson’s testimony was reliable and highly probative, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. See United

States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1996). 

II. LEE, No. 02-4732

Lee appeals from his conviction and 120-month sentence imposed

pursuant to his guilty plea, for conspiracy to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine and more

than fifty grams of cocaine base. Lee contends that his guilty plea was

not knowingly and voluntarily made because there were many references at his guilty plea hearing to the potential application of the

"safety valve" provision under the Sentencing Guidelines that he ultimately did not receive. 

The district court’s conclusion that Lee’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made was not plainly erroneous. See United

UNITED STATES v. BARNETT 5
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 123

S. Ct. 200 (2002). 

We therefore affirm Barnett’s and Lee’s convictions and sentences.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions have been adequately presented in the materials before the court.

AFFIRMED

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