### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 19, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. STEV EN AN DR EW TID WELL

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 03-441 Roy B. Mor gan, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-01820-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jul y 21, 2005

The de fenda nt, Steven Andre w Tidwell, tried for ag g ravated burg lary and theft of pr operty betwee n $500 and $1,000, wa s convicted of theft. The trial court imposed a two- y ear sentenc e to be se rved in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. I n this appeal of right, the de fenda nt arg ues that the e vidence was insufficient, that the tria l court er red by rul ing that the state could c ross-examine him with a prior burg lary offe nse for

which he ha d rec eived judicial diver sion, and that the sentenc e is e x cessive. T he judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Ra msd a le O' De Ne a l, Jr
., Jac ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Ste ve n A nd re w T idw e ll.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Preston Shipp, Assi stant Attorney Gene ral; and J ody S. Pi ckens, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

At approximately 7:30 p.m. on Marc h 25, 2003, Dr. James E. Selby , the Vice President for Student Services at Jackson State Communit y College , encounte red the defe ndant in a sec ond-floor computer la

b locat ed in t he Ne lms Building on c ampus. As he wa lked past the lab, he saw the defe ndant t hroug h a window in the door "w alking in a crouche d position" and carrying a computer CPU (centra l proce ssing unit). When Dr. Selby opened the door, t he defenda nt hurriedly place d the component behind the c abinet of a television stand. Another computer had a lso been unplug g ed and

remove d from its mounting. When asked w hat he was doing, the def endant he sitated, then explained that someone who h ad i d en t i fi ed himself as Ry an Sparks with the sc hool's O ffice of I nformation Tec hnology

had aske d him to get " some comp u t er s re ady to be taken out of

[t here ]" bec ause the y neede d to be picked up for repair. The defenda nt, who was a st udent at the college at t he ti me of the offe nse, provided his identification card f or Dr. Selby

and then lef

t at his reque s t

. After

calling-2-

se c urity to a ssu re that the la

b wa s loc ke d, Dr

. She lby le arn e d that the de fe nd a nt, wh o r e sid e d f if ty miles away , did no t h av e a cl ass on campus that evening and did not have any of his schedule d

course s in the Nelms Building

.

At trial, Diane Har

ris, J ackson' s State' s Direc tor of Human Resource s an d Af firmative Action, testified that computerized recor ds dating back to 1985 indicated that the colleg e had neve r employ ed any one name d Ry an Sparks. Franc es Edmonds o n, the Reg istrar of the school, testified that the Colleg e had e nrolled three students with simil ar names i n the past: Robert G. Sparks in the fall of 1989; Robert Ry an Sparks in the fall of 1998 and spring of 1999; and R y an L ee Sparks in the fall of 2003. She determined that no one named Ry an Sparks was enrolled in the school in the spring of 2003.

Ry an L ee Spar

ks testified that he wa s not a s tudent in the spring of 2003 and that he had

never been e mploy ed by

the Off ice of I nformation Te chnolog y . Robert R y an S p ar ks provided simil ar te stimony

. Ry an Keith Sparks, who ha d never been a student at J ackson State, te stified that he had g one to hig h school with the defe ndant but had not see n him since g raduating in 2001.

Robert Grissom, the Dire ctor of the Offic e of I n formation Technolog y , testified that the computer CPUs in question would have been value d at appr ox imately $760 at the time of the offe nse. Linda Seg o, a tec hnical ser vices mana g er w ho super v i s es al l of the school' s computer technicia ns, including repa ir work order s, testified that there was no e mploy ee named Ry an Sparks and ther e wa s nothing wr ong with the two computers that ha d been move d by the def endant.

The de fe n d an t testified that at the time of the offe nse, he w as a student at J ackson State, wher e he ha d been enrolled for approximately a y ear and a half. He state d that during that time, he

wa s a lso e mpl oy e d at a Ha rd e e ' s re staur a nt in Sel me r, wh e re he liv e d, a nda t a n I HO P r e staur a nt i n J ackson. H e claimed that on the day of the off ense, he had g one to J ackson to do some shopping at the ma ll a ndde c ide d to sto p b y the c omp ute r l ab to ty

pe a n artic le he ne e de d to su mma ri ze f or c la ss. I t w a s h is t e sti mon y

that ju st a s h e wa s f

inish in g h is pap e r, a

ma n w ith a

wa lki e -t a lki e a nda

g old name tag that rea d "Jackson State OIT" and "Ry an Sparks" came into the lab and aske d whether the defe ndant " minded helping him out, he had a lot of wor k to ge t done." The de fendan t testified as fo llo ws :

I tho u gh t I ' d be a g ood Samaritan a nd help him out a littl e bit. I asked w hat he neede d. He sa id he had to take two computers out of that lab. They neede d to have the har d drive imag es re -g hosted on them, and he had to ta ke them fr om there ove r to the main office at the OI T building, and he had to g o g et the dolly to put them on and he w ould be rig ht back, a nd I said okay . I

unhooked one of

the two computer s and we nt and set it over in the c orner wher e he had point ed and told me to, " Set them over the re. I ' ll be rig ht back," and at that time wa s when Dr . Selby came in.

The de fenda nt testified that he had selec ted the Nelms Building computer lab to work in that eve ning beca use he h ad had a

class in that building the pr evious semester and wa s familiar with it. The-3-

de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d a

prior bu rg lary of fe ns e in M c Na iry

Cou nty in Febru ary 2003 . H e a lso acknow ledg ed that he ha d a computer at his residenc e at the time of the offe nse.

I

I nit ia lly , th e de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e

. I n a re la te d iss ue , he a lso claims that the trial court erre d by deny ing his motion for judgment of acquittal at the c lose of the state' s proof.

Rul e 29 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Cri min a l Proc e du re e mpo we rs the tr ia l judg e to d ir e c t a judgme nt of ac quittal when the evide nce is insufficient to w arr ant a conviction either at the time the
state re sts or at the conclusion of a ll the evidence . Overturf v. State, 571 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. 1978). At t h e point the motion i s made, the tria l court must favor the opponent of the motion with the strong est leg itimate view o f t h e evidenc e, including all rea sonable infe renc es, and disca rd any
counter vailing e vidence

. Hill v. State, 470 S.W .2d 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). The standa rd by wh ich the trial c ourt determines a motion for judg ment of ac quittal at that time is, i n essenc e, the same standa

rd wh i ch applies on a

ppeal in dete rmining the sufficie ncy of the e vidence afte r a conviction. State v. B al l , 973 S.W .2d 288, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) ; State v. Anderson, 880 S.W .2d 720, 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.

Where a defe ndant chal l en ges t h e suff iciency of the e vidence , the state is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re as o n ab l e inferenc es which mig ht be dra wn the re fr om. Sta te v. Ca

bb a g e , 5 71 S.W. 2d 83 2, 83 5 (T e nn . 197 8)

. Th e c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the weig ht to be g iven their testimony , and th e re co n ciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury

as the trier

of fa ct. Liakas v. State, 199 Te nn. 298, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956); B yrg e v. Sta te , 5 75 S.W. 2d 29 2, 29 5 (T e nn . Crim . App . 1 97 8) . O n a pp e a l, the re le va nt q ue sti on is whether , afte r re viewing the evidenc e in t he li g ht most favora ble to the state, a ny

rational trier

of fa ct

c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(e) ; State v. Wi lliams, 657 S .W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). Be cause a ver dict of g uilt removes the presumption of innoce nce and raises a presumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal defe ndant bea rs the burde n of showing that the evidenc e was leg ally insufficient to sustain a g uiltyverdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

"A p e r s o n c o mm it s th e f

t o f p r o p e r ty if

, w ith in te n t to d e p r iv e th e o w n e r o f p r o p e r ty , the person knowing ly

obtains or exercises c ontrol over the pr o p er ty without the owner' s eff ective

c on se nt. " Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 14 -1 03 . " ' Kn ow ing ' re fe rs to a pe rs on wh o a c ts kno wi ng ly wi th respe ct to the conduct or to c ircumstance s surrounding the conduct when the per son is awar e of the
nature of the c onduct or that the c ircumstance s exi st." Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 302(b).

The de fenda nt admits that he "e x erc ised control" over the school' s computers but conte nds that he did not have the requisite int ent t o deprive the school of its property . He a rg ues that he w as-4-

" a s s i s t i n g , i n h i s m i n d
, a n e m p l o y e e o f t h e s c h o o l w h o s a i d t h e c o m p u t e r w a s i n n e e d o f r e p a i r

. " In our view, this was a classic c redibility question, falling well within the purview of the jury . Dr. J ames Selby

testified that he discove red the defe ndant moving c omputers during evening hours at

a computer lab on the J ackson State campus. When que stioned, the defe ndant hesitated b ef ore providing information that prove d to be fa lse. Throug h the testimony of numerous w itnesses, the
state int ro du c e d e vid e nc e that no pe rs on na me d Ry a n Sp ark s, wh om the de fe nd a nt ha d c la ime d to be assist i n g , had eve r bee n employ ed by the colleg e or w as enr olled as a student that se mester. Although the defe ndant denied ha ving be en eng ag ed in t h e t h ef t o f the c omputers, the jury , who ob se rv e d h is d e me a no r f ir st- ha nd , a c c re dit e d th e te stimony of the state ' s w itn e sse s, a s w a s it s prer og ative, and c hose not to ac cr edit that of the de fenda nt. See State v. Summerall, 926 S.W .2d 272, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The e vidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fac t to have fo un d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e c ri me of the ft

.

II

Next, cl ai m i n g t hat " [p] rior bad a cts are not admissible in criminal cases," the def endant contends that the tria l court er red by permitti n g t h e state to c ross-examine him reg arding a prior burg lary offe nse for which he had re ceive d judicial diversion. The state arg ues that the de fenda nt has wa ived consider ation of the issue by failing to raise it in his moti on for ne w trial and that, in any

case , the evidenc e wa s proper ly admitted.

Gene rally , the fa ilure to prese nt an issue i n a mot ion for ne w trial re sults in waiver. Rule 3(e )

o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e s t h a t f o r ap p e a l s " i n a l l c a s e s tr i e d b y a j u r y, no issue p re s en t ed fo r revie w shall be pre dicated upon e rror in the admission or exclusion of

e vid e nc e , ju ry

ins truc tio ns g rante d or r e fu se d,

. . . o r o the r g ro un d u po n w hic h a ne w t ri a l is so ug ht, unless the same w as spec ifically s tated in a motion for a new tria l; otherwise such issues will be
treated as wa ived." Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) ; see a lso St ate v. Ma rtin, 940 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a defe ndant relinquishes the rig ht to arg ue on appea l any issues that should have been pr esente d in a mot ion for new t rial). W hether proper ly assig ned or not, howe ver, this court may consider pla in err or upon the record under Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. State v. Og le, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984).

B e fo re a n e rr or

ma y be so re c og nize d, it must be " plain" a nd mus t af fe c t a " su bs ta nti a l r ig ht" of the a ccuse d. The wor d "pla in" is sy nony mous with "cle ar" o r eq u ivalently "obvious." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain er ror is not mere ly

err or that is conspicuous, but espec ially eg reg ious error t h at s t rikes at the f airne ss, integrity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s. See State v . Wooden, 658 S.W .2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) . I n State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), this c ourt define d "substantial right" as a rig ht of " fundame ntal proportions in the indictment proce ss, a rig ht to the proof of e very element of the off ense a nd . . . constitutional in nature." I n that case , this court established five fa ctors to be applied in determining whe ther a n err or is plain:

(a ) T he re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh at oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ou rt ;-5-

(b ) a c le ar andun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w m us t ha ve be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d mu st h a ve be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or must be " nece ssary to do substantial just ice."

I d. at 641-42. Our

supreme c ourt cha

rac teriz ed the Adkisson test as a " clea r and me aning ful standard" and empha siz ed that eac h of the five fac tors must be prese nt before an er ror qua lifies as plain err or. State v. Smith, 24 S .W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000).

The re cord r efle ct s t h at o n February 14, 2003, the def

endant e ntere d pleas of g uilt in t he McNa iry CountyCircuit Court to theft betwee n $500 and $1,000; burg lary ; and theft be tween $1,000 and $10,000. I n that case , the trial court imposed order ed a two-y ear period of pr obation pursuant
to our j udicial di version st atute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313. Prior to trial, the state provided notice of its intent to impeach the defe ndant wit h the burglary offe nse. Beca use the de fenda nt had

rec eived judicial diversion, the trial court c onsidered the issue under Te nnessee Rule of Evidenc e 608, which g overns the a dmissibi lity of prior bad acts, rathe r than Tenne ssee Rule of Evidenc e 609, dealing with the admissibilit y of prior c onvictions. See State v. Walter Dale Dishman, No. 03C01- 9409-CR-00318 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Sept. 26, 1995) (holding that char g es dismissed afte r succ essful completion of pretria l dive rsion could be use d to impeach witness unde r Rule 608). Th e tr ial co urt de te rm ine d th a t th e bu rg lary of fe ns e wa s a dmi ssi ble fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s, stating, " We'r e dea ling with the issue of truthfulness today ," and finding that its probative value outweig hed the da ng er of unfair pr ejudice.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 60 8 p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art a s f oll ow s:

(b ) S pe c if ic I ns ta nc e s o f C on du c t. S pe c if ic ins ta nc e s o f co nd uc t of a wi tne ss for the pur

pose of attacking or supporting the witness’s cr edibility , other than

c on vic ti on s of

c ri me s a s p ro vid e d in Rul e 60 9, ma y no t be pr ov e d b y

e xtri ns ic

ev i d ence. They

may , howeve r, if probative of truthfulness or untr uthfulness and

un de r the fo llo wi ng c on dit ion s, be inq uir e d int o on c ro ss- e xami natio n of the wi tne ss

conce rning the witness’s char acte r for truthfulne ss or untruthfulness or c oncerning the cha rac ter for truthfu lness or untruthfulness of another witness a s to which the char acte r witness being cross-e x amined has testified. The conditions which must be satisfied bef

ore a llowing inquiry

on cross-e x amination about s uch conduc t probative solely of truthfulness or untr

uthfulness are : (1) The court upon reque st must hold a hearing outside the jury ' s prese nce and

mus t de te rmin e that th e a lle g e d c on du c t ha s p ro bativ e va lue a ndthat a re a so na ble f a c t u a l b a s i s e x i s t s f

o r t h e i n q u i r y; (2) The conduct must h av e occ urre d no more than te n y ear s befor e

commence ment of the a ction or prose cution, . . .; and (3) I f the w i t n ess t o be impeac hed is the ac cused in a criminal prose cution, the State must g ive the ac cused r easona ble written notice of the impea ching conduct befor e trial, and the court upon reque st must determine that the conduc t's pr obative-6-

va lue on c re dib ili ty

ou tw e ig hs its un fair

pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t on the su bs ta nti ve iss ue s. The c ourt may

rule on the a dmissibi lityof such pr oof p ri o r t o t h e trial but in any event sha ll rule prior to t h e t es t i m o ny of the a ccuse d. I f the c ourt makes a final determination that such proof is admissible for impea chment purpose s, the ac cused need not a ctually

testify at the trial t o later c halleng e the pr opriety of the determination. . . .

Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b).

Th e on ly argum ent made b y the de fe nd a nt i s th a t " [p]r ior ba d a c ts a

re no t a dmi ssi ble in criminal ca ses." That is an er ro n eo u s assertion. See, e .g ., State v. Patton, 593 S.W .2d 913, 919 (T en n

. 1 9 7 9 ) (s t at i n g t h at t h e "ex t en s i o n o f [ ev i d en t i ar y ru l es 6 0 8 an d 6 0 9 ] s o as t o p ro v i d e c o v er age to criminal defe ndants is in keeping with the time-honored holding of our c ourts that, as a g ener al rule, whe n a criminal defe ndant ' elec ts to plac e himself upon the stand a s a witness, he c an be tr eate d in all respec ts as any

other witness' ") . I n this case, the trial court complied with Rule of Evidenc e 608, holding a

jury -out hea

ring on the matter a nd making t h e ap propriate finding s. The re cord

c o n t a i n s a c e r t i f i e d j u d g m e n td e m o n s tr a t i n g t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n td i d i n d e e d p l e a d g u i l t y t o b u r g l ar y, for whic h he re ceive d judicial diversion just prior to committi ng the offe nse in this case. The trial court prope rly

determined that the burg lary plea was rele vant to the defe ndant' s cre dibilit y and that i t s p ro b at i v e v al u e o u t we i gh ed i t s u n fa i r p re j u d i ci al ef

fe ct

. T h e t ri al co u rt ex cl u d ed t h e d ef en d an t 's two theft plea s on the g round that they wer e too similar to the offe nse on trial. Further, the trial court limit ed the state to the following question: "You a re t h e s am e Steven Tidwell who a dmitted on Fe bruary the 14 of 2003 to committing a bur g lary on April the 20
, 2002? " The def endant r eplied th th aff irmatively

and no extraneous pr oof was offe red. Under these c ircumstance s, there w as no er ror and, ther efor e, no plain er ror. The defe ndant is not entitled to relief.

III

Finally
, t h e d ef

en d ant claims t hat the " sentenc e imposed by the court was extreme and

unrea sonable." He arg ues that the trial court should ha ve imposed some form o f alternative
sentenc ing, spe cifica lly

community

corr ections, and that the $2,500 fine wa s excessive.

When there is a c halleng e to the leng th, rang e, or manner of service of a se ntence , it is t he duty of this court to c onduct a de novo r eview w ith a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). This pre sumption i s "c onditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l cou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and circumstance s." State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597
, 6 0 0 (T enn. 1994). " I f the trial c ourt applies inappr opriate f actor s or otherwise f

ails to follow the 1989 Se n t en ci n g Ac t, the presumption of cor rec tness falls." State v. She lto n, 85 4 S.W.2 d 116 , 123 (T e nn . Crim . App . 1 99 2) . T he Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts provide that the bur den is on the def endant to show the impropri et y o f t h e sente nce. T enn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.-7-

Our re view re quires an analy sis of (1) the evidence, if any , rec eived at the t rial and se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) t h e p ri n ci p les of sente ncing and the a rg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the offe nse; (5) any mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential fo r rehabilitation or treatment. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102, -103, -210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. Especia lly

mitigated or

standard of

fende rs convicte d of Class C, D, or E fe l o n i es ar e, of

course , p re s u m ed t o be fa vorable candidates " for a lternative se ntencing options in t he abse nce of evidenc e to t he contr ary ." T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6) . Wit h certain statutory exceptions, none of which a

pply here , proba t i o n m u s t be automatica lly considere d by

the trial court if the sentenc e imposed is eight y ear s or less. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-303( b) (Supp. 2000).

Among the fa ctors applica ble to probati o nc o n s id e r ation are the circ umstances of the offe nse, the def endant' s criminal re cord, soc ial history and pre sent condition, and the deter rent e ffe ct upon and best intere st of the defe ndant and the public. State v. Gre ar, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978). The nature and circ umstances of the offe nses may

often be so eg reg ious as to prec lude the g rant of probation. See S tate v. Poe, 614 S.W .2d 403, 404 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). A lack of c andor ma y also milit ate a g ainst a g rant of pr obation. State v. Bunc h, 646 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983)

.

The purpose of the Communi ty Correc tions Act of 1985 was to provide an alternative mea ns of punishment for " selec ted, nonviolent felony offe nders in front-e nd community based a lternatives to incarc eration." Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-36- 103. The CommunityCorrec tions sentence pr ovides

a de sir e d d e g re e of

fl e xibil ity th at may be bo th b e ne fi c ia l to the de fe nd a nt y e t se rv e le g iti ma te

s o c ie ta l a im s

. St a te v

. G r if f ith
, 7 8 7 S. W. 2 d 3 4 0
, 3 4 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 0 )

. E v e n in c ases whe re the defe ndant meets the minimum requ i rements of the Communit y Correc tions Act of 1985, the de fe nd a nt i s not ne c e ssa

ri ly e nti tle d to be se nte nc e d und e r the Ac t as a ma tte r o f l a w o r rig ht. Sta te v. Tay lor, 744 S.W .2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App.1987) . The following offe nders a re e ligible f

or Com mun ity

Cor re c tio ns :

(1) Per sons who, without this option, would be incar cer ated in a cor rec tional instit ution; (2) Per sons who are convicted of propert y -r elated, or drug /alcohol-re lated felony offen ses or other

felony offe nses not involving crimes ag ainst the person a s provided in title 39, chapte r 13, parts 1-5; (3 ) P e rs on s w ho are c on vic te d o f n on vio le nt f e lon y of fe ns e s; (4) Per sons who are convicted of felonyoffe nses in which the use or possession of a we apon wa s not involved; (5) Per sons who do n o t demonstrate a prese nt or past pattern of beha vior indicating violence; (6 ) P e rs on s w ho do no t dem on str a te a patte rn of c omm itt ing vio le nt o ff

e ns e s; and-8- Persons who ar e sente nced to inca rce ra t i o n o r on esc ape at the time of consideration will not be elig ible.

See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-36- 106(a)

.

At t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g , t h e s t a t e i n tr o d u c e d s w o r n c o p i e s o f t h e M c N a i r y

C o u n ty judgme nts demonstrating that the petitioner ha d been g rante d judicial diversion for the three prior felony offe nses in 2003 and t he pre sentenc e re port prepa red by the B oard of

Probation. The defe ndant did not introduce a ny proof.

I n mitigation, the trial c ourt applied fac tor number (1) , that the def endant' s conduct ne ither

cause d nor threatened serious bodily injury

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 1). The trial court applied thre e enhanceme nt fac tors: (2) that t h e def endant ha s a pre vious historyof criminal convictions or criminal behavior in a ddition to that nec essary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (9) that the def

endant ha s a pre vious historyof unwillingne ss to co m p l y wi t h t he conditions of a

se nte nc e inv olv ing re le a se in the c ommun ity ; and(1 8) that th e defe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e while on school prope rty

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(2), ( 9), (18) . The trial c ourt sentenc ed the def endant as a R ang e I offe nder to two y ear s, the maxi mum in the rang e, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 5), to be served in the De partment of Correc tion. The trial c ourt order ed ser vice of the sentenc e primarily

beca use the de fenda nt failed to succe ssfully complete his judicial diversion pr og ram.

I n our view, the trial court did not a buse its discr etion by ordering service of the two-y ear sentenc e. A littl e over

a month befor e committing this offe nse, the de fenda nt, after admitting thre e fe lon ie s, ha d b e e n g ive n th e op po rtun ity to cl e ar his c ri min a l re c or d. Al l he ha d to do wa s r e fr a in fr om c ri min a l c on du c t. T hat he didno t su g g e sts a re sis ta nce t o re ha

bil itatio n. Un de r the se circ umstances, the de nial of alternative sente ncing was a ppropriate

.

The de fenda nt also contends that the $2,500 fine assessed by the jury and appr oved by

the trial court is excessive. Our constitution prohibit s fines over $50 unless approve d by the jury . Tenn. Con st. art . V I , § 14 . A fi ne imp os e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

ma y no t e xce e d th a t fi xed by the jury . St a te

v. Mah on ey , 874 S.W. 2d62 7, 63 0 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ). Th e re are no e xce pti on s to the se g u i d e l i n e s u n l e s s t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a i v e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s o r h i s r i g h t t o a tr i a l b y j u r y. State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Durso, 645 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Tenn. 1983). This court has jurisdiction to revie w a fine beca use it is part of the sentenc e. See State v. B ry ant, 805 S.W .2d 762, 763 (Tenn. 1991). Our re view is de novo with a pr esumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. State v. B yrd, 861 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

He re , th e jury

imp os e d a

$2 ,5 00 fi ne , w hic h w a s w ith in the pe rm iss ibl e rang e fo r a Cla ss E felony conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111( b)(5) (providing that jury may assess a f ine

no t exce e din g $3 ,0 00 fo r C la ss Efe lon y c on vic tio n) . It is , o f c ou rs e , w e ll s e ttl e d th a t th e po we r t o decla re the appropriate punishment for a crime f alls within the authority

of t he leg islature. Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S .W. 558 (1914). The imposition of a fine, within the limits set bythe-9-

jury , is to be based on the f actor s provided by

the 1989 Sentencing Act; t he trial court must consider the d e f e n d a n t ’ s ab i l i t y

t o p a y t h e f i n e , t h e e v i d e n c e f

r o mt h e tr i a l
, t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g p r o o f in reg ard to the defe ndant’s ability to pay , and other fac tors of judg ment involved in the setting of the total sentence

. Bry ant, 805 S.W .2d at 766; see Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-207( 7); see also State v. Marsha ll, 870 S.W .2d 532, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (stating that a def endant’ s abilityto pay

“ is no t ne c e ssa

ri ly a c on tr oll ing [fa c tor ]”) ; Sta te v. Mic ha e l We stl e y Portze r, No . 0 1C0 1- 92 08 -C C00252 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug . 12, 1993).

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 40-35-301( b) provides that “when imposing sentenc e . . . the

c ou rt sh a ll i mpo se a

fi ne , if a ny , n ot t o e xce e d th e fi ne imp os e d b y the jury .” Th e tr ial cou rt is

“ ob lig a te d to e va luate the fi ne

. . . [a nd ] ma y no t si mpl y

imp os e the fi ne a s fixe d by the jury .” Sta te v. Michae l Wi lson, No. 01C01-9602-CC-00073 (Te n n

. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul y 31, 1997). I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e sta

bli sh a re c or d to i nd ica te that

it c on sid e re d th e app lic able fac to r s in ap p r o v in g th e f in e

. T h u s , th is c o u r t is n o t b o u n d b y th e p r e s u mp ti o n o f corr ectne ss on appea l. State v. Donald Eric Williams, No. 01C01-9405-CR-00165 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec . 22, 1994).

Neve rtheless, the r ecor d does not establish why the fine is ex ce s s i v e. T h e $2,500 fine as

rec ommended by

the jury and ac cepte d by

the trial judg e is n o t p at en t l y excessive. See State v. Mil le r, 73 7 S. W.2 d 5 56 , 5 58 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ). B e c a us e Dr. S elby int e rr up te d th e the ft
, the re wa s n o n e e d f

or re sti tut ion

. Th e de fe nd a nt do e s no t c la im that th e fi ne is o uts ide of his abil ity to pay . The a mount, on its fac e, is neither unf air nor ina

ppropriate

.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE