## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 75, 896

EX PA R TE SH EL TO N D EN O R I A JO N ES, A ppl i c ant

ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. 5 9 6 2 0 7 - B I N T HE 2 4 8 t h J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT HA RRI S CO UNTY

J OHNS ON , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C ourt i n w hi c h K ELL ER , P. J. , and M E YE RS , W OMACK , K EA S LER , H ERVEY , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . P RI CE , J. , f i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h H OL C OM B , J ., jo in e d . H OL C OM B , J. , f i l e d a di s s e nt i ng opi ni on i n w hi c h P RI CE , J. , j oi ne d. O P I N I O N This is a subsequent application for writ of ha beas c orpus filed pursua

nt to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.071, § 5. We deny relief

. I n November

1991, a jury

convicted a

pplicant of the of

fe n s e o f capital murde r. The jur y

answe red the specia l issues submit ted pursuant to Code of Criminal Proc edure article 37.071, and the trial court, acc ording ly , set punishment at death. J on es v . S tate , No. AP-71,369 (Te x . Crim. App. May 4, 1994)(not desig nated f or publication).2

The punishment jury -cha

rg e instruction at issue in this cause r ead, I f you deter

mine, when g iving e ffe ct to the mitigatingevidenc e, if an y , t hat a life sentenc e, as r efle cted by

a neg ative finding to the issue under considera

tion, rather than a de ath sente n ce, is an appropr iate re sponse to the per sonal culpability of the de fe nd ant, the n a

ne g a tiv e fi nd ingsh ou ld b e g ive n to on e of the sp e c ia l is su e s. The punishment jury char g e also included the two statutory specia l issues. Special I ssue No. 1 asked, “ Was the conduc t o f [ ap p l icant] that caused the death of the dec ease d committed de lib e rate ly

and wi th t he reas on abl e e xpe c tatio n th a t th e de a th o f t he de c e a se d o r a

no the r w ou ld result? ” S pecia l I ssue No. 2 aske d, “I s there a probability

that [applicant] would commi t criminal acts of violenc e that would constitute a continuing thr eat to socie ty ? ” The jury answe red both issues aff irmatively , and the verdic t f orm, which contained no ref ere nce to mitig ating evidenc e, re flec ted that, in open cour

t, the jury returne d those aff

irmative answe rs to specia l issues as its ve rdict. The trial court a ccor dingly

assessed a

sentenc e of de ath. We denied applica

nt’s initial post -convic tion appli ca t i o n for writ of habea s corpus a nd dismiss ed his first subsequent a pplication for wr i t of habe as cor pus. Ex parte J

ones , N os . WR62,589-01 and WR -62,589-02 (Tex. Crim. App. October 26, 2005)(not desig nated f or publication). On Marc h 6, 2006, this Court receive d th e instant post-conviction application for writ of ha be a s c or pu s, in whic h a

pp licant ra ise d a

sin g le a lle g a tio n: t

he fo rm e r s pe c ia l is su e s f a ile d to provide a n adequate vehicle for t h e j ury to give full consideration and eff ect to his mitigating

e vid e nc e . H e a sse rt e d th a t th e nu lli fi c a tio n in str uc tio n th a t h e di d rec e ive ha d th e same constitutional inadequac ies. On September 13, 2006, we f

ound that the alleg ation sat i sfies the require ments of Article 11.071, § 5(a) , and that the r equire ments for c onsideration of a subsequent application had be en met. Ac cording ly , we rema nded the ca

use to the trial cour

t for conside ration3

of the a lleg ation. Up on its re tur n f ro m r e mand , on Apr il 9, 200 8, we fi le d an d set thi s ca se fo r s ub mis sio n to the Court . T he pa

rt ie s w e re or de re d to br ie f a numbe r o f i ssu e s: 1) Was applicant’ s trial objection suffic ient to preser ve er ror? S h o u ld this C ourt co n t i n u e to ut iliz e the Al

ma nz a v . S

tate , 6 8 6 S. W. 2 d

1 5 7 ( T e x. Cr im

. Ap p . 1 9 8 5 ), standard of

revie w? I f so, has a

pplicant shown “some ha rm” (if prese rved) or “egreg ious harm” ( if not prese rved) ? 2) Doe s applicant’s mitig ating evidenc e mee t the Tennard v. Dretk e , 542 U.S. 274 (2004), “ low threshold for r eleva nce” standard? 3) I s ap p l i cant’s miti g ating evidenc e ade quately encompa ssed within the statutory sp e c ia l is su e s? Doe s th e futur e da ng e ro us ne ss i ssu e pr ov ide a ve hic le fo r the jur

y to express its reasoned mor al re sponse to this evidence ? The Contentions of

the P artie s Applicant conte nds that err or was prese rved beca use t he record r efle cts that defe nse counse l

e xpre ssl y state d th a t hi s r e qu e st f

or mod if ic a tio n o f t

he jur y c ha rg e wa s b e in g mad e purs ua nt t o Penry I

. Fur ther, when the t rial court asked the state t o respond, the pr osecutor stated that it was the state’s position that the proposed instruction adequately char g ed the jury on the issues decide d in the Penry case . Applicant ar g ues that the proble mat i c s p ec i al issues, in conjunction with the nullification instruction as applied to t he mi tigating evidence in this case , resulted in error that defies harm a naly sis and that the har

m from such e rror

satisfies any

st andar d for ha

rm, “e g reg ious” or “some.” Applicant sugg ests that, since e ither har m standard is met, this Court need not dec ide which sta nd ard a pp lie s. Ap pli c ant c on te nd s th a t hi s e vid e nc e me t Te nn ar d ’s low-thre shold standard for rele vance , and “t h at t h e former spec ial issues of the Te x as ca pital-sentenc ing sc heme did not provide a n adequat e v eh i cle f

or the jury

to give full consideration and full eff ect to his mitigatingevidenc e.”4

He a lso asser

ts that “[t] he problem was not cure d by providing a suppl emental c harg e that instructed the jurors to answe r one of the specia l issues dishonestly if they believed that the mitigatingevidenc e jus tif ie d a se nte nc e le ss t

ha n d e a th, ” and

that th e sp e c ia l is su es and ins tr uc tio ns g ive n to his sentenc ing jur

y did not permit the jury

to give full consideration and eff ect to that evide nce. I n s up po rt

of his argume nt, a

pp lic ant a sse rt s th a t a

ratio na l juro r at the pe na lty ph a se c ou ld have c on c lud e d, in l ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e a t the g uil t ph a se , th a t a pp lic ant’ s c on du c t w a s d e lib e rate in th a t it ma

y h av e b e e n d e s ign e d to av o id ar r e s t o r mo ti v a te d b y s o me o th e r p ur pose, but

never theless, a juror

might also have re asonably conclude d that applicant’ s psy cholog ical condition reduc ed his moral culpa

bility so as to mak e a d ea th sentence unwar rante d. He a

rgues, that under those circ umstances, hone st l y an s wer ing the deliberateness spec ial issue would have r equire d an

a ff ir mativ e ans we r, thu s the de lib e rate ne ss sp e c ia l iss ue c ou ld no t se rv e a s a ve hic le fo r the jur y to express its reasoned mor al re sponse to his mit iga ting e vidence

. Applicant also a sserts that the mitigating e vidence conce rning his psy chol og ical prof ile, which indicate s that he is influence d by consistent, strong external forc es, is rele vant to the sec ond specia l issue, but as an ag g ravating f actor beca use it sugg ested a

“y es” a nswer to the que stion of futur e da ng e ro us ne ss. He c on te nd s th a t th is c ir c ums tanc e le ft the jur y wi tho ut an

a de qu a te ve hic le to e xpre ss i ts r e a so ne d mo ra l r e sp on se to h is e vid e nc e of his ps y c ho log ic a l im

pa ir me nt. The e vidence that appl i ca n t prese nted at trial, a nd to which he now points as r eleva nt mitig a ti n g e v id e n c e th a t i s o u ts id e th e s c o p e o f th e s p e c ia l i s s u e s , in c lu d e s a p s y c h o log ical impairment that m ak es h i m susceptible to the influenc es of c onsistent, stronge r, anti-soc ial persona litie s in

h is environment, his abandonme nt by his biologica l father , and his intellige nce, w ork ethic, reliability , and trustworthiness. He c ontends that the spec ial issues and the instructions g iven5

did not permit the jury

to give full consideration and full eff ect to that evide nce. Applicant ar g ues t hat t he jurors “could not express the m oral judgment t hat a death sentenc e

was e x cessive in lig ht of [his ] intelligenc e, good work ethic, reliability , and trustworthiness, if they also conc luded beyond a re asonable d o u b t t h at he might be dang erous in the f uture.” Applicant’s brief on submission, p. 17. He a sserts that the future -dang erousne ss special issu e was thus “a defic ient vehicle for giving all of [his] mitigatingevidenc e mea ningf ul consideration as a basis for a sente nce le ss than death.” Applicant’s br ief on submission, p. 18. Applicant asser ts that “[a] sentenc ing sc heme that c onditions consideration of any of a de fe n dant’s constitutionally rele vant mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e on

jur or s’ wi lli ng ne ss t o d isr e g ard the ir oaths to re nd e r a

tr ue ve rd ic t is pr e c ise ly the sort of struc tural er

ror that cannot be subject to r outine harmless err or revie w.” Applica nt’s brief on submissi on, p. 34. He also argues t hat, between the specia l issues that preve nted the jurors f rom g iving their rea soned moral response to his mitigating evidenc e and the nullification instruction that inserted capr iciousness into the proce eding , the resulting err or sever ely and irrevoc ably war ped the fr ame wo rk

of the pr oc e e din g , th

us re su lti ngin e rr or

that de fi e s h arm

ana ly sis

. Th e state argue s that a

pp lic ant ha s no t pr e se rv e d e rr or . I t no te s th a t a pp lic ant o bje c te d o nly to specific wording in the s upplemental mi tigation instruction and not on the basis of the instruction in its entirety , nor did a

pplicant object on the basis of the jury ’s ability to c onsider ap p l icant’s mitigatingevidenc e. F urther, a pplicant fa iled to alleg e jury -cha rg e er ror ba sed on the nullification instruction and the j u ry ’s ab i l i ty to consider a

nd g ive ef

fec t to his m itigation evide nce on dir ect appea l and in his first and sec ond writ applications. S tate’s br ief on submission, p. 17-18. N o ti n g th a t th e Su

p r e me Co u rt, in S

mith v. Texas , 550 U.S. 297, 313 (2007)(Smith I I ), approve d the application of the Almanza sta nd ard of re vie w, the state a sse rt s th a t Almanza sh ou ld6

Penry v . Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 1 apply , that the applica

ble option is that for unobjecte d-to err or, that ap plicant must theref ore demonstrate e g reg ious harm, and that he has not done so. Wit h respe ct to rele vance , the state a g ree s that “applica nt’s mitigatingev i d ence satisfies Te nn ar d ’s low thr e sh old

sta nd ard fo r rel evan ce.” ( State ’s B ri e f, pp . 1 5, 25 , 2 8) Th e state

never theless asser

ts that the jury

“could g ive meaning ful consider ation and ef fec t to the applica

nt’s mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e un de r t he sp e c ia l is su e s, inc lud inge vid ence of a pp lic ant’ s ‘ e mpt

y ve sse l’ pe rs on a lity

and fa the r’ s a ba nd on me nt. ” (S tate ’s B ri e f, p. 15 ) I t a dd s that, e ve n if the jur y wa s una ble to consider unde r t he special issues applicant’ s evidenc e that he was abandone d by his fathe r, such evidenc e had only

a tenuous c onnection to applica nt’s culpability

for the instant off

ense. Ana lys is Tennard v. Dretke

Stand ard Ap pli c ant a sse rt s th a t hi s “ mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e satis fi e s T enn ar d ’s low threshold standa

rd f o r r e l e v an c e . ” T h e s t a t e c o n c e d e s t h a tth e e v i d e n c e m e e t s th e s t an d ar d

. We agr ee wi t h ap p l i cant and the state that applicant’ s mitigatingevidenc e satisfies the Te nn ar d standard, thus we continue

our inq uir y and c on sid e r wh e the r ap pli c ant’ s mitig a tin g e vid e nc e c ou ld b e g ive n f ull e ff e c t w ith in the spec ial issues or fe ll outsi de their sc ope.

Reasoned Mor al Response to Mitigating Evidence I n 2007, the Supr em e C o u rt issued opinions in two companion case s, Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman , 550 U.S. 233 (2007), and Brewer v. Q uarterman , 550 U.S. 286 (2007). In Ab du lKab ir , which re visited Penry I and its pr og e ny , it

state d th a t 1 the jury must be permitted to "c onsider fully " such mitigating evidenc e and that such7

consideration "would be me aning less" unle ss the jury not only had such e vid ence available to it, but also was permitted to g ive that evidenc e mea ningf ul, miti g ating eff ect in imposing the ultimate sentenc e. Penry I , 49 2 U .S. , at 32 1, 32 3, 10 9 S. Ct. 29 34 , 106 L

. Ed . 2 d 2 56 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) ; Graham , 506 U.S., at 47 5, 11 3 S. Ct. 89 2, 12 2 L . E d. 2d 26 0 ( a c kn ow le dg ingthat a " c on sti tut ion a l de fe c t" has occ urre d not only

when a jury is "pre cluded f

rom eve n consideringcer

tain ty pes of mitigating evidenc e," but a lso when "the defe ndant' s evidenc e [i] s place d befor e the se nte nc e r b ut the se nte nc e r ha [s] no re lia ble me ans of g ivi ng mit ig a tin g e ff e c t to that evidenc e" ). Ab du l-Kab ir at 260. See also Ex parte Moreno , 245 S.W .3d at 422 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008)(“a jury must be empower ed by t h e trial c ourt’s instructions to give ‘mea ningf ul effe ct’ to all mitigating evidenc e that a c apital def endant introduc es at the punishment phase of his trial.”). Th e se nte nc e r i n a

c a pit a l c a se mus t be pe rm itt e d to give fu ll e ff e c t to a ll c on sti tut ion a lly rele vant mitigatingevidenc e. Tennard v. Dretk e , 542 U. S. 2 74 , 2 84 -8 5 ( 20 04 ); Penry I , 492 U.S. at 318. Relevanc e in t he contex t of m itigating evidenc e introduce d in a ca pital sentencingproce eding is no differe nt than in any other contex t, thus the gene ral evidentiary standard applies: evidenc e that has any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the action more or l ess probable than i t would be without the evidenc e is rele vant. Id. , citing McKoy v

. North C arolina , 494 U.S. 433 (1990). Thus the state cannot bar the consideration of evidenc e if the sentenc er co u l d re as onably find that it warr ants a sente nce le ss than death. Id . “Onc e this low threshold for r eleva

nce is met, ‘the Eig hth Amendment re quires that the jury be able to consider a

nd g ive effec t to’ a capital defe ndant’s mi tigating e vidence .” Id . at 285, quoting Bo y dev . Ca lif

or nia , 49 4 U .S. 37 0, 37 7- 78 (1 99 0) . “ Re le va nt m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e is evi den ce whic h te nd s lo g ic a lly to prove or disprove some fa ct or c ircumstance wh ich a f act- finder c ould rea sonably deem to have mitigatingvalue.” Id . at 284-85, q u o ti n g M c Ko yv . No r th Carolina . Such Pe nr ye rr or pr od uc e s a

rea sonable likelihood that the jury interpre ted the specia l issues to forec lose ade quate c onsideration8

T he p o rt i o n of t he i nst ruct i o n quo t ed i n P en ry I I rea d s, 2
I f y ou det er mi ne, whe n gi vi ng ef f ect t o t he mi t i gat i ng ev i dence , i f an y , t hat a l i f

e s ent enc e, as r ef

l ect ed b y a ne g a tive find ing to the issu e un d e r c o n sid e ra tio n , ra the r th a n a d e a th se n te n c e , i s a n a p p ro p ria te res p o nse t o t he p ers o nal cul p ab i l i t y of t he d ef end ant , a negat i ve f

i nd i ng shoul d b e gi ven t o o ne o f t he sp ec i al i ssue s. P en ry I I , 5 3 2 U .S. at 7 9 0

. T he releva nt p o rti o n o f t he i nstructi o n in t he i nstant ca use rea d s, I f y ou det er mi ne, wh en gi vi ng ef f ect t o t he mi t i gat i ng evi dence , i f any , t hat a l i f e s ent enc e, as r ef

l ect ed b y a n e g a tive find ing to the issu e un d e r c o n sid e ra tio n , ra the r th a n a d e a th se n te n c e , i s a n a p p ro p ria te res p o nse t o t he p ers o nal cul p ab i l i t y o f t he d ef end ant , t hen a negat i ve f i nd i ng shoul d b e gi ven t o one o f t he sp ec i al i ssue s. B r ewer , 5 5 0 U .S . at 2 8 9 -9 0 ; s ee al s o, M or eno , 245 S. W

. 3d a t 426. 3 Sm i t h v

. Te xas , 543 U

. S. 37, 48 ( Sm i t h I ) 4 of the mitigating e vidence

. Smith II at 316. I n Penry v . Johnson , 532 U.S. 782 (2001)( Penry I I ), the Supreme Court held th at the jury instruction on miti g ation was inef fec tive and illogic al. The Court noted that attemp t s b y the trial court, the state, and the defe nse to clar ify the supplemental instruction “do not bolster our confide nce in the jurors’ ability to g ive effec t to Penry ’s mitigatingevidenc e in dec iding his sentenc e. Rather they highlig ht the arbitra

ry way in which t he supplementa l instruction operate d, and the f act that the ju ry was esse nti a lly

ins tr uc te d to re tur

n a fa lse ans we r t o a

sp e c ia l is su e in o rd e r t o avo id a de a th sentenc e.” Id . at 801. The instruc tion at issue in Penry is virtually identical to the instruction from thi s c a se . Thus the nu lli fi c a tio n instru c tio n in this ca se wa s not suf fi c ie nt to cure e rr or if

the sp e c ia l- 2 iss ue ins tr

uc tio ns the mse lves were ina de qu a te to p e rm it the jur or s to g ive me anin g fu l e ff e c t to applicant’ s miti g ating evidenc e. Applicant sug g ests that much of his evidenc e wa s miti g ating an d o u t s i d e t he scope of the specia l issues. Among the circ umstances f ound by the S upreme Court to fall out side the scope of the old specia l issues are a troubled childhood, lear ning disa biliti es, low I Q/specia l education 3 49

Id

. 5 A b d u l-K a b ir , 5 5 0 U .S . at 2 4 0 -4 1 , 2 5 6

. 6 Id

. 7 Id

. 8
B r ewer , 5 5 0 U .S . at 2 9 5 -9 6

. 9 Id

. 10 Id .; s ee al s o M art i nez , 233 S. W

. 3d a t 320. 11
B r ewer a t 2 9 5 -9 6

. 12 Johns on v . Te xas , 50 9 U

. S. 35 0 , 36 9 (19 9 3 ); G r aham v . Col l i ns , 50 6 U

. S. 46 1 , 47 5

- 7 6 (19 9 3 ). 13 G r aham , 5 0 6 U .S . at 4 7 5 -7 6

. 14 status , ne g le c t, a

ba nd on me nt, ne ur olo g ic a l da ma g e , subs tan ce ab us e , fa mil y vio le nc e in 5 6 7 8 9 childhood, mental illness, and domination by another

. Circumstance s that fall within the scope 10 11 12 of the sp e c ia l is su e s in c lud e y outh and re de e min g pe rs on a l qu a lit ie s. 13 14 I n Smith I , the Supreme Court de scribed a varie ty of m itigating evidenc e: at an ear ly ag e, the defe ndant had be en diag nosed wit h potential org anic learning disabiliti es and spe ech ha ndicaps; the defe ndant had I Q score s of 75 and 78, and as a re sult had been in spec ial-educ ation classes dur ing most of his time in sc hool; de spite his low I Q and lear ning disabiliti es, the defe ndant’s beha vior at school was of

ten exemplary ; the defe ndant’s father was a drug addict who enga g ed in g angviolence and cr iminal activities and stole money from fa mily members to support a drug addiction; and the d ef en d ant was 19 year s old when he c ommitt ed the c rime. Smith I , 5 4 3 U

. S. a t 4 1

. O f these, the Sup re me Court

fo un d that Smith’ s e vid e nc e of his I Q sc or e s and his tor y of pa rt ic ipatio n in

sp e c ia leducation classes wa s releva nt miti g ating evidenc e that a jur y might have considere d to be a re ason to impose a sentenc e less than de ath and wa s outside the scope of the spec ial issues. Id . at 44-45.10

I n Ab du l- Kabir , su

pra , the Supreme Court noted mitig ating evidenc e that included the defe ndant’s fa

mily members’ testimony

descr ibing h i s u n h appy childhood of neg lect and abandonme nt, as well as e x pert testimony from two psycholog ists “that his viol ent prope nsities were

cause d by

fac tors beyond his control–namely , neurolog ical dama ge and childhood neg lect and ab an d o n m en t ” a n d

“s u gges t i n g t h at h i s d an ger o u s ch ar ac t er m ay h av e be en th e re s u l t o f h i s ro u gh childhood and possible neur ologic al damag e[.] ” Ab du l-Kab ir , 550 U.S. at 240-41, 256. I n Brewer , the Supreme Court likew ise noted that the defe ndant’s mitigatin g ev i d en ce included that: the defe ndant had suffe red from depre ssion three months befor e the of fense ; he had been br iefly

hospitaliz ed for that depre ssion; the defendant’s c o-def endant, a woman with whom he was obsesse d, dominated and manipulate d him; he ha d been abused by his father ; he had witnesse d his father abuse his mother; a

nd he had a

bused drug s. B r e we r , 5 50 U.S. at 289-90. The Court conclude d that the jury must be allowed to consider B rew er’ s evidenc e of me ntal illness, substance abuse, a nd troubled childhood, and a lso must be able to respond to it in a re asoned, mora l manner and we igh suc h evidenc e in dec iding whe ther the defenda nt is truly deser ving of death. Id . at 295- 96. I n Penry I

, the Supreme Court c oncluded that the special issues we re too limited to give mitigatingeff

ect to the de fenda

nt’s evidenc e of me ntal reta rdation and sever e childhood abuse and that su c h mi tig a tin g e vid e nc e wa s thus outsi de the sc op e of the sp e c ia l is su e s. Whil e “ [t]he jur

y mus t ha ve a ‘m e anin g fu l ba sis to c on sid e r t he re le va nt m iti g a tin g qu a lit ie s’ of t he defenda

nt’s proff ere d evidenc e[,] ” Ab du l-Kab ir , 550 U.S. at 259, quoting Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350 (1993), the spe cial issues alone may provide f

o r the a dequate consideration of the defe ndant’s mitigating e videnc e. We observe that in Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S. 461, 475-7611

(1993) the Supre me Court held that proff ere d mitigatingevidenc e of the d efe ndant’s youth, ba c kg ro un d o f d i f

f i c u l t u p b r i n g i n g , a

nd his re de e min g c ha

ra c te r t ra its c ou ld b e g ive n c on sti tut ion a lly adequate consider ation in the course of the jury ’s deliber ation on the spec ial issues and wa s thus not beyond the effec tive rea ch of the j ury . In Johnson v. Texas , 5 09 U. S. 3 50 , 3 69 (1 99 3) , th e Sup re me Court likewise held that the de fenda nt’s y outhful ag e as a

rele vant mitigatingcirc umstance w as within the eff

ective rea ch of the jury ; “the ill effe cts of youth that a def endant may

experience are subject t o chang e and, as a re sult, are r eadily compre hended a s a mitigating f actor in consideration of the sec ond specia l issue.” Johnson , 509 U.S. at 369. I n Moreno , the mitigatingevidenc e a t i s s u e in v o lv e d M o reno’ s troubled childhood, including a birth def ect to his left ear which require d multipl e surge ries throughout hi s first seven y ear s. There

was e vidence that he was also taunted by neig hborhood boy s beca use of the de formity , althoug h he

wa s c on so le d b y

hi s mo the r. Whe n h e wa s st ill a sma ll c hil d, his mot

he r a nd g ra ndmot he r b oth beca me ver y ill, and his father had to g et a se cond job in order to pay the medica l expenses. When he wa s fiftee n y ear s old, his mother died, and he took he r death very hard. The rea fter he dropped

out of sc ho ol, wo rk e d at va

ri ou s p oo rl y

pa id j ob s, and

liv e d in his fa the r’s ho us e re lativ e ly unsupervised. H e wa s eig hteen y ear s old at t he ti me he committed the cha rg ed off ense. A dditional mitigatingevidenc e included te stimony from var ious family

friends a nd jail chaplains a

bo ut h is g ood persona l char acte ristics. Moreno , 245 S.W .3d at 423-24. We concluded that “[a]t least with respe ct to h is e vid e nc e of

a tr ou ble d c hil dh oo d, [Mor e no ] wa s ent itl e d to” a jur y ins tr uc tio n as a

ve hic le to express its reasoned mor al re sponse to such mitigating e vidence

. Id . at 425 . We he ld t hat be c a us e

c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he of fe nd e r c an r e a so na

bly jus tif y a jur y a sse ssm e nt of a lif

e se nte nc e , a

nd if tho se circ umstances are not a lrea dy fully or meaning fully encompa ssed within one or both of the spec ial12

issues, then a sepa

rate jury instruction is constitut ionally require d. Id . at 426. We a lso no te d th a t w e c ou ld “ no lon g e r m a int a in t hat e vid e nc e of

a tr ou ble d chil dh oo d is adequately

encompa ssed within the statutory specia l issues.” Id

. Be cause the evidenc e of More no’s troubled childhood could not be g iven meaning ful eff ect within the context of the statutory specia l iss ue s a nd the tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to g ive a

se pa rate jur y in st ruction t

hat w ou ld e mpo we r t

he jur y to assess a life sentenc e o n t h e basis of suc h mitigatingevidenc e, notwithstanding its answers to the specia l issues, we vacated the punishment por tion of Moreno’ s judgme nt and re manded to the tria l court for a new punishment hearing

. Id . at 431. The mi tigating evidence that was he ld to be outside the scope of the spec ial issues was that of the defe ndant’s troubled c hildhood. I n Ex parte M

artinez , 233 S.W .3d 319, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), w e noted mitigating

e vid e nc e of

the de fe nd ant’ s hosp ita lizatio n on mult ipl e oc c a sio ns in s tate ps y c hiatr ic fa c ili tie s, his abuse of alcohol since the ag e of thirtee n, and a tr oubled childhood. We conclude d that Martinez had pr e se nte d c on sti tut ion a lly re le va nt m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e and that th e jur

y did no t ha ve a veh icle to g ive this evidence meaning ful consider ation. We there fore g rante d habea s corpus re lief, set aside t h e d ea t hs en t en ce , an d

re m an d ed t h e ca s e t o th e t ri al co urt fo r a n o th er p un i s h m en th ea ri n g. Martinez , 233 S.W .3d at 323-24. I n eac h of t hese cases, the mitigating evidenc e that was held to be outside the scope of the specia l issues differs sig nificantly from applicant’ s miti g ating evidenc e. We ar e unconvinc ed that

a pp lic ant’ s p ro ff

e re d mi tig a tin g e vid e nc e wa s o uts ide the sc op e of the sp e c ia l is su e s. Ap pli c ant d id

no t sh owe vid e nc e of

a se ri ou sly tr ou ble d c hil dh oo d. Rathe r, e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t he ha d a sta ble family background and was raised in a cohe sive two-par ent household, albe it not by his biologica l fathe r, who a

bandoned him. There was no evidenc e of lear ning disabiliti es, low I Q, or ne urolog ical13

damag e. Rather, there was testimony about applicant’ s intelligenc e. There was no testimony that he ab u sed substance s. Although a pplicant pre sented e vidence that he suff ers f rom psy cholog ical irregularities or de ficits, including what his psycholog ist e x pert witness de scribed a s “empty vessel sy ndrome,” which made him susceptibl e to beinginfluence d by others, such e vidence is a far -cr y from the sort of psy cholog ical mi tigation evidenc e that has be en dete rmined to be Pe nr yevidenc e. F ur the r, the fa c ts o f t

he of fe ns e re but th a t a sse ssm e nt a s to the of fe ns e c ha rg e d; a pp lic ant s ho t a po lic e of fi c e r duri ng a tr a ff

ic sto p, wi tho ut pr ov oc a tio n or ur g ing of arm e d vio len ce by his

c omp anio n. Th e te sti mony a s to his y outh a nd re de e min g c ha

ra c te r t ra its is the so rt

that th e Sup re me Court ha s h e ld t o f

a ll w ith in t

he sc op e of

the sp e c ia l is su e s. We no te that th e Sup re me Court ha s sa id t hat it ha s “ ne ve r d e nie d th a t g ra vit y ha s a pla c e in the re levanc e ana ly sis, insofar as e vidence of a trivial f eatur e of the d ef

en d an t’s char acte r or the

c i r c u m s t an c e s o f

t h e c r i m e i s u n l i k e l y t o h av e a n y t e n d e n c y t o m i t i g a t e th e d e f e n d an t ’ s c u l p a

b i l i ty. . . . Rather, the question is simply whether the evidenc e is of such a char acte r that it mig ht serve a s a basis for a sentenc e less than death, Skipper [v. South Caroli na, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)], supra, at 5.” Te nn ar d , 542 U.S. at 286 (interna l quotation ma rk s omitt ed). We c onclude that a pplicant’s mitigation evidenc e, while mee ting the Tennard standard f or re levanc e, had “ only

a tenuous

connec tion–‘ some arguable r eleva nce’ –to the defe nda

nt’ s mo r a l c u lp a

b il ity .” Ab du l-Kab ir , 5 50 U. S. at 253 n.14. Of a ll the sorts of evidenc e that have been note d by the Supreme Court a s releva nt mitigatingevidenc e, only

two circ umstances, y outh and posi tive persona l char acte ristics, are prese nt in this case , and thos e are the sorts of evidence that the Supreme Court ha s held are within the scope of the for mer spec ial issues. Be cause the jury could g ive full and meaning ful eff ect to that evidence within the scope of the former specia l issues, there wa s no Pe nr yerr or.14

Relief is denied.

Deliver ed: J une 10, 2009 Do no t pu bli sh