[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Straley, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5206.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2019-O HIO -5206

T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . S TRALEY , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Straley, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5206.] Criminal law—Motion to withdraw a guilty plea—No manifest injustice shown— Defendant was mistakenly informed at sentencing that his sentences were nonmandatory—Defendant was informed of the maximum sentences for each count to which he pleaded gu ilty, confirmed that he understood the possible sentence, and was sentenced to the aggregate sentence to which he had agreed. (No. 2018-1176—Submitted August 6, 2019—Decided December 19, 20 19.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Highland County, No. 17CA4,
2018-Ohio-3080.

__________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} This appeal asks whether a defendant who pleads guilty suffers a manifest injustice under Crim.R. 32.1 if the trial court fails to tell the defendantS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 during his plea colloquy that a portion of his agreed-upon sent ence is mandatory. Here, the court of appeals misapplied our precedent on both voi d sentences and postsentencing motions to withdr aw a guilty plea and concluded that appellee, Gregory S. Straley, should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals and reinst ate the trial court’s judgment denying Straley’s moti on to withdraw his guilty plea. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} In 2009, appellant, the state of O hio, and Straley entered into a negotiated plea agreement throug h which Straley would plead gui lty to 8 of the 14
counts for which he was indicte d. The counts to which he agree d to plea included 3 counts of second-degree-felony sexual battery under R.C. 2907 .03(A)(5) (the victim is under 13 years old at the time of the offenses). In exchange for Straley’s agreement to plead guilty to those 8 counts, the state agreed t o dismiss the other 6 counts of the indictment. The p arties also agreed to a recomme nded sentence on each of the counts, with an aggregat e sentence of 35 years and 10 months. {¶ 3} At the time Straley was charg ed with violating R.C. 2907.03(A)( 5), R.C. 2907.03(B) and 2929.13(F)(3) required mandatory prison sen tences when the victim is under 13 years of age. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7059, 7067, 7087-7088. Straley’s guilty-plea form included spa ces for indicating whether a prison term was mandatory for each offense. The word “No” is handwritten in the corresponding spaces for each sexual-battery charge. The form
also indicates that a “prison term is presumed necessary” for t hose charges. {¶ 4} The trial court told Straley during his plea colloquy that none of his prison sentences were mandatory and that while it would not imp ose community control, Ohio law allowed comm unity control to be imposed:

Okay. Now, under the law none of these sentences are mandatory, meaning that you have to be sent to prison. Some ca sesJanuary Term, 2019

3 there are mandatory prison sentences where community control is not permitted. Community control is permitted by law in this c ase. It’s not recommended and it’s impr obable that even if it were recommended that it would be gra nted. * * * So, you understand that that is legally possible, although it’s not going to happe n in this
case?

The trial court als o confirmed with Stral ey that he understood that he was agreeing to plead guilty to the specified charges “in exchange for a rec ommendation from the state of 35 years and ten m onths incarceration, and a dismi ssal of the other
counts of the indictment.” The c ourt accepted Straley’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed-upon aggregate sentence, which included consecutive seven-year prison terms for the three second-degree-felony sexual-battery offense s. Straley’s sentencing entry also indicate d that none of his prison sentenc es were mandatory. {¶ 5} On direct appeal, Straley argued that the trial court erred by imposing mandatory sentences without first telling him they were mandato ry. The court of appeals held that because the parties agreed to the sentences a nd the sentences were clearly authorized by law, they were not reviewable under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). State v. Straley , 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA4, 2009-Ohio-6170, ¶ 23-26 (“ Straley

I

”). {¶ 6} In 2017, Straley filed a postsent encing motion under Crim.R. 32 .1 to withdraw his guilty plea. He ar gued that res judicata did not apply and that his guilty plea was invalid because t he trial court imposed nonmand atory prison terms for his second-degree-felony sex ual-battery convictions instead of mandatory ones.
The trial court denied the mo tion, finding that res judicata ba rred it, that Straley had not demonstrated a manifest injustice under Crim.R. 32.1 becaus e he did not allege that at the time of his plea he w as unaware that the sentences were mandatory, and that Straley waited too long—eig ht years—to file his motion.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 7} In a two-to-one decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed. 2018-Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, ¶ 9 (“ Straley II ”). The court noted that Straley had raised the sentencing-error argument on direct appe al, but the court of appeals in Straley I held that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precl uded review of the agreed

sentence. Straley II at ¶ 7, 17. Nonetheless, the court of appeals cited our prece dent
on void and voidable sentences. B ecause the trial court senten ced Straley to nonmandatory prison terms in cont ravention of Ohio law, the cou rt of appeals held
that the sentences were void. Id. at ¶ 21. As such, res judicata did not apply, and the sentences could be reviewed at any time. Id. at ¶ 19-21, citing State v. Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22. {¶ 8} Next, the court of appeals rejected the state’s argument that a greedupon sentences could not be reviewed under Ohio law. Id. at ¶ 22. Citing our
decision in State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923,
the court said that “ ‘a trial court does not have the discreti on to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that ignores mandatory statutory provi sions.’ ” Straley II at ¶ 23, quoting Underwood at ¶ 20. It also rejected the state’s argument that Straley knew that he had been sentenced to a prison term of 35 years an d 10 months. Instead, the appellate court held that the trial court’s failur e to follow the statutory mandate “prejudiced Straley because it rendered his sentence vo id so that he has not yet been properly and legall y sentenced in the underlying c ase.” Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 9} The court of appeals ultimately held that the trial court’s err or amounted to a manifest injustice because “the trial court misad vised Straley that his entire 35 year, 10 month agreed prison sentence was non-mandato ry even though R.C. 2929.13(F)(3) made 21 years of that sentence mandatory.” Straley II , 2018- Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 31. Regarding Straley’s eight-ye ar delay in filing his motion to withdraw, the court held that he was “permitted t o contest the sentence at any time,” “[b]ecause his sen tence was void in that it inclu ded 21 years of nonmandatory prison time for his three second-degree felony sexual batteryJanuary Term, 2019

5 convictions.” Id. at ¶ 32. Although the court was “completely cognizant of the absurdity of this result,” it nonetheless found itself bound by Ohio statutory law and our interpretation of it. Id. at ¶ 34. {¶ 10} In a concurring opinion, Judge Harsha expressed further frustra tion
with the “absurd” result:

[T]he real absurdity here is the fact that if Straley had taken a direct appeal and won, his sentence woul d have been vacated but his
conviction would have remained in effect. Only the illegal sen tence was void. * * * Here he waits 8 years, makes a motion to withd raw his plea based upon the imposition of an illegal, i.e. void, se ntence. Now his motion to withdraw his plea must be granted, and his conviction vacated based upon th e Supreme Court of Ohio’s
determination that a trial court’s failure to follow a mandator y sentencing provision results in the sentence not simply being erroneous and thus voidable, but rather, void ab initio. Accor dingly, such an error need not be raised on direct appeal, but is subje ct to collateral attack at any time, by a motion to vacate.

Id. at ¶ 36 (Harsha, J., concurring). {¶ 11} Writing in dissent, Judge Abele agreed that the result is absur d and
that we should reconsider our void-sentence jurisprudence. He opined that the “root of the problem is the supreme court’s characterization of error s in sentencing as void judgments. Generally, a void judgment is one that a court issues when it lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or if a co urt lacks the inherent power to enter a particular judgment.” Id. at ¶ 40 (Abele, J., dissenting). “This is not the situation when Ohio common pleas courts issue felony se ntences, unless, for example, the court exceeds the maximum sentence or somehow strays beyondS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 the court’s specific jurisdiction.” Id. He concluded that Straley is entitled to a remedy to correct his sentence , or to see that he receives the benefit of his bargain, but that the withdrawal of his guilty pleas after eight years d oes not serve the interests of justice. Id. {¶ 12} The state appealed, and we accep ted the following proposition o f
law:

A defendant should not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea 8 years after the hearing wh en he has been given the benef it of the plea agreement reached and the problem can be remedied with a resentencing hearing.

II. Analysis {¶ 13} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that a trial court may grant a defendant’ s postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea to “correct a man ifest injustice.” To resolve this matter, we need only apply that rule and our exist ing plea-withdrawal precedent. {¶ 14} “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the bur den of establishing the exist ence of manifest injustice.” State v. Smith , 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. A “manifest injustice” is a “clear or ope nly unjust act,” State
ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner , 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998), and relates to a fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice, State v. Tekulve , 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Kreiner at 208 and Smith at 264. The term “has been variously defined, but it is clear that unde r such standard, a postsenten ce withdrawal motion is allowable only in ext raordinary cases.” Smith at 264.January Term, 2019

7 {¶ 15} Although Crim.R. 32.1 does not provide a time limit for moving to withdraw after a sentence is imposed, “an undue delay between t he occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion i s a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the
motion.” Smith at 264, citing Oksanen v. United States , 362 F.2d 74, 79 (8th Cir.1966). And generally, res judicata bars a defendant from r aising claims in a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea th at he raised or could have raised on direct appeal. See State v. Ketterer , 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010- Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59. An appella te court reviews a tr ial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse-of-discretion sta ndard. Smith at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Francis , 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶ 32. Straley did not suffer a manife st injustice under Crim.R. 32.1 {¶ 16} T his matter stems from Straley’s postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas—an attack on his pleas, not his sentence. The trial court overruled the motion because (1) it was barred by res judicata, (2) Stral ey did not show that he would not have pled guilty if the trial court had told him a bout the mandatory sentences, and (3) Straley waite d eight years to file the motio n. {¶ 17} The court of appeals found that Straley suffered manifest injus tice
based on the trial c ourt’s misstatements that his sentences wer e not mandatory, stating that “[i]t is difficult to fathom a more fundamental fl aw in proceedings than when a court imposes an illegal, void sentence on a defendant.” Straley II , 2018- Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 29. But the sentence imposed is not the issue here.
The issue is the effect that the trial court’s erroneous statem ents had on Straley during the plea proceedings. We agree with the trial court tha t Straley did not show that any error caused him to forgo trial and plead guilty inste ad. And although Straley never argued to the trial court that he would not have pled guilty had he known some of the sentences were mandatory, the facts surroundi ng his plea belieS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 any such argument. The guilty-plea form Straley signed provide d the maximum sentences for each count to which Straley was pleading guilty a nd informed Straley that the court could impose consecutive sentences on the counts . It included the state’s sentencing recommendati on as to each count, including t he state’s recommendation that the sentences be served consecutively. The trial court reviewed the maximum sentences with Straley four times during t he plea colloquy. Straley confirmed that he unders tood both the maximum sentence the court could impose and that the court could order the sentences be run cons ecutively. Although the trial court mistakenly told Straley it was “legally possibl e” for the court to order community control, the trial cour t then clearly told Straley “i t’s not going to happen in this case.” Straley c onfirmed he understood that. {¶ 18} Straley confirmed more than on ce that he understood that the co urt was not obligated to follow the parties’ agreed sentencing reco mmendation and that
the court had discretion to sentenc e him to a longer sentence—u p to the maximum sentence. Despite this discreti on, the trial court sentenced S traley to the parties’ agreed aggregate prison sentence of 35 years and 10 months. Th ere is no manifest injustice where Straley was sentenced to the aggregate sentence to which he agreed in exchange for his guilty plea. He could not have reasonably expected to serve any less than that sentence. {¶ 19} Straley argues that he need not show prejudice here, citing our recent decision in State v. Bishop , 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766,
because the trial court’s misstatements had the same effect as a complete failure to satisfy Crim.R. 11. See Bishop at ¶ 19 (a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 does not implicate an analysis of prejudice). But the trial court here did not wholly fail to comply with Crim.R. 11. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) req uires that a
defendant understand the “nature of the charges against him and the maximum penalty involved” in order for his plea to be knowing, intellig ent, and voluntary. As stated, the trial court reviewed the maximum sentences with Straley four timesJanuary Term, 2019

9 during the plea colloquy, and Straley confirmed that he underst ood the maximum sentence on each count to which he intended to plead guilty. T he guilty-plea form Straley signed also outlined the maximum sentences. Under thes e circumstances, Straley must show that the trial court’s misstatements prejudic ed him. {¶ 20} Straley argues that the trial court’s error prejudiced him beca use he would become eligible for j udicial release under R.C. 2929.20 t en years earlier if his sentences were all nonmandatory. But at the time Straley e ntered his guilty plea in 2009, a person who was sentenced to a prison term of more th an ten years was ineligible for judicial release. Former R.C. 2929.20, Am.Sub.H .B. No. 15, 151 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5228, 5233-5237. The General Assembly did not provide judicial-release eligibility to inmates serving sentences longe r than ten years until
the amendment of R.C. 2929.20 in 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. Plai nly, Straley could not have factored judicial-release eligibility into his d ecision to plead guilty because judicial release w as not available to him in 2009. {¶ 21} Straley’s eight-year delay in moving to withdraw his plea also
undercuts his assertion that he would not have pled guilty if h e knew part of his sentence would be mandatory. See Smith , 49 Ohio St.2d at 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324. Straley knew about the issue with his sentence in 2009, when he filed his direct appeal. In that appeal, Strale y specifically, and unsuccessful ly, argued that the trial court erred by imposing mandato ry sentences without first telli ng him they were mandatory. See Straley I , 2009-Ohio-6170. He did not suggest then that the trial court’s purported error affected his plea. {¶ 22} Because Straley cannot show that he suffered prejudice, the tri al court did not abuse its discretion in denying Straley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Res judicata {¶ 23} Res judicata generally bars a defendant from raising claims in a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea th at he raised orS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 could have raised on direct appeal. See Ketterer , 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, at ¶ 59. Straley did not argue on direct a ppeal that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that the t rial court erred by imposing mandatory sentences without first telling him that the y were mandatory. But he did not argue that the trial court’s misstatements preve nted him from making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. Straley cou ld have challenged his guilty plea on direct appeal. See State v. Sarkozy , 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Becaus e he did not, the
trial court did not abuse its dis cretion in finding that res ju dicata barred Straley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeals misapplied our precedent
on void-versus-vo idable sentences {¶ 24} In reversing the trial court’s decision to deny Straley’s motio n, the court of appeals misapplied our p recedent on void-versus-voidab le sentences. Citing Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, which stat ed that a void sentence may be reviewed at any time, on direct app eal or by collateral attack, the appellate court rejected the trial court’s applicat ion of res judicata. Straley II , 2018-Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 19. Because the trial court sentenced Straley to nonmandatory prison terms in contravention of Ohio l aw, the court of appeals concluded that the sente nces were void and res judicata did not preclude
later review. Id. at ¶ 21. {¶ 25} We have said that “[i]n general, a void judgment is one that ha s been imposed by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or the authority to act. State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 27. Unlike a void judgment, a voidable judgment is one rendered by a court that has both jurisdiction and authority to act, but the court’ s judgment is invalid, irregular, or erroneous.” State v. Simpkins , 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12.January Term, 2019

11 {¶ 26} In recent years, our void-versus-voidable-sentence jurisprudenc e has swelled, most notably in the cont ext of improperly imposed post release control. See, e.g ., Simpkins (resentencing required because improper imposition of postrelease control rendered sentence void); State v. Bezak , 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961 (same); see also Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 6-18 (providing a detailed history of our void-sentence jurisprudence). We have also applied this jurisp rudence in regard to other criminal penalties. See, e.g. , State v. Harris , 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 18 (failure to impose mandatory driver’ s-license suspension renders that part of the sentence void); State v. Moore , 135 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 14 (failure to impose ma ndatory fine when no affidavit of indigency wa s filed renders void that part of the sentence waiving the fine); Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, at ¶ 28 (imposing separate sente nces for allied offense renders the sentences void). {¶ 27} As the entire appellate panel e xpressed, our void-versus-voidab lesentence precedent has frustrated our courts. See also Fischer at ¶ 41-56 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). But here, the appellate court inv oked that precedent erroneously. Straley did not attack his sentences—he used the trial court’s failure to tell him that they were mandatory to support his motion to w ithdraw his guilty plea. Whether res judicata should apply under our void-versus- voidable-sentence precedent does not matter in this context. It applies because Straley failed to attack his guilty pleas on direct appeal. Ketterer , 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, at ¶ 59.
III. Conclusion {¶ 28} We conclude that Straley did not suffer a manifest injustice wh en the trial court failed to tell him during his Crim.R. 11 plea collo quy that he would be subject to mandatory prison sent ences for his second-degree-fel ony sexual-battery convictions. We reverse the judg ment of the Fourth District Co urt of Appeals andS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 reinstate the trial court’s judgment denying Straley’s motion t o withdraw his guilty plea. Judgment reversed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and F ISCHER , J., concur.

K ENNEDY , J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.

D E W INE , J., concurs, with an opinion.

D ONNELLY , J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
S TEWART , J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________ K

ENNEDY , J., concurring in judgment only. {¶ 29} Because the doctrine of res judicata bars appellee Gregory S. Straley’s collateral attack on his judgment of conviction, I co ncur in the court’s reversal of the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeal s and reinstatement of the trial court’s denial of Straley’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. However, contrary to the majority’s analysis, I would not reach the question whether Straley has proven that a manifest injustice exists tha t would justify withdrawing his pleas: the conc lusion that res judicata bars hi s motion eliminates any need to reach the motion’s merits.

Facts and Procedural Posture {¶ 30} In 2009, Straley and the state entered into a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to 8 counts of an indictment, the state w ould dismiss 6 remaining counts, and the partie s would jointly recommend an ag gregate sentence of 35 years and 10 months in prison. Three of the counts charg ed Straley with second-degree-felony sexual ba ttery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(5); t hose counts required the trial court to impose mandatory sentences. Pursua nt to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the trial court was prohibited from accepting Stra ley’s plea without first advising him in the plea colloquy that because the senten ces for those three counts were mandatory, Straley was not eligible for the imposit ion of community-January Term, 2019

13 control sanctions. However, the trial court instead advised St raley that none of his sentences were mandatory and that community control was permitt ed by law in his case and was legally possible. Nonetheless, the trial court to ld Straley that he would not receive community-control sanc tions rather than prison, and Straley pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court then im posed the jointly
recommended sentence of 35 years and 10 months in prison. {¶ 31} On direct appeal, the appellate c ourt rejected Straley’s claim that he had not pleaded guilty to one of the three counts of second-deg ree-felony sexual battery, holding that the trial court had sufficiently complied with Crim.R. 11(C) and “had the authority to then (1) accept Straley’s written gui lty pleas and (2) convict Straley of all the counts in the plea agreement.” 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA4, 2009-Ohio-6170, ¶ 21 (“ Straley I ”). The court also rejected an assignment of error asserting that “[t]he trial court erred by imposing a mandatory sentence without advising the appellant t hat the sentence was mandatory, ” id. at ¶ 8, because pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), a sentence that is jointly reco mmended by the parties and imposed by the tria l court is not subject to review when it is “authorized by law,” id . at 23-25. We declined review. 125 Ohio St.3d 1462, 2010-Ohi o-2753,
928 N.E.2d 738. {¶ 32} More than eight years after pleading guilty, Straley moved to withdraw his pleas, asserting that they were not entered knowin gly, intelligently, and voluntarily and therefore were invalid. He also argued tha t the sentences on
his three convictions for second- degree-felony sexual battery w ere void because the trial court had imposed a nonmandatory prison sentence even though a mandatory prison sentence was re quired by statute. The trial c ourt denied the motion on the basis of res judicat a and alternatively found tha t Straley had failed to demonstrate that withdrawal of his pleas was needed to correct a manifest injustice. {¶ 33} The court of appeals reversed, holding that the sentences for t he three convictions of second-degree-felo ny sexual battery were void be cause the trialS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 court had disregarded mandatory sentencing provisions, and ther efore, res judicata did not preclude a collateral attack on them. 2018-Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, ¶ 21 (“ Straley II ”). The appellate court then hel d that this court’s intervenin g decision
in State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, had abrogated the holding in Straley I , and that because Straley’s nonmandatory sentences were not authorized by law, “the State’s claim that t he agreed sentence
could not be reviewed is meritless.” Straley II at ¶ 24. The court held that notwithstanding the jointly reco mmended sentence, Straley was p rejudiced by the trial court’s error: “[t]he trial court’s failure to follow th[ e] statutory mandate prejudiced Straley because it rendered his sentence void so tha t he has not yet been properly and legally sentenced in the underlying case,” id. at ¶ 26. Lastly, the court of appeals concluded that Straley had demonstrated a manifest i njustice supporting his motion to withdraw his plea, because “[i]t is difficult to fathom a more fundamental flaw in proceedings than when a court imposes an il legal, void sentence on a defendant,” id . at ¶ 29. {¶ 34} On appeal to this court, the thr eshold question is whether Stra ley’s attack on his judgment of convic tion is barred by res judicata.
Res Judicata {¶ 35} According to the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment of
conviction bars a convicted defe ndant who was represented by co unsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that jud gment, any defense or any claimed lack of due proce ss that was raised or could hav e been raised by the defendant at the trial, which res ulted in that judgment of conv iction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Perry , 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. As we expla ined in State v.

Saxon , “the doctrine serves to preclude a defendant who has had his day in court from seeking a second on that same issue,” and it “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigatio n of an issue onJanuary Term, 2019

15 which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportun ity to be heard.” 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18. {¶ 36} Res judicata bars the relitigation of constitutional issues, State v.

Lott , 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 19, inc luding claims that the accused’s guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligent ly, and voluntarily made, State v. Ketterer , 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59- 60. It also bars an attempt to relitigate the question whether an offender’s sentence complies with mandatory statutory provisions. State ex rel. McKinney v. Schmenk , 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 N.E.3d 871, ¶ 10-12 (res judicata barred renewed claim that a sentence imposed for an allied offense of similar import is void). {¶ 37} Straley could have cha llenged the validity of all of his guilty pleas on direct appeal. The same error that he now claims prohibited him from entering knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty pleas—statements in his plea colloquy that the sentences for the three second-degree-felony sexual-ba ttery counts were not mandatory—appeared on the face of the record in 2009 when h e filed his notice of appeal. Moreover, in reviewin g Straley’s claim on direct ap peal that he had not entered a plea on one count of sec ond-degree-felony sexual batt ery (one of the counts subject to a mandatory se ntence), the court of appeals h eld that all of Straley’s guilty pleas were entered after the trial court compl ied with Crim.R. 11, so that “the trial court had the authority to then (1) accept S traley’s written guilty pleas and (2) convict Straley of all the counts in the plea agr eement, including count
seven.” Straley I , 2009-Ohio-6170, at ¶ 21. The court of appeals also held that the jointly recommended sentences were “clearly authorized by law” and that Straley was bound by the sentences that he had agreed were appropriate. Id . at ¶ 25. {¶ 38} We have recognized that res judicata does not apply to void judgments. Lingo v. State , 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 46; State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), fn. 6. But inS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 deciding whether res judicata ba rred Straley’s motion to withdr aw his pleas, the court of appeals, in Straley II , focused on the wrong judgment. The validity of Straley’s pleas, convictions, and sentences had already been de termined on direct appeal in Straley I by a valid judgment binding the parties—the Fourth District Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain a n appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the Highland County Court of Common Pleas,

see Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.C. 2953.02. It is the appellate court’s judgment in Straley I that bars Straley’s subsequent motion to withdraw his pleas and his attempts to invalid ate his sentences, notwithstan ding Straley’s claims that his pleas are invalid and th at his sentences are void. See McKinney , 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 N.E.3d 871, at ¶ 10-12; see also State ex rel. Peoples
v. Johnson , 152 Ohio St.3d 418, 2017-Ohio-9140, 97 N.E.3d 426, ¶ 13 (expl aining that res judicata precludes collateral attacks seeking to relit igate jurisdictional determinations). {¶ 39} The court of appeals sugg ested another reason why Straley I did not control, stating that this cour t’s subsequent decision in Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, “in effect, abrogated our hol ding in Straley I as it pertains to the assignments of error challenging his sentenc e.” 2018-Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 24. In Underwood , we held that a jointly recommended sentence was not “authorized by law” within the meaning of R.C. 2953.08( D) if that sentence did not comply with mandato ry sentencing provisions. Underwood at ¶ 20. {¶ 40} However, we have explained that res judicata applies despite a subsequent change in the law: “[ t]here is no merit to [the] cla im that res judicata has no application where there is a change in the law due to a judicial decision of
this court.” State v. Szefcyk , 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996). In Szefcyk , the court of appeals affirmed Szefcyk’s conviction for involu ntary manslaughter predicated on his commission of a minor-misdemeano r marked-lanes violation, and we declined review. Id . at 94. We subsequently held that a minorJanuary Term, 2019

17 misdemeanor cannot serve as the predicate offense for involunta ry manslaughter, and the trial court granted Szefcyk’s petition for postconvicti on relief on the basis of that new ruling. Id . at 95. The court of appeals reversed, and we affirmed, holding that because Szefcyk had already had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue on direct appeal, his petition for postconviction relief was barred by res judicata. We concluded that “ ‘ “ [p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bou nd by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered foreve r settled as between the parties.” ’ ” Id ., quoting Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). {¶ 41} Similarly, here, the court of appeals determined the validity o f Straley’s pleas, convictions, and sentences in Straley I , and res judicata is not defeated by the fact that the prior judgment “may have been wro ng or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.” Moitie at 398. Because a
new decision from this court is not an exception to the doctrin e of res judicata, our intervening decision in Underwood does not give Straley a basis to collaterally attack his judgment of conviction. {¶ 42} The majority’s analysis fails t o appreciate the se time-honored principles. It reaches the merits of Straley’s motion to withd raw his pleas before it
decides whether that motion is barred by res judicata. Then, i t decides that res judicata does in fact bar Straley’s motion to withdraw, which o bviates the need to
consider the merits of that motion in the first instance. The majority concludes by editorializing that “our void-ve rsus-voidable-sentence jurispru dence has swelled” and “has frustrated our courts” only to decide that “[w]hether res judicata should apply under our void-versus-voidable-sentence precedent does no t matter.” Majority opinion at ¶ 26, 27.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 {¶ 43} However, because res judicata precludes Straley from relitigati ng the questions whether his pleas, c onvictions, and sentences are val id, any further
discussion of whether this court should or should not revisit o ur void-sentence jurisprudence would contravene o ur duty not to issue advisory o pinions as well as “ ‘the cardinal principle of judi cial restraint—if it is not ne cessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,’ ” State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner , 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United Stat es Drug Enforcement Administration , 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J ., concurring in part and in judgment). {¶ 44} Because the majority opinion unnecessarily considers the merits of arguments that are barred by res judicata, I concur only in its judgment reversing the court of appeals.

_________________ D E W INE , J., concurring. {¶ 45} I concur in today’s majority decision. The majority correctly concludes that even if Gregory S . Straley’s sentence could be c onsidered void under our caselaw, he has not demonstrate d a manifest injustice that would entitle him to withdraw his plea. It also correctly concludes that res judica ta applies: regardless of whether Straley’s sentence is void, his failure to challenge his plea on direct appeal bars him from attacking it. . . {¶ 46} It is no surprise, though, that the court of appeals reached th e result it did. Its conclusion flowed naturally from this court’s expa nsion of the voidsentence doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries to include a variety of sentencing errors and from this court’s broad pronouncement tha t a void sentence can be attacked at any time, principles of res judicata notwith standing. See , e.g. , State v. Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22. As I, and others, have explained, th is court’s expansion of the vo id-sentence doctrine is inconsistent with concepts of jurisdiction and finality that are a central premiseJanuary Term, 2019

19 of our judicial system. See , e.g. , State v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 37 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment o nly); Grimes at ¶ 27 (French, J., concurring in judgment only); Williams at ¶ 35-68 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); see also State v. Johnson , 155 Ohio St.3d 441, 2018-Ohio-4957, 122 N.E.3d 126, ¶ 12 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only); Johnson at ¶ 17 (DeGenaro, J., concurring in judgment only). {¶ 47} This case is simply further evidence that it is long past time to end this court’s dalliance with perpetually modifiable sentences. . As the majority notes, all three judges on the p anel below expressed their frus tration with our precedent in this area. 2018-Ohio-3080, 107 N.E.3d 8, at ¶ 34 (Hoover, P.J.) (“we are completely cognizant of the absurdity of this result,” but “we * * * are bound by the law as set forth by the Ohio Legislature and the Supreme Court of Ohio’s interpretation of that law”); id . at ¶ 37 (Harsha, J., concurring) (“Ohio should return to the traditional approach corr ecting such legal errors and de clare them to be errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, not ones that divest a court o f the power to make such mistakes”); id. at ¶ 40 (Abele, J., dissenting) ( “I believe that the root of t he problem is the supreme court’s characterization of errors in se ntencing as void judgments”). {¶ 48} And the Fourth District is hardly alone. Not long ago, the Thi rd District Court of Appeals bemoan ed the “mass confusion” that ha s resulted from this court’s departure from traditional principles “as to what mistakes by a trial court rendered a sentence void or voidable,” which has been com pounded by this court’s “sloppiness [in expanding ] the void-sentencing-error co ncept beyond postrelease-control cases to inc lude other random nonjurisdicti onal-sentencing
errors.” State v. Kegley , 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-18-03, 2018-Ohio-4167, ¶ 13-14. The Tenth District Court of Appeals recently warned that this c ourt’s extension of
the void-sentence doctrine “threa ten[s] to swallow the rule [on finality] and lead to a situation where virtually any a llegedly serious error in sent encing can be revivedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 time and time again without being foreclosed by res judicata.” State v. Steele , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-187, 2018-Ohio-3950, ¶ 11, fn. 1; accord State v. Davic , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18A P-569, 2019-Ohio-1320, ¶ 11, fn. 2. {¶ 49} Today, the majority takes a step in the right direction by cabi ning the
void-sentence doctrine at least a bit. But as this case illust rates, until we return to our traditional understanding of void and voidable sentences, w e—and courts
across Ohio—will continue t o have a mess on our hands.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J., concurring in judgment only. {¶ 50} I concur in the court’s judgment reversing the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals. I agree that appellee Gregory Stral ey was not prejudiced by the trial court’s statement at Straley’s plea hearing that h is entire prison sentence was nonmandatory. The reason that he was not prejudiced, thoug h, is because the trial court imposed nonm andatory sentences. {¶ 51} The trial court did not just fail to tell Straley that his sent ences were mandatory. The court affirmatively stated that the sentences w ere not mandatory. More importantly, the plea form a nd sentencing entry both affir matively stated that all of Straley’s sentences are nonmandatory. A court speaks th rough its journal. State v. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 15. If the sentencing entry states th at the trial court imposed nonman datory sentences, then Straley is serving nonma ndatory sentences, plain and simpl e. {¶ 52} Given that the trial court disc ussed the nonmandatory nature of the sentences that it intended to impose, the state had a full and fair opportunity to object to the trial court’s sent encing decision. The state fai led to do so at the plea and sentencing hearing and f ailed to appeal the matter. {¶ 53} To the extent that res judicata should be applied here, it appl ies against the state. And I believe that res judicata does apply to sentencing errors like the one in this case. I agree with the position long held by f ormer Justice LanzingerJanuary Term, 2019

21 that sentencing errors, by and large, do not deprive a sentenci ng court of subjectmatter jurisdiction or create a void, infinitely nonfinal sente nce:

Regardless of whether the senten ce contains a mistake, everyone who leaves the courtroom after a sentencing hearing under R.C. 2929.19 has an expectation and understanding that a final decision has been made, one that can be a ppealed (by either party) withi n 30 days and corrected, if necessary, by the court of appeals.

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Singleton , 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 58 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). {¶ 54} The state has the authority to appeal sentences that are impose d following a conviction for a felony, and the state—not the defe ndant—is the party that should appeal decisions that are adverse to the state. See R.C. 2945.67(A); R.C. 2953.14. Thus, although the trial court’s sentencing deci sion contained an error, the onus was on the state to bring that error to the att ention of the trial court or the court of appeals. {¶ 55} This court has long held that def endants must abide by erroneou s judgments in order to promote the interest in finality. See State v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18 (“res judicata promotes the principles of finality and judici al economy by preventing endle ss relitigation of an
issue on which a defendant has al ready received a full and fair opportunity to be heard”), citing State ex rel. Willys-Overland Co. v. Clark , 112 Ohio St. 263, 268, 147 N.E. 33 (1925). But res judicata should work in the same w ay against all parties, includi ng the state. See State v. Joseph , 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio954, 926 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 30 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting) (“If the state does not appeal an erroneous sentence within 30 days, it should not be allowed to turn back theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 clock, as if the sentence did not occur”). The doctrine of res judicata must work both ways or else it doe s not work at all. {¶ 56} Because Straley is serving nonmandatory sentences, he cannot
demonstrate a manifest injustice irrespective of whether the no nmandatory aspect of some of those sentences is contrary to law. The trial court correctly denied Straley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and I agree with the majority’s
decision to order the reinstatement of the trial court’s decisi on. Accordingly, I concur in judgment only.

_________________ Anneka Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, for appel lant. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defe nder, and Peter Galyardt, Assist ant Public Defender, for appellee.

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