IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 14, 2010

LUIS D. VIDALES ROMERO v. JOE EASTERLING, WARDEN 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 10-CR-42 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2010-00680-CCA-R3-HC - Filed October 18, 2010

The pro se petitioner, Luis D. Vidales Romero, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition

for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of

the petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J.C. MCLIN and D. KELLY

THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Luis D. Vidales Romero, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper,Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and David H. Findley, Senior Counsel,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

The petitioner was convicted in April 2001 of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell

more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone, a Class

A felony, and was sentenced to fifteen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On

February 8, 2010, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his

sentence violates the Drug-Free School Zone Act and is, therefore, illegal. The habeas court

entered an order summarily dismissing the petition on February 16, 2010, on the basis that

the trial court had jurisdiction to impose the sentence. The petitioner then filed a timely

notice of appeal to this court.
ANALYSIS

Whether the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief is a question of law.

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007); Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903

(Tenn. 2000). As such, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness given to

the trial court’s findings and conclusions. Id.

The grounds upon which habeas corpus relief may be granted are narrow. Davis v.

State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 758-59 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). It is well-established in

Tennessee that the remedy provided by a writ of habeas corpus is limited in scope and may

only be invoked where the judgment is void or the petitioner’s term of imprisonment has

expired. Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d

624, 629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport, 980 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

A void, as opposed to a voidable, judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the court

did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256

(citing Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998)). A petitioner bears the

burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by a preponderance of the

evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). Furthermore, when “a habeas

corpus petition fails to establish that a judgment is void, a trial court may dismiss the petition

without a hearing.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260 (citing Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753,

755 (Tenn. 2005)).

The petitioner argues on appeal that the judgment is void because it is in “direct

contravention with” Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501(i) and 39-17-432 (b), (c),

and (d). However, there is nothing in these statutes that renders the petitioner’s sentence

illegal. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i) enumerates certain felonies for

which a defendant must serve his entire sentence, while Tennessee Code Annotated section

39-17-432 provides for enhanced punishments, including service of the full minimum

sentence, for a defendant convicted of a drug offense committed within a school zone.

The petitioner additionally argues that the habeas court erred by not considering the

holding in Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010). We agree with the State, however,

that Davis, in which our supreme court concluded that a defendantsentenced under the DrugFree School Zone Act “may legally bargain for a higher [release eligibility date] in exchange

for a lower sentencing range,” id. at 765, has no bearing on the legitimacy of the petitioner’s

sentence in this case. We conclude, therefore, that the habeas court’s summary dismissal of

the petition was proper.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the summary dismissal

of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

_________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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