97-296

 No. 97-296

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 146N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

PAMELA JEAN HAXTON SNOW, 

 Petitioner and Cross-Appellant,

 and

ERIC MATTHEW SNOW,

 Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Carbon,

 The Honorable Robert W. Holmstrom, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Eric Matthew Snow, Pro Se, Roberts, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Mark A. Bryan; Bryan & Atkins, Bozeman, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: April 23, 1998

 Decided: June 9, 1998

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996

Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent

but shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court

and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to

the State Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly

table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.

¶2 Eric Matthew Snow (Eric), acting pro se, appeals from the decision of

the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Carbon County, dissolving his marriage

to Pamela Jean Haxton Snow (Pam) and enforcing the parties' separation

agreement as to custody of the minor children. Eric maintains that Oregon has

jurisdiction over the dissolution and custody matters and that the Carbon

County District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over these matters. As

a result, Eric moved to dismiss the dissolution action for lack of jurisdiction. 

The District Court determined that since both parties reside in Montana,

Montana is the home state of the children pursuant to the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), and Oregon declined jurisdiction, it

properly exercised jurisdiction. In addition, the District Court determined that

the marriage was irretrievably broken, and that Pam's requests for modification

of visitation and restraining order should be granted. Eric appeals from the

District Court's order denying Eric's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,

granting the restraining order and granting Pam's motion for modification of

visitation. Pam cross-appeals for attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing

Eric's past due child support obligations. We affirm.

 Factual and Procedural Background

¶3 Pam and Eric were married in Newberg, Oregon, in December 1986. 

There are two children of the marriage, Colton born February 1989 and

Matthew born October 1991. The parties resided in Oregon until 1994 when

Pam took her annual vacation to visit her parents at their home in Montana. 

Pam asserts that during that visit she came to the realization that she needed

a break from her marriage. As a result, Pam filed for unlimited legal

separation in Oregon. Thereafter, the parties entered into a Marital Settlement

Agreement which was adopted as part of the Judgment of Unlimited

Separation. The Marital Settlement Agreement provided that Pam would have

custody of the children and Eric would have visitation rights. Eric agreed to

pay $150 in child support and $50 in maintenance monthly. Pam relocated to

Montana in the winter of 1994 and Eric followed shortly thereafter. Both

parties currently reside in Roberts, Montana. Pam is employed as a teacher at

$15,000 per year and Eric works as a laborer at $8.00 per hour or

approximately $11,512 annually.

¶4 In July 1995, Pam filed for dissolution of the marriage in Carbon

County District Court. At the time of filing, Pam had resided in Montana for

close to one year and Eric for seven months. Eric was represented by counsel

for a short time in the dissolution proceedings; however, the attorney moved

to withdraw and Eric proceeded pro se. In August 1996, Eric filed a document

entitled "Amended Motion to Reopen Case and Amended Motion to Give Full

Custody of Parties Minor Children to Father" in Oregon. Pam filed a motion

to dismiss. The Oregon court held a hearing and issued an Order and

Judgment dismissing Eric's motion and holding that Montana is the home state

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of the children pursuant to the UCCJA and refusing to exercise jurisdiction

over custody matters. Eric filed a notice of appeal in the Oregon court on

January 13, 1997 and according to the parties, the Oregon appeal is still

pending.

¶5 Meanwhile, Eric filed a motion to dismiss Pam's Petition for

Dissolution asserting that the Carbon County District Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Pam moved to deny Eric's Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter,

the Montana District Court denied Eric's motion to dismiss and held a trial

upon Pam's Petition for Dissolution. The District Court found that: 1) the

marriage was irretrievably broken; 2) the Judgment of Unlimited Separation,

including the Marital Separation Agreement, issued by the Oregon court was

entitled to full faith and credit; 3) Eric should be restrained from taking the

children out of the state without permission and from harassing Pam at work;

4) the visitation portion of the separation agreement should be modified to

require Eric to remain within 10 feet of his car when picking up and dropping

off the children and limiting his telephone visitations with the children to the

hour of 6:00-7:00 p.m.; and 5) Pam had shown changed circumstances so

substantial and continuous that the current child support provision is

unconscionable; therefore child support payments should be increased to $231

per month.

¶6 Furthermore, the District Court explained by Memorandum that it was

obligated to give the Oregon Decree full faith and credit pursuant to the United

States Constitution and that it had jurisdiction to modify the visitation and

support terms because Montana is the home state of the children and Oregon

had declined to assume jurisdiction. It is from the District Court's Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Decree of Dissolution that Eric

appeals. Although Eric presents "eight issues and a constitutional question"

on appeal, this Court will address only the issues of jurisdiction, modifications

to visitation, and the restraining order as only those issues are properly before

the Court. In addition, Pam cross-appeals for attorney fees and costs.

 Discussion

¶7 1) Did the District Court err in denying Eric's motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction?

¶8 Prior to trial, Eric moved to dismiss this action asserting that the

District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Parental

Kidnaping Protection Act (PKPA). It is Eric's contention that only the Oregon

court has jurisdiction. The District Court denied Eric's motion to dismiss

determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter. A district court's

decision regarding its jurisdiction is a conclusion of law. This Court reviews

a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the district court's

interpretation of the law is correct. Steer, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue (1990), 245

Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04. 

¶9 Congress enacted the PKPA to establish national standards by which

a court can determine whether it has jurisdiction in child custody proceedings.

Through the PKPA, Congress sought to discourage continuing interstate

controversies over child custody and to facilitate the enforcement of custody

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determinations of sister states. See In re Marriage of Shupe (1996), 276 Mont.

409, 413-14, 916 P.2d 744, 746-47. Furthermore, the United States Supreme

Court has imposed a duty on the states to enforce child custody determinations

entered by a sister state, if the determination is consistent with the provisions

of the PKPA. Thompson v. Thompson (1988) 484 U.S. 174, 108 S.Ct. 513,

98 L.Ed.2d 512. For the custody decree to be consistent with the PKPA, the

state must have jurisdiction under its own laws, and the court which made the

original custody determination must no longer have jurisdiction or it has

declined to exercise such jurisdiction. Marriage of Shupe, 916 P.2d at 747. 

¶10 The Oregon Judgment of Unlimited Separation provided that Pam

would have custody of the children and provided a schedule for Eric's

visitation with the children. In the District Court proceedings, Eric, before the

trial, specifically withdrew his requests for modification to custody. 

Therefore, the only custody-related issue before the District Court was Pam's

request for a modification to visitation. The District Court determined, first,

that the Oregon court's award of custody, as stated in the Judgment of

Unlimited Separation, was entitled to full faith and credit. In addition, the

District Court determined that it had jurisdiction to modify visitation. With

regard to its jurisdiction, the District Court specifically determined that

Montana is the home state of the children, both parents reside in Montana, and

Oregon had declined to assume jurisdiction. 

¶11 We determine that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction

over the matter and that the District Court properly afforded full faith and

credit to the parties' settlement agreement as adopted by the Oregon Judgment

of Unlimited Separation. 

 II

¶12 2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in modifying the

conditions of visitation?

¶13 During the trial, both parties introduced evidence of continuing

problems which result when Eric picks up and drops off the children at Pam's

house. Several witnesses testified to Eric's harassing Pam with phone calls. 

And, Eric admitted to taking the children to Oregon without Pam's permission

during one of his visits. As a result, Pam moved to modify the conditions of

visitation to require Eric to remain within 10 feet of his car when picking up

or returning the children, to restrict telephone visitation to the hour of

6:00-7:00 p.m., and to prohibit Eric from removing the children from the State of

Montana without Pam's written consent or an order of the court. The District

Court granted each of Pam's requests for modification of visitation. 

¶14 We review a district court's findings relating to modification of

visitation to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. This

Court will reverse a district court's decision to modify visitation only where an

abuse of discretion is clearly demonstrated. In re Marriage of Elser (1995),

271 Mont. 265, 268, 895 P.2d 619, 622.

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¶15 The District Court found that there was an ongoing dispute between the

parties regarding visitation. The record reveals that the parties have tape

recorded one another and taken photos without the other's permission, had

verbal disputes in the presence of the children and have confrontations nearly

every time Eric visits the children. In addition, the District Court found that

Eric had removed the children from the State of Montana without permission

in violation of the terms of visitation. Finally, the court found that Eric has

been verbally abusive and tried to intimidate Pam and members of her family

when he has come to the family ranch for visitation. The District Court's

findings are not clearly erroneous.

¶16 The District Court determined that, based on its findings, efforts to limit

the controversy between Pam and Eric would be in the best interest of the

children, therefore the court granted the requested modifications. The District

Court further supported the modifications by explaining that, the

modifications, while slightly changing the manner in which Eric exercises his

visitation, do no change the duration or nature of visitation. We determine that

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the terms of

visitation.

 III

¶17 3) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in granting Pam's motion

for restraining order?

¶18 Pam presented evidence that Eric verbally abused and intimidated her

at her job, when exercising visitation, and on occasions when she was out with

the children. Pam moved for a restraining order restraining Eric from stalking

Pam, excluding Eric from Pam's residence and property except when

exercising his visitation rights, restricting Eric from bringing guns, cameras

and recording devices on Pam's property, requiring Eric to stay within 10 feet

of his vehicle when picking up and returning the children, requiring Eric to

refrain from loitering on the property when visiting the children, restraining

Eric from being within 25 feet of Pam in any public place, enjoining Eric from

removing the children from the jurisdiction of the court, restraining Eric from

contacting Pam's employer without permission of the court and restraining Eric

from subjecting the children to psychological examinations without approval

of the court.

¶19 The District Court determined that, because the parties live in a small

community, a grant of all the restraints requested by Pam would be

inappropriate. Therefore, the District Court limited the restraining order to

prohibiting Eric from contacting Pam's employers, from approaching Pam in

public places and from making harassing phone calls to Pam's home or 

workplace. The granting of an injunction is discretionary and this Court will

sustain such grant unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Curran v. Dept. of

Highways (1993), 258 Mont. 105, 107, 852 P.2d 544, 545. The record reveals

that the conditions of restraint placed on Eric are reasonable under the

circumstances. We determine that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in granting the restraining order.

 IV

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¶20 4) Is Pam entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? 

¶21 Pam cross-appeals for an award of attorney fees based on the provisions

of the Marital Settlement Agreement and Rule 32, M.R.App.P. The Marital

Settlement Agreement provides that "[s]hould either party incur any expense

or legal fees as a result of the breach of any portion of this Marital Settlement

Agreement . . . the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees and suit

expenses. . . ." Pam asserts that because Eric is delinquent in his child support

payments, he has breached the Marital Settlement Agreement and should be

liable for the attorney fees and costs incurred in the portion of her dissolution

action for enforcement of delinquent child support payments. 

¶22 In addition, Pam seeks an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to

Rule 32, M.R.App.P., which provides that "[i]f the supreme court is satisfied

from the record and the presentation of the appeal in a civil case that the same

was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds, . . . damages may be

assessed . . . ." Pam asserts that Eric's appeal to this Court is frivolous and that

she should be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the

appeal. 

¶23 We determine that Pam's cross-appeal for attorney fees and costs must

fail for two reasons. First, Pam did not request attorney fees and costs

pursuant to the Marital Settlement Agreement at the District Court. This Court

has continually reiterated that it will not review issues presented for the first

time on appeal. Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut (1996), 278 Mont. 268,

273, 924 P.2d 264, 267. Pam did not raise the issue of attorney fees and costs

at the District Court and this Court is without jurisdiction to review Pam's

request. Second, we determine that Eric's appeal, while not meritorious, was

taken with substantial and reasonable grounds. Therefore, we deny Pam's

request for damages pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P. Affirmed.

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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