NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 18-2810

___________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. GERMAINE HALL, Appellant

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands Criminal No. 3-17-cr-00019-005 District Court Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez

___________________ _________________ Argued: December 10, 2019 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge , McKEE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: July 31, 2020)

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OPINION *

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* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 McKee, Circuit Judge. Germaine Hall appeals the judgment of sentence that was im posed following his conviction for various charges related to his conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. He challenges a jury’s verdict 1 for conspiracy to po ssess cocaine with the intent to distribute and the reasonableness of his 160-month sentence. He further argues that prosecutorial misconduct, the erroneou s admission of hearsay testimony, and the District Court’s decision to allow the partie s to stipulate to th e admission of evidence with an interrupted chain of custody affected the fairness of the proceedings thus denying his right to due process. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 2

I.
Hall’s first challenge concerns the denial of his renewed Rule 29 motion. After several counts of the multi-co unt superseding indictment ag ainst Hall were dismissed and he was acquitted by the jury of another c ount, Hall sought a Rule 29 Judgment of Acquittal claiming that the government failed to prove the existenc e of an underlying agreement or unity of purpo se between him and his alle ged conspirators. After conducting a plenary review of the record and applying the sa me standard as the District Court, we will affirm. 3

1 Hall proceeded to trial alone after the di strict court granted co-defendant Gerald Mercer’s severance motion. App. 6, 22-23. 2 The district court had jurisd iction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 32 31, which grants to district courts “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” This cour t has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 United States v. Freeman , 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d Cir. 2014).3 The evidence presented of Ha ll’s involvement with his co-conspirators to possess and distribute cocaine rested upon the testim ony of cooperating w itness, Kishaun Carey. 4 He testified that he was contacted by co-con spirator Craig Richardson when there was a shipment ready for pick up and distribution. 5 Richardson would sometimes direct him to pick up a shipment from co-conspirator Ma kimba Barry in West Palm Beach, Florida. 6
On other occasions Richardson would tell Care y to pick up the shipment from Hall, in Orlando, Florida. 7 Carey testified to picking up th ree shipments from Hall between late 2015 and May 2016 at Richardson’s direction. 8 Carey did not have any other contact with Hall. 9 After he sold the cocaine, Carey cont acted Richardson to find out who would be picking up the proceeds. 10 Either co-conspirator Jama l Haynes or Barry came to collect. 11
Viewing this testimony and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the government, we must affirm the District Court. As we have stated many

4 A second witness, Kinia Blyd en, testified to transporting cocaine from St. Thomas to Florida in June 2016. App. 292. She testified that co-con spirator Jamal Haynes picked her up from the airport when she arrived in Florida and drove her to a residence where she left the drugs, pack aged in a “clear seal,” with Hall. App. 295. As the jury acquitted Hall of a substantive count concerning this in teraction charged at Count Four, we will not consider this testimony in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Hall’s conspiracy charge. 5 App. 261-262, 269. 6 App. 262, 264. 7 App. 265, 267. 8 App. 268, 271. 9 App. 280. 10 App. 264. 11 App. 270.4 times before, “a conspiracy may be prov en entirely by circumstantial evidence.” 12 Moreover, the government need not prove “eac h defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s details, goals, or other participants” to demons trate a unity of purpose, intent to achieve a common goal, and agreement to work towards that goal. 13 The fair inferences from Carey’s interactions and connections wi th Richardson, Hall, Haynes and Barry demonstrate Hall’s knowledge of th e drug conspiracy and its aim. 14 Carey’s interactions with Hall cannot be reduced do wn to a mere “buyer-seller relationship” as Richardson directed Carey as to when to get shipment s from Hall and then Rich ardson directed other individuals to coordi nate payments with Carey. Ad ditionally, the length of Carey’s affiliation with Richardson, Ha ll, Barry, and Haynes evidence s his comprehension of the conspiracy’s scope and serves as add itional circumstantial knowledge of Hall’s membership. 15
Hall next argues that there was a material variance between the single conspiracy charged in the indictment and the evidence pres ented at trial. As Hall failed to raise his variance argument with the District Court, we review it for plain error. 16 Hall again bases his claim on the government’s alleged failure to put forth evidence from which a jury

12 United States v. Claxton , 685 F.3d 300, 309 ( 3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Wexler , 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1988)). 13 United States v. Gibbs , 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 14 Claxton, 685 F.3d at 310 (inferring similar k nowledge from circum stantial evidence). 15 United States v. Pressler , 256 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2001). 16 See United States v. Vosburgh , 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Daraio , 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006).5 could infer his knowledge of, a nd desire to participate in th e charged conspiracy. For the reasons stated above, we find no error here, plai n or otherwise.
When reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the government and assessing whether there was a variance, we consider: (1) “whether there was a common goal among the conspirators;” (2) “whether th e agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the cont inuous cooperation of the conspirators;” and (3) “the extent to whic h the participants overlap in the various dealings.” 17 In assessing whether the conspirators shared a common goal we consider the “underlying purpose of the alleged criminal activity” in broad terms. 18 Thus, framing the underlying purpose as a desi re to obtain and distribute cocaine for profit, we find sufficient evidence that Hall ha d a unity of purpose with hi s alleged co-conspirators, intent to possess and distribute cocaine, and an agreement to work with them in furtherance of that goal. 19
Third, Hall challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the District Court erroneously factored into his sentence am ounts of cocaine not attributable to him. As Hall concedes he failed to preserve his sentencing argument in the District Court, 20 we review it for plain error. 21 Hall fails to meet his burden of plain error. He attempts to

17 United States v. Kemp , 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Ci r. 2007) (citation omitted). 18 United States v. Rigas , 605 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). 19 United States v. Pressler , 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 20 01) (describing sufficient evidence to evince a conspiracy). 20 Appellant’s Br. at 1, 16. 21 United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 1 86 (3d Cir. 2013).6 limit his exposure to only the amount Carey te stified to obtaining from him. However, as there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Hall was a member of a conspiracy, the District Court appropriately considered the relevant conduct of Hall and his co-conspirators when fashioning his sentence. 22 As testified to by his co-conspirators, that conduct included the possession and distribu tion of 50 to 150 kilograms of cocaine. Accordingly, the Court finds no plain error with this finding nor does it find the resulting sentence to be unreasonable. 23

Hall next claims that the District Court permitted prosecutorial misconduct by way of leading questions and efforts to introdu ce inadmissible evidence. As Hall did not object to any of the Governme nt’s questions, his claims ar e reviewable only for plain

error. 24 His claims are completely without merit. The cour t consistently and properly policed the conduct of the prosecution duri ng the trial with re primands when the questioning became leading on direct, side bars to ensure witnesses would be providing relevant testimony, questioni ng regarding the admissibility of proffered exhibits, and consistent balancing of the prosecutor’s ques tions under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 25 Hall also claims that Carey perjured himself by testifying that he saw Hall

22 Gibbs , 190 F.3d at 214. 23 Id .; see also United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (discussing the benchmark for a reasonable sentence). 24 See Gov’t of V.I. v. Mills , 821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Wher e, as here, a defendant did not object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we re view for plain error.”); United States v. Fulton , 837 F.3d 281, 302 (3d Cir. 2016) ( questions that misst ate the evidence are reviewed for plain error.) 25 See, e.g ., App. 108, 152, 204-06, 208, 375.7 with fourteen kilograms of co caine and the prosecution failed to correct that testimony. We disagree. As Hall concedes, the Governme nt’s failure to correct perjured testimony is reversible only if, among other things, (1) the witness actually committed perjury and (2) “there is a reasonable likelihood that th e false testimony could have affected the verdict.” 26 “Perjury” is “false testimony concer ning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” 27 Hall has not shown that Carey held this intent. 28 In addition, at trial, Carey did not attribute to Hall any drug amounts beyond three deliveries totaling eight or nine kilograms. 29 Thus, there is no reasonable likelih ood that Carey’s testimony affected the verdict. Further, Hall elicited Carey’s statement about the “additional cocaine” as impeachment on a collateral matte r. Although Carey denied the statement, in light of the other evidence of Hall’s guilt, it is not likel y that the statement ha d any effect on the verdict.
Defendant’s remaining arguments regardin g the admission of stipulated evidence and his co-conspirator’s statements are also me ritless. Hall’s counsel stipulated to certain evidence with Hall’s a pproval, and by stipulating to th e chain-of-custo dy evidence Hall

26 Appellant’s Br. at 25 (quoting United States v. Hoffecker , 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also United Stat es v. John-Baptiste , 747 F.3d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 27 Hoffecker , 530 F.3d at 183. 28 See Appellant’s Br. at 25-26. 29 See App. 268.8 waived his rights to appeal the issue. 30 Additionally, the admissions of co-conspirators that are made during and in furthera nce of the conspiracy are not hearsay. 31

II.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

30 See Gov’t. of V.I. v. Rosa , 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n explicit agreement or stipulation constitutes a waiver of rights if the defendant was aware of the right.”); see also United States v. Ceballos , 789 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[B]e cause we conclude that [the defendant] waived her right of confrontation through her counsel’s unchallenged stipulation to the admission of the testimony, he r claim is entirely unreviewa ble.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 31 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987), superseded by statute on other grounds United States v. Bobb , 471 F.3d 491, 498 (3d Cir. 2006).