FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-759

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CHRISTOPHER ALLEN TEACHMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

David W. Fina, Judge.

January 2, 2019

B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

Appellant was convicted of sexual battery and lewd and 

lascivious molestation of a child. Before trial, Appellant provided 

a confession during an interview with a police investigator. At 

trial, the victim testified in detail about the molestation and forced 

sexual activity, which began when she was eight years old and 

continued until she was fifteen years old. Appellant now argues 

on appeal that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress 

his confession to law enforcement. In addition, he asserts that 

reversible error occurred when the trial court excluded evidence of 

the victim’s consensual sexual relationship with her boyfriend. 
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I. The Confession

“‘A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the 

appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the 

[reviewing] court must interpret the evidence and reasonable 

inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most 

favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.’” Rodriguez v. 

State, 187 So. 3d 841, 845 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 

So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1996)). Where there is no dispute over the 

statements made, we must “review de novo the trial court’s 

conclusion that the officer’s statements did not render Appellant’s 

statements involuntary.” Ramirez v. State, 15 So. 3d 852, 855 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2009); see also State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 425 (Fla. 

2014) (holding that the trial court’s application of law to the facts 

is reviewed de novo). 

Appellant came to the police interview voluntarily, and his 

confession was taken in a non-custodial setting. Before the 

interview began, the investigator told Appellant that he was not 

under arrest, did not have to answer questions, could leave at any 

time, and could request an attorney at any time. Appellant was 

never threatened with harm, and the interview lasted less than 

thirty minutes. Although the investigator told Appellant that 

things would be easier for him if he told the truth, and the 

investigator would tell the prosecutor if Appellant was cooperative, 

these comments were neither improper nor coercive. See Caraballo 

v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1247 (Fla. 2010). 

Although “[i]t is well-settled that statements obtained 

through direct or implied promises are involuntary and, thus, 

inadmissible at trial,” there must be “a causal connection between 

the improper conduct and the statement.” Ramirez, 15 So. 3d 

at 855-56. Moreover, although some promises may require 

suppression, “an interrogating officer may, without rendering a 

confession involuntary, promise to make a suspect’s cooperation 

known to the prosecutor or advise the suspect that ‘it would be 

easier on him’ if he cooperated.” Id. at 856 (quoting Blake v. State, 

972 So. 2d 839, 844 (Fla. 2007)); see Caraballo, 39 So. 3d at 1247. 

In Caraballo, the supreme court noted that the facts of Ramirez 

regarding the offers of help by law enforcement were “much more 

excessive” than the facts surrounding Caraballo’s confession and 
3

did not require reversal of the trial court’s ruling admitting the 

statements. 39 So. 3d at 1247. Here, the investigator’s offers to 

inform the prosecutor that Appellant cooperated were not 

excessive and not similar to the “unique circumstances” this court 

described in Ramirez. 15 So. 3d at 857. 

Appellant also argues that his confession was involuntary,

because he had met the investigator years earlier, when Appellant 

was himself a victim of sexual abuse. Appellant asserts that the 

bond of trust established by that encounter lowered his resistance 

to threats, promises, and misrepresentations of law. 

In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319 (1959), law 

enforcement officers ordered a defendant’s close childhood friend 

to use false pretenses to encourage the defendant to confess. The 

officers kept sending the friend in to “play on [the defendant]’s 

sympathies” until the defendant finally confessed after eight 

straight hours of questioning. Id. The Supreme Court held that 

the use of the friend was a factor in determining that the 

confession was involuntary, observing that “[t]here was a bond of 

friendship between them going back a decade into adolescence. It 

was with this material that the officers felt that they could 

overcome [the defendant]’s will.” Id. at 323.

Here, the investigator, who was not Appellant’s close 

childhood friend, informed Appellant that the purpose of the

interview was to investigate the alleged sexual offenses. It was

Appellant, not the investigator, who first brought up the past 

encounter, stating that he regretted refusing the investigator’s

offer of psychological counseling years ago. The investigator then 

essentially minimized that past encounter and returned to the 

instant allegations, telling Appellant, “Well, we’re all 

indestructible when we’re young, and then we have to grow up, and 

we have to mature. So [the victim] is not telling lies; is she?” 

The investigator did not manipulate the encounter to exploit 

Appellant or diminish his ability to decline to answer questions. 

While later in the interview the investigator offered to help 

Appellant get counseling assistance, he did so only after Appellant 

confessed: When Appellant finished describing the incidents of 

molestation, the investigator said, “All right. I want to get you that 

help, but I do have to arrest you. Okay?” The investigator never 
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suggested that this post-confession offer was contingent on getting 

anything in return from Appellant. Thus, the offer did not induce

the confession.*

Appellant also asserts that the investigator’s remarks 

regarding allegations that Appellant’s wife told the victim to lie to 

police improperly induced his confession. After describing the 

seriousness of the allegations against Appellant’s wife, the 

investigator told Appellant, “It’s very damaging that three people 

heard, two people heard and [the victim] confirms that [your wife] 

said to lie to the investigator.” The investigator then told 

Appellant:

That’s what you and [your wife] are facing, because y’all 

are not telling me the truth. You’re telling part of the 

truth, but you’re not telling the whole truth. And I think 

you can tell me the truth to keep her out of trouble. I’m 

not after her. I want to leave her out. The kids [have] got 

to have somebody. . . . 

So what I’m throwing out to you and [your wife] is we 

can continue with this lie, but . . . [i]f y’all don’t tell me

the truth today I have no choice but to type my paperwork 

and file charges on both of y’all.

(Emphasis added.) Shortly thereafter, Appellant stopped denying 

the allegations against him.

Although the State argues that these comments were merely 

asking for information that might exonerate Appellant’s wife, a

plain reading of the transcript indicates an implied promise: 

Confess to the allegations and the charges against Appellant’s wife 

 * At the end of the interview, the investigator did ask

Appellant if anything had been promised “to make you tell these 

statements---” and Appellant replied “No, sir. . . . Other than 

getting me help.” The investigator then acknowledged Appellant’s

assertion. Without context, this acknowledgement suggests that a 

quid pro quo promise was made. The transcript itself, however, 

refutes that interpretation, as the offer was made after Appellant 

confessed. 
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will go away and one parent will remain home. But the record does 

not support a conclusion that these statements rendered 

Appellant’s confession involuntary. Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 

326, 331 (Fla. 1997) (finding preponderance of evidence sufficient 

to demonstrate voluntariness of confession). Appellant never 

expressed any fear or concern about what would happen to his wife 

or children if he did not admit to the sexual acts with his 

stepdaughter. 

At the end of the interview, when the investigator asked if any 

promises were made in exchange for the confession, Appellant 

made no mention of leniency for his wife. Appellant was given an

opportunity to say that he confessed in hopes of protecting his wife,

but instead, he only asked for counseling help. Accordingly, we 

reject Appellant’s arguments that his confession was involuntarily 

obtained. 

II. The Excluded Evidence

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the 

State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the victim’s sexual 

relationship with her boyfriend. A proffer of the evidence being 

excluded is necessary to preserve a claim of improperly excluded 

evidence “because an appellate court will not otherwise speculate 

about the admissibility of such evidence.” Lucas v. State, 568 

So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1990); see also Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 

544 (Fla. 1999) (“if it is alleged that evidence has been improperly 

excluded and the appellate record does not establish that a proffer 

has been made, the lack of an adequate record will be grounds to 

affirm.”).

Florida’s rape shield law bars the admission of evidence of 

consensual sexual activity between a victim and any person other 

than the accused, unless it is established in camera that the 

evidence is relevant to consent by a similar pattern of conduct, or 

that the accused is not the source of semen, pregnancy, injury, or 

disease. § 794.022, Fla. Stat.; Gomez v. State, 245 So. 3d 950, 953 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The rape shield law does not exclude 

evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the Florida 

Evidence Code; instead, section 794.022 is a codification of 

Florida’s relevance rules as applied to the sexual behavior of 

victims of sexual crimes. Carlyle v. State, 945 So. 3d 540, 546 (Fla. 
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2d DCA 2006); Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1984); see also § 90.403, Fla. Stat.

A defendant’s “right to full and fair cross-examination, 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, may limit [section 794.022]’s

application when evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct is 

relevant to show bias or motive to lie.” Kaplan, 451 So. 2d at 1387; 

see also Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1991) (holding that 

the defendant’s right to a full and fair defense was infringed where 

the victim’s consensual sexual relationship with a third person was 

relevant). In Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 923, the defense proffered 

evidence that the minor victim was concealing her consensual 

sexual activity from her mother, and that a scheduled medical

examination would have revealed the concealment. The supreme 

court held that this proffered evidence was admissible as highly 

probative to the defense theory that the victim fabricated rape 

charges against the defendant in order to avoid being caught in a 

lie about having sex with her boyfriend. Id. 

Here, there was no proffer of evidence at trial, so the question

is whether there is an adequate record of the excluded evidence to 

put the trial court on notice of the potential error. See Goodwin, 

751 So. 2d at 544. 

At the hearing on the State’s motion in limine, defense counsel 

mentioned that a family member believed the victim “made the 

allegations up because [she] and her boyfriend got caught doing 

what they weren’t supposed to be doing” and he “might want to go 

into that” at trial. Defense counsel generally agreed that the 

victim’s chastity should not be discussed, but asserted:

[A]t the same time we need to explore the motive of 

possibly of why – again, why [the victim] is making these 

allegations and it might have something to do with her 

boyfriend. So again, I haven’t deposed [the victim] yet, so 

I’m going to address some of this in depositions and flesh 

it out. 

But I think that – right, attacking her chastity, that’s 

improper, but the nature of the relationship with her 

boyfriend, [Appellant’s] approval of it, I think that could 
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explain as part of a possible motive for her making these 

accusations.

No mention was made of the victim hiding her sexual relationship 

or that an upcoming medical examination would uncover such; the 

excluded evidence was that Appellant caught the victim with her 

boyfriend in an inappropriate behavior. But without additional 

facts such as those in Lewis, where the sexual nature of the 

victim’s relationship with her boyfriend was critical to the theory 

of defense, here the probative value of the minor victim’s sexual 

activity is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice

and is precluded from admission under section 794.022, Florida 

Statutes. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding the evidence.

We note that our review is limited to the facts presented at 

the motion in limine hearing. Although defense counsel surmised

at the hearing that upcoming depositions might produce additional

relevant information, this does not constitute an “adequate record” 

sufficient to put the trial court on notice that the as-yet-unknown 

evidence would be admissible at trial. See Goodwin, 751 So. 2d at 

544; Lucas, 568 So. 2d at 22. 

AFFIRMED. 

KELSEY, J., concurs; WINOKUR, J., concurs with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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WINOKUR, J., concurring. 

While I agree with the majority that we should affirm the 

conviction below, I write to expand upon the effect that “promises” 

from police to a suspect during an interrogation have on a 

confession’s admissibility. I believe we should emphasize that a 

promise only renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible 
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when the promise overbears the free will of a suspect to choose 

whether to confess. “The test to determine whether a confession is 

voluntary—in other words, not coerced—is whether it was the 

product of free will and rational choice.” Martin v. State, 107 So. 

3d 281, 298, 315 (Fla. 2012) (deciding whether officers’ 

interrogation tactics “overbore [the suspect’s] free will such that he 

was unable to make a rationale choice with regard to confessing”). 

The mere existence of a promise by the officer or a “quid pro quo” 

agreement between the officer and suspect does not, in itself, 

render the confession involuntary. I question the continuing 

viability of cases suggesting that it does.

The standard to determine whether a confession is voluntary 

is well-settled: “In order for a confession to be voluntary, the 

totality of the circumstances must indicate that such confession is 

the result of free and rational choice.” Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 

839, 843–44 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 326, 

329 (Fla. 1997)). This standard focuses on the suspect’s state of 

mind, specifically on the effect that any particular police tactic 

during interrogation has upon the suspect.1 In other words, the 

mere existence of a promise alone, even a “quid pro quo” 

 1 Of course, Teachman never testified that his will was 

overborne by officer promises. The Maryland Court of Appeals 

addressed this point in Lee v. State, 12 A.3d 1238, 1253 (Md. 2011)

(citation omitted):

To be sure, the State has the burden to prove 

voluntariness. We cannot help but note, nonetheless, that 

Petitioner did not testify at the suppression hearing. 

Therefore, we do not have even his word that [the 

officer’s] improper comment overbore his will and 

produced his confession. . . . [A] mere promise, whether it 

be of leniency or, as here, confidentiality, without more, 

will not render a confession involuntary, for federal (or 

state) constitutional purposes.

The same is true here. Teachman details numerous 

allegations of promises and threats issued by Detective Musgrove, 

but presents only conjecture that these promises and threats 

overbore his will to make a rational choice. 
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agreement, should not render any confession involuntary. See

Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 608 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that “it 

does not matter that the accused confessed because of the promise, 

so long as the promise did not overbear his will.”).

A different line of cases suggests otherwise, holding that a 

promise alone may render a confession involuntary. These cases 

stem from Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897), 

which held that a confession “must not be extracted by any sort of 

threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, 

however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” The 

United States Supreme Court has repudiated this rule from Bram, 

see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (holding that 

this statement from Bram “does not state the standard for 

determining the voluntariness of a confession”), which the Florida 

Supreme Court has acknowledged. See Martin, 107 So. 3d at 313–

14. Nonetheless, some Florida cases continue to follow the rejected 

rule that a confession “obtained by any direct or implied promises” 

is per se involuntary, including Ramirez v. State, 15 So. 3d 852 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2009), cited in the majority opinion. See id. at 855 

(“It is well-settled that statements obtained through direct or 

implied promises are involuntary and, thus, inadmissible at 

trial.”). See also Walker v. State, 771 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2000) (“A confession or inculpatory statement is not freely and 

voluntarily given if it has been elicited by direct or implied 

promises, however slight.”). To the contrary, a promise to a suspect 

unaccompanied by a showing that the promise overbore the 

suspect’s will does not render a confession involuntary.2 The 

suggestion that any promise that induces a confession 

 2 This observation applies equally to the oft-stated rule that 

any “quid pro quo” agreement between the police and the suspect 

automatically renders a confession involuntary. See, e.g., Ramirez,

15 So. 3d at 856 (“the presence of an express ‘quid pro quo’ bargain 

for a confession will render the confession involuntary as a matter 

of law”). The “express quid pro quo” rule directly contradicts the 

proper voluntariness rule, which looks at the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether police misconduct overbore 

the suspect’s free will and made it impossible for the defendant to 

make a rational choice as to whether to confess. 
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automatically renders a confession involuntary, no matter how 

inconsequential and no matter whether it deprived the defendant 

of the ability to make a rational choice, should be finally and 

explicitly rejected.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Kathryn Lane, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.