IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis Boyd, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 515 M.D. 2020

: SUBMITTED: July 22, 2022

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :

Parole, Pennsylvania General Assembly, :

Pro Tem Joe B. Scarnati III/or Current :

Pro Tem Speaker of the House of :

Representatives Mike Turzai or Current :

Speaker, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: November 4, 2022

Before this Court are the preliminary objections of Respondents, the 

Pennsylvania General Assembly, President Pro Tempore Jake Corman, Speaker of 

the House of Representatives Bryan Cutler (collectively, General Assembly) and the 

Pennsylvania Parole Board to Francis Boyd’s Amended Petition for Review.

1

 After 

review, this Court sustains the General Assembly’s preliminary objections thereby 

dismissing the General Assembly from the above-captioned action. As for the 

Board, we sustain its first and third preliminary objections based on the fact that 

1 The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole was renamed the Pennsylvania Parole 

Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 16.1 of the Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776, No. 115 (effective 

February 18, 2020); see also Sections 6101 and 6111(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code, as 

amended, 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 6101, 6111(a).
2

Boyd is essentially challenging his sentence and confinement, thereby raising a 

claim sounding in habeas corpus, over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. 

Consequently, we transfer this matter, which sounds in habeas corpus, to the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the sentencing court, as the court of 

proper jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code.

2

Boyd was convicted of second-degree homicide in December 1976, and

sentenced to life imprisonment. In August 2020, Boyd filed a parole application 

with the Board requesting a parole hearing because the sentencing judge did not state 

that his sentence was without parole. On August 30, 2020, Boyd received the 

Board’s denial of his request based upon Section 6137(a) of the Prisons and Parole 

Code (Parole Code), 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a), which provides that the Board may parole 

any offender, except an offender serving life imprisonment.

On September 4, 2020, Boyd filed a Petition for Review in this Court’s 

original jurisdiction against the Board and the General Assembly seeking that this 

Court: (1) declare Section 6137 of the Parole Code unconstitutional under the 

Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions as applied to Boyd and other 

individuals serving life sentences for felony-murder convictions pre- and post-1974; 

(2) sever Section 2502(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) (relating to 

second-degree murder), from Section 6137 of the Parole Code and order a 

resentencing hearing sentencing Boyd to either a minimum sentence of 30 years and 

a maximum sentence of life, or a sentence of life with the possibility of parole; and 

(3) order the Board to develop plans to review Boyd’s case, and all other felonymurder convictions, for parole consideration.

2

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). Section 5103(a) provides that, if a matter is brought in a court of this 

Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction, the court shall not quash the matter, but shall 

transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth.
3

On October 27, 2020, the Board filed preliminary objections to Boyd’s 

Petition. On November 23, 2020, Boyd filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended 

Complaint. On February 12, 2021, the General Assembly filed a response to the 

motion titled “Response to Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint of 

Respondent the Pennsylvania General Assembly, In the Nature of Preliminary 

Objections.” By February 25, 2021 Order, this Court granted the motion and 

accepted for filing the attached Amended Petition for Review. The Amended 

Petition added Respondents Corman and Cutler, seeking the same relief as the 

original Petition. 

On March 19, 2021, the General Assembly filed preliminary objections 

to the Amended Petition seeking that the Court dismiss it with prejudice or,

alternatively, dismiss the General Assembly Respondents from the action. The 

General Assembly objects to the Amended Petition, alleging: (1) lack of jurisdiction 

based on the legal insufficiency of a pleading pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure (Rule) 1028(a)(4) - demurrer; (2) lack of jurisdiction or improper venue 

pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(1); (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(4) - demurrer (no specific allegation against the 

General Assembly Respondents); (4) failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(4) - demurrer (claims against the 

constitutionality of the statute creating the penalty for second-degree murder are too 

stale to be cognizable); and (5) lack of jurisdiction based on speech and debate 

immunity pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(1), (4).

On March 25, 2021, the Board filed preliminary objections seeking 

dismissal of the Amended Petition, with prejudice. The Board objects to the 

Amended Petition, alleging: (1) lack of jurisdiction/improper venue pursuant to Rule 
4

1028(a)(1); (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 

Rule 1028(a)(4) - demurrer (asserting the staleness of Boyd’s challenge); (3) 

improper party pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(5); and (4) demurrer pursuant to Rule 

1028(a)(4) (binding precedent precludes Boyd’s assertion that a life sentence 

without parole for felony murder committed by an adult is cruel and unusual 

punishment under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions).

Initially,

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as 

true all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for 

review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced 

therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions

of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain 

preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that 

the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be 

resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits 

every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal 

sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be 

sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed 

to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When 

ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to 

the complaint.

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted).

Respondents argue that Boyd’s Amended Petition should be dismissed 

for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.3 Specifically, Respondents contend that 

Boyd’s assertion that the statutory scheme related to second-degree murder is 

inapplicable is meritless based on Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & 

3 This is the General Assembly’s first Preliminary Objection, and the Board’s fourth 

Preliminary Objection.
5

Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019). Respondents further contend that the United States 

Supreme Court and Pennsylvania state courts have consistently rejected the 

argument that a mandatory life sentence without parole for second-degree murder is 

violative of any constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Boyd rejoins that Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code (relating to

sentences without parole) omits second-degree murder from the statute. Boyd 

asserts that the statute was amended by the General Assembly eight times since it 

was enacted in 1974 but that the General Assembly has not added second-degree 

murder to this provision. Boyd maintains that this shows legislative intent to exclude 

second-degree murder from the statute. However, Section 1102(b) of the Crimes 

Code provides:

Except as provided under [S]ection 1102.1 of the Crimes 

Code[, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1] (relating to sentence of 

persons under the age of 18 for murder),] a person who 

has been convicted of murder of the second degree, of 

second[-]degree murder of an unborn child or of second[-

]degree murder of a law enforcement officer shall be 

sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b) (emphasis added).

Additionally, Section 6137(a)(1) of the Parole Code declares:

The [B]oard may parole subject to consideration of 

guidelines established under [Section 2154.5 of the 

Sentencing Code,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154.5 (relating to 

adoption of guidelines for parole) or subject to [S]ection 

6137.1 [of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137.1] (relating 

to short sentence parole)[,] and such information 

developed by or furnished to the [B]oard under [S]ection 

6174 [of the Parole Code] (relating to right of access to 

offenders), or both, and may release on parole any 

offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the 

[B]oard by this chapter, except an offender condemned 

to death or serving life imprisonment...
6

61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) (emphasis added).

In Hudson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that, 

because Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code omits second-degree murder from 

sentences without parole, an inmate convicted of second-degree murder should be 

eligible for parole. The Hudson Court explained: 

Section 9765 [of the Sentencing Code] was never intended 

specifically to create a personal right to be reviewed for 

parole. Rather, it was meant to direct common pleas 

courts in discharging their sentencing obligations. . . . 

Since [an a]ppellant lacks any legal right to parole 

eligibility, there is no warrant for a reviewing court to alter 

his sentence.

Relatedly, it is important to recognize that the Board is an 

administrative agency of the Commonwealth. Thus, it 

“can only exercise those powers which have been 

conferred upon it by the [l]egislature in clear and 

unmistakable language.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. 

Dep’t, . . . 638 A.2d 194, 200 ([Pa.] 1994) (quoting Hum[.] 

Rel[s.] Comm’n v. Transit Cas. Ins. Co., . . . 387 A.2d 58, 

62 ([Pa.] 1978)). There is no statutory authorization for 

the Board to grant parole to an individual sentenced to a 

mandatory life term. Indeed, to the contrary, the Board 

may “release on parole any inmate to whom the power to 

parole is granted to the [B]oard by this chapter, except an 

inmate condemned to death or serving life imprisonment.” 

61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) (emphasis added).

We therefore conclude that the Board lacks the power to 

release on parole an inmate servicing [sic] a mandatory 

life sentence for second-degree murder.

Hudson, 204 A.3d at 399 (bold emphasis added; citations omitted). Accordingly, 

Boyd’s argument that he should be eligible for parole because Section 9765(c) of 

the Sentencing Code omits second-degree murder is meritless.
7

Further, with respect to Boyd’s contention that a life sentence without 

parole violates the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions because it is cruel 

and unusual punishment, the United States Supreme Court has long held:

[T]his claim has no support in the text and history of the 

Eighth Amendment [to the United States Constitution, 

U.S. Const. amend. VIII]. Severe, mandatory penalties 

may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the 

constitutional sense, having been employed in various 

forms throughout our [n]ation’s history. . . . [M]andatory 

death sentences abounded in our first Penal Code. They 

were also common in the several [s]tates-both at the time 

of the founding and throughout the 19th century. See

Woodson v. N[.] Carolina, 428 U.S. [280,] 289-[]90

[1976]. . . . There can be no serious contention, then, that 

a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual 

becomes so simply because it is “mandatory.” See

Chapman v. U[.]S[.], 500 U.S. 453, 467 . . . (1991).

Hamelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (italics added).

Moreover, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted:

Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly and unanimously 

held that “[t]he Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment is coextensive with the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments [to] the United States 

Constitution,” and that “the Pennsylvania Constitution 

affords no broader protection against excessive sentences 

than that provided by the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution.” [Commonwealth v.] Barnett, 50 

A.3d [176,] 197 [(Pa. Super. 2012)] (quoting

Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 743 (Pa.

Super. 2008)).

Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 267 (Pa. Super. 2013). Consequently, a life 

sentence without parole does not violate either the United States or the Pennsylvania 

Constitution.
8

Accordingly, the General Assembly’s preliminary objections are 

sustained, and those parties are dismissed from the above-captioned action. Further, 

notwithstanding our determination that Boyd has failed to state a claim in our 

original jurisdiction, we believe that he is essentially challenging the legality of his 

sentence and confinement such that he has asserted a habeas corpus claim. 

Consequently, we sustain the Board’s first and third preliminary objections. 

Consistent with our holdings in Ellis v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 596 M.D. 2019, filed 

April 13, 2021), and Cook v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 472 M.D. 2019, filed May 13, 

2020), therefore, we transfer this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County, the sentencing court.

4

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita

Judge Covey, Judge Fizzano Cannon and Judge Wallace did not participate on the 

decision for this case.

4 After this case was decided, our Supreme Court decided Scott v. Pennsylvania Board of 

Probation and Parole, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa., No. 16 WAP 2021, filed October 19, 2022), which 

further confirms the result here.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis Boyd, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 515 M.D. 2020

:

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :

Parole, Pennsylvania General Assembly, :

Pro Tem Joe B. Scarnati III/or Current :

Pro Tem Speaker of the House of :

Representatives Mike Turzai or Current :

Speaker, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of November, 2022, the preliminary objections

of the Pennsylvania General Assembly Respondents to Francis Boyd’s (Boyd) 

Amended Petition for Review are SUSTAINED, and the General Assembly 

Respondents are hereby DISMSSED from the action.

In addition, the first and third preliminary objections of the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole are SUSTAINED, and this matter is 

transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The 

Commonwealth Court Prothonotary shall transfer the record, together with a 

certified copy of the docket entries, to the prothonotary of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francis Boyd, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 515 M.D. 2020 

:

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :

Parole, Pennsylvania General Assembly, : Submitted: July 22, 2022 

Pro Tem Joe B. Scarnati III/or :

Current Pro Tem Speaker of the :

House of Representatives Mike :

Turzai or Current Speaker, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: November 4, 2022

I concur with the Majority to the extent that it disposes of Francis 

Boyd’s second issue, namely, whether the General Assembly intended felonymurder convictions to be parole-eligible under 61 Pa. C.S. § 6137(a). However, 

because I also believe that the Majority unnecessarily delves into an issue that we 

cannot consider in this posture, namely, whether a mandatory life sentence is an 

unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment, I respectfully dissent from that 

portion of the Majority’s analysis. 

The Majority correctly concludes that the recent Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court decision in Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 204 A.3d 
PAM - 2

392 (Pa. 2019), held that the General Assembly did not intend defendants convicted 

of second-degree murder to be eligible for parole. See Id. at 399. To the extent that 

Boyd challenges his parole denial on that ground, our disposition must be guided by 

Supreme Court precedent. 

However, after correctly concluding that we do not have jurisdiction to 

address Boyd’s overarching challenge to his conviction and sentence, the Majority 

nevertheless goes on to conclude that life sentences without parole do not violate 

either the United States or the Pennsylvania Constitutions. We have no jurisdiction 

over that issue, and it is immaterial to our disposition of the parole eligibility 

question.1 Accordingly, as this Court is without jurisdiction to address this issue 

here, I would limit our holding to the question of parole eligibility and transfer the 

remaining claims to the Court of Common Pleas. To the extent that the Majority 

goes any further, I respectfully dissent.2

. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

1 Both the General Assembly Respondents and the Pennsylvania Parole Board argue in 

their preliminary objections that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to Boyd’s 

conviction and sentence. See General Assembly Preliminary Objection II; Board Preliminary 

Objection I. Moreover, the Board’s argument that life sentences are not cruel and unusual 

punishment is contained in its fourth preliminary objection, upon which the Majority does not rule. 

See Board Preliminary Objection IV; Majority Opinion at 6, Order. 

2 The Majority’s constitutional analysis therefore is, at best, dicta. See Rendell v. 

Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 983 A.2d 708, 714 (Pa. 2009) (any statement in a court’s 

opinion that is “ancillary and, ultimately unnecessary to the resolution of the controversy” is not 

decisional and is merely non-binding dicta) (citations omitted).