COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Huff and Senior Judge Clements

LELA WEIFORD MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0311- 18-1 PER CURIAM MARCH 5, 2019 CITY OF HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Walter J. Ford, Judge (Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant. (Kendall Bynum, Assis tant City Attorney; Lola Rodriguez Perki ns, Senior Deputy City Attorney; Rachel E. Mad den, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Riley Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellee.

Lela Weiford (mother) appeals th e circuit court orders terminating her parental rights to her seven children and approving the f oster care goal of adoption. Mother argues that the circuit court erred by (1) approving the foste r care goal of adoption because the City of Hampt on Department of Social Services (the Department) failed to prove that the goal of adoption was in the children’s best interests and that reas onable efforts were made to reunite the children with their parents and (2) terminating mother’s parenta l rights under Code § 16.1-283( C)(2) because the Department failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the termination. Upon reviewing the recor d and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accord ingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND 1 “On appeal, ‘we view the evidenc e and all reason able inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va . App. 375, 386 (2012) (quoting Jenk ins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180 (1991)). Mother is the biological mothe r to seven children, M.W., X.W., K.W., S.W., Z.B.W., Z.J.W., and V.W. The Departmen t first became involved with the family when a dog bit Z.B.W. and S.W. on two different dates in 2015. Both of the children required medical treatment for the dog bites. The Department offered family support and child car e services, but mother refused the services because she “did not want anyone in her home or ca ring for her children.” On May 1, 2016, the Department again became involved with the f amily after V.W., who was ten months old at the time, a lmost drowned. Mother reporte d that she was taking a shower with V.W. and Z.J.W., who was tw o years old at the time. She l eft the bathroom to get dressed and thought her boyfriend, Juan Alcal a, was watching the childr en. 2 When Alcala came into the bedroom, mother asked Alcala a bout the children. They ran back to the bathroom and found V.W. under the water because the tub drain was broken. V.W. wa s blue and unresponsive. M.W. ran next door and asked the neighbors to call 911, while m other and Alcala performed cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. F irst responders revived V.W. and transported him to the

1 The record in this case was seal ed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing relevant portions of the record f or purposes of resolving the i ssues raised by appellant. Evidence and factual findings below that are necessary to address the as signments of error are included in this opinion. Consequently, “[t] o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we unseal only those speci fic facts, finding them relev ant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previousl y sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).

2 Alcala was the biological fath er to the three youngest childre n, Z.B.W., Z.J.W., and V.W.- 3 - hospital. The hospital staff no ticed that V.W. had a purple br uise on his right eyelid and that mother was “aggressive” with hi m. When asked about V.W.’s brui se, mother said that the day before, on April 30, 2016, Z.J.W. had knocked a chair off a tab le, and it hit V.W. The next day, on May 2, 2016, the Department removed all seven of the children from mother’s care. The three olde st children, who ranged in age fr om ten years old to seven years old, were placed in one foster home, and the four youngest chil dren, who ranged in age from four years old to one year old, were placed in a nother nearby foster home. The Department required mother t o complete a parental capacity evaluation, which the evaluator completed on June 16, 2016. The evaluator expressed concern about mother deferring to Alcala, who was not a “safe i ndependent care provider,” for “primary care, limit setting, supervision, and discipline” of her children. The evaluator op ined that mother had “an ongoing high risk for maladaptive parenti ng and inadequate supervision. ” Based on the recommendations of the evaluator, the Department required mother to participate in parenting classes, a substance abuse treatment program, domestic violence and relationship cla sses, one-on-one parent mentoring services, and intensiv e individual psychotherapy. Mo ther completed the counseling services and four parenting course s. She also completed the su bstance abuse treatment program and had all negative drug screens . Mother activ ely participate d in visitation wit h her children. Although she had some financial struggles, mother maintained a job and housing. By March 24, 2017, mother had made sufficient progress to permi t the Department to start the process of allowing a t rial home placement with the c hildren and mother. The Department informed mother t hat Alcala, who had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was not allowed in the home because the children were not safe around him. The Department was concerned that Alcala was t oo “unpredictable,” “angry,” and “verbally aggressive.” Furthermore, Alcala had not bee n compliant with his treatment p lan for therapy and medication- 4 - management. The Department revi ewed with mother the steps that she could take if Alcala came to the house while the ch ildren were present. On April 1, 2017, the children began day visits with mother at her home, and on April 28, 2017, they started overnight vi sits. On April 30, 2017, the De partment transitioned the four youngest children for a trial home placement. On May 1, 2017, the Department learned that Alcala had been at the home while the children were presen t. Alcala had disciplined M.W. and “pushed him out the front door and threw his shoes at him.” O n May 2, 2017, the Department met wi th mother, who reported that Alcala had been to the home only one time. The Department warn ed mother that the children were at risk of being removed fro m her home if Alcala was prese nt. The children’s guardian ad litem subsequently met with the children and learned that Alcala had been at the home multiple times and had spent the ni ght while they were present. In spite of the Department’s instructions, mother continued to all ow Alcala to pare nt and discipline the children. Upon learning this information, the Department h ad “grave concerns regarding her[] ability to keep the children safe due to her poor judgeme nt, lack of growth in increasing her protective capacity and past CPS [h]istory.” Accordingly, the Department removed the children from mother’s home on May 5, 2017, and placed them back in thei r foster homes. On May 7, 2017, Alcala boarded a bus a nd moved to California. On July 18, 2017, the Department filed petitions for a permanen cy planning hearing with the goal of adoption. On August 15, 2017, the City of Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the J DR court) approved the goal of a doption for the children. Mother appealed the permanency planning o rders to the circuit court. On October 10, 2017 the JDR- 5 - court entered the orders termina ting mother’s parental rights t o her children. 3 Mother also appealed the termination or ders to the circuit court. On January 26, 2018, the parties app eared before the circuit co urt. The Department reported that the children had “some behavior problems and stru ggles,” but their foster parents were able to manage their beha viors. The children had establis hed a good rapport with their foster parents. Mother presented letters fro m several friends, who supported mo ther and expressed their willingness to help her as needed. Mother also wrote a letter, expressing her love for the children and her desire to have t he children returned to her. After hearing all of the eviden ce and argument, the circuit court found that it was in the children’s best interests to ter minate mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approve the goal of adopti on. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determinati on based on the child’s best interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun C ty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. D ep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plai nly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t

3 The JDR court also terminated th e fathers’ parental rights to their children. S.W.’s father, Harry Lee Walker, appealed the permanency planning orde r and the termination of parental rights order to the cir cuit court, which approved the goal of adoption and terminated his parental rights. Walker appeal ed the circuit court’s ruling to this Court. See Walker v. City of Hampton Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Record No. 0312-18-1. Alcala andthe other father did not appeal the JDR court’s rulings.- 6 - of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quotin g Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)). Mother argues that the circui t court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate her parental rights and approve the goal of adoption. Mother specifically asserts that the Department failed to prove that termination of her parental rights and approval of the goal of adoption were in the children’s best interests. She further co ntends that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to assi st her in remedying the conditio ns that led to the children’s foster care placement and to reunite her with the children, especially after Alcala left Virginia on May 7, 2017. The Department argues that mot her did not raise these specific arguments with the circuit court, so this Court should not consider them under Rule 5A:18. The Department asserts that mother did not move to strike the Department’s evidence, and he r closing argument focused on allowing her to “have one final, l ast ditch attempt to make thi s work.” During her closing remarks, mother claimed that the trauma and abuse that she had faced in her life affected her choices , but “the ultimate removal of her children has got to be the one thing that . . . is the ultimate m otivation for her.” Mother r equested that the circuit court give her “one additional opportunity to reunite” with her children, but she did not argue that the “statutory criteria” had not been met, as she argues on appeal. In additi on, she endorsed the final orders as “Seen and objected to” with no further explanation. “No ruling of the trial cour t . . . will be considered as a ba sis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonabl e certainty at the time of t he ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of A ppeals to attain the ends of j ustice.” Rule 5A:18. “Ordinarily, endorsement of an order ‘Seen and o bjected to’ is not specific enough to meet the requirements of Rule 5A:18 because it does not s ufficiently alert the trial court to the claimed error.” Herring- 7 - v. Herring, 33 Va. App. 281, 286 (2000) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515 (1991) ( en banc )). “This Court has held that ‘[ c]ounsel may meet the mandates of Rule 5A:18 in many ways. For instance, counsel m ay make clear the ground for his objection in a motion to strike the evidence or in closing argument. ’” Moncrief v. Div. of Child S upport Enf’t ex rel. Joyner, 60 Va. App. 721, 729 (2012) (quoting L ee, 12 Va. App. at 515). “T he Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal w hich was not presented to the t rial court.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Serv s., 62 Va. App. 296, 315 (2013) (quotin g Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)). “The purpos e of Rule 5A:18 is ‘to e nsure that the trial court and opposing party are given the opportu nity to intelligently addre ss, examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoidi ng unnecessary appeals.’” Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 544 (2018) (quoting Andrews v. C ommonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 493 ( 2002)). Mother raises specific argume nts on appeal that she did not ra ise in the circuit court; however, “[i]n interpreting Rule 5A:18, the Supreme Court has a lso held that ‘if a trial court is aware of a litigant’s legal position and the litigant did not e xpressly waive such arguments, the arguments remain preserved for appeal.’” Moncrief, 60 Va. App. at 729 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010)). T he circuit court was aware that mother opposed the termination of her parental r ights and the goal of adoption. T herefore, assuming without deciding that mother sufficien tly preserved her arguments for appeal, we find that the circuit court did not err in terminating m other’s parental rights to he r children under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approving the goal of adoption. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a court may terminate parent al rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the- 8 - reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. “[S]ubsection C termination d ecisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the origi nal danger to the child, but on t he demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of S oc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271 (2005). Contrary to mother’s arguments , the Department provided her wi th numerous services in an effort to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s p lacement in foster care. “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with r eference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a court must determine what constitut es reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Harrison v. Tazewel l Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 163 (2004) (quoting Fer guson v. Stafford Cty. Dep ’t of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338 (1992)). The Department initially removed the children from mother’s care because of inadequate supervision. In September 2015, a dog bit two of the children, and then, a few months later, in May 2016, the youngest child almost drowned when Alcala was sup posed to be watching him. The Department referred mother t o a parental capacity evaluator , and based on the evaluator’s recommendations, the Departmentrequired mother to participate in parenting courses, counseling, substance abuse tr eatment, and domestic violence cl asses, all of which mother completed. The Department also arranged for mother to visit wi th the children, which she did on a regular basis. After mother co mplied with these requirements , the Department moved toward transitioning the children for a trial home placement with moth er. The Department stressed to mother that Alcala, who was noncom pliant with the Department’s requirements, should not be around the children while they wer e at her house. Mother assur ed the Department that he would not be at the home. Mother, howev er, allowed Alcala to spend t he night and to discipline her- 9 - children. Despite all of the servi ces provided to mother, she continued to exercise poor judgment and also showed that she could not protect the children because she continued to allow Alcala to be around the children. The circuit court found that moth er was a “threat to these chi ldren” and did “not have the ability, or else she doesn’t care about the safety of her child ren.” The circuit court recognized mother’s love for her childre n, but “she has not properly effec ted her job as being a mother to those children.” When the Department placed the children with mother on a trial basis, the children had been in foster care for approximately one year. “ It is clearly not in t he best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] r esponsibilities.” Tackett, 6 2 Va. App. at 322 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990)). Mother had the opportunity to show that she had remedied the c onditions that led to the children’s placement in foster care; instead, she proved that s he could not apply what she had learned and adequately protect the children. At trial, she arg ued for more time, and on appeal, she asserts that the Departm ent should have continued to provid e her additional services after the children were removed from the trial home placement. The Department had been working with her for more than twelve mont hs, and she had not demonstrated, during that time period, that she was able to care for the ch ildren. “Code § 16.1- 283(C)(2)’s tw elve-month time limit ‘was designed to prevent an indetermin ate state of foster care “drif t” and to encourage timeliness by the courts and social services in addressing the circumstances that resulted in the foster care placement.’” Dung Thi Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human S ervs., 63 Va. App. 157, 171 (2014) (quoting L.G. v. Amherst C ty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 V a. App. 51, 56 (2003)).- 10 - Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in holding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate mother’ s parental rights under Code § 16 .1-283(C)(2) and approve the goal of adoption. 4
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summar ily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.

4 With respect to mother’s challe nge of the foster care goal of adoption, “[o]ur decision to affirm the termination order nece ssarily subsumes this aspect o f [her] appeal because a preponderance-of-the-evidence st andard governs judicial modific ations of foster care plans.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265 n.3.