NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0694n.06 No. 08-5769 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. TRO Y PA RK ER, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

O P I N I O N

Be for e : B AT CH ELD ER , C hie f Cir c uitJudg e , M OORE and CO OK , C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Following a jury trial in f eder al court, Tr oy Park e r wa s c on vic te d of fo ur c ounts of ba nk fr a ud , in vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 13 44 , a nd six c ounts of eng ag ing in a

mon et ar y t ra nsaction in proper ty from spec ified unlawf

ul activity

(i.e., money launder ing) , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The district court sentenc ed Parke r to 120 months of imprisonment and five y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Par ker’ s counsel p re s en t s two arguments on appea l; in a supple mental pro se br ief, Parke r wishes to aug ment his counsel’s sec ond argument and also to assert an o t h er claim re lated to his sentence . For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURE Parker owned and operated s ever al cleaning businesses i n the g reater Cincinnati, Ohio, and Covington, Ke ntucky , are a. Using false st at em ents of his acc ounts rece ivables, tax filings, and2

equipment inventories, Parker obtained sever al loans and lines of cr edit for these businesses from banks in the Northe rn Ke ntucky are a betwe en 2002 and 2004. Parker ’s fra ud eventua lly

came to the F B I ’s a tte nti on , a

nd Park e r w a s in dic te d b y a fe de ra l g ra nd jur y in No ve mbe r 20 07 on

fo ur c ounts of bank f raud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and seven counts of money launder ing in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (for tra nsfer ring loan proc eeds f

rom one ba

nk to another ba

nk). Six day s prior to the sche duled jury trial, Parker ’s counse l moved for a sec ond continuance to allow time to investigate Parker ’s diag nosis of and treatment for Dissociative I dentity Disorder (“ DI D” ) b y

Dr . D on a ld B e e re , a

c lin ic a l ps y c ho log ist . A c c or din g to t he PSR in thi s c a se , at th e tim e of the arr e st f

or the ins tant o ff

e ns e Park e r h a d b e e n s e e ingDr . B e e re fo r c ouns e lin g rel ate d to his DI D as a condition of hi s supervised r elea se for a prior c rime. The district c ourt denied c ounsel’s motion for a continuanc e bec ause it found that a co n tinuance w as not war rante d under the circ umstances—Par

ker ha d known of his diag nosis f or four y ear s and it wa s included in the pretria l report—and bec a

u s e th e ti me to f

il e a n o ti c e o f e xp e rt t e s ti mo n y

r e late d to a d e f e n d an t’ s me n ta l he a lthha d p a sse d. Th e c a se pr oc e e de d to tr ia l, a nd P arker did no t in tr od

uc e any wi tne sse s in

his defe nse. The g overnme nt dismi ssed one of the money -launde ring counts, and the jury found Parke r g uil ty of a ll o the r c ounts

. The PSR groupe d all counts of co n v i ct i o n for se ntencingand re commended a Guidelines rang e of 97 to 121 months of imprisonment with an offe nse leve l of 29 and a criminal history cate g ory I I

. This rang e was reduc ed to 97 to 120 months because the money -launde ring counts are statut or ily c a pp e d at 12 0 mon ths

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d a ll o f P ark e r’ s c ouns e l’ s o bje c tio ns to the Guidelines c alculation base d on specific offe nder chara cter istics for downw ard de parture s and reje cted the g overnme nt’s reque st for either an upwa rd depa rture or an upwa

rd var iance . The c ourtF e de ra l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 12 .2 pr e sc ri be s th e pr oc e dure s a de fe nd ant m

us t 1 follow in fede ral c ourt to introduce menta l-hea lth related e vidence or def enses in a c riminal trial. I n p e rt ine nt p art , Ru le 12 .2 state s, (a) Notice of

an Insanity

Def ense. Adefe ndant who intends to asser t a def ense of insanity at the time of the a lleg ed off ense must so notify

an attorne y

for the g overnme nt in writing within the time provided f or filing a pre trial motion, or at any later time the c ourt sets, and file a copy of the notice with the cler k. A d e f e n d an tw h o f

a i l s t o d o s o c an n o tr e l y o nani n s an i ty d e f e n s e . T h e c o u rtm ay, for g ood cause , allow the def endant to file the notice late, g rant a dditional tr ia l- pr e pa

ra tio n ti me , o r m a ke oth e r a pp ro pr ia te or de rs . (b ) No tic e of

Expe rt Ev ide nc e of

a Me nta l Co nd iti on . I f a

de fe nd ant i nte nd s to introduce e x pert e vidence relating to a me ntal disease or defe ct or a

ny other mental condition of the de fenda nt bear ing on . . . ( 1) the issue of guilt . . . , the defe ndant must--within the time provided for filing a pretria l motion or at any la te r t ime the c ourt

se ts- -n oti fy

an atto rn e y

fo r t he g ov e rnme nt i n w ri tin g of thi s intention and file a c opy

of the notice with the cler k. The c ourt may , for g ood cause , allow the def

endant to file the notice late, g rant the pa rties additional tr ia l- pr e pa

ra tio n ti me , o r m a ke oth e r a pp ro pr ia te or de rs . 3 then made a thoroug h revie w of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac tors and sentenc ed Parker to 120 months of imprisonment for e ach c ount, to be serve d concur rently , and a total of five y ear s of supervise d

r e l e a s e . P ar

k e r f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t h e n e x td ay. II. AN AL YSI S A. Denial of Parker ’s Mot ion f or a Continuan ce Park e r a rgue s th ro ug h c ouns e l th a t th e dis tr ict c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyinghis motion for a continuance to investigate what c ounsel asser ts was newly

reve aled infor

mation of a prior DI D diag nosis by

Dr. B eer e re levant to Parke r’s menta l sta t e bec ause the district court improperly

construed the motion as a n untimely attempt to se ek an insanity defe nse under

Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b). 1The Gove rnment conte nds that Parker ’s motion for a c ontinuance w as an untimely notice 2 of intent to introduce e vidence under Rule 12.2( b). We apply the same a

buse-of -discre tion standard of

revie w to a denia l on those g rounds. See U nited States v. Mc

Lernon , 746 F.2d 1098, 11 15 (6 th C ir . 1 98 4) (“ Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e ha s w ide dis c re tio n to e xcu se a pp e lla nts ’ f a ilure to g rant timely

notice of the ir expert’s testimony [ under Rule 12.2(b)], but also has broad discr etion to exclude such testimony .”). Parker has not alleg ed that the de nial abridg ed any particula r constitutional rig ht, but our 3 case s indicate that the f

ailure to investig ate a

defe nse theory

and/or c all a def

ense w itness may imp lic a te e ith e r t

he Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o p re se nt a de fe ns e wi th c ouns e l or

the F if th Amendment rig ht to due proce ss. See G arner , 5 07 F .3 d at 40 8; Crossley , 224 F.3d at 854–55. 4 We reviewfor a

buse of discretion the district c ourt’s denia l of a motion for a continuance

. 2 United States v. Garne r , 50 7 F. 3 d 3 9 9 , 408 (6th Cir. 2007). We may conclude that the district court’s de nial of a c ontinuance r ises to the level of a constitutional violation only if the district court 3 dis pla y e d “ a n un re a so nin g and arb itr ary ins ist e nc e up on e xpe dit iou sn e ss in t he fa c e of a jus tif ia ble reque st for dela

y .” United States v. Crossley , 224 F.3d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 2000) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). The de nial also must have resulted in actua l prejudice to the defendant’s de fense , which may

b e “e s t ablished by

showing that a continuanc e would have made r eleva nt witnesses

ava i l able or added something to the defe nse.” Id. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) . B e c a

us e

“ ‘[t ]he re are no mec han ica l test s f or de c idi ngwh e n a

de nia l of a c on tin ua nc e is s o a

rb itr ary a s to vio la te du e pr oc e ss, ’” our inq uir y is de pe nd e nt u

po n th e c ir c ums tanc e of

thi s c a se and

“ ‘p art ic ula

rl y . . . the re asons pre sented to the trial judge at the time the reque st is denied,’” w ith the rec og nition that “[a] reasonable time for ade quate pr epar ation of t he ac cused’ s defe nse is the first esse ntial of trial fair ness.” Garner , 5 0 7 F. 3 d

at 4 0 8 (q u o t i n g Ungar v . S arafi te , 376 U.S. 575, 588–91 (1964)). I no u r a n al y s i s , we m ay

co n s i d er s ev er al n o n -d i s p o s i t i v e f ac t o rs , i n cl u d i n g: the leng th of the reque sted delay ; w hether other continuance s had been r equeste d and g rante d; the convenie nce or inconvenienc e to the parties, witnesse s, counsel and the c o u rt ; w h e t h e r t h e d e l ay w a s f o r l e g i t i m a t e r e a s o n s o r

w h e t h e r i tw a s “ d i l a t o r

y,5

pu r p o s e f u l o r c o n tr iv e d ;” w h e th e r

th e d e f e n d an t c o n tr ib u te d

to th e c ir c u ms tance s g ivi ngri se to t

he re qu e st; wh e the r de nying the c on tin ua nc e wi ll r e su lt i n id e nti fi a ble prejudice to defe ndant’s ca se; and the c omplex ity of the c ase. Powell v. Collins , 332 F.3d 376, 396 ( 6th Cir. 2003). Parker ’s trial counsel filed a motion re questing the continuance at issue six day s befor e the schedule d trial start date stating that he did not become awa re of Parker ’s DI D di ag nosis or treatment with Dr. B eer e until he was me et i n g wi t h P ar ker to discuss fina l trial matters the da y befor e. Counsel stated that he n ee d ed additional time to investigate this new evide nce be cause “[i] f Mr. Parker ’s DI D was pr esent at or befor e the time of the alleg ed cr iminal activity then it has a dire ct b ea ri n g o nwh et h er

o r n o tM r. P ar k er fo rm ed o r co u l d h av e fo rm ed t h e re qu i s i t e ‘i n t en t ’ t o en gage i n t h e a l l e g e d c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . ” D o c . 2 2 ( P l

. C o n t i n u an c e M o t

. a t 3 )

. A t t h e h e ar i n g f o u rd a ys be fo re tr ia l, P ark e r’ s c ouns e l ar g ue d tha t he d id n ot y e t ha ve e no ug h in fo rm a tio n to fo rm the ba sis of a Rule 12.2 notice related to insa nity or to de cide whether any information “is g oing to have any bear ing on the criminal intent, a s I raise in my memorandum.” Doc. 69 (Mot. Tr. at 8–9). Counsel also asser ted that he wa s prepa

red to g o to trial, but that he was c oncer ned that Parke r would be p re j u d i ce d i f c o u n s el h adm i s s eds o m et h i n g. The district cour

t de nied the motion on the rec ord at the hear ing, c onstruing it as a n attempt to file an untimely

notice of Rule 12.2(b) e vidence of a me ntal disease be aringon g uilt, and barre d any expert testimony

at trial re g ardingParker ’s mental condition. The court noted that “the f act that the pretria l se rvice s repor t doe s include the ref

ere nce to D r. Be ere , [demonstrates that] y our client

cer tainly had knowledg e that ther e may be something there which potentially co u l d impact the defe nse of the a ction,” and that “the def endant c erta inly

knew of this diagnosis and c ondition for almost four y ear s and, in fac t, has bee n tr eating with Dr. B eer e for 18 months while he’s bee n on6

supervised r elea se.” Id. at 13, 14–15. The court was also influence d by the fac t that it had alrea dy g ra nte d o ne c o nt i n

u a n c e f o r a p p ro xima te ly

se ve n w e e ks to a c c omm od a te de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s sc he du le in another tria l. The court found “that the second delay is of the defe ndant’s own making ,” “that the delay of the c urre nt motion will unduly delay the proc eeding s,” and “ that the def endant ha s failed to show adequate g ood cause to excuse his failure to g ive the [Rule 12.2(b)] noti ce.” Id. at 14. The

c a se pr oc e e de d to tr ia l a s sc he du le d, and the de fe ns e pr e se nte d n o w itn e sse s at tr ia l. We c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n. We h a ve pre vio us ly conclude d that it is not an abuse of d iscretion to deny a continuanc e whe re the defe nse counse l’s claimed lac k of adequate prepar ation time was based on late notice of evidenc e obtained f

rom the defe ndant or the def

endant’ s unwillingness to help pre pare the def ense. Se e Br oo m v. Mi tc he ll , 441 F.3d 392, 414–15 ( 6th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 549 U.S. 1255 (2007). And t he S upreme Court has noted t hat a dist rict cour

t does not nece ssarily

abuse its discre tion when its denial of a c ontinuance results in the defe nse off

er i n g n o ev i dence

. Ungar , 376 U.S. at 589. Even if it is “ar g uable” that another court may

have gr anted the continuance —and we ag ree that it is definitely arguable unde r the circ umstances he re—“ the fa ct that something is a rg uable does not make it unconstitut ional.” Id. at 591. B ased on the timing of the reque st, the mention of Parker ’s treatment w ith Dr

. Be ere in the pretria l service s repor

t, Parker’ s knowledg e of his own tre atment, and de fense counsel’s acknow ledg ment that he knew Parker was unde rg oing c ounseling prior to his trial in this case, we

co n cl u d e t h at i twa s n o tan ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o nfo r t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt t o d en y t h e r eq u es t

. Al t h o u gh

we a re w ary to condo n e basing the denial of a continuanc e on def

ense c ounsel’s nee d to rely on a defe ndant with an alleg ed mental disability that aff ects his me mory

—and g iven these c onsiderations7

we may have de cided diff

ere ntly had we been the trial court—we cannot ag ree that the district court abused its discre tion here. We are also unpersua ded that Parker has satis fied his burden to demonstrate a ctual pre judice from the de nial “by

showing t h at a continuance would have made rele vant witnesses available or added something to the def ense.” Crossley , 22 4 F .3 d a t 85 5 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; see Un ite d S tat es v . H ar ris , 308 F. App’x 932, 938 (6th Cir. 2009) ( unpublished opinion) (“Ashowing of prejudice based on new evidence or newwitnesses that the de fenda nt would have pr oduced if the motion had been g rante d must be made with spec ificity .”). Par ker co ntends that if the cour t had g ra nte d a sh or t c ontin ua nc e , th e n “ the de fe ns e c ou ld h a ve of fe re d D r. B e e re a s a

wi tne ss to e xpla in to the jury

Parker ’s inability

to rec all any of t he events outlined in the indictment”—testimony that Parker asser ts would not have been presented to be ar on w hether Parker met the leg al def

inition of insanity or whe ther Parke r had the requisite mental state in a manner that implicates Rule 12.2(b). Appellant B r. at 20–21. I t is unclea r how Dr . Be ere ’s potential testimony , as Parke r cha rac terizes it on appeal, would ha

ve adde d to his d efe nse in a non-e x pert c apac ity that could esc ape the

re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 12 .2 (b ), e sp e c ia lly

in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t that Park e r did no t te sti fy a t tr ia l and

his counsel did not prese nt an ar g ument related to Parker ’s inability to r eca ll the events at issue. See id. (stating Dr. Be er e wo uld not have off ere d testimony

about an insanity

defe nse or pr ovided an “opinion on a[n] ultimate issue to be decide d by the trier of

fac t” but rathe r could have testified that “[i] n Dr. B eer e’s opinion Parke r’s amnesia wa s so compl et e that it was likely that another

‘alter ’ perf ormed these acts ”) ; R eply Br . at 2–3 (“ Dr. B eer e’s testimony would have only

conce rned Park e r’ s me nta l c on dit ion a t th e tim e of

[Dr . B e e re ’s ] tr e a tme nt o f P ark e r, no t th e tim e fr a me of his offe nses.”) . Under

the circ umstances a s prese nted to the district court, a nd even w ith the additional8

inf or ma tio n r e la tin g to D r. B e e re ’s po te nti a l te sti mony that Pa rk e r i nc lud e d in

his br ie f o n a

pp e a l,

we c annot conc lude that the district cour t abused its discretion in deny ing the continuance

. B. Denial of

P arker’ s Request for a U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 Depart ure “We do ‘not re view dec isions of a district cou rt n o t t o depar t downwar d unless the re cord ref lects that the district c ourt was not awar e of or did not understand its discretion to make suc h a depar ture.’” Un ite d S

tat es v . H e ath , 5 2 5 F. 3 d

4 5 1 , 4 5 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Pu c k e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 2005)). Althoug h he ac knowledg es that the district cour t here clea rly bo t h wa s aw ar e of a

nd understood its discretion to depa rt downwa

rd under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, Parke r ar g ues throug h counsel that the district court misapplied § 5K2.13 t o the fa cts here b e c a u s e t h e c o u rtm i s i n t e r

p r e t e d t h e “ v o l i t i o n a l p r o n g ” o f

t h e “ s i gn i f i c a nt l y r e d u c e d m e n t a l c a p a c i t y” de fi nit ion un de r § 5K 2. 13 . App e lla

nt B r. a t 27–2 8. We may re vie w the dis tr ic t court ’s de c isi on on ly to the extent required to dete rmine whe ther the c ourt incorr ectly applied § 5K2.13 as a matter of law, United States v. Santillana , 540 F.3d 428, 431 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct. 469 (2008), but we

may no t r e vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s of fa c t re la te d to § 5K 2. 13 , e ve n if “ ‘a c ourt ’s fa ilure to g rant a downwar d depar

ture is . . . base d on cl ea rl y err oneous finding s of fa ct,’” United States v. Pu c k e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Un ite d Sta te s v . Clar k , 3 85 F .3 d 6 09 , 6 23 (6 th Cir. 2004)), cert. de nied , 5 47 U. S. 1 12 2 ( 20 06 ); see also United States v . Jones , 445 F.3d 865, 868–69 (6th Cir.) (re aff

irming that circuit pre cede nt constraining revie w of a district court’s de cision not to depart downw ard to instance s where the court failed to r ecog nize or understand its discretion survived Booke r , b ut ho ld ing that “ Pu c k e tt did no t a lte r o ur

a bil ity to r e vie w t

he ov e ra ll

rea sonablene ss of a district cour t’s sentenc e”) , cert. de nied , 549 U.S. 912 (2006).9

The district cour

t utili zed the 2007 edition of t h e Gu i delines Manua l. Section 5K2.13, a policy statement, authorizes a sentenc ing c ourt to exercise its discretion to depa rt downwa

rd if “( 1) t h e d e f e n d an tc o m m i t t e d t h e o f

f e n s e w h i l e s u f

f e r i n g f r o m a s i g n i f i c an t l y r e d

u c e d m e n t a l c a

p a c i t y; and (2) the signific antly reduc ed mental capa city contributed substantially to the commission of the of fe ns e .” U. S.S. G. § 5 K2 .1 3 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he Ap pl ica tio n N ote de fi ne s “ sig nif ic a ntl y

re du c e d me nta l c a

pa c ity” to m e an th a t “ the de fe nd ant, a lth ou gh convic te d, ha s a sig nif ic a ntl y imp a ir e d a

bil ity to ( A) u nd ers tand

the wr on g fu lne ss o f t

he be ha vio r c omp ri sin g the of

fe ns e or to

e xer c ise the po we r of re a so n [(th e c og nit ive imp a ir me nts pr on g )]; or

(B ) control be havior that the defe ndant knows is wrong ful [(the voliti onal impairments prong )].” Id. cmt. n.1 (empha sis added); see U nited States v. Sadolsky , 2 34 F .3 d 938 , 942 (6 th Cir . 200 0) (e xpla ini ng ho w t he “ sig nif ic a ntl y reduc ed mental c apac ity ” def inition has two prongs) . “[Section] 5 K2.13 does not require a direc t

causa l link between the [si g nificantly reduc ed mental capa city ] and the crime c harg ed.” Sadolsky , 234 F.3d at 943 (explaining that the sig nificantly reduc ed mental c apac ity

may be a motivating fac tor in the offe nse but nee d not be par t of the off

ense c onduct itself). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t st a te e xplic itl y

that it fo un d th a t Park e r d id suffer fro m a

“ sig nif ic antl y re du c e d me nta l c a

pa c ity” a s d e fi ne d und e r § 5K 2. 13 . Ins te a d, the c ourt m o v e d d ir e c tly to apply ing the standard in § 5K2.13 f or whe ther or not someone with a sig nificantly reduc ed mental

c a p a c i t y m a y r e c e i v e a d o w n w ar d

d e p artu r e

—

w h e t h e r “ ( 1 ) t h e d e f

e n d an tc o m m i t t e d

t h e o f f e ns e wh ile su ff

e ri ngfr om a

sig nif ic ant ly redu ced

me nta l c a

pa c ity ; and (2) the sig nificantly reduc ed mental ca pacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offe nse.” U. S

. S

. G. § 5K2.13 (empha sis added). The court fir st found that “althoug h Dr. Be ere cer tainly diag nosed the de fenda nt

w i t h [ D ID ] , i ti s c e rt a i n l y n o tc l e ar an d i t ’ s c e r t a i n l y n o tp r o v e n , a tl e a s ti nm y v i e w , b y aParker argues that the district cour t relied on the w rong set of fac ts throug h lay

testimony 4 t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r

P ar k e r ’ s D ID d i a g n o s i s m e tt h e “ s i g n i f i c an t l y r e d

u c e d m e n t a l c a

p a c i t y” definition, which led the c ourt to ignor e the de finition’s volit ional prong . We may not reviewthe district court’s fa ctual finding s relate d to its decision not to gra nt the § 5K2.13 downwa

rd depar ture. Se e Pu c k

e tt , 422 F.3d at 346. The district court did discuss that trial testimony demonstrated that Parker a ppear ed to have “contr ol of his fac ulties” and did not “show[] t he s l i gh t es ts i gn s o f a nal t er

p er s o n al i t y ” du ri n g t h e t i m e p er i o d o f t h e o ff en s e, b u tt h es e m u s i n gs did not affe ct the district cour t’s application of § 5K 2.13. Doc. 80 ( Sent. Tr. at 123–25). As in Santillana , “[a]lt houg h we would be fre e to re view a c laim that [ Parker ]’s sentence 5 is unreasona

ble under the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, [Parker] did not raise such a claim in his appea l, thus 10 preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, that the de fenda nt committed the offe nses while suff eringfrom that

a ff lic tio n. ” Do c . 8 0 ( Se nt. Tr . at 123 ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt thu s f ound that Park e r h a d n ot m e t th e fi rs t require ment under § 5K2.13. The dist rict court next reje cted Parker’ s arg ument that he could mee t the sec ond require ment, stating that “[a]s suming for purposes of t his arg ument that he did suffe r fr om t hat pa rt ic ula r s ig nif ic antl y re du c e d me nta l c a

pa c ity , I do n’ t be lie ve that th e re ’s pr oo f t hat it substantially

contributed to the c ommissi on of the off enses he re.” Id. at 123–24. One c ould arg ue that the district court misapplied § 5K2.13 by assuming that Parker ’s DI D diag nosis met the standard for “ signific antly

reduc ed mental c apac ity ” instead of making a finding to that effe ct, but contra ry to Parker’ s argument on appea l, the court did not misapply § 5K2.13’s def

initions b y m ak i n g an improper f

inding—the c ourt made no finding , which wa s likel y t o P ar k er ’s benefit. The district 4 court moved dire ctly

to consideringwhether , assuming Par ker suf fer ed fr om a “sig nificantly r e d uced mental ca pacity ” under

§ 5K2.13, that s t at u s b oth was pre sent at the time Parke r committed the offe nse and c ontributed substantially to that commission. For these r easons, we conclude t hat the district court applied § 5K2.13 in a procedura lly proper manner that was not a misi nterpre tation of the law. Th e re fo re we do no t ha ve jur isd ic tio n to c on sid e r w he the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in its decision to not g rant a

depar ture unde r § 5K2.13. 5wa ivi ngfu rt he r r e vie w h e re ,” and

he “ ha s ma de no e ff

or t to de ve lop [an

ov e ra ll r e a so na

ble ne ss] argument here or elsew here in the rec ord” in re sponse to the g overnme nt’s notice in its brief that Parker ’s sentenc e wa s otherwise pr ocedur ally rea sonable. Santillana , 540 F.3d at 433 & n.1. Parker ’s brief

provides an ove rview of

the § 3553(a ) fa ctors and se ntencingrequire ments but do e s n ot a

rgue that any

oth e r a sp e c ts o f P ark e r’ s se nte nc e we re pr oc e dura lly or su bs tanti ve ly unrea sonable with re fer ence to those fac tors, and no such obje ctions were raised at the sentenc ing hear ing. See Doc. 80 ( Sent. Tr. at 105–51). 11 C. Use of “Intended L oss” Rather t han “Actual Los s” for U.S.S .G. § 2B1.1 Parker has re quested to file a

pro se supple m en t al b ri ef that asserts that the district cour t misapplied U.S.S.G. § 2 B1

. 1 i n its loss calc ulation beca use the c ourt utiliz ed a f

lawed “ intended loss” calc ulation that failed to make a c redit ag ainst the loss for money returne d and the va lue of

c o ll a te r a l. We h a v e c o n s id e r e d Pa r k e r ’ s p r o s e is s u e an d

w e c o n c lu d e th a t i t lacks merit. W e there fore deny

his request to file this supplemental brie f.

III . C ON CL USI ON For these re asons, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment. Al t h o u gh we que stion the district court’s rel i an ce o n the ability of a de fenda

nt with a potential mental-he alth problem that aff ects his memory to inf

orm his attorney of the ef

fec t of his mental-hea lth treatment, we conclude that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de ny in g P arke r’ s mo tio n f or a c on tin ua nc e in light of the other c ircumstance s prese nt here . The dist ri ct co u rt also did not misi nterpre t the applicable law under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, and we there fore conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Parker ’s further arguments related to the district c ourt’s decision not to apply § 5K2.13 to reduc e Parke r’s sente nce.