UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) DEMETRA BAYLOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1995 (ABJ) ) MITCHELL RUBENSTEIN & ) ASSOCIATES, P.C., ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation is sued by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson granting in part plaintiff’ s two motions for attorney’s fees and costs for work completed in furtherance of plaintiff’s su ccessful claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Report & Recommendation (Oct. 24, 2014) [Dkt. # 45]. Both parties objected to the Re port and Recommendation. Def.’s Objections to Report & Recommendation [Dkt. # 46] (“Def.’s Ob jections”); Pl.’s Ob jections to Report & Recommendation [Dkt. # 47] (“Pl.’s Objecti ons”). After considering the Report and Recommendation and the parties’ filings, in light of the applic able standard, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The Court will therefore grant plaintiff’s motions for attorney’s fees in part and will deny them in part, and will enter judgment for fees in the amount of $41,989.80, plus post-judgment interest. BACKGROUND The underlying litigation centers on plaintiff’s claim that defendant engaged in harassing and deceptive debt collection practices in violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. , the2 District of Columbia Debt Collec tion Law (DCDCL), D.C. Code § 28-3814 et seq. , and the District of Columbia Consumer Protec tion Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. See Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. On February 7, 2014, after th e parties briefed defenda nt’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff accepted defendant’s Rule 68 offer of judgment as to plaintiff’s federal claim only. Pl.’s Notice of Acceptance of Def.’s Rule 68 Offer of Judgment [Dkt. # 11]. The Clerk of Court entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor “in the amount of $1,001.00 plus costs and expenses together with reasonable attorney fees for a ll claims under the Fair De bt Collection Practices Act.” Judgment on Offer & Acceptance [Dkt. # 14]. Plaintiff then filed a motion pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) seeking $442.95 in costs and $155,700.00 in attorney’s fees for 346 hours of wo rk on plaintiff’s su ccessful FDCPA claim at the “prevailing market rate” of $450.00 per hour. Pl.’s Mot. for Award of Att’y’s Fees and Costs [Dkt. # 15] at 2; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Award of Att’y’s Fees and Costs [Dkt. # 15] (“Pl.’s 1st Fee Mot.”) at 12. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2, the Court referred the matter to a magistrate judge for preparation of a report and recommendation. Order Referring Mot. for Att’y’s Fees (Mar. 24, 2014) [Dkt. # 18]. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s fee motion, arguing that plaintiff’s fees were “grossly and intolerably exaggerated,” and requested that the Court deny plaintiff’s request in its entirety. Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s 1st Fee Mot. [Dkt. # 20] (“Def.’s 1st Fee Opp.”) at 1. Plaintiff subsequentlyrequested additional fees for drafting and filing her reply to defendant’s opposition, bringing her fee request to $195,332.00 1 for work expended on the complaint, the opposition to defe ndant’s motion to dismiss, and the fee petition and reply. Pl.’s Reply Mem. to Def.’s 1s t Fee Opp. [Dkt. # 21] (“Pl.’s 1st Fee Reply”) at 1.
1 Plaintiff revised her initia l 346 hour request downward to 345.74 hours, but added an additional 110.40 hours for drafting the reply to defendant’s opposition, to which plaintiff applied a twenty percent “discount.” Pl.’s Re ply Mem. to Def.’s 1st Fee Opp. (“Pl.’s 1st Fee Reply”) [Dkt. # 21] at 1 n.1.3 In July 2014, the Court granted in part and de nied in part defendant’s motion to dismiss, leaving only two of plaintiff’s claims under the DCDCL intact and dismissing the remainder of plaintiff’s state law cl aims. Order (July 8, 2014) [Dkt. # 26]; Mem. Op. (July 8, 2014) [Dkt. # 27]. In August 2014, defendant filed a motion fo r relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 60(b)(5), arguing that the FDCPA judgmenthad been satisfied. Def.’s Mot. for Relief from J. [Dkt. # 34]. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Pl.’ s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Relief from J. [Dkt. # 37]. The Court denied defendant’s motion and noted that: [B]oth parties have insisted upon clutteri ng the docket with pleadings that fall outside the ordinary motion, opposition, a nd reply called for by the federal and local rules. There would be little justification for the these sorts of excessive, repetitive, and unnecessarily sharp pleading s in any case, but in this case in particular, given the nature of the allegations and the amounts at stake, there has been a particularly striking expenditure of effort and resources on both sides that has tried the Court’s patience and wasted the Court’s time. Order (Sept. 11, 2014) [Dkt. # 41] at 2. The Co urt then permitted plaintiff “to amend her motion for attorney’s fees only to include the fees incurred in connection with her opposition to defendant’s motion for relief [from judgme nt], but not her proposed surreply.” Id. at 2–3. In response to the Court’s order, plaintiff s ubmitted an amendment to her original fee request, seeking an additional $19,440.00 for 43.20 hours expended in responding to defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. Amendment to Pl.’s 1st Fee Mot. [Dkt. # 42] (“Pl.’s 2nd Fee Mot.”). Defendant opposed plaintiff’s amended request, despite the fact that it was explicitly permitted by the Court, and again argued that pl aintiff’s fee award should be eliminated or drastically reduced because “[t]he time claimed by the Plaintiff reflects ‘grossly excessive hours.’” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Supp. Fee Pe tition [Dkt. # 43] (“Def.’s 2nd Fee Opp.”) at 2, quoting Bell v. Prefix, Inc. , 784 F. Supp. 2d 778, 783 (E.D. Mich. 2011). Plaintiff, after professing to be “perplexed” by defendant’s filing and considerate of the Court’s admonition to4 stop “cluttering the docket,” nevertheless file d a six-page reply to defendant’s two-page opposition, and requested an additional $5,940.00 for the 13.20 hours spent drafting that document. Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s 2nd Fee Opp. [Dkt. # 44]. After considering the parties’ many pleadings, Magistrate Judge Robinson issued a Report and Recommendation on October 24, 2014, recommending that plaintiff’s initial fee request of $195,332.00 be reduced by eighty-five percent because: (1) the hours requested for drafting and filing the complaint, the opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the fee petition were significantly more than would re asonably be required for that amount of work, Report & Recommendation at 8–9; (2) plaintiff in cluded in her request hours expended on the District of Columbia law claims, on which plaintiff did not prevail, id. at 9; (3) “some of the hours [plaintiff] expended had no purpose in the contex t of the status of this action” because the work was performed after defendant had alr eady offered to accept judgment on the FDCPA claims, id. at 9–10; and (4) plaintiff’s c ounsel failed to “heed the Court’s admonition to refrain from filing submissions that are ‘unnecessarilyenlarge[d] with sharp attacks’ on the opposing party and counsel.’” Id. at 10, quoting Minute Order (Feb. 11, 2014). The report also recommended reducing the 56.40 hours claimed in the second fee request by fifty percent, to 28.20 hours at the requested rate of $450 per hour, becau se plaintiff’s counsel “again engaged in the tactics against which the Court cauti oned, thus expending considerable unproductive activity.” Id. at 11. In total, then, the Magistrate Judge recommended awarding plaintiff $41,989.80 in attorney’s fees: $29,299.80 for the first fee request and $12,690.00 for the second fee request. The report also recommended awardi ng plaintiff all requested costs and postjudgment interest. Id.5 STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and Lo cal Rule 72.2, a court may refer nondispositive matters, including the award of a ttorney’s fees, to a Magistrate Judge for resolution. 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); LCvR 72.2(a). U pon referral, the Magistrate Judge “must promptly conduct the required proc eedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also LCvR 72.2(a). Once the Magistrate Judge issues his or her decision, any party may raise objections to that decision within fourteen days “after being served with the order.” LCvR 72.2(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The district court shall review “timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also LCvR 72.2(c). “Under that deferential standard, a ma gistrate judge’s factual findings or discretionary decisions must be affirmed unless, ‘although there is evidence to support [them], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firmconviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Am. Ctr. for Civil Justice v. Ambush , 794 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2011), quoting Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 130 F.R.D. 507, 508 (D.D.C. 1990).

2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), a court alternatively “may refer a motion for attorney’s fees to a magistrate ju dge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D ). Under those circumstances, the court would review a report and recommendati on prepared under Rule 72(b) de novo . Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also LCvR 72.3(c). But the Court did not make a Rule 72(b) referral in this case. Rather, the Court expressly referred the attorney fee dispute to the Magistrate Judge for decision pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. Order (Mar . 24, 2014) [Dkt. # 18] (“It is ordered that the Motion for Attorney’s Fees filed by plaintiff . . . is referred to a Magistrate Judge for preparation of a report and recommendation pursuant to L.Cv.R. 72.2.”). That rule permits a district judge faced with objections to a Report and Recommendation to “modify or set aside any portion of a magistrate judge’s order under this Rule found to be clearly err oneous or contrary to law.” LCvR 72.2(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (permitting referral of nondispositive matters to a magistrate judge and providing for modification where report is “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law”). Accordingly, that is the proper standard of review in ruling on th e parties’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report.6 ANALYSIS I. Attorney’s Fees A. Defendant’s Objections The Court begins with defendant’s objec tions to the Report and Recommendation. As a threshold matter, defendant incorrectly argu es that the Court should review the Report and Recommendation de novo

. See Def.’s Objections at 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Objections [Dkt. # 51] at 1–3. Where, as here, a nondispositive matter is referred to a magist rate judge pursuant to Local Rule 72.2 or Federal Rule 72(a), the re port and recommendation is reviewed under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. See LCvR 72.2(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also supra note 2. Rather than identifying any clear error committed by the Magistrate Judge, defendant instead offers a variety of old and ne w arguments for denying plaintiff’s fee request outright or reducing it even further, and i t asks this Court to review the Report and Recommendation’s findings and conclusions anew. Because defendant has not even attempted to show that the Report and Recommendation’s findings are clearlyerroneous, the Court could overrule defendant’s objections on that ground alone. However, even if defendant had properly fr amed its objections as assertions of clear error, defendant’s arguments would not warra nt modifying the Report and Recommendation. Defendant first urges the Court to deny plaintiff’s fee award altogether on the grounds that the “initial fee petition is shocking ly unreasonable” and that the supplemental fee petition is similarly “excessive and should shock the conscien ce of this Court.” Def.’s Objections at 3, 8. In support of its claim, defendant offers the follo wing arguments: that it is within the Court’s discretion to deny plaintiff any fee award where the request is so outrageous that it “shocks the conscience,” id. at 3–4, 8; that other districtcourts have completely denied fees for “far less7 egregious” requests, id. at 4–7; and that the Report and Re commendation “failed to consider the expert testimony of Melvin Hirshman, former Bar Counsel for the state of Maryland” on this point. Id. at 7. Not one of these allegations leaves the Court “‘ with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,’” Ambush , 794 F. Supp. 2d at 129, quoting Fed. Savs. & Loan, 130 F.R.D. at 508, simply because the Magistrate Judge awarded any fees at all. Neither the fact that a court may – but is not compelled to – exercise its discretion and decline to award fees where a request is “outrageously unreasonable,” nor the fact that other courts have completely denied fee requests in other cases, warrants a finding of clear error here. The cases cited by defendant permit, but do not mandate, rejecting an award outright and therefore cannot show that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on that poi nt was an abuse of discretion or clearly

erroneous. 3 The Report and Recommendati on acknowledged that a magistrate judge “may indeed have discretion to” “deny any award” wher e a fee request is outrageous or unreasonable. Report & Recommendation at 8 n.4, citing Carmel & Carmel PC v. Dellis Const., Ltd. , 858 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2012). However, the Magistra te Judge found that there was “no basis to exercise such discretion here,” and instead went on to “[d]eter mine a reasonable number of hours in accordance with the applicable authorities.” Id. “Ultimately the court has ‘broad discretion in deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded on the particular facts of each case.’” Poett v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 846 F. Supp. 2d 96,
3 Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc. , 71 F. Supp. 2d 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the case cited by defendant as “most analogous” to the present case, see Def.’s Objections at 5–6, does not change this result. In that FDCPA case, the court did not decline to award any fees at all, as defendant urges here. Rather, the court engaged in a de tailed analysis of the hours expended, and reduced the prevailing party’s fee request of more than $34,000 to an award of $3,675.00 – roughly eleven percent of the original request. Savino , 71 F. Supp. 2d at 176–77. In light of the end result in Savino , the recommendation that plaintiff be awarde d only fifteen percent of the first fee request and fifty percent of the second request can hardly be viewed as an abuse of discretion.8 99 (D.D.C. 2012), quoting Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Court cannot find that the Magistrate Judge abused this discretion in declining to deny plaintiff’s fee award in its entirety, especially in the context of the FDCPA, where “the fee award under § 1692k is mandatory in all but the most unusual circumstances.” Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson , 53 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1995), citing Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113–14 (3d Cir. 1991). In light of the sign ificant reduction to the total fee request recommended by the Magistrate Judge, the C ourt is unconvinced that the recommendation to award plaintiff any fees deviated so far from the FDCPA’s reasonableness standard that it constitutes clear error or is otherwise contrary to law. Cf. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co. , 146 F.3d 899, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Although a district court might in some circumstances consider a fee request . . . so ‘outrageously unreasonable’ that outright denial of the request or an item within the request would be appropriate . . . th e district court’s decision to award a lesser figure than the lodestar request, rather than denying the request outright, was within the district court’s discretion.”) (inte rnal citations omitted); Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs.,
LLC , 616 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 2010) (“We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in declining to categorically stri ke all compensation for [plaintiff’s counsel].”). Additionally, the fact that the report “failed to consider the expert testimony of Melvin Hirshman,” who “examined the pleadings and moti ons in this case and opined that the . . . hours claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel are ‘excessive and shocking,’” Def.’s Objections at 7 (citations omitted), is hardly grounds for rejecting the Re port and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge engaged in an independent review of the pleadings and motions, including specific time entries on plaintiff’s counsel’s time sheets, in reaching th e eighty-five and fifty percent reductions she applied to plaintiff’s fees. See Report & Recommendation at 8–11. A determination of the9 reasonableness of an attorney fee request – an issue which is squarely and singularly committed to the court’s discretion – is not the type of “s cientific, technical, or other specialized” area of inquiry that would require an ex pert to “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a ). The Magistrate Judge’s decision not to rely on Mr. Hirshman’s testimony is therefore not clear error. The Court also notes that defendant’s issu es with the number of hours claimed by plaintiff are, at least in part , a result of defendant’s own acti ons. Duplicative and unnecessary filings by defendant, especially the motion for relief from judgment and the objection to plaintiff’s court-approved supplem ental fee request, required plai ntiff to expend additional time and effort in responding and drove up the number of hours sought in the fee petitions. See generally Order (Sept. 11, 2014) at 2. To deny plai ntiff any fees whatsoever would reward defendant’s contentious behavior , which the Court will not do. Defendant’s objections on that ground are therefore overruled. In the alternative, defendant asks the Court to reduce the hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel from $450 to $175 per hour. Def.’s Objections at 9–11. But the problem with this challenge to the Magistrate Judg e’s Report and Recomme ndation is that defendant never once objected to the $450 hourly rate when it was reque sted by plaintiff in her first fee motion, see generally Def.’s 1st Fee Opp., or to that rate when it was requested by plaintiff in her second fee motion. See generally Def.’s 2nd Fee Opp.; see also Report & Recommendation at 3 (“Defendant, in its opposition, does not appear to dispute either Plaintiff’s entitlement to an award, or the hourly rate claimed by Plaintiff’s c ounsel.”). On that point, defendant claims that its argument that the fee award should be denied outright “challenge[d] not only the number of hours billed by Defendant [sic], but also the hourlyrate billed by Plaintiff’s counsel.” Def.’s10 Resp. to Pl.’s Objections at 14; see also id. (“[A]lthough Defendant advocates that this Court should deny any fee to Plaintiff’s counsel , Defendant’s opposition also puts at issue . . . the hourly rate claimed.”). But upon review of de fendant’s oppositions to both of plaintiff’s fee motions, the Court finds that they focused exclusively – and repeatedly – on the aggregate number of hours claimed and the argument that plaintiff’s fees shoul d be denied entirely. See generally Def.’s 1st Fee Opp.; Def.’s 2nd Fee Opp. Ther efore, the hourly rate issue has been waived. “‘[I]t would be fundamentally unfair to permit a litigant to set its case in motion before the magistrate, wait to see which way the wind was blowing, and – having received an unfavorable recommendation – shift ge ars before the district court.’” Aikens v. Shalala , 956 F. Supp. 14, 23 (D.D.C. 1997), quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. , 840 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1988). Defendant failed to contest the reasonable ness of plaintiff’s hourly rate before the Magistrate Judge, and this Court will not now consider that untimely objection. See id. (“[T]his court will not consider ‘an argument which could have been, but inexplicably was not, presented’ to the Magistrate Judge in the first instance.”), quoting Paterson-Leitch , 840 F.2d at 991. In any event, the Court cannot find that it was clear error for the Magistrate Judge to accept the Laffey matrix rate of $450.00 per hour for plaintiff’s counsel’s
work where defendant offered no altern ative rate in opposing the fee motions. In sum, defendant has not shown that the Magistrate Judge’s findings are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. For that re ason, the Court will overrule defendant’s objections. B. Plaintiff’s Objections Plaintiff’s submissions are not a significant improvement over defendant’s when it comes to the standard of review; ind eed, plaintiff invites the Court to apply both the clear error and de11 novo tests. See Pl.’s Objections at 4. While plaintiff rais es a host of objections to the Report and Recommendation, she also falls short of identifying any clear errors that would warrant rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Plaintiff first asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in reducing the fee award on the grounds that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in unproductive, wasteful, and duplicative activity. 4 Id. at 5–7. The Report and Recommendation determined that the 346 hours plaintiff’s counsel claims she spent “litigating the FDCPA claims in this case” constituted excessive and unnecessary effort. 5 Report & Recommendation at 8–9 (“[I]n th e context of this action, the term ‘litigation’ is misplaced: the only ‘litigation’ in whic h Plaintiff engaged prior to filing [her initial fee motion] was the filing of the co mplaint, and the filing of an oppositio n . . . to the defendants’ 4 Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge mis takenly stated that plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss was “‘confined to le ss than one page of text.’” Pl.’s Objections at 5, quoting Report & Recommendation at 9. Plain tiff did file a brief “Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” but also filed a twenty-f our page “Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” which included seventeen pages relate d to the FDCPA claims on which plaintiff prevailed. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8] at 1–17. Plaintiff did so notwithstanding the fact that the Local Rules of this Court require only the filing of a single memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to a motion. See LCvR 7(b). In any event, this small oversight by the Magistrate J udge is not dispositive, as the Report and Recommendation identifies a variety of reasons for recommending that plaintiff’s initial and supplemental fee petitions be reduced by ei ght-five and fifty percent, respectively. 5 Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate J udge’s conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel “‘expressly concedes that some of the hours expended had no purpose in the context of this action,’” referring to the 87 hours plaintiff’s couns el spent drafting her opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss “‘in spite of the fact that De fendants had already offered to accept judgment on said claims.’” Pl.’s Objections at 6, quo ting Report & Recommendation at 9–10. Plaintiff’s counsel avers that she was unaware of the ex tended Rule 68 offer un til after she filed the opposition. Id. at 6–7. While it may be true that plainti ff did not pick up the offer of judgment from her mailbox until January 29, 2014, two days af ter she filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss, the offer of judgment was delivered to the address identified by plaintiff’s counsel as her law firm on January 17, 2014, well be fore the opposition was due. See Ex. A to Pl.’s Fee Reply [Dkt. # 21-1]. Plaintiff’s counsel’s apparent failure to pick up this mail cannot serve as the basis for an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that at least a portion of the 87 hours plaintiff spent opposing the mooted motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim was wasteful or unnecessary. Plaintiff’s objection on that ground is therefore overruled.12 motion to dismiss.”). After reviewing the case law and plaintiff’s counsel’s time sheets, the Court cannot find clear error in that determination and the subsequent fee reductions, especially in light of the degree of success plain tiff’s counsel attained for her client. In fact, the Court finds that the roughly 93 hours’ worth of work for which the report recommends compensating plaintiff far more accurately reflects what would be expected for a reasonable attorney to complete those various filings. The reductions here are reasonable and plaintiff was awarded a quite generous portion of her requested fees in comparison to similarly situated prevailing parties. See, e.g. , Beasley v. Red Rock Fin. Servs., LLC , 589 F. App’x 138, 141, 143 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of discre tion where trial court reduced fee request of $52,120.00 to an award of $5,000.00 based on the limited statutory damages the plaintiff had recovered under the FDCPA); Savino , 71 F. Supp. 2d at 174, 177 (reducing the plaintiff’s fee request of more than $34,000 to an award of $3,675.00 in FDCPA action). Plaintiff benefits from the clear error standard here, and her obj ection on that ground will therefore be overruled. Plaintiff further argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in reducing plaintiff’s fee award for time spent on the District of Columbia claims on which plaintiff did not prevail. Pl.’s Objections at 5, 7–9. Plaintiff c ontends that she is entitled to “seek reimbursement for such claims as said claims are based on the same common nucleus of operative facts as the FDCPA claims.” 6 Id. at 5. While that may be true, where “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a 6 Plaintiff also argues that the reduction for time expended on the District of Columbia claims is improper because defendant did not raise that argument. Pl.’s Objections at 8. But the Court – and the Magistrate Judge – is required to consider not only whether there are unrelated, unsuccessful claims that should be discounted from a fee award, but also whether the fee award is reasonable in light of the level of success attained for the client. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Thus, the Magistrate J udge was required to determine whether the requested fee award was reasonable in light of the limited success on plaintiff’s claims and to reduce the fee award accordingly, regardless of whether defendant raised that point.13 reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount . . . even where the plainti ff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983). 7 That is precisely the case here, where plai ntiff’s counsel sought more than $220,000 in fees for a successful FDCPA claim worth only $1,001.00 to her client. The Magistrate Judge was therefore justified in reducing plaintiff’s fee award to reflect the fact that she succeeded on only one individual claim, and the Court will no t find clear error in that determination. See F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Magaw , 102 F.3d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Even in cases where claims are interrelated, courts s hould proportion fees to the ‘significa nce of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reas onably expended on the litigation.’”), quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Plaintiff further maintains that the Magistrate Judge erred in reducing plaintiff’s fee award for hours expended in drafting and filing s ubmissions that were “unnecessarily enlarge[d] with sharp attacks” on the opposin g party. Pl.’s Objections at 9–11; see also Report & Recommendation at 10, quoting Minute Order (Fe b. 11, 2014). Plaintiff cites no law for her assertion that it was clear error for the Magistrate Judge – in exercising her broad discretion in awarding fees – to apply a percentage reduction to plaintiff’s fee award based on the volume of unproductive and wasteful activity that violated an explicit order to be respectful in pleadings filed before the Court. She variously argues th at the Court’s order only prohibited attacks on opposing counsel , not on the opposing party ; that the order did not apply to the fee motions; and that “reasonable minds may differ as to whether” plaintiff’s comments directed at the opposing

7 While Hensley involved a different fee-shifting stat ute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, this Circuit applies that case’s rule to “all federal statutes limiting fee awards to ‘prevailing part[ies].’” George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks , 963 F.2d 1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1992), quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.14 party constituted “sharp attacks. ” Pl.’s Objections at 9–10. None of these arguments supports a finding of clear error. Plaintiff was twice unambiguously directed to refrain from unfounded and hyperbolic attacks on her opponent, 8 and she failed to do so. See Report & Recommendation at 10–11 (describing the various instances in which plaintiff “engaged in the tactics against which the Court cautioned”). The Magistrate Judge properl y exercised her discretion in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to fees for hours spent engaging in those wasteful and unnecessary actions, and that such behavior warranted a percentage reduction in plaintiff’s total fee award. See, e.g. , Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am . v. Brand Energy Servs. LLC , 746 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126 (D.D.C. 2010) (“If a court determines that . . . waste of effort has occurred, it has the discretion to simply reduce the proposed fee by a reasonable amount without an item-by-item accounting.”), citing LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Plaintiff’s objection on that ground is therefore overruled. Finally, plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the FDCPA does not mandate a fee award in the lodestar am ount. Pl.’s Objections at 12–16. Plaintiff argues that “the lodestar method is appropriate” in the fee-shifting context, id. at 12, that it is “the established method” for calculating such fees, id. , that it is the “prevailing method of fee calculation,” id. at 13, and that it “is the appropriate method” for determining fees. Id. at 16. The fact that the lodestar method is usually the proper approach to determining fees does not

8 See Minute Order (Feb. 11, 2014) (“[T]he Court n eed not exercise its jurisdiction to permit parties to file pleadings that are unnecessari ly enlarged with sharp attacks on counsel such as ‘defendant disingenuously assert s,’ or ‘defendant absurdly argues,’ or ‘it is hard to believe that defendants would stoop to such a blatant mischar acterization.’”); Order (Sept. 11, 2014) at 2 (“There would be little justification for the these sorts of excessive, repetitive, and unnecessarily sharp pleadings in any case, but in this case in particular . . . there has been a particularly striking expenditure of effort and resources on both sides that has tried the Court’s patience and wasted the Court’s time.”).15 conflict with the Magistrate Judge’s statement that it is not mandatory in the FDCPA context where circumstances justify a departure from the lodestar amount. Although no court in this circuit appears to have squarely a ddressed the issue, the Court finds the Fourth Circuit’s analysis persuasive on this point: [Section] 1692k does not mandate a fee awar d in the lodestar amount. If the concept of discretion is to have any meaning at all, it must encompass the ability to depart from the lodestar in appropriate circumstances. Hensley itself recognized that, in certain circumstances, an award in the lodestar amount may be excessive. When “a plaintiff has achie ved only partial or limited success,” the district court, in calculating an appropriate fee award, “may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Carroll , 53 F.3d at 629, quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436–37; accord Dowling v. Litton Loan Servicing LP , 320 F. App’x 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the plaintiff has achieved only partial success, the award may be adjusted as necessary to achieve a reasonable result.”); Thornton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP , 312 F. App’x 161, 164 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no abuse of discretion where the “district c ourt reduced the lodestar amount by 85% in the light of the nominal amount of the statutory damages awar d that [plaintiff] received” under FDCPA). The Magistrate Judge did not commit clear error when she followed the guidance of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in declin ing to award plaintiff the full lodestar amount under circumstances where “the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigatio n... times a reasonable hourly rate” resulted in “an excessive amount” in light of the “only partial or limited success” attained by plaintiff’s counsel on plaintiff’s claims. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436; see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA , 559 U.S. 573, 598 & n.16 (2010) (noting that “courts have discretion in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees” under the FDCPA, and that while “[m]any District Courts apply a lodestar method,” those courts “permit[]16 downward adjustments in appropriate circumstances”). Plaintiff’s objection on this point is therefore overruled. The Court concludes that plain tiff has failed to demonstrate that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. For that reason, the Court will overrule plaintiff’s objections. II. Costs Defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that plaintiff be awarded $442.95 in costs, and argues that costs have already been paid to plaintiff along with the judgment of $1,001.00 in plaintiff’s favor. Def.’s Objections at 12, citing Report & Recommendation at 11. Defendant has indeed presented plaintiff with a check for $1,443.95, see Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. for Relief from J. [Dkt. # 34- 5], and by plaintiff’s own admission, that check has been deposited in plaintiff’s counsel’s clie nt trust account. Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Relief from J. [Dkt. # 37] at 1 n.1. The Court will not revise the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on this point, as costs have been paid to plaintiff and this part of the report has therefore already been satisfied. III. Post-Judgment Interest The parties did not object to the Report a nd Recommendation’s award of post-judgment interested to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will adopt that section of the report in its entirety. IV. Additional Fees Plaintiff requests compensation for an add itional 63 hours of time spent researching and drafting the objections to the Magistrate Judg e’s report, Pl.’s Objections at 17, and for 44.1 hours for researching and drafting plaintiff’s response to defendant’s objections. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Objections [Dkt # 49] at 2. Because these reques ts do not in any way relate to the success of17 plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, or to the opposition to defendant’s motion for relief from judgment for which the Court authorized plaintiff to seek fe es, the Court finds that these requests are “too attenuated from the adjudication of the . . . complaint to be reimbursable.” Wright v. District of Columbia , 883 F. Supp. 2d 132, 134 (D.D.C. 2012). Granting plaintiff an additional $48,195.00 for objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s genero us recommendation that plaintiff be awarded $41,989.80 is simply not warranted. Plaintiff’s reque st for reimbursement for these additional fees is therefore denied. CONCLUSION The Court finds that neither pl aintiff nor defendant has demons trated that the Magistrate Judge committed clear error or that the Report and Recommendation was contrary to law. Therefore, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. As a result, the Court will grant plaintiff’s motions for attorney’s fees in part and will deny them in part, and will enter judgment for fees in the amount of $41,989.80, plus post-judgment in terest. A separate order will issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge DATE: January 6, 2015