UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS 

No. 20-3367 

DANIEL D. BARRY, APPELLANT, 

V. 

DENIS MCDONOUGH, 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. 

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals 

(Argued October 25, 2021 Decided February 3, 2022) 

Kenneth H. Dojaquez, of Topeka, Kansas, for the appellant. 

Melissa C. Loomis, with whom James M. Byrne, General Counsel; Mary Ann Flynn, Chief 

Counsel; and Sarah W. Fusina, Deputy Chief Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief 

for the appellee. 

Before ALLEN, FALVEY, and JAQUITH, Judges. 

ALLEN, Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. JAQUITH, Judge, filed an opinion 

concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

ALLEN, Judge: As a general matter, VA compensates veterans for service-connected 

conditions by applying the Schedule for Rating Disabilities, which is meant to reflect the average 

impairment in earning capacity those conditions cause.1

 But Congress has also provided that, under 

certain circumstances, veterans will be entitled to receive compensation at a disability rate above 

that provided in the rating schedule. One device for providing such additional compensation is 

special monthly compensation (SMC).2

 This appeal concerns certain aspects of the SMC structure 

Congress has created and VA has implemented through its regulations. 

Appellant Daniel D. Barry served the Nation honorably in the U.S. Army from July 1969 

to November 1971.3 We gratefully acknowledge Mr. Barry's extraordinary service in Vietnam, for 

which he earned a Purple Heart. In this appeal, which is timely and over which the Court has 

1 See 38 U.S.C. § 1155; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(a). 

2 See 38 U.S.C. § 1114. 

3

 Record (R.) at 3326. 
2 

jurisdiction,4 he contests a March 16, 2020, Board of Veterans' Appeals decision that denied 

entitlement to SMC at the rate payable under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(n).5

This matter was submitted to a panel of the Court principally to address 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.350(f)(3), a portion of the regulation VA promulgated to implement the SMC program 

Congress established. As we will explain, § 3.350(f)(3) allows a veteran to receive an intermediate 

or half-step rating increase in SMC under certain circumstances, a rating device we will describe 

in more detail below.6 The specific question we address today is whether § 3.350(f)(3) may be 

used more than once to provide for such an intermediate or half-step rating increase for SMC. In 

other words, does § 3.350(f)(3) provide for only one intermediate rating or may it be used to 

provide multiple intermediate ratings subject only to the maximum rate payable for SMC? Because 

we hold that § 3.350(f)(3) entitles a claimant to receive only one half-step rating increase in SMC 

benefits, we conclude that the Board did not err when it failed to discuss the possibility of 

entitlement to any additional half-step ratings under § 3.350(f)(3). We also conclude that 

appellant's other arguments on appeal are without merit. Accordingly, we will affirm the March 

2020 Board decision. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Since 1971, appellant has been receiving disability compensation benefits for injuries he 

suffered as a result of a landmine explosion that led to an above-the-knee amputation of his right 

leg. In addition to SMC benefits appellant receives for above-the-knee amputation of his right leg, 

loss of use of both feet, and loss of use of one eye, appellant is service connected for PTSD (with 

a 70% disability rating), a right shoulder condition (60%), a left shoulder condition (50%), a left 

eye disability (30%), left eye disfigurement (30%), bilateral hearing loss (20%), a lumbar spine 

injury (10%), a right hand injury (10%), left and right hip disabilities (10% each), hypertension 

(10%), and tinnitus (10%). He also has noncompensable service-connected disabilities that are not 

at issue here. Appellant has had a combined 100% disability rating since 1971, to which VA has 

added his SMC benefits. 

4 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a). 

5

 R. at 5-10. 

6

 We use "half-step" and "intermediate" interchangeably in this opinion. 
3 

Relevant to this appeal, appellant receives SMC benefits under section 1114(p), title 38, 

U.S. Code, at an intermediate rate, that is a rate between sections 1114(m) and 1114(n) per 38 

C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). Appellant sought an increase in SMC, which was ultimately denied by the 

regional office (RO), and appellant appealed to the Board. After the Board ruled against him, 

appellant appealed to this Court. In August 2019, the Court remanded appellant's claim for 

increased SMC under section 1114(n) because the Board failed to consider SMC exceptions under 

§ 3.350(f)(4). Appellant raised no issues concerning an increased SMC rating under § 3.350(f)(3); 

his appeal focused entirely on (f)(4). 

In March 2020, the Board issued the decision on appeal, concluding that appellant is not 

entitled to SMC at the rate provided under section 1114(n). The Board explained that appellant 

already receives an intermediate rate increase under § 3.350(f)(3), and the exception under § 

3.350(f)(4) that allows for a full step increase was not available to appellant given the nature of his 

disabilities. As to subsection (f)(4), the Board recognized that independent of appellant's loss of 

use in the lower extremities (a reason why he receives SMC benefits already), his additional 

disabilities are collectively rated at 100%.7

 But the Board went on to explain that the exception 

allowing increased SMC under "(f)(4) requires that the separate 100[%] disabling disability be a 

single disability, not simply a combination of disabilities stemming from the same etiology."8 The 

Board assessed the differences in the language between § 3.350(f)(3) and (f)(4) to support its 

conclusion.9

 This appeal followed. 

II. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Appellant's primary argument on appeal is that the Board misinterpreted § 3.350(f)(3) and, 

therefore, erred when it did not consider whether he was entitled to additional SMC benefits under 

that provision. Appellant posits that intermediate ratings under § 3.350(f)(3) are not limited to just 

one half-step increase. Rather, he asserts that the plain language of the regulation provides for as 

many intermediate increases as a claimant's condition can justify, subject only to the maximum 

SMC rate Congress has set. In that regard, he provides an example of how he believes § 3.350(f)(3) 

should have been applied in his case. His application goes like this: we start with appellant's 

7

 R. at 6-7. 

8

 R. at 7. 

9

 R. at 7-9. 
4 

entitlement to SMC(m) based on the loss of use of his legs; then VA should consider that he has a 

70% rating for PTSD that allows him to go up one intermediate step to receive compensation at 

the SMC(m 1/2) level; then VA should consider that he has two 30% ratings for left eye conditions 

that combine to make a 50% rating, which entitles him to another intermediate step to receive 

compensation at the SMC(n) level; then combining his left and right shoulder ratings, he would 

get another intermediate increase up the SMC(n 1/2) level; and finally, the remainder of his 

disabilities combine to a 50% rating that entitles him to obtain the maximum rate for SMC benefits, 

provided for at the SMC(o) level.10

Alternatively, appellant argues that § 3.350(f)(4) provides grounds for him to obtain SMC 

at a higher rate. He doesn't contest the Board's decision that none of his disabilities are 

independently rated at 100% such that he would be entitled to greater SMC benefits under 

subsection (f)(4).11 Rather, he maintains that § 3.350(f)(4) is invalid because it prohibits a total 

disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) awarded under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 from 

being used as the equivalent of a 100% rating for a single disability, such that subsection (f)(4) 

would warrant an increase in his SMC compensation. He explains that his request for increased 

SMC compensation raised the issue of entitlement to TDIU, which, as we noted, he argues equates 

to a total disability rating that would make him eligible for increased SMC under § 3.350(f)(4). 

Therefore, he posits that "the Secretary's restriction in § 3.350(f)(4) that only a 100% schedular 

rating can qualify a veteran for a full increase in SMC benefits is contrary to [his] own 

regulations."12 

Finally, appellant raises a second alternative argument, asserting that the record reasonably 

raises the issue of entitlement to an extraschedular rating under the current version of 38 C.F.R. § 

3.321(b). He contends that what he characterizes as his request for a total rating was enough to 

raise the issue of entitlement to an extraschedular rating under § 3.321(b), and the Board erred by 

not considering it.13

10 The record reflects that appellant has been receiving SMC at the (m 1/2) level since 2005, R. at 573, so we assume 

that appellant's explanation in his brief starting at the lower (m) level is merely for demonstrative purposes. 

11 Because he raises no argument about this point, he has abandoned any appeal about it. See Pederson v. McDonald, 

27 Vet.App. 276, 283 (2015) (en banc). 

12 Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 15. 

13 Id. at 8. 
5 

For his part, the Secretary argues that appellant's interpretation of § 3.350(f)(3) is 

incompatible with the regulatory and statutory scheme for the provision of SMC benefits. The 

Secretary explains that a plain reading of § 3.350(f)(3), and review of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(p), the 

relevant portion of the authorizing statute, provides for only one intermediate step increase for any 

additional disabilities independently rated at 50% or more, not multiple intermediate step 

increases. He also notes that appellant raised this argument for the first time before the Court in 

this appeal and urges us to decline to address it. During oral argument, the Secretary maintained 

that if the Court concludes that § 3.350(f)(3) is ambiguous, then his interpretation should receive 

deference.14 

Second, the Secretary asserts that the Court should reject appellant's argument that 

§ 3.350(f)(4) is invalid not only because appellant raised this argument for the first time on appeal 

(just as he raised the subsection (f)(3) argument), but also because appellant does not contest the 

Board's determination that he is ineligible for a full step increase under § 3.350(f)(4) other than 

with respect to TDIU. But, the Secretary continues, appellant has not been adjudicated to be 

entitled to TDIU. So, because he is not in receipt of TDIU and does not contest the Board's 

determination that he is ineligible for a full step increase under § 3.350(f)(4), the Secretary 

maintains that appellant's request that the Court invalidate the portion of (f)(4) addressing TDIU 

is tantamount to asking the Court to issue a prohibited advisory opinion. The Secretary then asserts 

that if the Court decides to address the issue on the merits, appellant's argument fails because the 

regulation's express prohibition on using TDIU to justify a full-step increase is not unlawful. 

Finally, the Secretary asserts that the Court should not address entitlement to an 

extraschedular rating under § 3.321(b) because that issue was neither expressly argued to the Board 

nor reasonably raised by the record. He states that the purpose of extraschedular ratings is to 

compensate veterans when their disabilities are incapable of evaluation under the rating schedule. 

And here, appellant has not argued that any of his service-connected disabilities is so severe or 

manifests in such unusual or extraordinary symptoms that a schedular rating is inadequate. 

In his reply brief, appellant did not address the Secretary's assertions that the issues 

concerning §§ 3.350(f)(3) and (f)(4) are raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, the Court 

should not consider them. However, during oral argument he urged us to exercise our discretion 

14 Oral Argument at 43:22-43:29, Barry v. McDonough, U.S. Vet. App. No. 20-3367 (oral argument held Oct. 25, 

2021), http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/oral_arguments_audio.php. 
6 

to hear his arguments on the merits. Additionally, appellant concedes that he never argued that the 

rating schedule was not capable of compensating his individual disabilities. Rather, he clarified 

that his extraschedular rating argument is that because he asked for a total rating under § 

3.350(f)(4), the Board was required to consider whether referral for an extraschedular rating under 

§ 3.321(b) was warranted.15 

III. ANALYSIS

 As we noted above, appellant's principal argument on appeal concerns the operation of 38 

C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). He then provides a first alternative argument focusing on 38 C.F.R. § 

3.350(f)(4) and a second alternative under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b). We will follow appellant's lead 

and consider these arguments in the order of priority he has used. But before doing so, we must 

consider an antecedent question about whether we should address the arguments on the merits at 

all, given that appellant did not raise any of them before the Board. 

A. Issue Exhaustion

 Our first task is to consider whether to invoke the doctrine of issue exhaustion and decline 

to address appellant's arguments, all of which have been raised for the first time on appeal to this 

Court. Traditionally, when presented with an argument newly raised on appeal over which we have 

jurisdiction, the Court has discretion to hear the argument, decline to address it, or remand the 

matter as appropriate.16 Exercising this discretion entails a case-by-case analysis that weighs 

appellant's interests against the "institutional interests the doctrine exists to service."17 The law 

continues to recognize the longstanding "importance of issue exhaustion with respect to 

administrative tribunals" because "'orderly procedure and good administration require that 

objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while [the agency] has 

opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts.'"18 

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that issue exhaustion is 

appropriate when "[a] veteran raises an argument for the first time on appeal to the Veterans Court 

15 Reply Br. at 7. 

16 Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377-89 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also 38 U.S.C. §. 7252(a). 

17 Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377. 

18 Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 

344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)). 
7 

and the Veterans Court determines that the VA's institutional interests outweigh the interests of 

the veteran under the balancing test set forth in Maggitt."19 In Maggitt, the Federal Circuit held 

that, because exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement in the 

veterans benefits system, this Court may hear arguments raised before it in the first instance 

provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the appeal. 

We acknowledge that recently, in Carr v. Saul, the Supreme Court addressed issue 

exhaustion in the context of nonadversarial administrative proceedings before the Social Security 

Administration (SSA). In that context, and with respect to the particular argument at issue in Carr, 

the Supreme Court held that it was error for a court to impose an issue-exhaustion requirement on 

constitutional challenges not raised before the SSA.20 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that 

claimants who applied for SSA disability benefits and who had hearings conducted or decisions 

issued by an administrative law judge (ALJ) whose appointment purportedly was not in accordance 

with the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution were not required to assert such 

Appointments Clause challenges before the SSA and could appropriately raise them for the first 

time in Federal court. 21 The Supreme Court explained that in nonadversarial administrative 

proceedings the issue exhaustion doctrine should not be used for, at least, constitutional questions, 

"which usually fall outside the adjudicator's areas of technical expertise[,]" and futile questions, 

which are questions that are beyond the authority of an agency to address.22 But the Supreme Court 

also suggested that "in the sphere of routine objections to individual benefits determinations, the 

scales might tip differently."23 

It may be that Carr has affected how courts should consider issue exhaustion in the context 

of veterans benefits determinations. While the Supreme Court specifically addressed the concept 

in connection with SSA administrative adjudication, the Court's reasoning was frequently based 

on the more general differences between adversarial and nonadversarial proceedings.24 However, 

19 Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Scott, 789 F.3d at 1377-81 (addressing contexts 

in which the requirement of issue exhaustion is appropriate). 

20 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1362 (2021). 

21 Id. at 1362. 

22 Id. at 1360-61. 

23 Id.; id. at 1360 n.5. 

24 Id. at 1358-62. 
8 

while we have considered Carr, we need not assess its potential implications today. That is so 

because we conclude that it is appropriate for us to consider all appellant's arguments on the merits 

based on traditional issue exhaustion principles, which, if anything, provide for issue exhaustion 

to be employed in more situations than is likely the case under Carr. 

We begin with appellant's argument that 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(4) is invalid. Though 

appellant raised this argument for the first time on appeal, it is clearly appropriate for us to consider 

this argument. The Board is bound by VA regulations.25 So, it would have been futile for appellant 

to raise this argument before the Board. "Resort to the administrative process is futile if the agency 

will almost certainly deny any relief . . . because it . . . lacks jurisdiction over[] the matter."26 And 

as the Supreme Court recently held in Carr, "[i]t makes little sense to require litigants to present 

claims to adjudicators who are powerless to grant the relief requested. Such a vain exercise will 

rarely 'protect administrative agency authority' or 'promot[e] judicial efficiency.'"27 Therefore, it is 

appropriate for us to consider appellant's argument concerning the invalidity of § 3.350(f)(4). 

We will also exercise our discretion to address appellant's arguments concerning § 

3.350(f)(3) and § 3.321(b) on the merits. These arguments call on us to make purely legal 

determinations. And when we decide such legal questions, we do so de novo.28 Of course, we 

recognize that an agency has an important interest in addressing regulations within its expertise 

even if a court will usually interpret those regulations without deference to the agency.29 Therefore, 

we acknowledge that there are institutional factors that weigh in favor of employing issue 

exhaustion principles here. But on balance we believe that the individual interests carry the day. 

Appellant is in a favored class: veterans. His challenge in large measure does not call on the 

Agency to employ its expertise and apply legal principles to assess his particular circumstances. 

Instead, he asks that the Court make certain legal determinations that would frame how the Agency 

25 See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(c). 

26 Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 1, 39 (2019) (quoting Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 

90, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 

27 Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1361 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). 

28 See Foster v. McDonough, 34 Vet.App. 338, 344-45 (2021); see also Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 532, 539 (1993) 

(en banc).

29 See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 485 (1986) ("Because of the agency's expertise in administering its 

own regulations, the agency ordinarily should be given the opportunity to review application of those regulations to a 

particular factual context."). 
9 

would assesses his claims. And the appellate judicial process has allowed VA to advance its views 

about the legal questions at issue, protecting the institutional interests we recognize are in play. 

And finally, appellant was represented by a non-attorney agent before the Board. Given the 

complex legal issues at the core of appellant's arguments on appeal, the lack of a lawyer before the 

Agency cuts in appellant's favor. Accordingly, after carefully balancing the competing interests at 

stake, we will exercise our discretion to address appellant's arguments in the first instance.30 

B. Interpretation of § 3.350(f)(3) 

We begin with basic, and likely familiar, principles underlying our interpretative endeavor. 

Questions of regulatory interpretation are questions of law that the Court reviews de novo.31 The 

basics of regulatory interpretation are well established. We look first to text and structure of a 

regulation, which is the best indication of its plain meaning.32 If the plain meaning of the regulation 

is clear on its face, then such plain meaning controls, and "that is 'the end of the matter.'"33 

While the plain language of a regulation is critically important to the interpretive effort, it 

is not uncommon for courts to consider other things to assess a regulation's meaning. In other 

words, regulatory interpretation requires the Court to "bring all its interpretative tools to bear" and 

to "make a conscientious effort to determine, based on indicia like text, structure, history, and 

purpose, whether the regulation really has more than one reasonable meaning."34 As Justice Kagan 

recently made clear on behalf of the Supreme Court, "a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just 

because it found the regulation impenetrable on first read. Agency regulations can sometimes make 

the eyes glaze over. But hard interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often 

be solved."35 A regulation could be genuinely ambiguous to the extent it may not directly address 

an issue, or it may prove susceptible to more than one reasonable reading when applied to some 

30 Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1360-61; Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377. 

31 See Foster, 34 Vet.App. at 344-45. 

32 See Goodman v. Shulkin, 870 F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

33 Tropf v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 317, 320 (2006) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994)); see also 

Kisor v. Wilkie, __U.S. __, __, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).

34 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421; see Savage v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 259, 265 (2011) (citing Black & Decker Corp. v. 

Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 986 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir.1993) ("Regulations, like statutes, are interpreted according to 

canons of construction.")). 

35 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
10 

fact patterns.36 But a regulation is not ambiguous simply because both parties insist that the plain 

meaning supports his or her position and neither party's interpretation is unreasonable to the 

Court.37 

 Before we turn to § 3.350(f)(3) in particular, a little background about SMC is in order to 

provide context. SMC is available when a veteran's service-connected disability or disabilities 

cause "additional hardships above and beyond those contemplated by VA's schedule for rating 

disabilities."38 The rate of SMC "varies according to the nature of the veteran's service-connected 

disabilities."39 Basic levels of SMC are listed in section 1114(k), providing for compensation 

where a veteran, as a result of service-connected disability, has also suffered one of the listed forms 

of anatomical loss. 

 A veteran who meets the requirements set out in section 1114(k) can potentially receive 

additional benefits through the SMC structure Congress has created. Namely, higher levels of SMC 

may be awarded if, in addition to one or more of the disabilities specified in subsection (k), the 

veteran also meets the requirements for any of the rates specified in subsections (l) through (o).40

And, in cases where a veteran is entitled to an SMC rate between (l) and (n) and also has additional 

service-connected disabilities not captured by any SMC rate, the SMC rate can be increased by 

either a half or a full step, but not more than the maximum SMC rate set out in subsection (o).41

Specifically, section 1114(p) provides that "in the event the veteran's service-connected disabilities 

exceed the requirements for any of the rates prescribed in this section, the Secretary may allow the 

next higher rate or an intermediate rate, but in no event in excess of $4,667." 

 Now let's turn to the focus of this appeal concerning SMC. Section 3.350, VA's 

implementing regulation for SMC ratings, provides for full and half-step rate increases in SMC in 

36 Id. at 2410. 

37 Id. at 2423. 

38 Breniser v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 64, 68 (2011); see 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k)-(s). SMC is a statutory benefit provided 

for strictly noneconomic purposes to compensate veterans who suffered anatomical loss as a result of a serviceconnected disability, no formal claim is ever required, and it is always in addition to compensation benefits already 

being received. When more than one SMC rate is applicable, rates are calculated using the combined ratings table. 

39 Moreira v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 522, 524 (1992). 

40 38 U.S.C. § 1114. 

41 38 U.S.C. § 1114(p). There are seven levels of SMC rates between (l) and (o): (l), (l 1/2), (m), (m 1/2), (n), (n 1/2), 

and (o). 
11 

certain circumstances. As germane here, a half-step increase is provided for under § 3.350(f)(3), 

which states: 

Additional independent 50 percent disabilities. In addition to the statutory rates 

payable under 38 U.S.C. [§] 1114 (l) through (n) and the intermediate or next higher 

rate provisions outlined above, additional single permanent disability or 

combinations of permanent disabilities independently ratable at 50 percent or more 

will afford entitlement to the next higher intermediate rate or if already entitled to 

an intermediate rate to the next higher statutory rate under 38 U.S.C. [§] 1114, but 

not above the (o) rate. In the application of this subparagraph the disability or 

disabilities independently ratable at 50 percent or more must be separate and 

distinct and involve different anatomical segments or bodily systems from the 

conditions establishing entitlement under 38 U.S.C. [§] 1114 (l) through (n) or the 

intermediate rate provisions outlined above. 

A full-step increase is provided for under § 3.350(f)(4),42 which states: 

Additional independent 100 percent ratings. In addition to the statutory rates 

payable under 38 U.S.C. [§] 1114 (l) through (n) and the intermediate or next 

higher rate provisions outlined above additional single permanent disability 

independently ratable at 100 percent apart from any consideration of individual 

unemployability will afford entitlement to the next higher statutory rate under 38 

U.S.C. 1114 or if already entitled to an intermediate rate to the next higher 

intermediate rate, but in no event higher than the rate for (o). In the application of 

this subparagraph the single permanent disability independently ratable at 100 

percent must be separate and distinct and involve different anatomical segments 

or bodily systems from the conditions establishing entitlement under 38 U.S.C. [§] 

1114 (l) through (n) or the intermediate rate provisions outlined above. 

To review where the parties stand, appellant argues that a plain reading § 3.350(f)(3) shows 

that if a veteran has multiple disabilities rated at least at 50%, each disability rated 50% (and each 

combination of disabilities adding up to 50%) allows for a half step increase up until the point at 

which the claimant reaches the upper limit for SMC in section 1114(o). In other words, he 

maintains the plain language of the regulation shows that one is not limited to just a single halfstep increase. In contrast, the Secretary asserts that the plain meaning of § 3.350(f)(3) allows for 

only one half-step increase, regardless of how many disabilities a claimant has that are service 

connected and rated 50% disabling. 

42 While one of appellant's alternative arguments focuses directly on (f)(4), we set the regulation out here because it 

provides some context for our interpretation of (f)(3). 
12 

Confining ourselves for a moment to subsection (f)(3) in isolation, there is some indication 

that the regulation does not provide for multiple half-step increases. First, (f)(3) employs the phrase 

"additional single permanent disability or combinations of permanent disabilities independently 

ratable at 50[%] or more."43 The use of "or" suggests a choice of one thing or another. If appellant's 

view were correct, it seems "and" would be more appropriate. In addition, having such a qualifying 

disability or combination of disabilities allows for "entitlement to the next higher intermediate 

rate."44 The use of the term "the" in conjunction with the singular term "rate" points in the 

Secretary's direction. 

Despite these textual clues, the reality is that the plain language of § 3.350(f)(3) standing 

alone does not conclusively resolve the issue dividing the parties. The regulation doesn't clearly 

answer the question we face. But that does not mean that we should immediately "wave the 

ambiguity flag."45 Based on an assessment of the regulation using the wide array of interpretive 

tools at our disposal (with our subsection (f)(3) focused points in the background), we ultimately 

agree with the Secretary that § 3.350(f)(3) permits only one intermediate increase. 

Section 3.350(f) implements section 1114(p). In section 1114(p), Congress provides that 

"the Secretary may allow the next higher rate or an intermediate rate." 46 The use of the terms 

"the" and "an" in conjunction with the singular term "rate" in the authorizing statute indicates that 

one singular "rate" would be provided through any regulation the Secretary adopted to implement 

the statute. Moreover, this interpretation is most consistent with the rest of the statute's language 

and structure. For example, section 1114(k) provides that "the rate of compensation therefor shall 

be [X amount] for each such loss."47 The italicized language suggests that multiple losses can 

qualify for SMC under subsection (k), standing in stark contrast to the more limited language in 

section 1114(p). We have previously found such intrastatutory comparisons useful when 

interpreting section 1114.48 

43 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3) (2021) (emphasis added). The regulation goes on to repeat the "disability or combination of 

disabilities" language in a separate sentence. 

44 Id. (emphasis added). 

45 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 

46 38 U.S.C. § 1114(p) (emphasis added). 

47 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k) (emphasis added). 

48 See Bria v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 228, 232-36 (2021). 
13 

In addition, VA's implementing regulation, § 3.350(a), recognizes the plurality of the 

statute. It provides that SMC under section 1114(k) "is payable for each anatomical loss or loss of 

use" of the anatomy specified.49 The fact that Congress chose to include the language providing 

for multiple applications of an SMC rate, i.e., section 1114(k), in one part of the statute, but not in 

others, i.e., section 1114(p), is compelling. And VA's implementation of those varying approaches 

through its implementing regulations is a faithful application of the choices Congress made. When 

Congress drafted section 1114 and chose to include certain language in one situation but not in 

another, we can assume that this decision was intentional.50 Thus, if VA or Congress intended 

section 1114(p) to allow for multiple applications, like section 1114(k), both the statute and 

implementing regulations would have been written differently. For example, with respect to halfstep increases, either the statute or regulation could have used the phrase "for each such loss or 

losses" after the term "rate." 

And we can't forget how significant section 1114(p) is because it is what provides VA with 

the authority to adopt § 3.350(f)(3) in the first place. VA is powerless to provide more benefits 

than Congress elected to authorize.51 The language in § 3.350(f)(3) is at least clear that "entitlement 

to the next higher intermediate rate" will be afforded when the requirements are met.52 This 

language does not conflict with the statute's language that "the Secretary may allow the next higher 

rate or an intermediate rate."53 Indeed, we think this language does precisely what Congress 

authorized. But even if we thought that the regulation could be read to provide more than Congress 

authorized, we would not lightly assume that the Agency went beyond the authority Congress 

provided. In that regard, when a regulatory provision can be interpreted in a way that harmonizes 

it with the statute it implements, courts should adopt such a harmonious interpretation.54 

49 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(a). 

50 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("'W]here Congress includes particular language in one section 

of a statute but omits it in another section . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely 

in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'" (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). 

51 Contrary to our dissenting colleague's contention, our reading of the regulation is consistent with the plain meaning 

of the language used by Congress in section 1114(p) to authorize only one full or one one-half step SMC rate increase. 

Just because "Congress could have used stricter and more narrowly tailored language," post at 20, does not empower 

us to ignore the plain meaning of the language Congress did use. 

52 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3) (emphasis added). 

53 38 U.S.C. § 1114(p) (emphasis added). 

54 United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25 (1982) ("We consider first whether the [r]egulation harmonizes 
14 

Finally, to give real meaning to § 3.350(f)(4), which, recall, provides for a full-step 

increase, we think that subsection (f)(3) cannot practically mean that multiple half-step increases 

are possible. It would be odd to say that a veteran may obtain higher benefits using multiple halfsteps to get a full-step increase (or, as appellant's example for his case shows, even more) under 

subsection (f)(3), without meeting the fairly restrictive requirements for the full-step increase 

under subsection (f)(4). Canons of construction require us to avoid rendering any portions of a 

regulation meaningless or superfluous.55 While it may not be that appellant's interpretation of 

subsection (f)(3) renders subsection (f)(4) entirely meaningless, it strikes us that appellant's 

interpretation of subsection (f)(3) undermines subsection (f)(4) in a way that suggests appellant's 

interpretation is not the better of the competing conceptions the parties have advanced. 

In sum, we hold that § 3.350(f)(3) can only be used once to increase a claimant's SMC 

rate.56 As explained above, there are indications pointing to that interpretation even if we confined 

ourselves to the language of (f)(3) standing alone. In addition, Congress purposefully omitted 

language concerning repeated use in section 1114(p), on which (f)(3) is based, despite permitting 

repeated use in other sections of the statute. And, reading § 3.350(f)(3) as we do, provides purpose 

for its subsequent subsection (f)(4). Because we can use the tools of interpretation to assess the 

regulation's meaning, we need not resort to other canons of construction, including deference to 

the Agency's interpretation of the regulation were it "genuinely ambiguous" or the pro-veteran rule 

of construction from Brown v. Gardner.

57 Therefore, we hold that the Board did not err when it 

failed to consider the application of § 3.350(f)(3) more than once in its assessment of whether 

appellant was entitled to a higher SMC rate. 

with the statutory language."); Anthony v. United States, 520 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[C]ourts should not 

interpret an agency regulation to thwart the statutory mandate it was designed to implement."). 

55 See Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[C]anons of construction . . . require us to give effect 

to the clear language of a [regulation] and avoid rendering any portions meaningless or superfluous."). 

56 Our dissenting colleague disagrees with our holding in this regard and asserts that under § 3.350(f)(3) appellant is 

entitled to an SMC(n) rate. Under that logic, appellant would be eligible for at least two half-step increases in his SMC 

rate but no more. This is a result neither party advocated. It's not clear to us why, given our dissenting colleague's 

position on the meaning of § 3.350(f)(3), one would stop at two half-step increases. 

57 Our dissenting colleague spends significant time discussing how, precisely, the pro-veteran canon of construction 

from Brown v. Gardner fits into statutory and regulatory interpretation more generally. This is certainly an important 

issue and, as the dissent makes clear, one that deeply divided the Federal Circuit. But we express no views concerning 

the pro-veteran canon's place within the "order of operations" used for statutory and regulatory interpretation. 

Consistent with Kisor, we do not need to reach that question because the interpretive tools that we rely on, including, 

most importantly, adherence to the authorizing statute in section 1114, bears out our interpretation of § 3.350(f)(3). 
15 

C. TDIU and § 3.350(f)(4)

 We will now briefly address appellant's two alternative arguments concerning purported 

Board errors. Starting with § 3.350(f)(4), appellant contends that this portion of the regulation is 

invalid because it excludes TDIU as a basis on which to provide a veteran with a full-step increase 

for SMC, and the Board, therefore, erred when it denied him an increase under § 3.350(f)(4). There 

are multiple levels to this argument. First, appellant asserts that the Board failed to consider the 

reasonably raised issue of entitlement to TDIU based on the severity of his vision, shoulder, and 

hip disabilities. Second, appellant maintains that the Board is required to treat a TDIU rating as a 

total rating per § 4.16(b). Finally, appellant contends that had the Board applied § 3.350(f)(4) 

properly, it would have awarded him a full-step increase based on his purported entitlement to 

TDIU. He requests that we find § 3.350(f)(4) invalid to the extent it excludes TDIU from 

consideration as basis for a full-step increase and that we remand the matter to the Board to 

correctly apply the law. The Court is not persuaded. 

The Board must address all potentially applicable regulations that are reasonably raised by 

the record.58 Entitlement to TDIU "is implicitly raised whenever a pro se veteran, who presents 

cogent evidence of unemployability, seeks to obtain a higher disability rating."59 Thus, we have 

held that the Board may be required to address TDIU where there is evidence of an inability to 

work and the veteran is not in receipt of the maximum rating.60 As we have explained, TDIU is 

not a separate claim, "but rather involves an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a disability 

or disabilities."61 

 Appellant has been in receipt of a total combined disability rating, plus SMC(k) benefits, 

since November 1971, on the day after he was discharged from service. There is nothing in the 

record to show that the issue of unemployability arose at any point since 1971 and appellant has 

not contested any of his schedular ratings for his various service-connected disabilities.62 Although 

58 Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 589, 593 (1991). 

59 Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Whether TDIU was explicitly raised is 

not at issue here; therefore, we need not consider it. See Appellant's Br. at 14 (contending only that "the issue of 

entitlement to TDIU for a single disability was reasonably raised by the record"); see also Pederson, 27 Vet.App. at 

281-86. 

60 Harper v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 356, 361 (2018). 

61 Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Cet.App. 447, 452 (2016). 

62 Comer, 552 F.3d at 1366 (requiring "cogent evidence of unemployability"). 
16 

there is evidence in the record to suggest that he may have difficulties with employment, that does 

not show that he is unable to engage in substantially gainful occupation as a result of his serviceconnected disabilities. In sum, we don't think the record supports appellant's contentions that the 

issue of TDIU was reasonably raised.63

But even if we assumed that the record somehow suggested that the Board should have 

considered TDIU in connection with appellant's claims seeking an increase in his SMC benefits, 

that would matter not at all in terms of whether we can grant appellant the remedy he seeks. Recall 

that appellant has asked us to strike § 3.350(f)(4) down to the extent it excludes TDIU as a basis 

on which to grant increased SMC. But appellant is not in receipt of a TDIU. That simple truth 

means that we cannot consider appellant's challenge to § 3.350(f)(4) because it is entirely

predicated on the exclusion of TDIU as a basis for increased SMC, a benefit to which appellant is 

not (at least yet) entitled. Although the validity of a regulation is a legal question, we cannot issue 

advisory opinions no matter how interesting the hypothetical question presented to us may be.64

And that is clearly what appellant is asking us to do here because, as we've said, he is not in receipt 

of TDIU now. So, even if we struck down the regulation, it would not assist him in obtaining a 

greater rate for SMC unless there were other developments. Moreover, if appellant wishes to 

request TDIU, he is free to do so before VA. Until VA has found appellant to be entitled to TDIU, 

any matters flowing from how such an entitlement might or might not affect SMC are not ripe. 

D. Extraschedular Consideration 

Section 3.321(b) currently states that "[t]o accord justice in the exceptional case where the 

schedular evaluation is inadequate to rate a single service-connected disability, the Director of 

Compensation Service or his delegate is authorized to approve" an extraschedular evaluation.65

63 See Hilkert v. West, 12 Vet.App. 145, 151 (1004) (en banc), aff'd per curiam, 232 F.3d 908 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (table). 

64 See Barnett v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 83, 87 (2019) (declining to address an argument because doing so "would amount 

to an unauthorized advisory opinion"); Quirin v. Shinseki, 22 Vet.App. 390, 396 (2009) (holding that "the Court will 

not ordinarily consider additional allegations of error that have been rendered moot by the Court's opinion or that 

would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion"); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 

482 F.3d 1330, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Under [the prohibition against advisory opinions] doctrine, federal courts 

are to decide only 'actual controversies by judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon 

moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in the 

case before it.'" (quoting Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367 

(1960))).

65 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (2021). Effective January 8, 2018, VA amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b). See 82 Fed. Reg. 57,830, 

57,834. 
17 

Appellant argues that the Board erred when it failed to address whether he is entitled to an 

extraschedular rating under the amended—that is current—version of § 3.321(b). He asserts that 

"the record reasonably raised a request to refer, to the Director of Compensation and Pension 

Services [(Director)], [his] ratings."66 In his reply brief, appellant explains that "there is no legal 

requirement that [he] do more than ask for a total rating in order to raise [the issue of] entitlement 

to a[n extraschedular] rating under § 3.321(b)."67 And he contends that because he is seeking a 

one-step increase in SMC under § 3.350(f)(4), and that is only available for a total rating, "this 

necessarily requires the Board to apply § 3.321(b) to achieve a total rating."68 

Appellant offers no real authority to support his position, either factual or legal. Most 

significantly, although appellant is in receipt of service connection for multiple disabilities, he 

does not identify any disability that he claims has an exceptional disability picture warranting a 

higher evaluation under extraschedular rating principles. In addition to this fatal lack of proof—or 

even allegation—appellant's argument again amounts to an invitation for us to render some type 

of advisory opinion. Even if we assumed that the evidence reasonably raised the issue of 

extraschedular consideration for some (unidentified) disability for some (unidentified) reason, 

appellant agrees that the matter would need to be forwarded to the director for consideration. So, 

there is no guarantee that appellant would be awarded an extraschedular rating for any of his 

disabilities and, therefore, we would not be able to assess how any extraschedular consideration 

might affect an enhancement of his SMC rate just as we couldn't deal with the TDIU issue 

discussed above. And we note in addition that appellant doesn't seriously address these significant 

flaws in his argument. In sum, because appellant's argument is purely speculative and severely 

underdeveloped, we will not address it further.69

In addition to his argument that the record reasonably raised the issue of an extraschedular 

rating, we recognize that appellant also raises substantive arguments about how the current version 

66 Appellant's Br. at 17. We note that appellant refers to a previous organizational structure within VA. Currently, 

there is a Compensation Service with the Pensions and Fiduciary Service constituting a separate entity. SEE DEP'T OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2020 FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION MANUAL, at 20 (May 15, 2020), https://www.va.gov/VAFunctional-Organization-Manual-2020-4.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2021). 

67 Reply Br. at 8. 

68 Id. at 7. 

69 A "decision advising what the law would be on an uncertain or hypothetical state of facts" is the very definition of 

an advisory opinion. Aldridge v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 392, 394 (2015) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. 

Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 262 (1933)); see also Locklear v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 410, 416 (2006). 
18 

of § 3.321(b) should be applied, as well as about the continued viability of this Court's caselaw in 

the extraschedular arena in light of the amendment to § 3.321(b). For the reasons we have 

explained, these issues are not ripe for review. So, to be clear, we express no opinion about these 

aspects of appellant's argument. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

After consideration of the parties' briefs, oral argument, the governing law, and the record, 

the Court AFFIRMS the March 16, 2020, Board decision. 

JAQUITH, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join sections I, II, III.A, III.C, 

and III.D of the Court's opinion in full. And the first several paragraphs of III.B capably chronicle 

the principles for interpreting regulations, the context of SMC, the text of the salient subsections, 

and the parties' arguments. However, because I read the statute and regulation as plainly providing 

for two half-step increases—to the intermediate rate and, for the veteran already there, to the next 

higher statutory rate—I respectfully dissent from the Court's holding that only one half-step 

increase is available under § 3.350(f)(3), and from the Court's conclusion that the Board did not 

err when it failed to discuss the possibility of an additional half-step rating under § 3.350(f)(3). 

A. The Veteran's Combat Wounds and Disability Ratings 

On October 23, 1970, a land mine exploded under then-Sergeant Barry while he was 

engaged in combat operations against hostile forces in Vietnam.70 His wounds required an open 

amputation of his right leg above the knee, which was done in an evacuation hospital.71 He also 

suffered extensive loss of tissue on his left leg, exposing his tibia, and fragment wounds to his 

right hand and left eye.72 Sergeant Barry spent the next 13 months assigned to hospitals, until he 

received a disability retirement in November of 1971.73 

A rating decision in February 1973 awarded the veteran SMC, effective November 1971, 

for his loss of one foot.74 A May 2011 rating decision reflected SMC under section 1114(k), 

70 R. at 3298. 

71 R. at 3298, 3391. 

72 R. at 3338, 3391. 

73 R. at 3326. 

74 R. at 2808. 
19 

effective from November 1971 to November 2005 for the veteran's loss of one foot; SMC under 

section 1114(k) effective from July 1983 for the veteran's "loss of use of one eye having only light 

perception"; SMC under section 1114(m) effective from November 2005 for the veteran's loss of 

one leg and loss of use of his other leg; and SMC under section 1114(p) and § 3.350(f)(3), at the 

rate intermediate between subsection (m) and subsection (n), effective from November 2005, for 

the veteran's 

loss of use of both feet (claimed as muscle graft left leg & previously rated as right 

above knee amputation; traumatic thrombophlebitis, left leg; SFW, left leg with 

muscle loss MG XI; s/p left knee replacement; scar of the left calf; & scar, left leg) 

with additional disabilities, scar of the right flank, status-post muscle graft right 

latissimus dorsi muscle group II (claimed as back scar from donor site of muscle 

graft) independently ratable at 50 percent or more.[75, 76]

The May 2011 rating decision lists additional compensable service-connected disabilities, 

including the following: PTSD, rated 70% disabling; left eye injury with glaucoma, 30%; 

glenohumeral arthritis of the right shoulder, 30%; glenohumeral arthritis of the left shoulder, 20%; 

lumbosacral strain, 10%; and healed fractured fingers of the right hand, with traumatic tattooing, 

10%.77 In September 2012, the veteran sought an increase in his SMC.78 

The most recent rating decision in the record, dated December 2014, recites the same bases 

for the veteran's SMC that the rating decision recited in May 2011.79 By December 2014, the 

veteran's additional compensable service-connected disabilities included all those listed in 2011, 

with increased ratings for his glenohumeral arthritis of the right shoulder, from 30% to 60%, and 

for his glenohumeral arthritis of the left shoulder, from 20% to 50%.80 And the veteran had the 

following additional service-connected disabilities: Left eye disfigurement, rated at 30%; defective 

75 R. at 1005. 

76 The Board refers only to rating decisions issued in February 2011, October 1973, and October 1975. R. at 6. The 

Board's action regarding the 1973 and 1975 rating decisions was affirmed by the Court in 2019. R. at 127-31. In 2018, 

the Board found that the February 2011 "rating decision that granted service connection for a scar of the right flank, 

status-post muscle graft right latissimus dorsi muscle group II and assigned an initial noncompensable rating" was not 

final and binding because the RO had not issued a Statement of the Case on the matter. R. at 139-40. None of the 

February 2011, October 1973, and October 1975 rating decisions are at issue in this appeal. 

77 R. at 1003-05. 

78 R. at 816. 

79 R. at 573. 

80 R. at 570-71. 
20 

hearing, 20%; bilateral degenerative joint disease of his hips (10% each); hypertension, 10%; and 

tinnitus, 10%.81 So the veteran's constellation of compensable disabling conditions includes his 

above-the-knee amputation of his right leg, loss of use of his left leg, loss of use of both feet, and 

loss of use of one eye, for which he receives SMC, plus PTSD (70%), right shoulder arthritis 

(60%), left shoulder arthritis (50%), left eye injury with glaucoma (30%), left eye disfigurement 

(30%), defective hearing (20%), a lumbar spine injury (10%), a right hand injury (10%), left and 

right hip joint disease (10% each), hypertension (10%), and tinnitus (10%). 

B. The Plain Meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3) 

Based on these facts, the veteran argues that the plain meaning of § 3.350(f)(3) entitles him 

to four intermediate rate increases, to the SMC rate prescribed by section 1114(o). The Secretary 

contends that the one intermediate increase the veteran has received is all he is entitled to under 

the plain meaning of the regulation. The majority reads subsection (f)(3) the way the Secretary 

does but acknowledges that the plain language of § 3.350(f)(3) does not conclusively resolve the 

issue. The words I see in subsection (f)(3) give the veteran SMC at the section 1114(n) rate, but 

no higher. 

As the majority notes, if the meaning of a regulation is clear from its language, "that 

meaning controls."82 Section 3.350(f)(3), titled "Additional independent 50 percent disabilities," 

is quite specific. It describes the disabilities that warrant a higher rate of SMC: "additional single 

permanent disability or combinations of permanent disabilities independently ratable at 50 percent 

or more . . . [which] must be separate and distinct and involve different anatomical segments or 

bodily systems from the conditions establishing entitlement" to SMC. Subsection (f)(3) also 

specifies the outcome: "entitlement to the next higher intermediate rate or if already entitled to an 

intermediate rate to the next higher statutory rate under 38 U.S.C. 1114, but not above the (o) rate." 

The subsection makes clear that the rate outcome under § 3.350(f)(3) is in addition to those under 

the other intermediate rate or next higher rate provisions in the regulation. And it identifies ratings 

that may not be utilized—those for arrested tuberculosis. What subsection (f)(3) doesn't say or 

suggest is what VA and the majority contend it means: that only one additional disability, or 

81 R. at 571-72. 

82 Petitti v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 415, 422-23 (2015). 
21 

combination of disabilities, rated at 50% counts. The Court should not "read into the regulation a 

limitation to its applicability that is simply not there."83 

The majority also misconstrues the significance of the statutory authorization in section 

1114(p). Section 1114(p) limits the SMC rate increases for service-connected disabilities that 

exceed the requirements for the 1114(k) prescribed rates not just to an intermediate rate, but to the 

next higher rate. As we have previously recognized in considering section 1114, if Congress had 

intended the limited effect VA and the majority read into the law, Congress could have used stricter 

and more narrowly tailored language.84 The actual words of § 3.350(f)(3) limiting entitlement "to 

the next higher intermediate rate or if already entitled to an intermediate rate to the next higher 

statutory rate" dovetail with—and give effect to—the section 1114(p) language allowing "the next 

higher rate or an intermediate rate." 

The meaning of § 3.350(f)(3) advanced by the Secretary and sanctioned by the majority 

apparently adds an unstated qualifier to the regulation. They see a regulation that limits a veteran 

with additional disabilities (otherwise uncounted in setting SMC) to entitlement "to the next higher 

intermediate rate or if already entitled to an intermediate rate under the other intermediate rate 

provisions outlined above to the next higher statutory rate." But the italicized words obviously are 

not in the regulation. "We cannot rewrite [the] text to include criteria absent from its face."85 VA 

demonstrated that it knew how to differentiate increases under subsection (f)(3) from those under 

other subsections of § 3.350, when that was intended, saying in the very next sentence that 

subsection (f)(3) increases had to be based on disabilities distinct from those establishing 

entitlement under different statutory subsections "or the intermediate rate provisions outlined 

above"—apparently referring to the intermediate rate provisions in § 3.350(f)(1) and (f)(2). 

The qualifying word VA actually chose to use in subsection (f)(3)—"already"—is an 

adverb that expresses a temporal relation. "Already" means "[b]y or before a time stated or 

implied." 86 So subsection (f)(3), by its terms, entitles a veteran previously entitled to an 

intermediate rate—as Mr. Barry was, effective November 2005 per the May 2011 rating 

83 See Southall-Norman v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 346, 351-52 (2016). 

84 Payne v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 373, 385 (2019). 

85 Langdon v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 

86 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (3d ed. 1969); see WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, COLLEGE EDITION

42 (1968) (defining "already" as "by or before the given or implied time; previously"). 
22 

decision—to the next higher statutory rate (for him, the section 1114(n) rate) if a later increase in 

his qualifying permanent disabilities warrants it. That issue was not addressed by the Board. 

Moreover, this case shows the fallacy of the notion that subsection (f)(4) means that 

subsection (f)(3) must permit only one SMC intermediate step increase. Nothing about reading 

subsection (f)(3) to entitle a veteran with sufficient additional disabilities to a second intermediate 

step, thereby going to the next higher statutory rate, renders (f)(4) superfluous or meaningless. 

Section 3.350(f)(4) establishes entitlement to a full step up—based on an "additional single 

permanent disability independently ratable at 100 percent apart from any consideration of 

individual unemployability"—that is, to the next higher statutory rate; or if the veteran is already 

entitled to an intermediate rate, § 3.350(f)(4) entitles the veteran to the next higher intermediate 

rate. The rating for a veteran with a single permanent disability independently ratable at 100% can 

advance a full step immediately, so there is nothing incongruous or odd in the potential for a 

veteran's disability rating to advance two intermediate steps over time (to reach the next higher 

statutory rate) for two single permanent disabilities or combinations of permanent disabilities 

independently ratable at 50% or more. Mr. Barry's circumstances illustrate that point emphatically. 

Using common math, the 12 additional compensable disabilities listed in Mr. Barry's December 

2014 rating decision total 320%! And applying the VA formula for arriving at combined ratings87

results in a 100% rating when just his four highest rated additional disabilities are counted. 

C. VA's Duty To Maximize Benefits 

The majority's ratification of the Secretary's interpretation of § 3.350(f)(3) also conflicts 

with VA's duty to maximize benefits. "VA's duty to maximize benefits requires VA to assess all 

of the claimant's disabilities . . . to determine whether any combination of the disabilities 

establishes entitlement to special monthly compensation."88 And VA's duty to maximize benefits 

requires it to resolve doubt in favor of claimants, including when determining SMC.89 VA failed 

to fulfill these obligations here, instead reading restrictions into § 3.350(f)(3) that are not there—

87 See 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2021). 

88 Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 242, 250 (2010), as amended (Apr. 21, 2011). 

89 Morgan v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 162, 164, 167-68 (2019); see 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103(a) (2021), 4.3 (2021). 
23 

which VA cannot do, "because, in doing so, [it] imposes a greater burden on a claimant than the 

law does."90 

D. The Pro-Veteran Canon 

In addition, the construction of § 3.350(f)(3) argued by VA and adopted by the majority 

conflicts with the longstanding pro-veteran canon—"'that provisions for benefits to members of 

the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries' favor.'"91 The Secretary argues that 

the pro-veteran canon does not apply because subsection (f)(3) is not ambiguous, and the majority 

seems to agree. But the space between the majority's assessment that the plain language of the 

regulation is not conclusive and the majority's ultimate indication that the regulation is not 

genuinely ambiguous highlights the canon's significance. 

The path from inconclusive language to no genuine ambiguity is well mapped but a little 

slippery. Determining the plain meaning of a regulation requires the Court to "bring all its 

interpretative tools to bear" to "make a conscientious effort to determine, based on indicia like text, 

structure, history, and purpose, whether the regulation really has more than one reasonable 

meaning."92 We look to the law to determine whether "there is only one reasonable construction 

of a regulation."93 The canons of regulatory construction "require interpretation of words in their 

context with an eye to the law as a whole."94 The context of the law as a whole seems to include 

the veteran's canon.95 

In King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, the Supreme Court stated that it presumed that Congress 

understood the pro-veteran canon as a basic rule of statutory construction, and the Court applied 

that canon to read a provision in the veteran's favor, even if the language left its significance 

unsettled.96 In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Supreme Court read the statute at issue in light of the 

veteran's canon, declaring that "[w]hile the terms and placement of [the statute] provide some 

90 Ward v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 233, 240 (2019); English v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 347, 353 (2018). 

91 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011) (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 n.9 (1991)). 

92 Huerta v. McDonough, 34 Vet.App. 76, 80 (2021) (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423-24 (2019)). 

93 Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 

94 Ortiz-Valles v. McDonald, 28 Vet.App. 65, 69 (2016). 

95 See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440-42; King, 502 U.S. at 221 n.9; Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 

U.S. 275, 285 (1946). 

96 502 U.S. at 221 n.9. 
24 

indication of Congress' intent, what is most telling here are the singular characteristics of the 

review scheme that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans' benefits claims." 97 In 

Fishgold Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., the Supreme Court declared that veterans laws are "to 

be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour 

of great need," and the Court showed us how to do so—"construe the separate provisions of the 

[law] as parts of an organic whole and give each as liberal a construction for the benefit of the 

veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits."98 

The slipping stems from two words in an oft cited pro-veteran canon case, Brown v. 

Gardner: "interpretive doubt."99 In Gardner, the Board denied the veteran's claim for benefits 

under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 based on disabilities resulting from surgery in a VA facility.100 The Board's 

denial rested on 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3) (1993), which interpreted the statute as only covering an 

injury that proximately resulted from fault by the VA or from an accident during treatment or 

rehabilitation.101 Though the statute afforded compensation for injuries resulting from surgery, 

rather than the veteran's misconduct, and said nothing about fault by VA, the Secretary argued that 

a fault requirement inhered in the statutory requirement of a compensable injury.102 In rejecting 

that argument based on the law's "text and reasonable inferences from it," the Supreme Court 

looked first to the pro-veteran canon, which it summarized as "the rule that interpretive doubt is to 

be resolved in the veteran's favor."103 

In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court declared that courts must exhaust all the traditional 

tools of construction before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, but the Court did not 

address whether the pro-veteran canon is part of that toolkit.104 On remand, the Federal Circuit 

97 562 U.S. at 440-42 (emphasis supplied). 

98 328 U.S. at 285. 

99 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 

100 Id. at 116-17. 

101 Id. 

102 Id. at 117. 

103 Id. at 117-18. See Chadwick J. Harper, Give Veterans the Benefit of the Doubt: Chevron, Auer, and the Veteran's 

Canon, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 958-59, 961 (2019) ("The language and logic of [Gardner] suggest that 

courts should apply the veteran's canon before turning to deference doctrines," and "Gardner's suggested order of 

operations" is one reason "the veteran's canon should be recognized as a traditional tool of interpretation."). 

104 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
25 

filled the breach, declaring: "Under [Gardner] . . . the canon does not apply unless 'interpretive 

doubt' is present," a precondition which "is not satisfied where a sole reasonable meaning is 

identified through the use of ordinary textual analysis tools, before consideration of the pro-veteran 

canon."105 On that basis, the Federal Circuit determined that the canon did not apply because the 

regulatory text at issue had only one reasonable meaning.106 The conclusion in Kisor IV that the 

disputed term was not ambiguous107was the opposite of its prior holding—which did not cite 

Gardner or mention the pro-veteran canon. 108

The dissent in Kisor v. McDonough (Kisor IV) disagreed that interpretive doubt "must be 

established before the pro-veteran canon can be applied."109 Judge Reyna declared: 

Fundamentally, when a veterans' benefit provision is ambiguous on its face, the 

pro-veteran canon must be weighed alongside the other traditional tools in resolving 

interpretive doubt, including whether interpretative doubt exists. Neither the 

Supreme Court's decision in this case, nor this court's precedent, supports the 

majority's assumption that interpretive doubt is to be determined before resort to 

the pro-veteran canon may be had. To the contrary, the pro-veteran canon is a 

traditional tool of construction. It requires that we discern the purpose of a veterans' 

benefit provision in the context of the veterans' benefit scheme as a whole and 

ensure that the construction effectuates, rather than frustrates, that remedial 

purpose: that benefits that by law belong to the veteran go to the veteran.[110]

The debate continued when the Federal Circuit denied the veteran's petition for en banc 

review.111 A concurrence concluded that Gardner made interpretive doubt "a precondition for 

applying the canon," and "the hierarchy of interpretive tools" means courts "should consider the 

pro-veteran canon only if, after exhausting all applicable descriptive tools in search of the 

provision's best meaning, a range of plausible interpretations remains, none of them fairly 

described as the best."112 A dissenter's response included the following: 

105 Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1316, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir. 2021) (Kisor IV) (quoting Gardner, 513 U.S. at 117-18), 

cert. denied, No. 21-465, 2022 WL 89296 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022). 

106 Id. at 1326. 

107 Id. at 1319. 

108 Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Kisor I), vacated and remanded sub nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. 

Ct. 2400 (2019). 

109 Kisor IV, 995 F.3d at 1327 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 

110 Id. 

111 Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (per curiam order) (Kisor V). 

112 Id. at 1354-59 (Prost, C.J., concurring). 
26 

The pro-veteran canon of construction is not meant to be an afterthought. It is a tool 

in the interpretive toolkit that aids in gleaning congressional intent where the plain 

text of the statute or regulation does not clearly answer the question at hand. . . . 

The majority . . . cites only Brown v. Gardner for its decision to remove the proveteran canon—and apparently numerous other canons—from the interpretive 

toolkit it employs. But [Gardner] does not hold that the pro-veteran canon is only 

an after the fact inquiry. . . [a]nd, it does not say that the pro-veteran canon is 

anything other than an interpretive canon. . . . The panel majority's latest approach 

is inconsistent with multiple Supreme Court cases which discuss the pro-veteran 

canon and treat it as one of the many canons of construction to be collectively 

employed when interpreting veterans benefit provisions. . . . [W]hen reviewing an 

agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation (as is the case here), the Supreme 

Court has made clear that we are to apply all tools of statutory construction to glean 

congressional intent. Where differing plausible, reasonable interpretations of the 

terms of a regulation are possible, Congress has spoken: it wants veterans' benefits 

to be administered in a "pro-claimant" manner.[113]

And Judge Reyna added: "[Kisor IV] means that the pro-veteran canon comes into play at the 

bottom of the ninth inning, after three outs have been made, and as the players head to their 

respective dugouts. But by then, it's game over."114 

Of course, we cannot decide whether Gardner bears the weight Kisor IV gives it (by 

Gardner's terms and in light of Henderson, King, and Fishgold), and we need not try to do so to 

resolve this case—because the situation here fits nicely within Gardner, whether read through the 

lens of the majority or the dissenter in Kisor IV, or those of the concurrences or dissents in Kisor 

v. McDonough (Kisor V). At most, the Secretary has shown the existence of ambiguity in the text 

and meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3), and the pro-veteran canon mandates that such interpretive 

doubt be resolved in the veteran's favor.115 

E. Deference to the Secretary's Interpretation of § 3.350(f)(3) 

At oral argument, in response to direct questions by the Court, the Secretary contended—

for the first time—that if § 3.350(f)(3) was deemed ambiguous, VA's consistent approach and 

interpretation that only one half-step increase is permitted should be given deference. As support, 

the Secretary pointed only to VA's Adjudicative Procedures Manual (M21-1). But deference is not 

warranted under these circumstances. The Court generally won't entertain contentions raised for 

113 Id. at 1366 (O'Malley, J., dissenting). 

114 Id. at 1376. 

115 See Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118; Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 252, 256 (2008). 
27 

the first time by counsel at oral argument.116 The M21-1 provision was never cited or discussed—

by the parties, the regional office, or the Board—so there is no indication that it was the basis of 

the denial of the veteran's request for SMC at a higher rate.117 

The pertinent M21-1 section states: "Apply the provisions of 38 CFR 3.350(f)(3) or 38 

CFR 3.350(f)(4), whichever is appropriate, only once in a rating decision."118 Then the section 

emphasizes that "[c]oncurrent entitlement to SMC under both 38 CFR 3.350(f)(3) and 38 CFR 

3.350(f)(4) is prohibited."119 If we entertain the Secretary's belated and underdeveloped argument, 

we should hold that neither manual provision merits deference. Interpretations according to agency 

manuals lack the force of law and do not warrant deference.120 The Board is not bound by the M21-

1, so the Court will not defer to it.121 And deference is especially inappropriate where, as here, the 

manual adds a limitation to the applicability of a regulation.122 

The manual's statement regarding the interplay of subsections (f)(3) and (f)(4) has no direct 

application to Mr. Barry, but it bears on the majority's stated belief that two steps under subsection 

(f)(3) cannot be harmonized with subsection (f)(4) and the Secretary's contention at oral argument 

that a veteran could not receive SMC under both subsections. That contention does not square with 

the subsection itself. Subsection (f)(4) specifies that its whole step increase is "[i]n addition to . . . 

the intermediate or next higher rate provisions outlined above," which include subsection (f)(3). 

The manual's directions do not deserve deference because they are not reasonable interpretations 

of the regulation.123 Moreover, as previously indicated, to the extent the regulation permits a 

reading that would entitle the veteran to the next higher statutory rate of SMC for his constellation 

of additional permanent disabilities, the pro-veteran canon requires the more expansive reading.124

116 Ray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 58, 69-70 (2019); Overton v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 257, 265 (2018). 

117 Ray, 31 Vet.App. at 69-70; Overton, 30 Vet.App. at 265. 

118 See VA ADJUDICATIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL M21-1, pt. VIII, subpt. iv, ch. 4, § A.6.a., 

http://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).

119 Id. at § A.6.b. 

120 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 

121 Ray, 31 Vet.App. at 70. 

122 See Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 115-16 (2017). 

123 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. 

124 See Sharp v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 267, 275-76 (2009). 
28 

When "the Secretary's interpretation is unfavorable to veterans, such that it conflicts with the 

beneficence underpinning VA's veterans benefits scheme, and a more liberal construction is 

available that affords a harmonious interplay between provisions," the more liberal construction 

prevails.125 

Furthermore, VA should not be allowed to institute, via its procedures manual, more 

restrictions on veterans benefits than it proposed and adopted through notice and comment 

rulemaking.126 Deference is unwarranted under the circumstances presented in this case because 

such deference would permit VA, under the guise of interpreting § 3.350(f)(3), "to create de facto 

a new regulation."127 

F. Conclusion 

The veteran was already receiving SMC at the intermediate rate between section 1114(m) 

and 1114(n), so his increasingly extensive disabilities entitle him to the full measure of SMC that 

section 1114(p) and § 3.350(f)(3) authorize: the next higher statutory rate—the rate payable under 

section 1114(n). The plain meaning of the statute and regulation therefore require reversal of the 

Board's denial of entitlement at the 1114(n) rate. To the extent the plain language of the law is not 

conclusive, the plain meaning is unsettled or ambiguous, there is interpretive doubt, or there is 

more than one reasonable interpretation, the pro-veteran canon also requires reversal. 

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority's affirmance of the 

Board's denial of the veteran's entitlement to SMC at the 1114(n) rate. 

125 See Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 267, 272 (2013). 

126 See Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 203 (2021); Murillo v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 108, 110 (1997). 

127 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).