United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 22, 2019*

Decided April 23, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1765

SWAYSEY RANKIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS BAKER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 16-CV-3138

James E. Shadid,

Judge.

O R D E R

Swaysey Rankin, an Illinois inmate, has sued a doctor and warden for violating

the Eighth Amendment by requiring that he use the prison’s regular “sick call” system, 

rather than its hypertension clinic, to treat his scalp condition and knee pain. The 

district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. Because Rankin furnished 

no evidence to support a finding that either defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his medical needs, we affirm.

 

* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-1765 Page 2

We construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party (Rankin), drawing all 

reasonable inferences in his favor. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In March 2015 Rankin went to the free clinic for chronic hypertension at Western Illinois 

Correctional Center. He saw Dr. Thomas Baker, then the prison’s medical director. 

During his visit at the clinic, Rankin complained of “excruciating” knee pain and

“unbearable” scalp pain from folliculitis (an inflammation of the hair follicles).

Dr. Baker told Rankin that he treats only issues relating to high blood pressure at the 

hypertension clinic unless the patient presents an emergency, and none of Rankin’s 

complaints qualified. Dr. Baker advised Rankin to sign up to see a nurse at a “sick call”

to have his ailments addressed. To sign up for a sick call, an inmate asks a correctional 

officer to put his name on a list to see a nurse within 72 hours. Rankin told Dr. Baker 

about three times when he tried but was unable to sign up for a sick call. Twice he 

asked an officer in his unit to sign him up and once he put his request in the 

medication-refill box, but he did not get to see a nurse any of these three times. 

The day after Dr. Baker advised Rankin to use the sick-call process, Rankin began 

filing grievances. He first complained that Dr. Baker should have treated his folliculitis

and knee pain at the hypertension clinic and that he should not have to use the sick-call 

process because it requires a $5 copayment. Dr. Baker received and responded to this 

grievance. He reiterated the limited purpose of the hypertension clinic and noted that 

the copayment is required by state law. Rankin then filed more grievances, but nothing 

suggests that Dr. Baker saw these. In these grievances he repeated that Dr. Baker 

refused to treat his nonhypertensive conditions and that he “tried on numerous 

occasions to get put on [the] inmate sick call list all to no avail.” When he did not 

receive a sick call, he assumed that the correctional officers whom he had approached 

had failed to put his name on the sick-call list. He also said that sometimes officers 

refused to put his name on the sick-call list because he did not show his identification 

card or wear his state-issued “blues.” 

Rankin also complained “several times” to Jeff Korte, the warden. Specifically, he 

stopped Korte in the hallway to show him blood and pus caused by his folliculitis. 

Korte told Rankin that he “would look into it,” but Rankin did not get an immediate

sick call. About six months after Rankin saw Dr. Baker, Rankin received additional care

at the hypertension clinic. A nurse practitioner whom he saw in the clinic prescribed 

shampoo and ointment to treat his folliculitis. The next month, another doctor 

prescribed ibuprofen to help his knee and scalp pain.
No. 18-1765 Page 3

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rankin sued Dr. Baker and Korte, accusing them of 

deliberate indifference to his folliculitis and knee pain, and to his difficulties with the 

prison’s sick-call system. (Rankin also sued others, but he does not challenge judgment 

in their favor.) Rankin maintained that he submitted “dozens” of sick-call requests, but 

neither he, nor other inmates who also said that they made sick-call requests, received a 

sick-call visit. Prison officials replied that they have no records of his attempts to sign 

up for a sick call, but they have records of other inmates successfully using the system. 

The judge entered summary judgment for Dr. Baker and Korte. He concluded that a 

jury could not reasonably find that either was personally aware of a problem with the 

prison’s sick-call system, and Dr. Baker’s approach to addressing only blood-pressure

issues at the hypertension clinic was reasonable. 

On appeal Rankin first contends that the judge resolved disputed facts

improperly by deciding that the sick-call process worked. But even if we assume that 

Rankin and other inmates did not always receive sick-call visits when they requested 

them, that assumption does not support a finding that Dr. Baker and Korte are liable. 

For Rankin to hold them liable for violating the Eighth Amendment, the record must 

contain evidence that they knew about and recklessly ignored a problem with the

sign-up process for sick calls. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 839 (1994); 

see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), as amended (Aug. 25, 

2016). But the record contains no such evidence. Rather, Rankin told Dr. Baker only that 

on three occasions he did not receive a requested sick call and that he objected to the 

$5 copayment. And he submitted grievances that he could not get on the sick-call list. 

For two reasons, this is not sufficient to create liability. First, Rankin did not tell either 

Dr. Baker or Korte anything that might have allowed them to identify the source of his

difficulties with the sick-call process, such as the officers who ignored his requests and 

when. Prison officials who do not address a problem not adequately raised with them 

do not reflect deliberate indifference because they need not take as true every complaint

that an inmate asserts. See Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2004). Second,

the only detail that Rankin supplied—he resented the $5 copayment—does not violate 

the Constitution because Rankin does not assert that this condition was unaffordable. 

See Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2012).

Rankin next maintains that Dr. Baker’s refusal to treat his folliculitis and knee 

pain at the hypertension clinic reflects deliberate indifference. An official does not 

violate the Eighth Amendment unless the official recklessly disregards a serious risk of 

medical harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846. Dr. Baker’s response was reasonable: he told 

Rankin that he treated only blood-pressure issues in the hypertension clinic unless the 
No. 18-1765 Page 4

inmate presented an emergency, which his follicle condition and knee pain were not. 

Rankin now argues on appeal that at the clinic he was limping and that pus and blood 

oozed from his scalp. But Rankin presented no evidence to the district court that

Dr. Baker even saw these asserted conditions, let alone that they required immediate 

intervention. A reasonable jury, therefore, could not find that Dr. Baker’s referral to the 

sick-call system was “blatantly inappropriate” and lacked professional judgment. 

See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751; see also Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).

Finally, Rankin argues that Korte deliberately disregarded his medical needs. 

But as warden Korte is liable only if the problems with Rankin’s medical care occurred 

at Korte’s direction or with his knowledge and consent to those problems. See Gentry 

v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). The only relevant evidence that Rankin 

presents about Korte is that he heard Rankin’s medical complaints, saw some blood and 

pus on Rankin’s pillow, and replied that he would look into the problem. As warden 

Korte may leave to others the responsibility of handling medical care and grievances.

See Estate of Miller v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, Rankin fails to establish liability by 

asserting that Korte “brushed off his complaints, leaving them to be handled through 

the chain of command.” See Estate of Miller, 847 F.3d at 429.

AFFIRMED