Annual Report

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

2008
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

May 2008

Annual Report
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Commissioners

Chair

Michael Cromartie

Vice Chairs 

Preeta D. Bansal

Dr. Richard D. Land

Don Argue

Imam Talal Y. Eid

Felice D. Gaer

Leonard A. Leo

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Nina Shea

John V. Hanford, III, ex officio, nonvoting member
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Staff

Patricia Carley, Acting Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Judith Ingram, Director of Communications

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration

Dwight Bashir, Senior Policy Analyst

Elizabeth Cassidy, International Legal Specialist

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Senior Policy Analyst

Kody Kness, Legislative Assistant

Bridget Kustin, Communications Specialist

Tiffany Lynch, Researcher

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst
United StatesCommission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2008

The PRESIDENT

The White House

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, 

as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair 

Enclosure
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2008

Hon. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Secretary of State

Department of State

DEAR MADAME SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair

Enclosure
Hon. NANCY PELOSI

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representative

DEAR MS. PELOSI: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 

105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair

 

Enclosure

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2008
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2008

Hon. ROBERT BYRD

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

DEAR MR. BYRD: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 

202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 

105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair

 

Enclosure
IN MEMORIAM

JOE CRAPA

1943-2007

This Annual Report is dedicated in memory and respect to Joseph R. Crapa, 

who served as the Commission’s Executive Director from 2002 until his 

untimely death from cancer in 2007. 

A committed public servant, Mr. Crapa guided this bipartisan body with 

consummate skill, combining a keen sense of public service with an abiding 

commitment to advancing the cause of religious freedom. He helped the 

Commission amplify its voice and broaden its reach. He came in as an 

accomplished policymaker and left as a friend and advisor to Commissioners 

and Commission staff alike.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION

The Commission is the first government commission 

in the world with the sole mission of reviewing and 

making policy recommendations on the facts and 

circumstances of violations of religious freedom globally. 

The Commission’s impact and success in accomplishing 

its mission are achieved through its efforts to bring 

advice and accountability to U.S. foreign policy in the 

promotion of religious freedom abroad. By providing 

reliable information and analysis, and careful and specific 

policy recommendations, the Commission provides 

the U.S. government and the American public with the 

tools necessary to promote this fundamental freedom 

throughout the world.

In the words of a key drafter of IRFA, the Commission 

was established for the purpose of ensuring “that 

the President and the Congress receive independent 

recommendations and, where necessary, criticism of 

American policy that does not promote international 

religious freedom.”1

The Commission, which began its work in May 1999, is 

not a part of the State Department and is independent from 

the Executive Branch.

The Commission is composed of 10 members. Three 

are appointed by the President. Three are appointed by 

the President pro tempore of the Senate, of which two 

are appointed upon the recommendation of the Senate 

Minority Leader. Three are appointed by the Speaker of the 

House of Representatives, of which two are appointed upon 

the recommendation of the House Minority Leader. The 

system of appointments thus provides that leaders of the 

party in the White House appoint five voting members, and 

leaders of the other party appoint four. 

The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom serves ex officio as a non-voting member. 

Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise and 

experience in foreign affairs, human rights, religious 

freedom, and international law; the membership also 

reflects the religious diversity of the United States.

The report covers the period May 2007 through April 

2008. In June 2007, Felice D. Gaer completed her term 

as the Chair of the Commission, during which Michael 

Cromartie, Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, and Nina Shea 

served as Vice Chairs. In July 2007, Michael Cromartie 

became Chair, and Preeta D. Bansal and Dr. Richard D. 

Land became Vice Chairs. Commissioners serve a two-year 

term and can be reappointed. 

In carrying out its mandate, the Commission reviews 

information on violations of religious freedom as presented 

in the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices and its Annual Report on International 

Religious Freedom. The Commission also consults 

regularly with State Department and National Security 

Council officials, U.S. Ambassadors, and officials of foreign 

governments, as well as with representatives of religious 

communities and institutions, human rights groups, 

other non-governmental organizations, academics, and 

other policy experts. It visits foreign countries to examine 

religious freedom conditions firsthand. The Commission 

also holds public hearings, briefings and roundtables.

The Commission has met with President George 

W. Bush and senior members of his Administration, 

including the Secretary of State and the National Security 

Advisor, to discuss its findings and recommendations. 

The Commission also briefs Members of Congress, 

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created 

by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor violations 

of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, 

as defined in IRFA and set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and related international instruments, and to give independent policy 

recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress.

1

 Congressional Record, S12999, November 12, 1998.
U.S. Ambassadors, and officials from international 

organizations. In addition, the Commission testifies before 

Congress, participates with U.S. delegations to international 

meetings and conferences, helps provide training to 

Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials, and advises 

the Administration and Members of Congress and their 

staff on executive and legislative initiatives. 

The Commission raises issues and brings its findings 

and recommendations to the American public through its 

public speaking activities, press conferences, other public 

events such as roundtables and briefings, its publications, 

Web site, and media outreach. During this reporting 

period the Commission’s activities were covered by the 

Christian Science Monitor, International Herald Tribune, 

Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, The 

Washington Post, The Washington Times, the wires, 

National Public Radio, and PBS, to name a few.

Commissioners reside throughout the United States, 

and the Commission has traveled around the country to 

hold public hearings, public meetings, and other activities 

to inform the American people of its work. 

While the work of the Commission is conducted year 

round, the Commission compiles an annual report of 

its policy recommendations in May to the President, the 

Secretary of State, and Congress. This report covers the 

period from May 2007 – April 2008.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom

May 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: The Commission’s Role in Advancing Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

A Prison Without Bars: an Update of the Commission’s North Korea Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 

Promoting International Religious Freedom at the United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Other Countries on the Commission’s CPC List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138

Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146

People’s Republic of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Countries on the Commission’s Watch List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189

Bangladesh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196

Belarus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206

Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231

Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241

Additional Countries Closely Monitored. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Countries Previously on the Commission’s Lists: Georgia, India, and Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263
Other Countries under Review: Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .283

Appendix 1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .298

Appendix 3: International Human Rights Standards: Summary of Provisions 

on Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
The year 2008 marks the tenth anniversary of 

the passage of the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA), legislation that threw a 

spotlight on the importance of religious freedom around 

the world and on the need to promote this freedom as an 

integral component of U.S. foreign policy. Developments 

of the past decade have strengthened the importance of 

freedom of religion or belief, as the U.S. government navigates a world threatened by religion-based extremism and 

religion-imbued conflict. The issue of religious freedom 

is now understood to have a profound impact on our own 

political and national security interests, as well as on political stability throughout the world. Whether in the Middle 

East, Southeast Europe, East Asia, or elsewhere, religion 

and the striving for religious freedom have often been 

explicit or implicit factors in civil strife. Religion can also 

be a powerful force for reconciliation. Clearly, the right to 

exercise freedom of religion or belief is too fundamental to 

be left undefended from the whims of autocrats, extremists, 

and demagogues.

IRFA provided a new array of diplomatic mechanisms 

that could be employed to advance this freedom internationally. It created the Office of International Religious 

Freedom at the Department of State, headed by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, 

and required that the Department draw on its network of 

U.S. embassies around the world to collect information on 

religious freedom conditions for constant monitoring and 

the annual publication of the International Religious Freedom Report. It also put an official in place at the National 

Security Council to advise on religious freedom issues.

IRFA also established the Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent, bipartisan federal body of private citizens mandated to advance freedom 

of religion or belief. The Commission, with nine voting 

members, monitors international violations of religious 

freedom, provides reliable information and analysis, and 

makes policy recommendations to the President, State Department, and Congress on how best to ensure that people 

the world over are free to believe and manifest their belief, 

in accordance with international human rights norms.

Throughout the past decade, the existence of IRFA has 

sparked an increase in U.S. policymakers’ recognition of 

the importance of religious freedom to people around the 

world, and its protection is now a recurrent focus of international actors. This change is also felt among religious 

freedom advocates throughout the world, many of whom 

are struggling under oppressive conditions, including 

some whom Commission delegations have met in their 

prison cells or in their homes, where they are being held 

under house arrest. Encouraged by the spotlight on this 

previously neglected area of human rights, non-governmental organizations and the media have risen to the task 

of documenting violations as well as advances, and their 

grass-roots efforts dovetail with those of governments and 

international organizations. Much room remains, however, for more effective U.S. policies promoting freedom of 

religion or belief.

Two countries can be singled out as exemplifying 

IRFA’s impact. After decades of having its poor human 

rights and religious freedom record overlooked, Saudi 

Arabia was finally added to the State Department’s list 

of “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs, the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom, in 2004. Finally 

under scrutiny for its severe religious freedom abuses, the 

Saudi government has been forced to address its record 

and has pledged to reform. The task ahead is to ensure 

that those pledges are implemented in practice. Vietnam 

1

Introduction

Throughout the past decade, the 

existence of IRFA has sparked an increase 

in U.S. policymakers’ recognition of the 

importance of religious freedom to people 

around the world, and its protection is now 

a recurrent focus of international actors.
2

has also come to recognize, as a result of the IRFA process 

and its designation as a CPC, that religious freedom matters, both in its relations with the United States and to its 

own citizens. The CPC designation worked as Congress 

intended when it passed IRFA, making religious freedom 

a priority in U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The government 

of Vietnam engaged on religious freedom concerns, legal 

issues, and prisoners—and there was noticeable progress. 

Nevertheless, enough serious religious freedom concerns 

remain for the Commission to conclude that it is too soon 

for the Administration to have lifted the CPC designation 

for Vietnam. 

The Commission’s Impact under IRFA

The Commission has made an impact on CPC designations, 

a key aspect of the implementation of IRFA. Since 2001, it 

has successfully recommended that North Korea, Eritrea, 

Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan be added to the U.S. 

government’s list of the most severe violators of religious 

freedom. It has persuaded successive U.S. Administrations of the need to highlight religious freedom abuses in 

meetings with high-level dignitaries, including from the 

governments of China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, 

Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam. Its findings and policy 

recommendations have been incorporated into dozens of 

bills and resolutions in Congress.

For example, over the past decade, the Commission has influenced the debate on U.S. foreign policy 

regarding Sudan. The Commission was one of the first 

to call for a Special Envoy for Sudan, who was named by 

President Bush in September 2001. It helped ensure that 

desperately needed humanitarian assistance went to the 

worst-hit areas of Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, 

by persuading the United States to increase aid outside of 

the UN’s Operation Lifeline Sudan program, which is influenced by the government of Sudan, and it successfully 

encouraged the Administration to increase non-lethal 

assistance to opposition-controlled areas in Sudan. The 

Commission continues to conclude that the U.S. government has a crucial role to play in the future of Sudan, both 

by enlisting international support to press the Sudanese 

government to end its delaying tactics on implementing 

the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and by considering new sanctions to respond to such non-compliance. 

The Commission has also helped shape U.S. policies 

with regard to China. In 2002, the Commission recommended to President Bush that he condition a state visit 

to China on the Chinese government providing him with 

an opportunity to make a major speech on religious freedom and human rights televised live and uncensored to 

the Chinese people. That speech was delivered at China’s 

Tsinghua University and broadcast live nationwide on 

Chinese state television. The Commission sent a delegation to China in 2005 to discuss with Chinese officials the 

government’s systematic violations of the right to freedom 

of religion or belief, including crackdowns on religious 

activities among Buddhists in Tibet, Muslims in Xinjiang, 

and unregistered Roman Catholic and Protestant communities. The delegation also drew attention to the protection of North Korean refugees in China. China remains a 

prominent focus of the Commission’s work, with at least 

five separate hearings and panel discussions organized by 

the Commission, as well as the regular presentation of expert testimony before various congressional committees. 

The unrest in Tibet as this report goes to press illustrates 

the necessity of keeping religious freedom concerns at the 

heart of U.S. policy toward China.

The Commission highlighted the undemocratic nature of Pakistan’s separate-electorate system for religious 

minorities; the Pakistan government abolished separate 

electorates in 2002. The Commission also pressed for action against extremist religious groups and schools that 

promote violence, an issue that came to the forefront of 

U.S. policy only after the events of September 11. The 

Commission has regularly spoken out about the country’s 

blasphemy laws, which commonly involve false accusations and result in the lengthy detention of and violence 

against Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims on account of their religious beliefs, as well as on other issues, 

including the laws violating the fundamental rights of the 

Ahmadi community, the persistent sectarian violence 

targeting Shi’as, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, and the 

The Commission was among the 

first voices in Washington to call 

attention to the grave plight of 

religious minorities in Iraq.
3

Hudood ordinances, which violate the rights of women.

Regarding Vietnam, the Commission successfully 

advised the U.S. House of Representatives in 2001 to ratify 

the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, but only following adoption of legislation calling on the Vietnamese 

government to make substantial improvements in the 

protection of religious freedom—sending a signal to the 

Vietnamese government of America’s commitment to 

human rights. The Vietnam Human Rights Act was overwhelmingly passed by the House prior to the Bilateral 

Trade Agreement vote.

The Commission was among the first voices in Washington to call attention to the grave plight of religious minorities in Iraq. As early as 2004, the Commission warned 

of legal shortcomings in Iraq that could result in discrimination against and repression of religious minorities. In 

December 2004, the Commission wrote to President Bush 

to urge the United States to do more to protect religious 

communities and religious sites from the escalating violence against them. In 2006, the Commission wrote to 

Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky seeking new or 

expanded options for allowing members of Iraq’s smallest 

religious minority communities access to the U.S. refugee 

program. That letter was followed by a Commission oped on the subject in The Washington Times, which helped 

spur congressional hearings and led to the State Department’s decision to establish a task force on Iraqi refugees. 

In the past year, the Commission held two hearings on the 

topic, and raised the issue during a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in May 2007 and through 

follow-up letters in February and September 2007.

The Commission also conducted a major study of the 

impact of a new U.S. immigration procedure, “Expedited 

Removal,” on asylum-seekers in the United States. The 

study was authorized by the Commission’s mandate to 

monitor implementation of Title VI of IRFA, which has 

provisions related to asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants, with particular attention to individuals who 

have fled—or committed—severe violations of religious 

freedom. The study found that while implementation of 

some of the training and reporting provisions of Title VI 

has heightened awareness of religious persecution issues 

among immigration officials, other training and operational provisions remain under- or even un-implemented. 

Although Expedited Removal was intended equally to 

protect the integrity of U.S. borders and bona fide asylum seekers, the Commission’s study found that serious 

implementation flaws meant asylum seekers were at risk 

of being returned to countries where they may face persecution. The study also found that asylum seekers were 

detained inappropriately, in prison-like conditions and 

in actual jails. Those shortcomings were still apparent in 

2007 when the Commission did a follow-up study, or “report card,” on the Expedited Removal program.

The Commission’s Annual Report

This annual report reviews the Commission’s activities during the past year and specifically:

• describes conditions for religious freedom and related 

human rights in the countries of central concern to the 

Commission and highlights key findings;

• presents the Commission’s policy recommendations 

to ensure that the promotion of freedom of religion or 

belief becomes a more integral part of U.S. foreign policy, 

furthering both our nation’s humanitarian and national 

security interests; and

• reports on the actions the Commission has taken to raise 

public awareness of religious freedom violations, and 

summarizes the Commission’s efforts to keep Congress 

and the Administration informed of religious freedom 

conditions throughout the world. 

The wide array of activities and publications in this 

reporting period illustrates the major impact the Commission has on developing U.S. policy to promote religious 

freedom abroad. Commissioners have testified before 

congressional committees and caucuses, met with highranking U.S. Administration officials including Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice, held hearings and press conferences on pressing religious freedom issues, conducted 

fact-finding missions to other countries, and published 

numerous policy papers, press releases, and op-eds.

Assessing the Status of Religious Freedom 

Firsthand

Each year, the Commission conducts visits to foreign 

countries to examine threats to religious freedom and to 

formulate potential policy responses. During this reporting period, Commission delegations visited Saudi Arabia, 

Turkmenistan, and Vietnam, all countries that have been 

on the Commission’s list of the worst violators of religious 

freedom, as well as Sweden, Jordan, and Iraq to examine 

INTRODUCTION
4

Iraq-related issues. The visit to Saudi Arabia was intended 

to assess how far the Saudi authorities have progressed in 

implementing their previously articulated commitments 

to improve the climate for religious freedom. On the visit 

to Turkmenistan, Commissioners considered the extent to 

which the Central Asian country has undertaken reforms 

since the December 2006 death of longtime dictator Saparmurat Niyazov. The trip to Vietnam enabled Commissioners to gauge the impact of newly adopted government policies concerning religious freedom, and in Sweden, Jordan, 

and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Commissioners met with 

displaced Iraqis and officials to gather current information 

about religious freedom conditions inside Iraq. 

Saudi Arabia

The delegation to Saudi Arabia, led by then-Chair Felice D. 

Gaer, raised issues concerning the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief that affect Saudi citizens and 

the large population of foreign workers, as well as others 

outside the country. The delegation visited three regions of 

the country in order to hear differing viewpoints: Riyadh, 

Jeddah and the Eastern Province. The discussions focused 

on: halting the dissemination of intolerant literature and 

extremist ideology; reform of school textbooks and curricula to remove language encouraging intolerance, hatred, 

or violence on the basis of religious differences, whether 

against Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus or others; protecting the right of private worship; curbing harassment 

by the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice; 

and empowering the National Human Rights Commission. 

The delegation also explored Saudi government efforts to 

institute political and social reforms, the establishment of 

indigenous human rights institutions, the steps taken to 

combat religious extremism, religious freedom restrictions 

and discrimination affecting followers of different schools 

of thought within Islam, limitations on the universal human 

rights of women, and freedom of expression, including on 

sensitive issues relevant to religion in the press and other 

media.

The Commission was informed of certain institutional initiatives by the Saudi government to address 

human rights violations. The issue of abuses by the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice—the religious police—also received unprecedented exposure in 

the Saudi media during the delegation visit. Yet, despite 

Saudi government pledges to institute reforms, the Commission concluded that many of these promises remain 

just that—promises—that have not yet been reflected in 

the promulgation and implementation of tangible protections for human rights. Although the Saudi government 

has permitted some initial steps toward the development 

of civil society, policies that would advance reforms have 

not yet been realized. 

Turkmenistan

Chair Michael Cromartie led the Commission delegation to Turkmenistan eight months after the death of 

President Niyazov, under whom virtually no independent 

religious activity was allowed and severe government 

restrictions left most religious activity under strict, often 

arbitrary, state control. In addition, Niyazov’s personality 

cult took the form of a quasi-religion to which everyone in 

Turkmenistan was forced to adhere, and his book of “spiritual thoughts,” the Ruhnama, was required in mosques 

and churches alongside the Koran and the Bible. President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov has initiated some 

changes, including the release, just prior to the Commission’s trip, of the country’s former chief mufti, Nasrullah 

ibn Ibadullah, and 10 other prisoners of conscience. 

The Commission raised many concerns with President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and other Turkmen 

government officials, including: the 2003 law on religion, 

particularly those articles that violate international norms 

pertaining to freedom of religion or belief; the stateimposed ideology, particularly that of the personality cult, 

that infringes upon or severely diminishes the practice of 

freedom of religion or belief and related freedoms of association, movement, expression, and the press; intrusive 

and onerous registration procedures that hinder the registration of peaceful religious communities; administrative 

fines on and the imprisonment of leaders or members 

of peaceful unregistered religious communities whose 

activities are deemed “illegal”; obstacles to the purchase 

or rental of land or buildings intended as houses of worship or for meeting purposes; the great difficulty in the use 

of private homes and public halls in residential areas for 

worship services; and a legal ban on the importation and 

printing of religious and other material. 

The delegation found that despite new developments, 

the system of oppressive laws and practices that have led 

to severe violations of human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, remain in place. In addition, the overall 
5

repressive atmosphere that characterized public life in 

Turkmenistan under President Niyazov remains largely 

unchanged, and significant religious freedom problems 

and official harassment continue. 

 

Vietnam

In Vietnam, Commissioners led by Chair Michael Cromartie visited Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, the Central 

Highlands, and Soc Trang Province in October – November 2007 to discuss conditions for freedom of religion and 

related human rights. The Commission met with Prime 

Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and other government officials 

and with representatives of Vietnam’s diverse religious 

communities. Moreover, the delegation was permitted 

to meet with prisoners of concern and others held under 

house and pagoda arrest and advocated for their release. 

The Commission also urged the government to undertake 

full, impartial, and effective investigations into continued 

report of restrictions and abuses on the freedom of religion 

among ethnic minorities and religious groups the government views as “political” or “security” threats. 

The Commission found that since 2004, after Vietnam was named a CPC, permissible religious activity has 

increased. However, the Commission remained skeptical 

that genuine reform has been fully implemented, particularly in the context of Vietnam’s continued repression of 

peaceful political and religious dissent. 

The Commission also found that in some areas of the 

country, provincial leaders are using their authority to 

restrict and abuse religious freedom. In the Central Highlands and Central Coast, local officials have confiscated 

the lands belonging to ethnic minority Protestants. In the 

Central Highlands, provincial officials are instructed to 

deny medical, educational, financial and other government services to “religious families” as well as to the family members of recent converts. In Sac Trong and An Giang provinces, Hoa Hao and Khmer Buddhists have been 

arrested after demonstrating against religious freedom 

restrictions and abuses. The Commission raised theses 

issues, as well as concerns about continued restrictions 

targeting the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam, with 

government officials. 

The Commission concluded that while religious 

freedom conditions are gradually improving in Vietnam, 

significant problems remain, includijng restrictions on 

and the mistreatment of certain religious groups and the 

continued detention of “prisoners of concern.” These prisoners include people who, motivated by their religion or 

conscience, express views or organize in support of legal 

or political reforms to advance religious freedom, those 

who monitor religious freedom problems and are arrested 

or otherwise punished for publicizing their findings, and 

those who peacefully organize or protest to draw attention 

to persistent religious freedom concerns. 

Sweden, Jordan, and the Kurdistan Region of 

Iraq

In November 2007, Commission staff traveled to Sweden 

to meet Iraqi asylum seekers, refugees, and internally 

displaced persons (IDPs). In March 2008, a delegation 

of Commissioners traveled to Amman, Jordan and Erbil, 

Iraq for additional meetings with refugees and IDPs from 

Iraq. The purpose of these visits was to learn from displaced Iraqis the circumstances under which they fled their 

homes, in order to determine what role religious repression 

may have played in that flight. 

The Commission delegation to Jordan and Iraq 

also met with representatives of international and nongovernmental organizations that are assisting the asylum 

seekers, refugees, and IDPs. In addition, in Erbil, the 

Commission met with members of the Kurdistan Regional 

Government and other local government officials and representatives of local religious communities, human rights 

organizations, and political parties, as well as with U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker and other U.S. officials to discuss reports of discrimination against religious 

minorities both in Kurdish-dominated areas and in other 

parts of Iraq.

INTRODUCTION

The Commission has played a 

key role in efforts to encourage 

the U.S. government to increase 

resettlement options for members 

of vulnerable groups fleeing 

religious repression.
6

Keeping Congress Apprised of Religious 

Freedom Issues

Commission-Sponsored Hearings

The Commission held four hearings during the reporting 

period. Two focused on religious minorities, sectarian 

violence, and the refugee crisis in Iraq, one examined the 

aftermath of the “Saffron Revolution” in Burma, and one 

explored religious freedom in, and U.S. policy toward, Iran.

The first hearing on Iraq, held in July, focused on 

the threats faced by members of the smallest religious 

communities. Commissioners heard testimony of representatives of religious minorities and others who had 

been deliberately victimized by militants—and, witnesses 

claimed, even by members of the Iraqi police and security 

forces—testimony that included reports of murder, torture, and abductions for ransom; parishioners sleeping in 

churches to escape death squads and insurgents; families 

being given just hour deadlines to vacate their homes; 

and expropriated land, forced conversions and alleged 

extortion in the form of taxes on non-Muslims. The Commission was joined at the hearing by Reps. Anna Eshoo 

(D-CA) and Christopher Shays (R-CT).

The second hearing on Iraq, held in September, 

examined the causes, dimensions, and patterns of intraMuslim sectarian violence, including the targeting of 

individual Muslims for killings and other violence on account of their religious identity as well as any potential 

Iraqi government role in that violence. It also examined 

U.S. policy in relation to Iraq’s refugee crisis, focusing on 

internal displacement and Iraqis sheltering in neighboring countries. Witnesses included Assistant Secretary of 

State Ellen R. Sauerbrey, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees’ Assistant High Commissioner for Operations, and Dana Graber, Iraq Displacement Specialist, International Organization for Migration. 

Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), Sen. Gordon Smith (R-OR), and 

Rep. Steve Israel (D-NY) also addressed the Commission 

at the hearing.

“After the Saffron Revolution: Religion, Repression, 

and the U.S. Policy Options for Burma,” a hearing held in 

December 2007, evaluated how the Burmese military contributes to violent repression of peaceful dissent, ongoing 

abuses against ethnic minorities, and regional instability. 

It also examined UN diplomatic efforts and U.S. policy 

options for bringing about democratic change in Burma. 

Witness panels addressed the role of Buddhist monks in 

the demonstrations, the military’s manipulation of Buddhism to bolster its political legitimacy, the monks’ fate 

since the crackdown, the impact of the military’s ethnic 

policies, prospects for recent UN diplomacy in Burma, and 

suggestions for additional multilateral diplomatic action. 

Witnesses also evaluated sanctions and other U.S. policy 

options for bringing about democratic change in Burma. 

Six witnesses, including Jeffrey Feltman, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, testified before the Commission at its February 2008 

hearing on “Advancing Religious Freedom and Related 

Human Rights in Iran.” The Commissioners and witnesses discussed human rights abuses in Iran, current U.S. 

policy, and potential avenues for more effectively addressing rights violations in the Islamic Republic. Witnesses 

highlighted the dire situation facing religious minorities 

in Iran, particularly Baha’is, who are seen as heretics and 

are not recognized by Iranian authorities, as well as Sufi 

Muslims and Evangelical and other Protestant Christians.

They also pointed to state-sponsored anti-Semitism and 

Holocaust denial rhetoric that have increased fear among 

Iran’s Jewish community.

Testimony by Commissioners at Other 

Congressional Hearings and Events

Commissioners also presented expert testimony before 

congressional bodies. In September, Commissioners 

Leonard Leo and Imam Talal Eid presented the findings 

of the Commission’s 2007 Annual Report at a meeting of 

the Religious Freedom Working Group, a bicameral body 

co-chaired by Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN) and Rep. Roy 

Blunt (R-MO). Commissioner Leo also discussed the Commission’s trip to Vietnam at a joint briefing in December for 

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, the Task Force 

on International Religious Freedom, and the Congressional 

Caucus on Vietnam. In October 2007, the Commission and 

the Congressional China Caucus co-hosted a roundtable 

discussion on Capitol Hill focusing on current problems 

facing refugees and asylum seekers in China, particularly 

North Koreans, Uighur Muslims, and Tibetan Buddhists.

In January 2008, Commissioner Nina Shea addressed 

human rights abuses and religious persecution in Burma 

at an off-the-record briefing of the congressional Task 

Force on International Religious Freedom. Commissioner 

Felice D. Gaer testified before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) 
7

INTRODUCTION

in February 2008. She reviewed the record of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

in combating anti-Semitism, noting that anti-Semitism 

poses a significant danger to the security of OSCE participating states. In March, Commissioner Shea spoke about 

religious freedom conditions in Iran at a meeting of the 

bipartisan Iran Working Group. 

Countries of Particular Concern and the 

Watch List

Each year, the Commission makes recommendations to the 

Department of State on “countries of particular concern,” 

or CPCs: countries whose governments have engaged in 

or tolerated systematic and egregious violations of the 

universal right to freedom of religion or belief. After a 

country is designated, the U.S. president is required by law 

to oppose the violations by taking actions specified in IRFA. 

The Commission stresses that under IRFA, CPC designation 

is just the start to diplomatic activity aimed at promoting 

freedom of religion or belief.

In this reporting period, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of State designate the following countries as CPCs: Burma, the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, the People’s 

Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. This report contains chapters 

detailing the status of religious freedom in each of those 

countries.

The Commission also compiles a Watch List of countries that do not merit CPC designation but require close 

monitoring in an effort to improve conditions for the freedom of religion or belief. The Commission’s Watch List in 

this reporting period includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 

Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The Commission is concerned about the serious abuses in these 

countries, and that the governments either continue to 

be responsible for repression of and/or violence against 

persons amounting to serious violations of freedom of 

religion, or have failed to punish the perpetrators of those 

acts. 

More information about the Commission’s recommendations on all of these countries can be found in this 

report.

Assessing U.S. Government Performance

The Commission has played a key role in efforts to encourage the U.S. government to increase resettlement options 

for members of vulnerable groups fleeing religious repression. In particular, the Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government expand the possibility of resettlement 

for refugees from Iraq’s smallest religious communities, 

including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Mandaeans, and Yazidis, who are heavily targeted in Iraq and disproportionately 

represented among the refugee populations in neighboring 

countries. The Commission recommends that the State 

Department open a Priority 2 categorization for members 

of these particularly vulnerable groups and expand family 

reunification options for Iraqi refugees with relatives in the 

United States.

In May 2007, the Commission met with Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice to discuss the Commission’s grave 

concern over the deteriorating situation for freedom of religion and belief in Iraq, including the plight of the smallest religious minorities. In addition to Iraq, the Commissioners raised religious freedom and associated human 

rights issues in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, China, Bangladesh, 

Turkey and the 56-member OSCE. Then-Vice Chairs Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Nina Shea, and Michael Cromartie 

and Commissioners Richard D. Land and Preeta D. Bansal 

attended the meeting.

The same month, Commissioners met with Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff regarding asylum 

seekers in the Expedited Removal process. The meeting 

followed the Commission’s congressionally-authorized 

Fully integrating religious freedom into the U.S. foreign policy agenda will continue 

to be a key challenge for U.S. policymakers in future decades as they work to advance 

this fundamental freedom in accordance with the IRFA legislation.
8

2005 study, published under then-Chair Preeta D. Bansal, 

which found that implementation of the Expedited Removal procedure allowing U.S. border officials to quickly 

remove illegal aliens from the country was seriously 

flawed. The meeting occurred after the Commission’s 

February 2007 follow-up study, issued under then-Chair 

Felice D. Gaer, which noted the failure of most relevant 

federal agencies to adopt the Commission’s recommendations regarding ways to ensure that persons fleeing 

repression on account of their religion are not denied refuge in the United States.

Throughout the fall of 2007, the Commission advocated for the renewal of the mandate of the UN independent 

expert (or “Special Rapporteur”) who investigates and 

reports on violations of the freedom of religion or belief 

around the world. The Commission set out its views on 

the vital need to renew the Special Rapporteur’s mandate 

in a September 2007 letter to Secretary of State Rice, in 

which it also called for the U.S. government to speak out 

firmly against the increasing pressure in international 

institutions, including the UN Human Rights Council, to 

shift the focus from promoting religious freedom to halting so-called “defamation of religions.” The UN Special 

Rapporteur’s mandate was renewed at the December 2007 

session of the UN Human Rights Council, at which Commissioner Leonard Leo participated as part of the U.S. 

delegation. 

Raising Public Awareness

The Commission has also voiced concerned on issues 

connected with freedom of religion or belief during this 

reporting period, including through reports, press releases 

and op-eds. An article in the Las Cruces Sun-News, by 

then-Commissioner Bishop Ricardo Ramirez and Commissioner Michael Cromartie, urged a reinvigorated U.S. 

leadership role in efforts to revive peacemaking in Sudan. 

Commissioner Cromartie and then-Chair Felice D. Gaer 

published an op-ed in The Washington Times calling on 

the U.S. government clearly and unequivocally to press 

Pakistan to decriminalize blasphemy and to urge the Pakistani government to take more serious steps to combat 

Islamic extremism.

The Commission also highlighted religious freedom 

issues by sponsoring public events. In October 2007, the 

Commission co-sponsored two public events on the human rights situation in Kazakhstan with Freedom House 

and the Open Society Institute, featuring two leading 

Kazakh human rights activists, Ninel Fokina, Chair of the 

Almaty Helsinki Committee and Evgeny Zhovtis, Chair 

of the International Bureau of Human Rights, along with 

several representatives of Kazakhstan’s Hare Krishna community. 

In December 2007, Commission Chair Michael Cromartie presented the Commission’s Policy Focus Turkmenistan, based on the conclusions of the Commission’s 

trip to that Central Asian country, at a roundtable sponsored by Freedom House. In January 2008, the Commission co-sponsored a presentation at the Kennan Institute 

for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson 

Center on “The Putin Government’s Responses to Increased Xenophobia,” featuring Aleksandr Verkhovsky, a 

leading Russian expert on xenophobia and freedom of 

religion.

In April 2008, the Commission published Prison 

Without Bars, a follow-up report to its 2005 study of religious repression in North Korea. The purpose of the new 

report was to determine whether religious freedom conditions have changed, if the repressive government policies 

discussed in the first report remain in force, and whether 

refugees repatriated to North Korea continue to face harsh 

treatment. The report confirmed the continuing, pressing 

need for more effective action on the international level to 

address the repression of religious freedom and other human rights in North Korea.

The past decade has resulted in significant progress 

toward the primary goal of IRFA: to institutionalize concern for religious freedom in the U.S. government’s foreign policy apparatus. Yet, as the chapters in this Annual 

Report demonstrate, the process is far from complete. 

Fully integrating religious freedom into the U.S. foreign 

policy agenda will continue to be a key challenge for U.S. 

policymakers in future decades as they work to advance 

this fundamental freedom in accordance with the IRFA 

legislation. Indeed, ten years after the adoption of IRFA, 

promoting religious freedom has proved to be more vital 

than ever to the political and humanitarian interests of the 

United States, as well as to national and global security. 
INTRODUCTION
Mecca Gate, Jeddah
S 11

ince its inception, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has raised serious 

concerns about religious freedom conditions in 

Saudi Arabia and recommended that the country be designated by the Secretary of State as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of the right to freedom of religion 

or belief. The Commission was instrumental in securing 

Saudi Arabia’s official CPC designation in September 2004. 

In July 2006, as a consequence of CPC designation, 

the State Department announced that ongoing bilateral 

discussions with Saudi Arabia had enabled the U.S. government to identify and confirm a number of policies that 

the Saudi government “is pursuing and will continue to 

pursue for the purpose of promoting greater freedom for 

religious practice and increased tolerance for religious 

groups.”1

 

Nearly one year after the State Department announcement, the Commission traveled to Saudi Arabia in 

late May and early June 2007 to discuss religious freedom 

concerns and examine policy measures to ensure progress 

by the Saudi government in implementing several of its 

stated policies related to religious practice and tolerance. 

Such stated policies include: 1) halting the dissemination of intolerant literature and extremist ideology within 

Saudi Arabia and abroad; 2) reviewing and revising educational materials and textbooks; 3) protecting the subsidiary rights to private worship and to possess personal 

religious materials; 4) curbing harassment and repression 

of religious practitioners; and 5) empowering officially 

sanctioned human rights institutions. In addition, the 

Commission discussed the status of religious pluralism in 

the Kingdom, including freedom of religion or belief with 

respect to followers of different schools of thought within 

Sunni and Shi’a Islam, as well as for non-Muslims.

Although the Commission was extended various 

courtesies and assistance by the Saudi government in connection with the visit, the government refused Commission requests for meetings with officials at key agencies 

such as the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent 

Vice (CPVPV) and the Ministries of Education and Justice. 

The Commission also requested, but was not granted, 

meetings with members of the Consultative Council 

(Shura) and representatives of the King Abdul Aziz National Center for Dialogue, which inhibited the delegation from hearing various governmental points of view 

on a full range of issues. After the visit, then Commission 

Chair Felice D. Gaer wrote in late June 2007 to the Saudi 

Ambassador in Washington, DC and to the Chair of the 

Saudi Human Rights Commission, requesting textbooks 

from the current Saudi government curriculum, further 

information, and responses to outstanding questions. As 

of this writing, the Commission has not received a reply 

from the Saudi Ambassador. A July 2007 letter to the Commission from the Saudi Human Rights Commission stated 

that textbooks currently are being reviewed and copies 

would be sent to the Commission upon completion, although no completion date was given.

U.S. Policy

Until the State Department’s CPC designation in 

2004, many observers of the U.S.-Saudi relationship had 

been critical of the unwillingness of successive U. S. administrations to raise religious freedom and other human 

rights concerns as part of the bilateral agenda. The Commission had urged CPC designation for several years prior 

to the designation. In 2004, the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 CommisSAUDI ARABIA

Indeed, it is the conclusion of 

this Commission that CPC designation 

and subsequent U.S.-Saudi bilateral 

discussions have not resulted in 

substantial reforms by the Saudi government concerning religious freedom.
12

sion) concluded that Saudi Arabia was a “problematic 

ally in combating Islamic extremism,” and called on the 

United States to “confront problems with Saudi Arabia in 

the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.” Notwithstanding 

CPC designation, many observers contend that, even now, 

the United States does not want to jeopardize important 

bilateral security and economic ties by pushing for political and human rights reforms. Indeed, it is the conclusion 

of this Commission that CPC designation and subsequent 

U.S.-Saudi bilateral discussions have not resulted in substantial reforms by the Saudi government concerning religious freedom. 

In September 2005, Secretary Condoleezza Rice approved a temporary 180-day waiver of further action to 

allow for continued diplomatic discussions between the 

U.S. and Saudi governments and “to further the purposes 

of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).” The 

July 2006 announcement by the State Department included a renewal of the waiver by Secretary of State Rice. 

Other than the waiver, no action under IRFA has been 

taken by the U.S. government as a consequence of CPC 

designation.2

 

In August 2007, Congress passed legislation (H.R. 1, 

“Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”) that requires the President to report to 

it within 180 days on progress made by the Saudi government since 2001 “to facilitate political, economic, and 

social reforms, including greater religious freedom.” As 

discussed in the recommendations below, this assessment should include progress by the Saudi government on 

implementation of the July 2006 confirmation of policies. 

The Commission urges the U.S. government to address more actively and publicly religious freedom and 

other human rights issues with the Saudi Arabian government and report openly on the success or failure to implement genuine reforms in these areas in order to ensure 

that initiatives by the Saudi government will result in substantial, demonstrable progress. Specific recommendations are presented at the end of this chapter.

Findings

The Commission’s findings from its visit and other information received during the past year are outlined below, 

followed by a detailed discussion of those findings and 

recommendations for U.S. policy. It should be reiterated 

that the Commission did not meet with a fully representational set of interlocutors during its visit. The majority 

of persons with whom the Commission met, both in and 

outside the government, stated their view that King Abdullah is making some efforts to bring much needed human rights reforms to the Kingdom. Most agreed that the 

pace of reform has been slow, and that obstacles—including but not limited to corruption and resistance within 

the Royal family and religious establishment from elements that oppose change—have hindered progress. The 

Commission visit confirmed that the Saudi government 

persists in severely restricting all forms of public religious 

expression other than the government’s interpretation 

and enforcement of Sunni Islam. 

General Findings: Lack of Progress on Reform 

Efforts

• Despite Saudi government pledges to institute reforms, 

particularly those confirmed in the July 2006 list issued 

by Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John V. Hanford III, the Commission concludes that 

many of these promises remain just that—promises—

that have not yet been reflected in the promulgation and 

implementation of tangible protections for human rights. 

Although the Saudi government has permitted some 

nascent steps toward the development of civil society, 

policies that would advance reforms have not yet been 

realized. 

• The Commission continues to conclude that if the Saudi 

government were to implement fully the July 2006 policies it has previously identified and confirmed to the U.S. 

government for the purpose of improving conditions for 

The Commission visit confirmed 

that the Saudi government persists 

in severely restricting all forms of public 

religious expression other than the 

government’s interpretation and 

enforcement of Sunni Islam.
13

religious practice and tolerance, it would begin to diminish some of its institutionalized abusive practices that 

have resulted in severe violations of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief in Saudi Arabia and 

worldwide. However, the Saudi government has not 

been transparent with regard to evidence of progress on 

these policies. Nor has it established adequate measures 

to implement universal human rights standards and to 

provide enforceable remedies to the alleged victims. The 

Commission concludes that, as a result, little progress 

has been made with regard to implementation of the 

policies in practice.

• Some institutional response by the Saudi government to 

external and internal pressures to address the country’s 

poor overall human rights situation has resulted in the 

establishment of two officially tolerated human rights institutions and more public discussion in the media about 

some human rights issues, including through a series of 

National Dialogue meetings. However, there continues 

to be substantial resistance to change from various sectors within the Saudi government, and numerous other 

impediments remain. In addition, many of the recommendations that have come out of the relevant National 

Dialogue meetings—on the rights of women, religious 

extremism, and educational reform—have not been 

implemented.

• Despite some increase in public space to discuss human 

rights issues, pervasive restrictions remain on civil society and political activists, including representatives of 

minority religious groups, particularly regarding freedom 

of speech, assembly, and association. The Commission 

to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (CPVPV), also known 

as the religious police or mutawaa, exercises largely 

unchecked power to curtail rights, and the courts do not 

offer due process protecting the individual or effective 

remedies for violations of those rights. 

State Enforcement of Religious Conformity 

• Saudi Arabia has a diverse population, both regionally 

and religiously, despite decades of Saudi government enforcement of religious conformity. Permitting the public 

practice of only one interpretation of Islam and requiring 

public behavior to comply with this interpretation violates universal human rights standards and has resulted 

in discrimination and human rights violations against 

members of indigenous Muslim communities who follow 

other schools of thought, such as Shi’a Muslims, Ismailis, 

and non-conforming Sunnis, as well as both Muslim and 

non-Muslim expatriate workers.

• The Saudi government’s harsh enforcement of its interpretation of Islam, together with other violations of 

freedom of religion, adversely affect the human rights of 

women in Saudi Arabia, including with regard to freedom 

of speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom 

from coercion, access to education, and full equality 

before the law. The Commission noted some increase in 

public space to discuss human rights practices affecting 

women. Unfortunately, the Saudi government has continued discriminatory measures aimed at the destruction, rather than realization, of many of the human rights 

guaranteed to women.

• There is a general attitude and policy of the government 

of curtailing universal rights for non-Saudi visitors to the 

country and inhibiting the enjoyment of human rights 

on an equal basis for expatriate workers, particularly for 

the two – three million non-Muslim workers, including 

Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and others, who have 

come to Saudi Arabia for temporary employment. Provisions often included in labor contracts require expatriate 

workers to conform to Saudi religious customs and traditions, in the process forcing them to waive their inalienable human rights and submitting them to the limits of, 

and rights abuses by, Saudi employers.

Exportation of Extremist Ideology and 

Intolerance in Education Materials in Saudi 

Arabia and Around the World

• The Saudi government has undertaken some security 

measures to combat extremism inside the country, such 

as a “re-education” program for convicted “extremSAUDI ARABIA

Commissioners Leo, Bansal, Gaer, Cromartie, and Eid with the 

Deputy Interior Minister, Dr. Ahmad al-Salem (fourth from right) 

along with Interior Ministry officials and members of the Human 

Rights Commission.
14

ists” and the retraining or dismissal of imams known to 

espouse extremist views. However, these efforts appear 

to be designed to address security concerns rather than 

to implement reforms to protect human rights, including 

religious freedom.

• The Commission received mixed and contradictory 

messages about which government entity in fact has 

responsibility over materials that are sent abroad. Due to 

insufficient information provided by the Saudi government, the Commission could not verify that a formal 

mechanism exists within the Saudi government to review 

thoroughly and revise educational texts and other materials sent outside of Saudi Arabia. It appears that the 

Saudi government has made little or no progress on efforts to halt the exportation of extremist ideology outside 

the Kingdom. 

• There is very little transparency in the process of textbook 

revision, curriculum reform, and teacher training efforts. 

Moreover, there is evidence that intolerant and inflammatory elements remain in textbooks. Despite numerous requests to obtain copies of textbooks during and 

after the Commission’s visit, Saudi government officials 

did not provide a single textbook to the Commission. 

Furthermore, Saudi government officials did not provide 

requested information on 1) how many teachers and 

principals have been retrained; 2) how many teachers have been held accountable for deviating from the 

approved curriculum; or 3) whether or how teachers’ 

manuals have been revised to include the promotion of 

religious tolerance. 

Official Harassment of Private Religious Practice

• Incidents of harassment, detention, abuse, and interference by members of the Commission to Promote Virtue 

and Prevent Vice (CPVPV) during non-Muslim private 

worship services have decreased over the past year. 

However, other than at a few tolerated compounds where 

private worship takes place, expatriate workers go to 

great lengths to worship in private for fear of government 

interference, which can occur if the worship service is 

too loud, has too many people in attendance, or occurs 

too often in the same place. Furthermore, Saudi officials 

do not accept that for members of some religious groups, 

the practice of religion requires more than the individual 

or a small group worshipping in private, but includes the 

need for religious leaders to be able to conduct services 

in community with others. Foreign religious leaders 

continue to be prohibited from seeking and obtaining 

visas to enter Saudi Arabia and minister to local religious 

communities. Despite repeated requests for details on 

the parameters surrounding private worship, guidelines 

as to what constitutes “private” worship were not specified by Saudi officials. 

• In addition to the abuses, the CPVPV regularly oversteps 

its authority with impunity and is not subject to judicial 

review. Despite the fact that the CPVPV is not allowed to 

engage in surveillance, detain individuals for more than 

24 hours, arrest individuals without police accompaniment, or carry out any kind of punishment, members 

have been accused of killing, beating, whipping, detaining, and otherwise harassing individuals. Some Saudis 

would like to see the entity dissolved altogether, while 

others would like to see greater accountability of its employees and volunteers, including prosecution for abuses. During the past year, CPVPV abuses were the subject 

of numerous articles in the Arabic and English press, 

garnering unprecedented attention in the public and international media. There have been a greater number of 

investigations of abuses, yet in the recent cases that have 

been prosecuted, CPVPV members have not been held 

accountable and complainants report summary dismissals without due process for them to obtain redress.

Empowerment of Officially Recognized Human 

Rights Institutions

• The government’s Human Rights Commission (HRC) 

can advance human rights protections if it examines all 

Commissioner Gaer meets with the Minister of Islamic Affairs, 

Sheikh Saleh al-Shaykh.
15

internationally recognized human rights issues and its 

recommendations to the Saudi government are implemented in practice. The HRC would be more representative were it to include women members; it should also 

include freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief in its initial training on international human rights. 

The Commission welcomes the HRC’s commitment to 

take up the issue of societal discrimination against Muslims who dissent from or who follow different schools of 

thought within Islam.

• The non-governmental National Society for Human 

Rights can play a more constructive role in protecting human rights by continuing to maintain its independence 

from the government and ensuring that its reporting and 

recommendations are in conformity with universal human rights standards.

State Enforcement of Religious Conformity 

The Commission visit confirmed that the Saudi government persists in severely restricting all forms of public 

religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and enforcement of its version of Sunni Islam. This 

policy violates the rights of the large communities of Muslims from a variety of schools of Islam who reside in Saudi 

Arabia, including large populations of Sunnis who follow 

other schools of thought, Shi’a Muslims, and Ismailis, 

among others.4

 The government tightly controls even the 

restricted religious activity it does permit—through limits 

on the building of mosques, the appointment of imams, 

the regulation of sermons and public celebrations, and 

the content of religious education in public schools—and 

suppresses the religious views of Saudi and non-Saudi 

Muslims who do not conform to official positions. For example, only imams following a single school of Islam are 

permitted in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, centers 

of Islamic thought traditionally reflective of Islam’s great 

diversity because of the influx of pilgrims from all over the 

world.

Saudi Arabia has a very diverse population, both 

regionally and religiously, despite decades of Saudi government enforcement of religious conformity. Permitting 

the public practice of only one interpretation of Islam and 

requiring public behavior to comply with this interpretation violates universal human rights norms and has resulted in discrimination and human rights violations against 

members of indigenous Muslim communities who follow 

other schools of thought, such as Shi’a Muslims, Ismailis, 

and non-conforming Sunnis, as well as both Muslim and 

non-Muslim expatriate workers. The Saudi government 

attitude toward expatriate workers, particularly nonMuslim workers, is that they have come to Saudi Arabia 

only to work. As a result, provisions are often included in 

labor contracts requiring expatriate workers to conform 

to Saudi religious customs and traditions, forcing them to 

waive their inalienable human rights and submitting the 

workers to the limits of, and rights abuses by, Saudi employers.5

The Rights of Women

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and other violations of freedom of religion adversely 

affect the human rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including freedom of speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom from coercion, access to education, and full 

equality before the law. For example, when appearing in 

public women must adhere to a strict dress code and can 

be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment only with 

the consent of a male relative. Women require written 

permission from a male relative to travel inside or outside 

the country and are not permitted to drive motor vehicles. 

In addition, the Saudi justice system, in which courts apply Islamic law to the cases before them, does not grant a 

woman legal status equal to that of a man. Testimony by a 

woman is equivalent to one-half the testimony of a man; 

daughters receive half the inheritance that their brothers 

receive; and women have to demonstrate legally speciSAUDI ARABIA

Turki Al Sudairy, Chair of the Saudi Government’s Human Rights 

Commission (far right), meets with the USCIRF delegation along 

with other members of the Human Rights Commission.
16

fied grounds for divorce, while men may divorce without 

giving cause. In one of the most egregious cases in recent 

years, in November 2007, a woman, known in the media 

as the “Qatif Girl,” was convicted and sentenced to 200 

lashes and six months in prison because, immediately 

before she was gang raped by seven men in 2006, she was 

found alone in a car with a man who was not her relative, 

which is illegal in Saudi Arabia. She escaped the sentence 

only because King Abdullah pardoned her in December, 

though he also said he believed the punishment for the 

alleged crime was appropriate.

In February 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertürk, undertook a formal visit to Saudi Arabia and offered several preliminary 

observations and recommendations. Among them, the 

Rapporteur found that while there has been a “demystification of the taboo around violence against women” 

in recent years, there still existed “practices surrounding 

divorce and child custody, the absence of a law criminalizing violence against women and inconsistencies in the 

application of laws and procedures” that “continue to prevent many women from escaping abusive environments.” 

Furthermore, the Rapporteur found that members of the 

CPVPV were “responsible for serious human rights abuses 

in harassing, threatening and arresting women who ‘deviate from accepted norms’.” The Rapporteur also highlighted the situation facing female migrant domestic workers 

of all faiths and backgrounds who continue to face serious human rights abuses and various forms of violence. 

Among other recommendations, the Rapporteur urged 

the Saudi government to develop “a legal framework 

based on international human rights standards,” which 

would include a law criminalizing violence against women and a family law on marriage and divorce.

Shi’a Muslims

During its visit, the Commission met with numerous 

representatives of minority Muslim communities. The 

Commission found that Shi’a Muslims and members 

of indigenous Muslim communities who follow other 

schools of thought are subject to government restrictions 

on public religious practices and official discrimination in 

numerous areas, particularly in government employment 

and education. Nevertheless, Saudi officials claimed that 

the government does not discriminate on the basis of different schools of thought within Islam. One high-level 

official pointed to the fact that the Shi’a community has 

its own judges on personal matters and claimed that the 

community funds its own mosques because they have 

refused government assistance. However, Shi’a interlocutors said that the community does not register its mosques 

because of the fear of Ministry of Interior interference in 

activities that are already severely restricted. According 

to some Shi’a interlocutors, there are no Shi’a ministers in 

the government and very few Shi’a leaders in large corporations or in high-level government positions, particularly 

in the security agencies. 

Two of the major concerns that were repeatedly 

raised by interlocutors were the ongoing discrimination 

by teachers against Shi’a children in schools and the intolerant content in school textbooks. Shi’a community 

leaders expressed concern that their children go to school 

and are told by state-employed teachers that they are “bad 

people,” that “Shi’a Muslims are worse than Christians 

and Jews,” or that “Shi’a Muslims are not true Muslims.” 

Others showed school textbooks that contained discriminatory and inflammatory language about the Shi’a community. When the Commission raised this concern, one 

Saudi government official simply denied it, claiming that 

there is no textbook in the Kingdom which says that Shi’a 

Muslims are infidels.

Moreover, several non-governmental interlocutors 

cited concerns about fatwas (religious edicts) issued by 

conservative Sunni clerics in recent years, including in 

2007, which justify committing violent acts against Shi’a 

Muslims. Members of the Shi’a community expressed a 

desire to see more active government intervention when 

clerics issue such provocative edicts. Furthermore, in 

many cases, application of criminal law includes harsher 

punishments for Shi’a Muslims as well as Ismailis. Since 

many Saudi judges consider Shi’a Muslims and Ismailis 

to be “non-believers,” they are frequently dealt with more 

severely by the courts. 

Upon its return from Saudi Arabia, the Commission 

learned that since January 2007, dozens of members of 

the Shi’a community in the Eastern Province have been 

detained for up to 30 days and then released for holding 

small religious gatherings in private homes. None of the 

individuals have been charged with any crime, nor have 

Saudi authorities offered any explanation other than suggesting that the short-term detentions were punishment 

for holding private religious gatherings. Furthermore, the 

Commission learned that several British and American 

Shi’a men who traveled to Mecca in early August 2007 
17

were harassed and beaten by members of the CPVPV.6 According to one of those detained, a member of the CPVPV 

was making derogatory remarks about Shi’a Muslims in a 

public lecture inside a mosque. When the CPVPV member realized that the visitor was Shi’a, he arrested him after 

a short exchange of words. Nearly a dozen of the Shi’a 

men, including two minors, were detained and held overnight after hours of interrogation and verbal and physical abuse. According to one of the individuals who was 

detained, intervention by British and American diplomats 

helped secure their release. 

On a positive note, several members of the Shi’a community pointed out that over the past few years, there 

have been some improvements for the Shi’a community 

in the Eastern Province, particularly regarding the public 

expression of religious practice. Members of the Shi’a 

community in Qatif, where they represent the majority 

of the population, held their largest public gathering in 

observance of Ashura without government interference 

in 2007. However, authorities continue to prohibit observance in other areas of the Eastern Province, such as in AlAhsa and Dammam. It was also noted that there has been 

an increase in the number of Shi’a judges and courts for 

family matters and personal status. While the Shi’a community points to increased dialogue with the government, 

there is limited progress on a number of practical issues, 

such as the ability to teach Shi’a beliefs to Shi’a children in 

schools and the inability to re-open mosques and hussainiyas (Shi’a community centers) in Al-Ahsa and Dammam 

that have been closed by the government for years. 

Due to U.S. Embassy security policies, the Commission was not able to visit Najran in the south, home to the 

vast majority of Ismailis in the Kingdom. However, the 

delegation was able to meet with some non-governmental 

interlocutors who had knowledge of the situation of Saudi 

Ismailis. Human rights advocates report that Ismailis, a 

Shi’a sect numbering some 700,000 inside Saudi Arabia, 

continue to suffer severe discrimination and abuse by 

Saudi authorities, particularly in government employment and education. The government does not finance 

the building of mosques for Ismailis and has closed down 

several places of worship in recent years. In 2000, in 

the Najran region, after members of the CPVPV raided 

and closed down an Ismaili mosque, approximately 100 

Ismailis, including clerics, were arrested. Many were 

released after serving reduced sentences, but dozens remained in prison for several years. As of this writing, 17 

Ismailis remain in prison, some of whom reportedly have 

been flogged. 

Another Ismaili, Hadi Al-Mutaif, also remains in 

prison after originally being sentenced to death for apostasy in 1994 for a remark deemed blasphemous, which 

he made as a teenager. Al-Mutaif continues to serve a 

life sentence on reduced blasphemy charges and some 

non-governmental interlocutors said that because of the 

nature of the crime, the King cannot pardon him. Defense 

lawyers are trying to appeal in court, claiming that Al-Mutaif violated civil rather than criminal law. According to 

an official at the Interior Ministry, King Abdullah planned 

to pardon Al-Mutaif last year, but because Al-Mutaif’s 

offense is considered a hadd crime by the court and not 

a tahzir crime, there are fewer options for intervention.7

 

According to government officials, the issue is now in the 

hands of the Supreme Court. The Saudi Human Rights 

Commission stated that it was also working on this case.

Other Minority Muslim Communities

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing 

SAUDI ARABIA

Permitting the public practice of only one interpretation of Islam and requiring public 

behavior to comply with this interpretation violates universal human rights norms and 

has resulted in discrimination and human rights violations against members of indigenous 

Muslim communities who follow other schools of thought, such as Shi’a Muslims, Ismailis, 

and non-conforming Sunnis, as well as both Muslim and non-Muslim expatriate workers.
18

the nature of the regime are used by the Saudi government to suppress discussion and debate and to silence 

dissidents. Promoters of political and human rights reforms, as well as those seeking to debate the appropriate 

role of religion in relation to the state, its laws, and society, 

are typically the target of such charges. For example, in 

March 2008, a Turkish Muslim citizen was sentenced to 

death by a court in Jeddah for allegedly blaspheming the 

prophet Muhammad; the sentence is being appealed to a 

higher court. According to a press report, two witnesses 

testified that they heard the Turkish man swear at God 

and the prophet Muhammad in a barbershop and reported it to authorities. In April 2007, an Egyptian Muslim 

guest worker reportedly was sentenced to death in the 

town of Arar in northern Saudi Arabia for allegedly desecrating the Koran and renouncing Islam. Media reports 

indicated that a court found the man guilty of no longer 

being a Muslim for “violating the boundaries set by God.” 

In addition, spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” 

continue to be used by the Saudi authorities against nonconforming Muslims. According to press reports, in 2007 

the CPVPV arrested at least 25 individuals in Taif for practicing witchcraft and sorcery. Several individuals remain 

in prison on these charges. 

In late December 2006, approximately 49 foreign 

guest workers, all members of the Ahmadi Muslim religious movement, were arrested by the CPVPV at a place 

of worship in Jeddah. In January and February 2007, an 

additional nine Ahmadis were arrested. In January 2007, 

after Saudi authorities began deporting several of the 

Ahmadi prisoners, mostly Indian and Pakistani nationals, 

international human rights groups called on the Saudi 

government to halt expulsions of foreign workers on account of their religious beliefs and affiliations. Despite 

this call, by early April 2007, all 58 of the Ahmadis had 

been deported. None of those deported are known to 

have been charged with any criminal offenses. In addition, two other Ahmadi religious leaders, who were not 

in Saudi Arabia during the initial arrests of 49 Ahmadis 

in December, have not returned to the country for fear of 

arrest and prosecution by Saudi authorities. According to 

the State Department, the Saudi government said that it 

had deported as many as 150 Ahmadis but it provided no 

explanation for their arrests or deportations.

Over the past few years, members of the Sufi community have been harassed, arrested, and detained because 

of their non-conforming religious views, although there 

have been no new reports of such incidents in the past 

year. In September 2003, the mutawaa arrested 16 foreign workers for allegedly practicing Sufism; their status 

remains unknown. In June 2005, Saudi authorities shut 

down a weekly gathering held by a Sufi leader who adheres to the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence. 

The Dissemination of Extremist Ideology and 

Intolerant Literature in Saudi Arabia and its 

Exportation Around the World

For years, the Commission has expressed concern that 

Saudi government funding and other funding originating in Saudi Arabia have been used globally to finance 

religious schools, hate literature, and other activities that 

support religious intolerance and, in some cases, violence 

toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. During the 

past year, there were continued reports, including from 

the State Department, of virulently anti-Semitic and antiChristian sentiments expressed in the official media and 

in sermons delivered by clerics, who in some cases continue to pray for the death of Jews and Christians, despite 

having been disciplined for preaching extremist views. 

During its visit, the Commission gained some information from Saudi government officials regarding efforts 

to combat extremism and contain dissemination of hate 

literature within Saudi Arabia. However, despite raising 

many questions on the subject, the Commission was told 

very little about Saudi government efforts to halt the exportation of extremist ideology and literature outside the 

Kingdom. According to the State Department, the Saudi 

Commissioner Prodromou with Princess Loulwa bint Faisal, Vice 

Chair of the Board and General Supervisor of Effat College for 

Women, Jeddah.
19

government either itself operates or tightly regulates all 

publishing entities inside Saudi Arabia. 

Efforts to Combat Extremism Inside Saudi 

Arabia

In recent years, the Saudi government has undertaken 

some security measures to combat extremism, such as a 

“re-education” program for convicted “extremists” and 

the retraining or dismissal of imams known to espouse 

extremist views. However, these efforts appear to be designed to address security concerns rather than to implement reforms to protect human rights, including religious 

freedom. 

According to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, there are 

approximately 72,000 mosques in the country and about 

120,000 employees paid by the Ministry, including imams 

and muezzins (those who make the call to prayer).8

 According to Saudi officials, the government uses several 

methods to deal with imams who preach hatred and extremism in mosques. The Minister of Islamic Affairs stated that there are government-appointed Islamic scholars 

in each province who meet with the particular imam who 

has been identified as advocating extremist views. In the 

first instance, the representative of the Ministry engages 

in direct dialogue by meeting with the imam in question 

in public to discuss the matter. If this dialogue fails to 

convince the imam to change his views, the Ministry representative meets with the imam privately. If this discussion is not successful, the imam will be dismissed from his 

post or, in some cases, criminally charged if he is found to 

have incited violence. According to the Ministry, approximately 1,000 have been dismissed since the September 11 

attacks on the United States. Since the Commission visit, 

a press report indicated that Interior Minister Prince Naif 

gathered hundreds of imams and preachers in Riyadh 

to stress the importance of combating extremist ideas 

through activities such as Friday sermons.9

 

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs claimed to have started 

“retraining” imams who espouse intolerance since 2006, 

and that this has yielded positive results, although no statistics or detailed information were provided. In March 

2008, the Saudi government announced that the Ministry 

of Islamic Affairs and the King Abdul Aziz National Center 

for Dialogue would carry out the retraining of 40,000 additional Muslim clerics in the Kingdom as part of a program 

to promote tolerance and moderation in Saudi society.10 

Imams are reportedly trained at a special training center 

that allows them a chance to be exposed to more moderate views. Saudi officials also stated that teachers, imams, 

or professors who promote hatred and intolerance are dismissed. Those let go can work in other fields of public or 

private employment, but not within the education system. 

Among those people who have been arrested for 

promoting hatred and inciting violence, several, particularly those who have been sentenced to prison terms, 

have gone through a “re-education” program that aims to 

encourage prisoners to renounce extremist beliefs. According to one high-level Saudi official, more than 700 

individuals have gone through this program and been 

given jobs, and then subsequently tracked and monitored. 

Furthermore, Saudi authorities claim to make every attempt to arrest those who promote violent acts, not just 

the perpetrators of the acts. Despite repeated requests by 

the Commission during and after its visit, no further statistics or details on dismissals were provided; nor was the 

Commission permitted to meet any “retrained” imams or 

those engaged in the training process.

Efforts to Halt Exportation of Extremist Ideology 

Outside Saudi Arabia

Saudi authorities categorically denied that extremist literature or materials were ever distributed through official 

government channels outside the country, despite numerous well-documented studies and reports to the contrary.11 There was acknowledgement from some officials 

that before the September 11 attacks, many Saudi Muslim 

volunteers took it upon themselves to distribute extremist 

materials abroad. Saudi authorities claim to have found 

a “very small amount” of intolerant material abroad that 

would be considered extremist and this material has been 

subsequently destroyed. According to Saudi officials, unless there is explicit permission by the Ministries of Culture and Information or Islamic Affairs, no materials can 

be sent overseas. Despite requests for further clarification, the Commission could not confirm whether a formal 

mechanism exists to review thoroughly and revise educational materials and other materials sent outside of Saudi 

Arabia. In addition, the Commission received mixed and 

contradictory messages about which government entity 

has responsibility over materials that are sent abroad.

When asked about reports that Islamic Affairs sections in Saudi embassies worldwide have been responsible for both distributing extremist and intolerant materials and providing diplomatic status to Muslim, even 

SAUDI ARABIA
20 non-Saudi, clerics, a high-level Saudi official said that 

these sections have been closed temporarily, pending 

reorganization, due to these reports. No time-frame was 

given for these reorganization efforts. In the meantime, 

the Commission was told, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

is analyzing what further steps should be taken. However, 

it is not clear if the activities of the Islamic Affairs sections 

are being carried out through other entities in Saudi embassies. Despite requests for clarification, the Commission was not able to determine whether diplomatic status 

is still being given to religious personnel, including imams 

and religious teachers, both Saudi citizens and non-Saudi 

foreign nationals.

Exportation of Extremism: an American Case 

in Point?

The Commission has raised concerns for many years that 

the Saudi government and members of the royal family 

directly and indirectly fund the global propagation of an 

ideology which promotes hatred, intolerance, and other 

human rights abuses, including violence. The concern is 

not about the propagation of Islam per se, but about credible reports that the Saudi government’s interpretation of 

Islam promotes abuses of human rights, including violent 

acts, against non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. One 

potential example that gained attention in recent years 

is the Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA), a Saudi government 

school located in northern Virginia. The operation of the 

school raises serious concerns about whether it is in violation of a U.S. law restricting the activities of foreign embassies and whether textbooks used at the school are in 

violation of international human rights standards.

The ISA is unlike conventional private or parochial 

schools in the United States in that it is operated by a 

foreign government and uses that foreign government’s 

official texts, and therefore falls under the Commission’s 

mandate to monitor the actions of foreign governments in 

relation to religious freedom. The ISA’s board is chaired 

by the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, the school is 

located on two properties, one of which is owned, the 

other leased, by the Saudi Embassy, and the institution 

shares the Embassy’s Internal Revenue Service employer 

tax number. 

In October 2007, the Commission requested that the 

Secretary of State commence immediate diplomatic discussions and appropriate actions under the Foreign Missions Act by securing the release of all Arabic-language 

textbooks used at the ISA. The Foreign Missions Act gives 

the Secretary of State the authority to regulate foreign 

missions in the United States and the broad discretion to 

decide how to treat such missions based on, among other 

things, “matters relating to the protection of the interests 

of the United States.”12 The Secretary’s authority includes 

the power to require a foreign mission to divest itself of 

or forgo the use of property and to order it to close. The 

Commission made its recommendation to ensure that the 

books used at the ISA be publicly examined to determine 

whether they promote discrimination, intolerance, or 

violence based on religion or belief. The Commission’s 

concerns are not theoretical, as independent studies have 

found that textbooks used in Saudi schools, which the ISA, 

until last fall, also claimed to use, have incited violence 

against others on the basis of their religion.

Commission concerns about the ISA are exacerbated 

by the Saudi Embassy officials’ repeated refusals, despite 

the strong basis of concern and requests from the Commission and Members of Congress, to make textbooks 

available for outside scrutiny. The Saudi government 

has claimed that it has made changes to the textbooks, 

including in the July 2006 confirmation of policies, by stating that it thoroughly reviews and revises “educational 

materials and other literature sent abroad to ensure that 

all intolerant references are removed, and where possible, 

attempt to retrieve previously distributed materials that 

contain intolerance.”

Following its visit to Saudi Arabia, the Commission 

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing the nature 

of the regime are used by the Saudi government to suppress discussion 

and debate and to silence dissidents. 
21

again requested copies of the textbooks used at the ISA, 

but as of this writing, Saudi Embassy officials have not 

made them available. Shortly after the Commission raised 

the issue last October, the Saudi government reportedly 

turned over textbooks used at the ISA to the State Department, but as of this writing, the Department has not made 

them available either to the public or to the Commission. 

After the Commission issued its recommendation on 

the ISA in October 2007, the school did distribute some 

textbooks during a series of open houses held for selected 

reporters and congressional staffers. However, it did not 

make available the texts thought to have the most problematic passages, including Tawhid (monotheism) and 

Tafsir (Koranic interpretation). The Commission continues to monitor this situation.

Intolerant References in Educational 

Materials and Textbooks 

In March 2006, the Saudi Embassy in Washington published a report summarizing efforts by the Saudi government to revise the state curriculum and a number of 

school textbooks to exclude language promoting religious 

intolerance.13 Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations from outside Saudi Arabia continue to report 

the presence of highly intolerant and discriminatory 

language, particularly against Jews, Christians, and Shi’a 

Muslims, in educational materials published by the Ministry of Education.14 It was these very kinds of contradictory 

assessments that the Commission sought to learn more 

about during its visit to Saudi Arabia. However, as mentioned above, the Commission’s request to meet with a 

representative of the Ministry of Education was denied.

In several meetings with a variety of other Saudi officials, the Commission requested copies of textbooks, 

which were not supplied during the visit. Specifically, 

the Commission requested copies of textbooks used at all 

grade levels on Hadith (Islamic traditions), fiqh (matters 

of religious law and ritual), tawhid (matters of belief ), 

Arabic language, and Saudi history. Despite the promise 

of several officials to send them to the Commission’s office in Washington and later written requests by the Commission, as of this writing, nothing has been received. A 

July 2007 letter to the Commission from the Saudi Human 

Rights Commission stated that textbooks currently are being reviewed and copies would be sent to the Commission 

upon completion, although no completion date was given. 

The Commission delegation was told by U.S. Embassy officials that it also had not received copies of textbooks from 

the Saudi government, despite numerous requests over a 

period of several years.

According to a high-level Saudi official, oversight for 

textbooks and curricula fall within the jurisdiction of the 

Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs stated that it does not 

have jurisdiction over textbooks or the education curriculum. Saudi officials did confirm that an inter-Ministerial 

committee was formed “some years ago” to review textbooks for intolerant content, although it was never made 

clear whether final decisions for changes to be made were 

under the purview of the Ministry of Education or the inter-Ministerial committee. A high-level Foreign Ministry 

official told the Commission that the Saudi government 

did review all the textbooks and removed language that 

was deemed to promote hatred and violence. According 

to this official, a representative of the Foreign Ministry 

served as a member on the committee. Most Saudi officials admitted some intolerant material in textbooks, but 

claimed that this was a very small portion of the curriculum. Furthermore, Saudi officials contended that much 

progress has been achieved over the past two – three years 

and that the government continues to work on the issue. 

They also claimed that the government does not discriminate against any particular religious group and that government textbooks do not promote discrimination against 

people of different religious backgrounds. However, as 

SAUDI ARABIA

From left to right, Commissioners Leo and Argue and Rep. Steven Israel 

(D-NY) at USCIRF’s October 2007 press conference on Saudi Arabia.
22

discussed below, evidence from textbooks shown to the 

delegation privately demonstrates the contrary.

During the visit, non-governmental interlocutors offered varied perspectives on Saudi textbooks and the education system. Some claimed that the Saudi government 

has made progress in removing some disparaging references in textbooks, and ascribed the overhaul to both internal and international pressure. Others, however, while 

stating that some intolerant material had been removed 

over the past few years, indicated that much objectionable 

and discriminatory material remains. Some individuals 

pointed out that children from non-Sunni families must, 

on exams, affirm statements in the textbooks to the effect 

that their own religious beliefs are false; these children 

will otherwise fail the course and be forced to repeat it until they answer correctly. This is particularly true when the 

texts refer to Shi’a beliefs and tenets. The consequences 

frequently induce serious confusion for children regarding 

their beliefs, and, in some cases, psychological trauma. 

Despite a request for clarification by the Commission, Saudi government officials did not respond to questions as to whether all students at the primary, secondary, or university levels are required to receive the same 

instruction in Islamic religious education, regardless of 

the child’s religious background. Nor would the officials 

clarify whether students from different religions or sects 

of Islam are able to question the conclusions drawn about 

their sects or communities in the classroom. Individuals 

told the Commission privately that only one form of Islam 

is taught in schools and several Shi’a interlocutors supported this claim.

Other non-government interlocutors drew attention 

to additional weaknesses in the education system that 

resulted in the promotion of intolerance. Many pointed 

to the fact that the majority of Saudi teachers were poorly 

qualified; others stated that most teachers indoctrinated 

students in a “culture of intolerance” and that the attitudes and training of the teachers needed to be addressed 

in order to bring about change in the system. Some argued that regardless of the quality of the textbooks, it is 

the teachers who are manipulating the texts to promote 

intolerance, rather than understanding, among and between religious groups, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 

On this matter, one Saudi government official 

claimed that some teachers who promote intolerance and 

hatred have been fired and that others are being retrained. 

However, despite attempts to get further information from 

Saudi authorities, the Commission did not receive information about how many teachers and principals have 

been retrained. Furthermore, the Saudi government did 

not provide information about how many teachers have 

been held accountable for deviating from the approved 

curriculum, or if teachers’ manuals have been revised to 

include promotion of tolerance.

Some non-governmental interlocutors stated that the 

entire education system is in disarray and needs a complete overhaul, beyond simply removing intolerant language in the textbooks, to ensure that students are properly prepared for the job market. In 2007, the Saudi government approved a $3 billion project “to ensure overall 

development of its students by increasing their knowledge 

as well as their physical, professional, psychological and 

intellectual capabilities.”15 According to interlocutors, this 

process will take approximately three years to complete. 

However, none of these reform efforts will directly address 

the issues of intolerance.

In July 2006, the State Department stated that the 

Saudi government had confirmed that it plans to “revise 

and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant 

references that disparage Muslims or non-Muslims or that 

promote hatred toward other religions or religious groups, 

a process the Saudi government expects to complete in 

one to two years [by July 2008].” In September 2007, the 

State Department reported that “changes made in 2006 

and 2007 to the education system focused on updating 

teaching methods, including the use of increased class 

participation, active problem-solving methods, and small 

group workshops, but did not include revising substantive material.” The State Department also reported that 

the Saudi government had taken “limited measures” to 

remove disparaging passages about other religious groups 

from its textbooks and that some 2006-2007 textbooks 

“were found to be more tolerant than previous textbooks 

and had fewer negative references to non-Muslims.” 

Early in 2008, the Saudi government posted on one 

of its Web sites16 the current school year’s curriculum, 

including all relevant religious texts taught in primary, 

middle, and secondary schools in Saudi Arabia. However, 

a survey of the texts on the Saudi government Web site 

reveals that many of the passages previously flagged by 

the Commission and other independent researchers for 

inciting religious violence and hatred still remain. 
23

State Harassment of Private Worship and 

the Inability to Obtain and Possess Religious 

Materials without Harassment

There are no non-Muslim citizens in Saudi Arabia and no 

places of worship in the country are permitted other than 

mosques. In addition, the Saudi government enforces and 

limits public worship to its sanctioned version of Sunni 

Islam.

In meetings with the Commission delegation, several 

Saudi officials argued that it is not possible to have places 

of worship other than mosques in the Kingdom because 

Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s two holiest sites: Mecca 

and Medina. Moreover, most officials asserted that there 

is a hadith (oral tradition) from the Prophet Muhammad 

which says that only Islam can exist on the Arabian Peninsula, although another Saudi official and other interlocutors contended that this hadith is subject to differing interpretations. Although the Commission pointed out that 

other countries on the Arabian Peninsula, such as Qatar 

and the United Arab Emirates, do permit non-Muslim 

public places of worship, some officials went so far as to 

state that having non-Muslim places of worship on Saudi 

soil would be equivalent to building mosques on Vatican 

property in Italy. Commissioners drew a distinction between a geographic entity in Italy of two square miles with 

800-900 residents versus a country the size of Saudi Arabia 

containing between two and three million non-Muslim 

residents. In addition, some officials claimed, without 

providing any evidence, that if a non-Muslim place of worship were built in the Kingdom, the public would be outraged and the place of worship would be subject to attack 

by extremists and conservative elements in the Kingdom. 

Another official claimed, again without providing any 

evidence, that public opinion among Muslims outside of 

Saudi Arabia would never permit the government to allow 

public worship by non-Muslims because the Kingdom is 

home to the twin holy sites. What is more, some officials 

suggested that if expatriate workers wish to practice their 

faith in public, they should leave Saudi Arabia and go to 

other countries in the region. 

Saudi officials reiterated the government position 

that non-Muslim expatriate workers are permitted to worship in private. However, guidelines as to what constitutes 

“private” worship remain unclear and vague. The Foreign 

Ministry estimated that there are between two and three 

million non-Muslim expatriate workers in the Kingdom. 

Some officials suggested that as long as non-Muslims 

practice their religion in small groups in private homes, 

no security entity would interfere, since there is no law 

that prohibits non-Muslims from practicing in this manner. Furthermore, they maintained that members of the 

CPVPV are not permitted to enter private dwellings under 

any circumstances. 

Despite these claims, there continue to be instances 

in which members of the CPVPV have entered and raided 

private homes where non-Muslim expatriate workers were 

worshipping. According to some non-governmental interlocutors, the incidents of raids on private homes of nonMuslim expatriate workers by members of the CPVPV and 

other security authorities have decreased in the past year. 

However, expatriate workers from countries such as the 

Philippines, India, Pakistan, and some African countries 

continue to be vulnerable to surveillance and raids by 

Saudi authorities, despite the fact that CPVPV members 

are not permitted to conduct such surveillance.17 In fact, 

representatives of non-Muslim communities continue to 

assert that, in practice, religious freedom simply does not 

exist in the Kingdom. The Commission was told, however, that conditions for private worship are better in the 

Eastern Province than elsewhere in the country, such as 

in the Nejd region in the central part of the country, where 

private religious services continue to be surveilled and, in 

some cases, raided by Saudi authorities. 

It is unclear whether Saudi missions abroad inform 

expatriate workers who will be entering the Kingdom 

about their right to private worship, including the right 

to bring personal religious materials inside the Kingdom. 

Despite previous assurances by the Saudi government that 

this policy is in place, requests for clarification were not 

answered. Furthermore, Saudi officials do not accept that 

for members of some religious groups, the practice of religion requires more than individual private worship, but 

includes the need for religious leaders to be able to conduct services in community with others. Religious leaders 

continue to be prohibited from seeking and obtaining visas to enter and minister to local religious communities. 

On a positive note, non-governmental interlocutors 

indicated that there has been a decrease in recent years in 

the practice by customs officials of confiscating personal 

religious materials when expatriate workers or visitors 

enter the Kingdom. Nevertheless, in August 2007, a press 

report found that the official Web site of the state-owned 

SAUDI ARABIA
24

Saudi Arabian Airlines included information for travelers 

that the Airlines claimed was based on Saudi government 

customs regulations: “Items and articles belonging to 

religions other than Islam are also prohibited. These may 

include Bibles, crucifixes, statues, carvings, items with 

religious symbols such as the Star of David, and others.”18 

This information clearly contradicts the reported Saudi 

policy, also confirmed to the United States, that customs 

inspectors at borders will not confiscate personal religious 

materials. Within days of the publication of the initial 

press report and other subsequent articles, the Saudi Arabian Airlines Web site removed the language about prohibiting specific religious materials.

In recent years, senior Saudi government officials, 

including King Abdullah and the Grand Mufti, have made 

statements with the reported aim of improving the climate 

of tolerance toward other religions; both also continued 

publicly to call for moderation. In November 2007, King 

Abdullah met with Pope Benedict at the Vatican. In 

March 2008, after a senior Muslim cleric, Sheikh AbdulRahman al-Barrak, issued a fatwa calling for the death 

of two writers who questioned why Christians and Jews 

should be considered apostates, King Abdullah proposed 

a dialogue with representatives of the so-called monotheistic faiths, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. However, 

several days after King Abdullah’s public proposal, press 

reports indicated that the Saudi Grand Mufti made clear 

that if such a gathering were to take place, representatives 

of the Jewish faith would not include Israeli Jews. 

Official Harassment of Religious Practice 

Restrictions on public religious practice, for both Saudis 

and non-Saudis, are officially enforced in large part by 

the CPVPV, a government entity that includes an all-male 

force of approximately 5,000 field officers and a total of 

10,000 employees in over 500 offices throughout the country. There are also hundreds of “unofficial” volunteers 

who take it upon themselves to carry out the work of the 

CPVPV. The CPVPV, which reports to the King, is tasked 

with enforcing public morality based on the Saudi government’s interpretation of Islamic law. Members of the 

CPVPV patrol the streets enforcing dress codes, maintaining the strict separation of men and women, and ensuring 

that restaurants and shops are closed during daily prayers. 

During its visit to the Kingdom, Commission requests to 

meet with representatives of the CPVPV were denied by 

the Saudi government.

Within the past year, members of the CPVPV have occasionally conducted raids on worship services in private 

homes. They continue to harass, detain, whip, beat, and 

otherwise mete out extrajudicial punishments to individuals deemed to have strayed from “appropriate” dress and/

or behavior, such as wearing Muslim religious symbols not 

sanctioned by the government. 

Saudi officials told the Commission delegation that 

members of the CPVPV are required to be accompanied 

by law enforcement officials while in the line of duty, 

although this is not always the case in practice. One highlevel Saudi official said that CPVPV members are required 

to be trained, but many are not, and others work alone 

instead of together with police officers. According to 

one press report, members of the CPVPV did not receive 

their first ever training until early September 2007.19 According to the Interior Ministry, members of the CPVPV 

do not have the right to detain or conduct investigations 

of suspects and must immediately turn suspects over to 

the police.20 Saudi government officials claimed to have 

dismissed and/or disciplined members of the CPVPV for 

abuses of power, although reports of abuse persist. 

During the Commission’s visit, representatives of the 

National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) said that it had 

received numerous complaints from Saudi citizens and 

expatriate workers about alleged abuses by the CPVPV. In 

its first ever report released in May 2007, the NSHR documented several such cases, including unsubstantiated 

accusations, questionable interrogation practices, beatings, unnecessary body searches, forced entry into private 

homes, and coerced confessions.21 The NSHR has recommended that CPVPV regulations be specified publicly for 

clarification. According to representatives of the NSHR, 

members of the CPVPV are required to wear uniforms and 

badges, but many do not comply with this regulation and 

it is not necessarily enforced. 

Over the past year, there has been unprecedented 

media coverage, both inside and outside Saudi Arabia, of 

alleged abuses by the CPVPV. Numerous cases have gone 

to trial or are going to trial, including alleged beatings 

and deaths of Saudi citizens.22 In late May 2007, nearly a 

dozen members of the CPVPV raided the home of a man 

suspected of possessing and selling alcohol in Riyadh. 

The 28 year-old man, Salman al-Huraisi, died in custody at 

one of the CPVPV offices in Riyadh, and family members 
25

accused members of the CPVPV of beating him to death. 

Autopsy results confirmed that he died due to physical 

abuse. After an investigation by Saudi authorities, the 

Riyadh Governorate announced in June that all official 

CPVPV members involved were cleared of any wrongdoing, and that an “unofficial” volunteer, or part-time worker, would be held responsible for the death of the man.23 

Even before the official investigation was complete and 

the announcement made, Minister of Interior Prince Naif 

stated publicly that a preliminary investigation proved 

that members of the CPVPV were not responsible for the 

man’s death. In November, a lower court acquitted two 

members of the CPVPV who were eventually charged with 

the killing of al-Huraisi. The Court of Cassation ordered a 

re-trial after identifying several errors made by the lower 

court, including failure to hear expert witnesses. In April 

2008, a retrial began and it is still in progress as of this 

writing.

In another case, a man died in June 2007 in the custody of members of the CPVPV in the northern town of 

Tabuk after he was apprehended for being found alone 

in a vehicle with a female who was not his relative. It was 

later established that the man, Ahmad al-Bulaiwi, was a 

part-time driver for the woman’s family. Four individuals, including three members of the CPVPV and a police 

officer, went on trial for their involvement in the man’s 

death; however, in late July, the court dropped the charges 

against all four men, reportedly due to the fact that an 

autopsy showed the man died of natural causes while in 

CPVPV custody.24 Bulaiwi’s family is appealing the decision of the court. There were also several incidents in the 

past year in which members of the CPVPV were in cars 

pursuing, at high speeds, individuals who either died or 

were seriously injured after the pursuit resulted in vehicle 

accidents.25 In one of the cases, a CPVPV spokesman 

denied any participation involving CPVPV members; in 

other cases, investigations are ongoing. 

Several non-governmental interlocutors with whom 

the Commission met expressed outrage about the abuses 

of the CPVPV and their belief that members of the CPVPV 

had long overstepped their authority with impunity. 

Many expressed concern that CPVPV members consider 

themselves “above the law” and have never been held 

responsible for abuses. Some believed that a fatwa (religious edict) exists that does not allow CPVPV members to 

be held accountable under the law, although the existence 

of this fatwa could not be verified. Despite the media attention, many contended that members of the CPVPV will 

not be prosecuted or brought to justice because they are 

protected by elements within the religious establishment 

and the Royal family.

Despite specific requests for further information, the 

Commission did not receive any response from the Saudi 

government on the number of CPVPV members who have 

been trained or retrained to ensure that the human rights 

of Muslims and non-Muslims are protected. In addition, 

the Saudi government did not respond to an inquiry about 

the number of CPVPV members who have been held accountable in the past for committing abuses or overstepping their jurisdiction.

In July 2007, after the Commission’s visit, Interior 

Minister Prince Naif issued a directive requiring CPVPV 

members to deliver immediately any individual arrested—

male or female—to local authorities, reaffirming a Royal 

decree issued in 1981.26 According to this directive, interrogations at CPVPV centers are prohibited and members 

who fail to abide by the guidelines should be dismissed. 

Furthermore, the directive gives authority to the General 

Investigation and Prosecution Authority to conduct random inspections of CPVPV offices. In June, the president 

of the CPVPV, Ibrahim al-Ghaith, announced that the 

CPVPV had established a legal department, the Department of Rules and Regulations, to handle legal matters 

SAUDI ARABIA

For years, the Commission has 

expressed concern that Saudi government 

funding and other funding originating 

in Saudi Arabia have been used globally 

to finance religious schools, hate literature, 

and other activities that support 

religious intolerance and, in some cases, 

violence toward non-Muslims 

and disfavored Muslims.
26

and compliance with internal regulations, and had hired 

a spokesperson to handle public relations at its national 

headquarters.27 It is not yet clear whether these changes 

represent genuine reform efforts or reform on paper only.

Empowerment of Officially Sanctioned 

Human Rights Institutions 

Human Rights Commission 

In September 2005, the Council of Ministers, chaired by 

King Abdullah, approved the establishment of a government-appointed, 24-member Human Rights Commission 

(HRC) that reports directly to the King. The membership 

of the HRC was not finalized until early 2007 and does not 

include any female members, although in March 2008, the 

HRC’s Chair, Turki Al Sudairy, announced that a new royal 

decree would allow women members on the Commission. 

The HRC is mandated to “protect and promote human 

rights in conformity with international human rights standards in all fields, to propagate awareness thereof, and to 

help ensure their application in a manner consistent with 

the provisions of the Islamic Sharia.”28 During its visit, the 

Commission delegation met with Al Sudairy and numerous members of the HRC’s Board.

According to several members, the HRC hopes to 

develop a knowledge of international human rights norms 

among the citizens and residents of the Kingdom, including about international treaties that the Saudi government 

has ratified. Because the Koran is the constitution of the 

country, members of the HRC stated that the country 

must operate strictly in accordance with Islamic law. The 

HRC stated that it already has negotiated agreements for 

cooperation with some government agencies, including 

the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Social Affairs, 

and the Red Crescent Society. In July 2007, the Ministry 

of Islamic Affairs agreed to work with the HRC to begin 

an awareness campaign in the Kingdom “to promote the 

ideals of human rights in the teachings of Islam.”29 The 

campaign will focus on creating awareness among Saudi 

citizens and residents about the teachings of human rights 

in Islam and will reportedly include Friday sermons, with 

the intention that imams will take part in fostering a culture of respect for human rights in mosques.

The HRC has not yet trained the police and security 

forces in human rights practices, but plans to do so. In addition, the HRC has initiated a dialogue with the Office of 

the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 

in Geneva, and UNHCHR representatives are scheduled to 

go to the Kingdom to conduct a training session for members of the Board. According to members of the HRC, the 

Board will also receive technical assistance from the UN 

in Geneva. 

The HRC is also developing pamphlets on various 

human rights issues to demonstrate that human rights are 

not a “foreign” concept, but rather, in accordance with 

Islam. In this context, however, one of the representatives 

of the HRC told the Commission that there are two principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with 

which it disagrees: 1) allowing Muslim women to marry 

non-Muslim men, and 2) conversion from Islam to another faith, although the HRC representative acknowledged 

that the latter is in dispute among Muslim scholars. 

Procedurally, the HRC receives complaints from 

individuals and follows up to determine whether there 

has been a possible violation. The HRC then begins an 

investigation and makes appropriate recommendations to 

relevant government agencies. According to the HRC, it 

has received more than 1,000 complaints and has resolved 

at least two-thirds of them. 

The members of the HRC identified several ways in 

which the HRC and the Saudi government are working 

to advance freedom of religion or belief in the Kingdom. 

These include the facts that: 1) the King regularly makes 

statements against religious bigotry; 2) the King Abdul 

Aziz National Center for Dialogue brings together all sectors of society, including various Muslim sects; 3) the 

government has removed approximately 2,000 imams who 

The Commission delegation speaks with Iyad bin Amin Madani, 

Minister of Culture and Information
27

preached religious hatred and intolerance; 4) the HRC 

is introducing a “culture of human rights” to the public; 

5) several cases involving imams inciting violence were 

brought to the attention of the HRC, which reported the 

cases to the relevant Ministries; and 6) an HRC women’s 

section will be established soon to deal with women’s 

rights in accordance with sharia. In addition, during the 

Commission’s visit, the HRC publicly announced that it 

would take up the issue of societal discrimination against 

Muslims who follow different schools of thought within 

Islam.30

Several Board members admitted that the HRC’s 

mission is still in the process of being formulated. They 

acknowledged that there is much to be accomplished, 

but also expressed a need to move slowly and introduce 

concepts gradually, so as not to push too hard on a population that is not familiar with international human rights 

concepts, particularly those related to freedom of religion 

or belief. 

It is the Commission’s view that the HRC can advance 

human rights protections if it examines all internationally 

recognized human rights issues and its inquiries regarding individual complaints and recommendations to the 

Saudi government are implemented in practice. 

National Society for Human Rights

In March 2004, the Saudi government approved the formation of a National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), 

the country’s first, and up to now, only independent, 

legally recognized human rights body. The NSHR is comprised of 41 members, including 10 women, and is chaired 

by a member of Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Council (or 

Shura), a 150-member advisory body. The NSHR, which 

was originally endowed by King Fahd, submits its reports 

and recommendations directly to King Abdullah. The 

Commission delegation met with members of the NSHR 

in Jeddah, the Eastern Province, and at its national headquarters in Riyadh. The NSHR has offices in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, and Jizan, and will be opening an office in 

the northern region in the future.

Representatives of the NSHR stated that they work 

to promote the human rights of all in Saudi Arabia, both 

citizens and foreign nationals, as well as Saudi citizens 

abroad. They obtain information through individual 

complaints, site visits, public reports, and the media. The 

NSHR also studies state compliance with Islamic and 

international law and works to explain to the public that 

there is no contradiction between international human 

rights standards and Islamic law. According to members 

of the NSHR, their work is conducted in accordance with 

Islam and they are hoping to clarify through reporting that 

many human rights problems arise in the Kingdom because of old, outdated traditions and customs rather than 

religious precepts. Therefore, the issues can be addressed 

without contradicting Islamic principles.

The NSHR works with Saudi government agencies in 

order to press for the implementation of its recommendations. Representatives of the NSHR told the Commission 

it had already received cooperation from several government agencies, but admitted that the Ministry of Interior 

has not been fully cooperative. Generally speaking, the 

NSHR continues to have difficulties in getting government agencies to comply with international standards. 

As of this writing, no members of security agencies have 

received training on international human rights treaties, including the UN Convention against Torture, which 

NSHR members believed to be particularly important for 

security personnel. According to members of the NSHR, 

government agencies are required to respond to NSHR 

inquiries within three weeks, but this does not usually 

happen in practice.

Since 2004, the NSHR has received more than 12,000 

complaints in various areas, from judicial issues to labor 

matters.31 Representatives of the NSHR claimed to have 

resolved almost 70 percent of those complaints. Expatriate workers also lodged numerous complaints with the 

NSHR. Complaints related to family matters make up 

approximately 40 percent of all cases; some of the most 

important issues on the social level are domestic violence, 

SAUDI ARABIA

Prince Turki Bin Mohammad Bin Saud Al-Kabeer, Deputy 

Assistant Minister for Political Affairs and Head of International 

Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
28

divorce, and sexual harassment by relatives. According 

to the NSHR, raising women’s issues used to be taboo 

some years ago, but today their issues can more openly 

be discussed in the media and in public. The NSHR office 

in Dhahran said it receives at least four complaints about 

domestic violence per day. According to NSHR members, 

the Ministry of Social Affairs recently established a new 

unit within the Kingdom to deal with violence against 

women. 

Just days before the Commission delegation arrived 

in Saudi Arabia, the NSHR published its first ever report 

calling for wide-ranging improvements in human rights 

practices in the Kingdom. The lengthy report details 

abuses in the Kingdom on most international human 

rights issues and offers numerous recommendations for 

the Saudi government. 

Although the section of the NSHR report on the 

“Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief” uses religious 

justifications to support the international right to freedom 

of religion or belief, it also reaches some troubling conclusions. The section highlights the fact that there should 

be no compulsion in religion and that “it is forbidden to 

force someone to forsake his religion and adopt another...

[and] man’s freedom to choose his religion is the basis of 

belief.”32 Later in the section, the report states that “every 

individual is free to believe in anything and to adopt any 

ideas he wants.” However, the report also specifies reasons that so-called apostates from Islam deserve retribution: “the apostate...according to Islamic Sharia, deserves 

punishment for raising fitnah (sedition), mayhem and 

damaging the general public order of the Islamic state.” 

The Commission is disappointed that the report does not 

discuss any objections, from scholars or from a universal 

human rights perspective, to the concept of apostasy or 

the severe punishments. The report notes that no one has 

been executed for apostasy in recent years and claims that 

non-Muslims enjoy the right to private worship. 

The section also states that because of decades of 

“conservative religious culture,” there is a consensus within Saudi society that no religion other than Islam should 

be practiced in public. The report concludes that “this 

does not represent a violation of the right to freedom of 

belief, which is essentially a personal belief.” Despite the 

NSHR’s conclusions, it should be noted that the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties 

to which Saudi Arabia is a party clearly provide that the 

right to freedom of religion or belief includes the freedom 

“either individually or in community with others and in 

public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”

The Commission believes that the NSHR can play 

a more constructive role in protecting human rights by 

maintaining its independence from the government and 

ensuring that its reporting and recommendations are in 

conformity with universal human rights standards.

Commission Activities

In recent years, the Commission has spoken out numerous times about religious freedom concerns in Saudi Arabia. In January 2008, the Commission released a public 

statement calling on President Bush to raise ongoing Saudi violations of the freedom of religion and other human 

rights during his meetings that month with Saudi leaders 

in the Kingdom. In October 2007, the Commission held a 

press conference at which it released its findings from the 

May-June visit to Saudi Arabia and presented the Commission’s assessment of Saudi government progress on 

implementation of the July 2006 confirmation of policies. 

In April 2007, Commissioners Felice D. Gaer and Nina 

Shea met with the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to 

Saudi Arabia, Ford M. Fraker, to discuss persistent religious freedom concerns. In December 2007, the Commission issued a public response to a letter from a group 

of parents of students at the Islamic Saudi Academy in 

northern Virginia. 

In June 2006, then-Commission Vice Chair Shea 

testified on behalf of the Commission before the House 

International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Human Rights and International Operations at a hearing 

entitled “The Plight of Religious Minorities: Can Religious 

Pluralism Survive?” Commissioner Shea’s testimony focused on religious freedom conditions in five countries—

Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—as well as 

recommendations for U.S. policy. In September 2006, the 

Commission publicly expressed concern that the State 

Department had removed longstanding and widely quoted language, “freedom of religion does not exist,” from its 

2006 Report on International Religious Freedom on Saudi 

Arabia, despite the fact that the report states that “there 

generally was no change in the status of religious freedom 

during the reporting period.”

In October 2006, the Commission held a briefing on 
29

SAUDI ARABIA

the current status of human rights and reform in Saudi 

Arabia with Ibrahim al-Mugaiteeb, President of Human 

Rights First Society, a human rights organization in Saudi 

Arabia that, despite repeated attempts to gain official recognition, has never been granted a license to function by 

the Saudi government. Mr. al-Mugaiteeb operates in the 

Kingdom at his own risk. In November 2006, the Commission issued a statement and wrote to then U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Oberwetter about misleading claims by Saudi authorities regarding the purported 

release of religious prisoners in the southwestern region 

of Najran.

ENDNOTES

1

 Office of the Spokesman, State Department Media Note, “Ambassador at Large for 

International Religious Freedom Briefs Congress on U.S.-Saudi Discussions on Religious 

Practice and Tolerance,” July 19, 2007 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69197.

htm).

2

 Under IRFA, the simple designation of a country as a CPC is not by itself sufficient 

action. CPC designation carries an obligation that one or more of certain actions 

specified in Section 405 of IRFA be taken, unless the Secretary of State, as the President’s 

designee, determines that pre-existing sanctions are adequate or otherwise waives the 

requirement.

3

 Unfortunately, the Commission did not have access to certain Muslim minority 

communities. Therefore, this section of the report is limited in its focus to minority 

Muslim communities about which the Commission obtained firsthand information.

4

 Expatriate workers are also reportedly subject to physical abuse by their employers.

5

 Commission staff interviewed one of the American Shi’a Muslim visitors upon his return 

to the United States in September 2007. Also see Stephen Schwartz, “Saudi Arabia’s 

Koran Cops,” The Weekly Standard, September 3, 2007 (http://www.weeklystandard.com/

Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/023xwsaa.asp).

6 Hadd, a punishment mandated by the Koran, generally cannot be overturned by the 

state. Tahzir, a punishment not mandated by the Koran, is considered discretionary and 

less serious and can be overturned by the state.

7

 The primary mission of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs is to supervise and finance the 

construction and maintenance of the vast majority of mosques in the country, in addition 

to spreading the teachings of the Koran and translating it into as many languages as 

possible. The Ministry also maintains all Islamic endowments, particularly the two holy 

sites in Mecca and Medina. The Ministry publishes Korans and reviews materials in 

mosques to ensure compliance with its standards. 

8

 Raid Qusti, “Awareness Drive to Promote Human Rights Set,” Arab News, July 11, 2007 

(http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=98370&d=11&m=7&y=2007).

9

 Magdi Abdlehadi, “Saudis to Retrain 40,000 Clerics,” BBC News, March 20, 2008 (http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7308040.stm).

10 For example, see Center for Religious Freedom and Institute for Gulf Affairs, Saudi 

Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance, Freedom House, 2006 (http://www.hudson.org/files/

publications/CRF_SaudiReport_2006.pdf).

11 22 U.S.C. 4301(c).

12 “Summary of Saudi Arabia’s Comprehensive Program to Revise the National 

Educational Curriculums,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, March 2006.

13 Center for Religious Freedom and Institute for Gulf Affairs, Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum 

of Intolerance, Freedom House, 2006 (http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/CRF_

SaudiReport_2006.pdf).

14 P.K. Abdul Ghafour, “Education System Undergoing Major Overhaul,” Arab News, April 

17, 2007 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=95083&d=17&m=4&

y=2007).

15 http://www.eschool.gov.sa/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=109.

16 It should be noted that during its visit, the Commission delegation had very limited 

access to non-Muslim expatriate workers from non-Western countries.

17 Michael Freund, “Saudis Might Take Bibles from Tourists,” Jerusalem Post, August 8, 

2007 (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1186557401034&pagename=JPost%2F

JPArticle%2FShowFull). 

18 Mariam Al Hakeem, “Case Against Saudi Religious Police Adjourned,” Gulf News, 

September 4, 2007 (http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/09/04/10151174.html).

19 Faiza Saleh Ambah, “An Unprecedented Uproar Over Saudi Religious Police,” The 

Washington Post, June 22, 2007, p. A14.

20 The Commission obtained from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh a provisional translation 

into English of the original NSHR May 2007 report written in Arabic.

21 Roula Khalaf and Andrew England, “Saudi Religious Police Face Pressure,” Financial 

Times, June 5, 2007.

22 See Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Hold Religious Police Accountable for 

Killing,” July 25, 2007 (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/07/25/saudia16476.htm); and 

Raid Qusti, “Commission Cleared in Huraisi Death,” Arab News, June 26, 2007 (http://

www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=94954&d=26&m=6&y=2007).

23 Abdullah Shiri, “Charges Dropped Against Saudi Police,” Associated Press, July 

31, 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/31/

AR2007073101044.html).

24 Yousuf Muhammad, “Car Crash Kills 4 in Madinah; Commission Role Suspected,” 

Arab News, April 1, 2008 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=10844

8&d=1&m=4&y=2008).

25 See Asharq Al-Awsat, “Saudi Interior Ministry Issues Warning Against Commission,” 

July 15, 2007 (http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=9580) and Raid Qusti, 

“Govt Cautions Commission Members,” July 15, 2007 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page

=1§ion=0&article=98507&d=15&m=7&y=2007).

26 Raid Qusti, “Virtue Commission Chief Disputes NSHR Findings,” Arab News, June 11, 

2007 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=97340&d=11&m=6&y=2

007).

27 The Commission delegation obtained from the Human Rights Commission a copy of 

their statute, Saudi Council of Ministers Decision No. 207, dated September 12, 2005. 

See Article I of the statute.

28 Raid Qusti, “Awareness Drive to Promote Human Rights Set,” Arab News, July 11, 2007 

(http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=98370&d=11&m=7&y=2007).

29 Raid Qusti, “Rights Group to Study Claims of Sectarian Prejudices in Society,” Arab 

News, June 3, 2007 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=96997&d=3

&m=6&y=2007).

30 Raid Qusti, “Need to Teach Human Rights in School Stressed,” Arab News, January 6, 

2008 (http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=105345&d=6&m=1&y=2

008).
CComm ommission ission Re R ecommendations commendations

Below are Commission recommendations regarding U.S. policy 

toward Saudi Arabia.

 Strengthen U.S. Human 

Rights Diplomacy as Part of 

the Bilateral Relationship

The U.S. government should:

• continue to designate Saudi Arabia 

a “country of particular concern,” 

or CPC, under IRFA, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief;

• create a formal mechanism to monitor implementation of the July 2006 

policies as part of every meeting of 

the United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue, co-chaired by the 

U.S. Secretary of State and the Saudi 

Foreign Minister; and ensure that 

U.S. representatives to each relevant 

Working Group of the Strategic Dialogue, after each session, or at least 

every six months, report its findings 

to Congress; 

• work with the Saudi government to 

establish a civil society component 

of the United States-Saudi Arabia 

Strategic Dialogue so that nongovernmental entities from both 

countries can be given a platform to 

discuss mutual human rights concerns, including freedom of religion 

or belief; 

• report to Congress, as part of the 

reporting required under H.R. 1, 

Section 2043 (c) (1(b)) (“Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007”), 

on progress by the Saudi government to implement the July 2006 

previously identified and confirmed 

policies related to religious practice and tolerance; a description of 

such progress should include Saudi 

government transparency and any 

benchmarks and timetables established for implementation of the 

July 2006 conformed policies;

• expand the religious educators 

program—which brings Saudi 

religious leaders and scholars to the 

United States through a three week 

International Visitor Program ( IVP) 

to learn about religious freedom 

in the United States—to include 

visits to Saudi Arabia by appropriate American leaders and educators, and increase the numbers and 

diversity and range of experience of 

visitors to both countries;

• address the work of the Human 

Rights Commission (HRC) and 

National Society for Human Rights 

(NSHR) by:

• urging the Saudi government 

to ensure that all government 

agencies cooperate fully with the 

HRC and the NSHR, including by 

publishing the decree requiring 

cooperation and abiding by it, including with penalties for failure 

to cooperate;

• urging the HRC to study the situation of freedom of religion or 

belief in the Kingdom, based on 

universal human rights standards, 

and report its findings publicly;

• offering to facilitate training on 

universal human rights standards, 

including the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief, as well as to provide 

limited technical support on 

universal norms to the HRC and 

NSHR; and

• urging the Saudi government 

to implement recommendations from the NSHR’s May 2007 

report, which, while not addressing religious freedom concerns 

per se, if implemented, could be 

a welcome initial step towards 

improving overall human rights 

compliance in the Kingdom.

 Address Exportation 

of Extremist Ideology and 

Intolerance in Education 

Materials in Saudi Arabia and 

Around the World

Given that official Saudi school textbooks continue to include language 

encouraging hatred and violence that 

30

1 

2 
SAUDI ARABIA

adversely affects the interests of the 

United States and that the Saudi government, despite repeated requests 

over a period of several years, has 

failed to make its current textbooks 

available to support its claims that 

such language has been eliminated, 

the U.S. government should:

• request that the Saudi government:

• make publicly available the 

curricula and teacher training 

manuals used in state primary 

and secondary schools inside the 

country;

• provide an accounting of what 

kinds of Saudi official support 

have been and continue to be 

provided to which religious 

schools, mosques, centers of 

learning, and other religious organizations globally, including in 

the United States;

• make public the content of 

educational and other materials sent abroad to demonstrate 

whether such activities promote 

hatred, intolerance, or justify or 

encourage other human rights 

violations; 

• establish a transparent public 

effort to monitor, regulate, and report publicly about the activities 

of Saudi charitable organizations 

based outside Saudi Arabia in 

countries throughout the world;

• cease granting diplomatic status 

to Islamic clerics and educators 

teaching outside Saudi Arabia; 

and

• ensure that Islamic affairs sections in Saudi embassies throughout the world remain closed 

indefinitely in accordance with 

past promises;

• report publicly to Congress on 

all the above areas as part of the 

reporting on progress of Saudi 

government implementation of the 

July 2006 confirmation of policies, 

referred to in the recommendation 

above; and

• communicate and share information with other concerned governments about the July 2006 policies 

related to Saudi exportation of hate 

literature and extremist ideology. 

 Press for Immediate 

Improvements in Other 

Areas Related to Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

The U.S. government should continue 

to advance adherence to international human rights standards, including 

the freedom of everyone to “manifest his religion or belief in worship, 

observance, practice and teaching” 

and prohibit coercion in matters of 

religion or belief. Saudi government 

persistence in severely restricting all 

forms of public religious expression 

other than the government’s interpretation and enforcement of its version 

of Sunni Islam is a violation of the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief. As initial steps, the 

U.S. government should press for immediate improvements in respect for 

religious freedom, including by urging the Saudi government to: 

• establish genuine safeguards for the 

freedom to worship privately; 

• end state prosecution of individuals 

charged with apostasy, blasphemy, 

sorcery, and criticism of the government; 

• dissolve the Commission to 

Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice 

(CPVPV) and entrust law enforcement to professionals in law 

enforcement agencies with a precise 

jurisdiction and subject to judicial 

review and immediately ensure 

that members of the CPVPV are 

held accountable and prosecuted 

for abuses; conduct prompt and 

independent investigations into reported abuses; ensure complainants 

due process and other rights under 

international law, including the 

right to challenge the lawfulness of 

his/her detention and be released if 

it is not lawful; and provide the right 

to a remedy, including an enforceable right to compensation; 

• allow foreign clergy to enter the 

country to carry out private worship 

services; 

• review cases and release those who 

have been detained or imprisoned 

for violations of human rights 

including their religious belief or 

practices; 

• permit independent non-governmental organizations to monitor, 

promote, and protect human rights; 

• invite the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief to 

conduct a visit to Saudi Arabia in 

accordance with the standard terms 

for such a UN visit; 

• ratify international human rights 

instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and cooperate with UN 

human rights mechanisms;

• implement the recommendations 

made in Section II (“Address Exportation of Extremist Ideology and 

Intolerance in Education Materials 

in Saudi Arabia and Around the 

World”).

31

3 

T 33

he Commission has recommended that 

Vietnam be named a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) every year since 

2001. The State Department followed the Commission’s 

recommendation in 2004 and 2005, designating Vietnam 

a CPC in those years. In May 2005, in response to the CPC 

designation, the State Department reached an agreement 

with Vietnam “that addresses a number of important 

religious freedom concerns,” in order to establish benchmarks for improvement in religious freedom conditions 

and avoid potential sanctions. In November 2006, one 

week before President George W. Bush’s visit to Vietnam 

for an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 

in Hanoi, the State Department removed Vietnam’s CPC 

designation, citing its progress on religious freedom and 

the release of “prisoners of concern.” 

A Commission delegation visited Vietnam from October 23 – November 2, 2007 to assess current religious 

freedom conditions and evaluate reports of both progress and ongoing abuses. The Commission found that 

religious freedom conditions in Vietnam continue to be 

mixed, with improvements for some religious communities but not for others; progress in some provinces but 

not in others; reforms of laws at the national level that 

are not fully implemented or are ignored at the local and 

provincial levels; and still too many abuses of and restrictions on religious freedom affecting most of Vietnam’s 

diverse religious communities. Some important changes 

were implemented and prisoners were released after the 

U.S. government designated Vietnam a CPC; however, it 

is not yet correct to state that the Vietnamese government 

is fully committed to respecting religious freedom instead 

of maintaining control of its diverse religious communities. In view of the ongoing and serious problems faced 

by many of Vietnam’s religious communities, the uneven 

pace of reforms meant to improve the situation, the continued detention of religious prisoners of concern, and 

what can only be seen as a deteriorating human rights 

situation overall, the Commission again recommends that 

Vietnam be designated a CPC in 2008. 

Since 2004, there have been important signs of improvement in religious freedom conditions in Vietnam. 

The government has expanded the zone of permissible 

religious activity and released a number of prisoners from 

a list provided by the State Department. It has issued new 

administrative ordinances and decrees that outlined registration procedures and outlawed forced renunciations of 

faith. However, this notable progress occurred alongside 

persistent abuses, discrimination, and restrictions. The 

government continues to imprison and detain dozens 

of individuals motivated by their religion or conscience 

to advocate for religious freedom reforms in Vietnam. 

The government persists in maintaining control of most 

religious organizations and restricts their activities and 

growth through a pervasive security apparatus and the 

VIETNAM

The Commission found that 

religious freedom conditions in 

Vietnam continue to be mixed, with 

improvements for some religious 

communities but not for others; progress 

in some provinces but not in others; 

reforms of laws at the national level 

that are not fully implemented or are 

ignored at the local and provincial 

levels; and still too many abuses 

of and restrictions on religious 

freedom affecting most of Vietnam’s 

diverse religious communities.
34

process of requiring official recognition, registration with 

government-approved religious organizations, and permission for most activities. Independent religious activity 

is illegal, and legal protections for government-approved 

religious organizations are often vague and subject to 

arbitrary or discriminatory interpretation based on political factors. There are no clear penalties or procedures for 

holding accountable police or government officials who 

restrict or abuse religious freedom. While new laws have 

promised needed protections, they have not been fully 

implemented or have sometimes been used to restrict 

and discriminate. In addition, religious communities 

and individuals viewed as political or security threats by 

the Vietnamese government face continued harassment, 

detention, or arrest. These include ethnic minorities, 

both Buddhist and Protestant, whose religious practice is 

viewed, in the words of a government training manual, as 

something to be “resolutely overcome.” 

Since January 2007, when Vietnam joined the World 

Trade Organization (WTO), religious freedom conditions 

have not improved as quickly or as readily as other areas 

important to the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship. Vietnam’s 

overall human rights record remains very poor and in 

fact has deteriorated since that time, and the government 

has moved decisively to repress any perceived challenges 

to its authority. More than 30 legal and political reform 

advocates, free speech activists, labor unionists, and independent religious leaders and religious freedom advocates 

were arrested in 2007, placed under home detention or 

surveillance, threatened, intimidated, and/or harassed. 

Given the prominence of religious leaders in advocating 

for the legal and political reforms needed to guarantee 

religious freedom fully, their continued imprisonment or 

detention must be considered when measuring religious 

freedom progress in Vietnam. 

In testimony given before the U.S. Senate in March 

2008, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific 

Affairs Christopher R. Hill stated that Vietnam “no longer 

qualifies as a severe violator of religious freedom” because 

Vietnam has made a commitment to further change and 

because “all individuals the United States had identified as 

prisoners of concern for reasons connected to their faith” 

have been released. However, the Commission believes 

that the State Department’s attempts to define religious 

prisoners as those arrested for “reasons connected to their 

faith” draws a needless distinction between “political” 

and “religious” activity not consistent with international 

human rights law. The Commission maintains that there 

may be scores of religious “prisoners of concern,” including well-known religious freedom advocates such as Fr. 

Nguyen Van Ly and Nguyen Van Dai; imprisoned members of Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Khmer Buddhist religious 

communities; and United Buddhist Church of Vietnam 

(UBCV) and Catholic religious leaders held under administrative detention, in violation of core human rights protections. In many of the most recent cases, those detained 

were motivated by their religious vocation, conscience, 

or belief to call for the legal or political reforms needed 

to guarantee religious freedom or to organize peaceful 

demonstrations against religious freedom restrictions. 

Both the freedom to worship and the freedom to advocate 

peacefully for an end to religious freedom restrictions are 

actions consistent with the guarantees of the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which include 

protections for the freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion. 

This was made plain to the Commission during its 

meetings with prisoners Nguyen Van Dai and Li Thi Cong 

Nhan. Both pointed out that though Vietnam’s constitution guaranteed religious freedom, further legal reforms 

were needed in order for this freedom to be fully realized. 

Both said that they were peaceful advocates and in contrast to government claims, did not aim to “destabilize” 

Commissioner Cromartie speaks with the head of the Foreign 

Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Hanoi.
35

the Vietnamese government. Both also stated that the 

protection of religious freedom was an important foundation of their professional work. Nguyen Van Dai stated 

openly that his religious freedom advocacy was part of 

the reason he was arrested in March 2007. The continued 

detention of religious prisoners of concern, and the existence of vague “national security” provisions in various 

laws used as the basis for their arrest (see below), is a primary factor in the Commission’s determination that Vietnam remains a serious violator of religious freedom. 

In addition to prisoners, other serious religious freedom violations continue to occur in Vietnam. Prominent 

religious communities, including the United Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam (UBCV) and some Hoa Hao and 

Cao Dai Buddhist groups, face unwarranted restrictions 

and abuses because of their attempts to organize independently of government oversight and control. Ethnic 

minority Buddhists and Protestants are often harassed, 

beaten, detained, arrested, and discriminated against, and 

they continue to face some efforts to coerce renunciations 

of faith, exemplified in the beating and subsequent death 

last year of an ethnic minority Protestant who refused to 

recant. Today, the intensity and number of religious freedom violations are at a lower level in comparison to previous years, which is a significant development; however, 

the changes have not yet been substantial enough to warrant the country’s removal from the CPC list. 

The Commission maintains that the State Department’s removal of the CPC designation for Vietnam in 

November 2006 was premature. In addition to the fact of 

ongoing religious freedom violations, removing the CPC 

designation suspended the diplomatic framework that 

had led to a productive bilateral engagement on religious 

freedom and other human rights concerns and therefore 

removed the potential incentives and leverage needed to 

urge the Vietnamese government to continue to improve 

its human rights record. Thus, in order to address Vietnam’s persistent, severe religious freedom concerns and 

articulate fully to the Vietnamese government that religious freedom and related human rights are critical matters affecting bilateral relations, the Commission urges the 

U.S. government to re-designate Vietnam a CPC. 

The Commission Visit to Vietnam

The Commission delegation to Vietnam visited Hanoi, 

Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), Hue, Pleiku, Banmenthuot, 

and Soc Trang. Commissioners met with Prime Minister 

Nguyen Tan Dung, Lt. General Nguyen Van Huong, the 

Vice Minister of Public Security, and members of the National Assembly, as well as numerous other government 

leaders and local officials. Even though human rights 

remains a sensitive bilateral issue, Vietnamese officials 

were willing to engage the Commission’s questions and 

accommodated all of the Commission’s requests for meetings and trip locations, including visits with current and 

former detainees. During its meetings with officials, the 

Commission made clear that the aim in raising concerns 

about religious freedom and other human rights was to 

improve U.S.-Vietnamese relations, which, the Commission maintains, cannot be fully normalized on the basis 

of mutual economic interests alone. Commissioners 

indicated that improving protection for religious freedom 

and related human rights, in both law and practice, would 

be of great benefit to bilateral relations and Vietnam’s 

international standing, particularly in light of Vietnam’s 

election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 

Council. 

During its meetings, the Commission noted the 

many steps that Vietnam could take to improve bilateral 

relations, including the revision or repeal of all vague 

“national security” provisions that result in human rights 

violations, such as Article 88 of the Criminal Code or OrVIETNAM

Given the prominence of religious leaders in advocating for the legal and political reforms 

needed to guarantee religious freedom fully, their continued imprisonment or detention 

must be considered when measuring religious freedom progress in Vietnam.
36

dinance 44,1 the release of all remaining prisoners of concern, and the lifting of remaining restrictions on independent religious practice. The Commission raised prisoner 

cases and specific legal issues, and sought information 

about Vietnam’s commitment to progress on these and 

other religious freedom issues. Both Prime Minister Dung 

and Lt. Gen. Huong invited the Commission to return at a 

later date, leaving the door open to future discussions. In 

addition to meetings with government officials, the Commission met with representatives of Vietnam’s diverse 

religious communities, including representatives from the 

Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha, the UBCV, and the Cao Dai, 

Cham Muslim, Hoa Hao, Protestant, and Roman Catholic 

communities. Commissioners also met with representatives of various ethnic groups, including individuals from 

Hmong and Montagnard Protestant and Khmer Buddhist 

communities. 

In general, Commissioners were allowed to meet with 

religious leaders and dissidents without Vietnamese government officials present. However, in Ho Chi Minh City 

and some provincial areas, several dissidents and religious 

leaders expressed some fear about meeting with the Commission, having been warned by police not to “say anything negative.” It was soon discovered that police contact 

with and warnings to interlocutors prior to their meetings 

with the Commission was routine. Most religious leaders 

and human rights activists indicated that they expected to 

undergo some questioning after the meetings; however, 

most did not fear any serious repercussions. 

The Commission found that religious freedom conditions have improved somewhat in ethnic minority 

areas, particularly for Protestants in parts of the Central 

Highlands. However, improvements often depend on the 

province, minority members’ religious affiliation, and the 

goodwill of provincial officials. In the Central Highland 

province of Gai Lai, for example, ethnic Montagnard 

Protestants associated with the government-approved 

Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) have 

established a positive working relationship with the provincial officials, which has led to the re-opening of many 

religious venues closed after 2001, new religious training 

courses for pastors, and the construction of at least one 

new church building. However, in other ethnic minority 

areas of the Central Highlands and central coast region, 

there were reports of restrictions, land seizures, discrimination, and other abuses of religious freedom. It was also 

clear that government officials, even in Gai Lai province, 

remain wary of independent Protestant groups not affiliated with the SECV. 

Reports of abuses and restrictions continue to emerge 

from Hmong Protestants and Khmer Buddhist communities. In recent years, the largest number of arrests, detentions, and incidents of harassment have come from ethnic 

minority Hmong and Khmer provinces. The government 

continues to be suspicious that religious activism will 

promote ethnic solidarity and eventually lead to calls 

for autonomy. In the northwest provinces and parts of 

the Mekong Delta, the government is suspicious of any 

independent religious activity it cannot fully control and 

actively suppresses any efforts to protest religious freedom 

restrictions publicly. During its visits to ethnic minority areas, the Commission emphasized to government 

officials that such policies of repression can often lead 

directly to the type of resentment and public protest they 

seek to avoid. 

Vietnamese Protestants, Catholics, and non-UBCV 

Buddhist leaders uniformly reported that conditions had 

improved since the United States designated Vietnam a 

CPC in 2004. Some leaders attributed changes directly to 

Vietnam’s desire to join the international community as 

well as to the U.S. promotion of religious freedom in its 

bilateral relations. The pace of progress has been faster in 

urban areas and among groups viewed as “non-political.” 

Nevertheless, even in urban areas, there are continuing 

problems. The government actively discourages independent religious activity and refuses to recognize legally the 

UBCV and some Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. Although 

the government has legally recognized different Protestant 

denominations and Buddhist groups and allowed them to 

operate and organize independently, it requires religious 

leaders and followers from the UBCV, Hoa Hao, and Cao 

Commissioners Gaer, Eid, and Leo meet with Father Phan Van Loi 

(center), currently under house arrest, and Father Gyyi in Hue.
37

Dai to affiliate only with government-approved religious 

organizations. 

The situation for the UBCV and independent Hoa 

Hao and Cao Dai groups remains a serious religious freedom concern that has not significantly improved in recent 

years. The UBCV’s attempts to create an independent 

organizational structure have been met with the harassment, detention, interrogation, and long-term administrative detention of the UBCV leadership, including the Most 

Venerable Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang. The 

Commission met with Thich Quang Do in Ho Chi Minh 

City and Thich Thien Hanh, another UBCV leader, in Hue. 

The restrictions on the UBCV leadership have also affected monks, nuns, and lay members of the community. 

There have been reports of the harassment and detention 

of leaders of the Buddhist Youth Movement, denunciations of UBCV monks and nuns, and harassment of lay 

Buddhists attending known UBCV pagodas. Independent 

Hoa Hao groups face similar restrictions, particularly in 

An Giang province. Over the past three years, 18 Hoa Hao 

have been arrested for either distributing Hoa Hao sacred 

texts or protesting restrictions on Hoa Hao religious practices. Fourteen Hoa Hao remain in prison, including four 

Hoa Hoa sentenced in 2007 for staging a peaceful hunger 

strike and a religious leader who sent written testimony to 

the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Vietnam 

in 2006. 

Findings 

• Vietnam’s designation as a CPC in 2004 resulted in 

positive bilateral diplomatic engagement on religious 

freedom that led to important reforms in the Vietnamese 

government’s treatment of its religious communities. 

The CPC designation did not hinder U.S.-Vietnamese 

security or economic cooperation, as both areas, in fact, 

flourished between 2004 and 2006. Rather, diplomatic 

engagement brought about by the CPC designation 

provided a framework and incentives to discuss religious 

freedom and other human rights concerns, including 

restrictions on peaceful assembly, expression, and association. 

• In view of the ongoing and serious problems faced by 

many of Vietnam’s religious communities, including the 

continued detention of numerous religious prisoners of 

concern, the Commission again recommends that Vietnam be designated a CPC in 2008. 

 Prisoners of Concern

• There are scores of known religious “prisoners of concern” in Vietnam, persons imprisoned in violation of 

their human rights, for reasons related to their exercise 

or advocacy of freedom of religion or belief, including, 

for example, calling for legal reforms to advance religious 

freedom or organizing protests against religious freedom 

restrictions. The number includes at least 15 individuals detained under administrative detention orders. It 

does not, however, include the Montagnard Protestants 

who were arrested after the demonstrations for religious 

freedom in the Central Highlands in 2001 and 2004. 

Precise information on why these religious leaders and 

adherents were arrested has been difficult to obtain, but 

the continued imprisonment of Montagnards remains 

another persistent religious freedom problem. 

Ongoing Religious Freedom Abuses

• There have been some noted improvements in religious 

freedom conditions in Vietnam, including the expansion 

of permissible religious activity for Catholics, non-UBCV 

Buddhists, and some Protestant groups, the decrease 

in overt restrictions on the religious activities of most 

religious communities in urban areas such as Hanoi and 

Ho Chi Minh City, and government support for the building of some new religious venues, the training of some 

VIETNAM

Commissioners Eid, Leo, Cromartie, and Gaer with the Most 

Venerable Thich Quang Do of the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam, 

Ho Chi Minh City.
38

new religious leaders, and the holding of several large 

religious gatherings, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City. 

• Nevertheless, despite the positive changes, the Commission found that religious freedom problems continue to 

be severe in some provincial areas or among religious 

groups and individuals the government views as political 

or security threats. For example, the Vietnamese government continues to place some restrictions on Vietnamese 

Catholics and remains suspicious of ethnic minority 

religious groups, such as Montagnard and Hmong Protestants and Khmer Buddhists. Ethnic minority Protestants especially continue to face harassment, detention, 

arrests, discrimination, property destruction, and some 

forced renunciations of faith. 

• The Central Highlands region, the scene of protests for 

land rights and religious freedom in 2001 and 2004 that 

were violently dispersed by the authorities, continues to 

be the site of particularly severe religious freedom and 

other human rights violations. Since the demonstrations, officials have imprisoned those believed to have 

organized or taken part in the protests and those who 

sought asylum in Cambodia during police crackdowns 

after the demonstrations. Some Montagnard villages and 

communes remain under tight government control, and 

no international observer has been allowed unobstructed 

access to the region. Even “approved” churches face 

problems in this region; one-third of the SECV churches 

in Dak Lak province that were closed in 2001 continue 

to face serious restrictions on their activities and police 

regularly break up meetings. 

• The freedom of movement, expression, and assembly 

of UBCV leaders continues to be restricted and there is 

significant official harassment of monks, nuns, and youth 

leaders associated with the UBCV. The government also 

continues to ban and actively discourage participation 

in independent factions of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, 

two religious groups unique to Vietnam, as well as the 

estimated 3 million ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists. 

All three groups are subject to harassment, surveillance, 

arrests, interrogation, and detention, as well as the 

defrocking of Buddhist monks. Most of the “prisoners of 

concern” come from among these three groups. 

Government Training of Provincial Officials

• Implementation of the new religion ordinances and 

regulations remains a problem and has led to uneven 

enforcement, religious freedom restrictions, and some 

abuses. Assistant Secretary of State Hill, in his March 

2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, 

stated that the Vietnamese government was training government officials “throughout the country” to implement 

the new religion laws, a sign, he suggested, of “progress.” However, official Vietnamese government figures 

indicate that since 2005, they have conducted only 16 

training courses and eight workshops for Vietnamese 

civil servant in 17 of Vietnam’s 59 provinces. 

• The value of government-sponsored training seminars or 

workshops remains unclear, since the regulations regarding legal registration continue to be routinely misapplied or ignored in provincial areas—particularly in the 

Mekong Delta, northwest provinces, Central Highlands 

and central coastal regions, including Hue. In addition, 

there is evidence to suggest that in the Central Highlands, 

government officials were in fact trained to discriminate 

against Protestant communities by denying them housing, medical, educational, and other government benefits, including foreign assistance and development aid. 

• The Vietnamese government’s training materials for dealing with religious adherents in the northwest provinces 

continue to be antagonistic toward ethnic minority 

Hmong Protestants and Catholics and do not fully reflect 

Vietnamese law or international human rights standards. 

Provincial officials are urged to control and manage 

existing religious practice through the law, to halt “enemy forces” from “abusing religion” to undermine the 

Vietnamese state, and to “overcome...and solve the root 

causes...of the extraordinary growth of Protestantism.” 

Registration Issues

• The Vietnamese government has extended national legal 

recognition to various Protestant and Buddhist groups 

and to Baha’is, and has provided pledges of protection for 

religious activities. However, there are several different 

levels of legal recognition offered to religious groups, 

with “national” recognition being the most difficult to 

obtain. Most religious groups are granted permission to 

conduct “specific religious activities,” a status that limits 

religious activities sometimes to a specific leader, location, or only to weekly worship. This last level of recognition has been used, on occasion, to restrict religious activities and members’ participation, particularly among 

ethnic minority Protestants. 
39

• Despite clear timetables for providing responses, the 

Vietnamese government has not responded to more than 

a thousand applications for legal recognition, including 

applications from Protestant house churches in southern Vietnam and Hmong Protestant churches in the 

northwest provinces, making them technically illegal. 

In several instances, churches whose applications for 

legal recognition were delayed or denied faced threats of 

closure by government officials. 

• During the past year, some religious groups have stopped 

seeking legal recognition because government officials 

have placed conditions on the approvals of applications. 

These conditions include requiring application materials 

to include personal information about church members, 

a reduction in the size of religious groups’ management 

committees at the district level, religious leaders to 

become police informants on the activities of other religious groups, and the participation of religious leaders in 

communist ideology courses. 

Prisoners of Concern

By September 2006, then-U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Michael Marine was quoted by the Voice of America as saying that there were no longer any “prisoners of concern” 

in Vietnam. That claim was referenced when the State 

Department decided to lift Vietnam’s CPC designation two 

months later. As mentioned above, Assistant Secretary 

Hill, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee in March 2008, claimed that “all individuals 

the United States had identified as prisoners of concern 

for reasons connected to their faith” have been released. 

Assistant Secretary Hill stated that the State Department 

recognized and continued to advocate for the immediate 

release of individuals imprisoned the previous year for 

involvement “in the pro-democracy group Bloc 8406, and 

other fledgling pro-democracy groups.” Drawing a line 

between “political” and “religious” activity, the contention that there were no longer any religious prisoners of 

concern was a principal reason the State Department no 

longer considered Vietnam a “severe violator of religious 

freedom.” 

However, the Commission maintains that there may 

be scores of prisoners of concern, including religious 

freedom advocates such as Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and Nguyen 

Van Dai; at least two dozen members of the Cao Dai, Hoa 

Hao, and Khmer Buddhist communities; and those being 

held under long-term administrative detention, including UBCV leaders Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang 

Do and Catholic Fr. Phan Van Loi. In virtually all of these 

cases, the persons were detained, in part, because of their 

religious freedom advocacy. However, inexplicably, the 

State Department appears to exclude from consideration 

in this category the arrest or detention of those who, motivated by their religious belief, vocation, or conscience, 

organize in support of legal or political reforms to promote religious freedom, or those who monitor freedom 

of religion and are arrested or otherwise punished for 

publicizing their findings. In addition, there are hundreds 

of Montagnard Protestants arrested after demonstrations 

in 2001 and 2004 for religious freedom and land rights 

held in the Central Highlands, including an undetermined 

number of religious leaders.

It is the Commission’s view that in all of the most 

recent cases of arrest, imprisonment, and other detention, religious leaders and religious freedom advocates 

had engaged in actions that are protected by international 

human rights instruments. In addition to the freedoms 

to believe and to worship, the freedom to peacefully advocate for religious freedom is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, which 

protect not only the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief,2

 but also the related rights 

of freedom of opinion and expression,3

 and to freedom of 

peaceful assembly and association.4

 Moreover, the right 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief 

is “far-reaching and profound” and “encompasses freedom of thought on all matters [and] personal conviction,” 

as well as “the commitment to religion or belief.” 5

 These 

international human rights law standards are specifically 

incorporated in IRFA’s definition of how to assess a “violation of religious freedom.”6

 Public action may have led to 

the advocates’ detention or arrest, but the actions were 

taken on behalf of the right to religious freedom; thus, 

their detention is clearly a violation of international protections for this right. 

The “prisoners of concern” include:

• Five Cao Dai followers being held after they were arrested 

in Cambodia for handing out fliers critical of the Vietnamese government’s control of and restrictions on Cao 

Dai religious practice. The five were arrested in July 2005 

with three other Cao Dai members, returned to Vietnam, 

VIETNAM
40

and sentenced to 13 years for “fleeing abroad to oppose 

the Government” and “propagating documents against 

the Vietnamese Government to incite demonstrations 

and riots.” 

• At least a dozen Hoa Hao followers incarcerated since 

2005 for protesting restrictions on Hoa Hao practice and 

the arrest of Hoa Hao followers, including four sentenced 

in May 2007 for staging a peaceful hunger strike. 

• Five Khmer Buddhists arrested in February 2007 for leading a demonstration protesting restrictions in Sac Trong 

province. Also, imprisoned is Khmer Buddhist monk Tim 

Sarkhorn, who was arrested in Cambodia and returned to 

Vietnamese authorities allegedly for illegally crossing the 

border, though reportedly he was arrested for engaging in 

non-violent activities critical of the Vietnamese government’s repression of the language, culture, and religious 

traditions of the Khmer ethnic minority in Vietnam. 

• At least 15 individuals being detained under long-term 

administrative detention orders, including UBCV and 

Catholic religious leaders. 

It is the Commission’s view that Fr. Nguyen Van 

Ly, Nguyen Van Dai, and Li Thi Cong Nhan should also 

be considered “prisoners of concern,” since they were 

detained, in part, because of their religious freedom advocacy. These three religious freedom and legal reform 

advocates were among the first arrested in March 2007 

as part of the larger crackdown on democracy, labor, free 

speech, and human rights advocates by the Vietnamese 

government.

Father Ly had been arrested in 2001 and sentenced 

to 15 years in prison after submitting written testimony to 

this Commission. After he was granted an early release 

in 2005, he helped found Freedom of Speech magazine 

and organize the Bloc 8406 democracy movement, which 

began in April 2006 after hundreds of people signed a 

public petition calling for greater democracy and human 

rights, including religious freedom, in Vietnam. In April 

2006, Fr. Ly founded the Vietnam Progression Party with 

the primary goal of restoring freedom of religion, speech, 

and association in order to build a society that respects 

“people’s interests and human rights accords.” One year 

after founding the Progression Party, Fr. Ly and four of his 

associates were sentenced under Article 88 of the Vietnamese Criminal Code for “propagandizing against the 

state.” Fr. Ly received a sentence of eight years in prison 

and five years of house arrest. 

Nguyen Van Dai, one of Vietnam’s few human rights 

lawyers, has defended individuals arrested for their religious activities. He is also the co-founder of the Committee for Human Rights in Vietnam and one of the principal 

organizers of Bloc 8406. He was also arrested and given 

a five year sentence. Some of the public charges leveled 

against Fr. Ly, Dai, and his associate Li Thi Cong Nhan are 

related to their religious freedom advocacy. In the state 

Family and Society newspaper, for example, Fr. Ly is described as “joining hands with black forces and reactionary elements to build a force under the cover of freedom 

of religion activities.” In the online publication of the 

Ministry of Public Security entitled Law and Order, Dai 

is accused of collecting “evidence of Vietnam’s religious 

persecution” to send to “enemy powers and overseas 

reactionaries.”7

 

In addition to the prisoners of concern identified by 

the Commission, another persistent religious freedom 

problem is the long-term imprisonment of ethnic minority Montagnard Protestants. The Vietnamese government 

arrested and detained hundreds of Montagnards suspected of participating in protests for land rights and religious 

freedom in the Central Highlands region in 2001 and 2004. 

The non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights 

Watch has compiled a well-documented list of 355 Montagnards who remain in prison.8

 Eyewitnesses confirm 

the continued long-term detention of Montagnards, including minors. Nguyen Khac Toan, sentenced to 12 years 

in prison for his advocacy of free speech and Internet 

freedom in 2002, mentioned that he shared a prison with 

“225 ethnic Protestant Montagnards.” In the past seven 

years, ethnic minority Montagnards have been arrested on 

suspicion of engaging in demonstrations, for alleged connections to Montagnard groups in the United States, for 

organizing refugee flights to Cambodia, or for affiliation 

In recent years, the largest number 

of arrests, detentions, and incidents of 

harassment have come from ethnic 

minority Hmong and Khmer provinces. 
41

with the banned Tin Lanh Dega, an ethnic minority Protestant association that purportedly mixes religious activity 

with political activism. 

It is difficult to determine the exact number of Montagnards imprisoned specifically because of their religious 

affiliation or activities; however, an official in the SECV 

has compiled a list of almost 150 individuals imprisoned 

for alleged sympathy with Tin Lanh Dega or because they 

allegedly failed to turn in members of their congregations 

who participated in the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations. 

Testimony by recently released detainees indicates that 

the Vietnamese government arrested many whose only 

“crime” was affiliation, whether through employment, 

church, or family with individuals suspected of “antigovernment” activity. A full accounting of Montagnard 

prisoners, and at the very least, the unconditional release 

of those imprisoned solely on account of their religious 

identity or association, should be a critical element of future U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogues. 

Vietnam’s Religious Communities: Improving 

Conditions for Some, Ongoing Restrictions 

and Abuses for Others 

The number of those who profess to be religious adherents 

continues to grow in Vietnam. In large urban areas, the 

Vietnamese government has expanded the zone of permissible religious activity for Catholics, non-UBCV Buddhists, and some Protestant groups. Religious leaders in 

Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City report few overt restrictions 

on their normal worship activities and the government 

continues to support the building of some new religious 

venues, the training of some new religious leaders, and 

permission to hold several large religious gatherings, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City. Protestant groups report 

that police harassment has also declined overall, although 

the movement and activities of a number of their leaders 

continue to be monitored by the police. Improvements 

reportedly depend on geographic area, ethnicity, or the 

relationship established by religious leaders with local or 

provincial officials. Many religious leaders said positive 

changes began in early 2005 and continued through 2006, 

a time frame that corresponds with the U.S. government’s 

designation of Vietnam as a CPC, an action that made 

religious freedom concerns a priority in U.S.-Vietnamese 

bilateral relations. Many religious leaders claimed that 

positive religious freedom changes were also made because of the Vietnamese government’s desire to join the 

international community, a goal that included WTO accession and election to a non-permanent seat on the UN 

Security Council. 

Despite noted improvements, the Commission found 

that religious freedom problems remained serious in 

some provincial areas and among religious groups and 

individuals the government views as political or security 

threats. For example, the Vietnamese government continues to be suspicious of ethnic minority religious groups, 

such as Montagnard and Hmong Protestants and Khmer 

Buddhists; those who seek to establish independent religious organizations, such as the UBCV, Hao Hoa, and 

Cao Dai; and those it considers to pose a political threat, 

such as “Dega” Protestants and individual Mennonite, 

Catholic, Buddhist, and house church Protestant leaders. 

Among these groups, there continue to be incidents of 

harassment, detention, arrests, discrimination, property 

destruction, and some forced renunciations of faith. 

The government continues policies to maintain 

control of most religious organizations and restricts 

their activities and growth through a pervasive security 

apparatus, bureaucratic impediments, the process of official recognition and registration, and the requirement 

of official permission for certain activities. Independent 

religious activity remains illegal, and legal protections for 

government-approved religious organizations are both 

vague and subject to arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations based on political factors. The new Ordinance on 

Religion and Belief, which came into effect in November 

2004, reiterates citizens’ right to freedom of religion, including the freedom not to follow a religion; it also states 

that violations of these freedoms are prohibited. However, 

while the Ordinance promises needed protections, they 

are often not fully implemented or not available to all 

religious groups, and are sometimes used to restrict and 

discriminate against religious groups rather than advance 

religious freedom. 

Vietnamese Catholics

Vietnamese Catholics report that the government has 

gradually eased its oversight over the selection and ordination of priests. It is still the case that all students for the 

priesthood must be approved by local authorities before 

enrolling in a seminary and again prior to their ordination 

as priests. However, the Church often moves ahead with 

ordinations after informing government officials. The 

government technically maintains veto power over VatiVIETNAM
42

can appointments of bishops, but it reportedly cooperates 

with the Church in the appointment process. The government recently approved a bishop for the newly created Ba 

Ria Vung Tau Diocese, allowed a new Jesuit seminary to 

be built in Ho Chi Minh City, and permitted several local 

dioceses to hold religious education classes for minors on 

weekends and conduct some charitable activities. Hanoi 

continues to discuss conditions for the normalization of 

relations with the Holy See, discussions that included a 

meeting between Pope Benedict XVI and Prime Minister 

Dung at the Vatican and a corresponding visit of a highlevel Vatican delegation to Vietnam in February 2007. 

Nevertheless, Catholics in Vietnam continue to face 

some restrictions. For example, in 2007, the government 

rejected the appointment of two bishops and two priests 

because of inappropriate “family backgrounds.” There 

are also persistent restrictions on the establishment of 

Catholic seminaries and the recruitment of seminary 

candidates. In addition, there are continuing problems 

for Catholics in many rural areas. In Ninh Binh province, 

local police destroyed a sacred “Pieta” statue during a 

procession, although in that incident, the police were reportedly reprimanded by provincial authorities. The Archbishop of Hanoi is restricted from traveling to dioceses in 

certain regions of the country, including northwest Vietnam. Other examples of problems include the fact that 

provincial authorities in Son La and Dien Bien provinces 

refused to register a local Catholic diocese and mistreated 

lay Catholic leaders, Ha Giang provincial authorities refused to grant a parish priest a legal residency permit, and 

officials in Thua Thien-Hue province placed restrictions 

on the recruitment of seminary students. 

The diocese of Hanoi continues to be locked in a 

property dispute with the government over buildings and 

property owned by the Papal Nuncio in Hanoi and seized 

by the government more than 50 years ago. In December 

2007, some Catholics began staging prayer vigils at one 

property, leading to a tense stand-off with police that included threats and the beating of at least one participant. 

Prime Minister Dung intervened in the stand-off and has 

reportedly begun negotiations with the Vatican on the 

properties’ return. Catholics in Hanoi are reportedly staging new vigils at the Thai Ha Redemptorist Church. The 

government press has encouraged local authorities to 

take “extreme action” to end the vigils and Catholic leaders have been brought in for “working sessions” with local 

police. The Commission will continue to monitor this 

ongoing situation. 

Protestants in Vietnam

 Conditions for Protestants have improved somewhat 

since 2004, particularly in urban areas. Protestant religious leaders told the Commission delegation that in the 

months immediately preceding President Bush’s visit to 

Vietnam in November 2006, there were many positive 

changes, including an improvement in relations with government officials, decreased official harassment, fewer 

reports of forced renunciations of faith, expedited approvals of legal recognition applications, and the release of 

prisoners. The government also allowed worship activities 

to expand—mostly in urban areas, but also in parts of the 

Central Highlands as well as among Protestants affiliated 

with the government-recognized SECV. 

However, after the State Department lifted the CPC 

designation and Vietnam achieved both Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and accession to the WTO, 

momentum reportedly slowed considerably in many 

places, and stopped altogether in others. Because of poor 

implementation of Vietnam’s regulations and ordinances 

on religion, noncompliant provincial officials, or government suspicion of ethnic minorities, Protestants continue 

to face problems. New bureaucratic or administrative 

controls are being used by some local officials to restrict 

worship activities, including zoning laws that prohibit attendance at services in other districts, the denial of applications for legal recognition, or the regular use of the application process to demand personal information about 

the members of religious communities and/or gain conCommissioners Cromartie, Eid, and Leo with Father Steven Chun Tin, 

a religious freedom advocate, Ho Chi Minh City.
43

VIETNAM

trol over the administrative affairs of independent house 

churches. In addition, some local officials have conditioned approval of registration applications on the leader’s 

willingness to become a government informant. Many, 

if not most, of these recent problems can be considered 

isolated cases, but taken together, they appear to indicate 

that the Vietnamese government remains determined to 

maintain ongoing control over the practice of religion in 

ways that contravene human rights norms.

In addition to official restrictions, members of Protestant religious communities continue to face beatings 

and other ill-treatment, interrogations, harassment, fines, 

threats, and forced renunciations of faith, though the 

number and frequency of such abuses are fewer today 

than in the past. In January 2007, security forces tore 

down part of the church structure and briefly detained 

the congregation of Pastor Nguyen Quang in Ho Chi Minh 

City. Pastor Quang had previously been arrested in 2004, 

along with five other members of his congregation. In 

June and July 2006, police beat two men and two women 

from an unregistered Protestant church in Thanh Hoa 

province, after a dispute erupted over the home used by 

the congregation as a place of worship. Although there are 

reports that security officials were punished for the June 

incident, another member of the congregation in Thanh 

Hoa was beaten in October 2006 when he refused police 

orders to leave a prayer meeting. 

In September 2006, Protestant pastor Tran Van Hoa 

was arrested and detained for two weeks and security officials closed down Christmas celebration services in a Baptist church in Haiphong, Bac Giang province. In Quang 

Ngai province, security officials reportedly told ethnic 

Hre Protestants that “unless they behave,” their churches 

would be destroyed and leaders arrested “once the APEC 

[the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting] is over.” In the past year, local officials have destroyed 

property or confiscated land from Hre Protestants, fined 

adherents, and told leaders that they would be “tolerated 

as long as they did not gather in large groups.” In June 

2005, police detained 17 ethnic Hre Protestants; when 

community members refused to cease their religious activities, their homes and rice fields were burned and their 

land confiscated. 

In the past 18 months, unregistered Protestant 

churches in Ben Tre, Kien Giang, Long An, and Soc Trang 

provinces reported that police had harassed their congregations, confiscated property, disrupted holiday services, 

and threatened to close their buildings. Incidents of local police harassment and beatings were also reported 

in the provinces of Quang Ninh, Hai Phong, Lang Son, 

Son La, Thanh Hoa, and Tra Vinh, often involving disruption of “illegal” meetings at Protestant house churches 

or restrictions on religious holiday celebrations. In November 2007, police broke up a house church meeting in 

Haiphong. There have also been reports of clashes beIt is the Commission’s view that in all of the most recent cases of arrest, imprisonment, 

and other detention, religious leaders and religious freedom advocates had engaged in 

actions that are protected by international human rights instruments.

Commissioner Cromartie meets with the leadership of the Ho Chi 

Minh City Cao Dai.
44

tween Vietnamese Protestants and local Khmer Buddhists 

in the Mekong Delta, allegedly instigated by provincial 

officials. 

There is also disturbing evidence that provincial officials discriminate against ethnic minority Protestants. 

Children are denied access to high school, based on 

outdated laws prohibiting the entry of children from religious families. There are also reports that Protestants are 

denied access to government benefits readily available 

to non-Protestants. In addition, local officials reportedly intimidate family elders, threatening to take away 

their government benefits unless they convince younger 

family members to renounce their religion. Montagnard 

Protestants have long complained of targeted discrimination, but there is troubling evidence that both provincial 

and government officials are training local officials in 

these discriminatory tactics. At a 2007 training workshop 

in Kontum, local police and government officials were 

reportedly trained in ways to deny medical, educational, 

housing, financial and other government services to 

“religious families” or to the families of recent converts. 

In addition, officials were instructed to divert foreign aid 

projects from known Protestant villages. 

In March 2008, leaders of the SECV issued a public 

letter alleging that in spite of public promises to protect 

religious freedom, the Vietnamese government continues 

to confiscate and destroy church properties, interfere in 

church leadership decisions, and instigate communal 

violence against Protestants affiliated with the SECV. 

Moreover, the SECV expressed concern that government 

officials continue to interfere in the organization’s internal 

affairs, including the reassignment and ordination of religious leaders. SECV leaders also claimed that despite 

efforts to engage government officials on issues of concern, two SECV churches were destroyed in Ho Chi Minh 

City in December 2007 and provincial authorities had 

allowed several ethnic Khmer, including a number of Buddhist monks, to vandalize and destroy church property 

and beat the members of two SECV congregations in the 

Mekong Delta, a region where Khmer Buddhist culture 

and religious practice are also severely restricted. In 

addition to these abuses, the SECV’s letter also states 

that despite repeated requests, there has been no action 

resolving the SECV’s claims on as many as 256 properties 

confiscated by the government after 1975. 

Forced Renunciations of Faith

Incidents of forced renunciations of faith continue to occur, generally targeting ethnic minority Protestants, but 

including also some UBCV monks and nuns in recent 

years. A February 2005 decree outlawed the practice of 

large-scale forced renunciations of faith, which were a 

national policy before that time. According to the State 

Department, there continue to be “isolated but credible 

reports” in which local authorities “encourage renunciations” of recently converted Christians and pressure them 

to return to their traditional beliefs. In September 2006, 

a pastor in Dak Nong province reported that the deputy 

chairman of Dak Mil district accused him and his church 

of “anti-government activities” for not participating in 

required Sunday buffalo sacrifices, an activity that would 

have been contrary to his religious beliefs. There were 

other cases of fines, police summons, short-term detentions, or threats of withholding government benefits used 

to induce individuals to abandon their religion, including 

30 ethnic minority Protestants in Coastal Ninh Thuan province and 10 Hmong Protestants in Dien Bien province. 

In 2007, two Hmong Protestant leaders in Sang Chai 

hamlet, Lu Thanh village, Si Ma Cia district were physically assaulted and threatened with a gun in an attempt to 

force a new Protestant church to close and to coerce the 

members of the congregation to recant their religion. In 

Dien Bien province, Muong Lay district, Cha Cang commune, local authorities encouraged Hmong clan leaders 

to pressure local Protestant families to cease practicing 

Commissioner Leo speaks with church members outside the new, 

government-recognized, official meeting place of Central Highlands’ 

Protestants.
45

VIETNAM

their faith, including by forcing some families to construct 

traditional altars in their homes and/or to sign formal 

documents renouncing their beliefs. In Thai Binh province, Tien Hai district, Dong Lam commune, local authorities tried to force Protestant house church pastor Nguyen 

Van Cam to sign documents committing him to stop 

holding church services. In Dien Bien province, East Dien 

Bien district, police broke up a house church meeting, 

banned worshippers from gathering, confiscated religious 

material, fined followers, forced some to cut wood, and 

visited the homes of church members to pressure them 

to abandon their faith. Religious leaders in the northwest 

provinces and central coast region, including leaders and 

followers from the Inter-Evangelistic Movement Bible 

Church, also reported that they were being denounced as 

“enemies of the state” for “believing in an American religion,” and were forced to pay fines.

The most serious recent case of forced renunciation involved the beating death in Phu Sen province of 

an ethnic minority Protestant man named Y Vin Het. 

Credible reports from Phu Sen indicated that Y Vin Het 

was repeatedly beaten in police custody for refusing to 

recant his faith. He could not afford medical care and 

died of internal injuries in March 2007. Religious leaders 

complained about police tactics, but provincial officials 

forced the young man, without any independent medical 

examination or investigation, to mark a paper indicating 

that he was injured in a drunken brawl, a story repeated 

to the Commission during its meeting with the Ministry of 

Public Security (MPS). The Commission asked for the Phu 

Yen provincial police responsible for the beating death 

to be held responsible and for an account of their punishment to be published in the MPS’s newspaper Law & 

Order. As of this writing, there has been no response from 

the MPS and no information about whether those responsible for Y Vin Het’s death have been brought to justice, 

or whether there has been any independent or effective 

investigation.

Specific Problems in the Central Highlands

Montagnard Protestants

During the Commission’s visit to the Central Highlands in 

November 2007, religious leaders indicated that the situation had markedly improved during the past two years, 

particularly for groups affiliated with the SECV. In Gai 

Lai and parts of Dak Lak provinces, local religious leaders 

and government officials have worked together to re-open 

churches closed since 2001, approve religious training 

classes, and legally recognize congregations. However, 

relations between ethnic minority residents of the Central 

Highlands and Vietnamese government officials remain 

tense in some provinces and there continue to be reports 

of an intrusive security presence in the region. 

The Vietnamese government remains on guard 

against ethnic minority unrest since the Central Highlands 

was the scene of protests for land rights and religious 

freedom in 2001 and 2004. Numerous eyewitnesses report 

that the 2004 demonstrations were disrupted by attacks on 

protesters by security forces and hired proxies. There are 

credible reports of especially severe violence occurring 

in Dak Lak province, including the killing of at least 10 

demonstrators. No public investigation of or accounting 

for police action during the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations 

has occurred. Since the demonstrations, however, Vietnamese officials have imprisoned those believed to have 

organized the protests, others suspected of taking part, 

and those who sought asylum in Cambodia during police 

crackdowns after the demonstrations. Vietnamese security officials have also pursued Montagnards into Cambodia to stop the flow of asylum seekers. Some Montagnard 

villages and communes remain under tight government 

control, and no international observer has been allowed 

unobstructed access to the region, though diplomats have 

occasionally visited, including representatives of the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Ellen 

Sauerbray, the then-U.S. State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Populations, Refugees, and Migration. 

There continue to be reports of Montagnards seeking asylum in Cambodia, despite efforts to halt the refugee flow 

by both the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments. 

Religious leaders reported that in recent years, the 

government has relaxed some restrictions, allowing a reported 100 churches in the Central Highlands to register 

legally with the SECV. Several hundred more have been 

given de facto or official permission to operate pending registration decisions. As many as 700 of the 1,250 

churches and meeting points closed after 2001 have since 

been re-opened. However, religious freedom improvements depend upon province, religious affiliation, and 

the goodwill of local and provincial officials. For example, 

severe restrictions on the activities of religious groups 
46

and believers in parts of Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Kontum, 

and Bien Phouc provinces continue. In Dak Lak province, 

the Commission delegation met with one house church 

Protestant pastor who described how government authorities had threatened to remove his residency permit, 

brought lawsuits against him to confiscate his property, 

and harassed and threatened his congregation until many 

of them left. Officials then put a sign up at the end of the 

road prohibiting entry to what was termed a “secret military area.” This pastor stated that 14 other congregations 

affiliated with his group experienced similar problems. 

Many of the pastor’s legal problems “disappeared” immediately prior to his meeting with the Commission; 

however, there have not been additional improvements 

since the Commission delegation left Vietnam and most 

of the same problems remain. Other ethnic minority Protestants, including members of the Stieng minority in Bien 

Phouc province and the Hre ethnic minority in Quang 

Ngai, continue to face discrimination and harassment 

or have had property confiscated by provincial officials. 

Central government authorities either ignore these problems or have not yet acted to curtail them. After conducting extensive interviews with Montagnard Protestants in 

2007, Human Rights Watch confirmed that ethnic minority Protestants face severe restrictions on religious practice, 

expression, and association. Most repression targeted 

Protestants who refused to join the SECV or who were suspected of affiliating with the banned Tin Lanh Dega (Dega 

Protestant Church). 

The Vietnamese government views Tin Lanh Dega as 

a subversive institution combining religion and advocacy 

of political autonomy. A recent study commissioned by 

the UNHCR found that few self-identified adherents of Tin 

Lanh Dega sought any type of political autonomy; rather, 

most sought “enhancement of their human rights position” and the “need to gather in independent Tin Lanh 

Dega church communities” that are separate from what 

they viewed as the Vietnamese-led SECV. Even those Tin 

Lanh Dega leaders who expressed a desire for greater 

political autonomy sought to advance this position peacefully. Nevertheless, to suppress Tin Lanh Dega activity or 

sympathy with the group, security officials in Dak Nong, 

Dak Lak, and parts of Gai Lai and Kontum provinces have 

engaged in severe violations of religious freedom and 

related human rights. Human Rights Watch found that 

police do not allow people to gather for worship, often live 

in the homes of known religious leaders, constantly monitor and interrogate religious leaders, and arrest and detain 

those found meeting clandestinely for prayer. Police also 

reportedly pressure some to sign pledges agreeing to 

“abandon Christianity and politics.” In addition, police 

also use a variety of methods to coerce suspected Dega 

Protestants to join the SECV, the government-approved 

religious organization. In February and March 2006, police in Gia Lai province reportedly detained individuals 

from several allegedly Tin Lanh Dega congregations in an 

attempt to force them to affiliate with the SECV. Police 

asked those detained whether they would remain “political” or whether they would follow the “Christianity of [the 

Prime Minister].” Those who refused to cease their religious activity reportedly were beaten and later released. 

SECV religious leaders told the Commission that attempts 

by police to coerce alleged Tin Lanh Dega congregations 

to join the SECV were made without their knowledge or 

cooperation. 

Beatings and Other Ill-Treatment, Restrictions, 

Detentions, and Discrimination 

Religious leaders in the Central Highlands have reported 

that progress made in the previous year has, for the most 

part, stalled. New legal registrations and recognitions 

have stopped, officials are refusing to approve new building permits, and the authorities have not renewed permission to hold additional religious education classes. Over 

the past year, even members of the government-approved 

SECV have been subjected to beatings and other ill-treatment, arrests, and various restrictions, including government discrimination. According to the State Department, 

one-third of the SECV churches in Dak Lak province that 

were closed in 2001 continue to face severe restrictions on 

their activities. Police regularly prevent people from gathering and break up meetings, halting religious activity in 

as many as 100 congregations. In Say Thay, Kontum province, district officials told visiting State Department diplomats that “no religion” existed in the area and refused 

to provide details about the alleged beating of two ethnic 

minority Dao Protestant leaders. In July 2006, police in 

Dak Nong province arrested and reportedly mistreated 10 

ethnic minority M’Nong Protestants and accused them 

of “participating in American Protestantism” and “antigovernment activities.” Six were detained for between 

three and six months. As of January 2007, four remained 
47

VIETNAM

incarcerated under obscure provisions in the legal code 

relating to national security and “national solidarity.” Religious leaders from Dak Nong report that most of those 

arrested were young people holding unauthorized prayer 

meetings outside of a recognized religious venue and for 

possessing cell phones. 

Abuses in the Northwest Provinces

Among Protestant groups, ethnic minorities in Vietnam’s 

northwest provinces continue to experience the greatest 

number of restrictions and abuses. Since 2001, the government has closely monitored Hmong Protestants and 

conducted campaigns among them involving harassment, 

detention, beatings, and forced renunciations of faith. 

During this time, hundreds of churches and meetings 

points have been forced underground, and in the period 

between 2002 and 2003, at least two pastors were beaten 

to death while in detention. The Vietnamese government 

has long tied the growth of Protestantism in the Hmong 

community to alleged separatist aims that require a security response. 

Recent government documents appear to recognize 

that ethnic minority Protestants in the northwest provinces have a “genuine need” to practice their religion. 

Over the past several years, the Vietnamese government 

has begun to allow Hmong Protestants to gather for worship purposes and, according to the State Department, to 

conduct religious activity in homes “during the daytime.” 

In the last year, the government has given an estimated 

60 churches official permission to conduct legal religious 

activity as a “pilot project.” An estimated 1,000 other 

religious venues in the northwest provinces are seeking 

affiliation with the Evangelical Church of Vietnam, North 

(ECVN), and hundreds of other house church Protestant 

groups are conducting some sort of independent religious 

activity in the region. 

However, these positive moves have been accompanied by persistent official harassment and even repression. For example, ECVN leaders were told to stop accepting new applications for registration after the number 

reached 671. Though required by law to respond to new 

applications in a timely manner, Vietnamese government 

officials have denied or ignored all new applications for 

legal recognition, making these religious groups technically illegal. ECVN officials were told that they should 

not expect approval of new registration applications this 

year. Two Protestant leaders from Lao Cai province were 

detained for two weeks and fined because they traveled 

to Hanoi to acquire registration application forms from 

ECVN leaders. 

ECVN leaders have also expressed concern about 

the way local authorities are interpreting the new laws on 

religion. In a State Department investigation of the current situation, ethnic minority religious leaders reported 

that security officials regularly attend religious services, 

check church membership lists, and force anyone not on 

the list to leave. In some locations, security officials have 

Independent religious activity remains illegal, and legal protections for 

government-approved religious organizations are both vague and subject to 

arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations based on political factors.

Commissioner Leo meets with members of the Vietnamese 

Buddhist Sangha (VBS), Soc Trang.
48

reportedly barred anyone under the age of 14 from attending services, banned mid-week meetings and programs 

for children and young people, and insisted that religious 

leaders be chosen under their supervision. During its visit 

to Vietnam, the Commission confirmed that some of these 

practices continue to occur. 

Forced Renunciations, Detentions, and Fines

Despite a February 2005 decree prohibiting forced renunciations of faith, official efforts to coerce individuals 

to renounce their religion reportedly continue. In 2006, 

Protestants in Muong Lay district, Dien Bien province, 

were forced by police to construct traditional animistic 

altars in their homes and sign documents renouncing 

Protestantism. In April 2006, four Hmong Protestants 

from Gap Trung village, Hoang Su Phi district, Ha Giang 

province were pressured unsuccessfully by border guards 

to sign documents renouncing their faith. Also in April 

2006, police in Dien Bien province beat 10 Hmong Protestants in an attempt to induce them to renounce their 

faith. In January 2007, security officials threatened to 

freeze the bank account of a Protestant leader in Muong 

Khong district, Dien Bien province unless he either left 

the district or renounced his faith. Members of one house 

church Protestant group in the northwest provinces report 

that police actively broke up meetings of worshippers and 

authorities refused to register their meeting areas. Members of this group reported that they were forced to “meet 

secretly at night, in the fields” in order to worship and that 

police actively pressured them to abandon their religion 

and return to “traditional beliefs.” There are no reports 

that any security officials have been punished for these 

actions, despite the fact that they have been technically 

illegal since the February 2005 decree. 

In addition, although the number of reported abuses 

has declined in recent years, the persistent reports detailing detentions, fines, and other forms of harassment 

indicate that the central government continues to limit the 

religious freedom of ethnic minority groups in Vietnam. 

Ethnic minority Protestants have been fined and detained 

for carrying Protestant literature and training materials 

and for providing researchers with information about 

religious freedom conditions. In Muong Nhe district, 

Dien Bien province, a house church deacon was detained 

after he returned from Hanoi carrying church documents 

and applications for registration. Since that time, there 

are reports that a special task force of security personnel has been living in the district to monitor the activities of Hmong Protestants there. In January 2007, four 

Protestants from Tuyen Quang province were arrested for 

transporting 115 Christian books and training materials. 

They were released after a week and fined $1,000—several 

years’ wages. Police have threatened to charge the village chief of Muong Nhe district, Dien Bien province with 

national security crimes for sending researchers documents about government attempts to “prohibit Christian 

practice” in the northwest provinces. In June 2007, a 

Protestant group in Bat Xat district, Lao Cai province reported that local government authorities imposed fines 

of up to approximately $100—amounting to one half 

year’s wages—on eight “illegal Protestants” and imposed 

material fines on nine others (apparently by confiscating 

chickens). The “illegal Protestants” were accused of following Protestantism without seeking permission from 

provincial authorities, although the group had submitted 

an application for registration with the ECVN. Sometimes 

the harassment results in violence, as in July 2007, when a 

government-sanctioned veterans’ group in Ha Giang province burned down a home where ethnic minority Protestants met for worship and damaged other buildings in an 

attempt to stop their worship activities. 

The United Buddhist Church of Vietnam

The restrictions and abuses faced by the UBCV remain a 

serious religious freedom concern in Vietnam. The freedoms of movement, expression, and assembly of UBCV 

leaders continues to be restricted, and there is significant 

official harassment of monks, nuns, and youth leaders 

associated with the UBCV. During its trip to Vietnam, the 

Commission met with the Most Venerable Thich Quang 

Do in Ho Chi Minh City and the Venerable Thich Thien 

Hanh in Hue. Thich Quang Do, as well as Thich Huyen 

Quang, are still restricted in their contacts and movement. 

Western diplomats and high-level Vietnamese officials 

have met with these leaders in the last year, and Thich 

Huyen Quang was allowed to seek needed medical treatment. However, 12 senior UBCV monks remain under 

some form of administrative probation or “pagoda arrest.” 

Charges issued in October 2004 against UBCV leaders for 

“possessing state secrets” have not been rescinded. Repression of the UBCV is not entirely focused on its leadership, as local attempts by monks to organize “provincial 
49

VIETNAM

boards” are also thwarted. 

During its meeting with the Most Venerable Thich 

Quang Do, the Commission delegation asked about the 

Vietnamese government’s charge that the UBCV was a 

“political” organization. In September 2007, President 

Nguyen Minh Triet threatened to put on trial and convict UBCV monks who “are hiding under the cloak of 

religion...to overthrow the government.” Thich Quang 

Do said that his advocacy for religious freedom and related human rights in Vietnam was directly related to his 

vocation as a monk and the “2,000 year old tradition of 

Mayahana Buddhism.” According to Thich Quang Do, 

“Buddhists promise not to kill, steal, engage in sexual 

misconduct, or lie, but when the government steals land, 

engages in sexual trafficking of young girls, stifles free 

speech, or arbitrarily kills or mistreats victims in prison 

we must speak out against state repression, that is why 

the government views the UBCV as political and why we 

are threatened with arrest and detention.” Thich Quang 

Do continued, “But our first need is freedom of religion,” 

[and] “the Vietnamese people need religious freedom 

to address all of Vietnam’s growing social problems. We 

have tried to organize and carry out our work peacefully, 

but we are unable.” 

Since 2005, the UBCV has organized more than 20 

provincial and local representative boards in central and 

southern Vietnam. Police regularly harass and interrogate monks and laypeople who have organized provincial 

level boards in Quang Nam-Danang, Thua Thien-Hue, 

Binh Dinh, Dong Nai, Quang Tri, Lam Dong, and Bac Lieu 

provinces. Monks have been detained and ordered to 

withdraw their names from the boards and cease all connections with the UBCV. Over the past year, government 

officials in Lam Dong province have sought to depose 

Thich Tri Khai from his post as superior monk of the Giac 

Hai pagoda in Dong Duong district. In late March 2008, 

pressure on the Giac Hai pagoda increased, as police and 

representatives of Vietnam’s Fatherland Front, a Communist Party organization, reportedly offered bribes to anyone who would denounce Thich Tri Khai. Twelve Buddhist monks associated with the government-approved 

Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha (VBS) signed a petition 

supporting Thich Tri Khai’s ouster. However, 239 monks 

affiliated with the UBCV signed another petition opposing the government’s action. All of those who signed the 

counter-petition have been threatened and subjected to 

“working sessions” at local police stations. 

Prior to their action targeting Thich Tri Khai, Lam 

Dong provincial officials reportedly issued a “secret plan” 

in September 2007 to orchestrate his removal, according to the International Buddhist Information Bureau in 

Paris. The document, which the Information Bureau has 

obtained, is an indication of the Vietnamese government’s 

aim to harass and restrict the UBCV in Vietnam. It describes the “illegal” UBCV as a “hostile force” using “the 

advantage of religion to oppose the State and sabotage 

the people’s great tradition of unity.” The document also 

advises provincial authorities to “mobilize local people 

against those who take advantage of religion...consolidate 

evidence in the form of complaints from local people and 

religious followers about Thich Tri Khai’s morals and virtue, and [launch] public accusations against him.” Thus 

far, however, the government has been unable to depose 

or remove Thich Tri Khai from the Giac Hai pagoda, despite the trumped up charges and denunciations from 

A market in the Mekong Delta. 
50

local Buddhists. 

The efforts of Lam Dong provincial officials are being 

duplicated in other areas. In April 2008, police and local 

officials reportedly entered the UBCV-affiliated Phuoc 

Hue pagoda in Quang Tri province, vandalized the property, destroyed statues and the pagoda’s gate, assaulted 

monks filming the vandalism, and beat head monk Thich 

Tu Giao. Police also assaulted and detained Thich Tu 

Giao’s mother and members of the Buddhist Youth Movement present at the pagoda. Local officials set up barriers 

on roads leading to the pagoda and put up signs declaring 

the pagoda to be a “forbidden area.” It was the second 

time police had vandalized the Phuoc Hue pagoda over 

the past year. Previously, police destroyed a newly-built 

kitchen and warehouse and allegedly stole money contributed by local Buddhists for pagoda building projects. 

Restrictions and abuses targeting the UBCV affect 

lay Buddhists as well as associated monks and nuns. The 

Vietnamese government has actively sought to stop the 

organization of the Buddhist Youth Movement. In the 

last year, police have briefly detained monks attending 

a youth conference in Hue and have subjected the lay 

Buddhist organizers of the conference to constant interrogations and harassment. In 2007, the UBCV’s national 

youth leader, Le Cong Cau, was held under house arrest 

during preparations for the Hue conference. In late November and early December 2007, UBCV Youth Leaders 

Ho Dac Thich and Mai Tien Son from Phuong Vy district, 

Hue were detained and interrogated. Other youth leaders 

in Phuoc Vinh district, Tay Loc district, and Huong Phong 

village were detained and interrogated. All reportedly 

were asked to resign their positions under the threat that 

criminal charges would be brought against them. Police 

also threatened to revoke family members’ government 

benefits. Former religious prisoner and monk Thich Thien 

Minh continues to face constant harassment and in March 

2007, local officials reportedly tore down the pagoda in 

which he was living. The next day he was presented with 

a “police order” accusing him of “activities opposing the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” In addition, Thich Thien 

Minh was ordered to renounce his position as UBCV 

Youth Commissioner, cease all contacts with the outlawed 

UBCV leadership, and disband operation of the Former 

Political and Religious Prisoners Association, which the 

authorities consider an “illegal organization.” 

Vietnamese authorities continue to threaten and 

detain monks and adherents of UBCV affiliated monasteries, as well as others seeking to meet UBCV leaders. Lay 

Buddhists who visit the pagodas of known UBCV leaders 

are harassed and information about them is collected. In 

December 2005, reports emerged that UBCV nun Thich 

Nu Thong Man was subject to a “denunciation campaign” 

and expulsion order by provincial authorities in Khanh 

Hoa province. Police threatened local villagers with the 

loss of jobs and government services unless they publicly 

denounced the nun and reportedly asked provincial authorities to have her expelled from the local monastery. In 

January 2007, security officials from Binh Dinh province 

issued orders prohibiting future religious gatherings at the 

Thap Thap monastery, reportedly threatening that local 

Buddhists would lose their jobs or their children would be 

expelled from school if they did not obey. 

Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Khmer Buddhist 

Communities

The government continues to ban and actively discourage participation in independent factions of the Hoa Hao 

and Cao Dai, two religious groups unique to Vietnam 

claiming membership of four million and three million 

While the handbook is important 

because it recognizes the legitimacy of 

“some” religious activity, it also indicates 

that the Vietnamese government will 

continue to control and manage religious 

growth, label anyone who seeks to 

spread Christianity in the northwest 

provinces a national security threat, 

and use unspecified tactics to 

“persuade” new converts to 

renounce their beliefs.
51

VIETNAM

respectively. There are also an estimated three million 

ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists, centered in the Mekong 

Delta region. Long-standing restrictions on the Khmer 

have lead to peaceful demonstrations in both Cambodia 

and Vietnam. The Vietnamese government has viewed 

such actions as a threat to public order and responded 

with harassment, surveillance, arrests, interrogation, and 

detention, as well as the defrocking of Buddhist monks, 

some of whom have taken the lead in organizing protests. 

The Commission met with Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious 

leaders in Vietnam and visited Soc Trang province to 

discuss issues related to Khmer Buddhism in Vietnam. 

Improvements experienced by other religious groups have 

not extended to these communities. In addition, most of 

the “prisoners of concern” described above come from 

these three groups. 

Both the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao pointed to the government’s ongoing oversight of and control over their communities’ internal affairs. The Cao Dai continue to protest 

that the Vietnamese government controls their rituals, celebrations, funerals, and the selection of religious leaders. 

For example, the government has long banned the use 

of séances, the key method for selecting Cao Dai leaders. 

Another complaint is related to the government’s rejection of the Cao Dai charter drawn up before the 1950s, the 

official unwillingness to allow the community to maintain 

its own independent source of income, and the seizure 

without compensation of Cao Dai properties after 1975. 

Some Cao Dai traditionalists have refused to participate 

in the government-appointed management committees 

and have formed independent groups. Eight Cao Dai were 

arrested in 2005 for protesting government control. 

The government-recognized Hoa Hao Administrative 

Committee (HHAC) was organized in 1999. Several leaders of the Hoa Hao community, including many pre-1975 

leaders, have openly criticized the HHAC, claiming that it 

is subservient to the government. They have set up their 

own organization, the Hoa Hao Central Buddhist Church 

(HHCBC), and have sought legal recognition. HHCBC 

leaders and followers face significant official repression. 

The government has arrested individuals caught distributing the sacred texts of the Hoa Hao founding prophet, 

Huynh Phu So, broken up ceremonies held by the HHCBC 

commemorating its founder, and destroyed sacred properties, including a library and other artifacts in An Giang 

province. Religious leaders also claim that the Religious 

Publishing House publishes only a part of the Hoa Hao 

sacred texts and actively restricts attempts to distribute 

full scriptures. 

In May 2007, a court in the Dong Thap province sentenced four Hoa Hao followers to between four and six 

years in prison for “creating public disorder” under Article 

245 of the 1999 Penal Code. The four were arrested for 

their involvement in a peaceful hunger strike protesting 

the arrest and imprisonment of at least eight other Hoa 

Hao sect members in 2005, as well as more general allegations of government suppression of the Hoa Hao religion.

The Vietnamese government’s repression of the 

language, culture, and religion of ethnic Khmer living 

in Vietnam has intensified, leading to growing resentment. Long-simmering tensions emerged in 2006 and 

2007, as Khmer Buddhist monks in Cambodia protested 

the Vietnamese government’s religious freedom restrictions in demonstrations that were violently dispersed by 

Cambodian police. In February 2007, more than 200 Buddhist monks staged demonstrations in Sac Trong province 

to demand greater religious freedom, including, among 

other demands, more language instruction in the sacred 

Pali language and the lifting of a ban on month-long ordination ceremonies. At least 10 monks were defrocked 

and five arrested for taking part in the demonstrations. 

According to reports, five other Khmer Buddhists are being held under administrative detention in their pagodas. 

In May 2007, five monks were sentenced to terms ranging from two to five years for “causing a public disorder.” 

In July 2007, the Vietnamese government arrested Tim 

Sakhon, a Khmer Buddhist monk living in Cambodia, on 

Commissioners Argue, Bansal, Cromartie, Gaer and Eid meet 

with human rights advocate Nguyen Van Dai at Cau Dien Prison, 

Hanoi.
52

charges of “illegally crossing the border.” Sakhorn was 

earlier defrocked by Cambodian Buddhist leaders for undermining the “friendship” between Vietnam and Cambodia when he organized demonstrations in Cambodia.

After the February 2007 demonstration in Soc Trang, 

provincial officials and police expanded surveillance and 

restrictions on Khmer Buddhist religious activity and 

pressured Khmer Buddhist leaders to identify or defrock 

monks critical of the government. As Theravada Buddhists, the Khmer have ethnic and religious traditions 

distinct from the dominant Mahayana Buddhist tradition 

practiced in most places of Vietnam. Khmer Buddhists in 

Cambodia have called for a separate religious organization for their co-religionists in Vietnam, an idea roundly 

rejected by provincial officials during the Commission’s 

visit to Soc Trang. 

Government Handbook on Religious Practice 

in the Northwest Provinces

The Committee on Religious Affairs in Hanoi publishes 

a handbook to instruct provincial officials in northwest 

provinces of Vietnam on how to manage and control religious practice among ethnic minorities. The Commission 

was critical of the 2006 version of the handbook because it 

offered instructions on ways to restrict religious freedom, 

including a command to “resolutely subdue” new religious growth, “mobilize and persuade” new converts to 

return to their traditional religious practice, and halt anyone who “abuses religion” to undermine “the revolution.” 

While the handbook is important because it recognizes 

the legitimacy of “some” religious activity, it also indicates 

that the Vietnamese government will continue to control 

and manage religious growth, label anyone who seeks to 

spread Christianity in the northwest provinces a national 

security threat, and use unspecified tactics to “persuade” 

new converts to renounce their beliefs. 

The Commission, as well as international human 

rights NGOs, criticized the 2006 handbook, noting that it 

promoted control of religious communities rather than 

protection of religious freedom. The Commission also 

pointed out that the text did not reflect international human rights norms on religious freedom and seemed to 

condone forced renunciations of faith targeting “new” 

converts. Vietnam’s Committee on Religious Affairs 

promised to revise the 2006 handbook and issue a new 

version in 2007. The revised handbook was presented to 

the Commission during its meeting with the Religious Affairs Committee in Hanoi. 

An analysis of the revised handbook reveals, unfortunately, that the new edition is hardly better than the previous one. Provincial officials continue to be urged to control and manage existing religious practice through law, 

halt “enemy forces” from “abusing religion” to undermine 

the Vietnamese state, and “overcome the extraordinary...

growth of Protestantism.” This last instruction is especially 

problematic, since it suggests that the growth of Protestantism among ethnic minority groups continues to be 

viewed as a potential threat to public security and that it is 

the “responsibility” of officials to stem it. As stated in the 

revised handbook, “Protestant growth can explode at any 

time...and is spreading to other tribes and regions...some 

can take advantage of religion to practice superstition, to 

violate the policies and laws of our State, to incite division 

among the people, to cause disturbances, to violate the 

common good or threaten the security of the State.”

In the 2006 version of the handbook, local authorities 

were told to identify ethnic minority Protestants “new” 

to the faith and “mobilize and persuade” them to “return 

to traditional religious practices.” In the revised 2007 

version, these commands are replaced with more vague 

instructions to “solve the root cause” of Protestant growth 

by “mobilizing” ethnic groups to “preserve their beautiful religious traditions” by “developing the economy and 

society...to raise the standard of living.” The words are 

different, but the task of officials managing religious communities remains essentially the same: religious practice 

must be managed and controlled, religious growth must 

be thwarted, and outsiders who, in their view, use religion 

to undermine the state must be stopped. 

The 2007 version of the handbook was revised, as 

promised, but the new version does not promote or fully 

protect religious freedom in the northwest provinces of 

Vietnam. Rather, it tolerates some religious practice while 

continuing to view new religious growth as a political and 

security problem needing to be “overcome” and “solved.” 

Legal Registration and the Implementation of 

the New Ordinance on Religion and Belief 

Both Vietnamese and U.S. government officials have 

claimed that the implementation of the November 2004 

Ordinance on Religion and Belief and the expansion of 

legal recognition for religious groups are signs of progress 
53

VIETNAM

in the protection of religious freedom in Vietnam. The Ordinance does affirm the right to freedom of religion. However, it also requires that all religious groups register with 

the government in order to function legally, and bans any 

religious activity deemed to cause public disorder, harm 

national security and national unity, or “sow divisions.” 

In addition, there continue to be problems in the implementation of a number of the provisions of the Ordinance, 

problems that include: the excessive denials or delays in 

approving thousands of legitimate registration applications, the refusal to register all but a handful of Protestant 

congregations in the north and the northwest provinces, 

inconsistent registration procedures and other legal requirements, continued restrictions on the recruitment or 

selection of religious leaders, difficulties in establishing a 

sufficient number of Catholic seminaries and Protestant 

pastor training courses, and unresolved land expropriation claims involving a number of religious groups. 

Religious organizations that gain legal recognition 

are, in principle, allowed to open, operate, and refurbish 

places of worship, train religious leaders, and obtain permission for the publication of materials. To obtain official 

recognition, an organization must first receive registration 

at the national level. According to the legal framework, 

a religious organization must have been in operation in 

Vietnam for 20 years in order to move through the three 

legal stages needed to receive national-level registration. 

To its credit, since 2006, the Vietnamese government has 

issued national-level recognition to at least six Protestant 

organizations, five Buddhist groups, and the Baha’i community. 

Other religious groups have encountered problems in 

the application process. The most basic level of registration is the most problematic, whereby a single religious 

venue is given permission to “carry out specific religious 

activities” that may be limited to approval of place, time, 

and number of people attending. This level of registration 

sometimes requires annual renewal. The second level of 

registration allows religious venues to affiliate with an already established religious organization or denomination. 

It is possible, after one year, for this group of religious 

venues or organization to draft a government-approved 

constitution and hold a convention to elect officers. At 

that time, the group can apply to Hanoi for national-level 

recognition. Vietnam’s Prime Minister must authorize an 

organization’s application in order for it to gain national 

legal status. Only those religious groups that reach this final level of recognition can carry out the activities detailed 

in the Ordinance on Religion, such as religious education, 

the ordination of leaders, the operation of religious sites, 

and the conducting of charitable activities. 

One benefit usually noted about the Ordinance is 

that it makes the registration process clearer than the 

regulations used in the past. The new Ordinance does set 

specific timetables and delineates a process for gaining 

national-level recognition. Nevertheless, though religious 

groups have been approved for legal recognition at all levels, even with the Ordinance, the most common response 

to applications is either no response or denial. Religious 

venues whose approvals are denied remain illegal.

Other problems with the Ordinance have also 

emerged: 

• The requirement that registration be gained for “specific 

religious activities” has been used to restrict religious 

practice. Some registered congregations in the northern 

region and the northwest Highlands complained that 

officials attend services, deny entrance to individuals not 

on application lists, refuse to approve religious meetings 

that are not held on weekends, and prevent members 

from participating in services through harassment by 

local authorities or their agents. Annual activities by 

congregations must also be registered with the authorities, and activities not on the accepted annual calendar 

require separate government approval.

Some of the problems encountered 

by religious groups in the registration 

process require a political solution, such 

as legal recognition of the UBCV and some 

Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. Other 

problems require better training on 

the Ordinance and implementation 

regulations among Vietnamese 

government officials.
• The approval process is slow and there is no redress for 

denials. Thousands of applications for legal recognition 

have not been answered, including at least 671 applications from ethnic Protestant churches seeking to affiliate 

with the ECVN. There are similar approval problems 

in the Mekong Delta region. Religious venues that are 

denied legal recognition have no clear avenue of appeal. 

Provincial authorities have threatened to close several 

religious venues that have been denied registration. 

• There are frequently unreasonable demands made by 

local officials, including that a religious organization 

provide lists of members of all its congregations as a 

precondition to registration, even though this specific 

requirement was not codified in the Ordinance on Religion. Many house church Protestants have ceased seeking national registration because local and provincial 

authorities are requiring that all district/provincial administrative staff be removed, religious leaders undergo 

indoctrination classes in Communist ideology, and denominational leaders become government informants 

as conditions for application approval. 

• Not all religious groups are eligible for registration. 

Independent Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups, and some 

Mennonite, Baptist, and other house church Protestants 

in the Mekong Delta, Central Highlands, and northwest 

provinces have not been allowed to register. UBCV 

Buddhists are required to affiliate with the Vietnamese 

Buddhist Sangha (VBS). 

Some of the problems encountered by religious 

groups in the registration process require a political solution, such as legal recognition of the UBCV and some Hoa 

Hao and Cao Dai groups. Other problems require better 

training on the Ordinance and implementation regulations among Vietnamese government officials. Assistant 

Secretary of State Hill, in his March 2008 Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee testimony, publicly stated that Vietnam’s efforts to train government officials to implement 

Vietnam’s new religion laws were a sign of “progress.” 

However, in Vietnam, when the Commission asked about 

the number of training programs that have been conducted for government officials, the delegation was told 

that between 2005 and 2007, the Vietnamese government 

conducted 16 training courses and eight workshops for 

Vietnamese civil servants in 17 of Vietnam’s 59 provinces. 

Given the problems encountered implementing Vietnam’s 

Ordinance on Religion, it is difficult to see how the relatively small number of training sessions for government 

officials can be viewed as a sign of progress. 

Clearly, the Ordinance offers many important promises that have not yet been fulfilled and may never be 

given Vietnam’s lack of an independent and transparent legal system and judiciary. In addition, there are 

too many problems with the implementation of religion 

laws to conclude that, at this time, Vietnam protects the 

individual’s right to religious freedom in law. Other than 

the limited number of training courses conducted in the 

past few years, it continues to be unclear exactly what 

provincial officials and security personnel are learning in 

government-sponsored training seminars. Regulations 

regarding legal registration are routinely misapplied or 

ignored in provincial areas, particularly in the Mekong 

Delta, northwest provinces, Central Highlands, and central coastal regions, including Hue. In addition, in the 

Central Highland province of Kontum, there is evidence 

suggesting that provincial authorities are being trained to 

discriminate against Protestant families by denying them 

housing, medical, educational, and other government 

benefits and diverting foreign assistance and development 

aid away from known Protestant villages. Recent reports 

indicating that provincial officials in the central coast 

and northwest provinces also denied medical benefits to 

Protestants and threatened family elders with a cut-off 

in aid unless younger family members renounced their 

beliefs demonstrate that discrimination is a tactic in other 

regions and provinces of Vietnam. 

54

ENDNOTES

1

 Article 88 targets people for “propagandizing against the state,” and Ordinance 44 is an 

administrative detention ordinance, which includes detention in mental hospitals.

2

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, Art. 18. 

3

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, Art. 19. 

4

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 20; International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, Arts. 21 & 22. 

5

 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 

1993), para 1. 

6

 See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Sec. 2(a) (2) & (3) and 3(13). 

7

 Other human rights advocates who have been temporarily detained, interrogated, 

beaten, arrested, or had warrants issued for their arrest since January 2007 include Fr. 

Chun Tin and Fr Phan Van Loi; Mennonite Pastors Nguyen Quang and Tran Van Hoa; 

Catholic seminary professor Nguyen Chinh Ket; and lawyers Li Thi Cong Nhan and Le 

Quoc Quan. 

8

 Human Rights Watch, No Sanctuary: Ongoing Threats to Indigenous Montagnards in 

Vietnam’s Central Highlands, Volume 18, Number 4, June 2006.
CComm ommission ission Re R ecommendations commendations

I 55 n addition to recommending that 

Vietnam continue to be named a 

CPC, the Commission has other recommendations for U.S. government 

action.

 Press for Immediate 

Improvements to End 

Religious Freedom Abuses, 

Ease Restrictions, and 

Release Prisoners

The U.S. government should, through 

its regular diplomatic exchanges with 

Vietnamese government officials, 

make clear that ending violations 

of religious freedom is essential to 

the expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations. It should urge the Vietnamese 

government to take action to halt 

religious freedom abuses and restrictions, release prisoners, and take other measures to ensure that Vietnam’s 

policies are consistent with international religious freedom standards 

including:

Prisoner Releases

• releasing or commuting the sentences of all religious prisoners of 

concern, including those imprisoned or detained on account of 

their peaceful advocacy of religious 

freedom and related human rights 

including, among others, Fr. Nguyen 

Van Ly, Nguyen Van Dai, Li Thi Cong 

Nhan, members of ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and 

northwest provinces, Khmer Buddhist monks, the Cao Dai and Hoa 

Hao followers, and those held under 

administrative detention including 

Fr. Phan Van Loi, UBCV Patriarch 

Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Quang 

Do, and the other UBCV leaders 

detained since the 2003 crackdown 

on the UBCV’s leadership; 

• publicizing the names of all Montagnard Protestants currently in 

detention for reasons related to 

the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations, 

allowing visits to prisoners from 

representatives of the International 

Committee of the Red Cross or other 

independent foreign observers, and 

announcing publicly that a prompt 

review of all such prisoner cases will 

be conducted; 

The Revision of Laws to Reflect 

International Human Rights 

Standards

• amending the 2004 Ordinance on 

Religious Beliefs and Religious 

Organizations, Decree 22, the 

“Prime Minister’s Instructions on 

Protestantism,” and other domestic 

legislation to ensure that such laws 

do not restrict the exercise of religious freedom and instead conform 

to international norms regarding 

the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, including 

revising the vague national security 

provisions in the 2004 Ordinance; 

• enforcing the provisions in the 

Prime Minister’s “Instructions on 

Protestantism” that outlaw forced 

renunciations of faith and establishing specific penalties in the Vietnamese Criminal Code for anyone 

who carries out such practices; 

• ending the use of such far-reaching 

“national security” provisions as Article 88 or Article 258 of the Criminal 

Code, which have resulted in the 

detention of advocates for religious 

freedom and related human rights 

such as the freedoms of expression, 

association, and assembly; 

• revising or repealing ordinances 

and decrees that empower local 

security police to arrest, imprison, 

or detain citizens in administrative 

detention for vague national security or national solidarity offenses, 

including Ordinance 44, Decree 38/

CP, Decree 56/CP, and Articles 258, 

79, and 88, among others, of the 

Criminal Code, and ending their de 

facto use to detain advocates;

• establishing a clear and consistent 

legal framework that allows religious groups to organize and engage 

in humanitarian, medical, educational, and charitable work; 

• investigating and publicly reporting on the beating deaths of Hmong 

Protestant leaders Mua Bua Senh 

and Vang Seo Giao and the 2007 

beating death of Hroi Protestant Y 

Vin Het in Phu Sen province, and 

prosecuting anyone found responsible for these deaths; 

Protecting Independent 

Religious Practice

• establishing a non-discriminatory 

legal framework for religious groups 

1 
to engage in peaceful religious 

activities protected by international 

law without requiring groups to 

affiliate with any officially registered 

religious organization, for example:

• allowing the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) 

or the Khmer Buddhists to operate legally and independently of 

the official Buddhist organizations and the Vietnam Buddhist 

Sangha, including allowing the 

UBCV’s Provincial Committees 

and Buddhist Youth Movement 

to organize and operate without 

restrictions or harassment;

• allowing leaders chosen by all 

Hoa Hao adherents to participate 

in the Executive Board of the 

Hoa Hao Administrative Council 

or allowing a separate Hoa Hao 

organization, such as the Hoa 

Hao Central Buddhist Church, to 

organize legally and operate with 

the same privileges as the Administrative Council;

• allowing Cao Dai leaders opposed 

to the Cao Dai Management 

Council to form a separate Cao 

Dai organization with management over its own affairs; and 

• allowing Protestant house church 

groups in the Central Highlands, 

central coast, and north and 

northwest provinces to organize independently and without 

harassment, and allowing them 

to operate, if desired, outside of 

either the Southern Evangelical 

Church of Vietnam (SECV) or the 

Northern Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam (ECVN);

• allowing all Hoa Hao groups freely 

and fully to celebrate their founding Prophet’s Birthday, allowing the 

printing and distribution of all the 

groups’ sacred writings, and allowing the rebuilding of the Hoa Hoa 

Buddhist Library in Phu Tan, An 

Giang province;

• approving the registration applications of all 671 ethnic minority 

churches in the north and northwest provinces and allowing them 

to affiliate immediately with the 

Evangelical Church of Vietnam 

(ECVN), consistent with the deadlines established in the Ordinance 

on Religious Belief and Religious 

Organizations; 

• creating a national commission 

of religious groups, government 

officials, and independent, nongovernmental observers to find 

equitable solutions on returning 

confiscated properties to religious 

groups;

The Training of Government 

Officials

• revising the Training Manual for the 

Work Concerning the Protestant Religion in the Northwest Mountainous 

Region to reflect fully international 

standards regarding the protection 

of religious freedom and removing language that urges authorities 

to control and manage existing 

religious practice through law, 

halt “enemy forces” from “abusing 

religion” in order to undermine the 

Vietnamese state, and “overcome 

the extraordinary...growth of Protestantism”; 

• issuing clear, public instructions for 

provincial officials regarding the 

registration process, consistent with 

the provisions of the Ordinance, 

including by restating the timetables 

for responding to applications; 

providing redress for denials; and 

ceasing unreasonable demands for 

information or other conditions 

placed on registration applications, 

such as demanding names of all 

members of religious communities, 

requesting management changes, 

requiring denominational leaders 

to convene conferences to undergo 

indoctrination classes, and requesting that denominational leaders become informants on other religious 

groups; 

• issuing a “National Handbook for 

Religious Work” to train the estimated 21,000 new government officials 

engaged in “religious work,” which 

should include an unambiguous 

statement about the need to respect 

international standards regarding 

religious freedom, guidelines for 

interpreting the Ordinance on Religion and Belief, detailed procedures 

on how to oversee the legal recognition process, a clear explanation 

of the duties of provincial officials 

under the law, and a description of 

the rights of religious communities 

under Vietnamese law and international human rights standards, 

including providing avenues to 

report inappropriate actions by local 

officials or police; 

• issuing a public statement clearly 

stating that the denial of educational, medical, housing, and other 

government services or economic 

assistance, including foreign aid, 

based on religious belief, affiliation, 

or ethnicity is contrary to Vietnamese law and that government officials found using such tactics will 

be prosecuted under the law;

Asylum and Refugee Issues

• allowing ethnic minorities in the 

Central Highlands or northwest 

provinces to seek asylum safely in 

Cambodia and continue to allow 

representatives of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and other appropriate international organizations unimpeded 

access to the Central Highlands 

in order to monitor repatriated 

Montagnards, consistent with the 

56
57

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on January 25, 

2005 between the UNHCR, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and provide 

unhindered access for diplomats, 

journalists, and non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) to members 

of all religious communities in 

Vietnam, particularly those in the 

Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces; and

• halting incursions into Laos and 

Cambodia by the Vietnamese military and police in pursuit of those 

seeking asylum because of abuses 

of and restrictions on their religious 

freedom. 

 Establish New Priorities 

for U.S. Assistance Programs

The U.S. government should assist the 

government of Vietnam in the development of protections for religious 

freedom in Vietnam, including by 

taking the following actions. 

• Fully implementing the Montagnard 

Development Program (MDP) created as part of the House and Senate 

Foreign Operations conference 

report of 2005 and continued in the 

2008 conference report to provide 

targeted humanitarian and development funds to ethnic minorities 

whose demands for land rights and 

religious freedom are closely connected. This program is consistent 

with Vietnam’s own stated goals 

of reducing poverty in the Central 

Highlands and northwest provinces and with the need for reform, 

transparency, and access to regions 

where many religious freedom 

abuses continue to occur. 

• Re-allocating some funds that formerly supported the STAR (Support 

for Trade Acceleration Program) 

to new projects in human rights 

training, civil society capacitybuilding, non-commercial rule of 

law programs in Vietnam, education 

programs for minors and young 

adults, and exchange programs 

between the Vietnamese National 

Assembly and the U.S. Congress. 

Funds should go to the creation of 

a pilot program that would be the 

counterpart in Asia of the Supporting Eastern European Democracy 

(SEED) program and could be called 

Promoting Equal Rights and the 

Rule of Law (PEARL). 

• Ensuring that rule of law programs 

include regular exchanges between 

international experts on religion 

and law and appropriate representatives from the Vietnamese government, academia, and religious 

communities to discuss the impact 

of Vietnam’s laws and decrees on 

religious freedom and other human 

rights, to train public security forces 

on these issues, and to discuss ways 

to incorporate international standards of human rights in Vietnamese laws and regulations.

• Working to improve the capacity 

and skills of Vietnamese civil society 

organizations, including medical, 

educational, development, relief, 

youth, and charitable organizations 

run by religious organizations.

• Offering some Fulbright Program 

grants to individuals and scholars 

whose work promotes understanding of religious freedom and related 

human rights.

• Encouraging the Vietnam Educational Foundation, which offers 

scholarships to Vietnamese high 

school-age students to attend 

school in the United States, to select 

youth from ethnic minority group 

areas (Montagnard and Hmong), 

from minority religious communities (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic, 

Protestant, Cham Islamic, and 

Khmer Buddhists), or former novice 

monks associated with the Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam and 

Khmer Buddhists.

• Working with international corporations seeking new investment in 

Vietnam to promote international 

human rights standards in Vietnam 

and find ways their corporate presence can help promote and protect 

religious freedom and related human rights.

• Expanding funding for additional 

Voice of America (VOA) and Radio 

Free Asia (RFA) programming for 

Vietnam and to overcome the jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should: 

• continue oversight, establish benchmarks, and measure progress of the 

U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogues, renewed in 2007, by holding 

appropriate hearings on a report 

the State Department is required to 

submit to Congress on the trajectory 

and outcomes of bilateral discussions on human rights and detail 

progress made on a series of issues 

specified by Congress (see Sec. 702 

of PL 107-228);

• appropriate additional funds for the 

State Department’s Human Rights 

and Democracy Fund for new 

technical assistance and religious 

freedom programming, funding that 

should be commensurate with new 

and ongoing programs for Vietnamese workers, women, and rule of law 

training; and

• engage Vietnamese leaders on 

needed legal revisions and protections of individuals related to the 

far-reaching national security provisions that are currently used to arrest and detain peaceful advocates 

for religious freedom and related 

human rights.

VIETNAM

2 
St. Basil’s Cathedral, Moscow
S 59

ince 2000, the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom has raised serious concerns 

about conditions for freedom of religion or belief 

in Turkmenistan and has recommended that the country 

be designated by the Secretary of State as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom 

and related human rights. Despite the Commission’s repeated recommendation, throughout some of the darkest 

years of repression in Turkmenistan, the U.S. government 

has never designated it as a CPC under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

Under the late President Saparmurat Niyazov, who 

died in December 2006, Turkmenistan was among the 

most repressive and isolated states in the world. Virtually 

no independent public activity was allowed and severe 

government restrictions meant that most religious activity was under strict and often arbitrary state control. The 

2003 law on religion further codified the country’s highly 

repressive policies, in effect banning most religious activity, despite legal amendments promulgated in 2004 to relax 

registration requirements. Registration for many religious 

groups remained difficult, and any activities by unregistered groups were deemed “illegal.” Moreover, the law set 

severe penalties for those found guilty of participating in 

so-called “illegal” religious activity. 

In addition, Turkmenistan’s public life was dominated by President Niyazov’s quasi-religious personality cult, 

including, most notoriously, the president’s two-volume 

work of “spiritual thoughts” known as the Ruhnama. The 

Ruhnama was employed by the government to play a preeminent role at various levels of the country’s educational 

system, displacing some—and in some areas, most—

academic subjects. What is more, the government under 

President Niyazov required that the Ruhnama be given 

equal prominence to the Koran and the Bible in mosques 

and churches. 

President Niyazov was succeeded by Gurbanguly 

Berdimuhamedov, who moved to implement educational 

reforms and also promised reforms in a variety of other 

sectors. Despite the flaws accompanying his orchestrated 

presidential election, and while no changes have been 

made to the country’s oppressive laws, he nonetheless 

has initiated some limited positive steps relevant to religious freedom and other human rights. These include 

the release in August 2007 of 11 political prisoners, some 

decline in President Niyazov’s oppressive personality cult, 

the formation of two new official commissions relevant 

to human rights concerns, and an expressed willingness 

to consider reform of the country’s religion law. Despite 

these achievements, however, the system of oppressive 

laws and practices that have led to severe violations of 

human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, 

remain in place. In addition, the overall repressive atmosphere that characterized public life in Turkmenistan 

under President Niyazov remains largely unchanged. As 

Human Rights Watch noted in February 2008, “although 

the Turkmen government of President Berdimuhamedov 

has begun to reverse some of the most ruinous social policies and the cult of personality that characterized Niazov’s 

rule, it remains one of the most repressive and authoritarian in the world.”

TURKMENISTAN

The Ruhnama was employed by the 

government to play a preeminent role at 

various levels of the country’s educational 

system, displacing some—and in some 

areas, most—academic subjects. What 

is more, the government under President 

Niyazov required that the Ruhnama be 

given equal prominence to the Koran and 

the Bible in mosques and churches.
60

In order to examine religious freedom and related 

human rights concerns in Turkmenistan and in light of 

the new government’s statements and actions, the Commission traveled to Turkmenistan in August 2007. The 

Commission delegation visited Turkmenistan in part to 

ascertain the measures taken to address religious freedom 

problems, including whether the new Turkmen government will in fact adopt reforms leading to major improvements in protections for human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief, and whether further democratizing 

reforms will be undertaken in the near future. The late 

President Niyazov had severely isolated Turkmenistan, 

limiting both foreign visitors to the country and the number of Turkmen citizens allowed to travel abroad. The 

new government, in contrast, has re-opened the country 

to many official visitors from other countries, including 

high-ranking representatives from the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

responsible for human rights. 

The Commission delegation met with President 

Berdimuhamedov and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 

Justice, Education, Culture, and Internal Affairs, as well as 

representatives of the Council on Religious Affairs (CRA), 

the Institute on Democracy and Human Rights, and the 

head of the parliamentary human rights committee. The 

delegation also held meetings with the representatives of 

a variety of religious communities and several civil society 

organizations, and took part in a public meeting with the 

country’s former chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who 

had been released from prison in August, shortly before 

the Commission visit. In addition, the delegation met 

with OSCE representatives, the Papal Nuncio, and ambassadors from several western countries. 

The Commission raised a number of key concerns 

with Turkmen government officials. Among these issues 

were the 2003 law on religion, particularly those articles 

that violate international norms pertaining to freedom of 

religion or belief; the state-imposed ideology, particularly 

that of the personality cult, that infringes upon or severely 

diminishes the practice of freedom of religion or belief 

and related freedoms of association, movement, expression, and the press; intrusive and onerous registration 

procedures that hinder the registration of peaceful religious communities; administrative fines on and imprisonment of leaders or members of peaceful unregistered religious communities whose activities are deemed “illegal”; 

obstacles to the purchase or rental of land or buildings 

to be used as houses of worship or for meeting purposes; 

onerous impediments to the use of private homes and 

public halls in residential areas for worship services; and a 

legal ban on the importation and printing of religious and 

other material. 

Findings

It is still too early to determine whether any of the government’s statements or actions will have a substantial impact on the legal structure or actual enjoyment of freedom 

of religion or belief in Turkmenistan. However, in light of 

persistent, serious problems, the Commission concludes 

that its recommendation that Turkmenistan be designated 

a CPC should not be rescinded at the present time. The 

Commission acknowledges the positive steps undertaken 

by the government of President Berdimuhamedov, and 

encourages the new government to implement reforms to 

bring Turkmenistan’s laws, policies, and practices into accordance with international human rights norms. At the 

very least, these steps should include reform of the religion law and the removal of any state-imposed ideology 

from the religious practice of Turkmenistan’s citizens.

General Conditions for Freedom of Religion or 

Belief

• Most Turkmen government officials, including President 

Berdimuhamedov, were willing to discuss the various 

issues raised by the Commission, including the possibility of amending laws relevant to freedom of religion 

or belief. In addition, President Berdimuhamedov has 

taken some steps to diminish the oppressive personality cult of the former president, and has formed two new 

Commission Chair Cromartie with former Chief Mufti Nasrullah ibn 

Ibadullah.
61

TURKMENISTAN

official commissions relevant to human rights concerns 

(discussed below). 

• The 11 political prisoners released by President Berdimuhamedov following the recommendation of a new official 

commission to examine citizens’ petitions on the work of 

law enforcement bodies, included the country’s former 

chief mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who had been 

sentenced in a secret trial on unsubstantiated charges of 

involvement in an alleged coup attempt. The Commission delegation took part in a meeting with Ibadullah, 

whose imprisonment the Commission had long protested. With the exception of Ibadullah, it remains unclear 

whether other released prisoners have had their full civil 

and political rights restored. 

• President Berdimuhamedov and other officials also told 

the Commission that the Turkmen government is considering the adoption of certain legal reforms relevant 

to human rights, including religious freedom. In August 

2007, during the Commission’s visit to Turkmenistan, 

President Berdimuhamedov announced the formation 

of a new commission to examine how Turkmenistan’s 

legislation conforms to international human rights commitments and by early 2008, the Turkmen government 

reportedly had initiated this process. 

• Significant religious freedom problems and official harassment continue and, at least in some regions, certain 

religious freedom conditions may be deteriorating: 

• Religious practice continues to be fully controlled by 

the state, including severe limitations on religious 

instruction even for the two largest religious communities, Sunni Muslims and Orthodox Christians. 

• The repressive 2003 religion law remains in force, giving rise to, among other problems, serious difficulties 

for the legal functioning of minority religious groups. 

• Despite an apparent decreased emphasis on the forcible state promotion of former President Niyazov’s 

spiritual writings, or Ruhnama, the book continues to 

be present in mosques, all of which are tightly controlled by the state. 

• Police raids on and other forms of harassment of 

registered and unregistered religious groups increased, 

particularly on the local level, during the first six 

months of 2007, though they have declined somewhat 

since then. 

• The absence of a law providing genuine alternatives to 

military service has resulted in prison sentences for the 

members of certain minority religious communities. 

• The government prevents unregistered churches from 

buying or renting property, and there is official pressure on homeowners to prevent unsanctioned meetings for worship. 

 

Legal Reforms and Registration

• During the Commission’s visit, Turkmen government officials referred to a 2004 presidential decree lowering the 

requirement for the number of persons belonging to a religious community to qualify for its legal registration from 

500 persons to five. The government told the Commission that there are only two religious communities with 

pending registration requests; since the Commission 

visit to Turkmenistan, two other religious groups were 

registered. With regard to other ongoing problems for 

members of registered religious minority communities, 

Turkmenistan officials told the Commission delegation 

that they were prepared to hold a second conference with 

members of registered religious communities to discuss 

outstanding issues. 

The Commission acknowledges 

the positive steps undertaken by the 

government of President Berdimuhamedov, 

and encourages the new government to 

implement reforms to bring Turkmenistan’s 

laws, policies, and practices into 

accordance with international human 

rights norms. At the very least, these 

steps should include reform of the religion 

law and the removal of any state-imposed 

ideology from the religious practice 

of Turkmenistan’s citizens.
62

• Nevertheless, the 2003 religion law remains highly problematic and some of its provisions continue to violate 

international standards with regard to freedom of religion or belief, including the requirement that religious 

groups must be registered in order for their activities to 

be legal; the fact that the government must be informed 

of all financial support received from abroad; the strict 

government control of, and limitations on, people’s ability to gather for worship; the ban on the public wearing of 

religious garb except by religious leaders; and the severe 

restrictions on religious education.

• There continue to be significant problems in gaining legal 

registration in Turkmenistan. Local and regional governments sometimes do not recognize a religious group or 

organization even if the group is registered at the national 

level. Because of the intrusive requirements and the 

ongoing harassment of registered communities, several 

religious groups are not currently seeking registration, 

thereby increasing the likelihood of official interference 

in the ability of those groups to function. 

• Obtaining worship space is difficult for most, if not all, 

communities. For unregistered groups it is virtually 

impossible, as it is illegal for them to rent or buy worship 

space. Worship in private homes, even for members of 

registered groups, is strictly limited to nuclear families; 

security officials routinely break up religious meetings in 

private homes and search homes without warrants. 

Other Religious Freedom Concerns

• Various minority religious communities, both registered 

and unregistered, continue to face official harassment, 

particularly outside the capital city of Ashgabat. These 

problems include police raids, detentions, and threats 

by police and other security services, as well as demands 

for payment of onerous fines, some of which were levied 

by courts years ago. Religious literature is also routinely 

confiscated.

• The printing and import of religious literature continues 

to be rigorously controlled and limited by the government, and customs agents still confiscate religious materials. Even the import of literature that is technically legal 

is reportedly extremely difficult in practice. Representatives of almost all registered religious minority communities reported a severe shortage of religious literature.

• Turkmenistan’s legal code lacks a genuine civilian alternative to compulsory military service. Article 219, Part 

1 of the Criminal Code punishes refusal to serve in the 

armed forces with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. By early 2008, six members of the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses had been sentenced to jail under this article, 

though all ultimately were given suspended sentences. 

• There continue to be restrictions on freedom of movement on account of religion. For example, the Turkmen 

authorities continue to place severe limits on the number 

of Muslims permitted to perform the hajj. Moreover, 

despite official protestations to the contrary, the Turkmen government still appears to have a secret “black 

list” of individuals who are denied permission to leave 

the country, although one such case, involving family 

reunification of an unregistered Baptist from the city of 

Dashoguz (often spelled Tashauz) and a U.S. citizen, was 

resolved in July 2007. Representatives of various religious 

minority communities told the Commission delegation 

that they are not allowed to travel overseas, including for 

religious education not permitted inside the country, and 

their co-religionists are also often denied permission to 

enter Turkmenistan. 

Current Status of the Personality Cult and the 

Ruhnama

• There are some, though contradictory, indications that 

the new government has decreased official emphasis on 

President Niyazov’s all-pervasive personality cult and 

the Ruhnama. For example, President Berdimuhamedov has made attempts to curtail the imposition of the 

sworn oath of loyalty to President Niyazov. Although the 

Ruhnama continues to be part of the school curriculum, 

government officials told the Commission that they have 

significantly decreased the time devoted to its study. Reportedly, new textbooks have been printed with greater 

focus on conventional subjects, although other reports 

indicate that not enough time has passed to implement 

significant changes to the actual texts and that in fact, 

only the presidential photographs have been updated. 

• Nevertheless, the Turkmen government is still promoting the Ruhnama in religious affairs and as a mandatory aspect feature of public education. The Ruhnama

remains a required subject of school exams, and in 

September 2007, the government sponsored an international conference devoted to the text. Moreover, also in 
63

September, President Berdimuhamedov told a U.S. audience at Columbia University that “I want to emphasize 

this—the book [Ruhnama] will be mandatory teaching in 

all educational institutions, from kindergarten through 

college. Why? Because it contains a lot of wisdom related 

to our heritage.” 

• The Ruhnama is still widely found in mosques; in the 

Niyazov Memorial Mosque, the country’s largest mosque 

located in the village of Gipchak just outside Ashgabat, 

virtually all of the inscriptions carved on the walls are 

from the Ruhnama. 

General Conditions for Freedom of Religion 

or Belief

Turkmenistan under President Niyazov

President Niyazov’s pervasive authoritarian rule and escalating personality cult effectively prevented any opposition or independent religious activity within the country. 

While President Niyazov’s government had made small 

adjustments to the laws that closely regulate religious 

practice, these changes had over the years done little to 

alter in practice the country’s generally repressive policies.

A 2003 law on religion further codified the Turkmen 

government’s highly repressive policies, effectively banning most religious activity and setting criminal penalties 

for those found guilty of participating in “illegal” religious 

activity. The law also required religious groups to coordinate with the Turkmen government any contacts with coreligionists abroad. In response to international pressure, 

President Niyazov issued a decree in March 2004 stating 

that religious communities may register “in the prescribed 

manner,” and reduced the registration requirement from 

500 members to five. In May 2004, President Niyazov 

issued several decrees decriminalizing unregistered religious activities and easing other requirements for registration, resulting in the registration of nine small groups, in 

addition to the majority Sunni Muslims and the Russian 

Orthodox Church. These amendments, however, did not 

substantially change the overall highly repressive environment in Turkmenistan; in fact, some reports indicate that 

the new, ostensibly eased registration requirements were 

used as a method of more effective state control over religious communities, not least because they afforded officials the legal right to know what occurs at every meeting 

of a religious group. In any case, religious groups that did 

not meet the often arbitrary registration rules still faced 

administrative penalties, including imprisonment and 

large fines due to their unregistered status.

President Niyazov’s personality cult, bolstered by the 

forceful official promotion of the Ruhnama, was comparable to a state-imposed religion. Students were required 

to study the Ruhnama extensively at all public schools 

and institutes of higher learning, and Niyazov insisted 

that the Ruhnama supersede other religious and historical 

texts. Reports indicate that mullahs in Turkmenistan were 

told to stop reading the Koran in mosques and restrict 

themselves to the Ruhnama, which also was required in 

mosques and churches alongside the Koran and the Bible.

Changes under the New President

After his highly orchestrated electoral win in February 

2007, President Berdimuhamedov moved to implement 

educational reforms and also promised reforms in the 

agricultural, health, and other social sectors. He has also 

expanded Internet access and promised to allow more 

international contacts; indeed, his first official action 

was to order the opening of 15 Internet cafes in various 

cities, although access fees are high, politically sensitive 

sites are blocked, and copies of the Ruhnama are reportedly displayed. In the president’s first decree, aimed at 

the educational system that President Niyazov had done 

much to destroy, secondary schooling was increased from 

nine to 10 years and higher education from two to five 

years; the new president also promised to facilitate access for Turkmen citizens to universities and institutes in 

other countries. In March 2007, the Turkmen president 

signed an educational reform decree that recognized 

foreign diplomas and initiated reform of the high school 

curriculum. Reportedly, 23,000 teachers have returned 

to work at increased wages, and the Commission delegation was informed that the country’s new leader has told 

U.S. diplomats that he wants more international exchange 

programs. Police and street controls on travel inside Turkmenistan have also been eased. 

The new leadership has also begun to distance itself 

from President Niyazov’s personality cult. For example, 

President Berdimuhamedov has made some initial attempts to alter the imposition of the sworn oath of loyalty 

to President Niyazov, calling for assigning a specific time 

and place when the oath should be made and suggesting that it should be restricted to special occasions. In 

March 2007, Berdimuhamedov proposed a new law on 

TURKMENISTAN
64

loyalty oath procedures and regulations, enabling people 

to swear an oath on a book other than the Ruhnama, and 

signed a decree ordering that President Niyazov’s name 

be replaced by the words “Turkmen president” on the 

presidential banner. In January 2008, Berdimuhamedov 

issued an order that the national holiday on February 19, 

Niyazov’s birthday, which previously had been celebrated 

in conjunction with Flag Day, would henceforth mark only 

Flag Day. On the other hand, while new primary, secondary, and university textbooks were printed in the past year, 

reports indicate that the only perceived change was in the 

pictures: the new president’s photographs replaced those 

of President Niyazov.

President Berdimuhamedov acknowledged to the 

Commission that his country “may have some shortcomings on religion and other issues” but that he hoped that 

the Commission delegation could help to improve the 

situation. Shirin Akhmedova, director of the Presidential 

Institute on Democracy and Human Rights, told the Commission that “the government of Turkmenistan is looking 

forward to working more closely with the international 

community.” 

In August 2007, on the last day of the Commission’s 

visit to Turkmenistan, President Berdimuhamedov announced the formation of a new commission to examine 

how Turkmenistan’s laws conform to its international 

human rights commitments, thus indicating a possible 

willingness to consider reform of the country’s repressive laws on human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief. The commission held its inaugural session in 

September, when it formally adopted a new draft national 

program on human rights and approved a human rights 

project in conjunction with the European Union and with 

UN refugee and development agencies. The commission 

also reportedly reviewed existing Turkmen human rightsrelated laws in an effort to ensure greater conformity with 

international human-rights standards and norms. 

The Release of the Former Chief Mufti

In February 2007, President Berdimuhamedov ordered 

the establishment of a government commission, led by 

the Chairman of the Supreme Court, to examine citizens’ 

petitions on the work of law enforcement bodies, though 

neither its membership nor procedures were specified. 

By establishing this commission, the new president continued a previous tradition of allowing citizens, however 

theoretically, to petition the president. With the new 

commission, however, the president indicated that government agencies, rather than the office of the president, 

should address the petitions. Reportedly, this governmental commission has received thousands of petitions 

from Turkmen citizens, including from the family of the 

former chief mufti, on such issues as police abuse, allegations of bribery, and unjustified arrests and prosecutions. 

Some observers have suggested, however, that the 

actual role of the commission is to test the political loyalty 

and effectiveness of the various government agencies to 

which citizens’ petitions are sent. For example, in July 

Commissioners at a celebratory (sadaka) lunch to mark the release of former Chief Mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah from prison.
65

TURKMENISTAN

2007, the president fired and later arrested the Chairman 

of the Supreme Court, allegedly in part due to his failure 

to ensure that cases originating from the commission had 

been properly reviewed. In October, the president dismissed the Minister of Internal Affairs, reportedly because 

of an alleged doubling of cases involving ministry corruption and abuse under review by the commission. By late 

2007, the State Department reported, the commission had 

examined only three cases that led to further review by the 

Supreme Court and reductions in sentences. 

In August 2007, the president acted on the new commission’s significant first decision, which was to pardon 

and release from prison 11 prisoners of conscience, 

including the country’s former chief mufti, Nasrullah 

ibn Ibadullah, who had been serving a 22-year prison 

term handed down during a closed trial in 2004. Ibadullah, who opposed President Niyazov’s decree that the 

Ruhnama be displayed next to the Koran in the country’s mosques, was officially charged with treason for an 

alleged role in a 2002 coup attempt against President 

Niyazov. However, the presidential pardon ordering the 

release of the 11 prisoners stated that the convicts had 

expressed “sincere repentance...for the acts committed by 

them,” implying that the 11 former prisoners had committed actual crimes, although neither their supposed crimes 

nor the nature of their trials had been specified. 

Ibadullah was allowed to resume work with the official Council of Religious Affairs, no longer as a deputy 

chairman but as a senior adviser. Other former political 

prisoners, however, including those imprisoned for alleged religious offenses, as well as three Jehovah’s Witnesses who were given suspended sentences in July 2007 

for their refusal to serve in the military, were not eligible 

for employment. Under Turkmenistan’s laws, such cases 

require the restoration of a former prisoner’s civil and political rights, or “rehabilitation,” and not just pardon by the 

government. 

Legal Structures, Registration, and the 

Fundamentals of Religious Practice 

Religious affairs are technically governed by the Council 

on Religious Affairs (CRA), whose members are appointed 

by the government and report to the president. Membership includes representatives of the Sunni Muslim 

community and the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as 

government officials, but includes no representatives of 

other minority religious groups. Although the CRA is supposed to act as an intermediary between the government 

bureaucracy and registered religious organizations, it acts 

essentially as an arm of the state. The CRA controls the 

hiring, promotion, and firing of Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, who are required to report regularly 

to the CRA. It also examines and controls all religious 

publications and activities. 

Since Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991, 

religious groups have been required to register with the 

government in order to engage in any religious activities. 

The 1997 version of the country’s religion law effectively 

banned all religious groups except the state-controlled 

Sunni Muslim Board and the Russian Orthodox Church, 

though religious instruction even for these two communities remained severely limited. Despite decrees issued in 

2004 easing registration requirements, obtaining registration continued—and continues—to be a serious problem 

for many religious groups, a problem compounded by the 

penalties levied on unregistered groups that are accused 

of engaging in “illegal” religious activities. In May 2004, 

President Niyazov issued several decrees decriminalizing 

unregistered religious activities. However, representatives 

of various minority religious communities told the Commission that they faced continuing official harassment, 

particularly outside the capital Ashgabat, regardless of 

whether they are registered or unregistered. These problems included police raids and threats by police and other 

security services, as well as demands for payment of onerous fines, some of which were levied by courts years ago 

(see below).

The new version of the religion law, promulgated in 

2003, remains highly problematic and some of its provisions continue to violate international standards with 

regard to freedom of religion or belief. These problems 

include: intrusive registration criteria; the requirement 

that the government be informed of all financial support received from abroad; a ban on worship in private 

homes for unregistered groups and the public wearing 

of religious garb except by religious leaders; and severe 

and discriminatory restrictions on religious education. 

The Turkmen government has also interfered in internal 

leadership issues and organizational arrangements of religious communities. Under President Niyazov, the Turkmen government had pressured the local Church to take 

Turkmenistan’s parishes outside of the jurisdiction of the 
66

Central Asian diocese in Uzbekistan and put them under 

the Patriarch of Moscow, which in July 2005 rejected this 

proposal, although the proposal was accepted two years 

later. President Berdimuhamedov told the Commission 

in August 2007 that he believed that the Russian Orthodox 

Church (ROC) in Turkmenistan should be under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. In October 2007, the 

ROC Holy Synod in Moscow placed Turkmenistan’s ROC 

parishes under the Moscow Patriarchate’s jurisdiction, removing it from the Central Asian diocese in Tashkent. According to the news agency Forum 18, the official reason 

for this decision was “to ease pastoral oversight” over the 

12 isolated parishes and the ROC convent in Ashgabat.

President Berdimuhamedov’s establishment of a new 

commission to examine how Turkmenistan’s legislation 

conforms to international human rights commitments 

may be a sign that legal changes to improve religious 

freedom and other human rights protections are being 

considered. It remains, however, too early to determine 

whether this commission will result in any substantive 

changes in Turkmenistan. During the Commission’s meeting with Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov, he 

indicated his hope that “cooperation could emerge from 

collaboration in other areas...to work together to improve 

existing legislation” in connection with U.S. assistance on 

exchange and training programs. 

In February 2008, the news agency Forum 18 reported that Shirin Akhmedova, the director of the Presidential 

Institute on Democracy and Human Rights, pledged that 

the process of amending the religion law would be “transparent” and would involve “international experts.” However, she did not provide a time table for the bill or clarify 

what sections of the law might be amended. Akhmedova 

also noted that Turkmen citizens could also present their 

suggestions for legal amendments to the religion law. Although the religious freedom experts at the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have not 

yet been invited to take part in this process, after five years 

of requests the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief finally received an official invitation to visit 

Turkmenistan in 2008. 

Registration 

For many years, as a result of the 1997 law on religion, 

only two religious communities were legally registered in 

Turkmenistan: Sunni Muslims and the Russian Orthodox 

Church. That law made it all but impossible for other 

religious groups to register and thus function legally. In 

March 2004, in response to international pressure, President Niyazov issued a decree stating that religious communities may register “in the prescribed manner,” reduced 

the registration requirement from 500 members to five, 

and eased other requirements for registration. The result 

was the registration of nine small groups, in addition to 

the Sunni Muslims and the Russian Orthodox Church. 

Since the 2004 decree, however, registration has been 

used as a method of more effective state control over religious communities, as it affords officials the legal right to 

know what occurs at every meeting of a religious group. 

Participants in religious meetings who refuse to provide 

details about their gatherings risk having their communities charged with violating registration requirements. 

Moreover, religious groups that do not meet the often arbitrary registration rules still face administrative penalties 

that may include imprisonment and/or large fines due to 

their unregistered status. 

In spite of the difficulties, other religious groups, 

including various religious minority communities have 

gained registration since the 2004 decree, including 

groups of Adventists, Baptists, Baha’is, and Hare Krishnas. 

Turkmenistan’s small community of Shi’a Muslims, most 

of whom are members of ethnic minorities, remains unregistered, but reportedly many of its congregations are 

allowed to function. The country’s small Roman Catholic 

community also remains unregistered, due to the legal reDespite decrees issued in 2004 easing 

registration requirements, obtaining 

registration continued—and continues—

to be a serious problem for many religious 

groups, a problem compounded by the 

penalties levied on unregistered groups 

that are accused of engaging in 

“illegal”religious activities.
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TURKMENISTAN

quirement that a religious community be headed by a citizen of Turkmenistan. The Catholics in Ashgabat, however, 

are permitted to meet for worship services in the chapel of 

the Vatican Nunciature. Turkmenistan’s Jewish community, estimated by the State Department to number 1,000, 

are mostly ethnic Russians who came to Turkmenistan 

after World War II. Although the Jewish community is 

allowed to meet for religious observances, it has decided 

not to seek registration.

Akhmedova told the Commission that there were 120 

religious organizations currently registered in Turkmenistan. Other government officials claimed that many steps 

had been taken to ease registration, referring to the 2004 

presidential decree that lowered the numerical threshold 

to qualify for registration as a religious group. Foreign 

Minister Meredov said that some of these steps were in response to concerns raised by the U.S. government. Meredov also claimed that at present, all organizations wanting 

to register had done so. He denied that there were obstacles to gaining registration and claimed that those who 

wish to register need only apply. Turkmenistan’s Ministry 

of Justice is currently reviewing four such applications, 

Meredov said, though some had been returned to applicants to “improve compliance with Turkmen law.” After 

the Commission visit, two small minority Protestant communities outside Ashgabat were registered, one in the city 

of Turkmenabat and another in the city of Turkmenbashi. 

Akhmedova explained to the delegation how the 

registration process should work. The CRA advises the 

government on registration, while the Justice Ministry 

manages the actual registration process. All applications 

are reviewed by an intergovernmental commission that 

includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice 

and Internal Affairs, as well as the Security Service. The 

review process typically takes one month, but can take up 

to three months. Groups denied registration will, Akhmedova claimed, receive a written notice and explanation for 

the decision. If the flaws in the application are corrected, 

the applicants may re-apply. 

As for other issues affecting registered religious minority communities, Turkmen government officials told 

the Commission that they were willing to hold a follow-up 

to the October 2005 roundtable discussion between the 

government and members of various religious communities to address other problems. 

Continuing Registration Problems

According to the representatives of a number of minority 

religious groups, there continue to be significant problems 

in obtaining registration in Turkmenistan. According to 

the State Department, some groups reported confusion 

over registration requirements because of conflicting 

statements by government officials from different ministries. The Commission was told that despite a surge in 

the registration of religious groups in 2004, that process 

has slowed. In addition, local and regional governments 

sometimes do not recognize a religious group or organization even if it is registered at the national level. Moreover, 

Minarets of the Niyazov Memorial Mosque, inscribed with 

Ruhnama citations.
68

it is reportedly more difficult for ethnic Turkmens or Uzbeks than for Russians to register as members of a Christian denomination; Turkmen officials did not respond to 

the Commission delegation’s requests for information 

about these reports.

In some instances, these groups said, the CRA may 

not find problems with a registration application, but the 

Justice Ministry may oppose that application on what 

were reported as questionable grounds. It was also reported that the Justice Ministry has taken upon itself to 

advise several smaller unregistered groups to combine 

with other, currently registered communities, without 

giving any consideration to possible doctrinal differences 

or some groups’ need for organizational autonomy. One 

group was told by the CRA that all prior decisions denying their registration applications “were correct,” without 

any further information. One church leader said that his 

group has been trying to register for two years, but that the 

government would not acknowledge the group’s efforts. 

The leader of another registered Protestant church 

described the difficult branch registration procedure his 

group experienced. The church was required to meet 

seven registration criteria, and despite providing that 

information and being assured that nothing further was 

needed, the government still had not given registration 

approval. In many cases, he noted, the government will 

not even acknowledge that religious communities have 

branches in other cities. The Hare Krishna Society was informed by the government in the past year that it is authorized to open a branch; however, the government had told 

members of that community previously that it would begin to register other branches, and thus far there had been 

no progress in that regard. The Baha’is also submitted the 

necessary documents, but had been told by the government that there is “no legislation on branch registration.” 

Yet when the Commission raised the issue of registration, particularly that of local branches, during a meeting 

at the Justice Ministry, Serdar Valiyev, Director of the Registration Department, said that a registered organization 

automatically receives legal status when it is entered in 

the main national register. Branch organizations are not 

subject to these requirements, as they are regulated by 

the main organization. To register a branch, he claimed, 

the main organization need only present information 

regarding the branch to the Ministry of Justice. However, 

this was clearly not the experience that various religious 

groups in Turkmenistan described to the Commission 

delegation.

People from historically Muslim ethnic groups who 

want to register Christian churches are more often denied 

registration than communities comprised largely of individuals of Slavic origin. The Commission was informed 

that in some cases, local and national government officials have told such church members that they “cannot 

be Christians because they are ethnic Turkmen.” Because 

officials refuse to issue registration denials in writing, the 

groups in question have not been able to identify the official or officials responsible for these refusals. In one case, 

the members of a church were told repeatedly that their 

church would never be registered because they are Turkmen and “Turkmen are supposed to be Muslim.” Justice 

Ministry officials also suggested that they remove certain 

articles from the church charter documents in order to 

gain registration. In this case, in addition to trying to 

change the substance of the church’s charter, officials also 

reportedly used spurious clerical errors as the basis for 

denying the registration application. 

Finally, the Commission was told that the Turkmen 

government may try to convince prospective congregants 

that they should not join minority religious communities. Often officials claim that religious minority groups 

are “cults.” The Turkmen government has also told several 

churches that it is not their role to assist the poor, drug 

addicts, and others. 

Practical Effects of Registration

The Turkmen government reportedly actively solicited 

new religious groups to register in the period 2004 – 2005, 

and several groups were easily and rapidly registered at 

that time. Once those religious communities were registered, however, state officials began to subject the groups’ 

charters to strict review. Thus, some representatives of 

Turkmenistan’s religious minority community believe that 

the Turkmen government undertook registration mainly 

due to pressure from the United States and OSCE and 

that the Turkmen government still did not truly recognize 

them. Indeed, despite their registered status, a member 

of a religious minority group told the Commission that in 

many instances, the group still needed permission from 

the city of Ashgabat’s CRA in order to undertake routine 

activities, such as seeking to increase its membership.

The situation for religious minorities is particularly 

difficult outside the capital, where some groups continue 

to face onerous administrative documentation burdens. 
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TURKMENISTAN

According to the leader of a registered religious minority 

community, “the fact that we are registered did not help 

in any way...there is no freedom, just pressure from the 

government. And there is certainly no freedom outside 

Ashgabat.” Some registered groups told the Commission 

delegation that they believed that registration has become 

a method to expose their members to possible official 

discrimination or harassment and actually worsened the 

situation. On the other hand, several leaders of registered 

religious minority communities told the delegation that in 

Ashgabat, they are free to meet for worship. 

Members of various registered religious minority 

communities told the Commission what Turkmen officials had claimed would be the benefits of registration. 

For example, the Adventist church was informed that the 

government would not demolish its churches (one had 

been demolished by the authorities in 1999—see below) 

and the community would have access to worship space. 

The government kept its promise to the Hare Krishnas that 

once they were registered there would be no further arrests of their members. On the other hand, the CRA also 

promised that members of registered communities could 

meet for worship in private homes, but Turkmenistan’s 

religion law allows home worship only for members of 

nuclear families. Religious adherents who ignore these 

legal prohibitions on home worship may be subject to 

various penalties, ranging from official warnings to job 

loss, police raids, and/or detention. 

Despite their illegal status under Turkmen law, several religious minority communities have decided that registration either violates their freedom of conscience or does 

not entail enough benefits to justify the intrusive government requirements and procedures. One leader of an 

unregistered community told the Commission delegation 

that Turkmenistan’s religion law is “only paper and has no 

operative meaning” and that “even registered churches 

enjoy only limited religious freedom.” Another unregistered religious leader said that he had asked state officials 

about the practical benefits of registration and they had 

refused to answer him. Faced with this lack of information, he had decided against applying for registration. 

There are, however, numerous negative consequences for those groups that decide to forego registration. For 

example, the leader of one unregistered group told the 

Commission that his group’s illegal status “keeps potential 

congregants away.” He also observed that lack of registration limits his group’s ability to practice its religion fully, 

as well as to organize charitable assistance programs. 

Worship Space

In Turkmenistan, obtaining worship space is difficult for 

most religious communities. For unregistered groups, it 

is virtually impossible, as it is illegal for them to rent or 

buy worship space. Worship in private homes is limited 

to members of nuclear families who belong to registered 

religious communities, although Turkmen officials have 

told the State Department that worship in private homes 

is allowed as long as neighbors do not object. Nevertheless, security police reportedly break up religious meetings in private homes and search homes without warrants. 

The leader of one registered Christian community told the 

Commission that after his group was registered, he could 

no longer invite friends and family to worship, even in his 

own apartment, as his group was told by the government 

that private worship must be limited to husband and wife 

and children and could not include adult parents and 

siblings. 

The government has forced some groups to write letters stating that they will not gather for worship until they 

are registered. Indeed, Turkmen officials have stated that 

the eased registration requirements that Niyazov promulgated in 2004 do not mean that religious adherents will 

no longer be required to request official permission before holding worship services. One leader of a registered 

Pentecostal church told the Commission that his home in 

Ashgabat had been confiscated by the government several 

years ago because he had allowed unsanctioned worship 

services to be held there. Despite years of efforts, the 

church leader has been unsuccessful in efforts to have the 

building—his personal property—returned to him. Nevertheless, five registered minority religious communities 

have managed to establish public places of worship, three 

of which were rented and two of which were in the private 

homes of community members.

President Niyazov had refused to allow the Russian 

Orthodox community to build a new cathedral in the 

capital of Ashgabat, though he had allocated land for 

that purpose 10 years ago. According to Forum 18, final 

construction work on the community-funded convent 

next to St. Nicholas’ Church in Ashgabat was halted in late 

2005, after President Niyazov reportedly warned Orthodox 

clergy privately that if construction went ahead he would 

order demolition of all the country’s Orthodox churches. 

The Commission was told that construction of the Russian 
70

Orthodox cathedral was now proceeding, albeit slowly, 

due to the need to design the building to withstand earthquakes. President Berdimuhamedov told the Commission 

that the Turkmen government recently had granted land 

to build a new church in Ashgabat.

Under President Niyazov, the Turkmen government 

had a history of closing, confiscating, or destroying houses 

of worship. Appropriate compensation has never been 

made to the various religious communities affected by this 

practice, nor is there any complaint process or new law 

providing compensation. For example, in 2000, two unregistered mosques were bulldozed by the authorities and 

in 2003 the Abu Bekir mosque in Ashgabat was closed. In 

March 2004, President Niyazov proclaimed that no new 

mosques should be built anywhere in the country; seven 

mosques are reported to have been destroyed in that year. 

In addition, according to the State Department, the government refuses to allow the final construction of three 

Shi’a mosques, two near Ashgabat and one in Turkmenbashi. In July 2005, a Sunni “family” mosque in Turkmenbashi was demolished, and in 2006, two Shi’a mosques 

were razed. 

In 1999, two Hare Krishna shrines near the city of 

Mary were torn down by Turkmen authorities; the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Ashgabat was bulldozed 

that same year. Baptist and Pentecostal churches were 

confiscated in 2001. In 2005, the historic Armenian Apostolic Church in the city of Turkmenbashi was partially 

demolished by local officials and sealed off; that community has neither received compensation for the partial destruction nor has the church been returned to it. A court 

ruling in 2006 denied compensation to the Seventh Day 

Adventist community for the government’s destruction of 

its church.

While under the new government, there have been 

no reports of the destruction of any houses of worship by 

the Turkmen authorities, no measures have been taken to 

redress the claims of those religious and other communities whose property was destroyed under the Niyazov government. Some new construction is underway, however. 

In March 2007, the parliament voted funds to finish construction of a mosque in the city of Mary and in October, 

and the governor of the Dashoguz region announced a 

tender for construction of a large new mosque. 

Religious Literature

The publication of religious literature inside Turkmenistan 

is banned by decree, resulting in a severe shortage of such 

literature, which also is rarely available for purchase. An 

additional difficulty is the government’s legal requirement 

that the CRA must approve the content of all religious 

literature and the fact that there are no representatives of 

religious minorities on the CRA.

By law, only registered religious communities are 

permitted to import religious literature, on a limited basis, 

depending on the number of people in a given house of 

worship. The local CRA frequently confiscates literature 

and even photocopies it. In some cases, the CRA allegedly 

has required that adherents make a written apology for 

the possession or import of such material. According to 

the members of the religious minority communities with 

whom the Commission met, despite limited legal provisions to the contrary, they are denied official permission 

to import religious literature. In any case, they said, the 

experts at the CRA who are required by law to examine 

such literature are, at best, informed only about Islam 

and Russian Orthodoxy. Moreover, religious literature is 

often confiscated before it can be submitted for official 

examination. On a positive note, however, one leader of 

a registered religious community told the Commission of 

some improvements under President Berdimuhamedov; 

for example, one may now receive some religious material, though it cannot be shared with others. In addition, 

the State Department reported that, unlike in previous 

years, ethnic Turkmen members of unregistered religious 

groups accused of disseminating religious material did 

not receive harsher treatment than members of other ethnic groups.

The head of one registered religious community told 

Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov with Commissioners Argue 

and Eid.
71

TURKMENISTAN

the Commission delegation that until now, no pastor in 

his church had received official permission to bring the 

legal allotment of any religious text into the country, even 

though his church had translated some of its religious 

literature into Turkmen so that government officials could 

read it. The Russian Orthodox Church can receive and 

distribute Bibles easily, but according to the leaders of a 

number of other Christian communities, the Orthodox 

Church does not share the literature with Protestant 

churches because those churches allegedly may be seen 

as competitors. Nevertheless, the Russian Orthodox 

community was also affected by the government’s past 

policies, which banned Turkmen residents from receiving 

Russian publications by mail, including the Journal of the 

Moscow Patriarchate. As far as is known, that ban remains 

in effect.

In one instance, a leader of a minority religious community was detained for receiving Christian materials in 

the mail. The authorities instructed him to write to the 

sender and ask him not to send any more religious material. Even registered churches need to consult with the 

CRA before they import religious literature. In another 

instance, the Ministries of National Security and Internal 

Affairs detained a pastor for questioning at the post office 

after receiving religious materials in the mail, with the justification that the material could promote extremism and 

violence. Religious communities reportedly need a government license in order to reproduce religious literature 

already in their possession. One leader of a registered 

Protestant community told the Commission delegation 

that the Justice Ministry had called and threatened his 

church for attempting to make copies of religious literature without a license. 

When the Commission delegation raised the issue 

of religious literature with the CRA, Russian Orthodox 

representative Father Sapunov stated that in the view of 

his church, Turkmenistan had enough religious literature 

and perhaps it would be better to ask whether there was 

a need for such material. Father Sapunov also stated that 

the law sets out what kind of materials may be imported 

and in what quantity. The Council, he maintained, has 

always tried to help, but the Turkmen authorities have 

the right to inquire about the reason so many Bibles are 

needed. Sapunov claimed that he himself saw no problem 

with the import of religious materials, but the Council 

must follow the law. Deputy Chairman Nurmukhamet 

Gurbanov maintained that there is no evidence that the 

rights of Turkmen citizens had been violated with regard 

to the import of religious literature. 

Religious Education 

Turkmenistan’s religion law bans the private teaching of 

religion and those who engage in such instruction are liable for legal penalties. Only those who have graduated 

from institutions of higher religious education (domestic 

or foreign is not specified) and approved by the CRA may 

offer religious instruction. Citizens have the right to receive religious education alone or with others from these 

official institutions; some independent religious education takes place unofficially. Usually, home schooling is 

allowed only in cases of severe illness or disability and not 

for religious reasons.

Under Article 6 of the November 2004 amendments 

to the religion law, mosques are allowed to provide religious education to children after school for four hours 

per week, as long as parents have given their approval. 

Some Sunni mosques have regularly scheduled Koran 

instruction. The 2003 religion law prohibits the Russian 

Orthodox Church from conducting religious education 

programs without CRA and presidential approval and 

there were, according to the State Department, no reports 

that such programs had been approved. 

In June 2001, President Niyazov’s government closed 

the madrassa in the town of Dashoguz, leaving only the 

theological faculty at the Turkmen State University in Ashgabat to conduct Islamic education. That faculty was later 

dissolved and absorbed into another department, with the 

Chief Mufti Rowshen Allaberdiyev meets with Commissioners 

Argue, Eid, and Cromartie at Niyazov Mosque in Gipchak.
72

result that only one institution of Islamic education is currently open. It was set up after 2001 and has a curriculum 

controlled by the government. The country’s largest religious minority, the Russian Orthodox, has no institution 

for religious education in Turkmenistan, although even 

under President Niyazov, men were allowed to leave the 

country to train for the clergy. The Shi’a, who are mainly 

represented among the country’s Iranian and Azeri ethnic 

minorities, also have no religious training institutions in 

Turkmenistan.

Religious minorities, even those that have gained 

registration, are in a particularly difficult situation. One 

religious minority leader told the Commission delegation that most religious training is conducted informally, 

in private homes. Some churches are able to train clergy 

based on formal programs, but others are not. Some clergy members are able to receive their religious education 

and ordination overseas.

Other Religious Freedom Concerns

Continuing Official Harassment of Religious 

Minorities

Under the late President Niyazov, police routinely interfered in the activities of both registered and unregistered 

religious communities. Security police frequently broke 

up religious meetings in private homes, searched homes 

without warrants, confiscated religious literature, and 

detained and threatened congregants with criminal prosecution and deportation. Family members of detained 

religious leaders were subjected to harassment, discrimination and internal exile. In addition, members of some 

religious minority groups, particularly Protestants, Hare 

Krishnas, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, faced official pressure 

to renounce their religion publicly, and were sometimes 

forced to swear an oath on the Ruhnama. Though such 

raids and other forms of harassment were less frequent 

last year than in previous years, they have continued following President Niyazov’s death.

According to the State Department, however, although the Turkmen government had increased harassment of some registered and many unregistered religious 

minority groups after the February inauguration of 

President Berdimuhamedov, reports of such incidents 

decreased by the end of 2007. Yet, despite official pledges 

to improve the situation, registered and unregistered 

religious groups continue to experience serious discrimination and maltreatment from government officials, 

particularly outside Ashgabat. One leader of a registered 

religious minority community told the Commission that 

some actions against his community are carried out by 

the local city governments, while other operations involve 

the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Sixth Department, which 

deals with organized crime and terrorism. For example, 

in March 2007, authorities raided a meeting of an unregistered religious group in a private house in Abadan and 

the home owners were fined. In June 2007, police raided 

a meeting of the registered Light of the East Pentecostal 

community in the city of Dashoguz. In August 2007, a 

branch community of a nationally registered Protestant 

church in western Turkmenistan was raided by police; 

literature was confiscated and a member was arrested. 

There was a similar incident at another branch church. 

The leader of another registered Protestant church told 

the Commission that in one incident, local and regional 

officials brought a bus to detain and remove the church 

members who had assembled without government authorization. There were no arrests, but the religious gathering 

was broken up and the literature confiscated. Forum 18 

reported that police raided a Baptist service in December 

2007 in a private home in the town of Balkanabad in western Turkmenistan.

Members of several unregistered religious groups, including some Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, said that 

the Turkmen government sometimes deployed anti-terrorist and secret police raids against their groups, which 

were frequently followed by arrests. Forum 18 reported 

in November 2007 that in one town, local officials encouraged a Muslim community to apply for registration, but 

secret police later ordered them to drop their effort and 

not to publicize their situation. The group is reportedly 

allowed to function in a limited capacity. In some instances, unregistered church leaders were threatened with 

the loss of their retirement savings. According to the State 

Department, in the past year, police officers subjected 

ethnic Turkmen who converted to Christian denominations other than Russian Orthodoxy to harassment and 

mistreatment, including verbal abuse for denying their 

heritage by converting to a religion viewed by the government as “non-traditional” for Turkmen. 

Several religious minority groups noted that the 

Turkmen authorities appeared to be using charges leveled against them in the past as a means to make current 
73

TURKMENISTAN

religious activity extremely difficult. Since early 2007, 

there has been increased pressure on the Jehovah’s Witnesses: meetings have been raided, literature confiscated, 

and fines imposed. Jehovah’s Witnesses employed in state 

agencies reported being subject to harassment and public 

ridicule and pressured to leave their jobs, while many had 

already been dismissed or had their contracts discontinued. Several Jehovah’s Witnesses were summoned to 

police stations in connection with incidents that allegedly 

had taken place several years ago, and fines, issued as 

long as three years ago, were only now being enforced.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses have experienced other serious problems in 2007, particularly in 

April 2007. For example, police confiscated internal 

passports during a raid in the city of Turkmenabad; three 

Jehovah’s Witnesses were detained and one of them, a 

woman, claims to have been sexually molested by police. 

Although a prosecutor first ruled the passport seizure to 

be illegal, after he talked to police he threatened to fine 

the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In two other incidents, as a result 

of police actions in Ashgabat, two Jehovah’s Witnesses 

lost their jobs after police interrogated them about their 

beliefs. Three days later, in the city of Dashoguz, police 

confiscated some literature from a Jehovah’s Witness who 

was later fined at a police station.

Absence of Alternatives to Military Service

Another unresolved issue affecting Turkmenistan’s religious freedom record is the country’s lack of a genuine civilian alternative to compulsory military service. In 2007, 

six members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses were sentenced 

to prison—although they ultimately received suspended 

sentences. They were prosecuted under Article 219, Part 

1 of the Criminal Code for refusal to serve in the armed 

forces with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The five were still denied their full civil and political 

rights, including the free choice of employment. For example, Jehovah’s Witness Suleiman Udaev, who was sentenced in August 2007 but freed from prison in September, 

must still pay 20 percent of his wages to the state. In addition, he will not be able to leave his home village without 

permission, and will be officially assigned to work in the 

local collective farm. According to the State Department, 

the government pardoned three other members of the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses under an annual amnesty program. 

In December 2007, a sixth conscientious objector received 

an 18-month suspended sentence for refusing compulsory 

military service. Amnesty International reported that 

some of these men were informed that if they persisted in 

their conscientious objection, they could again face conscription and imprisonment. 

Freedom of Movement Issues

Under President Niyazov, there was deliberate official 

interference in international freedom of movement of religious adherents in Turkmenistan. Many of these policies 

have continued under the new government. Entry visas 

are refused to religious workers who are, in many cases, 

critical to the functions of a particular religious community, and other individuals known to participate in religious 

activities have been pointedly prevented from leaving the 

country. 

The Turkmen authorities continue to limit the number of Muslims permitted to perform the hajj. In November 2006, the government announced that only 188 of 

the country’s official quota of 4,600 would be allowed to 

go to Mecca. Yet, even the country’s official newspaper 

acknowledged in April 2007 that it was the duty of every 

President Berdimuhamedov’s establishment of a new commission to examine how 

Turkmenistan’s legislation conforms to international human rights commitments may 

be a sign that legal changes to improve religious freedom and other human rights 

protections are being considered. It remains, however, too early to determine whether 

this commission will result in any substantive changes in Turkmenistan.
74

Muslim to undertake the hajj. The Commission delegation repeatedly raised the severe limitations on the number of Muslims allowed to perform the hajj. In response, 

President Berdimuhamedov claimed that while the government will pay for only one planeload (188 people) of 

Muslim hajj pilgrims, there is no legal limit on those who 

can afford to undertake the hajj at their own expense. 

While this was not, in fact, the situation under Niyazov, 

it remains to be seen whether this will be the policy of 

the new government. According to the State Department, 

there were anecdotal reports indicating that additional 

persons may have undertaken the pilgrimage at their own 

expense. 

Baptist Vyacheslav Kalataevsky, who was born in 

Turkmenistan but holds Ukrainian citizenship, was deported from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan in 2001, allegedly due to his membership in an unregistered Baptist 

congregation in the city of Turkmenbashi. In March 2007, 

as he attempted to regularize his residential status in that 

city, he was arrested by the security police. Kalataevsky’s 

trial took place in May 2007, at the same time, that the 

then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 

Arbour, was visiting Turkmenistan. Kalataevsky was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for “illegally crossing 

the border” in 2001. One month later, in June 2007, he 

was transferred to a labor camp to serve his sentence. As 

part of the traditional 2007 Ramadan prisoner release, 

Kalataevsky was released from camp. One month later, he 

was allowed to rejoin his family in Turkmenbashi. In November 2007, a few days after his return to Turkmenbashi, 

Kalataevsky reportedly received an official warning not to 

meet for worship with his fellow Baptists and in December, the State Department reported, Turkmen authorities 

denied Kalataevsky’s request for residency even though 

his family lives in Turkmenbashi. He was deported to 

Ukraine one week later. In another case, Baptist pastor 

Yevgeny Potolov, head of an unregistered congregation 

belonging to the Baptist Council of Churches, was deported in July 2007, seven weeks after his arrest for religious 

activity. After Baptist leader Aleksandr Frolov was deported in June 2006, his family moved to Russia following 

a year of unsuccessful appeals that he be allowed to return 

to Turkmenistan. In the past, the Turkmen government 

has refused entry visas to several priests who are Russian 

citizens and were invited by the Russian Orthodox community to Turkmenistan. According to Forum 18, in 2007 

the ROC did not encounter similar problems. 

Despite official protestations to the contrary, the 

Turkmen government appears to maintain a secret “black 

list” of selected individuals who are denied permission to 

leave the country. Former Baptist prisoner of conscience, 

Shageldy Atakov, reportedly is banned from leaving Turkmenistan; he was most recently denied exit permission in 

June 2007. In 2006, a Migration Service official referred 

to an exit blacklist on which Atakov’s name appeared, 

most likely because he had not had his full political and 

civil rights restored after serving a prison term. In August 

2007, a court granted exit permission to Merdan Shirmedov, an ethnic Turkmen leader of an unregistered Baptist 

community in the city of Dashoguz, to travel to Turkey to 

rejoin his family in the West. Nevertheless, the court gave 

no explanation as to why Shirmedov had been denied permission to leave the country since January 2007. 

The leader of one minority community told the Commission that some religious leaders and their families are 

still prohibited from leaving the country and their mail 

is searched and read by the security service. Two years 

ago, two men from this church tried to travel to Azerbaijan to attend a Bible school. In November 2007, a Turkmen Evangelical Church pastor was escorted off a plane 

bound for Ukraine. According to the State Department, 

when he wrote a complaint to the State Agency for the 

Registration of Foreign Citizens, he received a reply notPeople from historically Muslim 

ethnic groups who want to register 

Christian churches are more often denied 

registration than communities comprised 

largely of individuals of Slavic origin. 

The Commission was informed that in 

some cases, local and national government 

officials have told such church members 

that they “cannot be Christians because 

they are ethnic Turkmen.”
75

TURKMENISTAN

ing that his claim was not valid. A Baha’i activist said that 

there is a secret ban on invitations for relatives to come to 

Turkmenistan, although members of the Baha’i community can travel out of the country. The State Department 

reports that others, including some religious leaders, were 

allowed to travel outside the country in 2007.

When the Commission delegation raised the issue 

of Turkmen citizens being denied exit permission due to 

their religious affiliation, the country’s officials denied 

that this had ever occurred. For example, Presidential 

Institute on Democracy and Human Rights Director 

Akhmedova claimed that Turkmenistan did have an “exit 

visa regime” left over from Soviet days, but those barriers 

had since been removed. The new Deputy Chairman of 

the CRA, Nurmukhammet Gurbanov, told the delegation, 

“I have never met a person who was not allowed to enter 

or leave Turkmenistan because of his religion.”

Current Status of the Personality Cult and the 

Ruhnama

President Niyazov’s personality cult was bolstered by 

the forceful official promotion of a book containing the 

late president’s “spiritual thoughts,” known as Ruhnama. 

Imams were also reportedly instructed by the government to repeat an oath of loyalty to the “fatherland” 

and to President Niyazov after each daily prayer. Under 

President Niyazov, students were required to study the 

Ruhnama at all public schools and institutes of higher 

learning. Moreover, according to the State Department, 

President Niyazov used his teachings “in part to supersede 

other established religious codes, as well as historical and 

cultural texts, and thereby influence citizens’ religious and 

cultural behavior.” A law promulgated in 2002 enjoined 

parents and guardians “to bring [children] up in spirit of...

the unshakeable spiritual values embodied in the holy 

Ruhnama.” The study of the Ruhnama also replaced many 

subjects in the school curricula and was a required subject at institutes of higher learning.

After Turkmenistan’s chief mufti, Ibn Ibadullah, lost 

his position in 2003 for opposing the elevation of the 

Ruhnama, he was replaced by Kakgeldi Wepayev, who 

was soon put under house arrest for alleged involvement 

in the purported coup attempt against Niyazov. In 2004, 

three ethnic Uzbek imams lost their positions for opposing the elevation of the Ruhnama as a sacred text. Indeed, 

the head of a mosque in Ashgabat, Imam Hoja Ahmed 

Orazgylyjov, died after being sentenced to internal exile 

in the remote town of Tejen for alleged “criminal activity.” 

Some believe that Orazgylyjov was sent into internal exile 

due to his refusal to support the Niyazov regime based 

on his religious beliefs. Furthermore, credible reports 

indicate that mullahs in Turkmenistan were told in 2005 

Market (tolkuchka) scene, Ashgabat.
76

to stop reading the Koran in mosques and restrict themselves to the Ruhnama. 

The religion-like quality of the personality cult became even more apparent in March 2006, when President 

Niyazov announced on Turkmen state television that anyone reading the Ruhnama three times “would be assured 

a place in heaven.” The president’s books were required 

to be displayed in mosques and churches alongside the 

Koran and the Bible. In at least one instance, a mosque 

was closed by the National Security Ministry after mosque 

leaders refused to place the Ruhnama on a par with the 

Koran. Ruhnama quotations also were carved alongside 

Koran citations in the country’s largest mosque. As noted 

above, Turkmenistan’s former chief mufti, Nazrullah ibn 

Ibadullah, who opposed this requirement, was sentenced 

to 22 years in prison; he remained in prison until August 

2007, when he and 10 other political prisoners were released by President Berdimuhamedov. Since the autumn 

of 2006, a Sunni mullah has reportedly been forcibly held 

in a closed psychiatric hospital in the Lebap region of 

Turkmenistan due to his critical sermons in a village in the 

Kaakha district near Ashgabad, according to Forum 18. 

His name and current status are unknown.

As during the Soviet period, the government under 

President Niyazov retained tight control over Islamic 

practice and observance and remunerated and monitored 

all members of the Muslim clergy. Although Islam was 

always allowed as one of the country’s tolerated religions, 

only those Muslim religious teachers and believers who 

accepted and fully cooperated with state authority were 

tolerated. As his personality cult intensified, President Niyazov attempted to gain even tighter control over Islamic 

practice by ordering the publication of a list of religious 

rituals purportedly common to all Turkmen to which all 

Muslims in Turkmenistan were expected to adhere. Secret 

police were reportedly sent to attend mosques to identify 

Muslims who performed religious rites in a way that differed from the officially-prescribed Turkmen practice. 

According to some reports, the new leadership intends to decrease emphasis on the Ruhnama and has 

already taken some steps to distance itself from President 

Niyazov’s personality cult. The imposition of the sworn 

oath of loyalty to President Niyazov has been curtailed 

and limited only to certain occasions. In March 2007, 

Berdimuhamedov proposed a new loyalty oath procedure 

enabling people to swear an oath on a book other than 

the Ruhnama. According to Forum 18, however, the 9,000 

prisoners released in 2007 were required to swear a loyalty oath on the Koran and the Ruhnama. The Turkmen 

Academy of Sciences, closed by President Niyazov, has 

been re-opened. A series of articles by Turkmen scholars 

exploring the country’s history, including through the excavation of Islamic and archeological sites, have recently 

been published on official Web sites and in November 

2007, the works of four classical Turkmen authors were 

published in small editions. This is a departure from the 

time of President Niyazov, who had insisted that historical 

and cultural topics be influenced primarily by his views of 

Turkmen history as published in the Ruhnama. 

Nevertheless, the future of the formal personality 

cult in Turkmenistan remains unclear. During its visit to 

Turkmenistan, the Commission noticed that several of the 

portraits and golden statues of President Niyazov that he 

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs 

Nurmukhammet Gurbanov with Commissioners Argue and Eid.
77

TURKMENISTAN

himself had had built are still found throughout Ashgabat. 

However, a Turkmen government official reportedly told 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in February 2008 that 

Berdimuhamedov ordered the removal of all portraits of 

Niyazov and of Ruhnama citations from the outside of 

buildings throughout the country. Yet, the State Department reported that the government still requires ministry 

employees to pass tests demonstrating knowledge of the 

Ruhnama, as well as other subjects; employees who fail 

the exam are reportedly dismissed. In addition, though 

Niyazov’s portraits are being removed, many large portraits of the country’s new president are now visible in the 

capital. It is too early to determine whether these new 

portrait displays are an aspect of President Berdimuhamedov’s consolidation of power or mark the beginnings of 

new authoritarian presidential rule, accompanied by a 

new personality cult. On his fiftieth birthday, President 

Berdimuhamedov ordered commemorative coins with his 

picture, but when Turkmenistan marked its independence 

day in October 2007, the commemorative coins did not 

bear any presidential image.

Ruhnama Still Given Prominence in Religious 

Life

At the large mosque in President Niyazov’s native village 

of Gipchak, which was built on President Niyazov’s orders 

and which the Commission visited, it was readily apparent that Ruhnama inscriptions dominated the exterior 

and interior walls. Inside the mosque, above the mikhrab, 

or the special bay in the main wall that is directed toward 

Mecca, was inscribed the word “Turkmenbashi,” President 

Niyazov’s self-designated title, a display that most Muslims would consider deeply offensive. Turkmenistan’s 

chief mufti stated that “the Ruhnama citations do not 

violate Islamic law because there is no requirement that 

there be writings inside a mosque.” At the Ministry of 

Culture, it was claimed that “the way Islam is practiced in 

Turkmenistan is different than in other places. Our mode 

of belief is different from Arabs. Our poetry is adapted 

from the Koran, and the Ruhnama is very similar.” The 

Interior Ministry official also claimed that the matter was 

discussed with representatives from Arab countries prior 

to building the mosque and that no one had expressed a 

concern about the design “because all of the verses from 

the Ruhnama that appear within the mosque relate to 

Turkmenistan’s relationship with God.” 

Clearly, the Ruhnama continues to be an imposing 

state presence in the religious life of the people of Turkmenistan. One interlocutor told the Commission that 

Muslim clerics can lose their jobs for refusing to teach the 

Ruhnama in the mosques. The Ruhnama apparently also 

continues to impinge on members of the minority communities. A member of a religious minority group told the 

Commission that “refusing to acknowledge the Ruhnama 

as a sacred text can have serious effects on a person’s educational and professional opportunities.” In the past, he 

said he had been punished for refusing to write about the 

Ruhnama at school. 

The Role of the Ruhnama in Education

Official and unofficial sources report a decreased role 

for the Ruhnama in Turkmenistan’s educational system. 

Turkmenistan’s Minister of Education, Mukhammetgeldi 

Annaamanov, told the Commission that “the sacred Ruhnama was written by our former leader for the education 

and upbringing of Turkmen youth. It was used and will 

continue to be used, but there will now be only one hour 

of instruction each week.” Under President Niyazov, one 

hour per day in institutions of higher learning was devoted to study of the text. Annaamanov also specified that 

the government currently mandates “only 362 hours of 

instruction in the Ruhnama over 10 years of formal education,” and that Muslim and Russian Orthodox religious 

leaders, presumably CRA representatives, assist in curriculum development. While at the Ministry of Education, 

the Commission delegation was shown the official decree 

eliminating the teaching of the Ruhnama in primary 

schools and curtailing the teaching of the text in high 

Members of several unregistered 

religious groups, including some Baptists 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses, said that the 

Turkmen government sometimes deployed 

anti-terrorist and secret police raids 

against their groups, which were 

frequently followed by arrests.
78

schools from one hour per day to one hour per week, except for the final year in which it will be taught two hours 

per week. On another occasion, the Commission was told 

that “recently the new president cut Ruhnama classes in 

high schools and totally removed the book from elementary schools. They also did away with the Ruhnama oath 

in schools.” 

Another Education Ministry official, however, stated 

that the Ruhnama “tells the history of Turkmenistan” 

and that the text is part of the curriculum for students 

from the ages of seven to 17; indeed, he claimed, “many 

students read it of their own free will.” He also stated that 

the Ruhnama is a spiritual but not a religious book, and 

that reading it leads to “purity” and provides a moral and 

philosophical background. During a visit to one of several Ashgabat Turkmen-Turkish public high schools, the 

delegation was shown a special room that was still known 

as the Ruhnama room. In addition, in contrast to what 

the Commission was told by the Minister of Education, 

reports indicate that the Niyazov curriculum is still in use 

at universities in Turkmenistan, and that the Ruhnama is 

still one of the main textbooks for all university students. 

The State Department reported that President Berdimuhamedov continued with 2006 plans to construct a Ruhnama university, though the projected university’s focus 

began to change from “studying the deep roots of the nation’s great spirit” to include a more international outlook. 

In fact, all of Niyazov’s texts—the Ruhnama, Ruhnama 

II, poetry volumes, The Spring of My Inspiration, and My 

Beloved—remained part of the school curriculum, and 

passing tests on knowledge of the Ruhnama was still necessary for advancement or graduation, though less class 

time was spent on these works than in the past.

Commission Activities

The Commission continues to raise concern at a variety of 

venues about the status of religious freedom in Turkmenistan. In October 2006, Commission staff took part in a 

roundtable on Turkmenistan sponsored by RFE/RL at the 

OSCE Human Dimension Meeting in Warsaw. In January 

2007, then-Commission Chair Felice D. Gaer met with 

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher to discuss 

concerns over U.S. policy on Turkmenistan and the failure 

to name the country a CPC. In August 2007, Commission 

Chair Michael Cromartie and Commissioners Imam Talal 

Y. Eid and Donald H. Argue traveled to Turkmenistan, 

where they met with President Berdimuhmedov and other 

government officials, as well as representatives of religious 

communities and civil society. In December 2007, the 

Commission released a policy brief about its visit to Turkmenistan and sponsored an event at Freedom House entitled “The State of Freedom in Turkmenistan” to launch 

its publication. In December 2007, Commission staff 

gave a talk on Uzbekistan and the CPC process in Berlin 

at the Forum on Freedom of Religion or Belief, a private 

organization comprised of international legal specialists. 

In January 2008, Commission staff made a presentation 

in Brussels on the status of freedom of religion or belief in 

Central Asia at events sponsored by the NGO European 

Platform on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. 

The Commission has met with the U.S. Ambassador 

to Turkmenistan to discuss bilateral relations, the status of 

religious freedom and other human rights, and steps the 

United States might take to ameliorate the situation. As 

recommended by the Commission, the UN Commission 

on Human Rights (UNCHR) passed resolutions condemning Turkmenistan for repression of religious and political 

rights in 2004. In March 2005, the Commission met with 

delegation heads from the United States and European 

Union (EU) countries at the 61st session of the UNCHR 

session and presented information about violations of 

religious freedom in Turkmenistan, questioning the decision of the United States and the EU not to introduce a 

resolution on Turkmenistan at the 2005 UNCHR. 

The Commission also continues to make public statements and take part in meetings with U.S.-based experts 

and activists concerned with Turkmenistan. In January 

2007, the Commission co-sponsored and spoke at an 

event entitled “Religious Freedom and State Policy in 

Central Asia,” together with the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS). After Niyazov’s death, the 

Commission issued a press statement with an extensive 

set of new recommendations on ways to promote religious freedom and other human rights in Turkmenistan. 

In July 2005, the Commission held a public briefing with 

the CSIS, on “U.S. Strategic Dilemmas in Uzbekistan and 

Turkmenistan.” The briefing discussed the human rights 

situation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the nature of 

local extremist and terrorist threats, and U.S. and other 

strategic interests in the region. 
79 The CPC Designation

The Commission has noted the initial steps undertaken by 

the government of President Berdimuhamedov to lessen 

some aspects of the repression mandated by President Niyazov, and encourages the new government to implement 

further specific steps to bring Turkmenistan’s law, policies, and practices in line with international human rights 

norms, including for freedom of religion or belief. Nevertheless, in light of the persistent, severe problems, until 

tangible and systemic reforms have been implemented, 

the Commission continues to recommend that the U.S. 

government designate Turkmenistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

The Commission recommends that the U.S. government encourage continued reforms, indicating to the 

government of Turkmenistan the specific measures that it 

must take to end particularly severe violations of freedom 

of religion or belief and other human rights, including: 

• repeal immediately all laws, decrees or regulations, 

including major changes in the 2003 religion law, that 

violate international norms pertaining to freedom of 

religion or belief; 

• repeal the state ideology, imposed through the Ruhnama, that infringes upon or severely diminishes the practice of freedom of religion or belief and related freedoms 

of association, movement, expression, and the media. 

• eliminate intrusive and onerous registration procedures 

and abolish criminal or other penalties for engaging in 

religious or other peaceful activity solely because it is 

not approved by the state; 

• halt unjust arrest, detention, harassment, deportation, 

fines and residential and workplace intimidation of 

religious leaders and their adherents on account of their 

religious or other beliefs; 

• end fully the past practice of harassing and deporting religious leaders and imposing fines on leaders or 

members of peaceful unregistered religious communities whose activities are deemed “illegal”;

• promulgate new regulations and adopt new policies to 

ease the importation of religious and other material and 

permit the domestic printing and dissemination of such 

material in accordance with international standards; 

and

• implement genuine legal alternatives to military service 

on grounds of religious or conscientious objection, 

possibly modeled on Organization on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proposals and other 

international precedents.

 Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and Other Human Rights

The Commission further recommends that the U.S. government urge the government of Turkmenistan to:

• end the personality cult of the late President Niyazov, 

particularly in the country’s religious life and educational 

system, including by removing the Ruhnama—a book 

containing President Niyazov’s “spiritual thoughts”—

from mosques and other houses of worship and by further decreasing reliance on the Ruhnama in educational 

curricula; 

• release and fully restore the civil and political rights of 

all former political prisoners, including those in internal 

exile;

• permit the inspection of places of imprisonment, including labor camps, prisons, and temporary places of 

detention, by independent impartial experts such as the 

International Committee of the Red Cross and/or Red 

Crescent;

• promote and expand the work of the government’s 

Commission to Examine Turkmenistan’s Legal Obligations under International Human Rights Law, established 

in August 2007, including by involving international 

legal experts, such as the Organization on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Panel of Experts on 

Religion or Belief and Panel on Freedom of AssociaCComm ommission ission Re R ecommendations commendations

2 

1 
tion, and relevant UN agencies and 

by preparing and submitting all 

outstanding reports to human rights 

treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, 

and regional bodies; 

• reform laws, decrees, and regulations to bring them into conformity 

with international legal obligations, 

such as dropping penalties on individuals under the administrative 

code for engaging in unregistered 

religious activities; instructing local 

and other officials to remove obstacles to the purchase or rental of land 

or buildings to be used as houses of 

worship or for meeting purposes; 

permit the use of private homes and 

public halls in residential areas for 

worship services; allow children to 

receive private religious education; 

allow the publication and distribution of religious literature inside 

Turkmenistan; and permit freedom 

of movement for members of all 

religious and other communities as 

well as increasing the numbers of 

Muslims allowed to undertake the 

hajj; and

• reform the government’s other 

policies toward religious practice, 

including ending state interference 

in the management of religious 

communities and the selection and 

training of religious leaders, including from Sunni and Shi’a Muslim 

and the Russian Orthodox communities, as well as from Protestant 

and other minority communities, 

reopening the country’s Sunni 

theological faculty, and permitting 

the members of the Shi’a Muslim 

community to practice their religion 

freely.

 Expanding U.S. Programs 

and Other Activities to 

Promote Reform 

The Commission also recommends 

that, in the longer term, the U.S. government make the following efforts 

to expand activities in Turkmenistan 

that would protect and promote human rights:

• increase and improve radio, 

Internet, and other broadcasts of 

objective news and information, 

including topics such as religious 

freedom and other human rights 

and religious tolerance, by: 

• expanding and improving broadcasts to Turkmenistan by the 

Turkmen Service of Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 

including by increasing coverage 

of issues relating to freedom of 

religion or belief and by adding 

broadcasts in the Russian language and providing additional 

programming for the estimated 12 

million Turkmen in the diaspora, 

particularly in Iran, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan; and 

• restoring Voice of America’s 

Russian-language television and 

radio broadcasts to Central Asia, 

particularly relating to human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief.

• use appropriate avenues of public 

diplomacy to explain why freedom 

of religion or belief is an important 

element of U.S. foreign policy, as 

well as specific concerns about 

violations of freedom of religion or 

belief in Turkmenistan;

• assist in improving Turkmenistan’s 

educational system, particularly 

with regard to curricula on religious 

freedom and other human rights, 

by:

• expanding “American corner” 

reading rooms and Internet access in various regions; 

• reprinting Russian and Turkmenlanguage materials on human 

rights, particularly on international norms on freedom of 

religion or belief, including civic 

education materials such as “The 

Law that Unifies Us,” a text on the 

importance of respect for the law 

that was first published and distributed through the OSCE Center 

in Ashgabat; and 

• providing funds for libraries in 

Ashgabat and other cities, including materials on human rights, as 

well as information on freedom of 

religion or belief, tolerance, civic 

education, and international legal 

standards; 

• develop assistance programs to 

encourage civil society groups that 

protect human rights and promote 

religious freedom, including by: 

• expanding “train-the-trainer” 

legal assistance programs for 

representatives of religious communities to act as legal advisers in 

the registration process; and

• specifying freedom of religion 

as a grants category and area of 

activity in the Democracy and 

Conflict Mitigation program of 

the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and the 

Democracy Commission Small 

Grants program administered by 

the U.S. Embassy; and

80

3 
• expand international contacts and 

increase U.S. involvement in various 

types of communities in Turkmenistan by:

• increasing the current Peace 

Corps budget of $70 million and 

the current budget of USAID 

programs, projected to reach $12 

million in FY 2008, including by 

involving religious leaders on 

community projects in efforts 

to address social problems and 

to increase religious and ethnic 

tolerance; 

• expanding exchange programs, 

including with civil society leaders, students, and others concerned with human rights; 

• increasing funding for programs 

that help citizens understand and 

claim their legal rights; 

• cooperating with the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, in part by resuming joint activities with human 

rights activists from Turkmenistan to encourage civic education, 

including on international norms 

on freedom of religion or belief as 

well as other human rights, and 

also by encouraging the OSCE officially to respond to the Turkmen 

government’s offer in May 2007 to 

host an OSCE experts’ level meeting; and

• organizing a travel grant category 

for non-governmental organizations and members of diverse 

religious communities to enable 

them to take part in various international conferences, including 

those of the OSCE. 

 Strengthening Efforts in 

the International Arena

With regard to international fora, the 

Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government urge the government 

of Turkmenistan to: 

• implement the recommendations of 

the October 2006 Report of the UN 

Secretary General on the Situation 

of Human Rights in Turkmenistan;

• agree to the numerous requests for 

visits by the UN Special Rapporteurs 

on Torture, the Right to Education, 

Extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary 

executions, Freedom of Opinion 

and Expression, and the Independence of the Judiciary; and from the 

Representative of the UN Secretary 

General on the Human Rights of 

Displaced Persons; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

on the Situation of Human Rights 

Defenders; the Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention, as well as representatives of the OSCE, including 

the Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief, and provide the 

full and necessary conditions for 

such visits; and 

• participate fully in the OSCE, by

• participating in the annual 

Human Dimension meeting in 

Warsaw; 

• expanding the activities of the 

OSCE Center in Ashgabat, particularly on human rights, including programs with local schools, 

universities, and institutes; and

• complying with relevant OSCE 

commitments on key human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. 

TURKMENISTAN

81

4 

83 Update on Religious Freedom Conditions in 

North Korea and New Interviews with Former 

North Korean Security Agents

In December 2005, the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom published a report entitled Thank You 

Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion 

in North Korea. That report, based on extensive interviews 

with North Korean refugees who fled through China to 

South Korea from 1999 – 2003, provided a much needed 

window on religious freedom conditions inside North 

Korea and the consequences for refugees who are forced 

to return. The North Koreans interviewed for that report 

provided compelling eyewitness accounts of public executions of religious believers, torture and imprisonment of 

refugees repatriated from China, the state’s manipulation 

of religious institutions to gain international prestige and 

foreign currency, and recent developments inside North 

Korea, including the revival of Shamanistic practice and 

fortune-telling. 

Those initial interviews also provided compelling 

details about the rites, requirements, and rituals of the 

quasi-religious personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung 

and his family. Veneration of the Kim family is part of an 

all-encompassing ideological system known as KimIlSungism. All North Koreans are required to attend weekly 

meetings and to keep pictures of the Kim family in their 

homes, and there are specific penalties for those who refuse to follow the required rituals. From those interviews 

it was learned that even the infamous “Yodok” prison 

camp has a special shrine where inmates, despite living in 

appalling conditions, are required to keep a special pair of 

socks for entry. KimIlSungism is not merely a method of 

social control, but the ideological basis of the Kim family’s 

political legitimacy. 

Thank You Father Kim Il Sung presented valuable 

information about religious freedom conditions in North 

Korea for the widest possible audience of policymakers, 

diplomats, journalists, religious leaders, and researchers 

on religious freedom and related human rights in North 

Korea. The findings from that report were conveyed to 

senior U.S. Administration officials, Members of Congress, 

relevant UN agencies including the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korea, and a variety of think tanks in Washington, New York, Rome, and Seoul. That report has been 

translated into Korean and is available on the Commission’s Web site at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/

pdf/nkwitnesses_wgraphics.pdf.

Updating Thank You Father Kim Il Sung

Over the past year, a team of researchers contracted by 

the Commission conducted 32 additional interviews with 

North Korean refugees who fled to China from 2003 – 2007 

and six interviews with former North Korean security 

agents who defected to South Korea over the past eight 

years. The purpose of these supplementary interviews 

was to determine if religious freedom conditions had 

changed to any degree, if repressive government policies 

uncovered in the first report remained in force, and if repatriated refugees continue to face harsh treatment at the 

border.1

 The new refugee interviews are the basis of a report published by the Commission in April 2008 entitled, 

“A Prison Without Bars”: Refugee and Defector Testimonies 

of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in 

North Korea.

“A Prison Without Bars”:

Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations

of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea

Clearly, the plight of North Korean 

asylum-seekers requires continued 

vigilance and action from the 

international community.
84

Forcibly Repatriated Refugees

Recent refugee testimony provides further evidence that 

North Koreans face a well-founded fear of persecution if 

repatriated from China and require protection as refugees 

under the international Convention Relating to the Status 

of Refugees. The forcible repatriation of refugees from 

China remains an issue of special concern, particularly 

because refugees are singled out for harsher punishment 

if they are suspected of having had close and ongoing contact with South Koreans or religious groups. Refugee testimony confirms that repatriated North Koreans are asked 

repeatedly about their religious affiliations and associations in China. They suffer harsh interrogation, torture, 

and prolonged detention, particularly if it is discovered 

that they have either converted to Christianity while in 

China or had contact with South Koreans—both of which 

are considered to be political offenses. 

As David Hawk, the lead researcher for the first 

Commission report, and others have argued, the harsh 

treatment of repatriated refugees, particularly for their 

religious beliefs or associations, may constitute a crime 

against humanity according to international human rights 

treaties.2

 Clearly, the plight of North Korean asylumseekers requires continued vigilance and action from the 

international community.

The Supremacy of KimIlSungism

The new refugee interviews provide substantial details 

about the strength and scope of KimIlSungism. Absolute 

reverence for the Kim family continues to be indoctrinated into every North Korean, through schools, media, 

and the workplace. Enthusiastic veneration can advance 

careers and ensure access to daily necessities, while disinterest, “complaints,” or “wrong thoughts” can lead to the 

imprisonment of up to three generations of one’s family in 

the notorious political prison labor camps (kwanliso). The 

penalties for challenging KimIlSungism are well known, 

but refugee testimony did provide some information 

about individual private rebellions, lax enforcement of 

some rituals, and widespread dissatisfaction with the personality cult’s requirements. 

 

New and Surviving Religious Practices

Additional insight into surviving religious activity in North 

Korea is also gained from the recent interviews. Despite 

decades of repression, anti-religious propaganda, and 

the promulgation of KimIlSungism, remnants of Buddhism, Christianity, and traditional folk beliefs such as 

Shamanism persist. For example, there was a notable 

amount of eyewitness testimony about Buddhist temples 

that are preserved as “heritage” or “tourist” attractions 

by so-called “monks” paid by the Korean Workers’ Party. 

However, despite testimony about surviving Buddhist 

religious venues, only two refugees interviewed for the 

Commission’s new report witnessed any religious practice 

at these venues—and what they witnessed was practiced 

clandestinely. 

The persistence—and even popularity—of Shamanistic practice, particularly by exorcists and fortune-tellers, 

The agents told of infiltrating Korean-Chinese churches in China, posing 

as “pastors,” or setting up mock prayer meetings to gather information and 

entrap new converts in North Korea.

Commission Chair Cromartie and Moon-Soo Kim, current 

Governor of Gyeonggi Province and former Member of South 

Korea’s National Assembly, discuss A Prison Without Bars in 

Seoul.
85

continues to be an intriguing finding of the Commission’s research. Most refugees interviewed had visited, or 

knew of a family member who had visited, an exorcist or 

fortune-teller. Despite ongoing bans on these practices, 

they are apparently tolerated in rural areas—and indeed, 

practitioners are even frequented by high ranking officials 

and military officers. 

The current group of refugees also provides additional information about clandestine Protestant activity, 

including details about surviving religious practices and 

“new” religious activity fueled by cross-border contacts 

with China. The refugees testified to the existence of 

secret meetings and missionary activity occurring in the 

border regions. Although there is not enough data from 

these interviews to determine the size and scope of clandestine Protestant activity, it is nevertheless clearly perceived as a threat by North Korean security officials. 

Interviews with Former North Korean Security 

Agents

One important new facet of the new report is the inclusion of former North Korean Security Agents among those 

interviewed, providing particularly unusual and valuable 

insight into police tactics and efforts to curtail clandestine 

religious activities. The Commission interviewed former 

National Security Agency (NSA or Bowibu) and Public Security Agency (PSA, or Anjeobu) officers. Their testimony 

confirms that refugees face extensive interrogation about 

their religious contacts and affiliations once they are reA PRISON WITHOUT BARS

The reality of life for the people of 

North Korea can perhaps best be 

summarized by the words of one former 

government official, “The only reason the 

North Korean system...still exists is because 

of the strict surveillance system... 

North Korea is a prison without bars.”

Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS), left, with Commissioner Eid and Commission Chair Cromartie at a USCIRF briefing and press conference announcing the release of the report, A Prison Without Bars.
86

patriated from China. Their statements also acknowledge 

the torture and mistreatment of repatriated refugees, particularly those who confessed to contact with South Korean humanitarian organizations or who were suspected 

of being religious believers. 

The former North Korean security agents testify to 

increased police activity aimed at halting religious activities in the border regions with China. The agents told of 

infiltrating Korean-Chinese churches in China, posing as 

“pastors,” or setting up mock prayer meetings to gather 

information and entrap new converts in North Korea. The 

former agents believed Protestantism to be an ideological 

competitor to the “one and only ideology—KimIlSungism.” 

They also understood Protestantism as a security threat, 

suspecting that its growth was a product of “South Korean and American intelligence” agencies. The testimony 

presented in the new report suggests that the repression 

and mistreatment of repatriated refugees, and anyone 

suspected of conducting clandestine religious activity in 

North Korea, will continue. 

Conclusion

Clearly, religious freedom and other human rights conditions in North Korea remain among the world’s worst, as 

the testimony of this more recent group of interviewees 

confirms. Moreover, the regime headed by Kim Jong Il 

maintains an unyielding dominance over virtually every 

aspect of life there, aided by the state-imposed veneration 

of the Kim family and enforced through an extensive government network of control that intrudes upon virtually 

every aspect of life in North Korea. 

The Commission on International Religious Freedom 

has worked actively since its inception to draw the world’s 

attention to ways that the internationally guaranteed right 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is 

consistently—and severely—violated by the North Korean 

government. The Commission has devoted considerable 

resources to helping voices that are heard all too rarely—

Leaders of the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), including NKHR President Rev. Benjamin H. Yoon 

(far right), met with the USCIRF delegation in June 2008 in Seoul, and are pictured here with the Korean-language version of A 

Prison Without Bars. 
87

the voices of North Koreans—to reach policymakers far 

beyond the DPRK’s borders. The reality of life for the 

people of North Korea can perhaps best be summarized 

by the words of one former government official, “The only 

reason the North Korean system...still exists is because 

of the strict surveillance system... North Korea is a prison 

without bars.”

“A Prison Without Bars”: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief 

in North Korea can be found on the Commission’s Web 

site at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/A_Prison_Without_

Bars/prisonwithoutbars.pdf.

A PRISON WITHOUT BARS

ENDNOTES

1

 Researchers were also asked to 1) interview a more geographically diverse sample of 

refugees to confirm previous findings; 2) ask additional questions about the practice of 

Buddhism in North Korea; and 3) seek more information about conditions for refugees 

repatriated from China.

2

 Hawk, David, Concentrations of Inhumanity: An Analysis of the Phenomena of 

Repression Associated With North Korea’s Kwan-li-so Political Penal Labor Camps, 

Freedom House: 2007; and Christian Solidarity Worldwide, North Korea: A Case to 

Answer, A Call to Act, CRS: 2007.

The Tower of Juche Idea, opposite Kim Il Sung Square in 

Pyongyang.
88
89

PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral organizations as a way to 

advance religious freedom worldwide. The 192 member 

states of the United Nations have all agreed, by signing 

the UN Charter, to “practice tolerance” and to “promot[e] 

and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 

sex, language or religion.” These fundamental freedoms 

include the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief, which is protected in numerous international 

human rights instruments, including the 1948 Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1981 Declaration on 

the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 

Over the past several years, the Commission has become increasingly concerned that certain initiatives by 

some states at the UN could have negative consequences 

for the UN’s ability and efforts to continue to advance 

compliance with norms guaranteeing religious freedom 

worldwide. These initiatives include a recent attempt to 

limit the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as an ongoing campaign 

to create an international legal principle that would protect religions, rather than individuals, from alleged “defamation” and, in the process, violate key principles that 

guarantee freedom of expression and freedom of religion 

or belief. 

The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

In 1986, on the initiative of the United States, the UN 

Commission on Human Rights appointed an independent 

expert, or Special Rapporteur, to investigate and report 

on instances of religious intolerance and violations of the 

internationally-protected right to freedom of religion or 

belief around the world. The Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief monitors this fundamental 

freedom worldwide, communicates with governments 

about alleged violations, conducts country visits, and, perhaps most importantly, brings religious freedom concerns 

to the UN and public attention. 

The position of Special Rapporteur was held from 

1986 to 1993 by Mr. Angelo d’Almeida Ribeiro of Portugal,

from 1993 to 2004 by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor of Tunisia, and 

since 2004 by Ms. Asma Jahangir of Pakistan. Over the 

years, the successive Special Rapporteurs have visited and 

reported on the religious freedom situations in, chronologically, China, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Greece, India, Australia, Germany, the United States, Vietnam, Turkey, Bangladesh, Argentina, Algeria, Georgia, Romania, Nigeria, Sri 

Lanka, France, Azerbaijan, the Maldives, Angola, Israel, 

the Palestinian Territories, and India. In addition, the current Special Rapporteur plans to visit Turkmenistan in the 

near future. Bangladesh, China and Iran also have agreed 

in principle to allow her to visit, although dates for these 

These initiatives include a recent attempt 

to limit the mandate of the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

as well as an ongoing campaign to create an 

international legal principle that would protect religions, rather than individuals, from 

alleged “defamation” and, in the process, violate key principles that guarantee freedom of 

expression and freedom of religion or belief.
90

visits have not yet been determined. 

In September 2007, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate came up for renewal before the UN Human Rights 

Council, the successor to the UN Commission on Human 

Rights. At the time, it appeared that some countries might 

seek either to abolish the mandate or to change its focus 

from the individual right to freedom of religion or belief 

to the purported right of religion itself to be protected 

from alleged defamation. Since championing its creation, 

the U.S. government had always been a strong supporter 

of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief. Yet, when the issue of renewing the position arose at 

the September 2007 Human Rights Council session, the 

United States was silent, reportedly because of a policy 

decision, based on dissatisfaction with the Council, to 

downgrade significantly the participation of the United 

States in the Council’s ongoing deliberations. 

In response, the Commission advocated publicly and 

in private meetings with Administration officials that the 

U.S. government should re-engage with the Council on 

this vital issue. The Commission noted that, consistent 

with the importance of religious freedom in American 

history, IRFA makes promoting the freedom of religion 

or belief around the world a foreign policy priority of the 

United States, and that the Special Rapporteur’s mandate 

is an important tool in the international protection of this 

freedom. In the end, the United States did participate 

actively on the issue at the December 2007 Council session and the Special Rapporteur’s position was renewed 

(without an emphasis on the protection of religions) for 

three additional years. A Commission representative participated in the U.S. delegation to that session.

The Campaign to Protect Religions from 

Alleged Defamation 

In recent years, and particularly since the controversy 

over a Danish newspaper’s publication of cartoons of the 

Prophet Mohammed in September 2005, some countries 

with predominately Muslim populations have increasingly sought to emphasize halting so-called “defamation 

of religions,” a concept without basis in international 

law. Since its inauguration in June 2006, the UN Human 

Rights Council has adopted three resolutions calling on 

UN member states to outlaw defamation of religions, all of 

which were sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference (OIC) and opposed by most of the Council’s 

democracies. As in prior years, a similar OIC-sponsored 

resolution currently is working its way through the UN 

General Assembly. In addition, at the March 2008 Human Rights Council session, the OIC succeeded, over the 

objections of most of the Council’s democratic states, in 

amending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression to require that expert to 

report on instances of defamation of religions as “abuses” 

of the freedom of expression. The OIC has indicated that 

its ultimate goal is the adoption of a binding international 

covenant to protect religions from defamation.1

 

Although the defamation resolutions purport to seek 

protection for religions generally, the only religion and religious adherents that are specifically mentioned are Islam 

and Muslims.2

 Moreover, even assuming that other religions are included, the resolutions do not specify which 

religions are deserving of protection, or explain how and 

by whom this would be determined. By contrast, protecting the internationally-established individual right to the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief 

does not require answering these thorny questions. As the 

UN Human Rights Committee has explained, this right: 

...protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ 

are to be broadly construed. [The right] is not 

limited in its application to traditional religions 

or to religions and beliefs with institutional 

characteristics or practices analogous to those 

of traditional religions.3

 

The right thus protects adherents of any religion or 

belief, including newly established religions and minority 

religions that can be subject to hostility by the predominant religious community4

—adherents who not only 

may not be protected, but may be even more likely to be 

repressed under a legal rule against the defamation of 

religions.

The resolutions also do not define what exactly makes 

a statement defamatory to religions or explain who decides this question. However, other OIC documents reveal 

that the OIC appears to deem any criticism of Islam or 

Muslims to be religiously defamatory speech—a view that 

goes well beyond the existing legal concept of defamation.5

 The most comprehensive such document to date is 

the March 2008 First OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, which cites as defamatory speech the publication 

of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed or Allah 
91

in newspapers in several European countries and South 

Africa, Pope Benedict’s quotation of a fourteenth-century 

Byzantine emperor’s allegation that Mohammed was “bad 

and inhuman” for commanding his followers to spread 

Islam by the sword, and “derogatory political statements 

against Islam from some Western politicians.” In the latter 

category, the examples include comments critical of Islam 

or Muslims by Dutch, Austrian, Norwegian, Italian, and 

Swiss politicians, mostly from far-right parties. Also mentioned is Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ production of a thenunreleased film that the OIC believed would “vilify” the 

Koran,6

 and an article by a British columnist that called 

Islam “an uncompromising seventh-century ideology.” 

Protecting religions from defamation is often justified 

in the name of promoting religious tolerance, but in fact, 

it promotes intolerance and human rights violations. As 

the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

has noted, 

the rigorous protection of religions as such may 

create an atmosphere of intolerance and can give 

rise to fear and may even provoke the chances 

of a backlash. There are numerous examples of 

persecution of religious minorities as a result 

of excessive legislation on religious offences or 

overzealous application of laws that are fairly 

neutral. As a limit to freedom of expression, it 

can also limit scholarship on religious issues 

and may asphyxiate honest debate or research. 

[In addition, it] can limit discussion of practices within religions that may impinge on other 

human rights. In such a context, criticism of 

practices—in some cases adopted in the form 

of a law—appearing to be in violation of human 

rights but that are sanctioned by religion or perceived to be sanctioned by religion would also 

come within the ambit of defamation of religion. 

The dilemma deepens, as independent research 

on the impact of such laws may not be possible, 

as a critical analysis of the law may by itself, in 

certain situations, be considered as defaming 

the religion itself.7

 

It is worth noting that these resolutions are being put 

forward not by liberal democracies, but by authoritarian 

regimes that limit the religious freedom and other human rights of their citizens at home. Legal protections 

against defaming religions allow repressive governments 

and religious extremists to suppress and punish whatever 

they deem to be offensive or unacceptable speech about a 

particular, favored religion or sect. Such prohibitions have 

been used to restrict peaceful discussion of the appropriate role of religions in state and society, to prevent criticism of specific political figures or parties, to curb dissent 

from prevailing views and beliefs, and even to incite and 

to justify violence. 

Many of the countries promoting this international 

effort have laws that are similar to the defamation proposals in their own countries, usually against blaspheming 

only one religion (Islam), and often resulting in gross human rights violations. For example, in Pakistan—the chair 

of the OIC in the Human Rights Council—the domestic 

law makes blasphemy against Islam a criminal offense 

subject to severe penalties, including death. These broad 

provisions have been abused by extremists to intimidate 

members of religious minorities, including members of 

disfavored minority Muslim sects, and others with whom 

they disagree, as well as by the unscrupulous simply to 

carry out a vendetta or gain an advantage over another 

person. Blasphemy allegations in Pakistan, which are 

often false, have resulted in the lengthy detention of, as 

well as threats of violence and actual violence against, the 

accused. Even persons who have been acquitted of blasphemy have been forced into hiding or to flee the country 

because of fears of vigilante violence. 

This multilateral campaign to insert “defamation” 

of religions into various resolutions and to demand new 

norms to prohibit it appears to be an attempt by its proponents to extend their national blasphemy laws into the 

international arena, notwithstanding these laws’ incompatibility with universal human rights norms. Legal prohibitions on defaming or criticizing a religion, or even all 

religions, violate the principles outlined in international 

human rights instruments, which guarantee the right of 

IRFA

Protecting religions from defamation is 

often justified in the name of promoting 

religious tolerance, but in fact, it promotes 

intolerance and human rights violations.
92

everyone to freedom of opinion and expression as well as 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

They also improperly subordinate the protection of every 

individual’s human rights to the protection of religion qua

religion. 

As the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief has recognized, international human rights law 

protects individuals, not religions or belief systems, and 

the individual right to freedom of religion or belief does 

not include the right to have one’s religion or belief be free 

from criticism.8

 “Freedom of religion primarily confers a 

right to act in accordance with one’s religion but does not 

bestow a right for believers to have their religion itself protected from all adverse comment.”9

 In addition, as noted 

by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 

Expression, the limitations on freedom of expression that 

are allowed under international human rights law to protect the rights or reputations of others and to prevent the 

advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 

“are designed to protect individuals rather than belief systems, [thus] guaranteeing that every person will have all of 

his or her human rights protected.” 10 Moreover, the right 

to freedom of opinion and expression applies “not only to 

comfortable, inoffensive or politically correct opinions, 

but also to ideas that ‘offend, shock and disturb.’”11 

 The Commission has spoken out repeatedly against 

repressive domestic blasphemy laws in Pakistan, Sudan, 

and elsewhere.12 It has been following closely, and with 

increasing concern, the OIC’s apparent campaign to internationalize these provisions. In September 2007, the 

Commission wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

urging the United States to oppose a threatened attempt 

by the OIC to require the work of the Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief to focus on combating 

defamation of religions. Although it is not a voting member of the Council, the U.S. delegation, including the Commission, engaged vigorously on this issue at the December 

2007 Council session, as did the European Union members and Canada. Eventually, the Special Rapporteur’s 

position was renewed without any such requirement. 

However, because of the rejection of the OIC’s proposed 

amendments—which included the addition of language 

on the protection of religions under international and 

national law and the removal of a reference to the right to 

change one’s religion—the OIC members of the Council 

abstained.13 This was the first time that a routine resolution on freedom of religion and the Special Rapporteur’s 

mandate was not approved by consensus. 

As the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has recognized, 

international human rights law protects individuals, not religions or belief systems, 

and the individual right to freedom of religion or belief does not include the 

right to have one’s religion or belief be free from criticism.

ENDNOTES

1

 Statement of Mr. Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu, OIC Secretary General, UN Human Rights 

Council, Fourth Session, March 12, 2007. Although this statement referred to a 

convention against defamation of religions generally, other OIC documents have stated 

its aim as the establishment of “international legislation combating defamation of Islam 

and discrimination of Muslims” only. First OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, 

May 2007-March 2008, Organization of the Islamic Conference, March 2008, p. 8. 

2

 The OIC has characterized the General Assembly’s adoption in 2006 of an OICsponsored resolution on combating defamation of religions as “reflect[ing] the 

international community’s views and willingness to eliminate any discrimination 

against Muslims or defamation of Islam.” Ibid., p. 24. 

3

 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 

1993), para. 2.

4

 Ibid.

5

 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 

right to freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, A/HRC/7/14, 28 February 

2008, paragraphs 38-39 (noting that defamation laws “protect people against false 

statements of fact that could damage their reputation” and expressing concern about 

the dangers of expanding them to protect abstract values or institutions, including 

religions.)

6

 The film, titled “Fitna” (Strife), subsequently was released on the Internet. It 

intersperses quotations from the Koran and video of preachers advocating violence 

with graphic images from the September 11, 2001 attacks and other terrorist acts and 

argues that Muslims are seeking to subjugate the West. 

7

 Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, 

and the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 

xenophobia, and related intolerance, Doudou Diene, further to Human Rights Council 

decision 1/107 on incitement to racial and religious hatred and the promotion of 

tolerance, A/HRC/2/3, September 20, 2006, para. 42-43.
I 93 n order to ensure that the UN fully 

maintains its crucial function to protect 

and promote freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, the U.S. government 

should: 

• continue firmly and unequivocally to support a mandate and mandate-holder for 

the position of UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief that focuses 

on the internationally-protected right of 

every individual to the freedom of thought, 

conscience and religion or belief, rather than 

on the purported rights of religions; 

• continue to oppose efforts in international 

fora to establish an international legal principle that would claim to “protect” religions 

from defamation or criticism, offering new 

rights to religions that would undermine 

many fundamental, individual human 

rights; and

• work diplomatically, through its new Special 

Envoy to the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference (OIC) and its ambassadors in 

OIC countries, to persuade OIC members 

that religious intolerance and discrimination 

can best be fought not through national or 

international legal prohibitions that purport 

to stop criticism or “defamation” of religions, but rather through efforts to encourage respect for the human rights of every 

individual. 

Commission Recommendations

8

 Ibid., paragraphs 36-38.

9

 Ibid., paragraph 37.

10 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 

freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, A/HRC/7/14, 28 February 2008, 

paragraphs 40, 65-66, 85. 

11 Ibid.

12 See, e.g., U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Sudan: USCIRF 

Condemns Punishment of Teacher for Allegedly Insulting Religion, Urges her Release 

and Safe Passage, December 1, 2007; U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, Pakistan: USCIRF Decries Abuse of Blasphemy Laws, Apostasy Bill, June 

11, 2007. 

13 The OIC members also expressly disassociated themselves from the resolution’s 

reference to the right to change one’s religion, which they said they do not consider 

to be binding—despite the fact that this right is a long-recognized element of 

international human rights law. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 

22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), para. 5 (“The Committee observes that 

the freedom to ‘have or adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom 

to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or 

belief with another or to adopt atheistic views. . . .”). 
The Old City in Damascus, Syria. Syria is home a large number of Iraqi refugees.
95

Overview of the Commission’s Work with 

Refugee, Asylum and Immigration Issues

As stated in the preamble of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA): 

The right to freedom of religion undergirds the 

very origin and existence of the United States. 

Many of our nation’s founders fled religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and 

minds the ideal of religious freedom... From its 

birth to this day, the United States has prized 

this legacy of religious freedom and honored 

this heritage by standing for religious freedom 

and offering refuge to those suffering religious 

persecution.

Consistent with the language in these principles, Title 

VI of IRFA included several provisions related to asylum 

seekers, refugees, and immigrants, with particular attention to those individuals who have fled—or committed—

severe violations of religious freedom. Title VI also authorized the Commission to conduct a major study of the 

impact of a new U.S. immigration procedure established 

in 1996, called “Expedited Removal,” on asylum seekers. 

This study was conducted in 2003 and 2004, and the Commission released its findings and recommendations in its 

Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal in February 2005. Two years after the release of the report, the 

Commission released a “report card” in 2007 of the agencies responsible for Expedited Removal on their implementation of the report’s recommendations.

As part of its monitoring of the implementation of 

Title VI of IRFA, the Commission has concluded that 

implementation of some of the training and reporting provisions of Title VI has resulted in a heightened awareness 

of religious persecution issues among relevant decisionmakers and adjudicators. Other training and operational 

provisions, however, remain under or even unimplemented—nearly eight years after IRFA’s enactment. The 

Commission continues to urge the State Department and 

other relevant agencies to implement fully IRFA’s Title VI 

provisions. 

Working with the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, 

and Homeland Security, as well as the U.S. Congress, the 

Commission had several notable achievements in the 

refugee, asylum, and immigration fields in the past year.

• The Commission released a report card in 2007 assessing 

the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice on their implementation of Commission recommendations in the Commission’s Report on 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal two years following 

the release of the report.1

• The Commission met with Department of Homeland 

Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Assistant Secretary 

of Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Julie L. Myers, and Chief Immigration Judge 

David L. Neal following the release of the 2007 report 

card.

• The Department of Homeland Security created a new 

training module for its personnel on cultural awareness 

and asylum issues based on the Commission’s recommendations to protect asylum seekers in the Expedited 

Removal process.

• The Department of Homeland Security implemented 

quality assurance procedures to better track parole decisions for asylees in the Expedited Removal Process as 

recommended by the Commission. 

• Legislation was introduced by Senator Joseph Lieberman 

in the Safe and Secure Detention Act of 2007 as part of 

IRFA and the u.s. refugee 

and asylum programs

The Commission’s report card concluded 

that two years after the Study was 

released, most of the serious implementation 

flaws identified in the Study have yet 

to be addressed, and most of the Study’s recommendations have not been implemented.
96

comprehensive immigration reform to implement many 

of the recommendations of the Commission’s study on 

Expedited Removal.

• The Commission conducted trainings on international 

religious freedom issues for U.S. government officials involved in the asylum and refugee adjudication processes, 

including immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals at the Executive Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice, as well as the Refugee 

Corps and Asylum Officers of the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services in the Department of Homeland 

Security.

Expedited Removal Study Report Card: Two 

Years Later

In early 2007, the Commission released a report card assessing the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on their implementation of recommendations put forth in its congressionallyauthorized Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal (hereafter referred to as the Study), which examined 

how adequately the two federal agencies implemented 

congressionally-mandated protections for asylum seekers 

facing Expedited Removal (see below). 

The Commission’s report card concluded that two 

years after the Study was released, most of the serious 

implementation flaws identified in the Study have yet to 

be addressed, and most of the Study’s recommendations 

have not been implemented. In 2008, one year after the 

report card was issued, many of the Commission’s concerns continue to be valid and the problems identified 

remain unaddressed.

Expedited Removal—included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—

provides for the prompt removal of aliens without proper 

documentation to their country of origin. However, the 

process includes the risk that refugees, who often travel 

without proper documents, might be mistakenly returned 

to their persecutors. To address this risk, Congress implemented several special procedural protections, including detention of asylum seekers while a determination 

is made if the alien has a “credible fear” of persecution 

(credible fear determination) and, if the asylum seeker 

goes before an immigration judge (IJ), allowing some to 

be paroled while their asylum case is pending. If it is determined that the asylum seeker does not have a credible 

fear of persecution, he or she is returned to the Expedited 

Removal process and removed promptly.

At least five separate entities are involved in Expedited Removal. Within DHS, it is Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) that first encounters aliens and identifies 

those subject to Expedited Removal and those seeking 

asylum. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is 

responsible for detaining asylum seekers until Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) makes the credible fear 

determination. For those asylum seekers found to have 

a credible fear, the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) takes over; immigration judges hear 

the cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or 

Board) reviews any appeals. With so many immigration 

officers involved in so many locations, coordination remains a major challenge within DHS, and between DHS 

and DOJ.

Although Expedited Removal was intended to protect 

the integrity of U.S. borders while also protecting bona 

fide asylum seekers, the Study discovered that serious implementation flaws place asylum seekers at risk of being 

Although Expedited Removal was intended to protect the integrity of U.S. borders 

while also protecting bona fide asylum seekers, the Study discovered that serious 

implementation flaws place asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries where 

they may face persecution. The Study also found that asylum seekers were 

detained inappropriately, under prison-like conditions and in actual jails.
97

returned to countries where they may face persecution.

The Study also found that asylum seekers were detained 

inappropriately, under prison-like conditions and in actual jails.

DHS has not made any public response to the Study, 

despite an assurance by DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 

and Assistant Secretary for Policy Stewart Baker in a May 

2007 meeting with the Commission and an earlier request 

from the Senate Appropriations Committee in Report 109-

083 to consult with EOIR and report to the Committee by 

February 2006 on various aspects of the agency’s implementation of the Study’s recommendations. The House 

of Representatives Appropriations Committee in Report 

109-79 also urged DHS to consider implementation of 

specific Study recommendations. It should be emphasized that none of the Study’s recommendations require 

congressional action. However, because of concern over 

the agencies’ failures to address the Study, Senator Lieberman introduced legislation in 2007 that would mandate 

implementation of a number of the Commission’s recommendations. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The Commission found that in more than half of the Expedited Removal interviews observed during the Study, 

immigration officers failed to read a script advising aliens 

in the Expedited Removal process that they should ask for 

protection without delay if they have any reason to fear 

being returned home. The Study further found that in 72 

percent of the cases, asylum seekers were not provided 

an opportunity to review sworn statements taken by immigration officers to make any necessary corrections 

for errors in interpretation before signing. These sworn 

statements are not verbatim, are not verifiable, often suggest that information was conveyed to the asylum seeker 

which was in fact never conveyed, and sometimes contain 

questions that were never asked. Although they resemble 

verbatim transcripts, they are not. The Study found that 

these unreliable documents are often used against asylum 

seekers when their cases are presented before an immigration judge. 

DHS regulations also require that, when an asylum 

seeker expresses a fear of return, he or she must be referred to an Asylum Officer to determine whether the fear 

is “credible.” Yet, in nearly 15 percent of the cases that 

Study experts observed in person, asylum seekers who expressed a fear of return were nevertheless removed without a referral to an Asylum Officer. Of those cases, nearly 

half of the files indicated that the asylum seeker had not 

expressed any fear.

The Study put forth five recommendations to CBP to 

enhance and expand quality assurance procedures to ensure that Expedited Removal procedures are being properly followed, including: 1) expand existing videotape 

systems to all ports of entry and border patrol stations 

and have “testers” verify that procedures are correctly 

followed; 2) reconcile conflicting field guidance to clarify 

the requirement that any alien who expressed fear be referred for a credible fear interview; 3) inform immigration 

judges that forms used at ports of entry and the border are 

not verbatim transcripts of the alien’s entire asylum case, 

despite their appearance, so that they can be given proper 

weight; 4) save scarce detention resources by not placing 

asylum seekers with valid travel documents in Expedited 

Removal; and 5) improve monitoring so that existing border procedures are correctly followed. 

Before the report card’s release, DHS failed to provide 

information on steps taken by CBP to address these issues 

and there was no public information to indicate that any 

of the recommendations had been implemented. On the 

contrary, information provided by DHS during the course 

of the Orantes litigation revealed that supervisors continue to rely almost exclusively on file reviews of Expedited 

Removal orders, and that the relevant DHS officials had 

IRFA

The Commission found that in more 

than half of the Expedited Removal 

interviews observed during the Study, 

immigration officers failed to read a script 

advising aliens in the Expedited Removal 

process that they should ask for protection 

without delay if they have any reason 

to fear being returned home.
98

no knowledge of whether DHS had adopted the Commission’s recommendations. During the Commission’s meeting with Secretary Chertoff, the Commission was told that 

CBP had taken steps to increase enforcement and review 

of its procedures and field guidance related to cases of 

Expedited Removal, as well as to improve training of field 

officers. However, the Commission’s primary recommendation, the expansion of existing videotape systems to 

verify that procedures are correctly followed, has yet to be 

implemented.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

The Study found that despite established national criteria 

to determine when asylum seekers in Expedited Removal 

should be released from detention pending their asylum 

hearing, there was no evidence that the criteria are actually being implemented. The Study found wide variations 

in release rates across the country, from 0.5 percent in 

New Orleans and 4 percent in New Jersey, to 94 percent 

in San Antonio and 81 percent in Chicago. Additionally, 

the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers referred for 

credible fear are detained—for weeks or months and occasionally years—in penal or penitentiary-like facilities. 

On average, asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution are detained for 60 days, and one third are held 

for 90 days or more. Many facilities are, in fact, jails and 

prisons, and in some of these facilities, asylum seekers 

live alongside U.S. citizens serving criminal sentences or 

criminal aliens—even though ICE detention standards do 

not permit non-criminal detainees to be co-mingled with 

criminals. ICE has experimented with alternatives to detention, and has opened one secure facility—in Broward 

County, Florida—that resembles a refugee center rather 

than a penal institution. Broward, unfortunately, remains 

the exception. 

The Study put forth five recommendations to ICE 

to ensure that detention standards and conditions are 

appropriate for asylum seekers and to implement more 

consistent parole criteria, including: 1) train detention 

center personnel to work with non-criminal, psychologically vulnerable asylum-seekers; 2) work with the 

immigration courts to ensure that detained aliens in 

Expedited Removal, including those who have not been 

referred for a credible fear determination, have access to 

legal service providers; 3) change detention standards so 

that non-criminal asylum seekers are not detained under 

penal conditions; 4) codify existing parole criteria into 

regulations; and 5) ensure consistent and correct parole 

decisions by developing standardized forms and national 

review procedures to ensure their proper application. 

Since the release of the report card, ICE has taken 

steps to increase communication and cooperation with 

the Commission on its efforts to address concerns raised 

in the Study. In 2007, ICE implemented some of the Commission’s recommendations, but it also enacted policies 

contrary to the recommendations. In December, in compliance with a Commission recommendation, ICE jointly 

released a new training module on cultural awareness 

and asylum issues. The previous month, ICE announced 

new quality assurance procedures to track parole decisions and statistics. However, the same policy directive 

expanded the criteria that must be met to allow asylum 

seekers to be paroled, rather than simply codify the existing criteria as the Commission recommended. Unfortunately, this move may actually extend detention for 

asylum seekers. 

The agency has also been unwilling to develop alternatives to detention. A December 2006 Audit Report 

by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found 

instances of non-compliance with existing ICE Detention Standards at all five of the facilities surveyed, three of 

which were included in the Commission’s Study. Moreover, an April 2006 DHS OIG Audit Report recommended 

The Study put forth three 

recommendations to ensure asylum 

seekers are not turned away in error, 

including: 1) subject both positive and 

negative credible fear findings to similar 

review procedures; 2) expand the existing 

pro bono program for the credible fear 

process to all eight Asylum Offices; 

and 3) allow Asylum Officers to grant 

asylum at the credible fear stage.
99 that ICE expedite alternatives to detention and improve 

the capacity of data management systems to track information on the rationale underlying parole decisions. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS)

The Study found that, despite their expertise and authority to grant asylum outside the Expedited Removal context, Asylum Officers have a limited role in the Expedited 

Removal process. The Study found a high rate of positive 

credible fear determinations, reflecting the deliberately 

generous preliminary screening standard used in order to 

assure that a refugee is not mistakenly returned. However, review procedures for negative credible fear determinations were found to be more onerous, and might have 

the unintended consequence of encouraging positive 

determinations. The Study also found that the partnership between the Arlington, Virginia Asylum Office and 

the Capital Area Immigrants Rights Coalition to ensure 

legal advice for credible fear determinations was a success worth replicating. The partnership not only provides 

detained asylum seekers with legal advice, but has also 

improved efficiency by increasing the number of asylum 

seekers who, after consulting with counsel, chose not to 

pursue their claims. 

The Study put forth three recommendations to 

ensure asylum seekers are not turned away in error, including: 1) subject both positive and negative credible 

fear findings to similar review procedures; 2) expand the 

existing pro bono program for the credible fear process to 

all eight Asylum Offices; and 3) allow Asylum Officers to 

grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

The Commission commends USCIS for its April 2006 

memorandum on increasing quality assurance review 

for positive credible fear determinations, the release of 

an updated Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Lesson 

Plan, and the announcement in December 2006 that it 

welcomes approaches by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to expand the existing pro bono program to 

the other seven Asylum Office cities. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Agency-wide

The Study found extensive problems with the overall management and coordination of the Expedited Removal process, including insufficient quality assurance practices, 

inadequate data management systems, poor communication between responsible DHS bureaus, and no mechanism to address system-wide issues. The Commission 

put forth four recommendations to address these coordination and management flaws: 1) create a high-level 

Refugee Coordinator position; 2) address implementation 

and coordination issues before expanding the Expedited 

Removal program; 3) create a reliable data management 

system that allows for real-time information on asylum 

seekers in Expedited Removal; and 4) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage.

While DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff did appoint 

a Refugee Coordinator, no other recommendations were 

acted upon. In February 2006, a Senior Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Policy was appointed. The Commission 

remains concerned, however, that unless supported by a 

fully staffed office and with the necessary authority within 

the Department to make the needed changes, the position cannot implement the Study’s recommendations, 

ensure consistent asylum policy and legal interpretations 

Department-wide, and monitor the system on an agencywide basis to ensure that changes remain in place and 

problems are addressed as they arise. 

The Commission’s broad recommendation was that 

Expedited Removal not be expanded until the serious 

problems identified in the Study were resolved. Despite 

this recommendation—and the failure to resolve the 

problems cited in the Study—DHS has in fact expanded 

Expedited Removal from a port-of-entry program to encompass the entire land and sea border of the United 

States, to a distance of 100 miles inland. The Commission 

continues to be concerned about this extension of Expe-
100

dited Removal, despite its specific recommendation that 

flaws in the process must be addressed before such an 

expansion. 

The Commission discovered in the DHS OIG Audit 

Report in April 2006 that ICE lacks data analysis capabilities to manage the detention and removal program in an 

efficient and effective manner. The Commission continues to urge the Department to develop a department-wide 

data management system to allow for real-time information on asylum seekers in the Expedited Removal process. 

The Commission also continues to urge DHS to allow 

Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage, 

a recommendation which Secretary Chertoff and other 

DHS officials have told the Commission is currently under 

review. 

Department of Justice, Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR)

The Study found that sworn statements taken at ports 

of entry and the border are inaccurate and incomplete, 

and that credible fear determinations are not intended 

to document the asylum seeker’s entire claim. Nevertheless, the Study found that in 2 percent of all cases, sworn 

statements and/or credible fear determination records 

were used to impeach the asylum seeker. In 39 percent of 

all cases, the immigration judge cited these documents in 

denying the claim. The Study also found that one in four 

asylum seekers who are represented by pro bono attorneys 

are granted asylum, whereas only one in 40 unrepresented 

asylum seekers succeed. 

The outcome of the asylum seeker’s case also seems 

to depend largely on chance; namely, the IJ who happens 

to be assigned to hear the case. Among IJs sitting in the 

same city who hear a significant number of asylum cases, 

some grant almost zero percent of applications, while others grant 80 percent. Of the asylum cases appealed to the 

BIA, only 2 to 4 percent are reversed. A particular concern 

is the use of “summary affirmances without opinion,” 

whereby a single Board member can endorse an IJ decision without providing a reasoned written opinion discussing the issues raised on appeal. This practice, while 

allowing the Board to work through some of its backlog, 

can reduce confidence in the rigor of the Board’s review 

and has led to an increase in appeals of BIA decisions to 

federal circuit courts. Another drawback of summary affirmances is that they do not provide any guidance to IJs, 

since any errors other than those cases requiring reversal 

of the decision are not corrected by the Board. 

The Commission put forth six recommendations to 

improve consistency in asylum determinations by IJs. 

These are: 1) reinstate funding for immigration judge 

training; 2) expand the Legal Orientation Program (LOP), 

conducted by NGOs under EOIR’s direction in order to 

provide legal information to detained aliens, improve 

their access to pro bono counsel, reduce detention costs, 

and increase immigration cost efficiency; 3) improve the 

quality of immigration court decisions; 4) work with ICE 

to ensure that detained aliens in Expedited Removal, including those who have not been referred for a credible 

fear determination, have access to legal service providers; 

5) improve administrative review of asylum appeals; and 

6) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible 

fear stage. 

The Commission welcomes the efforts EOIR has 

made to address the concerns raised in the Study. In 

August 2006, the Commission expressed approval of 

new DOJ reforms based on the Commission’s recommendations. The reforms included: implementation of 

performance and supervision measures to promote better 

consistence and quality of IJ decisions; improvement and 

The Commission’s broad recommendation was that Expedited Removal not be 

expanded until the serious problems identified in the Study were resolved. Despite 

this recommendation—and the failure to resolve the problems cited in the Study—DHS 

has in fact expanded Expedited Removal from a port-of-entry program to encompass 

the entire land and sea border of the United States, to a distance of 100 miles inland.
101

increased explanation of BIA decisions; increased training 

of IJs, BIA members, and EOIR staff; and expansion and 

improvement of EOIR’s pro bono programs.

EOIR has also increased training opportunities 

provided to immigration judges. In January 2007, EOIR 

informed the Commission that it is expanding and improving training for all IJs, including some country specific trainings, and that it welcomed Commission input or 

recommendations for these training sessions. EOIR is also 

providing more resource materials for the judges. In August 2006 and 2007, all IJs participated in a five-day training conference, which included presentations on religious 

freedom by the Commission and the State Department’s 

Office of International Religious Freedom, and mandatory 

workshops concerning asylum law and procedures and 

improving oral decisions. The conference also included 

circuit-specific reference materials. In November 2006, 

all IJs received an in-depth outline on asylum credibility 

and corroborating evidence in the federal Courts of Appeals. Additionally, a one-week training course for new 

IJs was held in March 2007 that included lectures on asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the 

Convention against Torture, a discussion of credibility 

developments under the REAL-ID Act, and a mock asylum 

hearing. 

The Commission was also pleased to learn that EOIR 

in January 2007 doubled the number of LOP sites from 

six to 12, with an additional four pilot sites for unaccompanied minors in the custody of the Office of Refugee 

Resettlement. In addition, EOIR formed a Pro Bono Committee to oversee expansion and improvement of its pro 

bono programs. 

The Commission noted efforts by EOIR to improve 

immigration adjudication through additional training 

and resource materials and the consideration of “quality 

assurance procedures (i.e., peer review) to address the 

significant variations in approval and denial rates among 

immigration judges.” The Commission further notes that 

the BIA has decreased the number of summary affirmances and has also added new Board members. It continues 

to urge the BIA to increase the number of written opinions 

in asylum cases. 

U.S. Inter-agency Disagreement Hampering 

Protection for Many Who Fled Religious 

Persecution

A legislative development in the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (as 

amended in 2005 by the REAL ID Act) has inadvertently 

become a barrier for refugees and asylum seekers who 

have fled religious persecution at the hands of terrorists 

and terrorist regimes.57 Essentially, an alien is now 

held inadmissible if he or she provided any in-kind or 

monetary assistance (i.e., “material support”) to any 

group that advocates, conspires to commit, or commits an 

illegal act of violence, even if such support was provided 

under duress or was directed toward a group supported 

by the U.S. government. This policy has left thousands of 

refugees stranded in camps overseas as their applications 

have been put on hold by DHS and UNHCR. 

The Departments of Justice, State, and Homeland 

IRFA
102

Security may waive this so-called “material support bar” 

under certain circumstances. In 2006, Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice announced a waiver for the Burmese 

Karen, Karenni, and Chin ethnic groups and for the Tibetan Mustangs and Cuban Alzados, groups fighting for 

democracy in their respective countries. In January 2007, 

Secretary Chertoff announced that provisions of material 

support to terrorism do not apply to those seeking asylum 

or adjustment of status to those that provided support to 

the following groups: the Karen National Union and Karen 

National Liberation Army, Chin National Front and Chin 

National Army, China National League for Democracy, 

Kayam Mew Land Party, Arakan Liberation Party, Tibetan 

Mustangs, Cuban Alzados, and Karenni National Progressive Party. In late 2007, Hmong and Montagnards from 

Southeast Asian countries also were exempted from material support bars. Additionally, a duress exemption has 

been granted for victims of Tier III terrorist groups.3

 In 

December 2007, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

2008 broadened the categories of people now eligible for 

a waiver and granted the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security the discretionary authority to determine 

that the “Tier III” definition shall not apply to any group 

that would otherwise fall within its scope. Groups that 

“have engaged terrorist activity against the United States 

or another democratic country or that has purposefully 

engaged in a pattern or practice of terrorist activity that is 

directed at civilians” continue to be prohibited from receiving a waiver. 

These steps have not fully addressed the situation, 

however. Individuals who provided support under duress 

to Tier I or II terrorist groups are still barred from entry 

into the United States. Many Iraqis fleeing religious and 

other forms of persecution in their country—as many as 

13 percent of those referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program—have had their resettlement cases delayed 

because of material support concerns. Finally, the U.S. 

government may rescind waivers without notice and without allowing asylum seekers to challenge the revocations, 

raising due process concerns. 

 Individuals who have voluntarily supported foreign 

terrorist organizations, such as those designated by the 

Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, should certainly be excluded from 

the United States. However, denying refugees admission 

to the United States because they were physically forced 

against their will to assist a terrorist organization, or because they provided inconsequential support to organizations which oppose particularly repressive regimes, is 

not only undermining the international leadership of the 

United States in the field of human rights, it is endangering the lives of innocent refugees who have fled terror or 

repression.

The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to resolve this impasse without further delay. Bona 

fide refugees should not continue to be barred from the 

United States if they represent no genuine security threat.

Access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program for those who have Fled Severe 

Violations of Religious Freedom

The Commission has repeatedly urged that the U.S. Refugee Program be made more accessible for refugee applicants who have fled severe abuses of religious freedom, 

particularly those who have fled countries of particular 

concern (CPCs). The Commission has been joined in 

this call by the Congress, which enacted a provision in 

the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 requiring that 

the President, in his annual report on proposed refugee 

admissions pursuant to section 207(d) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, include information about specific 

measures taken to facilitate access to the U.S. Refugee Program for individuals from each CPC.4

 

The Congress also renewed for FY07 the Lautenberg 

In January 2007, EOIR informed 

the Commission that it is expanding and 

improving training for all IJs (immigration 

judges), including some country specific 

trainings, and that it welcomed Commission 

input or recommendations for these 

training sessions. EOIR is also providing 

more resource materials for the judges.
103

(formerly Specter) Amendment, which provides relief to 

religious minority refugee applicants from Iran by clarifying the adjudication standards specific to their claims.5

 

The Commission recommends that Congress and the 

President continue to extend the Lautenberg Amendment 

until the government of Iran ceases to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.

The United States has the largest program in the 

world to interview and process refugees in third countries 

for resettlement, with a proposed ceiling (for FY08) of up 

to 70,000 refugee admissions. With more than 8 million 

refugees in the world, however, access to the U.S. Refugee 

Program is tightly controlled, to the extent that for every 

year since 1991, the refugee admissions level has been 

undersubscribed by 5,000 refugees or more. Refugees 

overseas may not submit an application to the Refugee 

Program unless they are referred by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or unless they belong 

to a specific group that has been deemed a “processing 

priority” by the Secretary of State. U.S. embassies may 

also refer cases to the Refugee Program for resettlement, 

but such referrals are an insignificant percentage of the 

overall caseload. 

Since the release of its 2005 Annual Report, the 

Commission has called upon the Department of State to 

facilitate access for certain specific groups, including Afghan Hindus under threat of imminent deportation from 

Germany, ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, 

and other religious minorities who have fled targeted 

violence in Iraq, and Sudanese Christians who, due to the 

severity of past persecution or special vulnerabilities, will 

be unlikely candidates for voluntary repatriation. Other 

groups that may warrant consideration include Jehovah’s 

Witnesses from Eritrea who have fled to Sudan, as well as 

ethnic and religious minorities from Burma—such as Chin 

and Karen Christians and Rohingya Muslims—who have 

no realistic hope of imminent integration into countries of 

first asylum or safe and voluntary repatriation to Burma.

Problems in Implementation of Title VI of 

IRFA

Training Consular Officers in Refugee and 

Asylum Adjudications and Human Rights, 

Particularly Religious Freedom

Section 602 of IRFA mandates training on the U.S. Refugee 

Program for consular officers. The Commission remains 

concerned, however, that training of State Department 

consular officers in the Refugee Program continues to fall 

short of IRFA requirements in that the training concentrates on only one narrow aspect of the Refugee Program. 

Although consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, as noted above they are authorized to refer 

individuals in need of protection to the Refugee Program.6

 

Such referrals rarely take place. A report by Professor 

David Martin at the University of Virginia, commissioned 

by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees 

and Migration, recommended that the Department provide new Foreign Service officers with more systematic 

instruction on refugee and humanitarian programs and 

on the specific opportunities and procedures for referrals.7

 Further, the Commission’s Report on Asylum Seekers 

in Expedited Removal noted concern over evidence that it 

may be increasingly difficult for refugees and asylum seekIRFA

...(D)enying refugees admission to the United States because they were 

physically forced against their will to assist a terrorist organization, or because they 

provided inconsequential support to organizations which oppose particularly 

repressive regimes, is not only undermining the international leadership of the 

United States in the field of human rights, it is endangering the lives of 

innocent refugees who have fled terror or repression.
104

ers to obtain protection in the United States, and called for 

a study on the extent to which consular officers are trained 

in the Refugee Program, as is required by IRFA, and on the 

impact such training is having on referrals made by U.S. 

embassies to the Refugee Program. The Commission regrets that no such study has been undertaken to date.

IRFA Procedural Requirements Relating to the 

U.S. Refugee Admissions Program

Section 602 of IRFA also contains other requirements for 

the U.S. Refugee Program. Among these are the requirement that the State Department establish uniform procedures for overseas processing entities, which prepare, 

under contract with the Department, the applications of 

individuals seeking refugee status, as well as for personnel responsible for preparing refugee case files for refugee 

adjudications. 

Although the State Department has made progress in 

complying with this provision by developing a “Worldwide 

Refugee Admissions Processing System” (WRAPS) to promote uniformity in the preparation of refugee case files, 

WRAPS does not provide any substantive guidance in two 

central aspects of the preparation of refugee case files: the 

preparation of each refugee applicant’s persecution story 

and the filing of requests for reconsideration of refugee 

applications that are denied. 

In the Commission’s 2004 Annual Report, it was noted that the State Department’s Population, Refugees, and 

Migration Bureau had expressed its intention to establish 

an internal working group on overseas processing entities. Professor David Martin, in the paper commissioned 

by the Department, also recommended that such a group 

develop guidelines consistent with section 602 of IRFA.8

 

The Commission reiterates its recommendation that the 

State Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration 

Bureau more fully implement the requirements set forth 

in this provision of IRFA.

Section 602 also requires the State Department to 

develop guidelines to address potential hostile biases in 

individuals working in the U.S. Refugee Program. While 

the Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration (PRM) 

has included a provision in the cooperative agreement 

requiring each overseas processing entity (OPE) to take 

steps to ensure against hostile biases of employees toward 

any particular refugee applicant, no guidelines have been 

developed. In November 2006, PRM did hold a session 

during its training of OPEs where this issue was discussed.

The Commission urges PRM to draw guidance from this 

discussion to form the basis of such guidelines as mandated under IRFA.

Inadmissibility of Religious Freedom Violators

Although section 604 of IRFA holds any alien inadmissible 

who, as a foreign government official, was “responsible 

for or directly carried out...particularly severe violations 

of religious freedom,” the Commission has not seen any 

evidence that the Departments of State and Homeland 

Security have developed a lookout list of aliens who are 

inadmissible on this basis. This lifetime bar on admissions has only been invoked once to render an alien inadmissible. In March 2005, it was used to exclude Governor 

Nahendra Modi of Gujarat state in India for his complicity 

in the reportedly pre-planned riots in 2002 that resulted in 

the deaths of nearly 2,000 Muslims. The Commission had 

issued a statement urging such an action. 

Directly related to identifying and barring severe religious freedom violators from entry to the United States, 

section 402(b)(2) of IRFA requires that the President determine the specific officials responsible for violations of 

religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments 

of CPCs. Section 408(a)(1) requires that the identities of 

these officials be published in the Federal Register (“when 

applicable and to the extent practicable”). To date, no 

individual officials responsible for particularly severe religious freedom violations have been identified from any 

CPCs, despite these requirements.

The Commission urges the Departments of State and 

Homeland Security to implement these provisions of IRFA 

to identify and exclude religious freedom violators.
105

IRFA

ENDNOTES 1

 The Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal can be accessed at http://www.

uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum_refugees/2005/february/index.html. The report 

card can be accessed at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/scorecard_FINAL.pdf. 2 See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006), as amended by Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT ACT 

OF 2001 (P.L. 107-56) and Section 103 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13). 3

 Tier I and II terrorist organizations are defined as those designated under Title 8, U.S. 

Code, §1189, or subsequently by the Secretary of State. Tier III terrorist organizations 

are those that consist of two or more individuals, who engage in terrorist activities or 

have a subgroup that engages in terrorist activities. 4

 The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333) SEC. 305. ANNUAL 

REPORTS.

(b) COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN.—The President shall include in 

each annual report on proposed refugee admission pursuant to section 207(d) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157(d)) information about specific 

measures taken to facilitate access to the United States refugee program for individuals 

who have fled countries of particular concern for violations of religious freedom, 

identified pursuant to section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)). The report shall include, for each country of particular 

concern, a description of access of the nationals or former habitual residents of that 

country to a refugee determination on the basis of—(1) referrals by external agencies 

to a refugee adjudication; (2) groups deemed to be of special humanitarian concern 

to the United States for purposes of refugee resettlement; and (3) family links to the 

United States. 5

 P.L. 110-5, Section 20412

6

 This is an important function, since individuals fleeing persecution may not submit 

an application for refugee status unless they either (1) receive such a referral from an 

Embassy or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or (2) fall into one 

of the narrowly defined processing priorities of “humanitarian concern” to the U.S. 

Refugee Program. 7

 David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New 

Era of Refugee Resettlement (July 2004), p. 72 (http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/36495.pdf). 8

 See Martin, p. 143.
Monks at Drepung Monastery, Lhasa, Tibet.
107 In passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), Congress not only recognized 

the global importance of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, but also made the promotion of this critical freedom a matter of U.S. law. This 

action ensured that advancing international religious 

freedom became an integral part of the U.S. government’s 

foreign policy agenda. IRFA established a number of interrelated mechanisms to pursue this goal. These include: 

an Office of International Religious Freedom in the Department of State headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom; an annual report by the 

State Department on the conditions of religious freedom 

in each foreign country and U.S. actions to promote religious freedom; and the establishment of the United States 

Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

The Commission was created by Congress through 

IRFA expressly to advocate a prominent place within U.S. 

foreign policy for the promotion of religious freedom 

throughout the world. The Commission was mandated 

both to monitor the status of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief globally and to make recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, 

and Congress on ways the U.S. government can further the 

protection and promotion of this freedom and related human rights in its relations with other countries. 

Under IRFA, the President is required to single out 

and explicitly name those countries that are the most 

egregious violators of religious freedom, and the Act contains a formal mechanism for doing so. Section 402(b)(1) 

of IRFA specifically directs the President at least annually 

to designate each country in which the government has 

engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom” as “a country of particular concern” or 

CPC. Particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

are defined as those that are “systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious.”1

 In defining violations of religious freedom, 

IRFA directly refers to the “internationally recognized 

right to freedom of religion and religious belief and 

practice” as laid out in such international instruments as 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2

 

Severe Religious Freedom Violators: the 

Commission’s CPC List

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption of 

the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), legislation that underscores the importance of religious freedom 

around the world and the need to promote this freedom 

as an integral component of U.S. foreign policy. Developments of the past decade have strengthened the significance of this critical freedom, which affects the political 

and humanitarian interests of the United States, as well as 

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

AND THE COMMISSION WATCH LIST

This year marks the tenth 

anniversary of the adoption of the 

International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), legislation that underscores the 

importance of religious freedom around 

the world and the need to promote this 

freedom as an integral component of 

U.S. foreign policy. Developments of 

the past decade have strengthened the 

significance of this critical freedom, 

which affects the political and humanitarian interests of the United States, 

as well as America’s national 

security concerns.
108

America’s national security concerns. 

As required by IRFA and pursuant to the Commission’s review of the facts and circumstances regarding 

violations of religious freedom around the world, the 

Commission wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

in May 2008, continuing to recommend that she, using 

authority delegated to her by the President, designate as 

CPCs the following 11 countries: Burma, Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, 

Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 

CPCs: the Failure to Designate and Adequately 

Respond

The process of CPC designation as outlined under IRFA, 

and the implementation of meaningful policies in response to such designations, should be considered among 

the most serious actions taken by the U.S. government in 

its human rights policy. Under IRFA, however, the simple 

designation by the U.S. government of a severe violator of 

religious freedom as a CPC is not by itself sufficient action. 

CPC designation carries an obligation that one or more of 

certain actions specified in Section 405 of IRFA be taken, 

unless the Secretary of State, as the President’s designee, 

determines that pre-existing sanctions are adequate or 

otherwise waives the requirement.4

 If a CPC designee is 

already subject to ongoing, multiple, broad-based sanctions “imposed in significant part in response to human 

rights abuses,” then one or more of these pre-existing 

sanctions can be designated as meeting the requirements 

of IRFA.5

The CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool. It 

provides the Secretary of State with a range of specific 

options to take to address serious violations of religious 

freedom. It does not automatically entail sanctions, but 

requires that the Secretary of State enter into direct consultations with a country to find ways to improve the situation. To avoid more punitive actions, one policy response 

under IRFA is for the CPC country to enter into a binding 

agreement with the United States that spells out specific 

actions the government will take to end the violations that 

gave rise to the designation.

When used properly, the CPC designation:

• sends the clear signal that U.S. interests include concern 

for human rights; 

• starts a dialogue where specific benchmarks on progress 

are agreed upon in order to avoid economic sanctions;

Commissioners Land, Prodromou, Cromartie, Leo, and Shea at the May 2008 press conference announcing the release of the 

2008 Annual Report.
109

• allows the Secretary of State in an incremental fashion to 

employ or use the threat of punitive actions to address 

egregious abuses of religious freedom; and 

• allows the Secretary of State to waive any specific actions 

if progress is being made toward addressing serious violations of freedom of religion or belief.

The Commission is concerned that the State Department has not designated any country as a CPC since 

November 2006. IRFA specifically directs the Secretary 

of State, delegated by the President, on an annual basis, 

to review religious freedom conditions around the world 

and, based on that review, to designate as CPCs those 

countries in which the government has engaged in or 

tolerated “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” The annual review must occur by September 1 of 

each year and, while IRFA does not set a specific deadline 

for the CPC designations, the fact that those designations 

are based on that review indicates that they should be 

made in a timely way thereafter. As of May 2008, no CPC 

designations have yet been made based on the review 

that had to be completed by September 1, 2007. The 

State Department issued its annual Report on International Religious Freedom in September 2007, as required 

by statute, but without making any CPC designations.

While the report is extremely valuable, its purpose is to 

help the Administration identify the very worst religious 

freedom violators as required by IRFA. The CPC designation process is vital to that legislation. The State Department’s delay in naming CPCs following the annual review 

deadline undermines IRFA’s statutory scheme, and may 

send the unfortunate signal that the U.S. government is 

not sufficiently committed to the IRFA process, including 

by seeking improvements from the most severe religious 

freedom violators.

IRFA prescribes a list of actions from which the President can select appropriate policy responses for each 

CPC. This was done in the case of Eritrea, to which, in 

September 2005, you announced the denial of commercial export of defense articles and services covered by the 

Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted. This 

was the first unique presidential action to be undertaken 

under IRFA as a result of CPC designation. With respect 

to Burma, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, substantial and 

important sanctions are in place, initially imposed on other grounds and then redesignated for religious freedom 

reasons under IRFA. In the case of China, the Chinese 

government’s egregious religious freedom violations have 

been met with a relatively weak U.S. response, a redesignation of sanctions restricting exports of crime control 

and detection instruments and equipment. The designation of a severe religious freedom violator as a CPC should 

be followed by the implementation of a clear policy response uniquely directed at addressing religious freedom 

violations such as the recommendations for each CPC that 

are provided in the Commission’s report.

Moreover, the Commission encourages the State 

Department to comply with the requirements of IRFA in 

the case of the most recently named CPC, Uzbekistan. As 

stated in the Report on International Religious Freedom, 

the State Department has opted “to establish a dialogue 

aimed at improving religious freedom” in lieu of a presidential action. The Commission hopes that these negotiations are directed toward negotiating a binding agreement 

on Uzbekistan for measures to improve religious freedom, 

which would be an acceptable action provided under 

IRFA. A single CPC, Saudi Arabia, was granted a 180-day 

waiver exempting it from any presidential action whatsoever; first announced in 2005, the waiver was subsequently extended in 2006 for two years, “to further the purposes 

of the (International Religious Freedom) Act.” With the 

waiver, the U.S. has not implemented a single policy response to the denial of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia, 

one of the world’s most egregious violators.

Re-Designations: Persistently Severe Violators

In November 2006, Secretary of State Rice re-designated 

Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, 

Sudan, and Uzbekistan as CPCs. The Commission agreed 

that there had been no improvements substantial enough 

to warrant the removal of these eight countries from the 

CPC list. In many of these countries, conditions have instead deteriorated further.

• The military junta that governs Burma has directed increasing repression at ethnic and religious minorities, democracy activists, and international humanitarian agencies over the past year. In September 2007, the Burmese 

government violently cracked down on the peaceful 

“Saffron Revolution” demonstrations by Buddhist monks, 

killing at least 30 people and unleashing a wave of killings, arrests, de-frockings, and disappearances. Ethnic 

minority Christians and Muslims have encountered the 

most sustained repression in recent years. Moreover, 

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
110

following the September 2007 unrest, the junta has also 

increased repression of Burmese Buddhists.

• In China, severe crackdowns targeting Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, “underground” Roman Catholics, “house church” Protestants, and various spiritual 

movements such as Falun Gong continue unabated. The 

recent, concentrated wave of repression in Tibet has 

thrown a glaring new spotlight on the repressive policies 

and practices of the Chinese government, which continues to restrict religious practice to government-approved 

religious associations and tries to control the growth and 

activities of both registered and unregistered religious 

groups. Ethnic minority religious groups such as Tibetan 

Buddhists and Uighur Muslims, unregistered groups, 

and those derided and termed by the government to be 

“cults” are subject to the most brutal abuses. 

• The conditions for religious freedom in Eritrea appear 

to have worsened over the past year, including arbitrary 

arrests and detention without charge of members of 

unregistered religious groups, and the torture or other 

ill-treatment of hundreds of persons on account of their 

religion, sometimes resulting in death. The State Department reports that the number of long-term prisoners 

continues to grow, noting that at least 160 additional 

members of unregistered religious groups were detained 

without charges by Eritrean authorities in the past year. 

• The already poor religious freedom record of Iran has 

deteriorated further, especially for religious minorities—including Baha’is, Sufi Muslims, and Evangelical 

Christians—who face relentless arrests, imprisonment, 

and harassment. Fears among Iran’s Jews have grown 

due to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s repeated 

denials of the Holocaust and other anti-Semitic statements. Dissidents and political reformers continue to be 

imprisoned on criminal charges of blasphemy and for 

criticizing the Islamic regime. Nearly 150 Baha’is have 

been subjected to a wave of arrests and detention since 

late 2004; some have been sentenced to prison terms 

ranging from 90 days to one year on dubious charges that 

include “spreading propaganda against the regime,” and 

the fear of arbitrary arrest has grown.

• North Korea affords its citizens no protections for universal 

human rights, including religious freedom; the regime 

perceives religion as a security threat to be combated at all 

costs. The government severely represses public and private 

religious activities and maintains a policy of pervasive 

control over government-sanctioned religious practice. A 

new Commission study released in April 2008 confirms that 

refugees who are forcibly repatriated from China face severe 

persecution, including harsh interrogations, long-term imprisonment, and torture if they are found to have converted 

to Christianity or have had ongoing contact with South 

Korean churches. The report also revealed that new efforts 

Countries Named as CPCs 

by the Department of State

Countries Recommended for CPC 

Designation by the Commission

Countries on the 

Commission’s Watch List

• Burma

• China

• Eritrea

• Iran

• North Korea

• Saudi Arabia

• Sudan

• Uzbekistan

• Burma

• China

• Eritrea

• Iran

• North Korea

• Saudi Arabia

• Sudan

• Uzbekistan

• Pakistan

• Turkmenistan

• Vietnam

• Afghanistan

• Bangladesh

• Belarus

• Cuba

• Egypt

• Indonesia

• Nigeria
111

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

are underway to suppress the growth of religious activity in 

North Korea spurred by cross-border contacts with China.

• The government of Saudi Arabia continues to commit 

serious violations of freedom of religion and related human rights of the members of Muslim communities from 

a variety of schools of Islam, as well as non-Muslims, by 

banning all forms of public religious expression other 

than that of the government’s own interpretation of one 

school of Sunni Islam and by interfering with private 

religious practice. The government in Saudi Arabia 

also continues to be a source of funding used globally 

to finance religious schools, hate literature, and other 

activities that support religious intolerance and, in some 

cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored 

Muslims—actions that are incompatible with the Saudi 

government’s commitments as a member of the United 

Nations. In addition, the government’s policy of curtailing universal rights for non-Saudi visitors to the country 

and inhibiting the enjoyment of human rights on an 

equal basis for expatriate workers, particularly the two – 

three million non-Muslim workers, including Christians, 

Hindus, Buddhists, and others, who have gone to Saudi 

Arabia for temporary employment, results in severe religious freedom violations. 

• In Sudan, an authoritarian government—which has 

pursued coercive policies of Arabization and Islamization resulting in genocide—severely restricts the religious 

freedom and other human rights of its population. Most 

of the victims of Sudan’s decades-long North-South Civil 

War were Christians or followers of traditional African 

religions. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, religious freedom 

conditions have improved in southern and central 

Sudan. However, there are serious government-directed 

obstacles to implementing the CPA, and despite the 

creation of the constitutionally-required Commission 

on the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital, 

the CPA agreement has not yet resulted in significant 

changes in practice in government-controlled areas of 

the North. The government’s continuing attacks and 

genocide in Darfur, as well as its deliberate obstruction of 

the CPA and in Darfur of international peacekeepers and 

humanitarian assistance, including its failure to cooperate with the Security Council-mandated investigation by 

the International Criminal Court of alleged war crimes, 

impugn the commitment of Sudanese leaders to support 

human rights guarantees. 

• In Uzbekistan, which was designated in 2006, the government has continued to arrest Muslims and harshly 

repress groups and close mosques that do not conform to 

government-prescribed practices or that it alleges to be 

associated with extremist political programs. Thousands 

of Muslims who reject the state’s control over religious 

practice have been imprisoned in recent years, many of 

them are denied the right to due process, and there are 

credible reports that many of those arrested are tortured 

or beaten in detention. As of 2007, according to the State 

Department’s own estimate, there were at least 5,000 

non-conforming Muslims in prison, including some 

interned in psychiatric hospitals. Moreover, Uzbekistan 

has a highly restrictive law on religion that severely limits 

the ability of religious communities to function, leaving 

more than 100 religious groups currently denied registration. The Uzbek government faces security threats, but 

these threats do not justify the government’s harsh abuse 

of religious believers or the continued practice of torture, 

which reportedly remains widespread. 

Vietnam: Severe Religious Freedom Violations 

Continue

Vietnam was removed from the State Department’s CPC 

list in November 2006, on the eve of President Bush’s visit 

to Hanoi for the Asian Pacific Economic Conference. The 

Commission expressed its concern over the decision to 

lift the CPC designation, citing continued arrests and detentions of individuals in part because of their religious 

activities and the persistent, severe religious freedom restrictions targeting some ethnic minority Protestants and 

Buddhists, Vietnamese Mennonites, Hoa Hao Buddhists, 

and monks and nuns associated with the Unified Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam (UBCV). 

A Commission delegation traveled to Vietnam in 

October 2007 and found that progress in improving conditions for religious freedom has been very uneven: improvements for some religious communities do not extend 

to others; progress in one province is not similarly realized 

in another; national laws are not fully implemented at the 

local and provincial levels; and there continue to be far 

too many abuses and restrictions of religious freedom, 

including the imprisonment of individuals for reasons related to their religious activity or religious freedom advo-
112

cacy. In view of the overall deterioration of human rights 

conditions in Vietnam, which includes continued abuses 

of religious freedom and related human rights, the Commission continued to find that lifting the CPC designation 

for Vietnam was premature. The Commission recommended that Vietnam be re-designated as a CPC in 2008.

In contrast to the State Department, the Commission 

maintains that there continue to be religious “prisoners 

of concern” in Vietnam, the long-term detention of whom 

should be a factor in determining whether Vietnam continues to be a severe violator of religious freedom. Since 

the CPC designation was lifted and Vietnam joined the 

World Trade Organization, positive religious freedom 

trends have not kept pace with other elements of the U.S.-

Vietnamese relationship. Arrests, detentions, discrimination, and other restrictions continue, perpetrated by 

recalcitrant provincial officials and abetted by the central 

government’s suspicion of religious leaders believed to 

have political motives or the expansion of religious adherence in some ethnic minority areas. In addition, Vietnam 

has initiated a severe crackdown on human rights defenders and advocates for the freedoms of speech, association, 

assembly, and religion, including many religious leaders. 

Saudi Arabia: the U.S. Government Response to 

an Important CPC Designation 

In July 2006, Secretary of State Rice decided to leave in 

place a waiver “to further the purposes” of IRFA by announcing that bilateral discussions with Saudi Arabia had 

enabled the United States to identify and confirm a number of policies that the Saudi government “is pursuing 

and will continue to pursue for the purpose of promoting 

greater freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups.” The Saudi government’s stated 

reforms, however, have not been implemented. As a consequence, the Commission remains seriously concerned 

about: (1) whether and how the Saudi policies will be put 

into effect and (2) how the United States will monitor and 

report publicly on them.

A Commission delegation traveled to Saudi Arabia 

last summer and found that, in spite of many promises by 

government officials, little has changed on the ground to 

improve religious freedom conditions. The Saudi government persists in severely restricting all forms of public 

religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and enforcement of its school of Sunni Islam. It 

is clear that the government has not substantially revised 

the Ministry of Education textbooks used in schools across 

Saudi Arabia and abroad to remove material that incites 

violence and fuels extreme religious intolerance, even 

though this pledge for textbook reform was included in 

the Department’s July 2006 statement confirming Saudi 

policies.

The Commission therefore continues to recommend 

that the State Department report publicly to Congress 

every 120 days on the implementation of the policies 

identified in the bilateral discussions. The policies in 

question—if implemented in full—could advance muchneeded efforts to dismantle some of the institutionalized 

policies that have promoted severe violations of freedom 

of religion or belief in Saudi Arabia and worldwide.

Other Severe Violators Not on the State 

Department List

Of the countries not on the State Department’s CPC list, 

in addition to Vietnam, the Commission continued to find 

that Pakistan and Turkmenistan persist in engaging in or 

tolerating particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The Commission strongly recommended that these 

countries be designated as CPCs.

• Despite the dramatic events in Pakistan in the past year, 

the Commission finds that all of the serious religious 

freedom concerns, including violence, on which it has 

previously reported persist. Sectarian and religiously 

motivated violence continues in Pakistan, particularly 

against Shi’as, Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, and the 

government’s response remains inadequate. A number 

of the country’s laws, including legislation restricting the 

USCIRF Commissioners with members of a visiting delegation of religious leaders from Africa at the press conference 

announcing the release of the 2008 Annual Report.
113

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Ahmadi community and laws against blasphemy, have 

been used to silence members of religious minorities and 

dissenters, and they frequently result in imprisonment 

on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence 

against the accused. The Hudood Ordinances—Islamic 

decrees predominantly affecting women that are enforced alongside Pakistan’s secular legal system—provide 

for harsh punishments, including amputation and death 

by stoning, for alleged violations of Islamic law. There 

is also mounting evidence from multiple sources that 

Pakistan’s government has been complicit in providing sanctuary to the Taliban. Finally, the government of 

Pakistan has extended its undemocratic practices into 

the international arena by promoting measures at the 

UN to halt the so-called “defamation of religions,” which 

clearly violate the right to freedom of expression, as well 

as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

• Significant religious freedom problems and official 

harassment of religious adherents persist in Turkmenistan, where police raids and other forms of harassment 

of registered and unregistered religious groups continue 

more than a year after the death of longtime dictator 

Saparmurat Niyazov. The repressive 2003 religion law 

remains in force, causing severe difficulties for the legal 

functioning of religious groups. The government is still 

promoting the former president’s personality cult in 

the form of the Ruhnama in religious affairs and as a 

mandatory feature of public education. Although the 

new president has taken some isolated steps, including 

the release of the country’s former chief mufti, systemic 

legal reforms directly related to religious freedom and 

other human rights have not been made. Turkmenistan’s 

removal from the Commission’s CPC list is therefore not 

warranted. 

The Commission’s Watch List

In addition to its CPC recommendations, the Commission 

has established a Watch List of countries where conditions 

do not rise to the statutory level requiring CPC designation but which require close monitoring due to the nature 

and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or 

tolerated by the governments. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 

Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria comprise 

the Commission’s Watch List. The Commission is concerned about the serious abuses in these countries, and 

that the governments either have not halted repression 

and/or violence amounting to severe violations of freedom of religion, or have failed to punish those responsible 

for perpetrating those acts. The Commission urges the 

U.S. government to pay particular attention to the poor 

situation for religious freedom in these countries, which, 

if not reversed, may deteriorate and require CPC designation during the coming year.

• In Afghanistan, conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief continue to be highly problematic. The country’s 

flawed new constitution does not protect the right of 

individuals to dissent from the prevailing orthodoxy 

regarding Islamic beliefs and practices, leading in some 

cases to serious abuses, including judicial action that 

violates the rights of the accused. The Afghan government’s incapacity to exercise authority effectively outside 

the capital, Kabul, contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom and other human 

rights in many regions, and religious extremism, including through the return of the Taliban, is an increasingly 

real threat once again in Afghanistan. 

• In Bangladesh, Islamist radicalism and violence and 

the threat of serious violence and continued discrimination against members of religious minority communities 

remain significant concerns. Since the installation of a 

new caretaker government, there have been numerous 

and alarming reports of serious human rights abuses, 

including suspected extrajudicial killings by the security 

The State Department’s delay in 

naming CPCs following the annual 

review deadline undermines IRFA’s 

statutory scheme, and may send the 

unfortunate signal that the U.S. government is not sufficiently committed to 

the IRFA process, including by seeking 

improvements from the most severe 

religious freedom violators.
114

forces, arbitrary detentions, torture, and curbs on press 

freedom. In addition to violent attacks against Hindus, 

Christians, and Ahmadi Muslims, the pre-independence 

Vested Property Act continues to be used as justification for some Muslims to seize Hindu-owned land with 

impunity.

• Already harsh religious freedom conditions in Belarus

deteriorated in 2007, with the government harassing 

and imposing the payment of sharply increased fines on 

members of certain religious groups, especially those 

whom officials allege to have links to foreign entities 

or political agendas. In January 2008, Belarus issued a 

decree that further tightened strict government regulations on foreign religious workers. The authoritarian 

government of President Aleksandr Lukashenko enforces 

the country’s harsh 2002 law on religion, resulting in 

serious regulatory obstacles and bureaucratic and legal 

restrictions on the activities of many religious communities. In 2007, 50,000 Christians of various denominations 

in Belarus signed a petition to reform the 2002 law, but in 

March 2008 the Belarusian government rejected it.

• In Egypt, the government has taken inadequate measures to stop repression of minority religious adherents 

and “unorthodox Muslims” or, in many cases, to punish 

those responsible for violence or other severe violations 

of religious freedom. Despite some increased public 

space to discuss religious freedom issues in the media 

and other fora as well as some positive, but limited, 

judicial rulings on some religious freedom cases, serious 

religious freedom violations continue to affect Coptic Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Baha’is, as well as members 

of minority Muslim communities, all of whom are also 

subject to religiously-motivated attacks. The government 

has also done too little to combat rampant anti-Semitism 

in the state media. 

• Religious belief and practice remain under tight governmental control in Cuba despite a change in governmental leadership. Both registered and unregistered 

religious groups continue to suffer official interference, 

harassment, and repression. Political prisoners and human rights and pro-democracy activists continue to be 

denied the right to worship. There are reports of religious 

leaders being attacked, beaten, or detained for opposing 

government actions, and political prisoners, as well as 

human rights and pro-democracy activists, are increasingly limited in their right to practice their religion. 

• Although the situation has continued to improve in 

Indonesia, concerns remain about ongoing communal 

violence and the government’s inability or unwillingness to curb it, the forcible closures of places of worship 

belonging to religious minorities, the growing political 

power and influence of religious extremists who harass 

and sometimes instigate violence against moderate 

Muslim leaders and members of religious minorities, and 

the arrests of individuals considered “deviant” under Indonesian law. There are persistent fears that Indonesia’s 

commitment to secular governance, ethnic and religious 

pluralism, and a culture of tolerance will be eroded by 

some who promote extremist interpretations of Islam.

• Nigeria continues to suffer from violent communal conflicts along religious lines. Other concerns in Nigeria are 

the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the criminal 

codes of several northern Nigerian states and discrimination against minority communities of Christians and 

Muslims. At least 29 Christians were killed and numerous churches burned in religiously motivated rioting in 

September and December 2007, which led to the flight 

of some 3,000 people. In February 2008, riots broke out 

among a mob of Muslim youths who torched a police 

station and looted Christian and police officers’ homes. 

One person was killed and five were seriously wounded. 

Summaries of conditions in all of the countries discussed in this chapter, as well as the Commission’s policy 

recommendations, can be found in the country chapters 

of this report. 

ENDNOTES

1

 IRFA § 402 (b)(1)(A).

2

 IRFA § 3(13).

*** Commissioner Leo declines to join this portion of the letter. A separate statement 

setting forth reasons immediately follows this chapter.

3

 The authority to make these decisions has been delegated by the President to the 

Secretary of State.

4

 IRFA § 402(c)(5). 
115

“I cannot join the portion of the Commission’s letter to 

Secretary Rice that discusses the failure of the Department 

of State to make CPC designations and prescribe presidential actions in response to CPC designations, and that 

further criticizes the U.S. government for relying only on 

pre-existing sanctions without adding any new presidential actions. I shall not express an opinion one way or the 

other on these matters.

“I do not believe it is this Commission’s duty to police 

the executive branch’s compliance with Sections 401 and 

405 of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). 

That is Congress’s responsibility as part of its oversight 

role. The Commission’s only responsibilities are those 

set forth in Section 202 of the Act, and they are essentially 

confined to evaluating the condition of religious freedom 

abroad and making particular recommendations about 

how to improve it.

“Section 202 of IRFA sets forth two ‘primary responsibilities.’ The first is to review ‘the facts and circumstances 

of violations of religious freedom presented in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Annual Report, 

and the Executive Summary, as well as information from 

other sources as appropriate.’ In other words, the Commission is to cull facts and circumstances demonstrating 

religious freedom violations from a review of a broader set 

of human rights practices and materials.

“The second responsibility is to make policy recommendations ‘with respect to matters involving international religious freedom.’ This is not a general mandate, 

but instead flows naturally from the previous subsection. 

Specifically, the Commission develops factual findings 

about a country’s religious freedom violations (Section 

202(a)(1)), and then makes policy recommendations 

about how to rectify them (Section 202(a)(2)).

“A broad interpretation of the second responsibility—

that the Commission can make general pronouncements 

about Executive Branch action (or inaction) under IRFA—

is not, in my view, supported by the language or structure 

of Section 202. That reading of Section 202 would be correct if the first responsibility captured both a command 

to make findings about violations and a command to 

make recommendations for their resolution. The second 

responsibility would then stand alone, as a general mandate. However, as written, the second responsibility of 

making policy recommendations is simply a follow-on to 

the specific country-by-country findings we are to make. 

At least that is the reading that I think is dictated by the 

plain meaning of the statute’s structure and words.

“No other part of Section 202 suggests a broader 

charge or mandate. The Commission is to ‘recommend 

policies of the United States Government with respect to 

each foreign country.’ It is to ‘monitor facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom.’ And, the job of 

‘evaluating United States Government policies in response 

to violations of religious freedom’ is tied to making policy 

recommendations with respect to ‘each foreign country.’ 

If Congress wanted us to generally police executive branch 

compliance with Sections 403 and 405 of IRFA (timely 

issuance of reports, decisions to issue sanctions, etc.), it 

knew how to say that and should have said so explicitly.

“I agree with the notion that, in a manner of speaking, 

the Commission was established to ‘keep State honest.’ 

However, we did not get that job by Congress having delegated to us in 1998 a piece of its oversight responsibility, 

which entails an overall performance review. Rather, we 

‘keep State honest’ through the thoroughness of our findings and the incisiveness of our recommendations in relation to particular countries, because that gives the President, Congress, and the public a set of benchmarks from 

which they can make their judgments about the Department’s performance, and, in particular, the performance 

of the State Department’s Office of International Religious 

Freedom.

“There are practical issues here, also. I have no objection to the Commission saying that more should be 

done respecting a particular country (such as Uzbekistan) 

based upon a review of the facts on the ground and what 

we think might be most effective. That can produce specific action by the U.S. government that improves religious 

freedom for a specific population or group. The Commission is at its best, and works with the greatest amount of 

unity and collegiality, when this kind of technical work 

is tackled. However, a blanket criticism or review strikes 

me as not yielding the same value, and I fear that blanket 

pronouncements and criticisms are far more susceptible 

to being construed as political broadsides.”

Separate Statement of Commissioner Leo Regarding the Failure to Designate and Adequately 

Respond to CPCs
Mae La refugee camp near the Thailand/Burma border, near the town of Mae Sot.
117

OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE

COMMISSION’S cpc LIST

Serious human rights abuses, including systematic 

and egregious violations of religious freedom, 

perpetuated by Burma’s military regime continue to be 

widespread. In the past year, the Burmese government’s 

extremely poor human rights record deteriorated, with 

increasing repression directed at ethnic and religious 

minorities, democracy activists, and international humanitarian agencies. In addition, in September 2007, the 

Burmese government used violence to halt peaceful demonstrations by Buddhist monks, violence that resulted in 

deaths, arrests, defrocking, and disappearances. Since its 

inception, the Commission has recommended that Burma 

be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

The State Department has followed this recommendation 

and consistently named Burma a CPC.

The military junta that governs Burma, the State 

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), monitors the 

activities of all religious organizations through a pervasive 

internal security apparatus. The government imposes 

restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and 

censors all religious publications, has supported, allowed, or instigated violence against religious minorities, 

and in some areas of the country, has forcibly promoted 

Buddhism over other religions. Ethnic minority Christians and Muslims have encountered the most sustained 

difficulties in recent years; however, in the aftermath of 

the September 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” the junta has 

increased repression of Burmese Buddhists. The Burmese government has closed monasteries, arrested and 

defrocked monks, and curtailed their public religious 

activities. In the past year, SPDC policies have continued 

to isolate Burma from the international community, multilateral organizations, and its neighbors.

In September 2007, monks from several major monasteries joined Burmese activists in a series of small demonstrations to protest a sudden increase in fuel prices. After several activists were arrested and detained for staging 

the initial protests, Buddhist monks took over the leader

ship of the growing demonstrations. On September 5, in 

the town of Pakokku, the government militia fired warning shots over the heads of the peacefully demonstrating 

monks and beat some of them with bamboo sticks. In response, Burma’s monks broadened their demands, calling 

for release of all political prisoners and the initiation of a 

process leading to the democratization of the country. 

In the several weeks that followed, Buddhist monks 

organized peaceful demonstrations in most of Burma’s 

major cities. In response, the SPDC initiated a violent 

crackdown on the protests in late September 2007. The 

military, along with several militia units, fired live rounds 

into crowds of demonstrators, carried out baton charges, 

and used tear gas to break up crowds. There are reports 

of at least 30 deaths, although some experts estimate that 

the actual number is much higher. Journalists and activists in Burma state that at least 4,000 people, an unknown 

portion of whom were monks, were arrested during the 

crackdown, with estimates that between 500 and 1,000 remained in detention months later. What is more, between 

September 26 and October 6, the military carried out 

coordinated raids against 52 monasteries throughout the 

country, detaining large numbers of monks and arresting 

those perceived as leaders of the demonstrations. Monks 

were tortured in detention and then forcibly defrocked 

and required to return to their villages. Human rights 

organizations state that about 200 – 300 monks currently 

Burma 

The Burmese government has closed monasteries, arrested and defrocked monks, and 

curtailed their public religious activities.
118

remain imprisoned due to their role in organizing the 

demonstrations, with most facing trial on charges relating 

to terrorism. Since August 2007, when the junta first initiated steps to quell dissent among activists and the clergy, 

at least 15 individuals have received sentences of more 

than nine years imprisonment. At least 70 individuals, 

including many monks, also remain unaccounted for following the government crackdown.

In January 2008, a spokesperson from the National 

League for Democracy (NLD) reported that several monks 

were sentenced for their role in leading the August and 

September demonstrations. U Kitharihya from Seikthathukhah monastery was sentenced to seven and one 

half years imprisonment; U Kawmala from Adithan monastery was sentenced to two and one half years; U Wunnathiri from Yadanabonmyay monastery was sentenced 

to three years; and U Eindiya from Myoma monastery was 

sentenced to seven and one half years. All four monasteries are located in the city of Sittwe. U Gambira was also 

arrested and has been charged under Section 17/1 of the 

Unlawful Association Act, Section 13/1 of the Immigration 

Act (for illegal movement across borders), and Article 5(J) 

of the Emergency Provisions Act (for encouraging demonstrations). He is being detained in Insein Prison.

Several monasteries remain closed or are functioning 

in a more limited capacity, including Ngwe Kyar Yan monastery, where only approximately 50 of the original 180 

monks in residence have been permitted to return. In addition, Maggin monastery, Thingan Gyun township, Rangoon was forcibly sealed off by the authorities in November 2007 and most of the monks and civilian assistants 

were arrested or detained for supporting the September 

protests and giving refuge to democracy activists. Maggin monastery, in addition to being a religious center, was 

also an orphanage and a hospice for HIV/AIDS patients. 

Government authorities continue to monitor closely monasteries viewed as epicenters of the protest. 

In addition to the events surrounding the violence 

against the monks and other demonstrators last year, 

other, persistent religious freedom problems remain. The 

SPDC continues to be locked in a decades-long conflict 

with armed groups of ethnic minorities in the countryside. 

Renewed government attacks on ethnic villages have resulted in additional human rights abuses, including killings, rapes, forced labor, communal violence, displaced 

persons, and forced renunciations of faith. The military 

has, at times, forcibly promoted Buddhism and Burman 

culture and language among ethnic minorities and targets 

religious leaders for harassment and arrest. Human rights 

and humanitarian aid groups report that a military offensive targeting the Karen ethnic minority intensified last 

year, resulting in the destruction of 167 villages and the 

internal displacement of approximately 76,000 individuals. After more than 10 years of sustained conflict in the 

eastern region of the country, over 500,000 people remain 

internally displaced. In the past year, the government increased its deployment of regiments in Karen state, where 

there are now 10 divisions compared to the nine divisions 

posted there in 2006. Following the crackdown on peaceful demonstrators during the Saffron Revolution last year, 

some armed ethnic movements abandoned ceasefire 

agreements because of the anger and mistrust brought on 

by the violence.

In the past year, members of minority religious 

groups, especially Muslims and Christians, continued to 

face serious abuses of religious freedom and other human 

rights by the military. In some localities, military commanders have forcibly conscripted members of ethnic and 

religious minorities for forced labor. Those who refuse 

conscription are threatened with criminal prosecution or 

fined. Those who do not carry out their tasks have been 

shot or beaten to death. Christians and Muslims have 

been forced to engage in the destruction of mosques, 

churches, and graveyards and to serve as military porters. 

They reportedly have also been forced to “donate” labor to 

build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and monasteries. 

In November 2006, Chin women in Thantlang township 

were required to assist in the cleaning and decorating 

of a local Buddhist monastery. Those who refused were 

Commissioners Eid, Land, and Gaer at USCIRF’s December 2007 public 

hearing, “After the Saffron Revolution: Religion, Repression, and the U.S. 

Policy Options for Burma.”
119

heavily fined. In January 2007, 14 Christians in Mutapi 

township were conscripted for construction of a Buddhist 

temple. They were required to work on Sunday, denying 

them their right to participate in religious services. In 

July 2006, about 13 acres of land were confiscated from 

Chin Christian residents in Tedim township for construction of a Buddhist monastery. In August of the same year, 

about 50 families were evicted from their homes in Hakha, 

capital of Chin state, for expansion of the city’s 45 year old 

monastery. In both localities, those losing their land and 

their homes received no compensation. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities have resulted in outbreaks of violence over the past 

several years, some of it instigated by Burmese security 

forces against ethnic minority Muslims. In January 2005, 

two Muslims were killed and one Buddhist monk severely 

injured in communal violence in Rakhine (formerly 

known as Arakan) state. Police and soldiers reportedly 

stood by and did not halt the violence against Muslims 

until Muslims started to fight back. In February 2006, 

violent clashes erupted between Muslims and Buddhists 

in Rakhine and local authorities were hesitant to respond. 

During the riots, at least three people reportedly died 

and three mosques were destroyed. In the past two years 

since the riots, authorities have prevented local efforts to 

rebuild the mosques. Muslims throughout the country 

report that they have not been permitted to construct new 

mosques and that they must pay onerous bribes to secure 

permission to repair older facilities. 

In addition to violence, overt discrimination against 

Muslims, particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, is widespread and severe. The government has denied citizenship to Rohingya Muslims, who number approximately 

800,000 in Burma, on the grounds that their ancestors 

allegedly did not reside in the country prior to British 

colonial rule. Without citizenship, Rohingya Muslims 

face restrictions on their freedom of movement; refugees 

report that some Rohingya are prevented from owning 

property legally, residing in certain townships, or attending state-run schools beyond the primary level. Since 

1988, the government has permitted only three marriages 

per year per village in the predominantly Muslim parts of 

Rakhine state. Muslims also report difficulties in obtaining birth certificates for newborns, particularly in the city 

of Sittwe. Enforcement of such policies widened in the 

past year. In June 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights 

of the Child expressed concern over the situation among 

Rohingya children, particularly with regard to the denial 

of their right to food, health care, and education, as well 

as to their ability to survive, develop, and enjoy their own 

culture and be protected from discrimination. In April 

2007, a panel of UN experts, including the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination 

and Xenophobia, issued a statement declaring that the 

Burmese government’s denial of citizenship for Rohingya 

Muslims “has seriously curtailed the full exercise of their 

civil political, economic, social and cultural rights and led 

BURMA

The military has, at times, forcibly 

promoted Buddhism and Burman 

culture and language among ethnic 

minorities and targets religious leaders 

for harassment and arrest.

Buddhist monks march down a street in Rangoon.
to various discriminatory practices. This includes severe 

restrictions on freedom of movement; various forms of 

extortion and arbitrary taxation; land confiscation and 

forced evictions; restricted access to medical care, food 

and adequate housing; forced labor; and restrictions on 

marriages.”

Muslims reported difficulties in constructing new 

mosques or re-building those previously destroyed. In 

2002, authorities in Rakhine state destroyed 13 mosques, 

halting only in response to international pressure. Local authorities reportedly replaced the mosques with 

government-owned buildings and Buddhist temples 

and have refused to issue the necessary permission for 

mosque construction on other sites. In July 2005, authorities forced the closure of a Muslim school on the grounds 

that its teachers had tried to convert Buddhist children 

to Islam by offering private courses. In August 2006, 

Muslim sources in Rakhine state reported that border security forces issued an order requiring the closure of five 

mosques, four madrassas, and 18 pre-madrassas. At the 

end of 2007, only two madrassas had been permitted to 

reopen. In early 2007, authorities reportedly destroyed 

repairs that were completed at a mosque in Northern Rakhine state following damage in a severe storm. Authorities in that state also stepped up arbitrary “inspections” 

of mosques; mosque members were reportedly forced to 

destroy nine mosques in the region when religious leaders 

failed to produce operation permits during inspection. In 

addition, although Buddhists account for only 2 percent 

of the population of Rakhine state, Rohingya Muslims 

continue to report that they are routinely forced to provide 

labor for construction of Buddhist shrines and pagodas in 

local villages. 

Christian groups continue regularly to experience 

difficulties in obtaining permission to build new churches, 

as well as to hold public ceremonies and festivals and 

import religious literature. Authorities have reportedly 

denied permission for the construction of new churches 

since 1997 in certain parts of Chin state. Similar restrictions are reportedly imposed in the capital of Kachin state, 

in some localities in Karen state, and among Catholics and 

Baptists in Karenni state. In late 2007, a military general 

in Shan state confiscated land from a Catholic diocese and 

destroyed the home of the bishop. No compensation has 

been awarded. In all these areas, Christians are required 

to obtain a permit for any gathering of more than five 

people outside of a Sunday service. Permission is regularly denied, or secured only through bribes. In Rangoon 

in 2001-2002, authorities closed more than 80 Protestant 

house churches because they did not have proper authorization to hold religious meetings. Authorities refused to 

grant applications to obtain such authorizations and few 

of the closed churches have been reopened. Additional 

reports of church closings in Rangoon and Mandalay 

have been received within the last year. In February 2006, 

authorities in Rangoon issued a ban on the Phawkkan 

church, which had been in operation for over 20 years. 

Also in February 2006, a Chin evangelist in Insein township was ordered to halt services that he hosted in his 

home. In October 2006, a Christian orphanage in Chin 

state was reportedly forced to close. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, there 

are credible reports that government and military authorities made active efforts to convert Christians to Buddhism. 

In 2004, numerous reports emerged alleging that under 

the guise of offering free education, local officials separated children from their parents, and the children were 

instructed to convert to Buddhism without their parents’ 

knowledge or consent. Some groups reported that these 

measures decreased in the past year; however, local human rights organizations report that the practice continues. In Chin state, there are continued reports that government authorities offered financial and career incentives to ethnic Burman Buddhist soldiers to marry Chin 

Christian women. Chin families who agreed to convert to 

Buddhism were offered monetary and material incentives, 

120

Christian groups continue regularly 

to experience difficulties in obtaining 

permission to build new churches, as 

well as to hold public ceremonies and 

festivals and import religious literature.
121

as well as exemption from forced labor. In February 2007, 

a Christian pastor was arrested for writing a letter to General Than Shwe, the chief of the military junta, urging an 

end to the persecution of Christians. Naga Christian refugees leaving Burma continually report that members of 

the army, together with Buddhist monks, closed churches 

in their villages and attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

In addition to denying building permits, the government of Burma continues to discriminate against members of minority religious groups in education, publishing, 

and access to public sector services and jobs. In public 

schools nationwide, all students are required to recite 

a daily Buddhist prayer. While some Muslim students 

are permitted to leave the room during this time, some 

schools require non-Buddhist students to recite the 

prayer. 

 According to the State Department’s 2007 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices, even before last year’s 

crackdown, members of the Buddhist sangha (community 

of monks) were and continue to be subject to a strict code 

of conduct that is reportedly enforced through criminal 

penalties. Monks are not allowed to preach political 

sermons or make public views critical of SPDC policies, 

nor are they permitted to join political parties. Military 

commanders retain jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks 

in military court for “activities inconsistent with and 

detrimental to Buddhism.” In several instances between 

1988 and 2007, monks and nuns have been defrocked or 

imprisoned, and an estimated 100 monks and novices 

remain imprisoned as prisoners of conscience related to 

activities dating before the September 2007 events. In 

May 2003, the number of Buddhist clergy in prison for 

supposed political activity reportedly increased when the 

Burmese government organized an attack on the motorcade of Aung San Suu Kyi and placed her in “protective 

custody.” Travel restrictions, including an overnight curfew, remain in effect at several monasteries. In August 

2006, authorities arrested five Buddhist monks and 15 

laymen at a monastery in Rakhine state on the charge that 

they were allowing members of the National League for 

Democracy (NLD), the democratic opposition party that 

won the annulled 1990 parliamentary elections, to meet 

on monastery premises. As far as is known, the 20 monks 

and laymen remain in prison. 

In an unprecedented unanimous resolution passed 

shortly after the Burmese military government’s crackdown during the Saffron Revolution, members of the UN 

Security Council condemned the Burmese junta’s violent 

BURMA

In an unprecedented unanimous resolution passed shortly after the Burmese 

military government’s crackdown during the Saffron Revolution, members of 

the UN Security Council condemned the Burmese junta’s violent response to the 

peaceful demonstrations and called for the prompt release of political 

prisoners and for cooperation with a UN-led effort to engage the 

government in dialogue on a transition to civilian rule.

There are over 10,000 temples and other religious structures scattered 

across the plain at Bagan.
122

Commission Recommendations

response to the peaceful demonstrations and called for 

the prompt release of political prisoners and for cooperation with a UN-led effort to engage the government 

in dialogue on a transition to civilian rule. In a series of 

visits to Burma, the Secretary General’s Special Envoy 

Ibrahim Gambari met twice with Aung San Suu Kyi. In 

addition, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur 

on Human Rights in Myanmar, visited Burma for the first 

time in three years in mid-November. Most recently, 

the junta denied Mr. Gambari’s request for a visa to visit 

Burma in February 2008, suggesting instead that the visit 

be postponed until April. Although the military government has appointed an envoy to facilitate communication 

with Aung San Suu Kyi and has allowed her to meet with 

members of her party twice since September 2007, they 

have stated clearly that there will be no role for the NLD, 

Suu Kyi’s party, within Burma’s process towards national 

reconciliation. 

In the past year, Commission staff continued to 

meet with exiled Burmese ethnic and religious leaders, 

including Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims, and with 

members of congressional and international delegations 

that visited Burma. In February 2008, Commissioner 

Nina Shea made a presentation about religious freedom 

concerns in Burma at the “Briefing on Burma” held by 

the Congressional Taskforce on International Religious 

Freedom and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. 

Commissioner Shea discussed Commission policy recommendations with Reps. Trent Frank and Joe Pitts, as 

well as with congressional staff. 

In December 2007, the Commission convened a 

hearing entitled “After the Saffron Revolution: Religion, 

Repression and the U.S. Policy Options for Burma.” The 

hearing included testimony from experts on U.S. and 

multilateral policy on human rights in Burma and Burma’s ethnic minority communities. It also featured testimony from an exiled Burmese Buddhist monk and a journalist who was an eyewitness to the violent crackdown in 

Rangoon that followed the September 2007 demonstrations. In February 2007, Commission staff participated 

in a briefing convened by the Congressional Taskforce on 

International Religious Freedom on religious persecution 

in Burma, which discussed the political and religious repression of Christians and Muslims.

I

n addition to recommending that Burma be designated a CPC, the Commission makes the following 

recommendations.

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

should:

 Strengthen coordination of U.S. 

policy on Burma both within the U.S. 

government and with U.S. allies through: 

• creating an interagency taskforce on Burma under 

the National Security Council (NSC), headed by 

a senior ranking official, to coordinate policy and 

actions on Burma throughout the U.S. government, 

including implementation of sanctions, humanitarian aid, democracy promotion, counternarcotics, 

trafficking in persons, and other policy objectives; 

• appointing a Special Coordinator on Burma, with 

the rank of Ambassador, to coordinate multilateral 

and bilateral diplomatic efforts and serve as the 

Administration’s point person for efforts to bring 

about political reconciliation and democratic reform in Burma; and

• organizing a coalition of democratic nations in Asia 

to replace the moribund Bangkok Process in order 

to construct a roadmap outlining concrete steps 

Burma needs to take in order to end economic and 

political sanctions, including addressing humanitarian and human rights abuses, the release of 

political prisoners, and a transition to civilian rule; 

 Continue to assist and support U.N. 

and other multilateral diplomatic efforts 

by:

• initiating action on a UN Security Council resolution on Burma that offers the UN Secretary General 

a clear mandate for his interactions with Burmese 

authorities, including full and unimpeded access 

for the UN Special Envoy on Burma and the UN 

2 

1 
123

Special Rapporteur on Burma; a 

clear timetable, with repercussions, 

for the Burmese government if it 

does not immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi; the 

establishment of a UN monitoring 

mission of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights inside 

Burma; and the taking of steps to 

ensure a peaceful and orderly transition to civilian rule; 

• supporting the mission of the UN 

Secretary General’s Special Envoy 

on Burma and the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, including their 

unrestricted access to opposition 

political leaders, prisoners, independent human rights monitors, 

and humanitarian aid organizations 

in all parts of Burma; and

• seeking access to Burma by the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion and Belief for an immediate visit with unrestricted access 

to religious communities and to 

regions where religious freedom 

abuses are reported; 

 In all diplomatic 

interactions with the 

government of Burma, or 

with Burma’s closest allies, 

continue to press for:

• the unconditional release of all 

persons detained or arrested for 

the peaceful exercise of religious 

freedom and related human rights, 

including revealing whereabouts of 

people who are still detained and 

missing, including the more than 

300 monks who led or participated 

in the protests during August and 

September, 2008; 

• the unconditional release of 

National League for Democracy 

(NLD) Chair Aung San Suu Kyi 

and other political prisoners and 

direct engagement with the NLD 

and leaders of the country’s ethnic 

minority groups in dialogue leading to a peaceful, time-bound, and 

monitored transition to democratic 

civilian rule;

• the issuing of public orders to security forces and local government 

officials to stop forcible closure 

of churches and mosques, the 

destruction of religious shrines and 

symbols, the instigation of communal violence against Muslims, the 

forced promotion of Buddhism and 

the renunciation of other religions 

among ethnic minorities, and discrimination against non-Buddhist 

minorities;

• an end to the use of forced labor and 

the use of children and members 

of religious minorities as porters 

or military labor, and the active 

enforcement of its own Order 1/99 

(May 1999) and Order Supplementing 1/99 (November 2000), which 

instruct SPDC officials and military commanders to refrain from 

employing forced labor of civilians, 

except in emergencies;

• the lifting of restrictions on the construction and renovation of churches and mosques and on the printing 

of religious literature, consistent 

with international standards, and 

an end to policies of forced eviction 

from, and the confiscation and destruction of, Muslim and Christian 

properties, including mosques, 

churches, religious meeting points, 

schools, and cultural centers; 

• an end to policies that discriminate 

on the basis of religion in land use, 

education, allocation of land, job 

promotion, marriage, access to government services, citizenship, freedom of movement, and marriage, 

and the invitation of international 

technical assistance to help draft 

laws that conform to international 

legal standards on these matters;

• compliance with the recommendations of UN General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/60/L.53 on the Situation of Human Rights in Burma, 

adopted by the General Assembly 

in November 2005, which includes 

the granting of unimpeded access to 

both the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Burma and the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Burma; and, 

• the ratification of core international 

human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights; 

 To support local 

democracy efforts, continue 

to: 

• provide assistance, through the 

State Department’s Economic Support Fund (ESF), to empower Burmese civil society groups organizing 

humanitarian assistance, conducting human rights documentation efforts (particularly religious freedom 

abuses faced by the Muslim and 

Buddhist communities), and providing public advocacy, leadership, 

and legal training to Burmese living 

in and outside of Burma. 

BURMA

4 

3 
124

Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of

The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK 

or North Korea) remains a repressive and isolated regime 

where dissent is not tolerated and there are few, if any, 

protections for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief 

does not exist, as the government severely represses public and private religious activities and closely controls the 

government-sanctioned religious practice. Unfortunately, 

there is no evidence that religious freedom conditions 

have improved in the past year. The government continues to view religious belief and practice as a potential 

competitor to the officially propagated cult of personality centered on North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his 

late father, Kim Il Sung. In the past several years, North 

Korean government officials have reportedly arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed individuals 

discovered engaging in clandestine religious activity. In 

addition, North Korean refugees repatriated from China 

are frequently harassed, ill-treated, and imprisoned, particularly if it is discovered that they have had contact with 

South Koreans or converted to Christianity while in China, 

both of which are considered political offenses. Although 

the DPRK has claimed to various UN human rights treaty 

bodies that it protects religious freedom, there is little 

evidence that any real religious activity exists, except underground. The Commission continues to recommend 

that North Korea be designated a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, which the Department of State has done 

since 2001.

Because of the North Korean government’s extremely 

tight control over all information entering and leaving the 

country, detailed data about religious freedom conditions 

is difficult to obtain. In 2005, the Commission authorized 

researchers to interview 40 North Korean refugees living 

in South Korea. The resulting study, authored by David 

Hawk and entitled Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, 

Conscience, and Religion in North Korea, shows how successive North Korean governments suppressed the country’s once vibrant religious and intellectual life and put in 

its place a quasi-religious cult of personality surrounding 

the Kim family. The report also describes the survival of 

very limited religious activity in North Korea. 

In April 2008, the Commission released an update of 

that report entitled A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and 

Defector Testimony of Severe Violations of Religion and 

Belief in North Korea. The new report incorporates the 

findings from 38 additional interviews with North Korean 

refugees and defectors living in South Korea, whose testimony confirms that Buddhist, Christian, and traditional 

religious practices, such as Shamanism, exist in North 

Korea, though practiced either clandestinely or under 

tightly controlled conditions in the capital city of Pyongyang. The refugees interviewed for A Prison Without Bars

also attest to the continued vulnerability of North Korean 

refugees repatriated from China, who are subject to illtreatment and likely imprisonment if they admit to having 

had contacts with South Korean humanitarian organizations in China or to having converted to Christianity. AcIn the past several years, North 

Korean government officials have 

reportedly arrested, imprisoned, 

tortured, and sometimes executed 

individuals discovered engaging in 

clandestine religious activity.

Commissioners Cromartie, Gaer, and Eid with U.S. and 

Republic of Korea soldiers at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 

on the border between North and South Korea.
cording to former police officials interviewed for the Commission’s report, the North Korean government fears the 

spread of Christianity through cross-border contacts with 

religious groups in China and views it as a security threat. 

The report details new measures taken by police to halt 

the distribution of religious literature and uncover clandestine religious activity, including infiltrating churches 

in China and setting up mock prayer meetings in North 

Korea to entrap converts. The full report can be found at 

http://www.uscirf.gov/images/A_Prison_Without_Bars/

aprisonwithoutbars-final.pdf.

In the 1980s, the North Korean government established “religious federations” for Buddhists, Chondokyists 

(referring to Chondokyo, or “Eastern Learning,” a syncretic belief largely based on Confucianism but which also 

incorporates elements of Taoism, Shamanism, Buddhism, 

and Catholicism), and Christians. According to defector 

testimony, these federations are led by political operatives whose goal is to implement the government’s policy 

of control over religious activity, as well as to gain foreign 

humanitarian assistance and maintain religious sites as 

cultural centers. For example, the official Korean Buddhist and Christian Federations restrict religious activities 

at monasteries, temples, and churches in North Korea. 

Although the religious federations maintain offices in 

Pyongyang and their delegates on occasion travel abroad, 

they have no presence in any other city or region in the 

country. The federations also operate churches, temples, 

and shrines in North Korea. 

A Buddhist presence continues to survive in North 

Korea. Refugees have testified that quasi-functioning 

Buddhist shrines and temples are maintained as cultural 

heritage sites by caretakers (gwalliwon) who do not perform any religious functions. There is some testimony 

describing the role of government-employed monks who 

give lectures, lead tours, and meet foreign dignitaries. 

Unlike Christian churches, most of which were destroyed 

over the past 50 years, refugees spoke of the preservation 

of Buddhist temples, including the government’s refurbishing of an existing site at Anbul, South Hamgyeong 

Province in 2000. While a Buddhist material culture 

survives above ground, recent refugee testimony has not 

provided much evidence of underground Buddhist activity. There are some indications that some kind of informal 

Buddhist practice remains, though evidence of this is 

scarce.

One Catholic and two Protestant churches were built 

in Pyongyang in 1988 and 1992. Services have been held 

in these churches since the mid-1990s in response to the 

growing presence of foreign aid workers in Pyongyang. 

Access to these church services is tightly managed and 

monitored, and most North Korean refugees report that 

they exist as showpieces for foreign visitors. Nevertheless, in addition to foreign visitors, those permitted to 

participate in services include some North Korean citizens 

whose families practiced Christianity prior to the Korean 

War. The absence of a priest for Roman Catholics means 

that mass cannot be celebrated and most sacraments cannot be performed. According to aid workers who attended 

the churches, it was impossible to determine if any of the 

North Koreans attending the churches in Pyongyang were 

genuine in their beliefs because of the large number of 

security personnel present during the services. International observers report that North Korean congregants 

regularly arrive and depart as a group in tour buses. 

125

NORTH KOREA

The North Korean flag at “Propaganda Village” is visible from the South 

Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone. 

Commissioners Eid, Prodromou, Gaer, and Cromartie meet with North 

Korean refugees at Hanawon, the South Korean processing center for 

North Korean refugees.
126

The Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church opened 

in Pyongyang in August 2006. Two North Koreans are reportedly receiving Orthodox theological training in Moscow. There are also reportedly three Buddhist temples 

and a Chondokyist shrine in Pyongyang. Government 

officials have claimed that Buddhist temples are cultural 

relics that need to be preserved. There is a department 

of religion at Kim Il Sung University, but graduates and 

faculty are said to be involved in training security forces to 

identify repatriated refugees who may have become Christian adherents during their time in China. Many graduates also reportedly work with the officially sanctioned 

religious federations and interact with foreign religious 

visitors. The Korean Presbyterian Church of South Korea 

reports that it has reached an agreement to build a new 

Protestant church in Pyongyang; however, construction 

plans have not progressed. 

In addition to the churches in Pyongyang, the North 

Korean government claims that some 500 house churches 

operate in North Korea with official approval. Until recently, it was impossible to verify who attended the house 

churches and ascertain whether they existed outside of 

Pyongyang. South Korean scholars were recently allowed 

to attend house church services and they reported that 

participants are largely individuals whose families were 

Christians before 1950 and that some house churches do 

in fact operate outside of Pyongyang. The number or size 

of house churches allowed to operate in North Korea is 

impossible to verify. Those who have attended such gatherings report that they are very small gatherings of family 

members, are closely monitored by police, and operate 

without materials or trained leaders. 

The Commission continues to receive credible reports that underground religious activity, or that which 

takes place outside of government sanction and control, 

is growing, despite pervasive suppression. According to 

the testimony of refugees, anyone discovered taking part 

in unauthorized religious activity, which includes carrying religious literature in public, distributing religious 

literature, or engaging in public religious expression and 

persuasion, is subject to severe punishment, such as longterm imprisonment in labor camps, torture, and possible 

execution. There continue to be reports of torture and 

execution of religious believers, including a January 2005 

report of the execution of six religious leaders. Additionally, in March 2006, authorities in Pyongyang sentenced Son 

Jong Nam to death on charges of spying for South Korea. 

Son’s conversion to Protestantism in China, his repeated 

attempts to seek refuge in China, and his alleged, private 

criticism of the North Korean regime reportedly served as 

a basis for the sentence. As of this writing, it is not possible to verify whether Son Jong Nam has been executed. 

The practice of imprisoning religious believers is 

reportedly widespread. However, neither the State Department nor any other official or non-governmental 

source has been able to document the number of religious 

detainees or prisoners. The most compelling and reliable 

information about prison conditions and prisoners comes 

from North Korean refugees who migrated through China 

to South Korea. According to some reports, an estimated 

6,000 Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15” located in the northern part of the country. According to 

testimony at the Commission’s January 2002 hearing, prisoners held on the basis of their religious beliefs are treated 

worse than other inmates, a fact confirmed by refugees 

interviewed for both of the Commission’s reports. For 

example, religious prisoners are reportedly given the most 

dangerous tasks while in prison. In addition, they are 

subject to constant abuse from prison officials in an effort 

to force them to renounce their faith. When they refuse, 

they are often beaten and sometimes tortured to death. 

North Korean refugees and refugee assistance organizations report a growing number of Christian adherents in 

the prison system due to a spread of Christianity from 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs (center) and other officials 

from the Ministry meet with the USCIRF delegation in Seoul
127

cross-border proselytizing by South Korean and Chinese 

missionaries in the border area. 

The North Korean government forcefully propagates 

an ideology known as “Juche” or “KimIlSungism” centered 

on the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung and Kim 

Jong Il. Pictures of the “Great Leader” (Kim Il Sung) and 

the “Dear Leader” (Kim Jong Il) hang on the walls of every 

house, schoolroom, and workplace. The only exception is 

in the churches of Pyongyang, where crosses hang in the 

place of the portraits. Under threat of fines and other penalties, North Koreans are required to maintain and display 

the portraits of their leaders. Every North Korean wears 

a lapel pin of the Great Leader. Schools are required to 

study and memorize the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of the Party.” On several 

occasions throughout the past year, North Korean media 

sources quoted Kim Jong Il’s instructions that ideological 

education must take precedence over academic subjects 

in the nation’s schools. North Korean refugees report that 

each village contains a “Kim Il Sung Research Center” 

where they are required to attend weekly meetings. One 

scholar estimated that there may be as many as 450,000 

such centers, including one in the infamous Yodok prison 

camp. Meetings include watching inspirational films on 

the Dear Leader’s life, indoctrination sessions on the principles of Juche, and public self-criticism sessions. 

The government also forcefully controls all means of 

transmitting information in the country, including television, radio and print media, access to the Internet, and 

cellular and landline phone communication. Possessing anti-state written materials, listening to foreign radio 

broadcasts, or altering radios so that they might receive 

foreign broadcasts constitute crimes punishable by longterm imprisonment, and international phone lines are 

available only under highly restricted circumstances. Cell 

phone use for the general population has been banned 

since 2004. In October 2007, a factory head was executed 

NORTH KOREA

Refugees have testified that 

quasi-functioning Buddhist shrines 

and temples are maintained as cultural 

heritage sites by caretakers (gwalliwon)

who do not perform any 

religious functions.

Commissioner Felice D. Gaer (third from left) speaks at a conference on human rights in North Korea convened by the Citizen’s 

Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Korea University, and Handong International School of Law.
128

in front of a crowd of 150,000 people because he made 

international phone calls. There is credible evidence that 

public executions continue to rise as North Korean officials seek to control and prevent outside information from 

reaching North Korea. 

As a result of the prolonged famine and the highly 

oppressive nature of the regime, an estimated 300,000 

refugees have fled North Korea to China during the past 

decade. With the easing of famine conditions over the 

past several years, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 remain in China today. China, according to an agreement 

with North Korea, considers all of these refugees to be 

economic migrants who are subject to forcible repatriation. According to North Korean law, leaving the country 

is tantamount to treason and all returnees are subject to 

arrest and imprisonment, often accompanied by torture. 

According to refugee testimony, those determined to have 

migrated to avoid famine conditions are sometimes released after a short period of detention or forced labor. 

However, over the past few years, refugees report that 

repatriated North Koreans are currently facing harsher 

penalties upon return, with increased numbers of firsttime returnees being sentenced to one to five years imprisonment, regardless of their reasons for fleeing North 

Korea. Anyone suspected of having contact with either 

South Korean humanitarian or religious organizations is 

extensively interrogated. Security forces try to determine 

if those repatriated have become adherents of Christianity 

or have otherwise been “contaminated” by their contact 

with South Korean or Korean-Chinese religious groups. 

Cross-border contact with China and the presence of foreign humanitarian and religious organizations working 

among North Korean refugee populations has heightened 

the regime’s fears of the spread of new religious activity, particularly Christianity. According to refugee and 

defector testimony, North Korean border guards and 

security officials are being trained and instructed on how 

to identify and halt such activities, as well as the distribution of religious literature. Refugees continue to provide 

evidence that security forces use torture during interrogation and subject anyone found to have had contact with 

Protestant or other religiously-based aid organizations in 

China to long-term imprisonment in hard labor facilities 

designated for political prisoners. The North Korean government also continues to offer rewards to its citizens for 

providing information that leads to the arrest of individuals suspected of involvement in cross-border missionary 

activities or the distribution of Bibles or other religious 

literature. 

In November 2004, the North Korea Human Rights 

Act was signed into law by the U.S. Congress. The legislation cites Commission findings and includes provisions 

reflecting several Commission recommendations, including the appointment of a Special Envoy on Human Rights 

in North Korea. In August 2005, President Bush appointed 

The number or size of house churches allowed to operate in North Korea 

is impossible to verify. Those who have attended such gatherings report that 

they are very small gatherings of family members, are closely monitored 

by police, and operate without materials or trained leaders.

Prof. Jae-Chun Won, lead researcher of A Prison Without Bars (far 

right), USCIRF staff, and Commissioners Gaer and Eid meet with 

members of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, including 

Chair Kyong-Whan Ahn (center).
129

Jay Lefkowitz to this position. Commissioners met with 

Ambassador Lefkowitz in November 2005 to present the 

Commission’s study, Thank You Father Kim Il Sung, and 

to discuss the Commission’s policy recommendations on 

religious freedom and other human rights issues in North 

Korea. 

In the last year, the Commission continued to conduct activities in Washington, DC and elsewhere to raise 

public awareness of violations of religious freedom in 

the DPRK and to engage policy makers and Members 

of Congress in implementation of policy recommendations that would address these violations. In November 

2005, the Commission released Thank You Father Kim 

Il Sung at a press conference with several Members of 

Congress. Commissioners and staff also briefed relevant 

policy makers at the National Security Council, the State 

Department, and in both Houses of Congress about the 

findings of the study. In March 2006, the Commission 

hosted, together with the American Enterprise Institute, a 

panel presentation entitled “Religious Freedom in North 

Korea: Update and Options,” at which David Hawk, lead 

researcher of the Commission’s study on North Korea, 

gave a presentation on the findings of the study, with 

commentary from other panelists. Then-Commission 

Chair Michael Cromartie presented opening remarks and 

Ambassador Lefkowitz gave a keynote address.

In May 2006, in cooperation with the Asia Society and 

with Refugees International, the Commission co-hosted 

a conference in New York to discuss options for raising 

human rights concerns within the spectrum of security 

concerns involving the Korean Peninsula. Commissioner 

Preeta D. Bansal moderated a panel that discussed the key 

strategies and mechanisms needed to establish a broader 

security agenda for Northeast Asia that would include 

human rights concerns. The panel included presentations from Republic of Korea National Assembly Member 

Chung Eui-yong, Japan’s Human Rights Ambassador 

Fumiko Saiga, and Brookings Institution Senior Fellow 

Roberta Cohen. On an earlier panel focusing on human 

rights issues in North Korea, David Hawk offered a presentation on the Commission’s study.

Also in May 2006, the Commission hosted a briefing 

on Capitol Hill to discuss the situation of North Korean 

refugees in China. The briefing included statements from 

Kato Hiroshi, General Secretary of Life Funds for North 

Korean Refugees; Joel Charny, Vice President of Refugees 

International; and Marcus Nolan of the International Institute for Economics. The panelists discussed the struggles that North Korean refugees face in China, including 

trafficking in persons, fear of deportation, and recovery 

from the ordeals they faced while still inside the DPRK. 

Then-Commission Executive Director Joseph R. Crapa 

served as a moderator. 

In July 2006, at a town hall meeting convened by Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York, the Commission 

released a Korean language version of its study, Thank 

You Father Kim Il Sung. During the event, Congressman 

Ackerman moderated a panel that included presentations 

from then-Commission Chair Felice D. Gaer and David 

Hawk, lead researcher on the study. 

NORTH KOREA

Chong Jinseok, Cardinal of the Republic of Korea.
130

Commission Recommendations

I

n addition to recommending that 

North Korea continue to be designated a CPC, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government 

should:

 Promoting Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

• use all diplomatic means to urge 

the North Korean government to 

undertake the following measures 

that would help bring the DPRK into 

compliance with its international 

legal obligations with respect to 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief:

Ending Abuses

• end the severe human rights 

violations, including imprisonment and execution on account 

of religion or belief, against 

individuals not affiliated with the 

state-sponsored religious federations or those North Koreans having contact with foreign religious 

groups in China;

• release prisoners from administrative detention in kwanliso political penal labor colonies, such 

as those reported to be in certain 

villages in the “total control zone” 

at Camp No. 15 (Yodok), as well 

as those who remain detained 

in other facilities for exercising 

their right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, 

and rehabilitate remaining religious adherents held in lifetime 

detention;

• end the coercive enforcement of 

the official ideology, Juche/KimIlSungism, that results in discrimination and other human rights 

violations against adherents of 

other religions or belief systems; 

• end prohibitions and punishments for importing religious 

literature from abroad;

Promoting Compliance with 

International Norms

• enable adherents of systems of 

thought and belief not covered by 

the existing federations, such as 

Confucianism, Shamanism, and 

other indigenous Korean belief 

systems, to practice their religion 

or belief without government 

interference and to form organizations for that purpose;

• implement the existing Constitutional provision allowing for the 

construction of places of worship 

outside the capital city of Pyongyang, including for religious 

groups who are not affiliated with 

the state-sponsored federations 

or for which there is no applicable 

federation;

• allow individuals and religious 

groups to engage in public expression of their religion or belief 

and to inform others of their 

belief systems; and

• allow clergy or religious leaders to 

travel abroad for higher education and/or training, and allow 

the residence of foreign clergy 

in North Korea where there are 

shortages.

 Integrating Human Rights 

and Human Security Issues 

into Negotiations on Security 

Concerns in Northeast Asia

The U.S. government should:

• work with regional and European 

allies to fashion a comprehensive 

plan for security concerns on the 

Korean Peninsula that includes 

agreements on human rights and 

humanitarian concerns—modeled 

after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 

and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe—as 

suggested by the Commission and 

in Sec. 106 of the North Korean Human Rights Act and

• in negotiations on nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula, 

including at the Six-Party Talks, 

work with regional allies to reach 

agreements on pressing human rights and human security 

concerns, including monitoring 

of humanitarian aid, resettlement 

of refugees, family reunifications, 

abductions, and other pressing 

human rights issues, including 

religious freedom, and linking 

future economic assistance and 

diplomatic recognition to concrete progress in these areas; and 

• initiate, within the formal structure of the Six Party Talks, targeted working groups on issues 

of regional and international 

concern, including monitoring of 

humanitarian aid, refugees, and 

abductions, and fully integrate 

these issues into the agenda of 

the Six Party Talks at the earliest 

possible date. 

 Maintaining the Mandate 

of the Special Envoy on 

Human Rights in North Korea

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that all funds authorized under the North Korean Human Rights 

Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-333; 22 

3 

2 

1 
131

NORTH KOREA

U.S.C. 7801) are requested and used 

to fulfill the purposes of the Act and 

that the Special Envoy on Human 

Rights in North Korea, appointed by 

President Bush in accordance with 

the Act, is allowed to implement the 

key provisions of the Act including 

new human rights and democracy programming, promotion of 

information into and out of North 

Korea, and discussions with foreign 

governments about a durable solution to the plight of North Korean 

refugees including seeking broader 

permission and greater cooperation 

from foreign governments on refugee protection and resettlement.

 Protecting and Aiding 

North Korean Refugees

The U.S. government should:

• urge the Chinese government to 

uphold its international obligations 

to protect asylum seekers, by 1) 

working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

to establish a mechanism to confer 

temporary asylum on those seeking 

such protection and to permit safe 

transport to countries of final asylum; 2) providing the UNHCR with 

unrestricted access to interview 

North Korean nationals in China; 

and 3) ensuring that any migrants 

who are being returned pursuant 

to any bilateral agreement are not 

potential asylum seekers refouled 

in violation of China’s obligations 

under the 1951 Refugee Convention 

and its 1967 Protocol;

• urge the Chinese government to 

allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to 

North Koreans in China, to address 

growing social problems, abuses, 

and exploitation experienced by this 

vulnerable population and work 

with regional and European allies 

to articulate a consistent and clear 

message about China’s need to protect North Korean refugees; 

• in bilateral relations with China, 

Russia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and other countries 

in East Asia, continue to stress U.S. 

and international concerns about 

providing safe haven, secure transit, 

and clear resettlement procedures 

for North Koreans; and

• make every effort to ensure that its 

screening, processing, and resettlement of North Korean refugees are 

as efficient and expeditious as possible; and

• continue coordination among the 

Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

regional allies, including South 

Korea, to facilitate resolution of any 

remaining technical, legal, or diplomatic issues that hinder additional 

resettlement of North Koreans in the 

United States. 

 Pursuing Multilateral 

Diplomacy and Human 

Rights in North Korea 

The U.S. government should:

• encourage nations with diplomatic relations with North Korea 

to include religious freedom and 

other human rights in their talks 

with North Korea, and to urge the 

North Korean government to invite 

UN Special Rapporteurs and other 

appropriate UN bodies to assess the 

human rights and humanitarian 

situation, to monitor the delivery 

of humanitarian assistance, and to 

recommend reforms and technical 

assistance programs; 

• urge the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to open 

an office in Seoul, South Korea for 

the purpose of initiating technical 

assistance programs addressing 

regional and transnational issues 

including, but not limited to, abductions, human trafficking, police and 

border guard training, legal reform, 

political prisoners, and abuses of 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief; and

• work with regional allies and appropriate international bodies to ensure 

that future economic, energy, or 

humanitarian assistance to North 

Korea will be effectively monitored 

to ensure that aid reaches the most 

vulnerable populations and is not 

diverted to military use.

 Expanding Public 

Diplomacy Programs for 

North Korea 

The U.S. government should:

• continue to expand radio, television, Internet, and print information available to the North Korean 

people through:

• additional appropriations to the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors to allow Radio Free Asia 

and Voice of America to increase 

shortwave and medium-wave 

broadcasting to North Korea; and 

• additional funding through the 

National Endowment for Democracy and the Department of State 

Human Rights and Democracy 

Fund to disseminate information on human rights, including 

religious freedom, inside North 

Korea in the form of written and 

electronic materials, DVDs, and 

digital programming.

6 

5 

4 
In addition, the U.S. Congress 

should: 

• create in inter-parliamentary working group that includes current and 

former elected officials and other 

experts from the U.S., Europe and 

Asia to discuss ways to include 

human rights and human security 

concerns in any future security 

arrangement in Northeast Asia, 

provide ideas for diplomats and 

policymakers, and build public 

and political support for creating 

a framework that addresses both 

human rights and other outstanding 

security and economic concerns on 

the Korean Peninsula;

• continue to appropriate all the 

funds authorized in the North Korea 

Human Rights Act of 2004 for public 

diplomacy, refugee assistance, 

democratization programs, and 

relevant travel by the Special Envoy 

on North Korea and renew the Act’s 

mandate when it expires in 2008; 

and,

• raise religious freedom and related 

human rights as a prominent concern in appropriate congressional 

or congressional staff visits to North 

Korea, including distribution of 

Korean language reports of the 

Commission, and reiterate requests 

seeking access for international 

monitors to North Korean prisons as 

promised by Vice Foreign Minister 

Kim Gye-gwan to a visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

delegation in August 2003. 

132
Eritrea

 

The government of Eritrea continues to engage in 

systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom, 

and the situation appears to have deteriorated in the past 

year. Current violations include arbitrary arrests and 

detention without charge of members of unregistered 

religious groups, and the torture or other ill-treatment of 

hundreds of persons on account of their religion, sometimes resulting in death. Other serious concerns include 

the prolonged ban on public religious activities by all 

religious groups that are not officially recognized, closure 

by the authorities of the places of worship of these religious groups, inordinate delays in acting on registration 

applications by religious groups, and the disruption of 

private religious and even social gatherings of members of 

unregistered groups. In February 2004, the Commission 

recommended for the first time that the State Department 

designate Eritrea a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC, which the State Department did in September 2004 

and each year since then. In September 2005, Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice announced the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of defense articles and services 

covered by the Arms Control Export Act, with some items 

exempted, the first unique presidential action to be undertaken under the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response to the CPC designation, a 

move commended by the Commission. Because religious 

freedom conditions did not change in the past year, the 

Commission continues to recommend that Eritrea remain 

a CPC.

Since gaining independence from Ethiopia in 1993, 

Eritrea has been ruled by the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), which continues to be led by 

persons who came to prominence as freedom fighters in 

the war for independence. After an initially promising 

start toward democratization, the PFDJ government has 

become increasingly repressive. In 2001, the government 

suspended implementation of a democratic constitution, canceled elections, curtailed press freedom, began a 

crackdown on political opponents, and restricted religious 

groups it perceived as undermining national unity. The 

government is also maintaining the country on a near-war 

footing out of a fear of renewed hostilities with Ethiopia. 

The Eritrean government officially recognizes only 

four religious groups: the (Coptic) Orthodox Church of 

Eritrea, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and 

the Evangelical Church of Eritrea, a Lutheran-affiliated 

denomination. Although there is no state religion, the 

government has close ties to the Orthodox Church, the 

largest and oldest of Eritrea’s Christian communities, and 

is suspicious of newer groups—in particular, Protestant 

Evangelical, Pentecostal, and other Christian denominations not traditional to Eritrea. 

Although relations among the four governmentrecognized religious communities are generally good, 

leaders of the established groups, particularly the Orthodox Church, have expressed concerns about the growth 

of newer, more activist religious groups. Government officials have criticized “non-traditional” Christian groups 

for engaging in aggressive evangelism that is allegedly 

socially divisive and alien to Eritrea’s cultural traditions. 

Government officials have also pointed to foreign or 

foreign-inspired Muslim fundamentalists as seeking to 

radicalize traditional Eritrean practice of Islam and thus 

create tensions in a society that is roughly half Christian 

and half Muslim. Government concerns regarding foreign backing for religious groups have resulted in strict 

ERITREA

133

As part of the campaign against 

the religious activities of those persons 

not belonging to officially recognized 

religious denominations, Eritrean security 

forces have disrupted private worship, 

conducted mass arrests of participants 

at religious weddings, prayer meetings, 

and other gatherings, and detained 

those arrested without charge for 

indefinite periods of time.
controls both on humanitarian activities by international 

faith-based organizations and on foreign funding going to 

indigenous groups for religious or charitable activities. 

In 2002, the government imposed a registration 

requirement on religious groups requiring each group 

applying for approval to provide detailed financial and 

membership information, as well as background on its 

presence in Eritrea. Affected groups included Protestant 

Evangelical and Pentecostal Christian denominations, as 

well as the Baha’is. Some of these groups have operated 

in Eritrea for several decades. Exempted from the new 

requirements for registration were the four “sanctioned” 

religions. Jehovah’s Witnesses were not among the groups 

offered the opportunity to register. By stipulating that 

there could be no public religious activities pending registration, the decree effectively closed places of worship 

and prohibited public religious activities, including worship services, of all other religious communities in Eritrea.

Although some groups submitted the required applications, to date, none have been approved. As a result of the 

registration requirement and of the government’s inaction 

on registration applications, all of Eritrea’s religious communities except the four government-sanctioned religious 

groups lack a legal basis on which to practice their faiths 

publicly. In September 2006, the government confiscated 

the assets and seized control of the charitable institutions, 

including schools and an orphanage, of one of the groups 

that had tried to register, the Kale Hiwot (“Word of Life”) 

Protestant Church. 

As part of the campaign against the religious activities of those persons not belonging to officially recognized 

religious denominations, Eritrean security forces have 

disrupted private worship, conducted mass arrests of 

participants at religious weddings, prayer meetings, and 

other gatherings, and detained those arrested without 

charge for indefinite periods of time. Hundreds of members of unregistered religious groups, as well as dozens of 

Muslims who oppose the government-appointed mufti, 

are believed to be detained at any given time. Because 

of government restrictions, it is difficult to determine the 

precise number of religious prisoners at any one time, and 

releases sometimes go unreported; however, the State Department reports that the number of long-term prisoners 

continued to grow in the past year. According to the State 

Department, at least 160 additional members of unregistered religious groups were detained without charges by 

Eritrean authorities in the past year. 

Persons detained for religious activities often were 

not formally charged, permitted access to legal counsel, 

accorded due process, or allowed access to their families. Some prisoners were released after detentions of several days or less, but others spent longer periods in detention. The government held individuals who were jailed on 

account of their religious affiliation at a variety of venues, 

including facilities administered by the military. On December 24, 2007, Eritrean officials reportedly imprisoned 

35 persons belonging to the underground Faith Missions 

Church following a raid on a building in the port city 

of Massawa, where the members of the underground 

church were meeting. Those imprisoned were placed in 

the notorious Weea Military Training Center, and reportedly are still being held there. There are credible reports 

that the security forces have used coercion on detainees 

134

A Baha’i Center closed by government order in 2002, Asmara.

Shida (“sandals”) Square, a monument to fighters in Eritrea’s 

war for independence from Ethiopia.
to secure repudiations of faith; some prisoners were required to recant their religious beliefs as a precondition of 

release. During the past year, there have been occasional 

reports of deaths of religious prisoners who refused to 

recant their beliefs. Other religious detainees have reportedly been beaten, tortured, confined in crowded conditions, or subjected to extreme temperature fluctuations.

Government violations of religious freedom are alleged to be particularly severe in the armed forces. During the war with Ethiopia, some Eritrean soldiers accepted 

various forms of Protestantism, reportedly alarming 

government officials and leading to the banning of prayer 

meetings among armed forces members. Attendance at 

such meetings is punishable by imprisonment. Moreover, 

armed forces members and national service inductees 

reportedly face severe punishment for possession of religious literature, including Bibles.

Since 1994, the government of Eritrea has denied a 

range of government services and civil and political rights 

to members of the country’s small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Many Jehovah’s Witnesses refused on 

religious grounds to participate in the 1993 referendum 

on independence or to accept the national military service required of all citizens, both male and female. The 

government chose to interpret these actions as a rejection 

of Eritrean citizenship. In accordance with a presidential 

decree issued in October 1994, Jehovah’s Witnesses have 

been barred from obtaining government jobs, business 

licenses, and government-issued identity and travel documents. Lack of Eritrean identity cards prevents Jehovah’s 

Witnesses from obtaining legal recognition of marriages 

and land purchases.

Jehovah’s Witnesses who have refused to serve in the 

military have been imprisoned without trial, some for over 

a decade, even though the maximum legal penalty for 

refusing to perform national service is two years. These 

government actions, which continued in the past year, are 

customarily taken without due process of law or any administrative appeal. Moreover, the requirement of a military training component for secondary school graduation 

effectively denies educational and employment opportunities to young Jehovah’s Witnesses, encouraging many to 

flee their homeland. Some children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been expelled from school because of their refusal 

to salute the flag or to pay for membership in the officially 

sanctioned national organization for youth and students. 

Individual members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses are regularly arrested and imprisoned for expressing their faith to 

others. Some are quickly released, while others are held 

indefinitely without charge. Although there have been 

no recent reports of mass arrests, in 2003 and 2004, whole 

congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested while 

attending worship services. According to the State Department, a total of 25 members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses are 

currently being held without charges or trial. 

Since 2005, the government has increasingly interfered in the internal affairs of the Orthodox Church of 

Eritrea. Security forces have targeted reformist elements 

in the Orthodox Church, arresting religious activists and 

preventing their meetings. The government has also 

tightened its grip on the highest levels of the Church. In 

August 2005, the Church’s Synod, allegedly acting at the 

government’s behest, stripped Orthodox Patriarch Antonios of much of his authority, with his administrative 

duties being assumed by a government-appointed layperson. In January 2006, the Synod moved to depose the 

Patriarch. In a letter dated January 15, 2006, the Patriarch 

denounced the Synod’s actions as illegal under canon law 

ERITREA

135

In accordance with a presidential decree issued in October 1994, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses have been barred from obtaining government jobs, business 

licenses, and government-issued identity and travel documents. Lack of Eritrean 

identity cards prevents Jehovah’s Witnesses from obtaining legal 

recognition of marriages and land purchases.
and announced the excommunication of the governmentappointed administrator. These actions by the Patriarch, 

who, according to some reports, has been placed under 

virtual house arrest, have been ignored by Church leaders 

who are compliant with the government’s actions. In December 2006, the government reportedly ordered that all 

tithes and offerings to the Church must be placed in a government account, that priests’ salaries must be paid from 

this account, and that priests deemed by the government 

to be in excess of parish needs must report for military 

service. In May 2007, the Synod installed a new Patriarch, 

believed to be more compliant with government direction. 

The government’s concerns regarding religious 

activities appear to be linked to real or perceived security threats, and government spokespersons have cited 

Pentecostals, along with Muslim extremists, as threats to 

national security. Islamic militants operating out of Sudan have engaged in a low-level insurgency against the 

government, occasionally employing terrorism as a tactic 

in their campaign to establish an Islamic state. However, 

human rights organizations report that they consider it 

likely that many of the Muslim suspects detained without 

charge by the security forces are being held primarily for 

their views, including their criticism of alleged anti-Muslim discrimination or their opposition to the governmentrecognized leadership of the Muslim community, rather 

than for supporting or engaging in violence. None of the 

suspected Christian groups are known to have engaged in 

or advocated violence. 

The Commission has met on a number of occasions 

with State Department personnel, Eritrean diplomats, religious community representatives, and others concerned 

with religious freedom in Eritrea. In October 2004, the 

Commission sent a staff delegation to Eritrea to study religious freedom conditions firsthand. During a six-day visit, 

the delegation discussed the religious freedom situation 

with senior Eritrean government officials, leaders of the 

four major faiths sanctioned by the Eritrean government, 

as well as with unregistered religious groups, representatives of non-governmental organizations, United Nations 

personnel, and members of the U.S. and foreign diplomatic communities. In a January 2005 letter to Secretary 

Rice, the Commission commended the Administration for 

Eritrea’s designation as a CPC and recommended subsequent actions that the Administration should take, in accordance with IRFA, in response to that designation. The 

Commission welcomed the Secretary’s announcement in 

September 2005 that Eritrea would be subject to the firstever presidential action under IRFA specifically taken in 

response to CPC designation.

A novice monk praying in front of a Buddha figure, Burma

Since 2005, the government has 

increasingly interfered in the internal 

affairs of the Orthodox Church of Eritrea. 

Security forces have targeted reformist 

elements in the Orthodox Church, 

arresting religious activists and 

preventing their meetings.

136
137

Commission Recommendations

As a consequence of the designation of Eritrea as a CPC, the 

Commission has recommended that 

the U.S. government should:

• maintain the denial of commercial 

export to Eritrea of defense articles 

and services covered by the Arms 

Control Export Act, with some 

items exempted, as announced by 

the Secretary of State in September 

2005;

• engage in vigorous advocacy of religious freedom and other universal 

human rights at all levels of involvement with the government of Eritrea 

and draw international attention 

to religious freedom abuses there, 

including in multilateral fora such 

as the United Nations; and

• review development assistance to 

Eritrea with the aim of redirecting 

such assistance to programs that 

contribute directly to democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law; 

increases in other forms of development assistance should depend 

on measurable improvements in 

religious freedom. On December 

31, 2005, USAID closed its offices 

and ended most assistance programs in Eritrea, with the exception 

of certain humanitarian activities. 

The Commission recommends that 

any resumption of U.S. development 

assistance should entail a thorough 

review as described. 

With regard to religious freedom 

conditions in Eritrea, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. 

government should:

• urge the government of Eritrea to 

undertake the following actions to 

improve respect for religious freedom in that country by:

• releasing detainees held solely on 

account of their peaceful religious 

activities; 

• implementing the constitution’s 

existing guarantees of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion, 

including the freedom to practice 

any religion and to manifest such 

practice;

• instituting a registration process 

for religious groups that is transparent, non-discriminatory, not 

overly burdensome, and otherwise in accordance with international standards;

• promptly registering those religious groups that comply with the 

requirements issued in 2002, and 

not requiring religious groups to 

provide identifying information 

on individual members;

• taking official, public action to 

permit religious groups to resume 

their public religious activities 

pending registration, including 

reopening of places of worship 

closed by the ban in 2002;

• issuing a public order to the 

security forces reminding them 

that religious practice is not to be 

interfered with except in those 

circumstances permitted by international law; and

• extending an official invitation 

for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief and by the UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention;

• encourage unofficial dialogue with 

Eritreans on religious freedom issues, specifically by:

• the promotion of a visit to Eritrea 

by U.S. leaders concerned with 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief in order to 

meet with Eritrean authorities 

and other opinion-makers and 

to facilitate dialogue among all of 

Eritrea’s religious communities;

• the expanded use of educational 

and cultural exchanges, such 

as the Fulbright Program, the 

International Visitor Program, 

and lectures by visiting American 

scholars and experts, in order to 

introduce more Eritreans to the 

workings and benefits of societies 

in which religious freedom and 

other human rights are respected; 

and

• seek the cooperation of other 

countries in promoting greater understanding by Eritreans of international standards regarding freedom 

of religion or belief;

• intensify international efforts to resolve the current impasse between 

Eritrea and Ethiopia regarding 

implementation of the boundary 

demarcation as determined by the 

“final and binding” decision of the 

International Boundary Commission established following the 1998-

2000 war; and

• support, and offer to provide funding for, the creation of an independent human rights commission 

in Eritrea, in line with the Paris 

Principles1

 for such organizations, 

including independence, adequate 

funding, a representative character, 

and a broad mandate that includes 

freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief.

ENDNOTES

1

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 

National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of 

Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, 

National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 

of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/

fs19.htm, accessed April 3, 2008).
138

Iran

The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, 

including prolonged detention, torture, and executions 

based primarily or entirely upon the religion of the accused. Over the past few years, the Iranian government’s 

poor religious freedom record has deteriorated, especially 

for religious minorities and in particular for Baha’is, Sufi 

Muslims, and Evangelical Christians, including intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and imprisonment. 

Heightened anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial rhetoric 

and activities by senior government officials have increased fear among Iran’s Jewish community. In early 

2008, the Iranian parliament began considering a new 

proposal that would codify serious punishments, including the death penalty, on converts from Islam. Since 

the 1979 Iranian Revolution, significant numbers from 

religious minority communities have fled Iran for fear 

of persecution. Dissident Muslims also continue to be 

subject to abuse. Since 1999, the State Department has 

designated Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC. The Commission continues to recommend that Iran 

remain a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 

proclaims Islam, specifically the doctrine of the Twelver 

(Shi’a) Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the 

country. It stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic criteria. 

The head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme 

Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has direct control 

over the armed forces, the internal security forces, and the 

judiciary. The Assembly of Experts, a group of 86 Islamic 

scholars elected to eight-year terms by popular vote from 

a government-screened list of candidates, choose the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis (parliament) for adherence 

to Islamic and constitutional principles. The Constitution 

grants the Guardian Council the power to screen and 

disqualify candidates for elective offices based on a vague 

and arbitrary set of requirements, including candidates’ 

ideological and religious beliefs. The 290-member Majlis

is elected by popular vote to four year terms and candidates are screened by the Guardian Council. Five seats in 

the Majlis are reserved for recognized religious minorities: 

two for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian Christians, 

and one each for Iranian Jews and Zoroastrians. 

In recent years, hundreds of prominent Muslim activists and dissidents from among the Shi’a majority advocating political reform have been sentenced to lengthy prison 

terms by the Revolutionary Court on charges of seeking 

to overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; others have been 

arrested and detained for alleged blasphemy and criticizing the nature of the Islamic regime. Reformists and journalists are regularly tried under current press laws and the 

Penal Code on charges of “insulting Islam,” criticizing the 

Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that deviate 

from Islamic standards. Prominent Iranian investigative 

journalist Akbar Ganji was released from prison in March

2006 after serving a six-year prison sentence on reportedly spurious charges of “harming national security” and 

“spreading propaganda” against the Islamic Republic. 

Ganji was arrested and convicted as a result of attending 

a human rights conference in 2000 in Germany, where he 

publicly expressed views critical of the Iranian regime. 

Following a visit to Iran, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression concluded 

in early 2004 that such charges brought by Iranian courts 

“lack any objective criteria” and are open to “subjective 

and arbitrary interpretation by judges implementing 

them.” 

A number of senior Shi’a religious leaders who have 

opposed various religious and/or political tenets and 

Over the past few years, the 

Iranian government’s poor religious 

freedom record has deteriorated, 

especially for religious minorities 

and in particular for Baha’is, 

Sufi Muslims, and Evangelical 

Christians, including intensified 

harassment, detention, arrests, 

and imprisonment.
139

practices of the Iranian government have also been targets 

of state repression, including house arrest, detention without charge, trial without due process, torture, and other 

forms of ill treatment. In October 2006, a senior Shi’a 

cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi, who 

opposes religious rule in Iran, and a number of his followers were arrested and detained after clashes with riot 

police. Iranian officials charged him with “sacrilege” for 

having claimed to be a representative of the hidden Imam, 

a venerated figure in Shi’a Islam. Boroujerdi has denied 

these charges. While the current status of Boroujerdi and 

his followers is unknown, it appears that he and several of 

his followers remain in detention. 

Muslim minorities continue to face repression. Some 

Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread abuses 

and restrictions on their religious practice, including 

detentions and torture of Sunni clerics, as well as bans 

on Sunni teachings in public schools and Sunni religious 

literature, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Sufi and 

Sunni Muslim leaders are regularly intimidated and harassed by intelligence and security services and report 

widespread official discrimination. The Sunni community 

still has not been able to build a mosque in Tehran. Ethnic Turkmen Sunni Muslims from the northeastern part 

of Iran bordering Turkmenistan report an intense government campaign to convert them to Shi’a Islam.

In November 2007, clashes in the western city of Borujerd between security forces and followers of a mystic 

Sufi order resulted in dozens of injuries and the arrests 

of approximately 180 Sufis. The clashes occurred after 

authorities began bulldozing a Sufi monastery; authorities are reportedly cracking down because the number of 

Sufi followers is growing. It is not clear how many remain 

in detention or if any charges have been brought against 

those arrested. In May 2007, security forces arrested the 

leader of the Nematollahi Gonabadi Sufi order, Nurali 

Tabandeh; the reason for his arrest and whether formal 

charges have been brought against him are not known. In 

February 2006, Iranian authorities closed and destroyed a 

Sufi house of worship in the northwestern city of Qom and 

arrested approximately 1,200 Sufis who took to the streets 

in protest. Most were released within hours or days, although dozens reportedly suffered serious injuries. More 

than 170 Sufis were detained and reportedly tortured in 

order to extract confessions that would be broadcast on 

national television. Those who were released were forced 

to sign agreements saying they would not attend Sufi 

religious activities in Qom and would make themselves 

known to intelligence offices. Some were forced to sign 

documents renouncing their beliefs. In May, a court sentenced more than 50 Sufis to jail on various charges in 

connection with the February incident. According to the 

State Department, the defendants and their two lawyers 

were sentenced to a year in prison, fines, and 74 lashes. In 

addition, there were reports that the government is considering banning Sufism outright. 

The constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected religious 

minorities who may worship freely and have autonomy 

over their own matters of personal status (e.g. marriage, 

divorce, and inheritance). Nevertheless, the primacy of 

IRAN

A number of senior Shi’a religious 

leaders who have opposed various 

religious and/or political tenets and 

practices of the Iranian government 

have also been targets of state repression, 

including house arrest, detention 

without charge, trial without 

due process, torture, and other 

forms of ill treatment.

Witnesses Roya Boroumand, Payam Akhavan, and Paul Marshall testify at the USCIRF public hearing on Iran, February 2008.
140

Islam and Islamic laws and institutions adversely affects 

the rights and status of non-Muslims. Members of these 

groups are subject to legal and other forms of discrimination, particularly in education, government jobs and 

services, and the armed services. Non-Muslims may not 

engage in public religious expression and persuasion 

among Muslims; some also face restrictions on publishing religious material in Persian. In 2004, the Expediency 

Council—an advisory body appointed by the Supreme 

Leader with ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over 

legislation between the Majlis and the Guardian Council—authorized collection of equal blood money for the 

death of Muslim and non-Muslim men. Baha’is, Sabian 

Mandaean men, and all women remain excluded from the 

revised ruling. According to the law, Baha’is can be killed 

with impunity.

Since August 2005, the Iranian government has 

intensified its campaign against non-Muslim religious 

minorities. A consistent stream of virulent and inflammatory statements by political and religious leaders and an 

increase in harassment and imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, these groups indicate a renewal of 

the kind of oppression seen in previous years. Ayatollah 

Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, has publicly attacked non-Muslims and referred to them as “sinful 

animals” and “corrupt.” In November 2005, after publicly 

criticizing Ayatollah Jannati’s remarks, the lone Zoroastrian member of the Iranian parliament was charged 

with the “dissemination of false information, slander and 

insult” by Iranian authorities, although the case never 

went to trial. In March 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur 

for Freedom of Religion or Belief confirmed that religious 

freedom conditions are worsening for all religious minorities in Iran, particularly Baha’is. In early 2008, the Iranian 

parliament began considering a new law that would impose serious punishments, including the death penalty, 

on converts from Islam. Although the Iranian government 

has in the past applied the death penalty for apostasy under Islamic law, it has not been explicitly codified. If this 

recently proposed penal code is passed, it would seriously 

endanger the lives of all converts from Islam, particularly 

members of the Baha’i faith, who are already considered 

apostates, even if they are fourth- or fifth-generation 

Baha’i adherents.

The Baha’i community has long been subject to 

particularly severe religious freedom violations in Iran. 

Baha’is, who number approximately 300,000 – 350,000, 

are viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities, and may 

face repression on the grounds of apostasy. Since 1979, 

Iranian government authorities have killed more than 200 

Baha’i leaders in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been 

dismissed from government and university jobs. Baha’is 

Commissioners at a USCIRF public hearing on Iran, February 2008.
may not establish places of worship, schools, or any independent religious associations in Iran. In addition, 

Baha’is are barred from the military and denied government jobs and pensions as well as the right to inherit 

property, and their marriages and divorces are also not 

recognized. Baha’i cemeteries, holy places, and community properties are often seized and many important 

religious sites have been destroyed. 

In recent years, Baha’is in Iran have faced increasingly harsh treatment. Baha’i property has been confiscated or destroyed and dozens of Baha’is have been harassed, interrogated, detained, imprisoned, or physically 

attacked. In 2007, Baha’i cemeteries were destroyed in 

Yazd and outside of Najafabad. In the past several years, a 

series of articles in the government-controlled newspaper 

Kayhan, whose managing editor is appointed by Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, have vilified and demonized the Baha’i faith and its community in Iran. In March 

2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief revealed a confidential October 2005 letter from 

the Iranian Chairman of the Command Headquarters of 

the Armed Forces to several Iranian government agencies 

directing these entities to collect information on all members of the Baha’i community in Iran and to monitor their 

activities. An August 2006 letter from the Iranian Ministry 

of Interior requested provincial officials throughout the 

country to “cautiously and carefully monitor and manage” 

all Baha’i activities. Moreover, the Iranian Association 

of Chambers of Commerce reportedly is compiling a list 

of Baha’is in every type of trade and employment. In the 

past, waves of repression against Baha’is began with government orders to collect such information, and the new 

directives have created a renewed sense of insecurity and 

fear among Baha’i adherents.

In the past two years, dozens of Baha’is have been 

arrested, detained, interrogated, and subsequently released, in some cases after weeks or months in detention. 

Charges typically ranged from “causing anxiety in the 

minds of the public and of officials” to “spreading propaganda against the regime.” In December 2005, Zabihullah 

Mahrami, a Baha’i who had been jailed for more than 10 

years on charges of apostasy, died in prison under mysterious circumstances. In May 2006, 54 Baha’is, mostly 

young women in their teens and 20s, were arrested in Shiraz while teaching underprivileged children non-religious 

subjects such as math and science. In November 2007, 

three of the Baha’is were sentenced to four years in prison 

for “spreading propaganda against the Islamic Republic.” According to numerous media reports, the other 51 

Baha’is were given one year suspended sentences, conditional upon their attendance at courses held by the state’s 

“Islamic Propaganda Organization,” which would require 

them to sign documents saying they are Muslim. They 

have refused to participate in these courses. Throughout 

the fall of 2006, several other Baha’is were arrested and 

released, pending trial. Approximately 150 Baha’is have 

been arbitrarily arrested since late 2004. Dozens are 

awaiting trial, while others have been sentenced to prison 

terms ranging from 90 days to one year. All of those convicted are in the process of appealing the verdicts. As of 

this writing, 10 Baha’is are in prison and there are more 

than 60 Baha’is awaiting trial on account of their religious 

beliefs. 

In the past, Baha’is in Iran have not been allowed to 

attend university. Significantly, in the fall of 2006, because 

the 2006-2007 applications did not require students to list 

religious affiliation, for the first time in decades nearly 300 

Baha’i students were admitted to a number of universities 

and colleges in Iran; however, the majority of those admitted were later expelled when it became known that they 

were Baha’is. Although more than 1,000 Iranian Baha’i 

students registered for the national university entrance 

141

In November 2007, clashes in the 

western city of Borujerd between 

security forces and followers of a 

mystic Sufi order resulted in dozens 

of injuries and the arrests of 

approximately 180 Sufis. The 

clashes occurred after authorities 

began bulldozing a Sufi monastery; 

authorities are reportedly cracking 

down because the number of Sufi 

followers is growing.

IRAN
142

examination in 2007, only 77 have been able to enroll during the current school year. The low number is reportedly 

due to the fact that more than 800 Baha’i students were 

only told months after they had completed the examination that their files were “incomplete.” In August 2006, 

the Baha’i International Community received a copy of a 

confidential letter issued sometime in 2006 by the director general of the Central Security Office of Iran’s Ministry 

of Science, Research and Technology, which instructs 81 

Iranian universities to expel any student who is discovered to be a Baha’i, whether at the time of enrollment or 

in the course of his or her studies. Furthermore, during 

the past year, young Baha’i schoolchildren in primary and 

high schools increasingly have been vilified, pressured to 

convert to Islam, and in some cases, expelled on account 

of their religion. In December 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the Iranian government’s poor human rights record, including its continued human rights abuses targeting religious minorities 

and the escalation and increasing frequency of violations 

against members of the Baha’i faith. 

Christians in Iran, in particular Evangelical and 

other Protestants, continue to be subject to harassment, 

arrests, close surveillance, and imprisonment; many 

are reported to have fled the country. Iranian President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly has called for an end 

to the development of Christianity in Iran. Over the past 

few years, there have been several incidents of Iranian 

authorities raiding church services, detaining worshippers 

and church leaders, and harassing and threatening church 

members. According to one Christian advocacy organization, dozens of house church leaders were arrested and 

interrogated in the past year for engaging in religious 

activities in their homes. It is a common practice, particularly in cases involving offenses based on religious belief, 

for Iranian authorities to release prisoners but to leave the 

charges against them or their convictions in place in order 

to threaten them with re-imprisonment at any time in the 

future.

In December 2006, at least eight house church leaders were arrested in a sweep by authorities in four different cities. The church leaders were charged with evangelization and “acts against the national security of the 

Islamic Republic.” All were released within days or weeks 

of the original arrests. According to the State Department, 

a Christian couple who had been arrested in September 

2006 for leading a house church in Mashhad was released 

after almost two weeks in detention. Formal charges have 

still not been made against the couple, but authorities 

have indicated that the couple’s arrest and detention were 

in connection with their Christian beliefs and activities. 

In May 2006, a Muslim convert to Christianity, Ali Kaboli, 

was taken into custody in Gorgan after several years of police surveillance and threatened with prosecution if he did 

not leave the country. He was interrogated, held incommunicado, and released after a month. No charges have 

been filed against him. During the past few years, representatives of the Sabian Mandaean Association reported 

that even the small, unrecognized Mandaean religious 

community, numbering between five and ten thousand, is 

facing intensifying harassment and repression by authorities. 

Official policies promoting anti-Semitism are on the 

rise in Iran, though members of the Jewish community 

have usually been singled out on the basis of “ties to Israel,” whether real or perceived. Since coming to power, 

President Ahmadinejad and other top political and clerical leaders have made public remarks in the past year denying the existence of the Holocaust and stating that Israel 

should be “wiped off the map.” In 2007, there was a rise in 

this officially sanctioned anti-Semitic propaganda, involving official statements, media outlets, publications, and 

The Baha’i community has long been subject to particularly severe 

religious freedom violations in Iran. Baha’is, who number approximately 

300,000 – 350,000, are viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities, and 

may face repression on the grounds of apostasy.
143

books; anti-Semitic editorial cartoons depicting demonic 

and stereotypical images of Jews, along with Jewish symbols, were also published in the past year. 

In the fall of 2006, in response to the Danish cartoon 

controversy, a prominent newspaper, Hamshahri, cosponsored a cartoon contest in which the paper solicited 

submissions from around the world attacking Jews and 

the Holocaust. Iran’s official Cultural Ministry awarded 

the contest’s first prize of $12,000. In past years, several 

government-controlled newspapers celebrated the anniversary of the anti-Semitic publication, the Protocols of the 

Elders of Zion. In February 2006, the leader of Iran’s Jewish community, Haroun Yashayaei, sent an unprecedented 

public letter to President Ahmadinejad expressing serious 

concern about the President’s repeated Holocaust denial 

statements and the extent to which these statements have 

intensified fears among Iran’s 25,000 – 30,000-member 

Jewish community. Official government discrimination 

against Jews continues to be pervasive. According to the 

State Department, despite minimal restrictions on Jewish religious practice, education of Jewish children has 

become increasingly difficult in recent years, and distribution of Hebrew religious texts is strongly discouraged. In 

December 2006, President Ahmadinejad hosted a Holocaust denial conference in Tehran. In response, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan denounced the conference, and 

the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement 

condemning statements made by President Ahmadinejad 

denying the Holocaust.

The government’s monopoly on and enforcement of 

the official interpretation of Islam negatively affect the human rights of women in Iran, including their right to freedoms of movement, association, and thought, conscience, 

and religion, as well as freedom from coercion in matters 

of religion or belief. The Iranian justice system does not 

grant women the same legal status as men; for example, 

testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of two 

women. Provisions of both the Civil and Penal Codes, in 

particular those sections dealing with family and property 

law, discriminate against women. In April 2007, Iranian 

authorities arrested five women’s rights activists for their 

involvement in collecting signatures for the Campaign for 

Equality, aimed at ending discrimination against women 

in the application of Islamic law in Iran. Some of the activists’ demands included: 1) that women’s testimony in 

court carry the same weight as that of men; 2) equality of 

inheritance rights between men and women; 3) eliminating polygamy; and 4) the equality of compensation payments between women and men in the event of wrongful 

death. Two activists were released after one day and the 

other three were released on bail after nearly two weeks 

in detention. In October and November 2007, Hana Abdi 

and Ronak Safarzadeh, respectively, were arrested for 

activities related to the Campaign for Equality. As of this 

writing, they continue to be held without charge. 

In March 2008, Freedom House released a study on 

“Discrimination and Intolerance in Iran’s Textbooks.” The 

study found that the country’s textbooks published for 

the 2006-2007 school year, including religious subjects for 

grades 1 – 11, teach “the country’s children to discriminate against women and minorities, to view non-Muslims 

with suspicion if not contempt, and to perpetuate the 

regime’s theocratic ideology.” While the study found that 

the textbooks did not contain any “direct hostility” toward 

recognized religious minorities, the textbooks include intolerant content about the Baha’i religion, including that 

the Baha’i faith is a “hidden” minority and a “false sect” 

IRAN

Women in Qom, a city considered holy by Shi’a Muslims.
144

that is used as a tool for foreign governments.

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in Iran, as well as human rights groups and other Iran experts and policymakers. In February 2008, the Commission held a hearing on 

Capitol Hill entitled, “Advancing Religious Freedom and 

Related Human Rights in Iran: Strategies for an Effective 

U.S. Policy.” The Commission hearing explored current 

U.S. policy toward Iran, highlighting the deteriorating religious freedom conditions and other human rights abuses 

taking place in Iran. In March 2008, Commissioner Nina 

Shea briefed Members of Congress on religious freedom 

conditions in Iran at a congressional Iran Working Group 

briefing titled “Assessing the Human Rights Situation of 

Ethnic Religious Groups in Iran.” In January 2007, the 

Commission released a statement on Holocaust Remembrance Day, including a reference to the Iranian government’s hosting of the December 2006 Holocaust denial 

conference as an example of a government that actively 

fuels anti-Semitism. 

In August 2006, the Commission called on the National Cathedral to ensure that former Iranian President 

Mohammad Khatami would be questioned about his record on human rights and religious freedom during a presentation he was to make at the Cathedral in September.

The Commission wrote a letter to Reverend Canon John 

Peterson of the National Cathedral’s Center for Global 

Justice and Reconciliation, pointing out the irony of inviting Mr. Khatami to speak on the role of the Abrahamic 

faiths in the peace process when, in his own country, Mr. 

Khatami served as President during a time when religious 

minorities—including Jews, Christians, Sunni and Sufi 

Muslims, Baha’is, dissident Shia Muslims, and others—

faced systematic harassment, discrimination, imprisonment, torture, and even execution based on their religious 

beliefs. In September, then-Commission Chair Felice D. 

Gaer and Vice Chair Nina Shea published an op-ed in the 

Washington Post pointing to this “troubling irony” of inviting President Khatami to speak at the National Cathedral 

on the role the Abrahamic faiths can play in shaping peace 

in the world. In June 2006, then-Commission Vice Chair 

Nina Shea testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 

International Operations at a hearing titled “The Plight of 

Religious Minorities: Can Religious Pluralism Survive?”

Commissioner Shea’s testimony focused on religious freedom conditions in five countries—Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—and presented recommendations 

for U.S. policy. 

In December 2006, at least eight 

house church leaders were arrested in 

a sweep by authorities in four different 

cities. The church leaders were charged 

with evangelization and “acts against 

the national security of the 

Islamic Republic.”

Stone carving in bas-relief at Persepolis, the capital city of the 

ancient Persian empire. 
Commission Re

commendations

145

I

n addition to recommending that 

Iran continue to be designated a 

CPC, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• at the highest levels, vigorously 

speak out publicly about the dete-

riorating conditions for freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief in Iran, and draw attention to 

the need for the international com-

munity to hold authorities account-

able in specific cases where severe 

violations have occurred, such as:

• extremely poor treatment of the 

Baha’i community; 

• increasing problems facing Chris-

tians, Sufi Muslims, and dissident 

Muslims; and

• state-sponsored anti-Semitism 

and Holocaust denial activities; 

• work within its current overall 

policy framework to ensure that 

violations of freedom of religion and 

belief, and related human rights, are 

included in any multilateral or bi-

lateral discussions with the Iranian 

government;

• ensure that funding budgeted to 

promote democracy and human 

rights in Iran includes support 

for effective initiatives advancing 

freedom of religion or belief, as 

well as ways to promote rule of law 

programs that specifically seek to 

protect religious minorities in Iran; 

• adequately fund U.S. public 

diplomacy entities, such as Voice 

of America and Radio Farda, and 

expand and develop new program-

ming solely focusing on the situ-

ation of human rights—including 

the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief—in Iran;

• continue to support a UN General 

Assembly resolution condemning 

severe violations of human rights, 

including freedom of religion or be-

lief, in Iran, and calling for officials 

responsible for such violations to be 

held accountable;

• call on the UN Human Rights Coun-

cil to monitor carefully and demand 

compliance with the recommen-

dations of the representatives of 

those special mechanisms that have 

already visited Iran, particularly 

those of the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

(1995), the Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention (2003), and the 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Opinion and Expression (2003); and

• encourage the UN Human Rights 

Council to continue to use its 

procedures to maintain oversight of 

conditions for freedom of religion 

or belief in Iran, including, as Iran 

has issued a standing invitation, 

continued visits and reporting by 

the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, and other 

relevant special rapporteurs and 

working groups.
146

Pakistan

Dramatic political events unfolded in Pakistan in the 

past year having a serious impact on the rule of law and 

human rights protections generally, though the consequences for religious freedom conditions remain unclear. 

Notwithstanding the upheaval, all of the serious religious 

freedom concerns on which the Commission has reported 

in the past persist. Sectarian and religiously motivated 

violence continues, particularly against Shi’a Muslims, 

Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, and the government’s 

response continues to be insufficient and not fully effective. A number of the country’s laws, including legislation 

restricting the rights of the Ahmadi community and laws 

against blasphemy, frequently result in imprisonment 

on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence 

against the accused. Moreover, despite some minor 

improvements, Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic 

decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced alongside the 

country’s secular legal system, provide for harsh punishments, including amputation and death by stoning, for 

violations of Islamic law. Finally, substantial evidence 

that the government of Pakistan has been complicit in 

providing sanctuary to the Taliban also mounted in the 

past year. In light of these persistent, serious concerns, 

the Commission continues to recommend that Pakistan 

be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

To date, the State Department has not designated Pakistan 

a CPC.

The political landscape in Pakistan has changed 

substantially over the past year. In March 2007, President 

Pervez Musharraf removed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, ostensibly for abusing his office for personal 

gain but reportedly because the President feared that the 

Chief Justice would oppose his maneuvers to be elected to 

a new term in office. The suspension resulted in large and 

widespread demonstrations against Musharraf and in favor of an independent judiciary. In August, the Supreme 

Court voted to reverse that suspension of the Chief Justice 

and Musharraf agreed to accept the ruling. Musharraf 

secured his reelection as president to another five-year 

term in October by ensuring that the vote was held by the 

outgoing National Assembly, which was dominated by his 

supporters, rather than after the parliamentary elections, 

scheduled to be held the following month. That same 

month, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned to 

Pakistan after eight years in exile. 

In November 2007, President Musharraf imposed 

martial law, suspended the country’s constitution, and 

disbanded the Supreme Court. His government also arrested thousands of its opponents, including judges and 

lawyers, human rights activists, journalists, and other 

leaders of civil society in Pakistan. Among those placed 

under house arrest was Asma Jahangir, the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and a noted 

human rights activist in Pakistan. Musharraf purportedly 

took these actions in part because of the dangers posed 

by religious extremists, yet many observers contend that 

it was the Musharraf government’s political alliance with 

militant religious parties that had served to strengthen 

such groups and give them influence in the country’s 

affairs disproportionate to their support among the Pakistani people. Most of those arrested were eventually 

released, largely because of international pressure. The 

state of emergency was eventually lifted, but most of its 

repressive provisions have been left in force under the 

“restored” constitution. On December 27, 2007, former 

Prime Minister Bhutto was assassinated. Elections were 

postponed until February 2008, at which time the country’s two main parties long in opposition, the Pakistan 

People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, won 

the majority of seats, with the latter coming in second 

in the popular vote. Significantly, the representation of 

Pakistan’s coalition of militant religious parties, known 

as Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), fell from 56 elected 

seats out of 272 to just six in the new parliamentary assembly. In March 2008, Yousaf Raza Gillani of the Pakistan People’s Party was elected prime minister by the new 

Assembly; among his first actions was to order the release 

Sectarian and religiously motivated violence continues, particularly against Shi’a 

Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, 

and the government’s response continues to 

be insufficient and not fully effective.
147

of the Supreme Court head and other judges who had 

been placed under house arrest by Musharraf in November. In a significant step, in April 2008, the new government of Pakistan ratified several key UN human rights 

documents, including the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention 

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 

Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).

It is not yet clear what impact these developments 

will have on religious freedom, which has been severely 

violated by successive Pakistani governments in the past. 

Discriminatory legislation, promulgated in previous 

decades and persistently enforced, has fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded the social and 

legal status of members of religious minorities, including 

Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians. Government officials do not provide adequate protections from 

societal violence to members of these religious minority 

communities, and perpetrators of attacks on minorities 

are seldom brought to justice. In some recent instances, 

the government of Pakistan has directly encouraged religious intolerance. In March 2006, it was reported that, in 

an attempt to persuade people in the regions bordering 

on Afghanistan not to support Islamist militants, the Pakistani military dropped leaflets claiming that those militants were fighting against Pakistan “in connivance with 

Jews and Hindus.”

Many religious schools, or madrassas, in Pakistan 

provide ongoing ideological training and motivation to 

those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad. In mid-2005, the government 

of Pakistan renewed its effort to require all madrassas

to register with the government; madrassas were also 

ordered to expel all foreign students. By that year’s end, 

despite an outcry from some militant groups, most of the 

religious schools had registered. However, reports indicate that the registration process has had little if any effect 

on the content of the schools’ curricula, which remains 

extremist and includes exhortations to violence, and 

there are still no government controls on the madrassas’

sources of funding. It therefore continues to be doubtful 

whether these belated official efforts to curb extremism 

through reform of the country’s Islamic religious schools 

will be accompanied by other measures to make them 

effective. Moreover, these efforts do not adequately address the much wider problem of religious extremism 

in Pakistan and the continued, unwarranted influence 

of militant groups on the rights and freedoms of others. 

By issuing proclamations that were not acted upon, the 

Musharraf government only strengthened sectarian and 

extremist forces. In addition, by arresting judges, lawyers, 

human rights activists, and others during the November 

2007 imposition of martial law, Musharraf in fact acted 

against those who speak out against the very extremism 

he claimed to be combating. Beginning in early 2008, 

Pakistan has experienced an intensified bombing campaign carried out by Islamist militants seemingly intent on 

disrupting life in Pakistan. Hundreds of people have been 

killed, including in the city of Lahore, which until recently 

was largely unaffected by extremist violence.

The Musharraf government did take action against 

extremists in some instances. Perhaps the most prominent—and controversial—action taken in the last year was 

in July 2007, when Army and security forces launched a 

military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) 

in Islamabad. For several months prior to the operation, 

militants, including young women, who took over the 

mosque engaged in a series of vigilante actions against 

brothel owners, alcohol sellers, and others, in some cases 

kidnapping owners and holding them hostage. Some policemen were also held hostage in the mosque. The subsequent military operation against the mosque resulted 

in the deaths of 10 members of the security forces and 79 

militants, including the mosque’s leaders. According to 

the State Department, the confrontation prompted the 

Musharraf government to renew its efforts to curb extremist teachings in madrassas across the country.

Despite President Musharraf’s appeals for religious 

PAKISTAN

An annual procession in Karachi in observance of the birthday 

of the Prophet Muhammad.
148

moderation and tolerance, in addition to indiscriminate 

extremist attacks, there are chronic levels of religiously 

motivated violence, much of it committed against Shi’a 

Muslims by Sunni militants. Ahmadis, Christians, and 

Hindus have also been targeted by Sunni extremist groups 

and mob violence. In January 2008, twelve people were 

killed and 25 others wounded when a suicide bomber 

blew himself up in a Shi’a mosque in Peshawar, northwestern Pakistan. The bombing occurred during Muharram, an annual Shi’a religious holiday. In October 2007, 

Islamic militants threatened to bomb a Christian family 

in northwestern Pakistan for refusing to convert to Islam. 

The month before, the family had received a similar threat. 

In August and September 2007, three Christian ministers 

were murdered by “fanatics” in separate incidents. In 

June 2007, Christian families were forced to flee a village 

in Punjab province after Protestants were attacked by an 

armed mob of over 40 men with guns, axes, and sticks 

demanding that they halt their meeting. Seven persons 

were injured. Perpetrators of such attacks on minorities 

are seldom brought to justice. Hindus also faced some 

societal violence, including in April 2008, when dozens 

of Muslims at a factory in Karachi beat a Hindu colleague 

to death for allegedly making derogatory remarks about 

Islam. The body reportedly had marks indicating that the 

man had been tortured. An investigation into the killing 

revealed that the man had made no derogatory remarks at 

all but was only accused of doing so by a disgruntled colleague. In addition, Hindu temples have been the object 

of violence in the province of Baluchistan, where Hindus 

are the largest religious minority and where ethnic Baluchi insurgents have been waging a struggle against the 

central government for many years. 

Ahmadis, who number between 3 and 4 million in 

Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the full 

practice of their faith. Pakistan’s constitution declares 

members of the Ahmadi religious community to be 

“non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. 

Barred by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis are also 

proscribed by law from many other actions. They may 

not call their places of worship “mosques,” worship in 

non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are 

otherwise open to all Muslims, perform the Muslim call 

to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, 

publicly quote from the Koran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also illegal for Ahmadis to 

preach in public, to seek converts, or to produce, publish, 

or disseminate their religious materials. In September 

2007, the Ahmadis in Rahim Yar Khan in the southern part 

of the Punjab province reported nine cases of serious harassment of members of the Ahmadi community; in one 

incident, clerics reportedly demanded the dismantling of 

the Ahmadi mosques in the area and passed an edict punishing Muslims for maintaining contacts with Ahmadis. 

In some of these cases, police were reportedly intimidated 

against investigating violence or other action against Ahmadis. Moreover, because they are required to register 

to vote as non-Muslims, a policy that was reaffirmed by 

Pakistani government officials in February 2004, Ahmadis 

who refuse to disavow their claim to being Muslims are 

effectively disenfranchised. The one potentially positive 

development—the December 2004 abolition of the religious identification column in Pakistani passports, which, 

among other advances, enabled Ahmadis to participate in 

the hajj—was derailed in March 2005, when members of a 

government ministerial committee restored the column, 

reportedly in response to pressure from militant religious 

parties. As far as is known, there has never been an effort 

on the part of any Pakistani government to institute any 

reform of the anti-Ahmadi laws.

Prescribed criminal penalties for what is deemed to 

be blasphemy include life imprisonment and the death 

penalty. Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, 

result in the lengthy detention of, and sometimes violence 

against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of 

other religious minorities, as well as Muslims. Because 

the laws require no evidence to be presented after alDewan-e-Khas (King’s personal quarters) in Lahore Fort, built during the 

Mughal Dynasty.
149

legations are made and no proof of intent, and contain 

no penalty for leveling false allegations, they are easily 

used by extremists to intimidate members of religious 

minorities and others with whom they disagree. They are 

also often used by the unscrupulous simply to carry out 

a vendetta or gain an advantage over another. Although 

the penalties were amended in October 2004 with the 

aim of reducing the more maliciously applied charges, 

the minor procedural changes have not had a significant 

effect on the way the blasphemy laws are exploited in 

Pakistan. The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is 

further compounded by the lack of due process involved 

in these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often pack the courtroom and make 

public threats about the consequences of an acquittal. 

Such threats have proven credible, since the threats have 

sometimes been followed by violence. Although no one 

has yet been executed by the state under the blasphemy 

laws, some persons have been sentenced to death. Several of those accused under the blasphemy laws have been 

attacked, even killed, by vigilantes, including while in 

police custody; those who escape official punishment or 

vigilante attack are sometimes forced to flee the country. 

According to the State Department, in 2007, at least 

25 Ahmadis, 10 Christians, and six Muslims were arrested 

on blasphemy charges; most refused bail because of the 

danger of vigilante violence. In March 2008, an 80 yearold Ahmadi man was arrested for allegedly desecrating 

the Koran, a crime punishable by life in prison; an Ahmadi 

spokesman claimed that he was falsely charged and that 

the accuser aimed only to impugn Ahmadis. In June 2007, 

Younis Masih, a Christian who had been imprisoned for 

two years, was sentenced to death on a charge of blasphemy. Masih reportedly angered a group of Muslims by 

expressing concern about the noise level of their gathering; they later accused him of making derogatory remarks 

about Islam. As a result, a mob reportedly attacked a 

number of homes in the area belonging to Christians; 

Masih and his wife were also beaten in the attack. Also 

in June 2007, a group of Christian nurses in a hospital in 

Islamabad were charged with blasphemy; before charges 

were filed in that case, the women were threatened with 

violence. In May 2007, an 84-year old Christian man 

was arrested after being accused of burning a Koran; the 

family claimed that he was accused by someone who 

wanted his land. He was released soon after. There have 

also been some acquittals of those accused of blasphemy 

charges. In September 2007, a Christian teenager was acquitted of charges that he had ripped up pages containing 

Koranic verses after prosecution witnesses changed their 

original testimonies. While this and other acquittals are 

welcomed, in virtually all cases, those acquitted have been 

forced into hiding because of fears of vigilante violence 

against them.

Under the Hudood Ordinances, rape victims run a 

high risk of being charged with adultery, for which death 

by stoning remains a possible sentence. In October 2003, 

the National Commission on the Status of Women in 

Pakistan issued a report on the Hudood Ordinances that 

stated that as many as 88 percent of women prisoners, 

many of them rape victims, are serving time in prison for 

allegedly violating these decrees, which make extramarital 

sex a crime and adultery a criminal offense. The Hudood 

laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The UN 

Committee Against Torture, as well as the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation do constitute acts in breach of the obligation to 

prevent torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under international human rights 

standards and treaties. Although these extreme corporal 

punishments have not been carried out in practice, lesser 

punishments such as jail terms or fines have been imPAKISTAN

Government officials do not provide adequate protections from societal 

violence to members of these religious minority communities, and perpetrators 

of attacks on minorities are seldom brought to justice. In some recent instances, 

the government of Pakistan has directly encouraged religious intolerance.
150

posed. In a positive development, correcting one of the 

most heavily criticized purported crimes that were prosecuted by the standards of these religious ordinances, in 

December 2006, President Musharraf signed into law a bill 

curtailing the scope of the Hudood Ordinances regarding rape charges. The new law removed the crime of rape 

from the sphere of the Hudood laws and put it under the 

penal code, thereby doing away with the requirement that 

a rape victim produce four male witnesses to prove the 

crime. Under the new legislation, convictions for rape will 

be based on forensic and circumstantial evidence. This 

change followed another amendment to the Ordinances 

enacted in July 2006 allowing women convicted of purported sexual transgressions to be released on bail rather 

than having to remain in prison—sometimes for lengthy 

periods—waiting for their cases to come to trial.

In July 2005, the government of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), then led by the MMA, passed a 

bill—known as the “Hasba bill”—which created a “watchdog” position to monitor the observance of “Islamic 

values” in public places. The bill would have enabled 

this person, called the mohtasib, to ensure that people 

respect the call to prayer, prevent people from doing business on Fridays, and stop unrelated men and women 

from appearing in public together. There were concerns 

that the bill also would have imposed Taliban-like restrictions on women’s movement and dress. Following 

an outcry in other parts of Pakistan and abroad, the law 

was later declared to be unconstitutional by Pakistan’s 

Supreme Court. In November 2006, the NWFP assembly 

again passed a revised version of the legislation, but the 

governor refused to sign the bill, citing its unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court again blocked the bill. It is 

significant to note that in the February 2008 elections, the 

ruling MMA government was resoundingly defeated by 

the Awami National Party, considered to be a nationalist, 

more secular party.

Finally, the government’s abuse of religious freedom 

is not contained within Pakistan’s borders; rather, under 

the Musharraf government, Pakistan has become a sigUnder the Hudood Ordinances, rape 

victims run a high risk of being charged 

with adultery, for which death by 

stoning remains a possible sentence.

Badshahi Mosque, Lahore
nificant exporter of religious intolerance and religiouslymotivated militant violence. This is evident not least in 

the effective sanctuary the Musharraf government has 

afforded the Taliban inside Pakistan; as a result, the Taliban has been able to regroup, re-arm, and intensify crossborder attacks inside Afghanistan, substantially increasing 

instability and violence in that country. In January 2007, 

a UN representative confirmed that Pakistan was harboring Taliban leaders. The State Department had named the 

Taliban regime of Afghanistan a “particularly severe violator” of religious freedom from 1999 until the regime was 

deposed in 2001.

The government of Pakistan has also extended its undemocratic practices—and its efforts to appease religious 

extremists—into the international arena. In March 2007, 

Pakistan again presented a resolution to the UN’s new 

Human Rights Council in Geneva supporting measures to 

halt the so-called “defamation of religions.” The backers of 

the resolution claimed that their aim was to promote religious tolerance, but in practice, such laws routinely criminalize and prosecute what is often deemed—capriciously 

by local officials in countries where such laws exist—to be 

“offensive” or “unacceptable” speech about a particular 

religion. Defamation of religion laws clearly violate principles outlined in international human rights instruments, 

which guarantee the right to freedom of expression, as 

well as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 

Moreover, they appear to grant rights to entire religions 

rather than to individuals. Regrettably, the resolution 

again passed the Council.

Throughout the past year, the Commission continued to meet with representatives of the various religious 

communities in Pakistan, including Muslims, Ahmadis, 

Christians, and Hindus, as well as with human rights organizations, academics, and other experts. In January 2008, 

the Commission issued a statement calling on the U.S. 

government to urge the government of Pakistan to put an 

end to vigilante violence and to provide adequate protection to human rights defenders during the time of political 

turbulence. In November 2007, the Commission issued a 

statement expressing grave concern over the introduction 

of martial law by President Pervez Musharraf, noting that 

his action damaged the legitimacy of his government and 

seriously threatened the future of democracy in Pakistan. 

The statement also noted that the continued influence 

of militant groups in Pakistani politics and society has 

severely compromised the rule of law and the protection 

of human rights for Pakistan’s citizens, and has been particularly problematic regarding internationally guaranteed 

rights to freedom of religion, expression, and association. 

Virtually all of the country’s severe religious freedom 

problems—including the country’s blasphemy laws; the 

laws violating the fundamental rights of the Ahmadi community; the persistent sectarian violence targeting Shi’a 

Muslims, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians; and the Hudood Ordinances, which violate the rights of women in 

Pakistan—were exacerbated by religious militant groups’ 

representation in parliament, penetration of the state 

security services and police force, and pressure on the 

judiciary. 

Also in November, the Commission issued a statement deploring the placement of Asma Jahangir, the UN 

Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

under house arrest. The Commission called on the U.S. 

government, at the highest levels, to protest Ms. Jahangir’s detention and to urge the government of Pakistan 

to release her immediately so that she may continue her 

important work as Special Rapporteur. Ms. Jahangir was 

released soon after. In June 2007, the Commission spoke 

out against the abuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan, declaring them to be a severe violation of the universally 

guaranteed right to the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief. The Commission also expressed 

serious concern over a draft bill that would have imposed 

the death penalty for apostasy, or converting from Islam to 

any other religion.

151

Despite President Musharraf’s 

appeals for religious moderation 

and tolerance, in addition to 

indiscriminate extremist attacks, 

there are chronic levels of 

religiously motivated violence, 

much of it committed against 

Shi’a Muslims by Sunni militants.

PAKISTAN
Commission Recommendations

 In March 2006, the Commission wrote to President 

Bush, urging him, during his meeting with President 

Musharraf, to indicate that improvements in religious 

freedom conditions in Pakistan are essential to any 

meaningful advances in the war on terrorism and to successes in the global promotion of democracy. In addition, then-Commission Chair Michael Cromartie, together with Commissioner Elizabeth H. Prodromou, published an op-ed in the Philadelphia Inquirer on March 3, 

2006 calling on President Bush to raise religious freedom 

concerns with President Musharraf. In January 2006, the 

Commission wrote again to President Bush urging him 

to discuss in his January meeting with Pakistani Prime 

Minister Shaukat Aziz the need to promote and protect 

religious freedom and tolerance in Pakistan.

In June 2005, the Commission held a hearing on 

Capitol Hill entitled, “The United States and Pakistan: 

Navigating a Complex Relationship,” during which experts examined U.S. policy toward Pakistan, highlighting 

the serious religious freedom and other human rights 

problems in Pakistan. In July, the Commission issued 

a press statement expressing serious concern about the 

“Hasba bill.”

The Commission’s May 2001 report on Pakistan 

played a key role in highlighting to U.S. and Pakistani 

government officials the undemocratic nature of the Pakistani separate electorate system for religious minorities. 

In January 2002, the Pakistani government abolished the 

system of separate electorates.

I

n addition to recommending that Pakistan be designated a CPC, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should strongly urge the 

government of Pakistan to: 

• reinforce the rule of law in Pakistan, including 

by strengthening protections for the freedoms of 

speech, association, assembly, and the media, and 

by restoring and resolutely defending an independent judiciary;

• make more serious efforts to combat religious 

extremism in that country, addressing especially the 

consequences of the Musharraf government’s political alliance with Islamist political parties, which 

afforded an inordinate amount of influence to these 

groups, and which, in turn, had a strong negative 

impact on religious freedom in Pakistan; 

• take active measures immediately to cease its direct 

and indirect toleration and support of the Taliban in 

the country’s border regions, which has had the dire 

result of exporting militant violence and terrorism 

by enabling the Taliban to re-arm and re-establish 

itself across the border in parts of Afghanistan; the 

government’s refusal to take effective measures 

against the Taliban in Pakistan should result in 

a curtailment of U.S. military assistance to that 

country;*

• halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council 

and other international fora of introducing the socalled “defamation of religions” resolution, which 

clearly distorts and violates the internationally 

guaranteed rights to freedom of expression, as well 

as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;

• decriminalize blasphemy and, in the interim period 

until that action is taken, implement procedural 

changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce and 

ultimately their abuse; and ensure that those who 

are accused of blasphemy and people who defend 

152

* Commissioners Leo and Shea dissent from this recommendation. Their separate 

statement immediately follows this chapter.
153

Pakistan Recommendation: Separate 

Opinion of Commissioners Leo and Shea

“We write separately for the single purpose of taking 

issue with one of the Commission’s recommendations—

namely, that provision of U.S. military aid be curtailed in 

light of the ‘effective sanctuary’ the Pakistani government 

has afforded the Taliban.

“First, the report cites no evidence that military aid 

is actually being used to support the Taliban’s efforts or 

to insulate them from defeat. Indeed, to the extent that 

military aid to Pakistan is being used to thwart Taliban 

efforts—and, at least some of that aid most certainly 

is—then cutting off the assistance might have the effect 

of making matters worse. A more appropriate recommendation would be to urge the U.S. government to 

investigate whether, as a matter of official Pakistan policy 

or deliberate indifference on the part of Pakistan officials, 

U.S. military aid is being used for any improper purposes 

related to the Taliban; and to undertake steps to stop the 

use of such funds if that is in fact the case, which could 

include a curtailment of military assistance.

“Second, we believe that the Commission is not in 

a position here to decide whether cutting off military aid 

is the most effective response, assuming a problem. The 

geopolitical dynamics in that country are enormously 

complicated. The Commission has not undertaken the 

kind of thoroughgoing inquiry that would shed light on 

the issue, and, we are not certain that it ever could here.”

them are given adequate protection, including by 

investigating death threats and other actions against 

them carried out by militants, and that full due process is followed; 

• take more effective steps to prevent sectarian violence 

and punish its perpetrators, including by making 

greater efforts to disarm militant groups and any religious schools that provide weapons training; and

• rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, which effectively 

criminalize the public practice of their faith and 

violate their right to freedom of religion guaranteed 

in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In addition, the U.S. government should:

• expand U.S. government contacts beyond the Pakistani government to include a more open and public 

dialogue with a variety of representatives of civil society in Pakistan, including groups and political parties 

that may be critical of the current government;

• give greater attention and assistance to institutions 

in Pakistan that are crucial to its democratic development, particularly the judiciary and the police, which 

are reported to be especially corrupt, ineffective, and 

lacking accountability, thereby contributing to violations of human rights, including religious freedom, in 

Pakistan; and 

• in administering its education assistance to Pakistan, 

focus more specifically on promoting reform in the 

state schools, where the State Department reports that 

textbooks regularly present religious intolerance as 

acceptable and include derogatory statements about 

religious minorities, particularly Jews and Hindus.
154

People’s Republic of

China

The Chinese government continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations of freedom of religion or 

belief. Yet, religious communities are growing rapidly in 

China and the freedom to participate in officially sanctioned religious activity increased in many areas of the 

country over the past year. High-ranking Chinese government officials, including President Hu Jintao, have praised 

the positive role of religious communities in China and 

articulated a desire to have religious groups promote “economic and social development”—an endorsement that 

may open legal space for religious groups to conduct charitable, medical, and economic development activities. 

However, despite this growing “zone of toleration” for the 

worship and charitable activities of China’s religious communities, the government continues to restrict religious 

practice to government-approved religious associations 

and registered religious venues and seeks to control the 

activities, growth, and leadership of both “registered” and 

“unregistered” religious groups. 

Religious freedom restrictions and sometimes brutal 

abuses continued to target unregistered religious groups, 

those considered by the government to be “cults,” and 

religious communities associated with ethnic minority 

groups. Severe crackdowns targeting Uighur Muslims, 

Tibetan Buddhists, “underground” Roman Catholics, 

“house church” Protestants, and various spiritual movements such as Falun Gong continued in the last year. The 

level of religious repression increased in Tibetan areas 

and in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 

Moreover, legal reforms, which were issued in 2005 with 

the promise of increased religious freedom protections, 

have not halted abuses and are used in some cases to justify some arrests and additional restrictions. Since 1999, 

the Commission has recommended that China be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State 

Department has followed the Commission’s recommendations and named China a CPC since 2000. 

As in past years, the Chinese government continued 

to implement the National Regulations on Religious Affairs (NRRA), issued officially in March 2005. The regulations include provisions that require all religious groups 

and religious venues to affiliate with one of seven government-approved religious associations. When registered, 

religious communities can apply for permission to possess property, provide social services, accept donations 

from overseas, conduct religious education and training, 

and host inter-provincial religious meetings. Within the 

bounds of the Chinese legal system, the NRRA can expand 

protections for the registered religious communities. 

However, it remains the Commission’s conclusion that 

the NRRA, by stipulating registration in government-sanctioned religious associations and requiring permission for 

many routine religious activities, strengthens governmental management or supervision of religious affairs, thereby 

offering Party officials extensive control over religious 

practice and related activities. In addition, the NRRA only 

protects what the government considers “normal” religious activity, making unregistered religious groups illegal 

and subject to restriction or other punishments. Vague 

national security provisions in the NRRA override stated 

protections if a religious group is deemed to disrupt national unity or solidarity. 

The Chinese government requires all religious organizations to become registered as a means for the government to manage religious activity and maintain control of 

independent religious practice. Some Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and members of spiritual movements have 

refused to join the officially-sanctioned religious organizations due to their reluctance to: 1) provide the government 

with the names and contact information of their followers; 

2) submit leadership decisions to the government or to 

one of the government-approved religious organizations 

whose leadership they view as complicit in arrests and 

restrictions placed on unregistered religious activity; and 

3) seek advance permission from the government for all 

major religious activities or theological positions or face 

unspecified penalties. To illustrate the last point, authoriDuring the past year, pressure 

on unregistered groups to register 

with government-approved 

associations increased.
155

ties from the Religious Affairs Bureau in Yicheng county, 

Hubei province, forced a registered Protestant church to 

close because it allowed the pastor from another province to lead services at the church without gaining prior 

permission. In addition, an abbot at a monastery in the 

Tibetan area of Golog prefecture, Qinghai province, was 

forced to step down in May 2007 when he refused to sign a 

pledge denouncing the Dalai Lama. During the past 

year, police have also closed registered and unregistered 

churches and temples, many with large memberships and 

networks, in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Shandong, 

and Tibet. 

During the past year, pressure on unregistered groups 

to register with government-approved associations increased. Protestant “house church” groups and “underground” Catholic priests continue to experience the most 

intense coercion. Any religious group that refuses to 

register is technically illegal and subject to various forms 

of punishment, though in 2007, the response by local officials varied from region to region. In some areas of China, 

large Protestant “house church” groups met openly and 

with the knowledge of local officials; in other areas even 

small, independent gatherings faced detention, closure, 

beatings, confiscation of personal property, fines, or, in 

some cases, criminal prosecution. Though there were 

problems throughout China, unregistered religious groups 

experienced the most abuses and harassment in Anhui, 

Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, and Xinjiang provinces. 

 In Tibetan Buddhist and Muslim regions, the implementation of the NRRA has led to additional restrictions 

and more intense campaigns of “patriotic education” 

among monks, nuns, and imams. Tibetan Buddhist and 

Uighur Muslim religious leaders have long been required 

to demonstrate political loyalty, but new laws give provincial officials specific mandates to monitor the training, assembly, publications, and speeches of Muslim and 

CHINA

In September 2007, the government 

also issued a new regulation that would 

allow it to interfere directly in the selection 

of reincarnated lamas, an essential element 

of Tibetan Buddhist religious practice.

Drepung Monastery, Lhasa
156

Tibetan Buddhist leaders. Patriotic education campaigns 

are intended to quell any activities viewed as political dissent and to build up leaders who are considered “patriotic 

and devoted.” During the Commission’s visits to the 

XUAR and Tibet, local government leaders said that patriotic education campaigns had ended, but religious leaders 

made clear that “political education” still occurred on a 

regular basis. 

In the past year, the government continued to demolish Tibetan Buddhist structures and statues, including the 

homes of individual monks or nuns, because they were 

constructed without authorization. In June 2007, authorities in Lhoka Prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR) carried out the demolition of a large Buddha statue 

at Samye Monastery. In a separate incident in September 

2007, about twenty Tibetans formed a human chain to 

prevent the destruction of a statue of Guru Rinpoche near 

Mount Kailash, which Tibetans consider sacred. The statue was completely demolished over the course of about 

three days. In September 2007, the government also issued a new regulation that would allow it to interfere directly in the selection of reincarnated lamas, an essential 

element of Tibetan Buddhist religious practice. Tibetan 

leaders outside China contend that the new regulations 

are intended to control the selection of the next Dalai 

Lama. The new regulations require monasteries to seek 

government permission to search for a reincarnated lama 

and maintain a reincarnated lama in residence. In addition, the government must approve the choice of all reincarnated lamas and the selection process may not be influenced by any individual or entities outside the country. 

Depending on the importance of the reincarnation itself, 

candidates must receive permission from either provincial 

level government officials or from officials in Beijing. 

The regulations on reincarnated lamas are part of the 

Chinese government’s continued campaign to diminish 

the stature and influence of the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Refusal by monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai 

Lama or to pledge loyalty to Chinese Communism is met 

with expulsion from their monasteries, imprisonment, 

and torture. In Sichuan province during June and July 

2007, authorities required monks at Kardze monastery 

and neighboring Lithang Monastery to sign statements 

denouncing the Dalai Lama. Police also forcibly confiscated several pictures of the Dalai Lama and copies of his 

writings from the monks’ private dormitories. On August 

1, Runggye Adak, a Tibetan nomad, staged a protest calling for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet and for the freedom of Gendun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama) at a 

festival in Kardze and was immediately arrested. In November 2007, Adak was sentenced to eight years imprisonment on charges of “incitement to split the country.” 

Three others, including one monk, were also sentenced to 

prison terms of ten, nine, and three years for attempting 

to publicize the case. During the last year in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Region, the government forced many 

monks to sign statements denouncing the Dalai Lama and 

compelled parents to withdraw their children from education programs at monasteries. Authorities in Lhasa also 

warned parents about allowing their children to participate in religious holidays, including activities such as visiting or circumambulating temples and deities or wearing 

amulet cords. Students failing to comply with the orders 

were threatened with expulsion from school. 

Arabic calligraphy inside the mosque on the grounds of the Xinjiang 

Islamic Institute complex in Urumqi.
157

After the Dalai Lama received the U.S. Congressional 

Gold Medal in October 2007, Tibetans in many localities 

staged public celebrations. Several Tibetans were briefly 

detained after they set off fireworks in celebrations in 

Tibetan areas of Gansu Province. On October 17, when 

monks at Drepung monastery in Lhasa staged religious 

ceremonies to celebrate the award, police entered the 

monastery by force, closed it off to the public for at least 

two weeks, and detained those believed to have organized 

the celebrations. Nearby Nechung monastery was also 

reportedly closed to the public for one week. Tibetan students and government employees in Lhasa also reported 

that they were ordered to refrain from participating in 

prayer ceremonies in the weeks before and after the Dalai 

Lama’s award. Those who refused to comply were threatened with loss of their jobs and, for retirees, with loss of 

retirement benefits.

On January 1, 2008, the government issued implementation guidelines for the NRRA in Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The regulations continue to assert 

state control over all aspects of Tibetan Buddhist belief 

and practice, including more specific control over the 

movement of monks and nuns, religious training, the 

building or repairing of religious venues, and the conducting of large-scale religious gatherings. When the new 

implementation guidelines for Tibet were issued, official 

media reports indicated that they were intended to “resist 

the Dalai Clique’s separatist activities.” 

On March 10, 2008, monks from Drepung monastery peacefully demonstrated to protest, in part, ongoing 

patriotic education efforts and other religious freedom 

restrictions at the monastery. The Chinese government’s 

response to the peaceful protest of monks, including 

sealing off monasteries and arresting monks, touched off 

demonstrations that led to property destruction, arrests, 

and numerous deaths. Demonstrations later spread to 

Tibetan areas outside the TAR. On April 14, Chinese soldiers fired on several hundred monks and local residents 

at the Tongkor monastery in Ganzi. Witnesses claim that 

between eight and 15 persons were killed and others arrested. Unrest in Ganzi was sparked by the Chinese government’s announcement of new “patriotic education” 

campaigns aimed at suppressing Tibetan loyalty to the 

Dalai Lama. When monks at Tongkor resisted the new 

campaigns, police entered the monastery and destroyed 

pictures of the Dalai Lama and arrested several monks. 

The police fired on the crowd that had gathered to protest 

the arrests. 

Monks at the Jokhang temple affirmed to foreign 

reporters visiting Lhasa during the demonstrations that 

repression of religious freedom lies at the heart of their 

grievances. Despite the deep resentment of this practice, 

Chinese officials have stepped up “patriotic education” 

campaigns, especially in monasteries, to pressure Buddhist monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and 

show loyalty to Chinese communist rule. Zhang Qingli, 

party secretary of the TAR, has called the Dalai Lama a 

“wolf in monk’s robes” and “a devil with a human face 

but the heart of a beast” and dismissed the exiled leader’s 

supporters as the “scum of Buddhism.” Zhang ordered not 

just monks but students, government workers, and business people throughout Tibet to participate in patriotic 

education sessions and sign denunciations of the Dalai 

Lama. 

The Chinese government acknowledges that more 

than 100 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns are being held 

in prison. Tibetan human rights groups claim that these 

prisoners are subject to torture and other ill-treatment. 

Following a series of high-profile releases of and reduced 

sentences for Tibetan Buddhists between 2001 and 2005, 

the Chinese government has not responded to international calls for additional releases. In February 2005, 

CHINA

Despite the deep resentment of this practice, Chinese officials have stepped 

up “patriotic education” campaigns, especially in monasteries, to pressure 

Buddhist monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and show loyalty 

to Chinese communist rule.
158

the Chinese did release Phuntsog Nyidron, a nun who 

had been imprisoned since 1989, but placed her under 

strict house arrest and surveillance. She was permitted 

to meet with the Commission during its 2005 trip to Tibet 

and later pressed the Chinese government to allow her 

to travel abroad for needed medical attention. The authorities later allowed her to travel to the United States in 

March 2006. The Chinese government continues to deny 

repeated international requests for access to the 19-yearold man Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama 

designated as the 11th Panchen Lama when he was six 

years old. While he is technically “disappeared,” government officials have claimed that he is being “held for his 

own safety,” while also insisting that another boy, Gyaltsen 

Norbu, is the “true” Panchen Lama. In recent years, Chinese authorities have, on several occasions, featured Norbu in public ceremonies where he stresses the importance 

of loyalty to the Communist government and endorses the 

government’s official version of Tibetan history. 

In January 2003, Tibetan Buddhist monk Tenzin 

Delek Rinpoche was arrested on charges related to a 2002 

bombing incident and later sentenced to death. U.S. officials were promised that the case would be reviewed by 

the Supreme People’s Court. Although the review never 

occurred, Tenzin Delek’s death sentence was commuted 

to life imprisonment in January 2005. In August 2007, several units from the People’s Armed Police were deployed 

to Kadze Tibetan Prefecture, Sichuan Province to disperse 

protesters who had gathered to demand the release of 

Tenzin Delek and of the more recently arrested Ronggye 

Adak. Pawo Rimpoche, a reincarnate lama recognized by 

the Karmapa Lama in 1994, remains under strict surveillance and is not permitted to leave his monastery. In the 

last year, delegations from the United States who have requested permission to meet with him have been denied. 

There are increasing and disturbing reports that 

China is actively seeking to prevent Tibetans from leaving 

the country and encouraging the forcible repatriation of 

asylum seekers from Nepal and India. In late September 

2006, Chinese guards on the Nepalese border opened 

fire on a group of approximately 70 Tibetan refugees, 

resulting in the death of a 17-year-old nun. Members of 

the group, who were unarmed when soldiers fired upon 

them from a distance, included monks, nuns, and children who were seeking refuge in India in order to receive 

religious education denied them in Tibet. Following the 

shooting, soldiers took several members of the group into 

custody. Those detained were required to pay heavy fines 

while some were tortured with cattle prods and forced 

to perform hard labor. In a similar incident in October 

2007, border guards fired at a group of approximately 30 

Tibetans, mostly monks and nuns, who were attempting 

to flee in the same area on the Nepalese-Tibetan border. 

Although no casualties were reported in the incident, 

seven individuals, including three monks, were taken into 

Chinese custody. 

In the XUAR, or Xinjiang, conditions for freedom of 

religion and belief are particularly poor and the provincial 

government intensified repression of all religious groups 

in the province. According to government officials, this 

repression is justified by its policy to “stamp out terrorism, 

separatism and religious extremism” in the XUAR. During the last year, Uighur Muslim clerics and students have 

been detained for various “illegal” religious activities, 

“illegal religious centers” have been closed, and police 

continue to confiscate large quantities of “illegal religious 

publications.” The government continues to limit access to mosques, including the participation of women, 

children, Communist Party members, and government 

employees. All imams in Xinjiang are required to undergo 

annual political training seminars to retain their licenses, 

and local security forces monitor imams and other religious leaders. Imams at Uighur mosques are reportedly 

required to meet monthly with officials from the Religious 

Affairs Bureau and the Public Security Bureau to receive 

In several localities in Xinjiang, 

plainclothes police are reportedly 

stationed outside of mosques to 

enforce rules forbidding children 

and government employees 

from attending services.
advice on the content of their sermons. Failure to report 

to such meetings can result in the imam’s expulsion or 

detention. Religious leaders and activists who attempt 

to publicize or criticize human rights abuses in the XUAR 

have received prolonged prison terms, on charges of 

“separatism,” “endangering social order,” and “incitement 

to subvert state power.” 

Officials in the XUAR continue to restrict the teaching of Islam to minors. During the Commission’s visit to 

China, local government officials confirmed that minors 

were prohibited from participating in any religious activity or instruction before the completion of nine years of 

compulsory public education. The existence of such a 

policy contradicts statements made by other Chinese 

central government officials who claimed that no restrictions exist prohibiting the religious activities of minors. 

Teaching religion to minors continues to be a criminal 

offense in the XUAR. Aminan Momixi, a woman in a rural 

area of Xinjiang, was arrested and detained in August 2005 

for holding religious classes for 37 students in her home. 

Authorities in Xinjiang report that Momixi was released; 

however, they have failed to account for her whereabouts 

and U.S. government officials have been refused permission to meet with her. In several localities in Xinjiang, 

plainclothes police are reportedly stationed outside of 

mosques to enforce rules forbidding children and government employees from attending services. There are 

reports that in some areas, individuals under the age of 30 

are prohibited from attending mosque. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, professors, university students, and other 

government employees are prohibited from engaging in 

religious activities, such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious materials, observing Ramadan, and wearing head coverings, and are reportedly subject to fines 

if they attempt to do so. Such standards are reportedly 

enforced more strictly in southern Xinjiang and in other 

areas where Uighurs account for a higher percentage of 

the population. 

In the past year, authorities in the XUAR introduced 

regulations to ensure that the government-approved 

Chinese Patriotic Islamic Association controls all hajj

pilgrimages. To fulfill these new regulations, XUAR authorities require Muslims to turn over their passports to 

local government offices for registration. To retrieve their 

passports, Muslims are required to submit information 

regarding their hajj travel plans to ascertain that they did 

not receive a foreign visa without authorization. Uighur 

human rights activists outside of China also expressed 

concern that the new policy may be used to identify and 

punish Uighurs who travel outside of the XUAR. 

In response to persistent international pressure, 

Chinese authorities released Uighur human rights activist Rebiya Kadeer in March 2005. In June 2006, Kadeer’s 

three sons, Kahar, Alim, and Ablikim, were detained and 

placed under arrest in order to prevent them from meeting with a visiting congressional delegation. In October, 

Kahar and Alim were tried on charges of tax evasion and 

Alim was later sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 

The two were also fined a total of over $75,000. In February 2007, Ablikim was tried in secret on charges of “subversion of state power” and later sentenced to nine years 

imprisonment. In December 2007, when family members 

were granted their first visit with Ablikim in nearly one 

year, the family reported that Ablikim was seriously ill, 

had been subjected to torture, and was denied adequate 

medical treatment.

Relations between unregistered Roman Catholic congregations and the officially-recognized Chinese Patriotic 

Catholic Association (CPA) are strained, due to past government repression and the growing number of CPA bishops and priests secretly seeking ordination and approval 

of the Vatican. An estimated 90 percent of Catholic clergy 

have reconciled with the Vatican. Nonetheless, the CPA 

does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint bishops, though, in some recent cases, the Vatican 

has been allowed quietly to approve bishop selections. 

For example, in September 2007, bishops were ordained 

159

CHINA

Commissioner Land at a bookshop run by the Three Self Patriotic 

Movement. 
in dioceses in Beijing and Guizhou with the approval of 

both Beijing and the Vatican. These ordinations reversed 

a recent trend of bishop ordinations occurring without 

Vatican approval. In 2006, three bishops were ordained 

without Vatican approval. In June 2007, Pope Benedict issued an open letter to Chinese Catholics. The Pope recognized that greater religious freedom exists in China today 

than in the past, but that “grave limitations remain,” and 

it is unacceptable for the Church to accept undue restrictions. Nevertheless, the Pope called on Chinese Catholics 

to resolve past differences in an atmosphere of “respectful 

and constructive dialogue.” The Chinese government continues to maintain that normalization of ties with the Holy 

See will begin only if the Vatican revokes its diplomatic relations with Taiwan and agrees to cease its “use of religion 

as a means to interfere in China’s internal affairs.” 

Harassment, surveillance, and detention of “unregistered” Catholic priests and bishops continued in the last 

year. In March 2007, authorities in Shaanxi province took 

Bishop Wu Qinjing of the Zhouzhi diocese into custody, 

where he remains. Bishop Wu was ordained in September 

2006 with Vatican approval, but without the approval of 

the local CPA. He was reportedly beaten in custody and 

forced to sign a document promising not to participate 

in diocese management. In June 2007, Bishop Jia Zhiguo 

was detained for three weeks and beaten in custody. 

Bishop Jia was again detained in August and held without trial until December 2007. In July, four priests from 

Hebei were arrested while traveling in Inner Mongolia, 

reportedly for their refusal to register officially with the 

local patriotic religious association. In August, Bishop 

Yao Liang was arrested and remains in custody; no formal 

charges have been issued in his case. There remain at least 

30 Roman Catholic bishops or priests under arrest, imprisonment, or in detention, including the elderly Bishop 

Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in detention, under 

house arrest, or under strict surveillance since the 1970s. 

In addition, there has been no information on the whereabouts of Bishop Shi Enxiang, who was arrested in April 

2001. On August 24, 2006, An Shuxin, Bishop Su’s Auxiliary Bishop, was released after 10 years of imprisonment. 

Unregistered Protestant groups in China continued 

to face harassment, detention, fines, beatings, confiscation of property, and arrest during the last year. A secret 

provincial document reportedly issued in Hubei province 

in July 2007 reveals that the Chinese government is conducting a nationwide campaign to “normalize” unregistered Protestant churches by giving them the option of 

either joining the Three Self-Patriotic Association or being 

suppressed. In the last year, an estimated 693 Protestant 

leaders and adherents were arrested, 38 of whom received 

sentences of one or more years, including in China’s infamous “re-education through labor” system. In addition, 

the State Department estimates that “thousands” of house 

church members were detained for short periods in the 

last year. In February 2007, police in Jiangsu province 

raided a prayer meeting and reportedly beat and arrested 

participants. In May 2007, police in the XUAR arrested 30 

house church leaders who were meeting with foreign religious leaders; those arrested were mistreated or beaten 

in custody. Ismail Tiliwaldi, Chairman of the XUAR, urged 

local police and religious affairs officials to “exercise 

stronger management” over Protestantism and Catholicism and to guard strictly against foreign infiltration and 

sabotage. Police in Kashgar, XUAR arrested Alimjan Yimit, 

an Uighur house church leader; he remains in detention 

on charges reportedly related to “national security issues.” Osman Imin (also known as Wusimanyiming) was 

arrested in November 2007 and sentenced to two years of 

“re-education through labor” on charges that he assisted 

foreigners in conducting “illegal religious activities” related to public religious expression and persuasion among 

160

Commissioner Cromartie with Vice Premier Hui. 
161

the Uighur community. 

Chinese officials continue to use charges of “illegal 

business activity” to sentence house church leaders who 

are involved in the printing and distribution of Bibles and 

other religious texts. Recent cases include Pastor Wang 

Zaiqing, who was sentenced to two years imprisonment 

in Anhui in October 2006 and Shi Weihan, who served 37 

days of criminal detention in Beijing in November 2007. 

In June 2006, Pastor Zhang Rongliang was sentenced to 

seven and one half years imprisonment on charges of 

obtaining a false passport. Two additional house church 

leaders, Chen Jiaxi from Anhui and Zhou Heng from Xinjiang, are currently facing trial on charges of “illegal business activity” under similar circumstances. 

Police continued to detain current and former Falun 

Gong practitioners and to place them in re-education 

camps. Police reportedly have quotas for Falun Gong 

arrests and also target former practitioners. Tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been sent to labor 

camps without trial or to mental health institutions for 

re-education because of their affiliation with an “evil cult.” 

Falun Gong practitioners claim that nearly 6,000 practitioners have been sent to prison and over 3,000 have died 

while in police custody. Some human rights researchers 

estimate that Falun Gong adherents at one time comprised up to half of the 250,000 officially recorded inmates 

in “re-education through labor” camps. The UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture reported that Falun Gong practitioners make up two-thirds of the alleged victims of torture. 

Given the lack of judicial transparency, the number and 

treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in confinement 

is difficult to confirm. During the Commission’s August 

2005 visit, high-level Chinese government officials defended the crackdown on the Falun Gong as necessary to 

promote “social harmony.” 

In the past year, reports continued to surface regarding the re-arrest of Falun Gong members who had been 

released after completing prison terms. For example, Bu 

Dongwei, a lawyer in Beijing working on legal aid issues 

for the Asia Foundation, was sentenced to two and one 

half years imprisonment for possession of Falun Gongrelated literature. In addition, the Chinese government 

has reportedly continued to pressure foreign businesses 

in China to sign statements denouncing the Falun Gong 

and to refuse to employ the group’s followers. Numerous 

allegations of government-sanctioned organ harvesting 

from incarcerated Falun Gong practitioners have surfaced within the last year. Independent investigation into 

the practices of a hospital in Sujiatun, Shenyang proved 

inconclusive. However, based upon a report from two 

prominent Canadian human rights activists, international 

human rights organizations have called for an independent investigation and for continued international attention to allegations of organ harvesting from prisoners. 

Since the banning of Falun Gong in 1999, the Chinese 

government has conducted a harsh campaign against “evil 

cults” and “heretical sects.” This campaign against “evil 

cults” has, in recent years, expanded to include leaders of 

long-established Protestant groups. Over the past year, 

CHINA

In the last year, an estimated 693 

Protestant leaders and adherents 

were arrested, 38 of whom received 

sentences of one or more years, 

including in China’s infamous 

“re-education through labor” system.

Commissioners Gaer and Bansal meet with former Tibetan 

political prisoner Phuntsog Nyidron.
162

religious leaders have been imprisoned and followers 

detained and fined for “illegal cult activity.” In June 2007, 

Zhang Geming and Sun Qingwen, both house church pastors in Shandong Province, were sentenced to one year 

of “re-education through labor” on charges of “using an 

evil cult to obstruct the law.” In August, following a raid 

on a meeting of house church leaders in Hubei Province, 

five church leaders were sentenced to 18 months of “reeducation through labor” and four other house church 

leaders received sentences of 12 months, all on charges of 

“using an illegal cult to disrupt enforcement of the law.” 

Family members of the pastors were not notified of their 

sentences until over two months following their initial 

detention, and several pastors claimed they were beaten 

during interrogation. In February 2008, 21 house church 

leaders were sentenced to terms of one to three years of 

“re-education through labor” following a raid on a leadership training session in Shandong Province in December 

2007, when police arrested 270 church leaders. The leaders were charged with being members of an “illegal cult” 

organization. 

In August 2007, authorities in Hunan Province issued 

provincial-level regulations to administer folk religion 

venues. The regulations are significant because they offer 

protections for religious practice outside the China’s five 

predominant religious communities (Buddhism, Daoism, 

Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam) and because they 

allow venues to register directly with provincial government officials. However, the new regulations allow registration only of existing venues and stipulate that no new 

sites may be built. In addition, any venue that is destroyed 

may not be rebuilt unless it retains “historical stature” and 

“great influence.” The State Administration for Religious 

Affairs (SARA) has established a division to deal directly 

with the management of folk religions. 

During the past year, there has been a continuing 

crackdown against human rights activists, lawyers, and 

others who attempted to use the Chinese legal system 

to defend the rights of Chinese citizens, including those 

who sought to practice their right to freedom of religion. 

In November 2007, human rights lawyer Guo Feixiong 

was sentenced to five years imprisonment on charges of 

“illegal business practices.” Guo was closely involved in 

the defense of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who 

faced charges of subversion following his efforts to defend 

the human rights and religious freedom of Falun Gong 

practitioners. Guo had also written legal essays defending 

Pastor Cai Zhuohua, who served three years in prison for 

“illegal business practices” due to his efforts to distribute 

Bibles among house church Christians. In September 

2007, attorney Li Hepring, a prominent religious freedom 

advocate, was beaten with electronic batons for nearly 

five hours and ordered to stop practicing law. The Commission continues to express concern that the crackdown 

reflects the unwillingness of the Chinese government to 

implement legal and political reforms that would offer 

Chinese citizens viable means to protect their human 

rights, especially their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and religious freedom.

In August 2005, a Commission delegation made a 

two-week visit to China to engage senior government officials on Chinese policies and practices relating to religious freedom. During the visit, the delegation traveled to 

the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Urumqi, Kashgar, 

and Lhasa. The Commission delegation raised questions 

about Chinese law and international human rights norms, 

the control and management of religious affairs, new 

regulations on “cults” and religious affairs, the situations 

in Xinjiang and Tibet, religious education of minors, and 

other matters relating to freedom of religion or belief, as 

well as the condition of North Korean asylum-seekers in 

China. 

During the past year, there has been a continuing crackdown against human 

rights activists, lawyers, and others who attempted to use the Chinese legal system 

to defend the rights of Chinese citizens, including those who sought to 

practice their right to freedom of religion.
163

In March and April 2008, the Commission issued 

public statements condemning the Chinese government’s 

crackdown on Tibetan Buddhist monks and calling for an 

end to violence and the independent monitoring of reports of arrests, disappearances, and deaths. Noting that 

the desire for greater religious freedom was an important 

demand of the protests, the Commission also publicly 

urged the Chinese government to resume negotiations 

with the Dalai Lama in order to address religious repression and other issues, including a full accounting of the 

Chinese government’s response to the demonstrations. 

In January 2007, the Commission held a public hearing on religious freedom conditions in China and to discuss policy options that the United States might pursue 

to improve religious freedom and related human rights 

conditions. Witnesses included an expert panel featuring 

the former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National 

Security Council and the Executive Director of the NGO 

Human Rights in China. A second panel of witnesses 

included representatives from several major religious 

communities in China, including Tibetan Buddhists, 

Uighur Muslims, unregistered Catholics, house church 

Protestants, and Falun Gong. All witnesses confirmed that 

the implementation of the March 2005 regulations on religious affairs had not led to any improvements in religious 

freedom conditions for their respective religious denomination. In April 2007, then-Chair Felice D. Gaer offered 

testimony at a briefing before the Congressional Human 

Rights Caucus on religious freedom conditions in Tibet. 

The Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama also offered testimony at the briefing, which was scheduled to coincide with 

the eighteenth birthday of the Panchen Lama. 

In October 2007, the Commission and the Congressional China Caucus co-hosted a roundtable discussion 

on current problems facing refugees and asylum seekers 

in China, particularly North Koreans, Uighur Muslims, 

and Tibetan Buddhists, for whom religious freedom is an 

important factor in the decision to seek asylum. The Commission hosted the briefing following reports of a second 

incident on the China-Tibetan border in which Chinese 

border guards fired on groups of unarmed Tibetan refugees. The Commission and the Caucus held the forum to 

encourage candid discussion between U.S. government 

officials, international organizations, congressional staff, 

and non-governmental representatives on how to engage 

the Chinese government to encourage treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with international 

standards. Commissioner Leonard Leo chaired the session and Rep. Madeline Bordallo of Guam, co-chair of the 

China Caucus, offered opening remarks. In follow-up to 

this discussion, Commission staff held meetings with the 

State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and 

Migration and with the Washington office of the UN High 

Commissioner on Human Rights to discuss specific policy 

recommendations. 

In November 2007, the Commission issued a statement condemning the Chinese government’s crackdown 

on human rights defenders and the so-called “campaign 

to root out foreign infiltration,” noting that this campaign 

seeks to penalize communities that do not enjoy official 

sanction. The Commission pointed out that Chinese government leaders have used these two campaigns, which 

have been explicitly endorsed at the highest levels of the 

central government, to violate human rights, including the 

right to freedom of religion or belief. 

CHINA

Commissioner Land discusses China’s forced repatriation of North Korean refugees at a May 2008 bicameral 

Congressional press conference regarding human rights 

abuses in China.
Commission Recommendations

164

I

n addition to recommending that 

China be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has made the following 

recommendations concerning U.S. 

policy toward China.

 Ending Human Rights 

Abuses in China

The U.S. government should continue to urge the Chinese government 

to end severe violations of religious 

freedom and other human rights and 

continue to allow effective monitoring of international human rights 

norms by various United Nations 

bodies and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. To this end, 

the U.S. government should urge the 

Chinese government to:

• end its current crackdown on 

religious and spiritual groups throughout China, including harassment, 

surveillance, arrest, and detention of 

persons on account of their manifestation of religion or belief; torture and 

ill-treatment of persons in prisons, 

labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and 

other places of confinement; and the 

coercion of individuals to renounce or 

condemn any religion or belief; 

• release all those imprisoned or detained on account of their manifestation of religious belief in contravention of international human 

rights standards; 

• issue a national decree that 

guarantees the right of minors to 

manifest their religion or belief and 

the liberty of parents to ensure the 

religious and moral education of 

their children consistent with their 

own beliefs; 

• establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under 

suspicion of, or charged with, 

offenses relating to state security, 

disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating 

in “illegal” gatherings or religious 

activities. This mechanism should 

also review cases of detained or 

imprisoned religious leaders, many 

of whom have been charged with 

specious criminal offenses; 

• extend an unconditional invitation 

to the UN Special Rapporteur on 

the Independence of Lawyers and 

Judges to China, and allow the Rapporteur full access in compliance 

with the terms of reference required 

by the Special Rapporteur; and

• determine dates for a visit to China 

by the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

in accordance with the terms of 

reference required by the Special 

Rapporteur. 

In addition, the U.S. government 

should: 

• raise publicly concerns about Chinese human rights abuses in multilateral fora, including at appropriate 

UN bodies or other international 

and multi-national fora, and ensure 

that preparations for such actions 

be made at appropriately high levels 

and with the widest possible support from other UN member states. 

 Building on Existing 

Efforts to Improve the Rule of 

Law in China

The U.S. government should 

make the promotion of the rule of law 

a greater priority of U.S. human rights 

diplomacy in China. To this end, the 

U.S. government should continue to 

urge the Chinese government to: 

• ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China 

signed in 1998;

• amend or repeal Article 306 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code, which 

has been used against attorneys 

who have vigorously defended the 

rights of their clients; 

• amend or repeal Article 111 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code, which labels as “state secrets” any published 

information deemed embarrassing 

to the government, and raise the 

issue of China’s use of “state security” as a rationale for suppressing 

dissent in bilateral and multilateral 

discussions and exchanges;

• repeal the Guiding Opinion on 

Lawyers Handling Collective Cases 

and similar local regulations that 

interfere with the ability of lawyers 

to represent the interests of their 

clients in collective cases, including cases involving the defense of 

religious freedom or related rights 

or violations on account of religion 

or belief;

• repeal Article 300 of the Criminal 

Procedure Code, which deals with 

individuals accused of crimes associated with “evil cults,” and also its 

associated legislation, the Decision 

of the Standing Committee of the 

National People’s Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, 

Preventing and Punishing Cult 

Activities; and

2 

1 
• end the use of government filters on 

Web sites and e-mail and remove 

official restrictions on Internet 

message boards and text messaging, 

including the blockage of access to 

certain Web sites related to religion, belief, or human rights; revise 

the September 2000 State Council 

regulations on Internet Content 

Providers (ICPs) and offer ICPs clear 

and consistent guidelines for Web 

site content and usage to ensure 

that Chinese law and practice in this 

area conform to international standards on the freedoms of opinion 

and expression.

 Building Programs to 

Support Chinese Rights 

Defenders

The U.S. government should support programs that will strengthen 

the ability of Chinese lawyers and 

activists to defend religious freedom 

or related rights or violations on account of religion or belief, advocate 

state policies that comport with international standards and support of 

a vibrant civil society and media. To 

this end, the U.S. government should 

support initiatives that promote the 

following goals:

• through the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund, 

institute new programs that: 

• increase the capacity and 

networking ability of nongovernmental organizations 

in China that address issues of 

human rights, including religious 

freedom, as well as the freedoms 

of expression, association, and 

assembly; 

• expand contacts between U.S. human rights experts and Chinese 

government officials, academics, 

representatives of both registered 

and unregistered religious communities, and non-governmental 

organizations on international 

standards relating to the right 

of freedom of religion or belief; 

on the importance and benefits 

of upholding human rights, 

including religious freedom; on 

reforms to the Chinese criminal 

justice system, including planned 

changes in the criminal procedure code; and on the role of 

defense lawyers; and

• increase consultations between 

international human rights experts and Chinese officials, judges 

and lawyers on the compatibility 

of Chinese laws, regulations, and 

practices with ICCPR standards 

on freedom of religion or belief; 

• through the newly instituted 

Human Rights Defenders Fund, 

make support available to Chinese 

lawyers and others who defend the 

internationally recognized rights 

of individuals and communities 

targeted because of their religious 

belief or practice.

 Expanding U.S. Outreach 

and Public Diplomacy in 

Tibet and Xinjiang

The U.S. government should:

• urge the Chinese government to 

allow a U.S. government presence, 

such as consulates in Lhasa, Tibet 

and Urumqi, Xinjiang, which could 

monitor religious freedom and 

other human rights conditions; and

• strengthen its efforts to highlight 

conditions faced by Uighur Muslims 

and Tibetan Buddhists by:

• increasing the number of educational opportunities in the United 

States for religious and other 

leaders from these regions, in 

order to enhance their understanding of religious freedom and 

other human rights according to 

international standards;

• creating legal clinics to assist 

those in areas of high concentrations of Uighur Muslim and 

Tibetan Buddhist populations to 

enforce their human rights under 

the Chinese Constitution and international law, similar to existing 

programs that serve other ethnic 

minority areas in China; 

• expanding ongoing assistance to 

civil society programs that promote Tibetan culture, language, 

and social welfare and developing 

similar programs for Uighurs; and 

• as the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors modifies its global 

priorities, ensuring continued 

availability of funds to maintain 

appropriate Tibetan and Uighur 

language broadcasting through 

the Voice of America and Radio 

Free Asia.

 The U.S.-China Senior 

Strategic Dialogue and 

Promotion of Human Rights

Within the planning and structure of the Senior Strategic Dialogue, 

the U.S. government should: 

• continue to prioritize human rights 

and religious freedom issues as 

key issues within the agenda of the 

Senior Dialogue, raise a full range of 

religious freedom concerns in highlevel discussions at each dialogue 

session and, where appropriate, 

invite human rights experts from 

within the State Department and 

other U.S. government agencies, as 

CHINA

165

5 

4 

3 
well as non-governmental experts, 

to participate in both pre-Dialogue 

planning and negotiating sessions; 

and

• ensure that religious freedom priorities raised in the Senior Dialogues 

are implemented through appropriate U.S. government foreign 

assistance programs on such issues 

as legal reform, civil society capacity 

building, public diplomacy, and 

cultural and religious preservation 

and exchanges. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress 

should:

• ensure that congressional oversight 

of U.S.-China human rights diplomacy is maintained by requiring the 

State Department to submit a regular public report to the appropriate 

congressional committees detailing 

issues of concern discussed during 

the Senior Dialogue, or any future 

bilateral human rights dialogues, 

and describing progress made 

toward a series of “benchmarks” 

initiated by Congress. 

 Raising the Profile of 

Religious Freedom and 

Related Human Rights 

Promotion through the 2008 

Olympic Games in Beijing

The U.S. Congress should:

• within funds appropriated for the 

security of U.S. citizens in Beijing 

during the 2008 Olympic Games, allocate sufficient resources to ensure 

that training and related information materials include content that:

• instructs security officials, 

Olympic spectators, and athletes 

regarding China’s commitments 

to respect for all visitors certain 

internationally recognized human rights standards during the 

Olympic Games; and

• informs U.S. citizens, participants, 

and spectators at the Olympic 

games of their rights protected 

under international law and 

identifies problem areas they may 

encounter with Chinese authorities, relating to the freedoms of 

expression, religion or belief, assembly, and association, including information on Chinese law 

and recent human rights practices of the Chinese government 

on these issues; 

• as part of such authorizations, 

designate consultations during the 

training process with the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom and relevant non-governmental organizations; and

• in order to promote a free and 

open environment, in concert with 

the principles of the International 

Olympic Committee (IOC) and the 

standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

designate appropriate funding to 

independent human rights organizations to monitor and report on 

human rights conditions during the 

summer games to ensure that the 

Chinese government is in compliance with relevant commitments 

made to the IOC to uphold human 

rights and international standards 

during the Summer Olympics. 

 Addressing the Conditions 

of North Koreans in China

The U.S. government should continue to urge the Chinese government 

to protect North Koreans in China. To 

this end, the U.S. government should 

urge the Chinese government to: 

• uphold its international obligations 

to protect asylum seekers by (1) 

working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

to establish a mechanism to confer 

at least temporary asylum on those 

seeking such protection; (2) provide 

the UNHCR with unrestricted access 

to interview North Korean nationals 

in China; and (3) ensure that any 

migrants who are being returned 

pursuant to any bilateral agreement 

are not potential asylum seekers 

refouled in violation of China’s 

obligations under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

• allow greater numbers of North 

Korean migrants who desire resettlement to have safe haven and 

secure transit until they reach third 

countries; 

• grant legal residence to the North 

Korean spouses of Chinese citizens 

and their children; and

• allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to 

North Koreans in China to address 

growing social problems experienced by this vulnerable population, including child and sexual 

trafficking and forced labor.

166

6 

7 
167

Sudan

The government of Sudan commits egregious and 

systematic violations of freedom of religion or belief in 

the areas under its control, particularly against Christians, 

Muslims who do not follow the government’s extreme interpretation of Islam, and followers of traditional African 

religions. Due to the ongoing, severe human rights violations committed by the government throughout much of 

the country, the Commission continues to recommend 

that Sudan be named a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC. The State Department has repeatedly adopted the 

Commission’s recommendation that Sudan be designated 

a CPC. 

In the past, the Commission has identified Sudan as 

the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese 

government’s genocidal atrocities against civilian populations. As a result of the government’s policies of Islamization and Arabization, more than two million people 

were killed and four million driven from their homes in 

the North-South civil war from 1983 until January 2005. 

The civilian victims of that conflict were overwhelmingly 

Southern Christians and followers of traditional African 

religions in contrast to the Arabic-speaking Muslims dominant in Khartoum. 

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, conditions for religious 

freedom have improved in the South and in the contested 

areas in central Sudan. The Commission continues to be 

seriously concerned, however, about severe human rights 

violations being committed by the Sudanese government 

in other regions of the country, including against both 

non-Muslims and Muslims who dissent from the government’s interpretation of Islam, as well as in the western 

region of Darfur, where the State Department has determined that acts of genocide have taken place and may still 

be ongoing. Continued attention and monitoring by the 

United States and the international community are necessary to ensure that the terms of the CPA, particularly those 

relating to freedom of religion or belief and other universal human rights, are implemented fully. 

The CPA followed and subsumed a series of partial 

and preliminary agreements addressing the relationship 

of state and religion, the national capital, power-sharing, 

wealth-sharing (i.e., of oil revenue), and security. The CPA 

affirmed the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, which established a number of principles regarding freedom of religion or belief, and the Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 

2004, which committed the parties to respecting a range of 

human rights. Moreover, the Protocol on Power-Sharing 

states explicitly that “The Republic of Sudan, including all 

levels of Government throughout the country, shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is or becomes a party.” 

The CPA committed the parties to a number of interim measures for the governance of Sudan during a sixyear Interim Period, to end in July 2011. According to the 

CPA: 

• a referendum will be held at the end of the Interim Period 

to determine whether the South stays within a united 

Sudan or becomes independent; 

• the 10 Southern states would be exempt from sharia 

(Islamic law), which, however, would continue to prevail 

in the North, and special provision would be made to 

protect the rights of non-Muslims in the national capital; 

• the National Congress Party in power in Khartoum 

and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 

(SPLM/A) dominant in the South would form a Government of National Unity, with the SPLM/A having a 

minority share of offices; the SPLM/A would assume 

responsibility for the government of Southern Sudan;

• local autonomy would be granted to the contested 

areas of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile 

State, which would, however, remain part of the North, 

and a special administration would be established in 

the oil-rich area of Abyei, whose boundaries would be 

determined by an independent commission; a popular 

referendum would determine whether Abyei continues 

Conversion from Islam is a crime 

legally punishable by death. In practice, 

suspected converts are subjected to intense 

scrutiny, intimidation, and sometimes 

torture by government security personnel 

who act with impunity.

SUDAN
168

to have a special status in the North or becomes part of 

the South; 

• elections for President of Sudan, President of Southern 

Sudan, the national legislature, state governors, and all 

state legislatures would be held “not later than the end of 

the fourth year of the Interim Period” (i.e. by July 2009); 

and 

• constitutional arrangements for the Interim Period 

would be according to an Interim National Constitution 

and an Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan. 

Since July 2005, Sudan’s current Government of National Unity has officially governed under the Interim National Constitution, which contains provisions guaranteeing universal human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief. As of this writing, however, many of these provisions, including those advancing human rights, have yet 

to be fully implemented. To protest the National Congress 

Party’s apparent lack of commitment to CPA implementation, the SPLM/A suspended its participation in the Government of National Unity at the ministerial level for more 

than two months, from October 11 to December 27, 2007. 

Last year, movement finally began on the constitutionally-required Commission on the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. In February 2007, a chairman 

was appointed, who later selected 28 commissioners 

from the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, as well as 

from among representatives of the Islamic, Christian, and 

other religious communities. The Commission has met 

once since that time. In August 2007, the Commission 

on the Rights of Non-Muslims reportedly approved plans 

for subcommittees, including one on religious education; however, no further efforts have been made. The 

National Human Rights Commission, called for in Sudan’s 

Interim Constitution, has yet to be created. In the nowautonomous South, the Interim Constitution of Southern 

Sudan, adopted in December 2005, separates religion and 

state and contains provisions for freedom of religion and 

for equality before the law regardless of religious belief.

The Government of Southern Sudan has established a human rights commission for the South, as well as a special 

court to prosecute crimes committed for religious reasons, 

including crimes against members of the South’s Muslim 

minority. 

In government-controlled areas of the North, the religious freedom and other human rights protections agreed 

to in the CPA and enshrined in Sudan’s Interim National 

Constitution have not yet resulted in significant changes 

to the government’s practice of enforcing its interpretation 

of Islam to the detriment of those holding other views. 

Muslims reportedly receive preferential access to limited 

government services and preferential treatment in court 

cases involving Muslims against non-Muslims. All Sudanese in the North, including Christians and followers of 

traditional African religions, are subject to sharia. Corporal punishments adopted from sharia are imposed on both 

non-Muslims and on Muslims who did not traditionally 

follow such practices. There is discrimination in granting 

governmental approvals required for the construction and 

use of places of worship. Although permits are routinely 

granted to build mosques, permission to build churches 

is often difficult to obtain. The State Department reports 

that since 2005 the government has issued three permits for new churches in the Khartoum area; permits for 

church construction were last issued in 1975. However, 

two of the permits were never formally received by the 

communities and Christian leaders remain skeptical that 

any actual construction will be permitted by government 

authorities. Churches built without such official permission by owners who register land for personal rather than 

church use exist at the authorities’ sufferance. 

Church-owned properties that are legally recognized 

A USCIRF delegation holds a meeting with residents of Camp Jebel 

Aulia, a refugee camp for internally displaced persons outside Khartoum. 

Here, Commissioner Cromartie and Senior Policy Analyst Steve Snow 

field questions from residents.
are nevertheless vulnerable to seizure in a legal atmosphere in which government action is not constrained by 

an independent judiciary. Prior to the establishment of 

the Government of National Unity, governments confiscated church property in the North and adequate compensation has yet to be provided. Reportedly, the National Unity government is pressuring some churches and 

other Christian facilities to move from central Khartoum 

to less prominent locations outside of the capital. In addition, for the first time since the signing of the CPA, there 

are reports that police disrupted a religious gathering. In 

January 2007, police raided the Episcopal Church of Sudan Diocese of Khartoum’s New Year prayer service using 

tear gas, injuring six worshippers.

Public religious expression and persuasion of nonMuslims by Muslims is allowed, but that of Muslims by 

non-Muslims is forbidden. In May 2006, four Sudanese 

Christians, including an Episcopal priest, were detained 

following contact with a Muslim woman who may have 

been interested in converting to Christianity. As the 

woman was estranged from her family and in hiding, the 

police acted under cover of a “kidnapping” investigation. 

Although all the detained Christians were released after a 

few days, three of them reportedly had been beaten while 

in custody. The woman was returned to her family and no 

further legal action was taken.

Conversion from Islam is a crime legally punishable 

by death. In practice, suspected converts are subjected 

to intense scrutiny, intimidation, and sometimes torture 

by government security personnel who act with impunity. 

Converts to Christianity from Islam face societal pressures and harassment from the security services to the 

point that they typically cannot remain in Sudan. The law 

against apostasy is also of concern to Muslims; the last 

instance in which the death penalty was applied was to a 

Muslim reformer in 1985. 

In contrast, government policies and societal pressure favor conversion to Islam. During the North-South 

civil war, some children from non-Muslim families who 

were captured and sold into slavery by pro-government 

militias were reportedly forced to convert. Reports continue of coerced conversion in government-controlled 

camps for internally displaced persons, as well as among 

prison inmates, Popular Defense Force trainees, and children in camps for vagrant minors. The government has 

also allegedly tolerated the use of humanitarian assistance 

to induce conversion to Islam. In government-controlled 

areas, children who have been abandoned or whose parentage is unknown are considered by the government to 

be Muslims and may not be adopted by non-Muslims.

The government also harshly punishes those it claims 

are engaged in alleged “blasphemy.” In November 2007, a 

British teacher was arrested for “abuse of religion” under 

sharia law for permitting her 7-year old students to name 

a teddy bear “Muhammed.” In December, she was convicted of blasphemy, inciting religious hatred, showing 

contempt for religious beliefs, and insulting Islam. She 

was subsequently pardoned and immediately deported. 

The school at which the teacher worked, a 105-year old 

British international school with more than 700 students, 

suspended its operations for several months after the incident, out of fear of reprisals. Additionally, throughout 

2007, the Government of National Unity continued to 

ban all independent reporting on the 2006 beheading by 

persons unknown of Mohamed Taha Mohamed Ahmed, 

the editor-in-chief of Al-Wafaq, who had been arrested 

and charged with blasphemy for publishing an article in 

2005 claimed by some to be disrespectful of the Prophet 

Muhammed.

Although relative North-South peace has brought 

improvement in human rights conditions in the South 

and in the Nuba Mountains, in the western region of 

Darfur, government forces and “Janjaweed” soldiers 

(government-backed militias from Arab tribes) since 

2003 have employed abusive tactics and brutal violence 

against African Muslim civilians, tactics similar to those 

169

SUDAN

Muslim leaders in Juba meet with the USCIRF delegation and officials 

from the U.S. Consulate.
170

used previously against non-Muslim Africans during the 

North-South civil war. Serious human rights abuses have 

included aerial bombardment of civilians, forced starvation as the result of deliberate denial of international 

humanitarian assistance, and the forcible displacement of 

civilian populations.

To date, efforts by the international community to 

protect Darfur’s civilian population have been wholly 

inadequate. Throughout 2007, Khartoum successfully 

delayed the full deployment of a joint UN-African Union 

(AU) peacekeeping force, as mandated by the UN Security 

Council, by imposing different limitations on the composition and independence of the forces. On January 1, 

2008 the joint UN-AU force took over from the AU force; 

however, only one-third of the promised 26,000 soldiers 

and police officers have been deployed. With villages 

destroyed and lives at risk from further attack by government-supported Arab militiamen, many civilians remain 

in camps, unable to return home to raise crops and thus 

end their dependence upon international humanitarian 

assistance. 

The perpetrators of these crimes, both members of 

the Sudanese armed forces and allied militias, have acted 

with impunity. In May 2007, the International Criminal 

Court (ICC) issued warrants for crimes against humanity 

and war crimes against Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed commander 

Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (also known as Ali 

Kushayb). Khartoum has refused to hand the two men 

over, claiming there is no evidence against them and that 

the ICC has no jurisdiction in Sudan. In September 2007, 

Harun, the former State Minster for the Interior in charge 

of the “Darfur Security Desk,” was appointed co-president 

of the national committee charged with investigating human rights violations in Darfur. Kushayb was reportedly 

imprisoned in November 2006 on “suspicion of violating 

Sudanese law” for acts committed in south and west Darfur; however, Amnesty International reported witnesses 

having seen him move freely in Darfur under police protection. On October 1, 2007, he was reportedly released 

from custody. This lack of accountability and the persistent use of such methods by the government of Sudan 

raise serious questions about the government’s commitment to abide by the terms of the CPA.

Actions resulting in mass killings by the government 

of Sudan against its own citizens have been repeatedly 

condemned as genocide. In the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, 

Congress found that the Sudanese government had committed acts of genocide during the civil war. By concurrent resolution in July 2004, Congress found the atrocities 

being committed in Darfur to constitute genocide. In 

congressional testimony delivered in September 2004, 

then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell announced that 

the State Department “had concluded that genocide has 

been committed in Darfur and that the government of 

Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may still be continuing.” In a statement issued by 

the White House the same day, President Bush urged the 

international community to work with the United States to 

The temporary housing for internally displaced persons at Camp 

Jebel Aulia.

Commissioner Cromartie and staff David Dettoni and Steve 

Snow meet with Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir, Roman Catholic 

Archbishop of Khartoum.
171

SUDAN

prevent and suppress acts of genocide in Darfur. In April 

2007, in an address announcing new sanctions against Sudan and individuals responsible for the violence in Darfur, 

President Bush once again referred to actions in Darfur as 

genocide.

The government’s genocidal actions stem in part 

from a policy of the governing elite in Khartoum forcibly 

to advance an Arab and Muslim identity in all parts of Sudan. This policy effectively relegates non-Arabs and nonMuslims to a secondary status and, moreover, conflicts 

with the reality that Sudan is a religiously diverse country 

with a large minority of Christians and followers of traditional African beliefs, as well as Muslims from a variety of 

Islamic traditions. Opposition to this coercive policy has 

fueled support for armed resistance by non-Muslim and 

non-Arab populations in the South, the Nuba Mountains, 

and elsewhere. During the North-South civil war, the current regime in particular used appeals to Islam, including 

calls by senior government officials for jihad, to mobilize 

northern Muslim opinion. Religious incitement by government officials contributed to the horrific human rights 

abuses perpetrated by government security forces and 

government-backed militias.

The Plight of Sudan’s Internally Displaced 

Persons and Refugees

One of the major issues facing Sudan is the situation 

of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 

The North-South civil war and the conflict in Darfur have 

together driven approximately 7 million people from 

their homes, including 5.4 million currently internally 

displaced from the two conflicts, making Sudan the locus 

of the largest IDP crisis in the world. Sudan’s total population today is just over 40 million. Most of the 4 million 

displaced from the North-South civil war are internally 

displaced, having fled to other parts of Sudan, particularly 

to the North. Of the 4 million, 500,000 became refugees 

in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, or Uganda. The overwhelming majority of those who fled as a result of the 

North-South civil war are Christians or followers of traditional African religions. Since 2003, the Darfur conflict 

has produced an additional two million internally displaced persons and sent another 250,000 into neighboring 

Chad and the Central African Republic as refugees. Unlike those who fled the North-South civil war, the Darfurians are almost all Muslims, members of tribes identified 

as African rather than Arab. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

oversees refugee returns, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in collaboration with Southern 

and central Sudanese authorities, coordinates IDP returns 

in Sudan. Both agencies emphasize that all returns by 

refugees and IDPs must be voluntary. Surveys indicate 

that most Southerners indeed wish to return to the South 

because of a desire to return to areas of origin, to take part 

in a new Southern Sudan, and to leave some of the harsh 

or restrictive living conditions in camps. IDPs living in the 

Khartoum area, for example, have limited access to employment or basic services and continue to face discrimination and harassment based on religious identification.

They have also been subject to forced relocations as the 

Khartoum government has demolished IDP camps in the 

capital city several times. There have been allegations that 

school enrollment for Sudanese refugee children in Kenya has recently been limited in order to encourage their 

families to return to Southern Sudan. Rising costs for food 

and fuel constrain international efforts to assist refugees 

and IDPs, increasing hardships faced by these vulnerable 

populations. 

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, more than 

250,000 refugees have returned to the South; 100,000 organized by UNHCR and the rest “self-assisted.” In addition, 

more than 1.4 million IDPs have returned to their homes, 

although only 140,000 have been assisted. The IOM plans 

Commissioner Cromartie and Sadiq Al Mahdi, former Prime 

Minister of Sudan and current President of the Umma Party, in 

Khartoum.
172

to assist 400,000 IDPs in Khartoum to return to the South 

in 2008. Returnees assisted by the UN or IOM receive a 

reintegration kit, which includes food rations for three 

months, cooking utensils, agricultural tools, landmine 

protection kits, and applications for micro-credit schemes 

to support the local economy. Those who return on their 

own, however, receive little assistance, either in transit 

or in their destination community. Most of the returnees 

are settling in urban areas, either because rural areas lack 

the services required to integrate the incoming population, or because after years of living in urban-like camp 

settings or Khartoum, the refugees and IDPs have become 

accustomed to urban living. This has led to a significant 

“squatter” problem, increased competition for overtaxed 

resources, and in some cases, discrimination against returnees.

The return of refugees and IDPs to the South is 

important for the planned 2009 elections and 2011 referendum in which millions of displaced persons are an 

important constituency and the votes of those who decide 

to return may be decisive. A much-delayed national census was finally conducted at the end of April 2008, despite 

SPLM objections that IDPs and refugees who had not 

yet returned to the South were not to be included in the 

count. However, Southern Sudan faces major challenges 

in its capacity to absorb and provide services to the large 

number of returnees. Years of civil war have devastated 

the South, making infrastructure, including the development of mass communications, schools, health clinics, 

and water and sanitation facilities, one of the steepest 

challenges to be met by the new government. Returnees 

also face obstacles, including limited employment opportunities, continuing security concerns, restitution of 

displaced persons’ land and property, potential communal tension, and unmet funding needs, which have limited 

the amount of assistance given to returnees and hindered 

development projects. The challenges that returnees 

face in the South, coupled with unmet high expectations 

for what many Sudanese feel should be a faster pace of 

development for the South, have led many IDPs to return 

to Khartoum, despite pressure from authorities there and 

terrible camp conditions. 

Commission Actions on Sudan

Sudan was one of the first countries to be a focus of 

attention by the Commission. Since its inception, the 

Commission has met with a broad range of government 

officials, religious leaders, human rights monitors, civil 

society representatives, and others knowledgeable about 

Sudan; has held public events to focus attention on religious freedom abuses in Sudan; has testified on Sudan at 

congressional hearings; and has visited Sudan to see the 

situation on the ground, traveling most recently to Khartoum, Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains and Juba, as well 

as to Nairobi and Lokichokio in Kenya in January 2006. 

In March 2006, the Commission issued Policy Focus: Sudan at a press conference with Members of Congress. In 

March 2007, the Commission co-sponsored a Capitol Hill 

event with the Hudson Institute’s Center on Religious 

Freedom and the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, to highlight congressional efforts on human rights 

and religious freedom in Sudan, in particular the work of 

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus’s Task Force on 

International Religious Freedom. The same day, the Commission sent a letter to President Bush urging renewed 

U.S. leadership to achieve implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to advance UN protection 

efforts in Darfur. 

The Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sudan. In September 

2001, following a Commission recommendation that the 

U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent individual to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the 

North-South civil war in Sudan, President Bush appointed 

former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace 

in Sudan, energizing the peace process. In September 

2006, President Bush appointed former USAID Administrator and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan 

Andrew Natsios as Special Envoy for Sudan, again following a Commission recommendation. On January 10, 2008, 

Richard “Rich” Williamson succeeded Andrew Natsios in 

this position. Other U.S. actions have followed Commission recommendations, including the Administration’s 

decisions to give peace in Sudan a higher priority on its 

foreign policy agenda, engage actively to move the warring parties toward peace, monitor progress toward implementation of a series of partial and preliminary peace 

agreements, limit the impact of U.S. Sudan sanctions on 

the South and other areas that have suffered from Khartoum’s abuses, and use U.S. assistance more effectively 

in alleviating the suffering of the Sudanese people and in 

aiding development in Southern Sudan. 
Commission Recommendations

173

I

n addition to recommending that 

Sudan continue to be designated a 

CPC, the Commission urges the U.S. 

government to remain engaged at the 

highest levels in bringing about a just 

and lasting peace for all of Sudan. In 

April 2007, in a major policy address 

on Sudan, President Bush announced 

that should diplomacy on Darfur 

continue to fail to secure Khartoum’s 

compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, the Administration 

would impose stronger measures 

on Khartoum, several of which the 

Commission recommends below. 

The Commission believes that the 

normalization of relations with Sudan 

and the lifting of U.S. sanctions must 

be preceded by concrete action and 

demonstrated progress by Khartoum 

in ending abuses, cooperating with 

international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in 

Darfur, and fully implementing the 

CPA.

 Coalition-Building

The U.S. government should:

• build on the Special Envoy’s efforts 

by lending the President’s personal 

prestige to enlist international support, including from the European 

Union, Sudan’s neighbors, and nations such as China and India that 

have major economic investments 

in Sudan, to press Khartoum to end 

its delaying tactics on CPA implementation; 

 CPA Verification and 

Follow-through

The U.S. government should:

• continue to press for the complete 

and timely implementation of the 

CPA’s human rights, power-sharing, 

revenue-sharing, and security arrangements, compliance that must 

include 1) Khartoum’s unconditional acceptance of the ruling of 

the Abyei Boundary Commission, 

which the U.S. government has a 

special obligation to enforce and 

see through to its implementation, 

2) the verifiable termination of all 

support for militias or elements 

of the Ugandan insurgent Lord’s 

Resistance Army operating in the 

South, and 3) the lifting of restrictions on peaceful political activities 

throughout the country in advance 

of elections;

• hold both the Northern leadership 

and the SPLM/A to the current 

schedule for elections and referenda, ensuring that these are true 

expressions of popular will and 

that their results are accepted and 

implemented;

• investigate and publicly report to 

the Congress every six months on 

the status of implementation of 

the CPA, with a particular focus on 

violations, assessing responsibility 

and indicating what actions are to 

be taken by the U.S. government in 

response; violations to be investigated should include the role of the 

Sudanese Armed Forces and associated militias in the November 2006 

fighting in Malakal, and Khartoum’s 

possible continued support for the 

Lord’s Resistance Army; and

• consider new sanctions as needed 

to respond to non-compliance with 

the terms of the CPA, including 

targeted sanctions such as asset 

freezes and travel bans against 

individuals and institutions, e.g., the 

National Congress Party, identified 

as responsible for serious human 

rights abuses or for impeding CPA 

implementation. 

 Southern Sudan

The U.S. government should:

• continue to support and strengthen 

the Government of Southern Sudan, 

assisting in the development of institutions and infrastructure necessary to protect human rights, deter 

a resumption of civil war, support 

the return of refugees and internally 

displaced persons, and prepare the 

South for the 2011 referendum on 

the South’s political future; 

• alleviate the impact of remaining 

U.S. sanctions on all areas under the 

control of the Government of Southern Sudan and local institutions in 

the border areas of Abyei, Southern 

Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains, 

including sanctions on communications equipment; and 

• provide, well in advance of the 2011 

referendum, specific security guarantees for the South in the event 

that Khartoum seeks to renew the 

North-South civil war or otherwise 

impose its will by force in violation 

of the CPA.

 Promotion of Human 

Rights, including Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

The U.S. government should:

• use U.S. bilateral discussions with 

Sudan, as well as UN mechanisms 

and bilateral discussions with third 

countries with influence in Sudan, 

to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to:

3 

2 

1 

4 
174

• allow all religious groups to 

conduct their activities without 

harassment, discrimination or 

undue interference, including 

activities such as publishing or 

importing religious literature, 

building, repairing, and operating 

houses of worship, and operating 

social service programs;

• repeal laws that punish changing one’s religion or encouraging 

another to do so; end official 

accusations of blasphemy, apostasy, “offending Islam,” or similar 

charges used to stifle public 

debate or restrict the right to 

freedom of expression;

• dismantle the burdensome bureaucratic obstacles the government places on international 

humanitarian assistance; remove 

the state security services from 

their current role in regulating 

humanitarian assistance;

• establish an independent and 

impartial national Human Rights 

Commission as called for in 

the Interim National Constitution and in accordance with the 

international standards1

 for such 

bodies in terms of independence, 

adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad 

mandate that includes freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief;

• abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as 

non-governmental organizations 

under regulations that give government officials effective control 

over their activities;

• permit relations between national 

religious communities and their 

co-religionists abroad in accordance with universal human 

rights norms;

• reform the state security services to be representative of all 

Sudanese and ensure that all 

national institutions such as the 

military, law enforcement agencies, and the highest levels of the 

judiciary are representative and 

equally protective of all Sudanese 

regardless of religious affiliation 

or belief;

• end the impunity with which 

members of the security forces 

and others acting as agents of 

the government have engaged in 

human rights abuses; urge the 

establishment of effective mechanisms for accountability for past 

abuses; and in the absence of 

such bodies, provide full cooperation with international institutions, including those mandated 

by the UN Security Council;

• cease using government-controlled media for messages of 

intolerance and discrimination 

against non-Muslims;

• exclude negative stereotyping 

in school textbooks; include in 

school curricula, in textbooks, 

and in teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for 

human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; history texts 

should reflect the religious and 

cultural diversity of Sudan’s past;

• undertake a comprehensive 

review, in collaboration with 

Sudanese civil society and independent international experts, to 

bring Sudanese law into compliance with Sudan’s international 

human rights obligations; and 

• cooperate fully with international 

mechanisms on human rights 

issues, including inviting further 

visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, the Special Rapporteur on 

the Situation of Human Rights in 

Sudan, the UN Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention, and the UN 

Human Rights Council’s HighLevel Mission on the Situation 

of Human Rights in Darfur and 

comply with the Mission’s recommendations.

 Personnel Resources

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that the Special Envoy has 

the personnel and other support 

needed to fulfill his mandate of facilitating the implementation of the 

CPA and pursuing peace in Darfur;

• appoint a high-level official to 

ensure that U.S. resources and 

influence are used effectively to 

assist the safe and voluntary return 

of Sudan’s refugees and internally 

displaced persons; and

• strengthen the capability of the U.S. 

Embassy in Khartoum to monitor implementation of the crucial 

human rights provisions of the 

CPA and to report on human rights 

abuses, including religious freedom 

in the North, as well as to advance 

the U.S. human rights agenda in Sudan by appointing a ranking official 

reporting to the Ambassador and 

working full-time on human rights. 

 U.S. Foreign Assistance

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that USAID, the State 

Department’s Human Rights and 

Democracy Fund, and other provid6 

5 
175

SUDAN

ers of U.S. government assistance 

develop a strategy and fund specific 

programs to 1) promote implementation of the human rights 

and religious freedom provisions 

of the CPA, and 2) advance legal 

protections and respect for freedom 

of religion or belief throughout 

Sudan, in recognition of (a) the 

central role of religion as a factor 

in the North-South civil war, and 

(b) the emphasis within the CPA 

on religious freedom concerns; the 

programs funded by USAID’s Office 

of Transition Initiatives should also 

be expanded; 

• adopt as specific objectives for these 

U.S. programs:

• improved citizen awareness and 

enforcement of the legal protections for human rights included 

in the CPA, the Interim National 

Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and the 

international human rights treaties, including the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan 

is a party; 

• grassroots reconciliation and 

“peace through dialogue” among 

Sudanese, including building on 

steps USAID has already taken to 

promote reconciliation among 

Southern Sudanese, recognizing that participants in such 

programs must be transported, 

housed, and fed; participants 

should specifically include religious and other civil society leaders from Sudan’s diverse religious 

and ethnic communities;

• greater capacity of those elements 

of civil society throughout Sudan 

(i.e. the North, the South, and the 

transitional areas) that promote 

religious tolerance, respect for 

human rights, and the peaceful 

resolution of conflicts, to advance 

those goals on both the national 

and the local levels; and

• development of an independent 

and impartial judiciary in Southern Sudan, including through 

training of judges, prosecutors, 

court administrators, and support 

personnel, with the aim to ensure 

international standards of due 

process, fair trial, and non-discrimination;

• expand the use of educational and 

cultural exchanges, such as the 

Fulbright Program, the International Visitors Program, and lectures 

by visiting American scholars and 

experts, in order to introduce more 

Sudanese to the experience of societies in which religious freedom and 

other human rights are protected 

by law; preference should be given 

to programs that bring together 

leaders from various religious and 

ethnic backgrounds from the North, 

South, and the transitional areas;

• expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan to provide objective sources of news and information and to improve awareness of 

the CPA and its implementation, including specific programming promoting grass-roots reconciliation 

and respect for freedom of religion; 

support independent television and 

radio broadcasting, including in the 

South, to the same end; and 

• promptly dispense financial assistance for humanitarian purposes, 

to build civil society, and to promote 

economic development in Southern 

Sudan, including in the area of an 

independent telecommunications 

network.

 Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons

The U.S. government should:

• increase support to UN agencies 

and their NGO partners in facilitating the spontaneous—as well as 

organized—voluntary return of refugees and the internally displaced, 

including through intensified efforts 

to monitor spontaneous or “selfassisted” returns to the South, provide safer modes of transportation, 

de-mine roadways, and develop a 

comprehensive return and reintegration strategy, as well as development plans, to enhance the capacity 

of Southern Sudan to absorb large 

numbers of IDPs and refugees; 

• increase technical assistance 

programs to assist the Government 

of Southern Sudan to develop and 

provide for basic services, including 

education, health, and water sanitation, to the returnees;

• work with UN agencies and NGO 

partners to ensure that the populations that remain in refugee and 

IDP camps continue to receive at 

least the same level of humanitarian assistance as before, so they are 

not unduly pressured into making 

“voluntary” returns; and

• work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, and its NGO partners 

to ensure that UNHCR expeditiously 

identifies those refugees for whom 

repatriation is not an appropriate or 

imminent solution to their displacement, including those who have suffered from past persecution; secure, 

as appropriate, timely local integration in countries of first asylum or 

resettlement to third countries for 

such refugees; and promptly devise 

a strategy to achieve this concurrent 

7 
176

with efforts to repatriate refugees to 

Sudan.

 Victims of Slavery and 

Human Trafficking

The U.S. government should:

• urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to prosecute strictly 

the crime of abduction into slavery, 

most of whose victims are women 

and children taken during the 

North-South civil war or in Darfur 

by government-sponsored militias, 

and ensure the speedy identification, voluntary return, and family 

reunification of victims, as well as 

measures for their rehabilitation 

and reparation.

 Peace in Darfur

The U.S. government should:

• closely monitor the Sudanese 

government’s compliance with UN 

Security Council resolutions addressing the conflict in Darfur;

• support a stronger international 

presence in Sudan sufficient to 

protect civilian populations and to 

monitor compliance with the peace 

accords and Security Council resolutions, including by:

• urging the United Nations-African 

Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to protect civilians in 

accordance with the highest international standards for peacekeeping operations;

• providing resources such as 

improved communications 

equipment, reliable vehicles and 

helicopters, and logistics assistance to enable peacekeepers 

to move quickly to places where 

abuses are occurring;

• bringing in advisers on civilian protection issues in armed 

conflict to train and work with 

international force commanders;

• ensuring that there is a secure 

environment for the delivery of 

humanitarian aid and the return 

of refugees and the internally 

displaced; providing an early 

warning system with GPS (global 

positioning system) capability to 

warn camps and villages of approaching forces;

• supporting the assignment of 

designated protection teams to 

camps for internally displaced 

persons;

• supporting the active enforcement of the aerial “no-fly” zone 

already specified in Security 

Council Resolution of March 29, 

2005, which calls for the immediate cessation of “offensive military 

flights in and over the Darfur 

region”;

• taking measures to prevent—and 

providing aid to those victimized 

by—widespread sexual violence 

and rape in Darfur, including by 

training advisers for the international forces in Darfur and 

by encouraging participating 

nations to include female troops 

and female police officers in their 

deployment to handle rape cases 

effectively; and

• supporting a substantial increase 

in the number of human rights 

monitors from the UN Office of 

the High Commissioner for Human Rights and in the number 

of international peacekeepers 

deployed in Darfur;

• prevail upon the government of 

Sudan to provide needed humanitarian access to international relief 

organizations;

• continue efforts to aid the suffering 

civilian population of Darfur, including by seeking an end to killing, 

to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement, and to Sudanese government impediments to the distribution of international humanitarian 

assistance; assisting refugees and 

internally displaced persons to return home in safety; and promoting 

a ceasefire as well as a peaceful and 

just resolution of the grievances that 

underlie the crisis; and

• urge the Sudanese authorities to 

cooperate with the international 

prosecution of those accused of 

violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in 

connection with the events in Darfur since July 1, 2002, in accordance 

with Security Council Resolution 

1593 of March 31, 2005, by handing 

Ahmad Harun and Ali Muhammad 

Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (also known as 

Ali Kushayb) over to the International Criminal Court.

8 

9 

ENDNOTES

1

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 

National Institutions for Protection and Promotion 

of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet 

No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and 

Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.

ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed April 3, 2008).
177

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan

Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991, 

fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief, have been under assault. A restrictive law on 

religion severely limits the ability of religious communities to function in Uzbekistan, facilitating the Uzbek 

government’s exercise of a high degree of control over 

religious communities and the approved manner in which 

the Islamic religion is practiced. The Uzbek government 

has continued to arrest Muslim individuals and harshly 

repress the activities of groups and mosques that do not 

conform to government-prescribed practices or that the 

government claims are associated with extremist political 

programs. This policy has resulted in the imprisonment of 

thousands of persons in recent years, many of whom are 

denied the right to due process, and there are credible reports that many of those arrested continue to be tortured 

or beaten in detention. Though security threats do exist 

in Uzbekistan, including from members of Hizb ut-Tahrir

and other groups that claim a religious linkage, these 

threats do not excuse or justify the scope and harshness 

of the government’s ill-treatment of religious believers. 

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of State 

continue to designate Uzbekistan a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. The Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should not be construed as an exculpatory defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist and highly 

intolerant organization that promotes hatred of the West, 

moderate Muslims, Jews, and others. In 2006, the State 

Department followed the Commission’s recommendation 

and named Uzbekistan a CPC.

Despite the constitutional separation of religion and 

state, the Uzbek government strictly regulates Islamic 

institutions and practice through the officially sanctioned 

Muslim Spiritual Board (the Muftiate). In 1998, the Uzbek 

government closed down approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 

mosques that were open at that time. In 2007, however, 

the State Department noted that a few unofficial, independent mosques were allowed to operate quietly under the 

watch of official imams. In the Ferghana Valley, viewed 

as the country’s most actively religious region, the state 

has confiscated a number of mosques and used them as 

warehouses or for other state purposes. Uzbek human 

rights defenders reported that as of late 2006, the Uzbek 

government had introduced various administrative and 

other obstacles to daily prayer practice in the Ferghana 

Valley. For example, in the Andijon region, the regional 

head of administration introduced restrictions on Islamic 

practice, such as bans on the five daily public calls to 

prayer from mosques and on the preaching by mullahs 

at weddings. Despite the presence of a Shi’a minority in 

the country, there is no training for Shi’a religious leaders. 

Nor does the government recognize foreign Shi’a religious 

education, although the State Department reports that 

Shi’a imams are sometimes educated in Sunni madrassas, 

which offer some courses in Shi’a jurisprudence. 

The state fully controls the training, appointments, 

and dismissals of Muslim leaders through the official Muftiate. There are 10 state-controlled madrassas (including 

two for women), which provide secondary education in 

Uzbekistan. In addition, the official Islamic Institute and 

Islamic University in Tashkent provide higher educational 

instruction. The State Department reported in 2006 that 

regional leaders in Uzbekistan have been instructed that 

children should not attend mosque; in the city of Bukhara, 

police have reportedly prevented children from doing so. 

The state also closes or confiscates privately-funded religious schools for its own purposes. For example, in Margilan and Andijon the government in 2004 and 2005 confiscated two madrassas, reportedly built with community 

funds. The state-controlled Muslim Board publishes some 

books and periodicals, as does the independent former 

Chief Mufti, Muhamad Sadyk Muhamad Yusuf.

Over the past decade and particularly since 1999, the 

Uzbek government has arrested and imprisoned, with 

Though security threats do exist 

in Uzbekistan, including from members 

of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups that 

claim a religious linkage, these threats 

do not excuse or justify the scope and 

harshness of the government’s 

ill-treatment of religious believers.
178

sentences of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who 

reject the state’s control over religious practice, or who the 

government claims are associated with extremist groups. 

As of 2007, according to a State Department estimate, 

there were at least 5,000 – 5,500 such persons in prison, 

including individuals sent to psychiatric hospitals. According to Uzbek human rights activists, in the past year, 

the number of arrests and detentions linked to religious 

convictions has risen sharply in the Uzbek capital Tashkent and its surrounding region. These Uzbek sources 

also estimate that during the first half of 2006, an estimated 150 Muslims were arrested and sentenced on charges 

related to their religious beliefs. 

Most of those arrested have no political connections, 

Uzbek human rights activists claim, and their only “crime” 

is performing their daily prayers and learning about Islam. 

According to the State Department in 2007, the Uzbek 

government has instructed some neighborhood committees and imams to identify local residents who might 

become involved in extremist activity or groups, using 

those who prayed daily or were overtly devout as criteria. 

Moreover, “authorities made little distinction between 

actual members [of the extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir] 

and those with marginal affiliation with the group, such 

as persons who had attended Koranic study sessions with 

the group.” Human rights organizations report that many 

of those in detention were arrested on false drug charges 

or for possession of literature of a banned organization. 

Once arrested, they often are denied access to a lawyer 

or are held incommunicado for weeks or months. Many 

of those imprisoned or detained for charges related to 

religion are treated particularly harshly; prisoners who 

pray or observe Muslim religious festivals are by many 

accounts subjected to further harassment, beatings, and 

other torture in an effort to force them to renounce their 

religious or political views. 

The use of torture continues to be widespread in Uzbekistan, despite promises from the government to halt 

the practice. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in 

his February 2003 report on Uzbekistan, concluded that 

“torture or similar ill-treatment is systematic” and that the 

“pervasive and persistent nature of torture throughout the 

investigative process cannot be denied.” Even after the 

publication of the Rapporteur’s report, reliance on the use 

of torture in detention did not significantly decrease, despite the Uzbek Supreme Court’s 2004 decree banning the 

use of evidence obtained by torture or other illegal means. 

The UN Committee against Torture also confirmed that 

there were numerous, on-going, and consistent allegations in the past year that torture continues to be used 

during criminal procedures, often before formal charges 

are brought. The Uzbek government has taken some 

limited steps to eliminate torture in detention, but there 

were numerous reports that ill-treatment remained routine and systemic. According to the State Department’s 

2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, “police, 

prison officials, and the [security services]... reportedly 

also used methods of abuse including suffocation, electric 

shock, deprivation of food and water, and sexual abuse in 

addition to beatings. Torture and abuse were common 

in prisons, pretrial facilities, and local police and security 

service precincts. Informants reported several cases of 

medical abuse, including forced psychiatric treatment 

on political grounds.” It has been reported that as many 

as 20 individuals in Uzbek prisons died as a result of illtreatment in October and November 2007. Convictions 

in the cases described in the above paragraph are based 

almost entirely on confessions, which, according to the 

State Department and many human rights organizations, 

are frequently gained through the use of torture. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch reported in 

November 2007 that particularly since the 2005 Andijon 

events (see below), it has become much more difficult to 

verify independently government claims of combating 

torture and improving prison conditions. 

The government of Uzbekistan does face threats to 

its security from certain extremist or terrorist groups that 

claim religious links, including the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan, which has used violence but whose membership reportedly declined after U.S. military action in 

Afghanistan in late 2001 killed its leaders. Uzbekistan 

continues to be subject to violent attacks; there were sevThe use of torture continues to be 

widespread in Uzbekistan, despite 

promises from the government 

to halt the practice.
179

UZBEKISTAN

eral incidents in 2004, although the motivation of those 

involved is difficult to determine. In the city of Andijon 

in May 2005, there were daily peaceful protests in support 

of 23 businessmen on trial for alleged ties to Islamic extremism. A small group reportedly seized weapons from a 

police garrison, stormed the prison holding the businessmen, released the defendants, and attacked other sites in 

the city. In connection with these events, on May 13, after 

several thousand mostly unarmed civilians gathered on 

the central square, Uzbek armed forces fired indiscriminately and without warning into the crowd. Estimated 

fatalities range from an official total of 187 to over 700, 

according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); some reports of non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) say as many as 1,000 men, women, 

and children were killed. During 2007, the Uzbek government continued to reject repeated calls from the United 

States, the European Union (EU), the OSCE, and the UN 

High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent 

international investigation into these events. 

In the aftermath of Andijon, Uzbek authorities jailed 

hundreds of local residents, human rights activists, and 

journalists on suspicion of involvement in the events. One 

Uzbek human rights NGO compiled a list of arrestees totaling 363 persons, in addition to those already convicted 

by the end of 2005, including dozens of people who had 

spoken to the press or reported on the events. Relatives 

of human rights defenders have also been targeted in attempts to pressure activists to stop speaking out about 

human rights violations; relatives of human rights activists have reportedly been threatened, dismissed from 

their jobs, beaten, and sometimes arrested, prosecuted, 

and imprisoned on fabricated criminal charges. In January 2006, one arrestee, human rights activist Saidjahon 

Zaynabitdinov, with whom a Commission delegation met 

in October 2004, was convicted of extremist activity and 

other offenses and sentenced to seven years in prison. He 

had shown journalists bullet casings reportedly used by 

the Uzbek authorities against the Andijon demonstrators. 

In February 2008, Zaynabitdinov was one of five Uzbek 

political prisoners released the day before the Uzbek 

government met with officials from the EU. The State 

Department reported that in several cases, the Uzbek government has pressured other countries forcibly to return 

Uzbek refugees who were under the protection of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 

In 2007, the UN Committee against Torture pointed to 

reports that some persons who had sought refuge abroad 

and were returned to Uzbekistan were kept in isolation in 

unknown places, and possibly subjected to breaches of 

the Convention against Torture. 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned in most Muslim countries, purports not to engage in violence but is intolerant of other 

religions and has in some circumstances sanctioned violence. The group calls for a worldwide caliphate to replace 

existing governments and for the imposition of an extremist 

interpretation of Islamic law. Although it does not specify 

the methods it would use to attain those goals, it does, according to the State Department’s religious freedom report, 

reserve the “possibility that its own members might resort 

to violence.” In addition, the State Department reports that 

Hizb ut-Tahrir material includes “strong anti-Semitic and 

anti-Western rhetoric.” Alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir

comprise many of the thousands in prison; in most cases, 

however, Uzbek authorities have failed to present evidence 

to the court that these persons have committed violence. 

Many of those arrested and imprisoned are not affiliated 

with Hizb ut-Tahrir but are wrongfully accused of membership or association, sometimes due to alleged—or 

planted—possession of the group’s literature at the time 

of arrest. The State Department reported in 2007 that 

as many as 4,500 of the estimated 5,000 to 5,500 political prisoners being held in detention were imprisoned 

based on alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir membership. It was also 

reported that in November 2007, three men who had 

been convicted of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir died at a 

prison in Andijon; the bodies of Fitrat Salakhiddinov and 

The Kalta Minor minaret and Mohammed Amin Khan Madrassa 

in Khiva, Uzbekistan.
180

Takhir Nurmukhammedov reportedly showed signs of 

torture and the third, unnamed prisoner, died later in the 

month. According to the State Department, local human 

rights activists reported in the past year that police and 

security service officers, acting under pressure to break up 

Hizb ut-Tahrir cells, frequently detained family members 

and close associates of suspected members.

After the May 2005 Andijon events, the number of 

court cases against independent Muslims in Uzbekistan 

reportedly increased markedly. Before May 2005, the 

authorities often accused arrested Muslims of being 

members of Hizb ut-Tahrir; since that time, however, arrested Muslims are usually accused—frequently without 

evidence—of being “Wahhabis” or members of another 

banned Islamist group, Akromiya, which played an important role in the Andijon events. “Wahhabi” is a term 

that usually refers to followers of a highly restrictive interpretation of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. In 

Uzbekistan, however, “Wahhabi” is a catchphrase used to 

refer to a range of Muslim individuals and groups, such 

as genuine extremists, those that oppose the Karimov 

regime, and those who practice Islam independently 

of government strictures. For the Uzbek authorities, all 

these groups and individuals are equally suspect and 

subject to government repression. The Uzbek criminal 

code distinguishes between “illegal” groups, which are not 

properly registered, and “prohibited” groups, such as Hizb 

ut-Tahrir, Tabligh, a Muslim missionary movement which 

originated in South Asia in 1920, and Akromiya, a group 

based on the 1992 writings of an imprisoned Uzbek mathematics teacher, Akram Yuldashev, which, according to 

human rights defenders in Uzbekistan, espouse charitable 

work and a return to Islamic moral principles. According 

to the State Department, the Uzbek government has pressured and prosecuted members of Akromiya (also known 

as Akromiylar) since 1997, claiming that the group is a 

branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and that it attempted, together 

with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, to overthrow 

the government through an armed rebellion in May 2005 

in Andijon. The charges against the 23 local businessmen 

Vendors selling non, a traditional Uzbek bread
181

UZBEKISTAN

on trial in Andijon in May 2005 included alleged membership in Akromiya. 

In June 2006, police confiscated a copy of the Koran, 

the hadith (sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad), other religious books, and tape recordings of the 

exiled mullah Obid kori Nazarov and his pupil Hairullah 

Hamidov, the Human Rights Initiative Group in Uzbekistan reported. The items were seized as material evidence 

against two men who were arrested and accused of “Wahhabism,” although reportedly they only sought independent religious education. Human rights sources indicate 

that Nazarov, who had been forced to flee the country after 

the authorities branded him a “Wahhabi” leader, was not 

promoting extremism, but simply operating outside of 

government strictures. The State Department reported 

that in September 2006, Ruhitdin Fakhrutdinov, a former 

imam of a Tashkent mosque, was sentenced in a closed 

trial to 17 years in prison. During his trial, which involved 

clear violations of due process, the independent imam 

was accused of being an extremist and charged with involvement in a 1999 car bombing in Tashkent, although 

no evidence was presented to the court of his involvement 

in violent acts. Fakhrutdinov was delivered in 2005 to the 

Uzbek authorities from his place of asylum in Kazakhstan, 

allegedly with the assistance of the Kazakh authorities. 

Uzbekistan’s Law on Freedom of Conscience and 

Religious Organizations, passed in May 1998, severely 

restricts the exercise of religious freedom. Through regulations that are often arbitrarily applied, the law imposes 

onerous hurdles for the registration of religious groups, 

particularly minority religious groups, such as stipulating 

that a group must have a list of at least 100 members who 

are Uzbek citizens and a legal address; criminalizing unregistered religious activity; banning the production and 

distribution of unofficial religious publications; prohibiting minors from participating in religious organizations; 

prohibiting private teaching of religious principles; and 

forbidding the wearing of religious clothing in public by 

anyone other than clerics. Only six entities meet the law’s 

requirement that religious groups must have a registered 

central administrative body so as to train religious personnel. The law also limits religious instruction to officially 

sanctioned religious schools and state-approved instructors, does not permit private instruction, and levies fines 

for violations. There are reports that Uzbekistan may be 

planning to change its religion law, although a written 

draft has not yet been made available. In October 2007, 

the Religious Affairs Committee deputy chairman reportedly sent letters to religious associations with nationally 

registered central administrations, giving them a two-day 

deadline to suggest possible changes to the current religion law. 

In December 2005, the government modified the 

country’s criminal and administrative codes to introduce 

heavier fines for repeated violations of rules on religious 

meetings, processions, and other religious ceremonies, 

as well as for violations of the law on religious organizations. The religious freedom news organization Forum 18 

reported in September 2007 that the Uzbek National Security Service (NSS or secret police), particularly its Department to Fight Terrorism, enforces controls on all religious 

activity and cracks down on certain activities in a manner 

reminiscent of the Soviet period. Forum 18 also reported 

last year that an official Andijon regional government 

document revealed that a regional branch of the Muftiate 

and the state Religious Affairs Committee were ordered 

“to bring under constant close observation” all registered 

religious organizations and “strengthen the struggle with 

individuals conducting illegal religious education and 

organizing small religious gatherings.” In addition, the 

Uzbek police and secret police conduct extensive surveillance on various religious denominations, including by 

stationing NSS agents in and around places of worship, 

planting hidden microphones in houses of worship, and 

recruiting spies within communities. 

The law’s effects on minority religious groups are apparent. According to the State Department in 2007, churches 

whose registration requests have been repeatedly refused 

included Bethany Baptist Church in the Mirzo-Ulugbek 

District of Tashkent, the Pentecostal Church in Chirchik, 

Some Christian communities 

continue to have their churches raided, 

services interrupted, Bibles confiscated, 

and the names of adherents recorded 

by Uzbek officials.
182

Greater Grace Christian Church in Samarkand, Emmanuel 

Church of Nukus, Karakalpakstan, the Mir (Peace) Church 

of Nukus, the Hushkhabar Church in Guliston, the Pentecostal Church in Andijon, and the Baptist Church in 

Gazalkent. All Protestant churches in the autonomous 

region of Karakalpakistan had lost their registration appeals by September 2005, and Karakalpakistan authorities also continued to exert pressure on the Hare Krishna 

community. Reportedly, the sole Hare Krishna advocate 

in the city of Urgench was harassed in 2007 as a supposed 

“enemy of the people.” The Uzbek government continues to threaten to halt the practicing of the country’s last 

registered Jehovah’s Witnesses community. According 

to Forum 18, two years after they applied for legal status, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses in the town of Kagan near Bukhara 

have not been granted registration; instead, this community has faced harassment, including a police raid in 

August 2007. In October 2007, 10 Jehovah’s Witnesses 

were threatened with death and each fined the equivalent 

of five years’ minimum wages. The state-run media also 

sometimes engages in harassment of religious minorities. 

Two prime-time Uzbek-language programs, broadcast on 

state TV in late 2006, claimed that Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses turned people into “zombies.” Protestant 

leaders have reported fears that these programs were part 

of a campaign to prepare the Uzbek population for further 

repression of minority religious communities. 

In past years, Christian leaders have reportedly been 

detained in psychiatric hospitals, severely beaten, and/or 

sentenced to labor camps. Some Christian communities 

continue to have their churches raided, services interrupted, Bibles confiscated, and the names of adherents 

recorded by Uzbek officials. In September 2007, police 

raided a gathering of Protestants near the southern town 

of Termez and took all those present to the police station, 

reportedly because of a police “work plan” for arrests. According to Forum 18, 12 individuals face prosecution under the administrative code and for the illegal distribution 

of religious literature, as well as for taking part in an illegal 

worship meeting. In February 2008, the Grace Presbyterian Church in Tashkent was ordered to cease all activities 

because it had lost its legal status for allegedly violating 

laws on public religious expression.

In late 2006, the Uzbek authorities stepped up their 

campaign against the leaders of several unregistered 

and even some registered Protestant communities, 

and in 2007, these Protestants continued to experience 

heavy fines and other official harassment. In November 

2007, Forum 18 reported that a Baptist pastor, Nikolai 

Zulfikarov, who heads a five-member unregistered congregation in Khalkabad, had been sentenced to two years 

correctional labor for “teaching religious doctrines without special religious education and without permission 

from a central organ of administration of a religious organization, and for teaching religion privately.” In March 

For many years, the Uzbek government has allowed only 20 percent of the 

country’s quota of pilgrims to make the religious hajj to Mecca, a number estimated 

by the State Department to be approximately 25,000 pilgrims, or 1,000 pilgrims 

for every 1 million of the population.

Mufti Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, former Chief Mufti of 

Uzbekistan, speaks with Commissioners Bansal and Gaer.
183

UZBEKISTAN

2007, a court in Andijon sentenced local Protestant pastor 

Dmitry Shestakov to four years internal exile for “illegal” 

religious activity; in December 2007, although he was 

eligible for release under the terms of a general prisoner 

amnesty, he was not released. Government harassment of 

Shestakov dates back almost a decade, reportedly because 

he had been involved in the conversion of some ethnic 

Uzbeks to Christianity. In February 2008, a Baptist in the 

city of Ferghana was fined the equivalent of nine months’ 

average wages for holding an unauthorized prayer meeting at his house, and a Pentecostal pastor near Tashkent 

was fined over two months’ average wages for violating 

the rules on teaching religion, although his congregation 

is part of a registered community.

According to most reports, it has become even more 

difficult to secure permission to publish religious literature in the past year. Permission is still required from 

the state Committee for Religious Affairs and the statecontrolled Muftiate, but reportedly, a secret instruction 

was issued in 2006 limiting publications to less than 1,000 

copies of any single religious book. Amendments to the 

criminal and administrative codes, which came into force 

in June 2006, instituted new penalties for the “illegal” production, storage, import, and distribution of religious literature, with penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment 

for repeat offenders. Reportedly, the chairman of the 

Committee for Religious Affairs has said that the import 

of foreign literature for Muslims had practically ceased. 

Fines for violations of these codes can be up to 100 – 200 

times the minimum monthly wage, or “corrective labor” 

of up to three years. Religious materials produced outside 

Uzbekistan are treated in a similar fashion under Article 

19 of the religion law. The Committee for Religious Affairs 

has the authority to determine if religious literature is “acceptable”; if not, it can be confiscated and destroyed. In 

the past year, Uzbek authorities continued to seize and destroy religious literature from numerous religious groups, 

including Muslims, Protestants, Hare Krishna adherents, 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Even legally imported literature 

is confiscated in police raids.

The Russian Orthodox Church publishes a newspaper 

and a journal (both in Russian) and maintains a Web site. 

The Catholic Church in Tashkent maintains an Internet 

news agency. Various Christian churches have set up a 

Bible Society in Tashkent, which produces limited supplies of Christian books, but the Religious Affairs Committee must approve each edition. Other religious minorities 

are almost entirely banned from producing religious 

literature in Uzbekistan, especially in the Uzbek language. 

The Jehovah’s Witnesses note that they cannot print or 

import their religious literature in Uzbek; the Religious 

Affairs Committee limits imports of Russian-language 

literature to registered congregations, making imports to 

the many unregistered Jehovah’s Witnesses’ communities 

prohibited.

For many years, the Uzbek government has allowed 

only 20 percent of the country’s quota of pilgrims to make 

the religious hajj to Mecca, a number estimated by the 

State Department to be approximately 25,000 pilgrims, 

or 1,000 pilgrims for every 1 million of the population. In 

2007, only 5,000 were permitted to undertake the hajj; 

pilgrims must be approved by local authorities, the secret 

police, and the Hajj Commission under the state Religious 

Affairs Committee, as well as the state-controlled Muftiate. Furthermore, hajj pilgrims reportedly must travel on 

state-run Uzbekistan Airlines and pay the equivalent of 

200 times the monthly wage. 

Since May 2005, the Uzbek government has intensified its efforts to isolate the people of Uzbekistan. It has 

cracked down on both domestic and foreign-based NGOs 

in order to minimize Western influence; according to the 

State Department, after many audits targeting a number of 

international, human rights-oriented NGOs, almost threefourths of these organizations were closed in 2006. Other 

elements of this campaign include: the detention and deportation in 2005 of a Forum 18 reporter and the demand, 

in March 2006, that the UNHCR close its office within one 

month. Although the NGO Human Rights Watch was able 

to re-establish an office in Tashkent in early 2008, Uzbek 

In the past year, Uzbek authorities 

continued to seize and destroy religious 

literature from numerous religious groups, 

including Muslims, Protestants, Hare 

Krishna adherents, and 

Jehovah’s Witnesses.
184

authorities have put its Uzbek translator, Umida Niyazova, 

on trial for allegedly storing “extremist materials” on her 

computer—material that was in fact the organization’s 

report on the Andijon events. In May 2007, she was given 

a suspended seven-year prison sentence and in February 

2008, the day before a meeting between EU and Uzbek 

officials, Niyazova was “amnestied.” 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with 

NGOs representing various religious communities in Uzbekistan, as well as human rights organizations, academics, and other Uzbekistan experts. In October 2004, the 

Commission traveled to Uzbekistan and met with senior 

officials of the Foreign, Internal Affairs, and Justice Ministries, the Presidential Administration, the Committee on 

Religious Affairs, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 

office. The delegation also met with the members of the 

Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, as well as 

other religious groups, Uzbek human rights activists and 

lawyers, alleged victims of repression and their families, 

western NGOs active in Uzbekistan, and U.S. Embassy 

personnel. In November 2006, the Commission issued a 

press statement welcoming the designation of Uzbekistan 

as a CPC.

Commission staff continues to take part in meetings 

with delegations of Uzbek religious leaders, human rights 

groups and academics from Uzbekistan, and U.S.-based 

experts and activists concerned with Uzbekistan. In 

January 2008, Commission staff made a presentation in 

Brussels on the status of freedom of religion or belief in 

Central Asia at events sponsored by the NGO European 

Platform on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. In 

December 2007, staff gave a talk in Berlin on Uzbekistan 

and the CPC process at the Forum on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief, a private organization comprised of international legal specialists. In January 2007, the Commission 

co-sponsored an event entitled “Religious Freedom and 

State Policy in Central Asia,” together with the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to discuss reCommissioners Gaer and Bansal with members of the Judiciary.
185

UZBEKISTAN

ligious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 

and other Central Asian states. In July 2005, the Commis-

sion held a public briefing on “U.S. Strategic Dilemmas 

in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,” also with CSIS. At a 

June 2005 Carnegie Endowment roundtable on Andijon, 

the Commission released its Policy Focus on Uzbekistan, 

which includes numerous policy recommendations. In 

May 2005, then-Commission Chair Michael Cromartie 

testified on Uzbekistan at a hearing of the U.S. Commis-

sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Language reflecting a Commission recommendation 

on Uzbekistan was included in the Consolidated Appro-

priations Act of 2005. The Congress conditioned funds 

to Uzbekistan on its “making substantial and continuing 

progress in meeting its commitments under the ‘Declara-

tion of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework 

Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States 

of America,’” such as respect for human rights, including 

religious freedom. The Commission’s recommendation to 

re-open the Voice of America’s (VOA) Uzbek Service was 

adopted in June 2005, but the U.S. Board for Broadcasting 

Governors and the President’s Budget request for fiscal 

year 2008 have again proposed the closure of the VOA’s 

Uzbek Service.
Commission Recommendations

186

 The U.S. government 

should ensure that it speaks 

in a unified voice in its 

relations with the Uzbek 

government. To that end, the 

U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. statements and actions are coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. concerns 

about human rights conditions in 

Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings with the Uzbek government; 

• following the European Union’s October 2005 decision, reduce aid and 

arms sales to Uzbekistan and ban 

visits by high-level Uzbek officials in 

response to the Uzbek government’s 

refusal to allow an independent 

investigation into the violence in 

Andijon in May 2005; 

• ensure that U.S. assistance to the 

Uzbek government, with the exception of assistance to improve humanitarian conditions and advance 

human rights, be made contingent 

upon establishing and implementing a specific timetable for the 

government to take concrete steps 

to improve conditions of freedom 

of religion or belief and observe international human rights standards, 

steps which should include:

• ending reliance on convictions 

based solely on confessions, a 

practice that often is linked to 

ill-treatment of prisoners, and 

implementing the recommendations of the UN Committee 

Against Torture (June 2002) and 

the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Torture (February 2003);

• establishing a mechanism to 

review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion of 

or charged with religious, political, or security offenses, including 

Criminal Code Articles 159 (criminalizing “anti-state activity”) and 

216 (criminalizing membership in 

a “forbidden religious organization”); releasing those who have 

been imprisoned solely because 

of their religious beliefs or practices as well as any others who 

have been unjustly detained or 

sentenced; and making public a 

list of specific and detailed information about individuals who are 

currently detained under these 

articles or imprisoned following 

conviction;

• implementing the recommendations of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts 

on Religion or Belief to revise the 

1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and bring it into accordance 

with international standards;

• registering religious groups that 

have sought to comply with the 

legal requirements; and 

• ensuring that every prisoner has 

access to his or her family, human 

rights monitors, adequate medical care, and a lawyer, as specified 

in international human rights 

instruments, and allowing prisoners to practice their religion while 

in detention to the fullest extent 

compatible with the specific 

nature of their detention;

• ensure that U.S. security and other 

forms of assistance are scrutinized 

to make certain that this assistance 

does not go to Uzbek government 

agencies, such as certain branches 

of the Interior and Justice Ministries, which have been responsible 

for particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 (IRFA); and

• use appropriate avenues of public 

diplomacy to explain to the people 

of Uzbekistan both why religious 

freedom is an important element 

of U.S. foreign policy, and what 

specific concerns about violations 

of religious freedom exist in their 

country.

 The U.S. government 

should encourage greater 

international scrutiny of 

Uzbekistan’s human rights 

record. To that end, the U.S. 

government should:

• work with other governments to 

urge the UN Human Rights Council 

to reverse its recent decision to end 

human rights scrutiny of Uzbekistan under confidential resolution 

1503 and to address this situation 

in a public country resolution at the 

Council;

• encourage scrutiny of Uzbek human rights concerns in appropriate 

international fora such as the OSCE 

and other multilateral venues, and 

facilitate the participation of Uzbek 

human rights defenders in multilateral human rights mechanisms; and

• urge the Uzbek government to agree 

to a visit by UN Special Rapporteurs 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and the Independence of the Judi1 

2 
187

UZBEKISTAN

ciary and provide the full and necessary conditions for such a visit.

 The U.S. government 

should support Uzbek human 

rights defenders and religious 

freedom initiatives. To that 

end, the U.S. government 

should:

• respond publicly and privately to 

the recent expulsions of U.S. nongovernmental organizations and the 

numerous new restrictions placed 

on their activities; unless these 

restrictions are rescinded, the U.S. 

government should make clear that 

there will be serious consequences 

in the U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relationship, including a ban on high-level 

meetings; 

• continue the careful monitoring of 

the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged religious, political, 

and security offenses and continue 

efforts to improve the situation of 

Uzbek human rights defenders, 

including by pressing for the registration of human rights groups and 

religious communities;

• support efforts to counteract the 

Uzbek government’s blockade on 

information into the country by 

increasing radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasting of objective news and 

information on issues relevant to 

Uzbekistan, including education, 

human rights, freedom of religion, 

and religious tolerance;

• reinstate funding for the Voice of 

America (VOA) Uzbek Language 

Service to the fiscal year 2007 

level of $600,000 so as to meet the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors’ 

stated goal of outreach to the 

Muslim world; reinstatement of the 

VOA Uzbek Service would reach 

the news-deprived population of 

Uzbekistan, in addition to the large 

Uzbek diaspora in Afghanistan and 

other neighboring countries; 

• increase foreign travel opportunities 

for civil society activists, religious 

leaders, and others in Uzbekistan 

concerned with religious freedom to 

permit them to take part in relevant 

international conferences;

• continue to attempt to overcome the 

objections of the Uzbek government in order to develop assistance 

programs for Uzbekistan designed 

to encourage the creation of institutions of civil society that protect 

human rights and promote religious 

freedom, programs that could include training in human rights, the 

rule of law, and crime investigation 

for police and other law enforcement officials; since such programs 

have been attempted in the past 

with little effect, they should be 

carefully structured to accomplish, 

and carefully monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of, these 

specific goals: 

• expanding legal assistance 

programs for Uzbek relatives of 

detainees, which have sometimes 

led to the release of detainees;

• expanding “train-the-trainer” 

legal assistance programs for 

representatives of religious communities to act as legal advisers in 

the registration process;

• specifying freedom of religion 

as a grants category and area of 

activity in the Democracy and 

Conflict Mitigation program of 

the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Democracy Commission Small Grants 

program administered by the U.S. 

Embassy; and

• encouraging national and local 

public roundtablesbetween Uzbek 

officials and representatives of 

Uzbek civil society on freedom of 

religion; and

• increase opportunities in its 

exchange programs for Uzbek human rights advocates and religious 

figures, and more specifically:

• expand exchange programs for 

Uzbek religious leaders to include 

representatives from all religious 

communities; and

• ensure that the U.S. Embassy 

vigorously protests cases when an 

Uzbek participant in an exchange 

program encounters difficulties 

with the Uzbek authorities upon 

return to Uzbekistan, and if such 

difficulties continue, inform the 

Uzbek authorities that there will 

be negative consequences in other 

areas of U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations, including a ban on high-level 

meetings.

3 
188
COUNTRIES ON THE COMMISSION’S 

WATCH LIST

Conditions for freedom of religion or belief in 189

Afghanistan have become increasingly problematic in recent years. The failure of the new constitution 

to protect individuals from within the majority Muslim 

community to dissent from the prevailing orthodoxy regarding Islamic beliefs and practices continues to result 

occasionally in serious abuses, including criminal court 

cases that are in violation of the rights of the accused. In 

addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan government 

to exercise authority over much of the country outside 

Kabul contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom and other human rights in many 

of the provinces. Although the status of religious freedom 

has improved since the fall of the Taliban regime, these 

developments indicate that religious extremism, including through the return of the Taliban, is an increasingly 

viable threat once again in Afghanistan. In light of these 

very real dangers to the declared U.S. goal of instituting 

democracy and human rights protections in Afghanistan, 

the Commission has determined that Afghanistan should 

remain on its Watch List. Since the United States has a 

crucial role to play, the Commission will continue carefully to monitor the regrettably deteriorating situation in 

Afghanistan. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution. The constitution contains an explicit recognition 

of equality between men and women and a reference to 

Afghanistan’s commitment to abide by its international 

human rights obligations. However, though the Constitution provides for the freedom of non-Muslim groups to 

exercise their various faiths, it does not contain explicit 

protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief 

that would extend to every individual, particularly to individual Muslims, the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s population. Other fundamental rights, such as the 

right to life and free expression, can be superseded 

by ordinary legislation. This omission is compounded by 

a repugnancy clause that states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion 

of Islam,” as well as by provisions for a judicial system 

empowered to enforce the repugnancy clause and apply 

Hanafi jurisprudence to cases where there is no other applicable law.

The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to 

religious freedom and the inclusion of a judicial system 

instructed to enforce Islamic principles and Islamic law 

mean that the new constitution does not fully protect individual Afghan citizens who dissent from state-imposed 

orthodoxy against unjust accusations of religious “crimes” 

such as apostasy and blasphemy. There are also fewer 

protections for Afghans to debate the role and content of 

religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of women and religious minorities, and to question interpretaAfghanistan

All of these cases, involving 

Muslim individuals exercising their 

internationally guaranteed rights, 

indicate that the inadequate guarantees 

for individual human rights in the 

constitution represent a significant 

problem for Afghanistan’s development 

as a democratic, rule of law-based 

state where fundamental human 

rights are protected.
190

tions of Islamic precepts without fear of retribution or being charged with “insulting Islam.” There is concern that 

these constitutional deficiencies could permit a harsh, 

unfair, or even abusive interpretation of religious orthodoxy to be officially imposed, violating numerous human 

rights of the individual by stifling potential dissent within 

the Afghan population. 

In the past few years, several very troubling cases 

exemplifying the constitution’s inadequacies came before the courts. The most recent example is the case of 

Parwiz Kambakhsh, who in January 2008 was sentenced 

to death for blasphemy in the northern Balkh province 

for circulating a document with opposing views about 

women’s rights in Islam. A panel of three judges ruled 

that because the article he circulated was “blasphemous,” 

he must receive the death penalty in accordance with 

sharia. Kambakhsh reportedly did not have a lawyer or a 

public trial. Although an influential council of religious 

scholars has pressed for the execution to be carried out, 

others—including several human rights and other civic 

organizations and groups of journalists—have led protests 

in his defense. As of this writing, Kambakhsh remains 

under a death sentence and has appealed his case. In December 2007, a government press aide was arrested and 

almost lynched for circulating a translation of the Koran 

in the Dari language that had not been approved by senior religious scholars. He is reportedly still in prison and 

awaiting trial.

In March 2006, Abdul Rahman, an Afghan citizen, 

was arrested and threatened with execution on the charge 

of changing his religion. His offense, according to a 

public prosecutor in Afghanistan, was “rejecting Islam.” 

Rahman was to face the death penalty if found guilty of 

apostasy. The prosecutor in the case called Rahman “a 

microbe [who] should be cut off and removed from the 

rest of Muslim society and should be killed.” The judge 

overseeing the trial publicly affirmed that if Rahman did 

not return to Islam, “the punishment will be enforced on 

him, and the punishment is death.” Within a few weeks, in 

the face of a massive international outcry about the case, 

the court dismissed the charges against him, citing lack of 

evidence and suspicions about his mental state, but concerns about his personal safety forced him to seek asylum 

abroad. In October 2005, Afghan journalist and editor 

Ali Mohaqiq Nasab was imprisoned after being found 

guilty of charges of blasphemy and “insulting Islam.” The 

purported “crime” of Nasab, editor of the journal Haqooqi-Zan (Women’s Rights), was to question discrimination 

against women and the use of certain harsh punishments 

under traditional Islamic law, including amputation and 

public stoning. Although Nasab, who is also an Islamic 

scholar, was initially sentenced to two years of hard labor, 

the prosecutor in the case reportedly intended to seek the 

death penalty against him. In December, Nasab’s term 

was reduced to a six-month suspended sentence, but only 

after he apologized to the court. 

All of these cases, involving Muslim individuals exercising their internationally guaranteed rights, indicate 

that the inadequate guarantees for individual human 

rights in the constitution represent a significant problem 

for Afghanistan’s development as a democratic, rule of 

These religious freedom concerns 

take place in a context of declining 

democracy more generally, including 

with regard to freedom of 

speech and the press.

Human Rights Commission Chair Sima Simar and member Ahmad Nader 

Nadery, himself a former prisoner of the Taliban, meet with Commissioner 

Bansal.
191

law-based state where fundamental human rights are 

protected. According a 2007 report from the UN Development Program and Kabul University, this problem has 

been exacerbated by the persistent weakness of the country’s central judicial system more generally, which continues to face substantial challenges that include mounting 

insecurity, a lack of basic infrastructure, massive corruption, an expanding illegal drug trade, and the unresolved 

human rights violations from previous conflicts that have 

given rise to a “climate of impunity” in many parts of the 

country. 

These constitutional pitfalls have been extended to 

other legislation also, and journalists and others, including publishers, sometimes face severe legal consequences 

for writing or disseminating material that is deemed “unIslamic.” The current media law prohibits publication or 

broadcast of information that insults “the sacred religion 

of Islam and other religions.” According to the State Department, the vagueness in the definition of what constitutes offensive material allows for the potential abuse of 

this clause with the aim of limiting freedom of the press 

and intimidating journalists. Indeed, this sort of abuse 

has already occurred. In November 2007, the popular 

“Tolo TV” was criticized by the country’s Culture Ministry 

and key Muslim clerics for broadcasting western-style 

programs. This and other such incidents are thought to 

be part of a growing “backlash” by Afghanistan’s powerful traditionalist religious forces against the liberalization 

that occurred after the fall of the Taliban. In January 2006, 

the Afghan Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism 

declared that though Afghan law allows citizens access to 

a free press, there are limitations that are “not imposed by 

the government but are in line with Islamic and national 

principles.” That same month, cable television was shut 

down in Balkh province for broadcasting films and music 

that were “against Islam and Afghan culture.” In February 

2006, the Afghan government, through a special media 

commission, imposed a fine on Afghan TV, one of four 

private stations in Kabul, for broadcasting “un-Islamic 

materials.” 

In July 2006, there were reports that Afghanistan’s 

Ulema, or council of Muslim clerics, proposed the establishment of a Department for the Promotion of Virtue 

and Prevention of Vice, an organization troublingly reminiscent of a similarly named body used by the Taliban to 

enforce its strict religious codes through public beatings, 

imprisonment, torture, and execution, including stoning 

to death. At the time, Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister for 

Religious Affairs was quoted as stating that the new Vice 

and Virtue agency will not be the same as that under the 

AFGHANISTAN
192

Taliban but would instead be aimed at promoting religious values through “education, preaching, and encouragement.” The proposal has reportedly been referred to 

the country’s parliament, but as of this writing, had not yet 

been enacted.

In May 2007, the General Directorate of Fatwas and 

Accounts under the Supreme Court issued a ruling on the 

status of the Baha’i religion and declared it distinct from 

Islam and a form of blasphemy. The ruling also noted that 

Baha’is would therefore be treated similarly to Christians 

and Jews. According to the State Department, while the 

ruling is not expected to affect the expatriate Bahai’is 

in Afghanistan, it may create problems for the country’s 

tiny (approximately 400) Baha’i community, primarily in 

issues involving marriage. Many Afghan Baha’is are married to Afghan Muslims, and the ruling could invalidate 

those marriages. Converts to the Baha’i religion would 

face the same consequences as other converts from Islam.

These religious freedom concerns take place in a 

context of declining democracy more generally, including 

with regard to freedom of speech and the press. In addition to cases involving views on religious interpretation, 

journalists in Afghanistan are coming under increasing 

pressure—and facing legal consequences—for criticizing 

political leaders, powerful local politicians, drug dealers, 

or warlords. In July 2007, an Afghan journalist who was 

critical of the government was released after four days 

detention on undisclosed charges. Another journalist, 

who reprinted extracts of an essay critical of President 

Karzai, remains in detention. According to a December 

2007 report from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, five staffers from Cheragh, an Afghan daily newspaper, were arrested and interrogated after security forces 

objected to a letter to the editor that had been published. 

The five were released only after the editor agreed to publish an apology. The office of another newspaper, Erada, 

was raided by armed men seeking to arrest the editor after 

he published an analysis deemed unacceptable. Similar 

attacks on media freedom are reportedly occurring with 

increasing frequency.

The security situation continues to deteriorate. Some 

experts claim that Afghanistan is at risk of collapsing into 

chaos due to the resurgence of the Taliban, the failure of 

reconstruction efforts, and record-level opium production. Due to the continued security problems, the government of President Karzai does not exercise full control 

over the country. As a result, the situation for religious 

freedom and other human rights is increasingly both 

precarious and problematic in many parts of the country. 

Concerns that the government of Pakistan has been providing sanctuary to the Taliban intensified in the past year, 

as the Taliban stepped up attacks inside Afghanistan, posing a threat to the stability of the government. In addition, 

the illegal militias have not been disarmed. According 

to the UN, there are hundreds of illegally armed groups, 

some of them nominally allied with the government, that 

continue to exercise power throughout the country and 

often perpetrate human rights abuses. These abuses include political killings, torture, coercion to enforce social 

and religious conformity, and abuses against women 

and girls, sometimes with the active support of the local 

courts and police. In some areas of Afghanistan, there is 

reportedly now a “parallel Taliban state,” and Afghans are 

increasingly receptive to Taliban courts, as they are, once 

again, seen as less corrupt than those administered by the 

tribal warlords. These substantial security threats, which 

have increased in the past year, present a persistent danger to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law 

The situation of Afghanistan’s religious minorities, which include small 

communities of Hindus and Sikhs, has also improved since the fall of the Taliban, 

as there is no longer any official discrimination, though societal violence 

against both groups, particularly in the areas outside of government 

control, continues to be a concern.
193

throughout Afghanistan. 

As far back as 2002, the Commission raised strong 

concerns about the decision not to extend the international security presence outside of Kabul and the repercussions that could potentially ensue as a consequence of 

this decision. In its report from that year, the Commission 

recommended that the “U.S. government should actively 

support expanding the international security presence 

beyond Kabul, as there [is] an urgent need to expand security in order to safeguard the process of political reconstruction in the country and to protect religious freedom 

and other human rights for all Afghans both in the near 

term and into the future.” It seems clear that the political reconstruction process has indeed become seriously 

threatened as a result of the alarming and deteriorating 

security conditions.

The rights of women were severely and egregiously 

violated in the name of religion by the Taliban regime. 

Since then, rights for women have improved significantly, 

especially in light of the fact that Afghan society has hardly 

ever experienced the notion of gender equality. There 

are a number of women serving in the parliament and on 

provincial councils. However, recent reports indicate that 

women’s inclusion in the government has been regressing. In 2006, President Karzai dropped all three female 

ministers from his cabinet. Under the previous Chief Justice, the Supreme Court sometimes ruled against women’s 

rights, including by banning women from singing on 

television and arresting a scholar who questioned polygamy. (The new make-up of the Court is seen as a positive 

development.) In addition, reports indicate that women 

in Afghanistan are frequently denied equal access to legal 

representation and due process, especially in rural areas, 

where rule of law is rare and justice is instead meted out 

by traditional councils. In August 2006, the UN released a 

report indicating that violence again women, particularly 

domestic violence, remains widespread in Afghanistan. A 

later report from January 2008 describes the persistently 

common practice of child marriages and the fact that girls 

are frequently sold into marriages in which they are illtreated. There are few avenues for redress.

Despite these concerns, some religious freedom 

problems have diminished since the rule of the Taliban. 

For example, the active persecution of Afghanistan’s Shi’a 

minority (approximately 15 percent of the population) 

that was perpetrated by the Taliban has largely ended, and 

Shi’as are once again able to perform their traditional processions and to participate in public life. In January 2005, 

President Karzai appointed a Shi’a scholar to the country’s 

Supreme Court, the first Shi’a scholar ever to be appointed 

to that body. The State Department reports that in February 2006, six people were killed during a Shi’a Ashura 

procession in Herat, though some consider the violence to 

have been politically rather than strictly religiously motivated. Most Shi’a are from the Hazara ethnic group, which 

has traditionally been harshly discriminated against and 

segregated from the rest of society due to a combination 

of political, ethnic, and religious reasons. The situation 

of Afghanistan’s religious minorities, which include small 

communities of Hindus and Sikhs, has also improved 

since the fall of the Taliban, as there is no longer any official discrimination, though societal violence against 

both groups, particularly in the areas outside of government control, continues to be a concern. Although there 

are no churches, expatriate Christians are reportedly able 

to meet for private worship services in Kabul and one or 

two other major urban centers. However, some religious 

advocacy organizations are reporting instances of societal 

intolerance of and violence against persons who have 

converted to Christianity. 

In the past year, the Commission continued to speak 

out about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. In 

January 2008, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice about the Kambakhsh case, noting that 

Kambakhsh’s conviction and sentencing on a spurious 

allegation of blasphemy was a clear violation of AfghaniAFGHANISTAN

Vice President Niamatullah Shahrani (left), Chair of the Constitutional 

Commission, speaks with Commissioners Gaer and Bansal.
194

stan’s commitments under international human rights 

laws and an alarming signal of deteriorating conditions for 

the freedom of religion or belief and other human rights in 

the country.

In July 2006, the Commission issued a statement 

raising several concerns about the proposed creation of a 

Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention 

of Vice. The Commission noted that the creation of such 

a government institution in Afghanistan charged with the 

promotion of religious adherence to state-imposed orthodoxy could amount effectively to a religious police 

force that could: violate Afghan citizens’ universal right 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, 

including the right to be free from state compulsion with 

regard to religious worship and practice; abridge the human rights of Afghan women and girls; impose political 

conformity and stifle political debate about human rights 

and political freedom in Afghanistan, as well as the role of 

religion in Afghan law and society; and arbitrarily determine the “correct” nature of religious adherence and what 

constitutes a “violation”—a significant problem given the 

wide variety of doctrines and practices that exist within 

the majority Muslim community in Afghanistan.

In March 2006, the Commission wrote to President 

Bush expressing its concern about the trial and threatened execution of Abdul Rahman on charges of apostasy.

In April, then-Commission Vice-Chair Felice D. Gaer 

testified on behalf of the Commission before a Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ Briefing on 

“Anti-Conversion Laws and Religious Freedom in South 

Asia and the Middle East: The Case of Abdul Rahman.” In 

her testimony, Commissioner Gaer described the weak 

state of human rights protections in Afghanistan today, 

and cautioned that freedom and democracy are still in 

peril in that country. In October 2005, the Commission 

issued a statement condemning the arrest and trial of Ali 

Mohaqiq Nasab on charges of blasphemy and “insulting 

Islam.” In December, the Commission wrote to the State 

Department asking that it urgently communicate with the 

German government to prevent the imminent involuntary deportation of thousands of particularly vulnerable 

asylum seekers from Germany to Afghanistan, including 

Hindu refugees who face the threat of violence upon return to Afghanistan. 

During the period that the constitution was being 

drafted, the Commission met with numerous high-ranking U.S. government officials to articulate the importance 

of institutionalizing human rights guarantees in the document that adequately protect the rights of each individual. 

The Commission also briefed Members of Congress and 

relevant committee staff on its policy findings and recommendations. In January 2003, the Commission held an international forum, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom 

in Crisis?” in cooperation with George Washington University Law School, which brought together Afghan leaders, U.S. policymakers, and other experts to discuss ways 

of integrating adequate human rights protections into 

judicial and legal reform processes. The Commission also 

raised the issue of religious freedom in numerous public 

statements, as well as in two separate opinion-editorial 

articles, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, 

authored by Commissioners Michael K. Young, Felice D. 

Gaer, and Preeta D. Bansal. In late 2003, the Commission 

was cited on this issue in over a dozen editorials in major 

newspapers worldwide. 

In August 2003, a Commission delegation visited 

Afghanistan for an intensive series of discussions with 

senior officials of the Transitional Administration, U.S. officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations 

and of Afghan civil society, former President Burhanuddin 

Rabbani, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic community, including the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In September 2004, 

the Commission issued a press release criticizing the Supreme Court Chief Justice’s attempt to stifle freedom and 

electoral democracy by calling for the disqualification of 

a candidate who made comments of which Chief Justice 

Shinwari did not approve.

The U.S. government should provide greater leadership and resources needed to secure freedom for all in 

Afghanistan, which regrettably appears to be reverting 

more and more to Taliban-like practices. The U.S. government should therefore step up its leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate the 

Afghan people’s gains in the protection of human rights, 

since the United States has been so directly involved in 

the country’s political reconstruction. Failure will leave 

Afghanistan not only less free but also more unstable, 

thereby contributing to regional insecurity and potentially 

serving again as a future haven for global terrorism that 

threatens U.S. interests. 
Commission Recommendations

With regard to Afghanistan, the 

Commission has also recommended that the U.S. government 

should:

 On Promoting the 

Individual Right to Religious 

Freedom and Other Human 

Rights

• vigorously support respect for the 

right of every individual to freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief in Afghanistan, and be 

prepared to make great efforts to 

ensure protection of fundamental 

human rights, including freedom of 

conscience and the equal rights of 

women, as outlined in international 

human rights instruments to which 

Afghanistan is a party; 

• use its influence to protect freedom 

of expression against charges that 

may be used to stifle debate, such 

as blasphemy, “offending Islam,” 

apostasy, or similar offenses, including expression on sensitive subjects 

such as the role of religion in society 

and the rights of women and members of minority groups; 

• act to bolster the position of those 

reformers who respect, and advocate respect for, human rights, since 

those persons in Afghan society who 

would promote respect for internationally recognized human rights 

are currently on the defensive and 

are threatened, and these people 

need U.S. support to counter the 

influence of those who advocate an 

Islamic extremist agenda; 

• amplify the voices of political reformers and human rights defenders by, among other things, encouraging President Karzai to appoint 

independent human rights defenders to the country’s independent 

national human rights commission; 

 On Addressing the 

Deteriorating Security 

Conditions

• make greater efforts to improve 

security outside Kabul in order for 

Afghanistan’s political reconstruction to succeed, because without 

adequate security, the warlords will 

continue to hold sway over much of 

the country, undermining the rule 

of law and Afghanistan’s nascent 

democratic institutions; 

• direct measurable, concrete support and benefits, including the 

improved, country-wide security 

referred to above, to the Afghan 

people, which, in turn, will enable 

the Karzai government and other 

moderates to make the hard choices 

necessary to oppose religious extremism;

 On Advancing 

Institutional Reform

• ensure that programs, administered 

by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, to help develop 

primary and secondary education, 

including through the printing of 

textbooks, and to provide civic education, incorporate, as part of the 

content, education on international 

standards with regard to human 

rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief, and religious tolerance;

• strengthen efforts to reform the 

judicial system, including through 

helping to develop sorely needed 

infrastructure and through strongly 

supporting the reconstruction in 

Afghanistan of a judicial sector 

operating under the rule of law and 

upholding civil law and international standards of human rights, 

and work to ensure that all judges 

and prosecutors are trained in civil 

law and international human rights 

standards, women are recruited 

into the judiciary at all levels, and 

all Afghans have equal access to the 

courts; and

• assist legal experts in visiting 

Afghanistan, engaging their Afghan 

counterparts, and providing information to the Afghan public on the 

universality of human rights and the 

compatibility of Islam and universal 

human rights, including freedom 

of religion and belief, and expand 

existing programs to bring Afghans 

to this country to experience how 

Islam and other faiths may be practiced in a free society. 

195

3 

2 1 
196

Bangladesh 

Since the declaration of a state of emergency in January 2007, Bangladesh has been in the throes of a political and constitutional crisis, the resolution of which will 

determine whether religious freedom and other universal 

human rights will be protected by democratic institutions 

and the rule of law, or whether the country will continue 

on a downward spiral toward authoritarianism, militarization, and intolerance. Since January 2007, previously 

scheduled national elections have been postponed, political freedoms severely curtailed, and human rights abused 

with impunity by the security forces. These deviations 

from democratic norms under the current “caretaker 

government” raise troubling questions about the future 

prospects for respect for a range of freedoms, including 

potentially freedom of religion or belief. The Commission 

placed Bangladesh on its Watch List in 2005 due to a number of concerns, some of which have increased in severity 

in the past year: 

• Islamist radicalism and violence that often targets nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women, and the 

judiciary, as well as the previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government’s initial downplaying of the 

problem;

• the anti-minority, particularly anti-Hindu, violence that 

occurred following the last general election in 2001 and 

the failure to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable for that violence and other instances of violence 

against members of religious minorities; 

• the ongoing seizure of minority-owned land; 

• discrimination against members of religious minority 

communities in their access to government services and 

public employment, including in the judiciary and other 

high-level government positions; 

• the intimidation and arrest of, as well as sometimes fatal 

attacks against, journalists, authors, and academics for 

debating sensitive social or political issues or expressing 

opinions deemed by radical Islamists, or by the caretaker 

government under Islamist pressure, to be offensive to 

Islam; and 

• the inadequate police response to the sometimes violent 

campaign against the minority Ahmadi religious community.

These concerns led the Commission to visit Bangladesh in February – March 2006 and to hold a public forum 

on Bangladesh the following October. Although the political context has been altered considerably with respect 

to the ongoing suspension of democracy, the Commission finds that religious freedom remains under threat 

in Bangladesh. If left unchecked, current trends toward 

greater intolerance and religiously-motivated violence, 

particularly toward Hindus, non-Muslim tribal residents, 

Ahmadis, and Christians, could further undermine human rights protections for all Bangladeshis. Accordingly, 

the Commission continues to place Bangladesh on its 

Watch List. 

Between 1991 and January 2007, notwithstanding 

difficult economic conditions, pervasive corruption, and 

devastating natural disasters, Bangladesh had a representative government, regular changes of power through free 

elections, a judiciary that sometimes ruled against those 

in authority, a lively press often critical of government 

policies, active participation of women in the workplace, 

and a functioning civil society with active human rights 

groups, women’s organizations, and numerous NGOs. 

However, democratically-elected governments in office 

since 1991 left untouched and, in some cases, supported 

overtly Islamic elements introduced in the constitution by 

previous military regimes, including the establishment of 

Islam as Bangladesh’s official religion, as described below.

Following independence from Pakistan in 1971, 

196

Aided by the expansion of Islamic 

schools (madrassas), charities, and 

other social welfare institutions, many 

of which receive foreign funding with 

varying degrees of government oversight, 

Islamist activists have gained significantly 

in political, economic, and social influence 

in Bangladesh in recent years.
197

Bangladesh was established as a secular state in which 

national identity was based on Bengali language and culture. The 1972 constitution contained strongly-worded 

guarantees for freedom of religious belief and practice, 

as well as equal treatment by the government for citizens 

regardless of religious affiliation. Subsequent military 

regimes amended the constitution, however, to introduce 

Islamic elements, including the affirmation that “absolute 

trust and faith in Allah” is to “be the basis for all actions” 

by the government. Although not judicially enforceable, 

this change in the constitution has been cited by minority 

rights advocates as diminishing the status of non-Muslims 

as equal members of Bangladeshi society. Islam was 

made Bangladesh’s state religion in 1988 under the military dictatorship of H.M. Ershad.

Aided by the expansion of Islamic schools (madrassas), charities, and other social welfare institutions, many 

of which receive foreign funding with varying degrees of 

government oversight, Islamist activists have gained significantly in political, economic, and social influence in 

Bangladesh in recent years. Since independence, those 

associated with Islamist political parties seeking to replace secular law with sharia (Islamic law) have generally 

been outside the political mainstream because of their 

support for Pakistan in Bangladesh’s 1971 war for independence. In the 2001 national elections, Islamist political parties, including the now-prominent Jamaat-e-Islami, 

were courted by and subsequently supported the centerright Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Members of 

Jamaat allegedly then used their positions in the BNP-led 

government to deny funding to or otherwise disadvantage groups viewed as opposing the Islamist political and 

social agenda championed by Jamaat. Although some of 

those who call for a more Islamist Bangladesh engaged in 

peaceful political and social activities, others adopted a 

more violent approach towards perceived opponents of 

Islam. 

The 2001 elections occasioned the most serious 

episode of anti-minority violence since independence, 

with killings, sexual assaults, illegal land-seizures, arson, 

extortion, and intimidation of religious minority group 

members, particularly Hindus, because of their perceived 

allegiance to the Awami League. The new BNP-led government essentially denied the scope of these abuses and 

few perpetrators were brought to justice.

This lack of accountability for anti-minority violence 

associated with the 2001 election led the Commission, 

minority advocates, and many others to be concerned that 

Bangladesh’s next national elections would also result in 

anti-minority violence. Some individuals with whom the 

Commission met during the February – March 2006 visit 

to Bangladesh were themselves experiencing difficulties 

in becoming registered. Others claimed that locations 

dominated by minority voters had not been visited by registration officials or, on the other hand, alleged that noncitizens believed to favor Islamist parties were being registered. Widespread concerns regarding the registration 

process were underscored by a U.S. National Democratic 

Institute study that found 13 million more individuals on 

the voter rolls than would be eligible according to Bangladesh’s census. 

BANGLADESH

Commissioner Bansal greets Bishop Theotonius Gomes, 

Auxiliary Bishop of Dhaka (left) and Archbishop Paulinus 

Costa, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dhaka.

Joseph R. Crapa and Commissioners Bansal, Gaer, and 

Cromartie meet with religious minority activists in Dhaka.
On January 11, 2007, threats by the main opposition party to boycott the national elections, alongside the 

ongoing controversy over voter registration and the impartiality of the electoral process, prompted the caretaker 

government to declare emergency rule and indefinitely 

suspend the national elections that were scheduled for 

later in the month. President Iajuddin Ahmed resigned, 

under opposition pressure, from his controversial position as Chief Advisor to the caretaker government charged 

with administering the country during the national 

election period. Under the supervision of Chief of Staff 

Moeen U Ahmed, the military was given sanction to enforce emergency rule, which included the suspension of 

the freedoms of speech and assembly, and due process, 

among other rights. Fakhruddin Ahmed (no relation), the 

head of the current caretaker government and a former 

World Bank official, has publicly declared his intention to 

hold “free, fair, and participatory” elections “within the 

shortest possible time,” pending correction of deficiencies 

in the electoral process, including the voter rolls.

Although the caretaker government has undertaken 

some needed measures, such as the January 2007 separation of the judiciary from the executive branch and the 

March 2008 decision to provide mobile phone coverage 

to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, home to many non-Bengali 

indigenous tribal groups, these actions also signal the 

tendency of the caretaker government to take actions well 

beyond its role of facilitating the resumption of democracy. More importantly, despite the caretaker government’s 

repeated public promises to uphold human rights, there 

have been numerous reports detailing serious human 

rights abuses, including suspected extrajudicial killings by 

the security forces, arbitrary detentions, torture, curbs on 

press freedom, and violations of the right of due process. 

Many of the reported abuses have been associated with 

Bangladesh’s high levels of political 

violence and instability have 

provided opportunities for religious 

and other extremist groups to 

expand their influence.

From right, Minister of Industries and Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami, Jamaat-e-Islami Senior 

Assistant Secretary General Mohammad Kamruzzaman, and another Jamaat-e-Islami official meet with a USCIRF delegation.

198
199

the high-profile anti-corruption campaign spearheaded 

by the military and the Anti-Corruption Commission, 

which have arrested thousands of individuals since January 2007, many of whom have been detained in harsh conditions without due process. Current detainees include 

former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, 

as well as other senior members of both parties. Sheikh 

Hasina, current leader of the Awami League, has been 

incarcerated since July 2007 on charges of extortion, and 

Khaleda Zia, current leader of the BNP, has been jailed 

since September 2007 on accusations of graft. 

The role of the military under the current caretaker 

government raises questions about the future of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights in 

Bangladesh. These institutions, important guarantors for 

religious freedom, could be further eroded if the country’s 

caretaker government prolongs its tenure in office by impeding efforts to prepare for the free and fair election of a 

national government truly representative of the popular 

will, such as by refusing to lift the state of emergency. The 

Election Commission, a non-governmental entity charged 

with organizing voter registration, has maintained since 

April 2007 that emergency restrictions on the freedom 

of political assembly seriously hinder the preparation 

of new voter rolls. Party leaders expressed concern in 

March 2008 that the Election Commission was unable to 

meet its internal deadlines for voter registration due to 

these constraints, raising doubts over the legitimacy of 

the proposed election timetable. Elections are currently 

scheduled to occur at the end of 2008. On the positive 

side, unlike the anti-minority violence surrounding the 

2001 national elections, the political turmoil that led to 

the postponement of the January 2007 elections has not 

resulted in widespread anti-minority, particularly antiHindu, attacks.

Bangladesh’s high levels of political violence and 

instability have provided opportunities for religious and 

other extremist groups to expand their influence. Due to 

a weak legal system and corrupt law enforcement, gangs 

employed by politicians and armed groups of Islamist 

or freelance vigilantes have engaged in criminal activities, particularly in rural areas, with relative impunity. 

Authors, journalists, and academics expressing opinions 

allegedly offensive to certain interpretations of Islam are 

subject to violent, sometimes fatal, attacks. Extremists 

oppose NGOs that promote the economic betterment of 

women and protection of women’s rights. Some such 

organizations have been bombed, presumably by these 

extremists.

Since the onset of the state of the emergency, Islamist 

groups have risen in political prominence and public visibility. In September 2007, restrictions on assembly under 

the emergency rules were apparently waived to allow Jamaat and other Islamist group supporters to burn effigies 

and stage widespread public protests against the publication of a newspaper cartoon they believed mocked an element of Bangladeshi Islamic culture. The newspaper Prothom Alo was pressured into firing a deputy editor, and the 

cartoonist, Arifur Rahman, was jailed without charge until 

his March 2008 release, following a global campaign by 

human rights and legal activists. In March 2008, restrictions on assembly were again lifted to allow protests by 

Islamic groups against a policy proposed by a consortium 

of women’s organizations to strengthen the constitutional 

provision for the equal rights of women. 

Bangladesh has the unusual distinction of having its 

two major parties, the BNP and the Awami League, led by 

women, both whom have served as Prime Minister, yet 

religious extremism, mostly among Muslims, victimizes 

Bangladeshi women of all faiths. Some Muslim clerics, 

especially in rural areas, have sanctioned vigilante punishments against women for alleged moral transgressions. 

Rape is also reportedly a common form of anti-minority 

violence, and incidents regarding Hindu women were reported in 2007. The government commonly fails to punish 

the perpetrators of these acts against women, since the 

The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, a frequent site for protests 

and target of threats in recent years.

BANGLADESH
200

law enforcement and the judicial systems, especially at 

the local level, are vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, 

and political interference. 

Politically-motivated bombings, assassinations, and 

other terrorist acts, often ascribed to Islamist militants, 

have exacerbated partisan tensions and increased the 

vulnerability of minority communities. In August 2004 

and January 2005, such attacks resulted in the deaths of 

prominent opposition political figures. In February 2005, 

the government banned two militant groups implicated 

in a series of bomb attacks on NGOs. Militants have been 

blamed for a coordinated wave of almost simultaneous 

bomb attacks, numbering in the hundreds, carried out 

in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts on August 17, 

2005. Militants were also implicated in a series of bomb 

attacks on Bangladesh’s judiciary in October-November 

2005. Among the victims was one of the country’s few 

judges from a religious minority community, a Hindu. 

The bomb attacks were accompanied by militant demands 

to substitute sharia law for Bangladesh’s current system of 

secular jurisprudence, and by threats against courts and 

judges who do not apply sharia. The then-government of 

Prime Minister Khaleda Zia responded with a campaign 

of arrests of militants suspected of involvement in the 

bombings and in other violent incidents. As a result of arrests made during this campaign, more than 30 suspected 

militants were detained and later sentenced to death. In 

March 2007, six members of the Islamist militant group 

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), including JMB 

leader Sheikh Abdur Rahman and notorious Islamist vigilante Siddiqul Islam, better known as “Bangla Bhai,” were 

executed for their involvement in bombings that took 

place in 2005.

Despite constitutional protections, Hindus and other 

non-Muslims in Bangladesh face societal discrimination 

and are disadvantaged in access to jobs in the government, armed forces, and police, as well as public services 

and the legal system. Religious minorities are also underrepresented in elected political offices, including the 

national parliament. Minority group advocates claim that 

religion plays a role in property and land disputes, pointing to expropriations of Hindu property since the Pakistan 

era and the gradual displacement of non-Muslim tribal 

populations by Bengali Muslims in the Chittagong Hill 

Tracts and other traditionally indigenous areas. Such disputes occasionally result in violence.

The Commission was told on its visit to Bangladesh 

that Hindus have left the country in large numbers in recent decades because of the atmosphere of uncertainty 

and fear under which religious minorities must live. 

Hindus, Christians, and representatives of other minority 

religious communities continue to express concerns regarding the safety of their co-religionists, citing the growth 

in Islamist radicalism and instances of violence, including fatalities, in which the victims’ religious affiliation or 

activities may have been factors. In June 2005, there were 

arson or bombing attacks against Ahmadi mosques in 

three locations. In July 2005, two Bangladeshis working 

for a Christian NGO were murdered, allegedly for showing 

Despite constitutional protections, 

Hindus and other non-Muslims in 

Bangladesh face societal discrimination 

and are disadvantaged in access to jobs 

in the government, armed forces, 

and police, as well as public services 

and the legal system.

Homes belonging to indigenous tribal residents of Bangladesh 

(known collectively as Adivasis, Paharis, or Jumma) burned as 

a result of military-backed encroachment of tribal lands in the 

Chittagong Hill Tracts (photo taken in Sajek by Udisa Islam, April 

2008).
201

a film depicting the life of Jesus. There are also occasional 

reports of violence by members of the majority religious 

community against individuals who convert from Islam to 

Christianity 

In addition to incidents of violence, the Vested Property Act (VPA), a pre-independence law enacted in 1965 in 

the wake of the India-Pakistan war, continues to be used 

as justification by some Muslims to seize Hindu-owned 

land. The 2007 report of the prominent Bangladeshi human rights organization Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) stated 

that in 2006 there were 54 seizures by Muslim individuals of Hindu-owned land and 43 attacks against Hindu 

temples by Muslims. The VPA’s implicit presumption that 

Hindus do not really belong in Bangladesh contributes to 

the perception that Hindu-owned property can be seized 

with impunity. 

The most serious and sustained conflict along ethnic 

and religious lines has been in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 

located on Bangladesh’s eastern border with India and 

Burma. The varied but non-Bengali/non-Muslim indigenous peoples in this formerly autonomous area (often 

referred to collectively as Adivasis or Paharis) had opposed inclusion in East Pakistan during the partition of 

1947, due to their identification with other tribal groups 

in northeast India. After Bangladesh won its independence in 1971, Bangladeshi authorities ignored appeals 

for restoring local autonomy in the Hill Tracts and indeed 

promoted an acceleration in Bengali settlement. The 

resulting armed indigenous people’s insurgency ended 

in December 1997 with the signing of the Chittagong 

Hill Tracts Peace Accords. Resentment remains strong, 

however, over settler encroachment, human rights abuses 

by the Bangladeshi military, and the slow pace of the 

government’s implementation of the peace agreement. 

Muslim Bengalis, once a tiny minority in the Chittagong 

Hill Tracts, now reportedly equal or outnumber members 

of indigenous groups. In 2007, Bangladesh human rights 

organizations reported a surge in Bengali settlements on 

tribal land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Islamist extremists in Bangladesh have also engaged 

in a public campaign against the Ahmadi community, 

which is viewed as heretical by many Muslims. The Ahmadis, also referred to as Ahmadiyya, are estimated to 

number about 100,000 in a population of 150 million. Anti-Ahmadi demonstrators have called on the government 

of Bangladesh to declare Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” as 

was done in Pakistan, and subsequently used in Pakistan 

to justify a range of legal limitations on the Ahmadi community and individual Ahmadis. The demonstrators have 

also called for curbs on Ahmadi missionary activity to the 

broader Muslim community. Although Bangladesh has 

thus far refused to declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, in 

January 2004, the then BNP-led government bent to militant pressure and banned the publication and distribution of Ahmadi religious literature. Police seized Ahmadi 

publications on a few occasions. The ban was stayed by 

the courts in December 2004, with further legal action 

still pending. Although the ban is not currently being enforced, it was not withdrawn by the BNP-led government 

before leaving office in October 2006, or by the subsequent caretaker government. 

Anti-Ahmadi activists object to Ahmadi houses of 

worship being called “mosques” and on a number of occasions have organized mass demonstrations in order 

to occupy or attempt to occupy the sites. In several instances, anti-Ahmadi activists have forcibly replaced signs 

identifying Ahmadi places of worship as mosques, putting 

in their place anti-Ahmadi signs warning Muslims away, 

sometimes with the assistance of the police. In some instances, the anti-Ahmadi agitation has also been accompanied by mob violence in which Ahmadi homes have 

been destroyed and Ahmadis held against their will and 

pressured to recant. Although the campaign against the 

Ahmadis has continued, the violence has diminished due 

BANGLADESH

Commissioners Bansal and Gaer meet with leading women’s rights 

activists.
202

to improved and more vigorous police protection. In February 2007, Ahmadis in Brahmanbaria were able to hold 

a major convention, which they had been unable to do 

for over a decade because of hostility from anti-Ahmadi 

militants.

The Commission visited Bangladesh February 26 

– March 2, 2006 at the invitation of the government of 

Bangladesh. The Commission delegation met with a 

broad range of individuals, including government officials, political leaders, human rights monitors, journalists, 

women’s rights advocates, Muslim religious leaders, leading members of the Ahmadi, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities, and civil society representatives. The 

government of Bangladesh received the delegation at a 

high level, including individual meetings with four members of the Cabinet: the Foreign Minister; the Minister 

for Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs; the Minister 

of Education; and the Minister of Industries, who heads 

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. The delegation also met 

with the Minister of State for Religious Affairs and with the 

Secretary for Home Affairs, whose responsibilities include 

law enforcement. 

The Commission also has met on a number of occasions during the past year with human rights monitors, 

representatives of religious communities, Bangladeshi 

diplomats, and others to discuss religious freedom in 

Bangladesh. In October 2006, with the participation of 

the International Republican Institute and the National 

Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Commission held a public forum in Washington, D.C. on the 

topic “The Bangladesh Elections: Promoting Democracy 

and Protecting Rights in a Muslim-majority Country.” Coincident with the forum, the Commission issued a Policy 

Focus on Bangladesh that included several policy recommendations. In April 2004, the Commission, together with 

Congressman Joseph Crowley, a member of the House 

Committee on International Relations, held a public hearing in Flushing, New York, on “Bangladesh: Protecting the 

Human Rights of Thought, Conscience, and Religion.” 

Commissioners Gaer, Cromartie, and Bansal along with USCIRF Senior Policy Analyst Steve Snow and former Executive Director 

Joseph R. Crapa meet with Habibur Rahman, former Chief Justice and head of the caretaker administration during the 1996 

national elections.
Commission Recommendations

203

With regard to Bangladesh, the 

Commission makes the following recommendations. 

 Urgent Measures to 

Prevent Anti-Minority 

Violence in the Upcoming 

Elections

In light of Bangladesh’s upcoming national elections, currently 

scheduled for December 2008, the 

Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should: 

• urge Bangladesh’s caretaker government to adhere strictly to the 

publicly announced timetable for 

undertaking all necessary actions 

to safeguard the voting rights of all 

Bangladeshis in the national elections, and to ensure that those elections are held freely and fairly and at 

the earliest practical date by:

• restoring public confidence in the 

non-partisan and independent 

character of both the Election 

Commission and the caretaker 

government;

• making every effort to prevent 

violence before and after the 

election, including instructing 

law enforcement bodies to ensure 

the security of all Bangladeshi 

citizens throughout the voting 

process;

• ensuring that the registration process will facilitate the enrollment 

of the maximum number of eligible voters before the election, in 

a manner that does not discriminate on the basis of perceived 

religious or political affiliation 

or ethnic background, deleting names of extra or ineligible 

voters, ensuring the inclusion of 

minority voters, and investigating 

and resolving complaints about 

the registration process fairly, 

promptly, and well in advance of 

the actual election; and promptly 

and thoroughly investigating any 

claims that registration efforts 

carried out thus far have not met 

such criteria; 

• using all practical technical 

means of ensuring the security 

of the ballot, including the use 

of “transparent” and numbered 

ballot boxes; 

• permitting and facilitating 

international and domestic nongovernmental monitoring of the 

entire electoral process; Bangladesh should be encouraged as a 

member of the United Nations 

and of the Commonwealth to use 

the resources of these and other 

international organizations with 

experience in assisting member 

states in conducting credible 

elections; 

• satisfying the requirements of 

monitors from the U.S. National 

Democratic Institute, the U.S. 

International Republican Institute, and the European Union, as 

well as election experts from the 

UN, all of whom refused to offer 

legitimacy to the severely flawed 

election scheduled for January 

2007; and 

• investigating fully the acts of violence committed in the aftermath 

of the 2001 elections and holding 

the perpetrators to account, with 

the aim of preventing similar 

recurrences in 2008 and during 

any other election period in the 

future;

• encourage Bangladeshi authorities, and in particular the caretaker 

government overseeing the election 

period, to ensure that the elections 

are not marred by violence by: 

• deploying security forces to work 

to identify and prepare against 

specific threats to vulnerable 

localities and communities, 

including religious and ethnic minorities, such as residents of the 

Chittagong Hill Tracts region;

• publicly ordering that the security 

forces undertake a maximum 

effort to prevent and punish 

election-related violence, particularly violence targeting members 

of minority religious communities, whether during the election 

campaign, on election day, or in 

its aftermath; and

• publicly condemning, outlawing, 

and swiftly responding to antiminority violence and discrimination in advance of the election 

and ensuring, through legislation 

if necessary, that election-related 

violence will be thoroughly investigated and that those responsible 

will be brought to justice; 

• prepare and publicize a comprehensive pre- and post-election 

analysis of the election process 

with recommendations for needed 

reform; 

• provide for official U.S. government 

monitors in advance of, and in connection with, the upcoming elections in addition to those already 

planned by the National Democratic 

Institute for International Affairs 

1 
204

and the International Republican 

Institute; and

• urge other states and international 

organizations to work together to 

increase monitoring and other efforts to forestall violence, with the 

assistance of indigenous human 

rights and other civil society organizations, and coordinate actions 

in support of a peaceful, free, and 

fair election in Bangladesh with 

other countries and international 

organizations.

 Urgent Measures to 

Protect Those Threatened by 

Religious Extremism 

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should urge 

the government of Bangladesh to:

• investigate and prosecute to the 

fullest extent of the law perpetrators of violent acts, including future 

acts and those already documented, 

against members of minority 

religious communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

promoting women’s human rights, 

and all those who oppose religious 

extremism; 

• rescind the January 2004 order banning publications by the Ahmadi 

religious community, continue to 

reject extremist demands to declare 

Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, protect the places of worship, persons, 

and property of members of this 

religious community, and fully investigate and promptly bring to justice those responsible for violence 

against Ahmadis; and 

• protect women from vigilante or 

anti-minority violence, combat 

claims of religious sanction or justification for violence against women, 

and vigorously investigate and 

prosecute the perpetrators of such 

violent incidents. 

 Urgent Measures to 

Condemn the State of 

Emergency

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should call 

on Bangladeshi authorities, particularly the caretaker government and 

the military, to: 

• lift the state of emergency;

• cease harassment of journalists and 

academics and ensure due process 

and equal treatment under the rule 

of law for all suspects, witnesses, 

and detainees; and

• lift restrictions on political activity both in and outside Dhaka, 

including undue restrictions on the 

location, type, and size of political 

gatherings, to promote accurate and 

thorough voter registration and to 

ensure that all parties have access to 

the right to assembly that has been 

implicitly granted to Islamist groups 

that were allowed to participate in 

protests and other gatherings in the 

past year. At the same time, security 

must be maintained for all of Bangladesh’s citizens, especially the vulnerable members of Bangladesh’s 

religious minority communities.

 Longer-Term Measures 

to Protect Universal Human 

Rights

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should urge 

the government of Bangladesh to:

• ensure that decisions on public 

employment in national institutions such as the civil service, the 

military, law enforcement agencies, 

and the judiciary, including at the 

highest levels, do not discriminate 

on the basis of religious affiliation, belief, or ethnic background; 

conduct and publicize the results of 

a comprehensive survey of minority 

representation in the public service; 

• establish effective, legally transparent mechanisms for handling complaints regarding discrimination in 

public employment;

• ensure that law enforcement and 

security services are equally protective of the rights of all, regardless 

of political or religious affiliation 

or belief, including due process for 

those accused of crimes, according 

to Bangladesh’s own constitution 

and relevant international standards;

• continue to support the independence of the judicial system from 

the executive in order to prevent 

political interference in the judicial 

process and to ensure that the 

courts afford equal access and equitable treatment to all citizens; 

• include in all school curricula, in 

school textbooks, and in teacher 

training for both public schools and 

government-regulated madrassas information on tolerance and 

respect for human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief; 

• promote the use of history and 

social studies texts in public schools 

that reflect the country’s religious 

diversity and are reviewed by an 

independent panel of experts to exclude language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, hatred, 

or violence toward any group of 

persons based on religion or belief; 

• repeal the Vested Property Act, 

discriminatory legislation that has 

been used unjustly to seize Hindu4 

3 

2 
owned property in the decades 

since Bangladesh’s independence 

and has continued to be used under 

successive governments to reward 

well-connected members of the majority community in Bangladesh; 

• ensure that publicly-funded support 

for domestic faith-based charitable, 

humanitarian, developmental, or 

educational activities be awarded 

on a non-discriminatory basis;

• permit NGOs to conduct legitimate 

humanitarian and developmental 

activities without harassment, undue interference, or discrimination 

and ensure that they are protected 

from extremist intimidation or 

violence; 

• guarantee the right of human rights 

defenders to receive funding from 

foreign sources, as set forth in the 

relevant UN instruments1

, without 

harassment, unless such foreign 

funding incites or supports religious 

extremism, hatred, or the destruction of the rights and freedoms 

guaranteed to Bangladeshi citizens.

 U.S. Assistance to Promote 

Human Rights, Including 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• make greater use of existing avenues 

of public diplomacy, including 

international exchange programs, to 

bolster the position of Bangladesh’s 

voices of moderation and of those 

reformers who respect and advocate 

respect for internationally recognized human rights, including the 

rights of women and of members of 

minority religious communities;

• assist Bangladeshi educational authorities in improving and expanding public education in order to 

enhance the availability and quality 

of education of all Bangladeshis, regardless of faith, gender, or ethnicity, and support non-governmental 

review of curricula and textbooks 

of public schools and madrassas

in particular, as many madrassas

receive foreign funding and are 

subject to little or no government 

oversight;

• support efforts to improve the human rights performance and professional competence of the security 

forces so that they can better protect 

all Bangladeshis from violence and 

intimidation by extremists;

• act to counter the extremist assault 

on Bangladesh’s secular legal system, including by (1) strengthening 

U.S. assistance to promote the rule 

of law and to enhance access to the 

legal system by women and members of religious minorities, and (2) 

informing Bangladeshis, through 

educational and cultural exchanges, 

broadcast and print media, and 

other means of public diplomacy, 

on the universality of human rights 

and the compatibility of Islam and 

universal human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief; and 

• support, and provide technical 

assistance for, the creation of an 

independent national human rights 

commission in Bangladesh able to 

investigate, publicize, and bring to 

the courts all categories of human 

rights abuses, including violence 

and discrimination against religious 

minorities, in accordance with 

international standards2

 for such 

organizations, i.e., independence, 

adequate funding, a representative 

character, and a broad mandate that 

includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

205

5 

BANGLADESH

ENDNOTES

1

 Article 13 of the Declaration on the Right and 

Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 

of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 

Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms, passed in 1998, states that “Everyone has 

the right, individually and in association with others, 

to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express 

purpose of promoting and protecting human rights 

and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means...”

2

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 

National Institutions for Protection and Promotion 

of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet 

No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion 

and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.

ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed April 3, 2008).
Belarus

Belarus has a highly authoritarian government, with 

almost all political power concentrated in the hands of 

President Aleksandr Lukashenko and his small circle of 

advisors. The Lukashenko regime has engaged in numerous serious human rights abuses, including involvement 

in the “disappearances” of several key opposition figures, 

the imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, 

and strict controls on the media. Human rights conditions deteriorated further after the March 2006 presidential elections, which observers from the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other 

organizations deemed fraudulent. The government of 

Belarus also continues to commit serious violations of 

the right of its citizens to freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief. Religious freedom conditions, 

which had already declined as a result of the strict law on 

religion passed in October 2002, deteriorated further in 

2007. The Commission continues to place Belarus on its 

Watch List, and will maintain scrutiny throughout the year 

to determine whether the government’s record has deteriorated to a level warranting designation as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC.

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2007

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the human 

rights record of the Belarus government “remained very 

poor and worsened in some areas, as the government continued to commit frequent serious abuses.” The State Department reports that the Belarus government continued 

to engage in arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonment of citizens for political reasons, such as for criticizing officials or participating in demonstrations. Court 

trials, whose outcomes were usually predetermined, were 

often conducted behind closed doors without an independent judiciary or independent observers. 

The State Department also reported that respect for 

religious freedom worsened in the past year, citing, among 

other factors, that authorities continued to harass and 

fine members of certain religious groups, especially those 

whom officials regard as linked to foreign cultures or having political agendas. Government structures to control 

and restrict religious groups are extensive and intrusive, 

leading some human rights groups to compare the situation for religious freedom in Belarus to that under the former Soviet regime. For example, Belarus has maintained 

its Soviet-era religious affairs bureaucracy, which includes 

a Plenipotentiary for Religious and Nationality Affairs, 

which was known until July 2006 as the State Committee 

for Religious and Nationality Affairs. The Plenipotentiary 

maintains a staff in Minsk as well as several officials in 

each of the country’s six regions. According to the Forum 

18 News Service, the six regions have 20 districts, with 

each district having a Department for Relations with Religious and Social Organizations as well as a Commission 

for Monitoring Compliance with Legislation on Religion. 

The country’s religion law, passed in October 2002, 

led to greater restrictions on religious freedom in Belarus. 

The law codified the activities of the official Committee of 

Religious and Nationality Affairs (since renamed) of the 

Council of Ministers (CRNA) and set up severe regulatory 

obstacles and major bureaucratic and legal restrictions on 

the activities of many religious communities. Essentially, 

the 2002 religion law prohibits: all religious activity by 

unregistered groups; any activity of religious communities except in areas in which they are registered; foreign 

citizens from leading religious activities; and unapproved 

religious activity in private homes, with the exception of 

small, occasional prayer meetings. The law set up a threetiered system of registration, and particularly restricts the 

activities of groups on the lowest tier. The law also mandated that all existing religious communities in Belarus 

re-register with the CRNA by November 2004. Most previously registered groups were re-registered, but the law was 

viewed as a strengthening of the government’s opportunities to deny registration to disfavored groups. 

206

In the past year, thousands of 

individuals from various Christian 

and other religious communities signed 

a petition to the Belarusian government 

to protest the country’s repressive 2002 

religion law and other restrictions 

on religious freedom.
207

In the past year, thousands of individuals from various Christian and other religious communities signed 

a petition to the Belarusian government to protest the 

country’s repressive 2002 religion law and other restrictions on religious freedom. In July 2007, Belarusian police in Minsk and at a Catholic pilgrimage site in Budslav 

detained 19 persons who were collecting signatures on a 

petition to reform the 2002 law. Arrestees included the 

secretary of the Belarusian Christian Democracy movement. Police confiscated literature, including 7,000 

newsletters and several hundred copies of a booklet, 

“Monitoring Violations of the Rights of Christians in Belarus in 2006.” Fourteen were detained for three hours 

without charge by district police in Budslav. A protocol 

was drawn up against the petition organizer, claiming he 

had distributed literature without publication details; he 

was warned to expect prosecution in Minsk, although as 

of this writing, he has not been contacted. (In Belarus, a 

person may legally distribute up to 300 copies of a piece 

of literature without publication details.) According to the 

news agency Forum 18, Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Kosinets, speaking at an unprecedented 

roundtable of religious leaders in Minsk in September 

2007, rejected the possibility that legal amendments to the 

law would be accepted. Kosinets also reportedly rejected 

Protestant leaders’ suggestion to introduce a category of 

“religious group” that would not need state registration. 

In March 2008, the petition gained the necessary 50,000 

signatures and was submitted to the Constitutional Court, 

Parliament, and Presidential Administration; the Court 

replied that appeals should be submitted via President 

Lukashenko, parliament, or other authorized state bodies. However, Forum 18 reported that later that month, 

government agencies rejected the mass petition, claiming 

that reports of religious freedom violations “do not correspond with reality.” 

Since coming to power in 1994, President Lukashenko has openly favored the Belarusian Orthodox Church 

(BOC), an Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate Russian 

Orthodox Church, resulting in a privileged position for the 

BOC. This relationship was codified in June 2003, when 

the Belarus government and the BOC signed a concordat 

setting out the Church’s influence in public life, which has 

contributed to the difficulties for many religious minorities (see below). In March 2004, the Belarusian government granted the BOC the exclusive right to use the word 

belarus

Monuments in the Brest fortress in Belarus, depicting the courage of the soldiers that defended it. The fortress took the first blow 

during the Nazi invasion in 1941. (OSCE/Mikhail Evstafiev)
208

“Orthodox” in its title. Several “independent” Orthodox 

churches that do not accept the authority of the Orthodox 

Patriarch in Moscow have been denied registration, including the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 

(BAOC) and the True Orthodox Church, a branch of the 

Orthodox Church that rejected the compromise with the 

Soviet government made by the Russian Orthodox Church 

in the 1920s. Authorities have warned a priest from the 

unregistered Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) 

that he could be jailed and fined for conducting “illegal 

religious activities,” including small gatherings in private 

homes. In November 2005, authorities denied registration 

to a ROCA parish in Ruzhany; a religious affairs official in 

Brest reportedly told ROCA members to worship at the 

BOC. In recent years, ROCA members have been fined 

four times, for a total of over $2,000, for worshiping in private homes. The community has more than once applied 

for registration, but in October 2006, there were reports 

that BOC officials were pressuring parishioners to withdraw their signatures from registration applications. Even 

the BOC is sometimes subject to government harassment. 

Forum 18 reported that in March 2007, the Committee for 

State Security (KGB) raided a prayer meeting of the BOC 

Transfiguration Fellowship in the city of Gomel, in the first 

known instance since the Soviet period of BOC adherents 

being targeted in Belarus for their religious activity. 

Some religious groups have been consistently denied 

registration, particularly Protestant groups. Forum 18 

reported in January 2008 that a secret ruling by the State 

Committee for Religious and Ethnic Affairs allegedly denied state registration to 12 “destructive sects”; included 

in that group were not only Aum Shinrikyo and Satanists, 

but also Ahmadiya Muslims.

One frequent basis for registration or re-registration 

denials has been the failure to provide a valid legal address, although, in some cases, registration is required 

before such an address can be obtained. Another basis is 

the alleged failure to limit activities to a specified location. 

In many cases, officials do not provide any reason for the 

denial of re-registration requests. In 2006, the Belarus 

government rejected the UN Human Rights Committee’s 

decision that it had violated religious freedom by refusing to register a nationwide Hare Krishna association. The 

authorities maintained that their refusal was “justified” 

because it was in accordance with Belarusian law, but 

they failed to address the UN Committee’s finding that a 

requirement for state-approved physical premises to gain 

legal registration is “a disproportionate limitation of the 

Krishna devotees’ right to manifest their religion” under 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

In June 2006, a Minsk court deregistered the Christ’s Covenant Reformed Baptist Church for lack of legal addresses. 

Without state registration, religious communities can 

be liable for fines levied under a Soviet-era provision of 

the Administrative Violations Code. Evidence indicates 

that since 2004, the Belarus authorities have increased 

the amount of the fines as well as expanded the range of 

religious groups that are subject to them. Until two years 

ago, such fines were usually approximately $15, and most 

often imposed on Council of Churches Baptist congregations, which refuse on theological grounds to register with 

any state authorities. Since 2006, fines have increased, in 

some cases dramatically. Forum 18 reported that in January 2008, the Baranovichi Emergencies Department fined 

the pastor and administrator of the New Life Pentecostal 

Church a total of $228 for fire safety violations, which is 

the equivalent of almost three weeks’ average wages. Pastor Kabushko suggested that the fire safety demands were 

an indirect way of putting pressure on his church. The 

Baranovichi congregation was first fined for fire safety violations a year ago and a major outlay of funds have been 

spent to meet the state authorities’ requirements. The 

previous year, the same church was fined a total of $5,455 

for “unsanctioned” religious activity. A court also ordered 

fines totaling $386 for three Baptist Council of Churches 

members in the same town in December 2007. Also in 

December 2007, members of a church in Grodno complained of an “illegally imposed fine” of $64 handed down 

to their pastor by a Grodno Court for holding an unregistered Harvest Festival service. 

In addition to fines, the Belarusian authorities appear to be adopting tougher sanctions, such as short-term 

detentions and imprisonment, against church leaders and 

parishioners who take part in unregistered religious activity. In March 2006, the pastor of the Minsk-based Christ’s 

Covenant Reformed Baptist Church received a 10-day 

prison term for conducting religious worship in his home. 

It was the first time in 20 years that a religious leader had 

been sentenced to imprisonment in Belarus. The church’s 

re-registration request had previously been denied. Pentecostal Bishop Sergey Tsvor faced similar charges, but 

they were dropped because of technical errors made by 

the police. Also in March 2006, authorities sentenced human rights lawyer Sergey Shavtsov to 10 days in detention 
209

for conducting an unsanctioned interdenominational 

seminar in a private cafe. In June 2007, one week after 

being fined for leading Sunday worship in John the Baptist 

Pentecostal Church in Minsk, Pastor Antoni Bokun was 

given a three-day prison term for leading a service; making him the third known person to be given short-term 

detention in post-Soviet Belarus for religious activity.

While re-registered religious organizations, including 

Muslims, Lutherans, and Baha’is, have held worship services at residential addresses without prosecution, the Administrative Violations Code (Article 167) and the 2002 religion law forbid most religious activity outside designated 

houses of worship without advance approval from state 

authorities. A first offense is punishable by a warning, a 

fine of between 20 and 150 times the minimum monthly 

wage, or three to 15 days’ imprisonment. A second violation within one year is punishable by a fine of between 

150 and 300 times the minimum monthly wage or 10 to 

15 days’ imprisonment. While the law permits persons 

to gather in private homes to pray, it requires that individuals obtain permission from local authorities to hold 

rituals, rites, or ceremonies in homes. In addition, the 

1998 Civil Code and the 1999 Housing Code do not allow 

a religious organization to be located at a residential address unless it has been re-designated as non-residential. 

Although the 2002 religion law allows a religious organization to meet at free-standing residential premises if local 

authorities approve, in practice, this process is largely left 

to individual officials who usually prevent religious communities from meeting for worship in residential buildings. Strict interpretation of the law may result in fines for 

worshippers. For four years, Protestant leaders have been 

trying to have this situation addressed, and in spring 2007, 

Adventist, Baptist, and Pentecostal leaders appealed to 

President Lukashenko. The Presidential Administration’s 

Department for Communication with Citizens confirmed 

that religious organizations may legally meet in private 

homes if local state authorities agree. Yet, police continued to interfere with religious meetings in residences 

several times in 2007, sometimes fining participants. In 

particular, Baptists, Pentecostals, and other Protestants 

were warned or fined for illegally conducting and hosting 

religious services. 

In addition to problems for home worship, the government continued to limit the ability of a number of 

groups to own or use property for religious purposes. The 

government permits the use of residential property for 

religious services only after it has been formally converted 

from residential use. This interpretation of the law effectively requires all religious organizations to re-register 

their properties as religious properties. However, authorities continued to reject requests for property registration 

from many Protestant churches, as well as from other religious groups new to Belarus. The State Department reports that in 2006 and 2007, the Living Word Church in the 

city of Grodno tried and failed at least seven times to rent 

meeting space from state proprietors. Minsk authorities 

informed the unregistered John the Baptist Church that it 

could not rent space at the state Trade Unions House in 

June 2007, allegedly due to “scheduling conflicts.” Moreover, Protestants in particular have expressed concern that 

securing permission to build new churches is almost impossible. In Minsk, city planners reportedly will not grant 

any such permits until 2030. Protestant churches also 

report being viewed as commercial organizations with 

regard to the Minsk Development Fund; those seeking 

property permits must pay a sum set by Minsk authorities 

that may be as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars. 

In addition, Forum 18 reports that some of the smaller religious communities continued to face great difficulties in rebuilding premises for worship in the past year. 

For example, the Grodno region Baptist congregation 

has been denied permission to rebuild its wooden 1920s 

church building. A related problem is the extreme difficulty in gaining official, legal re-designation of property 

for worship purposes, a situation affecting mainly Protestant communities, as unlike the Orthodox and Catholics, 

belarus

In addition to fines, the Belarusian 

authorities appear to be adopting tougher 

sanctions, such as short-term detentions 

and imprisonment, against church 

leaders and parishioners who take part 

in unregistered religious activity.
210

they are much less likely to own worship buildings. In 

February 2008, in response to the indefinite adjournment 

of a court case on the fate of their church building, the 

New Life Church in Minsk opted for civil disobedience, 

refusing to allow state inspectors who can impose fines 

onto church property; its pastor is currently threatened 

with a fine. The impasse appeared linked to uncertainty 

regarding which state body should resolve the issue. In 

late 2006, Grodno authorities granted permission to the 

Roman Catholic Blessed Virgin Mary Mother congregation to build a church for its 8,000 members; the parish 

had been worshipping in a wooden house that could hold 

only 300. Twelve members of the church had launched 

a hunger strike in early December 2006 until authorities 

acceded to their eight year long request. 

Various other laws, regulations, and directives also 

restrict the activities of registered religious communities. For example, groups are not allowed to function 

outside their geographic area of registration. If a registered religious community does not qualify as a “central 

association”—meaning it has not been legally recognized 

for over 20 years or it does not have enough members—it 

cannot own media outlets or invite people from outside 

Belarus to work with the community, as in the case of 

the Greek Catholic Church. The Society for Krishna Consciousness also does not qualify as a central association 

and therefore cannot rent a hall or produce a publication 

with a print run of over 300. 

All religious literature is subject to compulsory government censorship. Religious publishing is restricted 

to religious groups that have 10 registered communities, 

including at least one that was in existence in 1982. This 

requirement is onerous, since the cut-off date of 1982 goes 

back to the Soviet period of religious repression when few 

religious groups could operate. Some members of religious communities are harassed, fined, and detained for 

“illegally” distributing religious literature. For example, 

the government continued to harass and fine Hare Krishnas for distributing religious literature. According to the 

State Department, in January 2007, authorities confiscated 

14 books from a Hare Krishna who was fined $15 (32,000 

rubles) for illegally distributing religious material.

Although religious groups considered “new” to Belarus face many of the most serious problems, religious 

groups, such as Catholics and Jews, which are viewed by 

the government as more “traditional,” were also not exempt from offensive remarks by government officials or 

state media. For example, President Lukashenko himself 

is reported to have made public anti-Semitic comments. 

In October 2007, he referred to the Belarusian town of 

Babruysk as a “pigsty,” and “mainly a Jewish town—and 

you know how Jews treat the place where they are living.” His comments were broadcast live on national radio.

President Lukashenko has also made anti-Semitic statements in the past, such as comparing dishonest oligarchs 

with Jews and likening his critics to people with “hooked 

noses.” In June 2007, the state newspaper Respublika published an article that compared contemporary Catholic 

missionary activities to the Crusades and branded the 

involvement of Pope John Paul II in the fall of communism as a “devilish enterprise,” alleging his collaboration 

with the CIA. The Polish community in Belarus called for 

criminal charges against the article’s author as well as the 

newspaper’s editor, and the paper later issued an apology. 

Despite an order by the Prosecutor General and the 

Ministry of Information to remove from circulation the 

anti-Semitic and xenophobic newspaper Russki Vestnik, 

“Island of tears,” Minsk.
211

distribution of the newspaper resumed through the statedistribution agency. As in previous years, anti-Semitic 

literature continued to be sold at the National Academy of 

Sciences, and anti-Semitic literature is openly sold at several Belarusian Orthodox book fairs. The Roman Catholic 

Church reported that anti-Catholic literature is also sold 

at places linked to the Orthodox Church. Anti-Semitic 

and Russian ultra-nationalist newspapers and books are 

still sold at Pravoslavnaya Kniga (Orthodox Bookstore), a 

store that sells Orthodox literature and religious paraphernalia. The official Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) 

prayer calendar, printed in Minsk, continued to mark May 

20 as the anniversary of the 1690 death of a young child 

who was alleged to have been murdered by Jews. The 

May 20 prayer refers to Jews as “real beasts” who allegedly 

kidnapped and murdered the child for religious purposes; 

a link on the BOC Web site listed the child as one of the 

Church’s saints and martyrs. 

The Belarus government continued to demonstrate a 

lax attitude towards the problem of societal anti-Semitism 

and has not responded adequately to find and hold accountable those responsible for vandalism against Jewish memorials, cemeteries, or other property. According 

to the State Department, acts of anti-Semitic vandalism 

increased in 2007. In February 2007, neo-Nazi activists 

attacked Larissa Shukailo, who is the Jewish director of the 

Mogilyov branch of the Belarusian Association for Victims 

of Political Repression. Shukailo filed an official complaint, but no suspects had been identified several months 

later. In March, independent media reported two acts of 

vandalism of sites commemorating the killing of Minsk 

ghetto Bremen Jews; also in that month, vandals damaged the Star of David on a memorial in Kurapaty honoring Jewish victims of Stalinism. In May 2007 in the city of 

Borisov, police opened a criminal case in connection with 

the vandalism of the local Jewish cemetery, but several 

months later no suspects had been identified. In June, 

local Jewish leaders reported that a Jewish cemetery had 

been vandalized in Mogilyov; relatives appealed to the police, one of whom claimed that the tombstones may have 

been knocked down by a wind storm. As of mid-2007, 

there were three acts of vandalism against the monument 

to the victims of the Brest Jewish ghetto; police opened a 

criminal case but did not identify any suspects. The State 

Department reported that Jewish leaders petitioned the 

government in 2007 to investigate neo-Nazi activities, citing continued vandalism, anti-Semitic graffiti, and threats 

to civil society and religious congregations. Authorities 

responded with sympathetic letters but did not open any 

criminal cases in connection with these complaints. 

The Belarusian authorities also continued in 2007 

to use textbooks that promoted intolerance, particularly 

towards “non-traditional” religions. Leaders of Protestant 

groups criticized the chapter entitled “Beware of Sects,” 

which includes a paragraph on Seventh-Day Adventists, 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Ministry of Education continued to use another textbook which labels Protestants 

and Hare Krishnas as “sects,” although according to the 

State Department, the authorities promised to change the 

language in the books’ next edition. State-controlled print 

and broadcast media has also promoted intolerant views 

of “new” religious groups. In May 2007, the pastor of 

God’s Grace Head Church received a letter from the statecontrolled Lad television channel denying any wrongdoing after a broadcast that referred to the community as 

a “totalitarian and destructive sect.” In June 2007, state 

television channel ONT ran a news review item on “neoPentecostal sects.” A summary of that program claimed 

that Jehovah’s Witnesses and neo-Pentecostals, “with 

the aid of psychotechnology...drive people out of their 

minds”...and that they were the ones behind the Orange 

Revolution in Ukraine.

Because the 2002 religion law states that religious 

organizations do not have priority in reclaiming property 

confiscated in Soviet times if a former worship building 

is now used for culture or sports activities, only nine of 92 

historic synagogues in Belarus have been returned to the 

Jewish community since the country’s independence in 

1991. In another property dispute, the St. Joseph Catholic community in Minsk continued its campaign for the 

government to return a former Bernardine church and its 

monastery buildings, currently housing the state archives 

and slated to be converted into a hotel and entertainment 

center. In March 2007, the government made public new 

development plans; in response, the community launched 

a petition drive, which by March 2008 had reportedly garnered as many as 50,000 signatures.

In January 2008, Belarus issued a decree that further 

tightened strict government regulations on foreign religious workers. The Plenipotentiary for Religious and Nabelarus
tionality Affairs is now given sole discretion to rule on the 

necessity of religious work by foreign citizens. Moreover, 

the Plenipotentiary is not required to give reasons for refusing a foreign religious worker’s visit, and he may shorten a visit “if the period of time required for realization of 

the aims for which the foreign citizen is invited does not 

correspond to that requested.” Under the religion law, 

foreign religious workers must be invited by registered 

religious associations. In addition, the application procedure for foreign religious worker invitations is now much 

more detailed and must include relevant work experience, 

the timetable and syllabus of the relevant religious educational institution, and proof of knowledge of Belarusian 

and Russian. Approval for visits by foreign religious workers often involves a lengthy bureaucratic process, as the 

law requires one-year, multiple-entry “spiritual activities” 

visas for foreign missionaries and clergy. An organization 

inviting foreign clergy must make a written request to the 

Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious 

and Nationality Affairs (OPRRNA) including the proposed 

dates and reason for the requested visit. Even if the visit is 

for charitable activities, representatives must obtain a visa 

and permission from OPRRNA, which then has 20 days to 

respond; there is no appeal provision.

After its post-1991 revival, the Roman Catholic 

Church has experienced a shortage of qualified native 

clergy. Seven Polish Catholic priests and five nuns were 

expelled in late 2006; among other reasons, a reported 

factor was their “youth” and the fact that their alcohol rehabilitation meetings were open to everyone. A reported 

12,000 people protested their expulsion, including several 

Catholic bishops. The Belarusian Consulate in Warsaw 

has warned priests on short visits not to engage in any 

religious activity. In late 2007, 700 Catholics protested the 

government’s order that the Polish priest of the Gomel 

region’s Holy Trinity Church leave Belarus by March 2008; 

the denial of the priest’s annual visa may have been linked 

to his negative comments about Belarus in a 2007 interview in a Polish newspaper. 

According to the State Department’s religious freedom report, legislation prohibits “subversive activities” 

by foreign organizations and the setting up of offices by 

foreign organizations that incite “national, religious, and 

racial enmity” or “have negative effects on people’s physical and mental health.” In May 2007, a Polish citizen, an 

unofficial pastor of the John the Baptist Church, was fined 

$15 for holding unauthorized religious services at a fellow 

pastor’s home. He was ordered to leave the country by 

June 7 for “repeated violations of the regime governing the 

presence of foreigners” and barred from reentry for five 

years; authorities also canceled his residency permit due 

to his alleged involvement in “activities aimed at causing 

damage to the national security.” Moreover, if foreign citizens have not explicitly stated that they plan to participate 

in religious activities in Belarus, they can be reprimanded 

or expelled. In February 2007, the Belarus government 

deported seven U.S. citizens and banned them from the 

country for two years for “illegal teaching and illegal religious activities,” charging the group with administrative 

violations and fining them because they had not obtained 

permission from the Education Ministry before teaching 

English at a house of worship in Mogilyov. In June 2007, 

however, a court reversed the order. In another case involving an American citizen, in March 2007 the residence 

permit of a U.S. Protestant humanitarian aid worker in 

Minsk was cancelled and he was deported. Belarusian 

officials claimed he was involved in activities “aimed at 

causing damage to national security” but did not define 

the alleged threat. Members of the Hare Krishna community continued to report that existing legislation prevents 

212

The Belarus government continued to demonstrate a lax attitude towards 

the problem of societal anti-Semitism and has not responded adequately to find 

and hold accountable those responsible for vandalism against Jewish 

memorials, cemeteries, or other property.
Commission Recommendations

them from inviting foreign clergy to participate in religious 

activities. 

In contrast to the harsh measures described above, 

Lukashenko signed a law in late 2005 that exempted from 

tax the land and property of many religious organizations. 

The list of eligible religious organizations includes those 

denied re-registration but not yet liquidated by court 

order, such as the Minsk-based New Life Church and the 

Minsk Society for Krishna Consciousness. However, the 

recently liquidated Minsk-based Belarusian Evangelical 

Church and Belarusian Evangelical Reformed Union reportedly are not included.

The Commission traveled to Belarus in 2003 and met 

with officials of the State Committee on Religious and Nationalities Affairs as well as with representatives of various 

religious and human rights groups. The Commission released a report on Belarus in May 2003 with recommendations for U.S. policy, reflecting the findings from its visit to 

that country. The Commission welcomed passage of the 

2004 Belarus Democracy Act as well as President Bush’s 

reauthorization of that Act in January 2007. This legislation reflected certain Commission recommendations regarding freedom of religion in Belarus. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff has met 

with independent human rights activists from Belarus, 

including the author of the “White Book,” an extensive 

report on religious persecution in that country. In the 

past year, the Commission continued to take part in meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, presenting information on freedom of religion in 

Belarus and meeting with Belarusian officials. In January 

2008, Commission staff spoke in Brussels about U.S. policy 

promoting freedom of religion or belief at events sponsored by the non-governmental organization European 

Platform on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. 

213

Regarding multilateral approaches and international organizations, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

• use every measure of public and private diplomacy to advance the protection of human rights, 

including religious freedom, in Belarus, including 

enhanced monitoring and public reporting by 

the U.S. Department of State and the appropriate 

international organizations;

• coordinate with the European Union on the application of financial sanctions and visa bans on highranking Belarusian officials, particularly those who 

are directly responsible for or who have carried out 

the government’s abuses of religious freedom;

• undertake efforts to prevent Belarus from gaining membership in the new UN Human Rights 

Council; and

• urge the Belarus government to issue invitations to 

the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special Rapporteur on 

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 

Treatment or Punishment; the Special Rapporteur 

on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 

Freedom of Expression; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of 

Human Rights Defenders; the Special Rapporteur 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as the 

Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.

Regarding its bilateral relations with Belarus, 

the U.S. government should:

• urge the Belarus government to take immediate 

steps to end repression, including: 

• repealing the highly repressive religion law; 

• ending the practice of denying registration to 

religious groups and then erecting obstacles to 

religious practice because of that unregistered 

status; 
214

• providing the right to conduct 

religious education and distribute 

religious material; 

• halting government attacks on the 

persons and property of minority 

religious groups; 

• ensuring a greater effort on the 

part of government officials to 

find and hold to account perpetrators of attacks on the persons 

and property of members of 

religious minorities; and 

• providing free access by domestic 

and international human rights 

groups and others to sites of religious violence or the destruction 

of places of worship; 

• urge the Belarus government to 

ensure that no religious community 

is given a status that may result in or 

be used to justify impairment of the 

rights of members of other religious 

groups; 

• urge the Belarus government to 

publicly condemn, investigate, and 

prosecute criminal acts targeting 

Jews and the Jewish community, as 

well as members of other ethnic and 

religious communities;

• continue to support, publicly and 

privately, persons and groups 

engaged in the struggle against 

repression in Belarus, including the 

group of religious and opposition 

activists who make up the Freedom 

of Religion Initiative that published 

the “White Book”; and

• organize roundtables inside Belarus 

between members of registered and 

unregistered religious communities and international experts on 

freedom of religion.

Regarding U.S. programs and 

policies, the U.S. government should:

• institute fully the measures set forth 

in the 2007 Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which expresses 

the sense of Congress that sanctions 

be applied against the government 

of Belarus until the U.S. president 

“determines and certifies to the 

appropriate congressional committees that the government of Belarus 

has made significant progress” in 

meeting human rights conditions 

designated in the bill, including: 

the release of individuals who have 

been jailed on account of their 

political beliefs; the withdrawal of 

politically motivated charges against 

opposition figures; a full accounting 

of the “disappearances” of noted 

opposition leaders and journalists; 

and the cessation of all forms of 

harassment of independent media, 

non-governmental organizations, 

opposition groups, and religious 

organizations; specific sanctions 

would include: the denial of entry 

into the United States to highranking Belarusian officials, and the 

prohibition of strategic exports and 

U.S. government financing to the 

Belarusian government, except for 

humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products;

• ensure that the activities to promote democracy authorized by the 

Belarus Democracy Act include the 

right to freedom of religion or belief 

and the promotion of religious tolerance;

• urge Congress and the State Department to ensure that U.S. government-funded radio broadcasts to 

Belarus, including those of Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, continue at least at their present levels 

and that efforts are made to secure 

sufficient transmission capacity to 

ensure reliable reception throughout that country; and

• provide increased international 

travel opportunities, particularly to 

attend international conferences, 

for Belarusian civil society leaders, 

including representatives of human 

rights groups and religious leaders, 

and others who defend freedom of 

religion in that country. 
215

Cuba

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly 

controlled in Cuba. Religious freedom conditions have 

been affected in part by the ongoing government crackdown on democracy and free speech activists, resulting 

in a generally deteriorating situation for human rights, 

including religious freedom. A 2005 law on religion meant 

to “legalize” house churches has reinforced the government’s efforts to increase control over some religious 

practice. The Commission continues to place Cuba on 

its Watch List, and will monitor conditions of freedom 

of religion or belief in Cuba to determine if they rise to a 

level warranting designation as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba’s human rights record, which deteriorated 

significantly in 2003, continued to be poor in 2007. Cuba 

remains a Communist Party-dominated dictatorship. 

After seizing power in 1959, President Fidel Castro maintained a strong, centralized control of all facets of life in 

Cuba. In July 2006, Fidel Castro became ill and turned 

power over to his brother Raul Castro. In February 2008, 

Fidel resigned as head of state and five days later, on February 24, the National Assembly voted Raul officially as 

the next head of state of the Cuban government. Accepting the position, Raul stated that he would continue to 

consult with his brother on issues important to the future 

of Cuba. However, since becoming president, Raul Castro 

has lifted several restrictions, allowing for more private 

business transactions, greater freedom of movement inside the country, and more communication with the West.

Cubans can now legally own cell phones, stay at luxury 

hotels, visit beach resorts previously reserved only for 

tourists, rent cars, buy DVD players, and cultivate coffee 

and tobacco on unused state land. The government has 

also announced plans to allow Cubans to purchase computers, freely travel throughout the country, and start their 

own small businesses. These changes, however, while 

potentially positive steps, have not addressed restrictions 

on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of assembly, or 

freedom of speech.

Parliamentary, judicial, and executive institutions 

continue to exist in name only in Cuba and there is no 

legal or political avenue of dissent. Individuals who engage in dissent are harassed, jailed, and mistreated in 

prison. In February 2003, the Cuban government initiated 

an extensive crackdown on democracy activists, including 

those supporting the Varela Project, a referendum calling 

for economic and political reforms submitted to the Cuban government in 2002 and 2003, and the Christian Liberation Movement. Since that time, the crackdowns have 

continued and several more human rights activists have 

been imprisoned since Fidel transferred power to Raul in 

2006. In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban National Assembly unanimously passed an amendment making 

socialism the irrevocable basis of the constitution. 

Since 1959, the communist government has sought 

to suppress religious belief and practice because it was 

“counterrevolutionary.” During the early years of the 

Castro regime, government and Communist Party officials 

forced priests, pastors, and other religious leaders into 

labor camps or exile and systematically discriminated 

against those who openly professed religious belief by 

excluding them from certain jobs or educational opportunities. In the past decade, however, the state instituted 

a limited rapprochement with religious believers, and it 

seemed as though conditions might improve. For example, the government abandoned its official policy of atheism in the early 1990s. Castro welcomed a visit from Pope 

John Paul II in 1998 and visited Havana’s Jewish Community Center for its Hanukah celebration that same year. In 

2000, official recognition of religious holidays was reinstated, and members of Cuba’s Jewish community were allowed to emigrate to Israel. The Pope’s visit, in particular, 

sparked great hopes within the religious communities in 

Cuba, as well as among democracy activists, who viewed 

these steps as a softening of past government policies. 

Yet, despite optimism that religious freedom condiCUBA

Although the Cuban government 

seeks to project the image that the right 

to religious freedom is respected, in fact, 

government authorities continue to view 

the influence of religion as a threat to 

the ideology of Castro’s revolution.
216

tions would improve, violations and restrictions have continued, as has the government’s strong degree of control 

and generally hostile attitude toward religion. Although 

the Cuban government seeks to project the image that the 

right to religious freedom is respected, in fact, government authorities continue to view the influence of religion 

as a threat to the ideology of Castro’s revolution. In early 

2001, the Communist Party in Havana prepared a report 

that criticized inroads made by churches, particularly 

the Roman Catholic Church, into Cuban society, and asserted that the social work of the churches violated the 

law. Communist Party officials reportedly apologized to 

the Catholic Church hierarchy after the report became 

public. Nevertheless, Havana’s Catholic Cardinal, Jaime 

Ortega y Alamino, gave an interview in 2003 in which he 

asserted that “restrictions on religious freedom are returning” in Cuba, and that they represent a “return to the 

ideology of repression.” The crackdowns on the freedoms 

of speech, assembly, and association in Cuba since 2003 

have affected religious freedom conditions also. In 2004 

there were reports that a marked shift in government propaganda had taken place favoring strict interpretations of 

communist orthodoxy, including an assault on religious 

freedom and related human rights, a policy that reportedly continues.

The government’s main interaction with, and control 

of, religious denominations is through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban 

government also requires churches and other religious 

groups to register with the relevant provincial office of the 

Registry of Associations within the Ministry of Justice. According to the State Department, the Cuban government 

is most tolerant of those religious groups that maintain 

“close relations” with the state or those who “often [support] government policies.” Currently, there are approximately 50 state-recognized religious groups, primarily 

Christian denominations, half of which are members of 

the government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches 

(CCC). In recent years, the government had not granted 

recognition to any relatively new denominations; however, in March 2007, several denominations were granted 

full legal recognition, including some Yoruba and other 

Santeria, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Baptist, Buddhist, 

and Islamic religious groups. There are also small Jewish communities. The government has not prevented 

activities of the Baha’is and the Church of Jesus Christ of 

Latter-day Saints (Mormons), groups that are not officially 

Because an estimated 70 percent 

of the Afro-Caribbean population 

engages in at least some religious 

practice, which is viewed as presenting 

a potential grassroots threat to the 

government, religious groups in these 

communities are more heavily 

targeted than political 

opposition organizations.

Church of Saint Francesco d’Assisi.
217

registered, and has registered groups that do not belong to 

the CCC, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In the past, 

there were reports that conditions for Jehovah’s Witnesses 

had improved substantially; however, in the past year, 

there has been harassment of and discrimination against 

members of this group by local Communist Party and government officials. In 2007, Ray Luciano Lopez Morence, 

a Jehovah’s Witness, was detained for three days for refusing to fulfill the compulsory military service before being 

sanctioned and fined. 

In recent years, the Cuban government has rarely permitted the construction of new places of worship, and the 

government did not grant permission for the construction 

of any new worship buildings in 2007. However, according to the CCC, many churches expanded in 2007 without 

government permission. Many religious groups, registered and unregistered, hold services in private homes or 

similar accommodations, commonly known as “house 

churches.” There are reports that at least 10,000 house 

churches exist nationwide, the majority of which are technically illegal. Permission for meetings in house churches 

is frequently denied to those outside the recognized religious faiths and to those the government deems to be “an 

independent religious movement” (i.e. not recognized or 

hostile to government policies). If a complaint is made 

against a house church meeting, it can be broken up and 

the attendees imprisoned. Since 2005, several house 

churches from registered and unregistered denominations 

have reportedly been confiscated or destroyed. In many 

of these cases, local authorities told house church leaders 

and members that their buildings were “unsuitable” and 

then appropriated the buildings. One non-governmental 

organization reports that some of the churches were bulldozed, some remain vacant, and at least one was turned 

into a school.

A September 2005 law requires all house churches 

to register. In order to receive legal registration, the law 

requires that there be no more than three meetings per 

week; that a house church cannot be within two kilometers of another house church of the same denomination; 

and that detailed information on the number of members, 

when services will be held, and the names and ages of 

the inhabitants of the house be provided. The requirements also prohibit the participation of foreign citizens 

without government permission and the presence of such 

individuals in the mountainous regions. Put into effect 

as Directive 43 and Resolution 46, these requirements 

have increased concerns primarily among Protestant 

and Santeria religious groups, many of which hold unauthorized religious meetings in private homes several 

times per week. If the registration application is refused, 

the members of the house church are not permitted to 

meet. There are reports that at least one house church 

was demolished, several threatened with demolition, and 

several were shut down or confiscated since Direction 

43 and Resolution 46 were promulgated. There are also 

reports of individual worshippers receiving citations and 

some churches repeatedly being forced to pay large fines. 

However, there is no evidence that the new legislation has 

resulted in a systematic crackdown on house churches. 

In the past year, both registered and unregistered 

religious groups continued to experience varying degrees 

of official interference, harassment, and repression. The 

State Department reports that Cuban Interior Ministry 

officials regularly engage in efforts to monitor and control 

the country’s religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration, and harassment of religious clerics 

and laypersons. In January 2004, a Ministry of Interior official revealed in an interview that government infiltration 

of civil and religious organizations remains widespread. 

There have been reports of religious leaders being 

attacked, beaten, or detained for opposing certain actions 

CUBA

A corner in downtown Havana, Cuba.
218

of the local or state government. Priests who use sermons 

to criticize the government’s human rights record have 

been put under surveillance, threatened, and beaten. 

Religious leaders who refuse to express support for government programs or act as informants are reportedly 

harassed in ways that have included mob protests. Some 

pastors from denominations registered with the CCC who 

call for increased separation of church and state report 

harassment and threats by the government. In February 2006, Church of God Reverend Carlos Lamelas, an 

advocate for religious freedom and a critic of the state’s 

interference in the church, was arrested and held for four 

months, although he was never formally charged. He was 

not brought to trial until December, and then on human 

trafficking charges. However, a new prosecutor dropped 

the charges days later due to lack of evidence. Since his 

release, Lamelas has not been permitted to resume his 

leadership position of his church, a CCC member, despite 

his congregation’s support. 

Some Protestant house churches continued to be harassed and evangelical denominations reported evictions 

from houses used for worship (most of which were unauthorized and thus illegal). Because an estimated 70 percent of the Afro-Caribbean population engages in at least 

some religious practice, which is viewed as presenting a 

potential grassroots threat to the government, religious 

groups in these communities are more heavily targeted 

than political opposition organizations. According to the 

State Department, in the past year, independent Santeria 

priests have been threatened and pressured to assimilate 

into the government-sanctioned Yoruba Cultural Association. 

Political prisoners and human rights and pro-democracy activists are increasingly being limited in their right 

to practice their religion. Religious leaders report pressure, sometimes blatant, by the government to expel prodemocracy or human rights activists from their church 

and some activists have, in response, been asked by 

church leaders to distance themselves from the congregation. On Dec. 6, 2007, security officers forcefully entered 

the Santa Teresita de Nino Jesus Roman Catholic Church 

in Santiago and beat several human rights activists attending mass. Additionally, political prisoners report being 

denied the right to receive visits from clergy members, 

having Bibles and rosaries confiscated, and being prevented from attending religious services with other prisoners. 

The State Department reports that human rights activist 

Diosdado Gonzalez Marrero submitted 67 requests to allow a Catholic priest to visit him in prison, but was never 

granted a visit. 

Family members of these prisoners are also affected. 

In many churches, security officials reportedly continue 

to monitor sermons and sit behind the wives of political 

prisoners in order to intimidate them. March 18 marks 

the anniversary of “Black Spring,” the day in 2003 when 75 

human rights activists, independent journalists, and opposition political figures were arrested on various charges. 

Every Sunday since 2003, wives of those arrested, known 

as the Ladies in White because they wear only white, 

attend mass at Santa Rita Church in Havana and then 

walk down Havana’s embassy row, protesting their husbands’ imprisonments. The Ladies in White organization 

was the joint winner of the European Parliament’s 2006 

Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. In March 2007, 

government-directed mobs physically prevented wives of 

human rights activists, many from the “Ladies in White” 

organization, from traveling to Havana for mass at Santa 

Rita Catholic Church. The State Department also reports 

that several other political prisoners’ wives were warned 

they would be arrested if they attempted to join the other 

Additionally, there is a requirement that religious groups receive permission 

from local Communist Party officials prior to holding processions or events outside 

of religious buildings. Refusal of such permission is often based on the decision 

of individual government officials rather than the law.
219

wives at mass. 

All publications are required to be registered with the 

Ministry of Culture. However, the Cuban Conference of 

Catholic Bishops has refused to register its publications, 

arguing that such registration would mean a loss of content and format control. Although the government has 

not blocked the printing or publication of Catholic publications, increased government pressure in recent years, 

sometimes in the form of blocking the distribution of supplies, has led to the shutting down of several publications. 

In April 2007, Vitral magazine, an independent Catholic 

magazine that in the past has published articles critical 

of the Cuban government, announced that due to a lack 

of paper, ink, and Internet access, it would shut down. 

However, the magazine resumed publication in June 2007 

under new management.

Other means by which the government restricts 

religious practice include: enforcement of a regulation 

that prevents any Cuban or joint enterprise, except those 

with specific authorization, from selling computers, 

facsimile machines, photocopiers, or other equipment 

to any church other than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—

retail prices; an almost total state monopoly on printing 

presses; a prohibition on private religious schools; limitations on the entry of foreign religious workers; denial 

of Internet access to religious organizations; restrictions 

on making repairs to church buildings; and the denial of 

religious literature such as Bibles to persons in prison. 

Additionally, there is a requirement that religious groups 

receive permission from local Communist Party officials 

prior to holding processions or events outside of religious 

buildings. Refusal of such permission is often based on 

the decision of individual government officials rather than 

the law. According to the State Department, in 2005, the 

Catholic Church decided to stop seeking permits for religious processions in some areas. The State Department 

reports, however, that small, local processions occurred in 

provinces in 2007. For Easter, large processions were permitted in Camaguey and Santa Clara, and 800 youth participated in a special Easter observance outside Havana. 

On the tenth anniversary of Pope John Paul II’s trip 

to Cuba, Vatican envoy Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone traveled 

to Cuba in February 2008 and met with newly appointed 

Cuban President Raul Castro. Cardinal Bertone called 

for improved relations between the government and the 

Church and for increased openness in the state-controlled 

media, where the Catholic Church would like to have 

more religious services and events shown on government 

TV and radio. Unlike Pope John Paul, Cardinal Bertone 

did not call for the release of political prisoners.

CUBA
Commission Recommendations

220

With regard to Cuba, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

• use all diplomatic means to urge the Cuban government 

to undertake the following measures aimed at bringing 

Cuba into compliance with its international legal obligations with respect to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief:

• order, publicly and officially, the state security agencies to end: the instigation of mob violence against 

religious persons and other human rights activists, 

including those recently released from prison; the mistreatment of indigenous religious communities; and 

the harassment of the spouses of imprisoned human 

rights activists during religious services and hold those 

involved in any further incidents accountable for their 

conduct;

• revise government Directive 43 and Resolution 46 

restricting religious services in homes or on other 

personal property, as well as other national laws and 

regulations on religious activities, to bring them into 

conformity with international standards on freedom of 

religion or belief; 

• cease, in accordance with international standards, 

interference with religious activities and the internal 

affairs of religious communities, such as denials of 

visas to religious workers, limitations on freedom of 

movement of religious workers, infiltration and intimidation of religious communities, the arbitrary prevention of religious ceremonies and processions, and the 

attempted interference in the elections in religious 

bodies; and

• take immediate steps to end restrictions on religious 

activities protected by international treaties and covenants, including: 

• ending the practice of arbitrarily denying registration to religious groups, as well as detaining or harassing members of religious groups and interfering 

with religious activities because of that unregistered 

status; 

• issuing permits for construction of new places of 

worship; 

• ending the practice of evictions and requisition of 

personal property of religious individuals or communities without due process, restitution, or provision of alternative accommodation; 

• securing the right to conduct religious education 

and distribute religious materials; and 

• lifting restrictions on humanitarian, medical, charitable, or social service work provided by religious 

communities and protecting persons who conduct 

such activities under Cuban law.
221

EGYPT

Egypt

Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, 

and other human rights violations against members of 

religious minorities, as well as non-conforming Muslims, 

remain widespread in Egypt. Over the past few years, the 

Egyptian government has adopted several measures to 

acknowledge the religious pluralism of Egyptian society, 

including increased efforts to promote interfaith activity. 

Yet the government has not taken sufficient steps to halt 

the repression of and discrimination against religious believers, including the indigenous Coptic Orthodox Christians, or, in many cases, to punish those responsible for 

violence or other severe violations of religious freedom. 

The government also has not taken adequate steps to 

combat widespread and virulent anti-Semitism in the government-controlled media. On a positive note, in January 

2008, Cairo’s Court of Administrative Justice overturned 

the ban on providing official identity documents to some 

members of the Baha’i faith by allowing those Baha’is to 

put a dash or a symbol in the space designated for religious affiliation. There was also increased public space to 

discuss and debate a wide range of religious freedom concerns in the media and other public fora, which, in previous years, was discouraged and prevented by Egyptian 

authorities. Nevertheless, due to persistent, serious concerns, Egypt remains on the Commission’s Watch List and 

will continue to be monitored to determine if the situation 

rises to a level that warrants designation as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record that includes repressive practices that seriously violate freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The government maintains tight control over all Muslim religious institutions, including mosques and religious endowments, 

which are encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned 

interpretation of Islam. According to Egyptian officials, 

the government regulates these Muslim institutions and 

activities as a necessary precaution against religious extremism and terrorism. The state appoints and pays the 

salaries of all Sunni Muslim imams, all mosques must be 

licensed by the government, and sermons are monitored 

by the government. 

Human rights organizations inside the country are 

seriously concerned that Islamist extremism is advancing in Egypt, with detrimental effects on the prospects for 

democratic reform, religious tolerance, and the rights of 

women, girls, and members of religious minorities. Some 

believe that the government is not acting to its fullest ability to counteract this problem, especially in the areas of 

public education and the media, where extremist influence is growing.

There is continued prosecution in state security 

courts and imprisonment for those accused of “unorthodox” Islamic religious beliefs or practices that insult the 

three “heavenly religions”: Judaism, Christianity, and 

Islam. Article 98(f ) of the Penal Code, which prohibits 

citizens from “ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions 

or inciting sectarian strife,” has been applied to prosecute 

alleged acts by purportedly “unorthodox” Muslims. These 

include Muslim groups, such as the Koranists—a very 

small group in Egypt that does not accept as authentic 

neither hadith, the oral traditions of the life of the Prophet 

Muhammad, nor Sunna, accounts of the way the Prophet 

Muhammad lived his life—who are accused of practicing beliefs thought to deviate from Islamic law. In May 

2007, five members of an extended family belonging to the 

Koranists were arrested in Cairo. The detainees included 

Abdellatif Muhammad Said, who had been working on 

a Web site promoting reformist views of Islam, and Amr 

Tharwat, an employee of a pro-democracy center headed 

Over the past few years, the 

Egyptian government has adopted 

several measures to acknowledge the 

religious pluralism of Egyptian society, 

including increased efforts to promote 

interfaith activity. Yet the government 

has not taken sufficient steps to halt the 

repression of and discrimination against 

religious believers ... or, in many cases, 

to punish those responsible for 

violence or other severe violations 

of religious freedom.
by one of Egypt’s most well-known human rights and political reform advocates, Saad Eddin Ibrahim. One of the 

detainees claimed physical abuse while in detention. In 

October 2007, all five men were released. The government 

never stated precisely the charges against them, although 

a press report said that they had faced charges of “denigrating religions.” 

In February 2007, a court in Alexandria convicted and 

sentenced Abdel Karim Suleiman, a 22 year-old Internet 

blogger and former student at Al-Azhar University, to 

four years in prison, including three years for blaspheming Islam and inciting sectarian strife and one year for 

criticizing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Suleiman 

had used his blog to criticize some activities of Al-Azhar 

University and the attacks on Coptic Christians in Alexandria in October 2005. In March 2007, an appeals court 

upheld his sentence. In December 2004, 13 “unorthodox” 

Muslims were referred to trial by a State Emergency Court 

on charges of “insulting heavenly religions”; their status 

remains unknown. 

The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 

1981 and was renewed for another two years in May 2006, 

restricts many human rights, including freedom of religion or belief as well as freedom of expression, assembly, 

and association. The law must be extended again before 

May 2008 or it will expire. During his 2005 presidential 

campaign for a fifth six-year term, President Mubarak had 

pledged to rescind the law; in late December 2006, Mubarak stated that he intended to replace the Emergency Law 

with new anti-terror legislation. Under the Emergency 

Law, the security forces mistreat and torture prisoners, 

arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in 

prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in 

mass arrests. Thousands of persons have been detained 

without charge on suspicion of illegal terrorist or political 

activity; others are serving sentences after being convicted 

on similar charges. Egyptian and international human 

rights groups have asserted that the primary purpose 

of the State Emergency and Military Courts is to punish 

political activism and dissent, even when that dissent is 

peaceful. These courts are also used to detain and try 

individuals deemed by the state to have “unorthodox” or 

“deviant” Islamic or other religious beliefs or practices. 

In 2005, Egypt’s National Human Rights Commission formally called for the Emergency Law to be lifted.

Members of Egypt’s non-Muslim religious minorities, 

222

Members of Egypt’s non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Christians 

and Baha’is, report discrimination, interference, harassment, and surveillance by 

the Egyptian state security services. Over the past two to three years, there has 

been an upsurge of attacks targeting Coptic Orthodox Christians.

The Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Aly Gum’a with 

Commissioner Gaer.
particularly Christians and Baha’is, report discrimination, interference, harassment, and surveillance by the 

Egyptian state security services. Over the past two to three 

years, there has been an upsurge of attacks targeting Coptic Orthodox Christians. In some cases, perpetrators have 

been arrested and convicted. In December 2007, Muslims 

and Christians clashed in the upper Egypt town of Esna, 

where Muslim rioters vandalized a Christian church and 

set fire to shops owned by Coptic Christians. Local Egyptian authorities responded by arresting more than a dozen 

alleged perpetrators; however, rather than charging those 

responsible, the authorities subsequently released them 

and instead provided compensation to victims of the destroyed property. In June 2007, Muslim rioters attacked 

two Coptic Orthodox churches, damaged Christianowned shops, and injured seven Christians near Alexandria. In this instance, there is no indication that authorities pursued charges against those responsible. In May 

2007, Egyptian security forces arrested 59 Muslims who 

had been accused of setting fire to Christian homes and 

shops in clashes over church construction. Prosecutors 

reportedly ordered the arrests after taking the testimony 

of 12 Coptic Christians who were injured in the clashes in 

the village of Behma, south of Cairo, in which hundreds 

of Christians and Muslims fought with sticks and hurled 

bricks and firebombs at one another. The 59 Muslims 

were charged with arson and spreading sectarian strife. 

In the weeks following the May events, the local authorities sought to arrange several reconciliation meetings but 

had not pursued formal charges against or prosecutions of 

those responsible for the violence. According to the State 

Department, police responded quickly in that incident to 

contain the violence. 

In addition, Coptic Orthodox and other Christian 

denominations face societal intolerance and violence by 

Muslim extremists. Egyptian authorities have been accused of being lax in protecting the lives and property of 

these groups, as well as prosecuting those responsible for 

violent acts against them. In October 2005, Christians in 

Alexandria were the targets of rioting by extremists angered by the distribution of a DVD; resulting clashes left 

three Muslims dead and a Christian nun wounded. In 

February 2006, a criminal court in Alexandria sentenced 

a man to three years in prison for physically attacking 

the nun. In January 2006 near Luxor, more than a dozen 

Christians and Muslims were injured after clashes broke 

out when Muslim youths torched a house that Coptic 

Christians had been using as a makeshift church. According to the State Department, several Muslims involved 

with the Luxor violence were arrested and investigated by 

Egyptian authorities, although all were released without 

charges in May 2007. 

In April 2006, three Coptic Christian churches in Alexandria were attacked on Palm Sunday by a Muslim man, 

resulting in the death of one Christian and the wounding of approximately a dozen others. In the three days of 

demonstrations that followed the attacks, rioting broke 

out, leaving one Muslim man dead and almost 40 Christians and Muslims injured. Some groups blamed excessive police force for some of the injuries to both Muslims 

and Christians. According to the Interior Ministry, the 

man who attacked the churches was caught and is being 

held; he is believed to be “mentally unstable.” At least 100 

persons were detained in response to these events, some 

for questioning and others on suspicion of incitement to 

riot and taking part in the riot. A People’s Assembly factfinding committee was formed to investigate the incident 

and report its findings; as of this writing, the committee 

had not yet released its findings publicly. 

Violent attacks on Christian communities over the 

years have resulted in very few prosecutions of perpetrators, including the 2004 Court of Cassation decision to 

uphold the acquittal of 94 of 96 suspects who were charged 

with various offenses in connection with the killing of 21 

Christians in Al-Kosheh in late 1999 and early 2000. Some 

Egyptian human rights advocates believe that Egyptian authorities should investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in the violence. 

EGYPT

223

Commissioner Gaer with Sheikh Tantawi, the Grand Imam of 

Al-Azhar.
224

In addition to violence, Christians face official and 

societal discrimination. Although Egyptian government 

officials claim that there is no law or policy that prevents 

Christians from holding senior positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian community faces de facto discrimination 

in appointments to high-level government and military 

posts. There are only a handful of Christians in the upper 

ranks of the security services and armed forces. There 

is one Christian governor out of 26, one elected member of parliament out of 444 seats, no known university 

presidents or deans, and very few legislators or judges. 

According to the State Department, public university 

training programs for Arabic-language teachers exclude 

non-Muslims because the curriculum involves the study 

of the Koran. Under Egyptian law, Muslim men can marry 

Christian women but Muslim women are prohibited 

from marrying Christian men. Romantic relationships 

across this divide are often a source of tension between 

Muslim and Christian communities in Egypt. In February 2007, Muslim groups reportedly set fire to several 

Christian-owned shops in southern Egypt due to rumors 

of a relationship between a Muslim woman and a Coptic 

Christian man. Seven Muslims and one Coptic Christian 

were arrested on suspicion of taking part in arson attacks 

on Christian-owned stores and property.

For all Christian groups, government permission 

must still be sought to build a new church or repair an 

existing one, and the approval process for church construction is time consuming and inflexible. President 

Mubarak continues to have the authority to approve applications for new construction of churches and more than 

100 applications to build new churches await his decision. Though most of these applications were submitted 

more than five years ago, the majority have not received 

a response. Even some permits that have been approved 

cannot, in fact, be acted upon because of interference by 

the state security services at both the local and national 

levels. In December 2005, President Mubarak signed Decree 291 transferring authority for renovating or repairing 

existing churches from the president to the country’s 26 

governors. Although initially viewed as a welcome step, 

more than two years later, several churches continue to 

face significant delays in receiving permits and some local 

authorities continue to prevent maintenance and renovation of existing churches.

Although neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code 

prohibits proselytizing or conversion, the State Department has observed that the Egyptian government uses the 

Penal Code to discourage proselytizing by non-Muslims. 

Article 98(f ) of the Code is used frequently to prosecute 

alleged acts of proselytism by non-Muslims. Known converts from Islam to Christianity generally receive attention 

from the state security services; most conversions are 

therefore reportedly done privately. Egyptian government 

officials have stated that no law prevents conversion, but 

some individuals have been arrested for falsifying identity 

documents following conversion. In some instances, converts, who fear government harassment if they officially 

register their change in religion from Islam to Christianity, 

reportedly have altered their own identification cards and 

other official documents to reflect their new religious affiliation. 

In February 2008, in an important case, Egypt’s highest court reversed a lower court’s ruling prohibiting citizens from returning to Christianity after converting to Islam. However, in this case of 12 people allowed to return 

to Christianity, the court ruled that while their religious affiliation on identity documents can be changed to “Christian,” the documents must also refer to each individual as 

a “formerly declared Muslim,” thus potentially opening a 

new justification for police harassment and/or continued 

prejudicial treatment by officials responsible for providing 

public services, as well as societal violence. This potentially positive development may be short-lived, however. 

In March 2008, an Egyptian judge appealed the February 

ruling to the Supreme Constitutional Court to review the 

constitutionality of Article 47, which guarantees “freedom 

of opinion,” the law cited by the Supreme Administrative 

Hanging Coptic Church (El Muallaqa) in Cairo.
225

Court that allowed the 12 converts to Islam to return to 

Christianity. The appeal requests that the Constitutional 

Court rule on whether or not Article 47 contradicts Article 

2, which makes Islamic law the principal source of legislation. As of this writing, the appeal is pending.

In contrast to these re-conversion cases, the Egyptian 

government generally does not recognize conversions of 

Muslims to other religions. In a ruling in January 2008, 

an Egyptian court denied the right of Mohammed Hegazy 

to change his identity card to reflect his conversion to 

Christianity from Islam. Citing Article 2 of the Egyptian 

constitution, which says that Islamic law is the principal 

source of legislation, the judge ruled that since Hegazy 

was born Muslim and Islam is the “final and most complete religion,” he could not convert to another, allegedly 

less “complete” belief, such as Christianity. Hegazy, who 

has been subjected to death threats for trying to exercise 

the right to choose his religion freely, is the first convert to 

Christianity to sue the Egyptian government for officially 

rejecting his application to change his religious affiliation 

on identity documents. 

In other developments, in late November 2007, police 

in Qena arrested Siham Ibrahim Muhammad Hassan alSharqawi, a Muslim convert to Christianity who had been 

in hiding since 2003. She was interrogated for four days 

and threatened with beatings. According to press reports, 

her whereabouts have been unknown since November 27, 

though she may have been released and gone into hiding. In August 2007, two representatives of the Canadianbased Middle East Christian Association (MECA) were 

detained and charged with insulting Islam and tarnishing 

Egypt’s reputation abroad. One of those detained had 

apparently conducted an online interview with Muhammad Hegazy, the above-mentioned convert from Islam 

to Christianity, only days before his arrest. The two men 

were eventually released after 90 days in detention. In 

early November, three other employees of MECA were detained after they were reportedly investigating the death of 

a Christian man allegedly killed by Egyptian police. They 

were released without charge in late December. In April 

2007, Egyptian authorities released Baha Al-Accad, a citizen who was born Muslim but converted to Christianity. 

Accad was detained in April 2005, acquitted by a court for 

“contempt of religion,” subsequently released, detained 

again in 2006, and transferred to a prison in Wadi Natroun, where he was held for more than two years without 

charge. He was reportedly threatened by authorities upon 

his release. 

All Baha’i institutions and community activities have 

been banned since 1960 by a presidential decree. As a 

result, Baha’is are unable to meet and engage in group religious activities. Over the years, Baha’is have been arrested and imprisoned because of their religious beliefs, often 

on charges of insulting Islam. Almost all Baha’i community members are known to the state security services, and 

many are regularly subject to surveillance and other forms 

of harassment. Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center has 

issued fatwas (religious edicts) in recent years urging the 

continued ban on the Baha’i community and condemning 

Baha’is as apostates. There has been increased intolerance of Baha’is in both the independent and governmentEGYPT

All Baha’i institutions and community 

activities have been banned since 1960 

by a presidential decree. As a result, 

Baha’is are unable to meet and 

engage in group religious activities.

Commissioner Shea and Harold Koh, former Assistant Secretary of 

State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, testifying on Egypt 

before the Congressional Task Force on Religious Freedom, May 

2007.
226

controlled media in recent years. 

In a positive development, in January 2008, Cairo’s 

Court of Administrative Justice overturned the ban on 

providing official identity documents to some members 

of the Baha’i faith by allowing those Baha’is to put a dash 

or a symbol in the space designated for religious affiliation. The ruling only allows for Baha’is who were issued 

identity documents in the past to receive the new version, but not those who have never been issued identity 

documents. The Egyptian government’s requirement 

that religious affiliation be included on national identity 

cards has particularly affected the Baha’i community, as 

it has been the case up until this ruling that only the three 

“heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) 

are recognized and protected under the Constitution. 

Although no such limitation appears in the Constitution 

itself, the state has interpreted the text in this way because 

only three religions are recognized in Islam. Since “Muslim, Jew, or Christian” are the only choices, Baha’is have 

been prevented from obtaining identity cards, which are 

needed for many basic transactions, such as opening a 

bank account, buying a car, or obtaining a driver’s license. 

Moreover, the Egyptian government has made it illegal to 

be in public without an identity card. Because the Baha’i 

faith is banned, the community also has difficulty obtaining birth and death certificates, as well as obtaining or 

renewing passports. If fully implemented, this new ruling 

could potentially address one of the longstanding discriminatory polices related to freedom of religion or belief 

for Baha’is in Egypt. In April 2008, a press report indicated 

that the Egyptian Ministry of Interior decided not to appeal the January verdict, but planned to weaken it such 

that Baha’is would have the option only of putting dashes 

(--) in the religious affiliation section, and not writing 

“other” or leaving the section blank. 

There have been attempts in the past to address this 

issue. In April 2006, a lower Egyptian administrative court 

ruled that a Baha’i couple should be permitted to identify 

their religious affiliation on official government documents. This positive development proved short-lived, as 

the Interior Ministry appealed the ruling following the 

advice of religious authorities and some parliamentary 

members. A higher court suspended the original decision in May 2006, creating a renewed sense of insecurity 

in the Baha’i community. In August 2006, Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), a governmentappointed advisory body, held an unprecedented public 

symposium in Cairo focused solely on the Egyptian 

government’s policy requiring citizens to list their religion on national identification cards. At the symposium, 

human rights and civil society groups testified that the 

Egyptian government should reverse its policy. Nevertheless, in December 2006, the Supreme Administrative 

Court upheld the Egyptian government’s discriminatory 

policy of prohibiting members of the Baha’i community 

from obtaining national identity cards. Because Baha’is 

were forced to choose between claiming adherence to a 

religion other than their own or foregoing an identity card 

and other official documents, the court’s ruling effectively 

denied Egyptian Baha’is their rights as citizens of Egypt 

and subjected them to particular hardship in obtaining 

education, employment, and social services. The recent 

law requiring all citizens to carry new, computerized 

identity cards means that those who do not carry them 

face detention and arrest. Although no such arrests have 

Material vilifying Jews—with 

both historical and new anti-Semitic 

stereotypes—appears regularly in 

the state-controlled and 

semi-official media.

Representatives of the National Council for Human Rights, including noted international lawyer and Deputy Chair of the Council, Dr. 

Ahmed Kamal Abou El Magd (center).
227

been made, in 2005 – 2006, a Baha’i was dismissed from a 

job and at least two Baha’is (a student and lecturer) were 

expelled from universities because they were unable to 

obtain identity cards. 

Material vilifying Jews—with both historical and new 

anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears regularly in the statecontrolled and semi-official media. This material includes 

anti-Semitic cartoons, television programming such as a 

24-part series based on the notorious anti-Semitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” and spurious Holocaust denial 

literature. Egyptian authorities have not taken adequate 

steps to combat anti-Semitism in the media, despite official claims that they have advised journalists to avoid 

anti-Semitism. Human rights groups also cite persistent, 

virulent anti-Semitism in the education system, which is 

increasingly under the influence of Islamist extremists, a 

development the Egyptian government has not adequately addressed. The small Jewish community maintains and 

owns its property and performs required maintenance 

largely financed through private donations. In November 

2007, the American Jewish Committee announced that 

representatives had recently met in Cairo with Egyptian 

government officials to discuss the preservation of Jewish heritage in Egypt. Egyptian authorities, including 

the Minister of Culture and the head of the Ministry’s 

Supreme Council of Antiquities, pledged to move forward 

over the next few years with the restoration of the seven 

synagogues under the Council’s supervision as well as the 

possible development of a Jewish museum in Egypt. 

After several years of close surveillance, authorities 

increased repressive measures in late 2005 and early 2006 

against the small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who 

are not recognized by the Egyptian government. After a 

period of improved conditions and a significant decrease 

in harassment and abuse by government officials in 2006, 

the number of interrogations by Egypt’s state security 

services of Jehovah’s Witnesses increased in 2007 and 

early 2008. In particular, one member of the state security 

services in Cairo has increasingly used intimidation and 

threats of physical abuse to extract information about 

co-religionists. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Egypt continued 

to pursue legal recognition but have not made any significant progress with Egyptian authorities in the past year.

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups, which advocate or seek to establish an Islamic 

state in Egypt based on their interpretation of Islamic 

law, are considered illegal organizations by the Egyptian 

government under a law prohibiting political parties 

based on religion. Despite these restrictions, the Muslim 

Brotherhood has become more visible in Egypt’s political landscape. In fact, more than 100 members of the 

Muslim Brotherhood ran as independent candidates in 

the December 2005 parliamentary elections and won 88 

seats, up significantly from their previous 15. The Muslim 

Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups have used 

violence in the past to achieve their aims, including the 

assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and attacks on foreign tourists. Some of these groups persist in 

advocating violence. Egyptian security forces continue 

to arrest hundreds of suspected Islamists every year, and 

some are subject to torture and/or prolonged detention 

without charge. According to Egyptian and international 

human rights groups, at any given time, there are several 

thousand political detainees, including members of the 

Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups, 

in administrative detention and their cases are not being 

investigated. Most groups that closely monitor the detention of such individuals claim that the vast majority of 

these prisoners are in prison as a result of their political 

beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

On a positive note, in November 2005, the National 

Council for Human Rights (NCHR) announced the formation of a sub-group, the “Citizenship Committee,” to focus 

on religious freedom issues. As a result, the NCHR’s 2006 

and 2007 annual reports contained increased reporting on 

religious freedom concerns. Issues addressed in the most 

recent report included the situation of Baha’is, problems 

facing Jehovah’s Witnesses, violence targeting Christians, 

and the need for the government to pass a law on the conEGYPT

Buildings and pyramids of Cairo. 
228

struction of new places of worship for all religious groups. 

Throughout the past year, the Commission continued 

to meet with representatives of the various religious communities in Egypt, as well as with human rights organizations, academics, and other experts. In July 2004, a Commission delegation traveled to Egypt. While there, the 

delegation met with senior government officials, religious 

leaders, human rights groups, scholars, educators, legal 

specialists, and others active in civil society. In June 2005, 

the Commission released a Policy Focus brief on Egypt at 

an event at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, 

DC. The Policy Focus on Egypt provided details about the 

Commission’s visit to Egypt and presented recommendations for U.S. policy. 

In February 2008, the Commission issued a statement calling on the Egyptian government to respect the 

judicial rulings on identity cards for Baha’is and Christian 

converts, as discussed above. In June 2007, the Commission issued statements expressing concern about the May 

and June detention of five Koranists, and an appeal to the 

highest Egyptian court by 45 Coptic Christians requesting 

that their national identity cards officially recognize their 

return to Christianity. In May 2007, the Commission met 

in Washington, DC with the Deputy Chair of the Egyptian 

National Council for Human Rights to discuss ongoing 

religious freedom concerns in Egypt. Also in May, thenCommission Vice Chair Nina Shea testified at a Members’ 

briefing of the Task Force on International Religious Freedom of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus entitled 

“Religious Freedom in Egypt: Recent Developments.” 

In November 2006, the Commission issued a statement calling for the Egyptian government to reverse its 

discriminatory policy on national identity cards. In December, the Commission expressed deep regret over a 

decision by the Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt to 

uphold the Egyptian government’s discriminatory policy 

of prohibiting Baha’is from obtaining national identity 

cards. In January 2006, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requesting that the United 

States urge President Mubarak to prevent the imminent 

deportation of hundreds of refugees and asylum seekers 

back to Sudan, where many of them reportedly faced religious persecution. Approximately 3,000 Sudanese had 

been staging a peaceful protest in Cairo since September 

2005. In late December 2005, Egyptian police attempted 

to disperse the assembly by firing water cannons at the 

protesters and beating many; at least 25 men, women, and 

children died. 

In July 2005, then-Commission Vice Chair Felice D. 

Gaer testified before a Members’ Briefing of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus entitled, “The Human Rights 

Situation in Egypt: An Overview.” In November 2005, 

Commissioner Elizabeth H. Prodromou testified before 

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus at a hearing 

entitled “Religious Freedom in Egypt.” Also in July 2005, 

House Resolution 413 was introduced, expressing the 

concern of the House of Representatives that the amount 

of U.S. foreign assistance provided to Egypt over the past 

25 years has increased despite the lack of any meaningful 

political reforms by the government of Egypt. The resolution contains a significant number of the Commission’s 

recommendations with regard to Egypt. 
Commission Recommendations

229

 Taking Most 

Responsibility for Religious 

Affairs Out of the Hands of the 

Egyptian Security Services

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government urge the 

Egyptian government to:

• remove de facto responsibility for religious affairs from the state security 

services, with the exception of cases 

involving violence or the advocacy 

of violence;

• repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 1981, in order to allow 

for the full consolidation of the rule 

of law in Egypt;

• implement procedures that would 

ensure that all places of worship 

are subject to the same transparent, 

non-discriminatory, and efficient 

regulations regarding construction 

and maintenance, and take special 

measures to preserve Coptic Orthodox and other Christian properties 

and antiquities, which too often are 

subject to societal violence and official neglect;

• repeal Article 98(f) of the Penal 

Code, which “prohibits citizens 

from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian 

strife”; allow for full access to the 

constitutional and international 

guarantees of the rule of law and 

due process for those individuals 

charged with violating Article 98(f); 

and release Internet blogger Abdel 

Karim Suleiman and other individuals convicted under Article 98(f) on 

account of their religion or belief.

 Implementing Additional 

Reform in Order to Comply 

with International Human 

Rights Standards

The U.S. government should also 

urge the Egyptian government to:

• repeal a 1960 presidential decree 

banning members of the Baha’i 

community from practicing their 

faith;

• exclude from all educational textbooks any language or images that 

promote enmity, intolerance, hatred, or violence toward any group 

of persons based on faith, gender, 

ethnicity, or nationality, and include 

in school curricula, textbooks, and 

teacher training the concepts of 

tolerance and respect for human 

rights, including religious freedom, 

ensuring that textbooks meet the 

standards set out in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights;

• cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews 

and Baha’is, in the governmentcontrolled media and take active 

measures to promote understanding and respect for members of 

these and other minority religious 

communities;

• take all appropriate steps to prevent 

and punish acts of anti-Semitism, 

including condemnation of antiSemitic acts, and, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, 

counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric 

and other organized anti-Semitic 

activities;

• fully implement the January 2008 

ruling of Egypt’s Court of Administrative Justice, which overturned the 

ban on providing official identity 

documents to some members of 

the Baha’i faith by allowing those 

Baha’is to put a dash or a symbol 

in the space reserved for religious 

affiliation;

• remove the designation “formerly 

declared Muslim” from identity 

cards for those Christians who have 

converted back to Christianity from 

Islam, which makes the persons 

involved vulnerable to official harassment and societal violence;

• ensure that every Egyptian is 

protected against discrimination 

in social, labor, and other rights 

by modifying the national identity 

card either to (a) omit mention of 

religious affiliation from identity 

documents, or (b) make optional 

any mention of religious affiliation on identity documents, since 

currently, individuals must identify 

themselves as adherents of one 

of the three faiths recognized by 

the state—Islam, Christianity, or 

Judaism—or, as a result of the January 2008 ruling, put dashes (--) in 

the religious affiliation section;

• more actively investigate religiousbased violence against Egyptian citizens, particularly Coptic Christians, 

prosecute perpetrators responsible 

for the violence, and ensure compensation for victims;

• investigate claims of police negligence and inadequate prosecution 

of those involved in the Al-Kosheh 

case, as well as other past instances 

of violence targeting individuals on 

1 2 
account of their religion or belief, 

particularly members of the vulnerable Coptic Orthodox Christian 

community;

• request the National Council for Human Rights to investigate allegations 

of discrimination against Coptic Orthodox Christians as a human rights 

issue and to publish its findings and 

recommendations; and

• implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN Committee Against 

Torture, as well as other relevant 

international human rights treaties 

to which Egypt is a party. 

 Ensuring that U.S. 

Government Aid Promotes 

Prompt and Genuine Political 

and Legal Reforms and is 

Offered Directly to Egyptian 

Civil Society Groups

In addition, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• establish a timetable for implementation of political and human rights 

reforms, including steps described 

in the recommendations above; if 

deadlines are not met, the U.S. government should reconsider the appropriate allocation of its assistance 

to the Egyptian government;

• continue direct support for human 

rights and other civil society or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

without vetting by the Egyptian 

government;

• urge the Egyptian government to 

ensure that NGOs engaged in human rights work can pursue their 

activities without undue government interference, and monitor 

and report to what extent this is 

accomplished; and

• expand support of initiatives to 

advance human rights, promote 

religious tolerance, and foster civic 

education among all Egyptians, 

including support for:

• civic education and public 

awareness programs that reflect 

the multi-confessional nature of 

Egyptian society and the diversity 

of Egypt’s religious past;

• efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to review Egyptian educational curricula and 

textbooks for messages of hatred, 

intolerance, and the advocacy of 

violence, and to monitor equal 

access to education by girls and 

boys regardless of religion or 

belief; and

• preservation of Egyptian Jewish 

properties and antiquities in a 

publicly accessible site, such as in 

a museum, so that all Egyptians 

can better understand past and 

present Jewish contributions to 

their history and culture. 

In the context of the annual 

congressional appropriation for 

U.S. assistance to Egypt, Congress 

should require the State Department 

to report to it annually on the extent 

to which the government of Egypt 

has made progress on the issues described in this chapter, as well as on 

the progress of the U.S. government 

on offering funding directly to Egyptian NGOs without prior Egyptian 

government approval. 

230

3 
Indonesia

Indonesia’s transition to democracy since 1998 has 

contributed to a gradual improvement in conditions for 

human rights, including religious freedom. The majority of Indonesia’s diverse religious communities operate 

openly and without many restrictions, though religious 

groups outside of the six officially-recognized religions 

(Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 

and Confucianism) face some restrictions and discrimination. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government 

continues to take positive steps to address terrorism and 

past sectarian violence and to bring peace to the region 

of Aceh. The Commission remains concerned, however, 

about continued instances of communal violence, the 

forcible closures of places of worship belonging to religious minorities, the growing political power and influence of religious extremists, the human rights abuses perpetuated by the military and police, and the harassment 

and arrest of individuals considered “deviant” under Indonesian law. Moreover, various segments of the Indonesian government sometimes tolerate discrimination and 

abuse of religious minorities by extremist groups. Because 

of these persistent concerns, the Commission continues 

to place Indonesia on its Watch List. 

Islam in Indonesia is known historically for its tolerance and its assimilation and accommodation of a variety 

of indigenous cultural traditions. Over the past decade, 

there has been a revival of Islamic awareness and piety, 

previously repressed by the former military government. 

The wearing of Islamic dress has re-emerged as an outward sign of devotion; the number of Islamic banks, businesses, and publications is growing; and Islamic-themed 

art and fiction are becoming more popular. Indonesian 

Muslim leaders have engaged in vibrant discussions on 

the nature of democracy and pluralism, the separation of 

religion and state, women’s rights, and human rights more 

generally. There are numerous religious political parties 

and the role of Islam in politics and society, as well as the 

growth of terrorism justified on religious grounds, are topics discussed widely on television and radio and in numerous public fora, including during the 2004 presidential 

debates. 

The revival of Islamic piety, coupled with Indonesia’s 

new democratic openness, has strengthened Indonesia’s 

moderate Muslim institutions, but it has also nurtured 

religious groups espousing intolerance and extremism 

under the banner of Islamic orthodoxy. There continue 

to be a disturbing number of instances where allegedly 

heterodox Muslims and some non-Muslims face intimidation, arrest, or other violence for “denigrating religion,” 

“deviancy,” or “blasphemy.” If radical religious groups 

were to build a unified political base, there would be legitimate fears that Indonesia’s culture of pluralism, moderation, and tolerance would be eroded. Given the upcoming 

2009 Presidential election, the full protection of religious 

freedom, for all of Indonesia’s diverse religious communities, will be an important bellwether of Indonesia’s commitment to democracy. 

In 2002, the Commission placed Indonesia on its 

Watch List after sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi 

and the Malukus claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands of others. Religiously-motivated 

violence has declined sharply since that time and police 

have arrested—and local courts have sentenced—some 

individuals responsible for those acts of violence. While 

sectarian tensions remain tense in some places, local religious leaders and government officials, including Vice 

President Josef Kalla, have worked to promote reconciliation and defuse tensions in former conflict areas. Local 

governments have instituted interfaith development projects to rebuild churches, mosques, and homes destroyed 

in past violence. According to the State Department’s 

2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, police 

INDONESIA

231

The revival of Islamic piety, coupled 

with Indonesia’s new democratic 

openness, has strengthened Indonesia’s 

moderate Muslim institutions, 

but it has also nurtured religious 

groups espousing intolerance and 

extremism under the banner 

of Islamic orthodoxy. 
232

have arrested dozens of suspects, both Christians and 

Muslims, for past involvement in sectarian violence. Significantly, there have no deaths or injuries related to communal or sectarian violence in the Malukus during the 

past two years. 

Nevertheless, mob violence, terrorist acts, and sectarian tensions continue to be problems in Central Sulawesi, 

despite active efforts by local authorities to promote reconciliation and by police and security forces to apprehend 

perpetrators. Extremist groups continue to train, recruit, 

and operate in Central and South Sulawesi, and these 

groups have frequently been responsible for attacks on 

members of religious minorities and police, instigating 

mob actions to restrict religious activities, and organizing 

political efforts to segregate Central Sulwesi into Muslim 

and Christian enclaves. In 2005, extremists beheaded 

three Christian girls, shot two others waiting for a school 

bus, attacked Protestant religious leaders and services, 

and bombed a pork market and a Hindu temple in Poso 

and Palu, Central Sulawesi. Local religious leaders condemned the attacks as the work of “outside extremists” 

seeking to undermine interfaith reconciliation efforts. Police arrested the individual who planned the beheadings 

of the schoolgirls in Poso. In March 2007, the purported 

mastermind of the attacks was given a 20-year sentence 

and his accomplices were given14-year sentences. In addition to these arrests, police also apprehended at least 10 

others who confessed to participating in various bombings, beheadings, and shootings in Central Sulawesi over 

the past two years. Police in Central Sulawesi claim that 

they have arrested or killed 18 of the 29 individuals “most 

wanted” for sectarian violence, including two individuals accused of the 2006 assassination of Reverend Irianto 

Kongkoli.

Despite some successes, police tactics and alleged judicial favoritism have combined sometimes to exacerbate 

communal tensions. For example, in September 2006, 

Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, and Marianus Riwu 

were executed for their alleged roles in the 2000 killings 

of 191 Muslims at a local boarding school. Despite evidence that called into question the case against the three, 

including the public reservations of Poso’s former Chief 

of Police, subsequent higher courts allowed the execution 

to proceed. The executions led to violence in areas of East 

Nusa Tenggara Province, where the three men were born, 

and in Central Sulawesi. In Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, 

3,000 Christians rioted and burned down government 

buildings. In Kefamananu and Atambua, West Timor, between 3,000 and 5,000 persons, largely Christians, rioted, 

destroying government buildings, homes, and vehicles. 

In Central Sulawesi, on the same day as the executions, 

a mob beat two Muslims to death in the predominately 

Christian village of Taripa. Police arrested 17 people for 

participating in the killings; all of them admitted their involvement. Several other incidents occurred following the 

executions, including three small bombings, attacks on 

both Muslim and Christian targets, and an attack on the 

new Central Sulawesi police chief. Local religious leaders report that police continue to protect churches during 

services. 

In 2006, Vice President Kalla met with community 

and religious leaders in Central Sulawesi to urge reconciliation and assured residents that security personnel would 

remain in Poso to help resolve local conflicts. Some local religious leaders contend that that tactics used by 

counterterrorism units and police investigators sent from 

Jakarta, including a counter-terrorism unit called Detachment 88, a group partially trained and equipped by U.S. 

foreign assistance grants, have the potential to exacerbate 

problems further in Central Sulawesi. In the months following the executions of Tibo, da Silva, and Riwu, Detachment 88 units moved aggressively to arrest Muslim individuals suspected of participating in sectarian violence. 

In three separate raids during January 2007, police killed 

at least 16 people and captured 28 other suspects. During 

the funerals for two of those killed in the raids, mobs rioted, killing three people, including a local policeman. A 

week later, bombs exploded in the Ecclesia Poso Church, 

though there were no casualties. Local religious leaders 

report that extremists are now portraying the police as 

thoghut (anti-Muslim forces). There are concerns that the 

harsh tactics used by Detachment 88 will increase sympathy for extremists in Central Sulawesi, attract religious 

militants from other regions to Sulawesi, and eventually 

lead to a backlash against local Christians. Many grievances remain about the sectarian conflict that occurred in 

1999-2001, including fears that few of those responsible 

for instigating the violence will be held accountable. An 

estimated 35,000 people continue to live in camps for the 

internally displaced. Extremist groups, such as Mujahidin 

Kompak (MK) and Tanah Runtuh, continue to train and 

operate in Sulawesi. The June 2007 arrest of suspected terrorist leader Abu Dujana confirmed that terrorist networks 

are aiming to stoke sectarian tensions in Central Sulawesi 
233

INDONESIA

by planning bombings and assassinations of religious 

leaders. 

The Indonesian government continues to make notable progress in capturing and prosecuting persons accused of specific terrorist activities. Over the past several 

years, the government has prosecuted six individuals responsible for the suicide attack on the Australian Embassy 

in 2004, and three individuals who planned and implemented the 2005 Bali bombing. In 2007, police also arrested 17 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects for planning new 

terrorist operations in Central Sulawesi. In April 2008, an 

Indonesian court officially declared JI a terrorist organization and sentenced its military commander, Abu Dujana, 

to 15 years imprisonment for stockpiling weapons, harboring fugitives, and committing terrorist violence. The 

Court’s decision could pave the way for the banning of JI 

in Indonesia, something that the Indonesian government 

has heretofore been reluctant to do. 

Religious extremists are a very small but still influential minority in Indonesia. Moderate Muslim leaders and 

members of religious minorities report that they continue 

to face pressure, intimidation, or sometimes violence from 

protests organized by extremist groups. According to the 

Indonesian Institute on Democracy and Peace (SETARA), 

communal violence and the arrest and detention of predominantly Muslim individuals considered “deviant” under Indonesia law have risen during the past year. In most 

cases, extremists groups instigated mob violence or pressured local officials to make arrests or close religious venues. The epicenter of most religious freedom restrictions 

and abuses is in the region of West Java, with important 

cases occurring in East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, Jakarta, 

and Yogyakarta. 

Over the past several years, members of such groups 

as Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of Martyrs (MMI), the Alliances for Anti-Apostates 

(AGAP), the Islamic Umat Forum (FUI), and Laskar 

Jundullah have used pressure, intimidation, or violence 

against those whose views or actions they found unacceptable. Their actions have included intimidating judges 

and local officials; vandalizing and destroying buildings 

belonging to religious minorities, including Christian 

churches, Hindu temples, and Ahmadiyah mosques; 

threatening moderate Muslims or those considered “deviant”; and forcing the closure of some non-Muslim businesses during Ramadan. These actions have continued 

in the last year. The offices of the Liberal Islam Network 

(JIL), whose appeals for pluralism and tolerance in IndoThe Pura Ulun Danau Temple at Lake Batur, Bali.
234

nesia angered extremist groups, were attacked by mobs in 

August 2005. Police prevented the mobs from destroying 

the JIL offices, but JIL leaders continue to face pressure 

and some threats. In February 2006, hundreds of protesters closed down a home used as a Hindu temple in 

Tangerang City, Banten Province; the protestors claimed 

that no Hindus lived in the region. In March 2006, members of Laskar Jundullah accused two foreign university 

linguists living in South Sulawesi of translating the Bible 

into the local dialect and demanded that the two longtime residents be deported. Police dispersed the crowd, 

but allowed some in the group to ransack the couple’s 

home. In October 2006, a mob in Bogor, West Java beat 

to death Muslim cleric Alih bin Hadi, who was accused of 

holding heretical views, including that the hajj to Mecca 

was unnecessary, that zakat could be paid later than is 

customary, and that religious services could be held late 

at night. Previously, Alih had agreed to leave Bogor and 

stop preaching, but he returned a month before he was 

beaten to death. Three men are currently being held in 

custody for allegedly planning Alih’s murder. 

In the past year, according to Indonesian religious 

groups and human rights activists, there have been over 

35 incidents of mob action targeting the worship activities 

or venues of religious minority groups, a figure slightly 

lower than in previous years. In March, 2007, over 200 FPI 

members attacked the Arastamar School of Theology in 

East Jakarta, demanding that the school be closed down. 

Police intervened to stop vandalism of the property and 

the school remains open. In April 2007, dozens of individuals associated with the Anti-Apostasy Division (DAP) 

picketed a church in Bandung, West Java and demanded 

its closure for allegedly seeking to convert local Muslims, 

though church leaders denied these allegations. In June 

2007, a militant group vandalized a Protestant church in 

Bandung Regency, West Java. Two weeks later, demonstrators picketed a nearby church and housing complex 

demanding that worship in private homes be stopped. In 

both cases, worship activity was halted. 

In September 2007, a mob attacked and tried to destroy a church in Bandung, West Java, complaining that 

the noise made in worship disturbed the local community. In September 2007, a large crowd burned down a 

church in Siompi, Aceh and confronted worshippers during a meeting. Police briefly detained the pastor, allegedly 

because there were death threats made against him. At 

this time, the church has disbanded. In November 2007, 

individuals claiming to represent local villagers pressured 

provincial authorities in Duri Selatan village, Tambora 

district, West Jakarta to close a Catholic church. Also in 

November, members of several Muslim organizations 

pressured provincial officials to cancel building permits 

for a large Hindu temple in Bayan district, West Lombok, 

West Nusa Tenggara. In December, government officials 

successfully averted an attack on a Shi’a mosque in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, but later banned the Shi’a 

group’s activities in the city. Several Shi’a communities in 

East Java and Madura faced attacks, vandalism, threats, 

and legal action beginning in December 2007. In January 2008, a mob burned the Sangkareang Hindu temple, 

destroying the building and its contents, in Keru district, 

West Lombok. 

Police rarely arrest those responsible for vandalizing or destroying property of religious groups, but have 

intervened in some cases to prevent property destruction 

and to disperse crowds. Local government officials have 

sought to mediate between militant groups and religious 

minorities in some cases, but most often acquiesce to 

pressure from militants and revoke permits for longstanding places of worship or allow the destruction of religious 

venues operating without permits. In response to persistent criticism from religious minorities and international 

observers over the number of religious venues closed or 

destroyed in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion issued 

Joint Ministerial Decree 1/2006 to replace a previous, 

vaguely-worded decree that required religious groups to 

gain “community approval” before they could expand, 

renovate, or open new religious venues. Decree 1/2006 

requires a religious group with a membership of more 

Violence and legal restrictions 

targeting Ahmadiyah Muslims have risen 

dramatically since the July 2005 fatwa 

by the Indonesian Ulemas Council 

(MUI) that condemned the 

Ahmadiyahs as a heretical sect.
235

INDONESIA

than 90 persons to obtain the support of 60 local residents 

for any plans to build or expand a religious venue. That 

petition must then be sent to the Joint Forum for Religious 

Tolerance (FKUB), a provincial panel of religious leaders 

chosen proportionally by the number of religious adherents in the province. If there remains strong community 

opposition to the religious venue, the FKUB can find an 

alternative location. 

Observers claim that the new decree is designed 

to stop the proliferation of “house churches” and small 

Hindu temples (fewer than 90 members) and to remove 

permit decisions from local authorities who are subject 

to intimidation and corruption. Prominent Muslim religious leaders have stated publicly that the new decree is 

more restrictive than the previous one and might violate 

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights. It is too soon to evaluate fully whether 

Decree 1/2006 will reduce the number of forced closures 

of religious venues. In December 2007, the government 

announced its intention to “crack down” on mob violence 

targeting the worship venues of religious minorities. 

Nonetheless, Christian and Hindu groups continue to report discrimination or vandalism, despite having obtained 

the necessary signatures. For example, five Protestant 

churches in North Bekasi, Jabotabek region, East Jakarta 

continue to face vandalism and sporadic protests from 

the group Musholla (Cooperating Bureau of Mosques 

and Praying Rooms) because they meet in private homes 

and dwellings. Although they continue to worship and 

police protect their activities, local political leaders have 

not given permission for the churches to build permanent 

structures, despite the 2006 Ministerial Decree. The Commission will continue to monitor the decree, instances of 

forced closure of religious venues, and the ability of the 

Indonesian government to hold accountable groups that 

perpetrate violence and intimidation against members of 

religious minorities. 

Violence and legal restrictions targeting Ahmadiyah 

Muslims have risen dramatically since the July 2005 fatwa

by the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI) that condemned 

the Ahmadiyahs as a heretical sect. The MUI fatwas do 

not carry the force of law; however, police and prosecutors 

in some areas reference MUI edicts when making arrests 

and detentions of so-called “deviant” sects. In addition, 

the Indonesian government has not publicly distanced 

itself from recent MUI edicts. In the past two years, 

there have been numerous attacks by militant groups on 

mosques, properties, and individuals associated with 

Ahmadiyah. Police and local government authorities 

sometimes assisted mob violence or otherwise condoned 

militants’ activities. 

In February 2006, an Ahmadiyah housing complex 

in Gegerungan, Lombok was attacked; six persons were 

injured and 25 homes were destroyed. Reports indicate 

that police knew of the attack beforehand but were unable or unwilling to stop the violence. Although police 

briefly arrested several participants in the Gegerungan 

attack, they were quickly released when a mob protested 

at the police station. In March 2006, members of the 

Anti-Ahmadiyah Alliance destroyed homes of Ahmadiyah 

members in Prapen, Lombok; there were no arrests after 

this attack. As of this writing, 181 Ahmadiyah residents 

of Lombok were living in an internally displaced persons 

(IDP) camp in Mataram; they have not been allowed to 

return to or rebuild their homes. In South Sulawesi province, mobs closed and vandalized Ahmadiyah mosques 

and threatened Ahmadiyah followers in February, April, 

and October 2006. No arrests were made in any of these 

attacks. In October 2006 in Bogor, West Java, a mob damaged an Ahmadiyah mosque and the house of a local 

resident; no arrests were made in this case. In addition, 

some local governments continue to ban the activities of 

Ahmadiyah and other “messianic” Islamic sects, as well 

as some non-Muslim groups. The province of West Nusa 

Tenggara issued a ban on 13 religious sects, including Ahmadiyahs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and nine 

forms of indigenous beliefs as alleged deviations from 

Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. Reports indicate that 

the real targets of the legislation were Ahmadiyah and a 

messianic Islamic sect called Jamaah Salyifiah. Local bans 

Prayer at Mosque Istiqlal in Jakarta.
236

on Ahmadiyah practice were extended or remain in force 

in parts of West Java and West Nusa Teggara.

Ahmadiyah religious leaders and Indonesian human 

rights groups report that 15 incidents occurred in 2007 

involving property destruction, intimidation of worshippers, and continued closure of religious venues. In June 

2007, FPI staged two anti-Ahmadiyah demonstrations at 

a mosque in Tasikmalaya, West Java. The protestors demanded that the mosque be closed, vandalized the building, and circulated a petition demanding that the regional 

parliament dissolve the Ahmadiyah community. The Parliament of Taskimalaya refused to consider this petition, 

claiming that such a decision must be made by the central 

government. In November 2007, mobs attacked and destroyed Ahmadiyah mosques and properties in West Sumatra and West Java and threatened followers in Central 

Jakarta. In December, a series of mob attacks in Kunnigan, West Java spread to other localities in West Java, including the villages of Manis Lor and Sukajaya, destroying 

homes and two mosques. In response to the December 

attacks, Vice President Kalla issued a statement that Muslims who attack members of “deviant” Islamic sects would 

face “tough” police action and asked provincial leaders to 

“unseal [allow to reopen]...Ahmadiyah places of worship.” 

Despite Vice President Kalla’s public statements, 

there continue to be efforts to ban the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. In April 2008, the government’s Coordinating 

Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor 

Pakem) recommended that the Ahmadiyah community be 

disbanded because it “continues to follow activities that 

deviate from mainstream Islamic teachings.” Following 

Bakor Pakem’s recommendation, the Ministry of Religious 

Affairs and the Home Ministry drafted a joint decree to 

outlaw the Ahmadiyah as a “heretical” sect. Leaders from 

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s 

two largest Muslim organizations, claimed that while the 

government has the authority to “outlaw” the group, they 

did not counsel such a move, instead proposing “elegant 

discourse” with Ahmadiyah leaders. Other prominent 

Indonesian religious leaders, including former President 

Gus Dur, former Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Ma’arif, 

and noted Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra, strongly condemned the draft joint decree, stating that such a move 

violated the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of religion and reflected “extremist” elements in Islam rather 

than more “moderate” traditions that promote “peace, 

tolerance, and respect for religious difference.” President 

Yudhoyono’s spokeman stated publicly that there was 

little support for the joint decree within the Presidential 

Advisory Council and claimed that the President himself 

believed that a ban would be a “bad precedent” for freedom of religion in Indonesia. As of this writing, no further 

action has been taken, but the draft decree has not been 

withdrawn, and radical groups have been threatening to 

take action if the government does not implement the 

joint decree. 

The potential ban on Ahmadiyah reflects a larger 

trend in Indonesia, as provincial government arrest and 

sentence allegedly hereterodox Muslims for “deviancy.” 

Since 2005, over 150 individuals have been arrested or 

briefly detained under Article 156 and 156a of the criminal 

code, according to which “expressing feelings of hostility, 

hatred or contempt against religions” and “disgracing a 

religion” are punishable by up to five years in jail. Arrests, 

detentions, and re-education programs for “deviancy” 

continued in the past year. In 2006, Lia Eden, leader of the 

messianic Muslim sect Jamaah Alamulla, was sentenced 

to two years in jail for “denigrating religion.” In November 

2007, Lia Eden’s deputy, Abdul Rachman, was sentenced 

to three years in prison for “blasphemy.” 

In 2005, Iman Muhammad Yusman Roy was sentenced to two years in jail in East Java’s Malang District 

Court for reciting prayers in the Indonesian language, 

which local officials claimed tarnished the purity of Islam. 

Sumardi Tappaya, a Muslim high school religious teacher 

on Sulawesi, was sentenced to six months in jail in June 

2006 on charges of heresy. A relative had accused him of 

whistling during prayers, and local religious officials declared that whistling was “deviant.” A foreign citizen and 

an Indonesian were sentenced to five months and two and 

one half years in prison, respectively, for “proselytizing” 

and “denigrating religion” while working as humanitarian 

aid workers on the island of Madura in November 2006. 

Six counselors at an East Java drug and cancer treatment 

center were arrested and sentenced to between three and 

five years in jail for allegedly violating key precepts of Islam; local religious leaders characterized their rehabilitation center’s teachings as heretical. Rus’an, a lecturer at 

the Muhammadiyah University in Palu, Central Sulawesi, 

was charged with heresy and sentenced to house arrest for 

publishing an article entitled “Islam, A Failed Religion,” 

about corruption in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He 

was arrested after 2,000 people protested and closed the 

Palu paper where the article had been published. The lec-
237 turer was later released from house arrest and fired by the 

University. 

In the last year, according to reports from SETARA 

and the Wahid Institute, police have detained, held for reeducation, or plan to pursue legal action against followers 

of a sect called Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, a group with approximately 40,000 followers whose leader claims to be a 

prophet. In October and November 2007, police detained 

125 members of Al-Qiyadah during raids in West Lombok, 

Yogyakarta, East Lombok, and Central Java. Ninety-six 

members of Al-Qiyadah publically signed documents 

renouncing their beliefs, including the sect’s leader Ahmad Moshaddeq. Despite his recantation, Moshaddeq 

was sentenced to four years in prison in April 2008 for 

“violating the criminal code by committing blasphemous 

acts.” Provincial leaders stated that charges against other 

members of Al-Qiyadah are forthcoming. In the past year, 

several other small, primarily “messianic” Muslim groups 

were labeled “deviant” and faced government harassment 

or communal violence including Dzikir Asmaul Husa, 

Dayak Segandhu Losarang Indramayu, Tarekat Naqsabandiyah, Islam Model Baru, Hidup di Balik Hidup, and 

Nural Yaqin. 

In the past, Indonesia’s “deviancy laws” have primarily targeted small groups regarded as heterodox by Muslim 

religious leaders. However, in April 2007, police in Malang, East Java arrested eight Protestants for disseminating 

a “prayer” video that allegedly instructs individuals to put 

the Koran on the ground and pray for the conversion of 

Indonesia’s Muslim political leaders. Later in the same 

month, an additional 33 people were detained under 

Article 156. In September 2007, a local court found all 41 

guilty of “insulting religion” and sentenced each to five 

years in prison. An appeal of the convictions is pending in 

the East Java High Court. Prosecutors claim to be seeking 

at least 60 other individuals associated with the production and dissemination of the video. 

Three Protestant women sentenced to three years in 

jail under the Child Protection Law for allegedly attempting to convert Muslim children at their daycare center 

and youth recreation programs were released on parole 

in June 2007. The women claimed that family members 

had given permission for their children to attend the event 

and that no proselytizing had occurred. Witnesses failed 

to support the women during the trial because of alleged 

intimidation from members of local militant groups. The 

judge at the trial also admitted to being intimidated by 

extremist group members who attended the trial. 

The Commission continues to monitor the implementation of sharia in Aceh. In August 2005, the Indonesian government concluded a comprehensive peace 

agreement with the insurgent group Free Aceh Movement 

(GAM), ending a 30-year conflict that had resulted in significant human rights abuses. The agreement has recently 

led to a newly elected government and hope for a region 

hard hit by the tsunami and decades of civil conflict. 

However, neither the peace agreement nor the elections 

overturned Presidential Decree 11/2003, which allowed 

the province to establish and implement sharia law and 

establish sharia courts. Since the end of the civil war, 

sharia courts and their vice patrols, locally known as the 

Wilayatul Hisbah, have taken on a more prominent public 

position. For example, in 2007, 25 persons were caned 

for consuming alcohol, 59 people for gambling, and 32 

people for being alone with persons of the opposite sex, 

comprising a total number that is slightly fewer than for 

the previous year. Public canings have sometimes drawn 

crowds in the thousands. Though religious leaders insist 

that public caning is supposed to be a method of “shame 

not pain,” there are reports that some persons required 

hospitalization. The jurisdiction of sharia courts and the 

power of the Wilayatul Hisbah are controversial issues for 

the new Acehnese government. Local non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) in Aceh report that government 

oversight of Wilayatul Hisbah has improved recently, 

making the vice patrols less intrusive than in the past. In 

addition, the new Acehnese government disbanded vice 

patrols in the city of Banda Aceh.

An architectural detail depicting the life of Buddha at the Borobudur Temple, Java.
238

However, the expansion of sharia in Aceh has influenced local initiatives elsewhere in Indonesia. Efforts to 

implement sharia provisions nationally have consistently 

been defeated by a coalition of the largest Muslim organizations together with religious minorities. However, some 

provinces and localities are enforcing Islamic law at the 

municipal and regional levels. Indonesian NGOs estimate 

that at least 66 perda syaria, or local sharia laws, have 

been promulgated and enforced in the past four years. In 

South Sulawesi, Madura, and Padang, West Sumatra, local 

authorities issued laws extending sharia provisions to all 

Muslims, including enforcement of Islamic dress, prohibition on alcohol, and caning punishments. In Madura and 

South Sulawesi, civil servants are required to cease work 

activities during the call to prayer and recitation of the 

Koran is reportedly being required for promotion. In Padang, West Sumatra, the local mayor instructed all Muslim 

women to wear a headscarf and in Bulukumba Regency, 

women can be denied government services if they are 

not wearing headscarves. Similar laws have already been 

implemented in parts of West Java, including Cianjur, 

Tasikmalaya, and Garut. In the city of Tangerang, Banten 

Province, local laws have banned public displays of affection, alcohol consumption, and prostitution. In this 

case, the laws apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims. 

The anti-prostitution ban is being challenged in Indonesian courts because it defines a prostitute as anyone who 

draws attention to him or herself by attitude, behavior, or 

dress. In the past year, according to the State Department, 

31 women were arrested as prostitutes, including a married mother waiting at a bus stop during the early evening. 

Fifty-six Indonesian parliamentarians issued a petition 

calling for a review of local sharia legislation to determine 

if the laws conflicted with constitutional protections and 

national laws. The petition was later dropped, and no review was instituted. Indonesian human rights advocates 

have expressed fears that local perda syaria legislation is a 

backdoor attempt to implement sharia nationally and may 

be used to mobilize political support for the more extremist Muslim parties during the 2009 elections. 

The Commission regularly meets with Indonesian 

political leaders, human rights activists and defenders, 

journalists, and religious leaders, including representatives of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu communities from 

the regions of Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi, Java, Bali, and the 

Malukus, as well as others. 

U.S. government assistance to Indonesia currently 

supports programs in conflict resolution, multi-religious 

dialogue and tolerance, pluralism, and education, programs that are in line with previous recommendations by 

the Commission.
Commission Recommendations

239

The Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government urge the 

government of Indonesia to: 

• disarm fully and disband all outside 

militia forces in Sulawesi, the Malukus, and Papua, such as Laskar Jundullah, Mujahidin Kompak, Tanah 

Runtuh, and Laskar Merah Putih;

• continue efforts to bring to justice 

those who participated in, or are 

responsible for, sectarian and ethnic 

violence in Central Sulawesi, the 

Malukus, and Papua, by providing 

fair and transparent trials;

• provide protection for religious 

venues, as well as restitution to religious communities whose venues 

have been destroyed or closed due 

to mob violence or protests, and 

ensure that those responsible for 

such acts are prosecuted; 

• establish an independent commission, composed of prominent 

persons in Poso, with a presidential 

mandate to question civilian and 

military authorities about police 

and military activities during the 

violence in 2000-2001, to examine 

grievances from the 2000-2001 

conflict and suggest ways to address 

them, and to make recommendations about civilian and police 

activities to address current communal and terrorist activities; 

• commit sufficient resources for the 

resettlement of all of the internally 

displaced persons (IDPs) in Central 

Sulawesi and the Malukus, who are 

a reminder of the 1999-2002 sectarian violence and a potential recruitment pool for extremists; 

• publicly address the July 2005 

Indonesian Ulamas Council (MUI) 

fatwas prohibiting interfaith prayer, 

interfaith marriage, interfaith 

inheritance, religious pluralism, 

liberalism, and secularism, as well 

as the decisions condemning the 

Ahmadiyah community, as contradicting the ideals of religious freedom and tolerance in Indonesia’s 

constitution, and condemn publicly 

the communal violence and harassment that followed the issuance 

of the fatwas targeting moderate 

Muslim organizations, such as the 

Liberal Islam Network (JIL), as well 

as Ahmadiyah mosques and religious centers;

• withdraw the draft joint decree put 

forward by the Ministry of Religious 

Affairs banning Ahmadiyah in Indonesia as a “deviant sect,” protect 

Ahmadiyah religious practice from 

communal violence, and re-open 

Ahmadiyah religious venues closed 

in past communal violence; 

• amend the Joint Ministerial Decree 

No. 1/2006 (Regulation on Building 

Houses of Worship) to bring it into 

compliance with the Indonesian 

constitution’s protection of religious 

freedom as well as international 

standards, and remove any restrictive barriers on building and refurbishing places of worship for all 

religious groups in Indonesia; and

• transfer or remove from Papua 

any security, police, and militia 

personnel who were indicted for 

activities related to serious human 

rights abuses and war crimes by 

the UN’s Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) and the Ad Hoc 

Human Rights Court for East Timor 

in Jakarta.

In addition, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should:

• commend the government of Indonesia for its efforts to curb terrorism, 

establish peace in Aceh, and promote inter-religious understanding, 

conflict mitigation, and a vibrant 

discussion among members of civil 

society on the role of Islam in supporting human rights, democracy, 

and pluralism; 

• consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States 

(2006), continue to expand U.S.-Indonesian cooperation in economic 

development, democracy, education, good governance, pluralism, 

and rule of law programs by: 

• supporting Indonesia’s evolving 

legal and human rights reform 

agenda by providing training, 

capacity building, and targeted 

exchanges with Indonesian 

government agencies, legal and 

judicial institutions and legal 

and human rights-focused civil 

society organizations, including the National Human Rights 

Commission (Komnas HAM), the 

Supreme Court, and the Directorate General of Human Rights in 

the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights;

• expanding exchange programs 

that bring Indonesian scholars, 

judges, lawyers, and activists 

to the United States to initiate 

discussions with governmental, 

academic, and non-governmental 

experts on human rights, including religious freedom, rule of law, 

and the relationship between 

religion and the state;
240

• establishing programs and working with allies in Europe and 

elsewhere to support monitoring of the implementation of 

sharia law in Aceh and other 

parts of Indonesia to determine 

if individual rights and freedoms, 

including religious freedom, are 

being guaranteed for all citizens, 

and making sure that U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance 

programs do not support sharia 

police or courts in Aceh or other 

municipalities in Indonesia; 

• monitoring and publicly reporting on the impact of U.S.-funded 

humanitarian relief and postconflict development programs 

on the promotion of religious 

freedom and other human rights, 

monitoring that should include, 

for example, a report to the appropriate congressional committees;

• establishing programs that promote training and capacity-building for Indonesian human rightsfocused civil society organizations 

involved in conflict resolution, 

inter-religious dialogue, reconciliation, public interest law, and 

economic and social development in areas of communal and 

sectarian conflict; 

• prioritizing support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

and human rights-focused civil 

society organizations pursuing 

programs on inter-religious 

economic development, conflict 

prevention and social cohesion, 

and the resettlement of internally 

displaced persons in potential 

flashpoint areas such as Central 

Sulawesi, the Malukus, Papua, or 

parts of West Java;

• expanding U.S. government 

support for the promotion of 

religious pluralism in Indonesia 

by supporting seminars and conferences, international exchanges, 

intra-religious dialogue, and new 

radio, television, and publishing 

activities of interfaith and private 

organizations that promote 

respect for religious freedom and 

human rights; and

• expanding support for media, 

dialogue, and publishing ventures 

of Indonesian organizations 

seeking to promote intra-Muslim 

dialogue on the compatibility of 

Islam and human rights, democracy, and pluralism, including the 

translation of books by prominent 

Indonesian scholars into, as appropriate, Arabic, Urdu, Persian, 

Turkish, and English; and

• ensure that any ties with the Indonesian military and police should 

include, as priorities:

• reform of the Indonesian military, 

including transfer to civilian 

control, training in international 

human rights standards, and 

technical assistance in military 

law and tribunals; 

• dedicated funds for training 

Indonesian police in counter-terrorism techniques and protecting 

human rights in areas of sectarian 

conflict, including fellowships to 

the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand and participation 

in UN Police training programs 

(UNPOL); and 

• denial of U.S. assistance to any 

police or military unit found to 

engage in a pattern of violations 

of human rights.
241

NIGERIA

Nigeria

The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent religious freedom concerns continues to be inadequate. These concerns include an ongoing series 

of violent communal conflicts along religious lines; the 

expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the criminal codes 

of several northern Nigerian states; and discrimination 

against minority communities of Christians and Muslims. 

In addition, there are reports of foreign sources of funding 

and support for Islamic extremist activities in northern 

Nigeria, activities that threaten to fracture the already 

fragile relations between the two main religious groups. 

However, in recent years, Nigerian security forces have 

responded more quickly to quell sectarian violence and 

have taken steps to address the activities of Islamic extremist groups. Because of persistent concerns, the Commission continues to place Nigeria on its Watch List.

Over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience 

incidents of violent communal conflict along religious and 

ethnic lines, which are often intertwined. The popular 

movement in 12 northern Nigerian states to expand the 

legal application of sharia to criminal matters continues 

to spark communal violence and is an ongoing source of 

volatility and tension between Muslims and Christians at 

both the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of 

Muslim-Christian violence in the last few years threaten 

to divide further the populace along religious lines and to 

undermine the democratic transition and the foundations 

of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief 

in Nigeria. Social, economic, and political conditions 

have not improved in the country, fostering a climate of 

even greater tension among ethnic and religious communities. 

In April 2007, Umaru Yar’Adua was elected President 

in elections that were widely characterized by international and domestic observers as fraudulent. Reports of 

vote-rigging and political violence also emerged in some 

areas. In advance of the April elections, the Christian 

Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the National Supreme 

Council for Islamic Affairs issued joint statements urging 

adherents of the Christian and Muslim communities to 

exercise vigilance and tolerance. Many observers contend 

that these statements, among other actions, contributed 

to the fact that election-related violence along religious 

lines was minimal.

Since 1999, more than 10,000 Nigerians have been 

killed in sectarian and communal attacks and reprisals between Muslims and Christians. The most serious of these 

clashes occurred in Kaduna state (February and May 2000 

and November 2002); Jos, Plateau state (September 2001); 

Kano state and Yelwa, Plateau state (February-May 2004); 

and in northern and southeastern Nigeria, in the wake of 

the controversy over depictions of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish press in February 2006 (see below). 

Ethnic and religious violence continued throughout 

the past year, although the number of deaths resulting 

from the violence decreased compared to previous years. 

Dozens of people were killed and dozens of churches 

and mosques were destroyed in communal violence in 

several towns and villages in southeastern Nigeria, the 

Middle Belt region, and northern Nigeria. In September 

2007, rioting in the northern state of Kano resulted in the 

deaths of 10 Christians and the destruction of at least nine 

churches. At least 60 people were injured and more than 

500 displaced. The rioting started after Muslim students 

from a public high school claimed that a Christian student 

had drawn a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad on the 

wall of the school’s mosque. A Kano state committee investigating the September attacks stated in November that 

19 Christians were killed, not 10 as previously reported. In 

December 2007, at least 10 people were killed, more than 

30 injured, and three churches burned in the northern 

state of Bauchi. Some 3,000 people fled their homes in the 

area of the clashes. According to press reports, the violence started after a dispute over the planned construction 

of a mosque at a secondary school in Yelwa, in a mixed 

Muslim and Christian neighborhood of the city. Muslim 

students reportedly began to riot after unidentified individuals pulled out two foundation blocks of the mosque 

Over the last year, Nigeria 

continued to experience incidents of 

violent communal conflict along 

religious and ethnic lines, which 

are often intertwined.
242

under construction. In February 2008, also in Bauchi, a 

violent clash between a Muslim mob and the police over a 

woman accused of blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed 

left at least one person dead and five seriously injured. 

Muslim youth torched a police station and looted homes 

of Christians and of the police. Also in February, in the 

state of Kano, a policeman was killed and two Christian 

youth were injured when Muslim high school students 

started rioting over claims that a Christian student had 

written an article blaspheming the prophet Muhammad. 

In February 2006, approximately 50,000 people were 

displaced and at least 150 Muslims and Christians were 

killed in four days of sectarian violence across Nigeria, 

particularly in the cities of Onitsha, Maiduguri, Katsina, 

and Bauchi, after protests over caricatures of the Prophet 

Muhammad fueled underlying religious and ethnic tensions. Independent reports indicate that both Muslim 

and Christian groups initiated attacks on each other and 

reprisal attacks followed. Unlike in the past, the Nigerian 

government eventually raised the security alert level and 

directed law enforcement agents to deal decisively with 

eruptions of violence in any part of the country. At least 

400 people were arrested. In March 2006, the Nigerian 

Information Minister stated publicly that there were continuing efforts by some individuals, groups, and organizations to instigate “further violence and mayhem” in many 

northern and southern states and that those “already arrested for their roles in the violence will be fully prosecuted.” Widespread destruction of property took place, and 

numerous churches, mosques, and homes were burned 

down. To date, it is not clear if any perpetrators of the violence have been prosecuted.

There is sectarian violence within the Muslim community also. In July 2007, in the northern city of Sokoto, 

five Shi’a Muslims were killed and several houses burned 

in violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims over the 

murder of a Sunni cleric. The Sunni cleric was shot and 

killed while leaving a mosque after preaching. The predominantly Sunni population claimed the attack was 

planned by the minority Shi’a community. According to 

the State Department, more than 100 people were detained by Nigerian authorities and the investigation is 

ongoing. Relations had deteriorated between the two religious communities following violent clashes over the right 

to worship in the city’s central mosque in 2005. Shi’a Muslims claimed the murdered Sunni cleric spearheaded the 

attack against the Shi’a Muslims during the 2005 clashes. 

Despite the ongoing nature of sectarian violence, the 

number of those killed decreased in the past year due to 

a more rapid and effective response by security authorities. However, prosecution of those accused of instigating 

sectarian violence remains inadequate. Moreover, many 

Muslims and Christians have been identified as perpetraDespite the ongoing nature of 

sectarian violence, the number of those 

killed decreased in the past year due 

to a more rapid and effective response 

by security authorities. However, 

prosecution of those accused of 

instigating sectarian 

violence remains inadequate.

The road to Zuma Rock.
243

NIGERIA

tors of violence over the years, but very few, if any, have 

been prosecuted or brought to justice. At the same time, 

security and police forces have sometimes been accused 

of using excessive force, including extrajudicial killings, to 

curb communal violence. In previous years, former President Olusegun Obasanjo was criticized both inside and 

outside Nigeria for not responding more decisively to the 

violence and the communal tensions brought about by the 

sharia controversy, and for generally urging political negotiations rather than ordering the government to intervene to stop or prevent further violence. After becoming 

president, President Yar’Adua publicly stated his intent to 

create an interfaith advisory council of prominent Muslim 

and Christian leaders to assist the government in maintaining peace among its various religious communities.

After her visit to Nigeria in February-March 2005, 

the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, Asma Jahangir, stated that the Nigerian government should ensure that investigations of communal and 

sectarian violence are thorough, including through the 

identification and prosecution of the alleged perpetrators. 

In addition, the Nigerian government “should take very 

firm positions whenever religion is at the origin of human 

rights violations, regardless of which religious community is concerned.” In October 2006, the Sultan of Sokoto, 

Muhammadu Maccido, widely regarded as the spiritual 

leader of Nigerian Muslims, died in an airplane accident. 

In past years, Maccido had frequently spoken out in an 

effort to end sectarian and communal violence between 

Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. In November 2007, 

the newly-installed Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’ad Abubakar, 

principal leader of Nigeria’s 70 million Muslims, traveled 

to Washington, DC and publicly expressed his commitment to improving Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. 

As one of the new co-chairs of the Nigerian Inter-religious 

Council (NIREC), composed of 25 Muslim and 25 Christian leaders in Nigeria, Abubakar has expressed support 

for further addressing the issue by opening NIREC offices at the state and local levels to promote dialogue and 

greater understanding between Muslims and Christians, a 

USCIRF staff Dwight Bashir and David Dettoni with Imam Muhammad Kashafa and Pastor James Wuye, both Executive National 

Coordinators of the Inter-Faith Mediation Center, a Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum, Kaduna.
244

standing USCIRF recommendation.

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian states have 

extended or announced plans to expand the application 

of sharia in the state’s criminal law; however, there have 

not been further enactments in the past year. Although 

the particulars vary from state to state, each has adopted, 

or reportedly plans to adopt, a sharia-based penal code 

and provisions to extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts 

beyond personal status matters to include sharia crimes 

and punishments for Muslims only. Punishments include 

amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, often after trials that fall short of basic international legal standards. 

Defendants have limited rights of appeal and sometimes 

have no opportunity to seek legal representation. Women 

have faced particular discrimination under these codes, 

especially in adultery cases where pregnancy alone has 

been used as adequate evidence of guilt, and allegations 

of rape and sexual violence are rarely investigated by judges. In addition to criminal code changes that purportedly 

apply only to Muslims, some states have instituted or 

tolerated discriminatory practices based on religious precepts such as banning the sale and consumption of alcohol and disadvantaging women in education, health care, 

and public transportation. These practices affect Muslims 

and non-Muslims alike. For example, in July 2005, the 

state government in Kano banned women from riding in 

the same buses as men and from riding behind men on 

motorcycles. Moreover, a few northern Nigerian states—

Kano, Zamfara, and Niger—have sanctioned quasi-official 

Hisbah (religious police) to enforce sharia violations and 

other discriminatory practices. 

In past years, there have been several cases in which 

sharia courts have handed down sentences of death by 

stoning to Muslims for various offenses. In 2003, several 

such cases were overturned and thrown out on appeal; 

stoning sentences remain in several other cases, pending 

appeal. However, to date, no stoning punishments have 

ever been carried out in Nigeria. Nevertheless, in the past, 

sentences involving amputation and flogging have been 

carried out, although none in the past three years; several 

cases of this kind have been reversed on appeal, are in the 

process of appeal, or are awaiting sentencing. There are 

pending amputation and/or stoning sentences in Jigawa, 

Bauchi, Niger, Kano, and Zamfara states, though many of 

Iyan Zazzau, District Head of Sabon Gari & Senior Traditional Ruler & Official of Zaria Emirate Council (center, in blue) meets with 

residents of Zaria.
245

NIGERIA

these cases have been delayed continuously for various 

reasons.

Sharia punishments such as death by stoning and 

amputation have been topics of a national debate in recent years on whether these punishments constitute torture or inhumane or degrading treatment under the Nigerian Constitution. The UN Committee Against Torture, as 

well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated 

that flogging, stoning, and amputation do breach the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment under 

international human rights standards and treaties. On 

this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that the Nigerian government should ensure that practices and codes 

of all states are in compliance with international human 

rights conventions and it should conduct an “assessment 

of all the laws in force and analyze their compatibility with 

international human rights law.”

In addition to the sharia controversy and the violence 

it incites, Nigeria is plagued by a number of other serious 

problems regarding freedom of religion or belief. Christians in the northern states complain of what they view 

as discrimination at the hands of Muslim-controlled governments and describe their communities as having the 

status of “second-class citizens.” Most complaints predate 

the recent initiatives regarding sharia, and include allegations of official discrimination in the denial of applications to build or repair places of worship, access to education and state-run media, representation in government 

bodies, and government employment. Muslim communities in southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small 

fraction of the population, echo some of the complaints 

of minority Christian communities in northern Nigeria. 

Southern Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the media, education, and representation in government institutions. Although proselytizing is permitted by the Constitution, several northern 

states continue to ban some public religious activities to 

address public safety and security concerns. 

Since 2003, there have been a number of small, vocal 

Muslim groups in northern Nigeria that advocate strict 

application of sharia, and which, some argue, are helping 

create a haven for radical Islamic militants from outside 

Nigeria. Though not organized as a nationwide movement, some of these groups advocate a more forcible 

Islamization of all Nigerian society, regardless of religious 

affiliation. In recent years, Nigerian security forces have 

dealt more decisively with Islamic extremist groups, resulting in a decrease in the number of incidents related to 

these groups’ activities, a positive development. However, 

in April 2007, 12 Nigerian police officers were killed after 

Islamist extremists attacked a police station in Kano. Nigerian security forces responded by killing at least 25 of 

the self-styled “Taliban” militants, who Nigerian authorities said came into Nigeria from neighboring Chad.

Several observers inside and outside Nigeria have 

reported that financial support from Libya, Saudi Arabia, 

and Sudan has been used to build mosques and Islamic 

religious schools in northern Nigeria. Some have suggestSharia punishments such as death 

by stoning and amputation have been 

topics of a national debate in recent years 

on whether these punishments constitute 

torture or inhumane or degrading treatment 

under the Nigerian Constitution.

USCIRF staff David Dettoni and Dwight Bashir with Miriam Imhalobe, 

Head of the Legal Department, Women’s Rights Advancement and 

Protection Alternative.
246

ed that the extreme interpretation of Islam being preached 

in these mosques and religious schools is not a form of 

Islam that is traditional to Nigeria. Also, there are reports 

that an increasing number of Nigerian Islamic scholars 

and clerics are being trained in Saudi Arabia and return 

with a politico-religious ideology that explicitly promotes 

hatred of, and violence against, non-Muslims.

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in Nigeria, as well as 

human rights organizations, academics, and other Nigeria 

experts. The Commission has traveled twice to Nigeria, 

most recently in August 2003. In August 2004, the Commission issued a Policy Focus on Nigeria, which included 

recommendations for the U.S. government in relation to 

communal and sectarian violence, the expansion of sharia 

law in the north, discrimination against religious minorities, and increasing Islamic extremist activity. 
Commission Recommendations

247

With regard to Nigeria, the Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should:

• urge the Nigerian government to address the sharia controversy, oppose 

religious extremism, and hold accountable perpetrators of religious 

violence by:

• ensuring that sharia codes, as 

applied, uphold the principle of 

equality under the law between 

men and women and between 

Muslims and non-Muslims, 

and do not result in violations 

of international human rights 

standards with regard to freedom 

of religion or belief, due process 

of law, equal treatment before the 

law, freedom of expression, and 

discriminatory practices against 

women;

• ensuring that sharia criminal 

codes do not apply to nonMuslims or to individual Muslims 

who do not wish to go before 

sharia courts, and preventing law 

enforcement activities in northern states by any quasi-official or 

private corps of sharia enforcers;

• taking effective steps to prevent 

and contain acts of sectarian and 

communal violence, prevent 

reprisal attacks, and bring those 

responsible for such violence to 

justice; and

• ceasing immediately any official 

support for the so-called “religious police,” or Hisbah, and 

ensuring that state governments 

make greater efforts to halt the activities of these vigilante groups, 

including prosecuting those 

found to have taken the law into 

their own hands;

• expand U.S. presence and outreach 

efforts, primarily in northern Nigeria, by:

• opening a consulate or other 

official presence in Kano or elsewhere in the north;

• providing adequate Embassy 

and Consulate staff with appropriate local language skills, and 

requiring political and public 

affairs officers to regularly travel 

throughout Nigeria;

• increasing the capacity of the 

Hausa Service of the Voice of 

America to report fair and balanced views on communal conflict and human rights; and

• sponsoring several exchange 

programs each year on the topics 

of freedom of religion or belief, 

religious tolerance, and Islamic 

law and human rights that target 

religious leaders, human rights 

advocates, government officials, 

and northern Nigerians;

• expand U.S. support for communal 

conflict prevention and mitigation, 

through U.S. foreign assistance programs or otherwise, by supporting:

• Nigerian non-governmental 

organizations working on communal conflict prevention and 

mitigation, emphasizing capacitybuilding at the local level;

• human rights defenders, including legal aid groups that defend 

the constitutional and internationally recognized rights of individuals, especially women, who 

are impacted by sharia-based 

criminal codes;

• human rights defenders responding to credible allegations of 

religious discrimination in any 

part of Nigeria;

• funds for the expansion of training for the Nigerian federal police 

in human rights protection;

• programs and institutions, 

particularly where communal violence has occurred, that promote 

objective, unbiased, and noninflammatory reporting, consistent with the right to freedom of 

expression; and

• the expansion of Nigeria’s InterReligious Council, formed to 

promote dialogue between Christians and Muslims, and replicate 

the Council at the state and local 

levels; 

• continue to support and adequately 

fund the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a regional U.S. 

security partnership, succeeding the 

previous Pan-Sahel Initiative and 

comprised of African and Maghreb 

countries, including Nigeria, which 

helps to identify, publicize, and 

counter foreign sources of terrorism 

and religious extremism. 
248

A mosque in Esfahan, Iran
249

russia

Since its inception in 1999, the Commission has 

reported on the situation in Russia. In recent years, 

the Commission’s reporting on religious freedom conditions in Russia has included information on the sharp 

rise in violent crimes against persons on account of their 

religion or ethnicity. Although the Commission has not 

recommended that Russia be named a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for the most severe violations 

of religious freedom, the Commission is concerned that 

the country’s increasingly fragile human rights situation, 

which directly affects the status of religious freedom, warrants close scrutiny, not least because Russia is a model 

and bellwether for other countries in transition, especially 

from the former Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow has rallied other countries with questionable human rights practices to oppose efforts to draw attention to human rights 

violations by terming such efforts “meddling” by the international community.

Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has steadily 

retreated from democratic reform, endangering significant 

gains in human rights made since the end of the Soviet 

era, including in the areas of freedom of religion or belief. 

Evidence of this retreat includes increasing limitations on 

media freedom and on the role and independence of political parties; tighter controls on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious communities, and other civil society 

groups; harassment of human rights organizations; legal 

restrictions on freedom of assembly; and constraints on the 

use of popular referenda. The sharp deterioration in the human rights climate over the past few years appears to be a 

direct consequence of the increasingly authoritarian stance 

of the Russian government, as well as the growing influence 

of chauvinistic groups in Russian society, which seem to be 

tolerated by the government.

Unlike under the Soviet regime, most people in Russia today are generally able to profess and practice the 

religion of their choice. Nevertheless, minority religious 

groups continue to face some restrictions on religious 

activities, especially at the regional and local levels, stemming from a variety of factors, including Russia’s weak 

judicial system, inconsistent adherence to the rule of law, 

and local officials’ sometimes arbitrary interpretations 

regarding the status of the so-called “traditional” religions 

(see below). These problems include denials of registration (status of legal person) requests; refusals to allot land 

to build places of worship; restrictions on rental space for 

religious activities and lengthy delays in the return of religious property; and attacks in the state-controlled media 

that incite intolerance. Since the Russian government has 

not promulgated a clear and consistent policy on religious 

affairs, the status of freedom of religion or belief varies 

dramatically from region to region across the country. 

One of the key factors in determining respect for the rights 

of a given religious community is its personal relationship 

with individual state officials. 

In 1997, Russia passed a new law on religion. Requiring registration at both federal and local levels, the law 

OTHER COUNTRIES 

CLOSELY MONITORED

The Russian Federation

Many of the problems 

faced by Russia’s diverse minority 

religious communities stem from 

the notion set forth in the preface 

to the 1997 religion law that only four 

religions—Russian Orthodoxy, 

Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—

have “traditional” status 

in that country.
250

creates difficulties for previously unregistered as well as 

new religious groups. At the federal level, the majority of 

religious organizations have been registered under the law 

by federal officials and the Russian Constitutional Court. 

Religious groups that have taken their cases to court to 

overturn denials of registration have often been successful; however, administrative authorities have sometimes 

proved unwilling to implement court decisions. For example, the Salvation Army has not been re-registered in 

the city of Moscow, despite a 2002 Russian Constitutional 

Court ruling in its favor and an October 2006 ruling by the 

European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR). In addition, 

Russian authorities have denied registration to certain 

religious communities based on the allegedly insufficient 

time they have existed, despite a 2002 Russian Constitutional Court decision confirming that an active religious 

organization registered before the 1997 law could not be 

deprived of legal status for failing to re-register. The problem is particularly acute at the local level, since local officials sometimes either refuse outright to register groups 

or create prohibitive obstacles to registration. According 

to the State Department, a January 2006 amendment to 

the law requires that all registered local religious organizations notify the Federal Registration Service (FRS) within 

36 hours of any change in its leadership or legal address. 

If a local organization twice fails to meet this requirement, 

the FRS may file suit with a court to have it dissolved.

The 1997 religion law gives a minimum of 10 citizens 

the right to form a religious association, which, in turn, 

provides them the legal right for a house of worship. Yet, 

despite this legal guarantee, building or renting worship 

space continued to be a problem in the past year for a 

number of religious groups. For example, local authorities in Kaliningrad, Sochi, and St. Petersburg have not responded to longstanding requests from Muslim communities for permission to build mosques. Roman Catholics, 

Protestants, Old Believers, Molokans, and other alternative Orthodox communities have also reported difficulties in obtaining permission to build houses of worship. 

During 2007, the SOVA Center, a leading Russian human 

rights NGO, reported that Russian authorities, especially 

on the local level, have continued in their efforts to confiscate houses of worship already in use. In October 2007, 

a Russian law came into effect setting out the conditions 

and procedures for state-owned land appropriation that 

permits religious organizations to retain their current land 

plots for unlimited use until January 1, 2010. Until the 

2007 amendment, the SOVA Center noted, there had been 

no legal mechanism for religious organizations to privatize land plots. In 2007, the ECtHR ruled in favor of two 

religious organizations that brought cases against Russia. 

In January, it ruled that the 2002 abrogated rent contract 

with the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the city of Chelyabinsk 

was in violation of the European Convention on Human 

Rights and in July, it ruled that the 2003 ban by Chekhov 

city authorities on prayer meetings of the Evangelical 

Christian “Divine Grace” Church was illegal. 

Many of the problems faced by Russia’s diverse 

minority religious communities stem from the notion 

set forth in the preface to the 1997 religion law that only 

four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and 

Buddhism—have “traditional” status in that country. 

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which has played 

a special role in Russian history and culture, receives 

the bulk of state support, including subsidies for the 

construction of churches, although other so-called “traditional” religious communities also sometimes benefit 

from such subsidies. The ROC also has agreements with 

a number of government ministries on guidelines for 

public education, religious training for military personnel, and law enforcement decisions. 

ROC officials also sometimes use their influence with 

regional authorities to restrict the activities of other religious groups. There are frequent reports, particularly on 

the local level, that minority religious communities must 

secure ROC permission before officials allow them to build, 

buy, or rent a house of worship and that local authorities 

Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow.
251

russia

sometimes deny registration to minority groups at the behest of local ROC officials. For example, the religion news 

service Forum 18 reported in March 2008 that a court in the 

city of Smolensk deprived a United Methodist congregation of its legal personality because it ran a Sunday school, 

thereby violating the law against unlicensed Sunday school 

education; reportedly, the investigation began after a complaint by a local ROC bishop. 

The ROC proposal to add a voluntary course on the 

“Foundations of Russian Orthodox Culture” in the national education curriculum has also been viewed as an 

example of the ROC’s assertion of preferential status. Representatives of the four “traditional” religions reportedly 

favor religious instruction as part of the state curriculum, 

but only on a voluntary basis and making it available 

to members of all religious communities based on the 

number of participating students. However, several Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant leaders have objected to the 

proposal to introduce even voluntary Orthodox culture 

courses because they imply that one religious tradition 

constitutes the foundation of Russian culture. As of October 2007, the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman (RFHRO) had received numerous complaints from 

16 Russian regions concerning the introduction of these 

classes in schools, according to Mikhail Odintsov, the 

head of the RFHRO’s Freedom of Conscience Section. The 

most high- profile protest against the Orthodox culture 

class was a July 2007 open letter from 10 members of the 

Russian Academy of Sciences, who expressed concern 

over the “growing clericalization of Russian society” and 

“the ROC’s active penetration into all spheres of public 

life.” The letter was a response to proposals to make the 

class an official and required course in the general Russian Federation school curriculum. 

In January 2006, President Putin signed a restrictive 

new law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

that also affects the rights of religious communities. The 

law enables the Ministry of Justice’s Federal Registration 

Service (FRS) to interfere with the activities of NGOs and 

deny the registration of groups that do not meet certain 

requirements, including minor or trivial ones. The Federal 

Registration Service (FRS) established as a department 

in the Ministry of Justice in late 2004, is charged with enforcement of the NGO law, as well as the registration of 

all political parties and real property in Russia. Under the 

new law, FRS officials can order an examination of an organization’s documents, including financial information, 

as well as attend its events, without the group’s consent or 

a court order. If violations are found, the FRS can call for 

court proceedings against the group, possibly resulting in 

the group’s eventual liquidation. Moreover, the FRS has 

almost complete discretion to cancel programs and ban 

financial transactions by the Russian branches of foreign 

organizations. Although the law provides only the vaguest 

guidance on procedural and legal norms, it also establishes extensive and onerous reporting requirements. NGOs 

are required to submit detailed annual reports regarding 

all of their activities, the composition of their governing 

bodies, and documentation of expenditure and the use 

of other property, including assets acquired from foreign 

sources. NGOs have expressed concern about the administrative and financial burdens of these requirements.

In April 2007, the Russian authorities simplified reporting requirements for religious organizations under the 

amended 2006 NGO law, after numerous protests, including 

from the ROC. According to Forum 18, under these eased reporting requirements, income from Russian and foreign legal 

entities, foreign states, any enterprises, and “other” sources 

must be provided, but the requirement to report income 

from the Russian state or citizens has been dropped. Other 

reporting requirements that have been removed include 

providing information on religious congresses, conferences, 

Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz of the Roman Catholic 

Church with Commissioner Cromartie. 
252

or governing body meetings or the number of participants. 

Nevertheless, each religious organization must still supply 

the complete names, addresses, and passport details of its 

governing body, although centralized religious organizations 

may submit this data for their affiliate communities.

The SOVA Center reports that increased FRS activity in 

2007 in various parts of Russia may result in the liquidation 

under the NGO law of the legal status of numerous religious 

organizations. For example, in the Tyumen Oblast alone, 

the FRS successfully initiated cases in 2007 resulting in the 

denial of continued legal status to 25 Muslim, and several 

Protestant organizations, as well as one Russian Orthodox 

and one Roman Catholic group, all for minor failures to 

comply with reporting requirements. In the republic of 

Chuvashia, the FRS has filed 11 petitions to courts asking 

for the liquidation of the legal status of religious organizations and issued 28 warnings of non-compliance. In Nizhny 

Novgorod Oblast, 55 religious organizations were issued 

official warnings for non-compliance, including for missing 

reporting deadlines and digressing from their charters. In 

the city of Balashovo, Saratov Oblast, the FRS and the Tax 

Inspectorate ordered the denial of continued legal status 

to the Church of Evangelical Christian Baptists for failing 

to file tax returns; the church had not received any official 

warning of its legal infringement. In Yaroslavl, a district Tax 

Inspectorate retroactively revoked the registration of an Old 

Believer community.

In addition, as a result of this law, religious education is coming under increasing bureaucratic scrutiny 

and restriction. According to Viktor Korolev, the official in 

charge of the FRS section on religious organizations, there 

is a distinction between the religious educational activity of a licensed religious educational institution, which 

includes a paid teaching staff, special premises, and a 

three-year curriculum, and elementary instruction about 

religion, which does not require a special license. Several 

religious educational institutions were liquidated in 2007 

although they had operated for years without education 

licenses, including a madrassa affiliated with the Muslim 

Spiritual Authority in Mordovia, a branch of the Saifulla 

Kadi Islamic University in Dagestan, and a Biblical Center 

of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) in Chuvashia. 

In March 2008, it was reported that the FRS for the first 

time had published a list of seven religious educational 

organizations against which the FRS plans to file lawsuits 

to liquidate their legal entities, allegedly because they 

failed to provide required information. The list included 

the Moscow Higher Spiritual Islamic College, the Biblical 

College of Evangelical Christians, the Institute of Contemporary Judaism, the Biblical Missionary Academy of Full 

Gospel Christians, the Academy of the Union of Evangelical Churches, the Theological Academy of Presbyterian 

Christians, and the Extramural Theological Institute of 

Christians of Evangelical Faith. 

Russian law has several provisions that address crimes 

motivated by ethnic or religious hatred. For example, Article 

282 of the Russian Criminal Code forbids the incitement 

of ethnic and religious hatred. Unfortunately, Russia’s law 

enforcement agencies and judicial system have a history of 

infrequent, inconsistent, and even arbitrary and inappropriate application of these provisions. In all too many cases, 

particularly those involving members of Russia’s ethnic and 

religious minorities, Russian authorities have not treated 

hate crimes in a serious and consistent manner. In what 

could perhaps be seen as an acknowledgement of the problem, in March 2008 Interfax reported that the Investigation 

Committee of the Prosecutor General’s Office planned to 

set up a national agency to investigate extremism-related 

crimes. Also, in December 2007, Moscow police took part in 

an OSCE-sponsored seminar on ways to combat hate crimes.

Although no official Russian government statistics 

are available, the SOVA Center reported that in January–

September 2007 in Russia, there were 230 racially and religiously motivated attacks affecting a total of 409 people, 

In all too many cases, particularly those involving members of 

Russia’s ethnic and religious minorities, Russian authorities have not 

treated hate crimes in a serious and consistent manner. 
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including 46 fatalities. In the same period the previous 

year, there were 180 attacks with 401 victims, and 41 

deaths. The Center is concerned that such violence, often 

the result of attacks by racist groups usually referred to 

as “skinheads,” is growing dramatically. People from the 

former Soviet republics of Central Asia, who are predominantly Muslim, remained the main at-risk group, with 23 

killed and 36 injured. Moreover, persons or groups who 

have investigated or been publicly critical of hate crimes 

in Russia continue to be subject to violent attacks. Nikolai 

Girenko, a St. Petersburg expert on xenophobia who often 

testified in trials concerning hate crimes, was gunned 

down in June 2004. Local police claimed in May 2006—

two years after the murder and shortly before the meeting 

of the G-8 countries in July 2006—to have found the five 

men guilty of the killing, but some who were familiar with 

the case questioned whether these were the real perpetrators. In addition, several judges who have ruled against 

skinheads have received death threats. In October 2006, 

prominent Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who 

reported extensively on the situation in Chechnya, was 

murdered in Moscow in a crime that prosecutors have 

reportedly linked to her work. Her name was among those 

on “hit lists” of liberals that had appeared on ultranationalist Internet sites in Russia.

In the months of late 2007 and early 2008, the SOVA 

Center documented at least 22 acts of violence in 14 Russian regions affecting the property of religious and ethnic 

minorities. The trend of these attacks was similar to that 

in previous years: of the 22 affected sites, seven were Jewish, four were Moslem, three were Protestant, two were 

Roman Catholic, one was Russian Orthodox, and another 

Armenian. Moreover, RFHRO confirmed in 2007 that 

inter-religious violence and religiously-based vandalism remained serious problems. While illegal activities 

motivated by religious hatred receive the attention of law 

enforcement agencies and they initiate investigations 

with appropriate charges, the RFHRO noted that there are 

very few cases resulting in the conviction of the guilty individuals. As a result, members of religious communities 

often view themselves as lacking protections even during 

religious services, and express valid concerns about the 

security of their organizations’ property.

Most officials and NGOs agree that many of these attacks are motivated largely by ethnic intolerance, although 

religious and ethnic identities often overlap. Nevertheless, attacks such as those noted above have occurred 

against members of Muslim, Jewish, Protestant, and other 

religious communities and are explicitly motivated by 

religious factors; leaders of the three afore-mentioned 

communities have expressed concern about the growth 

of chauvinism in Russia. They are also apprehensive that 

Russian government officials have provided tacit or active 

support for a view held by many ethnic Russians that their 

country should be reserved for them and that Russian 

Orthodoxy is the country’s so-called “true religion.” Officials link this view to a perception that Russian identity 

is currently threatened due to a demographic crisis stemming from a declining birthrate and high mortality among 

ethnic Russians. In a legal reflection of this perception as 

well as the palpably growing nationalist atmosphere, a 

new government decree went into effect prohibiting foreigners from holding retail jobs in Russia as of April 2007. 

President Putin lent his voice to the nationalist campaign, 

saying it was necessary to protect the rights of Russia’s 

“indigenous” population on the labor market. 

Russian officials also display an inconsistent—and often inadequate—record in responding to media attacks and 

violence associated with anti-Semitism. Vandals desecrated 

several synagogues and Jewish community centers in 2007, 

the State Department reported, including in Saratov, Lipetsk, Borovichy, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Taganrog, 

Samara, Petrozavodsk, Perovo, Baltiisk, Kurgan, Khabarovsk, 

Vladivostok, Tomsk, and Kaliningrad. Kommersant reported 

that during a Moscow rally of several hundred nationalists 

in April 2008, in addition to expressions of hatred of Jews, 

there were calls for the murder of some Jewish government 

officials, but police reportedly did not react.

Moreover, there are at least 80 Russia-based anti-Semitic Web sites and, in various regions of Russia, approximately 100 small, ultranationalist newspapers that regularly print anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and other religiously 

and ethnically-based intolerant content. Particularly on 

the local level, officials often make an insufficient effort 

to pursue or punish perpetrators. For example, in May 

2007, a court sentenced a man convicted of fire-bombing 

the Jewish center in Ulyanovsk to a two-year suspended 

sentence for inciting ethnic hatred. Nevertheless, there 

are some reported cases when hate crimes legislation has 

been properly applied. For example, according to the State 

Department, a court in Novosibirsk sentenced the publisher of a local newspaper to two years in prison in June 

2007 for inciting anti-Semitism for publishing articles that 

openly called for violence against Jews. 
254

Russian rights advocates say that President Putin and 

senior members of his administration have not spoken 

out strongly enough in support of the multi-ethnic and 

multi-confessional nature of the Russian state and society. 

In fact, some western and other observers have suggested 

that Russian authorities have manipulated xenophobia for 

political purposes. The Kremlin is believed, for example, 

to have supported the formation of the ultra-nationalist 

Rodina political party—and then to have been unprepared for its popularity—as well as the politically active 

nationalist youth movement Nashi. Others have observed 

that the Kremlin, by issuing certain nationalistic statements as well as demonstrating a tendency to blame nonRussians for crime, has encouraged intolerant attitudes 

toward non-Russians and people who do not identify 

with the Russian Orthodox Church. President Putin has 

on occasion affirmed the value of pluralism, for instance 

at the meeting of the G-8 countries in July 2006, and has 

also on occasion decried anti-Semitism and hate crimes. 

Nevertheless, in the Commission’s view, more can and 

should be done to ensure that Russian law enforcement 

agencies recognize hate crimes for what they are—human 

rights abuses—and to prevent and punish such crimes, 

including those involving ethnicity and religion.

Protestant groups in Russia are frequent victims of 

hostile media attacks. According to the SOVA Center, 

media outlets in Tula Oblast were particularly aggressive in attacks against Protestants in 2007. Journalists 

frequently seek advice from the Orthodox Church when 

preparing articles about Protestants; as a result, media 

tends to reflect the ROC outlook on Protestants as dangerous “sectarians.” Moreover, pro-Kremlin nationalist 

youth movements have staged so-called “anti-sectarian,” 

i.e., anti-Protestant, public protests. In 2007, the Mestnye

movement organized a public protest entitled “No to Sects 

in the Russian Land!” outside Moscow and Nashi held an 

“anti-sectarian” picket in St. Petersburg, while the Young 

Guard picketed against Mormons in Saratov. In recent 

years, Evangelical Protestants and members of other minority Christian communities have also been targeted in 

violent attacks, to which local authorities reportedly have 

not adequately responded. 

Foreign religious workers continued to encounter 

visa restrictions in the past year. As in previous years, the 

Russian Foreign Ministry in 2007 continued its refusal to 

issue a visa to the Dalai Lama. A conference of Russian 

Catholic bishops expressed concern in October 2007 over 

entry visa restrictions faced by Roman Catholic priests, 

many of whom were issued only one 90-day visa during a 

six-month period, causing major difficulties for their work 

in Russia. According to a report by the Slavic Centre for 

Law and Justice, in October 2007, the Russian government 

imposed a 90-day limit for visas for foreign religious workers; for longer periods of residence, a more complex and 

lengthy procedure is now required.

In July 2006, Putin signed an amended version of the 

2002 law on countering extremism. Going beyond the law’s 

original definition of racial, ethnic, and religious motivations 

for crimes, it adds political motivation, allowing citizens to 

be charged with extremism if they are alleged, within the 

context of extremism, to have committed public slander of 

government officials, although these charges must be proven 

in court. A new version introduced in summer 2007 further 

widened the number and definitions of offenses that are 

punishable by the law, thus significantly expanding the law’s 

application even to people with only tangential or circumstantial connections with alleged extremist offenses.

As is the case in many other countries, the Russian 

government does face major challenges as it addresses 

extremism and acts of terrorism that claim a religious linkage, while also protecting freedom of religion or belief and 

other human rights. The rapid post-Soviet revival of Islam, 

along with the ongoing war in Chechnya and growing 

instability in the North Caucasus, compound difficulties 

for the Russian government in dealing with its 20 million 

The rapid post-Soviet revival of Islam, 

along with the ongoing war 

in Chechnya and growing instability in the 

North Caucasus, compound difficulties 

for the Russian government in dealing 

with its 20 million strong Muslim 

population, the country’s second 

largest religious community. 
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strong Muslim population, the country’s second largest 

religious community. Security threats from domestic terrorism, particularly those related to the conflict in Chechnya, are genuine. The North Caucasus region faces chronic 

instability due to a variety of factors: severe economic dislocation, especially among young men; the effects of the 

violence in Chechnya; some radical foreign influences on 

indigenous Muslims; and local grievances, particularly in 

Ingushetia. All these factors have combined to fuel volatile, and increasingly widespread, expressions of popular 

dissatisfaction by Muslims with the Russian government. 

Yet human rights groups are concerned that the methods used by the Russian government to address security 

threats could increase instability and exacerbate radicalism 

among Russia’s Muslim community. NGOs and human 

rights activists have provided evidence of numerous cases 

of Muslims being prosecuted for extremism or terrorism 

despite having no apparent relation to such activities. These 

included dozens of cases of individuals detained for possessing religious literature, such as the Koran, or on the 

basis of evidence—including banned literature, drugs, or 

explosives—allegedly planted by the police. The Commission has been informed of at least 200 cases of Muslims 

imprisoned on what reportedly are fabricated criminal 

charges of possession of weapons and drugs. 

According to human rights groups, a 2003 Russian Supreme Court decision to ban 15 Muslim groups for alleged 

ties to international terrorism has made it much easier 

for officials arbitrarily to detain individuals on extremism 

charges for alleged links to these groups. Police, prosecutors, and courts reportedly have used the decision to arrest and imprison hundreds of Muslims. It was not until 

July 2006 that the official government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta published a list of terrorist-designated organizations drawn up by the Federal Security Service (FSB)—a 

necessary step to give the ruling legal force—and the list 

afterward contained the names of two additional groups, 

without any supporting explanation for their inclusion. 

The Russian human rights group Memorial reports 

that men with long beards, women wearing head scarves, 

and Muslims perceived as “overly devout” are now viewed 

with suspicion. Such individuals may be arrested or “be 

disappeared” on vague official accusations of alleged Islamist extremism or for allegedly displaying Islamist sympathies, particularly in the volatile North Caucasus region. 

According to a February 2008 report by the Institute for 

War and Peace Reporting, in Ingushetia, more than 150 

people have been abducted by the Russian authorities or 

had been “disappeared” in recent years, including many 

who had no relationship to Islamist militancy. In early 

2008, outside Ingushetia’s largest city, Nazran, three men 

were shot without warning by security forces for being 

The Russian human rights group Memorial reports that men with long beards, 

women wearing head scarves, and Muslims perceived as “overly devout” are now 

viewed with suspicion. Such individuals may be arrested or “be disappeared” on vague 

official accusations of alleged Islamist extremism or for allegedly displaying 

Islamist sympathies, particularly in the volatile North Caucasus region. 

Commissioner Cromartie with Mufti Gusman Khazrat Iskhakov, 

head of the Council of Spiritual Affairs for Muslims of the 

Republic of Tatarstan. 
256

alleged extremists. Persons suspected by local police of 

involvement in alleged Islamist extremism have also reportedly been subjected to torture and ill-treatment in 

pre-trial detention, prisons, and labor camps. 

Muslim leaders have also been targeted by Russian 

officials. For example, a leading Muslim activist in the 

southern region of Astrakhan was charged with incitement 

to religious hatred by the regional authorities, although according to Forum 18, his lawyer from the Slavic Legal Center insisted that the charges were “very crudely falsified.” 

In another incident, after a court in the North Caucasus 

republic of Adygea rejected a case brought against a local 

imam for “incitement of hatred or hostility by insulting human dignity” under Article 282.1 of the Russian Criminal 

Code in March 2006, officials filed an administrative suit 

against the imam the following September—for the “illegal 

sale of spoiled butter.” In May 2007, Said Baburin, an imam 

in Ufa, Bashkortostan, was arrested after police claimed to 

have found explosives, a detonator, and heroin in his car. 

Although these charges were later withdrawn, the imam 

nonetheless went on trial in November 2007 on accusations 

of “extremist activity.” In Ufa, there have reportedly been 

three local protests to ask for the imam’s release and find 

those responsible for his unlawful arrest.

Under new amendments to the anti-extremism law, 

those who are alleged to have defended, or even expressed sympathy with, individuals charged with extremism are themselves liable to the same charges, resulting 

in a chilling effect on freedom of expression in Russia. 

According to the SOVA Center, in Adygeya, the prosecutor, without a court decision, banned two books in 2007, 

including a primer on Islam written by the Adygeya 

Muslim Spiritual Authority. In September 2007, a Moscow court upheld a lower court decision to declare as 

“extremist” Russian translations of the books of prominent Turkish Muslim theologian Said Nursi. As a result of 

this court decision, distribution of Russian translations 

of Nursi’s writings became illegal in Russia, because, in 

the court’s opinion, Nursi’s 14-part commentary on the 

Koran and Islam “aims to incite religious hatred.” An 

expert study commissioned by the RFHRO concluded 

that Nursi’s works did not appeal to religious hostility or 

intolerance; in Turkey, Nursi’s books are in public circulation. According to the RFHRO’s 2007 report, the court 

ignored the expert opinions of religious and secular specialists. The Ombudsman had unsuccessfully appealed 

to the court that since this case affects religious rights it 

required “particular attention.” 

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Members of the Inter-Religious Council of Russia meeting with the Commission delegation.
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This hostile atmosphere is also affecting Muslims’ 

ability to open and maintain mosques. The SOVA Center 

reported that in October 2007, the Russian Council of Muftis published a list of 13 cities in the Moscow region where 

local officials have prevented Muslim communities from 

obtaining construction permits for mosques. In August 

2006, the Russian Supreme Court upheld a lower court 

decision ordering that the local Muslim community pay for 

the demolition of its new mosque in the city of Astrakhan 

on the Caspian Sea. In May 2007, the Supreme Court agreed 

to reconsider the case. Allegedly, the city’s Muslim community had not received all the required building permits, although construction of this mosque had been partly funded 

by previous regional and city governments. In July 2007, 

the European Court of Human Rights decided to prioritize 

the case application from the Astrakhan mosque; as of this 

writing, the case is still under consideration.

In March 2007, a group of more than 3,000 Muslims, 

including four prominent imams, published an unprecedented open letter to President Putin asking him to intervene and stop the repression of Muslims in the name of 

the struggle against terrorism. The letter, published in the 

Izvestia daily, complained of what it called Muslim prisoners of conscience, including an arrested imam in the southern city of Pyatigorsk, who, they alleged, was only guilty of 

the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. The imam, Anton 

Stepanenko, received a suspended one-year sentence that 

same month for “inciting inter-ethnic and inter-religious 

hatred” and for “arbitrariness.” The letter also protested the 

case concerning Nursi’s writings, saying it could become “a 

precedent for practically all literature that cites the Koran to 

be outlawed in Russia.” Russian officials have consistently 

denied discriminating against Muslims.

A Commission delegation traveled to Russia in 

June 2006, visiting Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan, 

the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan. The Commission met with Russian government officials from the 

National Security Council, the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the FRS, and the 

Presidential Council on Religious Affairs, as well as with 

the President of the Republic of Tatarstan and other regional and local officials and legislators. The delegation 

also met with representatives from a wide range of Russia’s religious communities, as well as academics, legal 

advocates, and representatives of human rights organizations. The visit, the Commission’s second to Russia, 

was prompted by the passage of the new law governing 

the work of NGOs out of concern that the legislation 

would have deep repercussions for civil society and a 

harmful impact on the protection of freedom of religion 

or belief in Russia. In July 2006, the Commission issued 

a press release with recommendations to the G-8 after 

the Commission’s visit and that month it also hosted 

a public meeting with an official from Russia’s Federal 

Registration Service. Later in 2006, the Commission 

released a Policy Focus with findings and recommendations based on the Commission visit to Russia earlier 

that year. 

In January 2008, the Commission co-sponsored a 

presentation at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson Center on “The Putin 

Government’s Responses to Increased Xenophobia,” featuring Aleksandr Verkhovsky, a leading Russian expert on 

xenophobia and freedom of religion, and director of the 

SOVA Center. In May 2007, the Commission co-sponsored 

an event at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 

the status of Islam in the north Caucasus featuring Grigory 

Shvedov, director of the “Caucasian Knot” information 

agency and a board member of the Russian “Memorial” 

Society. In March 2007, the Commission released a report, Challenge to Civil Society: Russia’s Amended Law on 

257

President of the Republic of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev with 

Commissioner Cromartie.
258

Noncommercial Organizations, which provided the first 

detailed legal analysis of the legislation and its impact. 

Russian translations of the two recent Commission reports 

are available on the Commission Web site. Later in March, 

Commission staff discussed the findings of the Policy Focus as well as the NGO report at two public events held at 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL); the Commission also co-sponsored an event with RFE/RL featuring 

Aleksandr Verkhovsky, who discussed Russia’s new antiextremism law. 

In February 2006, Commissioner Elizabeth Prodromou 

traveled to Moscow to make a presentation on “Human 

Rights and Tolerance in Today’s Russia: an International 

View” at a conference in Moscow held by the Russian Presidential Administration Training Academy for state officials 

responsible for the regulation of religious affairs in Russia. 

The Commission also made a similar presentation at a conference on religion in Russia at the Moscow Humanities University. During the visit, Commissioner Prodromou met with 

representatives of human rights organizations and academic 

experts on freedom of religion in Russia. Also in February 

2006, the Commission held a roundtable at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, at which several experts 

discussed U.S. human rights policy towards Russia. 

In February 2005, the Commission held a joint briefing 

with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies on 

“Russia: Religious Communities, Extremist Movements and 

the State” chaired by Commissioner Felice D. Gaer, which 

presented expert views on the status of Muslims, Christians, 

and Jews, as well as on increased ethnic and religious extremism. Also in February, the Commission issued a press 

statement calling on President Bush to raise with President 

Putin the state of freedom of religion or belief in Russia at 

their then-upcoming meeting. In April 2005, the Commission held a briefing with Oleg Mironov, the former Human 

Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, and Mufti 

Ismagil Shangareev, director of the Islamic Human Rights 

Defense Center in Russia. Also in that month, Lyudmila 

Alekseeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, discussed 

religious freedom and other human rights concerns in Russia. In May 2005, Verkhovsky discussed religious extremism 

in Russia at an event co-sponsored with Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty. 

The Commission has advocated continued inclusion 

of the “Smith Amendment” in the Foreign Operations 

Appropriations bill. The Smith Amendment conditions 

foreign assistance to the Russian government on the 

President certifying that the Russian government has not 

implemented any statute, executive order, or regulation 

that discriminates against religious groups or religious 

communities, in violation of international norms on human rights and religious freedoms to which the Russian 

Federation is a party. Congress included this provision in 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. 

Kul Sharif Mosque, Kazan, Tatarstan.
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Commission Recommendations

 Combating Xenophobia, 

Intolerance, and Hate Crimes 

The U.S. government should urge 

the Russian government to: 

• condemn specific acts of xenophobia, 

anti-Semitism, and intolerance, as 

well as incidents of hate crimes, and 

to make clear that such crimes are 

to be treated by officials as human 

rights abuses, not “hooliganism,” and 

that they will be fully and promptly 

investigated and prosecuted;

• while vigorously promoting freedom 

of expression, take steps to discourage rhetoric that promotes xenophobia or intolerance, including 

religious intolerance;

• provide special training and other 

programs for law enforcement officers and other officials to address 

ethnic hatred and promote tolerance; 

• establish a special nationwide antidiscrimination body, as recommended by the Council of Europe’s 

European Commission Against 

Racism and Intolerance; 

• implement the numerous specific 

recommendations made by Russia’s Presidential Council on Human 

Rights, the official Russian Human 

Rights Ombudsman, and the Council of Europe’s Commission against 

Racism and Intolerance to address 

anti-Semitism and xenophobia and 

prevent and punish hate crimes, 

including full implementation by 

regional and local law enforcement personnel of criminal code 

provisions prohibiting incitement 

and violence motivated by ethnic 

or religious hatred, in accordance 

with standards established by the 

European Court of Human Rights 

(ECtHR); and

• report, as required, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE) on the specific 

measures that have been undertaken 

on a national level to address hate 

crimes, including maintaining statistics on these crimes, and strengthening legislative initiatives to combat 

them, and to take advantage of 

relevant OSCE training programs 

for Russian law enforcement and 

judicial officials. 

 Reforming or Withdrawing 

the 2006 Russian Law on NonCommercial Organizations 

The U.S. government should:

• establish a program to monitor 

implementation of Russia’s law on 

non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), including its impact on 

religious organizations;

• encourage the Russian government to withdraw or substantially 

amend the NGO law; failing that, 

the government should be urged to 

develop regulations that clarify and 

sharply limit the state’s discretion to 

interfere with the activities of NGOs, 

including religious organizations. 

These regulations should be developed in accordance with international standards and in conformance 

with international best practices; 

• encourage the Russian government 

to publish precise and transparent 

statistical data on a regular basis 

regarding the Ministry of Justice’s 

Federal Registration Service (FRS) 

activities related to implementation 

and enforcement of the NGO law; and

• devote added resources to legal 

training for Russian NGOs, giving 

them the tools to defend the civil 

society they have built, and speak 

out in support of defense attorneys 

who are harassed and threatened 

for defending their clients, including human rights defenders and 

religious groups.

 Ensuring the Equal Legal 

Status and Treatment of the 

Members of Russia’s Religious 

Communities

The U.S. government should encourage the Russian government to: 

• ensure that law enforcement officials 

vigorously investigate and prosecute 

acts of violence, arson, and desecration perpetrated against members 

of any religious community, their 

property, or houses of worship; set 

up a review mechanism outside the 

procuracy to ensure that government authorities and law enforcement personnel are investigated and 

sanctioned, as appropriate, if they 

are found to have encouraged or 

condoned such incidents;

• affirm the multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature of Russian society;

• affirm publicly that all religious 

communities in Russia are equal 

under the law and entitled to equal 

treatment, whether registered or 

unregistered; publicly express 

opposition to any legislation that 

would grant preferences to the purported “traditional” religions over 

other groups; and direct national 

government agencies to address 

and resolve continuing violations 

1 

2 

3
260

of religious freedom at the regional and local levels, 

including by:

• issuing instructions to local law enforcement, prosecutors, and registration officials as well as publicly affirming that members of all religious communities are to be 

treated equally under the law; 

• enforcing non-discriminatory, generally applicable 

zoning and building codes, and ordering an end to the 

practice of using local public opinion surveys that serve 

as a basis to deny land and building permits to minority 

religious communities; and 

• deleting from the preface to the 1997 Law on “Freedom 

of Conscience and Religious Organizations” the reference to the four “traditional” religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, as that reference, 

although it does not have legal standing, implicitly 

contradicts the Russian constitutional provision that 

“religious associations are separate from the state and 

are equal before the law” and has led Russian officials 

to establish inappropriate limits or demands against 

members of Russia’s other religious communities;

• denounce media attacks on any religious community and 

adopt administrative measures against government officials who fuel them;

• cease all forms of interference in the internal affairs of 

religious communities; 

• avoid taking steps that could exacerbate religious extremism by (1) developing policies and strategies to protect the 

religious freedom and other human rights of the members 

of Russia’s Muslim community and (2) reviewing past 

cases of alleged arbitrary detention or arrest of members 

of this community;

• distribute on a regular basis updated information on 

freedom of religion or belief, as well as on Russian constitutional provisions and jurisprudence on separation of 

church and state and the equal status of religious denominations, to the Russian judiciary, religious affairs officials 

at all levels of government, the FRS, the procuracy, and all 

law enforcement bodies;

• extend the current annual training program for regional 

and local religious affairs officials to include their counterparts in the judiciary, procuracy, law enforcement 

agencies, and to the FRS; 

• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman 

to set up a nationwide monitoring system on the status of 

freedom of religion or belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and

• accept a site visit to Russia from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and grant her unrestricted access to religious communities and to regions 

where religious freedom abuses are reported.

 Strengthening Attention to the Issue 

of Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. 

Diplomacy

The U.S. government should: 

• ensure that the U.S. Congress maintain a mechanism to 

monitor publicly the status of human rights in Russia, including freedom of religion or belief, particularly in the case 

of any repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect 

to Russia, and maintain the Smith Amendment as U.S. law; 

• urge the government of the Russian Federation to invite 

each of the three OSCE Personal Representatives on 

combating intolerance as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the Russian 

Federation during 2008-2009;

• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs (a) engage with regional and local officials throughout the Russian Federation, especially when violations of freedom of 

religion occur, and (b) disseminate information to local 

officials concerning international legal norms on freedom 

of religion or belief, including the rights of unregistered 

religious communities; 

• ensure that the issue of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, be raised within the context of 

negotiations on Russian accession to the World Trade 

Organization; and 

• work with the other members of the G-8 to ensure that 

the issue of human rights, including the human rights 

aspects of migration and protecting human rights in the 

context of counter-terrorism, are raised at all bilateral 

and multilateral meetings.

 Strengthening U.S. Programs on 

Promoting Religious Freedom and Combating 

Religious Intolerance 

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and 

other sectors in Russian society include the promotion of 

4

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russia

legal protections and respect for religious freedom as well 

as methods to combat xenophobia, including intolerance based on religion, and ensure that solicitations and 

requests for proposals should include these objectives;

• support programs developed by Russian institutions, 

including universities, libraries, NGOs, and associations 

of journalists, particularly those who have engaged in 

the activities described in the above recommendation, 

to organize conferences and training programs on issues 

relating to freedom of religion or belief, as well as on promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging pluralism, and combating hate crimes and xenophobia;

• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of 

the rights to freedom of religion or belief as guaranteed in 

Russian law and under its international obligations both 

in Russian courts and before the ECtHR; 

• translate, where necessary, into Russian and print or 

otherwise make available to Russian citizens relevant 

documents and materials, including: 

• hate crimes guidelines developed by the U.S. Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, as well as U.S. Department 

of Justice expertise on combating hate crimes and 

religiously-motivated attacks; and

• international documents and materials generated by 

Russian institutions relating to freedom of religion or 

belief, xenophobia, and hate crimes, as well as relevant 

U.S. Department of State and Commission reports, 

posting such documents on the U.S. Embassy Web site; 

• ensure that Russia’s citizens continue to have access to 

alternative sources of information through U.S.-government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well as Internet 

communications, and that these broadcasts include information about freedom of religion or belief and the need to 

combat xenophobia and hate crimes; in particular by:

• restoring the funding of Russian-language radio 

broadcasts of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to the levels of fiscal year 2007, 

restoring the broadcast hours that have been cut and 

planned staff reductions, and considering new vehicles 

for delivery of broadcasts; and

• increasing funding for radio broadcast programs in minority languages spoken in Russia, including the RFE/

RL Tatar and North Caucasus services, which are often 

the primary source of independent broadcast media in 

regions of Russia with majority Muslim populations;

• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic 

and religious cross section of the Russian population, with 

particular focus on educational and leadership development programs for students from the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim 

and other religious and ethnic minority populations; and 

• initiate International Visitors’ Programs relating to the 

prevention and prosecution of hate crimes for Russian 

officials and other relevant figures.

 Addressing the Crisis in Chechnya and the 

North Caucasus 

The U.S. government should:

• ensure that the continued humanitarian crisis in Chechnya 

and allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by the 

Russian military there and in other North Caucasus republics remain a key issue in U.S. bilateral relations with Russia;

• urge the Russian government to end and vigorously prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention, torture, 

rape, and other human rights abuses perpetrated by 

members of the Russian security services in Chechnya, 

including those by pro-Kremlin Chechen forces;

• urge the Russian government to abide by all resolutions 

passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 

Europe relating to the human rights and humanitarian 

situation in the North Caucasus, and reinstate regular onsite visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur 

for Chechnya; 

• urge the Russian government to accept a site visit to 

Chechnya from the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 

Executions and to reconsider the October 2006 decision to 

deny access to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture;

• work with other OSCE Member States to ensure that issues related to human rights abuses in the North Caucasus play a more prominent role in OSCE deliberations, 

and encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other 

forms of assistance to the civilian populations affected by 

the decade-long conflict in Chechnya; and

• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction programs for the North Caucasus 

also fund credible local partners in Chechnya, Ingushetia, 

and Daghestan. 

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russia

R

Countries Previously on the Commission’s 

Lists: Georgia, India, and Laos

Georgia

 eligious freedom conditions in Georgia continued 

 to improve in the past year. Under the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili, the number of 

reported incidents of violence against minority religious 

communities has markedly decreased, a trend that continued in the past year. Many of the leaders of the vigilante violence have been sentenced to prison for their 

involvement in the attacks. In the past year, President 

Saakashvili and the country’s Human Rights Ombudsman 

made numerous speeches and appearances in support of 

minority religious groups. While the Georgian Orthodox 

Church (GOC) remains the only religious group with formal legal status as a religious organization, most religious 

communities are able to operate in Georgia. These and 

other improvements in religious freedom conditions led 

the Commission to remove Georgia from its Watch List 

in 2004.

Under the government of former President Eduard 

Shevardnadze, members of minority religious groups, 

including Baptists, Roman Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of Orthodox churches 

that do not accept the primacy of the GOC Patriarchate, 

were subjected to over 100 violent vigilante attacks. Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as members of independent Orthodox churches, were particularly targeted. Local police 

were implicated in these attacks, as they often refused to 

intervene to protect the victims. What began in 1999 as a 

series of isolated attacks in the capital of Tbilisi escalated 

by 2002 into a nationwide scourge of widely publicized 

mob assaults against members of religious minorities. 

However, according to the State Department, increased 

investigations and prosecutions of the perpetrators of the 

violence, who included some GOC priests reportedly supported by others in the GOC hierarchy, led to improvements in the status of religious freedom. In late 2004, 

Georgian officials permitted the Jehovah’s Witnesses to 

operate legally in the country for the first time. Under a 

new registration process established by parliament in 

April 2005, 14 religious communities were able to obtain 

legal status as non-commercial organizations. 

Despite improvements, however, religious freedom 

concerns remain. Although the primary leaders of the 

violent mob attacks against members of religious minorities have been convicted, many others accused of 

participating in this violence—including local police 

officials—have not been held to account by the Georgian 

authorities, reportedly due to fears of offending the GOC 

hierarchy. Moreover, occasional mob attacks on religious 

minorities still occur, particularly against members of the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses.

There are also concerns about the status of the 

GOC, to which 65 percent of the country’s population 

claims adherence. In October 2002, the Georgian government signed a “concordat” with the GOC, granting 

the Church some authority over state school textbooks, 

the construction of religious buildings, and the publication of religious literature by other religious groups. 

Although the primary leaders of the 

violent mob attacks against members of 

religious minorities have been 

convicted, many others accused of 

participating in this violence—including 

local police officials—have not been 

held to account by the Georgian 

authorities, reportedly due to fears of 

offending the GOC hierarchy. 
264

Although the agreement was reaffirmed in January 2005, 

a new law the following April provided for the separation 

of state schools and religious teaching and narrowed the 

application of the concordat, such as limiting teaching 

by the GOC to after-school hours and eliminating school 

and teacher involvement. Nevertheless, public schools 

reportedly do offer an elective course on religion, which 

deals only with the theology of Orthodox Christianity. In 

response, the Ministry of Education is developing new 

textbooks that will discuss various religions in a neutral 

way. Reports continue, however, of societal pressure 

against students who are members of “non-traditional” 

religious minorities. The Georgian Human Rights Ombudsman reported that public school teachers sometimes offer Orthodox prayers in classrooms and display 

Orthodox icons in schools. The Education Ministry has 

formed a General Inspection Department to deal with 

complaints of inappropriate teacher behavior, and in 

2007, the Ministry was also drawing up guidelines for periodic teacher recertification in this regard. The General 

Inspection Department reported that 15 complaints of 

violations of religious freedom were filed in the first half 

of 2007, most of them concerning verbal abuse.

According to the State Department, the Roman 

Catholic Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, and several 

Protestant denominations continued to have difficulty 

obtaining permission to build new churches, due in part 

to the reluctance of local authorities to antagonize local 

GOC supporters. However, the GOC reportedly did not 

oppose new church construction by other religious groups 

when such construction did not obstruct or otherwise affect GOC sites. In past years, Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, 

Lutherans, Muslims, Old Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

and Roman Catholics had stated that the GOC Patriarchate had often acted to prevent them from acquiring, building, or reclaiming places of worship. In addition, Roman 

Catholics, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Armenian Apostolic 

Church, and the True Orthodox Church reportedly also 

faced GOC pressure, condoned by government officials, 

preventing them from building houses of worship. 

In April 2005, a new law was passed allowing religious 

communities to register as non-commercial organizations, 

since the GOC was the only religious community to have 

legal status in Georgia. As a result, the Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), Seventh Day Adventists, and 12 other religious denominations have been 

approved for registration. While this remedy generally is 

considered a satisfactory mechanism to grant legal personality to most religious groups, Muslims, the Roman Catholic 

and Armenian Apostolic churches, and some other groups 

reportedly are trying to devise a different arrangement with 

the government to accommodate their internal hierarchical 

structures. The leaders of other religious minority groups 

are also still seeking recognized legal status, a prerequisite 

for the community to own property collectively or organize 

most religious activities. The absence of formal legal status, 

264

Virgin Mary Metekhi Church, Tbilisi, Georgia.

There were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious identity in the 

past year; however, the State Department reported that the non-GOC religious minorities 

noted significant decreases in incidents of harassment, violence, or other direct pressures.
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C O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 

however, generally has not prevented most religious communities from functioning through affiliated, registered 

non-governmental organizations. 

Members of various religious minority communities 

have noted the positive role played by the government’s 

Human Rights Ombudsman in advancing their rights in 

accordance with international law. In December 2005, for 

example, the Human Rights Ombudsman issued a report 

calling for equal recognition under the law for all religions, a suggestion to which some Members of Parliament 

reportedly objected due to the historic role of the GOC. 

Despite general tolerance toward minority religious 

communities viewed as traditional to Georgia, opinion 

polls and views expressed in the Georgian media reflect 

significant societal intolerance towards Protestants and 

other religions seen as relatively new to Georgia. There 

were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on 

religious identity in the past year; however, the State Department reported that the non-GOC religious minorities 

noted significant decreases in incidents of harassment, 

violence, or other direct pressures. None alleged continuing organized campaigns of physical abuse. 

With regard to Georgia, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

• encourage the Georgian government to continue to 

investigate and prosecute those individuals, including 

local officials, who are alleged to have been complicit or 

engaged in violence against members of religious minority communities;

• encourage the Georgian government to establish a mechanism to enable all religious communities to gain legal 

personality under Georgian law in a manner that reflects 

internal structural characteristics of the communities and 

is consistent with international human rights standards; 

• fund programs in Georgia for journalists, religious leaders, 

and members of non-governmental organizations to promote religious tolerance and provide education on international standards on freedom of religion or belief; and

• encourage the Organization on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE), the OSCE Field Presence in Tbilisi, 

and the OSCE Panel of Experts on Religion and Belief to 

conduct activities in Georgia, including seminars on the 

OSCE’s “Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about 

Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools,” to increase public 

and official awareness of the importance of freedom of 

religion or belief and tolerance. 

India

The positive developments in India affecting freedom of religion or belief that began in 2004, when parliamentary elections resulted in installation of a coalition 

government led by the Congress Party, continued in the 

past year. Under the previous leadership of the Bharatiya 

Janata Party (BJP), the Commission in prior years found 

the Indian government’s response to increasing violence 

against religious minorities in the state of Gujarat and 

elsewhere to be inadequate. In response, from 2002 – 

2004, the Commission recommended that India be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. As a result 

of the changes that took place in India after the 2004 elections, the Commission in 2005 no longer recommended 

that India be designated a CPC. 

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, India has a democratically elected 

government, is governed generally by the rule of law, and 

has a tradition of secular governance that dates back to 

the country’s independence. India has a judiciary that is 

independent, albeit slow-moving and frequently unresponsive, but which can work to hold the perpetrators of 

religious violence responsible; an active civil society with 

many independent non-governmental human rights organizations that have investigated and published extensive 

reports on the rise of religiously motivated violence; and 

a free press that has widely reported on and strongly criticized the situation on the ground and the growing threats 

in the past decade to a religiously plural society.

Despite this, religious minorities in India have been 

the victims of violent attacks by fellow citizens, including 

killings, in what is commonly called “communal violence.” 

In the late 1990s, there was a marked increase in violent 

attacks against members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, throughout India, including 

killings, torture, rape, and destruction of property. Those responsible for communal violence were rarely held responsible for their actions, helping to foster a climate in which 

it was believed that attacks on religious minorities could be 

carried out with impunity. The increase in such violence in 

India coincided with the rise in political influence of groups 

associated with the Sangh Parivar, a collection of organizations that view non-Hindus as foreign to India and aggressively press for governmental policies to promote a Hindu 

nationalist agenda. Although it was not directly responsible 

for instigating the violence against religious minorities, 

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266

the BJP-led national government clearly did not do all in 

its power to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to 

counteract the prevailing climate of hostility against these 

minority groups, especially at the state and local levels. 

Of particular concern to the Commission were the 

February 2002 events in the state of Gujarat, when, after a 

fire on a train resulted in the death of 58 Hindus, hundreds 

of Muslims were killed across Gujarat by Hindu mobs. In 

addition, hundreds of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses and other kinds of infrastructure were looted or destroyed. More than 100,000 people fled their homes and, 

in the end, as many as 2,000 Muslims were killed. India’s 

National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an official 

body, found evidence of premeditation in the killings by 

members of extremist groups espousing Hindu nationalism, complicity by Gujarat state government officials, and 

police inaction in the midst of attacks on Muslims. Christians were also victims in Gujarat, and many churches 

were destroyed. 

In August 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat government to reopen its investigation of the 2002 

violence, criticizing the local police officials for poor 

investigative practices and inadequate follow-up. In July 

2006, a report from a committee attached to the Prime 

Minister’s office again chastised the Gujarat government 

for failing to improve the situation for Muslims in that 

state, noting that a “state of fear and insecurity” still existed for many Muslims there. In the past year, efforts to 

pursue the perpetrators have continued, albeit slowly, 

though human rights groups reported that many cases 

would likely continue to be closed or result in acquittals, 

due to lack of evidence or insufficient effort on the part 

of local police officials. In March 2007, the government 

announced that it would pay approximately $8,000 in additional compensation to the next of kin of persons killed 

in the Gujarat violence. 

In June 2004, a government-appointed committee of 

historians was tasked with removing the “distortions and 

communally-biased portions” of textbooks issued under 

the BJP government; they were replaced in 2005 with 

more moderate editions. The State Department reported 

in 2007 that during the past year, the National Council of 

Education Research and Training “acted systematically” 

to remove “tainted” textbooks with communal bias from 

schools and introduce more secular and objective school 

textbooks that seriously address atrocities committed 

against national minorities in India. 

Since taking office, the Congress Party coalition 

government has acted decisively to prevent communal 

violence in situations where it has erupted in the past. In 

February 2006, a mass rally of Hindu nationalists was held 

in the Dangs district of Gujarat calling on members of the 

indigenous “tribal” people to “reconvert” to Hinduism. 

Extremist groups had issued a number of highly inflammatory statements, particularly against Christians, and 

violence against local Christian communities was feared, 

as has happened in the past. However, the military was 

sent into the area to maintain peace; riot police were 

reportedly posted outside churches and temples and no 

violence occurred. In March 2006, after bombs exploded 

in the Hindu holy city of Varanasi killing 20 persons, allegedly instigated by Islamist groups, authorities reportedly 

acted swiftly to prevent retaliation against Muslims. Prime 

Minister Singh appealed for calm, and soldiers and police 

were deployed at holy sites across the country. In July 

2006, after reports implicated Muslim extremists in train 

bombings in Mumbai (Bombay) in which more than 200 

people were killed, successful efforts were made to prevent anti-Muslim rioting. 

According to the State Department’s 2007 religious freedom report, minority rights groups reported that incidents 

of communal violence had decreased in the past year. The 

State Department also reported that speeches by the prime 

minister and some state government officials in the past 

year regularly promoted communal harmony. In November 

2006, a central government-appointed panel known as the 

Sachar Committee acknowledged that Muslims in India 

face discrimination and other hardships. In response to the 

report’s findings, Prime Minister Singh pledged to do more 

to “address the imbalances.” In January 2007, based on this 

report, the national government directed all banks to provide 

preferential loans to minorities. In April 2007, Prime Minister 

Dozens of violent attacks carried 

out or incited by Hindu extremist groups 

against Christian institutions and persons

continued throughout the past year. 
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C O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 

Singh stated that efforts would be made to ensure that women and minorities were “properly represented” at all levels 

of government. Finally, in November 2007, the government 

adopted new rules enabling members of all religious communities to adopt children, ending a long era in which only 

Hindus were given this right.

Despite the improved situation, concerns about 

religious freedom in India remain. Attacks on Christian 

churches and individuals, largely perpetrated by individuals associated with Hindu nationalist groups, continue to occur, and perpetrators are rarely held to account 

by the state legal apparatus. Dozens of violent attacks 

carried out or incited by Hindu extremist groups against 

Christian institutions and persons continued throughout 

the past year. Among the most serious attacks occurred 

on December 24, 2007, in the state of Orissa, where 

clashes erupted between Hindus and Christians. According to some sources, hundreds of members of a Hindu 

extremist group, demanding that Christmas celebrations 

be halted, attacked Christian individuals, churches, offices, and residences, destroying homes, looting shops, 

and injuring a number of individuals. At least six persons 

were killed. Those actions were reportedly followed by 

retaliatory actions by Christians against Hindus. Other 

sources indicate that violence erupted after Christians 

attacked a Hindu leader or erected religious statues at a 

Hindu religious site. 

Regardless of the initial instigators of the violence, 

during the subsequent three days of rioting, 20 churches 

and an untold number of prayer houses and private residences belonging to both Hindus and Christians were 

destroyed. According to a January 2008 report of India’s 

National Commission for Minorities, although “the reasons for the outbreak of violence...are more varied than 

was apparent from media reports, there is no doubt that 

the Christian community and its places of worship were 

the principal target of attack. They bore the brunt of [the] 

violence and suffered the maximum damage. As a result, 

the Christian community continues to live in fear and 

feels insecure and unsafe.”

Jama Masjid Mosque, Delhi, India.
268

In November 2007, a mob of 150 members of a Hindu 

extremist group attacked a church in the state of Chhattisgarh, destroying the church building, beating the pastor, 

and kidnapping a young member of the church, who was 

later found dead. Despite the fact that the police were 

provided with the names of the attackers, officials reportedly waited until the following day to file a complaint. In 

January 2008, also in Chhattisgarh, more than 80 people 

were injured in an attack on a large Christian meeting 

carried out by extremists. The attackers reportedly beat 

the Christian worshippers and vandalized the makeshift 

church structure. In December 2007 and February 2008, 

there were incidents in the state of Karnataka in which 

churches were desecrated and the pastors assaulted. Similar attacks occur, sometimes in greater numbers, every 

month, particularly in states where the BJP heads the state 

government, including in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 

Gujarat, Chhatisgarh, and Jharkhand. In some instances, 

the police respond appropriately; in others, however, the 

police reportedly look the other way or even appear to be 

complicit in the attacks.

Several of the BJP-led states have laws against 

“forced” or “induced” religious conversions, which require government officials to assess the legality of conversions and provide for fines and imprisonment for anyone who uses force, fraud, or “inducement” to convert 

another. Reports of persons having been arrested or prosecuted under these laws are not common. Nevertheless, 

concerns have been raised that these laws can sometimes 

result in a hostile atmosphere for religious minorities, as 

states in which these laws exist tend to be those in which 

attacks by extremist groups are more common—and 

often happen with greater impunity—than elsewhere in 

India. For example, the state of Madhya Pradesh, which 

is headed by the BJP, was the scene of an increasing 

number of attacks in the past year. In June 2006, a report 

by the Indian national government’s National Commission for Minorities (NCM) found that Hindu extremists 

had frequently invoked the state’s anti-conversion law 

as a pretext to incite mobs against Christians. The NCM 

report also found that police in Madhya Pradesh were 

frequently complicit in these attacks. Similarly, the NCM 

report on the December 2007 violence in Orissa concluded that an important factor behind the attacks was the 

“anti-conversion” campaign carried out by groups associated with the Sangh Parivar. According to the report, the 

campaign against conversions “created an atmosphere of 

prejudice and suspicion against the Christian community...” and that “the role of the Sangh Parivar activists and 

the anti-conversion campaign in fomenting organized 

violence against the Christian community deserves 

close scrutiny.” 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted 

personal interviews with members of non-governmental 

organizations representing various religious communities 

in India, as well as human rights organizations, academics, and other India experts. In January 2008, the Commission issued a press statement expressing serious concern 

about the riots between the Hindu and Christian religious 

communities in Orissa, noting that the violence had had 

particularly severe consequences on the minority Christian 

community. In March 2005, the Commission issued a statement encouraging the Department of State to prevent the 

planned visit to the United States of Gujarat State Minister 

Narendra Modi, citing evidence presented by India’s NHRC 

and numerous domestic and international human rights 

investigators of the complicity of Gujarat state officials, led 

by State Minister Modi, in the February 2002 mob attacks 

on Muslims.

With regard to India, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should: 

• press the government of India to make more vigorous and 

effective efforts to halt the violent attacks against religious 

minorities that continue to occur with troubling regularity 

in India and to hold state governments and state governPreparation for the Hindu Durga Puja celebration from the 

Kumartuli neighborhood of Kolkata, India.
269

ment officials accountable for the violence and other 

unlawful acts that occur in their states; and

• urge the Indian government to continue its policies aimed 

at returning the country to its tradition of religious tolerance, including by:

• continuing to pursue, investigate, and lay charges 

against the perpetrators of the killings in Gujarat; 

• taking steps to prevent and punish communal violence, 

including by following through on a pledge made in 

2004 to enact a law criminalizing inter-religious violence; and

• continuing the kinds of measures that have successfully 

prevented outbreaks of violence in high-tension situations, and engaging in pre-planning to ensure that the 

police and other law enforcement agencies have 

the resources necessary to avert communal violence 

in the future.

Laos

The Commission removed Laos from its Watch List 

in 2005, citing steps taken by the Lao government to address religious freedom concerns. Conditions continued 

to improve for Laos’s Buddhist population and for nonBuddhist groups in the major urban areas. However, 

ethnic minority Protestants continue to face restrictions 

and some abuses in provincial areas, including arrests, 

short detentions, forced renunciation of faith, and forced 

evictions from villages. Though progress in some areas 

remains encouraging, the persistent religious freedom 

abuses and restrictions are troubling, particularly since 

the government had been moving in a positive direction 

in previous years. The Commission continues to monitor 

closely the actions of the Lao government with regard to 

religious freedom to determine if a return to the Watch 

List is warranted. 

The government continues to incorporate Theravada 

Buddhist rituals and ceremonies into state functions and 

ceremonies and Buddhism is largely exempt from the legal restrictions imposed on religious minorities. In major 

urban areas, non-Buddhist religious leaders continue to 

report few restrictions on their worship activities, and the 

government has allowed them to re-open, build, expand 

new places of worship, and/or carry out charitable work in 

recent years. Over the past two years, the Catholic Church 

was permitted to ordain five priests and a deacon, the 

first such ordinations since 1975. The government also 

allowed the building of a Catholic church in the northern 

province of Sayaboury and provided the Bishop of Luang 

Prabang more freedom to visit Catholics in the northern 

provinces, areas where both Protestant and Catholic religious practices were once severely restricted. Four new 

Protestant churches were built in the former Saisomboun 

Special Zone and Bolikhamsai province and churches 

formerly closed or destroyed were permitted to re-open in 

Bolikhamsai, Vientiane, and Bokeo provinces. The small 

Baha’i community was allowed to reclaim property in two 

provincial areas. 

Theravada Buddhism is closely associated with the 

dominant “lowland” Lao culture, which makes up approximately 50 percent of Laos’s population. However, 

the rapid growth of Protestantism among Laos’s many 

ethnic minorities is a constant cause of concern for Communist government officials. Authorities continue to view 

the spread of Christianity among ethnic minorities as an 

“American import” that poses a potential threat to the 

Communist political system, particularly as some ethnic 

minority groups have long resisted government control. 

Over the past several years, however, the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), the agency that oversees religious policy and regulates religious activities, has publicly 

called for greater religious reconciliation and tolerance, 

and reportedly intervened with provincial officials arresting and harassing ethnic minority Protestants—though 

with few measurable results.

Nevertheless, troubling reports persist that provincial 

and village-level officials confiscate the property of religious groups, arrest and detain persons, and otherwise 

harass individuals for participating in religious activities. 

Because the Lao government decentralized power to provinces and district leaders, its control over the actions of 

provincial-level authorities has weakened significantly in 

recent years. In some provincial areas, Protestant groups 

have been denied permission to hold religious services 

in homes, conduct public ceremonies, build permanent 

structures, import religious materials, or affiliate outside 

of the officially-recognized group, despite legal protections found in Decree 92, Laos’ law on religion. 

In the past year, Lao authorities continued to arrest 

and detain individuals for their religious activities. Currently, there are at least five individuals imprisoned or 

detained for activities related to religious belief and pracC O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 
270

tice, including a man abducted by police in Luang Namtha 

province. Six other individuals remain unaccounted for 

from a group of 27 ethnic Hmong Protestants detained 

after being repatriated from Thailand. The government 

released 21 from the group after almost 15 months in detention; six remain in detention and their whereabouts are 

unknown. Reports indicate that religious affiliation is at 

least part of the reason for the group’s detention. In addition, over the past two years, 11 individuals were detained 

for periods between two weeks and six months on charges 

related to constructing a church building without permission, engaging in public religious expression, or refusing 

to recant their beliefs. Most of these cases involved ethnic 

minority Protestants; however, in February 2007, two Buddhist monks were arrested and briefly detained for being 

ordained without government permission. Recent arrests 

and detentions occurred most often in Oudomsai, Luang 

Namtha, Savanakhet, and Salavan provinces. 

The number and frequency of reports of coerced 

renunciation of religion have diminished significantly in 

the past several years. Nonetheless, there continue to be 

instances in which ethnic minority Protestants face land 

confiscation, forced relocation, detention, or disappearances in provincial areas. Most reports occur in Oudomasai, Salavan, Bolikhamsai, and Luang Namtha provinces. In late 2005, authorities in the Muang Phin District 

of Savannakhet province detained 24 ethnic Brou Protestants for several days in order to force them to renounce 

their beliefs. All but two of the men recanted, and they 

remain in prison. In April 2006, officials in Salavan province reportedly arrested a village leader and expelled two 

families for refusing to renounce their religion. The village leader was held under house arrest until July 2006. In 

January 2007, police reportedly abducted an ethnic Thai 

Dam resident of Oudomsay province who had been an active leader in the Muang Houn Christian community. Also 

in January, Protestant families in Luang Namtha province 

were threatened with expulsion if they did not renounce 

their beliefs. In March 2007, there were similar reports in 

Bolikhamsai and Huaphanh provinces. 

Another ongoing concern of the Commission is the 

potential for restrictions and other abuses through Decree 

92, the government’s 2002 decree on religious activities. 

Decree 92 legitimized activities previously regarded as 

illegal, such as public religious persuasion, printing religious material, owning and building places of worship, 

and maintaining contact with overseas religious groups. 

There also continue to be credible reports that the LFNC 

uses Decree 92 to facilitate religious practice in some areas and to promote cooperation among religious communities. However, through Decree 92, the Lao government 

continues to provide officials with a potential legal basis 

for control of, and interference in, religious activities. For 

example, the government requires most religious groups, 

with the exception of the Buddhists, to report their activities to the LFNC. Religious leaders in Laos also claim 

that there continue to be restrictions on the publication 

of religious materials or public religious expression and 

persuasion, despite provisions in Decree 92. In addition, 

many religious activities can be conducted only with government approval, and the decree contains vague national 

security provisions that prohibit activities that create 

“social division” or “chaos,” reiterating Article 9 of the Lao 

Constitution and Article 66 of the criminal code, used in 

the past by government officials to arrest and detain arbitrarily ethnic minority Christians. 

In the past year, the Commission and its staff have 

met with Lao government officials and religious leaders, 

domestic and international human rights activists, 

academics and other experts on Laos. The Commission 

traveled to Laos and issued a report on its findings in 

February 2003. 

With regard to Laos, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• make clear to the government of Laos that continued 

improvements in the protection of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, including legal reforms, 

political accountability for government officials who 

perpetrate religious freedom abuses, and the release of 

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The number and frequency of reports 

of coerced renunciation of religion 

have diminished significantly in the past 

several years. Nonetheless, there continue 

to be instances in which ethnic 

minority Protestants face land confiscation, 

forced relocation, detention, or 

disappearances in provincial areas. 
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C O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 

any prisoner of concern detained because of religious 

affiliation or activity, is essential to further improvements 

in, and expansion of, U.S.-Laos relations;

• establish measurable goals and benchmarks, in consultation with the Commission, for further human rights 

progress in Laos as a guide for diplomatic engagement between Laos and the United States or for initiating a formal 

human rights dialogue with the government of Laos, addressing such human rights issues as ethnic and religious 

discrimination, torture and other forms of ill-treatment in 

prisons, unlawful arrest and detention, the absence of due 

process, and practical steps to ensure the right to freedom 

of expression, association, and assembly; 

• expand Lao language broadcasts on Voice of America 

(VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) while ensuring that the 

content of the Lao language broadcasts on VOA and RFA 

includes adequate information about the importance 

of human rights, including religious freedom, within 

Laos; and

• initiate and expand technical assistance and human 

rights programs that support the goals of protecting and 

promoting religious freedom, including: 

• rule of law programs that provide assistance in amending, drafting, and implementing laws and regulations; 

• human rights and religious freedom training programs 

for specific sectors of Lao society, including government officials, religious leaders, academics, lawyers, 

police, and representatives of international non-governmental organizations; 

• training, networking, and capacity-building for Lao 

groups that carry out charitable, medical, and development activities; 

• educational initiatives to combat intolerance of religious and ethnic minorities and to promote human 

rights education; and 

• the expansion of the number and funding of educational, academic, government, and private exchange 

programs with Laos that will bring a wide cross-section 

of Lao society to the United States. 

271

The window frame of a temple, Vientiane, Laos. 
272

The Kazakh government has 

penalized some Muslim groups, 

including some that espouse extremist 

political agendas. Human rights groups 

have expressed concern that due process 

is not being followed in many of these 

actions and that police, investigatory, 

and judicial officials have not provided 

public access either to trials or to 

information about these cases. 

Other countries under review: 

kazakhstan, malaysia, and turkey

Kazakhstan is defined in its constitution as a secular state that provides for freedom of religion. 

 Religious communities worship largely without government interference, though foreign religious 

associations are required by the constitution to conduct 

their activities, including, according to the State Department, appointing the heads of religious associations, “in 

coordination with appropriate state institutions.” The 

government has exempted registered religious organizations from taxes on collections and income from certain 

religious activities. The government has also donated 

buildings, land, and provided other assistance for the 

construction of new mosques, synagogues, and Russian 

Orthodox churches.

Under the 2005 amendments to the country’s religion 

law, religious organizations must register both with the national and regional Ministry of Justice offices. Unregistered 

religious activity is an administrative offense. To register, a 

religious organization is required to have at least 10 members and to submit an application to the Ministry of Justice; 

registration may be denied if the organization does not 

have enough members or if its charter violates the law. If literature has not been vetted during the registration process, 

it is deemed illegal. Foreigners are permitted to register 

religious organizations, but Kazakh citizens must comprise 

the majority of the 10 founders. The 2005 amendments also 

incorporated aspects of administrative code Article 375, 

allowing authorities to suspend the activities or to fine the 

leaders of unregistered groups. 

Under the Law on Public Associations, which applies 

to registered religious groups, a court may suspend all activities of a registered organization for up to six months if 

it is found to have violated the Constitution, any laws, or 

its own charter and bylaws. The State Department reports 

that police, procurators, and citizens may petition a court to 

suspend a registered organization for failure to correct such 

violations. If suspended by court order, the organization is 

banned from holding meetings, gatherings, or services.

Under the religion law, a religious organization 

whose charter includes religious education may be denied 

registration if it does not obtain approval from the Ministry of Education. Religious instruction is not permitted in 

public schools, but parents may enroll children in supplemental religious education classes provided by registered 

religious organizations. Neither law nor regulation prohibits foreign missionary activity, though under the amended 

religion law, foreign missionaries are required to register 

annually with the Justice Ministry and provide data on 

religious affiliation, geographic area, and duration of stay, 

as well as on all religious literature. 

Muslims

The national Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK), headed by the chief mufti, exerts significant 

influence over the country’s practice of Islam, including 

the construction of mosques and the coordination of hajj

travel. In 2002, the Kazakh Constitutional Council ruled 

against a proposed legal requirement that SAMK must 

approve the registration of any Muslim group. ReportKazakhstan
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edly, however, SAMK occasionally pressures non-aligned 

imams and congregations to join SAMK. Nevertheless, the 

State Department reported in 2007 that the Kazakh government continues to register some mosques and Muslim 

communities not affiliated with SAMK.

In the western city of Atyrau, however, a court ruled 

in July 2007 that the recently registered Darussalam Muslim community functioned “illegally” and ordered that 

the mosque, built with community funds, be given to the 

city Muftiate. Reportedly, shortly after the mosque was 

registered, the community was pressured by local authorities to accept an SAMK-affiliated mufti. According to the 

religious freedom news service Forum 18, two members of 

the Atyrau mosque wrote an open letter in December 2007 

complaining that imams are appointed without the community’s consent. 

The Law on Extremism, effective since February 2005, 

gives the government wide latitude to identify and designate religious or other groups as extremist organizations, 

to ban a designated group’s activities, and to criminalize 

membership in a banned organization. Government officials have expressed concern about possible political and 

religious extremism, particularly in southern Kazakhstan, 

where many Uzbeks reside. The Committee for National 

Security (KNB) stated in 2006 that the struggle against “religious extremism” is its top domestic priority. 

The Kazakh government has penalized some Muslim 

groups, including some that espouse extremist political 

agendas. Human rights groups have expressed concern 

that due process is not being followed in many of these 

actions and that police, investigatory, and judicial officials have not provided public access either to trials or to 

information about these cases. According to some leading Kazakh human rights activists, there may be as many 

as 300 Muslim individuals imprisoned in Kazakhstan on 

religion-related charges. Due to the lack of information, 

however, it is impossible to ascertain the veracity of these 

claims. As of late 2006, members of the Tabligh Jama’at, an 

international Islamic missionary organization, reportedly 

faced fines in various regions of Kazakhstan for giving sermons in unregistered mosques. According to Forum 18, 

government officials deny that they regard the group as 

“extremist,” claiming instead that its members are penalized for unregistered religious activity. 

In 2007, there were two trials in northern Kazakhstan of a reported 40 members of two banned Islamic 

groups. The first trial, in the city of Karaganda against 

30 members of the Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir, began 

in August. The defendants were charged with forming a 

criminal group, fomenting religious hatred, and carrying out extremist activities. In the city of Stepnogorsk, 

10 people, officially described as inspired by Wahhabist 

teachings, went on trial in July for organizing and operating a terrorist group, the sale and possession of weapons 

and explosives, and igniting inter-ethnic hatred in society. In both instances, human rights groups raised concerns about the apparent lack of due process, including 

the fact that the trials were closed. In the southern city 

of Shymkent, 15 Muslims were arrested in April 2007; 14 

were convicted on charges of terrorism and given sentences of up to 15 years at a closed trial in February 2008. 

Human rights activists told Forum 18 that at least 14 are 

believed to be innocent of the charges and that the police planted narcotics and extremist literature on them at 

the time of arrest. Relatives of those imprisoned claimed 

that the secret police had punished the men for their independent views. 

Non-Muslim Groups

In practice, most minority religious communities registered with the government without difficulties, although 

some Protestant groups and other groups viewed by officials as non-traditional have experienced long delays. For 

example, the Grace Presbyterian Church and a Pentecostal church in Atyrau reported in late 2007 that no reasons 

were given for the repeated denials—since 2002—of their 

registration applications to the Justice Department. Two 

leading Kazakh civil society groups, the Almaty Helsinki 

Foundation and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for 

President’s Palace, Astana, Kazakhstan
274

Human Rights and Rule of Law, have provided legal assistance to religious groups in the registration process. 

Although local officials may attempt to limit the practice 

of religion by some “non-traditional” groups, higher-level 

officials or courts, at least until recently, have usually 

overturned such attempts. 

Last year, there were signs that the government’s 

position toward religious freedom was becoming more 

restrictive. Two official documents issued in April 2007 

gave rise to concern: the “State Program of Patriotic Education,” approved by presidential decree, and a Justice 

Ministry booklet, “How Not to Fall Under the Influence of 

Religious Sects.” The Justice Ministry document includes 

the claim that “transferring to other religious faiths represents treason to one’s country and faith.” Furthermore, 

in January 2008, President Nazarbayev reportedly told a 

meeting of the only political party represented in parliament that illegal religious movements in Kazakhstan 

should be suppressed, that the “unchecked activity” of 

tens of thousands of missionaries should not be allowed 

in Kazakhstan, and that Kazakhstan should not become 

“the dumping ground for religious movements.” 

In other actions described by police as “part of the 

fight against terrorism and religious groups without registration,” raids and other harassment of various minority 

religious communities increased in 2007. Unregistered 

religious groups have reported more court actions and 

greater fines for non-registration in the past year. The 100 

congregations of the Council of Churches, which reject registration as a matter of principle, continue to refuse to pay 

court-ordered fines for unregistered religious activity. The 

Grace Presbyterian Church in the city of Karaganda—which 

had been subjected to a 15-hour police raid in August 

2007—also faced treason investigations from the National 

Security Committee (KNB), or secret police; in September 

2007, its members faced questioning by the tax police, 

including questions about why they attend a church and 

not a mosque. Reportedly, local police have also disrupted 

meetings of unregistered groups in private homes.

Kazakhstan’s human rights record has come under 

increasing international scrutiny, particularly because it 

will serve as Chair of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. In March 2008, the 

Baptist pastor of an unregistered church in Temirtau was 

threatened with arrest; according to Forum 18, the head 

of the Justice Department’s Religious Affairs Unit warned 

him that he should not appeal to the OSCE.

Although the Hare Krishna movement is registered at 

the national and local levels, its leaders reported continuing local harassment in 2007 over a lengthy land dispute. 

In April 2006, an appeals court upheld a lower court decision that the land in question should revert to the county 

government, allegedly due to a faulty land title dating 

from 1999. In November 2006, a police action demolished the homes of 26 members of the Hare Krishna farm. 

Members of the Hare Krishna community near Almaty 

were subjected to a raid by migration police during a religious festival in September 2007. In January 2008, Forum 

18 reported that the directors of the Society for Krishna 

Consciousness met with the regional governor about the 

official order to demolish their temple in the agricultural 

community, but the order reportedly still stands. 

The national Jehovah’s Witnesses Religious Center 

alleges that local officials have harassed local communities. For example, an unregistered Jehovah’s Witness 

community in the western city of Atyrau was subject to 

a police raid in August 2007. For seven years, the Justice 

Ministry in Atyrau has reportedly used minor technical 

infractions to deny repeated registration applications of 

this Jehovah’s Witness community. 

There were no reported incidents of official antiSemitism. In April 2004, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

invited the country’s Chief Rabbi to hold seminars for 

police officers on respect for religious minorities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided human 

rights training to law enforcement officers, including on 

religious freedom.

Malaysia

Religious freedom is a highly contentious political 

issue in Malaysia that is debated openly by politicians, huKazakhstan’s human rights record 

has come under increasing international 

scrutiny, particularly because it will serve 

as Chair of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. 
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C O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 

man rights activists, lawyers’ groups, journalists, and other 

sectors of civil society. Many non-Muslims express concern about the Muslim majority’s commitment to religious 

freedom and freedom of expression and call for interfaith 

dialogue; many Muslims perceive these concerns as an 

attack on Islam’s officially respected position. Although 

religious freedom concerns are debated openly and actively in Malaysia, there have been few political resolutions, as Malaysia’s courts and parliament have failed to 

address some of the most problematic issues. 

The Constitution of Malaysia formally proclaims 

the state to be secular and guarantees “every person the 

freedom to practice his or her religion in peace and harmony.” At the same time, the document also recognizes 

Islam as the “religion of the Federation,” defines Malays 

as Muslims, and limits the “propagation” of other faiths. 

Sunni Muslims are free to practice their religious beliefs 

with few limitations, but those deviating from accepted 

Sunni beliefs face some discrimination or other restrictions, including being subject to arrest and “rehabilitation.” 

For the most part, non-Muslims are free to practice their religious beliefs with few restrictions. In states 

where Muslims are a majority, local governments carefully control the building of non-Muslim places of worship, 

the allocation of land for non-Muslim cemeteries, and the 

distribution of religious materials. Approvals are needed 

for building religious venues and printing religious materials—approvals that are often granted slowly or through 

corruption. In peninsular Malaysia, the federal government restricts the distribution of books, movies, Web 

sites, and music it alleges might incite racial or religious 

disharmony. This ban does not extend to eastern Malaysia, where there are Chinese and Indian majorities. 

In recent years, however, ethnic Malay Christians and 

ethnic Indian Hindus have faced various problems that 

reflect the country’s long-contested political issues, including the viability of Malaysia’s dual legal systems (civil 

and sharia), the definition of who is a Muslim in Malaysia, 

and the many special privileges afforded ethnic Malay 

Muslims. Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu leaders are currently offering cautious support for Malaysia’s “secular” 

Constitution and an end to the positive discrimination 

policies benefiting Malay Muslims at the expense of other 

ethnic minorities. In the March 2008 elections, opposition parties scored important gains in the Parliament and 

gained control of several state-level governments. At least 

one state won by the opposition, Penang, announced that 

it will end all economic, educational, and political privileges reserved for ethnic Malays, sparking several small 

Malay protests. 

Civil Courts vs. Sharia Courts

Malaysia maintains two parallel justice systems: the secular court system based on parliamentary 

law and a sharia court system based on Islamic law. Sharia, enacted and enforced at the state rather than the federal level, applies only to Muslims, but legal problems have 

emerged when ethnic Malays convert to another religion 

or in family disputes between Malays and non-Malays. 

Where sharia court decisions affect a non-Muslim, he or 

she can seek recourse in the secular courts that, in theory, 

can overrule the sharia courts. For most of Malaysia’s history, there have been few jurisdictional battles between 

the two court systems. However, in recent years, questions of apostasy, conversion, divorce, child custody, and 

burial rights—and the interplay between sharia and civil 

courts—have become major legal and political issues. 

Under sharia law, Malaysians wishing to renounce 

Islam in order to profess another belief are subject to 

criminal sanctions, including being sentenced to “rehabilitation.” In 1998, after a controversial incident involving a 

Muslim converting to Christianity, the government stated 

that “apostates” would not face government punishment 

as long as they did not defame Islam after their conversion. However, the issue of which court—civil or sharia—

would make the decision on conversions was not clarified. 

After the 1998 ruling, enforcement of apostasy laws has 

occurred only occasionally, and almost entirely among 

Muslims considered to be “deviant.” In 1999, the Malaysian State Court ruled that secular courts have no jurisdiction to hear applications by Muslims to change religion. In 

May 2007, the Federal Court, Malaysia’s Supreme Court, 

Lake Garden, Malaysia.
276

supported this ruling and stated further that Malaysians 

wishing to convert from Islam to another religion must 

obtain an order from the sharia court. 

In March 2007, the Court of Appeals upheld a previous Federal Court ruling that allowed Muslims (or recent 

Muslim converts) to initiate divorce or child custody proceedings against a non-Muslim spouse in sharia courts. 

There are also sporadic cases in which provincial or local 

officials have intervened in family law matters; the most 

prominent cases involved marriages between Hindus and 

Muslims. In several other cases, state religious authorities detained and attempted to “rehabilitate” Muslim 

spouses who sought to renounce Islam or who married 

non-Muslims in a temple. Such marriages are not legally 

recognized. In one case, the child resulting from an interfaith union was removed from parental custody, pending 

“rehabilitation” of the detained Muslim parent. Lawyers 

and human rights advocates have spoken out about these 

practices and several cases remain under review at the 

Court of Appeals and the Federal Court. 

In 1999, Azlina Jailani, also known as Lina Joy, a Muslim who converted to Christianity, went to court to take 

“Muslim” off her identity card in order legally to marry 

another Christian. The 1976 Law Reform Act prohibits a 

Muslim from solemnizing a marriage under civil law with 

a non-Muslim. Subsequent local court decisions have 

contended that as an ethnic Malay, Joy’s constitutional 

right to religious freedom was limited by Article 160 of the 

Constitution, which states that all Malays are Muslims. A 

lower court hearing the Joy case decided that as a Muslim, 

her appeal should be decided by sharia courts. However, 

Joy refuses to acknowledge the standing of the sharia 

court over her case, claiming that sharia courts are for 

deciding personal status issues for Muslims. In September 

2005, the Court of Appeals ruled that the sharia court had 

to settle Joy’s appeal to have “Muslim” removed from her 

identify card. On May 30, 2007, the Federal Court backed 

the Court of Appeals decision. 

Problems for Ethnic Indian Hindus

The majority of Hindus face few restrictions on the 

practice of their religion. However, disputes over the presence or expansion of Hindu religious sites have added to 

already tense ethnic relations and resulted in claims of 

discrimination. After a violent conflict in Penang between 

Hindus and Muslims in March 1998, the government 

announced a nationwide review of “unlicensed” Hindu 

temples and shrines. Although implementation was not 

vigorous, beginning in 2005, state and local governments 

started to demolish “unlicensed” Hindu temples to make 

way for other development projects, claiming that the 

temples were located on government land. 

The Hindu temple and shrine destructions are 

spurred by ethnic and political competition in the countryside and battles over eminent domain in urban areas. 

Lawyers for the Hindu communities have had some success in raising the issue with national politicians; however, 

they have succeeded only in slowing—but not stopping—

shrine and temple destruction, particularly outside of 

Kuala Lumpur. In October 2007, authorities demolished 

the 100-year-old Maha Mariamman Hindu Temple and reportedly assaulted its Chief Priest. In December 2007, the 

Sri Periyachi Amman Temple in Tambak Paya, Malacca 

was demolished by local authorities to make way for a development project, despite having received a “stay order” 

from state officials.

Defining “Deviancy”

The government continues to publish a list of groups 

with “deviant” interpretations of Islam, maintaining that 

those groups endanger national security or cause divisions among Muslims. Fifty-six deviant teachings have 

been identified and prohibited, including Shi’a Islam, the 

Baha’i religion, the Ahmadi religion, transcendental meditation, and some messianic sects of Islam. The government has established guidelines on what constitutes “deIn recent years, ... ethnic Malay Christians 

and ethnic Indian Hindus have faced various 

problems that reflect the country’s long-contested political issues, including the viability 

of Malaysia’s dual legal systems (civil and 

sharia), the definition of who is a Muslim in 

Malaysia, and the many special privileges 

afforded ethnic Malay Muslims. 
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viant” behavior, and practitioners of religions so deemed 

may be arrested or detained with the consent of the sharia 

court, in order to “rehabilitate” them and return them to 

the “true path of Islam.” According to the State Department’s 2007 religious freedom report, although the small 

Shi’a community is listed as a “deviant” sect, its members 

are allowed to worship and operate openly. However, 

Shi’a Muslims face discrimination in employment and are 

closely monitored by the government. 

In November 2006, Malaysian police detained 107 

persons, including several children, during a raid in Kuala 

Lumpur against suspected followers of the banned al 

Arqam Islamic group. While all the detainees were subsequently released, Malaysian police stated that their 

intention to press charges in a sharia court against six of 

the arrested individuals. The government had banned al 

Arqam in 1994, labeling it a “deviant” sect. Ashaari Muhammad, the leader of the group’s approximately 10,000 

followers, subsequently spent 10 years under house arrest. 

In June 2007, authorities announced that they were seeking Ayah Pin, the leader of a non-violent religious group 

in Terengganu known as the Sky Kingdom, for supporting 

“deviant” religious practices. In 2005, at the instruction of 

state officials, police arrested approximately 70 Sky Kingdom members and destroyed all non-residential buildings 

on the group’s compound. One of the 70 arrested agreed 

to undergo religious rehabilitation; the cases against the 

other Ayah Pin followers were pending. In July 2004, the 

Federal Court dismissed an appeal by four followers of 

Ayah Pin seeking a statutory declaration that Sky Kingdom followers have the right to practice the religion of 

their choice. The Federal Court held that their attempt to 

renounce Islam did not free them from the jurisdiction of 

the state sharia court.

Turkey

According to the State Department’s 2007 Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom, the constitution of Turkey “provides for freedom of religion and the 

government generally respects this right in practice.” 

The Commission traveled to Turkey in November 2006. 

Throughout its visit, people of almost every tradition 

stated that, despite serious problems regarding the opening, maintaining, and operation of houses of worship, 

they were free to gather and worship as provided for in the 

country’s constitution. Moreover, most groups reported 

that conditions for religious freedom had improved in the 

past decade and particularly due to the reforms undertaken by the government during the accession process to 

the European Union (EU). However, the Commission also 

learned of significant restrictions on religious freedom for 

Muslims as well as for religious minority communities, 

including state policies and actions that effectively prevent non-Muslims from sustaining themselves by denying 

them the right to own and maintain property, to train religious clergy, and to offer religious education above high 

school. This has led to the decline—and some cases, virtual disappearance—of some of these religious minorities 

on lands they have inhabited for millennia.

Secularism and Nationalism

Turkey’s constitution establishes the country as a 

“secular state,” according to the policy defined by the 

country’s founder and first president, Mustafa Kemal 

Ataturk. Because Ataturk believed that religion was the 

primary cause for the Ottoman Empire’s lag in modernization vis à vis Europe, he and most of Turkey’s subsequent 

political leaders were determined to remove the influence 

of religion, including even expressions of personal belief, 

from public life in Turkey and to subject religion to state 

control. As such, the Turkish government’s concept of secularism differs from the American version of separation 

of religion and state, as it reflects state control over—and 

even hostility toward—religious expression in the public 

sphere. Many contend that the Turkish state’s interpretation of secularism has resulted in religious freedom violaAli Bardakoglu, President of the Religious Affairs Directorate 

(Diyanet), with Commissioners Gaer and Bansal.
278

tions for many of Turkey’s citizens, including the majority 

and minority religious communities.

The absence of religion from public life has remained 

controversial for many Turks and at several times in the 

ensuing decades they elected governments that were less 

rigid on policies toward religious expression for Muslims. 

The Turkish military, which is constitutionally identified 

as the guardian of Ataturkist secularism, ousted those governments, in part because the military determined that 

secularism was under threat. Turkey’s current governing 

party, the Justice and Development Party (known by its 

initials in Turkish, the AKP, or the AK Party), has roots in 

this movement for greater public religious expression. The 

AK Party won a plurality of 34 percent of the vote in national elections in November 2002, campaigning on a platform of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the reintegration of Islam into public life in a manner consistent with 

modernity and democracy. Following his declared aim 

to pursue EU membership, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan instituted a number of democratic reforms, many 

of which have dealt with some of Turkey’s most notoriously undemocratic practices. 

After elections in July 2007 returned the AK Party to 

power with a stronger plurality, the Turkish Parliament 

voted to change the 1982 constitution to, in effect, allow 

women with scarves to attend university. Viewing this as 

a blatant strike against Turkish secularism, in March 2008, 

a public prosecutor filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional 

Court seeking to shut down the AK Party and ban Erdogan and other AK officials from politics for five years. The 

Court agreed to hear the case, setting the stage for an historic confrontation between the secularist establishment, 

which, until the success of the AK Party, had been used to 

governing Turkey, and the newer elites, represented by the 

AK Party. The EU and the U.S. government have criticized 

the lawsuit, describing it as an attempt to overthrow the 

democratic order in Turkey.

In addition to the strict notion of secularism, the origins of the Turkish Republic left the Turkish political and 

military establishment with a highly nationalistic and narrow understanding of Turkish identity, which has also influenced the state’s view of religious freedom and minority 

rights. Built into the founding of Turkish identity was the 

implicit understanding that non-ethnic Turks residing in 

Turkey are potentially suspect, since they allegedly harbor 

a secret desire to secede from and hence, dismember the 

country. This fear of territorial dismemberment, linked to 

a strain of virulent nationalism in Turkey, still holds sway 

in some sectors of society, resulting in state policies that 

undermine ethnic and minority religious communities.

The January 2007 murder of Hrant Dink, a Turkish citizen and respected journalist of Armenian ethnicity, is just 

one example of such extreme nationalism. Dink had been 

convicted under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code 

for “insulting” the Turkish state because of his use of the 

term “Armenian genocide” in public, although his conviction was converted to a suspended sentence following EU 

and other international pressure. Some reports suggested 

that the perpetrator targeted Dink because he was not 

a Muslim, indicating that for some, religious extremism 

has fused with the extreme nationalism. A trial began in 

July 2007, but is closed because the purported assailant 

is a minor; a total of 19 suspects are on trial. An Istanbul 

court is also looking into allegations of official negligence 

or collusion, as Amnesty International reported in January 2008 that Dink had reported threats to his life to the 

Public Prosecutor but that steps were not taken to ensure 

his protection. According to that indictment, one of the 

defendants also acted as a police informer and told police 

months in advance of plans to assassinate Dink. Two gendarmerie officers have since been charged with dereliction of duty; however, lawyers for Dink’s family have called 

for more law enforcement officers to be brought to justice.

Muslims

The state carries out its management role with regard 

to the majority Muslim community through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or the Diyanet. The state, through 

the Diyanet, controls and supervises the religious institutions of the Sunni Muslim population, managing all 80,000 

mosques in Turkey and employing all imams as state 

functionaries. Religious practice and education (compulsory in the state schools for all Muslim children, though 

religious minorities are exempted) exclusively follow the 

Hanafi Sunni doctrine, although up to 20 percent of Turkey’s Muslims are Alevis. Although Turkey is renowned for 

its Sufi orders and they continue to exist in Turkey, they 

have been officially prohibited since the 1920s.

Until recently, religious dress, including the wearing 

of a headscarf, was banned in all public institutions, including government buildings, universities, and schools. 

The state prosecutor’s lawsuit against the AK government 

indicates the extent to which the “headscarf issue” is the 

most politically and popularly charged issue in Turkey 
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today, reflecting this persistent tug of war between those 

promoting Ataturk’s secularist legacy and those pressing 

for greater public expression of religion through religious 

symbols and clothing. Women wearing headscarves and 

their advocates have both lost their jobs in the public sector, including as nurses or teachers, and students wearing 

headscarves were not officially permitted to register for 

classes, even at private institutions. Members of the military have been charged with “lack of discipline” for performing Muslim prayers or being married to women who 

wear headscarves. 

After the July 2007 elections, the Turkish Parliament approved constitutional changes to guarantee all 

citizens the right to attend university regardless of dress, 

stating that “no one can be deprived of his/her right to 

higher education.” The change states that only traditional 

scarves—tied loosely under the chin—will be allowed; 

headscarves that cover the neck, as well as the full veil, 

would still be banned, as would all headscarves in government buildings. 

Alevis, an offshoot of Shi’ism that many Sunnis—and 

even many Shi’a Muslims—view as heretical, are a minority Muslim community in Turkey that make up anywhere 

from 15 to 25 percent of the population. Alevis are reportedly currently able to practice their beliefs relatively freely 

and build cem evleri or “gathering houses,” though there 

continue to be cases in which Alevis have been denied 

permission to build their meeting houses. However, none 

of the budget of the Diyanet goes to the Alevi community. Moreover, Alevi children must undergo the same 

compulsory religious education as all Muslims, which 

involves instruction only about Sunni Islam. A member of 

the Alevi community in Turkey took this issue before the 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which in October 2007 issued a ruling in favor of the Alevis, declaring 

that by making this religious education compulsory for all 

Muslims in Turkey, Alevis were being denied the “right of 

parents to ensure education in conformity with their own 

religious convictions.” It remains now for the Turkish government to implement this decision.

The Recognized Religious Minorities 

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty signed 

between Turkish forces and several European powers that 

formally established the Republic of Turkey, contained 

specific guarantees and protections for non-Muslim 

religious minorities in Turkey, which has since been interpreted by the Turkish government to refer only to the 

Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish communities. Yet legal recognition of these and other religious 

minority communities has not been implemented in Turkish law and practice. The absence of legal personality has 

over the decades resulted in serious problems with regard 

to their right to own, maintain, and transfer property as 

a community and as individuals and to train religious 

clergy, leading in some cases to a critical decline in these 

communities on their historic lands. As noted above, the 

problems for the minorities stem in part from the fact that 

most are not only religious but also ethnic minorities, and 

have thus faced some suspicion about their loyalty from 

the majority community.

At the time Turkey was founded in 1923, there were 

approximately 200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in the 

country. In 1955, by which time the number had fallen to 

100,000, violent riots broke out targeting the Greek Orthodox community, resulting in the destruction of private and 

commercial properties, desecration of religious sites, and 

killings. Due to the fallout from those riots and other difficulties for the Greek Orthodox minority, the number of 

Orthodox Christians has fallen to its current level of about 

2,500. In addition, though the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s 

constituencies extend to Orthodox communities in the 

United States, Europe, and Australia, the Turkish authorities do not allow the Patriarch to use the term “ecumenical” in his title, recognizing him only as the head of Turkey’s small (and decreasing) Greek Orthodox community. 

As a result, the government maintains that only Turkish 

citizens can be candidates for the position of Ecumenical 

Patriarch and for membership as hierarchs in the Church’s 

Holy Synod. Yet, since the Turkish state does not allow the 

Greek Orthodox minority to train its clergy, the very surMany contend that the Turkish state’s 

interpretation of secularism has resulted 

in religious freedom violations for many of 

Turkey’s citizens, including the majority and 

minority religious communities.
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vival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey are today at risk. 

After the military coup in 1971, the Turkish state 

nationalized all private institutions of higher learning, 

including those for religious training. One result was the 

closure of the Halki School of Theology, which is the theological seminary on the island of Heybeli that, since the 

nineteenth century, had trained religious leaders of the 

Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian communities worldwide. Despite repeated government promises, 

the Halki Seminary remains closed. 

The Armenian Patriarch, head of the Armenian Orthodox Church, similarly has no legal personality and 

there is no seminary in Turkey to educate clerics. As 

with the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarchate experiences direct interference in the selection of its 

religious leadership, and the Turkish state also prevents 

Armenian Christians from operating an independent 

seminary to train new clergy members. 

Many Jews report that the situation for Jews in Turkey is better than in other majority Muslim countries, as 

they are generally able to worship freely and their places 

of worship receive government protection when it is 

required. In addition, Jews operate their own schools, 

hospitals, and welfare institutions, as well as a newspaper. Nevertheless, there are concerns about attacks on 

synagogues and anti-Semitism in the media. In November 2003 and August 2004, synagogues were bombed by 

terrorists associated with al-Qaeda; 27 people were killed. 

The Turkish state took prompt action to arrest the perpetrators, reportedly carried out by a Turkish al-Qaeda cell. 

There is also increasing anti-Semitism in some media 

sectors that is generally coupled with anti-Americanism, 

particularly in media viewed as either nationalist or religious extremist. There are a growing number of specious 

stories about Israeli and U.S. misdeeds in Iraq, as well as 

pieces containing more conventional anti-Semitic stereotyping. All of these factors have resulted in an increasing sense of fear and insecurity among members of the 

Jewish community that had generally not been present 

before in Turkey. 

Property Issues and the Law on Foundations

Many of the most serious problems faced by religious 

minorities in Turkey involve property rights and ownership. While the Diyanet runs Sunni Muslim affairs, another government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar), regulates all activities of non-Muslim 

religious groups and their affiliated houses of worship and 

other property. The establishment of a foundation is the 

mechanism through which a minority religious community can own property, including worship buildings, schools, 

and other institutions, given their lack of legal status in 

Turkey. While a foundation enables a religious community 

to become a collective legal entity, the rules governing the 

foundations have been found to be intrusive and in many 

cases, onerous. 

Over the previous five decades, the state has, using 

convoluted regulations and undemocratic laws, confiscated hundreds of religious minority properties, primarily those belonging to the Greek Orthodox community, 

although Armenian Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews also 

reported such expropriations. In 1936, the government required all foundations to declare their sources of income; 

in 1974, the Turkish High Court of Appeals ruled that 

minority foundations had no right to acquire properties 

other than those listed in those 1936 declarations. Particularly since that time, the government has seized control 

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The state prosecutor’s lawsuit against the AK government indicates the extent to 

which the “headscarf issue” is the most politically and popularly charged issue in 

Turkey today, reflecting this persistent tug of war between those promoting Ataturk’s 

secularist legacy and those pressing for greater public expression of religion 

through religious symbols and clothing. 
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C O U N T R I E S P R E V I O U S LY O N T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S L I S T 

of hundreds of properties acquired after 1936; religious 

minority foundations that are recognized by the state can 

acquire property, but previously appropriated property 

cannot be reclaimed. There is also no right to appeal these 

government actions. 

In November 2006, the Turkish government, as part 

of the ninth reform package on EU accession, passed a 

new law governing foundations, making it easier to form 

a foundation and allowing non-Turkish citizens in Turkey to open foundations. The bill also enabled religious 

minorities to recover appropriated property, though it 

did not enable foundations to regain property that the 

state had sold to third parties, a category that reportedly 

involves a considerable amount of property. Then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the legislation. In 

February 2008, the newly elected Parliament passed a 

similar law that would return confiscated properties. 

Like the earlier version, this new law, while considered 

a positive first step, still does not apply to property sold 

to third parties. 

Other Religious Minorities

Syriac Christians experience problems similar to 

those of the Greek and Armenian Orthodox, particularly 

in obtaining permission to maintain ancient sites. The 

number of Syriac Christians in the southeastern part of 

the country was once much higher, but government pressure and the war between the government and secessionist Kurdish forces have resulted in the migration of significant numbers. Roman Catholics have also had their property confiscated by the government. From 1993 – 1996, 

the Turkish government held political consultations at the 

Vatican, which concluded in an agreement between the 

University of Ankara and the Jesuit Consortium Gregorianum and the reopening of the chapel at Tarsus; however, 

in most cases the state has taken possession of Catholic 

property or prohibited its use for other purposes. 

Roman Catholics, as well as Protestants, are also 

sometimes subject to violent societal attacks. In February 

2006, an Italian Catholic priest was shot to death in his 

church in Trabzon, reportedly by a youth angered over the 

caricatures of the Muslim prophet in Danish newspapers. 

Government officials strongly condemned the killing. A 

16 year-old boy was subsequently charged with the murder and sentenced to 19 years in prison. Also in February 

2006, a Slovenian Catholic monk was attacked in Izmir. In 

December 2007, a 19 year-old stabbed a Catholic priest 

outside a church in Izmir; the priest was treated and released the following day. 

Protestants in Turkey, who number approximately 

3,000, are primarily converts from other religions and are 

predominantly Turks by ethnicity. Protestant Christians 

often meet in the churches of other denominations, private homes, and in other places. Police sometimes bar 

Protestant groups from holding services in private homes 

and have detained and prosecuted individual Protestants 

for holding unauthorized gatherings. One of the most 

violent societal attacks occurred in April 2007, when three 

employees of an Evangelical Protestant publishing house 

in the city of Malatya were brutally murdered, reportedly 

by youths associated with a nationalist group. Five persons suspected of committing the murders were arrested 

soon after the attack, and five others were detained days 

later. Later evidence indicated that the five confessed 

murderers had links with local political officers, members of the special military forces, and regional members 

of Turkey’s nationalist political party. Turkey’s Interior 

Ministry in December 2007 opened a judicial investigation into the alleged collusion of public officials in these 

murders. In January 2008, one of the five on trial denied 

that the group intended to kill the three Christians, and 

blamed another suspect as the “ringleader” of the attack, 

who, he said, had “close relations” with the local police 

chief. The trial is continuing.

The late Hrant Dink (center), who edited Agos, an ArmenianTurkish weekly, with Commissioners Prodromou and Cromartie 

in November 2006. Dink was assassinated Jan. 19, 2007, 

allegedly by a 17 year old Turkish nationalist. 
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The Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral organizations as a way to advance respect for freedom of religion or belief, which is enshrined in numerous 

international human rights declarations and conventions. 

The 56 participating States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), comprising East and 

West Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union, 

along with the United States and Canada, have committed 

themselves to uphold extensive standards to protect freedom of religion or belief and to combat discrimination, 

xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. Freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief is singled out 

in the OSCE founding document, the 1975 Helsinki Final 

Act. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the OSCE has continued to be an important forum in which participating 

States have been held accountable for their human rights 

commitments. Moreover, the OSCE since its inception 

has involved non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as 

partners in its review of members’ human rights practices. 

In recent years, however, some participating states 

have sought to curtail the organization’s human rights activities. Russia, in particular, has often protested that the 

OSCE focuses too much of its criticism on the countries 

of the former USSR, while downplaying human rights 

problems in the West.1

 Russia has withheld needed consensus approval for the OSCE budget in the past, thereby 

putting in jeopardy many of the OSCE’s human rights 

activities. These activities are particularly important at 

a time when the governments of Russia and many other 

countries of the former Soviet Union are demonstrating 

an increasing lack of commitment to their human rights 

obligations, including efforts to combat racism, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance and discrimination. 

In October 2007, Russia, purportedly aiming to “improve” 

OSCE procedures, put forth several proposals that would 

have significantly increased government control over the 

civil society groups that could take part in OSCE meetings 

and activities, but the U.S. led a successful effort against 

this Russian proposal. The OSCE, citing an agreement 

made in Moscow in 1991, has reiterated that OSCE participating States have “categorically and irrevocably” declared that the “commitments undertaken in the field of 

the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct 

and legitimate concern to all participating States and 

do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the 

State concerned.”

Background on Racism, Xenophobia, 

Discrimination, and Intolerance

The past few years have witnessed a rise in incidents 

of racist discrimination, xenophobia, and intolerance 

toward members of religious and ethnic minorities in the 

OSCE region, including, for example, in Russia, Ukraine, 

and Kazakhstan, as well as in such democratic countries 

as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Extremist 

rhetoric that goes uncontested by political and societal 

leaders has also promoted an environment of intolerance 

toward members of various ethnic and religious minorities. Indeed, officials and state-run media are sometimes 

involved in efforts to inflame public opinion against minority groups in some parts of the OSCE region. 

Anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic views and actions also 

continue to be problems in many OSCE participating 

States and officials often fail to hold the perpetrators of 

anti-Semitic attacks to account. Anti-Zionism and vilification of Israel can also mask anti-Semitism. Reportedly, 

many of the recent anti-Semitic incidents in western Europe have been committed by marginalized young North 

African Muslim immigrants. In 2006, the most recent year 

for which comprehensive statistics are available, monitoring organizations reported that there were twice as many 

physical assaults on Jews in comparison with 2005, with 

the greatest increases in the United Kingdom, Canada, 
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and France. A disturbing number of anti-Semitic incidents were recorded also in Norway, Belgium, Germany, 

and Ukraine. Those monitoring these incidents find, as 

has the OSCE’s ODIHR, that when tensions escalate in the 

Middle East, anti-Semitic incidents increase worldwide. 

Opposition to the existence of Israel and political resentment regarding the conflict in the Middle East can cross 

the line into anti-Semitic acts. 

“Skinhead” gangs and neo-Nazi groups are other 

sources of hate-filled rhetoric and violence in many countries in the OSCE region. Migrants and members of various ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims 

and Jews, are targeted. Vandalism against religious and 

other property is also on the rise. Violent acts are often 

well documented, but they are rarely investigated and 

prosecuted as hate crimes. Instead, officials, prosecutors, 

and judges often trivialize such violence by treating it as 

“hooliganism,” particularly in Russia. When burnings, 

beatings, and other acts of violence target members of a 

particular group because of who they are and what they 

believe, such acts should be viewed not merely as police 

problems, but as human rights violations that require an 

unequivocal response. 

The OSCE Response 

In the last few years, the OSCE has set up several 

mechanisms to address intolerance and related human 

rights issues as mandated by the 2003 OSCE Ministerial 

Meeting. As a result of U.S. diplomatic leadership on this 

issue, since 2003 the OSCE has convened 10 high-level 

and expert conferences to address anti-Semitism and 

other tolerance-related issues. As the Commission recommended, in late 2004, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office 

appointed three Personal Representatives to promote 

tolerance. The OSCE also became the first international 

organization to name a prominent independent appointee 

specifically to examine anti-Semitism. At the same time, it 

established a Personal Representative monitoring intolerance toward Muslims, and a third who tracks other forms 

of intolerance, including xenophobia, racism, and intolerance against Christians and members of other religions. 

Finally, a new Tolerance Program within the OSCE’s Office 

of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions (ODIHR) 

was set up in late 2004 to monitor and encourage compliance with OSCE commitments to combat xenophobia, 

anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia, as well as to promote 

freedom of religion or belief.

Several OSCE institutions expressed concern in 2006 

over increased intolerance and discrimination in the 

OSCE region, particularly the OSCE Brussels Ministerial 

Council decision in December 2006 on measures to combat intolerance and discrimination and promote mutual 

respect and understanding.

OSCE Meetings on Tolerance and Related Topics

The OSCE Ministerial Council in 2003 mandated a 

major international conference to address anti-Semitism 

in the then-55 states of the OSCE region. The Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism in April 2004 was attended at 

the ministerial level and by 600 officials from 55 nations 

and by hundreds of NGOs. The conference recommended 

specific steps to fight anti-Semitism, including collecting 

and regularly reporting on hate crimes data, bolstering 

national laws, promoting educational programs, and combating hate crimes fueled by racist propaganda in the media and on the Internet. In the 2004 Ministerial Council, 

the participating States authorized the OSCE Chairmanin-Office to appoint three Personal Representatives to coordinate and highlight OSCE activities in this field. 

The 2005 Ministerial Council in Ljubljana called 

for OSCE activities in 2006 to concentrate on thematic, 

implementation-focused meetings, including tolerancerelated topics. In June 2006, Kazakhstan hosted the first 

OSCE Tolerance Implementation Meeting in Almaty, followed by a meeting on Holocaust education, hosted by 

Croatia, and a meeting on hate crimes data, hosted by 

Austria. The annual Human Dimension (HDim) meeting 

in Warsaw, Europe’s largest conference involving the NGO 

In recent years ... some participating states 

have sought to curtail the organization’s 

human rights activities. Russia, in particular, has often protested that the OSCE focuses 

too much of its criticism on the countries of 

the former USSR, while downplaying human 

rights problems in the West.
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THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

community, draws a wide variety of religious and ethnic 

groups, including from Muslim minority communities. In 

2007, there were two other tolerance-related OSCE events: 

in June, the Romanian government hosted a high-level 

conference on Combating Discrimination and Promoting 

Mutual Respect and Understanding, and in October, the 

Spanish OSCE Chair hosted a conference on Intolerance 

and Discrimination Against Muslims. 

These conferences have mobilized political support 

within OSCE participating States to address anti-Semitism 

and other forms of intolerance in a sustained manner 

and have raised awareness among NGOs and the public 

regarding anti-Semitism, discrimination against Muslims, 

and other tolerance-related issues in the OSCE region. 

The challenge remains, however, for the OSCE and its 56 

members to act on the ideas that have emerged from these 

conferences and reports and to translate them into activities and programs that will combat these forms of intolerance in all the OSCE participating States. 

OSCE Personal Representatives 

In December 2004, the 55 OSCE participating States 

authorized the then-Chairman-in-Office (CiO), Bulgarian 

Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, to name three Personal 

Representatives to promote tolerance. Anastasia Crickley 

of Ireland, Chair of the European Monitoring Centre on 

Racism and Xenophobia, was appointed as the Personal 

Representative on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and 

Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other 

Religions; Gert Weisskirchen, German parliamentarian 

and professor of higher education, was named the Personal Representative on Combating Anti-Semitism; and 

Omur Orhun, former Turkish Ambassador to the OSCE, 

was appointed the Personal Representative on Combating 

Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims. These 

appointments have been re-confirmed by each subsequent CiO, namely, Slovenia, Belgium, and Spain, and will 

extend at least through the end of 2008. The mandates 

of these Representatives include the promotion of better 

coordination of the implementation of decisions by the 

OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Councils on Tolerance 

and Non-discrimination as well as cooperation between 

the CiO and the ODIHR. 

The mandates of the three Personal Representatives 

address separate but interrelated issues that call for distinct, yet coordinated, responses. The persons selected by 

the OSCE CiO for these part-time and unpaid positions 

come from a variety of backgrounds. The 2007 Spanish 

OSCE CiO has expressed the view that the Personal Representatives should coordinate with the various relevant 

OSCE institutions and among themselves to fulfill their 

mandates and that their mandates should be better defined and their political profiles and resources increased. 

Indeed, the Commission is concerned that the work 

of the Representatives has been hampered by inadequate 

funding for staff and travel expenses, as well as other demands on their time and attention. The Commission also 

recommended that the activities of the Personal Representatives should be given more prominence in the work of the 

OSCE. For example, they should report in person to the annual ministerial meetings and their reports should be published and disseminated throughout and beyond the OSCE 

system. In addition, the OSCE CiO should invite them on 

some of his visits, refer to their work and conclusions in 

speeches, and encourage OSCE participating States and the 

18 OSCE Field Presences to invite them on official visits. 

Such measures could help enhance not only the profile 

of the Personal Representatives on Tolerance, but also increase the impact of their findings and recommendations.

During 2007, the Personal Representatives made 

contributions to various relevant OSCE meetings. These 

include the Warsaw HDim, the Bucharest June conference, and the Cordoba October conference hosted by the 

Spanish OSCE Chair, as well as meetings with the ODIHR, 

the Permanent Council, and the CiO. During 2007, CrickCommissioner Felice D. Gaer delivers testimony before the 

U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(Helsinki Commission) at their hearing on “U.S. and Civil 

Society Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism.”
286

ley made a presentation at the Warsaw OSCE Migration 

Seminar in May, Weisskirchen took part in the July Kiev 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting, and Orhun participated in the May ODIHR Human Dimension Seminar 

on Effective Participation and Representation in Democratic Societies. 

Country visits have played a key role in the work of 

the Personal Representatives and in their regular reports 

to the OSCE Permanent Council. They have all visited 

the United States. Orhun has held numerous meetings in 

Turkey and in earlier years made visits to the Netherlands, 

Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, and France. In 2007, 

he paid official visits to Ireland, Switzerland, Slovenia 

and Norway, and also made presentations at conferences 

sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Council, and 

UNESCO. Crickley also met with the UN in Geneva and 

has visited Great Britain and Austria, and has consulted 

with the European Union. Weisskirchen has held numerous conferences in Germany, has visited Russia, and in 

2007 paid an official visit to Croatia. According to the 

2007 report of the OSCE CiO, invitations from additional 

participating States to the Personal Representatives would 

enable them to meet with relevant government officials 

and raise key issues of concern directly with them, as well 

as to meet with NGOs and community and religious leaders without interference. 

The Commission also encourages each of the 

three Personal Representatives to undertake events 

with relevant NGOs as well as with the media. In 

2006,Weisskirchen held roundtables on the issue of antiSemitism involving the civil society sector in Germany, 

the United Kingdom and Canada; in 2007, together with 

the German delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, he convened an expert meeting on anti-Semitism; 

and in October, he took part in a roundtable with Baltic 

and Scandinavian civil society representatives. In the past 

year, Orhun, working with the ODIHR, has taken part in 

numerous meetings with representatives of Muslim communities across the OSCE region, including in France, 

Spain, the United States, Slovenia, and Portugal. At one of 

his earlier meetings in 2006, attended by NGOs and media 

experts, the portrayal of Muslims in public discourse was 

addressed. Based on the recommendations formulated at 

this meeting, the ODIHR announced in 2006 that it would 

develop a resource guide on improving reporting on Islam 

and Muslim communities in OSCE States. 

The Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights Tolerance Program

One of the major institutional responses of the OSCE 

to growing concerns regarding religious intolerance was 

to set up a new Tolerance Program within the ODIHR in 

late 2004. The mandate of the Tolerance Program includes 

OSCE efforts to promote tolerance and to combat intolerance and xenophobia, as well as to advance freedom of 

religion or belief. The United States has been a strong 

advocate for the establishment of the program and for 

sufficient funding for its activities. The Tolerance Program 

staff includes specialists on the issues of anti-Semitism, 

Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism, as well as on 

freedom of religion or belief. These specialists monitor 

and conduct research, write reports, conduct programs, 

and provide staff expertise for the three Personal Representatives and the ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief. The Tolerance Program 

was charged with setting up a database of information, as 

well as projects on such issues as data collection for hate 

crimes legislation, police training on hate crimes, and Holocaust education in specific countries. 

In accordance with a decision by the 2003 OSCE 

Ministerial Council, many of the Tolerance Program’s 

activities have centered on gathering and publicizing information related to tolerance and non-discrimination. 

The Program’s Web site, http://www.osce.org/odihr/16431.

html, which became operational in 2006, brings together 

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ODIHR Director Christian Strohal (right) visits the former Auschwitz 

concentration camp, prior to the publication of a book, supported by 

the ODIHR, on Holocaust education. (OSCE)
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THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

previously hard-to-find material that is directly relevant to 

addressing discrimination and to combating intolerance 

by providing access to information from OSCE participating States, NGOs, and inter-governmental organizations 

on international standards and instruments. The Web site 

also references Legislationline, ODIHR’s online database, 

and the Human Rights Information and Documentation 

Systems International index to 3,000 NGO Web sites, and 

provides customized access to more than 1.5 million documents. The Tolerance Program has developed a “Web 

site Guide to Tolerance Education” and a curriculum unit 

on “Holocaust Education and Anti-Semitism.” The Tolerance Program has also issued several useful publications 

on addressing priorities in various OSCE States, including 

“Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: An Overview of Statistics, Legislation, and National Initiatives”; 

“Education on the Holocaust and on Anti-Semitism: An 

Overview and Analysis of Approaches”; Holocaust Memorial Days in the OSCE Region: an Overview of Good 

Governmental Practices” (January 2008); and “Addressing 

Anti-Semitism: Why and How? A Guide for Educators” 

(December 2007). The latter, prepared by the ODIHR and 

Yad Vashem, offers guidelines for schools. 

In 2006, the ODIHR published further information 

on tolerance-related topics, including “Teaching Materials on the History of Jews and Anti-Semitism in Europe,” 

in cooperation with experts from seven pilot countries: 

Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, and Ukraine. This publication includes material 

on the history of anti-Semitism, contemporary forms of 

anti-Semitism, including as a form of discrimination, and 

a teaching guide on the subject. The ODIHR also produced two publications related to the struggle against hate 

crimes: “Challenges and Responses to Hate-motivated 

Incidents in the OSCE Region for the Period January-June 

2006,” and a fact sheet on the ODIHR Law Enforcement 

Officer Program on Combating Hate Crime, issued in English, Russian, Polish, and Serbian. In 2006, the Tolerance 

Program translated many of its key publications into the 

Russian language—particularly useful in light of the rising 

levels of xenophobia, racism, and various forms of intolerance in Russia and other former Soviet republics. However, that translation program did not continue in 2007, 

perhaps due to budget constraints. 

To date, the ODIHR’s Tolerance Program has emphasized activities with external organizations, although the 

Program could further expand its work with the 18 OSCE 

Field Presences and other OSCE institutions. The 2003 

OSCE Ministerial Council also tasked the Tolerance Program with acting as a focal point for the various national 

contact points on hate crime set up by the OSCE participating States. Information about practical initiatives from 

participating States, NGOs, and other institutions can also 

be submitted online. In December 2007, for example, the 

Tolerance Program ran a special program in the Russian 

Federation to train police on ways to combat hate crimes. 

As mentioned above, part of the Tolerance Program’s 

current mandate is to address freedom of religion or belief. Responsibility for the issue of religious freedom was 

removed from the ODIHR Human Rights Department 

when the issue was assigned to the Tolerance Program in 

late 2004. The Commission is concerned that as a result of 

this bureaucratic reassignment, freedom of religion or belief will be relegated as a corollary to tolerance work and 

will no longer be included in the ODIHR human rights 

programs. Instead, it should be anchored in the Human 

Rights Department and cooperate with the activities of the 

Tolerance Program. Furthermore, only one staff person in 

the Tolerance Program is assigned part-time to the issue 

of freedom of religion or belief since that person is also 

assigned to work with NGOs; in 2007, this position was 

removed from the unified budget, thus endangering its 

permanent status and changing its recruitment basis. In 

2007, the ODIHR held workshops on freedom of religion 

issues with NGOs, religious communities, and government officials in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. However, 

little news and information about those meetings was 

available in the out-of-date and sparse freedom of religion 

section of the ODIHR Tolerance Program Web site. 

OSCE Venues for Addressing Freedom of 

Religion or Belief Issues

Freedom of religion or belief is affirmed as a basic human rights principle in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Since 

then, the issue has been addressed in various ways by the 

OSCE: through the periodic OSCE and later ODIHR conferences to review implementation of human rights commitments by the 56 participating States; during several 

conferences that specifically addressed these issues, such 

as the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, held in Vienna in July 2005; in the structure of the ODIHR, where, until 

the Tolerance Program was set up, freedom of religion or 

belief was part of the Human Rights Department portfolio; 

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through the 18 OSCE Field Presences, where freedom of 

religion or belief can also be the subject of monitoring, 

reports, and related activities; and through the consideration of the views of relevant international, regional, and 

non-governmental human rights organizations. 

Under the auspices of the ODIHR, the OSCE also 

convenes an annual conference, traditionally held in Warsaw in October, to review implementation by the 55 OSCE 

participating States of their OSCE human rights commitments, including freedom of religion or belief. Known as 

the Conference on the Human Dimension (HDim), these 

10-day meetings bring together diplomats and representatives of other international organizations, and reportedly 

is the largest European human rights conference. These 

conferences have been criticized, however, for the failure 

of participating States to respond—either in words or in 

deeds—to criticism of their human rights records voiced 

at the HDim.

The ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief was re-organized in 2004 and expanded 

to a total of 58 persons nominated by countries from 

throughout the OSCE region, including an Advisory Council of 15 members. The Panel functions primarily as a consultative body for the governments of participating States 

considering new or amended legislation affecting freedom 

of religion, as well as for expert opinions on individual 

cases. The Panel reviews both proposed and enacted legislation under guidelines developed by the ODIHR and 

the Council of Europe Venice Commission based on international conventions and OSCE commitments. The Panel 

then issues recommendations to the participating States 

on bringing such legislation into conformity with international human rights standards.

Two publications relating to the work of the OSCE 

Panel of Experts were issued in 2007. One was a factsheet 

on freedom of religion or belief, released in June, and the 

other a curriculum guideline for teaching about religion 

and religious freedom issued in November. Developed in 

cooperation with education experts and aimed at legislators and schools, the Panel of Experts produced the “Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and 

Beliefs in Public Schools,” based on human rights principles and approaches. The human rights approach of the 

“Toledo Guiding Principles” offers a possible method to 

frame discussions about teaching about religion or belief 

in public schools, a controversial issue in many countries. 

The Panel has advised the governments of Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia on legislation and the panel’s 

recommendations on relevant legislation have been 

taken into consideration by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Bulgaria. In the case of Uzbekistan, however, the government has not responded to the 

Panel’s recommendations for revisions of its religion 

laws. In two recent examples of expert opinions on individual cases, the Panel determined that the situation of 

Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow is illustrative of problems 

in other post-Soviet countries, where registration requirements are being used to control religious groups. The 

Panel has also been critical of official threats to destroy 

Hare Krishna property in an agricultural cooperative in 

Kazakhstan, and in November 2006 offered its assistance 

in resolving this dispute. The Commission has observed 

that the activities of the Panel could be better known and 

more transparent, in particular with respect to those governments that ignore its recommendations. In addition, 

every year the Panel should hold at least one meeting of 

its entire membership. 

Commission Activities 

Since 2001, the Commission has participated with 

and often been members of U.S. delegations to OSCE 

meetings and has made extensive recommendations relating to the work of the OSCE on protecting freedom of 

288

These conferences have mobilized 

political support within OSCE 

participating States to address 

anti-Semitism and other forms of 

intolerance in a sustained manner and 

have raised awareness among NGOs 

and the public regarding anti-Semitism, 

discrimination against Muslims, 

and other tolerance-related 

issues in the OSCE region.
289

THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

religion or belief and on combating intolerance and antiSemitism in the OSCE region. Then-Commission Vice 

Chair Felice D. Gaer made public statements on behalf 

of the Commission at the first-ever special meeting on 

anti-Semitism in June 2003, as well as at the ODIHR HDim 

meeting the following October. In July 2004, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government should 

advocate an active role for NGOs in monitoring religious 

intolerance. In September 2004, at the OSCE Conference 

on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia, 

and Discrimination (Brussels), Vice Chair Gaer stressed 

the importance of freedom of religion or belief in the 

OSCE region. At the October 2004 OSCE HDim, the Commission made certain that public information on the status of freedom of religion or belief in various OSCE states 

and the Commission’s concerns about religious freedom 

were included in the concluding intervention by the U.S. 

delegation to the HDim meeting. 

At the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other 

Forms of Intolerance, held in Cordoba in June 2005, thenCommission Vice Chair Nina Shea spoke at the Panel of 

Experts Workshop on Promoting Tolerance and Ensuring 

Freedom of Religion and Belief on restrictive registration 

practices. Serving as official advisers to the U.S. delegation to the Cordoba meeting, then-Commission Chair 

Michael Cromartie and Vice Chair Shea met with various 

diplomats and NGO representatives. During the 2005 

OSCE HDim meeting in Warsaw, Commissioner Gaer 

served as a member of the U.S. delegation and made a 

plenary statement on the problems faced by ethnic minorities, including anti-Semitism. Commission staff also 

took part in a roundtable discussion on intolerance and 

discrimination against Muslims and made a presentation 

on how the Commission has addressed these issues. During the 2006 OSCE HDim, Commissioner Gaer, as Chair of 

the Commission, served as an official member of the U.S. 

delegation and presented a plenary statement on freedom 

of religion. Commission staff also made a presentation on 

freedom of religion in Turkmenistan during an event at 

this meeting. 

In 2007, Commissioner Gaer served on the official 

U.S. delegation to the HDim conference, during which she 

met with various delegations, the Personal Representatives on Tolerance, and ODIHR staff. In October 2007, 

Commission staff served on the official U.S. delegation to 

a Conference on Intolerance and Discrimination against 

Muslims hosted by the Spanish OSCE Chair.

The Commission was one of the first official bodies 

to speak out against the rise in anti-Semitic violence in 

Europe; it has also addressed anti-Semitism and related 

issues in countries such as Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, 

France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. 

The U.S. Congress introduced and unanimously passed 

resolutions in the Senate and the House on the rise of 

anti-Semitism in Europe. The Senate version cited the 

Commission’s findings and urged the Commission to continue documenting the issue. In February 2008, Commissioner Gaer testified at a hearing of the Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) entitled, “U.S. and Civil Society Efforts to Combat 

Anti-Semitism.” In her testimony, Gaer addressed Commission concerns about the rise of anti-Semitism, racial 

discrimination, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance in the OSCE region, the OSCE’s efforts to deal with 

these problems, and the record of the U.S. government on 

combating anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance 

through OSCE mechanisms.

The Commission has recommended that the U.S. 

government work with the OSCE and the U.S. delegation 

to ensure that separate attention is paid to anti-Semitism 

in the region and successfully advocated for the OSCE’s 

first special meeting on anti-Semitism. During preparations for that meeting, Commissioner Gaer stressed that 

acts of anti-Semitism must not be seen as hooliganism, 

but as human rights abuses that States should combat 

by robust implementation of their international human 

rights commitments. Participating on the U.S. delegation 

at the Berlin meeting, then-Vice Chair Gaer discussed 

anti-Semitism in the OSCE region and met with a wide 

variety of delegations and NGOs. During the Berlin conference on anti-Semitism, the Commission brought to 

the attention of the U.S. delegation the key role played by 

NGOs in monitoring anti-Semitism, intolerance, and discrimination, and this language was included in the delegation’s concluding speech. The resulting OSCE “Berlin 

Declaration” on anti-Semitism has served as a precedent 

for the UN in organizing its own public event on combating anti-Semitism. 
290

 Supporting the OSCE

With regard to the institution of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

• express strong support for the OSCE at the highest levels 

of the U.S. government in the face of attacks led by the 

Russian government, particularly on the OSCE’s human 

rights and tolerance activities carried out by the Office of 

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); 

• authorize and appropriate specially designated funds in 

addition to 2007 U.S. contributions to the OSCE for the 

purpose of expanding programs that combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and discrimination against Muslims, 

Christians, and members of other religions, and of developing ways to advance freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief.

• hold regular briefings at the State Department for 

members of the U.S. government and NGO community 

concerned with OSCE issues and make efforts to expand 

the number and scope of invitees; 

• recommend that the State Department routinely include 

in U.S. OSCE delegations representatives of relevant U.S. 

government agencies, such as Homeland Security and 

the Justice Department, as well as expand the number 

and range of civil society groups involved in the OSCE 

process; and

• ensure that U.S. OSCE delegations organize regular informational briefings for the civil society groups at OSCE 

meetings.

 Promoting Religious Freedom and 

Tolerance Within the OSCE’s Participating 

States

With regard to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief and the promotion of tolerance, the 

Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

urge that OSCE participating States undertake the following steps:

• ensure that they are complying with their commitments 

to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document on 

the Human Dimension, including adopting laws against 

incitement to violence and ensuring effective remedies 

for acts of discrimination;

• engage in a regular public review of compliance with 

OSCE commitments on freedom of religion or belief, on 

racial and religious discrimination, and on anti-Semitism, including by facilitating a more active role by NGOs 

as part of that process; 

• commit to condemn promptly, publicly, and specifically hate crimes and to investigate and prosecute 

their perpetrators; 

• take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts 

of anti-Semitism, such as to condemn publicly specific 

anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of attacks on Jews and their communal property, 

and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, 

to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized antiSemitic activities;

• condemn in a public fashion, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, attacks targeting Muslims and 

pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of such attacks; 

• ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be used as an 

unrestrained justification to restrict the human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, of members of 

religious minorities; 

• bring national legislation and practice, as well as local 

laws, into conformity with international human rights 

standards and OSCE commitments by: permitting all 

religious groups to organize and conduct their activities 

without undue interference; discontinuing excessive regulation of the free practice of religion, including registration or recognition requirements that effectively prevent 

members of religious communities from exercising their 

freedom to manifest religion or belief; and permitting 

limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief 

only as provided by law and consistent with participating 

States’ obligations under international law; 

• monitor the actions of regional and local officials who 

violate the right to freedom of religion or belief and provide effective remedies for any such violations; and

• establish mechanisms to review the cases of persons 

detained under suspicion of, or charged with, religious, 

political, or security offenses and to release those who 

Commission Recommendations

1 

2 
russia

291

have been imprisoned solely because of their religious 

beliefs or practices, as well as any others who have been 

unjustly detained or sentenced.

 Promoting Religious Freedom and 

Tolerance Through the OSCE’s Institutional 

Mechanisms

With regard to freedom of religion or belief and the 

promotion of tolerance, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government urge the OSCE to:

• ensure, as a matter of priority, the reappointment of the 

three Chairman-in-Office Personal Representatives on 

tolerance issues;

• make the country-specific reports of the three Personal 

Representatives available to the public;

• request that the three Personal Representatives report in 

person to the annual OSCE ministerial meetings; 

• request the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to invite the three 

Personal Representatives to participate on his or her 

official visits and refer to their work and conclusions in 

speeches and other presentations; 

• encourage OSCE participating States and the 18 OSCE 

Field Presences to invite the Personal Representatives on 

official visits;

• convene on a regular basis public review meetings to 

assess compliance by OSCE participating States of their 

commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, 

and anti-Semitism; 

• ensure that all participating States individually are taking concrete actions to live up to their commitments to 

combat discrimination and intolerance, in particular to 

combat anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, action which should include adopting 

laws to protect against incitement to violence based on 

discrimination, including anti-Semitism, and providing 

the individual with effective remedies to initiate complaints against acts of discrimination;

• convene expert conferences on anti-Semitism and freedom of religion or belief, as well as other tolerance issues, 

during 2008 and 2009;

• consider holding the Human Dimension Implementation 

Meeting (HDim) in September and October in several 

geographic areas in the OSCE region, preferably in areas 

with major OSCE Field Presences;

• consider reorganization of the HDim conference, including, for example, thematically-linked issues, such as Rule 

of Law (Elections; Judiciary; Penal System), Fundamental Freedoms (Religion, Expression/Media, Assembly/

Association, Movement), and Tolerance and Non-Discrimination (Gender and Minorities—Religious, Ethnic, 

Economic); 

• assist ODIHR in making it possible for the OSCE Field 

Presences and the ODIHR to hold public roundtables with 

local government officials, NGOs, and community leaders 

to discuss the concept and definition of hate crimes and 

the implementation of hate crimes legislation;

• encourage the ODIHR Tolerance Program staff to take 

part in ODIHR training of Field Presences and other OSCE 

staff; 

• provide voluntary, extra-budgetary funding for added 

staff to deal with freedom of religion or belief, working 

within the ODIHR Human Rights Program; 

• provide the ODIHR the necessary mandate and adequate 

resources to hire as part of the Unified Budget experienced staff at the working level, to direct the Tolerance 

Program, to monitor compliance with OSCE obligations 

on freedom of religion or belief, and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism;

• provide funding for the translation of additional ODIHR 

Tolerance Program reports into OSCE languages, particularly Russian, and for one ODIHR Tolerance Program 

staffer with Russian-language capability;

• consider ways to attract more public attention to the 

activities of the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, such as by bringing greater transparency 

to its activities and providing funds to enable the Panel to 

hold training seminars, including in the Mediterranean 

Partner States, about pertinent information on freedom 

of religious or belief;

• encourage the convening of an annual meeting of the 

OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

that is open to its entire membership; and

• consider opening the sessions of the OSCE Permanent 

Council to members of the press and public and/or webcast 

the proceedings of its sessions. 

THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

3 
292 BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Michael Cromartie, Chair

Michael Cromartie, Chair of the Commission, is Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy 

Center in Washington, D.C., where he directs the Evangelicals in Civic Life and the Media and 

Religion programs. The Ethics and Public Policy Center was established in 1976 to clarify and 

reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and domestic and foreign 

policy issues. Cromartie is also a Senior Advisor to The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 

in Washington and a Senior Fellow with The Trinity Forum.

Mr. Cromartie has contributed book reviews and articles to First Things, Books and Culture, 

The Washington Post, The Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, 

Stewardship Journal, and World. He is the editor of 16 books on religion and politics including, 

most recently, Religion, Culture, and International Conflict: A Conversation; Religion and Politics in America: A Conversation; and A Public Faith: Evangelicals and Civic Engagement.

He is an advisory editor at Christianity Today and an adjunct professor at Reformed Theological Seminary, and was 

an advisor to the PBS documentary series “With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Christian Right in America.”

Frequently asked to comment on the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, Mr. Cromartie has 

been interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, including National Public Radio, CNN, ABC News, The 

News Hour with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, and PBS. He has been quoted frequently in the Washington Post, New York Times, 

The New Republic, Christianity Today, Time, the National Catholic Reporter and U.S. News and World Report. He holds 

an M.A. in Justice from The American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia.

Commissioner Cromartie was appointed by President George W. Bush.

APPENDIX 1
293

APPENDIX 1

Preeta D. Bansal, Vice Chair

Preeta D. Bansal is a lawyer whose career has spanned government service and private practice. 

A partner at the international law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Ms. Bansal 

heads the appellate litigation group. She regularly represents major Wall Street and corporate 

clients on significant issues of law before the federal and state appellate courts, including the 

United States Supreme Court. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, she also serves 

on the advisory boards of several leading human rights and civil rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the National 

Women’s Law Center. 

Ms. Bansal served as the Solicitor General of the State of New York from 1999 through 2001. 

The New York Times called her a “legal superstar” and the New York Law Journal referred to her as 

“one of the most gifted lawyers of her generation, who combines a brilliant analytical mind with solid, mature judgment.” 

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College, and a magna cum laude

graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising Editor of the Harvard Law Review. She served as a law clerk 

to Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court (1990-1991) and to Chief Judge James L. Oakes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1989-1990). She served as Counselor in the U.S. Justice Department and 

as Special Counsel in the Office of the White House Counsel from 1993-1996. She has taught constitutional law, and was a 

Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 

Ms. Bansal was appointed to the Commission by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD), and reappointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). She served as Chair of the Commission in 2004-2005. 

Dr. Richard D. Land, Vice Chair

Dr. Richard Land has served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission since 1988. During his tenure as representative for the largest Protestant denomination in the country, Dr. Land has represented Southern Baptist and other Evangelicals’ concerns in the halls of Congress, before U.S. Presidents, and in the media.

As host of For Faith & Family, For Faith & Family’s Insight, and Richard Land Live!, three 

nationally syndicated radio programs, Dr. Land has spoken widely on the social, ethical, and 

public policy issues facing the United States. He is also Executive Editor of FFV, a national magazine dedicated to coverage of traditional religious values, Christian ethics, and cultural trends.

Dr. Land was featured in Time Magazine in 2005 as one of “The Twenty-five Most Influential Evangelicals in America.” The previous year, he was recognized by the National Journal

as one of the 10 top church-state experts “politicians will call on when they get serious about addressing an important 

public policy issue.”

Dr. Land’s latest book is The Divided States of America? What Liberals and Conservatives are Missing in the Godand-Country Shouting Match. Dr. Land has also recently authored Imagine! A God-Blessed America (2005) and Real 

Homeland Security (2004). He earned his A.B. magna cum laude at Princeton University and his D.Phil. at Oxford University.

Then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist reappointed Dr. Land to the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom in 2005. President Bush selected him for his two previous terms at the Commission (September 2001 to September 2004).
294

Dr. Don Argue

Don Argue, Ed.D., was appointed Chancellor of Northwest University in Kirkland, Washington, on August 15, 2007, after serving as President of Northwest for nine years. During his tenure 

as President, Northwest experienced substantial growth, including an increase in the number 

of faculty and the addition of 14 new buildings, including the Center for Graduate and Professional Studies and the Health and Sciences Center. During his tenure, enrollment also grew 

by 52 percent. 

Dr. Argue previously served as president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). 

The NAE is comprised of approximately 42,500 congregations nationwide from 51 member 

denominations, and individual congregations from an additional 26 denominations, as well as 

several hundred independent churches. 

He also served as President of North Central University in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 16 years. Under his leadership, the university received the Christianity Today “Decade of Growth Award” in recognition of being the fastest-growing college of its kind in the nation. 

Dr. Argue earned a Bachelor’s degree at Central Bible College in Springfield, Missouri, a Master’s degree at Santa 

Clara University in Santa Clara, California, and a Doctorate in Education at the University of the Pacific in Stockton, 

California. 

President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright invited Dr. Argue to serve on the President’s Advisory Committee on International Religious Freedom, for which he chaired the subcommittee dealing with international 

religious persecution. 

President Clinton appointed Dr. Argue, Theodore Cardinal McCarrick (Washington, D.C.) and Rabbi Arthur Schneier (New York City) to the first official delegation of religious leaders from the United States to visit The People’s Republic of China to discuss religious freedom and religious persecution with high-ranking officials including President 

Jiang Zemin. 

Dr. Argue has served as pastor of churches in Missouri and California. 

Commissioner Argue was appointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). 

Imam Talal Y. Eid

Imam Talal Y. Eid is Founder and Executive/Religious Director of the Islamic Institute of Boston. He is also the Muslim chaplain at Brandeis University and at the Massachusetts General 

Hospital. A native of Lebanon, he served as Imam at Al-Naaser Mosque in Tripoli for six years 

and as Imam and Religious Director of the Islamic Center of New England (MA) for 23 years.

Imam Eid earned a Master of Theological Studies (MTS) in 1991 from Harvard Divinity 

School, where he also earned his Doctor of Theology (Th.D.) in Comparative Religion in 2005.

He wrote his thesis on “Marriage, Divorce, and Child Custody as Experienced by American 

Muslims: Religious, Social, and Legal Considerations.” Imam Eid also holds a degree in Islamic 

Law (sharia), which he received in 1974 from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. 

Imam Eid is a well-known Muslim scholar, activist, and lecturer on Islam and Muslims, and 

on Christian, Jewish, and Muslim relations in North America. He promotes the knowledge of Islam through local and 

national radio and television programs, and through articles published in local and national magazines. He is a marital 

and family therapist and acts as an expert consultant on Islamic law, including on issues of marital dispute, marital violence, divorce, and child custody. 

294
295

APPENDIX 1

Imam Eid has served for a period of 20 years as the Chairman of Majlis Ash-Shura (Committee on Islamic Consultation) of the Islamic Council of New England in Massachusetts. He is also a member of the Quincy and Boston Clergy 

associations. He co-chaired the Archives for Historical Documentation of Boston, Massachusetts. He has received 

recognition awards from many local and national institutions, including the Massachusetts State Senate; the office of 

the District Attorney of Norfolk, Massachusetts; the Quincy (MA) City Council; the Quincy Human Rights Commission, 

Partners in Excellence Award (MGH); and Toastmasters International.

Commissioner Eid was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Felice D. Gaer

Felice D. Gaer directs the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the 

American Jewish Committee, which conducts research and advocacy to strengthen international human rights protections and institutions. 

Ms. Gaer is the first American to serve as an Independent Expert on the UN Committee 

against Torture. Nominated by the Clinton Administration and renominated by the Bush Administration, she has served on the Committee since 2000, including as Vice Chair (2004-2006), 

as General Rapporteur (2006-2008), and as year-round Rapporteur on Follow-up to Country 

Conclusions (2003 to present).

A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ms. Gaer serves on the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch/Europe and Central Asia and is Vice President of the International 

League for Human Rights. Encyclopedia Judaica describes Ms. Gaer as having “played the key role in assuring passage 

by consensus of the UN General Assembly’s first-ever condemnation of anti-Semitism” in 1998, and being an “architect 

of many initiatives linking women’s rights to human rights.” 

Ms. Gaer writes and lectures widely on U.S. and UN human rights policy, addressing issues including protecting 

civilians under threat, advancing the human rights of women, eradicating religious persecution abroad, resolving ethnic 

conflicts, and preventing genocide. One of the first to call for the issue of rape in armed conflicts to be addressed by the 

international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia, she was a key negotiator on the U.S. delegation to the Beijing 

World Conference on Women. Most recently, her article “Echoes of the Future? Religious Repression as a Challenge 

to US Human Rights Policy” appears in the volume, The Future of Human Rights: US Policy for a New Era, published in 

April 2008 by the University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ms. Gaer was a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human rights negotiations in the 1990s and has 

served on several OSCE delegations since then in her capacity as Chair and Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission. She 

serves on the board of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, the Eleanor Roosevelt Center and the Franklin and Eleanor 

Roosevelt Institute. In 2002 and 2003 she was cited in the annual Forward 50 list of Jewish Americans who are making a 

difference. 

Ms. Gaer is a graduate of Wellesley College, from which she received the Alumni Achievement Award in 1995. She 

also received advanced degrees from Columbia University. 

Ms. Gaer, who has served on the Commission since 2001, including two terms as Chair, three terms as Vice Chair, 

and one term on the Executive Committee, was appointed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). 
296

Leonard A. Leo

Leonard A. Leo serves as the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law & Public 

Policy Studies, an organization of over 40,000 conservatives and libertarians dedicated to limited, constitutional government and interested in the current state of the legal order. He manages the projects, programs and publications of the Lawyers Division. He also helps manage the 

Federalist Society’s government, media, and corporate relations, as well as special initiatives 

such as the organization’s Supreme Court Project and International Law Project.

Mr. Leo has participated actively in a number of international forums. He served as a U.S. 

delegate to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 2005, has been an observer to the World 

Intellectual Property Organization, participated in two World Health Organization delegations 

in 2007, and is involved with the U.S. National Commission to UNESCO.

Mr. Leo has published articles on religious liberty under the U.S. Constitution, presidential war powers, executive privilege, legislative responses to judicial activism, property rights, and several federal civil procedure issues. With 

James Taranto of the Wall Street Journal, he is the co-editor of Presidential Leadership: Rating the Best and Worst in the 

White House (Simon & Shuster, 2004).

Mr. Leo received his undergraduate degree with high honors from Cornell University in 1987 and his law degree 

from Cornell Law School with honors in 1989.

Mr. Leo is active in the affairs of the Catholic Church, serving as a member of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta 

and a member of the board of the National Catholic Prayer Breakfast.

Commissioner Leo was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations 

at Boston University, where she is also a Research Associate at the Institute on Culture, Religion 

and World Affairs. She has published widely on issues of religion and human rights, democracy, and security in Europe and the United States. Her publications have appeared in scholarly 

and policy journals such as European Journal of Political Research, Social Compass, Journal of 

the American Academy of Religion, Orbis, and Survival, as well as in numerous anthologies on 

Southeastern Europe and religion, democracy, and world affairs.

A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Prodromou 

has been an invited policy consultant in the United States and Europe, and has received academic awards and grants from Harvard University, New York University, Princeton University, 

and the Commission of the European Union; she was recently awarded a Distinguished Service Award by the Tufts 

Alumni Association.

She is the editor, co-editor, or author of forthcoming books on religion and world affairs, on issues of: Church-State 

Relations in Greece: European Enlargement, Democracy, and Religion; and Thinking through Faith: Perspectives from 

Orthodox Christian Scholars.

Dr. Prodromou holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 

as well as an M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.A. in International Relations and History 

from Tufts University. She has served as consultant at the U.S. State Department, the Foreign Affairs Training Center of 

the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Council, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the Council on Foreign Relations. 
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APPENDIX 1

Commissioner Prodromou was appointed to the Commission by then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 

in October 2004. She served as Commission Vice Chair in 2007, and is currently in her second term on the USCIRF.

Nina Shea

An international human-rights lawyer for 25 years, Nina Shea joined Hudson Institute as a 

senior scholar, where she directs the Center for Religious Freedom, in November 2006. For the 

10 years prior to joining Hudson, Ms. Shea worked at Freedom House, where she directed the 

Center for Religious Freedom, an office which she had helped found in 1986 as the Puebla Institute. Ms. Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom since its founding in 1999. She was appointed as a U.S. delegate to the United 

Nations’ Commission on Human Rights by both Republican and Democratic administrations.

For over a decade, she has worked extensively for the advancement of individual religious 

freedom and other human rights in U.S. foreign policy as it confronts Islamist extremism, as 

well as authoritarian regimes. For seven years, until 2005, she helped organize and lead a coalition of churches and religious groups that worked to end a religious war against Christians, traditional African believers, 

and dissident Muslims in southern Sudan; in 2004 and 2005, she contributed to the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution’s 

religious freedom provision; and she authored and edited two widely acclaimed reports, Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of 

Intolerance (2006) and Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques (2005), both of which translated 

and analyzed Saudi governmental publications that teach hatred and violence against the religious “other.” She regularly presents testimony before Congress, delivers public lectures, organizes briefings and conferences, and writes frequently on religious freedom issues. Her 1997 book on anti-Christian persecution, In the Lion’s Den, remains a standard 

in the field. Ms. Shea is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia. She is a graduate of Smith College and American University’s Washington College of Law.

Commissioner Shea was appointed to the Commission by then-Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL).
298 The International Religious Freedom Act Of 19981

SELECTED PROVISIONS

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402)

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom’’ means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations such as—

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;

(B) prolonged detention without charges;

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom’’ means violations of the 

internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth in the international 

instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as—

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for—

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary registration 

requirements;

(ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs;

(iii) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation;

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or

(v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice; or

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s religious belief or practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious 

conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution. 

APPENDIX 2

1

 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of State.
299

APPENDIX 2

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY SEVERE 

VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442)

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President1

 shall review the status of religious freedom 

in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that country has engaged in or tolerated particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom in that country during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review 

of that country under this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall designate each country the 

government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a country of particular 

concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445)

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President shall, according to section 

402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out consultations with the foreign government in question, 

carry out one or more of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as determined by the 

President. The President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with section 

116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the 

Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, insurance, 

extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance with section 

502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing the United States 

executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for 

violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of ) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any goods or 

technology to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President 

to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the 

export or reexport of goods or services;

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than 

$10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or 
300

determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement 

of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402.

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding agreement with the respective 

foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, 

policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already subject to multiple, broadbased sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing, the 

President may determine that one or more of these sanctions also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 

402(c)(5).]

Section 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447)

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the actions described in 

paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in substitution thereto) with respect to a country, if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that--

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action;

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority.

(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a), the President 

shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver or the intention to exercise the waiver, together with 

a detailed justification thereof.
301 International Human Rights Standards: Selected Provisions on 

Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as further information concerning 

international standards concerning the protection of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

A. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18:

 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 

religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 

religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18:

 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 

have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others 

and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 

 2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 

his choice.

 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 

are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 

convictions.

• In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), The treaty body that reviews compliance with the 

ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects: theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess 

any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to 

those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any 

religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities 

that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.

 —Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22

• European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), Art. 9: 

 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 

or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

• Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII: 

APPENDIX 3
302

 The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of though, 

conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

• UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 

Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

 (1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 

have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 

public or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would 

impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be 

subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or 

morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief include:

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)]

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)]

• Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or 

belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief; 

• No limitations permitted on this freedom; and

• No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to Have or To Adopt a Religion or Belief of 

His or Her Choice

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)]

• No limitations are permitted on this freedom.

• The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

• Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief include:

 (a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to specific 

beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief, or to convert; and

 (b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting political rights 

protected under article 25 of the ICCPR or access to education, medical care or employment

–Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(d)]

• This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with others.

• This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms:

 (a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain, including the 

building of places of worship, freely accessible places for these purposes;
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APPENDIX 3

 (b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, and seminaries or religious 

schools;

 (c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, observance of 

dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with 

certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group;

 (d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

 (e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

 (f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;

 (g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace appropriate leaders, priests and teachers 

called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 

 (h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; and

 (i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at 

the national and international levels.1

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)]

Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

• No derogation2

 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, even during “time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” (ICCPR, Art. 4(2) and UDHR, Arts. 29 & 30)

• Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed 

in article 18. 

• Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even 

if they would be allowed as limitations to other rights protected in the Covenant (for example, a limitation based on 

national security is impermissible). 

• Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and 

proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 

• Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. 

• Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on 

principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition or religion.

• Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to manifest 

their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of the constraint. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

• Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth therein. 

— UDHR Art. 30

4

 See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna Document.

5 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of war or serious public emergency, take measures that limit the applicability of certain rights for the 

period of the emergency. Such measures could go well beyond the scope of limitations to rights that are permissible at any other time. 
304

B. PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHALL NOT BE DENIED THE 

RIGHT, IN COMMUNITY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUP, TO PROFESS 

AND PRACTICE THEIR OWN RELIGION 

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, and UN Declaration on the 

Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, Arts. 1-2 and 4]

• In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 

culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language

—ICCPR, Article 27

• States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 

minorities within their respective territories, shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity, 

and shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

—UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

• The State “will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 

religious identity of national minorities on their territory. They will respect the free exercise of rights by 

persons belonging to such minorities and ensure their full equality with others.”

—OSCE Vienna Document

C. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST 

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 40(1-2)] 

This right includes the following components:

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and Subject to its 

Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without Distinction of Any Kind, Including Religion

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any Discrimination to the Equal 

Protection of the Law.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons Equal and Effective Protection 

Against Discrimination on Any Ground, Including Religion.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

• The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR is not limited to 

those rights which are provided for in the Covenant, and extends to prohibit discrimination in law or in fact 

in any field regulated and protected by public authorities; 

• The term “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, 

restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 

other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 

nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights 

and freedoms;

• The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical treatment in 

every instance;

• The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or 

eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR; and
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APPENDIX 3

• Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13)

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons or Person on the Grounds of 

Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4]

• States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in 

the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, 

political, social and cultural life.

• States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination.

• States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this 

matter.

—UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2)

• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 

human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups ....

—UDHR Art. 26(2)

• State parties will “foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different communities as 

well as between believers and non-believers.”

—OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

D. STATES SHALL PROHIBIT BY LAW ANY ADVOCACY OF NATIONAL, RACIAL OR 

RELIGIOUS HATRED THAT CONSTITUTES INCITEMENT TO DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILITY 

OR VIOLENCE

[ICCPR, Art. 20]

• No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious 

hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility or violence... [and] States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 

• State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in article 20 of the ICCPR, and 

should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or advocacy.

—HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2)

• Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of 

free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

—United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20

• States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, 

hostility or hatred, including anti-Semitism.

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

• States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect persons or groups who may be 

subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 

religious identity, and to protect their property;

—OSCE Copenhagen Document
306

E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f ) and 16(g)]

• State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

—ICCPR Article 18(4)

• The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.

• Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is permitted if it is given in a 

neutral and objective way.

• Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with ICCPR Art. 18 (4) 

unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of 

parents and guardians.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8)

• Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing 

in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

• Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the 

wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against 

the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

• The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.

• In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken 

of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of 

the child being the guiding principle. 

• Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health 

or to his full development, taking into account article 1(3) of the present Declaration.

—UN 1981 Dec., art. 5

F. FURTHER ELABORATION ON SELECTED TOPICS

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7]

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 

recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring:

• effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated;

• that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; and

• that such remedies are enforced when granted.

2. Relationship Between Religion and the State

• The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or traditional, or that its followers 

comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights 

under the ICCPR, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. 

• In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the predominant religion, or 

giving economic privileges to them, or imposing special restrictions on the practice of other faiths are not in accor-
307

APPENDIX 3

dance with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under 

ICCPR article 26.

• If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized 

under the ICCPR nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9)

• State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared to practice their faith within 

constitutional boundaries, “recognition of the status provided for them in their respective countries.”

—OSCE Vienna Document

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief

• The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to ensure the equal right of men and 

women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2)

• Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and 

culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses. States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to 

equal enjoyment of all ICCPR rights.

• State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and women’s rights, including:

• pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as gender-disaggregated data on infant mortality 

rates; 

• information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on measures to eliminate it; 

• measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, such as female infanticide, the burning of 

widows and dowry killings; 

• regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and

• whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men; whether measures are taken to ensure 

women equal access to legal aid, in particular in family matters; and whether certain categories of women are 

denied the enjoyment of the presumption of innocence.

• Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than those authorized by the ICCPR and 

must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules requiring permission from third parties, or by interference from fathers, 

husbands, brothers or others. Article 18 may not be relied upon to justify discrimination against women by reference 

to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

• The commission of so-called “honor crimes” which remain unpunished constitutes a serious violation of the ICCPR 

and laws which impose more severe penalties on women than on men for adultery or other offences also violate the 

requirement of equal treatment.

—HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

• Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women’s rights. These practices include :

• cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious extremism, and regulation of women’s 

clothing;

• discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, traditional childbirth practices, and dietary 

restrictions;

• discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, including practices related to marriage 

and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family planning, division of responsibilities);
308

• discrimination related to transmission of nationality;

• discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of finances;

• discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment of widows, and honor crimes, 

• attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse;

• social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of access to professional fields such as politics and religion; and

• aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a minority community.

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential that this freedom not be understood as a right of indifference with respect to the status of women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and Traditions (Amor Report)6

6

 Commission staff translation.
309

NOTES
310

NOTES
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, N.w. Suite 790

Washington, D.c. 20002

Www.uscirf.gov

Tel. 202-523-3240 Fax: 202-523-5020 

Email: Communications@uscirf.gov

Buddhist monks march on a street in protest against the military government in Yangon, Myanmar (Burma), 

Monday, Sept. 24, 2007. Since 2002, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 

has designated Burma a “country of particular concern” for systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of the right to thought, conscience, and religion or belief. (AP Photo)