T he Hon orab le Josep h M. Hoo d, Chief Un ited Sta tes District Judge for the Ea stern * Di str ic t of Kent ucky , s it ti ng by des ig nati on. NO T REC OM ME ND ED F ORPU BLIC ATION

Fi le Name: 07a 0378n.0 6 Fi led : June 6, 20 07 No. 06- 5358 UN ITED STATES C OU RT O F APPEA LS FO R THE S IX TH C IR CU IT
LORET T A LYNN, Pl ain ti ff-A ppel lee , v. SU RE -F IR E M US IC C OM PAN Y , I NC ., Defendant -A ppel lan t. / On A ppeal from t he U nit ed Sta tes Distric tCo urt for the Middle Di str ic t of Tenness ee

BEF OR E: RY

AN and GR IF FI N, C ircui t J udg es; and HO OD , C hie f Di str ic t J udg e. * RYAN , C i rc ui t J ud g e. T he plaint if f , Lore tta L y nn , th e fame d coun try mu sic artist, brou ght suit in a Te nne ssee sta te cou rt against the defend ant , Sure-Fire Music Compan y , I nc. , as ser

ti ng mul ti p le s ta te law cl aims ar is ing from a cont ra ct g ov er nin g copy ri g hts to musi c L y nn has co mposed. The s tate cour t di smi ss ed Ly nn’ s c omplai nt on the g ro unds that the federal Cop y ri g ht Actpreempted Ly nn’ s s tate law cl aims

. She t hen filed sui t in federal dis tr ic t cour t all eg ing the same sta te law ca uses of act ion the sta te t ri al
c ou rt fou nd w ere pree mp te d. H ow ev er , th e di s tr i c t c ou rt he l d th atLy nn ’ s st at e l aw c l ai ms
ar e notpreempted by

the Cop y ri g ht A ct, an d the re fore, must be di smi ss ed bec ause,
w ithou t preem ption , the court did no t have subjectmat ter jurisdiction. Altho ugh it “w on” in the district court, in the sense thatthe lawsuit against it wa s dismissed , Sure-Fire(N o. 06 -5 358) - 2 -

appeal ed, a rg uin g thatthe dis tr ic t c our t er re d i n hol din g thatLy nn’ s c lai ms w ere not pr eempte d b y

t h e C o p y r i g h tA c ta n d , t h e r e fo r e , t h e c o u rtw a s w i t h o u ts u bj e c tm atter jur is dic ti on. W e now

aff ir m. I. Lynn ent ered into an agreeme nt w ith Sure -Fire in 1 9 6 1 whereby Sure-Fire w ould
re cei v e w or ldw ide copy ri g ht int er est s in musi c compos ed by Ly nn in ex chang e for pay ing Ly nn roy al ti es
. In 19 66 , Ly nn an d Su r e- F i r e ex ec ut ed a ne w ag r ee me nt w i th th e same basic te rms plus on e no tab le a d d it io nal provision. Th e ne w agreeme nt provided th at it “s h a ll be null and v oid in the ev entthere is a cha nge of ow nersh ip in Sure-Fire Music Compan y , I nc. , i t bei ng
. . . [Ly nn’ s] demand[] thatsh e be ass ocia te d onl y w it h c ur re nt manag ement.” Atthe ti me of thi s 19 6 6 A gre e m ent, brothers D oy le, Teddy , Les li e, an d Lest er W il bur n ow ned Sure- Fi re
. By 2003, only

tw o of these four

brothers c ontroll ed SureFi re , and thereafter, othe r family members t ook ov er

the busi ness
. Ly nn beli ev ed that the newow nershi p tri g g ered th e “ nul l and v oid ” prov is ion of the 1966 A g re ement. She sued Sure- Fi re i n a Tenness ee state cour t, ra is ing si x

cl aims : (1 )
a req uestfor a dec larator y j udg ment t hat u nder

the 1966 A g re ement she n o w o wns the copy ri g hts to her

co mposi ti ons; ( 2) an act ion to re cov er cert ain m ast er

and demonst ra ti on
re c o rd i n g s i n S u r e - F i r e ’ s p o s s e s s i o n ; ( 3 ) c o n v e rs i o n ; ( 4 ) w i l l fu l a n d ma l i c i o u s b r e a ch of cont ra ct by

Sure- Fi re fo r faili ng to re new ce rt ain co py ri g hts and faili ng to col lect and dis tr ibu te for eig n roy alt ies ; (5) breac h of impl ied duty of g ood fait h and fair

deal ing ; and ( 6)
a req uestfor a n ac count ing of all forei g n roy alt ies

. The st ate c our

t di smi ss ed th e c omplai nt for l ack of subj ectmatte r jur is dicti on, ho l di ng t ha t th e C op y r i g htA c t pree mp te d Ly nn ’ s c l ai ms
. The c ou rt fou nd th at th e c l ai ms(N o. 06 -5 358) - 3 -

w er e “bas ed upon a de ter minat ion of copy ri g ht ow nershi p and ex plo it ati on of cop y ri g hted mater ial ” and c oncl uded t hat L y nn c oul d br ing her cl aims onl y

i n federa l cour

t. Ly nn t he n fi l ed thi s ac ti on in f ed eral di s tr i c t c ou rt, rai s i ng t he e x ac t s am e s i x c l ai ms she ple aded i n state cour t. She als o fil ed a moti on as ki ng the cour t t o det er mine w hether it had su bject ma tter jurisdiction. Sure-Fire respo nde d w ith a mo tion to dism iss o n the sole and s peci fic g ro und t hat t he C opy ri g ht A ct preempted Ly nn’ s s tate law cl aims

. In an opi nio n from t he benc h, t he dis tr ic t cour t found Ly nn’ s s tate law cl aims w ere notpreempted and di smi ss ed th e complai nt ag ain st Sure- Fi re , w it hout pre jud ic e, for

lack of su bje ct matter jurisdiction. Sure-Fire, although it “prevailed” below, app eals, a rg uing thatthe district cou rt inde ed h ad jurisdiction of the case beca use th e Copyrig ht Act co mp letely preem pts Lynn’s sta te l aw cl aims

. II. Ly nn c hal leng es Sure- Fi re ’s st andi ng to br ing i ts appeal , arg uin g thatsi nce SureFi re su cc ess fully

obta ine d a d is mis sal of t he acti on ag ain st iti n the di str ic t c our t, ithas pr ev ail ed and is not ag g ri ev ed by the dis tr ic t c our

t’ s j udg ment. Ly nn arg ues cor re ctl y that one has st andi ng to appeal onl y i f “ag g ri ev ed by

the jud ic ial acti on f ro m w hic h” the appeal is taken . Vangua rds of Clev elan d v . City

o f Cleveland , 753 F.2d 47 9, 48 4 (6th Cir. 198 5). How ev er , a “p re v ail ing ” par ty may nev erthel ess be ag g ri ev ed if the jud g ment entered i n i ts fav or w as not o n the g ro und f o r w hic h i t s oug ht di spos it iv e reli ef, but i nst ead, w as
er ro neous ly

g ro unded i n a r uli ng that m iss ta te s the l aw and lea v es the a ppeal ing par ty open t o furt her

l iab il ity . Stat ed di ff erentl y , t here are c ircums tanc es in w hic h a d efendant, alt houg h “ w inn ing ” the l aw sui t i n the tr ial co urt—i n the se nse that the cas e agai nstit w as dis mis sed— has sta ndi ng to appea l the tr ial co urt’ s d eci si on bec ause, for e x ample, the(N o. 06 -5 358) - 4 -

app ellantis errone ously denied the legal ruling it requested in its motion for sum ma ry jud g ment or

for d is mis sal

. In s uch an inst ance, the w inn ing /appeal ing par ty co nti nues to stan d exposed to l iability it shou ld not , and w ould not , have faced , but for the trial cou rt’s
er ro neous appl ic ati on of the law

. Sure- Fi re i s j ustsu ch a par ty

. Hav ing been sued in federal co urt on sta te law theor ies of cont ra ct and t ort, SureFire defend ed o n the g ro und thatLy nn’s sta te law claims do not lie, be cause they are pr eempted by

the Cop y ri g ht Act. The dis tr ic t cour t hel d j ustthe oppos it e and, as a resul t, Sure- Fi re arg ues, i t i s a g g ri ev ed. It now faces li abi li ty

u n d e r m u lt ipl e the or ies of Tenness ee l aw

and is deni ed the defenses av ail abl e to it under the Cop y ri g ht Act , i ncl udi ng the r ig ht t o l it ig ate t he i ss ues in federal co urt. W e are s ati sfied that Sure- Fi re has made a col orabl e s how ing that it is ag g ri ev ed by th e di s tr i c t c ou rt’ s de te r mi na ti on th at i t ha s no s ub j ec t ma tt er j ur i s di c ti on o v er this lawsui t and therefore ha s e sta bli shed the n eces sar y st andi ng to inv oke our appel lat e jur is dic ti on. W e hav e notov er loo ked Ly nn’ s a ddi ti onal arg uments , c halle n gin g our jur is dic ti on to hear

thi s a ppeal , how ev er , w e c oncl ude t hat t hey are w it hout meri t. III . W e tur n now

to the s ubst anti v e q uest ion w hether the dis tr ic t c our t er re d i n hol din g tha t Lynn’s claims w ere not pree mp ted by the Copyri ght Act an d tha t, as a result, the cou rt
w as w ithou t subje ct ma tter jurisdiction . W e revi ew a district court orde r dism issing a case for l ack of subj ect matter

j ur is dicti on de nov o. Sutt on v . St . J ude M ed. S .C ., Inc ., 419 F .3d 568 , 570 (6th Cir. 2005 ) ( citing Joelson v. U nited State s, 86 F.3 d 14 13, 141 6 (6th Cir. 1996) ). W e thi nk the d is tr ic t c our t di d noter r and w e w il l, therefore, aff ir m.(N o. 06 -5 358) - 5 -

As a general rule, a fede ral court has su bject m atte r juri sdicti o n i f t h e plain tif

f ’s
c o m p la in tin vo k e s fe d e ra l l a w a s t h e b a s is fo r t h e re li e f re qu e s t e d

. Ca t e rp il la r, I n c
. v. W il li ams, 482 U .S. 386, 3 9 2 (1987)

. Ly nn’ s c omplai nt i nv okes no federal law —const itution al, stat u t o ry, or othe rw ise—an d alleges only state law claims, strongly sug g est ing thatthi s c ase bel ong s i n t h e s tate cour t w here Ly nn fil ed i t i n the first pla ce. Bu t th e r ul e pros c r i bi ng fed eral c ou rt j ur i s di c ti on ov er pu r el y s ta te l aw c l aims has s om e
ex cept ion s, one of w hic h i s t he i nst ance in wh ich “ a f ederal sta tute w hol ly di spl aces the
s t a t e - l a w c a u s e o f

a c t io n t h ro u gh co m p le t e p re -e m p t io n
. ” B e n e f ic ia l N a t ’l B a n kv. An de rs on , 53 9 U .S

. 1, 8 ( 20 03 )

. S ure- F i r e arg ue s t ha t Ly nn ’ s o s te ns i bl e s ta te l aw c l ai ms
a r e c o m p l e t e l y

p r e e m p t e d b y

t h e f e d e ra l C o p y r i g h tA c t , p a rt i c u l a r l y § 3 0 1 o f t h e A c t

. W e agree tha t if

Ly nn’s claim s are preem pte d by the Copyri ght Act, Lynn’s com p la in t is transpo sed to on e s eeki ng C opy ri g ht l aw reli ef, thereby

co nferr ing su bjec t matt er jurisdiction on the district cou rt. S e e R it c h ie v . W illiams, 39 5 F.3d 283 , 286 -87 (6th Cir

. 2005)

. The q uest ion , t hen, is w hether Ly nn’ s a ll eg ati ons, al thoug h c asti n the l ang uag e of sta te l aw

ca uses of act ion , ac tu a lly see k reli ef that i s a v ail abl e ex cl usi v ely under the Cop y ri g ht A ct, v ia preempti on. Unde r § 301(a) of

the Cop y rig ht Act, a st ate la w cla im is p reem pte d if : “( 1) the work is w it h in t h e s co p e o f the ‘ subj ectmatte r of copy ri g ht,’ as sp eci fied i n 17 U. S.C . §§ 102, 103 ; and (2) the rights grant ed und er st ate la w a re e quiv alen t to any e x clusiv e rig hts w ithin the scope of

fede ra l co pyr ight as set outin 17 U.S.C. § 10 6.” W rench LLC v . Ta co Bell Cor p., 256 F .3d 4 46, 4 53 ( 6th C ir . 200 1) ( emphasi s a dded) ( ci tati on omi tted)

.(N o. 06 -5 358) - 6 -

The par ti es ag re e tha t Ly nn’ s mus ic al compos it ion s ( “t he w or k” ) are w it hin the “s ubj ectmatte r of copy ri g ht,” but they di sag re e w hether

the spec ificcl aims Ly nn mak es
ar e“ eq uiv ale nt” to the e x cl usi v e r ig hts co nferred by the Cop y ri g ht A ct and w it hin i ts sc ope as set ou t in 17 U.S.C. § 106 , the so-called “equiv alen cy requirem ent .” The eq uiv ale ncy

req uirement i s met w hen “t he s tate common l aw or st atuto ry

[r ig hts a pl ai n t i ff w a n t s v i n d i c a t e d ]

. . . a r e t h e s a me a s t h o s e p ro t e c t e d u n d e r § 1 0 6 of the Cop y ri g ht A ct. ” W re nch, 256 F. 3d at455. Se cti on 106 g iv es ex cl usi v e r ig hts : (1 ) to re produce the copy ri g hted w or k i n c opi es or phonorecords; (2 ) to prepare der iv ati v e w or ks bas ed upon the copy ri g hted w or k; (3 ) to distribut e cop ies or pho nore cords of t he copyrig hte d w ork to the pub lic by sa le or othe r transfer

of ow nershi p, or

by rental , l ease, or

l endi ng ; (4 ) in the case of

. . . musical . . . w orks, to p e rf o rm the cop y rig hte d w ork publ ic ly ; (5 ) in the case o f

. . . musical . . . w orks, . . . to display the cop y rig hte d w ork publ ic ly ; and (6 ) in the case of

soun d recordin gs, to perform th e cop y rig hte d w ork pub licly by means of a di g it al audi o transmi ss ion

. 17 U .S.C . § 106. A r ig ht de fined by st ate l aw

i s s een as eq uiv ale nt to on e of thes e federa l ri g hts i f it “may

be a br idg ed by

an a ct w hic h i n and of itsel f w oul d i nfri ng e one of the
ex cl usi v e r ig hts .” W re nch, 256 F. 3d at456. Lynn broug h ts ix

claims un der T enn essee law : (1) a request for a decla ratory jud g ment; (2 ) an ac ti on to recov er personal proper

ty; (3) c onv ersi on; ( 4) w il lful and mali ci ous breach of c ontract ; ( 5) breach of impl ied duty of g ood fait h and fair

deal ing ; and (6) a req uestfor a n ac count ing

. In ou r jud g ment, none of the se cl aims sa ti sfies the eq uiv a le n cy r e q uirement, as defined i n W re nch, and so none i s p re empted b y the Cop y ri g ht A ct.(N o. 06 -5 358) - 7 -

Ly nn c arefu l l y pl ea de d he r fi rs t c au s e of ac ti on to al l eg e on l y ow ne rship c l ai ms based ex cl usi v ely

on t he i nter pretati on o f the 1966 w ri tten amended ag re ement en tered by the par ti es. She has not ass erted a n i nfri ng ement c lai m or any othe r theor

y eq uiv ale nt to a right ex clusiv e to the Co pyr ight Act. W e agree w ith the district court tha t Sure-Fire’s obl ig ati on unde r the 1 966 c ontractto sur re nder and re tu rn a ll copy ri g ht en ti tl ements to Ly nn i f there i s a ch ange o f o wne rship i n Sure- Fi re , i nv olv es more than “a promis e to
re frai n from reproduci ng , per forming , dis tr ibu ti ng or dis pla y ing the w or k.” See id. at 457. A c lai m sol ely

to deter mine ow nershi p of copy ri g hts i s n ot a m o n g t h e ex cl usi v e r ig hts confer re d by

§ 10 6 of the Cop y ri g ht A ct and, ordin ar il y , i s a matte r of stat e l aw
. Ly nn’ s s econd and thi rd cl aims are c oncer ned w it h domi nio n ov er tang ibl e personal proper ty , see Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 29- 30- 101; Ral ph v . Pi pki n, 18 3 S. W .3d 3 62, 3 68 ( Tenn. Ct . Ap p. 20 05) , and they fall outs ide t h e s co p e of the Cop y ri g ht A ct. Se e 17 U. S.C . §§ 102( a) , 202

. Therefore, t hey are not preempted by

the Act

. See S tromback v . N ew Li ne Ci nema, 384 F. 3d 283, 305 (6 th Ci r. 2004) (c it ing Carson v . Dy neg y , Inc ., 344 F .3d 4 46, 456- 57 ( 5th C ir . 200 3) ). Lynn’s fourth and f if

th cl aim s seek the recovery of mo ney for mixed tort an d brea ch of contractcl aims and not f or damag es re lat ed to the los s o f anyr ig hts co nferred by the Cop y ri g ht A ct. St ated differentl y , t o prev ail on h er fourt h and fifth caus es of acti on, L y nn
mu st prove the forma tion a nd b reach of an enforcea ble w ritten contract w hich she w ould notbe ob lig ate d to pro v e if these claims w ere m erely for copyri ght inf ringemen t und er § 1 0 6

. T h e y a re n o t“e qu iva le n t ” t o t h e e xc lu s ive r ig h t s c o n fe rr e d b y § 1 0 6

. T h e re fo re , we hol d tha t t hese cl aims are notpreempted.(N o. 06 -5 358) - 8 -

Ly nn’ s sixth c la im req uest ing an a cc ounti ng l ik ew is e does not ass ert any of the
ex cl usi v e r ig hts protec ted b y the Cop y ri g ht A ct, but ask s o nly for t he famil iar

co mmon la w equitab le relief of a court-ord ered accou nting; in this instan ce, of earn ed foreign roy alties. A request for an acco unt ing of amo unt s at i ssue in a comm on law breach of contractcase is uni q uel y

a s tate law

cl aim and i t i s n eit her a righ t n o r a r e medy co nferred by

the Cop y ri g ht A ct. Therefore, Ly nn’ s s ixth c lai m is not preempted by the Act

. IV. Since each of

Ly nn’s claim s asserts a stat e law ca u s e o f

a c t io n an d no ne is pree mp ted bythe Cop y rig h tA c t , t here is no fede ral q uest ion to supp ort a district court’s
e xe rc is e o f

su bje c tm a t t e r j u ri s d ic t io n fo r t h is ca s e
. T h e d i s t ri c tco u rtd id n o te rr a n d we A FFIRM i ts jud g ment di smi ss ing Ly nn’ s c omplai nt.