2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-22-2015

Denard Trapp v. AMS Servicing LLC

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Denard Trapp v. AMS Servicing LLC" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 1013.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1013
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2211

___________

DENARD TRAPP, 

Appellant

v.

AMS SERVICING LLC; 

GDBT I TRUST 2011-1

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. N.J. No. 3-14-cv-02746)

District Judge: Peter G. Sheridan

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 11, 2015

Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 22, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Denard C. Trapp, pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his action to 

quiet title and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We will affirm the judgment 

of the District Court.

GDBT I Trust held a mortgage interest on Trapp’s property. Alleging that Trapp 

failed to make his mortgage payment, GDBT I Trust filed a foreclosure action in the 

Superior Court of New Jersey on April 5, 2013. On November 21, 2013, the New Jersey

Superior Court granted GDBT I Trust’s motion for summary judgment and transferred

the matter to the Foreclosure Unit of the Clerk’s Office of the Superior Court of New 

Jersey to proceed uncontested. 

Six months later, on April 30, 2014, Trapp filed a complaint in the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey requesting that the District Court declare the 

defendants’ mortgage invalid and quiet title in his favor. The Defendants—GDBT I 

Trust and its servicing agent—moved to dismiss. In response, Trapp filed an amended 

complaint that reiterated his claims, and he attached thereto a copy of a secondary 

mortgage, held by non-defendant Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., that he had paid in full. 

The Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, arguing that, to the extent Trapp 

challenged Countrywide’s secondary mortgage, he failed to join an indispensable party 

(i.e. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) and, moreover, that the District Court should 

abstain from producing a judgment contrary to the judgment of the Superior Court of 

New Jersey.
3

After a hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed 

Trapp’s complaint ruling that Trapp’s claims, if any, relating to the mortgage held by 

GDBT I Trust were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Trapp filed a motion for 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e). He also filed an “addendum” to his complaint, seeking 

to add claims for perjury and making false declarations before a court under 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1621 and 1623. The District Court denied Trapp’s motion for reconsideration. Trapp 

timely appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A timely appeal from an order 

denying a Rule 59(e) motion brings up the underlying judgment for review. See Quality 

Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982). We exercise 

plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). We review the District 

Court’s denial of reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex 

rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); Long v. Atlantic City 

Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012), 670 F.3d at 446 (stating that “our review 

of the order denying reconsideration is subject to a more deferential and circumscribed 

standard of review than would apply if we also were to have jurisdiction to consider the 

underlying dismissal order”). “To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, [an appellant] 

must show that the District Court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly 

unreasonable.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Moyer 

v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
4

We agree with the District Court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Trapp’s 

requests to invalidate the mortgage and quiet title in his favor. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction “over suits that are essentially 

appeals from state-court judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild 

LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four 

requirements are met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 

‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were 

rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 

to review and reject the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Trapp’s 

claims satisfy these four requirements. GDBT I Trust sought to foreclose for nonpayment of the mortgage, and the New Jersey Superior Court granted summary judgment 

in favor of GDBT I Trust and transferred the matter to the Office of Foreclosure to 

proceed uncontested. Thereafter, Trapp filed suit in the District Court, inviting it to 

invalidate the defendants’ mortgage and quiet title in his favor. As the District Court 

concluded, it lacked jurisdiction to do so under Rooker-Feldman because the requested 

federal relief would necessarily imply that the Superior Court’s decision was erroneous.

Nor did the District Court err in denying Trapp’s motion for reconsideration. “[A] 

proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening 

change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct 

clear error of law or prevent manifest unjustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 
5

669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurace Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 

1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Trapp’s Rule 59(e) motion provided no such grounds, and the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.