COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements an d Senior Judge Coleman Argued at Rich mond, Virginia

DAVID J. HOWELL MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0955-00-2 JU DGE JEAN HARR ISON CLEMENTS MAY 1, 2001 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFO RCEMENT,

ex rel . LINDA FISHER

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY Gary A. Hi cks, Judge David J. Howell, pro se . Nicholas S. Murphy, Special Counse l (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B. Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General; Craig M. Burs hem, Regional Special Counsel, on brief), for appellee.

David J. Howell ap peals from the ruling s of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the juvenile and dome stic relations district court. On appeal, he contends th e trial cour t erred in ruling that (1) his co ntempt was civil rather than criminal, (2) the issue of his driver 's license susp ension was moot, and (3) an appeal bond was required. Howell further contends that he was denied due process an d equal protecti on of the la w. Finding

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.appellate revi ew procedurally barred, we affirm the decisions of the trial court. 1

BACKGROUND David J. Howell wa s ordered to pay chil d support to Linda Fisher pursuant to va rious court orders, the current one providing for the payment of $75 per week. Payments were ordered to be made through the Divi sion of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE). On October 21, 1998 , DCSE filed a motion for a show cause summons against Ho well in the ju venile and dome stic relations district court, al leging that Howell was in arrears and seeking an adjudication of contempt. On that same date, DCSE also filed a petition seeking an or der suspending Howell 's driver's license because of his delinque ncy in child support payments. The clerk of the juvenile and do mestic relations dist rict court issued a show cause summons on February 19, 1999. On May 5, 1999, Howell filed a motion to reduce his child su pport obliga tion. On December 7, 1999 , the juvenile and domest ic relation s district court entered orde rs (1) establishi ng an arrearage of $26,882.22 as of November 30, 19 99; (2) finding Howell in civi l contempt of court; (3) suspending Howell's driver's li cense for fa ilure to provide support; and (4) denying Howell's motion to modify his

1 Because we conclude that Howell's appeal is procedurally barred, we do not address whether the trial court's order of February 10, 2000 was an appealable order pursuant to Code § 17.1-405 or whether Howell's notice of appeal therefrom was timely filed pursuant to Rule 5A:6.

- 2 -child support obli gation. The juvenile and domestic relations district court also sent enced Howell to twelve months in jail, but provided for his rele ase from custody upon payment of $5,000 toward his child su pport arrearage. On December 8, 19 99, after purgin g himself of contempt by paying $5,000 toward his arrearage, Howell filed a notice of appeal with the cler k of the juvenile an d domestic relations district court, indica ting his intention to appeal the juvenile court's December 7, 1999 orders, in cluding the court's establishment of the arrearage. The clerk's office required that Howell post an appeal bond equal to the arre arage. Th e following day, Howell filed a se cond notice of appeal . Unlike the first one, the second notice of appeal did not indi cate an in tention to appeal the establishment of the arrearag e. No appeal bond was set for the second notice of appeal. The reco rd does not reflect whether Howell withdrew the first noti ce of appeal, but it was not filed in the circuit co urt. The seco nd notice of appeal was received in the clerk's office of the circuit cour t on December 29, 1999. At a hearing before the circuit court on January 10, 2000, amidst confusion over wh at had been appealed from the lower court, Howell's counsel advise d the trial cour t that Howell was appealing the juvenile court's finding of civil cont empt of court, the suspension of Ho well's driver's license, the esta blishment of the arrearage, and the denial of Ho well's motion to amend child

- 3 -support. The tr ial court ruled th at the issues of civil contempt and the suspension of Howell's driver's license were mo ot because Howell had purged hi s contempt. An order memori alizing this ruling was entered on February 10, 2000, withou t objection by Howell. The trial cour t continued the issues of the establishment of the arrearage and Ho well's motion to redu ce his child support obligation, and gr anted Howell until April 10, 2000 to post an appeal bond of $26,882.22. On April 10, 2000, the trial court dismissed Howe ll's appeal of the establishm ent of the arrear age and of the denial of his motion to modify child support because of Howell's failure to post the appeal bond. An order reflecting the dismissal of Howell's appeal and remanding th e case back to the ju venile and domestic relations dist rict court was ente red on June 5, 2000. Howell's attorney endorsed th e order "Seen and Objected to" and noted Howell's objections as follows: (1) David J. Howell wa s tried and convicted of criminal failure to appear by th e Juvenile Court as opposed to civil contempt for failure to pay child su pport. It was the incorrect crim inal failure to appear which he appealed to this Circui t Court; and (2) David J. Howell agreed there was/is an outstanding arrearage of $26,000 [approxima tely]. However, $19,000 [appro ximately] wa s stayed by the Circuit Court. The st ay has never been recognized by Supp ort Enforcem ent. The $26,000 [approxi mately] is inclusive of the $19,000 [appro ximately]. On April 26, 2000, Ho well filed his notice of appeal of, in part, the trial co urt's order of February 10 , 2000 and, in part,

- 4 -the rulings from the hearing of April 10, 2000, su bsequently memorialized in the trial cour t's order of June 5, 2000.
ANALYSIS On appeal to this Court, Howell challenges the trial court's "civil" contempt ruling and the order suspending his driver's license. He also alleges that his rights of due process and equal protection were violated. He further contends that an appeal bond was not required because he did not appeal the establishment of the arrearage. In support of this last contention, Howell asserts that, when informed by the clerk of the juvenile and domestic relations district court that he was required to post an appeal bond of $26,882.22 to appeal his entire case, he "cancelled" his notice of appeal dated December 8, 1999. He then, his argument continues, returned the following day to the clerk's office to "renote [sic] his appeal," indicating that he wished to appeal to the trial court only the "criminal" jail sentence, the suspension of his driver's license, and the denial of his motion to amend his child support obligation. However, at the January 10, 2000 hearing on Howell's appeal, Howell told the trial court that he was appealing the juvenile court's finding of civil contempt, the suspension of his operator's license, the establishment of the arrearage , and the denial of his motion to modify child support. Furthermore, on February 10, 2000, the trial court entered, without objection

- 5 -by Howell, an order memorializing its January 10, 2000 rulings disposing of the issues of civil contempt and the suspension of Howell's license. Howell made no objection (1) to the trial court's finding in that order that the nature of the contempt of court issue before it was civil rather than criminal, (2) to the court's finding that Howell had not posted the required appeal bond and that the appeal would be dismissed unless the bond was posted within thirty days, or (3) to the court's dismissal of his appeal of the contempt and license suspension issues as being moot. On April 10, 2000, the trial court then dismissed Howell's appeal of the remaining issues--the establishment of the arrearage and Howell's motion to modify child support. Howell's only objections to the June 5, 2000 order memorializing those rulings were that the conviction he had appealed was criminal failure to appear rather than civil contempt for failure to pay child support and that a portion of his arrearage had been previously stayed by the circuit court. Moreover, at no point did Howell make the argument to the trial court that his constitutional rights had been violated. Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling ." (Emphasis added.) Thus, we will not consider a claim of trial court error as a

- 6 -ground for reversal "where no timely objection was made." Marshall v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 627, 636, 496 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1998). Nor will we "consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court. Rule 5A:18 applies to bar even constitutional claims." Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1988) (citations omitted). The main purpose of requiring timely specific objections is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. In addition, a specific, contemporaneous objection gives the opposing party the opportunity to meet the objection at that stage of the proceeding. Weidman v. Babcock , 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991). We hold, therefore, that, because they were either not timely presented or never presented to the trial court, the arguments Howell makes before us on appeal are procedurally barred by Rule 5A:18. Furthermore, our review of the record in this case does not reveal any reason to invoke the "good cause" or "ends of justice" exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's rulings. Affirmed.

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