IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0357

Filed November 21, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MARTY PAUL BINTNER

AND SHEILA VON BINTNER

Upon the Petition of

MARTY PAUL BINTNER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

SHEILA VON BINTNER n/k/a SHEILA VON JOHNSON,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Richard Davidson, 

Judge.

Marty Bintner appeals the modification of spousal support in the decree 

dissolving his marriage. AFFIRMED.

Todd J. Argotsinger and Bryan D. Swain of Salvo, Deren, Schenck, Gross, 

Swain & Argotsinger, P.C., Harlan, for appellant.

Jonathan Mailander of Mailander Law Office, Atlantic, for appellee.

Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Marty Paul Bintner appeals the modification of the decree dissolving his 

marriage to Sheila Von Johnson. Marty specifically contends the district court 

should not have extended the spousal support award or awarded Sheila attorney 

fees. Sheila requests Marty pay her appellate attorney fees. Upon our de novo 

review, we agree with the district court that modification is warranted and we affirm. 

We also award both trial and appellate attorney fees to Sheila.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parties were married in 1989. During their twenty-year marriage, they 

had six children together. Sheila was a homemaker for most of the marriage while 

Marty worked outside the home. Near the end of the marriage, Sheila was 

diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent treatment. Marty was making 

approximately $60,000 annually. When the two divorced, they stipulated to a 

spousal support award. Marty was to pay Sheila $800 per month for twelve years, 

with payments beginning in April 2009. The trial court dissolved their marriage, 

adopting their stipulated spousal support award. Sheila also received child support 

for the four youngest children.

Just days after the court entered the dissolution decree, Marty was laid off. 

He immediately petitioned to modify child support and spousal support due to his 

unemployment. The district court granted the petition, reducing his child support 

and his spousal support obligations by half. Marty paid the modified amount for 

the next four years and started a new job in 2013. In 2017, he began voluntarily 

paying Sheila the original $800 per month in spousal support despite the 

modification. By this time, the child support award was terminated because the 
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children had reached the age of majority and had become ineligible for support, 

but Marty still voluntarily provided some financial support to the children. Marty 

remarried around this time and remained married at the time of this appeal. 

After recovering from her illness, Sheila returned to school and became an 

esthetician and massage therapist. From 2018 to 2020, she made between 

$19,000 and $24,000 annually. Starting in 2020, Sheila elected to receive Social 

Security benefits. She testified at trial that her financial situation forced her to claim 

benefits early, in effect reducing the monthly benefit amount to $570 from the $719 

per month award she would have received if she elected to wait until age sixty-six 

to claim them. In 2022, Sheila suffered two heart attacks requiring stent surgeries 

and shoulder injuries to both of her shoulders. She attributed her need for more 

financial support to her health complications along with the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Specifically, her shoulder injuries prevent her from maintaining her esthetician 

practice, and her ability to have surgery to repair or replace her shoulders is limited 

by her diminished heart function. In 2021, Sheila petitioned to modify the 

dissolution decree, requesting an extension of spousal support, retroactive child 

support, and attorney fees. Following trial, the district court awarded Sheila $500 

per month in spousal support and granted a thirteen-year extension of the award 

plus $2000 in attorney fees, but it declined her request for retroactive child support. 

Marty now appeals, claiming the district erred in extending the duration of the

spousal support award and awarding attorney fees.

II. Modification of Spousal Support.

First, Marty contends the district court improperly modified the spousal 

support obligation by extending it and changing the amount. We review 
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dissolutions of marriage and their modifications de novo. In re Marriage of Sisson, 

843 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2014). While not binding, we give weight to the district 

court’s factual findings, especially those regarding witness credibility. Id.

“When a court determines support is necessary, it may continue the support 

obligation which has survived the dissolution of marriage because the obligation is 

grounded in public policy.” In re Marriage of Luebbert, 400 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1986). Modifications to spousal support require a substantial change in 

circumstances not contemplated by the original court. Sisson, 843 N.W.2d at 870–

71 (citing Iowa Code § 598.21C). A substantial change in circumstances may 

include “changes in employment, income, earning capacity, health, and medical 

expenses of a party.” Id. at 870. This gives the modifying court the ability to 

change durations and amounts of the award when the circumstances are 

“‘extraordinary’ and render the original award grossly unfair.” Id. at 871 (quoting 

In re Marriage of Wessels, 542 N.W.2d 489, 489 (Iowa 1995)). Generally, this may 

be evidenced by “the unexpected onset of a medical condition by a party that 

rendered the expectation of self-support unrealistic.” Id. at 871.

The extraordinary circumstances justifying a modification and extension of 

spousal support are present here. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Marshall, 394 

N.W.2d 392, 396–97 (Iowa 1986) (former spouse’s cancer diagnosis leads to 

reinstatement of spousal support payments); Wessels, 542 N.W.2d at 400 

(permanent psychiatric condition prevents former spouse from returning to 

employment); Sisson, 843 N.W.2d at 871–72 (modifying spousal support when 

former spouse is diagnosed with terminal cancer). Sheila has significant health 

concerns that prevent her from maintaining employment and self-sufficiency and 
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that were not contemplated at the time of the original decree. Through no fault of 

her own, Sheila’s health concerns have “been a general impediment in her ability 

to reenter and compete in the workforce.” Sisson, 843 N.W.2d at 872. She has 

been unable to work due to her shoulder injuries. She testified she cannot use her 

right shoulder, which renders her unable to work as an esthetician or to even be 

able to write her own name, and she will be unable to work until undergoing a 

complete shoulder replacement surgery. The left shoulder, though not as bad as 

the right, will require a similar repair surgery if not a complete replacement. 

Further, she suffers from diminished heart function due to her two recent heart 

attacks, each of which required extended hospital stays, the second of which

reduced her heart function to thirty-eight percent and only recovered to sixty-two 

percent function by the time of trial. Because of concerns about her ability to 

survive surgery after two heart attacks, the earliest she could have her right 

shoulder surgery is 2023 with an anticipated return to work in fall of 2023. But she 

testified her health prevents her from working full-time and she intends to return 

only part-time once recovered. When comparing her part-time income and Social 

Security benefits with her monthly expenses, there is a definite shortfall. This 

renders the original award grossly unfair as Sheila is unable to provide for herself

due to unexpected and severe health issues. See id. at 871.

Further, Marty has the ability to financially help meet Sheila’s needs. He 

testified at trial he currently has no plans to retire and will continue working as long 

as he’s able. He earned $108,600 in 2021, and he testified he expected to earn 

more in 2022. His imputed expenses and his level of income leave him with the 

ability to provide Sheila support.
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While Marty argues Sheila’s medical condition was contemplated by the 

court when it entered the original decree, we disagree. At the time of the 

dissolution, Sheila was diagnosed with breast cancer. The trial court awarded 

spousal support with the contemplation that Sheila would receive treatment and 

become self-sufficient within twelve years. Following her surgery, Sheila was “able 

to function pretty well” within the first year. In contrast, the health complications 

before us today are distinct, including a loss of full heart function due to two heart 

attacks as well as shoulder injuries requiring a complete shoulder replacement 

surgery of one shoulder and repair or possible replacement of the other. Sheila is 

not expected to be able to work until having surgery and, therefore, is unable to 

provide for herself financially. Further, even post-surgery and recovery, she is 

expected to only continue working part-time at most. This was not the expectation 

of the court when it awarded spousal support.

We turn, then, to the district court’s calculation of the amount of the support 

obligation. The court awarded $500 per month from April 2021 to March 2034, a 

total sum of $78,000. This would result in payments terminating when Marty turns 

sixty-seven years old and Sheila turns seventy-seven, ten years after the full 

retirement age specified by her Social Security benefits. This length was selected 

by the court because at that time, Sheila will be able to draw on Marty’s Social 

Security benefits due to the length of their marriage. While Marty counterargues 

Sheila is eligible five years earlier, when she is seventy-two and he is sixty-two, 

the record is insufficient to prove this claim. Specifically, though Sheila testified 

about contacting Social Security and being told that she may be able to draw from

Marty’s Social Security, nothing else in the record corroborates that possibility. 
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Thus, we are not convinced from such limited record that Sheila will have the 

additional support that would eliminate her need for spousal support earlier than 

the district court’s selected length. We therefore affirm the district court’s modified 

spousal support.

III. Attorney Fees Awards.

Marty next argues Sheila should not be awarded any attorney fees. He 

contends the district court abused its discretion in granting trial attorney fees and 

Sheila should not receive appellate attorney fees. We review the two arguments 

separately.

A. Modification Attorney Fees.

Marty challenges the district court’s award of $2000 in trial attorney fees to 

Sheila. The Iowa Code allows the court to award “reasonable” attorney fees to the 

“prevailing party” in a modification action. Iowa Code § 598.36 (2021). We review 

the award for an abuse of discretion. Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 469 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2016). An award of trial attorney fees depends on the parties’ relative 

financial positions. Id. We will overturn an award of trial attorney fees only if “it 

rests on grounds that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” In re Marriage of 

Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

Because we affirm, Sheila is the prevailing party. When modifying the 

spousal support obligation, the district court considered Sheila’s disparate income 

as compared to Marty. Sheila is unable to pay the attorney fees due to her failing 

health and inability to work. Meanwhile, Marty is still making a substantial sixfigure income. Because the district court properly considered such factors, we find 

no abuse of discretion.
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B. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Finally, Sheila asks us to award her an additional $4093.50 in appellate 

attorney fees. Appellate attorney fee awards are not a matter of right but are within 

our discretion. See Christy, 878 N.W.2d at 469. “[W]e consider the needs of the 

party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits 

of the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). We find Sheila is not in a financial position to 

pay her appellate attorney costs. Meanwhile, Marty has the ability to pay such 

fees. Therefore, we order Marty responsible for $4093.50 in appellate attorney 

fees.

IV. Disposition.

Because Sheila established a substantial change of circumstance that 

renders the original award grossly unfair, we affirm the court’s order extending the 

spousal support obligation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, 

we affirm the attorney fees award. Finally, we award appellate attorney fees to 

Sheila.

AFFIRMED.