IN THE SUPREME COURT OF AP PEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2013 Term

No. 12-0638

LEE TRACE LLC, Petitioner

V. GEARL RAYNES, ASSESSOR FOR BERK ELEY COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, BERKELEY COUNTY COUNCIL SITTIN G AS BOARD OF REVIEW AND EQUALIZATION, AND BERK ELEY COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondents

No. 12-0992

LEE TRACE LLC, Petitioner

V. GEARL RAYNES, ASSESSOR FOR BERK ELEY COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, BERKELEY COUNTY COUNCIL SITTIN G AS BOARD OF REVIEW AND EQUALIZATION, AND BERK ELEY COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondents

___________________ __________________ ________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County Honorable Christopher C. Wilkes, Judge Case No.: 11-AA-2

REVERSED AND REMANDED

___________________ __________________ ________________ 

### FILED October 21, 2013 released at 3:00 p.m. RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIASubmitted: September 4, 2013 Filed: October 21, 2013

Thomas Moore Lawson, Esq. Lawson and Silek, P.L.C. Winchester, Virginia Attorney for Petitioner Michael D. Thompson, Esq. Thompson & Pardo, PLLC Charles Town, West Virginia Attorney for Respondent Assessor Gearl Raynes

Norwood Bentley, Esq. Martinsburg, West Virginia Attorney for Respondent Council and Board of Review and Equalization

The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.i SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “ ‘This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate disposition under an abus e of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo .’ Syllabus Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield , 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).” Syllabus Point 1, In re: Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation’s Wood lands Retirement Community , 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008).

2. “ ‘An assessment made by a board of review and equalization and approved by the circuit court will not be reversed when supported by substantial evidence unless plainly wrong.’ Syllabus Point 1, West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization , 112 W.Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862 (1932) (other internal citations omitted).’ Syllabus Point 3, In re: Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation’s Woodlands Retirement Community , 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008).” Syllabus Point 2, Mountain America, LLC v. Huffman , 224 W. Va. 669, 68 7 S.E.2d 768 (2009).

3. “Title 110, Series 1P of the West Vi rginia Code of State Rules confers upon the State Tax Commissioner discretion in choosing and applying the most accurate method of appraising commercial and industrial properties. The exercise of such discretion

will not be distur bed upon judicial review absent a showing of abus e of discretion.”ii Syllabus Point 5, In re Tax Assessment Against Amer ican Bituminous Power Partners,

L.P. , 208 W. Va. 250, 539 S.E.2d 757 (2000).1 PER CURIAM:

These consolidated cases are before th e Court upon two separate appeals of Lee Trace LLC, Petitioner, from a March 23, 2012, order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County affirming the Board of Review and Eq ualization’s determination that Lee Trace’s challenge to the 2010 tax asse ssment for apartment property located at Hood Circle, Martinsburg, West Virginia, was not timely file d, and a July 24, 2012, order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County gran ting, in part, and denying, in part, Lee Trace’s petition for appeal of the Board of Review and Equali zation’s ruling setting the 2011 assessment value for the same property at $6,551,735.

In the first appeal, Lee Trace contends that the January 5, 2010, assessment

letter did not inform it of its right to appeal the 2010 asse ssment as expressly required by W. Va. Code §11-3-2a. In the second appeal , which pertains to the 2011 assessment, Lee

Trace contends that the circuit court erred in averaging the Asse ssor’s “hybrid” income approach assessment with the 2010 cost appro ach assessment; 2) the circuit court erred in according a presumption of correctness to th e Assessor when the A ssessor admitted that she had not performed an assessment compliant with legislative rules; 3) the circuit court erred in finding that the Assessor was not re quired to consider an income approach to value; 4) the circuit court ig nored evidence of the property ’s value submitted by Lee Trace and improperly relied on evidence that was not re levant to the property’s value; and 5) the

circuit court set an assessment that violated its equal protection rights. Upon reviewing2 the petitions, the responses, the submitted append ices, and the arguments of counsel, this

Court concludes that the circuit court’s or ders pertaining to both the 2010 and 2011

assessments should be reversed for the reasons set forth more fully below, and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND

A. No. 12-0638 Lee Trace owns real property located at 15000 Hood Circ le, Martinsburg, West Virginia 25403, consisting of appr oximately 17.02 acres. The instant appeal

involves the 2010 real estate tax assessment of the property. In 2008, an apartment complex was constructed on the property. Th e property was appraised and assessed by the Berkeley County A ssessor’s Office as land only for the tax year 2009, as construction on the apartment complex was not yet complete as of the July 1, 2008, statutory assessment date. However, by July 1, 2009, the stat utory assessment date for tax year 2010, construction of the apartment buildings an d other structures was complete, and the assessed value of the property for tax year 20 10 reflected a completed project. Lee Trace

listed the face amount of fire insurance carried on the “Application for Review of Property Assessment” dated February 10, 2011, as $ 17,000,000.00. On the same document, Lee

Trace declared the cost of construction of th e apartment complex on the property to be $12,927,378.00. On January 5, 2010, th e Assessor issued a No tice of Increase in3 Assessment informing Lee Trace that the property had increa sed in value to $7,895,530.00 for the 2010 tax year. Th e notice provided, in per tinent part, the following: Dear Taxpayer:

In accordance w ith Chapter 11, Article 3, Section 2A of the West Virginia Code, I am herewith notifying you that your current property assessment for the forthcoming year is $7,895,530 Your property assessment previously was $677,050 The difference between current and previous is $7,218,480 This represents an increase in the assessed value.

. . . If you believe an adjustment in th e assessed value is necessary, you should contact the County Commission sitting as a Board of Review and Equalization.

Lee Trace completed an “Application for Relief Based on Improper Notice Pursuant to West Virginia C ode § 11-3-2a and for Relief from Clerical Errors Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 11-3-27” dated December 21, 2010. It asserted that the notice it

received was insufficient because it failed to a dvise Lee Trace, LLC of its right to appear and seek an adjustment, and that the Assessor committed clerical erro rs by using different standards for appraising similar area propertie s and by failing to use income information in the appraisal.4 Counsel for Lee Trace appeared at the Berkeley County Council Meeting on February 3, 2011. The council subsequently advised Lee Trace’s counsel, by letter dated February 24, 2011, that it found that the ow ner of Lee Trace, Robert Cocker, was given adequate notice for the filing of the review and equalization application, but Mr. Cocker failed to timely file his request. The letter st ated that the council was without jurisdiction to consider the application, having adjourned sine die in February of 2010.

Lee Trace filed a petition for appeal with the Circ uit Court of Berkeley County on March 18, 2011. On March 23, 2012, the circuit court entered its Order Substituting Party, Denying Part of the Petiti on, and Setting a Heari ng. The circuit court opined that the notice was sufficient because W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a doe s not require that a particular date be given as a deadline, and because the notice referenced the appropriate code section, therein directing Lee Trace to the expl anation of process. The circuit court reasoned that “[a]ll persons ar e presumed to know the law.” State v. McCoy , 107 W.Va. 163, 172, 148 S.E. 127, 13 0 (1929). The circuit court al so found that the time for challenging the assessment was not extended because of clerical mistake, because Lee Trace challenged the assessment based on the method used , not “an unintentional or

inadvertent act” as described in W.Va. Code § 11-3-27. The circuit court found that Lee Trace did not challenge the assess ment at the proper time, and had waived its right to seek

correction. The circuit court affirmed the Bo ard of Review and Equa lization’s ruling with respect to the 2010 assess ment. Because Lee Trace had also challenged its 20115 assessment in the appeal to the circuit court, the court set a hearing to address the remaining issues. The circuit court entered an order on April 16, 20 12, clarifying that its previous order regarding the 2010 assessment was a final order for purposes of appeal. 1

B. No. 12-0992 For the 2011 tax year, the Assessor asse ssed the property at a value of $7,593,430.00 using a cost approa ch analysis to determine the value. Lee Trace filed an application for review of the 2011 assessmen t, which was received by the council on February 17, 2011, and attended a hearing w ith the Board of Review and Equalization on February 22, 2011. Lee Trace s ought to adjust the 2011 a ssessment by usin g the income approach, thus reducing the tax assessed valu e of the property. Deputy Assessor Tamera Edgar (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Edgar” or “the Assessor”) confirmed at that hearing

before the Board of Review a nd Equalization that some othe r apartment complexes in the area had assessments reduced by the Board upon consideration of in come when taxpayers specifically requested it, but that the income approach was not used to assess Lee Trace’s property because the data was not available to develop a “cap rate” used in the calculation

due to the lack of an y comparable sales in Berkeley County for the period in question. Thus, it was not possible for her to meet the specific requirements pertinent to performance of an income approach provided for in Legislative Rule § 110-1P-2.

1 To the extent that Lee Trace appeals fro m the April 16, 2012 order as final and appealable, this is the order date that we w ill reference in the rema inder of the Opinion.6 At the hearing, the Board of Review and Equalization asked the Assessor to provide it with a value that took into account the income of the property. Lee Trace provided additional income info rmation for 2010 to the Asse ssor on the day following the hearing, and the Assessor then completed a revised assessmen t which utilized realty rates to determine a capitalization rate in lieu of unav ailable market data, a nd also utilized actual rent of the property in lieu of economic rent. This “hybrid” income approach provided a value of $5,207,940.00 based up on her income approach. By letter dated February 24, 2011, the Berkeley Co unty Council, sitting as the Boar d of Review and Equalization,

ordered: After due consideration of the pr esentation of the applicant and the documents offered and of the presentation of the [a]ssessor, the [c]ouncil finds that the [a]ssessor’s original assessment of the value of the proper ty was $7,593,430, based upon a cost of construction approach, for this new property; that, the owner has requested an income appr oach compared to the cost comparison of the property, yielding an assessment of $5,207,940; that the [c]ouncil further finds that, a fair value is reached by averaging the value by income approach and the value by cost approach; that th e fair total assessed value is $6,400,690. Accordingly, the [c]ouncil [o]rde rs that the assessed value of the property should be reduced to $6,400,690, all as based on the evidence presented and up on the recommendation of the [a]ssessor.

Lee Trace appealed this order to the Circuit Court of Berkeley County alleging that the Board of Review and Equaliz ation’s consideration of a “hybrid” income7 approach subsequently offered by the A ssessor was improper, and that the Board’s averaging of the cost approach and “hybrid” income approach was improper. There was

an insufficient record from the Board of Revi ew and Equalization’s deliberations and the hearing held with regard to Lee Trace’s reque st for an adjustment to the assessment. There was no explanation on the record of how the Assessor arrived at the value derived from the cost approach or the value derive d from the “hybrid” in come approach. The circuit court permitted discovery to supplement the record.

In the course of discover y, Ms. Edgar testified that she utilized the income approach for properties only when taxpayers asked her to do so. Regarding Lee Trace, specifically, she said, “Well, I did the cost approach. The mark et data was considered but not done, because there were no sales. And I did the income approach. . . . We did an

income—when we received the information for Lee Trace, it was after the fact. But it was

done.” Lee Trace did not provide the Assessor’s office with income inform ation until late in January, 2011, and then, only two of the three years required by the Legislative Rule. Ms. Edgar testified that she had rental information—but not occupancy rate

information—about Lee Trace at the time she performed her appraisal but, “I just felt that being new construction, that I want ed to put more weight on that.” 2

2 Counsel had appeared on behalf of Lee Trace at an earlier co uncil meeting on February 3, 2011. At that hearing, Ms. Edgar told the council that she had met with Lee Trace’s counsel in March of 2010, and told him at that time that sh e would be happy to do an income assessment on the property if he would come to see her in January of 2011. She8 Ms. Edgar testified that when she perfo rmed the income approach appraisals, the appraisals were lowered. However, she ac knowledged that she did not recall an open market sale of an apartment co mplex in the area in recent years, and when developing the capitalization rate for the income approach , she used “Realty Rates” for the D.C. metropolitan area in place of the current se lling price of comparable properties. Specifically, she testified, Q (by counsel for Lee Trace): All right. When you did the income based appraisals only after people asked for them, is this the way you used that information where it says by dividing annual net income by the current selling price of comparable properties? Is that the method that you have used historically when you did an income based appraisal? A: That’s not how I derived the cap rate. Q: All right. How did you develop a cap rate? A: We mentioned this before. I used Realty Rates. Q: All right. Do you understa nd the difference between what you did using Realty Rates out of a book for different market areas as opposed to what’s set forth here in the statute?

informed council that, as of th e February 3, 2011, meeting, sh e had not received all of the necessary documentation from Lee Trace. By letter dated February 24, 2011, the county council advised Lee Trace, LLC that the co uncil had no jurisdiction to consider an application, dated December 21, 2010, related to the 2010 assessment, because the Board of Review and Equali zation had adjourned sine die in February of 2010. Ms. Edgar also testified that this was the first year that th e Board of Review and Equalization had averaged two different approaches to achieve the final assessment. She testified that it was done for “at least two” taxpayers.9 A: I understand that. But if yo u do not have a sale of an apartment complex during that year, you’re not going to be able to develop a cap rate using this method. You can’t do it if you don’t have the information. Q: All right. So – and each time when you did the income based appraisal after people ha d asked you to do it, you did look to see if there was a sale and then determined that there was not. Therefore, you could not follow the instruction of the statute. A: To my knowledge, I have not had an open market sale of apartment complexes recen tly in this county.

Also in the course of discovery, th e Assessor filed on January 6, 2012, a “Supplement to Record” in th e form of a report of appraisal performed by Rolston & Company. This report a ttached a market value of $10,950, 000 to the property, after taking an average of Rolston’s own cost approach and income approach figures. That appraiser wrote that “[t]he [s]ales [c]omparison [a]ppro ach could not be devel oped since there were

no sales in the area which were comparable to the subject.” He went on, “The [i]ncome [a]pproach was based on the actual income and ac tual and projected expe nses and is felt to be the best indicator of value. However, the [c ]ost [a]pproach needs to be considered and was given equal weight to the determination of value.”

Lee Trace then filed on April 17, 2012, a motion to supplement the administrative record with a report of apprai sal prepared by L. Steven Noble. Mr. Noble proposed values of $8,040,000 (cost appro ach); $6,700,000 (i ncome capitalization10 approach) and $8,200,000 (sales comparison approach). He wrote: The value conclusion is $6,630,5 00, heavily weighted by the [i]ncome [a]pproach, which fo r the Martinsburg, Berkeley County markets is appropriate. For apartment properties, the [s]ales [c]omparison [a]pproach is usually given more weight. However, the property has not r eached stabilization and a large adjustment was warranted for that characteristic. Furthermore, there are no recent comparable sales of land or apartments in the local market. And, although the [c]ost [a] pproach suffers from various forms of depreciation, they are market-derived deductions. For this non-stab ilized apartment property, the [i]ncome [a]pproach is weight ed heavily in the analysis.

On July 24, 2012, th e circuit court entered a final order granting, in part, and denying, in part, the petition for appeal. The c ourt found that the Asse ssor’s use of the cost approach was within her discretion, that the Board of Review and Equalization had discretion to request an income estimate and av erage the two values, and that the Board has the authority to equalize assessments by incr easing or decreasing the value. The court found, however, that the Board act ed arbitrarily because the fi nal value at which the Board arrived—$6,400,690—is not an accurate averag e of the income-deriv ed and cost-derived

values. The court wrote: Under this unique situation, the Court finds [it] best, legally and equitably, to set the va lue at the actual average. The [c]ourt notes a couple of the major factors in the record that support this value. Le e Trace is a complex either significantly newer (or more rece ntly built) or significantly larger than any of the comparab le complexes. So, this value, slightly higher, than possibly others, would be proper. Also, the value for the purposes of fire insurance is set at $17,000,000, which w ould yield an assess ment of 10,200,00011 (60%)—significantly above the value de termined by the Assessor and the Board. On the other hand, Petitioner’s appraisal is completed by someone not licensed to appraise property in West Virginia. This fact, along with the other evidence in the record, renders Petitioner’s appraisal unpersuasive. Most notably, the appraisal s ubmitted by the [c]ounty, done by a licensed appraiser and done in a manner which considers a large number of factors and appr oaches, finds in the market value to be $10,950,000. This amount clearly supports the Board’s attempt to average the two numbers, as 60% of the market value yields $6,570,000 (which is similar to what the mathematical average is). So the [c]ourt finds that the Bo ard’s affixing of the number was arbitrary, and Petitioner has met the burden, to wit: “average” was not mathematically correct. Further the [c]ourt finds that substantial evidence, as well as equitable factors, support a mathematical average of the income approach and cost approach assessments. Therefore, the most accurate way to fix this arbitrary number is to fix the math. A mathemat ical average appropriately considers all the factors and gi ves the due deference to the Board’s statutory authority to equalize assessments. Accordingly, the [c]ourt finds th at the value su pported by the evidence is the mathematical av erage of the cost and income approaches to the assessm ent, which is $6,551,735.

Following entry of the circuit court’ s orders pertaining to the 2010 and 2011 tax assessments, Lee Trace filed its Pe titions for Appeal with this Court.

II.12 STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘This Court reviews the circuit c ourt’s final order a nd ultimate disposition

under an abuse of discretion st andard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conc lusions of law are reviewed de novo .’ Syllabus Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield , 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).” Syllabus Point 1, Foster

Found. , 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S. E.2d 150 (2008). This Court has repeatedly reco gnized that “ ‘[a]n assessmen t made by a board of review and equalization and approved by the circuit cour t will not be reversed when supported by substantial ev idence unless plainly wrong.’ Syllabus Point 1, West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization , 112 W.Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862 (1932) (other internal citations omitted).” Syllabus Point 3, In re: Tax Assessment of Foster Founda tion’s Woodlands Retirement Community , 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S. E.2d 150 (2008).” Syllabus Point 2, Mountain America LLC v. Huffman , 224 W. Va. 669, 687 S.E.2d 768. The interpretation of a statute, or the constituti onality of a statute, as written or as applied, as in this case, presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review. Foster Found. , 223 W. Va. at 18-19, 672 S.E.2d at 154-55 (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dept. of West Virginia , 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995)); Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie

A.L. , 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. No. 12-063813 As it pertains to the 2010 property tax assessment, Lee Trace alleges that the Assessor failed to provide it w ith adequate notice as require d under W.Va. Code § 11-3-2a and constitutional due proc ess. West Virginia Code § 11-3-2a (2008) 3 requires that the Assessor provide notice to property owners w hose assessment has increased by more than ten percent from the prior year. That statute provides, in pertinent part, (a) If the assessor determines the assessed valuation of any item of real property is more than ten percent greater than the valuation assessed for that item in the last tax year, the increase is one thousand dollars or more and the increase is entered in the property books as provided in section nineteen of this article, the a ssessor shall give notice of the increase to the person assessed or the person controlling the property as provided in section two of this article. The notice shall be given at least fifteen days prior to the first meeting in February at which the county commission meets as the board of equaliza tion and review for that tax year and advise the person assessed or the person controlling the property of his or her right to appear and seek an adjustment in the a ssessment. The notice shall be made by first-class United St ates postage mailed to the address of the person assessed or the person controlling the property for payment of tax on the item in the previous year, unless there was a genera l increase of the entire valuation in any one or more districts in which case the notice shall be by publication of the notice by a Class II-0 legal advertisement in complia nce with the provisions of article three, chapter fifty-nine of this code. The area for the publication is the county. W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a.

3 Although W. Va. Code § 11-3 -2a was amended in June 2010 , the 2008 version of W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a is applicable in this case insofar as the notice at issue was dated January 5, 2010.14 The concluding paragraph of the Janua ry 5, 2010, notice provided to Lee Trace stated, “If you believe an adjustment in the assessed value is necessary, you should contact the county commission sitting as a Bo ard of Review and E qualization.” Lee Trace

asserts that the notice did not a dvise it of its right to appear or of the February 25, 2010, deadline, and because it was una ware of a deadline, it did not contact the Assessor or the

Board until March of 2010. Le e Trace alleges that, “Even if there were no specific statutory requirement of notice, this principle [that administ rative agencies observe basic rules of fairness] would seem to require that adequate notice and opport unity to be heard be

afforded. . . .” Mizell v. Rutledge , 174 W.Va. 639, 641, 328 S.E. 2d 514, 516 (1985). Also, “constitutional due process incl udes being informed of th e possible consequences of government action.” Id . Lee Trace contends that a plain reading of the notice reveals that

it did not conform to the statute. See W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a.

Conversely, the Respondents contend that a review of W.Va. Code § 11-3-2a

shows that the notice dated Ja nuary 15, 2010, conv eyed the exact wo rding required by statute. Respondents argue that “[a]ll persons are presumed to know the law.” State v. McCoy , 107 W.Va. at 172, 148 S.E. at 130. They argue that W.Va. Code § 11-3-24 clearly indicates that the county council will meet annua lly, not later than Febr uary 1st of the tax year and adjourn sine die no later than the last day of Fe bruary of the tax year. That code section also explains that anyo ne who fails to seek relief at that meeting has waived his right to ask for a correction of his assessment in that particular tax year. Additionally, the15 Berkeley County Council asserts that it is not always possi ble for the Assesso r to know the sessim dates for the Board of Review and Eq ualization, but a pers on can contact the Assessor and/or the council office, as provid ed in the notice, for details. “The law in prescribing the time when such complaints will be heard, give s all the notice required . . . .” Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108 , 111 U.S. 701, 710, 4 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1884). Furthermore, the Respondents maintain th at statutes establishing administrative procedures for the collection a nd assessment of taxes are to be construed in favor of the government. Mountain America LLC v. Huffman , 224 W.Va. at 683, 687 S.E.2d at 782 (finding W.Va. Code § 11-3-24 facially constitutional and cons titutional as to that case) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, Calhoun County Assessor v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp ., 178 W.Va. 230, 358 S.E.2d 791 (1987)).

Upon review of the notice at issue in this case, we find that it does not comport with the requirements established in W. Va. Code §11-3-2a, as it fails to adequately inform the person assessed or the person controlling the prop erty of his or her “right to appear” and seek an adjustment in the assessment. Because W. Va. Code §11-3-2a does not expressly specify what information cons titutes proper notice of the “right to appear,” this Court must necessarily decide this issue.

Here, the parties dispute whether the A ssessor is required to provide dates of

sessions for the Board of Review and Equalization in order to put the taxpayer on notice of16 the time frame for appeal. We believe that in order for Lee Trace to pr operly be advised of its right to appear under §11-3-2a, the notice at issue should have specified the place and time by which Lee Trace could object to the pr oposed increase in the valuation of the property. 4

The notice at issue here simply advise d Lee Trace that “[i]f you believe an adjustment in the assessed value is necessa ry, you should contact the county commission sitting as a Board of Review and Equalization.” No mentio n was made of the taxpayer’s right to appear by a specified time or at a sp ecific place, and no explanation was provided regarding the role the county commission served in the tax assessment appeals process. As a matter of due process, the taxpayer should be sufficiently aler ted of his or her appeal rights, and we find that the notice at issue in this case is insufficient on these grounds. Indeed, the requirement for the government to properly advise persons of their appeal rights is founded in prin ciples of statutory and constitutional due process. Mizell , 174 W. Va. at 643, 328 S.E.2d at 518; see also Chavis v. Heckler , 577 F.Supp. 201, 205 (D.C.D.C.

4 It is helpful to our analysis that the currently enacted vers ion of W. Va. Code §11-3-24, effective June 11, 2010, expressly anticipates that the taxpayer is gi ven notice of the time and place that the Board of Review and Equaliza tion is in session in order to object to the proposed increase in the valuat ion of the taxpayer’s proper ty. West Virginia Code §11-3-24(f) provides, in pertin ent part, “[a]ny person who r eceives notice as provided in subsection (e) of this section may appear before the board at the time and place specified in the notice to object to the proposed increase in th e valuation of the taxpayer’s property. . .” (emphasis added). Although th e notice at issue before us wa s dated January 5, 2010, six months prior to this version of the code being enacted, it is useful for purposes of determining what information constitutes proper notice of the right to appear.17 1983) (finding that failure to advise of right to appeal in social security case violates procedural due process ). In addition to these constituti onal principles, this Court has recognized that statutory notice provisions, su ch as in the instant case, require that a taxpayer be informed of the specific consequenc es of an assessor’s determination in order

to make an informed d ecision concerning appeal. Mizell, 174 W. Va. at 643, 328 S.E.2d at

518 ( citing In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Corp. , 158 W. Va. 229, 210 S.E.2d 641 (1974)). Accordingly, we reverse the circuit co urt’s April 16, 2012, order finding that Lee Trace’s appeal of th e 2010 tax assessment was untimely. 5

B. No. 12-0992 In the second appeal, Lee Trace allege s that the circuit court ruling was clearly erroneous for the follo wing reasons: 1) the circuit court erred in averaging the Assessor’s “hybrid” income approach assessment with the 2010 cost approach assessment; 2) the circuit court erred in ac cording a presumption of correctness to the

Assessor when the Assesso r admitted that she had not perf ormed an assessment compliant with legislative rules; 3) th e circuit court erred in finding that the Assessor was not required to consider an income approach to va lue; 4) the circuit cour t ignored evidence of the property’s value submitted by Lee Trace and improperly relied on evidence that was

5 To the extent that we reverse the circuit court’s ruling on these grounds, it is not necessary for this Court to address Lee Trac e’s remaining argument pertaining to the 2010 tax assessment -- whether there was an inadvert ent mistake or clerical error under W. Va. Code §11-3-27.18 not relevant to the property’s value; and 5) th e circuit court set an a ssessment violating its equal protection rights.

When valuing property for ad valore m taxation purposes, the property is required to be valued at its true and ac tual value. As this Court has stated, [t]ax assessments of property ar e required to be proportionate to the property’s value: “[A]ll pr operty, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law.” W. Va. Const. ar t. X, § 1. W. Va. Code § 11– 3–1 (1977) (Repl. Vol. 2008) further instructs that “[a]ll property shall be assessed annua lly ... at its true and actual value.” We have interpreted the term “value” with respect to tax assessments as meaning “ ‘wor th in money’ of a piece of property-its market value.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Killen v. Logan County Comm’n , 170 W.Va. 602, 295 S.E. 2d 689 [ (1982) ][, overruled on other grounds by In re Tax Assessm ent of Foster Found.’s Woodlands Ret. Cmty. , 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008) ]. Furthermore, we ha ve held that “[t]he price paid for property in an arm’s le ngth transaction, while not conclusive, is relevant evidence of its true and actual value.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Kline v. McCloud , 174 W.Va. 369, 326 S.E.2d 715 (1984).

Foster Found. , 223 W.Va. at 33, 6 72 S.E.2d at 169.

The West Virginia Code of State Rule s § 110-1P-2.2.1 (1991) recognizes three different appraisal methods for determin ing the fair market value of “commercial and industrial real and personal property for ad valorem tax purposes.” This subsection provides: “. . . the Tax Commissioner will c onsider and use, wher e applicable, three19 generally accepted approach es to value: (A) cost, 6 (B) income, 7 and (C) market data. 8 ” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1. Additionally, a ppraisals must consider a variety of other

factors. See W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.1 (1991) and W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.3 (1991). This series of regulations provides th at each of the enumerated factors should be considered, but “some . . . may be given more weight than others.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.4 (1991).

In the case before us, Lee Trace is not arguing that the Assessor failed to

consider all of the factors under the cost a pproach analysis, but ra ther that the Assessor violated the law in this assessment by failing to consider the income approach. Lee Trace also claims that the Board’s reduction, based u pon an estimate of what an income approach

6 To determine fair market value under the cost approach, “replacement cost of the improvements is reduced by the amount of accr ued depreciation and ad ded to an estimated land value. In applying the cost approach, the Tax Commissi oner will consider three types of depreciation: physical deteriorati on, functional obsolescence, and economic obsolescence.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1.1 (1991).

7 In determining the income approach, “[a] proper ty’s present worth is directly related to its ability to produce an in come over the life of the property. The selection of an overall capitalization rate will be derived from current available market da ta by dividing annual net income by the curr ent selling price of comparable prope rties. The present fair market value of the property shall th en be determined by dividing the annual economic rent by the capitalization rate.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1 .2 (1991). Under this type of valuation, economic rent means “the rental amount which a space or property would attain in the open market at the time of appraisal, whether it is lo wer, higher or the same as the actual contract rent.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.3.6 (1991).

8 The market data approach will be applied by “considering the comparable selling price of comparable properties.” W. Va. Code § 110-1P-2.2.1.3 (1991).20 would result in, contravened the regulations.

Conversely, the Respondents assert that the Assessor did not have a database from apartment complex owners for income approach compar ison, and she did not have sales of apartment complex owners to develop a capitalization rate for an income approach appraisal as required by W.Va. C.S.R. § 110-1 P-2.2.1.2. Lee Trace had not provided any income or operating statement for its property for 2010 at th e time she performed the initial assessment of the property. The Assessor had to give the Board of Review and Equalization a completed propert y book by February 2011, and Lee Trace did not give the Assessor timely information. The income appr oach appraisal was not completed in the

normal course of the Assessor’s dutie s, but at the Board’s request.

Respondents further allege that havi ng invited the Board to consider an income approach appraisal of its property as had been performed in a similar fashion for other apartment complex properties in past years, Lee Trace should not now be complaining that the Board and circuit court erred in using the assessed value derived by this income approach method. See Syl. Pt. 6, Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 48 0 S.E.2d 817 (1996) (stating “[a] litig ant may not silently acquiesce to an alleged error, or actively contribute to such error, and then raise that error as a reason for reversal on appeal.”). They aver that if Lee Trace disagreed with the methodology, it

should have informed the Board of its disagreement or produced its own income approach21 appraisal to the Board during the February 2011 session.

Title 110, Series 1P of the West Virg inia Code of State Rules is clearly intended by its language to give the Asse ssor discretion in choosing the method for

valuation. In syllabus point 5 of In re Tax Assessment Agains t American Bituminous Power Partners, L.P. , 208 W. Va. 250, 539 S. E.2d 757 (2000), th is Court held that “Title 110, Series 1P of the West Virginia Code of State Rules confers upon the State Tax Commissioner discretion in choosing and applying the most accurate method of appraising commercial and industrial properties. The exerci se of such discretion will not be disturbed upon judicial review absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”; see also Syl. Pt. 4, Stone Brooke Ltd. Partnership v. Sisinni , 224 W. Va. 691, 688 S. E.2d 300 (2009). West Virginia C.S.R. § 110-1P.-2.2 .2 embodies this intent found throughout the statutes and rules, and states in pertinent part, [w]hen possible, the mo st accurate form of appraisal should be used, but because of the difficu lty in obtaining necessary data from the taxpayer, or due to the lack of comparable commercial and/or industrial properties, choice between the alternative appraisal methods may be limited.

This Court has recognized that “t he Tax Commissioner has permitted an Assessor to select any one of these three me thods by which to value commercial real property for ad valorem taxation purposes, w ith a preference not for any one particular method but only for ‘the most accu rate form of appraisal.’ W. Va. C.S.R. § 110–1P–2.2.2.”22 Sisinni , 224 W. Va. at 700, 688 S.E.2d at 309.

Here, the circuit court properly conclu ded that an assessor need not perform a useless act of considering an appraisa l method where the assessor does not have sufficient data to perform that appraisal method. Lee Trace did not deliver all of its 2010 expense and income informatio n to the Board until mid-Febr uary of 2011. Additionally,

the data was not available for the Assessor to develop a “cap rate” used in the calculation

due to the lack of an y comparable sales in Berkeley County for the period in question. Thus, the Assessor’s choice was limited. See also Bayer MaterialSc ience, LLC v. State Tax

Comm’r , 223 W.Va. 38, 54, 672 S.E. 2d 174, 190 (2008) (rejecting taxpayers’ request to apply particular appraisal method where taxpa yers had not provided data necessary to apply that appraisal method because taxpayers’ corporate financial structure did not produce that type of data). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not commit error in ruling that the Assesso r’s choice of the cost approa ch was within her discretion under the plain language of the legislative rules and the authority of this Court.

We do, however, take issue with the circ uit court’s affirmation of the Board’s reduction in value based upon an estimate averag ing the cost approach value initially used by the Assessor with a “hybrid” income approach analysis subsequently performed by the Assessor at the request of the Board. Speci fically, we find that it was an abuse of discretion for the Board to utilize a “hybrid” in come approach value that did not comport23 with the requirements of W. Va. Code of State Rules § 110 -1P-2.2.1.2 and § 110-1P-2.3.6. 9

The record reveals that th e Assessor testified in her deposition that she could not develop a capitalization rate to do an inco me approach as required by W. Va. Code of State Rules § 110-1P-2.2.1.2 “. . . by dividing annual net income by the current selling price of comparable properties . . .” because “. . .if you do not have a sale of an apartment complex during that year, you’ re not going to be able to develop a cap rate using this method. You can’t do it if yo u don’t have the information.” The Assessor pointed out “ . . . to my knowledge, I have not had an open market sale of ap artment complexes recently in this county.” She also testified that in a ttempting to perform an income analysis, annual actual rent for the property wa s used instead of annual economic rent. West Virginia Code of State Rules § 110-1P-2.2.1.2 requires that “the present fair market value of the property shall then be determined by dividing the annual economic rent by the capitalization rate.” Therefore, we find that the Board of Review and Equalization’s use of the $6,400,690.00 assessed value utilizing this “hybrid” income approach in its methodology was plainly wrong as a matter of law, and the ci rcuit court erred in affirming the Board’s use of the “hybrid” income appr oach. “An assessment made by a Board of Review and Equalization and ap proved by the circuit court will not be reversed when supported by substantial evidence unl ess plainly wrong.” Syl. Pt. 2, Mountain America,

9 The requirements of W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2 .2.1.2 and § 110-1P-2 .3.6 are set forth more fully above. See footnote 7, supra.24 LLC v. Huffman , 224 W. Va. 669, 6 87 S.E.2d 768 (2009) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization , 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862 (1932)).

Although we determine that the Bo ard of Review and Equalization’s methodology was plainly wrong, the fact remains that Lee Trace has presented no evidence that the methodology used by the Assessor in her initial co st approach assessment of $7,593,430.00 was erroneous. Rather, it has a ppealed the 2011 assessm ent alleging that a proper income approach should have been used by the Assessor instead. As we stated above, we believe the Assessor was within her di scretion to utilize the cost approach method to appraise and assess the property. Once an Assesso r has selected an appraisal method and applied it to appraise and asse ss a parcel of commercial real property, the valuation placed upon the property by the assessor is accorded great deference and is presumed to be correct. “As a general rule, there is a presump tion that valuati ons for taxation purposes fixed by an assessor are correct.... Th e burden is on the taxpayer challenging the assessment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Western Pocahontas Props., Ltd. v. County Comm’n of Wetzel County , 189 W.Va. 322, 431 S.E.2d 661. Accord Syl. pt. 7, In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co. , 172 W.Va. 53, 303 S. E.2d 691 (“It is a general rule that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are presumed to be correct. The burden of showing an assessment to be e rroneous is, of course, upon the taxpayer, and proof of such fact mu st be clear.”). Cf. Syl. pt. 2, In re Tax Assessments Ag ainst the S. Land Co. , 143 W.Va. 152, 100 S.E.2d 555 (1957) (“In a case involving the assessment of property for taxa tion purposes, which does not involve the violation of a statut e governing the assessment of property, or a violation of a constitutional provision, or in25 which a question of the constitu tionality of a statute is not involved, this Court will not set aside or disturb an assessment made by an assessor or the county court, acting as a board of equalization and review, where the assessment is supported by substantial evidence.”), overr uled on other grounds by In re the Assessment of Shares of Stoc k of the Kanawha Valley Bank , 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959).

Foster Found ., 223 W. Va. at 33–34, 672 S.E.2d at 169–70. We find that the cost approach assessment performed by the Assessor is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lee Trace has not raised any error w ith respect to the me thodology used by the Assessor in performing the cost approach analysis. Thus, we find that Lee Trace has not met the requisite burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the Assessor’s cost approach asse ssment was erroneous. Theref ore, we accord the 2011 assessment made by the Assessor due deferenc e and find that the 2011 tax assessment for the property at issue should be adjusted to reflect the Assessor’s initial cost approach assessment value of $7,593,430.00. 10

IV.

CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, we reve rse the April 16, 20 12, order and the July 24, 2012, order of the Ci rcuit Court of Berkeley County and remand these matters to the circuit court for further proceedi ngs consistent with this Opinion.

10 Because we reverse the circuit court’s orde r on the grounds stated above, it is not necessary to address Lee Trace’s remaining assignments of error.26 Reversed and Remanded.