FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAY 31, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1677 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 97-00076 -CR- 4-RH -W CS UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us TERRY LEE PRESLEY, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1677 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00011 -CR- 4-RH -W CS UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us TERRY LEE PRESLEY, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.2 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ay 3 1, 200 7) Be fo re CA RN E S, W IL SO N and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. CAR NE S, Circuit Judge: Te rry Le e Pr esley

brings us two appeals, which w e have consolidated. In the first one he appeals the revocation of his supervisedrelea se. He contends th at unde r 18 U . S. C. § 35 83( i) the dis tr ic t c ourt l ac ke d j ur isd ic tio n to r ev oke his re le as e af te r the te rm

of it w as ove r, be ca

use the a lle ga tio ns b eh ind the w ar rant an d th e sum

m ons that w er e iss ue d to be ginthe r ev oc at ionpr oc ee din g w er e not sw or n. I n th e oth er

appe al , P re sle y

c ha lle nge s hi s c onvi ct ionon o ne c ount of poss essing a firear

m as a c onvi cted felon in violatio n of 18 U. S. C. §§ 92 1(g)(1), 924( a) (2 ); he c om

pla ins about

the dis tr ic t c our

t no t t el lin g th e j ur

y that i t c oul d acq ui t h im

if h is po ss es si on of t he fir earm was n eces sa ry .3 I. I n 19 98 P re sle y

ple ad ed gui lty to co nspi ri ng t o po sse ss m ar ij uanaw ith int en t t o di str ibu te and w as se nte nc ed to a tw en ty -f

our -m onth pr iso n te rm

to be fo llo w ed by athr ee -y ear pe ri od o f supe rv ise d r el ea se . A ft er c om ple tin g hi s pr iso n tim e and starting the release period, Pr esley adm itted in Ju ne of 2002 to three vio la tio ns o f his sup er

vis ed r el ea se c ondi tio ns, w hic h in cl ude d te sti ng p osi tiv e fo r m ar ij uana . A s ar es ult

of tho se vio la tio ns, the district court sentenced him to an additio nal m onth in prison and a newterm of supervised release that w as sc he du le d t o e nd on Ju ne 27 , 20 03 . Pr es le y did not m ak e it thr oughhis ne wte rm of sup er vis ed r el ea se any better than he did the first one. O n May 7, 2003, his probation officer petition ed the dis tr ic t c ourt f

or asum m ons or de ri ng P re sle y

to ap pe ar be fo re the c ourt and an sw er he r al le ga tio ns tha t he ha d vi olate d th e co ndi tio ns o f his ne wr el ea se by again testing p ositiv e for m arij uana use. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th at pe tit ion , and a sum

m ons is sued on May

27, 2003. T hen, on the sam e day the summ ons was issued, Presley ’ s probation officer filed a petition alleging three m ore supervised re le as e vio la tio ns, e ac h r el at ing to Pr es le y ’ s M ay 15, 200 3 arr es t by

the F lor ida St at e U niv er sity

P oli ce D ep ar

tm en t f or r es ist ing arr es t, pos se ssi ng c oc ai ne and m ar ij uanaw iththe int en t t o se ll, and a f ewoth er thi ngs. T his ti m e, tho ugh, the4

pr oba tio n of

fi ce r as ke d th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o is sue aw ar rant f or P re sle y ’ s arr es t ins te ad of asum m ons. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e pe tit ionand an arr es t w ar rant is su edon Ju ne 2, 2 00 3. The sum m ons and th e w arrant wer e eac h aim ed at getting Presley back before the district court for a supervised release hearing. Both w ere issued b efore Pr es le y ’ s te rm

of sup er vis ed r el ea se w as ove r, but

ne ith er w as se rv ed

on h im be fo re it s e xpi ratio n date . A nd, c ri tic al to fr am ing the iss ue s r ai se d inthi s a ppe al , bo th were b as edon all eg at io ns by the pa ro le off ic er t ha t wer e n ot swo rn . Pr es le y ’ s su

pe rv ise d r el ea se r ev oc at ionhe ar ing w as c ondu ct ed in co nj unc tio n w iththe se nte nc e he ar ing that f oll ow ed his c onvi ct ionon the f

el on- inposs ession charge that form s the basis for the second half of this cons olidated ap pe al . I t t ook pla ce on N ove m be r 29, 200 5. A ft er

he ar ing e vid en ce about

the alleged violatio ns, the district court found Presley guiltyof the single vio lation set out in the sum

m ons an d of

tw o of the thr ee in the w ar

rant. T he c ourt r ev oke d th e te rm of sup er vis ed r el ea se that othe rw ise ha d e nde d onJun e 27, 200 3, and i t se nte nc ed him to ei ght ee n m onths i m

pr iso nm en t. Before revoking Presley ’ s term of rele ase and sentencing him , the c ourt raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to proceed with the revocation. I t poin ted to the decision in United States v. Vargas-A m ay a, 389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir.5

2004 ), w hic h ha d in te rp re te d 18 U . S. C. § 35 83( i) to m ean th at any w ar rant pr ovi din g ac ourt w ithj ur isd ic tio n to r ev oke sup er vis ed r el ea se a ft er

the e nd o f it m ust be “ ba se d onsw or

n f ac ts. ” I d. a t 90 7. A ft er

he ar ing f ro m the part ie s onthe iss ue , the dis tr ic t c ourt di sa gr ee d w iththe N inth C ir cu it’ s V ar ga s- A m ay a de ci sio n. T he c ourt c onc lud ed

that un de r § 35 83( i) the sum m ons ga ve it

j ur isd ic tio n to co nsi de r the c harg e se t ou t i n th at doc um en t, and the w ar

rant g av e it j ur isd ic tio n to co nsi de r the thr ee c harg es se t ou t i n th at doc um en t, e ve n th oughne ith er doc um en t ha d b een ba se d o n s worn a ll eg at io ns . The sole issue Pre sley

raises about the revocation is whether the district co urt ha d j ur isd ic tio n to do i t, am atte r w e re vie wde nov o. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Najjar, 28 3 F .3d13 06 , 13 07 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ) (p er cu ria m ). T he gov er nin g st at ute pr ovi de s: T he pow er

of the c ourt t o r ev oke ate rm of sup er vis ed r el ea se f or vio la tio n of

ac ondi tio n of

sup er vis ed r el ea se . . . e xte nds be y ond the expir at ionof

the te rm of sup er vis ed r el ea se f or any pe ri od r ea sona

bly ne ce ssary f or the a dj udi catio n of

m atte rs ari sin g be fo re it s e xpi ratio n if , be fo re it s e xpi ratio n, aw ar rant o r sum

m ons ha s be eniss ue d onthe ba sis of an a lle ga tio n of

suc h avio la tio n. 18 U.S.C. § 3 58 3( i) ( em

ph as is ad de d) . Pr es le y c ont en ds tha t i n th e § 35 83( i) r ea chba ck pr ovi sio n th e w or ds

“ iss ue d onthe ba sis of

an a lle ga tio n of

suc h avio la tio n” m ean th at the w ar rant o r6

sum m ons m ust be ba se d no t j ust

on “ ana lle ga tio n of

suc h avio la tio n, ” as the statut e say s bu t ona

sw or n a lle ga tio n. H e w ra

ps tha t pr opos iti on i n th e Fo urth A m en dm en t’ s W ar

rant C lause , se e U . S. Co nst . A m en d. I V ( “ no W ar rants sha ll iss ue , but upo n pr oba

ble c au se , sup porte d by

O ath or a ff irm at ion. . . . ”) , and the V ar ga s- A m ay a de ci sio n, in w hic h th e N inth C ir cu it ag re ed that “ the pla in m eanin g of the te rm ‘ w ar rant’ [ in § 358 3( i) ] m eans a doc um en t . . . ba se d up on p ro bable cause and suppo rted by

sworn fa cts.” Id. at 904. T he governm ent, in re spon se, ci te s th e Fi fth C ir cu it’ s de ci sio n inU nit ed S ta te s v. G ar ci a- A va lin o, 444 F . 3d 4 44 (5 th C ir . ), c er

t. de nie d, ___

U . S. ___ , 127 S . Ct . 141 ( 2006 ), w hic h r ej ec te d th e Ninth Circuit’ s posi tion andinstead held that “ a w arrant for the arr est of a supe rv ise d r el ea se e ne ed

not c om ply w iththe O ath or

a ff irm at ionc lause of

the Fo ur th Am en dm en t.” Id . at 4 47 . T he spl it be tw ee n th e Fi fth and N inth C ir cu its ove r the r ev oc at ionw ar rant iss ue is int er es tin g, but

the ir dis ag re em en t do es not

e xte nd t o th e que sti on o f w h e t h e r u n d e r th e r e a c h b a c kp r o v i s i o n as u mmo n s , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e df r o m a w ar rant, m ust be ba se d ona lle ga tio ns m ad e unde r oa th o r af fi rm at ion . T he N inth Ci rc uit “ expr es s[ ed ] no o pin ion ” on the sum m ons que sti on, V ar ga s- A m ay a, 389 F. 3d at 90 6 n. 4, and the F if th C ir cu it’ s r ea soni ng o n th e w ar rant i ssu e m ak es it cl ear that i t w oul d a lso hol d th at a lle ga tio ns b ri ngi ng f

orth a sum m ons ne ed

not be7

sw or n. N o de ci sio ns w e ha ve se enhol d th at f or § 35 83( i) pur

pose s asum

m ons mu s tb e b a s e do n s w o rn a l l e g a t i o n s . Th e F o u rt h Ame n d men t , o f c o u r s e , s a ys noth ing abou t haling so m eone into court with a summ ons, instead of taking them int o c ust ody

w ithaw ar

rant. N or is the re anythi ng i n th e statut e its el f or inh er en t in th e wor d “ su m

m on s” th atreq ui res swo rn st at em en ts foron e to is su e. Presley argues that various provis ions in the feder al crim inal procedure ru le s sp ec if

y : ( 1) that a

“ sum m ons” m ay

be iss ue d inli euof

aw ar rant, if s up p o rt e db y ac o mp l a i n to r a f f i d a v i t s e s t ab l i s h i n g p r o b ab l e c au s e , F e d . R . C r i m. P. 4( a) ; ( 2) that a ll co m

pla int s m ust be “ m ad e unde r oa th, ” Fe d. R. Cr im . P . 3; and (3 ) that a sum m ons m ust be m ad e “ in the sam e fo rm a s aw ar rant e xc ep t tha t i t m ust r equir e the de fe ndant t o a ppe ar be fo re am ag istrate j udge a t a state d ti m e an d pla ce , ” Fe d. R. Cr im . P . 4( b) (2 ). T he se r ule s, he a dds, are “ co nst itu tio na lly com pelled.” W e do not th ink th at they are . Ther e is nothin g in the Cons titutio n, w hich does not even m ention su m m onses, that requires one to be based on sworn allegations. As f

or the crim inal rules provisi ons th at Pre sley relies on, they

are co nc ern edwit h h al in g i nt o c ou rt a cit iz en who se li be rty is o th erwi se un res tra in ed . Wha t’ s m iss ing f

ro m P re sle y ’ s arg um en t i s an a ppr ec ia tio n of

the c ust ody

status of on e o n s up erv is edrel eas e.In Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), the 1 El e ve nth Cir c uit a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll F if th C ir c uit de c isi on s h and e d d own p ri or to the close of

business on September 30, 1981. 8 Requirem ents contained in the Feder al Rules of Cr im inal Procedure that im pose pr oc ed

ur es f or takin g so m eo ne int o c ust ody do n ot n ec es sari ly

appl y to people who, like Pr esley , are under court supervision as part of a cr im inal sentence. See United State s v. H arrison, 461 F. 2d 11 27, 1130 (5th Cir. 1972 ). 1 T he r ea son the y

do n ot i s th at

ac onvi ct ed

c ri m ina l onparo le , a s inH ar ri son, or one who i s onsup er

vis ed r el ea se , a s inthi s c as e, is al re ady in “ co nstru ct ive cu sto dy . ” I d. ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. Br ow n, 117 F . 3d 4 71, 475 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) (c onc lud ing that a

“ supe rv ise d r el ea se e” is “ in c ust ody ” fo r pur pose s of f ili ng a fe de ra l ha be as pe tit ionund er

28 U . S. C. § 22 55) . A s ar es ult , asum m ons iss ue d to a co nvi ct ed

c ri m ina l onsup er

vis ed r el ea se , af

orm of c ust ody , is not

the sam e as a sum m ons iss ue d to ac iti ze n w ho i s f re e of r es tr ic tio ns o n hi s li be rty and n ot i n any ty pe of c ust ody . S ee H ar

ri son, 461 F . 2d at 11 30 ( “ [A ] paro le vio la tor is not technically

‘ arre sted’ as Rule 5(a) contem plates. R ather, . . . when ar rested under a paro le vio la tor

w ar rant, he is m er el y

pla ce d ina ct

ua l c ust ody

. . . . ”) . I t i s no t the sam e because the step fr om constructive custo dy

to actual custodyis shorter than th e le ap fro m

un su pe rv is edfree do m

to actua l cu st od y . If C ongress had wanted, it ea sily could have said th at for purposes of9

supp ly ing reach back j urisdictio n und er § 3583(i) a sum m ons m ust be sup ported by sw or n f ac ts. I t di dn’ t say

that. I nst ea d, Co ngr es s w ro te the statut e so tha t the onlyquestion is whether, before the e xpiration o f Pr esley ’ s release period, a summ ons “ has been issued o n the basis of an allegation o f such a violation” before the te rm of sup er vis ed r el ea se e xpi re d. 18 U . S. C. § 35 83( i) . H er e, the answ er to that qu es tio n is y es . T he sum m ons w as iss ue d onMay 27, 200 3, and the pe ri od o f supe rv ise d r el ea se w as not sc he dul ed

to en d un til am onth late r. T he r equir em en ts o f t h e s t at u t e w er e met , g i v i n g th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ju ri s d i ct i o n t o re v o k e P re s l ey’s su pe rv is io n e ve n a fte r th e p eri od of i t h aden de d. Although the district court did findPre sley guiltyof the violation specified in the sum

m ons, it s a

uth or ity to de te rm ine if

his sup er vis ed r el ea se sho uld

be revoked was not confined to the specifications of the summ ons. Instead, once P r e s l e y w a s b e f

o r e th e c o u rti th a dth e p o w e r t o c o n s i d e r

an y v i o l a t i o n o f

th e t e rms of the relea se and base a re vocation o n it. Se e § 3583(i) (conferr ing reach back j urisdictio n “ for any

period reasonably

necessary

for the adj udication of m atters ar isi ng b ef

or e its e xpi ratio n” ( em

pha sis a dde d) ); se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. N ar an

j o, 259 F. 3d 3 79, 383 ( 5thCi r. 200 1) ( “ [S ec tio n 35 83( i) ’ s] pla in l an gua ge pe rm its re voc at ionba se d onany

vio la tio n of

ac ondi tio n of

sup er vis ed r el ea se oc curr ing during th e supervision term , e ven if not contain ed in a petition for revocation filed1 0

dur ing that t er

m , so l ong as aw ar

rant o r sum

m ons w as iss ue d duri ng tha t t er m on the ba sis of

an a lle ge d vi olatio n. ”) . I n othe r w or ds, onc e the sum m ons ga ve it j ur isd ic tio n to de ci de w he the r to r ev oke P re sle y ’ s r el ea se , the c ourt a lso c oul d co nsi de r the spe ci fi catio ns c ont ai ne d inthe w ar rant. § 3 583( i) . T he de fe ndant m ust, of course, be given not ice but Presley does not s uggest th at he lacked notice of th e ch arg es . Fo r t h es e r ea s o n s , we wi l l af fi rm th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s re v o ca t i o n o f P re s l ey’s te rm of s up erv is edrel eas e. II. InP re sle y ’ s a

ppe al f ro m his f el on- in- poss es sio n c harg e, he c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y r ef use d to ins tr

uc t the j ur

y on the e le m en ts o f his necessity defense. W e have said that a defe ndant is enti tled to have the court ins tr uc t the j ur

y on h is the or

y of the c as e, “ as lon g a s it

ha s so m e ba sis in the ev ide nc e an d ha s le ga l su ppor t. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. N olan, 223 F . 3d 1 311, 131 4 (1 1thCi r. 200 0) ( pe r curi am) (c iti ng U nit ed S ta te s v. G ri gsby , 111 F . 3d 8 06, 814 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 7) ). W e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t P re sle y w as not e nti tle d to the ne ce ssi ty ins tr uc tio n. H is s tor

y is that he f

ound his ne phe wand s om e oth er c hil dr enin the ne ighbor hood play ing w iththe f

ir earm he w as la te r ch ar ge d w ithpos se ssi ng, and1 1

that t ak ing the gunw as ne ce ssary to pr ote ct

the m . T he n, he say s, he w al ke d up the str ee t t o hi s m oth er ’ s tr ai le r hom e, w hic h w as f ive m inu te s aw ay , and h id the gun under her house before being arre sted about th irty m inutes later. Presley

adm itted that he was c arry ing no t one but two cell phon es that day , which m eans that he had not one but tw o w ay s of

c al lin g lawe nf

or ce m en t or

som e oth er

r es pons ibl e party to t ak e poss es sio n of

the f ir earm . P re sle y , the re fo re , ha d a t l ea st o ne r ea sona ble al te rn at ive to poss es sin g th e gun him se lf , and the ne ce ssi ty

de fe nse w oul d no t ap ply unl es s he ha d no ne . S ee U nit ed S tate s v. D el ev ea

ux, 205 F . 3d 1 292, 129 7 (11th Cir. 2000) (setting out the elem ents of a necessity defense, includin g “ that th e d efen da nt ha d n o re as on ab le leg al alt ern at iv e to vi ol at in g t he law” ). Ac cepting his story

as true, the necessity

defense could not appl y

and the district co ur t was no t re qu ire d t o t el l t he jury ot he rwis e. III . T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r re voki ng P re sle y ’ s su pe rv ise d r el ea se in N o. 05- 1677 8 is AF FIRMED , and the j udgm en t e m body ing his c onvi ct ionin N o. 05- 1677 9 is a lso AF FIRMED .