[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-14616

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02691-AT

AUDREY EILEEN MORRISON,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ATLANTA,

MAYOR OF THE CITY OF ATLANTA,

CEASAR C. MITCHELL,

OFFICER ROBERT A. BOYD,

OFFICER G. WALKER, et al.,

Defendants–Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(June 9, 2015)

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Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Audrey Morrison appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment to the City of Atlanta and to Officers Boyd and Walker on her 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for excessive force and inadequate medical care. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Morrison, as did the 

district court. The facts arise from Morrison’s attendance at a concert at Chastain 

Park Amphitheater in August 2010. Morrison attended the Friday night concert 

with her husband and one of his co-workers. During the concert, Morrison moved 

to approach the stage and noticed a security guard directing other attendees to 

move back from the stage. She decided to go up the bleachers, away from the 

stage, and smoke a cigarette. On the way up the stairs, someone grabbed her 

around the throat and forcefully slammed her down onto the cement. She landed 

on the right side of her body and her face hit the cement. It was dark, and she did 

not know who attacked her, so she kicked the attacker in defense. She then heard 

her husband ask an individual why he slammed his wife to the ground. At that 

point, Morrison realized it was an officer. The officer punched her husband in the 

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face, knocked him to the ground and then smashed Morrison’s face into the cement 

until he secured her with handcuffs. Morrison stated that although she was injured 

and in pain, no EMS personnel checked her injuries. She did admit that she and 

her husband had been drinking at the concert.

The officer transported Morrison and her husband to a police station. 

Morrison did not identify her specific injuries, but claimed that she sustained 

abrasions to her face, neck, shoulder, and knee. During the five hours the police 

detained her at the station, no one checked her injuries or cleaned her wounds. 

During this time, she repeatedly asked to use a restroom, but none of the officers 

responded to her request. Eventually, she soiled herself. Morrison stated that no 

officer offered her or her husband water during their detention. At some point, her 

husband was able to use a restroom and get some water. Morrison asked him to 

bring her some water in his mouth. He was able to do that, and he spit the water 

into her mouth.

After someone informed Morrison that she was going to jail and would not 

be released until Monday, she started “freaking out” and hyperventilating. She 

was concerned for her 2 year-old child, who was with a sitter and had a medical 

condition that required regular medications. The sitter did not have enough 

medicine for the child, and Morrison begged the officers to allow her to call the 

sitter, but she received no response. Morrison became so distraught and anxious 

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and requested someone help her obtain her medicine, but no one offered to help. 

She then began to bang her head on the wall to get attention and treatment. 

Eventually, officers transported her to the Fulton County Jail, where she remained 

until early the next day, when the authorities released her.

B. Procedural History

Morrison filed her complaint against the City of Atlanta, Officers Boyd and 

Walker, Fulton County, and other defendants asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and state law for excessive force and inadequate medical care. The Fulton 

County defendants and the City defendants moved for summary judgment on all 

claims. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all 

claims. Morrison filed her notice of appeal. This court granted a joint motion to 

dismiss with prejudice the appeal as to the Fulton County defendants.

II. ISSUE

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City 

defendants on Morrison’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Myers 

v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).

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Like the district court, we “must consider the facts and the justifiable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” which here is 

Morrison. West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 2014). “Summary 

judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine dispute of any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “An issue of fact is 

‘material’ if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of 

the case. An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 

F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 

F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and 

seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in 

the course of an arrest.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002). 

“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an 

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree 

of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871–72 (1989)). This circuit has explained 

that the “application of de minimis force, without more, will not support” an 

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excessive force claim and will not defeat an officer’s qualified immunity. Nolin v. 

Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000). Qualified immunity functions as 

immunity from suit, and officials seeking qualified immunity must first establish 

that they were acting within their discretionary authority when the alleged 

constitutional violation occurred.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 

1291 (11th Cir. 2009). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who can overcome 

the qualified immunity defense by showing that (1) the defendant’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right and (2) this right was “clearly established at the time 

of the alleged violation.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th 

Cir. 2010).

To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the plaintiff must 

show both that a seizure occurred and the force used was unreasonable. See 

Troupe v. Sarasota Cnty., Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005). “The 

‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the 

question is whether the officer’s actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the 

facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or 

motivation.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 

1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). As a result, the question whether Officer 

Boyd acted unconstitutionally is answered from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer.

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The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from 

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 

the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . The calculus of reasonableness 

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that 

is necessary in a particular situation.

Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 996 

(11th Cir. 1994)).

Morrison’s excessive force claim fails. First, in her declaration, she 

admitted that she had no idea who slammed her to the ground. Despite this fact, 

she submitted no testimony or other evidence (other than her own hearsay 

statement) from the one person who allegedly identified Officer Boyd as her 

attacker—her husband—in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. On the other hand, Officer Boyd attested that he had no interaction with 

Morrison until after she was already on the ground and engaged in an altercation 

with private security officers. Morrison offered no competent evidence to refute

Boyd’s statement or to support her conclusory assertion that Officer Boyd was the 

individual who slammed her to the ground. Against Officer Boyd’s specific 

testimony regarding when his involvement with Morrison began, Morrison’s 

conclusory and speculative assertion is insufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. 

See Leigh v. Warner Bros. Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that 

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an affidavit that contains a brief conclusory assertion without supporting facts has 

no probative value).

Second, Morrison cannot demonstrate that the force Officer Boyd used to 

detain her was objectively unreasonable. Morrison admits that she had been 

drinking at the concert, and when Officer Boyd arrived at the scene, Morrison was 

struggling with security personnel. Officer Boyd used the force necessary to 

subdue Morrison. Moreover, Morrison does not demonstrate that she suffered 

more than minor injuries. She does not identify any specific injuries, but contends 

that she did not receive medical care to clean her open wounds. Morrison fails to 

overcome her burden to show that Officer Boyd is not entitled to qualified 

immunity under these circumstances. Accordingly, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment to Officer Boyd.1

B. Inadequate medical care

Morrison alleges that Officers Boyd and Walker provided no medical care 

for her injuries at the event facility or in the police precinct and contends that such 

conduct violated her constitutional rights.

 1 Morrison made no claims as to excessive force against Officer Walker and made no 

argument that any other defendant, including the City, should be liable for Officer Boyd’s 

conduct. Thus, the district court properly dismissed these claims and granted judgment for 

Officer Walker and the City on Morrison’s claim of excessive force.

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Due process requires penal facilities to provide inmates with adequate 

medical care. A pretrial detainee’s rights exist under the due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. Nonetheless, this 

circuit has applied the Eighth Amendment’s “serious medical needs” analysis to 

pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate medical treatment under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). 

To prevail on a deprivation of medical care claim, a prisoner must show that she 

suffered a serious medical need, the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to 

that need, and the indifference caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Mann v. Taser 

Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009).

Morrison cannot prevail on her claim of inadequate medical care. She does 

not present any sufficient evidence that she suffered from “an objectively serious 

medical need,” so grave that “if left unattended, pose[d] a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Morrison mentions only that she 

suffered facial wounds that were not cleaned and eventually became infected. 

These wounds do not constitute a serious medical need. See Duncan v. Corr. Med. 

Serv., 451 F. App’x 901, 903 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that a serious medical need 

can be either (1) “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize 

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the necessity for a doctor’s attention” or (2) one where “a delay in treating the need 

worsens the condition” (quoting Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307)). Accordingly, the 

district court properly granted judgment to the officers on Morrison’s inadequate 

medical needs claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the City and the 

officers on Morrison’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive force and inadequate 

medical care. The district court also properly dismissed the state law claims of 

assault and battery against the City, as it was entitled to sovereign immunity. See 

Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 346 (Ga. 2001) (sovereign immunity protects 

all levels of government from legal action unless they have waived immunity). 

Similarly, the district court properly granted official immunity to the officers on 

Morrison’s state law claims of assault and battery because she failed to offer any 

evidence that either officer acted negligently or with malice. See Gilbert v. 

Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 481 (Ga. 1994) (finding that official immunity offers 

limited protection from suit to governmental officers and employees); Grammens 

v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. 2010) (noting that public officer is personally 

liable for acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to 

injure). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

the defendants.

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AFFIRMED.

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