PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

JOACHIM O. ADDO, 

 Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent.

No. 18-9560

_________________________________

Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Petition for Review)

_________________________________

Kari E. Hong, Boston College Law School, Newton, MA on behalf of Petitioner.

Scott Stewart, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Division, Washington, D.C., (Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Greg D. 

Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, United States 

Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, 

D.C on the briefs) on behalf of Respondent.

_________________________________

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

Petitioner Joachim Addo is a native and citizen of Ghana. The Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial by an immigration judge (IJ) of his 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

December 14, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

application for asylum, withholding of removal,1 and protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). In the briefs on his petition for review by this court, he 

challenges the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that substantial 

evidence does not support the BIA’s determination that he could successfully avoid 

future persecution by relocating within Ghana.2 Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a), we agree with Petitioner that the decision on his ability to safely relocate is 

unsupported by substantial evidence. We grant the petition for review and remand to the 

BIA for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1

 “Congress changed the statutory language of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] to 

‘restriction on removal,’ but the corresponding regulations retain the old phrase 

‘withholding of removal.’” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.1 (10th Cir. 

2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)). Because the parties, the 

BIA, and the IJ all refer to “withholding of removal,” we will use that term as well.

2

 In this court Petitioner has not presented any argument challenging the ruling against 

him on his CAT claim, so he has waived the issue. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 

1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed 

abandoned or waived . . . [as are] arguments that are inadequately presented . . . .” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Petitioner’s briefs also rely on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), to argue that 

because the notice to appear sent to him by the Department of Homeland Security failed 

to state the time and date of his first removal hearing, the immigration court had no 

jurisdiction to order him removed. But after the briefing was completed this court 

rejected the same arguments in cases brought by other immigration petitioners. See 

Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1277–79 (10th Cir. 2020); Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 

941 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (10th Cir. 2019). Petitioner did not pursue the issue at oral 

argument, nor need we here.
3

In January 2017 Petitioner entered the United States. He expressed a fear of 

returning to Ghana and was granted a credible-fear interview. An asylum officer 

determined that Petitioner was credible and referred his case to adjudication. 

At a hearing in June 2017 the IJ determined that Petitioner was removable. 

Petitioner indicated, however, that he wished to apply for asylum, so the IJ scheduled a

hearing to consider the asylum claim. Petitioner filed an application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. He relied on the following

evidence:

Petitioner is the son of the chief of the Challa tribe. The tribe is small, with a 

population of about 4000. It is based in and around the town of Nkwanta, in eastern 

Ghana near the border with Togo. For several years the Challa have been in a land 

dispute with another tribe, the Atwode.

3

 

The Atwode tribe is larger than the Challa, with 10,000 to 15,000 members. But 

the Challa control more land in the Nkwanta district, and in the past they often leased

land to the Atwode. Starting in 2005 the Atwode began violating the lease terms and 

customs. Petitioner’s father therefore instructed the Challa to stop leasing land to the 

Atwode, and he took the Atwode to court over the land disputes, winning every case. 

The Atwode responded with violence against the Challa and vowed to eliminate 

Petitioner’s father and family. This led to several violent incidents perpetrated by the 

Atwode against Petitioner and other members of his family, which we summarize here. 

3

 Portions of the record refer to the Atwode as the “Akyode.” For clarity we use the 

spelling “Atwode” throughout this opinion. 
4

In 2012 six Atwode men stopped Petitioner at gunpoint in Nkwanta and beat him 

with sticks, breaking his legs. The men told Petitioner that they wanted to cripple him so 

that he could not lead the Challa in the future. The next day, Petitioner’s two brothers 

were attacked by the Atwode while on their way to visit Petitioner. One brother suffered 

a broken collarbone and internal bleeding, the other a slashed cheek. 

About two months later the Atwode attacked Petitioner’s father in his home. They 

attempted to shoot him, but the gun failed. Petitioner’s father reported the attack to the 

police, who arrested the gunman. In retaliation for the arrest, several members of the 

Atwode went to the home of Petitioner’s father, where they destroyed property and 

threatened to behead Petitioner’s father. The police did not respond, but members of the 

military who were in the area intervened to protect Petitioner’s father. 

Shortly after these attacks, Petitioner and his father agreed that, for his own safety,

Petitioner would relinquish his position as heir-apparent to the Challa chiefdom and

would move from Nkwanta to Accra, the capital of Ghana. But this did not stop the 

Atwode. In August 2014 several Atwode men showed up at Petitioner’s home in Accra. 

When Petitioner’s wife said that he was not at home, the men beat her. They told her to 

“tell [Petitioner] to advise his father to stop taking our people to court.” Certified 

Administrative Record (CAR) 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response to this 

attack Petitioner moved to a different part of Accra, but after moving he received a text 

message saying that the Atwode knew his new address and that moving would not help 

him. 
5

In November 2014 the Atwode assassinated Petitioner’s uncle. That same day, 

Atwode men came to Petitioner’s home in Accra. His wife, trying to mislead the men, 

said that Petitioner was on his way back to Nkwanta. The Atwode then burned down 

Petitioner’s house in Nkwanta. 

Petitioner and his brothers continued to receive death threats via phone calls and 

text messages. In June 2016 Petitioner moved again, but the threats continued and

became significant enough that Petitioner and his brothers began thinking about leaving 

Ghana. An example of these threats, documented in a police report filed by one of 

Petitioner’s two brothers, is a text message telling the brother that “if you don’t stop 

aiding [your father], we w[ill] bath[e] you with acid. We are monitoring you and would 

locate you anywhere you go.” CAR 453. In response to these escalating threats, 

Petitioner’s wife left Ghana for Kenya in September 2016, and his two brothers left the 

country in December 2016 and January 2017. One brother went to the Ivory Coast and 

the other moved to Benin.

In the middle of one night in late January 2017, when Petitioner was already 

preparing to leave Ghana, two gunshots were fired into his bedroom. He inferred that 

members of the Atwode had fired the shots because of death threats he received from the 

Atwode via text message. He escaped harm because at the time of the shooting he was in 

another room taking care of an ill son. Immediately after this incident Petitioner left 

Ghana. He took his children to Togo, then went on to the United States himself. 

As leader of the Challa tribe, Petitioner’s father continues to live in Nkwanta. A 

number of Challa tribesmen, including retired members of the military, live with 
6

Petitioner’s father to provide him with constant protection. Petitioner’s mother and six of 

his sisters also remain in Ghana, the sisters in Accra. 

B. Procedural History

The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the CAT. Although the IJ found Petitioner credible, the IJ concluded

that he had failed to show that he was persecuted on the basis of a protected ground 

because he had not proved that his father was the leader of the Challa tribe. Petitioner 

appealed to the BIA, which determined that Petitioner had sufficiently proved that his 

father was chief. The BIA explained that Petitioner was therefore entitled to a 

presumption that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution. It remanded the case 

to the IJ to assess whether the government could rebut this presumption by showing that 

Petitioner could safely and reasonably relocate within Ghana. 

On remand the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted the following 

additional evidence to prove that Petitioner could relocate within Ghana: (1) a profile of 

Ghana from an organization called the Joshua Project containing information about the 

population of different tribal groups within the country; (2) a World Factbook entry 

containing information about Ghana’s population, ethnic breakdown, and geography; (3) 

a profile of the Atwode tribe stating that the tribe is based in the Nkwanta district and that 

some members migrate to other parts of Ghana, “especially to Accra, Kumasi and the 

larger towns of the Volta region,” CAR 111; and (4) a letter from a researcher at the 

Library of Congress that discusses Nkwanta, including the region’s history of ethnic 
7

conflict, and states that there is no information suggesting any legal impediment to 

internal relocation within Ghana. 

The IJ again denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and protection under the CAT, ruling that the government had met its burden to establish 

that Petitioner could successfully relocate within Ghana. He again appealed the IJ’s 

decision on all three forms of relief. The BIA dismissed the appeal on the ground “that 

any presumption of future persecution has been rebutted by evidence demonstrating that 

[Petitioner] could internally relocate.” CAR 3. Because it affirmed on that ground, the 

BIA declined to address Petitioner’s other arguments. He then filed this petition for 

review.4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“[W]e review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination and limit our 

review to issues specifically addressed therein.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1279 

(10th Cir. 2006). But “when seeking to understand the grounds provided by the BIA, we 

are not precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of those same 

grounds.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). “This is 

4

 In July 2020, Petitioner informed the court that he had been removed from the United 

States and was awaiting the resolution of this appeal from a safe location abroad. We 

note that Petitioner’s removal has not mooted his petition for review because, “in the 

event this court grants his petition, [Immigration and Customs

Enforcement] would facilitate his return to the United States pursuant to its

Facilitation of Return Policy.” Igiebor v. Barr, No. 19-9579, at 9–10 (10th Cir. 2020).
8

especially appropriate where,” as in this case, “the BIA incorporates by reference the IJ’s 

rationale or repeats a condensed version of its reasons while also relying on the IJ’s more 

complete discussion.” Id.

“We consider any legal questions de novo, and we review the agency’s findings of 

fact under the substantial evidence standard.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 

(10th Cir. 2004). Under the substantial-evidence standard, “the administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The question whether a noncitizen can avoid 

future persecution by internally relocating is a factual determination. See Gambashidze v. 

Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2004); Thiam v. Holder, 555 F. App’x 773, 778 

(10th Cir. 2014).

B. Asylum

Petitioner argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the BIA’s ruling 

that Petitioner could safely avoid persecution by relocating within Ghana. We agree. 

To qualify for asylum, a noncitizen “must demonstrate either past persecution or a 

well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Matumona v. Barr, 945 

F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 2019) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Where

the noncitizen has demonstrated past persecution, he is entitled to a presumption of a 

well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The government

can rebut this presumption in several ways, including through showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the noncitizen can avoid future persecution by 
9

relocating within his country of nationality “and under all the circumstances, it would be 

reasonable to expect [him] to do so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii); see Ritonga v. 

Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 976–77 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Fear of persecution is not well-founded 

if the applicant can avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the country and it 

would be reasonable to expect her to do so.”). 

“[B]ecause the purpose of the relocation rule is not to require an applicant to stay 

one step ahead of persecution in the proposed area, th[e] [new] location must present 

circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to a well-founded fear of 

persecution on the basis of the original claim.” Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 

33 (BIA 2012). “DHS must demonstrate that there is a specific area of the country where 

the risk of persecution to the respondent falls below the well-founded fear level.” Id. at 

33–34. In evaluating whether relocation is reasonable, the court considers “whether the 

applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing 

civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; 

geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, 

and social and familial ties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). 5

 

In ruling that the government had met its burden, the BIA stated: 

The [IJ] relied upon the DHS’s evidence, especially a 2003 article, 

which states that the rival [Atwode] tribe does not control the entire 

country, but is limited to an area of about 190 square kilometers. The 

[IJ] found that, although [Petitioner] had relocated numerous times 

within Accra, there had been some infiltration of the [Atwode] into 

Accra, and [Petitioner] had never attempted “to relocate elsewhere 

5

 Because reversal is required on the “safety” portion of the relocation inquiry alone, we 

have no need to consider the reasonableness of relocation.
10

within Ghana.” Thus, the [IJ] reasoned that [Petitioner] could safely 

and reasonably relocate to a part of the country where the [Atwode]

tribe is not in control. These findings are not clearly erroneous.

CAR 4 (citations omitted). The IJ had provided the following explanation:

The Court finds that internal relocation is both practically and 

legally reasonable. Primarily, [Petitioner] was not persecuted by the 

government or any other national entity. He was harmed by a local 

group from the Atwode tribe. However, he has not established 

through credible, direct, and specific evidence that the men who 

previously attacked him are willing, capable, and inclined to 

persecute him throughout Ghana. Further, there is no evidence that 

[Petitioner] has any recognition outside his neighborhood such that 

he would be unsafe anywhere in the country.

Second, the DHS provided evidence that there are areas within 

Ghana that are ethnically heterogeneous, meaning [Petitioner] would 

be able to resettle there without concern of persecution based on his 

ethnicity. Furthermore, members of [Petitioner’s] family continue to 

live relatively safely in Ghana. Although his parents have been 

targeted in Nkwanta, [his] sisters remain safely in Accra. Initially, 

[Petitioner] also relocated to Accra following the first attack; 

thereafter, he stated that he moved “from place to place,” within

Accra because the assailants continued to pursue him. Notably, 

however, [Petitioner] merely relocated within different 

neighborhoods of Accra without attempting to relocate elsewhere 

within Ghana. The DHS has provided evidence that demonstrates the 

tribe [Petitioner] fears, the Atwode, operate within “an area of about 

190 square kilometers covering a crescent-shaped chain of villages 

in the Nkwanta district, Volta Region, near the Togo Border.” Some

of the tribe’s members have also migrated to Accra. However, 

[Petitioner] testified that the Atwode are not so powerful that they 

control the entirety of Ghana. In fact, they are a relatively minor 

tribe, with only 15,000 members compared to other Ghanaian ethnic 

groups such as the Akan, who comprise 47.5% of the population, or 

the Mole-Dagbon, who constitute 16.6% of the population. Even in 

the Nkwanta district, the Atwode are a minority—the predominant 

groups are the Gurma (50%) and the Ewe (18%). [Petitioner] may

relocate to a place outside traditional Atwode control and remain 

safe, especially since he is no longer the heir apparent of the Challa 

tribe, which is purportedly why he was being persecuted.
11

CAR 43–44 (citations omitted).

The analysis of the IJ and BIA is flawed. To begin with, their reliance on the 

Atwode tribe’s small size and limited area of control is misplaced. After all, Petitioner 

fled Nkwanta to Accra—a city of over two million people located more than 200 miles 

from the Atwode’s traditional area of control around Nkwanta—yet the Atwode tracked 

him to separate addresses there on several occasions, once assaulting his wife and once

being the ones responsible (or so Petitioner could reasonably believe) for shooting into 

his bedroom. The Atwode’s small numbers and localized homeland does not prevent 

them from operating in parts of the country outside Nkwanta. It does not take many 

henchmen or control of any territory to assault a few members of one family.

In defense of the agency rulings, the government argues that Petitioner’s 

experiences in Accra have little bearing on whether circumstances for Petitioner would be

better in another part of the country, see M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 33, because––

unlike other parts of Ghana––Accra is a place where the Atwode have “presence or 

influence.” Aplee. Br. at 24. But it points to no evidence that supports this argument. 

The government fails to explain the character or extent of the Atwode’s purported 

influence, and none of the evidence submitted to the IJ by DHS suggests that they enjoy 

any influence in Ghana’s capital at all.

6

 To be sure, the government is correct that

6

 Petitioner testified before the IJ that he believed many of the security guards at the 

Accra airport are Atwode, which, if true, might suggest that the Atwode have some 

influence in Accra. But because the government asserts that this claim is mere 

“conjecture,” Aplee. Br. at 25 n.9, it cannot rely on Petitioner’s testimony as evidence of 

Atwode influence in Accra.
12

members of the Atwode tribe are present in the capital. Indeed, the profile of the Atwode 

submitted to the IJ by DHS states that “[s]ome [Atwode] migrate in search of salaried 

jobs and education, especially to Accra, Kumasi and the larger towns of the Volta 

region.” CAR 111. But even this evidence indicates that Atwode also migrate to other 

places in Ghana and states only that the named cities are “especially” common 

destinations. CAR 111. The government has offered no evidence that Atwode are not

present in other Ghanaian cities to which it would have Petitioner relocate. And more 

importantly, the government has no evidence linking the Atwode’s ability to track and 

threaten Petitioner in Accra with the “presence” of Atwode migrants in that city. The 

government has thus failed to satisfy its burden to show that Petitioner’s experience in 

Accra––where he apparently was tracked, threatened, and shot at by Atwode as he moved 

from address to address––could not be duplicated in other parts of Ghana.

In particular, the IJ, the BIA, and the government all fail to address adequately the 

threatening text messages sent by the Atwode. As described above, in 2014 after 

relocating his family to a new part of Accra, Petitioner received a text message telling 

him that the Atwode knew of his location and that “moving from place to place” would 

not save him. CAR 484. And in a 2016 text message the Atwode told Petitioner’s 

brother, “We are monitoring you and would locate you anywhere you go.” CAR 453. 

These text messages call into question the IJ’s perplexing statement that Petitioner “has 

not established . . . that the men who previously attacked [Petitioner] are willing, capable, 

and inclined to persecute him throughout Ghana.” CAR 43. (In any event, it was the 

government’s burden to establish a lack of danger to Petitioner, not Petitioner’s burden to 
13

show danger.) Yet neither the IJ nor the BIA even mentions these threats in their 

decisions, nor does the government address them in its brief. Without any explanation of 

why the text messages can be ignored, and with no evidence suggesting that Petitioner’s 

experience in Accra would be unique, the conclusion that the Atwode could not or would 

not harm Petitioner in the “vast areas of Ghana beyond Accra and the Nkwanta District,”

Aplee. Br. at 24, finds no support in the record. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 

1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2020) (disagreeing with the BIA’s conclusion in a CAT case that the 

applicant could safely relocate within Mexico in part because “[n]either the IJ nor the 

BIA cited any evidence that there are states in Mexico where Los Zetas are unable to 

operate”). Cardenas v. I.N.S., 294 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2002) (asylum 

applicant’s receipt of “a direct threat . . . in which [his persecutors] informed him that 

[they] would get to him wherever he was located,” suggested that the applicant could not 

safely relocate in the country). 

The remaining reasons offered by the BIA and the IJ in support of their decisions 

are even less persuasive. First, the letter from the researcher at the Library of Congress 

states only that the researcher found nothing indicating that there would be a legal 

impediment to Petitioner’s relocating in Ghana. That letter is irrelevant to the risk 

presented by the Atwode, who likewise are unrestricted in searching for Petitioner within 

the country. See Xochihua-Jaimes, 962 F.3d at 1187. Also, the IJ supported his decision 

by noting that “there are areas within Ghana that are ethnically heterogeneous, meaning 

[Petitioner] would be able to resettle there without concern of persecution based on his 

ethnicity.” CAR 44. But Petitioner was in danger because of his position within his 
14

family, not just his ethnicity. Besides, both Accra and Nkwanta are also “ethnically 

heterogeneous,” yet the Atwode attacked Petitioner in both those locations. Living in an 

“ethnically heterogeneous” location did not protect Petitioner before, and there is no 

evidence that it would in the future. 

The IJ also supported his decision with the observation that “there is no evidence 

that [Petitioner] has any recognition outside his neighborhood such that he would be 

unsafe anywhere in the country.” IJ Op. at 2–3. But Petitioner did not need to be 

recognized by the local population to be in danger. Although Petitioner moved 200 miles

from his hometown of Nkwanta to Accra, a city of 2.3 million people, and relocated 

several times within that city, the Atwode were apparently able to track him down after 

each move. The risk to Petitioner was not that bigoted locals would recognize him as a 

member of a despised ethnic group; his danger arose from another group’s determined 

(and partially successful) targeting of the men in his family, which did not depend on 

local recognition.

Next, as the BIA noted, the IJ appears to have faulted Petitioner for “never 

attempt[ing] ‘to relocate elsewhere within Ghana.’” CAR 4 (quoting CAR 44). But 

“[t]he [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services] Asylum Office has [itself] 

emphasized that ‘[t]here is no requirement that an applicant first attempt to relocate in his 

or her country before flight.’” Law of Asylum in the United States § 2:22 at 3 (2020 ed.)

(citing Combined Training Course, Well-Founded Fear, REFUGEE, ASYLUM, AND 

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, at 28 (Jan. 17, 2019), available at 

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/Well_Founded_Fear_LP_
15

RAIO.pdf [perma.cc/RD44-M4V7]); see also Xochihua-Jaimes, 962 F.3d at 1182, 1186

(concluding that “[n]either the IJ nor the BIA cited any affirmative [e]vidence that [the

petitioner] could relocate” even where the BIA relied on “the lack of any attempt to 

relocate” by the petitioner). And, of course, after moving from Nkwanta to Accra, 

Petitioner did relocate several times within Accra in an unsuccessful effort to evade the 

Atwode. “[T]he purpose of the relocation rule is not to require an applicant to stay one 

step ahead of persecution.” M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33.

The IJ’s reliance on the fact that Petitioner “is no longer the heir apparent of the 

Challa tribe,” CAR 44, is likewise unreasonable. Petitioner relinquished his right to 

inherit the chiefdom in 2012, but between that time and when he fled the country in 2017,

the Atwode attacked his wife, burned down his house in Nkwanta, sent him death threats, 

and (Petitioner could reasonably infer) attempted to kill him by shooting into his 

bedroom. Also, the Atwode assassinated Petitioner’s uncle and attacked Petitioner’s 

brothers, none of whom were in the line of succession. The IJ may have viewed 

Petitioner’s abandonment of the right of succession as significant, but the Atwode 

evidently did not. 

Finally, the IJ thought it important that “members of [Petitioner’s] family continue 

to live relatively safely in Ghana. Although his parents have been targeted in Nkwanta, 

[Petitioner’s] sisters remain safely in Accra.” CAR 44. But gender equality did not 

appear to be a priority of the Atwode. They focused on the male members of Petitioner’s 

family—Petitioner himself, his father, his uncle, and his brothers. The safety of his 
16

sisters has little probative value, particularly when their experience in Accra has been so 

different from his. 

On this record we think it was unreasonable for the BIA and the IJ to decide that 

the government successfully rebutted the presumption that Petitioner has a well-founded 

fear of future persecution in Ghana. Their finding that Petitioner could safely relocate 

within Ghana is not supported by substantial evidence. See Arboleda v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 

434 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that relocation “would not successfully 

shield [an asylum applicant from] persecution” because, although the applicant “relocated 

from his farm . . . to the capital city,” “the [persecutors] continued to threaten [the

applicant] and his family . . . , [including through] frequent notes and telephone calls 

detailing the family’s activities and threatening them with death,” and by “burning down 

[the applicant’s] farm house”). 

C. Withholding of Removal

To qualify for withholding of removal, a noncitizen must make a showing similar 

to that required for an asylum claim. The applicant must “establish that his or her life or 

freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). And if it is determined that the applicant suffered past persecution 

on account of one of the protected grounds, “it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life 

or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of removal on [that] basis,” 

although the presumption can be rebutted by showing that the applicant could reasonably 

avoid the threat by relocating internally. See id. § 208.16(b)(1)(i); Rodas-Orellana v. 
17

Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 2015) (describing similar requirements for claims

for asylum and withholding of removal). But to qualify for withholding of removal,

applicants “must prove a clear probability of persecution on account of a protected 

ground,” a higher standard than the “reasonable possibility” showing necessary for 

asylum claims. Id. at 986–87 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Relying on this higher standard, the IJ reasoned that because Petitioner had “failed to 

prove that he warrants a grant of asylum, . . . it necessarily follows that he has likewise 

failed to meet the . . . burden of proving that he warrants a grant of withholding of 

removal.” CAR 45. Since we reverse the BIA’s decision on Petitioner’s asylum claim,

we must also reverse and remand to the BIA the withholding-of-removal claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

We GRANT the petition for review, REVERSE the BIA’s decision on 

Petitioner’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims, and REMAND to the BIA for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also GRANT Petitioner’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis.