[Cite as State v. Elkins, 2017-Ohio-5554.]

stCOURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsAARON BRADY ELKINS 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Case Nos. 2016 CA 00191 and 

 2016 CA 00195 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Alliance Municipal 

Court, Case Nos. 2016 CRB 698 and 2016 

TRC 01157 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 26, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CAITLYN R. SCHNEIDER JEFFREY R. JAKMIDES 

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR 325 East Main Street 

470 East Market Street Alliance, Ohio 44601 

Alliance, Ohio 44601 

 EDWARD J.MACK 

 TZANGAS, PLAKAS & MANNOS 

 220 Market Avenue South, 8th Floor 

 Canton, Ohio 44702 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 2

Wise, John, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Aaron Brady Elkins appeals his conviction and sentence for 

Underage Consumption, OVI (breath), and Turning at Intersections following a plea of no 

contest in the Alliance Municipal Court. 

{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

{¶3} This matter arises from a traffic stop which resulted in Appellant Aaron 

Brady Elkins being charged with violations of Alliance Codified Ordinance 313.04 Lane 

Use Control Signals Over Individual Lanes, and Ohio Revised Code §4511.19(A)(1)(d) 

OVI and §4511.19(A)(1)(a) OVI. (Supp. T. at 8-9, 14). Appellant was also charged with 

Underage Consumption under a different case number. Id. All of the charges arose as a 

result of a traffic stop that occurred in the City of Alliance, Stark County, Ohio, on April 

24, 2016. Id. 

{¶4} On the evening of April 24, 2016, Officer Christian Tussey was working as 

the OVI grant officer in the City of Alliance and observed Appellant enter the Taco Bell 

parking lot in what he considered to be beyond a reasonable rate of speed and then make 

contact with a cement barrier in that parking lot. Officer Tussey testified at a suppression 

hearing that he considered these actions to be reckless, therefore he watched the vehicle. 

He noticed that no one exited the vehicle and, after a short while, the vehicle pulled out 

of the parking lot and went around the business to get to State Street, rather than simply 

exiting directly from the parking lot to get to that same street. Officer Tussey then 

observed Appellant make a left-hand turn onto State Street where, instead of sticking to 

the inside lane, he drove directly to the outside lane of travel without signaling a lane 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 3

change. Officer Tussey testified that from his understanding of the law, motorists making 

a left-hand turn onto a four-lane road need to remain in the inside lane and then use the 

appropriate signal to merge into the curb lane. 

{¶5} Officer Tussey initially cited Appellant with a violation of Alliance City 

Ordinance 313.04 Lane-Use Control Signals. This section relates to traffic control signal 

indications and permitted lane travel. 

{¶6} Appellant was arraigned on April 27, 2016. 

{¶7} On June 22, 2016, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress and Dismiss. 

{¶8} On July 20, 2016, a hearing was held on said motion. 

{¶9} At the commencement of the suppression hearing, the prosecutor made a 

preliminary motion to amend the charge that was the subject of the hearing. Her motion 

asked the court to amend the charge from Alliance City Ordinance 313.04 to Alliance City 

Ordinance 331.14 Signals Before Changing Course, Turning Or Stopping. (Supp. T. at 

7). 

{¶10} No objection was lodged by defense counsel, and the motion was granted 

by the trial court. 

{¶11} Officer Tussey testified at the suppression hearing that the basis for his stop 

was his belief that Mr. Elkins failed to properly signal where required (Supp. T. at 13-14). 

{¶12} During the suppression hearing, there were numerous remarks from both 

the prosecutor and the police officer regarding rules for changing lanes in a turn. It is not 

clear from the record whether Officer Tussey understood that there was a city ordinance 

dealing with this aspect of traffic law, but it is clear that he initiated the traffic stop and 

wrote his citation for an alleged failure to use turn signals. (Supp. T. at 14). 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 4

{¶13} Near the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court made a remark to 

both parties referencing another section of the Alliance Codified Ordinances which he 

stated might also be relevant to the matter. He stated: 

Alright. And the basis of the ticket is he didn't signal a lane change. 

Mr. Jakmides has cited that in his brief and you've argued that before the 

Court. The Court is going to take the matter under advisement, but I would 

ask you all to have a quick look at Three Thirty-One One Oh. If anyone 

wants to submit any supplemental arguments for the Court, take that into 

consideration as well I'm gonna spend some time tomorrow, hopefully 

drafting up a decision by the Court. Okay. Anything else, Madam 

Prosecutor? (Supp. T. at 20-21). 

{¶14} By Judgment Entry filed August 18, 2016, the trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion to suppress, stating: 

For purposes of clarity, the Court does not find sufficient reasonable 

articulable suspicion for the cited violation of A.C.O. 313.04 or the amended 

citation of A.C.O. 331.14. Nevertheless, although the officer cited the wrong 

code section, the officer’s stop of the Defendant’s vehicle was proper. The 

Court also notes that the State has, after the conclusion of the hearing, filed 

a second motion to amend the citation to be a violation of A.C.O. 331.10. 

This second motion to amend will be taken under consideration for review 

at the next pretrial. (August 18, 2016, Judgment Entry at 5-6). 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 5

{¶15} The State’s second Motion to Amend was filed on August 18, 2016. 

According to the time-stamps, the motion to amend was filed immediately after the trial 

court’s judgment entry, with both reflecting a 10:04 a.m. time-stamp. 

{¶16} On September 21, 2016, another pre-trial was held. At this time, the second 

Motion to Amend filed by the State of Ohio was granted. On this day, Appellant entered 

a plea of no contest to Underage Consumption, OVI (breath), and Turning at Intersections 

Additionally, Appellant preserved his right to appeal the Court's ruling on the Motion to 

Suppress. (Plea T. at 5). 

{¶17} It is from this conviction and sentence Appellant now appeals, raising the 

following errors for review: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶18} “I. THE STATE OF OHIO DID NOT ESTABLISH THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS 

SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION BECAUSE UNDER 

ALLIANCE CODIFIED ORDINANCE 331.10(A)(2), THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO 

SHOW THAT IT WAS PRACTICABLE FOR APPELLANT TO TURN INTO THE CENTER 

LANE RATHER THAN THE CURB LANE, DESPITE HIS NEAR IMMEDIATE RIGHT 

TURN. 

{¶19} “II. AS INDICATED IN THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGEMENT ENTRY, 

NEITHER THE ORIGINAL NOR THE FIRST AMENDED CHARGE SUPPORTED A 

FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CHARGE WOULD BE 

AMENDED ERRONEOUSLY RELIED ON AN AMENDMENT THAT HAD NOT YET 

BEEN FILED WHEN THE JUDGEMENT ENTRY WAS WRITTEN, AND HAS THE 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 6

APPEARANCE OF COMING AS A RESULT OF THE SUGGESTION OF THE TRIAL 

COURT JUDGE AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING.” 

I., II. 

{¶20} In his Two Assignments of Error, Appellant claims the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress and finding that he did not have standing to challenge the 

warrantless search of his vehicle. We disagree. 

Standard of Review

{¶21} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In 

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said 

findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 

1 Ohio St.3d 19; State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 485; State v. Guysinger (1993), 

86 Ohio App.3d 592. Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the 

appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can 

reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio 

App.3d 37. Finally, assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and it has properly identified the law to be applied, an appellant 

may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the 

motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must 

independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the 

facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry (1994), 95 

Ohio App.3d 93; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623; Guysinger. As the United 

States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S. (1996), 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, "...as a 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 7

general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be 

reviewed de novo on appeal." 

The Traffic Stop

{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that probable cause is not 

required to make a traffic stop; rather, the standard is reasonable and articulable 

suspicion. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4358, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. 

Reasonable suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause. State v. Carlson

(1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 590. The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed 

in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 

paragraph one of the syllabus. In a situation where the officer has observed a traffic 

violation, the stop is constitutionally valid. Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 9, 

665 N.E.2d 1091. In sum, “ ‘ * * * if an officer's decision to stop a motorist for a criminal 

violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.’ ” State 

v. Adams, 5th Dist. Licking No. 15 CA 6, 2015–Ohio–3786, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Mays,

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 894 N.E.2d 1204, 2008–Ohio–4539, ¶ 8. Further, neither the United 

States Supreme Court nor the Ohio Supreme Court considered the severity of the offense 

as a factor in determining whether the law enforcement official had a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion to stop a motorist. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 

1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 

1091 (1996). 

{¶23} In the case at bar, the record establishes Officer Tussey first observed 

Appellant pull in to the Taco Bell parking lot at a high rate of speed, strike a concrete 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 8

barrier, sit in his car in the parking lot without ever exiting the vehicle, circle the building, 

and then make a wide left turn onto State Street into the curb lane, rather than the inside 

lane. The officer testified that he believed the wide turn onto State Street was a violation 

of Alliance City Ordinance 331.14 Signals Before Changing Course, Turning or Stopping, 

(initially cited improperly as ACO 313.04). 

{¶24} Alliance City Ordinance 331.14 SIGNALS BEFORE CHANGING COURSE, 

TURNING OR STOPPING, reads: 

(a) No person shall tum a vehicle or move right or left upon a highway 

unless and until such person has exercised due care to ascertain that the 

movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 

appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided. When required, a 

signal of intention to turn or move right or left shall be given continuously 

during not less than the last l 00 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 

{¶25} It is well-established that an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion does 

not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct has satisfied 

the elements of the offense. State v. Willis, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 103, 2015–Ohio–

3739, ¶ 25, citing Westlake v. Kaplysh, 118 Ohio App.3d 18, 20, 691 N.E.2d 1074 (8th 

Dist.1997) 

{¶26} Based on the above facts, the trial court found that the officer had a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Appellant. The judge is in the best position to 

determine the credibility of witnesses, and his conclusion in this case is supported by 

competent facts. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-55, 797 N.E.2d 71, 74 

(2003). The fundamental rule that weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 9

primarily for the trier of fact applies to suppression hearings as well as trials. State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584 (1982). 

{¶27} The officer’s testimony represents competent, credible evidence that 

Appellant had committed traffic violations, albeit not the one mistakenly cited by the officer 

or as amended by the prosecutor. Therefore, the factual finding of the trial court is not 

clearly erroneous. 

{¶28} We accept the trial court's conclusion that the officer’s belief that Appellant 

had committed a violation of the traffic laws gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop 

Appellant’s vehicle because the factual findings made by the trial court are supported by 

competent and credible evidence. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied 

Appellant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the initial stop of his vehicle was valid. 

State v. Busse, 5th Dist. No. 06 CA 65, 2006-Ohio-7047, ¶ 20. 

{¶29} We further find, upon review of the trial court’s judgment entry, that the trial 

court does not state that its decision is based on an amendment of the citation or an 

assumption that the citation would be amended. Rather, the decision was based on the 

facts as set forth above. The actual language in the entry notes that the State had filed a 

second motion to amend the charge and that such would be taken into consideration at 

the next pretrial. 

{¶30} While we cannot explain why the motion to amend is time-stamped after the 

trial court’s judgment entry, we do not find same to be significant to our determination of 

the issues in this appeal. 

 
Stark County, Case No. 2016 CA 00191 and 2016 CA 00195 10

{¶31} Accordingly, Appellant’s Assignments of Error are overruled. 

{¶32} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Alliance 

Municipal Court, Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By: Wise, John, J. 

Gwin, P. J., and 

Hoffman, J., concur. 

JWW/d 0616