THE CITY OF HARVEY,				)	Appeal from the 

							)	Circuit Court of

		Plaintiff-Appellant,	)	Cook County.

							)

	v.						)

							)	No.  00 CH 15907

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,		)	

COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	)

(AFSCME), COUNCIL 31, LOCAL 2404,	)	Honorable

							)	Richard A. Siebel,

		Defendant-Appellee.		) 	Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

	The appellant, the City of Harvey (Harvey), appeals the

trial court's order which granted the defendant's, American

Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),

Council 31, Local 2404 (Union), motion to confirm an arbitration

award.  On appeal, Harvey maintains the trial court erred because

the arbitration award: (1) should be vacated on the grounds that

the arbitrator did not have proper jurisdiction over the matter,

and (2) violated public policy which mandates that an employer

provide a safe workplace for its employees and eliminate known

dangers.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of

the trial court.

BACKGROUND

	This matter involves a Harvey employee who was terminated

following an incident in which he allegedly made threatening

remarks to his supervisor.  The employee was a member of the

Union.  The Union and Harvey were parties to a collective bargain

agreement which governed the employee's employment.  An expedited grievance was filed on the employee's behalf protesting the

discharge, and the dispute was arbitrated pursuant to the

collective bargainingcollective-bargaining agreement.  At the arbitration hearing,

Harvey raised a procedural and substantive issue regarding the

form and content of the grievance.  After hearing the dispute,

the arbitrator found that the employee was removed without just

cause.  Harvey subsequently filed suit in the circuit court of

Cook County and moved to have the arbitrator's award vacated. 

The Union responded to the suit and moved to confirm the

arbitrator's award.  The trial court denied Harvey's motion and

confirmed the arbitration award.  Harvey now appeals the trial

court's decision confirming the arbitration award.

THE FACTS

	The grievant, Dale Stokes, was employed by Harvey, which is

a municipality in southern Cook County, Illinois.  Stokes was

first employed as a laborer for Harvey's street department in

1986.  During his employment and at the time of his discharge,

Stokes was a member of the Union.  Harvey and the Union were

parties to a collective bargainingcollective-bargaining agreement (CBA) that governed

the terms and conditions of employment for certain Harvey

employees, such as Stokes.

	On September 30, 1999, while Stokes was at work, a

fluorescent lightbulb burst, releasing filaments that

precipitated him having an asthma attack.  Stokes informed his supervisor, Russell Knaack, of the situation and requested

permission to go to nearby Ingalls Memorial Hospital (Ingalls

Hospital) because he was having trouble breathing.  Knaack

granted Stokes permission and asked him if he needed a ride to

the hospital.  Stokes told Knaack that he did not because his

mother was coming to pick him up.

	Later while at Ingalls Hospital, Stokes, who was concerned

about whether worker's compensation would cover his medical

expenses, requested that hospital staff members telephone Knaack

to seek approval for the hospital visit under worker's

compensation.  The hospital staff made two telephone calls to

Knaack, and each time, Knaack informed the hospital staff members

that he would not give such approval, instead telling the

hospital staff members that they should call Harvey's city hall

to seek such approval.  

	Consequently, Stokes asked his mother, Pauline Stokes (Mrs.

Stokes), to go and speak with Knaack personally to clear up the

matter.  Mrs. Stokes went to the street department facility and

had a discussion with Knaack.  There are two rather different

versions of the content of this conversation that came out at the

arbitration hearing.

	Mrs. Stokes testified that during the meeting she asked

Knaack why her son's visit to the hospital was not covered by

worker's compensation.  Mrs. Stokes said that Knaack responded in an outburst by saying, "It's not job related and I'm not gonna

okay it.  If you want to get it okayed, call the mayor."  When

asked, "What do you mean in an outburst?"  Mrs. Stokes replied,

"He just screamed out.  You know, hollered out and says, 'I'm not

gonna do it, I'm not gonna do it.  If you want to, call the

mayor.  I'm not going to do it.'  And he said, 'It's dust all

over the world.'"

	Knaack denied making these comments to Mrs. Stokes.  Knaack

testified that he simply replied that the hospital visit was not

covered under worker's compensation and then turned and walked

away from Mrs. Stokes.

	Mrs. Stokes' testimony concerning what occurred next

follows: "I says, 'well, I'm not a child.'  And I walked away.  I

said, 'I'm 73 years old.  And I stood there for a minute because

I was upset.  And then I said, 'Well, what do you have to do, die

on this darn job?'  And I walked out.  That was it."

	Mrs. Stokes returned to the hospital and told Stokes about

her meeting with Knaack.  Stokes stayed at the hospital receiving

treatment and medication until 2 p.m., at which time Stokes left

and returned to work to fill out a report for worker's

compensation.

	The arbitrator's recitation of Knaack's testimony concerning

the next sequence of events follows:

		"At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Stokes came walking into the shop.  He was walking rather

briskly and hollered something which Knaack could not

make out.  He walked toward Stokes and Stokes walked

toward him.  Knaack asked Stokes 'What did you say? 

Stokes said, 'After work, you and I are going out in

the salt bin.' (Upon being questioned further, Knaack

said [the salt bin is] a place in the Street Department

where employees go to physically settle their

differences, to fight.)  With that Knaack said, 'Are

you threatening me?'  

		At that point, Knaack testified: 	'He ran right up

to me, he bumped into me, and he says "if you ever

disrespect my mother again, I'm going to kill you." 

And he was right in my face and he bumped into me.  I

kind of stepped –- or I went back a little, and I put

my left arm up for some separation between him and I. 

And at that point, another employee, Cleo Thurman,

grabbed him and picked him up and apparently carried

him back to the parts room.'

		Knaack continued his testimony, saying he went

back to his office and asked a secretary to call the

police and told her [of] the problem.  As he walked

back to the bench, past the parts room, he saw that

Thurman still had a hold of Stokes, had him up in the air.  As he went by, he heard Stokes say, 'I'm going to

kill that motherfucker.'"

	Stokes denied ever threatening Knaack.  Stokes did admit to

telling Knaack that he didn't like Knaack disrespecting his

mother.  Stokes also testified that Knaack bumped into him, and

he responded by saying, "Russ, don't push me."  After asking

Knaack not to push him for the second time, Stokes said, it was

at that point that Cleo Thurman came and separated the two men. 

Stokes also testified that he remained in the parts room for

approximately 10 to 15 minutes until he calmed down.

	On October 1, 1999, Knaack attempted to conduct a

preliminary hearing with Stokes as required by the CBA.  Stokes

refused to attend the meeting and also refused to sign a

predisciplinary form.  Knaack subsequently issued a 29-day

suspension to Stokes.  On October 1, 1999, Knaack also wrote a

memorandum to the mayor of Harvey, wherein he recommended that

Stokes be discharged.  On October 11, 1999, Harvey terminated

Stoke's employment.

	Stokes was later arrested and charged with battery, assault

and disorderly conduct as a result of the incident.  A trial was

held on January 25, 2000, and Stokes was found not guilty on all

charges.

	On October 15, 1999, Stokes and the Union filed a grievance. 

Harvey responded to the grievance, maintaining the document that Stokes submitted did not constitute a valid grievance.  On June

22, 2000, the parties participated in an arbitration hearing

before George Squillacote.  On August 30, 2000, Squillacote

issued his findings.  

	Initially, Squillacote decided that he had proper

jurisdiction over the matter.  Squillacote's findings as to

jurisdiction follow:

		"A look at the grievance will show one omission-

–it does not specifically state what is being grieved. 

The city argues that this is a fatal flaw leading to

the lack or arbitrability.  However, I would find that

under the circumstances here, it was clear what the

grievance concerned.  The grievance was filed by Stokes

just four days after his discharge.  What else could it

concern but that discharge?  And obviously, it relates

to the just cause provision of the CBA.  Also, Stokes

filed the grievance at Step 3, pursuant to the

'Expedited Procedures' article of the CBA and the

grievance specifically indicates it is being filed at

Step 3.  Thus, he did not have to use the form referred

to in the CBA for Step 2 grievances.  And that also

shows the grievance concerned Stoke's discharge–-as

discharges are permitted to be filed at Step 3.

		Accordingly, I find that a proper grievance was filed here–and timely filed–-and accordingly the matter

is arbitrable."

	Squillacote then went on to find that Stokes had been

terminated without just cause.  Harvey was ordered to allow

Stokes to return to work.  However, Stokes did not receive back

pay and was ordered to serve a 60-day suspension.

	 On November 2, 2000, Harvey filed a complaint pursuant to

the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2000)) as authorized by section 8 of the Illinois Public Labor

Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/8 (West 2000)) to vacate the

arbitration award.  The Union then filed a motion to confirm the

arbitration award.  On February 14, 2001, Harvey filed a motion

to vacate the arbitration award in response to the Union's

motion.  The Union filed a reply to Harvey's response.  On March

15, 2001, the trial court entered an order that granted the

Union's motion to confirm the arbitration award and denied

Harvey's motion to vacate the arbitration award.  On April, 11,

2001, Harvey timely filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I

	Harvey contends the trial court erred when it granted the

Union's motion to confirm the arbitration award.  Harvey

maintains the arbitrator did not have proper jurisdiction to rule

on the matter because Stokes failed to follow the proper procedures when he filed his grievance form.  Specifically,

Harvey argues that Stoke's grievance failed to set forth the

reason for the grievance as required by the CBA, and

consequently, the trial court should have vacated the

arbitrator's decision.

	The section of the CBA that details what a grievance should

contain follows:

	"Step 3

		If the grievance is not settled at Step 2, and the grievant or the Union wishes to appeal the decision to

Step 3, it shall be submitted to the Mayor and/or his designee with ten (10) business days after receipt of

the response at Step 2, or when a response should have been received at Step 2.  The grievance shall set forth the facts and circumstances and shall state the reason

for believing that the grievance was improperly denied

at Step 2.  The Mayor and/or his designee shall then investigate the grievance, and may hold a meeting with

the parties involved in the grievance at a reasonably

convenient time within ten (10) business day after

receiving the grievance.  The Mayor and/or his designee

shall then respond to the grievance, in writing, within

ten (10) business days after conducting such meeting. 

If the grievance is denied, or if no response is received, the Union may proceed to arbitration."

(Emphasis added.)

	Initially, the Union argues that Stokes filed his grievance

under the expedited procedures provision of the CBA and, as such,

was not required to state the nature of the grievance as required

under step 2 of the CBA.  In support of its argument, the Union

cites section B of the CBA, which follows:

		"Section B.  Expedited Procedures.  The Union may initiate grievances concerning discharges, suspensions

of more than five (5) days and denial of promotions at

the third step of the grievance procedure.  Whenever

practicable, such grievances unresolved at the third

step meeting shall be scheduled for arbitration within

sixty (60) days of the third step meeting."

	Also, the Union argues that there are no provisions in the

CBA which provide that a grievance which fails to state that

which is being grieved is defective and hence deprives the

arbitrator of jurisdiction.  The Union points to the fact that

the CBA does not specify the effect or remedy for a procedural

defect in a grievance.  In support of its argument, the Union

quotes language from Article VII of section D of the CBA to

illustrate the CBA's silence with respect to the effect of a

procedural defect in a grievance.  Article VII, section D of the

CBA states:  

		"Section D. Limitations.  Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring the Union to

process an unmeritorious grievance.  The term 'business

days' shall mean weekdays, Monday through Friday,

exclusive of holidays.  The parties may agree to an

extension of any time limits provided that such

agreement is in writing and signed by a representative

of each party.  If the Union fails to process a

grievance within the required time limits, the

grievance shall be considered withdrawn.  If the City

fails to respond to a grievance within the required

time limit, the Union may regard the grievance as being

denied and proceed to the next step.  An arbitrator

shall have no authority to: amend, modify, nullify,

ignore, add to or subtract from this Agreement; or

decide cases subject to Civil Service Commission

jurisdiction except as set forth in Section D.  Cases

involving oral reprimands may be processed through the

grievance procedure but shall not be taken to

arbitration."

	Lastly, the Union asserts that this type of procedural issue

is not jurisdictional but is rather within the exclusive and

unreviewable authority of the arbitrator. 	

	"This court has consistently recognized that the judicial review of an arbitral award is extremely limited.  [Citations.]

This standard reflects the legislature's intent in enacting the

Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act--to provide finality for labor

disputes submitted to arbitration.  See 710 ILCS 5/12 (West 1994)

(denying judicial authority to vacate arbitral awards except on

grounds recognized at common law).  The Act contemplates judicial

disturbance of an award only in instances of fraud, corruption,

partiality, misconduct, mistake, or failure to submit the

question to arbitration.  [Citation.]  Thus, a court is duty

bound to enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator acts

within the scope of his or her authority and the award draws its

essence from the parties' collective-bargaining agreement.

[Citation.]

	To this end, any question regarding the interpretation of a

collective-bargaining agreement is to be answered by the

arbitrator.  Because the parties have contracted to have their

disputes settled by an arbitrator, rather than by a judge, it is

the arbitrator's view of the meaning of the contract that the

parties have agreed to accept.  We will not overrule that

construction merely because our own interpretation differs from

that of the arbitrator.  [Citation.]"  American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central

Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304-05 (1996).

	In Board of Education of Posen-Robbins School District No. 1431⁄2, Cook County v. Daniels, 108 Ill. App. 3d 550 (1982), an action was instituted by a school board for a declaratory

judgment to vacate an arbitration award on a salary freeze

dispute with the union representing teachers.  The school board

decided to impose a sanction against teachers for failing to

pursue additional academic training as required by the

collective

bargainingcollective-bargaining agreement.  The teachers filed a grievance

and the matter went to arbitration.  The school board announced

its decision to pose a sanction in August 1978, and the teachers

filed their grievances in June 1979.  One disputed issue that

arose during the arbitration was the timeliness of the filing of

the grievances.  The collective bargainingcollective-bargaining agreement stated:

	"The aggrieved teacher shall file the grievance in

writing and at a mutually agreeable time, discuss the

matter with the principal in the presence of a Union

representative, if so desired, with the objective of

resolving the matter.  The filing of the grievance at

the first stage must be within five (5) school days of

the aggrieved becoming aware of the grievances."  108

Ill. App. 3d at 555.

	As to the timeliness of the grievances, the arbitrator found

that although the official grievances were not formally filed

until June 1979, the Board was aware of the existence of the

grievances from the time it began to implement its decision to sanction the teachers in the fall of 1978.  In making its

finding, the Daniels court wrote:

		"Questions involving contractual time limitations

are for the arbitrators, not the courts to decide. 

[Citation.]  Such decisions usually require construing

the contract in light of the customs and practices of

the industry, a task peculiarly within the competence

of the arbitrator.  [Citation.]  Moreover, since the

parties have bargained for the arbitrator's

construction of the agreement, the courts will not

overrule the arbitrator's decision because their

interpretation is different from that of the

arbitrator.  [Citation.]  In the present case we find

that the arbitrator's decision as to timeliness did not

constitute a manifest disregard of the agreement

between the parties so as to justify our overruling

it."  Daniels, 108 Ill.  App. 3d at 555-56.

	Here, although timeliness is not the issue, we find that

this situation mirrors that in Daniels.  Here, Stokes' grievance form clearly indicates that it is being filed at step 3 of the

grievance process.  Under the CBA, it appears that a grievant

must set forth that which is being grieved during step 2. 

Questions regarding the interpretation of a collective-bargaining

agreement are to be answered by the arbitrator.  Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d at 305.  Here, the arbitrator's decision went to the interpretation of the CBA.  We

find that his decision was within the scope of his authority and

the award draws its essence from the parties' collective-

bargaining agreement.  As such, we find that the trial court's

decision was proper.

II

	Next, Harvey argues that the trial court erred because the

arbitrator's award violates public policy.  Harvey contends the

arbitration award violates Illinois public policy, which mandates

that an employer provide a safe workplace for its employees and

eliminate known dangers.  In particular, Harvey asserts Stokes'

reinstatement would create an unsafe workplace at Harvey's street

department and, as such, the arbitrator's decision should be

vacated.

	The Union asserts that the arbitration decision does not

violate Illinois public policy.  The Union argues that the

arbitrator's decision is correct because the arbitrator took into

consideration Stokes' employment history and concluded that

Stokes would pose no future risk of harm and also issued Stokes a

60-day suspension to impress upon Stokes the seriousness of his

actions.  We agree with the Union's position on this issue.

	"Courts have crafted a public policy exception to vacate

arbitral awards which otherwise derive their essence from a collective-bargaining agreement.  The historical context of the

exception is grounded in the common law.  As with any contract, a

court will not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is

repugnant to established norms of public policy.  Likewise, we

may not ignore the same public policy concerns when they are

undermined through the process of arbitration.  [Citation.]

	However, in order to vacate an arbitral award upon these

grounds, the contract, as interpreted by the arbitrator, must

violate some explicit public policy.  [Citations.]  In this

respect, the exception is a narrow one and is invoked only when a

contravention of public policy is clearly shown.  [Citations.] 

Moreover, the public policy must be 'well-defined and dominant'

and ascertainable 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents

and not from generalized considerations of supposed public

interests.'  [Citation.]  This court has stated that it will look

to our 'constitution and *** statutes, and when cases arise

concerning matters upon which they are silent, then in its

judicial decisions and the constant practice of the government

officials' when determining questions regarding public policy.

[Citation.]

	Thus, application of the public policy exception requires a

two-step analysis.  The threshold question is whether a

well-defined and dominant public policy can be identified.  If

so, the court must determine whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in his interpretation of the agreement, violated the

public policy."  AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 306-08.

	Harvey maintains two sources from which this court can

identify Illinois public policy favoring the safety of employees

in the workplace: (1) the Illinois Health and Safety Act (820

ILCS 225/1 et seq. (West 2000)) and (2) Illinois case law, which recognizes a cause of action for negligent retention of an

employee, i.e., Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299 (1998).  We agree.

	Next, Harvey argues the arbitrator's findings indicate that

Stokes is a danger in the workplace because he engaged in abusive

and violent conduct toward his supervisor.  Harvey maintains

that, Stokes is a violent person and that his reinstatement would

create a dangerous work environment and violate Illinois public

policy.  The findings of the arbitrator follow:

		"I find that Stokes made the threats to Knaack as

alleged in Knaack's testimony.  First, I find he said

to Knaack: 'If you ever disrespect my mother again, I'm

going to kill you.'  I find that as Thurman was holding

Stokes, and Knaack passed by, Stokes said, 'I'm going

to kill that motherfucker –- and Knaack heard him say

it.  I cannot find that Stokes knew Knaack was passing

by and said it for[] him to hear.  I also find that

Stokes, at the beginning of this conflict period, did say to Knaack, 'After work, you and I are going out in

the salt bin."

	To support its argument, Harvey cited County of De Witt v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,

Council 31, 291 Ill. App. 3d 634 (1998).  In De Witt, a county brought an action to vacate an arbitration award that ordered the

reinstatement of a nursing home employee who had been discharged

for striking an elderly resident.  The county argued that the

award of reinstatement was against public policy.  

	A witness's description of the incident follows:

		"Winstead [discharged employee] grabbed the glass

from Tatham's [elderly resident] hand, hit her on the

side of her head, and slammed the glass down in front

of the other resident.  The hit caused Tatham's head to

move a little bit, but Zook [witness] did not think the

hit was hard enough to leave a mark.  De Witt, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 635.

	The De Witt court found that the award was against public policy and wrote:	

		"[t]he arbitrator's determination that Winstead

posed no threat for future abuse had no rational basis. 

In previous cases where an arbitrator found that the

employees could be trusted to refrain from future

misconduct, the employees did not deny their wrongdoing and were still punished in some way.  Here, Winstead

has stubbornly denied touching Tatham, even in the face

of overwhelming evidence that she did, in fact, strike

her.  We are also concerned that some of the other Home

employees may be covering up for her.  Certainly, this

is no clear indication that such an incident will not

happen again.

		Also, the arbitrator awarded complete

reinstatement to Winstead, without the slightest

reprimand for her behavior.  Thus, he did not take any

precautionary steps to deter future misconduct or to

ensure it will not be repeated.  [Citation.]  If

anything, the arbitrator's award encourages misconduct

because it prevents nursing homes from terminating

abusive employees unless it is proved the abuse is

repetitive or results in physical injury.  The

arbitrator's award does not in any way promote the

welfare and protection of the elderly and violates

public pol47icy."  De Witt, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 639.	

	This matter can be distinguished from the De Witt case.  Here, Stokes did not strike his employer.  Instead, Stokes

threatened his employer, and the arbitrator found that he did not

think that this behavior would reoccur because of the "special

circumstances under which [the threats] were made."  The arbitrator took into consideration that Stokes only made the

threats because he perceived that Knaack had disrespected his

mother.

	The arbitrator noted that Stokes had worked for Harvey for

approximately 13 years and nothing resembling this incident had

ever happened before.  Stokes' employment record indicated only a

very few minor disciplinary corrections in all the time that

Stokes worked for Harvey.  Also, the arbitrator punished Stokes

for his behavior by suspending him for 60 days and not awarding

back pay.  A portion of the arbitrator's decision follows:

		"I understand Knaack's concern, not only for

himself, but for not having an 'unsafe' atmosphere. 

However, I do not think that Stoke's presence in the

Street Department would create such an atmosphere. 

After all, Stokes has worke[d] there for 13 years and

nothing resembling this ever happened before.  His

employment record shows only a very few minor

disciplinary corrections in all that time.  But this

matter was highly unusual, involving his deep love and

care for his mother.  Such a situation could hardly be

expected to occur again.

		Accordingly[,] I find that the action of

termination of Stokes was not proper or justified. 

However, his actions were a serious disciplinary failure.  I think management has the right and duty --

as does this Arbitrator -- to impress on Stokes the

seriousness of his failure.  I think a suspension of

Stokes for a period of time is called for -- and I

think a short period of a week or so would not make the

impact required.  Rather, I think a period of a sixty-

day suspension, without pay, of Stokes would well have

been justified by the City at the time of the

misconduct -- and in the AWARD below, such suspension

shall have been considered to have been served at the

beginning of his termination."

	This case is more analogous to the State of Illinois v. AFSCME, Council 31, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1038 (2001), where the Department of Corrections (DOC) appealed an arbitration award

reinstating a prison guard, who had been discharged for his

involvement in an altercation with an inmate.  The trial court

confirmed the award, and the appellate court held that the

arbitrator's award did not violate public policy and hence was

valid.

	The circumstance which led to the fight follow:

	"[A]n inmate, who was walking to the dining room,

turned to Mr. Henderson, the correctional officer on

duty at that time and called him a 'crack head'. ***

After dinner, Mr. Henderson confronted the inmate while he was playing dominos with two other inmates.  Mr.

Henderson asked the inmate not to call him a crack head

again.  A heated discussion followed.  The inmate

repeated his taunt.  When Mr. Henderson directed him to

refrain, the inmate yelled, 'fuck you crack head,' and

stated, 'I have freedom of speech.'  Mr. Henderson then

punched the inmate in the face.  The inmate returned a

punch and the fight ensued.  Another inmate joined in,

striking Mr. Henderson twice.  Mr. Henderson fell to

the floor.  At that point, the fighting stopped. 

Eventually, a third inmate reported the incident." 

AFSCME, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 1040.

	The analysis of the arbitrator's decision is provided:

		"After determining that Mr. Henderson had violated

rules of employment, the arbitrator turned to the issue

of discipline.  In reaching his decision, the

arbitrator balanced aggravating and mitigating factors

to determine whether a discharge was the appropriate

penalty.  The mitigating factors noted in the award

were:  (1) the employee had 16 years of seniority at

the time of his discharge, (2) all of his evaluations

indicated that he met expectations in all areas except

attendance and, thus, was 	considered a good employee,

(3) there was no evidence of prior personnel problems with the employee, and (4) there was no premeditation

on the part of the employee.  After weighing these

factors, the arbitrator found that the discharge was

not for just cause.  He reinstated Mr. Henderson to his

former position without loss of seniority but with no

back pay."  AFSCME, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 1040.

	The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, and its

findings follow:

		"After reviewing his decision, we conclude that

the arbitrator made a rational determination that Mr.

Henderson was amenable to discipline.  It is clear to

us that in reaching this decision, the arbitrator

considered the potential of the employee to repeat his

offense and the risk posed to the Employer and to the

inmates of the facility.  The arbitrator specifically

noted that throughout 16 years of service, this

employee had received good evaluations, had no history

of prior personnel problems, and did not plan or

provoke the fight.  The arbitrator indicated that if

the employee did not have a proven track record, he

would have sustained the discharge.  Implicit in the

decision is the arbitrator's consideration of the

public policy against battering prisoners and

thoughtful determination that Mr. Henderson was amenable to rehabilitation and that the risk that he

would engage in similar incidents in the future was

low.  There is no requirement that the arbitrator

expressly state that an employee is amenable to

discipline. [Citations.]  If it is clear from the award

that the arbitrator made a rational finding that an

employee could capably return to and perform his duties

without impinging or undermining the public policy and

without posing a risk to public safety and welfare and

that the employee will refrain from the misconduct, the

court is obligated to affirm the award."  AFSCME, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 1042-43.

	We believe this set of facts more closely follows the

circumstances of this case.  Here, the arbitrator made a rational

finding that Stokes could capably return to and perform his

duties without creating a dangerous work environment.  The

arbitrator made a determination and considered the ramifications

his decision would have with Illinois's public policy.  As such,

we affirm the trial court's decision.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision to

confirm the arbitration award is affirmed.

	Affirmed.