IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 8, 2009

CHARLES EDWARD MERIWEATHER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

Nos. 2005-B-713, 2005-C-1868 Seth Norman, Judge

No. M2008-02329-CCA-R3-PC - Filed January 7, 2010

The petitioner, Charles Edward Meriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction

relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were

therefore unknowing and involuntary, due to counsel’s failure to inform him that the sentences

contained in his plea bargain agreement were illegal. The State concedes that the petitioner’s

sentences are illegal, rendering his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. We agree that the plea

bargain contains illegal sentences and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court

and remand the case to the trial court for the petitioner to be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed and

Remanded

ALAN E. GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Mark A. Kovach, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Charles Edward Meriweather.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., AttorneyGeneral and Reporter; Clarence E. Lutz, Assistant AttorneyGeneral;

Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Dan Hamm, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

FACTS

In 2006, the petitioner pled guilty in two separate cases to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine

and “sale of c/s over 26 gr or more coc.,” Class B felonies. Pursuant to the terms of his negotiated

plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years for each offense,

with one year to serve at 100 percent in the Department of Correction, followed by five years of

supervised probation. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for a total of two years

to serve at 100 percent in the Department of Correction, followed by a term of ten years of
supervised probation. On November 21, 2006, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, followed by an amended pro se petition, in which he raised claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. Following the appointment of

post-conviction counsel, the petitioner subsequently filed additional amended petitions in which he

alleged, among other things, that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary because the dayto-day sentences contained in his plea agreement prevent him from receiving statutorily-mandated

good-time credits and, thus, are illegal. 

At the July 16, 2008, evidentiary hearing, the petitioner complained that trial counsel, among

other things, failed to fully explain the ramifications of his guilty pleas, including the invalidity of

his day-for-day sentences and the fact that the appellate courts have held that a defendant “cannot

be made to give up anygood credits[.]” On cross-examination, he conceded that he had enough prior

felony convictions at the time of his guilty pleas to have been classified as a Range III, persistent

offender. He also acknowledged that he had committed one of the offenses to which he pled guilty

while out on bond for the other offense, which required that the sentences be served consecutively. 

Trial counsel testified, inter alia, that he fully discussed with the petitioner his criminal record, the

charges and evidence against him, the potential sentences he faced if convicted at trial, and the

ramifications of his plea agreement. He said that the petitioner was very knowledgeable about the

criminal justice system, understood what he was facing and the conditions of his plea agreement, and

was “very happy” with the plea bargain he received in the case. On cross-examination, counsel

testified that he and the petitioner discussed that the petitioner would have to serve two years dayfor-day, but that, to his recollection, “[t]he term good time never came up.” 

The post-conviction court denied the petition in a written order entered on October 6, 2008,

finding that trial counsel was not deficient in his representation and that the petitioner’s guilty pleas

were knowing and voluntary. With respect to the petitioner’s claim that his day-for-day sentences

were illegal, the post-conviction court made the following findings and conclusions: 

At the evidentiaryhearing, the petitioner brought another claim not mentioned

in the Petition: that counsel was ineffective for allowing petitioner to plead guilty 1

to an illegal sentence. Post-Conviction counsel claimed that day-for-day sentences

are not valid. He contends that day-for-day sentencing illegally deprives a convicted

individual of sentence reduction credits to which he is statutorily entitled. See

T.C.A. 41-2-111 (b). However, courts can order sentences of split confinement so

long as the period of confinement does not exceed the prisoner’s release eligibility

date. Jonathan Thornton v. State, No. E2003-00393-CCA-R8-PC, 2003 WL

1233478 (Tenn. Crim. [App.] at Knoxville, Mar[.] 17, 2003); State v. James Kevin

Underwood, No. E2000-01945-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 872436 (Tenn. Crim. App.

at Knoxville, Aug. 2, 2001). 

The petitioner raised this issue in the “Law and Argument” section of an amended petition for post-conviction

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relief filed on the same day as the evidentiary hearing.

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ANALYSIS

On appeal, the petitioner contends that the sentences contained in his plea bargain agreement

are illegal because day-for-day service deprives him of his statutory right to earn good conduct or

authorized work credits. The State agrees that the sentences are illegal, noting that the petitioner was

ineligible for probation and that “[w]hen a trial court imposes split confinement, the law is settled

that the court cannot deny a defendant the statutory right to earn good conduct credits or authorized

work.” 

We agree that the sentences are illegal, rendering the petitioner’s guilty pleas unknowing and

involuntary. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303, a defendant is eligible for

probation, subject to certain exceptions, if the sentence actually imposed on him is ten years or less. 

Since the petitioner received a twelve-yearsentence for each conviction, he was statutorily ineligible

for probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a) (2006). Moreover, a defendant who is sentenced

to a period of continuous confinement followed by probation is to serve his sentence of incarceration

in the local jail or workhouse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306(a) (2006); see also State v. Stephanie

C. Hadley, No. M2002-02441-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21957078, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15,

2003) (“The designated place of confinement for split confinement sentences must be the local jail

or workhouse.”). Furthermore,Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-111 provides that a prisoner

who has been sentenced to the county jail or workhouse for any period of time less than one year has

the right to earn good time credits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-111(b) (2006); see also State v.

Jared M. Barnes, No. E2001-00325-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL1565484, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.

10, 2001); James Kevin Underwood, 2001 WL 872436, at *3. Accordingly, we conclude that the

post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction court and remand the case to the trial court for the petitioner to be allowed to withdraw

his guilty pleas. 

___________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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